DETENTION AND
CORRECTIONS
CASELAW CATALOG

26th Edition
2015-2016

Volume Six: Sec. 39-50
Rod C. Miller
Donald J. Walter
Research and Review:
Joseph Heltzel
Chris Dickey
Richard Drennon
Kyle McCarty

CRS, Inc.

A Non-Profit Organization
925 Johnson Drive
Gettysburg, PA 17325
(717) 338-9100
Fax (717) 718-6178
www.correction.org
rod@correction.org
Copyright 2017

Table of Contents
DETENTION AND CORRECTIONS CASELAW CATALOG
VOLUME 1
How to Use the Catalog
Index and Topic Finder
Table of Cases
1. Access to Courts
2. Administration

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Administrative Segregation
Assessment of Costs
Attorney Fees
Bail
Civil Rights

VOLUME 2
8. Classification and Separation
9. Conditions of Confinement
10. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
11. Discipline

12. Exercise and Recreation
13. Ex-Offenders
14. Failure to Protect

VOLUME 3
15. Facilities
16. False Imprisonment/Arrest
17. Female Prisoners
18. Food
19. Free Speech, Expression, Assoc.
20. Good Time

21. Grievance Procedures, Prisoner
22. Habeas Corpus
23. Hygiene-Prisoner Personal
24. Immunity
25. Intake and Admissions
26. Juveniles

VOLUME 4
27. Liability
28. Mail
29. Medical Care

30. Mental Problems (Prisoner)
31. Personnel

VOLUME 5
32. Pretrial Detention
33. Privacy
34. Programs-Prisoner
35. Property-Prisoner Personal

36. Release
37. Religion
38. Rules & Regulations-Prisoner

VOLUME 6
39. Safety and Security
40. Sanitation
41. Searches
42. Services-Prisoner
43. Sentence
44. Standards

45. Supervision
46. Training
47. Transfers
48. Use of Force
49. Visiting
50. Work- Prisoner

CRS, Inc.
925 Johnson Drive, Gettysburg, PA 17325 (717) 338-9100
www.correction.org Fax (717) 718-6178 rod@correction.org
All Rights Reserved

SECTION 39: SAFETY AND SECURITY
Detention and Corrections Caselaw Catalog All "Righlll B.eaeroed
CRS, Inc. 925 Johnson Drive, Gettysburg PA 17325 (71'7) 338-9100 www.correction.org/
The following pages present summaries of court decisions which address this topic area. These summaries
provide readers with highlights of each case, but are not intended to be a substitute for the review of the full case.
The cases do not represent all court decisions which address this topic area, but rather offer a sampling of
relevant holdings.
The decisions summarized below were current as of the date indicated on the title-page of this edition of the
Catalog. Prior t.o publication., the citation. for each case was verified, and the case was researched in Shepard's
Citations to determine jf it had been altered upon appeal (reversed. or modmed), The Catalog is updated
annually. An annual supplement provides replacement pages for cases in the prior edition which have changed,
and adds new cases. Readers are encouraged to consult the Topic Index t.o identify related topics of interest. The
text in the section en.titled "How to Use The Catalog• at the beginning of the Catalog 1;1rovides an. overnew which
may also be helpful t.o some readers,
The case summaries which follow are organized by year; with the earliest case presented first. Within each
year, cases are organized alphabeti.cally by the name of the plamtiff. The left margin offers a quick reference,
highlighting the type of court involved and identifying appropriate subtopics addressed by each case.

1964:

U.S. District Court
JEWELRY

Bllllks v. Havener, 284 F.Supp. 27 (E.D. Vir. 1964). An inmate is allowed to wear a
religious medal even though jewelry has been banned from prisoners in other cases for
security reasons. (Youth Center, Lort.on, Virginia)
1967

U.S. District Court
RELIGIOUS GROUPS

Lee v. Crouse, 284 F.Supp. 541 (D. Kan. 1967), aff'd. 396 F.2d. 952 (10th Cir. 1968).
The size of groups at religious services may be restricted. (I.ansing, Kansas)
1968

U.S. District CO'Ul't
Konigsberg v. Ciccone, 285 F.Supp. 585 (W,D. Mo. 1968), aff"d, 417 F.2d. 161
RELIGIOUS SERVICES (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied. 397 U.S. 968 (1969). The right to attend religious
services can. be prohibited in such cases only when. it can. be shown. that institution.al
security is threatened. (Medical Center For Federal Prisoners, Springfield, Missouri)
U.S. Appeals CO'Ul't
SAFETY

REGULATIONS
DISCRETION
U.S. District Court
SEGREGATION

Long v. Parker, 890 F.2d. 816 (3rd Cir. 1968). Correction.al personnel, not the courts,
are responsU,le for promulgating regulations for the safety of the prison population. and
public as well as for the main.tenam:e and proper :func:tiol:img of the institation. ·
Correction.al officers must be grant.eel wide discretion. in the exercise of such authority.
(United States Penitentiary;Lewisburg, Pennsylvania)

W'tlson v. Kelley, 294 F.Supp. 1006 (N.D. Ga. 1968), aff'd, 898 U.S. 266
(1968). State statut.es requiring the segregation. of races in county jails are
UJJCOllStitutional, and although prison authorities may take racial tensions in.to account in
maintaining order and secarity, such consideration. should be made aft.er a danger to
security, discipline, and good order has become apparent, and not before. (Georgia)
1969

U.S. Appeals Court
REIJGION

Walker v. Blackwell, 411 F.2d 23 (5th Cir. 1969). Services must be permitt.ed equally
for all religions, although the time and frequency may be con.trolled. Security concems
justified refusal of Ma$lims' request to ·have a meal after sumiet. (Atlanta, Georgia)
1971

