TELECOM

rJj
WORTH

-RISES-

Worth Rises
Worth Rises is a non-profit advocacy organization dedicated to dismantling the
prison industry and ending the exploitation of those it touches. Partnering
deliberately with directly impacted people, we work to expose the
commercialization of the legal system and advocate and organize to protect and
return the economic value extracted from affected communities.

We envision a society in which no entity or individual relies on human caging or control for their
wealth, operation, or livelihood. Through our work, we strive to help pave the road toward a world
without police and prisons.
As part of our public education strategy, we conduct research, collect data, and perform innovative
analyses aimed at unmasking the harms caused by the prison industry. Understanding the mobilizing
power of knowledge, we transform our analyses into accessible and compelling content designed to
increase awareness and shift discourse around the commercialization of the criminal legal system.
Acknowledgements
Worth Rises graciously acknowledges everyone whose time, energy, and passion went into the
development of this report. Of course, we thank our staff members who worked tirelessly to get this
report across the finish line Bianca Tylek, Jan Combopiano, Taylor Campbell, Luke Noel, and Martin
Garcia. We thank David Etheridge-Bartow for his design and mensen for her illustrations. We also
extend our thanks to Connor McCleskey, Tolu Lawal, Dana Rasso, and Megan French-Marcelin for their
writing contributions, and Tamar Davis, Ekemini Ekpo, Hannah Ambinder, Benjamin Finegan, the
Harvard Prison Legal Assistance Project, and the Yale Undergraduate Prison Project for their research
support and editing assistance. Finally, we thank Adobe, and more specifically Jon Rogers, Jen
Alleman, Mark Apker, Julie Carvalho, Josh Felt, Michael Fielding, Prashant S G, Benjamin Hillyard,
Charlie Hunt, Nathan Metcalf, Mike Niedert, Nate Priday, Jamie Robinson, Aaron Sadock, and Tyson
Young, for citation assistance.
I

■

Table of Contents

Introduction

1

Chapter 1: Architecture + Construction

2

Chapter 2: Operations + Management

9

Chapter 3: Personnel

17

Chapter 4: Programs + Labor

23

Chapter 5: Equipment

32

Chapter 6: Data + Information

39

Chapter 7: Telecom

48

Chapter 8: Financial Services

59

Chapter 9: Food + Commissary

66

Chapter 10: Healthcare

75

Chapter 11: Transportation

83

Chapter 12: Community Corrections

89

Conclusion

100

Notes

101

II

■

Introduction

We are living in a watershed moment. In the wake of brutal police killings, people in more than 2,000
cities and towns, across all 50 states, have responded by demanding the defunding of the police and
the abolition of the carceral state. To observers, and to those of us who have done this work for years,
it is truly remarkable to hear abolition — a word that felt far from mainstream only months prior —
discussed in forums, teach-ins, boardrooms, and media. In moments like this, one easily forgets the
decades of work that shaped this moment.
But to do so would be to lose sight of the truth that meaningful victories are won not in days, but
through generations of principled struggle. We stand on the shoulders of giants and their tireless work
— Black, Brown, and Indigenous people like Angela Davis, George Jackson, Jalil Mutaquim, Assata
Shakur, Mumia Abu-Jamal, Joy James, Michelle Alexander, and countless others.
If we are truly to abolish police and prisons, we must understand the systems we wish to destroy. The
prison industry is comprised of a vast matrix of public-private partnerships that undergird the nation’s
commitment to human caging and control. It is a seemingly amorphous system of more than 4,100
corporations, and their government conspirators, that profit from the incarceration of mothers, and
fathers, and nieces, and cousins, and grandparents. It is a system built on bleeding people and
communities of their resources, and then even further exploiting their devastation.
This report maps the twelve sectors of the prison industry and details the extraction of wealth from the
families that have been most disproportionately brutalized by over-policing, mass criminalization, mass
incarceration, and mass surveillance. This report details how the carceral state has metastasized with
the help of the private sector across our economy and evolved to maintain systems of oppression in
the face of shifting public opinion.
With this report, we hope to offer a blueprint for the constantly changing prison industry we seek to
dismantle. In each chapter, we share the origin story of privatization for that sector, how much money
is in it for the corporations involved, the methods they use to extract resources from public coffers and
communities, which corporations are most active, and the harm they cause people, families, and
communities. We also share powerful first-person narratives that are critical to understanding the
impact privatization has had on people.
We must know where we came from to change the course of where we are going, especially as
corporations and their correctional partners pivot to new forms of shackling, such as electronic
monitoring and other forms of community surveillance, to profit from mass human control. By mapping
the past and present, we hope that readers can imagine and design a better future because abolition,
as the formidable geographer Ruth Wilson Gilmore reminds us, is not only about the dismantling of
systems, but also about the visioning of what we collectively build in its place.
We hope this report in its conveyance of information serves as a tool in the dismantling of the prison
industry and destruction of this wholly oppressive system; and that from there, we can create a world
built on care not cages.

1

ARCHITECTURE
+ CONSTRUCTION

“

This [layout] improves security and floods the facility with natural
light, making the white-painted cells feel more spacious.
HOK, architecture & engineering firm 1

Following the civil rights movement of the
1960s, state-sponsored deindustrialization and
suburbanization supported white flight and
hollowed out urban centers. In 1971, U.S.
President Richard Nixon launched the war on
drugs to intentionally disrupt urban Black
communities. 6 Incarceration quickly swelled, and
jails and prisons began popping up all over the
country, particularly in rural areas that were
struggling to replace jobs in waning industries
like farming and mining. 7
By the 1990s, the racist war on drugs and rising
crime rates stemming from increased structural
inequities had spurred the vilification of Black
people in the media and bipartisan consensus
on “tough-on-crime” policies. The 1994
Omnibus Crime Bill represented the culmination
of these ideologies, dramatically escalating jail
and prison expansion by offering states federal
subsidies — totaling $9 billion — to enact harsh
sentencing laws, including mandatory
minimums. 8 Consequently, between 1984 and
2005, a new prison or jail was built every 8.5
days in the U.S. 9 — 70 percent of which were in
rural communities continuing to suffer job loss
that eagerly bought into exaggerated promises
of economic prosperity. 10 All the while, jail and
prison architects, designers, and contractors
raked in billions of dollars.

Architecture + Construction

Description: Government agencies
contract with corporate architects,
designers, engineers, and contractors
to design, construct, renovate, and
maintain prisons, jails, immigrations
detention centers, and youth facilities.

$4.6 billion

Annual spending on correctional
construction 2

> 7,000

Correctional facilities across the U.S. 3

277%

Jail capacity growth 1970 – 2017 4

907,000

Jail beds across the U.S. 5

2

Correctional Facilities in the U.S. 11

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While correctional facilities are no longer being built with such haste, there is still plenty of business for
those who build them. Despite bipartisan efforts to drive down carceral populations in recent years,
old and decaying facilities continue to be restored or replaced with larger, more modern structures.
Across the country, law enforcement and policy makers alike have extolled the notion of
modernization as a means to make prisons and jails more humane, sinking millions and sometimes
billions of dollars into projects that do nothing to address the harms of the institutions themselves.
And architecture and construction firms are chomping at the bit to design and build this next iteration
of cells, boasting of innovation like window slats that allow natural light to pass through. Architects,
designers, and contractors that erect prisons and jails eagerly lay the foundation and framework for
mass incarceration, literally.

■

How Much Money is at Stake?

Federal, state, and local governments infuse the correctional construction industry with billions of
dollars every year. Government spending on correctional construction peaked at $8.0 billion in
2008 but fell to $4.6 billion by 2018 as public spending constricted after the market crash and the
carceral population began to fall. 12 Though some players exited the market amid concerns that it
would never bounce back to pre-2008 recession levels, many firms consolidated operations to
capitalize on economies of scale and pressed on. 13
Current spending is enough to grow bed capacity every year, particularly in rural jails where debunked
economic arguments still control the expansion narrative 14 and architecture, engineering, and
construction firms fund sheriff races. In fact, nationally, in the past decade, the jail population has
declined by roughly 40,000 while the number of jail beds has climbed by more than 86,000. 15 Many of
the largest correctional constructions projects today are new jails, ranging from $130 million for a
county jail in Land O’Lakes, Florida 16 to $8.7 billion for the plan to close the Rikers Island jail complex
in New York City and build four community-based jails in its stead. 17

Architecture + Construction

3

■What Corporations Are Involved?
Architecture, engineering, and construction
firms work hand-in-hand to design and build
correctional facilities. The largest architecture
players in the market are also some of the
nation’s largest firm: HDR and HOK. HDR has
designed over 275 correctional facilities 19
and HOK has designed more than 100,000
correctional beds. 20

Market Share 18
Turner Construction: 12%
Gilbane Building Company: 9%
Hensel Phelps: 8%
Other: 71%

While there are similarly dominant construction companies, construction contracts are often split
among large national corporations and regional firms in order to meet local job creation goals.
Still, the largest construction players in the correctional market include Turner Construction Company,
Gilbane Building Company, and Hensel Phelps, which together hold roughly 30 percent of the market.
Turner, a subsidiary of HOCHTIEF, the German company that built public infrastructure for the Nazi
party using forced labor, 21 generated $1.4 billion in revenue on prison and jail construction between
2007 and 2012. 22
Gilbane boasts of being one of the top five correctional builders for over a decade now. 23 Hensel
Phelps has built nearly 100 million square feet of correctional space. 24 Other major players in the field
include the Clark Construction Group, which has completed over $4.5 billion in correctional and
judicial projects round the country, 25 and McCarthy Building Companies, which was contracted by Los
Angeles County in 2019 to build a $2.2 billion new jail until activists forced the county to cancel the
project. 26

■ Correctional Design
A well-designed, humane prison is a perverse fallacy. No number of architectural bells and whistles
can change the fact that a more modern cage is still a cage.
The average size of a correctional cell — the closest thing to personal space an incarcerated person has
and must, at times, still share with one or two others — is not much larger than the size of a parking
space. Walls, floors, doors, and gates are constructed with the coldest building materials, an
assortment of stone, cement, cinder, iron, and steel. 27
Natural light is limited to what passes through
barred windows even in facilities with no
outdoor spaces. 28 Toilet and shower stalls are
built without doors or curtains. Visit rooms are
designed to prohibit contact with loved ones.
And all these indignities are explained away with
one claim: security.
The worst manifestation of this torture architecture
is a solitary confinement cell, a box the size of an
elevator in which people are confined for 22 to 24
Architecture + Construction

Government officials break ground at location of
new Utah prison 29

4

hours a day. 30 On any given day, between 61,000 and 100,000 people nationwide are tortured in
solitary, 31 and many will spend weeks, months, years, and even decades in solitary.
These cells are designed to remove human contact; a single slot in a metal door serves as the pass
through for food, mail, sound, and even light. 32 The use of solitary confinement in the U.S. has been
condemned by the United Nations and human rights organizations for its severe psychological effects,
and yet private architects, engineers, and contractors continue to design and build these spaces. 33in T
In recent years, architecture, engineering, and construction firms have changed their narrative about
their role in prison construction, moving from silence to hyperbolic claims that they design facilities
that minimize dehumanization and promote rehabilitation. 34 They gloat about wall murals of
naturescapes and floor glazing that extends the reach of natural light as they design expansion
projects meant to facilitate incarceration. 35

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average one bedroom apartment

■

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Business

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Comparison of solitary cell to average one-bedroom
apartment 36

Architecture + Construction

“Here is the inside view of my solitary cell door. Two
windows look onto the tier where staff escort other
prisoners. But the real show happens in the slot
below them. Everything passes through the slot: mail,
clothes, commissary, food, light.”

5

■

Johnny’s Story
During the 13 years I was incarcerated, I spent three years in solitary
confinement in increments of anywhere from three to ten months — all for
minor infractions. Solitary is devoid of human contact, and so much more:
light, sound, and color. My gray cells had just one interior-facing window
with frosted glass. It was the same window through which guards served
me the meals that helped me assess whether it was morning or night —
breakfast was at 7 a.m. and dinner at 4 p.m.

In solitary, it was quiet — so quiet that you could hear your thoughts, your
heartbeat, even small animals outside in the yard. I found inspiration any
way I could. I read the Bible — the only text I was allowed — at least ten
times over the course of my sentence. Other times, I read the ingredients
on my toothpaste and the few other products I could have. Desperate for human connection, I shouted
through vents to others in my solitary units, forging deep bonds with people whose faces I never saw.
Johnny Perez
New York

When I was younger, I sat in solitary blaming myself with a sense of hostility. As I grew older, those
thoughts morphed into anger, and I questioned how such a space could even exist? Who conceived of
it? Who designed it? Who built it? Who condemned me to it?
I am home now, but years later, I am still acclimating to life outside. Small spaces like public bathrooms
trigger memories of solitary. Nightmares about being incarcerated again sometimes creep into my
sleep. Despite it all, hope drives my dedication to criminal justice advocacy. As the National Director of
U.S. Prison Programs at the National Religious Campaign Against Torture, today, I advocate for an end
to solitary confinement and train other solitary survivors to do the same.

■

Environmental Hazards

Nearly 600 prisons have been built on or in close proximity to Superfund sites, contaminated land
zones identified by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency as toxic to human and environmental
health and requiring the sustained removal of hazardous materials. 37 The toxins in these locations have
been linked to cancer, heart disease, pulmonary disease, birth defects, depression, and tooth decay. 38
Despite decades of environmental justice advocacy originating from inside prisons with the Black
Liberation Political Prisoners in the late 1980s, 39 government agencies and complicit architects and
contractors continue to build prisons and jails on Superfund sites and other environmentally hazardous
areas with blatant disregard for the health and wellbeing of incarcerated people and correctional staff.
However, fights for environmental safety are starting to see modest returns. In 2015, Escambia County,
Florida sought to build a jail on a Superfund site in Pensacola. Advocates successfully demanded a
different site, though the county went on to build the jail in a hazardous flood zone. 40 In 2016, the
Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) planned to build a $444 million facility in Whitesburg, Kentucky,
located atop an old mine, next to a coal processing plant and sludge pond. 41 After vigorous
challenges by incarcerated people and allied advocates, the BOP withdrew its plan for the new
facility. 42 While the environmental justice efforts of advocates in these two instances proved successful,
many are not.

Architecture + Construction

6

For instance, people incarcerated at the
Pennsylvania State Correctional Institution –
Fayette have been exposed to hazardous
pollution for decades due to the dumping of
millions of tons of coal ash near the prison. 43
Toxic dust filled with mercury, lead, and arsenic
runs off into the prison water. Advocates have
wrestled for years with the Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections for legal relief but
have repeatedly been told that exposure levels
are safe, an assertion plainly contradicted by the
stories of the ailing people inside. 44

[Contractors] extract all the good
stuff from the land, then they sell it to
waste companies that contaminate
the land, and then they sell it to
prisons. Then they start shipping
inmates there, and people start
getting sick.
Richard Mosley, former incarcerated
advocate in Pennsylvania 45

Architecture, engineering, and construction
firms are not just complicit in the building of
prisons on toxic land, they also often introduce health hazards through their design and construction.
For example, in Texas, where temperatures routinely exceed 100°F, architects, engineers, and
contractors designed and built state prisons without air conditioning; 23 people have died from
overheating in those facilities. 46 In California, someone died in a correctional medical facility from
Legionnaires’ disease 47 caused by bacteria in the building’s water system. 48 The facility was built by
McCarthy Building Companies in 2010. By 2016, it was receiving failing grades from the state
inspector general. 49 Through their indifference to and exacerbation of environmental hazards in
correctional facilities, architecture, engineering, and construction firms have devalued the lives of
incarcerated people.

■

Construction Financing

Government agencies typically consider several factors when deciding whether to build a new or
replacement facility: overcrowding, dilapidation, need for specialized services, economic impact, job
creation, and revenue opportunities. 50 However, jail and prison construction has not always panned
out as expected. In fact, in many cases, it has been a financial sinkhole for taxpayers — and windfall for
architects, engineers, and contractors — with projects running over in cost and time estimates even with
the grossly underpaid labor of incarcerated people.
For instance, a recent prison project in Salt Lake City, Utah, a joint venture between Layton
Construction and Oakland Construction, 51 ran 18 months behind schedule and 20 percent over its
original $650 million budget. 52 In Santa Barbara, California, a new jail build that was originally
estimated to cost $77 million and slated for completion in the spring of 2019 culminated in a lawsuit
against contractor Rosser International after it went out of business in the summer of 2019 and
abandoned the project what it was only 80 percent completed and nearly 40 percent over budget. 53
And in Eureka, California, the construction of a youth jail was due to be completed in 2018, but a year
past the due date, the county was forced to release the contractor, Hal Hays Construction, for failure to
make adequate progress and go after its bond agent, Western Surety Company, to demand the
project be completed. 54
These projects only scratch the surface of the fiscal waste in the construction of cages for incarcerated
people that has diverted billions of tax dollars from the community investments in education, mental
health care, substance use treatment, affordable housing, and restorative justice.

Architecture + Construction

7

■

Maintenance

Construction firms are not just contracted for
new construction projects, but also for
renovations and simple maintenance projects.
While the firms contracted by government
agencies for these projects are often smaller,
local firms, their role is nevertheless critical to
the upkeep on facilities — which is often
questionable at best. In fact, the staff at these
corporations regularly see the atrocity of
conditions in our nation’s prisons and jails, and
yet they do little more than the bare minimum to
keep their walls standing. Notably, much like
they do with new construction projects, these
corporations often use prison labor to complete
contracted work, allowing them to save on
staffing costs and increase their profit margins
on even small projects. Incarcerated people are
also employed directly by facilities to do
everyday grounds maintenance from painting
walls to mowing the grass. Maintenance jobs are
actually the most common jobs offered to
incarcerated people without whom facilities
simply could not operate.

While architects, engineers, and contractors
masquerade as reformists and claim to design
better and more humane facilities, human rights
advocates have seen through their guises.
No matter how much natural light reflects off a
polyurethane floor or how many beautiful
naturescapes are painted on visit room walls, a
building designed to cage and hide people will
not address the divestment from Black, Brown,
and Indigenous communities that feeds mass
incarceration or heal the mass trauma caused
further perpetuated by it.

Learn More


Broken Ground: Why America Keeps
Building More Jails and What it Can Do
Instead, Vera Institute of Justice (2019)



Deadly Delays in Jail Construction Cost
Lives and Dollars Across California,
ProPublica (2019)



We Need to Rethink the Rikers Island
Replacement Jails, The Architect’s
Newspaper (2019)



County Failures, Not State Reforms, are
Killing People in California Jails, The
Appeal (2019)



How Prisons are Poisoning Their
Inmates, The Outline (2018)



Can the Rural Prison Economy Survive
Decarceration Era?, Associated Press
(2018)



Is There Such Thing as “Good” Prison
Design?, Architectural Digest (2018)



Big House on the Prairie: Rise of the Rural
Ghetto and Prison Proliferation, John M.
Eason (2017)



Prisons as Panacea or Pariah? The
Countervailing Consequences of the
Prison Boom on the Political Economy of
Rural Towns, Bryan L. Skyes (2016)



Is “Justice Architecture” Just? Aggregate
(2014)



Architects are Part of the Prison Industrial
Complex, Too, City Lab (2013)



Should Architects Design Prisons?,
Architect Magazine (2012)



A Billion Dollars and Growing: Why
Prison Bonding is Tougher on Florida's
Taxpayers than on Crime, Collins Center
for Public Policy and Florida Tax Watch
(2011)

Social justice architect Raphael Sperry explains that communities do not need “better prison design,
but better community design, and especially funding for community development.” 55

Architecture + Construction

8

OPERATIONS
+ MANAGEMENT

“

You just sell [prison beds] like you were selling
cars or real estate or hamburgers.
Thomas W. Beasley, founder of CoreCivic 1

The first private prison corporation, CoreCivic
(then known as Corrections Corporation of
America), was founded in 1983. The founding
executives included a former Chairman of the
Tennessee Republican Party and a former
warden of the Ramsey Prison Farm in Texas who
had used incarcerated Black men as personal
servants on his plantation. 6 The new corporation
hastily signed its first contract to build and
operate a federal immigration detention center
in Texas, but things did not start smoothly. 7
When construction took longer than expected,
executives rented a motel, put up barbed wire,
and opened the nation’s first private immigration
detention center. 8 CoreCivic’s largest
competitor, The GEO Group (GEO) (then known
as Wackenhut), got its start the following year
with a federal contract for an immigration
detention center in Colorado. 9

Description: Correctional agencies
contract with private prison
corporations to lease and operate
prisons, jails, youth detention facilities,
and immigration detention centers.

$5.8 billion

Private prison market size 2

118,444

People incarcerated in private prisons 3

75%

Immigrants held in private prisons 4

Through the 1990s and 2000s, the industry built
up its business by pushing draconian criminal
laws that drove incarceration across the U.S.
Until 2010, CoreCivic played a prominent role in
58
the American Legislative Exchange Council
Fewer
training
hours
for a corrections
(ALEC), 10 a conservative trade organization
officer in a private prison 5
through which state lawmakers and corporations
work together to draft model legislation. 11 As an
active member, and at times even corporate
chair, of ALEC’s Criminal Justice Task Force, CoreCivic executives helped draft and champion model
legislation for mandatory minimum, “three strikes,” and “truth-in-sentencing” laws in the early 1990s. 12
Operations + Management

9

The notorious 1994 Omnibus Crime Bill codified these and other severe sentencing laws at the federal
level, and included billions of dollars in prison construction grants for states that passed similar
legislation. 13 Within a year, 25 states passed “truth-in-sentencing” laws alone. 14 In 1995, ALEC
members drafted the Private Correctional Facilities Act to expand the use of private prisons state by
state 15 and the Prison Industries Act to expand the private sector’s access to prison labor. 16 And the
following year, thanks to a proposed amendment and testimony by executives at GEO, the
Appropriations Act of 1996 amended the original crime bill, which was silent on private prisons, to
authorize states to use federal grants issued under the bill to privatize prisons. 17
Banking on the quick uptake of all this new legislation, CoreCivic began borrowing huge sums to build
prisons before securing contracts to fill them. 18 When the growth rate of incarceration temporarily
slowed in the late 1990s, the corporation struggled to fill its new prisons and make interest payments
on the debt it used to build them. 19 Making matters worse for the corporation, a federal investigation
in 1998 sparked public outrage when it revealed brutal conditions in a CoreCivic prison in
Youngstown, Ohio. 20 The corporation’s costly speculative construction and poor financial
management, as well as public uproar about facility conditions came to a helm in 1999, causing its
stock to fall to mere pennies per share and putting it on the verge of bankruptcy. 21 Marred by
CoreCivic’s performance and general concerns about the industry, GEO’s stock followed and its
survival was similarly compromised. 22
Working with its creditors to restructure its debt, CoreCivic staved off bankruptcy just in time. 23 A few
years prior, in 1996, U.S. Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act, which significantly expanded the demand for immigrant detention and
deportation. 24 The federal Bureau of Prisons responded with requests for proposals that CoreCivic
and GEO quickly jumped at. 25 Doling out several contracts in the early 2000s, the federal government
gave the private prison industry the boost it needed to survive. 26
The industry thrived again until 2016, when the Obama Administration announced it would phase out
private prison contracts in the Federal Bureau of Prisons after a study revealed that private facilities
were less safe than public facilities. 27 The Department of Homeland Security followed by announcing a
review of immigration detention centers, 28 but eventually decided it would continue its use of private
prisons, citing a lack of alternative options. 29 Still, overnight, the stock price of the largest two private
prison operators, CoreCivic and GEO, tanked 40 percent and 35 percent, respectively. 30
Panicked executives moved to pay their way to survival. Within days, GEO contributed $250,000 to
pro-Trump super political action committees. 31 After the election, CoreCivic and GEO curried favor
with the incoming administration by donating an additional $250,000 each to the Trump inauguration
fund. 32 As a further sign of support, GEO also moved its annual meeting to a Trump resort. 33
This patronage paid off: the Trump Administration rescinded the phase out policy just weeks after
taking office, going as far as to instruct Federal Bureau of Prisons officials to identify incarcerated
people for transfer to private facilities. 34 GEO’s donations forced campaign finance watchdogs to sue
the Federal Election Committee for allowing the corporation to circumvent the ban on contributions
from federal contractors, a claim still being investigated by regulators. 35 But the Administration
continued its support of the industry with passage of the First Step Act, which funneled millions into
new reentry services provided by private prison operators among other things. 36
Though it faces potential state bans, the industry remains stubbornly entrenched in the federal system
today 37 with roughly half of its revenues each year coming from federal contracts. 38 But in the past two
decades, CoreCivic and GEO spent billions diversifying their business lines to ensure their survival.
Operations + Management

10

■

How Much Money is at Stake?

Private prisons hold about 120,000 people in the correctional system, or roughly 8 percent of the total
U.S. prison population. 39 The immigration detention system is significantly more reliant on private
prisons with more than 35,000 people, or 75 percent of detained immigrants, in private facilities in
2019 — up from 72 percent in 2017. 40 And, altogether, private prisons bring in $5.8 billion annually. 41
Private prison corporations are paid a fixed daily rate for each person they incarcerate, also known as a
“man-day” in the industry. 42 In this compensation structure, every empty bed represents lost revenue.
However, private prison corporations have insulated themselves from oscillations in occupancy rates
by incorporating occupancy guarantees in their contracts typically ranging from 80 percent to 90
percent, meaning that if a facility falls below the guaranteed occupancy rate, the contracting agency is
still required to pay as if the occupancy rate was met. In 2019, CoreCivic and GEO were paid for 23.4
million and 28.8 million man-days, respectively. 43
Since their start, private prison corporations have faced significant volatility at the hand of political
swings. And again, their industry is under threat as the criminal justice movement gains traction to
decarcerate prisons and jails and end mass incarceration. While these corporations are spending
hundreds of millions of dollars to protect their current business, they are also diversifying their
business by turning to community correction and other correctional services that open up new market
opportunities for them. 44

■

What Corporations Are Involved?

Two massive corporations dominate the private prison and immigration detention industry: CoreCivic
and GEO. Based on revenue, these two corporations control more than 57 percent of the U.S. private
prison market, 45 but they hold the vast majority of people in private facilities. 46
As the nation’s oldest private prison corporation, CoreCivic brings in $2.0 billion in annual revenues. 47
It remains heavily dependent on the federal government with roughly 51 percent of its revenue
coming from federal contracts, including 29 percent from ICE. 48 In the 1990s, CoreCivic acquired
many of its smaller competitors in the industry. In recent years, it has focused its acquisition activity in
the community corrections space with the hopes of diversifying its business lines. In 2015, it acquired
Avalon Correctional Services for $158 million to build out its residential reentry and day reporting
business. 49
Competing neck and neck for contracted beds in the U.S., GEO is the largest private prison
corporation in the world with additional operations in the U.K., Australia, and South Africa 50 and $2.5
billion in global revenues. 51 Over the past decade, the corporation has aggressively pursued
acquisition growth. In 2010, it purchased Cornell Companies, then the third-largest private prison
operator in the country, for $685 million. 52 GEO has also spent $1.0 billion diversifying beyond prison
management into transportation, residential reentry facilities, day reporting centers, and electronic
monitoring. 53
Management and Training Corporation (MTC) is a smaller operator that still has a significant presence
in both the criminal and immigration systems. Unlike CoreCivic and GEO, MTC is not publicly traded
and thus its financials are not available, but industry estimates put the corporation’s annual revenues at
roughly $840 million, though only about half is expected to come from the operation of U.S. prisons

Operations + Management

11

and jails. 54 While their competitors use acquisitions in community corrections to protect their bottom
lines from decarceration, MTC is expanding its existing workforce training programs. 55
Top Market Players

Annual Global Revenue
Annual U.S. Revenue
States
U.S. Prisons
U.S. Prison Beds
U.S Residential Reentry Centers
U.S Residential Reentry Beds

GEO 56
$2.5 Bn
$2.2 Bn
50
67
75,173
45
10,952

CoreCivic 57
$2.0 Bn
$2.0 Bn
21
50
73,000
29
5,000

Management &
Training Corp 58
$841 Mn
~$450 Mn
7
20
25,224
---

With CoreCivic, GEO, and MTC essentially swallowing up the field, the remaining private prisons
operators are regional outfits that only operate a handful of facilities each. These include LaSalle
Corrections, a family-run operation that manages prisons in Louisiana, Texas, and Georgia, 59 and
Akima Global Services, a defense contractor that staffs and operates immigration detention centers. 60
There is also a handful of large private prison corporations operating facilities in other countries with a
limited presence in the U.S. G4S, one of the world’s largest employers, operates private prisons in the
U.K. and staffs immigration detention facilities and transports detained immigrants in the U.S. 61
Sodexo, a French multinational conglomerate, operates private prisons in Australia and the U.K., 62
which it bought from CoreCivic, and provides foods services in U.S. prison. 63

■

Prison & Jails

Compensated for each day a person spends in one
of their beds, private prison corporations drive
profitability in just two ways: by increasing the
number of people in their facilities or cutting costs
related to their care. Since their start, these
corporations have done both with dire
consequences.
For decades now, private prison corporations have
spent millions of dollars on campaign contributions
and lobbying to advance policies that keep more
people in prison for longer and promote the
unregulated use of private prisons. 65 It is a story
MTC cell in Mississippi 64
that has been written about often. Less known is
the way in which they expand their market share by maintaining a revolving door of informal influence
with departments of corrections by regularly hiring former correctional administrators into high-paying
roles — often just days after leaving their government posts. 66 These new corporate executives use
their government experience and relationships to usher in and negotiate lucrative contracts for their
new employers.

Operations + Management

12

But these corporations also have even more direct ways to increase prison stays in their facilities or
further extract value from incarcerated people, and they exercise them liberally. Disciplinary infractions
are just one example. Corrections officers in private prisons, like those in public prisons, can issue
disciplinary infractions, hold review hearings, determine guilt or innocence, and hand down punitive
sentences. In private prisons, these sentences often involve the loss of good time credit, lengthening a
person’s stay and padding their bottom lines. 67 Unsurprisingly, the rate of guilty findings in disciplinary
review hearings is quite high — easily over 95 percent in many private prisons. 68 In one such
disciplinary hearing in a CoreCivic prison, a man lost thirty days of good time because he used a
broom to sweep the area in front of his cell without permission, which generated an extra $2,000 for
the corporation. 69
Yet, the easiest way that private prison
corporations stretch their profit is by lowering
People say a lot of negative things
operational costs, particularly staff pay, their
about [CoreCivic]. That we’ll hire
largest expense. By offering below market
anybody. That we are scraping the
wages and weak benefits, they attract
underqualified staff. 71 Making matters worse,
bottom of the barrel. Which is not
they spend on average 58 fewer hours training
really true, but if you come here and
staff than publicly operated facilities, and what
you breathing… then we’re willing to
little training they offer emphasizes the use of
hire you.
force—rather than de-escalation—as a response
to every situation, including mental health
CoreCivic training officer 70
crises. 72 The outcomes are frustrating for officers
set up to fail and detrimental for incarcerated
people at their whim. At one CoreCivic facility in
Tennessee, for example, poorly trained officers pepper-sprayed a man who had attempted suicide
before trying to help him. 73
Unsurprisingly, private prisons have high staff turnover, 74 but this constant churn of employees
exacerbates another common cost cutting measures: understaffing. In Idaho, for example, CoreCivic
did not just routinely understaff its facilities but it also then falsified records to make critical positions
appear filled. In 2012, the corporation paid $1 million to the state to settle fraud claims. 75 Audits of
federal and state prisons have revealed similar understaffing levels at private prisons around the
country operated by CoreCivic, GEO, and MTC alike. 76
Understaffed with corrections officers ill-suited or prepared to perform their duties effectively, let alone
safely, private prisons have created breeding grounds for flagrant human rights violations against
those in their custody. In Mississippi, for instance, the average hourly wage for corrections officers in
public prisons is $14.83 per hour, the lowest in the country. And yet, MTC, which operates three
prisons in the state, pays its officers as little as $9.50 per hour, amounting to an annualized salary of
just $19,760. 77 Predictably, MTC regularly reports vacancies as high as 31 percent in its facilities. 78
Unable to effectively manage its facilities, MTC prison administrators often lockdown entire facilities,
sometimes for months at a time: trapping people in their cells, prohibiting family visits and phone calls,
preventing doctor visits, and more. 79 Unable to go to commissary, people go without soap, blankets,
and even food. 80 This has led to understandable tensions at these facilities that have erupted violently
time and time again.

Operations + Management

13

■Matthew’s Story
I spent seven months incarcerated at George W. Hill Correctional Facility,
a local jail in Pennsylvania privately operated by The GEO Group. The day
I arrived, they charged me a $100 processing fee — I’d never heard of
such a thing, a fee to be booked. I didn’t have it, so they took 50 cents out
of every dollar my family put in my commissary account until it was paid.
The jail has a history of death — a lot of suicides — and when I walked in, it
made sense. The facility was understaffed and mismanaged, and the
conditions were filthy and unsanitary. Imagine what crawls in and what
seeps out of a commercial kitchen with doors left wide open all day.
Almost every morning, I went without breakfast. What they served was
inedible. Wednesdays were the worst — they served grits that smelled and
tasted like vomit.

Matthew Carrier
Pennsylvania

A health inspector once stopped by my cell during a facility inspection. I shared my concerns with her
about the cruelty and neglect I had experienced at the jail — all to profit a few executives sitting in
Florida. She was unphased.
But it wasn’t just the conditions, it was also how they were preparing people for release, or not. While
the facility held primarily people who were awaiting trial, there was no resources or programs for
people inside who had not been sentenced. The limited resources and programs that existed were
only available to the small number of sentenced individuals.
On my part, I longed for substance treatment. I wanted to be sober and I was willing to fight for my
sobriety, but I couldn’t do it alone. Against all odds, despite my incarceration, I made it. Today, out of
jail, I’m 21 months sober. Among other things, I spend my time speaking with local elected officials
and the public about the harm caused by private prisons. And thankfully, they’ve started to listen. The
most recently elected county council has committed to deprivatizing George W. Hill Correctional
Facility.

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Operations + Management

■

Immigration Detention

The private prison model does not change
moving from the correctional to immigration
detention landscape. Business is still driven by
more bodies, longer stays, and low costs. So,
much like it does in the correctional system, the
private prison industry pushes for harsh policies
in the immigration system intended to drive up
immigration detention. And private immigration
detention centers suffer from many of the same
problems as private prisons and jails, but the
people held in them have even fewer rights and
thus, at times, can suffer even more abuse.

14

As they do in their prisons and jails, private prison corporations cut corners on staffing and training in
immigration detention centers. In fact, given the lower risk population, they can drive costs down even
more significantly and produce even greater human rights violations. For instance, in 2017, Omar
Rivera, an asylum-seeker from El Salvador, led a hunger strike to protest poor conditions at the
Adelanto ICE Processing Center run by GEO. In response, staff beat him, pepper sprayed him, and
placed him in solitary confinement for nearly two weeks, according to a lawsuit filed by Rivera and
seven others who were detained at the facility. 82 The lawsuit, which is still awaiting trial, is one of
several against GEO involving assaults and deaths at the Adelanto facility. 83
Importantly, the privatization of the Adelanto facility is it itself an impropriety, but a common one in the
space. 84 Looking to circumvent rigorous federal procurement procedures, ICE and their private prison
contractors often look to intergovernmental service agreements (IGSA) to indirectly contract through
counties. 85 In these agreements, ICE contracts with counties for immigration detention beds, and the
county in turn subcontracts the operation of their facility to a private prison corporation. 86 The county
and private prison corporation then split the per diem ICE pays for each person held in the facility. 87
Interested in seeing more money flow into their districts, county officials have also pushed for harsher
immigration laws. 88 IGSAs represents a win, win, win for ICE, counties, and private prison corporations
all at the expense of the people detained.

■

Diversification

Amidst growing backlash, private prison corporations have tried to both whitewash the narrative
around their industry and diversify beyond traditional prison operation.
With profit on their mind and the criminal justice movement on their heels, in 2013, executives at both
CoreCivic and GEO restructured their corporations as real estate investment trusts (REITs). 89 In
exchange for keeping their assets primarily in real estate and paying out most of their earnings to
investors, REITs pay significantly lower taxes. 90 But the move also had important brand implications for
the corporations, which were trying to reframe themselves as merely government “landlords,” as one
CoreCivic executive put it. 91 But the marketing ploy failed and had an unintended consequence:
illiquidity — which activists quickly exposed.
After years of advocacy, public opinion has finally synonymized private prisons with corporate greed
and amorality. In the past year alone, nearly all major banks withdrew their financial support for private
prisons, 92 credit agencies downgraded their ratings, 93 and lawmakers passed laws intended to ban
private prisons in their states. 94 As a result, CoreCivic and GEO have experienced considerable market
volatility and suffered financially.
In a last-ditch effort to discredit public protest, the industry has banded together to spread
misinformation in support of their practices. In 2020, CoreCivic, GEO, and MTC created the Day1
Alliance, an industry trade group that claims to educate the public on the “valued role” private prisons
play in the U.S. 95 After recruiting veterans from far-right political organizations, the group launched an
offensive that supported weak reforms like the First Step Act, which funneled money into their coffers,
while trying to veil the industry’s history of abuse. 96
But it is too late, their access to capital has dried up. Past debt has begun to mature, and the
corporations are finding themselves having to take out more expensive new debt to pay off cheaper
old debt. They also have no capital for growth projects. The predicament led CoreCivic to announce
that it will drop its REIT status. 97
Operations + Management

15

However, there is still another strategy that private prison corporations have been deploying to save
their business and it seems to be working out better: expanding into community corrections, or the
growing industry of community-based control mechanisms like halfway houses, day reporting centers,
and electronic monitoring. Since 2004, both CoreCivic and GEO have spent billions acquiring smaller
competitors in this space and marketing it as the solution to mass incarceration. 98 While many have
unfortunately bought into these so-called “alternatives to incarceration,” criminal justice advocates are
actively rejecting the transformation of communities into carceral analogues. 99 At the very least,
certainly those who helped to create our carceral crisis should not be trusted to solve it.

Private prisons are a uniquely U.S. export, which
emerged in the 1980s as the perfect
encapsulation of the decade’s embrace of greed
and Reagan-era privatization. Prisons in the U.S.
had always been used to generate revenue, but
this was something new: the complete
outsourcing of the criminal legal system to the
highest bidder. And the corruption of money in
politics allowed them to help decimate families
in disproportionately Black, Brown, and
Indigenous communities.
Since then, private prisons have embedded
themselves in every facet of the criminal and
immigration systems. While people have begun
to challenge private prison corporations, there
must be vigilant attention paid to the industry’s
attempt to change its toxic image and expand
into adjacent business lines. After all, whether
walls are built out of concrete, wire, or WiFi, a
prison is still a prison, and a private prison still
needs more bodies to grow. No matter their
form, private prison corporations have no place
in any system that claims to bring about justice.

Operations + Management

Learn More


Are Private Prisons in Trouble?,
The Brennan Center (2019)



Who Makes Money from Private Prisons?
CNBC (2019)



“These People Are Profitable”: Under
Trump, Private Prisons Are Cashing in on
ICE Detainees, USA Today (2019)



An Examination of Private Financing for
Correctional and Immigration Detention
Facilities, In the Public Interest (2018)



Capitalizing on Mass Incarceration: U.S.
Growth in Private Prisons, The
Sentencing Project (2018)



Today, it Locks Up Immigrants. But
CoreCivic’s Roots Lie in the Brutal Past of
America’s Prisons, Mother Jones (2018)



Private Prisons, Explained, The
Conversation (2017)



The Banks that Finance Private Prison
Companies, In the Public Interest (2016)



A Brief History of America’s Private
Prison Industry, Mother Jones (2016)



Community Cages: Profitizing
Community Corrections and Alternatives
to Incarceration, American Friends
Service Committee (2016)

16

PERSONNEL

“

If they don’t fit the criteria, put them there anyway and
we will weed them out and fire them later.
Former manager at a third-party staffing firm 1

Private security corporations were the first to
enter the third-party staffing market in
Description: Correctional agencies
correctional facilities. These corporations began
contract with personnel corporations to
as private detective agencies at the turn of the
hire and train staff and implement
20th century, often hired by factory owners to
workforce management systems.
forcibly end labor disputes. 2 When the private
Commonly referred to as third-party
prison industry emerged in the 1980s,
staffing firms, personnel corporations
multinational security corporations like G4S
that hire and place staff are often
began purchasing these private detective
tapped to fill vacancies in security,
agencies as an entryway into the U.S. market. 3
medical services, and transportation.
Arming a large fleet of its staff with firearms, G4S
took contracts that its major competitors would
not, including contracts to staff youth detention
centers and drive prison transportation vans. 4 Other security conglomerates followed suit with their
own acquisitions—Securitas, for example, acquired the notorious strikebreaking Pinkerton National
Detective Agency in 1999 5 — and quickly, third-party security corporations established a foothold in the
U.S. carceral system.
Third-party staffing quickly spilled over into non-security roles as correctional administrators sought to
address staffing shortages related to the rapidly growing prison population. Vacancies continue to be
a grave concern in medical positions as the prison population has aged and incarcerated elders
require more care. 6 Officials stretch budgets by turning to part-time and temporary healthcare
workers. 7 Agencies have even turned to temporary healthcare providers to fill gaps left by their own
private correctional healthcare providers. 8
As prisons began to pop up across the country in the 1990s, there were also legal developments in
staff training. In 1989, in The City of Canton v. Harris, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a government
agency could be held liable for providing inadequate training to an employee that results in the
deprivation of a person’s constitutional rights so long as the failure to train amounted to deliberate
indifference. 9 The holding was applied to the correctional environment by several federal courts in the

Personnel

17

decade that followed. 10 This led correctional agencies to reconsider not just their training programs
but also how participation was documented and made standardized training curricula attractive.
In 2003, Lexipol emerged as the leading provider of training resources. And with the broad adoption
of internet services in the years that followed, the corporation began pushing online training instead of
in-person training to officials trying to cut costs. 11 Enticed by the increase in corrections bureaucracy,
technology corporations entered the space with specialized workforce software intended to help
officials track everything from trainings to attendance.

■

How Much Money is at Stake?

The U.S. private security industry generates
about $9 billion per year from government
contracts, but what portion the corrections and
immigration detention systems is responsible for
is unclear. 13 Security corporations have contracts
to patrol borders, shuttle people between
facilities, and even staff facilities and detention
centers themselves. 14

Employment of Corrections Officers by State 12

G4S alone has been awarded hundreds of
federal contracts related to immigration
detention, at times for providing violent border
security and at others for operating deadly
transport services. 15 In 2019, there was a record 510,854 arrests made by U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) and 50,922 people detained at the
end of the year. 16 Not only were both figures up substantially year-over-year, but the breakdown
between the two agencies showed disproportionate spikes in arrests and detention by CBP, 17 which
awarded a non-competitive contract to G4S at the beginning of the year for border security among
other things. 18
Beyond security, data is scarce about third-party staffing in the correctional and immigration detention
landscapes, but the understaffing of critical positions across prisons and jails, including those medical
units, suggests demand is strong. And while there is also no information about the size of the market
for private correctional training or workforce management systems, the nation’s 415,000 corrections
officers represent a sizable and stable market. 19

■

What Corporations Are Involved?

Third-Party Staffing
A handful of mega multinational corporations dominate the market for outsourced security in
correctional and immigration detention facilities. G4S is the world’s largest private security staffer in
prisons, jails, youth detention centers, and immigration detention facilities, and, in fact, the world’s
third-largest private employer. 20 It currently has lucrative federal contracts for guards and
transportation services valued at more than $500 million, earning $20 million per year on a single
contract with ICE to transport detained immigrants between facilities in just California. 21 G4S’ biggest

Personnel

18

competitor, Securitas, generates about $10 million per year transporting people detained by the U.S.
Marshals Service between hospitals and courthouses. 22
Unable to compete with G4S and Securitas in security staffing, smaller third-party staffing firms have
specialized in other correctional roles, most commonly medical positions. For example, Supplemental
Health Care provides short-term and temporary nurses to correctional facilities across the country but,
like its competitors, does not report how many contracts it has or how many facilities it serves. 23
Staff Training
While correctional agencies manage much of their own physical and hands-on training, they often rely
on private corporations such as Lexipol for classroom and online courses. Through its training brand,
CorrectionsOne Academy, Lexipol boasts of 1.9 million completed courses in 2017. 24 National trade
associations like the American Correctional Association and the National Institute of Corrections, which
evaluate and accredit facilities, also provide training resources. 25 Niche corporations, such as Mock
Prison Riots, offer violent tactical and situational training. 26 Notably, these corporations do not just
train correctional staff—they also establish the policies that govern their behavior. Lexipol has drafted
staff policies for 3,400 police, fire, and correctional agencies. 27
Workforce Management Systems
Workforce management services in corrections is dominated by broader workforce management
corporations that serve a host of industries. For example, Kronos, which brings in $1.4 billion annually
for workforce management services, 28 provides payroll management for government agencies,
including correctional departments like the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. 29
Other big players include Orion, which has a tailored corrections product, 30 and InTime, which only
works in the law enforcement space. 31

■

Third-Party Staffing

Third-party staffing firms provide contracted
labor to public and private correctional facilities
and immigration detention centers and
correctional service contractors, often on a
temporary basis to fill vacancies. Driven to cut
costs, these corporations have a history of lax
hiring standards and poor results. They often
hire people without diligently reviewing their
employment histories or hire candidates who
are clearly unqualified to fill vacancies. 33 From
security staff to medical practitioners,
unqualified and untrained staff can present a
significant threat to the lives of the incarcerated
people entrusted to their care.

In my 16 years, I don’t have enough
fingers and toes to count the bad
outcomes I’ve seen. And I’ve never
seen one physician disciplined.
Dr. Timothy Young, former medical
director at Georgia’s Augusta State
Medical Prison 32

For example, in 2006, the Georgia Department of Corrections hired Dr. Yvon Nazaire as a temporary
physician, relying on the vetting of Physician Providers, a third-party staffing firm. However, Physician
Providers failed to uncover that, in New York, Nazaire was on probation, had admitted to gross
negligence in the treatment of five emergency room patients, and was the subject of four malpractice
Personnel

19

death claims, though the information was widely available online. 34 Nazaire stayed with the agency
until 2015, when he was terminated after a media investigation exposed the painful deaths of nine
incarcerated women under his care — at least three died from substandard medical treatment. 35

■ Staff Training
While most correctional agencies, particularly state prison systems, still manage their own officer
training programs, many use private training resources and some entirely outsource officer training to
private corporations. The largest correctional training corporation, Lexipol, markets online training
courses comprised of videos and quizzes under the brand CorrectionsOne Academy. 36 Designed to
be cheap for correctional agencies and easy for officers, Lexipol’s online courses are increasingly
replacing in-person trainings. 37
Lexipol claims that officers can learn complex tasks, like negotiating a hostage standoff or deciding
whether to use deadly force, by watching a series of short videos. 38 But, quite obviously, an online
course cannot adequately prepare officers to deal with such crises. The corporation is setting officers
up for failure in such situations and threatening the lives of the incarcerated people in their custody.
And Lexipol is not the only private corporation teaching critical coursework online. The National
Institute of Corrections lists “Inmate Suicide Prevention” and “Responding to Sexual Abuse” as popular
online courses. 39
Lexipol also drafts policies for correctional agencies — at times the very policies that govern officer
training and proper protocols. Unsurprisingly, their boilerplate policies are very popular. They
prioritize the interest of their customer, the corrections agency, focusing more on protecting
correctional administrators from civil liability than on protecting the civil rights of incarcerated people.
Putting litigation risk above humane policy, Lexipol claims to save agencies money in settlement
payouts. But should things go awry, Lexipol disclaims any liability for the impact of its policies. 40
But the most bizarre spectacle in correctional
training is the West Virginia Mock Prison Riot.
Held at a vacant prison, this yearly exhibition
brings together hundreds of officers for a series
of combat competitions. The organizers bill it as
a training program to correctional agencies but
sell it to arms manufacturers as an opportunity to
market weapons. The conference is so lucrative
that corporations pay up to $25,000 to be
sponsors and even more for exhibit booths.
Some even hand out free samples of chemical
weapons like pepper spray and tear gas.
Filmmakers also sell footage of the riot to
corporations seeking “intense, realistic footage”
to use in their correctional advertisements. 42

Officer raiding a school bus during a mock prison
riot 41

The event encourages corrections officers to view incarcerated people as targets, not people. Egged
on by arms manufacturers, officers practice using tear gas on protestors, subduing mentally ill people
using pepper spray, and raiding school buses with shotguns. 43 There is no discussion of when to use
force — only which weapons to use. Events like these demonstrate how staff training corporations
encourage, perpetuate, and commodify the violence that people face behind bars every day.
Personnel

20

■Talib’s Story
It was 3 a.m. early one morning when I was violently snatched from the top
bunk of my cell at Soledad Correctional Training Facility in California and
slammed head-first into the wall by a corrections officer. I thought I was
dreaming.

Talib Williams
California

They zip-tied my hands and dragged me from my cell by the throat. I could
see my cell mate, a diabetic 55-year-old man with degenerative disc
disease in his spine and a chronic shoulder injury, crying out as he was also
dragged from his bunk, head-slammed and zip-tied. I remember two men,
equipped with night vision goggles and wearing helmets and fatigues,
with black marks covering their faces.

Wearing nothing but boxer briefs, I and the others were forced to walk on the filthy floor down the
central corridor toward the dining hall. Along the way, I witnessed the same thing happening in every
unit we passed. Officers yelled “Drag him!” as men were ripped suddenly from their sleep.
I arrived at the dining hall to find 200 other incarcerated men looking as shocked as me. I’ve been in
prison for nearly 20 years, and our cells had never been raided like this before. As I looked around, I
realized that every person sitting in the dining hall — from early 20s to late 70s — was Black.
Zip-tied, sitting practically naked in a freezing kitchen during the worst pandemic to hit the world in
more than a hundred years, it dawned on us that we were sitting next to each other without masks. We
began to demand face masks, but we were ignored. One officer yelled, “I hope you motherfuckers get
COVID!” Another shouted, “Black lives don’t matter!”
A week after the raid, during which nothing notable was found, the department released a statement
denying the injuries and claiming officers followed proper protocol. Well, if proper protocol calls for
dragging Black men by their necks out of bed, who wrote the protocol? Who trained the officers on it?
Who made them hate Black people? And who unleashed them on us?
This story was adapted, with the author’s permission, from an article originally published September 2,
2020 in the San Francisco Bay View.

■ Workforce Management Systems
Personnel corporations also provide specially designed workforce management systems for the
correctional environment. The largest, Kronos, sells cloud-based workforce technology that makes
administrative tasks easier. Their corrections system helps administrators, corrections officers, civilian
staff, and contractors manage absences, schedule time off, track attendance, process payroll, and run
reports to make data-driven decisions.
Importantly, however, Kronos is keen to recognize that the workforce in prisons and jails is not limited
to those who go home to their families every day, but also includes incarcerated workers. Kronos’
software allows prisons to more efficiently utilize prison labor by maximizing the productivity and
minimizing the down time of incarcerated workers making just pennies an hour. 44
Personnel

21

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Kronos for Public Safety: Corrections, marketing brochure 45

Personnel corporations supplement, train, and
manage the workforce behind the prison
industry. They deploy modern-day mercenaries,
fill vacancies with unquailed staff, train for
violence, reduce institutional liability, and
facilitate the abuse of prison labor. The true cost
of their involvement — in labor exploited, people
abused, and lives lost — is devastating.