U.S. Appeals CO'Ul't
HAlRLENGTH
FACIALHAIR

U.S. District Court
MEDIA ACCESS

DISl'URBANCE

Blake v. Pryse, 444 F.2d. 218 (8th Cir. 1971). Regalations covering hair length and
facial hair have been held not to raise constitution.al issues. Administrators can justify
such·rerulations t.o achieve purposes of identi:fication., hygiene, discipline andpreven.tion.
of concealment of contraband. (Federal Correctional Institute, San.dst.one, Minnesota)
Burnham v. Oswald, 333 F,Supp. 1128 (W.D. N.Y., 1971). Newsmen brought suit
seeking an. order permitting press interviews of in.mates in certain state correctional
:facilities. The district court held that guidelines applied by corrections officials which
resulted in forbidding interviews of inmates aft.er a riot took place was not an.
b:ifringemen.t of newsmen's first amendmen+. rights. A federal court will not substitate its
judgment as to restrictions requjred for safety and secarity of an. mstitation. for that of
prism, admrnistnt.ors unless a violation of constitation.al rights is clear. (Attica

Correctional Facility. New York)

39.1

U.S. District Court
LOCKS

Jones v. Wittenberg, 330 F.Supp. 707 (N,D. Oh. 1971), aff'd. 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir.
1972), Cell-locking syst.em must be placed in good working order. (Lucas Co., O}O

U.S. District Court

Seale v. Mason, 326 F.Supp. 1875 (D. Conn. 1971). Arguments for hair restriction are
based on health reasons and the need for identification of inmat.es. Where a prison
reculation limit.eel the jewelry women prisoners might wear t.o a wristwatch, earrings, a
ring and a necklace with a religious medal on it, the court held no infringement of aey
constitutional ~ht existed. ~ontville Correctional Cent.er, C.onnecticut)

HAlR
JEWELRY

1972

U.S. District Court
LOCKS

Baker v. Hamilton, 845 F.Supp. 845 (W,D. ~- 1972}. Broken locks con.tribute t.o a
finding of cruel and unusual pu:cisbrnent u t.o juveniles. (Jefferson County Jail,
Kentucky)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEGREGATION

Christma:c v. Skinner. 468 F.2d 728 (2d Cir. 1972). Puttin.g detainee in ''isolation for
three days did not constitute punishment, but only :maintenance of order and discipline,"
thus no minimal due process was necessary. (Monroe County Jail, New York)

U.S. District Court
PRETRIAL

Collins v. Schoonfield, 844 F.Supp. 257 (D, Md. 1972). A detainee can be deprived of
constitutional rights "only t.o the ext.ent such denial is required t.o insure that he
appears at trial and t.o restrain him from endangering or c:lisrupting the security of the
institution in which he is detained, or t.o deter him, if his conduct has already caused such
danger or c:lisruption. from repeating such conduct. Imna.tes may' not be punished for
conduct if innocuous or trivial nature under vague and uncertain standards and ·
reculatio:cs because such conduct may offend the sensibilities of individual corrections
officers where such conduct poses no threat t.o the security and order of the institlltion.
(Baltimore City Jail. Maryland)

DETAINEES

U.S. District Court
ACCESS TO
ATrORNEY

Elie v. Hepdersop. 840 F.Supp. 958 (E,D, La. 1972), Banning: qf lawyers who seem
int.ent on "instigating trouble" is approved. Att.orneya do not have a right t.o visit
inmat.es who have not sought their advice. (Louisiana Stat.e Penitentiary)

U.S. Appeals Court
LaReau v. MacDougall. 473 F.2d 974 (2nd Cir. 1972}, cert denied. 414 U.S.
RELIGIOUS SERVICES 878. Prisoners with a hist.ory of disruptive activity may be denied att.endance at
religious services. (Connecticut Correctional Institut.e, Somers)
1973

U.S. Appeals Court
Fallis v. United States. 476 F,2d 619 (5th Cir. 1978), Security and visiting rules are
RELIGIOUS SERVICES safficient grounds for refusing t.o allow Mormon "Family Home Evening:n contact visits.
CONTACT VISITS
(Atlanta Federal Penitentiary, Georgia)
.

1974
U.S. Supreme Court
MEDIA ACCESS

Pell v. Procum.er. 417 U.S. 817 (1974). Pell, a journalist, together with two other
journalists and f~ California Stat.e Pt-iscm. inmates, sought in.junctive and declaratoey
relief in a 42 U.S.C~ Section 1983 action challenging a California Department of
Corrections rule promulgated by- PL-ocunier, Direc:tor of the Department. The rule provided
that press and other media interviews with specific individual imnat.es would not be
permitt.ed. The U.S. District Court for the Southern. Division of California granted the
requested relief, holding +.hat the rule um:onstitutionally infringed their first and
fourteen.th amendment freedoms. The court dismissed +he journalists' claims on the
ground .that other sources of information were available t.o them. The prison officials and
joumalists appealed directly t.o the U.S. Supreme Court.
lffll:l2: 1 [S]ince [the rule prohibiting media interviews with specific individual
inmates] does not den:y the press access t.o
of information available t.o members of
the general public, we hold that it does not abridge the prot.ec:tion. that the first and
fourt.eentb. amendments guarantee," 417 U.S. at 885.
REASONING:
a. 1 [L]awful incarceration brmgs about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of.
m.any privileges and rights, a retraction justified by- the considerations underlying our
penal &yBt.em [Cite omitt.ed]. • 417 U.S. at 822.
b. 8 [A] prison mmate retains those first amendment rights that are not mconsist:ent
with his status as a prison.er or with the legitimate pen.ological objectives of the corrective
system. Th.us, challenges t.o prison restrktions that are assert.ed t.o mhibit first
amendment interest.a must be analyzed in terms of the legitimate policies and goals of the
cor.reetioDS syst.em. t.o whose ~ and C82'8 the prisoner has been. committ.ed in
accordam:e with due pl'OCeSS of law." 417 U.S. at 822.
c. "It is m. light of these legitimat.e penal objectives [deterrence, rehabilitation. and
sec:arili,y] that a court must assess cba])enges t.o prison regulations based on asseried
co.nsl:itatiomu rights of prisoners.• 417 U.S. at 823.