Personnel

Learn More


Dangerous Guards, Low Cost Security,
USA Today (2019)




Police Policy for Sale, The Appeal (2019)



The Mock Prison Riot: Where Guards
Play Jail, Al Jazeera (2014)



Can Privatization Kill?, The New York
Times (2012)

State Official Failed to Delve into Prison
Doctor’s Troubled Past, The Atlanta
Journal Constitution (2018)

22

PROGRAMS
+ LABOR

“

We need to keep some out there, that’s the ones that you can
work, that pick-up trash, the work release program, but guess
what? Those are the ones that they are releasing… they are
releasing the good ones, that we use every day to wash cars,
change oil in our cars, to cook in the kitchen, to do all that,
where we save money… well, they are gonna let them out.
Sheriff Steve Prator of Caddo Parish, Louisiana 1

When legislators moved to abolish slavery in
1865, they agreed to an important exception
Description: Correctional agencies
meant to retain control over the Black labor force
contract with private corporations to
that allowed enslavement as punishment for
provide rehabilitative and educational
committing a crime. As Black people sought
programs and course materials to
economic autonomy during the Reconstruction
incarcerated people. Agencies also
Era, politicians and their monied allies raced to
contract with private corporations to
rebuild their well of cheap, forced labor. They
provide vocational programs through
passed Black Codes to restrict the ability of Black
which they employ incarcerated
people to move freely, criminalizing so-called
workers, more commonly referred to as
acts of “vagrancy” such as unemployment. 2
prison labor. However, agencies most
States filled prisons with now-free Black people 3
frequently use prison labor themselves
and introduced the practice of “convict leasing,”
to both generate revenue and save
whereby wardens leased out incarcerated
costs.
people to local businessowners. 4 Quickly, the
practice became a huge source of revenue for
southern states — by 1898, it generated 73
percent of Alabama’s yearly revenue. 5 To justify the use of this forced labor, states recycled pro-slavery
arguments that it benefited Black people who needed to be rehabilitated and learn civilized
obedience. 6
By the early 20th century, a recession lowered the cost of labor and progressive reformers had soured
the public opinion on convict leasing, leading states to pass laws banning the practice. 7 In 1935, U.S.
Congress passed the Ashurst-Sumners Act of 1935 to prohibit the sale of product made using
incarcerated labor in interstate commerce, 8 though it notably excluded agriculture and services from
its prohibition. 9 Nevertheless, correctional administrators shifted and forced incarcerated people into
Programs + Labor

23

chain gangs to build public infrastructure. 10
Public outcry over the brutal treatment of people
on chain gangs led many states to ban the
practice by the 1950s, 11 though some still exist
today. 12 Administrators nevertheless continued
to use prison labor to maintain facilities and
produce goods in government-run correctional
industries. 13
By the 1960s, the concept of rehabilitation
expanded to also include education, and the
federal government introduced educational
funding for incarcerated people as part of the
Pell Grant program. Within a few years, nearly
ten percent of the prison population was
participating in Pell-funded programming. 18 As
the prison population boomed over the next few
decades, the private sector lobbied to regain
access to prison labor under the guise of
vocational training. 19 In 1979, Congress created
the Prison Industry Enhancement Certification
Program (PIECP), which allows private
corporations to once again employ incarcerated
labor at prevailing wages and for correctional
systems to garnish wages for room and board,
among other things. 20

67,000

Incarcerated people working for
government correctional industries 14

$0.00 - $0.63

Average wage range for incarcerated
workers in facility support jobs 15

5

States that do not pay incarcerated
workers 16

$14 billion +

Wages stolen from incarcerated workers
annually 17

But, in the midst of the “tough on crime” era that followed, politicians reversed course and began
pulling educational and other rehabilitative programs from prisons and jails, including those funded
by Pell Grants, relying on now-debunked studies to argue that rehabilitative programs did not work. 21
Some correctional administrators went so far as to declare the entire concept of rehabilitation
“dead.” 22 Incarcerated people were then responsible for paying for their own education, often buying
materials through mail orders. 23
Things pivoted again in recent years, when new
research showed that, in fact, education
$868
profoundly improves reentry success. 25 But
Annual
education
spending per person
despite the clear evidence in favor of education,
in federal prison 24
programs remained woefully underfunded in
most states into the early 2010s. 26 As a result,
the private marketplace for education services
and materials remained small. Since then, legislators have made limited efforts to increase funding for
rehabilitative and educational programs in prisons and jails. 27 But technology corporations have
entered the market with digital products, the prevalence of which is quickly expanding in facilities
across the country. 28

Programs + Labor

24

■

How Much Money is at Stake?

Nearly all of the 1.5 million people in federal and state prisons 29 are required to participate in some
combination of rehabilitative, educational, and work programming during their sentences. 30
Despite routine underfunding, the growth of the carceral population and evolution of correctional
theory have created a small market for rehabilitative and educational programs that cater to people
behind bars. Most prison systems require people to complete rehabilitative coursework such as
cognitive thinking, anger management, or life skills. 31 The majority also offer some type of educational
programming, and 22 states require people to take education classes. 32 Funding for correctional
education comes almost entirely through government grants for partnerships with local colleges, who
supply faculty instructors. 33 People in facilities that do not offer secondary education can at times pay
for their own correspondence courses taught by a variety of non-profit and for-profit colleges. 34
Work programs are the most pervasive type of correctional programming required across prisons. In
fact, in most prison systems, people are forced to work often under the threat of punishment, including
solitary confinement. 35 Job assignments fall into three categories: roughly 5,000 people work for
private corporations under PIECP, 36 a some thousands more work for private corporations services or
agriculture roles unregulated by PIECP, 67,000 people work for government-run correctional
industries, 37 and the remaining 1.4 million work in facility maintenance and system support jobs. 38
While cheap for private corporations, government-run businesses, and the carceral system itself,
Worth Rises estimates that incarcerated labor to be worth $14 billion each year based on minimum
wage, assuming all incarcerated people in prisons work a 30-hour week. 39
With more transitive populations, jails tend to have fewer programs or job placements but the
exponential growth of the pre-trial population over the last two decades has expanded their
prevalence.

■

What Corporations Are Involved?

Both government agencies and private corporations produce materials for rehabilitative programs.
The National Institute of Corrections, a division of the U.S. Department of Justice, developed Thinking
for Change, one of the most widely taught courses in prisons and jails. 40 The federal government
distributes these materials freely and funds pilot programs for new approaches. 41 Private researchers,
like those at Correctional Counseling, also develop and sell program materials to correctional facilities
and train instructors to teach their courses, which are each $500. 42
Publishers catering to adult education produce classroom materials. Publishing giant McGraw-Hill has
test preparation tools designed specifically for correctional facilities and other institutions that lack
internet access. 43 Smaller players like Paxen Publishing, which acquired the continuing education arm
of Houghton-Mifflin in 2018, specializes in GED course materials for correctional facilities. 44 And
though over two-thirds of all educational programs are provided by community colleges, 45 technology
is beginning to change the programming landscape in prisons and jails.
Correctional telecom corporations like Securus and Global Tel Link (GTL) have started providing
rehabilitative and educational programming over specialized computer tablets. 46 In response, a new
wave of technology startups positioned themselves as more ethical alternatives. Most prominent are
Edovo, which markets itself as a low-cost, one-stop-shop for correctional communication and

Programs + Labor

25

programming, 47 and American Prison Data Systems, which charges agencies for its tablet-based
education programs. 48
But still, the deepest financial opportunity in correctional programming is in work programs. While few
recognizable corporations directly employ incarcerated people today through PIECP, many support
prison labor through their sales and supply chains. For example, 3M, which uses prison labor in
Minnesota prisons, also provides raw materials to government-run correctional industries that are used
by incarcerated workers to manufacture products like license plates and school desks. 49 The
corporation is a premium member of the National Correctional Industries Association, a trade group
that protects the interests of correctional industries and pushes for the wider use of prison labor, along
with 26 others, including VF Workwear, which ironically has an explicit policy barring the use of forced
labor. 50 Another 60 corporations are standard members. 51
Still, there are many more corporations that use prison labor outside PIECP, which does not cover
agriculture, services, or the manufacturing of products that do not cross state lines. For instance, there
are corporations that contract with prison and jails to provide services like commissary operation.
These corporations often use incarcerated labor to fulfill their service contract but are protected from
disclosure under the program because the work does not cross state lines and thus does not fall under
federal authority and oversight. Many also obscure their role by not employing incarcerated people
directly but rather using prison labor through their partnership with facilities. Finally, dozens of smaller
corporations use prison labor to milk goats, 52 prepare potatoes, 53 make political campaign calls, 54 and
more. Many of their products make their way into popular supply chains.

■ Rehabilitative & Educational Programs
Nearly every correctional facility requires people to complete some form of rehabilitative
programming, 55 such as cognitive behavioral therapy, chemical dependency recovery, domestic
violence prevention, anger management, and treatment for people convicted of sex offenses. 56 But
these courses rarely provide people with the tools they actually need to succeed.
The most popular rehabilitative program is cognitive behavioral therapy, which claims to teach
improved decision-making skills. 57 But rather than rigorous coursework, correctional rehabilitation
corporations design and sell pre-packaged therapy programs that often consist of merely a booklet
titled “Thinking for a Change” or “Rules are Made to Be Followed.” 58 Many of these programs were
developed by federal researchers for classrooms and are freely available online, 59 but corporations
repackage cheap versions and sell them for the correctional market.
One of the most prominent distributors is Correctional Counseling, which sells the “Moral Reconation
Therapy” program and holds trainings for instructors. 60 Avoiding any discussion about the systemic
causes of criminal behavior, these courses teach people that they are incarcerated because they lack
self-control or social skills. 61 Many of these programs are so misguided that researchers now refer to
them as “correctional quackery.” 62 Nevertheless, correctional administrators continue to purchase
these program materials, insincerely claiming to prepare people for release. 63
The situation is even bleaker for educational programming, which is constantly under the threat of
funding cuts. With limited funding for formal education, many incarcerated people opt to just educate
themselves using the limited resources in their prison libraries. But even these informal methods are
Programs + Labor

26

threatened by privatization as computer tablets begin to replace libraries. Advertised as innovative
tools for education, entertainment, and communication, tablets further extract resources from
incarcerated people and their communities.
Prison telecom providers, notorious for charging as much as a dollar a minute for phone calls, use
tablets to bring their predatory business practices to prison education. For example, in West Virginia,
which contracts with Global Tel Link (GTL) for tablets, incarcerated people must pay $0.05 per minute
to read books that are free in the public domain online. 64 This scheme turns reading into a luxury that
many cannot afford. At GTL’s prices, the average incarcerated person would have to pay $30, or more
than four months of wages, to read a 300-page book. 65 And they use these tablets to justify funding
cuts for teachers and libraries, including law libraries. 66 Many correctional agencies allow this
predatory behavior because they earn kickbacks from purchases made on tablets. 67

■

Jorge’s story

Jorge Renaud
Texas

I spent decades working fields, tending crops, and paving the grounds of
Texas prisons. I never earned a penny. Texas doesn’t compensate
incarcerated people for their work.
Field labor was ugly. We were forced to perform physically demanding
tasks in the grueling heat of Texas summers. Mounted horseback and
armed with guns, officers watched over us to drive productivity. They
often incited fights for fun, while the administration claimed that the
exploitative, brutal work was good for us—that it built up our work ethic
and skill sets. It’s an argument recycled from plantation owners in the
antebellum South, whose plantations are now prisons, in many cases.

Eventually, I was allowed to move inside—out of the 100-degree heat—to work in kitchen commissaries,
clerking positions, and the furniture factory, where most furniture in the state capitol building is built.
But if I ever argued with an officer, they would threaten to put me back in the fields.
The state’s free labor scheme forces incarcerated people to develop “side hustles.” How else can you
afford deodorant from commissary or a phone call home? I got paid for writing for folks—writing
poetry, grievances, and appeals. Those who didn’t have a unique skillset had to take bigger risks. If
you worked in the kitchen, for example, you stole meat, sugar, or whatever you could, and risked
discipline to sell it in the underground prison economy. Taking from the master’s house could result in
the loss of one’s job or even solitary confinement.
The bottom line is that slavery is alive and well right here in Texas. Incarcerated people—majority Black
and Latinx like me due to racist policing and sentencing policies—work full days in backbreaking
conditions without pay and under threat of punishment. After three bids of 3, 7½, and 17 years, I
walked out of prison with only $50 each time—after nearly 50,000 hours of work.
Today, I’m committed to transforming the narrative around prisons and the policies that fill them as the
Regional Director of Policy and Advocacy at LatinoJustice. As an abolitionist, I want to do more than
reform our system. I want to replace it with a vision that truly rehabilitates lives and supports
communities. There’s no iteration of slavery that does that.
Programs + Labor

27
27

■

Prison Labor

In most facilities, the only vocational training someone can receive comes in the form of forced labor. 68
Almost every incarcerated person is required to work; those who refuse can be denied access to basic
privileges, like visitors, care packages, recreation, or even placed in solitary confinement. 69
Private Sector
About 5,000 incarcerated people work for
corporations through the federal PIECP, 71 which
We established this partnership with
allows corporations to access incarcerated labor
[Colorado Correctional Industries] in
to manufacture goods. 72 Several high-profile
2007, just as our need for goat milk
corporations use to PIECP workers, including
was growing... CCI had the means
Avery Dennison and Burlington Industries. 73
(the farmland, equipment, and
PIECP workers are required to receive prevailing
strong-willed human power and
wages for the manufacturing of goods, but
spirit) to get a Colorado dairy up and
correctional administrators are allowed to
running, and the results have been
garnish the cost of “room and board” and other
incredible…
deductions. 74 Many states further cut into
people’s income by requiring them to pay into
Haystack Mountain Cheese 70
mandatory savings accounts, paternalistically
dictating what people can do with their meager
earnings. 75 The result is that people are left with
a tiny fraction of what they actually earned and
less money to purchase necessities at commissary, support their families, and prepare for release.
In Nebraska, for instance, PIECP workers build furniture for use in many public schools in exchange for
a local prevailing wage — about $33 per day. 76 Thirty percent is used to pay for the cost of
incarceration, 18 percent is paid in taxes, 11 percent to social security, and 8 percent to crime victims
funds, leaving just a third of their actual paycheck. 77 The state’s mandatory savings program further
requires them to save 60 percent of their pay after deductions, reducing their take home pay to a little
more than $6 for a full day’s work — or $1 an hour — far less than the “prevailing wage” that the
program advertises. 78 And still, the pay for a PIECP job is better than nearly every other prison job.
In fact, despite the enormous loopholes in PIECP, those working for corporations in the program are
better served than those working for corporations in roles not regulated by PIECP, namely roles in
services or agriculture. 79 Corporations can use incarcerated labor to staff customer service call centers
with no requirement that they be paid prevailing wages, and many of those workers are still hit with
many of the same fees. And after the Trump Administration rolled out its zero-tolerance immigration
policy, many farms that depended on undocumented workers turned to prisons for cheap labor. 80

Incarcerated workers in Angola prison (2018) 81

Programs + Labor

Correctional Industries
Another 67,000 incarcerated people work for
government-run correctional industries, providing
services such as answering phones in call centers,
conducting asbestos abatements, and grave digging,
as well as manufacturing goods such as school
furniture, street signs, and military equipment that are
all consumed by various government agencies. 82 In
fact, many states have laws that make their own
correctional industries business a preferred vendor,
28

We would receive services from an
onshore agent — a U.S. citizen — but
at offshore prices.
Anonymous CEO of company that
utilized UNICOR 84

UNICOR call center advertisement 87

For 12 years, I worked at the prison
infirmary as a nurse’s aide. I was part
of the BERT, Blood Emergency
Response Team. I would clean
blood, feces, and bodily fluids
throughout the facility. For cleaning
a blood spill, I would be paid 75
cents. During every incident, I would
be forced to play ‘Russian Roulette’
with my health for these wages. If I
would refuse, I was liable to receive
a disciplinary infraction.
Gonzalo Aguilar, incarcerated person
in New York

thus requiring their other government agencies
to purchase products from it first to reduce costs
statewide. 83
Not only have states used prison labor to save
money by artificially subsidizing many
government agencies, but they have also used it
to generate revenue when facing budget gaps.
For example, in 2019, New York Governor
Andrew Cuomo announced a revenue plan that
required all drivers purchase new license
plates. 85 The plan was dependent on the cheap
labor of the states’ incarcerated workers, who
make as little as $0.16 manufacturing plates. 86
Yet, the exploitation of prison labor for
government-run correctional industries does
not start or stop with the agencies—it extends
up and down supply chains. Corporations
knowingly sell billions of dollars in raw materials
to correctional industries. 88 For example, license
plates manufactured by incarcerated workers are
made using raw materials provided by 3M, the
same company that makes Post-Its. 89 In fact, in
Washington, 3M hired lobbyists to urge elected
officials to pass a law requiring drivers to replace
their license plates every five years to ensure a
continual need for their raw materials and $10
million in annual revenue for the state. 90

Incarcerated firefighters in California (2017) 91

Incarcerated people working in correctional
industries are also often tapped to respond to
state emergencies in dangerous conditions for
little or no pay. For example, in California, in
2019, state officials used 200 incarcerated firefighters to combat the deadliest forest fires in state
history. They paid them just $2.90 to $5.12 per day, a sharp difference from the average $91,000 salary
that non-incarcerated firefighters were paid to do the same job. 92 Though two incarcerated firefighters
died fighting fires in 2017, 93 the job remains highly coveted because it pays significantly more than
other prison jobs. 94 As they risk their lives, incarcerated firefighters save California over $100 million
Programs + Labor

29

each year. 95 Until recently, incarcerated firefighters were often barred from working as firefighters after
release due to their criminal record. 96
Similarly, nearly every state tapped incarcerated workers to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic in
2020. Governor after governor grossly underpaid incarcerated workers to produce personal protective
equipment like masks and gowns for first responders, as well as hand sanitizer for the public. 97 New
York led the charge on this practice when Governor Andrew Cuomo publicly bragged about the
state’s mass production of hand sanitizer and joked about illegally selling it in the public market to
compete with commercial brands. All the while, he failed to ever mention the workers producing the
hand sanitizer or the $0.65 per hour they were earning on average. The New York City Department of
Corrections reached a new low when it went as far as to announce plans to employ incarcerated
workers to dig mass graves for those who succumbed to the disease and whose bodies went
unclaimed. Under public pressure, the City cancelled its plan. 98
Facility & System Support
The vast majority of incarcerated people work
to support the operation and upkeep of the
facilities in which they are held. They prepare
food, deliver commissary, do laundry, clean
units, perform maintenance, serve as clerks,
and more. 100 These jobs are critical to the
management of correctional facilities.

It was pretty much slave labor, but
there was nothing I could do about
that. I needed stamps to write to my
child. I needed hygiene products.
Laurie Hazen, incarcerated kitchen
worker in Massachusetts 99

Facility and system support jobs pay the least,
generally as little as $0.05 per hour. 101 And yet,
there are five states—Alabama, Arkansas,
Georgia, Florida, and Texas—that do not pay
anything to incarcerated people who work in their facilities. 102 Accordingly, it is nearly impossible for
the majority of incarcerated people to afford routine expenses such as basic hygiene products from
commissary or phone calls with loved ones. 103 Instead, the cost of these essentials are forced onto
their families, and most often Black, Brown, and Indigenous women.
By using grossly underpaid labor, elected officials and correctional administrators are able to disguise
the real financial cost of mass incarceration. An incarcerated person working a custodial job that pays
$0.14 per hour makes as little as $221 for an entire year’s worth of work. But if they were required to be
paid at least the federal minimum wage, or $7.25 per hour, that custodian would make $11,484 per
year, or 52 times more. As a society, we simply could not afford our carceral system if we actually had
to pay all labor real wages.
In total, incarcerated people who work in the U.S. are cheated out of an estimated $20 billion in wages
every year. 104 This wage theft is completely legal under the Thirteenth Amendment, which is
improperly celebrated for having ended slavery in 1865.

Programs + Labor

30

In prisons and jails across the country,
rehabilitative and educational programs have
routinely been deprioritized in favor of work
programs that are more profitable for both the
private and public sectors. Our comfort with
using prison labor is especially disturbing given
our national history with slavery and the racial
disparities in our carceral population. But until
we address the massive loophole in the
Thirteenth Amendment allowing enslavement as
the punishment for a crime, this reality will
persist. It is time that we end forced labor and
recognize all labor as deserving of wages and
protection from abuse.
Thankfully, advocates across the country are
doing just that. In recent years, Colorado,
Nebraska, and Utah passed referendums to
eliminating the clause in that state constitutions
that ratified the Thirteenth Amendment's
exception.105

Programs + Labor

Learn More


Coronavirus Limits California Efforts to
Fight Fires with Prison Labor, The New
York Times (2020)



The Free Prison Tablets that Aren’t Free,
The Outline (2019)



Environmental Injustice Behind Bars:
Toxic Imprisonment in America, The
Global Environmental Justice Project
(2018)



The True History of America's Private
Prison Industry, Time (2018)



Slavery in the US Prison System, Al
Jazeera (2017)



Prison Labour is a Billion-Dollar Industry,
with Uncertain Returns for Inmates, The
Economist (2017)



What are Inmates Learning in Prison?
Not Much, The Marshall Project (2017)



How Much Do Incarcerated People Earn
in Each State?, Prison Policy Initiative
(2017)



State and Federal Prison Wage Policies
and Sourcing Information, Prison Policy
Initiative (2017)

31

EQUIPMENT

“

Business is very good. Because crime is crazy and
there are lots of inmates. We are happy, the number
[of customers] is increasing every day.

Ahmad Afzal, director of Fine Cotton Textiles, a uniform manufacturer 1

As the prison population soared in the 1970s
and 1980s due largely to racist fear-mongering,
equipment and supplies corporations that had
previously served other institutional settings,
such as hospitals and schools, saw an
opportunity. 5 Appealing to the burgeoning
correctional market, these corporations began
manufacturing products specifically designed for
punitive settings, like triple-stacked bunks that
allow correctional administrators to pack people
in small cells and shackle restraints for people
experiencing mental health crises. When
population growth began to strain correctional
budgets, manufacturers and suppliers of even
basic consumer goods entered the market,
producing cheap knockoff supplies that barely
served their intended use.
At the same time, defense contractors and arms
manufacturers were expanding into the
correctional market through the sale of so-called
“less lethal weapons.” The demand for these
weapons surged after the 1972 Attica Prison
Uprising, when incarcerated men took control of
Attica Correctional Facility in New York to
demand better living conditions and an end to
racial assaults, common at the prison. State
officials responded with militarized violence,
killing 39 people. Ultimately, rather than
addressing or even acknowledging the injustices
Equipment

Description: Equipment and supplies
corporations furnish nearly everything
used in prisons and jails from desks and
uniforms to restraint jackets and tear
gas. The products they sell can be
organized into four categories:
furnishing and hardware, supplies,
security equipment, and security
technology.

1,300 +

Correctional equipment and supplies
corporations 2

$209,000

Federal Bureau of Prisons annual
spending on chemical weapons 3

104

Taser deaths in prisons and jails 4

32

raised by organizers, correctional administrators concluded that the uprising was a result of a lack of
security equipment. State officials immediately allocated $4 million in emergency funds — then equal
to 5 percent of the state’s correctional budget — to the purchase of “the latest things in mob control.” 6
Other states quickly followed suit, 7 and military-style weapons became commonplace behind bars.
As technology evolved over the years, corporations also started to sell security technology like
electronic locks and surveillance systems. Although these products were traditionally sold by
specialized correctional manufacturers, mega consumer brands have also expanded into the
correctional market through technology like facial recognition software.

■

How Much Money is at Stake?

The ubiquity of fear and prioritization of security above all else in prisons and jails has led correctional
administrators to spend excessively on equipment. Together, law enforcement and correctional
agencies spend $1.2 billion annually on security equipment and technology alone. 8 That figure is
expected to grow with the cost of new technology. 9 Correctional agencies spend as much as 10
percent of their annual budget on equipment with the largest expenditures coming from one-time
purchases of costly items like surveillance systems. 10 When short, they find other funding sources.
In many jurisdictions, they supplement their equipment and supplies budgets with money extracted
from incarcerated people and their families through commissary sales and phone calls. These funds
are, in some cases, placed in so-called “inmate welfare funds,” intended to support educational
programs, reentry services, and improvements to quality of life for people behind bars. But instead,
correctional administrators often use them to purchase routine equipment for corrections officers,
including weapons. 11
For instance, California penal code requires that “inmate welfare funds” be used “primarily for the
benefit, education, and welfare” of jailed people. 12 However, between 2011 and 2013, the Los
Angeles Police Department used 87 percent of the money in its “inmate welfare fund,” or $1.3 million,
for capital improvements, equipment for the medical dispensary, security camera monitoring, the
repainting and upkeep of jail facilities, and finally, televisions for entertainment. 13
While officials quickly allocate money for their own equipment, supplies for incarcerated people
remain under-resourced. Still, the sheer size of the incarcerated population drives even those sales.
But in the end, the true size of the correctional equipment and supplies market is unknown.

■

What Corporations Are Involved?

The steady demand for correctional equipment and supplies has created a highly fragmented
ecosystem of manufacturers and suppliers from “mom and pop” operations to multinational
conglomerates. Over 1,300 corporations sell correctional equipment and supplies, making it the
largest sector in the prison industry. 14 Though there are a handful of corporations that sell a variety of
products, most corporations in the space specialize in a single type of equipment or supplies, whether
it be furnishing, hardware, technology, weaponry, or a consumer good.

Equipment

33

In recent years, some of these niche areas have gone through a process of consolidation as more
established players acquire smaller competitors. For instance, Cornerstone Detention, a large
correctional equipment corporation that manufacturers and installs correctional furnishing and
hardware, has acquired ten equipment manufacturers in the past decade. 15 Other major players in
furnishing and hardware include Stanley Black & Decker, Assa Abloy, Kane Innovations, Southern
Folger, Accurate Controls, and Norix.
The largest supplier of correctional equipment and supplies is The Bob Barker Company, a family-run
business that sells over 5,000 different products for correctional facilities and collects an estimated $87
million in revenue annually. Founded in 1972 as a restaurant supply company, Bob Barker entered the
correctional market by selling kitchen equipment before expanding to sell uniforms and mattresses. 16
The corporation cemented its dominance in the industry by merging in 2006 with Leslee Scott, another
manufacturer in the space. 17 Today, Bob Barker sells nearly every type of equipment and supplies that
could be used behind bars, from weaponry to individual shampoo packets.
Investors have also emerged to provide financing to equipment manufacturers and suppliers seeking
to expand into the correctional market. These financiers require new entrants to maintain a gross profit
margin of 15 encouraging, encouraging aggressive pricing and cost cutting. 18
Top Market Players

Annual Prison
Revenue
Employees
Products

■

Stanley Black &
Decker
Corrections
Security 19

The Bob Barker
Company 20

Cornerstone
Detention
Products 21

Southern
Folger 22

Kane
Innovations 23

-

$87M

$60M

$41M

$33M

Hardware,
electronic
systems, locks

180
Furniture,
uniforms,
security
equipment,
hygiene
products

180
Reinforced
windows,
doors, cells

163
Hardware,
electronic
systems

125
Security
barriers,
furniture

Furnishing and Hardware

Equipment corporations that manufacture and supply furnishing and hardware have created a niche
market in the correctional space by playing on trumped-up safety and security concerns to sell
specially-designed, costly-augmented products that facilitate the dehumanization and abuse of people
behind bars. By degrading incarcerated people, furnishing and hardware manufacturers and suppliers
encourage facilities to use more extreme methods of confinement.
Examples of their products include:
“Therapeutic modules,” or human pens, used to cage people during programs 24
Benches with loops designed for handcuffs typical in booking areas 25
• Stackable, plastic, sleeping platforms intended for temporary use in overcrowded facilities 26
Basic plastic storage containers assigned individually to store and move property 27
• Hinged slots used to pass through food for individuals in solitary confinement 28
Equipment

34

■

Supplies

While equipment corporations invest in
reinforced furnishing and hardware for facilities
to justify higher pricing, those that manufacture
supplies distributed to incarcerated people cut
corners. These cheap, knockoff consumer
products claim to protect facility security but
create serious health risks, putting incarcerated
people in danger.

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Bob Barker Company 29
For instance, Bob Barker emphasizes both
“Areas of the body that have or are only even
contraband-prevention and cost-efficiency in
suspected of having come in contact with the product
selling its Maximum Security® & Clear All-in-One
should be rinsed immediately with plenty of running
Shaving Cream, Soap, and Shampoo, which is
water and possibly soap.”
merely unscented soap repackaged in a clear
bottle. However, the company takes cost
cutting a step further by replacing typical soap ingredients with dangerous preservatives not found in
free world consumer brands that irritate skin and may even cause birth defects. 30 Unbelievably, the
corporation’s own safety warning advises people to avoid skin contact with the soap. 31 Yet, at just
$0.14 per ounce 32 — compared to $0.32 per ounce for name-brand products like Suave 33 — it remains
attractive for correctional agencies. As a result, to protect their health, incarcerated people are forced
to purchase their own soap at commissary.

■

Security Equipment

Correctional equipment corporations enable
and encourage some of the most brutal
I can count one hand when [a Taser]
practices behind bars. They provide correctional
was used appropriately.
administrators with tools used to force people
into obedience, using advertising that either
Steve Martin, former general counsel
obscures or downplays the harm they inflict.
for Texas Department of Criminal
Some corporations go as far as to sell security
Justice 34
equipment that resembles medieval torture
devices. For example, Humane Restraint—whose
name alone makes light of its cruel products—
sells leg weights, restraint beds, and wrist
shackles with inappropriately kitschy marketing. 35 These restraints can cause severe physical and
mental harm. 36 Though federal, state, and local regulations often restrict the use of restraints,
corrections officers frequently turn to them to punish minor infractions. 37 In fact, in some facilities,
these restraints have become the default response to someone in need of mental health care. 38
With little regard for those on the receiving end of their equipment, these corporations, including arms
manufacturers and suppliers, also deceptively market dangerous weapons as “less lethal,” spreading
military-grade weaponry across prisons and jails while avoiding liability for the consequences of their
use. 39 These weapons include batons, stun guns, rubber bullets, tear gas, and pepper spray.
For instance, stun guns are extremely dangerous, but equipment corporations continue to sell them
without consequence. Axon, which sells Taser, previously advertised its products as “non-lethal” and
Equipment

35

EXTRA
HEAVY DUTY
LEATHER MUFFS
w ith a tta che d wristl e ts

Humane Restraints, Example from wholesale
catalog 42

(Jj

“safe” before adopting the term “less lethal” to
avoid lawsuits by people who suffered cardiac
arrest after being struck with their products. 43
Axon even warns that a stun gun is more likely to
kill someone if they have a mental illness, history
of drug use, or heart disease, 44 conditions that
are disproportionately common among
incarcerated people due to failures in social
support. Still, correctional agencies purchase and
use Tasers in large quantities, knowingly
endangering people behind bars. 45

'HRDHDCH"

■

Eart121
Bri
1J1w(5)

low1rJ1
CoU1

u

Safariland, Poster instructing corrections officers
how to use a baton to inflict pain without causing
lasting damage 40

Security Technology

For years, facilities have purchased cameras and
powered locks from security technology
corporations. However, these corporations are
increasingly developing and marketing new
Orwellian technology to surveil people using
biometric data, including their fingerprints,
retinas, and, in some cases, even the way they
walk. 46 And familiar consumer technology
corporations like Microsoft and Amazon are also
entering the space. Both have developed facial
recognition technology being implemented in
correctional facilities. 47 However, these new
security technologies raise serious concerns.

For instance, existing facial recognition
technology struggles to identify people of color
accurately, which creates a significant risk of false
identifications, especially among the
Safariland, poster instructing corrections officers
disproportionately Black, Brown, and Indigenous
how to use a baton to inflict pain without causing
prison population. 48 These identifications are
41
lasting damage
often used in prison disciplinary hearings, where
a false positive can lead to severe consequences: the denial of visits and calls, solitary confinement, or
even the denial of parole — often without any legal recourse. While local municipalities have begun to
pass legislation prohibiting this technology in the free world, 49 correctional administrators continue to
implement it across prisons and jails without transparency or accountability. 50
But these types false identifications are not limited to the analysis of biometric data. Security
technology also includes forensic equipment like drug tests used to detect contraband narcotics and
also often produce false positives with many of the same dire consequences for incarcerated people.
In New York, for example, leaked documents confirmed not only an abundance of false positives in
urinalysis tests conducted using Thermo Fisher Scientific testing equipment, but also false positives in
field tests conducted directly on suspected substances using tests manufactured by Sirchie. 51 This
faulty equipment caused many people to suffer for months in solitary confinement, some were even
refused early release. 52 Notably, these tests are not just use in New York, but across the country in law
enforcement, correctional, and even employment environments.
Equipment

36

■

Larry’s Story
On a hot July day in 2019, corrections officers dragged me out of my cell
and put me in handcuffs with their batons at their waists silently
threatening violence. They threw me in solitary confinement without
explanation and left me there for hours without anything as much as toilet
paper. The next morning, I received a misbehavior report that stated I had
tested positive for drug use. It was impossible, I knew I had not used
anything.

Larry Hardy
New York

As it turns out, I was among more than 2,000 incarcerated people who
falsely tested positive for drugs in 2019 as a result of faulty testing
equipment manufactured by Microgenics, a subsidiary of Thermo Fisher
Scientific.

Despite my pleas of innocence, I was sanctioned with 90 days in solitary confinement, loss of all
privileges, including regular and family reunification visits, and removal from all activities. Through the
summer heat, I was confined to a closet-sized cell with no ventilation, stripped of any personal
belongings, and limited to two showers a week. I was devastated, traumatized. My character,
reputation, and credibility were defamed. I went into a hopeless state of depression, feeling like there
was no chance that I would be vindicated. I questioned my faith.
Then, on my 67th day in solitary confinement, in late September, the reversal came down from prison
administrators. Just like that, my false positive had been reversed, my sanctions ended, and I was
returned to my cell in general population. It was as if nothing happened — but it had. A lot happened.
In November, hundreds of formerly and currently incarcerated people, who suffered loss of calls and
visits, solitary confinement, and even extended prison stays, filed a lawsuit against Thermo Fisher
Scientific and the New York Department of Corrections and Community Supervision. While there has
been momentum in the case and increased media coverage over the year since, my life and the lives
of hundreds of others just in New York have been irreparably damaged. And how many other states
and other agencies have used Thermo Fisher Scientific’s faulty drug tests to destroy lives?

■

Trade Assocations

Trade shows are the most important marketing
tool for correctional equipment and supplies
corporations. The American Correctional
Association (ACA), an influential industry trade
group with over 20,000 members, holds the
country’s largest annual trade show, known as
the “Congress of Corrections.” 54 An astounding
81 percent of sales made by the corrections
equipment and supplies industry occur at these
trade shows. 55 The American Jail Association
and Nation Sheriff’s Association also host large
trade shows each year.
Equipment

This is a great opportunity to meet
face-to-face with thousands of
decision-makers who have the need
and budgets for your products… We
wish you a profitable 2018.
American Correctional Association 53

37

Learn More


Police Equipment, The Marshall Project
(2018)



Shock Tactics: Inmate Deaths Reveal
“Torturous” Use of Tasers, Reuters (2017)



Video: Person in an Alabama jail Pepper
Sprayed While in a Restraint Chair,
Washington Post (2017)



Prisons are Using Military-Grade Tear Gas
to Punish People, The Nation (2016)



Making Profits on the Captive Prison
Market, The New Yorker (2016)



Welcome to Jail Inc: How Private
Companies Make Money Off US Prisons,
The Guardian (2016)



Prison Vendors See Continued Signs of a
Captive Market, The New York Times
(2015)

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American Correctional Association, advertisement
from annual conference program (2019) 56

Manufacturing and supplying inherently violent
equipment and supplies, corporations facilitate
the traumatization and abuse of people behind
bars, who are disproportionately Black, Brown
and Indigenous people. Worse yet, their products
are often purchased using public funds and
money siphoned from the families of incarcerated
people. By selling the tools that allow correctional
administrators to run facilities by brutal force,
these corporations are responsible for some of
the worst abuses in the prison industry.

Equipment

38

DATA +
INFORMATION

“

Laws have to determine what’s legal, but you can’t ban
technology. Sure, that might lead to a dystopian
future or something, but you can’t ban it.
David Scalzo, founder and managing partner at Kirenaga Partners 1

From the turn of the twentieth century, racist
ideologies were enshrined in crime statistics.
Touted as objective, the statistical discourse
ascribed criminal traits to Black people as innate
and even biological. Using early assessment
tools and biometric programs, Progressive Era
social scientists rationalized racially disparate
rates of arrest and punishment to propel forward
predictive policing and new tools aimed
at assessing criminal risk. 2
Prison and Jail Management Systems
It was not until the prison and jail population
began to explode in the 1970s that correctional
administrators began to introduce more robust
information management and classification
practices. They sought to manage growing
populations, improve efficiency, and, most
importantly, rebut litigation. 5 By the 1980s,
technology had become readily accessible and
correctional departments were eager to find
more sophisticated tools and systems that would
make facility management easier. 6 Private
software corporations responded to their calls
with increasingly sophisticated information
management tools.

Data + Information

Description: Law enforcement, courts,
and correctional agencies contract with
private corporations for data and
information systems that track
individuals in the criminal legal system.
These corporations also provide
decision-making tools that can
determine one’s experience in the
system. These systems and tools
include prison and jail management
systems, risk and needs assessment
tools, and biometrics.

$1.8 billion
Prison and jail management system
market size 3

59%

Projected market growth by 2026 4

39

Risk and Needs Assessment Tools
States introduced risk and needs assessment
tools in the 1920s to inform parole decisions,
150 +
relying on clinical evaluations of psychologists,
Risk and needs assessment tools 7
social workers, and criminal legal system actors. 9
Courts expanded their use into the pretrial
context to predict whether an accused person
77%
would return to court to face trial in the 1960s. 10
Increased likelihood of “high risk” flag
And in the 1970s, as the carceral population
for Black versus white defendant 8
began to balloon, risk and needs assessment
tools shifted from being a matter of professional
opinion to algorithmic calculations. 11 Soon,
actors across the criminal legal system started to
use risk and needs assessment tools to help set bail, determine sentences, assign security levels,
assess programming needs, make parole decisions, and establish supervision conditions. 12 Some
developed tools in-house while others looked to private corporations and foundations, resulting in the
release of more than 150 new risk and needs assessment tools over the next two decades. 13
Biometrics
Biometrics — the automated identification of a
person based on their physical or behavioral
traits — started well before modern
technology. 18 The New York prison system
began using fingerprinting to identify people as
early as 1902, and the Federal Bureau of
Investigations followed in 1924. 19 Between the
1930s and the 1990s, advances in face, eye, and
hand recognition technology significantly
expanded law enforcement’s use of biometrics,
which often helped reinforce racist policing. 20 In
2000, the National Institute of Justice began
testing emerging biometric technologies in
military prisons for broader correctional uses. 21

117 million

Faces stored by law enforcement 14

200,000 +

Incarcerated voice prints collected by
correctional telecom corporations 15

259 million

Projected identities stored by the
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
by 2022 16

In fact, some of the most sophisticated biometric
tools were developed for the military and later
adapted for law enforcement and correctional
675 million +
settings. 22 For example, in the 2000s, the U.S.
Minutes of recorded prison and jail calls 17
Department of Defense awarded the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology a $50
million grant to develop voice recognition
technology that it intended to use to combat terrorism. 23 In 2010, JLG, now a subsidiary of correctional
telecom giant Securus, licensed the technology to monitor prison and jail phone calls. 24
Around the world, advocates and lawmakers have sounded the alarm about the dangers of biometrics,
and at least some geographies have heeded these warnings. The European Union, for instance,
passed laws protecting personal biometric data, 25 but, in the U.S., this technology remains almost
entirely unregulated. 26 Thus, unsurprisingly, a growing number of private corporations are entering
the market eager to sell biometric data to everyone from big tech to law enforcement.

Data + Information

40

■How Much Money is at Stake?
Prison and Jail Management Systems
In 2017, the global prison and jail management systems market was valued at roughly $1.8 billion. 27
By 2026, it is projected to reach $2.8 billion. 28 North America, and the U.S. in particular, is expected to
dominate the market and drive much of its growth as it continues to the lead the world in incarceration
and increase the use of mobile and cloud technologies to store and share data across government
agencies. 29
Risk and Needs Assessment Tools
Nearly every state and the federal system use risk and needs assessment tools in the pretrial context
and correctional settings, and both are growing at the county level. 30 However, the market opportunity
for assessment tools is bigger than merely geographic expansion. Courts and correctional agencies
are increasingly using risk assessment tools at new decision points in the criminal legal system — from
bail to sentencing to classification to parole. 31 There are now hundreds of different risk and needs
assessment tools used across the country. 32 The use of these tools has increased most dramatically in
recent years: in 2013, just 10 percent of the U.S. lived in a jurisdiction that used a pretrial risk
assessment tool; by 2017, that number had risen to 25 percent. 33

Pretrial Risk Assessment Tools Used in Jurisdictions Across the U.S. 34

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Biometrics
The global biometrics market is projected to grow from $33 billion in 2019 to $65 billion in 2024. 35
While the use of biometrics is beginning to expand, its primary users remain law enforcement, military,
and border control. 36 Two of the leading drivers of its expected growth are surveillance and security —
from street corners to borders to cyberspace. 37 In the U.S. alone, there are 1,049 corporations that
scan biometric data 38 and, consequently, have access to over billions of pieces of identifying human
information. 39

Data + Information

41

■

What Corporations Are Involved?

Prison and Jail Management Systems
The prison and jail management systems market is dominated by a few large players and filled out with
dozens of smaller players. Among the oldest and most prominent is Syscon, which launched its first
prison and jail management system in 1985, 40 and now also tracks financial information, integrates
biometric data, and supports mobile devices and cloud storage. 41 Another major player promoting a
shift to cloud-based solutions is publicly-traded, information technology giant DXC Technology. 42
Equivant (formerly Northpointe), which is best known for developing one of the most widely used risk
and needs assessment tools, 43 is also a leading provider of prison and jail management systems, its
original core business. 44 But the field of management systems is quickly evolving beyond these
traditional software products thanks to major technology conglomerates like Amazon and Microsoft
that are now providing cloud-based data services to power advanced management systems for
government agencies like Immigration and Custom Enforcement (ICE). 45
Risk and Needs Assessment Tools
The three most widely used risk and needs assessment tools are Level of Service Inventory Revised
(LSI-R), Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions (COMPAS), and the
Public Safety Assessment (PSA). 46 The first two were developed by private corporations while the last
was developed by a private foundation. Multi-Health Systems Assessments developed LSI-R in 1995. 47
Since, LSI-R and adapted versions have been adopted widely in states like California and
Washington. 48 Created by Equivant in 1998, COMPAS is currently thought to be the most widely used
assessment tool with over 500 court systems and 100 correctional agencies, including seven state
prison systems, using the tool. 49 That is in large part because COMPAS has the broadest adaptations.
Arnold Ventures, backed by philanthropists Laura and John Arnold, spent $1.2 million to develop PSA
in 2013, 50 which has now been adopted by five state systems and 59 counties across 20 states. 51 Many
jurisdictions have also developed their own risk assessment tools, often using modified versions of
existing algorithms. 52 Virginia, for instance, developed its own tool, variations of which are now used in
at least 59 counties across 18 other states. 53
Biometric Databases
The top players in the biometric data market are a combination of large technology conglomerates
and smaller correctional vendors, and their products can range dramatically. 54 Some focus on a few
biometrics with a variety of applications while others will cover a variety of biometrics but focus
narrowly on law enforcement applications. For instance, Google, Gemalto, Academia, Facebook,
Microsoft, and Amazon lead the charge on facial recognition across markets 55 while DataWorks Plus
provides everything from fingerprint identification to facial recognition for just law enforcement
agencies — more than 1,000 agencies across the country. 56 Idemia is a major player that covers both a
wide array of biometrics and markets, and specifically helps law enforcement use facial recognition in
investigations. 57 Finally, some players spill over from other prison industry sectors like correctional
telecom giant Securus, which dominates the nascent voice printing market, recording and tracking
people across more than 240 correctional agencies. 58

Data + Information

42

■Vidal’s Story
I came up in the streets, and I am still in the streets. I am one of the few
activists who can organize among a unique diversity of people: the
Bloods, Crips, and Latin Kings gangs. And that’s because I once was a
gang member.
As a young person, my gang protected me. But I didn’t know that I was
being tracked by the police as a gang member until the moment I was
standing in a courtroom at just 16 years old.
Vidal Guzman
New York

While I was a gang member, that’s not why I was put into a gang
database. People are put in gang databases based on their
neighborhood, friends, clothing, and tattoos. Children as young as twelve
years old are put in gang databases for wearing certain colors in certain neighborhoods or just saying
“hi” to particular people on the block.
Gang databases are Stop and Frisk 2.0, a secret weapon that gives law enforcement almost
unregulated authority to stop and harass Black and Brown youth without reason. People in gang
databases, like me, are subject to constant surveillance and invasions of privacy: our movements are
tracked, and our social media is watched. And gang databases follow you for life.
When I came home from prison, I had “gang” parole, which meant I wasn’t eligible for early
termination like others and that the consequences for any violation would be exponentially worse.
After years of studying as an organizer, I have learned that gang databases aim to enforce social
control and disrupt our ability to organize. I see them now for what they are: racist, coercive systems of
surveillance.
Today, I help educate my people about gang databases and all forms of oppression as we work to
create our own systems of justice. I know we will get free.

■ Prison and Jail Management Systems
Prison and jail management systems are massive repositories of personal information used to track
people as they move through the criminal legal system. In the correctional setting, this information
includes a person’s security level, perceived gang affiliations, programming progress, administrative
sanctions, medical records, cell assignments, property inventory, and more. 59
Although portrayed as seemingly innocuous information systems, prison and jails management
systems are yet another tool correctional administrators use to surveil, profile, target, and control
incarcerated people. The use of gang databases is just one example. Up to 67 percent of prisons and
jails use restrictive housing to target people labeled as gang members, 60 meaning that a gang
designation often further restricts a person’s already limited movement while incarcerated.
And gang affiliations are not just tracked in prisons and jails, law enforcement in the criminal and
immigration context use these opaque databases to target Black, Brown, and Indigenous
communities. The criteria for inclusion can be simply wearing a certain color or congregating in a
Data + Information

43

particular neighborhood. Children as young as six years old have been added to gang databases. 61 In
one 2019 case, law enforcement jailed an El Salvadoran man seeking asylum for six months, took away
his children, and delayed his asylum after he was erroneously put in a gang database. 62
In recent years, technology has expanded the
capabilities of traditional prison and jail
management systems. Corporations have
GUARDIAN RFID helps corrections
developed coded identification cards and
soldiers command, control, and gain
wristbands that allow correctional administrators
operational dominance without
to track every move made by a person in their
compromise.
custody. Scanners placed around facilities log
each time someone passes a checkpoint and
Guardian RFID 63
interface with prison and jail management
systems to create a real-time record of
movement. 64 The result is a surveillance
panopticon whereby all movement is tracked and frequently penalized. And the cost of this monitoring
is often passed on to incarcerated people, who are charged as much as $25 to replace identification
cards and bands. 65
Cloud technology is further changing the landscape. As correctional facilities increasingly depend on
networked devices, security and technology corporations have developed products to store and
protect data online. 66 These tools give officers ready access to personal information and records using
smartphones or tablets. 67 In the immigration system, ICE spent nearly $600 million to build new
information infrastructures in 2019. 68 Partnering with Amazon and Palantir, ICE collects, stores, and
analyzes vast amounts of personal information that agents use to profile and surveil immigrants, their
friends, and family. Although information about the system is largely hidden from public view, it is
suspected to have enabled ICE agents to track and detain people in their homes, courthouses, and
even hospitals. 69

■

Risk and Needs Assessment Tools

Risk and needs assessment tools use algorithms to determine whether someone should be detained
pretrial, whether they qualify for diversion or reduced sentencing, which facility they should be
assigned to, what their treatment needs are during incarceration, and whether they should be granted
parole. While some jurisdictions have developed their own tools, many have turned to private
corporations. 70
In the pretrial context, risk assessment tools are purported to objectively measure risk of flight and risk
of rearrest, which in turn determine whether someone charged with a crime should be released,
granted bail, or detained pretrial. Proponents assert that risk assessment tools can reduce pretrial
incarceration or racial disparities in pretrial outcomes, but there’s little evidence they do. 71 Instead,
their mere use suggests not just that pretrial detention is justifiable, but also that the risk of flight is far
more likely than research has proven. 72 In fact, charitable bail funds have shown that, even without a
financial obligation to the court, people appear for their court dates 95 percent of the time. 73
Risk assessment tools rely on bias factors that reflect the overpolicing of Black and Brown
neighborhoods and inequalities that undergird mass criminalization. And yet, these tools are
dangerously painted as objective. For example, every risk assessment tool assesses one’s arrest
history, often including uncharged arrests and dismissed cases and ignoring the disproportionate
Data + Information

44

targeting of Black and Brown communities by
police. Most also rely on housing and
employment status, which further reflect racial
and economic biases. 74 And some even
consider the ZIP code in which a person lives,
the clearest proxy for race after decades of
entrenched residential segregation. 75 In the
end, risk assessment tools only further legitimize
existing structural disparities and racist policing
rather than reveal any meaningful conclusions
about a particular person.

I don’t like the idea myself of
COMPAS being the sole evidence
that a decision would be based
upon.
Tim Brennan, COMPAS developer 76

In sentencing and correctional contexts, risk and needs assessment tools are used to measure risk of
violence and “criminogenic” needs. They rely on many of the same bias factors, and thus also produce
racist outcomes. For sentencing, these assessments often determine eligibility for diversion, meaning
they can be the difference between someone going home and someone going to prison. Once in
prison, correctional administrators use assessment tools to determine a person’s security classification,
programming needs, and facility assignment, 77 factors that considerably affect a person’s experience
while incarcerated, including where they are incarcerated.
And despite their dramatic impact, the corporations behind proprietary risk and needs assessment
tools often refuse to turn over their algorithms, hiding remarkably important information about how
decisions are made. Corporations like Equivant are entrusted with critical decisions about whether to
incarcerate or free people but claim their formulas are trade secrets and must be shielded to protect
their competitive advantage. 78 This lack of public accountability has come at a deep cost. In 2016, a
study showed that COMPAS scored Black defendants more punitively than similarly situated white
defendants. Black defendants were twice as likely as white defendants to be labeled high risk and not
reoffend. 79
Nevertheless, government agencies and foundations continue to invest in risk and needs assessment
tools. In 2019, the National Institute of Justice spent $2 million on research using electronic monitoring
data to enhance risk assessment capabilities, 80 layering one problematic tool on top of another and
multiplying the concerns they raise, all under the guise of evidence-based practices.

■

Biometrics

Every year, law enforcement agencies increase
their use of biometrics to expand their
surveillance and enforcement operations.
Corporations help agencies collect data; they
also sell data to agencies that they collected
from other clients or the public market. 81
For example, correctional telecom corporations
like Securus collect, analyze, and sell voice
prints of incarcerated people and their loved
ones. With the enforcement power of its
correctional partners, Securus requires
incarcerated people to read preselected
Data + Information

~------ - -Q.:-•a...,.