sources

39.2

d. "When the question involves the entry of people into the priso:a.s for face-to-face
communication with inmat.es, it is obvious that institati.onal considerations such as
secarity and related administrative problems, as well as the accepted and legitimat.e policy
objectives of the corrections system itself, require that some limitation be placed on such
visitations." 417 U.S. at 826.
e. ''In the judgment of the state corrections officials, this visitation policy will permit
inmates to have personal contact with those persons who will aid in their rehabilitation,
while keeping visitatio:a.s at a manageable level that will not compromise institutional
secarity. Such considerations are peculiarly within. the province and professional
expertise of corrections officials and, in the absence of substantial evidence in the record t.o .
indicate that the officials have exaggerated their respo:a.se to these consideratio:a.s, c:ourts
should ordinarily defer to their expert judgment. 11
f. "[W]hen the issue involves a regulation limiting one of several means of
communication by an inmate, the institutional objectives furthered by that regulation, and
the measure of judicial deference owed to corrections officials in their att.empt to serve
those interests are relevant in judging the validity of the regulation." 417 U.S. at 827.
g. "[N]ewsmen have no constitati.onal right of access to prisons or their inmates
beyond that afforded the general public.• 417 U.S. at 834.
h. 'The right t.o speak and publish does not carry with it the unrestrained right to
gather information." 417 U.S. at 834 at 9, ~ Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. AT 16-17.
NOTE: Important t.o the Court's holding that the rule did not violate the inmates'
rights was its finding that adequate alternatives (mail and visitation) existed to provide
inmates with access t.o the outside world.· (Department of Corrections, California)
1975

U.S. Distdct Court
STAFFING

Alberti v. Sheriff of Harris Co., 406 F.Supp. 649 (S.D. Tex. 1975). Sufficient jail
staff shall be hired t.o provide one jailer for every twenty inmates. The number of jail
guards must be in.creased when additional guards are required for the safekeeping of
prisoners and the security of the jail. (Harris County Jail, Texas)

U.S. Distdct Court

Rhem v. Malcolm, 396 F.Supp. 1195 (S.D. N.Y. 1975), afrd, 527 F.2d 1041
(2nd Cir. 1975). Institution allowed to lock in inmates, consistent with least restrictive
alternative theory, during following times: 1) Post-breakfast lock-in to provide services for
inmates going t.o court. 2) Lock-in of one side of cell block while other side is eating. 8)
N"1ght time lock-in. Using proper classif'lcation procedures, the institution may impose a
more restrictive lock-in schedule for inmates determined t.o be security risks, (Manhattan
House of Detention, New York)

"LOCK-INB

1978
U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Bell v. Manson, 427 F.Supp. 450 (D, Conn. 1976). Strip and rectal searching aft.er
court appearances is upheld. (Community Correctional Center, Bridgeport)

U.S. District Court
VISITS

WoJfish v. Levi, 406 F.Supp. 1243 (S.D. N.Y. 1976). Restrictions on visitation of
pretdal in.mat.es must be justified by compelling necessity. Prison officials have the
ultimate burden of proof on this issue. Due process reqwres that the least restraint
necessary to assure institutional security and adminiP-ative manageability be
employed. (Metropolitan Correctional Facility, New York)

PRETRIAL
DETAINEES

1977
U.S. District Court
CONTRABAND

Goldsby v. Carnes, 429 F.Supp. 370 (W.D. Mo. 1977). All living units should be
checked for contraband at least once a month. (Jackson County Jail, Missouri)

1978
U.S. District Court
SEGREGATION

Bono v. Saxbe, 450 F.Supp. 934 (E.D. ID., 1978). Prisoners conf"med in the control imit
of the Marion Federal Penitentiary brought an action challenging the conditions of
their conf'mement. The district court held that: (1) prisoners did not have a fundamen:tal
liberty interest in remaining 1n. the general prison population but did have an interest
prot.ected by due process as a result of the prison's own. rules; (2) placement of prisoners in.
the control unit, which was done for preventative and not punitive reasons, could not be
based on the crime for which the prisoner was convicted or on the poSSl'bilii;y of escape
since every inmate in the Marion institution was a potential candidate for escape; (3)
prisoners placed in the control unit were entitled to written notice of hearing, written
reason, impartial decision rnaking, and immediate and later periodic review; (4) prisoners

were entitled to be told what affirmative actions they could take to expedite their release
from the control unit, and (5) conditions of confinement in. the control unit were not cruel
and unusual J:"Misbmen.t acept for the use of closed-front cells. (Federal Penitentiary,
Marion, Illinois)

39.3

U.S. District Court

FIRE SAFETY
U.S. Supreme Court
MEDIA ACCESS

Hamilt.on v. Covipgt.cm. 445 F.Supp. 195 (W.D. Ark. 1978). A duty is owed by the
sheriff to provide adequate security. Liability ~ emt for deaths and iajuries
oc:curring from a fire in an unattended jail. (Nevada County Jail, Arkansas)
Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 488 U.S. l (1978). This is a 42 U.S.C. Section 1988
action brought by KQED Broadcasting Coi:npany apinst Houchins, the sheriff of
Alameda County, Colorado, clairning deprivation of first am.en.drnen.t rights. KQED was
refased permission to inspect and photograph areas of a county jail where an inmate
suicide had taken place. Shortly after the initiation of this action, the -sheriff conduct.eel
monthly tours, open to the public, of certain. areas of the jail. KQED maintained this was
inadequate because once the tours were fwl media representatives might not have access,
and photographic and sound equipment were not allowed on the tours.
The U.S. district court granted a preliminary iD,jun.ction enjoining Houchins from
denying KQED and respollSl'ble representatives of the news media access to the jail, and
from prohibiting the use of photographic and sound equipment. On interloeutory appeal,
the circuit court of appeals affirmed the district court's order, concluding the media had a
first amendment and fourteenth amendment right of access to prisons and jails. Houchms
sought certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court. (Reversed and Remanded).
l-JEJ.D: Neither the First Amendment nor the Fourteenth Amendment mandat.es a
right of access to government information or sources of information within the
government's control. Under... [the] ...holdings in Pell v. Procanier... [Cite Omitted] ... and
Saxbe v. Wss:bingbm Post. .. [Cite Omitted] ... , until the political branches decree
otherwise...the media have no special right of access to the Alameda County Jail different
from or greater than that accorded the public generally. 488 U.S. at 15, 16. (Alameda
County Jail, Colorado)