~

The Intercept, Securus' Investigator Pro Platform
(2019) 82

45

phrases and creates a voice print for each
person. Those who refuse are barred from
Unless Securus or the sheriff’s office
calling their loved ones. 84 Additionally, the
receives an expunction order, that
voices of their loved ones outside are separately
information is still able to be resided
printed through phone call recordings, and
in the system and utilized. Unless we
often flagged if recognized speaking to more
get that [order], it doesn’t get
than one person in the same system. 85 This
deleted.
raises privacy, censorship, and retaliation
concerns for families with more than one
Jail Administrator in Fort Bend
incarcerated loved one and service providers,
County, Texas 83
advocates, and media who are often in contact
with many people in one system. And then in
the background, the corporation packages
these voice prints into databases which it sells to
federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. 86 Consequently, a person’s voice print lives long
beyond their incarceration.
Corporations claim that these tools are objective, but biometrics are disproportionately used to target
Black, Brown, and Indigenous people. Jurisdictions that use this technology rarely monitor its use or
release information about its accuracy, so it is impossible to even know the true scope of this issue. 87
Facial recognition, for example, has a significant risk of false identification, but only for people of color.
In fact, the darker someone’s skin, the more likely a system is to produce a false positive. 88 In one
study, researchers found that facial recognition tools could identify a white man correctly 99 percent of
the time compared to 65 percent for women with darker skin. 89 Despite this grave disparity, law
enforcement agencies are increasingly connecting this technology to footage captured by police
body-cameras and other surveillance sources, 90 putting overpoliced, Black, Brown, and Indigenous
communities at an even greater risk of harassment and violence. In a 2019 lawsuit, facial recognition
technology used on store surveillance footage misidentified and erroneously linked a Black teenager
to a string of thefts in Apple stores, leading to his wrongful arrest. 91

a

Immigration agents have also started to
use this technology around the country. In
J
at least three states that allow
undocumented people to get a driver’s
Signature
Face
Fingerprint
Hand
licenses, agents have used facial
Recognition
Recognition
Recognition
Recognition
recognition technology to analyze driver’s
license photos and identify immigrants
suspected of being undocumented. 92
~
This technology enables racial profiling
DNA
Vein Patterns
Voice
Iris
and forces undocumented immigrants to
Matching
Recognition
Recognition
Recognition
put themselves and their families at risk of
arrest and deportation for a driver’s
license — often an employment necessity. Tech corporations, funded by government initiatives, have
provided the computer software needed to further weaponize this technology. Launched in 2011, the
federal Cloud First program pushed for increased partnership between governments and private
developers of cloud technology. 93 The program allocated $20 billion for cloud computing solutions. 94
By 2022, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, which already holds the second-largest biometric
database in world, is slated to store the biometric data of at least 259 million people. 95 Amazon Web
Services provides the digital infrastructure needed to host such a massive data trove. 96
Data + Information

~

~

I

~

((<0

<®

46

Over the past few decades, corporations have
moved the collection, storage, analysis, and sale
of personal information from science fiction to
daily reality. But while these data and
information systems may seem innocuous
enough in movies, these tools can mean the
difference between life and death in the hands
of law enforcement and correctional agencies.
For Black, Brown, and Indigenous people, prison
and jail management systems, risk and needs
assessment tools, and biometrics make their
personal information perpetually accessible to
the law enforcement agencies that target them.
The technology corporations that develop these
systems and tools put Black, Brown, and
Indigenous people under a constant threat of
false predictions and identification, setting the
stage for a never-ending cycle of harassment
and violence.

Learn More


Mapping Pretrial Injustice: A CommunityDriven Database, Media Mobilizing
Project and Media Justice (2020)



The Secret History of Facial Recognition,
WIRED (2020)



An Organizer's Guide to Confronting
Pretrial Risk Assessment Tools in
Decarceration Campaigns, Community
Justice Exchange (2019)



Risk Assessment: Explained, The Appeal
(2019)



Fact Sheet: Electronic Monitoring
Devices as Alternatives to Detention,
National Immigration Forum (2019)



Who’s Behind ICE? The Tech and Data
Companies Fueling Deportations,
National Immigration Project, Immigrant
Defense Project, and Mijente (2018)



Recidivism Risk Assessments Won’t Fix
the Criminal Justice System, Electronic
Frontier Foundation (2018)



NYPD Gang Database Can Turn
Unsuspecting New Yorkers Into Instant
Felons, The Intercept (2018)



Making Sense of Pretrial Risk
Assessments, National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers (2018)




Machine Bias, ProPublica (2016)



Data + Information

The Perpetual Line-Up, Georgetown Law
Center on Privacy & Technology (2016)
The New Science of Sentencing, The
Marshall Project (2015)

47

TELECOM

“

The reason that we are in this mess right now, on my side,
[is that] my industry has abused the public and I’m willing
to admit that. We have abused the public.
Vincent Townsend, CEO of Pay-Tel Communications 1

The modern correctional telecom industry
emerged in the 1970s just as legislators began
passing dog whistle “tough-on-crime” laws that
sent the prison population surging. Initially,
AT&T controlled almost the entire correctional
telecom market much like the broader telecom
market. Though expensive, the costs of collect
calls from prisons and jails at the time were
comparable to the cost of such calls outside. But,
in 1984, when federal regulators broke up the
AT&T monopoly, new providers like MCI and
Sprint entered the correctional market and other
niche competitors quickly followed. They
cornered the market by agreeing to share
revenue from calls with prison and jail
administrators. By the mid-1990s, 90 percent of
correctional agencies nationwide had
contracted with a for-profit provider. 5

Description: Correctional telecom
corporations contract with correctional
agencies to provide communications
services, including phone calls, video
conferencing, and electronic
messaging, to incarcerated people and
their support networks. Layered on
these services are surveillance tools.

$1.4 billion

Correctional telecom market size 2

$16.35

Max cost of a 15-minute jail phone call 3

In the early 2000s, private equity firms began to
buy into the prison telecom market and drive
consolidation. In 2004, H.I.G. Capital formed
Securus Technologies — now one of the
1 in 3
country’s largest correctional telecom
Families with an incarcerated loved one
corporations — through the acquisition and
that go into debt trying to stay in touch 4
merger of two small niche providers. 6 That same
year, The Gores Group bought correctional
telecom provider Global Tel*Link (GTL), 7 and
two years later, in 2006, acquired and merged it with Verizon’s correctional telecom division to create
the country’s largest correctional telecom business. 8 Since then, the two corporations have traded
Telecom

48

hands among private equity investors several times. And with their financial backing, GTL and Securus
have acquired nearly every major competitor in the industry, creating a virtual duopoly. 9 Today, GTL is
owned by American Securities 10 and Securus, restructured under holding company Aventiv
Technologies, is owned by Platinum Equity. 11 Notably, The Gores Group and Platinum Equity were
founded and are run by brothers Alec and Tom Gores, respectively. 12
These correctional telecom corporations quickly became notorious for their high rates and exploitative
practices. In response, for two decades, families litigated and advocated for change. 13 Perhaps the
most persistent was Martha Wright-Reed, a grandmother fed up with paying the high cost of calling
her incarcerated grandson whose 2001 lawsuit would eventually come before the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC). 14 After more than a decade, the FCC started rulemaking in 2012
and instituted rate caps in 2015, but the industry challenged the agency’s regulations in court. 15
After the 2016 election, Ajit Pai, an attorney who formerly represented Securus, was appointed
Chairman of the FCC and announced that the agency would no longer defend its rate caps in court. 16
The decision effectively doomed the regulation, and rate caps for instate calls — those that originate
and end within a state and make up 80 percent of all prison and jail calls 17 — were struck down by a
federal court in 2017 on the claim that such rates were state matter and not for the FCC to regulate. 18
Since then, about half a dozen states 19 and cities have passed regulations or legislation to lower or
eliminate costs, but rates remain high across the country.
In the past decade, correctional telecom corporations have begun introducing new communication
services to the corrections landscape, including video conferencing, electronic messaging, and tablets,
as well as surveillance technologies, such as voice printing. These burgeoning products and services,
which come along with their own exorbitant price tags, are quickly changing the communications
space, necessitating new advocacy efforts.

■

How Much Money is at Stake?

The correctional telecom sector rakes in an estimated $1.4 billion annually in just phone call revenue,
with three corporations controlling 91 percent of the market. 20 Correctional telecom providers sign
exclusive contracts with federal, state, and local correctional agencies for monopoly control over
communications services in their facilities. These contracts often include profit-sharing clauses that
dictate what portion of call revenue the corporation will pay to the contracting agency, often referred
to as commissions or kickbacks. To further sweeten the pot, at times, providers offer to prepay these
commissions, make technology grants, and even pay signing bonuses. Corporations then charge
incarcerated people and their loved ones egregious rates for their products and services to cover
these government kickbacks and bake in their own profit margin.
Rates vary widely across the market based on federal, state, and local regulations, or lack thereof, and
the negotiating intentions and aptitude of each contracting agency. While the FCC has capped the
cost of interstate phone calls from both prisons and jails at $0.21 per minute for prepaid calls and
$0.25 for collect calls, instate calls — which make up over 80 percent of all calls — remain unregulated at
the federal level and inconsistently regulated at the state level. 21 As a result, instate call rates can run
as high as a dollar a minute in some states and counties. 22 The highest rates are most commonly
charged in local jails, which are often more reliant and interested in kickbacks and receive less
scrutiny. 23
Telecom

49

While many other sectors in the prison industry still have room for growth, telecom is quite a saturated
and mature market. Nearly every single correctional agency in the country contracts with a private
telecom provider for calling services. But thanks to decades of advocacy and recent wins, call rates are
declining. In just the last two years, the national average cost for a 15-minute call from jails dropped by
28 percent from $5.71 to $4.14. Several jurisdictions are now taking on the cost of calls directly rather
than passing it through to incarcerated people and their families or considering doing so. 24 And one,
San Francisco, recently prevented providers from even bidding with the industry’s antiquated, but
standard, per minute pricing model, and instead implemented a cost per phone line model that better
aligns with the pricing structure of the broader telecom market. 25
As a result, telecom corporations are introducing new product and service lines to diversify and grow
their businesses, including video conferencing, electronic messaging, and tablets, which are often
bundled in with their calling services to justify increased costs and avoid procurement. 26
Getting its start in 1995, video conferencing began to reach critical mass in the 2010s. 27 As of 2016,
over 600 facilities had introduced some form of video conferencing and, 28 as was often required
contractually by the corporations, 74 percent of agencies scaled back or eliminated visits after
implementation to drive up usage. 29 While corporations in the space have stopped contractually
mandating that facilities eliminate visits, they continue to benefit from these prior practices since few
facilities have reinstated visits.
Electronic messaging, often misrepresented as “email,” is not yet as common in prisons and jails, but
its availability has grown quickly over the past decade. 30 Corporations charge incarcerated people and
their loved ones for “stamps” to exchange electronic messages with limited character counts and extra
costs for attachments like photos. While complete data about electronic messaging services across the
correctional landscape is not available, in 2014, before Securus acquired it, JPay brought in $8.5
million on its electronic messaging product, a 77 percent increase over the year before. 31
These communication services and others are growingly provided through tablets. In many facilities,
providers charge incarcerated people to purchase tablets. For instance, in Pennsylvania, GTL charges
people $147 per tablet. 32 In other facilities, tablets are provided to incarcerated people for free, but
they are then charged either a subscription to use it or for each product or service used on it, or
both, 33 which creates a steady revenue stream for providers. In New York, for example, the state’s
contract with JPay, which included free tablets, was expected to generate $8.8 million over the fiveyear term. 34 In recent years, the largest telecom corporations have also expanded into the payment
processing business by acquiring the largest private correctional payment processors in the nation.

What Corporations Are Involved?

■
The correctional telecom market is essentially a

duopoly, with GTL and Securus controlling
82 percent. 36 GTL is the largest prison telecom
provider in the country with service contracts for
479 counties and 23 prison systems that together
hold roughly 960,000 people, giving it control of
43 percent of the market by population served. 37
The corporation has been owned by a string of
private equity firms.

Telecom

Market Share 35
ICsolutions
(CenturyLink): 5%
ICSolutions: 4%
Securus
(CenturyLink): 9%

Other: 9%

Global Tel
Link: 43%

Securus: 30%

50

Founded in 1980, GTL was first acquired by conglomerate Schlumberger Technologies in 1993. 38 In
2009, The Gores Group acquired GTL for an undisclosed amount and sold it to Veritas Capital and
Goldman Sachs in 2011 for $345 million. 39 Just two years later, the private equity firm put the business
back up for sale hoping to collect $800 million for it. 40 The winning bid came in at $1 billion from
American Securities, which continues to own the corporation. 41 Today, GTL generates $654 million in
revenue from its total suite of communication and other services. 42
Securus, the other major player in the market, has calling service contracts for 692 counties and 18
prison systems that together hold about 860,000 people, or 39 percent of the market. 43 However, due
to the recent diversification of its products and services, Securus rakes in roughly $700 million
annually. 44 Like its largest competitor GTL, Securus has also changed hands between various private
equity firms. Securus was formed out of the 2004 acquisition and merger of two smaller correctional
telecom corporations by H.I.G. Capital. 45 In 2011, Castle Harlan acquired Securus for $440 million. 46
Abry Partners joined Castle Harlan in 2013 when it acquired a 67 percent stake in the corporation at an
estimated valuation of $700 million. 47 Within just four years, the corporation more than doubled in
value, selling for $1.6 billion in 2017 to Platinum Equity, 48 a firm founded by Tom Gores, the brother of
Alec Gores, founder of The Gores Group. But in 2019, Securus’ valuation dropped hundreds of
millions of dollars as the leveraged loan debt propping up the corporation plummeted percent under
activist pressure. 49 In response, Platinum Equity restructured the corporation, separating out all its
business lines under a new holding company: Aventiv Technologies, 50 and launched an unsuccessful
public relations campaign to clean up the corporation’s image. 51
For the past decade, GTL and Securus have bitterly competed for market dominance through costly
patent litigation 52 and corporate acquisitions fueled largely by their private equity backing. Since 2012
alone, Securus has spent almost $600 million acquiring competitors and new business lines, 53
including its 2015 acquisition of JPay, which offers tablets and financial services. 54 GTL has also made
sizable acquisitions, including its 2017 purchase of Telmate, the fifth-largest provider in the market at
the time. 55 In 2019, their race to dominance came to a halt when advocates blocked Securus’ attempt
to acquire Inmate Calling Solutions (ICSolutions), the last independent player that could compete on a
national scale. They argued that the deal would destroy competition and lead to higher prices for
incarcerated people and their families. The FCC agreed, rejecting the deal after determining that it
was not “in the public interest.” 56
GTL and Securus have also pressured smaller competitors into signing licensing agreements that allow
them to expand their reach without attracting the attention of regulators, 57 obscuring the true nature
of the market landscape. Securus, for instance, used the threat of litigation to bully dozens of smaller
competitors into signing patent licensing agreements to achieve what it called “patent peace.” 58
But the corporate melding does not end there. GTL and Securus both serve as the customer-facing
partner for competitors providing only backend telecom infrastructure, often major telecom
corporations sensitive to public headlines. For instance, publicly traded CenturyLink stays out of the
critical limelight by providing only the backend telecom infrastructure and partnering with Securus and
ICSolutions for its customer-facing needs, namely payment collection. 59 In fact, up until 2020 when it
sold most of its correctional telecom business to ICSolutions, CenturyLink held the third largest
foothold in the market. GTL serves a similar role for Unisys and Talton Communications, the exclusive
telecom contractor for immigration detention facilities. 60
Today, ICSolutions is the third largest correctional telecom provider, earning $171 million annually. 61
The corporation accounts for roughly 12 to 15 percent of TKC, 62 a prison services conglomerate
owned by H.I.G. that provides financial, commissary, food, laundry, and maintenance services across
Telecom

51

the corrections landscape. 64 After its sale to
Securus fell through, H.I.G. made a desperate
attempt to offload ICSolutions to management
with a $280 million loan, $60 million of which
was interest-free. 65 But with roughly half of its
business controlled by CenturyLink, the deal
could not secure credit financing. To create a
viable standalone asset, H.I.G. was forced
instead to buyout CenturyLink’s correctional
telecom business — except its contract with the
Texas prison system, one of the nation’s largest,
that it holds in partnership with Securus. 66

People don’t call home… It’s just too
expensive. I feel like this is
separating families…
Casey Cormani, incarcerated person
in Millard County, Utah 63

The rest of the market is split among smaller providers like NCIC, Paytel, and City Tele Coin. 67 These
smaller players compete largely for jail contracts, which tend have fewer requirements. 68
Top Market Players 69
Annual Revenues

■

GTL

Securus

ICSolutions

$654M

~$700M

$171M

States Served

23

18

9

Counties Served

479

692

220

Incarcerated People

959,000

862,000

197,000

Average 15-Minute Jail Call
Max 15-Minute Jail Call

$2.93
$16.35

$3.72
$14.97

$2.63
$3.25

PHONE CALLS

Connecting with others, especially loved ones, is a core human need. For people behind bars, travel
time and costs as well as arbitrary visit restrictions often impede on the ability to connect with loved
ones in person. Consequently, in many cases, phone calls are the primary way that incarcerated
people stay in regular contact with their loved ones in the outside world.
And communication for incarcerated people is about more than interpersonal relationships. Regular
communication between incarcerated people and their loved ones is the easiest, cheapest, and most
effective way to reduce hopelessness and promote positive behavior during incarceration and
improve reentry success upon release. 70 It is also critical to mitigating the trauma children with
incarcerated parents face. 71
Despite the undeniable personal, familial, and public benefits of providing incarcerated people with
regular access to communication with loved ones, correctional administrators and their corporate
vendors have spent decades conspiring to exploit this most basic need by charging exorbitant call
rates. Correctional administrators often negotiate against the interest of those in their custody, and the
public, to collect hefty kickbacks on calls. An estimated 85 percent of state correctional systems collect
kickbacks on prison phone calls, 72 with some kickback commitments topping 90 percent of call rates. 73
In exchange for these kickbacks, administrators sign exclusive contracts with providers. 74 They then
build in their generous profit margin, leaving families no alternative to their costly calls.
Telecom

52

While interstate calls, also known as long-distance calls, are regulated federally, instate, or local, calls —
which make up 80 percent of prison and jail calls — are a state matter. 75 Unfortunately, not all states
have a government agency with the authority to regulate prison and jail calls, especially as providers
begin using cheaper but often unregulated internet protocols, 76 and of those with proper regulatory
authority, few use it, leaving providers to charge what they wish in most jurisdictions. And they do.
Jail Call Rates by Provider 77
GTL
Securus
Edovo
Amtel
NCIC
Reliance
ICSolutions
Paytel

$1.24

$2.03

$1.24

$2.56

$16.35
$14.97
$9.75

$1.35 $3.55

$7.50

$3.54

$7.50

$2.65

$3.75

$2.58
$1.65

■ Average

$2.43

$3.25
$3.15

Prison Rate

■ Min.

15-min Jail Call Rate

■ Max

15-min. Jail Call Rate

Today, 91 percent of people in prison or jail are forced to communicate using one of just three
providers: GTL, Securus, or ICSolutions. 78 Call rates range unjustifiably from $0.009 per minute to
more than a dollar per minute. 79 While rates have come down on average over the last decade, the
relief has not been felt equally across the country. The highest rates continue to be charged in jails,
where the relief has been minimal. In fact, as recently as this year, Securus was still charging nearly $25
for a 15-minute call. Under pressure from advocates, the corporation reduced what it called its
“outlier” contracts, or those in which a 15-minute call ran over $15, reducing 44 out of 53 of these
contracts to a cost between $10 and $15 for the same call – hardly a cause for celebration.80
When challenged on their egregious rates,
telecom providers use kickbacks as a political
tool. First, they build the dependency of their
correctional partners on these kickbacks,
incentivizing them to fight advocacy efforts to
lower rates, then they blame the correctional
agencies for their inability to lower rates. 82 And
while kickbacks do dramatically increase the cost
of the calls, these corporations rely on them to
win contracts and hide their own culpability.

We deliver on our promise to
increase your revenue…
ICSolutions pitch to facilities
administrators 81

For instance, in Connecticut, incarcerated people and their loved ones are charged as much as $0.325
per minute for call from state prison. 83 The state collects a 68 percent commission, 84 leaving the state’s
prison telecom provider, Securus, with more than $0.10 per minute. Meanwhile, in Illinois, where the
state takes no commission, Securus charges incarcerated people and their loved ones $0.009 per
minute. 85 Thus, Securus makes over ten times more in Connecticut per call minute than it does in
Illinois per call minute even after the impact of kickbacks are removed from the calculus.
And still, the exploitation does not end there. Correctional telecom providers also charge a myriad of
fees in addition to the per minute call rates. For instance, for families to receive calls from their
incarcerated loved ones they are generally encouraged to deposit funds onto a prepaid account — to
avoid the additional fees and higher rates for not doing so. But these deposits come at a steep cost of
$3 per transaction in most jurisdictions. To further maximize their profit, the corporations often cap
deposits at $50 to force more transactions and collect more fees. These fees can increase the cost of
Telecom

53

staying in touch with incarcerated loved ones by 40 percent. 86 And to top things off, in many states,
the corporations unlawfully take unused funds on accounts that have been inactive for just 90 days.
However big or small, $0.009 here or $1.00
there, these costs add up with detrimental
A dollar a minute strikes me as a fair
consequences for incarcerated people and their
price. I guess it depends what
loved ones. One in three families with an
viewpoint you’re coming from. The
incarcerated loved one goes into debt trying to
way I look at it, we’ve got a captive
pay for calls and visits alone. 88 These costs are
audience. If they don’t like [the
overwhelmingly borne by women, and as a
rates], I guess they should not have
result of the racist policing and the
got in trouble to begin with.
disproportionate criminalization and
incarceration of Black, Brown, and Indigenous
communities, they are largely women of color. 89
Tom Maziarz, purchasing manager
87
for St. Clair County, Illinois
Sadly, many families lose contact over lengthy
sentences because the financial burden is
untenable. Others are left struggling with the
financial burden for years after their loved one’s
90
release. Some have even plead guilty while awaiting trial in jail because they could not afford calls
with their attorneys. 91 And still others risk new charges and long sentences to use contraband
cellphones to stay in touch with loved ones and connected to a world they hope will not forget them. 92

■

Diane’s Story
My son was incarcerated for almost 15 years before I even realized the
burden that phone call fees were placing on my family and me. I just
hadn’t thought about it. But my Securus bill is the first one I pay every
month, and it often means that I can’t afford our gas or light bills. Yet, I
know the cost of not keeping in touch with my son would be even higher.

Diane Lewis
Connecticut

I’ve seen the difference between my son, who has a lot of support, and
others in prison who can’t make phone calls or never have family visits.
There’s a big difference, and it’s why they struggle while inside and often
go back after. It’s the anger and depression that comes with doing time
by yourself, and the lack of practical support needed when you get out.

I’m constantly forced to make sacrifices to pay Securus’ high prices, and those sacrifices have
consequences for my family. The week my sister fell ill and ultimately passed away, I spoke to my son
on the phone every day, four or five times, just to keep him posted on what was happening, so that he
could still feel like he was with us. My sister was his favorite aunt; I had to help him mourn. I
encouraged him to place as many calls as he wanted and had to shoulder the added financial burden
alongside the emotional burden of my own grief.
The absurd call rates and rushed nature of 15-minute conversations are a result of political decisions
and corporate business practices that ignore our humanity. And it pains me when the media reinforces
them. People think that just because my son committed a crime, he doesn’t deserve to know his family
or feel love. It burns me not just for him, but because it ignores me too. A mother is a mother
regardless of where her child is or what they’ve done. My love shouldn’t be exploited.
Telecom

54

■

Video Conferencing

Introduced in the mid-1990s, video conferencing has only recently taken hold in the correctional
landscape. It was marketed as a technology service that would augment family bonds by allowing for
connections that are more accessible than visits and more intimate than phone calls. Instead, video
conferencing has further separated families with incarcerated loved ones in many cases by replacing,
rather than supplementing, visits at costs that top the high cost of phone calls — an intentional ploy by
correctional telecom providers.
While video conferencing was originally introduced by two small players, VuGate and Renovo, it was
not until the nation’s largest correctional telecom providers, GTL and Securus, began selling video
conferencing services in the last decade that the product really gained meaningful traction. Since few
prisons and jail systems were procuring video conferencing services, they started by tacking the new
product onto existing telecom contracts and enticing correctional administrators with promises of
more kickbacks. 93 In fact, 84 percent of video conferencing services are contractually bundled with
phone, electronic messaging, or commissary services. 94
These larger corporations also have the capital to front the cost of installing video kiosks, recouping
their expenses and far more over the course of lengthy contracts. In the early years of the product roll
out, they contractually required administrators to eliminate or limit visits to force the use of their costly
systems, going as far as to call the new product “video visitation” to grossly suggest that video calls
were comparable to visits. Their plan worked and the term stuck. By 2016, more than 600 facilities in
46 states were using some form of video conferencing. 95 Jails, which hold largely local people, were
the early adopters 96 and 74 percent of them ended or significantly reduced visits after implementing
the technology. 97 It is devastating to families who can no longer look into their loved ones eyes or give
them a hug during a visit. It is even worse for those who do not have access to a phone or computer
and now have no way to communicate at all. 98 The corporations retired the contractual prohibitions on
visits after widespread outrage, 99 but continue to benefit as few facilities have reinstated visits since.
Unlike free video conferencing services in the outside world like Facetime, Zoom, or Google Hangouts,
video conferencing in prisons and jails are quite costly. More expensive than phone calls on average,
video calls run as high as a dollar per minute. 100 However, video calls are often prepaid for a set length
of time — often in 10, 20, or 30-minute intervals — and refunds are rarely issued when a call is
interrupted or prematurely terminated, which are common occurrences. Some jails offer free onsite
video conferencing, which requires families travel to the jail to use a kiosk to have a video call with
their incarcerated loved one who is likely in the same building or on the same premises.
And in addition to threatening visits and
imposing high costs on families, video
conferencing services are often poor in quality.
Grainy or blank video, distant or static audio,
and live monitoring further frustrate efforts to
connect using video conferencing. 102

The majority of the company’s profit
comes from the inmates
and their family.
Craig Diamond, director of marketing
for Telmate 101

In the end, while video conferencing can be a
powerful supplementary tool for incarcerated
people to connect with their loved ones,
especially when held in distant facilities,
correctional telecom providers deploy it in the
most exploitative and inhumane way, significantly undermining its beneficial value.
Telecom

55

■

Electronic Messaging

Electronic messaging has been in the correctional landscape for roughly a decade. However, like many
other technology products and services, it has picked up steam in recent years. For many with access
to technology, electronic messaging offers an easy and effective, though costly, substitute for postal
mail. But electronic messaging in prisons and jails is not comparable to email, though correctional
telecom providers attempt to suggest it is.
In prisons and jails, these corporations force incarcerated people and their families to buy “stamps”
that range from $0.05 to $1.25 and are sold both individually and in bundles to send electronic
messages. 103 Each stamp is good for a one message with a character or page limit — typically onepage typed or 5,000 characters. An additional stamp must be added for longer messages and for each
attachment. Videos require several stamps. For inexplicable reasons, outbound stamps can cost more
than inbound stamps. 104 The cost of stamps can also fluctuate, often around holidays. 105 And like
other prepaid telecom services, there are also often fees for purchasing stamps that add to the overall
cost of electronic messaging. When added together, these costs can quickly surpass the cost one
would bear to send the same content through U.S. postal mail, let alone email, which is free.
Cost of a Typed, Two-page Letter with
Two Attached Photos 106
Real world e-mail

$0.00

U.S. postal mail

$0.50

Electronic message to New York prison

$1.20

And unlike email, electronic messages are not delivered instantaneously. They are surveilled and
reviewed much like regular mail in prisons and jails before they are delivered and can take days to
reach the intended recipient. And it is also not always easy for incarcerated people to access their
emails. While some facilities have individual tablets that incarcerated people can use to access their
emails — generally at an additional one-time or subscription cost — in many facilities, incarcerated
people must access their emails on communal kiosks, which are often busy and have limited privacy.

■

Tablets

In an increasing number of systems across the country, incarcerated people are being allowed to
purchase tablets, which resemble knockoff iPads with basic software that cannot access the internet,
through which people can purchase communication, education, and entertainment products and
services. 107 Despite their poor quality, these tablets can cost north of $140, an enormous amount of
money for many incarcerated people often earning pennies per hour. 108
Telecom providers claim that tablets offer ready communication access, educational opportunities,
and solutions to idleness, bringing incarcerated people closer to their families and making institutions
safer. 109 And while modern technology is welcome in facilities generally devoid of it, these claims
ignore the unprecedented exploitation that these devices facilitate.
To push back on this narrative, correctional telecom providers now offer free tablets in many
jurisdictions, but this is not just an empty gesture, it is actually a doubly exploitive ploy. In negotiating
free tablet contracts, providers are often successful in convincing correctional administrators that to
recoup the cost of the tablets, the products and services sold on them — books, music, movies,
Telecom

56

electronic messages, and calls — must be priced higher. In other words, these contracts trade in a onetime fixed cost for higher rates into perpetuity, which cost incarcerated people and their loved ones
much more in the long run. Since 2016, tablet providers like JPay and GTL have executed free tablet
contracts in several states, including Connecticut, Indiana, Missouri, and New York. 110
The cost of correctional tablet products and services defy comprehension, and as is commonplace in
correctional telecom, correctional administrators often get kickbacks from tablet purchases. 111 A single
song on a JPay tablet can cost up to $2.50 and an album as much as $46 112 — compare that to the price
of a monthly Apple Music subscription, which costs $15 and allows up to six users to stream roughly 60
million songs. 113 And incarcerated people routinely lose their purchases when correctional
administrators switch providers. In Florida, for example, incarcerated users lost $11.3 million in music
purchases after administrators switched contractors in 2018. 114
Perhaps the most egregious tablet scam was exposed in 2019 when GTL was found charging
incarcerated people to read books available for free online. 115 Worse yet, GTL was charging readers
by the minute. 116 The $0.03 per minute rate would make reading too expensive for the average
person, nevertheless, people who typically earn little more than pennies for a full hour’s work and who
are statistically more likely to have literacy limitations or a learning disorders. 117

■

Surveillance

Correctional communication has long been monitored, but correctional telecom corporations now
lean heavily on new surveillance technology to advertise their products, raising critical concerns for not
just incarcerated people, but also the loved ones they are in communication with.
Correctional telecom providers record and store every conversation completed through their systems,
and even listen in live at times. They willingly share these recordings with law enforcement and
prosecutors. And while privileged communication with attorneys is supposed to be excluded, they
have illegally recorded and shared these calls too. In fact, Securus settled a lawsuit in 2016 for
recording 57,000 privileged calls between incarcerated people and their attorneys,118 and has faced
several similar lawsuits since.
The providers are now layering new surveillance technologies onto their communications services. For
instance, Securus has introduced voice print analysis tools — which were originally developed for the
U.S. Department of Defense to identify terroristic threats — to identify and track the voices of not just
incarcerated people, but also those who they call on the outside. 119 The corporation has already
documented more than 200,000 incarcerated people’s voice prints, raising deep concerns about how
their voice databases would be used if sold to law enforcement agencies. 120 Notably, in some systems,
incarcerated people can be denied phone access if they refuse to give the corporation a voice print.
Securus, and other corporations like it, then use
proprietary programs 122 to recognize specific
trigger words, often boasting about the ability to
decipher various accents or dialects. 123 Some
even claim they have trained their systems to
“speak inmate,” 124 presenting serious concerns
about the biases of those training the machines.

Telecom

We’ve taught the system how
to speak inmate.
James Sexton, executive at
LEO Technologies 121

57

And it is not just law enforcement who has been given access to private communication between
incarcerated people and their support networks,
it is also the public. Over the last few years, there
have been several major data breaches leaking
Learn More
recorded calls to the public. 125 In 2015, hackers
concerned about the constitutional rights of
 Prisoners Are Going Viral on TikTok,
incarcerated people leaked 70 million calls from
Vice News (2020)
Securus’ servers, revealing 14,000 recorded
 State of Phone Justice: Local Jails,
privileged attorney calls. 126 A lawsuit was
State Prisons and Private Phone
Providers, Prison Policy Initiative
brought, and the corporation quietly settled in
127
(2019)
2020, never revealing how many cases were

Tech Company Gave Two New
negatively impacted by the recording of those
Orleans-Area Sheriff’s Offices Access
calls.
to Track Cell Phones Without
Warrants, The Appeal (2019)

The correctional telecom industry exploits the
fundamental need for human connection.
Corporations in the market force families to
make impossible choices, such as paying for rent
or paying for a child to speak to an incarcerated
parent. And the situation was made materially
worse by the COVID-19 pandemic and ensuing
economic crisis. Families have been barred from
visiting incarcerated loved ones, at a time when
connection is more necessary and resources
lower than ever.
New technologies, like video conferencing and
electronic monitoring, have the potential to
connect incarcerated people and their loved
ones, but, in the hands of prison telecom
corporations, have been transformed into yet
another tool to extract resources from
communities. Behind this exploitation are some
of the nation’s most prominent private equity
firms, passively building wealth off of
overpoliced communities.



With Captive Customers, Utah Jails
Charge Vastly Different Rates for
Phone Calls from Loved Ones. They
Can Be More than $10 for 15 Minutes,
Salt Lake Tribune (2019)



Can Screen Time Replace the Warmth
of a Hug? Prisons Make a Big Push on
Devices, Fast Company (2018)



“Free” Tablets are Costing Prison
Inmates a Fortune, Mother Jones
(2018)



Captive Audience: How Companies
Make Millions Charging Prisoners to
Send an Email, WIRED (2018)



When Prisoners Are a ‘Revenue
Opportunity’, The Atlantic (2017)



The End of American Prison Visits:
Jails End Face-to-Face Contact – And
Families Suffer, The Guardian (2017)



'Video Visitation' is Ending In-Person
Prison Visits – and Prisons are Going to
Make a Ton of Money, Business Insider
(2016)



You’ve Got Mail: The Promise of Cyber
Communication in Prisons and the
Need for Regulation, Prison Policy
Initiative (2016)

 The High Cost of Calling the
However, the tide is turning against this
Imprisoned, The New York Times
predatory industry. After years of advocacy,
(2015)
cities and states across the country are looking
 Criminal Charges, The Verge (2015)
for change and are increasingly beginning to
 Screening Out Family Time: The Forconsider legislation to make prison and jail
Profit Video Visitation Industry in
communication free. These efforts have pushed
Prisons and Jails, Prison Policy
Initiative (2015)
this exploitation out into the public’s view and
dragged down the value of the entire industry.
Although the movement is still in its early days,
a growing group of prison phone justice
advocates are in a promising fight to connect families and end this exploitative industry for good.
Telecom

58

FINANCIAL
SERVICES

“

Numi’s model is based on ‘turnover.’ We market to the 3,300
jails in the country. When you go to the state or federal prisons,
you’re in there for a while. They don’t do us any good.

Richard E. Deloney Jr., Vice President of Business Development at Numi 1

The federal prison system was the first to
establish trust accounts for incarcerated people
in 1930. Upon doing so, administrators banned
families from bringing food and essential
products into facilities, forcing them to send
money to support their loved ones behind bars
instead. 2 The change also allowed correctional
administrators to easily garnish accounts and
collect abusive fines and fees. Historically, money
transfers to incarcerated people were processed
in-person, often during visits, or by mail, using
cash, checks, or money orders. And in many
facilities, money transfers are still processed in this way.

Description: Correctional agencies
contract with financial services
corporations to provide money transfer
services and debit release cards to
incarcerated people. Probation and
parole agencies also contract with these
corporations to process supervision and
other court-imposed fees.

However, the invention and expansion of the internet in the 1990s revolutionized electronic payments,
which date back to the 1870s, by enabling online payment processing. 3 But as with all technology, it
would be at least another decade before such modern payment processing services became available
in the correctional market. 4 And when they did, they would also carry steep price tags.
The federal prison system was the first to adopt these new financial innovations. In 1998, the federal
prison system contracted with J.P. Morgan Chase for the issuance of debit release cards — used to
disburse trust account balances to people upon release. A few years later, in 2000, it contracted with
Bank of America for the management of trust accounts for incarcerated people during their
incarceration, which, in turn, subcontracted money transfer services largely to Western Union and
Money Gram. Both exclusive, no-bid contracts were awarded by the U.S. Treasury under the National
Bank Act of 1864, which was passed to create the national banking system that helped fund the Civil
War when state banks were funding the confederate army.5 Today, the Act is used to dole out lucrative
government contracts to preferred banks without competitive bidding. 6

Financial Services

59

In 2002, tech entrepreneurs created JPay and introduced electronic money transfers to the broader
correctional landscape. But adoption was slow until corporate executives offered to pay correctional
administrators kickbacks on the fees they charged, 7 which further drove up the cost of the new online
service. Soon, many facilities, raced to replace free money transfer options with this costly service. By
2014, 400,000 incarcerated people were already in facilities that no longer had a free money transfer
option. 8
Throughout the 2000s, competitors emerged with their own money transfer services. And over the
years, JPay and these new players grew their financial services by introducing their own debit release
cards and expanding into the probation and parole space where they manage the electronic payment
of community supervision and other court-imposed fees.

■

How Much Money is at Stake?

The families and support networks of incarcerated people transfer an estimated $1.8 billion into
prisons and jails to support their loved ones every year. In 2015, the correctional money transfer
market was estimated to be worth $172 million — with the federal prison system contract worth $15
million, state prison contracts worth $99 million, and county jail contracts worth $58 million. 9 And while
reductions in the prison population in recent years suggest that the market opportunity has contracted
by 11 percent to $153 million, 10 there is still significant growth expected for the private sector,
particularly at the county level. In 2015, JPay, the largest player in the field, had 71 percent of the state
market, but less than 15 percent of the county market, 11 an area of focus for the market’s leading
player.
Unfortunately, little is known about the size of debit release card market. However, with about 615,000
people released from federal and state prisons and roughly 10 million people churned through county
jails each year, the market opportunity for debit release cards appears even larger than it is for money
transfers. 12 In 2014, a survey revealed that at least 17 out of 33 states had implemented debit release
cards and that nine of those had adopted the new financial tool in the last three years, suggesting that
uptake is rapidly increasing. 13
The payment processing market for probation and parole supervision and other fees was estimated to
be worth $298 million in 2015. 14 Declines in the number of people on probation and parole suggest
that the market opportunity is closer to $264 million today. 15 Nevertheless, the sheer volume of people
subjected to probation and parole supervision — 4.4 million as of 2018 — makes the probation and
parole payment market not just newer but also larger than that of money transfers. 16 And the market
may expand as some reformers argue for probation and parole as an “alternative to incarceration” — an
argument now used by corporations in the space.

■

What Corporations Are Involved?

Given the newness of privatized financial services in corrections, a small number of corporations
occupy the market — most entered in the early 2000s. Of the biggest players today, J.P. Morgan Chase
entered the market first in 1998, followed by Bank of America in 2000, JPay in 2002, TouchPay in 2003,
and Access Corrections in 2007. 17

Financial Services

60

JPay is undoubtedly the largest player in the correctional financial services sector of the prison industry
with a virtual monopoly over the market. 18 In 2014, JPay had 71 percent of the market share across
state agencies and 46 percent across all federal, state, and county agencies, 19 serving more than 1.7
million incarcerated people in 32 states, 40 percent of which had no alternative option. 20 That year,
JPay transferred more than $525 million in 7.5 million transactions, generating $53.9 million in
revenues for its financial services business segment. 21 By 2018, JPay’s financial services business was
generating $143.7 million annually — up 166 percent in just four years — with contracts in 35 states. 22
JPay only recently began serving the federal prison system, a relationship it sought for years and is
dependent on a subcontract with Bank of America, which has held the federal contract since 2000. For
years, Bank of America limited money transfers to Western Union. But as its contract grew in scope
over two decades, it has increasingly subcontracted with new vendors, many of which would not
otherwise qualify for federal contracts with the U.S. Treasury. Because it is these subcontractors that
typically interface with consumers, Bank of America’s role in the prison industry is often hidden from
public view, though this contracting structure exacerbates profiteering. 23
J.P. Morgan Chase is the exclusive provider of debit release cards for the federal prison system. JPay
and Access Corrections are common providers of debit release cards to state agencies. And Numi
Financial and Rapid Financial Systems are smaller vendors that often serve local jails.
Importantly, the financial services sector is quickly merging with the correctional telecom and
commissary sectors. In 2015, the two largest correctional financial services corporations were acquired
by the two largest correctional telecom corporations — Securus acquired JPay and Global Tel*Link
(GTL) acquired TouchPay. And Access Corrections is merely a product brand of the Keefe Group, the
largest correctional commissary corporation and parent company of the third largest prison telecom
corporation, ICSolutions. 24

■ Money Transfers
Given the limited earning opportunities offered
by prisons and jails, incarcerated people often
depend on money sent to them by loved ones
on the outside to pay for food, hygiene items,
medical copays, phone calls, and other
necessities not provided by correctional
facilities. Paying for these basic needs places a
strain on both incarcerated people and their
loved ones, and often their relationship, which is
only further exacerbated by the additional fees
charged by financial services corporations to
merely transfer funds.

$1.8 billion

Money transferred to incarcerated
people annually 25

$153 million

Correctional money transfer market
potential 26

45%
As with other service contracts in telecom or
Max money transfer fee 27
commissary, although incarcerated people and
their families pay these fees, correctional
administrators are generally responsible for the
contracts that set them. And with just a few
corporations holding the lion share of the market, bidding for these correctional contracts is rarely
Financial Services

61

competitive, allowing market players to set predatory rates in an often monopolistic environment and
rake in millions preying on families. 28

George T. Wilkerson (b. 1981), Central Prison, NC
“There’s a better way! Go online or call, use the
credit/debit option, and it’ll be deposited in
moments! Can your loved one really afford to wait
on a money order? He only has 7 cents left! Think of
all the things he can’t buy… Think how hungry he’ll
be.”

Similar again to telecom and commissary,
procurement in this market is often centered
around generating revenue for governments.
The industry was built on a profit-sharing model
between financial services corporations and
correctional agencies — the cost of which is
layered onto money transfer fees and billed to
families. 29 After years of corporate grooming,
some agencies now explicitly award contracts to
the bidder offering the highest kickback
percentage. 30 As a result, not only are contracts
often awarded to the most expensive service
provider, but correctional administrators are
also incentivized to limit cheaper or free
alternatives from which they do not profit.

Even in the jurisdictions where there are still free
options, these corporations use deceitful tactics
to get people to use their costly services instead.
For example, some states that contract with JPay nevertheless require that people still be permitted to
mail-in a check or money order at no cost. But to make things difficult, JPay then requires a money
despite slip accompany every deposit. Not only does the corporation make it impossible to find, when
asked, the corporation offers to mail the slip out to consumers in an effort to delay these free deposits.

And the money deposit slip itself is laden with shameless plugs for JPay’s online system: “Did you
know money orders/checks can take days to mail and process? There’s a more convenient way.” 31
These calls are paired with misleading statements that read “sign up for free,” when, in fact, after
creating an account, their online services are everything but free. 32 The corporation also routinely
rejects forms that it claims are completed incorrectly – only to process them without incident upon
receiving the same forms, unaltered, a second time. In the most egregious cases, JPay outright lies to
consumers about not being able to accept checks or money orders in states that require they do. 33
But even if everything goes right, JPay has a policy of holding checks for ten days before depositing
them. 34 All told, incarcerated people dependent on JPay can now wait as long as a month for funds
deposited by free options that previously took just a few days, and all this maneuvering helps JPay
force more consumers onto their expensive online platform. 35 In fact, a former marketing director for
JPay bragged that he shifted 78 percent of consumers using money orders to online deposits,
increasing annual revenue by $985,000. 36

■

Debit Release Cards

When a person is released from prison or jail, the predation of the financial services sector does not
stop. Prior to the privatization of financial services, incarcerated people who still had money in their
trust accounts at the time of their release would receive it in full, and at no cost, by cash or check. This
might be money they came in with or money they earned through work or that was deposited by loved
ones while they were incarcerated.
Financial Services

62

However, today, many prisons and jails entrust
financial services corporations with distributing
these funds, more commonly referred to as
“gate money,” 40 using debit cards that are
issued upon release. Not only do these
corporations ignore the challenges of being
restricted to a debit card for money in the
moments after release, such as paying for a taxi
or bus in certain communities where cashless
systems may not be prevalent, but they also
rarely disclose the countless fees associated with
the use, and mere possession, of the card.

$3.50

Max weekly debit release card
maintenance fee 37

$30

Max account closing fee for a debit
release card 38

These corporations charge exorbitant fees to
17
access one’s own money. People forced to use
States issuing debit release cards 39
debit release cards issued by Numi Financial, a
leading player in county jails, may be charged a
$2.95 fee per purchase, a $0.95 fee for declined
transactions, and a weekly service fee of $2.50. 41 Across various vendors, balance inquiry fees can
range from $0.50 at an ATM to $3.95 by phone. 42 Even closing an account comes at a cost — Access
Corrections charges $30 to cash out and close an account. 43
Interestingly, this is one of the few business models in the prison industry that distinctly profits off of
the act of releasing a person from prison or jail. These corporations are dependent on the churn of
people through prisons and jails, and thus they are interested in high arrest and admission rates,
shorter stays, and clear pathways back into the system. Consequently, their business model profits
most off low-level, repeat offenses like drug possession.

■ Jesse’s Story
I spent six years in federal prison, earning $0.40 an hour as an art
instructor. As an artist, it was the best job I could have, but I didn’t make
enough to cover my basic needs in prison. I was fortunate to have friends
and family who put money on my commissary account.
As my release got closer, I focused on saving money so that I could
survive when I came home. I worked as much as I could and limited my
trips to commissary. The day I was released, I had approximately $140 in
my account — not enough to get myself back on my feet, but it was
Jesse Krimes
something. To my suprise, my funds were put onto a prepaid debit card. I
New York
didn’t get a dollar in cash, which made my first few hours out difficult, and
the card had my prison photo on it — an immediate flag for anyone who
saw it that I had just left prison.
But the worst part was that the card issuer, J.P. Morgan Chase, was charging exorbitant fees on these
debit cards, which were designed specifically for people leaving prison. There were transaction fees

Financial Services

63

for everything, including a $10 fee for an ATM withdrawal. There was no way to avoid the fees; Chase
even charged an inactivity fee for not using the card.
I worked hard for every penny on that card. And now that I was free, Chase was taking a significant
portion of it. I saved all of my documents and receipts and was lucky enough to have a friend who
referred me to a lawyer. Without that support, I might never have challenged a system that's meant to
take advantage of already vulnerable people. Eventually, we filed a class action lawsuit against Chase
for charging formerly incarcerated people exorbitant fees on prepaid debit release cards. The case
was so strong, the bank settled in a matter of months. Chase was required to return nearly half a
million dollars to the thousands of formerly incarcerated people it stole from.
Today, I am a fulltime artist whose work has been featured in major institutions, including the
Philadelphia Museum of Art and MoMA PS1. I am also the cofounder of Right of Return, the first
national fellowship dedicated to supporting formerly incarcerated artists.

■

Probation + Parole Payments

Correctional supervision can take many forms.
Some people are placed on pretrial supervision
while awaiting trial. Others are sentenced to
probation supervision in lieu of incarceration.
And people released from prison or jail, often
serve time on parole, a period of supervision
after incarceration. Many states and counties
now charge people for their supervision,
claiming that the fees paid help offset the
operating costs of supervision as well as police,
prosecution, public defense, courts, and jails. 46

With so many towns economically
strapped, there is growing pressure
on the courts to bring in money
rather than mete out justice… Those
arrested are not told about the right
to counsel or asked whether they are
indigent or offered an alternative to
fines and jail. There are real
constitutional issues at stake.
Lisa Borden, attorney in
Birmingham, AL 47

Financial Services

$264 million

Supervision payment processing market
potential 44

1.1 million +

People on probation and parole making
payments through JPay 45

People subject to supervision are often required
to pay these periodic fees through a for-profit
payment processor that layers on yet another
fee. For those who cannot afford it, missing a
payment can lead to a technical violation of their
supervision conditions and jail time in some
states, feeding what many regard as modernday debtors’ prisons. 48 Familiar entities like
JPay, TouchPay, and Access Corrections
dominate the parole and probation payment
processing business. For example, in New York,
people on parole must pay $30 for their
supervision every month. The state has an
exclusive contract with JPay, which tacks on an
additional $1.99 for online payment and $2.99
for payment by phone. 49 These costs undermine
reentry efforts for those on parole working to
64

find employment and housing, especially since 45 percent already leave the state’s prison system with
court debt. And while the state does not consider non-payment a violation of parole, non-payment can
be considered in the decision to terminate or continue parole. 50 With 16,000 people on parole, the
New York rakes in as much as $6 million annually on parole supervision fees and JPay an estimated
$384,000. 51

■

Limited Recourse

The high fees charged for financial services in prisons and jails have been the subject of lawsuits and
consumer complaints for years. 52 The vast majority of these cases are brought under state consumer
protection laws. A small number have been successful, and many of these are forced into arbitration.
In one case, people formerly incarcerated in the federal prison system brought a class-action lawsuit
against J.P. Morgan Chase regarding fees on its debit release cards, which settled for more than
$400,000 in damages. 53
Advocates have also called for the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFBP) and state consumer
protection agencies to step in and meaningfully regulate financial services, particularly debit release
cards. 54 And while the CFPB has investigated some corporate practices in the space, 55 the continued
lack of regulation has empowered corporations to brazenly charge high fees that bear little relation to
the actual costs of the services provided. 56 In the
absence of regulation, others have simply
sought to renegotiate rates.
Advocates in New York, including those directly
impacted by correctional financial services,
pushed the state’s corrections department to
renegotiate money transfer rates with JPay,
resulting in a drop of as much as 41 percent. 57
Unfortunately, these wins are limited. More must
be done to systemically cure or prevent the
harm caused by these predatory financial
services corporations.

Financial services corporations showed up in the
correctional landscape without an invitation and
paid administrators off to take over a free
service. Now, their reach is growing faster than
ever, and faster than many of the other sectors in
the prison industry. Without a legislative,
regulatory, or litigative intervention, their
predatory services will become as ubiquitous as
that of the correctional telecommunications and
commissary corporations that have bought them
up.

Financial Services

Learn More


How Private Equity is Turning Public
Prisons into Big Profits, The Nation
(2019)



Lawsuit Reveals How Tech Companies
Profit Off the Prison-industrial Complex,
ThinkProgress (2018)



How States Can Take a Stand Against
Prison Banking Profiteers, George
Washington Law Review (2017)



The Multi-Million Dollar Market of
Sending Money to an Incarcerated
Loved One, Prison Policy Initiative
(2017)



The Financial Firm that Cornered the
Market on Jails, The Nation (2016)



How Private Bankers Cash in on
Released Prisoners, Vox (2015)



CFPB Comment: Curb Exploitation of
People Released from Custody, Prison
Policy Initiative (2015)



Profiting from Prisoners (series), The
Center for Public Integrity (2014, 2015)

65

FOOD +
COMMISSARY

“

[Aramark’s foodservice] was a human atrocity against the
inmates, in my opinion. The rotten garbage that was being
served, plus the way they were allowing it to be prepared.
Ronald Taylor, retired Michigan corrections officer 1

Prison and jail administrators have long
weaponized food — or the lack thereof — to inflict
additional punishment on incarcerated people. 5
The U.S. Supreme Court responded to the most
egregious of these practices in 1978 when it
ruled in Hutto v. Finney that serving incarcerated
people calorie-deficient and otherwise unhealthy
diets for a prolonged period of time constituted
a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s
protection against cruel and unusual
punishment. 6 This meant that administrators
could no longer force people behind bars to
subsist on bread, water, and gruel. Challenged
with improving food while facing rapid
population growth in the late 20th century,
administrators turned to the private sector that
promised quality foodservice at lower costs.

Since, corporations have maintained a regular
presence in the correctional food market and
include manufacturers and distributors of raw
and prepackaged ingredients as well as
foodservice managers responsible for the
preparation and serving of meals. As a former
Arizona foodservice supervisor explained,
“Though the inmates do most of the work, and
the corrections officers are there to maintain
order, it is civilian contractors who are often
responsible for every aspect of the meal
preparation: inmate training, adherence to
Food + Commissary

Description: Correctional agencies
purchase raw ingredients and
commissary products from private
manufacturers and suppliers and
outsource various types of food services
to foodservice corporations, namely the
preparation and service of kitchen food,
operation of commissary stores, sale of
care packages, and management of
visit room vending machines.

$4.1 billion

Correctional foodservice market size 2

$2.30
National average daily spending on food
per person in prison 3

6.4 x

Increased likelihood of food poisoning
in prison or jail 4

66

recipes, ensuring food safety standards are met, theft prevention, portion control, and general quality
of service.” 7 But rather than improving nutritional value and quality, privatization exacerbated the
carceral food problem. In Michigan, for example, privatized foodservice in state prisons has “been the
source of almost continuous scandal, embarrassment, and administrative difficulty.” 8 Yet, few of the
endless lawsuits regarding food in prisons and jails since Hutto have been successful.
Failures in foodservice have forced incarcerated
people to depend on commissary, or on-site
convenience stores first introduced in federal
prisons in 1930, 12 and care packages sent by
loved ones for food as well as hygiene and
clothing essentials — all of which are insufficiently
provided by correctional facilities. But the very
corporations that commit these foodservice
atrocities are often also entrusted with operating
commissaries and care package programs,
which means that providing substandard
foodservice is rewarded with increased revenue
in commissary and care package sales. 13 But the
food sold in commissary and care packages also
fails to meet the nutritional needs of
incarcerated people.

$1.6 billion

Annual commissary sales 9

17

States with privatized commissary
operations 10

$947

Average annual commissary spending
per person 11

In fact, the one place where incarcerated people
will, at times, find nutritional reprieve is in the vending machines of visit rooms. Understanding the
power of a shared meal, corporations sign exclusive contracts to stock visit room vending machines
with expensive ready-made food — a cost that the occasion of a visit might warrant.

■

How Much Money is at Stake?

The correctional foodservice industry, made up of just a handful of players, is estimated to rake in $4.1
billion each year. 14 Larger prison systems can serve as many as three million meals per week and pay
between 56 cents and three dollars per meal. 15 The largest provider, Aramark, serves 380 million
meals and brings in $1.6 billion in revenues from prison and jail food annually. 16
The commissary market that incarcerated people rely on to supplement prison and jail food, basic
hygiene, and clothing necessities was estimated to bring in $1.6 billion in 2016, but recent data
suggests a more accurate estimate could run far higher. 17 A survey of commissary sales in three state
prison agencies revealed that incarcerated people spend an average of $947 annually on commissary,
73 percent of which is spent on food. 18 And while less than half of prison commissaries are outsourced
to corporations, that figure is up 28 percent in just the past year. 19 In jails, outsourcing commissary
operations to corporations is more common. 20 Importantly, commissary operators also make money
charging families hefty deposit fees to transfer money into their loved ones commissary accounts. 21
Unfortunately, there is no aggregated data about the care package and vending machine markets
specifically in correctional settings.

Food + Commissary

67

■

What Corporations Are Involved?

The carceral food industry is dominated by
Market Share 22
Aramark, which pioneered the space in the 1978,
Sodexo, one of the world’s largest foodservice
Aramark: 38%
providers, and Trinity Services Group, which
23
Other:
entered in 1990. Today, Aramark operates in
56%
more than 600 correctional facilities 24 and serves
over a million meals each day 25 to bring in $1.6
billion annually on its correctional business 26 – or
Sodexo: 9%
roughly 12 percent of its total revenues. Sodexo
Trinity Services Group: 6%
takes in $360 million annually on its U.S.
27
correctional foodservice business. And Trinity
Services Group contracts with over 400 correctional facilities in 43 states to make $252 million annually
on its foodservice business, 28 which is almost 40 percent of its total $660 million in revenues. 29 Other
major prison foodservice providers include subsidiaries of Compass Group and The Elior Group. 30
The commissary market is similarly dominated by just a few familiar corporations: Aramark, Keefe
Group, Trinity Services Group, and Union Supply. 31 Keefe Group, the market’s largest player, entered
the business in 1975, 32 Trinity Services Group’s commissary business also dates back to the 1970s
through its subsidiary Swanson Services, 33 Union Supply emerged in 1991, 34 and Aramark launched its
commissary brand iCare in 2006. 35 Today, Keefe Group serves 650,000 incarcerated people in 14
states 36 and brings in more than $1 billion in revenues a year across all its business lines. 37 Most
commissary vendors also have a care package brand. 38
Notably, Trinity Services Group and Keefe Group joined forces in 2016 when they were merged under
TKC by its private equity owner HIG Capital, which also owns correctional healthcare and telecom
corporations. 39 Beyond its commissary and care package services, Keefe Group also has a subsidiary
that provides correctional telecom services (ICSolutions) and brand that provides correctional financial
services (Access Corrections). 40 Altogether, TKC is estimated to bring in $1.5 billion in sales, the
majority of which is derived from the carceral market. 41
The vending machine market is far smaller and served by smaller, and often local, vendors. These
include corporations like Microtronic US, Three Square Market, 365 Retail Markets, Canteen Vending,
Avanti Markets, and Fresh Healthy Vending. 42

I got meal costs down to $0.40 a day
per inmate. It costs $1.15 a day to
feed the department’s dogs.
Now, I’m cutting prisoners’ calories
from 3,000 to 2,500 a day.
Joe Arpaio, former Maricopa County,
Arizona Sheriff 43

Food + Commissary

■

Foodservice

Correctional administrators outsource
foodservice to corporations to reduce facility
operating costs with detrimental
consequences. 44 Few laws regulate foodservice
in correctional facilities, so contractors set their
own standards for quality and safety. 45
Considering little more than caloric
requirements, they pad their bottom lines by
employing incarcerated people at pennies an
hour to serve small portions of food that lack
68

nutritional content. 46 They often use inexpensive and unhealthy fillers or substitutes like margarine and
soy to increase caloric intake, leaving people hungry, exacerbating chronic health conditions like
diabetes, hypertension, and heart disease, and creating new health risks. 47
Still worse, in efforts to avoid waste costs,
these corporations ration food dangerously.
They serve food that is old or contaminated or
serve inadequate portions, if they do not run out
altogether. In 2014, an investigation at the
Gordon County Jail in Georgia, which had
contracted with Trinity Services Group, revealed
that incarcerated people were eating
toothpaste, toilet paper, and syrup packets out
of hunger. 49 Sadly, the human rights violations
committed by correctional foodservice providers
are endless.
Michigan’s experiment with private foodservice
vendors is perhaps the most notorious. In 2014,
leaked emails revealed that an Aramark
employee retrieved and re-served food that had
been thrown in the trash in a Michigan prison. 50

I watched a prisoner pull a rock out of
his mouth… Wasn’t 2 feet over from me
where I scan my IDs, and he’s like…,
‘What in the…?’ And he reaches into his
mouth and pulls a rock out bigger than
a pea… drops it on the table. Tink, tink,
tink. I was like, ‘What is that?’ And he
says, ‘It’s a rock.’

Their supervisor will give them a recipe
to serve 900 prisoners. Our institution
holds 1,100 normally, and depending
on which meal it is, they will add water
to all of their stuff to make their
products stretch.

When Aramark was the food service
vendor in Florida, it often shorted
meals with small portions and
missing ingredients. On one
occasion when I was assigned as a
kitchen worker, an Aramark
employee berated me for draining
water off the vegetables after they
were cooked. ‘Water is part of the
serving,’ the employee said.
David M. Reutter, incarcerated
foodservice worker and journalist
for Prison Legal News 48

On some days if they don’t run out, there
will be other problems with the food.
Raw, undercooked, sometimes burnt,
sometimes it’s soupy. If they don’t run
out, they screw it up somehow.

I’ve seen a bug that big in them collard
greens, like I couldn’t even handle it. A
perfect big ol’ bug right on the collard
greens… A well-cooked bug.

We had spaghetti one day, and one of
the officers came over and he was
eating, and he pulled a mop string out.

Various anonymous Michigan corrections officers 51

The following year, the state’s correctional administrators terminated a three-year contract with
Aramark early after a slew of controversies and contracted with Trinity Services Group instead. 52 But in
Food + Commissary

69

the first 15-months of the new contract, the state fined Trinity Services Group over $2 million for
various violations, including unauthorized meal substitutions, delays in serving meals, and sanitation
violations. 53 After two failed experiments with private foodservice providers, then-Governor Rick
Snyder announced in 2018 that the state would move back to running its own prison foodservice. 54
Michigan’s decision to bring foodservice back in-house was a rare one. Despite the abundance of
these stories and, in many cases, the agreement among incarcerated people and corrections officials
about the shortcomings of private foodservice, many prison and jail administrators continue to
outsource foodservice to corporations that put profit over people to deprive them of something as
simple as food.
In 2013, for example, Aramark was awarded a two-year $110 million contract to provide foodservice
across Ohio’s prisons. 55 Less than a year later, there were numerous reports of service failures,
including 65 instances when it failed to serve food or ran out of it and five instances when it served
food with maggots. 56 Though the state took the rare step of penalizing the corporation, Aramark took
the $272,300 in fines in stride and won next contract with the state in 2015, despite a cheaper
competing bid from a public union.57
Unsurprisingly these efforts to cut food costs have had a really damaging impact on the lives of
incarcerated people. In fact, incarcerated people are 6.4 times more likely to suffer from a food-related
illness than people in the general public according to the Center for Disease Control and Prevention. 58
Between 1998 and 2014, correctional facilities reported 200 foodborne outbreaks and 20,625
illnesses, 204 hospitalizations, and five deaths resulting from food sickness. 59
Sample Jail Food Costs
El Paso County Jail,
CO 60

Hall County Jail,
GA 61

Lake County Jail,
IN 62

Aramark

Trinity Food Service

Summit Food Services
(The Elior Group)

Cost per meal

$1.26

$0.99

$1.22

Number of meals served daily

5,220

2,550

2,550

Average daily population

1,740

850

850

Provider

And still, illness is not the only consequence of cost cutting measures — enslavement is yet another.
Commonly referred to as “plantation prisons” given their history as plantations in the ante-bellum
South, many prisons use incarcerated people to work in farming to harvest food for the facility. In 2002,
the most recent year for which data is available, 28 states and the Federal Bureau of Prisons had
incarcerated people working in agriculture. 63 In Georgia, for example, roughly 5,000 incarcerated
people work completely unpaid to produce 41 percent of food required by the state’s prisons. 64
While prison and jail administrators weaponize food to exact nutritional punishment and enslave
incarcerated people, incarcerated people have used their bodies as counter-weapons in political
struggles, practicing what some have termed “gastronomical resistance.” 65
Throughout history, across political movements, people with no weapons have used their bodies to
fight injustice and oppression. 66 Incarcerated people have time and time again effectively used hunger
strikes, one form of gastronomical resistance, to protest prison conditions and labor practices. In 2013,
for example, nearly 30,000 incarcerated people in California participated in a hunger strike that led to
the end of indefinite solitary confinement in state prisons. 67

Food + Commissary

70

■
We live in an environment designed
to deprive the senses. Our world is
almost completely devoid of colors,
pleasant scents, or tender physical
contact. Our senses are starving to
death. In such a bland artificial
existence, even a simple sugar treat
can be mistaken for an exotic
ecstasy.
John Adams, incarcerated essayist
for PEN America 68

Commissary

In prisons and jails, commissaries can offer an
expansive reprieve from the depravity of kitchen
food. Even when egregiously priced, off-brand
products can be innovatively transformed into
pleasurable community meals that serve as
another form of gastronomical resistance. 69 Yet,
commissary food comes with its own problems.
Pre-packaged foods are high in sugar and
sodium, 70 for example, and can cause or
exacerbate chronic health conditions, leaving
incarcerated people to choose between two
types of poison while private corporations
collect the spoils.

Some states and municipalities stock and
operate their own commissaries, usually
charging a markup on the resale of products to
cover operating costs and pad their coffers.
Many others choose to outsource their
commissary operations to private corporations
in exchange for a kickback on sales. While the
latter model is more profitable for commissary
corporations, they benefit from both because
they manufacture and supply many of the
unique products sold in commissaries in either
case. Under both models, operators inflate
product prices while offering substandard
brands to generate more profit. Importantly,
many of the commissary goods incarcerated
people purchase are used to meet basic food,
hygiene, and clothing needs that have not been
met by prison and jail administrators.
More specifically, besides foods, incarcerated
people often purchase simple hygiene products
Kenny Reams (b. 1974), Grady, AR, Capitalization
like shampoo and deodorant in commissary.
These products are often incredibly low in
quality – lotion the consistency of a watered-down gel – and yet priced exorbitantly. And culturespecific hygiene products are even hard to come by or more egregiously priced.
In most cases, it is the families supporting incarcerated loved ones who provide funds
to purchase these items given the insufficiency and subsequent garnishment of prison wages — when
wages are paid at all. A 2018 study of three state prison agencies found that, on average, incarcerated
people spent $947 annually on commissary products, substantially more than the $180 to $660
typically earned by incarcerated people working in these states. 71 And jails offer even fewer paid job
opportunities, meaning families supporting loved ones in pretrial detention, who often cannot afford
to pay bail, are also exploited by commissary schemes.
Food + Commissary

71

■Jasma’s Story
I was a young woman when went to prison. It was the most dehumanizing
experience of my life. Every day, I dealt with the profound racism and
misogyny of the system. Male guards constantly threatened to rape me
and the other women if we didn’t comply with their orders. On other days,
they just maliciously denied us necessary hygiene products. They used
their power to terrorize and degrade us.
I spent my first period in solitary. I was given just two cheap sanitary
napkins a day. The result was humiliating. I bled through my clothes and
Jasma Credle
had no option but to sit in the blood for hours. Back in general
New York
population, we did not get sanitary napkins or tampons at all. We had to
buy them from commissary, which we could only do once every two weeks, or suffer the humiliation of
bloodied bottoms.
And purchasing menstrual hygiene products from commissary was not an easy task. I had to plan
ahead, determining what I needed and, more importantly, what I could afford. Low-quality, generic
brand tampons cost twice as much on the inside — more than $5 for a pack of 18 — while our pay scale
ranged from just 10 to 25 cents an hour. I would work 50 hours just to afford decency during my
period.
Of course, sanitary napkins were not the only thing we needed from commissary. There were other
things like deodorant, shampoo, shower slippers, and even food. We had to buy pre-packaged food
to supplement the inedible, unhealthy, and limited diet served in the mess hall. Again, all at high costs
on low wages.
The truth is that prisons provide little of what you really need to survive — from sustenance to basic
hygiene. Instead, you need to rely on your family for all that. But most families supporting people
behind bars don’t have the money. They can’t afford to give their loved ones doing time the money
needed to buy even a shred of dignity inside.

■ Care Packages
Even commissary falls short of meeting basic human needs, so many correctional agencies have
historically allowed incarcerated people to receive homemade care packages from loved ones,
friends, and organizations. These care packages are subject to strict content guidelines and weight
restrictions that vary from institution to institution and can change without notice.
Increasingly, however, corporations are stepping in and convincing agencies to prohibit homemade
care packages and introduce sterile, privatized care package programs that give families a limited
menu of egregiously priced “pre-approved” products. Prison and jail administrators receive kickbacks
and empty promises about contraband reductions while corporations collect profits hand over fist. In
its bid for the West Virginia contract, for example, Union Supply Group, which runs the care package
program Union Supply Direct, projected that the state would earn about $95,000 per year thanks to a
17 percent commission rate on annual sales. 72

Food + Commissary

72

Privatized care package programs are no more than external-facing commissary stores. In fact, most
care package programs are run by commissary operators. They merely allow families to shop directly
from a comparably terrible menu with a few more brand name items. When these programs are
introduced, families are generally barred from sending fresh fruit and vegetables or filling bags with
cheap items from their local bodega, dollar store, or superstore. Instead, they must pay much more to
the few corporations that control care package program for their loved one’s facility. And families that
may have previously used social benefits to pay for items included in homemade care packages no
longer have that option either, putting care packages even further out of reach for the economically
distressed communities targeted by the criminal legal system. Moreover, ordering packages is not
easy for people without internet access or computer literacy, which is not uncommon.
In 2018, New York piloted a privatized care
package program. Of the six approved vendors
the state selected, only one sold menstrual
hygiene products — at four times the cost at the
local chain retailer. Thankfully, advocates forced
the state to cancel the pilot and prevented it
from taking permanent hold, but other states
have not been as lucky. 74
But limiting the items that incarcerated people
can receive and privatizing care packages is not
just financially exploitive, but also emotionally
deprave. Homemade packages are sent and
received with love, carefully crafted to include
favorite snacks and childhood reminders. Care
packages built in warehouse by strangers cannot
carry the same weight. Privatizing care packages
removes some of the last reminders of the
outside world that bring hope to an otherwise
hopeless place.

■

My support network isn’t very
technologically aware. My mom
doesn’t even own a computer, let
alone know how to place orders. I
won’t even mention what she can’t
afford. Essentially, I was one of the
few major financial contributors for
my family. Now DOCCS is
attempting to institute another
punitive restriction on our families.
John K., incarcerated New Yorker 73

Vending Machines

For incarcerated people, vending machines are limited to visit rooms and typically offer costly readymade items like pizzas and burgers. The small corporations in this market take advantage of their
captive audience: families. Sharing a hot meal can have a significant positive impact on a visit — food
has the power to create memories — and should be encouraged, not exploited.
But depending on the length of one’s visit, food can also be more of a necessity than a luxury. In 2018,
family relationships were strained when Pennsylvania temporarily suspended vending machine access
during prison visits. 75 “If you are elderly or diabetic or have a small child, it is impossible now for you to
visit your loved one,” explained Claire Shubik-Richards, head of the Pennsylvania Prison Society. 76
Families were eager to see vending machines returned to visit rooms despite the hefty cost of
products.

Food + Commissary

73

The exploitation of basic human needs like food
is both an anathema to human rights and the
perfect encapsulation of how the prison industry
functions. Corporations, and sometimes
government agencies, profit by spending as
little as possible to feed those who are in their
care. Worse yet, failures in one service line can,
in fact, drive revenue in another, creating
remarkably dangerous incentives. Legal,
legislative, and regulatory weaknesses allow
corporations to avoid any meaningful or longlasting consequences for their dehumanizing,
reprehensible food practices. The state of prison
and jail food is a crisis within in a crisis.

Food + Commissary

Learn More


Billions Served: Prison Food Regimes,
Nutritional Punishment, and
Gastronomical Resistance, Anthony Ryan
Hatch (2019)



Michigan’s Failed Effort to Privatize
Prison Kitchens and the Future of
Institutional Food, Civil Eats (2018)



In Florida Prisons, Canteens are Big
Money. But Not Everyone Pays the Same
Price., The Florida Times Union (2018)



Prison Food and Commissary Services: A
Recipe for Disaster, Prison Legal News
(2018)



The Company Store: A Deeper Look at
Prison Commissaries, Prison Policy
Initiative (2018)



Maggots with a Side of Dirt? What
Privatization does to Prison Food,
Governing (2018)



Prison Food is Making U.S. Inmates
Disproportionately Sick, The Atlantic
(2017)



The Big Business of Prisoner Care
Packages, The Marshall Project (2017)



Prison Food Politics: The Economics of
an Industry Feeding 2.2 Million, The
Guardian (2017)



Prison Food in America, Erika Camplin
(2017)



Paging Anti-trust Lawyers: Prison
Commissary Giants Prepare to Merge,
Prison Policy Initiative (2016)



What’s in a Prison Meal? The Marshall
Project (2015)

74

HealtHcare

“

...the company’s efforts to reduce costs interfered with my
ability, and with the staff’s ability, to provide appropriate
levels of care to inmates...
Charles Pugh, MD, former Medical Director at Corizon 1

Since the 1700s, people with mental illnesses
have been inhumanely warehoused in one
institution after anothe. 2 There was limited relief
in the late 1800s when psychiatric hospitals were
established to treat rather than torture people
suffering from mental illness. 3 At the peak of their
popularity in 1955, there were 560,000 people in
psychiatric hospitals in the U.S. 4 But the
introduction of antipsychotic medications in 1955
began a deinstitutionalization trend 5 that would
eventually lead to a substantial increase in
people with mental illness behind bars.

Description: Correctional agencies
contract with healthcare corporations to
provide a variety of healthcare services
to incarcerated people, namely medical
and behavioral healthcare, including
mental health and substance abuse
treatment. Correctional healthcare
companies also provide specialized
healthcare services such as diagnostic
testing and screening, ambulatory care,
pharmacy services, and hospice care.

In 1965, Medicaid accelerated
deinstitutionalization by excluding state
psychiatric hospitals and other similar state-run institutions from federal funding. 6 Consequently,
people with serious mental illness were moved to nursing homes or released to community programs
that were supported by federal funding from the Community Mental Health Act passed just two years
earlier. By the late-1970s, there were nearly two million people with mental illness in community health
facilities. 7 But, in 1981, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act substantially cut federal funding to
community-based treatment programs. 8 Without many treatment options left, many people with
mental illness suffered, and they quickly began to repopulate prisons and jails that are unequipped to
manage their needs.
Around the same time, the targeting of Black, Brown, and Indigenous communities by racist policing
and criminal policies caught up with the long-term underinvestment in the health and well-being of the
same communities to exacerbate medical needs inside prisons and jails. Soon, the history of racism in
medicine, mental health, and public health was on full display across the correctional landscape, 9
which was offering little more than first aid at the time. 10

Healthcare

75

But, in 1976, the Supreme Court affirmed the
constitutional right to healthcare for
incarcerated people when it determined that
“deliberate indifference to [the] serious medical
needs of prisoners” constituted a violation of the
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment in Estelle v. Gamble. 16
Correctional administrators quickly turned to
alternative healthcare systems for support,
including university systems, non-profit
hospitals, and the private sector. 17
In 1973, Riker’s Island became the first prison to
outsource healthcare when it contracted with
Montefiore Hospital, a non-profit hospital in the
Bronx. 18 However, it was in 1978 when the first
for-profit corporation, Prison Health Services,
Inc. (PHSi), now known as Corizon Health, came
on the scene. The industry expanded
significantly over the next few decades as the
deinstitutionalization of people with mental
illness continued, particularly in smaller to
midsize counties with tighter budgets and fewer
public options. 19 Today, correctional agencies
provide medical and mental healthcare, along
with a myriad of other health services, to those in
their custody through a matrix of for-profit, nonprofit, and government options.

$12 billion

U.S. prison healthcare spending 11

$4 billion +

Private correctional healthcare
market size 12

28

States with privatized healthcare 13

62%

Local jails with privatized healthcare 14

25

Average work hours required to pay a
medical copay in prison 15

■ How Much Money is at Stake?
The U.S. spends $12 billion annually on
Map of Privatization Delivery Systems 20
correctional healthcare, or roughly 15
percent of all correctional spending. 21 State
correctional agencies increased spending
on healthcare by 41 percent in the 10-year
period between 2001 and 2011, and the
federal prison system increased spending
on healthcare by 24 percent between just
2010 and 2014. 22 This rapid growth over
the past two decades made the market
incredibly attractive to the private sector. By
2005, an estimated 40 percent of
correctional spending was flowing to
correctional healthcare corporations. 23 Today, these corporations make claim to roughly $4 billion of
correctional spending, serving the healthcare needs of 28 states and 62 percent of jails in full or in part,
and those figures continue to expand. 24
•B1¥W<Arff1lndi<•t•
~U.NotAv•i~ble

Healthcare

76

The prison population also has deep healthcare needs that allow corporations to upcharge and make
cuts detrimental. Disproportionately Black, Brown, and Indigenous and often economically distressed,
the 2.1 million people in prisons and jails are more likely to suffer from medical and mental health
ailments even before entering the correctional environment due to the lack of investment in the health
and well-being of these communities. 25 Pre-existing health conditions are then compounded by
unhealthy and traumatic correctional environments to make incarcerated people more likely to suffer
from chronic illness, infectious diseases, substance abuse, and mental health ailments than people in
the general population. 26
More than 50 percent of all those in prison or jail have some mental health need. 27 Approximately 20
percent of the national jail population and 15 percent of the national prison population, or more than
350,000 people have a serious mental illness — ten times as many people as there are psychiatric beds
in hospitals. 28 And an estimated 65 percent of people in prison suffer from alcohols or drug
dependency. 29 Thus, unsurprisingly, corrections is an attractive market for pharmaceutical
corporations that manufacture anti-psychotics and drugs that treat opioid dependency.
All these healthcare concerns are more acute and costly for elderly people in prisons, a population that
has been rapidly growing due to punitive sentencing laws. Between 2000 and 2010, the number of
people behind bars who were 55 years old or older grew by 181 percent while the total prison
population grew by 17 percent over the same period. It costs roughly three times as much to
incarcerate an older person than a younger person due in large part to their healthcare needs. 30
Finally, incarcerated women and transgender people also encounter unique healthcare needs that
raise the cost of care.

■

What Corporations Are Involved?

Founded in 1978, PHSi was the first for-profit correctional healthcare corporation. 31 Correctional
Medical Services, which would later merge with PHSi, was founded in 1979. 32 MHM Services followed
in 1981, 33 California Forensic Medical Group in 1983, 34 and PrimeCare Medical in 1986. 35 NaphCare
came on the scene in 1989. 36 In 1994, Wexford Health Sources emerged. 37 Among more
contemporary corporations, Correct Care Solutions and Armor Correctional Health Services were
founded in 2003 38 and 2004, 39 respectively.
Mergers and acquisitions have begun to consolidate the correctional healthcare market. In 2011, the
two oldest correctional healthcare corporations, PHSi and Correctional Medical Services, merged to
form Corizon Health, 40 the largest player in the market at the time. 41 A couple years later, in 2013,
MHM Services, which historically focused its services on behavioral healthcare, entered into a joint
venture with publicly traded Centene Corporation to create Centurion Health. 42 Centene then
acquired its partner, MHM Services, in 2018. 43
That same year, H.I.G. Capital executed the
largest deal in the market when it purchased
Correct Care Solutions and merged it with
Correctional Medical Group Companies 45 to
create Wellpath, which is now the largest
correctional healthcare company with roughly
$1.5 billion in annual revenues 46 or roughly 30%
of the for-profit correctional healthcare market.
Healthcare

If you’re the only dance in town, you
can pretty much call your own shots.
Bobby F. Kimbrough Jr., sheriff of
Forsyth County, NC, on Wellpath 44

77

Its dominance in the field gives the corporation considerable bargaining power with correctional
agencies that have committed to outsourcing healthcare, a decision that is not always easy to reverse.
On occasion, Wellpath or one of its competitors may be the only provider bidding on a contract,
creating an imbalance of power which deeply impacts quality of care.
Top Market Players
Wellpath 47

Corizon 48

Centurion
Health 49

Wexford
Health 50

NaphCare 51

$1,600M

$1,050M

$585M

$314M

$322M

States

36

17

15

13

37

Facilities

400

220

300

120

N/A

Employees

15,000

7,150

9,000

2,200

2,700

Incarcerated Patients

300,000

180,000

330,000

97,000

80,000

Estimated Annual Revenues

■

MEDICAL CARE

While the U.S. Supreme Court established a constitutional right to healthcare for incarcerated people
in 1976, there have been no consistent or enforced quality-of-care standards, which has mean that
people in prisons and jails continue to receive poor healthcare. In fact, only six state prison systems
formally require and integrate quality monitoring systems in their oversight of healthcare. 52 And
quality is rarely a factor when evaluating the cost of care, which, in 2015, varied from $2,173 in
Louisiana to $19,796 in California on average per person per year. 53
Introducing profit motives into opaque
correctional environments, which are already rife
While it’s true that there’s this rubric
with abuse, critically exacerbates the harm
of using private vendors, it is
incarcerated people suffer as correctional
designed to absolve the sheriffs of
healthcare providers measure the cost of a
responsibility and involvement. It
person’s health and well-being against the cost
does not, however, improve quality.
to their bottom line. Often paid a flat fee, these
corporations are incentivized to cut costs as
Homer Venter, former chief medical
much as possible to pocket the rest. They
officer for the Correctional Health
routinely understaff facilities, hire unqualified
Services in New York City 54
practitioners, ignore preventative care, refuse
pain relief, and even deny life-saving treatments
and hospitalizations. Even well-intentioned
medical professionals working for these
corporations have reported pressure to provide the cheapest possible care even if inadequate to meet
a patient’s medical needs. 55
Predictably, these cost-cutting tactics result in substandard care with dire consequences. For instance,
between 2011 and 2012, Corizon cut the cost of hospitalizations from its predecessor by 53 percent,
increasing its profit margin from 14.6 percent to 24.2 percent by 2013. Over the next few years,
Corizon faced repeated wrongful death suits across the country with a common fact pattern:
healthcare professionals determine a suffering patient needs to go to the hospital, the corporation
Healthcare

78

denies hospitalization to save on costs, and the patient dies shortly after. Whether it was a tight chest, a
hip pain, or insufferable detox, in each case, the treatable condition was relayed to a Corizon medical
practitioner and ignored resulting in death. 56
Corizon is far from the only correctional healthcare provider with such a tragic resume. A recent survey
of the nation’s 523 largest jails revealed that those that outsourced healthcare to corporations had
mortality rates that were 18 to 58 percent higher than those that used a publicly managed medical
service, depending on the corporation. 57 NaphCare and Armor had the highest rates followed by
Corizon and Wellpath. 58 And two-thirds of those who died were awaiting trial. 59
Over the past few decades, correctional healthcare providers have also turned to telemedicine to
mitigate the need for onsite staffing. By 2011, 30 states used telemedicine for at least one medical
subspecialty or diagnostic service. 60 While claiming to offer some small benefits to incarcerated
people, such as faster access to specialty doctors, the major benefit is realized by the providers and
correctional administrators in cost savings. 61 In fact, telemedicine has birthed new market players like
KaZee, which equips correctional institutions with telemedicine capabilities and saved the Texas
Department of Criminal Justice nearly a billion dollars over a decade. 62
Desperate for care, incarcerated people have
brought tens of thousands of medical
malpractice lawsuits over the years against
Corizon is just hiring bodies, trying to
correctional healthcare providers. For example,
get their numbers up… There’s RNs
between 2009 and 2014, Corizon, the nation’s
there that don’t even know how to
largest prison healthcare company at the time,
start an IV. There are nurses that
was sued 1,364 times, or more than once every
can’t operate an oxygen tank. A lot
other day, for providing inadequate care. 64 And
of them have no type of training.
while correctional healthcare providers claim
these lawsuits are often frivolous or
Jose Vallejo, former Corizon nurse 63
unsubstantiated, their seven percent success
rate is only slightly lower than that of medical
malpractice lawsuits in the general public 65
despite the significant disadvantage incarcerated plaintiffs face in court. For example, in one case, a
court rejected the malpractice claim of an incarcerated patient, who received a late diagnosis of
lymphoma after months of pain, because he could not present expert testimony as to whether the care
he received “departed from accepted medical practice.” 66
And these corporate cost-cutting strategies shift real costs onto taxpayers in the short and long term.
In the short term, avoiding preventative healthcare exacerbates both acute and chronic illnesses, often
leading to hospitalizations that carry higher costs. In the long term, releasing people with
compromised health into communities creates a cost burden for public healthcare and social service
agencies. Yet, the biggest cost of this profiteering is measured in human lives: the mortality rate of
formerly incarcerated people is 3.5 times higher than others in the general population. 67

Healthcare

79

■Sheron’s Story
Five years ago, when I was in federal prison, I caught a bacterial infection
and suffered nerve poisoning. I spent three months on life support. When
I regained consciousness, I was paralyzed with severe respiratory issues. I
was moved to a facility in Atlanta, Georgia to complete my recovery and
undergo physical therapy. It took nearly a year to just walk, talk, and eat
again.

Sheron Edwards
Mississippi

Just as I was starting to reclaim my life, I finished my federal prison
sentence and I was extradited to Mississippi to serve a second, 20-year
sentence for the same crime in state prison. I walked into Mississippi’s
notorious Parchman plantation prison in the summer of 2017. I brought
all my prescriptions and treatments, but once they ran out, I quickly
learned I wasn’t getting anymore.

Centurion was the healthcare provider at the state prison. A nurse informed me that the company
wouldn’t provide the prescription medications, breathing treatments, or physical therapy I needed
because they exceeded the prison’s per person budget allocation. Still recovering, I had to do what I
could to heal on my own. I started by doing planks to strengthen my core, then moved on to push-ups
and wall squats.
It was far from easy. One day, I accidentally shattered my ankle because my bones were still brittle
from the paralysis. Once the swelling went down, I had to have a 6-inch rod and screws inserted in my
ankle. After the surgery and my cast was removed, Centurion gave me just one physical therapy
session. Early this year, Centurion was sued for malpractice, and they dropped their contract with the
Mississippi Department of Corrections. But while they may no longer serve our facility, I still feel the
long-term effects of their cheap healthcare, or lack thereof.

Behavioral health

24601 (b. 1995), State Correctional Institution Muncy,
PA

Over half of incarcerated people suffer from
mental illness 69 with 14 percent of those in state
and federal prison and 26 percent of those in
local jails suffering from a serious psychological
disease. 70 In fact, there are roughly ten times as
many people in prison or jail with a serious
psychological disease as there are psychiatric
beds in U.S. 71 Even still, these statistics — based
on self-reported data — underestimate the
prevalence and severity of mental illness among
incarcerated people, especially Black, Brown,
and Indigenous people whose disease is less
often properly diagnosed and treated. 72

“Money falls freely for psychiatric medications for
prisoners. It’s easier and cheaper to drug than to
heal.” 68

Given the high levels of untreated mental illness,
it is unsurprising that substance abuse or

Healthcare

80

addiction are also particularly high in the incarcerated population. More than 1.6 million people are
arrested for drug possession every year. 73 And more than half of the people in state prisons and twothirds of the people in local jails meet the diagnostic criteria for drug dependency or abuse (excluding
alcohol) — again based on self-reported data, meaning the true figures could still be higher. 74 Among
women, the problem is even deeper with 82 percent of women suffering from a serious substance
abuse disorder. 75 A 2013 report revealed that women were twice as likely to die from drug or alcohol
intoxication while incarcerated. 76
Despite the overwhelming prevalence of mental
illness and substance abuse and addiction
Drug and alcohol withdrawal
among incarcerated people, behavioral health
protocols were routinely not
needs may be among those least adequately
followed. We worked three days on
met by correctional healthcare corporations.
and two days off, and many times I
Roughly a million people arrested each year are
recall returning to duty to find a
at risk for untreated drug or alcohol withdrawal
78
patient in full-blown detox.
in jail. This is in part because government
agencies fail to allocate appropriate funding. In
Inga Jones, former Corizon nurse 77
fact, only 14 percent of correctional healthcare
spending is spent on mental health and 5
percent on substance abuse and addiction
treatment. 79 As a result, corporations often
choose quick pharmaceutical options in lieu of the time-intensive work required to treat patients with
these disorders effectively.
In doing so, private healthcare providers help pad the pockets of pharmaceutical corporations that
shamelessly market to the correctional field. For example, Alkermes, the manufacturer of Aristada and
Risperdal, treatments for schizophrenia, and Vivitrol, a treatment for opioid dependency, advertises its
pharmaceuticals in correctional brochures and at correctional conferences. 80 Worse yet, its drugs are
also knowingly used as forcible injections to restore pre-trial competency in a person deemed unfit to
stand trial. 81 Again, the outcomes are devastating. Suicide has been the leading cause of death in
local jails since 2000. 82 Many have suffered dangerous, even fatal, detoxes during their incarceration. 83
And overdoses are the leading cause of death among formerly incarcerated people upon release. 84

■

Medical Co-Pays

Despite the substandard care, incarcerated people are often expected to pay medical co-pays for
physician visits, medications, dental treatment, and other health services. At times paid to the for-profit
healthcare provider and at others to the government agency, co-pays in state prisons typically run
between $2 to $5 and are meant to recoup the cost of care and deter unnecessary doctor visits. 85
However, considering what little money incarcerated people have — either earned at a national
average of 14 cents per hour 86 or sent in by loved ones on the outside — and the other costs of
incarceration, these co-pays put healthcare out of reach for many. For example, an incarcerated
minimum-wage worker in North Carolina would need to work 100 hours to afford the five-dollar co-pay
required for a doctor’s visit. 87 By comparison, an equivalent co-pay for a non-incarcerated minimumwage worker in North Carolina would be $725. 88
Thirty-eight states charge incarcerated people medical co-pays, eight of which do not pay some, if not
all, of their incarcerated workers. 89 For example, until recently, Texas, which does not pay any
Healthcare

81

incarcerated workers, charged people
incarcerated in its state prisons a $100 annual
medical co-pay 90 to the tune of roughly $2
million per year in revenue for the state. 91 Recent
advocacy moved the legislature to drop the
$100 annual fee, though it was unfortunately
replaced with a $13.55 per visit, still the highest
state prison copay in the country. 92
And the costs do not end with co-pays.
Incarcerated people are sometimes expected to
pay for hospitalizations, rendered medical
services, and even basic, over-the-counter
medications, ointments, or treatments. 93 At
times, corporations operating commissaries and
providing healthcare compete to exploit people
while correctional administrators referee. Some
jails have removed basics like Tylenol from their
commissary lists to force incarcerated people to
pay the costly co-pay for a doctor’s visit to get
simple pain relief — a practice that earned the
medication the nickname “the $20 Tylenol” in
one North Carolina jail.

Learn More


Special Report: U.S. Jails are
Outsourcing Medical Care — and the
Death Toll is Rising, Reuters (2020)




The Private Option, The Atlantic (2019)
The Jail Health-Care Crisis, The New
Yorker (2019)



Corizon, the Prison Healthcare Giant,
Stumbles Again, The Appeal (2019)



State Prisons and the Delivery of
Hospital Care, Pew Charitable Trusts
(2018)



Providing Healthcare in the Prison
Environment, HDR (2018)



Prison Health Care: Costs and Quality,
Pew Charitable Trusts (2017)



The Current State of Public and Private
Prison Healthcare, University of
Pennsylvania, Wharton Public Policy
Initiative (2017)



The Steep Cost of Medical Co-pays in
Prison Puts Health at Risk, Prison Policy
Initiative (2017)



Incorrect Care: A Prison Profiteer Turns
Care into Confinement, Grassroots
Leadership (2016)

Regardless of how paltry the care they provide
 Profits vs. Prisoners: How the Largest
is, correctional healthcare corporations make
U.S. Prison Health Care Provider Puts
billions of dollars every year. And each year,
Lives in Danger, Southern Poverty Law
Center (2016)
more correctional administrators consider
 Private Healthcare Providers are
privatizing the provision of healthcare in their
Making Big Bucks Contracting With
facilities. They ignore the decades of lawsuits,
Prisons, Consumerist (2016)
critical independent studies, and desperate
 Punished for Addiction: Women
pleas of incarcerated people for quality care.
Prisoners Dying from Lack of
Meanwhile, incarcerated people, particularly
Treatment, ReWire News (2015)
Black, Brown, and Indigenous people, whose
health is already compromised due to racial
disparities in medicine, mental health, and
public health, are dying. The grim state of correctional healthcare was exposed this year during the
COVID-19 pandemic. Incarcerated people suffered disproportionate infection rates as staff carried the
virus into facilities where access to testing, hygiene products, personal protective equipment, and
medical supplies were limited and social distancing virtually impossible. There was only one solution
that medical professionals and advocates could agree on: jurisdictions had to release people. But
government officials have not all seen it the same way, and people are dying.
The bottom line is that prisons and jails are not made for care — they worsen health outcomes and
perpetuate trauma. Thankfully, advocates continue to bring lawsuits, running correctional healthcare
corporations that put profit over people out and demanding more investment in the health and
wellbeing of people in custody. 94 And many are simultaneously demanding divestment from prisons
altogether and investment in community health and healing. 95
Healthcare

82

TRANSPORTATION

“

You route the prisoner like a package,
but miss a single deadline, and you lose money.
Kent Bradford, former Director of Operations at TransCor America 1

The Extradition Clause of the U.S. Constitution
requires states to honor extradition orders made
by other states. However, in an 1860 ruling, the
U.S. Supreme Court decided that federal courts
could not enforce this requirement, giving states
discretion on whether to comply with interstate
extradition orders. 6 Then in 1987, in Puerto Rico
v. Branstad, the Court overturned its prior ruling,
holding that federal courts could, in fact, enforce
such interstate orders and that states have no
discretion as it relates to honoring interstate
extradition orders. 7

Description: Correctional agencies
contract with transportation
corporations to relocate incarcerated or
detained people in response to
transfer, extradition, and deportation
orders. While most operate by land,
some transportation corporations
operate by air.

540,000

Annual extraditions nationwide 2
Paired with the racist dog-whistle politics and
their “tough-on-crime” policies of the 1980s and
1990s, this decision is presumed to have
spurred interstate extraditions. While long
distance, interstate travel has always been
commonplace for the Federal Bureau of Prisons,
which depends on the U.S. Marshals Service to
transport people, it presented a new challenge
for state and local correctional administrators
with limited transportation operations.
Quickly, small specialty prison transportation
businesses began to crop up. Correctional
agencies, facing staffing constraints and
unexpected costs, eagerly turned to them to
fulfill extradition orders. 8 Some agencies even
came to depend on these corporations to

Transportation

26

States using privatized correctional
transportation 3

$511 million

ICE spending on transportation and
removals 4

175,000 +

Removals and transfers by ICE Air 5

83

transport incarcerated people for court
appearances, facility transfers, and hospital visits.
One flat fee for both male and
female inmates, including juveniles.
Inmate Services Corporation,
promotional material

Over the next 20 years, these small businesses
ballooned into crudely run corporations with
dangerous cost-cutting practices and deadly
consequences. 9

In the immigration system, the privatization of
transportation is a bit more recent. At their
inception in 2003, U.S. Immigration and Custom Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Patrol
(CBP) used the U.S. Marshals Service to transfer and deport people in their custody. But the agencies
quickly privatized transportation to cut costs, starting with the most expensive transportation method:
air flights. 10 ICE kicked off the privatization of deportations when it created the ICE Flight Operations
Unit, also known as ICE Air, in 2006, 11 and immediately partnered with CSI Aviation, an aviation
corporation and military contractor, to charter its flights. 12
That same year, CBP began outsourcing ground transportation services at the border to save federal
agents the task, 13 awarding its first contract to G4S. 14 In 2007, private prison giant The GEO Group
formed GEO Transport to meet ground transportation needs at an ICE processing center it
managed. 15 And with that, privatized transportation corporations became a regular part of the
immigration detention and deportation machine.

■

How Much Money is at Stake?

The U.S. Marshals Service is responsible for the transportation of people within the federal prison
system, moving more than 265,000 per year. 16 States and local correctional agencies across the
country also generally have their own transportation services. Though there is no concrete data
regarding the number of incarcerated people state and local correctional administrators move each
year, it is likely to fall into the millions. As of 2016, 26 states use privatized transportation to move
people in their custody. Paid between $0.75 and $1.50 per person per mile, these corporations are
entrusted with hundreds of thousands of trips every year. 17
States Contracting with Extradition Corporations 18

Transportation

ICE outsources most of its domestic and
international transportation needs. In 2019, ICE
spent $511 million to deport nearly 263,000
people, including asylum seekers. 19 The figure
represents an increase of 81 percent from $282
million in 2016, though the number of people
deported increased less than 10 percent over the
same period, 20 suggesting the cost of privatized
transportation has increased. The agency requested
another budget increase of $57 million for 2020 to
support an even greater number of deportations. 21

84

■

What Corporations Are Involved?

Though there are many small correctional transportation corporations, just a handful control the
majority of the market. There are 24 correctional transportation corporations registered with the U.S.
Department of Transportation, but only seven have state extradition contracts. 22

Prisoner Transportation Services of America (PTS) is the largest correctional transportation corporation
in the country, partnering with 1,200 agencies and moving more than 30,000 people each year. 23 In
the past 10 years, Massachusetts alone has paid PTS more than $1.3 million. 24 TransCor America, a
subsidiary of private prison giant CoreCivic, contracts with over 2,000 facilities largely across the South
and Southwest 25 and averages 2.2 million miles annually. 26 GEO Transport, a subsidiary of another
private prison giant The GEO Group, has 400 armed transportation officers and has transported 2.25
million people since starting up in 2007. 27 Other major players include U.S. Corrections, Inmate
Services Corporation, and Security Transport Services.
In the immigration context, ICE carries out its deportations with the help of GEO Transport 28 and G4S,
the world’s largest security corporation, 29 on the ground and Classic Air Charter in the air. 30 Classic Air
Charter was awarded its current $646 million contract in 2018 when it beat out CSI Aviation, ICE’s
longstanding air partner. 31 ICE paid CSI Aviation $906 million between 2010, when ICE privatized its
flights, and 2018. 32 Classic Air Charter also subcontracts with several smaller airlines to run flights, such
as Swift Air (owned by iAero Group) and World Atlantic Airlines. While ICE typically spends nearly
$8,000 per flight hour, 33 Omni Air international, a Special High-Risk Charter responsible for higher
profile deportations, charges ICE an incredible $33,500 per flight hour. 34

■

Correctional Transportation

State and local correctional administrators
routinely outsource transportation services to
corporations to avoid the staffing costs needed
to move incarcerated people. Paid per person
per mile travelled, these corporations go to
great lengths, quite literally, to maximize their
profits at the grave expense of their passengers
and, in many cases, even their drivers. 35 This
revenue model incentivizes contractors to pack
as many incarcerated people as possible in vans
and drive them along the most circuitous paths
to their destination. Chained together, people
Deadly crash involving a Prisoner Transportation
are regularly hauled for days and, in many
Services of America van and driver who fell asleep at
the wheel 38
cases, even weeks. 36 In one instance, a
passenger being extradited from Ohio to
Colorado for a parole violation was subjected to a tortuous 20-day journey in the back of a TransCor
van, though the corporation claimed its average trip was four to five days. 37
Worsening matters, drivers are generally paid only while on the road and expected to pay out-ofpocket for accommodations and other needs along their routes. This discourages stopping with
disastrous consequences. 39 Since 2000, private transportation vans have been involved in more than
Transportation

85

50 car accidents, many related to driver fatigue, 40 and in most cases, incarcerated passengers were
shackled but not wearing seat belts. 41 In fact, investigative journalism revealed that many vans do not
actually have working seat belts. 42 In 2009, a PTS driver fell asleep at the wheel in the wee hours of the
morning killing two guards and one incarcerated person onboard. 43
Under these conditions, drivers not only ignore their own needs, but also the needs of their
incarcerated passengers. Corporate policies allow drivers to limit food and ration water, 44 force
people to urinate and defecate on themselves, and ignore medical emergencies. 45 Sweltering heat
and faulty air conditioners further exacerbate these horrific conditions. 46 In 2012, for example, Steven
Galack was put on a PTS van from Florida to Ohio to answer for a warrant for failure to pay child
support. The air conditioner failed on a particularly hot day and the extreme heat made Galack
delusional. Rather than address his medical needs, transport guards beat him. A few hours later,
Galack died in the van. 47 PTS still charged the extraditing county $1,061 for his extradition. 48
For incarcerated women and gender nonconforming people, private transportation vans
present even more concerns. Women have been
forced to menstruate in McDonalds wrappers
while transport guards watched. 50 Faulty safety
equipment has endangered pregnant
passengers and their fetuses. 51 Sexual abuse is
also a constant threat. Since 2000, at least 14
women have reported being sexually assaulted,
some repeatedly, by staff while caged in private
transportation vans. 52 In one instance, a van
driver for Extraditions International sexually
assaulted a passenger under threat of death in a
bathroom during a rare stop. 53 Despite alerting
corporate staff at the stop, she was returned to
the van with the same driver for the remainder of
her four-day trip. 54 Litigation revealed that the
corporation hired the guard after he was fired
from his last job as a corrections officer for
assaulting another incarcerated person. 55

My prisoners got sick and threw up
on each other all the time. They
passed out from heat stroke — the
windows barely opened, for security
reasons, and the air conditioning was
always broken. It got so hot that they
would strip down to their underwear,
and I would have to buy them
buckets of ice and water.
Fernando Colon, former employee at
U.S. Corrections 49

Notwithstanding the extensive harm they cause, correctional transportation corporations have been
allowed to operate with near impunity. Only one federal law regulates the correctional transportation
industry: the Interstate Transportation of Dangerous Criminals Act, commonly known as Jeanna’s
Act. 56 Named after the original victim of a man who later escaped from a private extradition van, the
bill focuses on preventing escapes. 57 This Act also requires standards be set for passenger safety but
allows the American Correctional Association and correctional transportation corporations to weigh
in. 58 Investigative journalism over the past few years has sparked congressional inquiries into the
industry, 59 but there has yet to be meaningful change, 60 leaving incarcerated people subject to private
transportation without many protections.

Transportation

86

■

Joseph’s Story
In 2014, I was detained by police in New York. Though I was facing no
charges or warrants in the state, a warrant came up for my arrest in
Florida. So, instead of releasing me, I was booked and locked up. The
Orange County Sheriff’s Department in Florida was planning on
extraditing me and had 21 days to do so.

Joseph Delaluz
New York

Over the coming weeks, they asked for multiple extensions. After 45 days,
I was still in county jail. This time, when I was called to court again, I was
hopeful. My family was there too, and we all thought I would be released.
We were wrong and it broke us all.

Instead, the officers who brought me to court removed my handcuffs and handed me off to two armed
men in plain clothes, who put me in their own handcuffs. They gave me 15 minutes to say goodbye to
my crying family and then took me to the airport. I didn’t learn until later in the trip that these men were
with a private transportation service.
They paraded me through the airport in shackles in front of everyone. There was a chain around my
waist connected to my handcuffs. They strapped a large taser to my right bicep that would deliver a
shock if I moved more than six feet away. I had to board the plane first — in front of all the other
passengers. People stared at me in shock, and parents covered their children’s eyes as I passed. On
the plane, my feet were also shackled. During our three-hour layover, the officers hid me in the back of
a restaurant while we waited for our connection. I ate and used the bathroom in shackles too.
The whole extradition experience was humiliating. After traveling for 11 hours, we finally arrived. In
front of the county officers, the transportation officers finally removed all my shackles. They passed me
off to the county officers and went on with their lives. I was held for eight months before the state of
Florida dropped the charges and released me. In the meantime, they lost all of my property, including
the $300 I had when I was arrested, and refused to help me get back to New York. I never would have
made it home if my mom hadn’t bought me a Greyhound bus ticket back from Orlando.