1979
U.S. Supreme Court
SECURITY

RESTRICTIONS
SEARCHES
VISITS
CELL CAPACITY

Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979). Pretrial detainees confined in the Metropolitan
Correction Center (MCC) in New York City challenged virtually every facet of the
institution's conditions and practic:es in a writ of habeas corpus, alleging such
conditions and practices violate their constitutional rights.
MCC is a federally operated, short-term detention facility construct.eel in 1975.
Eighty-five percent of all in.mat.es are released within sixty days of .,dmission. MCC
was intended to include the most advanced and innovative features of modern design in
detention facilities. The key design element of the facility is the "modular" or ''unit"
concept, .whereby each floor housing in.mates has one or two self-contained residential
units, as opposed to the traditional cellblock jail construction. Within four months of the
opening of the twelve-story, 450 inmate capacity facility, this action was initiated.
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of N.Y. enjoined no less than twenty
practices at the MCC on constitutional and statllt.ory grounds, m&IJY of which were not
appealed. See. United States Ex Rel Wolfish v. Levi, 489 F.Supp. 114 (S.D.N.Y.). The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court decision, See. Wolfish v. Levi.
573 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1978), and reasserted the "compelling-necessity'' test as the standard
for determining limitations on a detainee's freedom.
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari "to consider the important constitutional
questions raised by [recent prison decisions] and to resolve an apparent conflict among the
circaits. 11 441 U.S. at 524: Do the publisher-only rule, the prohibition on receiving
.
packages from outside sources, the search of living quarters, and the visual inspection of
body cavities after contact visits constitute pllnisbment in violation of the rights of pretrial
detainees under the due process clause of the fifth arnen.dm.ent?
liEl,I>. "Nor do we think that the four MCC security restrictions and
practices...constitute 'punisbrnent' in violation of the rights of pretrial detainees under the
due process clause of the fifth amendment.• 441 U.S. at 560, 561.
REASONING: L (T]he determination whether these restrictions and practices
constitute punishment in the constitutional sense depends on whether they are rationally
related to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental purpose and whether they appear
excessive in relation to that purpose. 441 U.S. at 561.
b. Ensuring security and order at the institution is a permissible nonpunitive
objective, whether the facility houses pretrial detainees, convict.ed inmates, or both... [W]e
tbhik that these particalar restrictions and practices were reasonable responses by MCC
officials t.o legitimate security concems. [Detainees] simply have not met their heavy
burden of showing that these officials have exaggerated their response to the genuine
security considerations that activated these restrictions and practices. 441 U.S. at 561,

662.
CLOSING COMMENTS OF MAJORITY OPINION: "[T]he inquiry of federal courts
into prison l1l8llagement must be limited to the issue of whether a particular syst;em
violat.es any prohibition of the constitution, or in the case of a federal prison., a statute.
The wide ranp of 'judgment calls' that meet constitational and statutory requirements are
confided to officials outside of the judicial branch of government.• 441 U.S. at 562.

39.4:

GENERAL NOTES: The Court saw this case, a challenge to virtually every aspect of
the operation of a state of the art detention facility, as an opportunity to clarify the
judiciary's role in the operation. of prisons. The iive-four decision indicates there was no
general consensus as to what that role is, !!!'. how it should be applied. No less than three
possible standards of review are contained in the majority and dissenting opmions: 1) A
"ration.al basis", subjective test; 2) A balancing of interests test; 3) An objective standard of
review.
Despite J. Rehnquist's statement that "our analysis does not turn on the particulars of
the MCC concept or design," the majority's reasoning frequently looks to that concept or
design for justification of its positions. 441 U.S. at 525. Clearly, the "double-bunking"
holding should be interpreted as applicable ocly to facilities where:
a) Inmates are locked in their cells a maximum of eight hrs. a day and have access
t.o a wide range of activities and programs: and
b) No inmate is detained longer than sixty days.
Situations other than these likely will not fall within the strict holding on this issue.
(Metropolitan Correction. Center (MCC), New York)
U.S. District Court
SEGREGATION

Brown v. Neagle, 486 F.Supp. 364 (S,D. W.V. 1979). Placement in administrative
detention as an escape risk on the basis of escapes •from other institations by
acquaintances of the plaintiff is irrational. Return to general population and credit for the
good time which would have been earned in general population is ordered. The plaintiff is
to be treated as any other inmate. (Federal Correctional Institution, Alderson, West
Virginia)

U.S. Appeals Court
VISITS
CROWDING

MAIL
CLASSIFICATION
PROTECTION

Jones v. Diamond, 594 F.2d 997 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 102 S.Ct. 27
(1980). In. this opinion, the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed Mississippi
Distt'ict Court Judge William Cox's ruling on. what the Fifth Circuit termed a
"challenge to nearly every conceivable facet of the Jackson County Jail at Pascagoula,
Mississippi. 0 The court first noted that the conditions at the Jackson County Jail were
not "un.civilized" or "barbaric and inhumane', as the court had found rulings on. the
conditions of other jails. A peculiar aspect of this case was that convicted felons were
bemg held in the jail while the state penitentiary was being brought up to constitutional
standards. Consequently, there were convict.ad felons, convicted misdemeanants and
pretrial detainees in the jail. Accordingly, the court, in reviewing the conditions at the
jail, applied different standards depending on whether the inmate was pretrial detainee or
a convicted. felon or misdemeanant. The court then reviewed the hist.ory of corrections in
the State of Mississippi and specifically in Jackson County. It noted that Jackson County
officials had spent a considerable amount of money and instituted several new programs
in the last ten years. In. addition, at the time of this opinion, the county was in the
process of erectmg a new jail. After notmg these facts, the court made rulings in the
following areas,
VISITATION. The Court noted that convicted criminals do not have a constitutional
right t.o visitation ex:cept for legal counsel, whereas pretrial detainees rights are limited in
that they must yield, where necessary, to the needs of institutional seeurity. In. the Fifth
Circuit, the courts have held that a pretrial detainee also does not have constitutional
right to contact visitation. At the jail, visitation was officially limited to a brief period on
Sundays, although jail officials often. allowed visitation at other than regular hours.
However, there had been a serious smuggling problem at the jail. When the officials
ordered that visitors be searched before being allowed visitation to prevent smuggling, the
inmat.es riot.eel, causing $30,000 damage. The appellate court upheld the lower court's
ruling that the ex:isting visitation regUlations were constitaticmally adequate. The court
specifically point.eel· out that depriving inmates of contact visitation. was unconstitutional.
OVERCROWDING. Although there had been a serious overcrowding problem at the
jail, the construction of the new jail elimiuat«l any further problem. The court ruled,
however, that overcrowcihJg at the old jail was prohibited.
MAIL. The court clearly spelled out the rights of inmates with regard to mail:
[PJrison officials may constitutionally censor incoming and outgoinB general
correspondence. No numerical limitations may be placed upon prison
correspondence, but jail officials may employ a 'negative mail list' to eUminat.e any
prisoner correspondence with those on the outside who affirmatively indicate that
they do not wish to receive correspondence from a particular prisoner. Officials
may not require prior approval of the names of individuals with whom prisoners
may correspond. Finally, letters which concern plans for violations of prison rules
or which contain a graphic presentation. of sexual behavior in violation. of the law
may be withheld.
Outgoing mail to licensed att.orneys, courts, and court officials must be sent
unopened, and inron,ing mail from such sources may be opened only in the
presence of the inmate recipient, if considered necessary to determine authen:ticity
or to inspect for con.traband. Prisoners may be N.qUired to submit the names of
att.orneys reasonably in advance of proposed mailinp so that officials can
ascertain whet.her the named att.orney is licensed. Prisoners have the same
general rights as to media mail.
39.5