■

Immigration Detention Transportation

Many people came to the U.S. to avoid war,
violence, abuse, and poverty in their home
countries, 62 conditions that in many cases
resulted from more than a century of U.S.
military-backed coups and privatized
plundering. 63 Now, they are being forced back
into danger and desperation with the help of
large private transportation corporations.

I thought I would take my last breath
in the back of that van.
Floricel Liborio Ramos,
detained immigrant 61

The immigration detention transportation
industry is dominated by a handful of large conglomerates notorious for varied types of abuses across
the world. Immigrants are forced onto their vans, buses, and planes, chained together in leg restraints
like cattle. 64 If they refuse to board, they are tasered, put in body bags, and thrown on. 65 Throughout
Transportation

87

their journey, they are handcuffed and often restricted meals, denied medication, and subjected to
extreme conditions. 66 In the worst cases, they are beaten. 67
In 2017, for example, four detained immigrants were transported on a windowless van operated by
G4S between two immigration detention facilities. They were shackled at their wrists, waist, and ankles
and denied meals and medication. Unable to withstand the sweltering heat of the van cage, they
vomited and fainted. During the 24-hour trip that should have taken just five hours, their cries for help
were ignored. 68
That same year, 92 people were put on a privately chartered plane to be deported to Somalia. 69 For
undisclosed reasons, the plane was grounded in Senegal for almost 23 hours, during which
passengers were kept handcuffed, prevented from using the restroom, and verbally and physically
assaulted. 70 The abuse was only revealed because the plane, with all its passengers, was forced to
return to the U.S. In most cases, accounts of abuse abroad deportation flights never make it back to the
U.S. but instead remain abroad with deported people.

Paid per person per mile, correctional and
immigration detention transportation
corporations guard their bottom lines by
overcrowding vans, taking extended routes,
avoiding stops, and ignoring the needs of their
shackled passengers. With few government
protections or legal remedies available to those
harmed, these corporations create some of the
most inhumane conditions for incarcerated and
detained people.

Transportation

Learn More


They Let a Sick Inmate Die in a Van. Now
They Won’t Pay His Family $650,000, The
New York Times (2019)



Investigation Reveals Disturbing
Conditions for Prisoners Transported by
For-Profit Companies, Mother Jones
(2016)



Death, Abuse and Sexual Assault: The
Horrific and Unregulated Private Prison
Van Transport Business, Democracy
Now! (2016)



Inside the Deadly World of Private
Prisoner Transport, The Marshall Project
(2016)



The Horrible Things I Saw Driving a Van
Packed with Prisoners, The Marshall
Project (2016)



How to Investigate Private Prisoner
Transport in Your State, The Marshall
Project (2016)

88

COMMUNITY
CORRECTIONS

“

For me, you are walking money. I own your body.
Michelle Esquenazi, President of Empire Bails Bonds 1

The community corrections industry grew out of
centuries of bail and pretrial reform. Historically,
families and friends served as sureties for those
accused of crimes. But in the 1700s, as people
became more mobile and corporal punishment,
including imprisonment, began to replace fines
assessed for crimes, concerns about people
fleeing before trial rose. Bail became arbitrary
and increasingly less affordable, creating a
natural entry point for the commercial bail bond
industry. 2

Description: Government agencies
contract with community corrections
corporations to provide correctional
supervision outside of secured facilities
like prisons and jails. They include bail
bond agencies, diversion programs,
electronic monitoring, probation and
parole supervision, residential reentry
centers, and day reporting centers.

In 1898, the first commercial bail bond agency,
McDonough Brothers, emerged in San Francisco
and quickly similar agencies began to pop up
[I]n too many instances, the
across the country. 4 By the 1920s, researchers
[commercial bail bond] system...
were publishing studies about the inequities of
neither guarantees security to society
the money bail system, 5 but it was not until the
nor safeguards the right of the
1950s that the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that
accused.
access to bail was fundamental to the
presumption of innocence — though not an
Arthur L. Beeley,
3
absolute right. 6 In the 1960s, disdain for
The Bail System in Chicago (1927)
commercial bail bond agencies was mounting
amid reports of abuse and corruption and led to
the passage of the 1966 Federal Bail Reform Act,
which among other things, introduced pretrial supervision with the intention of curbing pretrial
detention. 7 By 1999, the federal system and nearly every state had created a pretrial supervised
release practice. 8
Probation evolved alongside money bail in the late 1800s as a way to divert people from prison. 9
Massachusetts was the first state to pass probation legislation in 1878, but because some considered it
Community Corrections

89

too lenient a sentence, it took nearly 80 years for the federal system and all states to adopt probation
laws. 10 Nevertheless, by the 1970s, probation was no longer about helping people succeed in the
community but about control, and a new industry emerged. Politicians seeking to be “tough-on-crime”
pushed for strict new requirements for people on probation, such as mandatory reporting and drug
testing. 11 Florida was the first state to outsource probation in 1975, but it was not until 1989 that
legislation in Missouri and Tennessee really opened the door to for-profit probation agencies. 12
Today, Georgia, which passed legislation permitting private probation in 2000 largely due to a
$75,000 industry bribe, 13 is the largest proponent of private probation with 80 percent of its courts
outsourcing probation supervision. 14
In its modern-day form, parole had its start slightly later than probation in 1907 in New York, but it
scaled faster. 15 As the use of parole grew, so did the use of residential reentry centers, more
commonly known as halfway houses. By 1944, the federal system and all states had adopted parole
systems, 16 and halfway houses were primarily run by nonprofits and religious organizations providing
substance abuse treatment, counseling, and job training. 17 By the 1980s, as racist fear-mongering and
“tough-on-crime” rhetoric began discouraging early release, 18 the management of halfway houses was
increasingly turned over to private contractors. 19 Then, in 1984, U.S. Congress passed sentencing
reform that eliminated parole in the federal system. 20 And the 1994 Crime Bill pushed states to enact
“truth-in-sentencing” laws that restricted early release. 21
As the number of people on probation and parole grew and technology advanced, so did the tools for
control. Electronic monitoring was first introduced in the 1960s to monitor youth’s compliance with
parole conditions and reward positive behavior. 22 However, by the 1980s, corporations and
correctional agencies were using electronic monitoring on a much wider population, claiming it
allowed agencies to release people from overcrowded prisons while still keeping them under
supervision. By charging supervision fees, correctional agencies could also use electronic monitoring
to shift the cost of incarceration onto those under supervision. 23 In recent years, new technology is
once again expanding the reach of community supervision as ankle monitors are slowly being
replaced with smartphone apps. 24
Since the 2008 financial crisis, government budgets have been strained and public outrage over the
scope of mass incarceration has grown, leading centrist politicians and private corporations to position
community corrections as the future of the criminal legal system. They refer to diversion programs,
probation and parole supervision, and electronic monitoring as “alternatives to incarceration” and shift
the costs of these so-called alternatives on to those subjected to them. 25 They have poured
government funding into the community corrections industry through legislation like the 2018 First
Step Act with enthusiastic support from the private prison industry, which has spent years preparing for
this shift. 26

■

How Much Money is at Stake?

The “tough-on-crime” era did more than just cause the prison population to explode. It also grew the
pretrial population and those under other forms of correctional supervision — all to the benefit of the
community corrections industry. Altogether, there are now 6.4 million people, or 1 in 40 people, in the
U.S. under correctional control through either incarceration or supervision. 27

Community Corrections
Community Corrections

90
90

Today, over-policing has created a steady flow of customers for the bail bond and diversion industries.
About 10.7 million people are booked into jail each year. 28 Only 23 percent are released on their own
recognizance. 29 Diversion programs are offered to another 8 percent by the one-third of jurisdictions
offering them. 30 The overwhelming balance will be held on bail. While there is no national data about
how many people are bailed out by commercial bail bond agencies, in New York City alone, about
77,400 people are released on bail annually, and nearly 80 percent of which use a commercial bail
bond agent. 31 In total, the bail bond industry issues about $15.9 billion in bonds each year, collecting
$1.3 billion in premiums from people accused of crimes and their families. 32
Between 1980 and 2016, the number of people under community supervision in the U.S. more than
tripled from 1.3 million to 4.4 million people. Probation accounts for 3.5 million, many of whom are
supervised by the private probation agencies that have penetrated more than a dozen states thus far.
Parole accounts for the remaining 880,000, who are often subjected to the hundreds of private halfway
houses operators across the country. 33 The federal prison system alone has about 7,000 people at any
given time in 171 such residential reentry centers, nearly all of which are run by corporations. 34
All those under community supervision are at risk for electronic monitoring. Between 2005 and 2015,
the number of people under electronic monitoring grew nearly 140 percent from 53,000 to more than
125,000. 35 Since then, many cities have doubled their use of monitors, making the real number much
higher. 36 And it does not stop there, these services have also crossed over into the immigration
landscape in recent years. In fact, more than 43,000 immigrants are wearing electronic monitors on
any given day. 37 Yet, in 2019, BI, the nation’s largest electronic monitoring corporation in both the
criminal and immigration systems, reported that it alone had 144,000 people in its electronic
monitoring program, 38 suggesting the total number of people on electronic monitors has grown even
more dramatically in the last five years. All this brings the electronic monitoring industry in North
America an estimated $580 million each year. 39

■

What Corporations Are Involved?

Bail Bonds
The bail bond industry operates in two distinct tiers: brick and mortar bail bond agencies and the large
financial sureties that insure them, which together are estimated to rake in $1.4 to $2.4 billion every
year. There are as many as 25,000 bail bond agents nationwide. 40 One of the largest is Aladdin Bail
Bonds, which has over 50 locations across 8 states and collects $14 million in revenue annually. 41
Behind bail bond agencies are more than 30 insurance companies, but nine insure the vast majority of
the $15.9 billion in bonds posted each year. 42 Major players include Tokio Marine, Fairfax Financial
Holdings, and R&Q. And the criminal legal system is not the only bond market — the immigration
system also has a ripe bond market that is dominated by Libre by Nexus. 43
Diversion Programs
The privatized diversion industry is highly fragmented. CorrectiveSolutions is one major player that
entered the private diversion market in the late 1980s and now has contracts to run programs in 100
jurisdictions across 17 states. 44 Drug treatment programs, which are largely unregulated, 45 are also
offered by a patchwork of larger providers like BounceBack and regional non-profits like Human
Service Associates, a Florida-based diversion provider that was shut down in 2014 after embezzling
state funds. 46 But household names like Exxon, Shell, and Walmart have also played a role in privatized
diversion programs, contracting with addiction rehabilitation programs that push unpaid hard work as
a treatment for addiction. 47
Community Corrections
Community Corrections

91
91

Community Supervision
Probation and parole supervision is a fragmented and localized market with just a few major players
like Judicial Corrections Services, a subsidiary of correctional healthcare giant Wellpath, 48 and Sentinel
Offender Services. Although the size of the industry is hard to determine, Sentinel was generating an
estimated $5 million in revenues annually in Georgia alone — just a fraction of its business — before
pulling out of the state in 2016 due to waning profitability. 49 Notably, in 2018, private prison giant
CoreCivic bought into this market with the $15.9 million acquisition of Recovery Monitoring Solutions,
which manages more than 6,500 people under correctional supervision in addition to the thousands in
its various monitoring programs. 50
Electronic Monitoring
The electronic monitoring industry is dominated by a few players. The largest, BI, which has 144,000
people on its electronic monitors across 50 states, is a subsidiary of private prison giant The GEO
Group. 51 Like its parent company, BI also plays a major role in the immigration system, with an
exclusive contract with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement to monitor undocumented
immigrants. 52 Between 2018 and 2019, BI saw its annual revenue increase $26.7 million due to an
increase in the number of people on its electronic monitors in both the criminal and immigration
systems. 53 However, the immigration bail bond agency Libre by Nexus also forces its customers to
wear ankle monitors as a condition of their bail. 54 Other major electronic monitoring corporations
include Attenti, SuperCom, SCRAM Systems, Satellite Tracking of People (STOP), a subsidiary of prison
telecom provider Securus. 55
Residential Reentry and Day Reporting Centers
The residential reentry, or halfway house, and day reporting market is comprised of a mix of private
prison operators, non-profits, and mom-and-pop house managers. Since 2005, the two largest private
prison operators, The GEO Group and CoreCivic, have rapidly expanded into community corrections
through the acquisition of halfway house operators and similar businesses in an effort to diversify their
revenue streams with their prison business under attack. 56
The GEO Group has been particularly aggressive, making over a billion dollars in acquisitions to
establish its position as the nation’s largest residential reentry and day reporting center operator. 57
The largest of these was the 2017 purchase of Community Education Centers for $360 million. 58 As of
2019, The GEO Group managed 45 residential reentry centers with nearly 11,000 beds and 68 day
reporting centers. 59 Notably, between 2018 and 2019, the corporation saw its annual revenue from
residential reentry and day reporting centers increase $31.2 million. 60
CoreCivic has taken similar steps, acquiring Avalon Correctional Services in 2015 for $158 million as
well as other smaller regional providers. 61 As of 2019, CoreCivic managed 29 residential reentry
centers with more than 5,000 beds. Between 2018 and 2019, CoreCivic’s community corrections
business, including community supervision and electronic monitoring, grew by 21 percent from
$101.8 million to $123.3 million. 62

■

Bail Bonds

After someone is arrested and charged with a crime, a judge decides whether they can await trial in
the community or must do so in a jail cell. In most cases, whether someone is detained pretrial is
dependent on their ability to post a bond — a refundable payment to the court meant to ensure that
Community Corrections

92

they will return for trial. 63 Often, judges have complete discretion in deciding whether someone is set
bail and how much. The national median bail for a felony is $10,000. 64

What has been made clear…is that
our present attitudes toward bail are
not only cruel, but really completely
illogical…usually only one factor
determines whether a defendant
stays in jail before he comes to trial.
That factor is not guilt or innocence.
It is not the nature of the crime. It is
not the character of the defendant.
That factor is, simply, money. How
much money does the defendant
have?
U.S. Attorney General Robert
Kennedy (1965) 65

Faced with the prospect of spending months in
jail before trial or pleading guilty, many people
turn to bail bond agents to post their bond in
exchange for a non-refundable premium,
typically 10 percent of the bond amount. Bail
bond agents also tack on hidden fees and
collateral requirements and intimidate families
to pay up. Families that struggle are often
trapped in cycles of debt while contending with
the looming threat of their loved one’s
incarceration if they fall behind on their payments. 74

This [industry] is completely
dominated by retired state probation
people and wardens of state prisons.
They created this industry for
themselves.
Sheriff Howard Sills
of Putnam County, GA 75

Community Corrections

It is estimated that as many as 500,000 people
held in local jails are there solely because of
their inability to pay bail. 66 Many spend time in
jail because they owe as little as $250. 67 The vast
majority are Black, Brown, and Indigenous
people. 68 Confinement worsened by inhumane
conditions in jails lead many to plead guilty
simply to get out on time served or avoid a trial
penalty. 69 In the end, rather than offering people
a path to freedom, money bail drives the growth
of pretrial detention while the number of
convicted people in jail has remained roughly
the same since 2000. 70 Money bail has created a
two-tiered system of justice in the U.S. 71 Wealthy
people charged with crimes post bail and go
home, but people without financial means in the
same position are forced to depend on
exploitative commercial bail bond agencies or
remain in jail until their case is resolved, which
can take months or even years.

2

Countries that allow commercial bail
bonds 72

$15.9 billion

Bail value posted every year 73

There has been local, state, and federal-level
movement to curtail the influence of the
commercial bail bonds industry, but the industry
pushes back with considerable power. 76 In
recent years, activists and advocates have
organized bail funds and done crowdfunding to
bail people out of jail. 77 The results of these bail
outs undermine the central argument that
undergirds the bail bonds industry: that money
bail is necessary to ensure people return to face
trial. 78 One study by a charitable bail fund found
that 95 percent of people bailed out returned to
court though they had no personal financial
obligation. 79
93

The situation is often even worse in the immigration system. Detained immigrants can often post bail
to be freed while awaiting their deportation proceedings, which typically last more than two years. But
the median immigration bond is $7,500, far beyond what many can afford on undocumented wages.
Immigration bail bond agencies, like Libre by Nexus, post immigration bonds in exchange for a 20
percent non-refundable premium. But, before paying the bond, Libre forces people to agree to wear
an electronic monitor. 80 These monitors come with outrageous fees that can rival the cost of the bond
itself: $460 activation fee, $50 device delivery fee, and $420 in monthly device lease charges. Many are
unaware of these charges — hidden in contracts written in a foreign language — until they receive the
bill. If people are unable to pay, Libre threatens them and their families with deportation. 81

■

Diversion Programs

Diversion programs are another example of a so-called “alternative to incarceration” used to extort
poor people. In counties across the country, administrators have outsourced these diversion programs
to private corporations that use the threat of incarceration to force people facing charges into costly
and ineffective programs. Consequently, wealthy people can pay their way out of a jail sentence while
people in poverty must choose between incarceration and debt.
In practice, privatized diversion is more like extortion than rehabilitation. Many diversion corporations
partner with prosecutor offices, who often receive a percentage of the fees paid by participants, giving
them an incentive to charge people unnecessarily and push them into diversion programs. Yet, in
some jurisdications, these corporations have entirely replaced prosecutors, going so far as to target
and contact people suspected of petty crimes before they have even been charged, threatening them
with prosecution unless they pay hundreds of dollars to enter their diversion program. 82
For example, in Illinois, dozens of counties contract with two diversion corporations,
CorrectiveSolutions and BounceBack. People who accept one of CorrectiveSolutions’ diversion plans
can end up with hundreds of dollars in fees — up to $175 for classes, $35 for administrative fees, and
countless other charges for rescheduling classes or late payments. In one county, the corporation sent
notices to over 3,000 people demanding they enter their program — 1,342 people completed it.
However, the state’s attorney office ended up only charging 11 of the hundreds of people who never
entered the program, suggesting that many people paid for diversion for charges that would never
have been brought. 83

· · · WARNING OF CRIMINAL CHARGES · · ·
The State's Anomey' Office has received a complaint against you for i uing a wonhless check( ) . (See list below,) Issuing a
worthless check with knowledge of insufficient funds and with the intent to defraud is a criminal offense punishable with jail time
and/or fines. It appears that you have ignored the demand by the recipient of the li sted chcck(s) to make restitution. ndcr

Illinois 1atu1cs, this can constitute criminal intent and a Warrant for your arrest can be issued.

The Kankakee County State's Anomey's Check Enforccmen1 Program allows check writers facing pos ible criminal ac1ion an
opportunity to avoid that action. But you must comply with the conditions of thi s diversion program.

CorrectiveSolutions letter threatening criminal charges 84

Community Corrections

94

Hundreds of private sober homes across the country also serve as diversion programs and trap people
in cycles of debt and addiction. 85 In many cases, these homes offer no treatment and are nothing more
than insurance scams. In Florida, for example, a treatment company called Whole Recovery ordered
their residents to undergo unnecessary drug tests and confiscated their keys and phones to prevent
them from leaving, all the while charging thousands of dollars in fraudulent claims to their insurance
companies. 86 And one Philadelphia-based rehabilitation corporation, Humble Beginnings, sent
countless patients to recovery centers in Florida like Whole Recovery, in exchange for kickbacks. 87 This
scheme has become so commonplace that it is widely known as the “Florida Shuffle.” 88
Still, perhaps the worst diversion abuse is seen in drug rehabilitation programs that push unpaid hard
work as the treatment for addiction. Investigative journalism in 2020 revealed at least 300 drug and
alcohol rehabilitation facilities in 44 states that required unpaid work. In some cases, this work was
contracted out to corporations — participants worked in oil refineries for Exxon and Shell, other
stocked warehouses for Walmart, and still others slaughtered chickens for Simmons Foods. These
corporations paid program operators, often non-profits, which used the funds to pay executives
generous salaries.90

■

Community Supervision

Currently, two-thirds of adults under control of
the criminal legal system are not incarcerated,
but under supervision in the community. 93 While
not confined to a carceral cell, people under
community supervision are often have their
travel rights restricted and remain under the
ever-present threat of incarceration and scrutiny
of the government.

4.4 million

Adults on probation or parole 91

25%

Prison admissions for technical violations
of probation or parole 92

Pretrial supervision, probation, and parole
function similarly but as different systems. Pretrial supervision is imposed on people facing charges
based on their “suitability” to remain free before trial. 94 Probation is a sentence that allows people who
are convicted of a crime to avoid incarceration if they agree to a series of conditions, fines, and fees. 95
The average person on probation has 15
conditions placed on their freedom. 96 Parole
offers release from prison or jail after a person
has served a minimum sentence at the cost of
It is my sense that the imposition and
similarly onerous conditions. 97
enforcement of probation conditions
has become more punitive in nature,
The conditions imposed by these various
and I think much of that may be
community supervision regimes are invasive and
attributed to the type of persons we
nearly impossible to meet, setting people up for
are attracting to the probation
rearrest for technical violations, not new crimes.
profession.
This is particularly true in Black and Brown
communities
that are subjected to over-policing
Dan Beto, former Texas probation
89
and for people with low income whose lack of
director
resources make certain requirements
particularly hard to meet. 98

Community Corrections

95

As a result, community supervision has created a revolving door to our prisons and jails, sending
people behind bars for trivial technical violations like showing up late to an appointment. There are
nearly 150,000 prison admissions each year for technical violations — a staggering 25 percent of
admissions nationwide. In some states, the number is even higher. For instance, in Kentucky, technical
violations account for 63 percent of prison admissions and 45 percent of the prison population on any
given day. 99
In many states, probation and parole are increasingly outsourced to private corporations
that boldly advertise shifting government costs onto supervisees to win contracts. Under this model,
courts pay nothing, and individuals are required to pay out of pocket for all costs associated with their
probation or parole. For example, Providence Community Corrections (PCC) charges people under its
supervision fees that range from $35 to $44 per month. 100 And they add fees for services such as drug
testing or mandatory classes that are compelled as conditions of probation or parole. In one case, PCC
charged a woman surviving on disability payments $20 per randomized drug test though her original
offense was not drug related. 101 For the those with low income who are disproportionately targeted by
the criminal legal system, even seemingly low costs are extremely burdensome, and can snowball
exponentially over time. People who cannot afford to pay these fees are often sent to jail or prison. 102

They really don’t care what you do,
as long as you hand over your
money. It’s like paying protection to
the Mafia.
Anonymous 20-year-old student
under supervision by Judicial
Correctional Services 103

■

Electronic Monitoring

Electronic monitoring is used to incarcerate
people in their own homes or restrict their
movement to a particular geographic area,
making life in the community nearly as restrictive
as life in a prison. And like privatized
supervision, electronic monitoring is increasingly
funded by the people subjected to it.

Electronic monitoring is often deceptively
portrayed as a tool to free people from
incarceration. However, in reality, electronic monitoring has merely expanded the number of people
under correctional control, transformed private spaces into carceral structures, and shifted correctional
costs from the government onto individuals, disproportionately Black, Brown, and Indigenous
people. 104 These costs include hefty setup fees of up to $200 and daily monitoring fees that can reach
$40, meaning that the cost of electronic monitoring can easily exceed the monthly cost of rent for
many. And if a device is damaged, those on supervision can be charged as much as $1,200 to replace
them. When people fall behind on their payments, they can be punished with home confinement, if
not already subjected to it, until they can come up with the money — a nearly impossible task if they
cannot leave their house. 105
Although people under supervision are often
required to work, the very presence of an
electronic monitor can make it difficult to find or
keep a job. These devices carry a stigma for the
people who wear them, often leading coworkers
and supervisors to pass judgment. One study
revealed that 22 percent of people forced to
wear an ankle monitor had been terminated

Community Corrections

No one wants to give you a job…
Because employers see the
monitor and they don’t like it.
They don’t like it at all.
Undocumented woman required
to wear an ankle monitor by ICE 106

96

from a job because of it. 107 They also make it difficult for people working physical labor jobs like
construction to wear necessary protective gear. 108
But electronic monitors jeopardize more than one’s ability to work, they also threaten the health and
well-being of those wearing them and that of their families. Monitors not only present new health
hazards, but also prevent people from getting necessary care. For example, an electronic monitor can
jeopardize one’s participation in an anonymous substance abuse treatment program, prevent a person
from appropriately caring for themselves or family in emergencies, or subject a person to
discrimination by healthcare providers. These devices also exact a psychological toll. For instance,
many have gone through the humiliating experience of charging a monitor in public given their limited
battery life. 109
Newer devices are even more invasive. Agencies around the country increasingly require people
convicted of driving under the influence to wear devices that measure the blood alcohol level in their
perspiration. These alcohol monitors alert law enforcement if they detect that someone has consumed
alcohol but are prone to false positives triggered by everyday products like lotion or cologne. 110 The
spread of smartphones has created yet another frontier for electronic monitoring. Invasive applications
like Guardian by Telmate and Touchpoint by SCRAM allow law enforcement to live monitor people
through their cellphones with incredible errors, putting the freedom of many at risk. 111 Other
smartphone applications like Promise claim to be change agents that offer people reminders about
court dates, databases of service referrals, and online courses all on the government’s dime, 112 but are
still paid per person, giving it little incentive to help people leave the system. 113 Far from being tools
for decarceration, as their developers claim, these applications are just 21st century shackles. 114

■ Sarah’s Story
The day my baby was born was supposed to be the happiest day of my
life. Instead, I spent the day defending my right to motherhood and right
to care. That’s when I learned that the stigma associated with wearing an
ankle monitor can kill you. It can also steal your child.

Sarah Faye Hanna
Texas

When I returned home from the hospital after giving birth, I got a call
from Child Protective Services informing me that a case manager was
coming to do a home inspection to make sure my baby was safe.
Apparently, a nurse had called the agency after she saw my ankle
monitor. I was shocked and hurt because I straightened out my life for my
baby.

My ankle monitor is a probation requirement I’ve had since I was released from jail, then rehab. I can
only leave my house between 7 a.m. and 7 p.m. and, when I’m home, I have to be tethered to the wall
for two hours every day to charge my monitor. Imagine tending to a crying baby attached to a wall or
worrying about being arrested for taking your baby to the emergency room?
For all this trouble, my husband and I have to pay $300 per month on top of the $250 per month to
simply be on probation. When I’m late on a payment, the monitoring company calls and threatens to
have me jailed again. They provide no other support. They didn’t even tell me when my ankle monitor
was going to be removed — but it was finally taken off just a few weeks ago.
Community Corrections
Community Corrections

97
97

Electronic monitoring has caused me physical, financial, and psychological hurdles since the day I
came home, not a pathway to recovery and reentry. People claim it’s an alternative to incarceration,
but I served my sentence. I’m on probation; I still have to report, and I still have to test for drugs. It’s not
replacing anything.

■

Residential Reentry + Day Reporting Centers

Residential reentry centers, or halfway houses, are intended to transition people successfully from
correctional settings to free society by providing a supportive structure. However, they often require
people to navigate confusing and often contradictory requirements while living in conditions that can
resemble the worst prisons and jails. 115

The living conditions were worse
than prison. When it rained, the
halfway house staff would break out
a dozen five-gallon buckets… We
had two bathrooms for over 70
guys…
Shon Hopwood, Georgetown Law
professor and former private halfway
house resident 116

In most cases, halfway house residents are
forced to find employment, if not enrolled in a
program. But in the federal system, for instance,
halfway houses can take up to 25 percent of
residents’ wages, preventing them from
becoming financially independent. 117
Unsurprisingly, these houses generate huge
profits for their operators but few benefits for
the people in them. In Pennsylvania, for
example, the state spends $110 million annually
on private halfway houses, but in 2013, a study
revealed that these halfway houses had worse
recidivism rates among their residents than
people who are released directly from state
prisons onto the street. 118

In New Jersey, private halfway houses cut costs with disastrous consequences. After officials decided
to move thousands of people incarcerated in state prisons to private halfway houses in the late
1990s, 119 the state signed a contract with Community Education Centers (CEC) worth $71 million per
year. Although CEC executives paid themselves millions in salaries and bonuses, the conditions in their
facilities were abysmal. Residents reported widespread sexual assault, rampant drug use, and
unqualified staff, 120 leading many to run away. 121 A series of investigations revealed that then-New
Jersey Governor Chris Christie had close ties with top executives of the corporation, and many were
also paid as state advisors. 122 And despite all these troubles, The GEO Group, which acquired CEC in
2017 for $360 million, continues to proclaim that its facilities in New Jersey are a national model. 123
Private day reporting centers also suffer from many of the same issues. Corporations in the space
typically sign contracts with state agencies that pay per diem rates per person in their programs.
Unsurprisingly, this model creates a strong incentive to create abusive program requirements that
keep people enrolled perpetually. In California, for example, The GEO Group’s programs — often
focused on behavioral thinking rather than education or vocational training — require people to take
courses at the center for 12 hours a day, 7 days a week. 124
Support has grown across the political spectrum for community-based restorative justice and
substance abuse treatment. But with the criminal legal system still in control, the increasing
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98

involvement of corporations has simply given
rise to a treatment industrial complex 125
incentivized to keep people in the system. These
corporations have lobbied to increase the use of
residential reentry and day reporting centers. 126
In 2018, they successfully secured increased
funding for these community corrections
solutions in the federal First Step Act. 127

Bail bond agencies reinforce a system that
allows wealthy people to pay their way out of jail
and working-class people — disproportionately
Black, Brown, and Indigenous — to suffer behind
bars. While they claim to perform a public
service, their history of abuse and lobbying for
punitive laws reveals their mere parasitic
dependency on racist and classist policing and
policies. Fortunately, communities around the
country are standing up to this powerful
industry. The end of the money bail system is in
sight, but corporate lobbyists are fighting back.
And the community supervision industry has
corporate lobbyists at work, too. Private prison
operators drafted the blueprint for mass
incarceration and lobbied for its
implementation. Now, as they watch their
business model come under attack by a cultural
change, they profess support for reforms that
would decrease the carceral population and
likely their bottom line. However, in the
background, they have spent millions lobbying
to make community corrections the solution of
the future and preparing for the shift. But the
people who created our carceral crisis cannot be
trusted to solve it.

Learn More


Challenging E-Carceration Project,
Media Justice and Urbana-Champaign
Independent Media Center



Street-Level Surveillance, Electronic
Frontier Foundation



Prison by Any Other Name: The
Harmful Consequences of Popular
Reforms, Maya Schenwar and Victoria
Law (2020)



Many of Miami’s Immigrants Wear
Ankle Monitors. Will Technology
Betray Them? Miami Herald (2019)



Digital Jail: How Electronic Monitoring
Drives Defendants into Debt, The New
York Times (2019)



How a Criminal Justice Reform
Became an Enrichment Scheme,
Politico (2019)



In Oklahoma, Private Companies Run
Pretrial Services, Driving People into
Debt, The Appeal (2019)



Confined and Costly: How Supervision
Violations Are Filling Prisons and
Burdening Budgets, The Council of
State Governments Justice Center
(2019)



Fact Sheet: Electronic Monitoring
Devices as Alternatives to Detention,
National Immigration Forum (2019)



No More Shackles, Media Justice
(2018, 2019)



Electronic Monitors: How Companies
Dream of Locking Us in Our Homes, In
These Times (2018)



“Set up to Fail”: The Impact of
Offender-Funded Private Probation on
the Poor, Human Rights Watch (2018)

 From Cages to the Community: Prison
Profiteers and the Treatment Industrial
For that same reason, the rise of surveillance
Complex, Prison Legal News (2018)
technology should be viewed with serious
 Community Cages: Profitizing
suspicion, not welcomed with open arms.
Community Corrections and
Despite the industry’s attempt to portray
Alternatives to Incarceration, American
dystopian technology like electronic monitoring
Friends Service Committee (2016)
as an “alternative to incarceration,” community
surveillance will, at best, replace physical
shackles with digital ones fueled by the same
racist systems of financial exploitation and, at worst, widen and deepen the net cast by the criminal
legal system. And these innovations will not save taxpayer money, they will merely impose a hidden
regressive tax on overpoliced Black, Brown, and Indigenous communities and those in poverty. We
must reevaluate these so-called solutions and dream of new ones if we are to truly free people.
Community Corrections

99

■

Conclusion

That was a lot. We know.
And sadly, it still is far from everything that could have been included in this report. As our
communities know too well, there are millions of examples of every harm that was mentioned and
there are still countless others that went unspoken. There are also many more who inflict this harm in
using the carceral system to build their wealth and livelihood — and not just in the private sector, but
also in government, unions, and non-profit organizations.
In fact, even unknowingly, many of us are implicated. Our tax dollars, pension funds, and retirement
accounts are all invested in the prison industry — the corporations covered here and a myriad of others.
Our favorite sports teams and cultural institutions are owned and supported by executives that build
their wealth off people in cages. Even the financial aid that helps us make tuition payments is, at times,
supplied by or invested in the prison industry.
The prison industry is ubiquitous in our lives. For many, this is entirely new. For those in our
communities, it is not — it is just a new articulation of painfully familiar experiences. But whether you
picked up new information or just a new perspective, we encourage you to reflect on what you read,
share the information with your loved ones, and find time for meaningful discussion.
Understanding our oppressive system is just the first step in moving toward the abolition of police and
prisons. The work is still ahead of us. We hope you will channel what rage or frustration this report
conjured up toward creating change in your community, however big or small. A seemingly impossible
task, we must do our best to carry forward the torch of our brave and brilliant elders and ancestors.
With their enduring guidance, we can dismantle the prison industry — root out its racist, classist, and
patriarchal core — and build in its place a truly liberated world.

Community Corrections

100

■

NOTES

Architecture + Construction
1.

“San Mateo County Maple Street Correctional Center,”
HOK, n.d., https://www.hok.com/projects/view/san-mateocounty-maple-street-correctional-center/.

2.

Zach Chouteau, “U.S. Census Bureau Report Shows Dip in
Government Correctional Construction.” Correctional
News, July 18, 2018,
http://correctionalnews.com/2018/07/20/u-s-censusbureau-report-shows-dip-governmentt-correctionalconstruction/.

3.

4.

5.

Wendy Sawyer and Peter Wagner, “Mass Incarceration:
The Whole Pie 2020.” Prison Policy Initiative, March 24,
2020, https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2020.html.
This number includes state prisons, federal prisons,
juvenile correctional facilities, local jails, immigration
detention facilities, and Indian Country jails.
Chris Mai, Mikelina Belaineh, Ram Subramanian, and Jacob
Kang-Brown, "Broken Ground: Why America Keeps
Building More Jails and What It Can Do Instead." Vera
Institute of Justice, November 2019,
https://www.vera.org/downloads/publications/brokenground-jail-construction.pdf.
Zhen Zeng, “Jail Inmates in 2018.” Bureau of Justice
Statistics, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Dept. of Justice,
March 2020,
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ji18.pdf.

6.

German Lopez, “Nixon Official: Real Reason For the Drug
War Was To Criminalize Black People and Hippies.” Vox,
March 23, 2016,
https://www.vox.com/2016/3/22/11278760/war-on-drugsracism-nixon.

7.

Emily Posner, “Public Comment on behalf of Abolitionist
Law Center.” Abolitionist Law Center, October 28, 2017,
https://fighttoxicprisons.files.wordpress.com/2017/11/alccomments-fseis-final.pdf.

8.

Hillary Shelton and Inimani Chettiar, “Want to Shrink
Prisons? Stop Subsidizing Them.” The Washington Post,
November 11, 2016,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/intheory/wp/2016/11/01/want-to-shrink-prisons-stopsubsidizing-them/.

9.

10.

11.

12.

Keely Herring, “Was A Prison Built Every 10 Days to House
A Fast-Growing Population of Nonviolent Inmates?”
PolitiFact, July 31, 2015,
https://www.politifact.com/factchecks/2015/jul/31/corybooker/was-prison-built-every-10-days-house-fastgrowing-/.
John Eason, “Why Prison Building Will Continue Booming
in Rural America.” The Conversation, March 12, 2017,
https://theconversation.com/why-prison-building-willcontinue-booming-in-rural-america-71920; Jon Schuppe,
“Does America Need Another Prison?” NBC News, March
22, 2018, https://www.nbcnews.com/specials/kentuckyprison-coal-country/.
John Eason, “Prisons as Panacea or Pariah? The
Countervailing Consequences of the Prison Boom on the
Political Economy of Rural Towns.” Social Science, January
12, 2017, https://www.mdpi.com/2076-0760/6/1/7/htm.
Chouteau, “U.S. Census Bureau Report Shows Dip in
Government Correctional Construction.”

Notes

13.

“Prison and Jail Construction Report Gives Snapshot of
Industry,” Correctional News, January 3, 2013,
http://correctionalnews.com/2013/01/03/prison-and-jailconstruction-report-gives-snapshot-industry/.

14.

Ibid.

15.

Mai, et al., "Broken Ground: Why America Keeps Building
More Jails and What It Can Do Instead."

16.

“Top 10 Major Upcoming Courthouse and Jail and Prison
Construction Projects - U.S. - May 2019,”
ConstructConnect, May 16, 2019,
https://www.constructconnect.com/blog/economy/top-10major-upcoming-courthouse-jail-prison-constructionprojects-u-s-may-2019.

17.

Matthew Haag, “4 Jails in 5 Boroughs: The $8.7 Billion
Puzzle Over How to Close Rikers.” The New York Times,
September 4, 2019,
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/04/nyregion/rikersisland-jail-closing.html.

18.

IBISWorld, report unavailable.

19.

“Justice: Innovating Justice Architecture,” HDR Inc., n.d.,
https://www.hdrinc.com/markets/justice.

20.

“Justice,” HOK, n.d.,
https://www.hok.com/projects/market/justice/.

21.

“The Construction Companies: Hochtief-Vinci,” Corporate
Watch, February 11, 2013, https://corporatewatch.org/theconstruction-companies-hochtief-vinci/; Robert Gellately,
The Oxford Illustrated History of the Third Reich. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2018.

22.

James Kilgore, “Monitors to Phones to Meals: These 5
Corporations are Quietly Making Billions Off
Incarceration.” Occupy, February 13, 2015.
https://www.occupy.com/article/monitors-phones-mealsthese-5-corporations-are-quietly-making-billionsincarceration#sthash.NBh8mA4x.cTwJ5X9W.dpbs.

23.

“Correctional Facilities,” Gilbane Building Company, n.d.,
https://www.gilbaneco.com/markets/overview-2/criminaljustice/correctional-facilities/.

24.

“Government + Justice,” Hensel Phelps, n.d.,
https://www.henselphelps.com/industry/governmentjustice/.

25.

“Correctional & Judicial,” Clark Construction, n.d.,
https://www.clarkconstruction.com/ourwork/sector/correctional-judicial.

26.

Lauren Gill, “LA County Supervisors to Vote on Canceling
Jail Contract.” The Appeal, August 8, 2019,
https://theappeal.org/la-county-vote-cancel-jail-contractmccarthy/.

27.

Ruth Delaney, Ram Subramanian, Alison Shames, and
Nicholas Turner, “Reimagining Prison Web Report.” Vera
Institute of Justice, October 2018,
https://www.vera.org/reimagining-prison-web-report.

28.

Ibid.

29.

Scott Sommerdorf, “Utah Governor Gary Herbert, center,
turns dirt along with other dignitaries at the site of the new
prison.” The Salt Lake Tribune, Wednesday, August 16,
2017,
https://www.sltrib.com/news/politics/2019/04/05/newutah-prison-is/.

101

30.

Stephanie Wykstra, “The Case Against Solitary
Confinement.” Vox, April 17, 2019,
https://www.vox.com/futureperfect/2019/4/17/18305109/solitary-confinement-prisoncriminal-justice-reform.

31.

Ibid.

32.

Jean Casella and Sal Rodriguez, “What Is Solitary
Confinement?,” The Guardian, April 27, 2016,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/27/what-issolitary-confinement; Joshua Manson, “How Many People
Are in Solitary Confinement Today?,” Solitary Watch,
January 4, 2019,
https://solitarywatch.org/2019/01/04/how-many-peopleare-in-solitary-today/.

33.

“United States: Prolonged Solitary Confinement Amounts
to Psychological Torture, Says UN expert,” United Nations
Humans Rights Office of the High Commissioner, February
28, 2020,
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNew
s.aspx?LangID=E&NewsID=25633; Wykstra, "The Case
Against Solitary Confinement."; Michael Sorkin, “Drawing
the Line: Architects and Prisons.” The Nation, August 27,
2013, https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/drawingline-architects-and-prisons/.

34.

“United States: Prolonged Solitary Confinement Amounts
to Psychological Torture, says UN expert,” United Nations
Humans Rights Office of the High Commissioner.

35.

Rachael Slade, "Is There Such a Thing as "Good" Prison
Design?" Architectural Digest, April 30, 2018,
https://www.architecturaldigest.com/story/is-there-such-athing-as-good-prison-design.

36.

R.A. De Leso, “Solitary Confinement is Shockingly Small” in
Wykstra, “The Case Against Solitary Confinement.”

37.

David N. Pellow, Jasmine Vazin, Harrison Ashby, Michaela
A. Austin, Sage Kime, Shannon Mcalpine, and Yue (Rachel)
Shen, "Environmental Injustice Behind Bars: Toxic
Imprisonment in America." September 2018,
https://gejp.es.ucsb.edu/sites/secure.lsit.ucsb.edu.envs.d7
_gejp2/files/sitefiles/publication/PEJP%20Annual%20Report%20
2018.pdf.

38.

Daniel Moattar, "U.S. Scraps Prison Plan for Abandoned
Coal Mine," DW, June 19, 2019,
https://www.dw.com/en/us-scraps-prison-plan-forabandoned-coal-mine/a-49258760.

39.

Pellow, et al, "Environmental Injustice Behind Bars: Toxic
Imprisonment in America."

40.

Panagioti Tsolkas, "Florida County Votes Against New Jail
on Former EPA Superfund Site, Opts to Stay in Flood
Zone." Prison Legal News, February 8, 2017,
https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2017/feb/8/florida
-county-votes-against-new-jail-former-epa-superfund-siteopts-stay-flood-zone/.

41.

Eli Hager, "Hal Rogers Wants a Prison in Letcher County.
The Trump Administration Has Doubts." Lexington Herald
Leader, November 8, 2017,
https://www.kentucky.com/news/state/article183540796.ht
ml.

42.

Sam Adams, "Feds, Anti-prison Forces Reach Pact to
Dismiss Lawsuit." The Mountain Eagle, August 21, 2019,

Notes

https://www.themountaineagle.com/articles/feds-antiprison-forces-reach-pact-to-dismiss-lawsuit/.
43.

Candice Bernd, Zoe Loftus-Farren, and Maureen Nandini
Mitra, "America's Toxic Prisons: The Environmental
Injustices of Mass Incarceration." Earth Island Journal,
https://earthisland.org/journal/americas-toxic-prisons/.

44.

Ibid.

45.

Michael Waters, “How Prisons are Poisoning Their
Inmates.” The Outline, July 23, 2018,
https://theoutline.com/post/5410/toxic-prisons-fayettetacoma-contaminated?zd=1&zi=3o6kc4f2.

46.

Lauren McGaughy, "Texas' Prison Heat Bill a 'Cop Out'
Because it No Longer Forces Units to Lower Temps,
Advocates Say." The Dallas Morning News, August 23,
2019,
https://www.dallasnews.com/news/politics/2019/04/18/tex
as-prison-heat-bill-a-cop-out-because-it-no-longer-forcesunits-to-lower-temps-advocates-say/.

47.

Wes Venteicher, "Bacteria That Killed California Inmate
Found to Be Widespread in Stockton Prison." The
Sacramento Bee, April 17, 2019,
https://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/thestate-worker/article229379304.html.

48.

"Legionnaires Disease Cause and Spread," Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, January 15, 2020,
https://www.cdc.gov/legionella/about/causestransmission.html.

49.

Francisco Aviles Pino, "Los Angeles County Votes to Stop
Construction of New Jail-Like Facility, Adding Momentum
to National Abolition Movement." The Intercept, August 22,
2019, https://theintercept.com/2019/08/22/los-angelescounty-mental-health-facility-abolition/.

50.

Mai, et al, "Broken Ground: Why America Keeps Building
More Jails and What It Can Do Instead."

51.

“Constructing the New Utah State Correctional Facility,"
Layton Okland - A Joint Venture, n.d.,
http://laytonokland.com/index.htm.

52.

Nate Carlisle, "New Utah Prison is Running About 20%
Over Budget, 18 Months Behind Schedule, and Will Hold
Fewer Inmates Than Planned." The Salt Lake Tribune, April
5, 2019,
https://www.sltrib.com/news/politics/2019/04/05/newutah-prison-is/.

53.

Mathew Burciaga, "'Professional Negligence' Led to Delays
on Northern Branch Jail Project, County Lawsuit Claims."
Lompoc Record, August 6, 2019,
https://lompocrecord.com/news/local/crime-andcourts/professional-negligence-led-to-delays-on-northernbranch-jail-project/article_a25a755c-fa39-5dba-9ee262ddb785656a.html.

54.

"Juvenile Hall Replacement Project," Humboldt County,
n.d., https://humboldtgov.org/2307/Juvenile-HallReplacement-Project; Shomik Mukherjee, "Juvenile Hall
Construction Stalled as Humboldt County Talks New
Terms." Times-Standard, October 5, 2019,
https://www.times-standard.com/2019/10/04/juvenile-hallconstruction-stalled-as-humboldt-county-talks-new-terms/.

55.

Raphael Sperry, "Is ‘Justice Architecture’ Just?," Aggregate,
March 6, 2015. http://www.we-aggregate.org/piece/isjustice-architecture-just.

102

Operations + Management
1.

Erik Larson, “Captive Company.” Inc., June 1, 1988,
https://www.inc.com/magazine/19880601/803.html.

14.

Elk and Sloan, “The Hidden History of ALEC and Prison
Labor.”

2.

Kelsey Oliver, “Incarceration Nation: Prison Overcrowding
and Government Attitudes Will Benefit the Industry.”
IBISWorld, December 2018.

15.

3.

E. Ann Carson, “Prisoners in 2018.” Bureau of Justice
Statistics, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Dept. of Justice,
April 2020, https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p18.pdf.

“Profiting from Public Dollars: How ALEC and Its Members
Promote Privatization of Government Services and Assets,”
In the Public Interest, 2012,
https://www.inthepublicinterest.org/wpcontent/uploads/ALEC_report_FINAL.pdf.

16.

Elk and Sloan, “The Hidden History of ALEC and Prison
Labor.”

17.

Eisen, Inside Private Prisons, p. 25.

18.

Philip Mattera, Mafruza Khan, and Stephen Nathan,
“Corrections Corporation of America: A Critical Look at Its
First Twenty Years.” Prison Policy Initiative, May 2003,
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/grassrootsleadership/
cca.pdf; Dan Pens, “Prison Realty/CCA Verges on
Bankruptcy.” Prison Legal News, July 15, 2000,
https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2000/jul/15/priso
n-realtycca-verges-on-bankruptcy/.

19.

“Prison Realty Announces Restructuring Led by Fortress
and Blackstone Investor Group,” CoreCivic, December 27,
1999, http://ir.corecivic.com/news-releases/news-releasedetails/prison-realty-announces-restructuring-led-fortressand.

20.

“Fatal Mismanagement at Ohio CCA Prison,” Prison Legal
News, June 15, 1998,
https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/1998/jun/15/fatalmismanagement-at-ohio-cca-prison/.

21.

Mattera, et al. “Corrections Corporation”; Pens, “Prison
Realty/CCA.”

22.

Eisen, Inside Private Prisons, p. 147.

23.

Mattera, et al. “Corrections Corporation”; Pens, “Prison
Realty/CCA.”

24.

Eisen, Inside Private Prisons, p. 148.

25.

Ibid.

26.

Ibid.

27.

Eileen Sullivan, “Obama Administration to End Use of
Private Prisons.” PBS NewsHour, August 18, 2016,
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/obamaadministration-end-use-private-prisons.

28.

“Statement by Secretary Jeh C. Johnson on Establishing a
Review of Privatized Immigration Detention,” Department
of Homeland Security, August 29, 2016,
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2016/08/29/statementsecretary-jeh-c-johnson-establishing-review-privatizedimmigration.

29.

Hanna Kozlowska, “The American Private Prison Industry
Has Scored Another Big Win with the US Government.”
Quartz, December 1, 2016, https://qz.com/850810/thedepartment-of-homeland-security-wants-to-keep-usingprivate-prisons-for-immigration-detention/.

30.

Jeff Sommer, “Trump’s Win Gives Stocks in Private Prison
Companies a Reprieve.” The New York Times, December
3, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/03/yourmoney/trumps-win-gives-stocks-in-private-prisoncompanies-a-reprieve.html.

31.

“Private Prison Company The GEO Group’s Pay to Play,”
Campaign Legal Center, December 8, 2017,
https://campaignlegal.org/cases-actions/private-prisoncompany-geo-groups-pay-play.

32.

Sharita Gruberg, “Trump’s Executive Order Rewards
Private Prison Campaign Donors.” Center for American
Progress, June 28, 2018,

4.

5.

6.

7.

Monsy Alvarado, et al., “‘These People Are Profitable’:
Under Trump, Private Prisons Are Cashing in on ICE
Detainees.” USA Today, December 29, 2019,
https://www.usatoday.com/indepth/news/nation/2019/12/19/ice-detention-privateprisons-expands-under-trumpadministration/4393366002/.
Cody Mason, “Too Good to Be True: Private Prisons in
America.” The Sentencing Project, 2012,
https://sentencingproject.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/01/Too-Good-to-be-True-PrivatePrisons-in-America.pdf.
“2018 ESG Report,” CoreCivic, 2018,
https://www.corecivic.com/hubfs/_files/2018ESGReport.pdf; Shane Bauer, American Prison: A
Reporter’s Undercover Journey into the Business of
Punishment. New York: Penguin Books, 2019, p. 21.
Shane Bauer, “Today It Locks up Immigrants. But
CoreCivic’s Roots Lie in the Brutal Past of America’s
Prisons” Mother Jones, October 1, 2018,
https://www.motherjones.com/crimejustice/2018/09/corecivic-private-prison-shane-bauerbook/.

8.

Ibid.

9.

Michael Rigby, “Wackenhut Changes Name to Geo Group,
Politics Remain the Same.” Prison Legal News, June 15,
2004,
https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2004/jun/15/wack
enhut-changes-name-to-geo-group-politics-remain-thesame/; “Geo Group History Timeline,” The GEO Group,
n.d., https://www.geogroup.com/history_timeline.

10.

11.

12.

13.

Brigette Sarabi and Edwin Bender, “The Prison Payoff: The
Role of Politics and Private Prisons in the Incarceration
Boom.” Western Prison Project, November 2000,
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/Prison_Payoff_Report
_WPP_2000.pdf.
Rebecca Cooper et al., “Hidden Corporate Profits in the
U.S. Prison System: The Unorthodox Policy-Making of the
American Legislative Exchange Council.” Contemporary
Justice Review 19, no. 3, June 18, 2016, p. 380–400,
https://doi.org/10.1080/10282580.2016.1185949.
Mike Elk and Bob Sloan, “The Hidden History of ALEC and
Prison Labor.” The Nation, August 1, 2011,
https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/hidden-historyalec-and-prison-labor/; “Ending the School-to-Prison
Pipeline: Hearing before the Subcommittee on
Constitution, Civil Rights and Human Rights of the
Committee on the Judiciary,” United States Senate, One
Hundred Twelfth Congress, Second Session, 2012,
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG112shrg86166/pdf/CHRG-112shrg86166.pdf.
Lauren-Brooke Eisen, Inside Private Prisons: An American
Dilemma in the Age of Mass Incarceration. New York:
Columbia University Press, 2019, p. 24.

Notes

103

https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/ne
ws/2018/06/28/452912/trumps-executive-order-rewardsprivate-prison-campaign-donors/.
33.

Amy Brittain and Drew Harwell, “Private-Prison Giant,
Resurgent in Trump Era, Gathers at President’s
Resort.” The Washington Post, October 25, 2017,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/with-businessbooming-under-trump-private-prison-giant-gathers-atpresidents-resort/2017/10/25/b281d32c-adee-11e7-a908a3470754bbb9_story.html.

34.

Charles P. Pierce, “It Sounds Like Jeff Sessions Is Planning
on Locking a Lot of People Up.” Esquire, January 30, 2018,
https://www.esquire.com/newspolitics/politics/a15926655/sessions-private-prisons/.

35.

“Private Prison Company The GEO Group’s Pay to Play.”

36.

37.

38.

39.

40.

Liliana Segura, “The First Step Act Could Be a Big Gift to
CoreCivic and the Private Prison Industry.” The Intercept,
December 22, 2018,
https://theintercept.com/2018/12/22/first-step-actcorecivic-private-prisons/.
Rick Paulas, “America’s Private-Prison Industry Has Always
Been All Right.” Pacific Standard, May 24, 2017,
https://psmag.com/economics/since-the-19th-century.
“CoreCivic 2019 Annual Report,” CoreCivic, February
2020, http://ir.corecivic.com/static-files/78f48d3d-5df144e2-ba20-fce435193496; “The GEO Group 2019 Annual
Report,” The GEO Group, February 2020,
http://investors.geogroup.com/Cache/IRCache/e8834b22
-d61e-72a5-e0925fdb26d2c9e4.PDF?O=PDF&T=&Y=&D=&FID=e8834b22
-d61e-72a5-e092-5fdb26d2c9e4&iid=4144107.
Lauren-Brooke Eisen, “Are Private Prisons in Trouble?”
Brennan Center for Justice, November 18, 2019,
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/researchreports/are-private-prisons-trouble.
Alvarado, et al., “‘These People Are Profitable’”;
“Detention Management,” Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, Department of Homeland Security, 2016,
https://www.ice.gov/detention-management;
“Immigration Detention: An American Business,” Worth
Rises, June 2018, https://worthrises.org/immigration.

41.

Oliver, “Incarceration Nation,” p. 3.

42.

Eric Schlosser, “The Prison-Industrial Complex (Part Two).”
The Atlantic, September 1997,
https://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/issues/98dec/pris2
.htm.

43.

“CoreCivic 2019 Annual Report;” “The GEO Group 2019
Annual Report.”

44.

Christopher Zoukis, “From Cages to the Community:
Prison Profiteers and the Treatment Industrial Complex.”
Prison Legal
News, March 6, 2018,
https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2018/mar/6/cages
-community-prison-profiteers-and-treatment-industrialcomplex/.

45.
46.

47.

Oliver, “Incarceration Nation,” p. 27.
Kara Gotsch and Vinay Basti, “Capitalizing on Mass
Incarceration U.S. Growth in Private Prisons.” The
Sentencing Project, July 2018,
https://www.sentencingproject.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/07/Capitalizing-on-MassIncarceration.pdf?eType=EmailBlastContent&eId=35b802
b2-5444-4a66-9f7c-a141a75bcaf2.
“CoreCivic 2019 Annual Report.”

Notes

48.

Ibid.

49.

“The Banks That Finance Private Prison Companies.” In The
Public Interest, November 2016,
https://www.inthepublicinterest.org/wpcontent/uploads/ITPI_BanksPrivatePrisonCompanies_Nov
2016.pdf.

50.

Alvarado et al., “‘These People Are Profitable.”

51.

“The GEO Group 2019 Annual Report.”

52.

“The GEO Group and Cornell Companies Announce $685
Million Merger.” BusinessWire, April 19, 2010,
https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20100419006
086/en/GEO-Group-Cornell-Companies-Announce-685Million.

53.

“The Banks That Finance Private Prison Companies.”

54.

Oliver, “Incarceration Nation,” p. 27.

55.

“Newsroom,” MTC, n.d.,
https://www.mtctrains.com/about-us/newsroom/.

56.

“The GEO Group 2018 Annual Report,” The GEO Group,
February 2029,
http://www.snl.com/interactive/newlookandfeel/4144107/
GEOGroup2018AR.pdf.

57.

“CoreCivic 2019 Annual Report.”

58.

Oliver, “Incarceration Nation.”

59.

“LaSalle Southwest Corrections,” LaSalle Southwest
Corrections, n.d., http://www.lasallecorrections.com/.

60.

“DHS Awards AGS Contract to Support Krome Detention
Center,” Akima Global Services, May 13, 2014,
http://www.akimaglobalservices.com/dhs-awards-akimaglobal-services-contract-to-support-krome-detentioncenter/.

61.

Helen Warrell, “Future of Problem Prisons in Question as
G4S Contract Is Stripped.” Financial Times, April 3, 2019,
https://www.ft.com/content/3eacae52-5628-11e9-a3db1fe89bedc16e.

62.

“Sodexo,” American Friends Service Committee, 2018,
https://investigate.afsc.org/company/sodexo.

63.

Ibid.

64.

Timothy Williams, “Inside a Private Prison: Blood, Suicide
and Poorly Paid Guards.” The New York Times, April 3,
2018,
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/03/us/mississippiprivate-prison-abuse.html.

65.

“Buying Influence: How Private Prison Companies Expand
Their Control of America’s Criminal Justice System.” In the
Public Interest, October 2016,
http://www.inthepublicinterest.org/wpcontent/uploads/ITPI_BuyingInfluence_Oct2016.pdf.

66.

“Board of Directors,” The GEO Group, n.d.,
https://www.geogroup.com/board_of_directors.

67.

Bauer, American Prison, p. 48.

68.

Ibid, p. 67.

69.

Ibid, p. 68.

70.

Ibid, p. 48.

71.

Oliver, “Incarceration Nation,” p. 20; Mason, “Too Good to
Be True.”

72.

Benjamin Hart, “Shane Bauer Talks Working Undercover at
a Private Prison.” New York Magazine, September 21,
2018, https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/09/shanebauer-talks-working-undercover-at-a-private-prison.html.

73.

David Reutter, “CoreCivic Prison in Tennessee Plagued
with Problems.” Prison Legal News, January 31, 2018,

104

https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2018/jan/31/corec
ivic-prison-tennessee-plagued-problems/.
74.

Bauer, American Prison, p. 150.

75.

Nicole Flatow, “Private Prison Firm To Pay Idaho $1 Million
For False Records That Left Key Security Posts Vacant.”
Think Progress, February 6, 2014,
https://thinkprogress.org/private-prison-firm-to-payidaho-1-million-for-false-records-that-left-key-securityposts-vacant-e98358713e88/.

76.

77.

78.

“Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Monitoring of
Contract Prisons,” Office of the Inspector General, U.S.
Department of Justice, August 2016,
https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2016/e1606.pdf; Ray
Downs, “DOJ Audit Says GEO Group Misspent $3 Million
in Troubled Prison.” New Times Broward-Palm Beach, April
27, 2015, https://www.browardpalmbeach.com/news/dojaudit-says-geo-group-misspent-3-million-in-troubledprison-6942528.
Kendall Downing, “Low Pay Contributes to Staffing
Problems at Mississippi Prisons.” WLOX, August 22, 2019,
https://www.wlox.com/2019/08/23/low-pay-contributesstaffing-problems-mississippi-prisons/.
Joseph Neff and Alysia Santo, “Mississippi Prison Killings:
Five Factors Behind the Deadly Violence.” The Marshall
Project, January 8, 2020,
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/01/08/mississip
pi-prison-killings-five-factors-behind-the-deadly-violence.

79.

Ibid.

80.

Joseph Neff and Alyssia Santo, “What Happened When
This Prison Couldn’t Hire Enough Guards? It Put Gangs in
Charge.” USA Today, June 25, 2019,
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/investigations/201
9/06/25/report-mississippi-prison-guardsgangs/1552783001/.

81.

“ACLU Challenges Prison-Like Conditions at Hutto
Detention Center,” American Civil Liberties Union, n.d.,

87.

Sarah Macaraeg, “Inside a Private Prison’s $150M Deal to
Detain Immigrants in New Mexico.” New Mexico In Depth,
October 26, 2017,
http://nmindepth.com/2017/10/26/inside-a-privateprisons-150m-deal-to-detain-immigrants-in-new-mexico/.

88.

Loren Collingwood, Jason L. Morin, and Stephen Omar ElKhatib, “Expanding Carceral Markets: Detention Facilities,
ICE Contracts, and the Financial Interests of Punitive
Immigration Policy.” Race and Social Problems 10, no. 4,
July 2, 2018, p. 275–92, https://doi.org/10.1007/s12552018-9241-5.

89.

“CCA Board of Directors Authorizes REIT Conversion,”
CoreCivic, February 7, 2013, http://ir.corecivic.com/newsreleases/news-release-details/cca-board-directorsauthorizes-reit-conversion; “The GEO Group Completes
Company Restructuring and Health Care Divestiture;
Began Operating in Compliance with REIT Rules Effective
January 1, 2013,” BusinessWire, January 2, 2013,
https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20130102005
486/en/GEO-Group-Completes-Company-RestructuringHealth-Care.

90.

“An Examination of Private Financing for Correctional and
Immigration Detention Facilities.” In The Public Interest,
June 2018, https://www.inthepublicinterest.org/wpcontent/uploads/ITPI_PrivatePrisonP3s_June2018FINAL.p
df.

91.

Ibid.

92.

“The Banks Still Financing Private Prisons,” The Center for
Popular Democracy, May 3, 2019,
https://populardemocracy.org/blog/banks-still-financingprivate-prisons.

93.

“Fitch Downgrades CoreCivic’s IDR to ‘BB-’; Negative
Outlook,” Fitch Ratings, April 21, 2020,
https://www.fitchratings.com/research/non-bank-financialinstitutions/fitch-downgrades-corecivic-idr-to-bb-negativeoutlook-21-04-2020.

94.

Catherine Kim, “A Growing Number of States Are Banning
Private Prisons.” Vox, December 2019,
https://www.vox.com/policy-andpolitics/2019/12/1/20989336/private-prisons-states-banscalifonia-nevada-colorado.

95.

Sue Sturgis, “Private Prisons Form Alliance, Hire Flack from
pro-Trump Attack Group.” Facing South, November 8,
2019, https://www.facingsouth.org/2019/11/privateprisons-form-alliance-hire-flack-pro-trump-attack-group.

96.

“Three Private Prison Firms Form Advocacy Group,” The
Crime Report, October 28, 2019,
https://thecrimereport.org/2019/10/28/three-privateprison-firms-form-advocacy-group/.

97.

Aziza Kasumov, “Private Prison Companies Move to Cut
Debt as Activists Hit Home.” Financial Times, August 20,
2020, https://www.ft.com/content/7df9172d-e155-42dabc05-8299566d0273.

98.

Christopher Zoukis, “From Cages to the Community:
Prison Profiteers and the Treatment Industrial Complex.”
Prison Legal News, March 6, 2018,
https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2018/mar/6/cages
-community-prison-profiteers-and-treatment-industrialcomplex/.

99.

Maya Schenwar and Victoria Law, Prison by Any Other
Name. New York: The New Press, 2020.

https://www.aclu.org/aclu-challenges-prison-conditionshutto-detention-center.
82.

83.

84.

85.

86.

Robert Kahn, "Refugees Say Private Prison Guards
Savaged Them." Courthouse News, May 30, 2018,
https://www.courthousenews.com/refugees-say-privateprison-guards-savaged-them/.
Madison Pauly, "In 3 Months, 3 Immigrants Have Died at
This Private Detention Center." Mother Jones, June 23,
2017,
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2017/06/adelantodeath-immigration-detention-geo/.
Rebecca Plevin, “How a Private Prison Giant Has
Continued to Thrive in a State That Wants It Out.” Desert
Sun, January 25, 2020, https://www.desertsun.com/indepth/news/2020/01/24/private-prison-giant-geo-thrivescalifornia-state-wants-out/2589589001/.
Lora Adams, “State and Local Governments Opt Out of
Immigrant Detention.” Center for American Progress, July
25, 2019,
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/ne
ws/2019/07/25/472535/state-local-governments-optimmigrant-detention/; David Rubenstein and Prathpeepan
Gulasekaram, “Privatized Detention & Immigration
Federalism.” Stanford Law Review, March 11, 2019,
https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/privatizeddetention-immigration-federalism/.
“TRAC Immigration Data,” Syracuse University, 2016,
https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/222/.

Notes

105

Personnel
1.

Brett Murphy, Nick Penzenstadler, and Gina Barton, “A
Security Empire Deployed Guards with Violent Pasts
across the U.S. Some Went on to Rape, Assault or Kill.”
USA Today, March 26, 2020,
https://www.usatoday.com/indepth/news/investigations/2019/10/30/dangerousguards-low-cost-security-g-4-s/3994676002/.

2.

“1892 Homestead Strike,” AFL-CIO, n.d.,
https://aflcio.org/about/history/labor-history-events/1892homestead-strike.

3.

Jennifer Bayot, “George Wackenhut, 85, Dies; Founded
Elite Security Firm.” The New York Times, January 8, 2005,
https://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/08/business/georgewackenhut-85-dies-founded-elite-security-firm.html; Beryl
Lipton, “From FBI Reject to Private Warlord: The Rise of
George Wackenhut.” MuckRock, January 10, 2017,
https://www.muckrock.com/news/archives/2017/jan/10/g
eorge-wackenhut-fbi/.

4.

5.

6.

7.

Brett Murphy, Nick Penzenstadler, and Gina Barton, “Five
Takeaways from Our Investigation into the World’s Largest
Private Security Company.” USA Today, December 15,
2019, https://www.usatoday.com/indepth/news/2019/10/30/five-takeaways-frominvestigation-into-g-4-s/4057981002/.
“Securitas and Pinkerton to Form World Leader in
Security,” Securitas, February 22, 1999,
https://www.securitas.com/media/pressreleases/Securitasand-Pinkerton-to-Form-World-Leader-in-Security/.
Matt McKillop and Alex Boucher, “Aging Prison
Populations Drive Up Costs.” The Pew Charitable Trusts,
February 20, 2018,
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-andanalysis/articles/2018/02/20/aging-prison-populationsdrive-up-costs.
“Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Medical Staffing
Challenges,” The Department of Justice Office of the
Inspector General, March 2016,
https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2016/e1602.pdf; Deborah
Shelton, Bill Barta, and Louise Reagan, “Correctional Nurse
Competency and Quality Care Outcomes.” Journal for
Evidence-Based Practice in Correctional Health 2, no. 1,
November 2018,
https://opencommons.uconn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?arti
cle=1019&context=jepch.

16.

“U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Fiscal Year
2019 Enforcement and Removal Operations Report,” U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 2019,
https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Docum
ent/2019/eroReportFY2019.pdf.

17.

Ibid.

18.

Heather Rohrlich and Justin Timmons, “The US Border
Patrol Is Fast-Tracking a $50 Million Job Due to the
Shutdown.” Quartz, January 24, 2019.
https://qz.com/1531702/the-us-border-patrol-is-fasttracking-a-50-million-job-due-to-theshutdown/#:~:text=This%20week%2C%20CBP%20said%2
0in.

19.

“Corrections Officers and Jailers,” U.S. Bureau Of Labor
Statistics, July 6, 2020,
https://www.bls.gov/ooh/protective-service/correctionalofficers.htm; “Corrections Officers and Bailiffs,” U.S.
Bureau Of Labor Statistics, May 2019,
https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes333012.htm#s.

20.

William Langewiesche, “The Chaos Company.” Vanity Fair,
March 18, 2014,
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/business/2014/04/g4sglobal-security-company.

21.

“2019 DOJ BOP Contract Lists,” USA Spending, 2019.

22.

“2019 DOJ DHS Contract Lists,” USA Spending, 2019.

23.

Timothy Landhuis, “Largest Healthcare Staffing Firms in
the United States.” Staffing Industry Analysts, August 31,
2018, https://healthcarousel.com/wpcontent/uploads/2018/09/Largest-Healthcare-StaffingFirms-in-the-US-20180831.pdf.

24.

“Online Corrections Training,” CorrectionsOne Academy,
2020, https://www.correctionsoneacademy.com/.

25.

“Training for Corrections Professionals,” National Institute
of Corrections, March 7, 2017, https://nicic.gov/training.

26.

“Mock Prison Riot 2020,” Mock Prison Riot, n.d.,
http://www.mockprisonriot.org/.

27.

Scott Morris, “Police Policy for Sale.” The Appeal, February
2, 2019, https://theappeal.org/lexipol-police-policycompany/.

28.

“Kronos Incorporated,” PrivCo, n.d.,
https://system.privco.com/company/kronos-incorporated.

29.

“Optimize Staffing Using Kronos TeleStaff,” Kronos, n.d.,
https://www.kronos.com/customers/californiadepartment-corrections-and-rehabilitation.

30.

“Corrections | Operational Workforce Management
Software,” Orion Communications, n.d.
https://www.orioncom.com/corrections.

31.

“Best-in-Class Jail Scheduling and Workforce
Management,” InTime, n.d.
https://intime.com/industries/corrections/.

32.

David Reutter, “Georgia Medical Prison Rife with
Dysfunction, Abuse and Dilapidated Conditions.” Prison
Legal News, September 3, 2018,
https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2018/sep/3/georg
ia-medical-prison-rife-dysfunction-abuse-and-dilapidatedconditions/.

8.

Shelton, et al. “Correctional Nurse Competency.”

9.

City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989).

10.

“A Jailhouse Lawyer’s Manual: Your Right To Be Free From
Assault By Prison Guards And Other Prisoners.” May 2017,
http://jlm.law.columbia.edu/files/2017/05/36.-Ch.-24.pdf.

11.

Ingrid Eagly and Joanna Schwartz, “The Privatization of
Police Policymaking.” Texas Law Review 96, no. 5, n.d.,
https://texaslawreview.org/lexipol/.

12.

“Corrections Officer Salary,” CorrectionalOfficerEDU.org,
2011, https://www.correctionalofficeredu.org/salaries/.

13.

Anna Amir, “Stand Guard: Electronic Security Systems Will
Pose A Threat To Industry Revenue Growth.” IBISWorld,
November 2018.

14.

Murphy, “A Security Empire.”

33.

Ibid.

15.

“G4S Federal Contracts,” U.S. General Services
Administration, n.d.,
https://beta.sam.gov/search?keywords=g4s&sort=relevance&index=&is_active=true&page=2&organization_
id=100011942.

34.

Danny Robbins, “State Official Failed to Delve into Prison
Doctor’s Troubled Past.” Atlanta Journal Constitution, July
13, 2018, https://www.ajc.com/news/state--regional-govt-politics/state-official-failed-delve-into-prison-doctortroubled-past/rjC8HlEa0ZjfRAVAP2BtzH/.

Notes

106

35.

Ibid.

36.

“Online Corrections Training,” CorrectionsOne Academy,
n.d., https://www.correctionsoneacademy.com/.

37.

Eagly and Schwartz, “The Privatization of Police
Policymaking.”

38.

“Online Corrections Training.”

39.

“The NIC Learning Center,” National Institute of
Corrections, n.d.,
https://nic.learn.com/learncenter.asp?id=178409&page=1
&CookieTest=CookiesAllowed.

40.

Morris, “Police Policy for Sale.”

41.

Evan Hill, “The Mock Prison Riot: Where Guards Play Jail.”
Al Jazeera America, May 20, 2014,

http://america.aljazeera.com/multimedia/2014/5/mockprison-riot.html.
42.

Ibid; Dave Gilson, “My So-Called Riot.” Mother Jones,
December 2009,
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2009/12/my-socalled-riot/.

43.

Gilson, “My So-Called Riot.”

44.

“Kronos for Public Safety: Corrections,” Kronos, 2019,
https://www.kronos.com/resource/download/33896;
Wendy Sawyer, “How Much Do Incarcerated People Earn
in Each State?” Prison Policy Initiative, 2017,
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2017/04/10/wages/.

45.

“Kronos for Public Safety: Corrections.”

15.

Andrew Ford, “Florida Sheriff Reintroduces Chain Gang.”
USA Today, May 2, 2013,
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/05/02
/brevard-county-sheriff-chain-gang/2130335/.

16.

Brent Staples, “The Chain Gang Show.” The New York
Times, September 17, 1995,
https://www.nytimes.com/1995/09/17/magazine/thechain-gang-show.html.

17.

“Factories with Fences.”

18.

Gerard Robinson and Elizabeth English, “The Second
Chance Pell Pilot Program: A Historical Overview,”
American Enterprise Institute, September 2017,
https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/TheSecond-Chance-Pell-Pilot-Program.pdf.

19.

Mike Elk and Bob Sloan, “The Hidden History of ALEC and
Prison Labor.” The Nation, August 1, 2011,
https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/hidden-historyalec-and-prison-labor/.

Programs + Labor
1.

Julia O'Donoghue, “Sheriff: Louisiana's early release of
prisoners means loss of 'the ones you can work'.” The
Times-Picayune, October 13, 2017,
https://www.nola.com/news/politics/article_50001c2cc3c4-528e-9bb2-210b9f30f964.html.

2.

“Black Codes and Pig Laws,” PBS, 2017,
https://www.pbs.org/tpt/slavery-by-anothername/themes/black-codes/.

3.

Angela Davis, Are Prisons Obsolete? New York: Seven
Stories Press, 2003, https://collectiveliberation.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/01/Are_Prisons_Obsolete_Angela_
Davis.pdf.

4.

Matthew J. Mancini, “Race, Economics, and the
Abandonment of Convict Leasing.” The Journal of Negro
History 63, no. 4, October 1978, p. 339–52,
https://doi.org/10.2307/2716851.

5.

“Convict Lease System,” University of Houston, 2019,
http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/disp_textbook.cfm?smtid
=2&psid=3179.

20.

6.

Blake Randol, “Auburn System.” The Encyclopedia of
Criminology and Criminal Justice, January 22, 2014,
https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118517383.wbeccj455.

“Prison Industry Enhancement Certification Program,” U. S.
Department of Justice, March 2004,
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/203483.pdf.

21.

7.

“Convict Leasing,” PBS, 2017,
https://www.pbs.org/tpt/slavery-by-anothername/themes/convict-leasing/.

Jerome G. Miller, “The Debate on Rehabilitating Criminals:
Is It True That Nothing Works?,” Prison Policy Initiative,
March 1989,
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/rehab.html.

8.

“Prison Industries Enhancement Certification Program,”
American Legal History, n.d.,
http://moglen.law.columbia.edu/twiki/bin/view/AmLegalH
ist/SaarWarnerProject.

22.

9.

“PIECO Final Guideline,” National Correctional Industries
Association, n.d., https://www.nationalcia.org/piecp-finalguideline.

Travis C. Pratt, Jacinta M. Gau, and Travis W. Franklin, Key
Ideas in Criminology and Criminal Justice. Thousand Oaks,
CA: Sage Publications, 2011, p. 71–85,
https://us.sagepub.com/sites/default/files/upmbinaries/36811_6.pdf.

23.

Ashley A. Smith, “Colleges Push for More Resources to
Support Prison Education Programs.” Inside Higher Ed,
November 6, 2018,
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2018/11/06/colleg
es-push-more-resources-support-prison-educationprograms.

24.

“Federal Bureau of Prisons Education Program
Assessment Final Report,” Department of Justice - Federal
Bureau of Prisons, November 29, 2016,
https://www.justice.gov/archives/dag/page/file/914026/d
ownload.

25.

Richard P. Seiter and Karen R. Kadela, “Prisoner Reentry:
What Works, What Does Not, and What Is
Promising.” Crime & Delinquency 49, no. 3, July 2003, p.
360–88, https://doi.org/10.1177/0011128703049003002.

10.

“Factories with Fences: 75 Years of Changing Lives,”
UNICOR, n.d.,
https://www.unicor.gov/publications/corporate/CATMC11
01_C.pdf.

11.

Michael J. Berens and Mike Baker, “Broken Prison Labor
Program Fails to Keep Promises, Costs Millions.” The
Seattle Times, December 13, 2014,
http://projects.seattletimes.com/2014/prison-labor/1/.

12.

Wendy Sawyer, “How Much Do Incarcerated People Earn
in Each State?” Prison Policy Initiative, April 10, 2017,
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2017/04/10/wages/.

13.

Ibid.

14.

Worth Rises, unpublished data model.

Notes

107

26.

Matthew Clarke, “Prison Education Programs Threatened.”
Prison Legal News, May 19, 2014,
https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2014/may/19/pris
on-education-programs-threatened/.

27.

“12,000 Incarcerated Students to Enroll in Postsecondary
Educational and Training Programs Through Education
Department’s New Second Chance Pell Pilot Program,”
U.S. Department of Education, June 24, 2016,
https://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/12000incarcerated-students-enroll-postsecondary-educationaland-training-programs-through-education-departmentsnew-second-chance-pell-pilot-program.

28.

Mack Finkel and Wanda Bertram, “More States Are Signing
Harmful ‘Free Prison Tablet’ Contracts.” Prison Policy
Initiative, March 7, 2019,
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2019/03/07/freetablets/.

29.

Wendy Sawyer and Peter Wagner, “Mass Incarceration:
The Whole Pie 2019.” Prison Policy Initiative, March 19,
2019, https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2019.html.

30.

Whitney Benns, “American Slavery, Reinvented.” The
Atlantic, September 21, 2015,
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/09/pri
son-labor-in-america/406177/.

31.

“2006 Awards -- Life Skills for State and Local Prisoners
Program,” U.S. Department of Education, August 1, 2006,
https://www2.ed.gov/programs/lifeskills/2006awards.html
.; “Corrections & Reentry,” CrimeSolutions, National
Institute of Justice, n.d.,
https://www.crimesolutions.gov/TopicDetails.aspx?ID=18
1.

32.

Lois M. Davis, et al., “Evaluating the Effectiveness of
Correctional Education.” Rand Corporation, 2013, p. 33;

33.

Christopher Zoukis, “The Second Step: Invest in Prison
Education Programs, Reinstate Pell Grants.” Prison Legal
News, July 2019,
https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2019/jul/2/second
-step-invest-prison-education-programs-reinstate-pellgrants/.

34.

35.

“Prison Education: Guide to College Degrees for Inmates
and Ex-Offenders,” The Best Schools, July 9, 2019,
https://thebestschools.org/magazine/prison-inmateeducation-guide/.
Kevin Rashid Johnson, “Prison Labor Is Modern Slavery.
I’ve Been Sent to Solitary for Speaking Out.” The Guardian,
August 23, 2018,
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/aug/2
3/prisoner-speak-out-american-slave-labor-strike.

36.

Sawyer, “How Much Do Incarcerated People Earn in Each
State?”

37.

Berens and Baker, “Broken Prison Labor Program.”

38.

Sawyer, “How Much Do Incarcerated People Earn in Each
State?”

39.

Ibid.

40.

Gary Mohr and Gayle Bickle, “An Intermediate Outcome
Evaluation of the Thinking for a Change Program.” Ohio
Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, 2013,
https://www.drc.ohio.gov/Portals/0/Planning%20and%20E
valuations/Eval_ThinkingforaChange.pdf?ver=2016-08-02132320-567.

41.

“Prison Reform: Reducing Recidivism by Strengthening the
Federal Bureau of Prisons,” U.S. Department of Justice,
March 6, 2017, https://www.justice.gov/archives/prisonreform; “Federal Bureau of Prisons Education Program

Notes

Assessment Final Report,” Department of Justice - Federal
Bureau of Prisons, November 29, 2016,
https://www.justice.gov/archives/dag/page/file/914026/d
ownload.
42.

“Moral Reconation Therapy - MRT Facilitator Training COST PROPOSAL,” Correctional Counseling, Inc., 2018,
https://www.ccimrt.com/wpcontent/uploads/2018/07/New-Cost-Estimate-for-MRTJune-2018.pdf.

43.

Brian Belardi, “McGraw-Hill Education Expands
Accessibility for Adult Ed Test Preparation Tools with New
Offline and Spanish Offerings.” McGraw Hill Education,
April 23, 2015,
https://investors.mheducation.com/investor-news/pressrelease-details/2015/McGraw-Hill-Education-ExpandsAccessibility-for-Adult-Ed-Test-Preparation-Tools-withNew-Offline-and-Spanish-Offerings/default.aspx.

44.

“Paxen Publishing Completes the Purchase of Houghton
Mifflin Harcourt’s Adult Education Assets,” Paxen
Publishing, April 9, 2018,
https://www.paxenpublishing.com/2018/05/paxenpublishing-completes-the-purchase-of-houghton-mifflinharcourt-adults-education-assets/.

45.

Partnerships Between Community Colleges and Prisons
Providing Workforce Education and Training to Reduce
Recidivism,” U.S. Department of Education, March 2009,
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ovae/pi/AdultEd/p
rison-cc-partnerships_2009.pdf.

46.

“Inmate Services - Education,” JPay, Inc., n.d.,
https://www.jpay.com/Education.aspx.; “GTL Unveils
Education Management Offering for Corrections
Professionals and Inmates,” GTL, July 27, 2016,
https://www.gtl.net/gtl-unveils-education-managementoffering-for-corrections-professionals-and-inmates/.

47.

Megan Rose Dickey, “Edovo Raises $9 Million to Provide
Incarcerated People with Tablet-Based Education.”
TechCrunch, April 8, 2018,
https://techcrunch.com/2018/04/08/edovo-raises-9million-to-provide-incarcerated-people-with-tablet-basededucation/.

48.

“American Prison Data Systems (APDS): Best-in-Class
Education Technology,” APDS, 2018,
https://apdscorporate.com/.

49.

Mike Baker and Michael J. Berens, “Why License Plates
Have Cost Us So Much.” The Seattle Times, December 15,
2014, http://projects.seattletimes.com/2014/prisonlabor/3/.

50.

Steve Rendle, “Modern Slavery Statement.” VF
Corporation, October 2019, https://www.vfc.com/modernslavery-statement.

51.

“NCIA Corporate Members,” NCIA, n.d.,
https://www.nationalcia.org/corporate-members.

52.

“Our History,” Haystack Mountain Inc., n.d.,
https://haystackmountaincheese.com/our-story/.

53.

Joel Millman, “Captive Labor on the Farm.” The Wall Street
Journal, October 18, 2011,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204774
604576630972860034248.

54.

John Washington, “Mike Bloomberg Exploited Prison
Labor to Make 2020 Presidential Campaign Phone Calls.”
The Intercept, December 24, 2019,
https://theintercept.com/2019/12/24/mike-bloomberg2020-prison-labor/.

55.

Grant Duwe, “The Use and Impact of Correctional
Programming for Inmates on Pre-and Post-Release

108

Outcomes.” National Institute of Justice, June 2017,
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/250476.pdf.
56.

“Corrections & Reentry Programs,” National Institute of
Justice Crime Solutions, n.d.,
https://www.crimesolutions.gov/TopicDetails.aspx?ID=31.

57.

Duwe, “The Use and Impact of Correctional
Programming.”

58.

Chris Hansen, “Cognitive-Behavioral Interventions: Where
They Come From and What They Do.” Federal Probation
72 no. 2, n.d.,
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/72_2_6_0.pdf;
“Rules Are Made to Be Followed Workbook,” Correctional
Counseling, Inc., 2020,
https://www.ccimrt.com/product/rules-are-made-to-befollowed-workbook/.

59.

60.

Matthew Makarios, “Program Profile: Thinking for a
Change.” National Institute of Justice Crime Solutions, May
4, 2012,
https://crimesolutions.ojp.gov/programdetails?id=242.
Hansen, “Cognitive-Behavioral Interventions.”; Duwe, “The
Use and Impact of Correctional Programming.”

61.

Hansen, “Cognitive-Behavioral Interventions.”

62.

Ibid.

63.

Ibid.

64.

Staff, “W. Va. Prisons Offer Inmate Tablets.” The RegisterHerald, October 25, 2019, https://www.registerherald.com/news/w-va-prisons-offer-inmatetablets/article_dfb530d0-a408-5695-aff83ef26fe9a018.html; C.J. Ciaramella, “West Virginia
Inmates Will Be Charged by the Minute to Read E-Books
on Tablets.” Reason, November 22, 2019,
https://reason.com/2019/11/22/west-virginia-inmates-willbe-charged-by-the-minute-to-read-e-books-on-tablets/.

65.

At an average reading of time of 2 minutes per page, a
300-page book would cost $30.00 per book. To pay
$30.00 at a wage of $0.04 per hour would require 750
hours of work, or about 4 months of labor.

66.

Finkel and Bertram, “More States Are Signing Harmful
‘Free Prison Tablet’ Contracts.”

67.

Whitney Kimball, “Bloodsucking Prison Telecom Is
Scamming Inmates With ‘Free’ Tablets.” Gizmodo,
November 26, 2019, https://gizmodo.com/bloodsuckingprison-telecom-is-scamming-inmates-with-fr-1840056757.

68.

69.

Michelle Phelps, “The Return of Rehabilitation?
Educational Programs for Prisoners Remain Inadequate.”
The Society Pages, 2017,
https://thesocietypages.org/specials/the-return-ofrehabilitation-educational-programs-for-prisoners-remaininadequate/.
Hanna Kozlowska, “US Prisoners Are Going on Strike to
Protest a Massive Forced Labor System.” Quartz,
September 9, 2016, https://qz.com/777415/anunprecedented-prison-strike-hopes-to-change-the-fate-ofthe-900000-americans-trapped-in-an-exploitative-laborsystem.

70.

“Our History,” Haystack Mountain Inc.

71.

Alexia Fernández Campbell, “Prison Strike 2018: Federal
Prisoners Work Factory Jobs for Much Less than the
Minimum Wage.” Vox, August 24, 2018,
https://www.vox.com/2018/8/24/17768438/nationalprison-strike-factory-labor.

72.

Makarios, “Program Profile.”

73.

Julie Goodridge et al., “Prison Labor in the United States:
An Investor Perspective.” Northstar Asset Management,

Notes

April 2018,
https://missioninvestors.org/sites/default/files/resources/P
rison%20Labor%20in%20the%20United%20States%20%20An%20Investor%20Perspective.pdf.
74.

Ibid.

75.

“Prison Industry Enhancement Certification Program,” n.d.,
https://4c99dc08-46a7-4bd9-b99048103d668bb3.filesusr.com/ugd/74ff44_663948d99c994
9fe8e8a5afaf8d87ae9.pdf.

76.

"Seating," Cornhusker State Industries, n.d.,
https://csi.nebraska.gov/products/seating. 63 PIECP
workers get paid $188,403 per quarter in gross wages, so
$2,093 per day, for $33 per person per day.

77.

"Prison Industry Enhancement Certification Program
(PIECP)," Cornhusker State Industries, n.d.,
https://csi.nebraska.gov/piecp.

78.

Ibid.

79.

Julie Goodridge et al., “Prison Labor in the United States:
An Investor Perspective.”

80.

Stian Rice, “Farmers Turn to Prisons to Fill Labor Needs.”
High Country News, June 12, 2019,
https://www.hcn.org/articles/agriculture-farmers-turn-toprisons-labor-to-fill-labor-needs.

81.

W. T. Whitney Jr., “Louisiana’s Angola: Proving Ground for
Racialized Capitalism.” People’s World, June 25, 2018,
https://www.peoplesworld.org/article/louisianas-angolaproving-ground-for-racialized-capitalism/.

82.

“BOP: UNICOR,” Federal Bureau of Prisons, n.d.,
https://www.bop.gov/inmates/custody_and_care/unicor_a
bout.jsp.

83.

Lilah Burke, “Public Universities, Prison-Made Furniture.”
Inside Higher Ed, February 14, 2020,
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2020/02/14/public
-universities-several-states-are-required-buy-prisonindustries.

84.

Alexia Fernández Campbell, “The Federal Government
Markets Prison Labor to Businesses as the ‘Best-Kept
Secret.’” Vox, August 24, 2018,
https://www.vox.com/2018/8/24/17768438/nationalprison-strike-factory-labor.

85.

Christopher Robbins, “NY’s New License Plates Will Still Be
Made By Prisoners Earning 65 Cents An Hour.” Gothamist,
August 23, 2019, https://gothamist.com/news/nys-newlicense-plates-will-still-be-made-by-prisoners-earning-65cents-an-hour.

86.

“State and Federal Prison Wage Policies and Sourcing
Information,” Prison Policy Initiative, April 10, 2017,
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/wage_policies.html.

87.

“The Best Kept Secret in Contact Centers,” UNICOR, n.d.,
https://www.unicor.gov/publications/services/CATMS361.
pdf.

88.

“Top Ten Benefits of Correctional Industries,” National
Correctional Industries Association, n.d.,
https://4c99dc08-46a7-4bd9-b99048103d668bb3.filesusr.com/ugd/df1d6e_27767a82614c4
6da984735a047dd00b2.pdf.

89.

Mike Baker and Michael J. Berens, “Why License Plates
Cost Us so Much.” The Seattle Times, December 15, 2014,
http://projects.seattletimes.com/2014/prison-labor/3/.

90.

Ibid.

91.

Annika Neklason, “Inmates Have Fought California’s
Wildfires Since WWII.” The Atlantic, December 7, 2017,
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/12/how

109

-much-longer-will-inmates-fight-californiaswildfires/547628/.
92.

93.

Nicole Goodkind, “Prisoners Are Fighting California’s
Wildfires on the Front Lines, But Getting Little in Return.”
Fortune, November 2019,
https://fortune.com/2019/11/01/california-prisonersfighting-wildfires/.
“Prisoners Are Getting Paid $1.45 a Day to Fight the
California Wildfires,” American Civil Liberties Union, n.d.,
https://www.aclu.org/blog/prisoners-rights/prisoners-aregetting-paid-145-day-fight-california-wildfires.

94.

Goodkind, “Prisons Are Fighting California’s Wildfires.”

95.

Lakshmi Singh, “Serving Time and Fighting California
Wildfires.” NPR, November 18, 2018,
https://www.npr.org/2018/11/18/669088658/servingtime-and-fighting-california-wildfires-for-2-a-day.

96.

Adesuwa Agbonile, “Inmates Help Battle California’s
Wildfires. But When Freed, Many Can’t Get Firefighting
Jobs.” The Sacramento Bee, September 6, 2018,
https://www.sacbee.com/news/california/fires/article2174
22815.html?__twitter_impression=true; Michael James,
"California Governor Signs Bill Giving Prisoners Battling
Wildfires a Shot at Becoming Pro Firefighters.” USA Today,
September 11, 2020,
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2020/09/11/califor
nia-gov-gavin-newsom-signed-bill-give-prisoners-shotbecoming-firefighters-after-release/5775119002/.

97.

Twitter Post, Worth Rises, March 31, 2020,
https://twitter.com/WorthRises/status/1245180283814584
320.

98.

Melissa Klein, “NYC’s Potter’s Field Has Buried Nearly 900
People during Coronavirus Outbreak.” New York Post,
June 27, 2020, https://nypost.com/2020/06/27/nycspotters-field-has-had-nearly-900-burials-amidcoronavirus/.

99.

Beth Schwartzapfel, “Taking Freedom: Modern-Day
Slavery in America’s Prison Workforce.” Pacific Standard,
May 7, 2018, https://psmag.com/social-justice/takingfreedom-modern-day-slavery.

100.

Julie Goodridge et al., “Prison Labor in the United
States: An Investor Perspective.”

101.

“State and Federal Prison Wage Policies.”

102.

Daniel Moritz-Rabson, “Inmates in Government Prisons
Are Paid Pennies to Manufacture Clothing, License
Plates and Office Supplies.” Newsweek, September 4,
2018, https://www.newsweek.com/prison-slavery-whobenefits-cheap-inmate-labor-1093729.

103.

“State and Federal Prison Wage Policies.

104.

Worth Rises, unpublished data model.

105.

Abolish Slavery National Network, n.d.,
https://abolishslavery.us/.

Equipment
1.

Rupert Neate, “Welcome to Jail Inc: How Private
Companies Make Money off US Prisons.” The Guardian,
June 16, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2016/jun/16/us-prisons-jail-private-healthcarecompanies-profit.

2.

“The Prison Industrial Complex: Mapping Private Sector
Players,” Worth Rises, April 2019.
https://worthrises.org/picreport2019.

3.

“Federal Bureau of Prisons Contracting Data,”
USAspending.gov, 2019,
https://www.usaspending.gov/#/.

4.

Peter Eisler, Jason Szep, and Charles Levinson, “Shock
Tactics: Inmate Deaths Reveal ‘Torturous’ Use of Tasers.”
Reuters, December 6, 2017,
https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usataser-jails/.

5.

David Segal, “Prison Vendors See Continued Signs of a
Captive Market.” The New York Times, August 29, 2015,
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/30/business/prisonvendors-see-continued-signs-of-a-captive-market.html;
Adam Bluestein, “Tapping the Prison Market.” Inc., January
24, 2012,
https://www.inc.com/magazine/201202/ecotensil-cutleryprison-bound.html.

Guarding-Equipment.html; “The Prison Industrial
Complex: Mapping Private Sector Players.”
9.

The Freedonia Group, “Law Enforcement & Guarding
Equipment.”

10.

Kathleen Frenette, “The Bureau Of Prisons Purchases Of
Goods And Services Report.” New Hampshire
Procurement Technical Assistance Program, 2008,
https://www.berlinnh.gov/sites/g/files/vyhlif2811/f/upload
s/purchasing_report.pdf; “FY 2015 Appropriations Report
- State Department of Corrections,” Arizona Department of
Corrections, n.d.,
https://corrections.az.gov/sites/default/files/fy2015_appro
priation_report.pdf.

11.

Jeff McDonald, “Money Meant for Inmate Welfare Spent
on Education, Staff, and Sheriff’s Department Expenses.”
The San Diego Union-Tribune, April 22, 2019,
https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/watchdog/s
tory/2019-04-21/money-meant-for-inmate-welfare-spenton-staff-sheriffs-expenses.

12.

“California Code, Penal Code - PEN § 4025,” Findlaw, n.d.,
https://codes.findlaw.com/ca/penal-code/pen-sect4025.html.

13.

“Inmate Welfare Fund Audit (AD No. 14-058),” Los
Angeles Police Department Audit Division, June 2015,

6.

Jessica Mitford, Kind & Usual Punishment: The Prison
Business. New York: Knopf, 1973.

7.

Ibid.

14.

8.

The Freedonia Group, “Law Enforcement & Guarding
Equipment - Industry Market Research, Market Share,
Market Size, Sales,

“The Prison Industrial Complex: Mapping Private Sector
Players.”

15.

“Timeline - Company History,” Cornerstone Detention,
n.d.,
https://www.cornerstonedetention.com/about/companytimeline.

16.

David Segal, “Prison Vendors.”

Demand Forecast, Market Leaders, Company Profiles,
Industry Trends,” August 2016,
https://www.freedoniagroup.com/Law-Enforcement-

Notes

http://lapd-assets.lapdonline.org/assets/pdf/14058%20inmate-welfare-fund.pdf.

110

17.

“History,” Bob Barker, n.d.,
https://www.bobbarker.com/history.

18.

Mark J. Perry, “The General Public Thinks the Average
Company Makes a 36% Profit Margin, Which Is about 5X
Too High, Part II.” American Enterprise Institute, January
15, 2018, https://www.aei.org/carpe-diem/the-publicthinks-the-average-company-makes-a-36-profit-marginwhich-is-about-5x-too-high-part-ii/; “Financing a Jail
Supplies and Equipment Company,” Commercial Capital,
March 5, 2013,
https://www.comcapfactoring.com/blog/financing-a-jailsupplies-and-equipment-company/.

19.

“Annual Reports & Year in Review,” Stanley Black &
Decker, n.d.,
https://ir.stanleyblackanddecker.com/financialinformation/annual-reports-year-reviews; “Correctional
Facility Security Solutions,” Stanley Convergent Security
Solutions, n.d.,
https://www.stanleysecuritysolutions.com/Corrections.

20.

“Bob Barker Company, Inc.,” PrivCo, n.d.,
https://system.privco.com/company/bobbarker_private_stock_annual_report_financials.

21.

“Cornerstone Detention Products,” PrivCo, n.d.,
https://system.privco.com/company/cornerstonedetention-products; “2017 Detention Equipment
Contractors Report” Correctional News, 2017)
http://correctionalnews.com/wpcontent/uploads/2017/11/DEC_Report_17.pdf.

22.

“Southern Folger,” PrivCo, n.d.,
https://system.privco.com/company/southernfolger_private_stock_annual_report_financials.

23.

“Kane Innovations,” Kane Innovations, 2017,
https://www.kaneinnovations.com/; “The Prison Industrial
Complex: Mapping Private Sector Players.”; “Kane
Innovations - Company Profile and News,”
Bloomberg.com, n.d.,
https://www.bloomberg.com/profile/company/0008042D:
US.

24.

Jack Dolan, “Objections Raised to Caging Inmates during
Therapy.” Los Angeles Times, December 28, 2010,
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2010-dec-28-lame-prison-20101228-story.html.

25.

“Security Cuff Benches,” Derby Industries, n.d.,
https://www.derbyindustries.com/ecommerce/products.cf
m?item=Benches-c125.

26.

“Portable Bunk Beds,” Norix Furniture, n.d.,
https://www.norix.com/products/detentionaccessories/stack-a-bunk/.

27.

“Underbed Storage Box, 6.3 Gal. Capacity,” Bob Barker,
n.d.,
https://www.bobbarker.com/products/security/personaleffects-storage/storage-boxes/box-underbed-storage-12cs.html.

28.

“Detention Food Pass Through Door,” Kryptomax, n.d.,
https://www.kryptomax.com/detention-access/detentionfood-pass-through-door/.

29.

“BB 2020 Catalog,” Bob Barker, 2020,
https://www.pageturnpro.com/Progress-Printing/93730BB-2020-catalog/sdefault.html#page/1.

30.

Stephie Grob Plante, “How a Lack of Personal Care
Products Contributes to Harrowing Conditions for
Detained Migrants.” Vox, July 3, 2019,
https://www.vox.com/thegoods/2019/7/3/20681071/border-detention-aocshampoo-personal-hygiene.

Notes

31.

“All-in-One Shampoo – Safety Data Sheet,” Bob Barker,
October 30, 2015,
https://www.bobbarker.com/media/resourcecenter/item/
m/s/ms40g-ab.sds.pdf.

32.

“All-in-One, Maximum Security, 1 Gal.,” Bob Barker, 2019,
https://www.bobbarker.com/clear-all-in-one-maximumsecurity.html.

33.

“Suave Shampoo & Conditioner, 12.6 Oz.,” Bob Barker,
2019, https://www.bobbarker.com/suave-2-in-1.html.

34.

Eisler, et al., “Shock Tactics.”

35.

“Humane Restraint,” Humane Restraint, 2020,
https://www.humanerestraint.com/.

36.

Julie Punches, “Behavioral Restraint Use for Violent/Self
Destructive Behaviors.” PolicyStat, August 2016,
https://www.stlukeshospital.com/wpcontent/uploads/2018/06/Behavioral-Restraint-Use-forViolent-Self-Destructive-Behaviors-Policy.pdf.

37.

Christie Thompson and Joseph Shapiro, “28 Days in
Chains.” The Marshall Project, October 26, 2016,
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2016/10/26/28-daysin-chains.

38.

Joseph Shapiro, “Federal Report Criticizes Harsh
Treatment of Lewisburg Prisoners.” NPR, July 13, 2017,
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2017/07/13/537076246/federal-report-criticizesharsh-treatment-of-lewisburg-prisoners.

39.

Eli Hager, “Alternatives to Bullets.” The Marshall Project,
September 23, 2015,
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/09/23/alternativ
es-to-bullets.

40.

“Baton Trauma Zone Chart,” Defense Technology, n.d.,
https://www.defense-technology.com/product/batontrauma-zone-chart/.

41.

“Baton Trauma Zone Chart,” Defense Technology, n.d.,
https://www.defense-technology.com/product/batontrauma-zone-chart/.

42.

“Heavy Duty Muff,” Humane Restraints, n.d.,
https://www.humanerestraint.com/products/heavy-dutymuff.

43.

Tim Reid et al., “Shock Tactics: As Taser Warns of Risks,
Cities Bear a Burden in Court.” Reuters, August 23, 2017,
https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usataser-legal/.

44.

“TASER® X3TM, X26TM, and M26TM ECD Warnings,
Instructions, and Information: Law Enforcement,” TASER
International, 2010,
https://fingfx.thomsonreuters.com/gfx/rngs/USATASER/0100503907S/images/warnings-2010.pdf.

45.

“Tasers Credited with Reduction in Mich. CO Attacks,”
Corrections1 by LEXIPOL, August 26, 2013,
https://www.correctionsone.com/products/lesslethal/taser/articles/tasers-credited-with-reduction-inmich-co-attacks-2Ak9teoR1M9T8jSe/.

46.

David Grossman, “Prisons Are Building Giant Biometric
Databases of Prisoners’ Voices.” Popular Mechanics,
February 1, 2019,
https://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/security/
a26112865/us-biometric-voice-archives-prisoners/.

47.

Joseph Menn, “Microsoft Turned down Facial-Recognition
Sales on Human Rights Concerns.” Reuters, April 16, 2019,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-microsoft-ai/microsoftturned-down-facial-recognition-sales-on-human-rightsconcerns-idUSKCN1RS2FV.

111

48.

Tom Simonite, “The Best Algorithms Still Struggle to
Recognize Black Faces.” Wired, July 22, 2019,
https://www.wired.com/story/best-algorithms-strugglerecognize-black-faces-equally/.

52.

George Joseph, NY State Prisons Abruptly Suspend Drug
Tests for Contraband.” Gothamist, August 26, 2020,
https://gothamist.com/news/ny-state-prisons-abruptlysuspend-drug-tests-contraband.

49.

Dave Lee, “San Francisco Is First US City to Ban Facial
Recognition.” BBC News, May 14, 2019,
https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-48276660.

53.

50.

“Correctional Facility Face Recognition,” FaceFirst, 2020,
https://www.facefirst.com/industry/correctional-facilityface-recognition/.

“Orlando Program Book,” American Correctional
Association, 2018,
http://register.aca.org/docs/conference/wc2018/EP_Orlan
do%202018-Final.pdf

54.

“Conferences,” American Correctional Association, n.d.,
http://www.aca.org/ACA_Prod_IMIS/ACA_Member/Events
/ACA_Member/Meetings/Meetings_Home.aspx?hkey=09
5d31c1-3ebd-4485-9ed6-b7685e702c48.

55.

“American Correctional Association,” Prison Policy
Initiative, n.d., https://www.prisonpolicy.org/aca.html.

56.

“Orlando Program Book.”

51.

Tim Requarth and George Joseph, “Leaked Documents
Say Roughly 2,000 NY Prisoners Affected by Erroneous
Drug Tests.” Gothamist, November 21, 2019,
https://gothamist.coam/news/leaked-documents-sayroughly-2000-ny-prisoners-affected-by-erroneous-drugtests.

Data + Information
1.

Ronald Bailey, “Facial Recognition and the Danger of
Automated Authoritarianism.” Reason, January 21, 2020,
https://reason.com/2020/01/21/facial-recognition-andthe-danger-of-automated-authoritarianism/; “Clearview
AI,” Kirenaga Partners, n.d.,
http://kirenaga.com/portfolio/clearview-ai/.