CLASSIFICATION. The court noted that the Constitution does not require that a
classification plan be put into effect, although a court may order such a plan to protect
imnat.es from homosexual attacks, violence and contagious diseases. The court ruled that
the policies in m:istence Ullder the Mississippi Code were adequate to protect the imnate.
SECURITY. While noting that an inmate is to be protected from assaults from other
imnat.es, the court also stated that relief could be provided only where there was a
showing of deliberate indif!erence to the inmates' security and protection. Here, there was
no such showing, and the court refused to issue mjunctive relief. · (Jackson County Jail,
Pascagoula, Mississippi)

1980
U.S. District Court
PUBLICATIONS

Brown v. Hilton, 492 F.Supp. 771 (D. N.J. 1980). The seizure of literature on the
making ~ bombs and weapons from an inmate does not violate the first amendment.
(New Jersey State Prison, Trenton)

U.S. District Court
SEGREGATION

Bukhari v. Hutto, 487 F.Supp. 1162 (E.D. Vir. 1980). While placement in segregation
based upon the political beliefs of an individual would violate the first amendment,
placement in segregation of an individual who is a member of an organization advocating
escape, who although a model prisoner, has already escaped once, and whose closest
associates have recently escaped from other institutions is a reasonable security measure.
Such placement in segregation does not require a Wolff type hearing, either before or
after, but the individual does have a due process base right to have any erroneous
information in the file which is considered in making the decision. (Vu-ginia Correctional
Center for Women, Goodland)

U.S. District Court
PROTECTION
SEPARATION

Campbell v. Bergeron. 486 F.Supp, 1246 (M.D. La. 1980), aff'd. 654 F.2d 719 (5th Cir.,
1981). Jail inmates have a right of personal safety when incarcerated. However, there
is nothing inherent in a failure to separate sent.enc:ed and pretrial imnates which
violates this ~ht. (West Baton Rouge Parish Jail, Louisiana)

U.S. District Court
TELEPHONE CALLS

Rodriguez v. Blaedow. 497 F.Supp. 558 (E.D, Wisc. 1980). Security considerations
permit the institution to monitor all telephone calls and justify a requirement that all
calls be made in English. (Correctional Institution, Waupun, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court

Sims v. Brierton. 500 F.Supp. 813 (N.D. Ill. 1980). Requiring inmates to submit to a
bod;y cavity search in order to consult with an attorney or to have a deposition taken
violates the right of access to the courts. There are no security considerations
demonstrated in this cont.ext which would support such a requirement. (Stateville
Correctional Cent.er, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
HATS

St. Claire v. Cuyler, 634 F,2d 109 (3rd Cir. 1980). Rejecting the lower court's
reuoning, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has upheld regulations of the Grate:ford,
Pennsylvania prison, preventing inmates from wearing hats even for religious purposes
and from a1;t.,,ding religious ~ s while in segregation. The lower court ruled against
the prison, holding that while the prison officials imposing the rules were seeking +.o
protect substantial security interests, they had not chosen the "least restrictive
alternative• for doing so. Prison officials argued that hats would provide an additional
place for the concealment of weapons or contraband. They also stated that some prison
cliques use head gear as a means of identification. According to the prison officials, group
identification can cause security problems if separate groups exhibit hostility toward each
other. The ban on attendance at religious services by prisoners in segregation was based
upon the prison's inability to mobilize the manpower to move the prisoners to and from
services. The appeals court first noted that convicted prisoners do not forfeit all their
constitutional protections. The court stated, however, that first mnendrneut freedoms may
be curtailed when prison officials reasonably believe that exercise of such freedoms would
be likely to result in disruption to the prisoner's order and stability. The court then held
that the showing of a substantial security int.erest, without more, was sufficient to shift
the burden of proof to the plaintiff. Were the plain.tiff to then prevail, it would be
necessary to show that the prison's security concerns were unreasonable or its response
exaggerated. The court found that no such showing was made here and thus reversed the
lower court. The clistrict court's "least restrictive alternative requirement, n the higher
court said, is not necessary. (Penns,ivaxiia Prison, Graterford, Pennsylvania)

U.S. Appeals Court
USE OF FORCE

Williams v. Kelly, 624 F.2d 695 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied. 451 U.S.
1019 (1980). Mother of prisoner, whose death was apparently caused when jailers
applied choke hold to him, brought wrongful death action against the jailers resting on
statute authorizing a civil action for deprivation of rights. The United States District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia entered judgment in favor of the jailers and the
prisoner's mother appealed. The court of appeals held that the clistrict court's