2.

Khalil Gibran Muhammad, The Condemnation of
Blackness: Race, Crime, and the Making of Modern Urban
America. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010.

3.

Yogesh Sengar, “Prison Management Systems Market
2026; Key Players: Safety Systems, Cisco Systems, Inc.,
Fujitsu, Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.” Gem Newz,
September 19, 2019,
https://www.gemnewz.com/2019/09/19/prisonmanagement-systems-market-2026-key-players-safetysystems-cisco-systems-inc-fujitsu-huawei-technologies-coltd/.

4.

Ibid.

5.

Gail Elias, “How to Collect and Analyze Data: A Manual for
Sheriffs and Jail Administrators.” PREA Resource Center,
July 2007,
https://www.prearesourcecenter.org/sites/default/files/libr
ary/howtocollectandanalyzedataamanualforsheriffsandjail
admn.pdf.

February 7, 2020, https://theappeal.org/new-datasuggests-risk-assessment-tools-have-little-impact-onpretrial-incarceration/.
11.

Henry, “Risk Assessment: Explained”: Danielle Kehl,
Priscilla Guo, and Samuel Kessler, “Algorithms in the
Criminal Justice System: Assessing the Use of Risk
Assessments in Sentencing.” July 2017,
https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/33746041/2
017-07_responsivecommunities_2.pdf; Nathan James,
“Risk and Needs Assessment in the Criminal Justice
System.” Congressional Research Service, July 24, 2015,
https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20150724_R44087_
0c47cc191ecc982888fa182c82ef0099a86eca8d.pdf.

12.

Henry, “Risk Assessment: Explained”; Kehl, et al.,
“Algorithms in the Criminal Justice System.”

13.

Anna Maria Barry-Jester, Ben Casselman, and Dana
Goldstein, “The New Science of Sentencing.” The Marshall
Project, August 4, 2015,
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/08/04/the-newscience-of-sentencing.

14.

Clare Garvie, Alvaro Bedoya, and Jonathan Frankle, “The
Perpetual Line-Up.” Perpetual Line Up, October 18, 2016,
https://www.perpetuallineup.org/.

15.

George Joseph and Debbie Nathan, “Prisons Across the
U.S. Are Quietly Building Databases of Incarcerated
People’s Voice Prints.” The Intercept, January 30, 2019,
https://theintercept.com/2019/01/30/prison-voice-printsdatabases-securus/.

6.

Tim Brennan, David Wells, and Jack Alexander,
“Enhancing Prison Classification Systems: The Emerging
Role of Management Information Systems.” NICIC, July
2004, https://info.nicic.gov/nicrp/system/files/019687.pdf.

7.

Anna Maria Barry-Jester, Ben Casselman, and Dana
Goldstein, “The New Science of Sentencing.” The Marshall
Project, August 4, 2015,
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/08/04/the-newscience-of-sentencing.

16.

Justin Rohrlich, “Homeland Security Will Soon Have
Biometric Data on Nearly 260 Million People.” Quartz,
November 7, 2019, https://qz.com/1744400/dhsexpected-to-have-biometrics-on-260-million-people-by2022/.

8.

“Report on Algorithmic Risk Assessment Tools in the U.S.
Criminal Justice System - The Partnership on AI,” The
Partnership on AI, April 23, 2019,
https://www.partnershiponai.org/report-on-machinelearning-in-risk-assessment-tools-in-the-u-s-criminaljustice-system/.

17.

“Our Mission – JLG Technologies,” JLG Technologies, n.d.,
https://jlgtechnologies.com/company/our-mission/.

18.

Stephen Mayhew, “History of Biometrics.” Biometric
Update, July 20, 2018,
https://www.biometricupdate.com/201802/history-ofbiometrics-2.

19.

"Biometrics: Definition, Trends, Use Cases, Laws and
Latest News," Thales Group, September 10, 2020,
https://www.thalesgroup.com/en/markets/digital-identityand-security/government/inspired/biometrics.

9.

Matt Henry, “Risk Assessment: Explained.” The Appeal,
March 25, 2019, https://theappeal.org/risk-assessmentexplained/.

10.

Ethan Corey, “New Data Suggests Risk Assessment Tools
Have Little Impact on Pretrial Incarceration.” The Appeal,

Notes

112

20.

21.

Shaun Raviv, “The Secret History of Facial Recognition.”
Wired, January 21, 2020,
https://www.wired.com/story/secret-history-facialrecognition/; Stephen Mayhew, “History of Biometrics.”
Biometric Update, July 20, 2018,
https://www.biometricupdate.com/201802/history-ofbiometrics-2.
Doug Wyllie, “How Biometric Technologies Will Help
Correctional Facilities.” Corrections1 by Lexipol, May 16,
2017, https://www.corrections1.com/products/policetechnology/investigation/biometricsidentification/articles/how-biometric-technologies-willhelp-correctional-facilities-HAjTzVlupizKxEVV/.

22.

Mayhew, “History of Biometrics.”

23.

Joseph et al., “Prisons Across the U.S. Are Quietly Building
Databases of Incarcerated People’s Voice Prints”

24.

“EXHIBIT 5 Comments Re Second Further Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking: Single Call Programs,” Prison
Policy Initiative, January 12, 2015,
https://static.prisonpolicy.org/phones/exhibits/singlecall/E
xhibit5.pdf.

25.

Mayhew, “History of Biometrics”; “Biometrics,” Thales
Group.

26.

Natalie Prescott, “The Anatomy of Biometric Laws: What
U.S. Companies Need To Know in 2020.” The National Law
Review, January 15, 2020,
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/anatomy-biometriclaws-what-us-companies-need-to-know-2020.

27.

“Prison Management Systems Market Is Projected to Grow
Significantly to Reach US$ 2,809.8 Mn by 2026 Persistence Market Research,” PRNewswire, January 10,
2019, https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/prisonmanagement-systems-market-is-projected-to-growsignificantly-to-reach-us-2-809-8-mn-by-2026-persistencemarket-research-831522467.html.

https://www.ibisworld.com/united-states/market-researchreports/biometrics-scan-software-industry/.
39.

“Biometrics in 2020,” Thales Group.

40.

“The Syscon Story,” Syscon, n.d.,
https://syscon.net/about/.

41.

“Corrections Tech,” Syscon, n.d.,
https://syscon.net/corrections-tech/#.

42.

“2019 Annual Report,” DXC Technology, 2019,
https://assets1.dxc.technology/investor_relations/downloa
ds/DXC_Annual_Report_2019_10K_Final_v4.pdf.

43.

Henry, “Risk Assessment: Explained.”

44.

“Northpointe Suite Custody Management,” Equivant, n.d.,
https://www.equivant.com/northpointe-suite-custodymanagement/.

45.

Karen Hao, “Amazon Is the Invisible Backbone of ICE’s
Immigration Crackdown.” MIT Technology Review,
October 22, 2018,
https://www.technologyreview.com/2018/10/22/139639/a
mazon-is-the-invisible-backbone-behind-ices-immigrationcrackdown/; “DXC Offender360TM Jail Management,” DXC
Technology, n.d.,
https://www.dxc.technology/enterprise_and_cloud_apps/
offerings/145028/145098dxc_offender360_jail_management.

46.

“Algorithms in the Criminal Justice System: Pre-Trial Risk
Assessment Tools,” Electronic Privacy Information Center,
n.d., https://epic.org/algorithmic-transparency/crimjustice/.

47.

Kehl, et al., “Algorithms in the Criminal Justice System.”;
“Level of Service Inventory-Revised (LSI-R) Profile and
Associated Costs,” Pennsylvania Commission on Crime
and Delinquency, n.d.,
https://www.pccd.pa.gov/Funding/Documents/Funding%
20Announcement%20QA/OCJSI/Level%20of%20Service
%20Inventory%20Revised%20Profile%20and%20Costs%2
02016.pdf.

28.

Ibid.

29.

Ibid.

48.

Kehl, et al., “Algorithms in the Criminal Justice System.”

30.

Henry, “Risk Assessment: Explained.”

49.

“Northpointe Suite Custody Management,” Equivant.

31.

Ibid.

50.

32.

“How Many Jurisdictions Use Each Tool?” Mapping Pretrial
Injustice, Movement Alliance Project & MediaJustice, n.d.,
https://pretrialrisk.com/national-landscape/how-manyjurisdictions-use-each-tool/.

33.

Ben Green, “The False Promise of Risk Assessments:
Epistemic Reform and the Limits of Fairness.” n.d.,
https://doi.org/10.1145/3351095.3372869.

Shaila Dewan, “Judges Replacing Conjecture With
Formula for Bail.” The New York Times, June 26, 2015,
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/27/us/turning-thegranting-of-bail-into-a-science.html; “Advancing Pretrial
Justice,” Advancing Pretrial Policy & Research, n.d.,
https://www.psapretrial.org/about/background.

51.

“Mapping Pretrial Injustice: A Community-Driven
Database,” Mapping Pretrial Injustice, Movement Alliance
Project & MediaJustice, n.d., https://pretrialrisk.com/.

“Common Pretrial Risk Assessments,” Mapping Pretrial
Injustice, Movement Alliance Project & MediaJustice, n.d.,
https://pretrialrisk.com/the-basics/common-prai/.

52.

Ibid.

53.

Ibid.

54.

“Criminal ID Solutions,” Biometric Update, n.d.,
https://www.biometricupdate.com/servicedirectory/criminal-id.

55.

“Biometrics,” Thales Group.

56.

“About Us,” Dataworks Plus, n.d.,
http://www.dataworksplus.com/about.html.

57.

“Our Journey,” Idemia, n.d.,
https://www.idemia.com/sites/corporate/files/aboutus/download/idemia-corporate-brochure-20190510.pdf.

34.

35.

“$65.3 Billion Biometric System Market Outlook, 2024 Breakdown by Authentication Type, Offering,
Functionality, End-User and Region,” GlobeNewswire
News Room, December 20, 2019,
https://www.globenewswire.com/newsrelease/2019/12/20/1963330/0/en/65-3-Billion-BiometricSystem-Market-Outlook-2024-Breakdown-byAuthentication-Type-Offering-Functionality-End-user-andRegion.html.

36.

“Biometrics,” Thales Group.

37.

“$65.3 Billion Biometric System,” GlobeNewswire News
Room.

58.

Joseph et al., “Prisons Across the U.S. Are Quietly Building
Databases of Incarcerated People’s Voice Prints”

38.

“Biometrics Scan Software Industry in the US - Market
Research Report,” IBIS World, October 28, 2019,

59.

“Custom Corrections and Jail Management Systems,”
Chetu, n.d., https://www.chetu.com/corrections.php.

Notes

113

60.

David Pyrooz, “Using Restrictive Housing to Manage
Gangs in U.S. Prisons.” National Institute of Justice, June
30, 2018, https://nij.ojp.gov/topics/articles/usingrestrictive-housing-manage-gangs-us-prisons.

61.

Alan Judd, “From Los Angeles, a Cautionary Tale for
Georgia’s New Gang Database.” The Atlanta JournalConstitution, March 11, 2020,
https://www.ajc.com/news/crime--law/from-los-angelescautionary-tale-for-georgia-new-gangdatabase/xewZlV5dMRuisz4izT4J4K/.

62.

Melissa del Bosque, “Immigration Officials Use Secretive
Gang Databases to Deny Migrant Asylum Claims.”
ProPublica, July 8, 2019,
https://www.propublica.org/article/immigration-officialsuse-secretive-gang-databases-to-deny-migrant-asylumclaims.

63.

“About Us,” Guardian RFID, n.d.,
https://guardianrfid.com/about.

64.

Leischen Stelter, “Technology Makes Agencies Efficient,
Keeps Officers and Inmates Safer.” In Public Safety, April 1,
2016, https://inpublicsafety.com/2016/04/technologymakes-agencies-efficient-keeps-officers-and-inmatessafer/.

65.

Camille Knighton, “Inmate Identification: Wristbands vs. ID
Cards.” Guardian RFID, August 10, 2018,
https://guardianrfid.com/blog/inmate-identificationwristbands-vs-id-cards.

66.

Steve Baker, “Correctional Security Trends to Watch in
2020.” Stanley Convergent Security Solutions, February
11, 2020,
https://www.stanleysecuritysolutions.com/blog/correction
al-security-trends-to-watch-this-year/.

67.

“Cloud-Based Biometrics Will Change the Face of Law
Enforcement,” M2SYS, March 24, 2015,
http://www.m2sys.com/blog/public-safety/cloud-basedbiometrics-will-change-the-face-of-law-enforcement/.

68.

"No Tech for ICE," Mijente, n.d., https://notechforice.com/.

69.

Spencer Woodman, “Palantir Provides the Engine for
Donald Trump’s Deportation Machine.” The Intercept,
March 2, 2017,
https://theintercept.com/2017/03/02/palantir-providesthe-engine-for-donald-trumps-deportation-machine/;
Peter Hall, “ICE Criticized for Arrest at Scranton Hospital.”
The Morning Call, March 16, 2020,
https://www.mcall.com/news/pennsylvania/mc-nws-paice-immigrant-arrest-hospital-scranton-coronavirus20200316-3itqa24pdfau3kjnkm62jcdsai-story.html.

70.

“How Many Jurisdictions Use Each Tool?” Mapping Pretrial
Injustice.

71.

Corey, “New Data Suggests Risk Assessment Tools.”

72.

“An Organizer’s Guide,” Community Justice Exchange,
December 2019,
https://university.pretrial.org/HigherLogic/System/Downlo
adDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=d76dd40a4988-7d4f-cdf5-aafc9cf9bba9&forceDialog=0.

73.

“Our Results,” Brooklyn Community Bail Fund, n.d.,
https://brooklynbailfund.org/our-results-1.

74.

“An Organizer’s Guide.”

75.

Chelsea Barabas, Karthik Dinakar, and Colin Doyle, “The
Problems With Risk Assessment Tools.” The New York
Times, July 17, 2019,
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/17/opinion/pretrialai.html.

Notes

76.

Julia Angwin et al., “Machine Bias.” ProPublica, May 23,
2016, https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-biasrisk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing.

77.

Morris L Thigpen, Virginia A Hutchinson, and Jim T
Barbee, “Objective Jail Classification Systems: A Guide for
Jail Administrators.” National Institute of Corrections, U.S.
Department of Justice, February 1998,
https://s3.amazonaws.com/static.nicic.gov/Library/014373
.pdf.

78.

Adam Harris, “How We Decided to Test Racial Bias in
Algorithms.” ProPublica, May 31, 2016,
https://www.propublica.org/podcast/item/how-wedecided-to-test-racial-bias-in-algorithms.

79.

Julia Angwin et al., “Machine Bias.”

80.

“Artificial Intelligence Research and Development to
Support Community Supervision,” National Institute of
Justice, 2019,
https://nij.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh171/files/media/doc
ument/NIJ-2019-15287.pdf.

81.

Sigal Samuel, “Facial Recognition Tech Draws Controversy
for Apple, Amazon, Microsoft.” Vox, April 27, 2019,
https://www.vox.com/futureperfect/2019/4/27/18518598/ai-facial-recognition-banapple-amazon-microsoft; D. J. Pangburn, “Due to Weak
Oversight, We Don’t Really Know How Tech Companies
Are Using Facial Recognition Data.” Fast Company, July 5,
2019, https://www.fastcompany.com/90372734/due-toweak-oversight-we-dont-really-know-how-techcompanies-are-using-facial-recognition-data; Rosalie
Chan, “What to Know about Palantir, the Big Data
Company That Works with ICE.” Business Insider, July 19,
2019, https://www.businessinsider.com/palantir-iceexplainer-data-startup-2019-7.

82.

Joseph et al., “Prisons Across the U.S. Are Quietly Building
Databases of Incarcerated People’s Voice Prints”

83.

Joseph, et al., "Why Is a Prison Company Storing the Voice
Prints of Even Innocent People?”

84.

George Joseph and Debbie Nathan, “Why Is a Prison
Company Storing the Voice Prints of Even Innocent
People?” Fast Company, February 14, 2019,
https://www.fastcompany.com/90307401/why-is-a-prisoncompany-storing-the-voice-prints-of-even-innocentpeople.

85.

“State of New York Contract Agreement - Securus
Technologies,” Prison Policy Initiative, New York State
Department of Corrections, 2017,
https://www.prisonphonejustice.org/media/phonejustice/
NYS_DOC_Contract_2017-2022.pdf.

86.

Joseph et al., “Prisons Across the U.S. Are Quietly Building
Databases of Incarcerated People’s Voice Prints”

87.

Garvie, et al., “The Perpetual Line-Up.”

88.

Steve Lohr, “Facial Recognition Is Accurate, If You’re a
White Guy.” The New York Times, February 9, 2018,
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/09/technology/facialrecognition-race-artificial-intelligence.html.

89.

Ibid.

90.

Jennifer Lynch, “Face Off: Law Enforcement Use of Facial
Recognition Technology.” Electronic Frontier Foundation,
May 2019,
https://docs.house.gov/meetings/GO/GO00/20190604/1
09578/HHRG-116-GO00-20190604-SD004.pdf.

91.

Aaron Mak, “What’s Going On With the Teenager Suing
Apple Over Facial Recognition Technology?” Slate, April
23, 2019, https://slate.com/technology/2019/04/a-

114

teenager-is-accusing-apple-of-misidentifying-him-with-afacial-id-system.html
92.

Bill Chappell, “ICE Uses Facial Recognition To Sift State
Driver’s License Records, Researchers Say.” NPR, July 8,
2019, https://www.npr.org/2019/07/08/739491857/iceuses-facial-recognition-to-sift-state-drivers-license-recordsresearchers-sa.

93.

Vivek Kundra, “Federal Cloud Computing Strategy.” The
White House, February 8, 2011,
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/
omb/assets/egov_docs/federal-cloud-computingstrategy.pdf.

94.

Ibid.

95.

Rohrlich, “Homeland Security.”

96.

Ibid.

12.

Kevin Dowd, “Billionaires, Buyouts and Basketball: The
Gores Brothers Take on Private Equity” PitchBook, June
19, 2018, https://pitchbook.com/news/articles/billionairesbuyouts-and-basketball-the-gores-brothers-take-onprivate-equity.

13.

Steven J. Jackson, “Ex-Communication: Competition and
Collusion in the U.S. Prison Telephone Industry.” Critical
Studies in Media Communication 22, no. 4, October 2005,
p. 263–80, https://doi.org/10.1080/07393180500288329.

14.

Ulandis Forte, “My Grandmother’s 20-Year Fight for Prison
Phone Justice.” Truthout, June 21, 2019,
https://truthout.org/articles/my-grandmothers-20-yearfight-for-prison-phone-justice/.

15.

“Ensuring Just and Reasonable Rates and Charges for
Inmate Calling Services Report and Order on Remand and
Fourth Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking -WC
Docket No. 12-375,” FCC, July 16, 2020,
https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC365581A1.pdf.

16.

Jon Brodkin, “Ajit Pai Accused of Conflict for Helping
Former Client, a Prison Phone Company.” Ars Technica,
August 10, 2017, https://arstechnica.com/informationtechnology/2017/08/ajit-pai-accused-of-conflict-forhelping-former-client-a-prison-phone-company/.

17.

“Ensuring Just and Reasonable Rates and Charges for
Inmate Calling Services Report and Order on Remand and
Fourth Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking -WC
Docket No. 12-375.”

18.

Global Tel*Link v. FCC, No. 15-1461 (D.C. Cir. 2017).

19.

Worth Rises, unpublished research.

20.

Worth Rises, unpublished data model.

21.

“Ensuring Just and Reasonable Rates and Charges for
Inmate Calling Services Report and Order on Remand and
Fourth Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking -WC
Docket No. 12-375.”

22.

Peter Wagner and Alexi Jones, “State of Phone Justice:
Local Jails, State Prisons and Private Phone Providers.”
Prison Policy Initiative, February 2019,
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/phones/state_of_phone_just
ice.html.

23.

“Comment Letter on Report and Order on Remand and
Fourth Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, WC
Docket No. 12-375,” Worth Rises, November 23, 2020,
https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/1123999325387/2020.11.23%2
0-%20Fourth%20NPRM%20%20Worth%20Rises%20Comment.pdf

24.

Katie Honan, “New York City Jail Inmates Can Now Make
Free Phone Calls.” The Wall Street Journal, May 1, 2019,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/new-york-city-jail-inmatescan-now-make-free-phone-calls-11556743962; “All
Campaigns,” Connect Families Now, n.d.,
https://connectfamiliesnow.com/ourcampaigns.

Telecom
1.

Eleanor Bell Fox and Daniel Wagner, “Time Is Money:
Who’s Making a Buck off Prisoners’ Families?” Center for
Public Integrity, September 30, 2014,
https://publicintegrity.org/inequality-povertyopportunity/time-is-money-whos-making-a-buck-offprisoners-families/.

2.

Worth Rises, unpublished data model. Includes phone
calling revenue only.

3.

Laurence Darmiento, “Prison Industry Deal Drags L.A.
Billionaire into Elizabeth Warren’s Campaign.” Los Angeles
Times, October 11, 2019,
https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2019-10-11/tomgores-elizabeth-warren-securus-technologies.

4.

Saneta deVuono-powell et al., “Who Pays? The True Cost
of Incarceration on Families.” Ella Baker Center, Forward
Together, Research Action Design, September 2015,
http://whopaysreport.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/09/Who-Pays-FINAL.pdf.

5.

Steven J. Jackson, “Mapping the Prison Telephone
Industry,” in Prison Profiteers Who Makes Money from
Mass Incarceration, edited by Tara Herival and Paul Wright
(New York: The New Press, 2009): p. 236-239.

6.

7.

8.

“H.I.G. Capital Acquires Evercom Holdings, Inc.-Forms
Securus Technologies, Inc.,” H.I.G. Capital, September 10,
2004, https://higcapital.com/news/release/h.i.g.-capitalacquires-evercom-holdings-inc.-forms-securustechnologies-inc.
“Gores Technology Group To Acquire Global Tel*Link
Corporation From Schlumberger Technologies, Inc,” The
Gores Group, July 21, 2004, https://www.gores.com/wpcontent/uploads/2018/01/Press-Release-GoresTechnology-Group-LLC-to-Acquire-Global-Tel-LinkCorporation-from-Schlumberger-Technologies-Inc..pdf.
“The Gores Group and Global Tel*Link Announce
Acquisition of Verizon Business’ Department of
Corrections Division,” The Gores Group, November 13,
2006, https://www.gores.com/wpcontent/uploads/2018/01/Press-Release-The-GoresGroup-and-Global-Tel-Link-Announce-Acquisition-ofVerizon-Business%E2%80%99-Department-of-CorrectionsDivision.pdf.

9.

Bianca Tylek and Connor McCloskey, “This Call May Be
Monopolized and Recorded.” The Marshall Project, July
11, 2018,
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/07/11/this-callmay-be-monopolized-and-recorded.

10.

“GTL,” American Securities, n.d., https://www.americansecurities.com/en/companies/GTL.

11.

“Aventiv,” Platinum Equity, February 2020,
https://www.platinumequity.com/ourportfolio/portfolio/2017/aventiv.

Notes

115

25.

“Request for Proposals for Incarcerated Person
Communication Services RFP # SHF | 2019-11/ Sourcing
Event No. 0000003286,” City and County of San Francisco,
December 20, 2019.

26.

Wagner and Jones, “State of Phone Justice.”

27.

Bernadette Rabuy and Peter Wagner, “Screening Out
Family Time: The For-Profit Video Visitation Industry in
Prisons and Jails.” Prison Policy Initiative, January 2015,
https://static.prisonpolicy.org/visitation/ScreeningOutFam
ilyTime_January2015.pdf.

28.

29.

30.

31.

Jack Smith IV, “‘Video Visitation’ Is Ending in-Person Prison
Visits – and Prisons Are Going to Make a Ton of Money.”
Business Insider, May 5, 2016,
https://www.businessinsider.com/video-visitation-isending-in-person-prison-visits-2016-5.
Timothy B. Lee, “Jails Are Replacing Visits with Video
Calls—Inmates and Families Hate It.” Ars Technica, May 14,
2018, https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2018/05/jailsare-replacing-in-person-visits-with-video-calling-servicestheyre-awful/.
Olivia Carville, “Ex-Cons Create ‘Instagram for Prisons,’
and Wardens Are Fine with That.” Bloomberg, February 6,
2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/201902-06/ex-cons-create-instagram-for-prisons-and-wardensare-fine-with-that.
“Securus Technologies: Public Lender Presentation,” The
Huffington Post, April 15, 2015,
https://big.assets.huffingtonpost.com/SecerusLenderPres
entation.pdf.

32.

“Tablets,” Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, n.d.,
https://www.cor.pa.gov/Inmates/Pages/Tablets.aspx.

33.

Matt Clarke and Ed Lyon, “Tablets and E-Messaging
Services Expand in Prisons and Jails, as Do Fees.” Prison
Legal News, April 2, 2018,
https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2018/apr/2/tablet
s-and-e-messaging-services-expand-prisons-and-jails-dofees/.

34.

Ibid.; Tonya Riley, “‘Free’ Tablets Are Costing Prison
Inmates a Fortune.” Mother Jones, October 5, 2018,
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2018/10/tabletsprisons-inmates-jpay-securus-global-tel-link/.

35.

Worth Rises, unpublished data model.

36.

Ibid.

37.

Ibid.

38.

“Order Accepting Settlement With Modification, Granting
Certificate Of Authority, And Closing Dockets P-0524/CT94-386 and P-5024/NA-94-387,” Minnesota Public Utilities
Commission, July 17, 1996,
https://www.edockets.state.mn.us/EFiling/edockets/searc
hDocuments.do?method=showPoup&documentId={99B8
C426-0574-49A3-A027B48113D505E3}&documentTitle=132675-A.

39.

Bianca Tylek, “Testimony Regarding Hearing: America for
Sale? An Examination of the Practices of Private Funds,
before Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of
Representatives,” Worth Rises, November 18, 2019,
https://ourfinancialsecurity.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/12/Worth-Rises-Testimony-HFSCHearing-11.19.19.pdf.

40.

Josh Kosman, “Prison Phone Profit.” New York Post, August
19, 2011, https://nypost.com/2011/08/19/prison-phoneprofit/.

41.

“American Securities Completes Acquisition of Global
Tel*Link,” American Securities, December 15, 2011,

Notes

https://www.american-securities.com/en/pressreleases/american-securities-completes-acquisition-ofglobal-tel-link.
42.

Susan Cockerham, “RE: Alabama PSC Annual Financial
Statements.” Prison Policy Initiative, March 23, 2020,
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/phones/financials/2019/GTL
_2019.pdf.

43.

Worth Rises, unpublished data model.

44.

Laurence Darmiento, “Troubled Companies Made Him
Billions. but This One Made Him Enemies.” Los Angeles
Times, September 5, 2019,
https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2019-09-05/la-fitom-gores-securus-prison-phone-mass-incarceration.

45.

Wagner and Jones, “State of Phone Justice.”

46.

Ibid.

47.

“Securus Technologies Sold To Abry Partners?,”
meshDETECT, March 28, 2013,
https://prisoncellphones.com/blog/2013/03/28/securustechnologies-sold-to-abry-partners/.

48.

Tylek, “Testimony Regarding Hearing: America for Sale?
An Examination of the Practices of Private Funds.”

49.

“Platinum Equity’s Prison Telecom Company Securus Sees
Debt Trade at up to 50 Percent Discount,” Private Equity
Stakeholder Project, February 6, 2020,
https://pestakeholder.org/platinum-equitys-prisontelecom-company-securus-sees-debt-trade-at-up-to-50percent-discount/.

50.

Kevin Bliss, “Securus Technologies Rebrands as Aventiv.”
Prison Legal News, January 9, 2020,
https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2020/jan/9/securu
s-technologies-rebrands-aventiv/.

51.

“Affordability, Accountability, Innovation and Reform,”
Platinum Equity, n.d.,
https://www.platinumequity.com/securus-transformation.

52.

Connor McCleskey, “Will the FCC Finally Stop a Prison
Telecom Merger?” Worth Rises, July 18, 2018,
https://worthrises.org/blog/2018/7/11/will-the-fcc-finallystop-a-prison-telecom-merger.

53.

Eric Markowitz, “Amid Death Threats, an Embattled Prison
Phone Company CEO Speaks Out.” International Business
Times, January 26, 2016, https://www.ibtimes.com/amiddeath-threats-embattled-prison-phone-company-ceospeaks-out-2276551.

54.

“Securus Technologies, Inc. Completes Transaction to
Acquire JPay Inc,” Securus Technologies, July 31, 2015,
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/securustechnologies-inc-completes-transaction-to-acquire-jpayinc-300122095.html.

55.

“GTL Acquires Telmate, a Leading Provider of Secure
Corrections Solutions and Community Corrections and
Probation, Parole Applications,” Telmate, August 1, 2017,
https://www.telmate.com/2017/08/01/gtl-acquirestelmate-a-leading-provider-of-secure-correctionssolutions-and-community-corrections-and-probationparole-applications-2/.

56.

Bianca Tylek, “How the Fight for ‘Prison Phone Justice’
Scored a Major Victory.” The Crime Report, April 23, 2019,
https://thecrimereport.org/2019/04/23/how-the-fight-forprison-phone-justice-scored-a-major-victory/.

57.

McCleskey, “Will the FCC Finally Stop a Prison Telecom
Merger?”

58.

“Securus’ Bilateral Patent License Agreements Allow
Facilities to Share Technology Developed and Bring More
Products to Corrections/Law Enforcement Quicker,”

116

Securus Technologies, September 29, 2016,
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/securusbilateral-patent-license-agreements-allow-facilities-toshare-technology-developed-and-bring-more-productsto-correctionslaw-enforcement-quicker-300336813.html.
59.

Wagner and Jones, “State of Phone Justice”; McCleskey,
“Will the FCC Finally Stop a Prison Telecom Merger?”

60.

Mark Rockwell, “ICE Seeks New Phone Services for
Detainees.” FCW, May 26, 2015,
https://fcw.com/blogs/the-spec/2015/05/ice-seeksservices.aspx; “Second One-Time Mandatory Data
Collection Description and Justification,” Talton
Communications, March 1, 2019,
https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/10301625230450/Talton%20D
escription%20and%20Justification%20(NF%20Ver).pdf.

61.

62.

63.

64.

65.

66.

“Inmate Calling Solutions, LLC Statements of Operations
(Unaudited),” Prison Policy Initiative, December 2019,
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/phones/financials/2019/ICS
_Income_Stmt_2019.pdf.
Davide Scigliuzzo, “HIG Plans Spinoff of Prison Phone
Operator After Failed Merger.” Bloomberg, January 24,
2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/202001-24/hig-plans-spinoff-of-prison-phone-operator-afterfailed-merger.
Jessica Miller, “With Captive Customers, Utah Jails Charge
Vastly Different Rates for Phone Calls from Loved Ones.
They Can Be More than $10 for 15 Minutes.” The Salt Lake
Tribune, April 29, 2019,
https://www.sltrib.com/news/2019/04/28/with-captivecustomers/.
“Our Companies,” TKC Holdings, n.d.,
https://www.tkcholdings.com/companies-103; Stephen
Raher, “Paging Anti-Trust Lawyers: Prison Commissary
Giants Prepare to Merge.” Prison Policy Initiative, July 5,
2016,
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2016/07/05/commissa
ry-merger/.
Scigliuzzo, “HIG Plans Spinoff of Prison Phone Operator
After Failed Merger.”
“Public Notice: Applications Filed For The Transfer Of
Control Of Centurylink Public Communications, Inc. To
Inmate Calling Solutions, Llc D/B/A ICSolutions NonStreamlined Pleading Cycle Established WC Docket No.
20-150,” Federal Communications Commission, June 25,
2020, https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-20673A1.pdf.

67.

Peter Wagner, “Prison Phone Giant GTL Gets Bigger,
Again.” Prison Policy Initiative, August 28, 2017,
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2017/08/28/merger/.

68.

Wagner and Jones, “State of Phone Justice.”

69.

Susan Cockerham, “RE: Alabama PSC Annual Financial
Statements”; Geoffrey Boyd, “Re: Securus Technologies,
Inc Annual Financial Statements.” Prison Policy Initiative,
March 27, 2019,
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/phones/financials/2018/Sec
urus_Preliminary_Consolidated_Balance_Sheet_2018.pdf;
“Inmate Calling Solutions, LLC Statements of Operations
(Unaudited).” All non-revenue data from Worth Rises,
unpublished data model.

70.

Joan Petersilia, When Prisoners Come Home: Parole and
Prisoner Reentry. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009,
p. 246. “Every known study that has been able to directly
examine the relationship between a prisoner’s legitimate
community ties and recidivism has found that feelings of
being welcome at home and the strength of interpersonal

Notes

ties outside prison help predict postprison adjustment.”
(emphasis in original).
71.

“Connecting Families Compelling Messaging for Prison
Phone Justice Campaigns,” Worth Rise, March 2020,
https://worthrises.org/s/Worth-Rises-Connecting-FamiliesMar-2020-FINAL-wbwf.pdf.

72.

“Prison Phone Fact Sheet,” Campaign for Prison Phone
Justice, n.d., https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/60001328413.pdf.

73.

“Rates and Kickbacks,” Prison Phone Justice, n.d.,
https://www.prisonphonejustice.org/.

74.

Drew Kukorowski, Peter Wagner, and Leah Sakala, “Please
Deposit All of Your Money: Kickbacks, Rates, and Hidden
Fees in the Jail Phone Industry.” Prison Policy Initiative,
May 8, 2013,
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/phones/pleasedeposit.html.

75.

“Ensuring Just and Reasonable Rates and Charges for
Inmate Calling Services Report and Order on Remand and
Fourth Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking -WC
Docket No. 12-375.”

76.

Karina Wilkinson, “Massachusetts Prison and Jail Phone
Rates Reform Background Sheet.” Prison Policy Initiative,
July 2020,
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/mass_contracts/ma_p
rison_and_jail_phone_rates_fact_sheet.pdf.

77.

Worth Rises, unpublished data model.

78.

Ibid.

79.

Ibid.

80.

Worth Rises, unpublished analysis.

81.

“About Us,” ICSolutions, n.d.,
https://www.icsolutions.com/FacilitiesHome/AboutUs.html

82.

Breanna Edwards, “Dawn Freeman’s Mission to Help
Returning Citizens Restart Their Lives.” Essence, January
17, 2020, https://www.essence.com/feature/dawnfreeman-securus-foundation-criminal-justice-reform/.

83.

“Rate Quote,” Securus Technologies, available at
https://securustech.online/#/rate-quote.

84.

“Information Processing Systems Agreement
(#10ITZ0119MA), between The State of Connecticut acting
by its Department of Administrative Services and Securus
Technologies, Inc.,” Connecticut Department of
Administrative Services, March 1, 2012.

85.

“Rate Quote,” Securus Technologies, available at
https://securustech.online/#/rate-quote.

86.

Wagner and Jones, “State of Phone Justice.”

87.

“TX Prison Issues: Phones,” TX Prisoners Network Support,
n.d., http://brokenchains.us/tdcj/prisonissues/phones.html.

88.

deVuono-powell et al., “Who Pays? The True Cost of
Incarceration on Families.”

89.

Ibid.

90.

Victoria Law, “Imagine Pleading Guilty Because You Can’t
Afford to Call Your Lawyer.” Truthout, February 17, 2019,
https://truthout.org/articles/imagine-pleading-guiltybecause-you-cant-afford-to-call-your-lawyer/.

91.

Ibid.

92.

Jimmie E. Gates, “State Supreme Court Upholds 12-Year
Sentence for Man Who Brought Cellphone into Jail.” The
Clarion-Ledger, January 16, 2020,
https://www.clarionledger.com/story/news/2020/01/16/m
an-sentenced-12-years-cell-phone-ms-jail-didntconfiscate/4488906002/; Stevie Borrello, Daniel
Fetherston, and Katherine Tutrone, “Prisoners Are Going

117

Viral on TikTok.” Vice News, November 12, 2020,
https://www.vice.com/en/article/7k9bzd/prison-inmatesare-going-viral-on-tiktok.
93.

Lee, “Jails Are Replacing Visits with Video Calls.”

94.

Rabuy and Wagner, “Screening Out Family Time.”

95.

Smith IV, “‘Video Visitation’ Is Ending in-Person Prison
Visits.”

96.

Rabuy and Wagner, “Screening Out Family Time.”

97.

Lee, “Jails Are Replacing Visits with Video Calls.”

98.

Jorge Antonio Renaud, “Video Visitation: How Private
Companies Push for Visits by Video and Families Pay the
Price.” Grassroots Leadership and Texas Criminal Justice
Coalition, October 2014,
http://grassrootsleadership.org/sites/default/files/uploads
/Video%20Visitation%20(web).pdf.

99.

Hanna Kozlowska, “Prison Communications Company
Securus Will No Longer Require Jails to Ban In-Person
Visits.” Quartz, May 5, 2015,
https://qz.com/400055/prison-communications-companysecurus-will-no-longer-require-jails-to-ban-in-personvisits/.

100.

Lee, “Jails Are Replacing Visits with Video Calls.”

101.

Danielle Wiley, “Telmate Tablets Create Positive
Environment for Inmates.” Idaho Press, January 23,
2016,
https://www.idahopress.com/news/crime_courts/jail/tel
mate-tablets-create-positive-environment-forinmates/article_fa1fbd82-36cf-541a-b1c5c81a99e18e03.html.

102.

Ibid.

103.

Stephen Raher, “You’ve Got Mail: The Promise of Cyber
Communication in Prisons and the Need for
Regulation.” Prison Policy Initiative, January 21, 2021,
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/messaging/report.html.

104.

“NYS DOCCS Inmate Services,” JPay, n.d.,
https://www.jpay.com/Agency-Details/NYS-DOCCSInmate-Services.aspx.

105.

Victoria Law, “How Companies Make Millions Charging
Prisoners to Send an Email.” Wired, August 3, 2018,
https://www.wired.com/story/jpay-securus-prisonemail-charging-millions/.

106.

“NYS DOCCS Inmate Services.”

107.

Riley, “‘Free’ Tablets Are Costing Prison Inmates a
Fortune.”

108.

Ibid.

109.

Karen L. Murtagh, “Commentary: Why Is New York
Giving Tablets to All State Prisoners?” Fortune, February
2, 2018, https://fortune.com/2018/02/02/jpay-tabletsprisoners-rape-new-york-state/.

110.

Mack Finkel and Wanda Bertram, “More States Are
Signing Harmful ‘Free Prison Tablet’ Contracts.” Prison
Policy Initiative, March 7, 2019,
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2019/03/07/freetablets/.

111.

Riley, “‘Free’ Tablets Are Costing Prison Inmates a
Fortune.”

112.

Michael Waters, “Free Tablets for the Incarcerated
Come with a Price.” The Outline, December 3, 2019,

Notes

https://theoutline.com/post/8329/jpay-free-tabletprogram-ripoff?zd=1&zi=fhfulnqe.
113.

“Apple Music,” Apple, n.d.,
https://www.apple.com/apple-music/. Apple Music is
$15 for a family of 6=$2.50 each.

114.

Riley; Ben Conarck, “Florida Inmates Spent $11.3 Million
on MP3s. Now Prisons Are Taking the Players.” The
Florida Times-Union, August 8, 2018,
https://www.jacksonville.com/news/20180808/floridainmates-spent-113-million-on-mp3s-now-prisons-aretaking-players.

115.

“The Cost of ‘Free’ Prison Tablets,” Appalachian Prison
Book Project, November 20, 2019,
https://appalachianprisonbookproject.org/2019/11/20/
how-much-does-it-cost-to-read-a-free-book-on-a-freetablet/.

116.

Ibid.

117.

Samantha Michaels, “People in Prison Are Way More
Likely to Have Dyslexia. the Justice System Sets Them
up to Fail.” Mother Jones, April 30, 2019,
https://www.motherjones.com/crimejustice/2019/04/people-in-prison-are-way-more-likelyto-have-dyslexia-the-justice-system-sets-them-up-tofail/.

118.

Jordan Smith, “Securus Settles Lawsuit Alleging
Improper Recording of Privileged Inmate Calls.” The
Intercept, March 15, 2016,
https://theintercept.com/2016/03/16/securus-settleslawsuit-alleging-improper-recording-of-privilegedinmate-calls/.

119.

George Joseph and Debbie Nathan, “Prisons Across the
U.S. Are Quietly Building Databases of Incarcerated
People’s Voice Prints.” The Intercept, January 30, 2019,
https://theintercept.com/2019/01/30/prison-voiceprints-databases-securus/.

120.

Ibid.

121.

“U.S. Prisons and Jails Using AI to Mass-Monitor Millions
of Inmate Calls,” LEO Technologies, October 24, 2019,
https://leotechnologies.com/us-prisons-using-ai-tomass-monitor/.

122.

Joseph et al., “Prisons Across the U.S. Are Quietly
Building Databases of Incarcerated People’s Voice
Prints”

123.

“Intelligence Bundles – Global Tel Link Request for
Proposals,” Shelby County, TN, 2016,
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/5004166SKM-C224e18101517500.html.

124.

“U.S. Prisons and Jails Using AI,” LEO Technologies.

125.

Jordan Smith and Micah Lee, “Massive Hack of 70
Million Prisoner Phone Calls Indicates Violations of
Attorney-Client Privilege.” The Intercept, November 11,
2015, https://theintercept.com/2015/11/11/securushack-prison-phone-company-exposes-thousands-ofcalls-lawyers-and-clients/.

126.

Ibid.

127.

Kieren McCarthy, “Remember When Securus Was Sued
for Recording 14,000 Calls between Prison Inmates and
Lawyers? It Just Settled.” The Register, May 21, 2020,
https://www.theregister.com/2020/05/21/securus_priso
n_wiretapping_lawsuit/.

118

Financial Services
1.

Arun Gupta, “The Financial Firm That Cornered the Market
on Jails.” The Nation, August 1, 2016,
https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/the-financialfirm-that-cornered-the-market-on-jails/.

2.

Daniel Wagner, “Megabanks Have Prison Financial
Services Market Locked Up.” Center for Public Integrity,
October 2, 2014, https://publicintegrity.org/inequalitypoverty-opportunity/megabanks-have-prison-financialservices-market-locked-up/.

3.

Mia Francis-Poulin, “Electronic Payments: A Brief History.”
Forte Blog, February 2, 2018,
https://blog.forte.net/electronic-payments-history/.

4.

Ariel Schwartz, “Here’s the Real Story behind the Apple of
Prison Tech.” Business Insider, July 2015,
https://www.businessinsider.com/apple-of-prison-techsreal-story-2015-7.

5.

Matthew Desmond, “American Capitalism Is Brutal. You
Can Trace That to the Plantation.” The New York Times,
August 14, 2019,
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/08/14/magazin
e/slaverycapitalism.html?mtrref=www.google.com&assetType=RE
GIWALL.

6.

Wagner, “Megabanks Have Prison Financial Services.”

7.

Daniel Wagner, “Prison Bankers Cash in on Captive
Customers.” Center for Public Integrity, September 30,
2014, https://publicintegrity.org/inequality-povertyopportunity/prison-bankers-cash-in-on-captivecustomers/.

8.

Ibid.

9.

“Securus Technologies: Public Lender Presentation,” The
Huffington Post, April 15, 2015,
https://big.assets.huffingtonpost.com/SecerusLenderPres
entation.pdf;

10.

“Securus Technologies: Public Lender Presentation” Laura
Maruschak and Todd Minton, “Correctional Populations in
the United States, 2017-2018,” Bureau of Justice Statistics,
Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Dept. of Justice, August
2020,
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus1718.pdf.
Estimate based on 2.123 million people (2018) making 12
transactions a year that generate an average of $6 per
transaction.

11.

“Securus Technologies: Public Lender Presentation.”

12.

Maruschak and Minton, “Correctional Populations in the
United States, 2017-2018.”; Zhen Zeng, “Jail Inmates in
2018,” Bureau of Justice Statistics, Office of Justice
Programs, U.S. Dept. of Justice, March 2020,
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ji18.pdf.

13.

“Use of Debit Card for Inmate Release Funds,”
Correctional Leaders Association, n.d.,
https://www.webcitation.org/6WSoaIjPb.

14.

“Securus Technologies: Public Lender Presentation.”

15.

“Securus Technologies: Public Lender Presentation;”
Maruschak and Minton, “Correctional Populations in the
United States, 2017-2018.” Estimate based on 4.399
million people (2018) making 12 transactions a year that
generate an average of $5 per transaction.

16.

Maruschak and Minton, “Correctional Populations in the
United States, 2017-2018.”

17.

Wagner, “Megabanks Have Prison Financial Services;” Nick
Leiber, “JPay, the Apple of the U.S. Prison System.”

Notes

Bloomberg Business, September 13, 2012,
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-0913/jpay-the-apple-of-the-u-dot-s-dot-prison-system; Tim
Ryan, “A Brief History Of Western Union Money Transfer
Services.” Streetdirectory.com, 2018,
https://www.streetdirectory.com/travel_guide/161051/mo
ney_management/a_brief_history_of__western_union_mo
ney_transfer_services.html; “TouchPay Holdings Company
Profile: Acquisition & Investors,” Pitchbook, n.d.,
https://pitchbook.com/profiles/company/53440-66;
“Access Corrections,” Keefe Group, n.d.,
https://www.keefegroup.com/companies/accesscorrections-114.
18.

19.
20.

Catherine Akenhead, “How States Can Take a Stand
Against Prison Banking Profiteers.” George Washington
Law Review 85, no. 4, July 2017, https://www.gwlr.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/01/85-Geo.-Wash.-L.-Rev.1224.pdf.
“Securus Technologies: Public Lender Presentation.”
Wagner, “Prison Bankers Cash in on Captive Customers.”

21.

“Securus Technologies: Public Lender Presentation.”

22.

“Securus Preliminary Consolidated Balance Sheet,” Prison
Policy Initiative, 2018,
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/phones/financials/2018/Sec
urus_Preliminary_Consolidated_Balance_Sheet_2018.pdf;
“About JPay,” JPay, n.d.,
https://www.jpay.com/AboutUs.aspx.

23.

Wagner, “Megabanks Have Prison Financial Services.”

24.

“The Prison Industry: Mapping Private Sector Players,”
Worth Rises, n.d.,
https://worthrises.org/theprisonindustry2020.

25.

Stephen Raher, “The Multi-Million Dollar Market of
Sending Money to an Incarcerated Loved One.” Prison
Policy Initiative, January 18, 2017,
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2017/01/18/moneytransfer/.

26.

“Securus Technologies: Public Lender Presentation”;
Maruschak and Minton, “Correctional Populations in the
United States, 2017-2018.” Estimate based on 2.123
million people (2018) making 12 transactions a year that
generate an average of $6 per transaction.

27.

Akenhead, “How States Can Take a Stand.”

28.

Amirah Al Idrus, “Debit Cards Slam Released Prisoners
with Sky-High Fees, Few Protections.” Center for Public
Integrity, September 30, 2014,
https://publicintegrity.org/business/debit-cards-slamreleased-prisoners-with-sky-high-fees-few-protections/;
Stephanie Clifford and Jessica Silver-Greenberg, “In
Prisons, Sky-High Phone Rates and Money Transfer
Fees.” The New York Times, June 26, 2014,
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/27/business/inprisons-sky-high-phone-rates-and-money-transferfees.html.

29.

Akenhead, “How States Can Take a Stand;” Wagner,
“Prison Bankers Cash in on Captive Customers.”

30.

Akenhead, “How States Can Take a Stand.”

31.

“Money Order/Check Deposit Form,” JPay, n.d.,
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/58e127cb1b10e31
ed45b20f4/t/5b67aea72b6a286b6247dfb7/15335215760
55/JPayDeposit+Form.PDF.

32.

Ibid.

33.

Emails received by Worth Rises.

119

34.

“Money Order/Check Deposit Form.”

48.

Ibid.

35.

Wagner, “Prison Bankers Cash in on Captive Customers.”

49.

36.

Ibid.

37.

Aleks Kajstura, “Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
Should Regulate Release Cards.” Prison Policy Initiative,
March 18,

“Directive No. 9250: Supervision Fees (Community
Supervision),” New York Department of Corrections and
Community Supervision, March 19, 2019,
https://doccs.ny.gov/system/files/documents/2019/07/92
50%20%20Supervision%20Fees%20%28Community%20S
upervision%29.pdf; “JPay Payments,” Department of
Corrections and Community Supervision, n.d.,
https://doccs.ny.gov/jpay-payments.

50.

Tammy Gamerman, “Fees, Fines and Fairness: How
Monetary Charges Drive Inequity in New York City’s
Criminal Justice System.” New York City Office of the
Comptroller, September 10, 2019,
https://comptroller.nyc.gov/reports/fees-fines-andfairness/.

51.

Ibid.; Estimate based on 16,000 people on parole paying
$1.99 monthly as a payment fee to JPay.

52.

Wagner, “Prison Bankers Cash in on Captive Customers.”

53.

David Brancaccio, “JPMorgan Chase Settles Debit Card
Lawsuit with Former Inmates.” Marketplace, August 5,
2016,
https://www.marketplace.org/2016/08/05/business/krime
s-interview/.

54.

“HRDC Files Joint Comment with CFPB Re Release Debit
Cards,” Human Rights Defense Center, March 24, 2015,
https://www.humanrightsdefensecenter.org/action/news/
2015/hrdc-files-joint-comment-cfpb-re-release-debitcards/; Herb Weisbaum, “Inmates Charged Fee After
Leaving Jail.” NBC News, March 24, 2015,
https://www.nbcnews.com/business/consumer/inmatescharged-fee-after-leaving-jail-n329151.

55.

Daniel Wagner, “Feds Probe Prison Banker As NYC
Leaders Try To Cap Its High Fees.” BuzzFeed News,
December 2, 2016,
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/danielwagner/feds
-probe-prison-banker-as-nyc-leaders-try-to-cap-its-high.

56.

“‘Release Cards’ Turn Inmates and Their Families Into Profit
Stream.”

57.

“NYS DOCCS Has Renegotiated Its Contract with JPay to
Lower Rates,” Worth Rises, n.d.,
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/58e127cb1b10e31
ed45b20f4/t/5cd329ced124c30001b4fe12/15573426711
89/2019.05.01++NYS+DOCCS+has+Renegotiated+its+Contract+with+JP
ay+to+Lower+Rates.pdf.

2015,
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2015/03/18/cfpbcomment/.
38.

Ibid.

39.

“‘Release Cards’ Turn Inmates and Their Families Into Profit
Stream,” Malta Justice Initiative, n.d.,
http://maltajusticeinitiative.org/release-cards-turninmates-and-their-families-into-profit-stream/.

40.

Mia Armstrong and Nicole Lewis, “What Gate Money Can
(And Cannot) Buy for People Leaving Prison.” The Marshall
Project, September 10, 2019,
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2019/09/10/whatgate-money-can-and-cannot-buy.

41.

Paul Tassin, “Numi Financial Skims Unauthorized Fees
From Inmates’ Accounts, Class Action Says.” Top Class
Actions, March 31, 2017,
https://topclassactions.com/lawsuit-settlements/lawsuitnews/588121-numi-financial-skims-unauthorized-feesinmates-accounts-class-action-says/.

42.

Kajstura, “Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.”

43.

Ibid.

44.