SEARCHES

39.6

findings that jailers applied fatal choke hold to prisoner in order to protect their own
safety and in a good faith effort to maintain order or discipline were not clearly erroneous
and therefore their conduct was not constitu.tionally tortious. (Atlanta Police Station,
Holding Room)
1981

U.S. District Court
BOOKS
CONTRABAND

Howard v. Cronk, 526 F.Supp. 1227 (S.D. N.Y. 1981). The prisoner's constitutional
right to visit with his legal counsel was not violat.ed by the prison policy of not
allowing prisoners to bring books into a legal visit. That rule was reasonable in light of
the security problem posed by books as a vehicle for smuggling contraband into the prison.
and it could not be said that the policy lmjustifiably obstruct.ed the prisoner1s access to his
attorney. (Green Haven Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
SECURITY
PRACTICES

Lareau v. Manson, 651 F.2d 96 (2nd Cir. 1981). Adopting most of the fin4ings of the
District Court, the Unit.ed States of Appeals for the Second Circuit has ordered major
reforms in the Hartford Comm.unity Correctional Cent.er (HCCC), dealing generally with
overcrowding. The constitutional standard for the legality of conditions of cnnfinement is
different for pretrial detainees.and for convict.ed inmates. For pretrial detainees, the t.est
is whether the conditions amount to punishment without due process in violation of the
fourteenth amendment. With respect to convicted inmat.es, the crit.erion is whether the
punishment is cruel and unusual as def'med under the eighth amendment.
Reviewing the numerous finclings of the district court, the appellat.e court looked to
the supreme court case of Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520. Viewing overcrowding at the
HCCC as relat.ed to pretrial detainees, the court cited the following standard of whether
such conditions amount to punishment: •It must be shown that the overcrowding subjects
a detainee over an ext.ended period to genuine privation and hardship not reasonably
relat.ed to a legitimate governmental objective."
Based upon this st.andard the court found that double-bunking in cells originally
designed for one person, compounded by overcrowded dayrooms, imposed unconstitutional
pnnisbment on pretrial detainees in all cases except where such hardship was relat.ed to a
legitimate governmental purpose. The court here found that these hardships promoted
neither security nor the effective management of the institution..
Other conditions were even less acceptable. The use of a glass enclosed dayroom
(dubbed the 11f'l.sh tank") as a dormitory room housing numerous inmates on a full time
basis was held to amount to pimisbmen.t and was thus unconstitutional with regard to
pretrial detainees. In addition. the placing of mattresses on the floors of cells to
accommodate more inmat.es and the assignment of healthy inmat.es to medical cells
(sometimes with mentally or physically ill cellmates) to alleviat.e overcrowding were held
to constitute impermissi"ble punishment.
The court further stat.ed that the length of incarceration of pretrial detainees becomes
relevant in such det.ermination: "Conditions unacceptable for weeks or months might be
tolerable for a few days." As such, the court indicat.ed that while double-bunking and
overloaded dayrooms might be tolerable, and thus constitutionally permissible for a few
days, aft.er 15 or so days, they would become unacceptable pianislnnent. The use of the
"f'lsh tank" and floor mattresses, however, were held to constitut.e rimishment regardless
of the number of days imposed.
Viewing the conditions as they relat.ed to convicted persons, the court point.ed out that
it was to be guided by a wholly 'different standard. Here, in order to constitute a
constitutional violation, the conditions had to be such as to amount to cruel and unusual
pnnisbment. Nevertheless, the court found the overcrowded conditions intolerable.
NQting that the thirty to thirty-five square feet of living space per inmate fell far short of
the standards promulgated by groups such as the Connecticut Department of Corrections,
the American Correctional Association, the Unit.ed Nations. and the National Sheriffs'
Association, and further noting that the dayroom at the HOCC offered the "relief of a
noisy subway pla1form" the court held that double-bunking, with respect to convict.ed
inmat.es, was unconstitutional except where inmates are confined Tl() more than about
thirty days.
As with the pretrial detainees, the court found that the constitutional rights of the
convicted inmat.es were immediately violat.ed by confinement in the "fish tank" and by
policies requiring them to sleep on mattresses on the floors and to be assigned to medical
holding cells for no reason other than. to alleviate overcrowding.
Finally, the court ordered that all newly admitt.ed inmates, with minor exceptions, be
given a medical examination within. forcy-eight hours of admission. (Hartford Community
Correctional Center, Connecticut)

U.S. Appeals Court

Olgin v. Darnell. 664 F.2d 107 (1981). The restrictions and conditions placed on a
pretrial detainee, particularly the removal of all bis clothes but bis underwear for one
day, were not arbitrary and purposeless. Those st.eps were unreason.ably related to the
legitimate governmental objective of calming participants in. the stabbingof a fellow
prisoner, restoring order and protecting inmates from a fire hazard created by the pretrial
detainee. (Midland County Jail, Tens)

CLOTHES
FIRE SAFETY

39.7

U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCHES. CELL

Olsen v. Klecker. 642 F.2d 1115 (8th Cir. 1981). Conducting unannounced cell searches
without aey cause is a valid security procedure. (North Dakota State Penitentiary)

1982
U.S. Appeals Court
Rogers v. Scarr, 676 F.2d 1211 (8th Cir. 1982). Court finds that Muslim imnates'
REIJGIOUS SERVICES rights are not violated. Several muslim imnates of the Iowa State Penitentiary filed
suit alleging that their religious freedom had been curtailed because they were denied
entrance to the prayer chapel for a short time and later refused to leave a restricted area
where they had started pr81iuc, They also challenged prison regulations allowmg prayer
caps and robes to be worn only in the chapel.
The lower court found no-constitutional violation, but ordered changes in prison
regulations in regard to religious practices. The court of appeals for the 8th Circuit,
agreeing that no violations had occurred, also vacated all orders of the lower cau.rt. stating
that the lower court had erred in ordering the changes where no constitutional violations
had been found and noted that prison adminiRators should be accorded liberal
discretions in l'l1lllmlg' the prison. The appeals court found that all regulations were
reasonably related to safety and security needs of the prison and that was evident from
the record that prison administrators had exercised good faith in trying to accommodate
the needs of the Muslim inmates' religious beliefs. (Iowa State Penitentiary)
U.S. Appeals Court
USE OF FORCE