“Securus Technologies: Public Lender Presentation”;
Maruschak and Minton, “Correctional Populations in the
United States, 2017-2018.” Estimate based on 4.399
million people (2018) making 12 transactions a year that
generate an average of $5 per transaction.

45.

“Securus Technologies: Public Lender Presentation.”

46.

Arthur Pepin, “2015-2016 Policy Paper The End of
Debtors’ Prisons: Effective Court Policies for Successful
Compliance with Legal Financial Obligations.” Conference
of State Court Administrators, 2016,
https://cosca.ncsc.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0014/26330/
end-of-debtors-prisons-2016.pdf.

47.

Ethan Bronner, “Poor Land in Jail as Companies Add Huge
Fees for Probation.” The New York Times, July 2, 2012,
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/03/us/probation-feesmultiply-as-companiesprofit.html?pagewanted=all&module=inline.

Food + Commissary
1.

Tom Perkins, “Michigan’s Failed Effort to Privatize Prison
Kitchens and the Future of Institutional Food.” Civil Eats,
August 20, 2018,
https://civileats.com/2018/08/20/michigans-failed-effortto-privatize-prison-kitchens-and-the-future-of-institutionalfood/.

2.

“United States Catering & Food Services for Correctional
Facilities Market 2020,” HTF Market Intelligence, October
2020.

3.

“Prison Food In America 2016,” edoc.bike, n.d.,
https://edoc.bike/documents/prison-food-in-america2016-87m0l7q1z6d8.

4.

Madison Pauly, “The Surprising Benefits of Serving
Prisoners Better Food.” Mother Jones, March 2019,
https://www.motherjones.com/crime-

Notes

justice/2019/03/prison-food-health-commissary-strikepublic-health-chronic-disease-pelican-bay/.
5.

“Prison Food in America 2016.”

6.

Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978).

7.

“Prison Food in America 2016.”

8.

Tim Michling, “What’s in This Macaroni? Privatization Is a
Tool, Not a Panacea.” Citizens Research Council of
Michigan, March 9, 2018, https://crcmich.org/whats-inthis-macaroni-privatization-is-a-tool-not-a-panacea/.

9.

Stephen Raher, “Paging Anti-Trust Lawyers: Prison
Commissary Giants Prepare to Merge.” Prison Policy
Initiative, July 5, 2016,
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2016/07/05/commissa
ry-merger/.

120

10.

“Keefe Commissary Network,” Keefe Group, n.d.,
https://www.keefegroup.com/companies/keefecommissary-network-112.

11.

Stephen Raher, “The Company Store.” Prison Policy
Initiative, 2018,
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/commissary.html.

12.

Daniel Wagner, “Megabanks Have Prison Financial
Services Market Locked Up.” Center for Public Integrity,
October 2, 2014, https://publicintegrity.org/inequalitypoverty-opportunity/megabanks-have-prison-financialservices-market-locked-up/.

13.

14.

15.

David Reutter, “Prison Food and Commissary Services: A
Recipe for Disaster.” Prison Legal News, August 4, 2018,
https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2018/aug/4/priso
n-food-and-commissary-services-recipe-disaster/.
“United States Catering & Food Services for Correctional
Facilities Market 2020,” HTF Market Intelligence, October
2020.
“12 Need-to-Know Statistics,” North American Association
of Food Equipment Manufacturers, 2018,
https://www.thenafemshow.org/wpcontent/uploads/Corrections-foodservice.pdf; Avery
Davis, “The Disgusting Truth Behind Prison Food in
America.” Spoon University, July 19, 2016,
https://spoonuniversity.com/news/the-disgusting-truthbehind-prison-food-in-america.

16.

“Food Services - Correctional Facility,” Aramark, n.d.,
https://www.aramark.com/industries/businessgovernment/correctional-facilities/food-services.

17.

Raher, “The Company Store.”

18.

Ibid.

19.

“Fact Sheet: Private Equity-Owned Firms Dominate Prison
and Detention Services,” Private Equity Stakeholder
Project, September 17, 2018,
https://pestakeholder.org/report/private-equity-ownedfirms-dominate-prison-and-detention-services/; “Keefe
Commissary Network.”

20.

Raher, “Paging Anti-Trust Lawyers.”

21.

Ben Conarck, “Florida Prisons Roll out More For-Profit
Services While Weighing Visitation Cuts.” The Florida
Times-Union, June 1, 2018,
https://www.jacksonville.com/news/20180601/floridaprisons-roll-out-more-for-profit-services-while-weighingvisitation-cuts.

22.

“United States Catering & Food Services for Correctional
Facilities Market 2020,” HTF Market Intelligence, October
2020.

23.

Anthony Ryan Hatch, Captivating Technology: Race,
Technoscience, and the Carceral Imagination. Durham,
NC: Duke University Press, 2019, pp. 67-84.

24.

Mecca Bos, “Don’t Go to Jail for the Dining Experience.”
Food Service News, February 2018,
https://www.foodservicenews.net/January-2018/Dont-Goto-Jail-for-the-Dining-Experience/.

Catering & Food Services for Correctional Facilities Market
2020,” HTF Market Intelligence, October 2020.
29.

“About Us,” Trinity Services Group; “Trinity Services
Group, Inc.,” PrivCo, n.d.,
https://system.privco.com/company/trinity-servicesgroup-inc.

30.

“Prison Food In America 2016.”

31.

“The Prison Industrial Complex: Mapping Private Sector
Players,” Worth Rises, April 2019,
https://worthrises.org/picreport2019.

32.

“Companies,” Keefe Group, 2019,
https://www.keefegroup.com/companies-101.

33.

“Swanson Services Corporation Is Now Part of Trinity
Services Group,” Trinity Services Group, 2016,
http://www.trinityservicesgroup.com/securecommissary/swanson-services/.

34.

“Union Supply Group,” Union Supply Group, 2020,
https://unionsupply.com/.

35.

Stephanie Simon, “Jailbirds Order Up Hot Wings.” The
Wall Street Journal, April 27, 2010,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703441
404575206153521909136.

36.

“Keefe Commissary Network,” Keefe Group, 2019,
https://www.keefegroup.com/companies/keefecommissary-network-112.

37.

Tim Barker, “Prison Services Are Profitable Niche for
Bridgeton Company.” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, February 15,
2015, https://www.stltoday.com/business/local/prisonservices-are-profitable-niche-for-bridgetoncompany/article_62560bec-4010-5342-9e115d647aecba2a.html.

38.

Taylor Elizabeth Eldridge, “The Big Business of Prisoner
Care Packages.” The Marshall Project, December 21, 2017,
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2017/12/21/the-bigbusiness-of-prisoner-care-packages/.

39.

“Fact Sheet: Private Equity-Owned Firms Dominate Prison
and Detention Services,” Private Equity Stakeholder
Project, September 17, 2018,
https://pestakeholder.org/report/private-equity-ownedfirms-dominate-prison-and-detention-services/.

40.

“Keefe Commissary Network,” Keefe Group, 2019,
https://www.keefegroup.com/companies/keefecommissary-network-112.

41.

“TKC Holdings, Inc.,” PrivCo, n.d.,
https://system.privco.com/company/tkc_private_stock_an
nual_report_financials.

42.

Julio Ojeda-Zapata, “Jails Offer Micro Markets Instead of
Vending Machines.” Corrections1, March 30, 2015,
https://www.corrections1.com/corrections/articles/jailsoffer-micro-markets-instead-of-vending-machines0Ifs8HTggJgtTs0F/; “Jail Vending,” MicroTronicus, 2020,
https://www.microtronicus.com/jail-vending.html.

43.

“Sheriff Runs Female Chain Gang,” CNN, October 29,
2003,
http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/Southwest/10/29/chain.gan
g.reut/.

44.

H. Claire Brown and Joe Fassler, “Prison Food Is Making
U.S. Inmates Disproportionately Sick.” The Counter,
January 3, 2018, https://newfoodeconomy.org/prisonfood-is-making-u-s-inmates-disproportionately-sick/.

25.

“Correctional Facilities,” Aramark, n.d.,
https://www.aramark.com/industries/businessgovernment/correctional-facilities.

26.

“United States Catering & Food Services for Correctional
Facilities Market 2020,” HTF Market Intelligence, October
2020.

27.

Ibid.

45.

“Prison Food In America 2016.”

28.

“About Us,” Trinity Services Group, n.d.,
http://www.trinityservicesgroup.com/trinity-servicesgroup/; “Prison Food In America 2016”; “United States

46.

Chris Hedges, “Food Behind Bars Isn’t Fit for Your Dog.”
Truthdig, December 23, 2013,

Notes

121

2017.303816?url_ver=Z39.882003&rfr_id=ori%3Arid%3Acrossref.org&rfr_dat=cr_pub%
3Dpubmed&

https://www.truthdig.com/articles/food-behind-bars-isntfit-for-your-dog/
47.

Michael Owen Jones, “Eating Behind Bars: On
Punishment, Resistance, Policy, and Applied
Folkloristics.” The Journal of American Folklore 130, no.
515, 2017, p. 72,
https://doi.org/10.5406/jamerfolk.130.515.0072; Monica
Eng, “Prisoners Sue over Soy Diet.” Chicago Tribune,
December 21, 2009,
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-2009-1221-0912200121story.html#:~:text=Prison%20menus%20indicate%20inmat
es%20are.

48.

David M. Reutter, “Prison Food and Commissary Services:
A Recipe for Disaster.” Prison Legal News, August 4, 2018,
https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2018/aug/4/priso
n-food-and-commissary-services-recipe-disaster/.

49.

Sarah Geraghty, “Failure to Provide Adequate Nutrition to
People in the Gordon County Jail.” Southern Center for
Human Rights, October 28, 2014,
https://www.schr.org/files/post/files/SCHR%20to%20Sheri
ff%20Ralston%2010%2028%2014.pdf.

50.

Carimah Townes, “Corporation Literally Served Inmates
Trash.” ThinkProgress, March 30, 2015,
https://archive.thinkprogress.org/corporation-literallyserved-inmates-trash-9504b8012941/.

51.

Roland Zullo, “Food Service Privatization in Michigan’s
Prisons: Observations of Corrections Officers.” March
2016, https://www.mco-seiu.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/02/Privatization-of-Prison-Food-_Mar_final.pdf.

52.

53.

54.

55.

Kyle Feldscher, “Michigan Cancels Aramark Contract to
Provide Food Service at State Prisons.” MLive, July 13,
2015, https://www.mlive.com/lansingnews/2015/07/michigan_cancels_aramark_contr.html.
Paul Egan, “Prison Food Contractor Hit with $2M in
Penalties.” Detroit Free Press, January 20, 2017,
http://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/2017/01
/20/prison-food-contractor-hit-2m-penalties/96824274/.
Michael Gerstein and Jonathan Oosting, “State Set to End
Private Prison Food Service.” The Detroit News, February
7, 2018,
https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/politics/2018/02
/07/michigan-snyder-private-prison-food/110187208/.
“Ohio Prisoners Complain of Maggots in Food,” The
Huffington Post, July 15, 2014,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/07/15/prisonmaggots-food_n_5588439.html.

56.

Ibid.

57.

Hatch, Captivating Technology: Race, Technoscience, and
the Carceral Imagination; Christopher Zoukis, “Ohio
Experiences Continued Problems with Aramark.” Prison
Legal News, March 18, 2018,
https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2018/mar/6/ohioexperiences-continued-problems-aramark/.

58.

Joe Fassler and Claire Brown, “Prison Food Is Making U.S.
Inmates Disproportionately Sick.” The Atlantic, December
27, 2017,
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2017/12/priso
n-food-sickness-america/549179/.

59.

Mariel Marlow, et al., "Foodborne Disease Outbreaks in
Correctional Institutions-United States, 1998–
2014." American Journal of Public Health 107, no. 7, 2017,
p. 1150-1156,
https://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/abs/10.2105/AJPH.

Notes

60.

Rachel Riley, “Attempted Riot Over Food At El Paso
County Jail Preceded by Rise In Complaints, Warnings
From Deputies.” The Gazette, March 7, 2017,
https://gazette.com/news/attempted-riot-over-food-at-elpaso-county-jail-preceded-by-rise-in-complaintswarnings/article_ad5cc7fb-5203-5ef8-94aa60efb60de43b.html; “Security Division,” El Paso County
Sheriff, n.d.,
https://www.epcsheriffsoffice.com/sections/detentionbureau/security-division; “Sheriff’s Office Releases Monthly
Statistics on Sheriff Elder’s Top Priorities,” El Paso County
Sheriff, March 7, 2019,
https://www.epcsheriffsoffice.com/newsreleases/sheriff%E2%80%99s-office-releases-monthlystatistics-on-sheriff-elder%E2%80%99s-top-priorities.

61.

“RFP #40-004 Inmate Food Services Annual Contract,” Hall
County Jail, n.d.,
https://agendasuite.org/iip/hall/agendaitem/details/2748;
“Inmate Food Services, Addendum #1,” Government
Contracts & Bids, June 19, 2019,
https://www.govcb.com/government-bids/INMATEFOOD-SERVICES-ADDENDUM-ANDNBD10964187599385094.htm; “Hall County, GA - Official
Website,”, Hall County Jail, n.d.,
http://www.hallcounty.org/bids.aspx?bidID=21.

62.

Craig Lyons, “County Eyes Nearly $1 Million Savings with
Jail Food Service Contract.” Chicago Tribune, November
7, 2018, https://www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/posttribune/ct-ptb-lake-jail-food-contract-st-1108-story.html.

63.

Hatch, Captivating Technology: Race, Technoscience, and
the Carceral Imagination.;

64.

“Food & Farm Services,” Georgia Department of
Corrections, January 2015,
http://www.dcor.state.ga.us/sites/all/files/pdf/Research/Fa
ct_Sheets/Info_Sheets_Food_Services.pdf.

65.

Hatch, Captivating Technology: Race, Technoscience, and
the Carceral Imagination.

66.

Banu Bargu, Starve and Immolate - the Politics of Human
Weapons. New York: Columbia University Press, 2015.

67.

Natasha Lennard, “Prison Strike Organizer Warns: Brutal
Prison Conditions Risk ‘Another Attica.’” The Intercept,
August 21, 2018,
https://theintercept.com/2018/08/21/prison-strike-2018attica/.

68.

“Commissary Day,” PEN America, November 19, 2012,
https://pen.org/commissary-day/.

69.

Hatch, Captivating Technology: Race, Technoscience, and
the Carceral Imagination.

70.

Eldridge, “The Big Business of Prisoner Care Packages.”

71.

Raher, “The Company Store.”

72.

Taylor Elizabeth Eldridge, “The Big Business of Prisoner
Care Packages: Inside the Booming Market for Food in
Pouches,” Prison Legal News, October 8, 2018,
https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2018/oct/8/bigbusiness-prisoner-care-packages-inside-booming-marketfood-pouches/.

73.

“Stop Package Restrictions in New York State Prisons! Take
Action Now!” Critical Resistance, December 20, 2017,
http://criticalresistance.org/nyspackages20171210/.

74.

“Packaging Love,” Worth Rises, n.d.,
https://worthrises.org/packaginglove.

122

75.

Samantha Melamed, “Sharing Meals Brings Families
Together, Even in Prison. Doing without Has Strained
Ties.” The Philadelphia Inquirer, January 3, 2019,

https://www.philly.com/news/pennsylvania-doc-prisonsecurity-crackdown-vending-food-20190103.html.
76.

Ibid.

Healthcare
1.

Deanna Pan, “TIMELINE: Deinstitutionalization and Its
Consequences.” Mother Jones, April 29, 2013,
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/04/timelinemental-health-america/.

2.

Renee Fabian, “The History of Inhumane Mental Health
Treatments.” Talkspace, July 31, 2017,
https://www.talkspace.com/blog/history-inhumanemental-health-treatments/.

3.

Pan, “TIMELINE: Deinstitutionalization and Its
Consequences.”

4.

E. Fuller Torrey et al., “More Mentally Ill Persons Are in
Jails and Prisons Than Hospitals: A Survey of the States.”
Treatment Advocacy Center and National Sheriffs’
Association, May 2010,
http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/storage/docum
ents/final_jails_v_hospitals_study.pdf.

5.

DJ Jaffe, “Medicaid Discrimination Against People with
Severe Mental Illnesses.” Mental Illness Policy Org, n.d.,
http://mentalillnesspolicy.org/imd/imd-medicaidmentally-ill.html.

6.

Ibid; Pan, “TIMELINE: Deinstitutionalization and Its
Consequences.”

7.

Pan, “TIMELINE: Deinstitutionalization and Its
Consequences.”

8.

Ibid.

9.

Derek H. Suite et al., “Beyond Misdiagnosis,
Misunderstanding and Mistrust: Relevance of the Historical
Perspective in the Medical and Mental Health Treatment of
People of Color.” Journal of the National Medical
Association 99, no. 8, August 2007,
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2574307/
pdf/jnma00207-0025.pdf.

10.

Jason Szep et al., “Special Report: U.S. Jails Are
Outsourcing Medical Care — and the Death Toll Is Rising.”
Reuters, October 26, 2020,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-jails-privatizationspecial-repor/special-report-u-s-jails-are-outsourcingmedical-care-and-the-death-toll-is-risingidUSKBN27B1DH.

11.

E Torrey et al., “More Mentally Ill Persons Are in Jails and
Prisons Than Hospitals: A Survey of the States.”

12.

Represents the collective revenues of six private
corrections healthcare providers: “PrimeCare Medical,
Inc.,” PrivCo, n.d.,
https://system.privco.com/company/primecaremedical_private_stock_annual_report_financials;
“Wellpath” PrivCo, n.d.,
https://system.privco.com/search?companies=wellpath;
“Corizon, Inc.,” PrivCo, n.d.,
https://system.privco.com/company/valitas-healthservices-inc/; “MHM Services, Inc.,” PrivCo, n.d.,
https://system.privco.com/company/mhmservices_private_stock_annual_report_financials/; John
Kennedy, “Lucrative Florida Prison Health Care Contract
Under Increasing Scrutiny.” The Palm Beach Post, June 8,
2018, https://www.palmbeachpost.com/news/state-regional/lucrative-florida-prison-healthcare-contract-

Notes

under-increasingscrutiny/slh8FmmxdWpH7TnHyW5HFN/; “Wexford Health
Sources, Inc.,” PrivCo, n.d.,
https://system.privco.com/company/wexford-healthsources_private_stock_annual_report_financials;
“NaphCare, Inc.,” PrivCo, n.d.
https://system.privco.com/company/naphcare-inc.
13.

“How and Why States Strive for High-Performing Systems,”
Pew Charitable Trusts, October 2017,
https://www.pewtrusts.org//media/assets/2017/10/sfh_prison_health_care_costs_and
_quality_final.pdf. Includes systems that are entirely
privatized and those that are partially privatized.

14.

Szep et al., “Special Report: U.S. Jails Are Outsourcing
Medical Care — and the Death Toll Is Rising.”

15.

Wendy Sawyer, “The Steep Cost of Medical Co-Pays in
Prison Puts Health at Risk.” Prison Policy Initiative, April 17,
2017,
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2017/04/19/copays/.

16.

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).

17.

David Redemske, “Providing Healthcare in the Prison
Environment.” HDR, 2018,
https://www.hdrinc.com/sites/default/files/201810/providing-heathcare-in-the-prison-environment.pdf.

18.

Kenneth L. Appelbaum, Thomas D. Manning, and John D.
Noonan, “A University-State-Corporation Partnership for
Providing Correctional Mental Health Services.” Psychiatric
Services 53, no. 2, February 1, 2002, p. 185–89,
https://doi.org/10.1176/appi.ps.53.2.185; Noga Shalev,
“From Public to Private Care the Historical Trajectory of
Medical Services in a New York City Jail.” American
Journal of Public Health 99, no. 6, June 1, 2009, p. 988–
995, https://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.2007.123265.

19.

Szep et al., “Special Report: U.S. Jails Are Outsourcing
Medical Care — and the Death Toll Is Rising.”

20.

“Prison Health Care: Costs and Quality - How and Why
States Strive for High-Performing Systems,” The Pew
Charitable Trusts, October 2017,
https://www.pewtrusts.org//media/assets/2017/10/sfh_prison_health_care_costs_and
_quality_final.pdf.

21.

Peter Wagner and Bernadette Rabuy, “Following the
Money of Mass Incarceration.” Prison Policy Initiative,
January 25, 2017,
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/money.html.

22.

Ana Singh, “Convicts without Care: How the Privatization
of Healthcare in the U.S. Prison System Fails to Protect
Inmates’ Health.” Berkeley Political Review, January 28,
2017, https://bpr.berkeley.edu/2017/01/28/convictswithout-care-how-the-privatization-of-healthcare-in-the-us-prison-system-fails-to-protect-inmates-health/;
“Managing Prison Health Care Spending,” The Pew
Charitable Trusts, 2013,
http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/
pcs_assets/2014/pctcorrectionshealthcarebrief050814pdf.
pdf; “State Prison Health Care Spending: An Examination,”
The Pew Charitable Trusts and the John D. and Catherine
T. MacArthur Foundation, July 2014,

123

http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2014/07/statep
risonhealthcarespendingreport.pdf.

36.

“Our Company,” PrimeCare Medical, Inc., n.d.,
http://www.primecaremedical.com/about-us/.

23.

Redemske, “Providing Healthcare in the Prison
Environment.”

37.

“About Us,” NaphCare, n.d.,
https://www.naphcare.com/about.

24.

See Footnote 12; “Prison Health Care: Costs and Quality How and Why States Strive for High-Performing Systems,”
The Pew Charitable Trusts, October 2017,
https://www.pewtrusts.org//media/assets/2017/10/sfh_prison_health_care_costs_and
_quality_final.pdf; Szep et al., “Special Report: U.S. Jails
Are Outsourcing Medical Care — and the Death Toll Is
Rising.”

38.

“History,” Wexford Health Sources, n.d.,
http://www.wexfordhealth.com/About-Us/History.

39.

“Correct Care Solutions LLC - Company Profile and News,”
Bloomberg, n.d.,
https://www.bloomberg.com/profile/company/0129892D:
US.

40.

“Armor Correctional Health Services, Inc.,” Dun &
Bradstreet, 2020, https://www.dnb.com/businessdirectory/companyprofiles.armor_correctional_health_services_inc.7de90fdf3
bd1af761409a8217b0b1229.html.

41.

“Corizon Launches From Correctional Healthcare Merger.”

42.

Matt Clarke, “Neither Fines nor Lawsuits Deter Corizon
From Delivering Substandard Health Care.” Prison Legal
News, March 3, 2020,
https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2020/mar/3/neith
er-fines-nor-lawsuits-deter-corizon-deliveringsubstandard-health-care/.

43.

“Centene Corp,” Investigate: A Project of the American
Friends Service Committee, October 18, 2018,
http://investigate.afsc.org/company/centene-corporation.

44.

“Centene To Acquire MHM Services to Expand National
Footprint in Correctional Healthcare Sector,” PR Newswire,
February 26, 2018, https://www.prnewswire.com/newsreleases/centene-to-acquire-mhm-services-to-expandnational-footprint-in-correctional-healthcare-sector300603870.html.

45.

Jim Baker, “HIG Capital’s and Wellpath’s Correctional
Healthcare Investment Risks.” Private Equity Stakeholder
Project, June 2019, https://pestakeholder.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/06/HIG-Capitals-CorrectionalHealthcare-Investment-Risks-PESP-062519.pdf.

46.

“Correct Care Solutions and Correctional Medical Group
Companies Join Forces to Deliver Best-in-Class
Healthcare,” H.I.G. Capital, October 1, 2018,
https://higcapital.com/news/release/correct-caresolutions-and-correctional-medical-group-companies-joinforces-to-deliver-best-in-class-healthcare.

47.

Marsha McLeod, “The Private Option.” The Atlantic,
September 12, 2019,
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/09/priv
ate-equitys-grip-on-jail-health-care/597871.

“Wellpath,” PrivCo; “About,” Wellpath, n.d.,
https://wellpathcare.com/about/; “Services,” Wellpath,
n.d., https://wellpathcare.com/services.

48.

Shalev, “From Public to Private Care the Historical
Trajectory of Medical Services in a New York City Jail.”

“Corizon, Inc.,” PrivCo; “About Corizon Health,” Corizon
Health, n.d., http://www.corizonhealth.com/AboutCorizon/Locations.

49.

Revenues based on $448M for MHM + $136M for
Centene’s 51% of 7 states - “MHM Services, Inc.,” PrivCo;
Kennedy, “Lucrative Florida Prison Health Care Contract
under Increasing Scrutiny”; “About Us,” Centurion Health,
n.d., https://www.centurionmanagedcare.com/aboutus.html; “Centene To Acquire MHM Services To Expand
National Footprint In Correctional Healthcare Sector,” PR
Newswire, February 26, 2018,
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/centene-toacquire-mhm-services-to-expand-national-footprint-incorrectional-healthcare-sector-300603870.html.

50.

“Wexford Health Sources, Inc.,” PrivCo; “History,” Wexford
Health Sources.

51.

“NaphCare, Inc.,” PrivCo; Stephanie Rebman,
“Birmingham Company Lands Contract for Health Services
in Atlanta Jail System.” Bizjournals.com, January 22, 2018,

25.

26.

Nicholas Freudenberg, “Jails, Prisons, and the Health of
Urban Populations: A Review of the Impact of the
Correctional System on Community Health.” Journal of
Urban Health: Bulletin of the New York Academy of
Medicine 78, no. 2, June 1, 2001, p. 214–35,
https://doi.org/10.1093/jurban/78.2.214.
“Incarceration and Health: A Family Medicine Perspective
(Position Paper),” AAFP, April 2017,
https://www.aafp.org/about/policies/all/incarceration.html
.; “Incarceration,” Office of Disease Prevention and Health
Promotion, 2020,
https://www.healthypeople.gov/2020/topicsobjectives/topic/social-determinants-health/interventionsresources/incarceration.

27.

Doris J James and Lauren E Glaze, “Bureau of Justice
Statistics Special Report: Mental Health Problems of Prison
and Jail Inmates.” US Department of Justice, Office of
Justice Programs, September 2006,
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/mhppji.pdf.

28.

“How Many Individuals with Serious Mental Illness Are in
Jails and Prisons?” Treatment Advocacy Center,
November 2014,
https://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/storage/docum
ents/backgrounders/how%20many%20individuals%20wit
h%20serious%20mental%20illness%20are%20in%20jails%
20and%20prisons%20final.pdf.

29.

“Incarceration and Health: A Family Medicine Perspective
(Position Paper),” AAFP.

30.

Brie A. Williams et al., “Addressing the Aging Crisis in U.S.
Criminal Justice Health Care.” Journal of the American
Geriatrics Society 60, no. 6, May 29, 2012, p. 1150–56,
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1532-5415.2012.03962.x.

31.

32.

33.

“Corizon Launches From Correctional Healthcare Merger,”
Corizon Health, June 3, 2011,
http://www.corizonhealth.com/Corizon-News/CorizonLaunches-From-Correctional-Healthcare-Merger1;
“Correctional Medical Services Inc,” Better Business
Bureau, 2020, https://www.bbb.org/us/mo/saintlouis/profile/health/correctional-medical-services-inc0734-110159644.

34.

“About,” MHM Services, n.d., http://www.mhmservices.com/about.html.

35.

“California Forensic Medical Group Inc - Company Profile
and News,” Bloomberg, n.d.,
https://www.bloomberg.com/profile/company/0130523D:
US.

Notes

124

Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau
of Justice Statistics Special Report, December 14, 2006,
https://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/mhppji.pdf.

https://www.bizjournals.com/birmingham/news/2018/01/
22/birmingham-company-lands-contract-for-health.html.
52.

“Prison Health Care: Costs and Quality - How and Why
States Strive for High-Performing Systems.”

70.

Jennifer Bronson and Marcus Berzofsky, “Indicators of
Mental Health Problems Reported by Prisoners and Jail
Inmates, 2011-12.” U.S. Department of Justice, Office of
Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics Special
Report, June 2017,
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/imhprpji1112.pdf.

71.

Michael Ollove, “Amid Shortage of Psychiatric Beds,
Mentally Ill Face Long Waits for Treatment.” Pew
Charitable Trusts, August 2, 2016,
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-andanalysis/blogs/stateline/2016/08/02/amid-shortage-ofpsychiatric-beds-mentally-ill-face-long-waits-for-treatment.

72.

Leah Pope, “Racial Disparities in Mental Health and
Criminal Justice.” National Alliance on Mental Illness, July
24, 2019, https://www.nami.org/Blogs/NAMI-Blog/July2019/Racial-Disparities-in-Mental-Health-and-CriminalJustice.

73.

“Arrests by Offense, Age, and Gender,” Office of Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 2018,
https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/crime/ucr.asp?table_in=1.

74.

Jennifer Bronson et al., “Drug Use, Dependence, and
Abuse Among State Prisoners and Jail.” U.S. Department
of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice
Statistics Special Report, June 2017,
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/dudaspji0709.pdf.

75.

Zoe Greenberg and Sharona Coutts, “Punished for
Addiction: Women Prisoners Dying from Lack of
Treatment.” Rewire News Group, April 1, 2015,
https://rewirenewsgroup.com/article/2015/04/01/punishe
d-addiction-women-prisoners-dying-lack-treatment/.

76.

Margaret Noonan, Harley Rohloff, and Scott Ginder,
“Mortality in Local Jails and State Prisons, 2000–2013 Statistical Tables.” U.S. Department of Justice, Office of
Justice Programs. Bureau of Justice Statistics, August
2015,
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/mljsp0013st.pdf.

77.

Ibid.

Woodrow Augustus Myers, Jr., MD, “A Letter to D.C.
Council Chairman Phil Mendelson.” Corizon Correctional
Healthcare, March 18, 2015,
http://www.corizonhealth.com/Corizon-News/a-letter-tod.c.-council-chairman-phil-mendelson.

78.

Kevin Fiscella et al., “Alcohol and Opiate Withdrawal in US
Jails.” American Journal of Public Health 94, no. 9,
September 1, 2004, p. 1522–1524,
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1448487/.

79.

“State Prison Health Care Spending: An Examination.”

“FAQs,” Wellpath, n.d.,
https://wellpathcare.com/about/faqs/; Philip G. Peters,
“Twenty Years of Evidence on the Outcomes of
Malpractice Claims.” Clinical Orthopaedics and Related
Research 467, no. 2, December 2, 2008, p. 352–57,
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11999-008-0631-7.

80.

“2019 ACA Boston Program Book: 149th Congress of
Correction,” American Correctional Association, 2019,
https://user-3imepyw.cld.bz/ACA-Program-Books/2019ACA-Boston-Program-Book-149th-COC/156/.

81.

Kirk Heilbrun and Christopher M. King, “Forced
Medication and Competency to Stand Trial: Clinical, Legal,
and Ethical Issues.” Psychiatric Times, April 29, 2017,
https://www.psychiatrictimes.com/forced-medication-andcompetency-stand-trial-clinical-legal-and-ethicalissues/page/0/2.

82.

Noonan, “Mortality in Local Jails and State Prisons, 2000–
2013 - Statistical Tables.”

83.

Greenberg and Coutts, “Punished for Addiction: Women
Prisoners Dying from Lack of Treatment.”

84.

Binswanger et al., “Release from Prison — a High Risk of
Death for Former Inmates.”

85.

Sawyer, “The Steep Cost of Medical Co-Pays in Prison Puts
Health at Risk.”

53.

Ibid.

54.

Joseph Darius Jaafari, “He Went into Jail with a
Toothache; He Ended up on Life Support — and in Debt.”
WITF, March 18, 2020,
https://www.witf.org/2020/03/18/he-went-into-jail-with-atoothache-he-ended-up-on-life-support-and-in-debt/.

55.

“Declaration of Charles Pugh, M.D., in Support of Plaintiffs
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary
Judgment by Defendants Corizon et al.,” January 30,
2015,
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2940992Dec-l-of-Pugh.html#document/p2/a324198.

56.

Szep et al., “Special Report: U.S. Jails Are Outsourcing
Medical Care — and the Death Toll Is Rising.”

57.

Ibid.

58.

Ibid.

59.

Ibid.

60.

Karishma A Chari, Alan E Simon, and Carol J Defrances,
“National Survey of Prison Health Care: Selected
Findings.” National Health Statistics Reports, July 28, 2016,
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhsr/nhsr096.pdf.

61.

62.

63.

64.

65.

66.

67.

68.

69.

“Telemedicine Behind Bars,” Prison Legal News,
December 15, 2013,
https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2013/dec/15/tele
medicine-behind-bars/.
“Telemedicine Breaks Out of Prisons to Widespread Use
During Pandemic,” AP News, June 8, 2020,
https://apnews.com/press-release/prcom/3d25102322ce3367d3d3386e2ee3f341.
Jimmy Jenkins, “Whistleblower Says Corizon Health
Administrators Directed Him to Cheat Arizona Prison
Monitors.” KJZZ, January 23, 2019,
https://kjzz.org/content/752172/whistleblower-sayscorizon-health-administrators-directed-him-cheat-arizonaprison.

Christopher Zoukis, “Seventh Circuit: Two-Month Delay in
Ordering Biopsy Not Deliberate Indifference.” Prison Legal
News, July 28, 2017,
https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2017/jul/28/seven
th-circuit-two-month-delay-ordering-biopsy-notdeliberate-indifference/.
Ingrid A. Binswanger et al., “Release from Prison — a High
Risk of Death for Former Inmates.” New England Journal of
Medicine 356, no. 2. January 11, 2007, p. 157–65,
https://doi.org/10.1056/nejmsa064115.
24601, In God We Trust, 2018,
https://worthrises.org/capitalizingonjustice.
Doris J James and Lauren E Glaze, “Highlights Mental
Health Problems of Prison and Jail Inmates.” U.S.

Notes

125

86.

Wendy Sawyer, “How Much Do Incarcerated People Earn
in Each State?” Prison Policy Initiative, April 10, 2017,
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2017/04/10/wages/.

87.

Sawyer, “The Steep Cost of Medical Co-Pays in Prison Puts
Health at Risk.”

88.

Ibid.

89.

Ibid.

90.

“Texas Department of Criminal Justice Annual Health Care
Services Fee,” Texas Department of Criminal Justice,
March 2019,
https://www.tdcj.texas.gov/divisions/cmhc/docs/TDCJ_An
nual_Health_Care_Services_Fee_Pamphlet.pdf.

91.

Matthew Clarke, “Texas: $100 Medical Copay for Prisoners
Generates Less Revenue than Expected.” Prison Legal
News, February 4, 2015,
https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2015/feb/4/texas100-medical-copay-prisoners-generates-less-revenueexpected/.

92.

Sawyer, “The Steep Cost of Medical Co-Pays in Prison Puts
Health at Risk.”

93.

Michelle Andrews, “Prisons and Jails Forcing Inmates To
Cover Some Medical Care Costs.” Kaiser Health News,
September 29, 2015, https://khn.org/news/prisons-andjails-forcing-inmates-to-cover-some-medical-care-costs/;
Jaafari, “He Went into Jail with a Toothache; He Ended up
on Life Support — and in Debt.”

94.

Audrey McNamara, “Health Care Provider Severs Ties with
Mississippi Prisons after Jay Z and Yo Gotti Lawsuit.” CBS
News, August 1, 2020,
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/healthcare-providersevers-ties-with-mississippi-prisons-after-jay-z-and-yogotti-lawsuit/.

95.

See “Drug Policy Action’s Measure 110 Prevails, Making
Oregon the First U.S. State to Decriminalize All Drugs &
Expand Access to Addiction and Health Services,” Drug
Policy Alliance, November 3, 2020,
https://www.drugpolicy.org/press-release/2020/11/drugpolicy-actions-measure-110-prevails-making-oregon-firstus-state.

Transportation
1.

2.

Private Prisoner Transport.” The Marshall Project, July 6,
2016,
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2016/07/06/insidethe-deadly-world-of-private-prisoner-transport.
Christian Mason, Tod W. Burke, and Stephen S. Owen,
“On the Road Again: The Dangers of Transporting Ailing
Inmates.” Corrections Today, November/December 2013,
https://www.aca.org/ACA_PROD_IMIS/docs/ochc/Mason_
Burke_Owen_Nov-DecCT13.pdf.

3.

Hager and Santo, “World of Private Prisoner Transport.”

4.

“Budget Overview Fiscal Year 2020 Congressional
Justification,” Department of Homeland Security, 2020,
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/19_0
318_MGMT_CBJ-Immigration-CustomsEnforcement_0.pdf.

5.

“Hidden in Plain Sight: ICE Air and the Machinery of Mass
Deportation,” Center for Human Rights, April 23, 2019,
https://jsis.washington.edu/humanrights/2019/04/23/iceair/#_ftnref5.

6.

Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. 66 (1860).

7.

Puerto Rico v. Brandstad, 483 U.S. 219 (1987).

8.

“Opposing Comment for Docket No. MCF 21067,” Human
Rights Defense Center, 2016,
https://www.humanrightsdefensecenter.org/media/public
ations/HRDC%20comments%208_8_16a.pdf; Alex
Friedman, “For-Profit Transportation Companies: Taking
Prisoners, and the Public, for a Ride.” Prison Legal News,
September 15, 2006,
https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2006/sep/15/forprofit-transportation-companies-taking-prisoners-and-thepublic-for-a-ride/.

9.

Friedman, “For-Profit Transportation Companies.”

10.

Nomaan Merchant and Angeliki Kastanis, “Deported
Immigrants Get Their Last Flight on ‘ICE Air.’” AP News,
December 17, 2018,
https://apnews.com/a1d44854cd134333b2cb85de85305
6c9.

11.

Jeffrey Kaye, “For Immigration Crackdown Proponent,
Deportations Mean Business.” HuffPost, May 29, 2010,

Notes

https://www.huffpost.com/entry/for-immigrationcrackdown_b_594426.
12.

Ibid.

13.

“U.S. Customs and Border Protection: Contracting for
Transportation and Guard Services for Detainees,” U. S.
Government Accountability Office, October 17, 2016,
https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-17-89R.

14.

Grahame Gibson, “G4S North America.” Group 4
Securicor, n.d., https://www.g4s.com//media/g4s/corporate/files/financialpresentations/2004/2008_g4s_north_america_presentatio
n_may_2008.ashx?la=en&hash=F892FCDF0B584B60E3F
C76AE8FFB2559.

15.

Colleen Robertson, “GTI Operations Tacoma ICE
Processing Center.” The GEO Group, May 25, 2015,
https://www.geogroup.com/News-Detail/NewsID/189.

16.

“Fact Sheet: Facts and Figures,” U.S. Marshals Service,
February 25, 2020,
https://www.usmarshals.gov/duties/factsheets/facts.pdf.

17.

Hager and Santo, “World of Private Prisoner Transport.”;
"Safety, Timeliness, & Efficiency: Transporting Roughly
30,000 Inmates For Over 1,200 Government Agencies Per
Year," Prisoner Transport Services, 2020,
https://prisonertransport.net/.

18.

Hager and Santo, “World of Private Prisoner Transport.”

19.

“2020 Congressional Justification.”

20.

Catherine E. Shoichet and Curt Merrill, “The Airline No
One Wants to Fly: How US Deportation Flights Work.”
CNN, January 17, 2018,
https://www.cnn.com/2017/05/26/us/ice-air-deportationflights-explainer/index.html.

21.

“2020 Congressional Justification.”

22.

Hager and Santo, “World of Private Prisoner Transport.”

23.

Website homepage, Prisoner Transportation Services, n.d.,
https://prisonertransport.net/.

24.

Ally Jarmanning, “Sen. Warren Asks DOJ Inspector
General to Investigate Private Prison Transport
Companies.” WBUR, October 9, 2019,

126

https://www.wbur.org/news/2019/10/08/elizabethwarren-prison-transport-companies-oversight.
25.

“Which Sectors of America’s Immigrant Detention System
Are Run by Private Companies?” In the Public Interest, n.d.,
https://www.inthepublicinterest.org/wpcontent/uploads/In-the-Public-Interest-Programs-NotProfits-Immigration-Path.pdf.

26.

“Frequently Asked Questions,” TransCor America, n.d.,
https://transcor.com/faq.

27.

“Secure Transportation,” The GEO Group, n.d.,
https://www.geogroup.com/geo_transport_inc.

28.

Ibid.

29.

“G4S 2018 Annual Report,” G4S, 2018,
https://www.g4s.com/-/media/g4s/global/files/annualreports/integrated-report-extracts-2018/g4s-fullintegrated-report-2018.ashx

30.

“Hidden in Plain Sight.”

31.

“CSI Aviation, Inc.,” U.S. Government Accountability
Office, February 7, 2018,
https://www.gao.gov/products/B-415631.

32.

Merchant and Kastanis, “Deported Immigrants Get Their
Last Flight on ‘ICE Air.”

33.

Ibid.

34.

Justin Rohrlich, “The Sole Airline Willing to Fly ‘High-Risk’
Deportations Is Price-Gouging ICE.” Quartz, December 5,
2019, https://qz.com/1761804/sole-airline-willing-todeport-high-risk-immigrants-is-price-gouging-ice/.

35.

Hager and Santo, “World of Private Prisoner Transport.”

36.

Eli Hager and Alysia Santo, “Death on a Prison Bus:
Extradition Companies’ Safety Improvements Lag.” The
New York Times, March 23, 2017,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/23/us/prisonertransport-vans.html

37.

Alysia Santo and Eli Hager, “A Man Died in a Private Prison
Van. The Company Says: Not Our Problem.” The Marshall
Project, March 29, 2019,
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2019/03/29/a-mandied-in-a-private-prison-van-the-company-says-not-ourproblem.

38.

Eli Hager and Alysia Santo, “Private Prisoner Vans’ Long
Road of Neglect.” The New York Times, July 6, 2016,
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/07/us/prisonertransport-vans.html.

39.

Hager and Santo, “World of Private Prisoner Transport.”

40.

Hager and Santo, “A Man Died in a Private Prison Van.”

41.

“Investigation Reveals Pattern of Prisoner Abuse in Private
Prison Transport Industry,” Equal Justice Initiative, July 27,
2016, https://eji.org/news/prisoner-abuse-in-privateprison-transport-industry/.

42.

Hager and Santo, “A Man Died in a Private Prison Van.”

43.

Hager and Santo, “World of Private Prisoner Transport.”

44.

Ibid.

45.

Tracy Jan, “Privately Run Prisoner Transport Company
Kept Detainee Shackled for 18 Days in Human Waste,
Lawsuit Alleges.” The Washington Post, April 24, 2018,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2018/0
4/24/privately-run-prisoner-transport-company-keptdetainee-shackled-for-18-days-in-human-waste-lawsuitalleges/.

46.

Hager and Santo, “A Man Died in a Private Prison Van.”

47.

Hager and Santo, “World of Private Prisoner Transport.”

48.

Ibid.

References

49.

“Opposing Comment for Docket No. MCF 21067.”

50.

Jaden Rhea, “Highway To Hell: The Privatized Prison
Transportation Industry And The Long Road To Reform.”
West Virginia Law Review, 2017,
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?ar
ticle=1008&context=wvlr.

51.

Joe Buglewicz, “The Horrible Things I Saw Driving a Van
Packed with Prisoners.” The Marshall Project, July 8, 2016.
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2016/07/07/thehorrible-things-i-saw-driving-a-van-packed-with-prisoners.

52.

Hager and Santo, “World of Private Prisoner Transport.”

53.

“Private Prisoner Transport Company Pays Damages in
Lawsuit Over Sexual Assault and Death Threats Against
Woman,” American Civil Liberties Union, March 14, 2003,
https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/private-prisonertransport-company-pays-damages-lawsuit-over-sexualassault-and-death.

54.

Ibid.

55.

Ibid.

56.

Jeanna’s Act, 114 Stat. 2784 (2000),
https://www.congress.gov/106/plaws/publ560/PLAW106publ560.pdf.

57.

Hager and Santo, “World of Private Prisoner Transport.”

58.

“34 U.S. Code § 60103 - Federal Regulation of Prisoner
Transport Companies,” LII / Legal Information Institute,
December 21, 2000,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/34/60103.

59.

“Senators Warren and Booker, Rep. Deutch Call for
Greater Oversight of Private Prisoner Transport
Companies,” U.S. Senator Elizabeth Warren of
Massachusetts, October 8, 2019,
https://www.warren.senate.gov/oversight/letters/senatorswarren-and-booker-rep-deutch-call-for-greater-oversightof-private-prisoner-transport-companies.

60.

Matthew Clarke, “Private Prisoner Transport Firm Closes
After Escape; Problems Continue to Plague Industry.”
Prison Legal News, May 3, 2019,
https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2019/may/3/privat
e-prisoner-transport-firm-closes-after-escape-problemscontinue-plague-industry/.

61.

Floricel Liborio Ramos, “ICE Put Me in a Hot Van with No
Windows or Water. I Thought I Would Die.” ACLU of
Northern CA, July 9, 2018,
https://www.aclunc.org/blog/ice-put-me-hot-van-nowindows-or-water-i-thought-i-would-die.

62.

“Refugees, Asylum-seekers and Migrants,” Amnesty
International, 2016, https://www.amnesty.org/en/what-wedo/refugees-asylum-seekers-and-migrants/; Duncan
Leatherdale, “Why Do People Risk Their Lives to Get to the
UK?” BBC News, October 23, 2019,
https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-50155073.

63.

Jeremy Scahill, “Intercepted Podcast: Killing Asylum: How
Decades of U.S. Policy Ravaged Central America.” The
Intercept, November 28, 2018,
https://theintercept.com/2018/11/28/killing-asylum-howdecades-of-u-s-policy-ravaged-central-america/.

64.

Nick Miroff, “ICE Air: Shackled Deportees, Air Freshener
and Cheers. America’s One-Way Trip Out.” The
Washington Post, August 10, 2019,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/ice-airshackled-deportees-air-freshener-and-cheers-americasone-way-trip-out/2019/08/10/bc5d2d36-babe-11e9-aeb2a101a1fb27a7_story.html?arc404=true.

65.

Shashank Bengali, “They Gambled, and Lost: Dozens of

127

Migrants Braved Thousands of Miles of Jungles, Seas and
Bandits to Reach the U.S. Then They Were Sent Home.”
Los Angeles Times, December 24, 2016,
https://www.latimes.com/projects/la-fg-immigration-trekamerica-bangladesh/.
66.

Bianca Bruno, “ICE Contractor Faces Suit Over ‘Inhumane’
Van Ride.” Courthouse News, May 22, 2019,
https://www.courthousenews.com/ice-contractor-facessuit-over-inhumane-van-ride/.

67.

“Hidden in Plain Sight.”

68.

Bruno, “ICE Contractor Faces Suit.”

69.

Jacey Fortin, “U.S. Put 92 Somalis on a Deportation Flight,
Then Brought Them Back.” The New York Times,
December 9, 2017,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/09/us/somaliadeportation-flight.html.

70.

“Hidden in Plain Sight.”

Community Corrections
1.

Nicolás Medina Mora, “Meet The Bail Bond Queen.”
BuzzFeed News, January 9, 2015,
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/nicolasmedinamor
a/meet-the-bail-bond-queen.

15.

“Dialogue – Issue 37: Parole in the United States: People &
Policies in Transition,” The Dui Hua Foundation, November
29, 2009, https://duihua.org/dialogue-issue-37-parole-inthe-united-states-people-policies-in-transition/.

2.

Timothy Schnacke, Michael Jones, and Claire Brooker,
“The History of Bail and Pretrial Release.” Pretrial Justice
Institute, September 23, 2010,
https://cdpsdocs.state.co.us/ccjj/Committees/BailSub/Han
douts/HistoryofBail-Pre-TrialRelease-PJI_2010.pdf.

16.

“Probation and Parole: History, Goals, and DecisionMaking - Origins of Probation and Parole,” American Law
Library, n.d., https://law.jrank.org/pages/1817/ProbationParole-History-Goals-Decision-Making-Origins-probationparole.html.

3.

Ibid.

17.

Schloss and Alarid, “Standards in the Privatization.”

4.

Ibid.

18.

5.

Hans Zeisel, “Bail Revisited.” University of Chicago Law
School, 1979,
https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cg
i?article=12006&context=journal_articles.

Timothy Williams, ‘It Didn’t Work:’ States That Ended
Parole for Violent Crimes Are Thinking Again.” The New
York Times, February 13, 2020,
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/13/us/parolevirginia.html.

19.

Todd Bussert, et al., “New Time Limits on Federal Halfway
Houses.” Criminal Justice 21, no.1, 2006,
https://www.frostbussert.com/files/new_time_limits_on_fe
deral_halfway_houses__4-06_.pdf.

20.

"Dialogue – Issue 37: Parole in the United States: People &
Policies in Transition.”

21.

Lauren-Brooke Eisen, “The Complex History of the
Controversial 1994 Crime Bill.” Brennan Center for Justice,
April 4, 2016, https://www.brennancenter.org/ourwork/analysis-opinion/complex-history-controversial1994-crime-bill.

22.

Emma Anderson, “NPR Choice Page.” NPR, May 24, 2014,
https://www.npr.org/2014/05/22/314874232/the-historyof-electronic-monitoring-devices.

23.

Robert Gable, “The Ankle Bracelet Is History: An Informal
Review of the Birth and Death of a Monitoring
Technology.” Journal of Offender Monitoring, 2015,
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/313100042_Th
e_Ankle_Bracelet_Is_History_An_Informal_Review_of_the_
Birth_and_Death_of_a_Monitoring_Technology.

24.

Ibid.

25.

Sarah Stillman, “Get Out of Jail, Inc.” The New Yorker, June
16, 2016,
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/06/23/getout-of-jail-inc.

26.

“GEO Group Statement on Federal Legislation on Prison
Reform (The FIRST STEP Act),” The GEO Group, November
9, 2019, https://wearegeo.com/2018/11/19/geo-groupstatement-on-federal-legislation-on-prison-reform-thefirst-step-act/.

27.

Laura Maruschak and Todd Minton, “Correctional
Populations in the United States, 2017-2018,” Bureau of
Justice Statistics, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Dept. of
Justice, August 2020,
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus1718.pdf.

6.

7.

Alison M. Smith, “U.S. Constitutional Limits on State
Money- Bail Practices for Criminal Defendants.”
Congressional Research Service, February 26, 2019,
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45533.pdf.
Warren Miller, “The Bail Reform Act of 1966: Need for
Reform in 1969.” Catholic University Law Review 19 no. 1,
1969,
https://scholarship.law.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=27
96&context=lawreview.

8.

Schnacke, Jones, and Brooker, “The History of Bail.”

9.

Ryan Labrecque, “Probation in the United States: A
Historical and Modern Perspective” Portland State
University, 2017,
https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?art
icle=1029&context=ccj_fac.

10.

“Probation and Pretrial Services History,” United States
Courts, n.d., https://www.uscourts.gov/servicesforms/probation-and-pretrial-services/probation-andpretrial-services-history.

11.

Labrecque, “Probation in the United States.”

12.

Christine S. Schloss and Leanne F. Alarid, “Standards in the
Privatization of Probation Services.” Criminal Justice
Review 32, no. 3, September 1, 2007, p. 233–45,
https://doi.org/10.1177/0734016807304949.

13.

Terry Carter, “Privatized Probation Becomes a Spiral of
Added Fees and Jail Time.” ABA Journal, October 1, 2014,
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/probationers
_prison_privatized_supervision_becomes_a_spiral_of_add
ed_fees_j.

14.

Lewis Wallace, “Welcome to Georgia, the Epicenter of the
Private Probation Racket.” The Outline, August 17, 2017,
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83.

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84.

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85.

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