Smith v. Iron County. 692 F.2d 685 (10th Cir. 1982). Use of mace on pretrial detainee
is found reasonable. The court found that the use of mace did not violate any
constitutional rights in this case. The plaintiff, awaiting disposition OJ1 a burglary charge,
was found on the floor under his bunk making banging noises. The jailer warned the
imnate that he would use mace if he was not given the object making the noise. Because
the jailer was the only person on duty in the facility in Cedar City, Utah, and because he
had reason to believe that a heavy metal object (six pound drain cover) might have been
used to harm anyone near the inmate, the use of mace was reasonable. The court also
noted that the jailer could not enter the cell without risking the escape of the plain.tiff and
his cell mate. (Iron County Jail, Utah)

1983
U.S. Appeals Court
Childs v. Duckworth, 705 F.2d 915 (7th Cir. 1983). Denial of religious articles to
REIJGIOUS ARI'ICLES practice satanic beliefs is proper. The Fifth Judicial Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled
that denial of an inmate's request to practice his alleged Satanic religion was justified in
the int.erest of prison security. Prison officials had found that the inmate·was insincere in
his professed belief since he never provided the information required to start an
organization, never obtained a sponsor, and was secretive about his group's rituals.
Without such information, the practice of the so-called religion presented a potential
threat to in.stitutional security since prison authorities had no way of knowing what would
occar at the Satanic services. Prison officials properly denied the prisoner a podium from
which to propagate his individual beliefs, candles and incense which were a fire hazard,
and a crystal ball which could be used to physically harm someone. In addition, prison
officials and the district court decided Satan.ism was not a religion., but rather a "nebulous,
philosophic concept. a (Indiana State Prison)

U.S. District Court
REIJGION

Karriem v. Bam. 32 Crim. L. Rptr. 2429 (D. D.C. 1988). Procedures for admitting a
minister to an institution are upheld. The district court upheld institutional procedures
which require a minister who desires to work in the institution to execute a form:
disclosing his superior, if aDT, agreeing to obey any orders from his superior; agreeing to
keep his superiors informed of his activities; and agreeing to refrain from any political
activities, finding that the procedures do not violate either the free exercise or
establisbm'lll.t clauses of the first: amendment. {District of Columbia Jail)

U.S. District Court

Keenum v. Ambqyer. 558 F.Supp. 1321 (E.D. Mich. 1983). Short-t.erm denial of visiting
does not violate inmate rights. A federal district court has determined that an inmate
at the Macomb County Jail suffered no violation of constitutional rights when authorities
prevented a certain individual from visiting him for three weeks. The restriction was
imposed after officials received a telephone call warning that the individual was going to
assist the inmate in an escape attempt. The court noted that in the three week period the
m.mat.e received other visitors, and he was able t.o communicate with the restrict.ed
individual through correspondence. (Macomb County Jail, Michigan)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCHES

Rutherford v. Pit.chess. 710 F.2d 572 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 104 S.Ct. 3227
(1984). P.retrial detamees class action suit brings changes. A class action suit was
filed against the Los Angeles County central jail by pretrial detainees. The federal
district court ordered twelve changes aftm a trial. Three of the changes were appealed by
county officials,

VIsrrs

WINDOWS

39.8

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decided that: low risk detainees were t.o be allowed
one contact visit per week; detainees would be allowed to be present during searches of
their cells; ·and the replacement of transparent windows by concrete enclosures was
justified. Subsequently the United States Supreme Court reversed on the first two issues.
(Los Angeles County Ceniral Jail)
1985

State Appeals Court
Dept. of Corrections v. Helt.on. 477 So.2d 14 (Fla. App, 1 Dist. 1985). When the
SECURITY PRACTICES Florida Department of Corrections dismissed a nurse for neglecting her duties, the
Career Service Cnmmission reduced it to a suspension without pay for four months. A
state appellate court let the commission's ruling stand, over objections from a dissenting
judge. He said·the nurse should have been ~ted-peoause the offenses she
committed were serious, in view that they OCCllrl'ed in a prison setting. She left syringes
on a desk, which could be found and used as weapons by inmates. Secondly, she neglected
to examine an inmate's head wounds, and she worked under the mfluen.ce of medication
without seeking authorization to do so. He said it was a gross abuse of discretion in
ordering her continued employment against the wishes of prison officials. (Department of
Corrections, Florida)
U.S. District Court
Dettmer v. Landon, 617 F.Supp. 592 (D.C. Va. 1985). Since an inmate's practicing of a
RELIGIOUS ARTICLES religion that was popular in northern Europe in the tenth and eleventh centary was
found to be a legitimate religion, prison officials were ordered to provide him.·with
ceremonial materials. Against their objections, officials were ordered to supply the inmate
with: 1) Sulfur, sea salt or uniodized salt; 2) Quartz clock with alarm; 3) Candles; 4)
Incense; 5) A white robe without a hood. The prison has general custody of the items to
be made available to the inmate at designated times. A robe without a hood was ordered
because of the officials' assertion that the hood could promote an escape attempt.
Prisoners who practiced more conventional religions such as Catholicism and Hinduism
were allowed access to candles, incense and robes.
The plaintiff's religion, referred to as the Church of Wicca (more commonly called
witchcraft) is practiced by an estimated 10,000 to 50,000 people in the United States.
(Powhatan Correctional Center, State Farm, Virginia)
U.S. Appeals Court
SAFETY
FIRE

Hoptowit v. Spellman. 753 F.2d 779 (9th Cir. 1985). Imnates brought an action
challenging conditions of cnnfinement in a state prison system. On remand, 682 F.2d
1237, the United States District Court entered judgm.ent finding conditions in violation
of the eighth amendment and ordered relief; the state appealed. The court of appeals held
that: (1) the change of administration, resulting in defendants named in the action either
leaving office or changing positions, did not warrant reopening the record on remand: (2)
inadequate lighting, vermm. infestation, substandard fire prevention, and safety hazards
in the prison violated minim.um requirements of the eighth amendment; and (3) the order
for relief was overbroad in requiring provision of adequate food and clothing where there
were no findings of inadequate food and clothing.
The prisoners have a right not to be subjected to an unreasonable threat of injury or
death by fire and need not wait until actual casualties occur in order to obtain relief from
such conditi~ Substmidard fire prevention at the state prison which endangered
inmates' lives violated the eighth amendment.
Persons involuntarily confined by the state have a constitutional right to safe
conditions of confinement. Safety hazards found throughout the state prison's
occupational areas, which were ezacerbated by prison's inadequate lighting and which
seriously threatened the safety and security of the inmates, created unconsti.tational
mfliction of pain. (State Penitentiary, W ashmgt;cm)

U.S. District Court
FIRE SAFETY
STAFFING

Miles v. Bell, 621 F.Supp. 51 (D,C.Comi. 1985). The focus of this complaint was
overcrowding, particularly in the housing unit, which once consisted of open
dormitories. Pretrial detam.ees brought a class action suit primarily alleging that the
overcrowded dorms increased the spread of disease among them and were psychologically
harmful because of the stress, lack of control over their areas and lack of privacy.
For security reasons and for the safety of a correctional officer, he is not permitted to
carry a key to the exterior doors in the housing units if he is working alone. The inmates
claim this and staff shortages would prevent them from ev8Cllating in case of a fire. The
court found no violation, since the correctional officer does carry keys t.o exit doors that
empty int.a adjoining units. A door in the laundry room. that was supposed t.o be one hour
fire resistant according t.o code, did not ~ to a constitutional violation. Finally, the
court found no violation in the unannounced entry int.a the dorms by female correctional
officers, who occasionally see unclothed inmates.
(Federal Correctional Institution at Danbury, Connectiaat)

U.S. Appeals Court
KEYS

Riley v. Jeffes, 777 F.2d 148 (3rd Cir. 1985). A Federal Appeals Court held that a
Pennsylvania inmate may sue prison officials because he is in fear of att.ack. Jam.es
Riley alleged in his suit that some inmates were given cell keys for most of the day

39.9

and left unsupervised. He contended that the keys sometimes were used to open other
inmates' cells, and that on one occasion his cell was opened, and he was robbed. He also
contended that this key practice allowed other inmates easy access to his cell while he was
asleep. As a result, he had lived in fear of robberies, assaults, threats, homosexual
activities, fights and stabbings for. the past six months. The court found that these
allegations, if true, required Riley to live day in and day out with a real and persistent
fear of personal injury and that prison officials were totally indifferent to his safety. The
court held that an inmate's right to be protected from constant threat of violence and
sexual assault from other inmates does not require that he wait until he actually is
assaulted before obtaining relief. It is only necessary that inmates show a pervasive risk
of harm from other prisoners, in order to prevail. (State Correctional Institution at
Huntingdon, ·Pennsylvania)
State Supreme Court
USE OF FORCE

State v. Thornton, 38 CrL 2173 (Mont Sup. Ct. 1<¥31/85). Montana Supreme Court
holds that physical restraint is not a necessary element in arrest and detention. A
truck driver was told that he was under arrest by a police officer and secured his
release by threatening the officer with violence. He was charged with escape and
appealed· to the Montana Supreme Court. The court upheld the charge, noting that
"official detention" was defined as detention by a peace officer pursuant to arrest. The
court noted that an arrest requires the existence of three elements: (1) authority to arrest,
(2) assertion of that authority with intention to effect an arrest, and (3) restraint of the
arrestee. The court explained that:
...the view that a physical restraint is a necessary element of an arrest is largely
discredited in recent cases. We agree with this position. Furthermore, we assert
that the standard for an arrest when there is not a physical restraint of the
defendant is whether a reasonable person, innocent of any crime, would have felt
free to walk away under the circumstances. This standard drops any technical
requirements for an arrest and the concept of restraint, and instead looks upon all
the facts and circumstances of each case.
As a result, the court ruled that a law enforcement officer need not exert actual physical
restraint over an individual in order to arrest him for purposes of a state law prom.biting
escape from official detention.

1986
U.S. Appeals Court
STAFFING

Alberti v. KJ.evenhagen, 790 F.2d 1220 (5th Cir. 1986). Appeals court upholds
remedial measures of district court, finding levels of violence and sexual assault
violated inmates' eighth amendment rights and ordering increased staffing. In a case
initiated in 1972, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed with
the sweeping corrective measures ordered by a federal district court. The original class
action suit was brought under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging that the facilities and
operations of the Harris County detention system violated inmate constitutional and
statutory rights. In February, 1975, a consent judgment was entered in the district court,
calling for upgrading of existing facilities, construction of a new central jail, and
committing the county to provide sufficient and adequately trained guards and other staff
to assure the security of inmates. In December, 1975, the county's compliance with the
consent judgment was challenged. Following hearings, a broad remedial order was issued.
The court ordered adequate training and pay increases for jail personnel and ordered that
staffing be increased to provide one jailer for every twenty inmates. In 1978 the court
reluctantly approved plans for a new central jail. The plaintiffs had argued against the
planned use of multiple occupancy cells, and the court expressly conditioned occupancy of
the new facility on the provision of adequate staff. In 1982 and 1983 the district court
held hearings to determine if adequate staffing was provided for the newly-opened
detention facility. The court ordered the county to prepare a plan which complied with
Texas Commission on Jail Standards (TCJS) requirements of one officer to forty-five
inmates, eventually approving such a plan. When the county failed to meet a June, 1983,
deadline for full staffing, the plaintiffs filed ~ motion for contempt. The county was
granted TC.JS approval in October for an alternative poststaffm.g plan, which provided less
staff than the previous "one to forty-five" plan. After extensive hearings in 1984, and the
presentation of evidence and testimo:cy on violence in the facilities, the court ordered the
implementation of a staffing plan which was similar to one proposed by the plaintiffs'
experts, calling for approximately the same number of staff as the original "one to fortyfive" plan, but incorporating a different assignment scheme; On appeal, the county
argued that the evidence presented in the 1984 hearings was not sufficient to support the
district court finding of constitutional violations, and that the new staffing plan ordered
1:iy the court exceeded what should be required to remedy a:cy such violations. The
appeals court affirmed all aspects of the district court corrective orders, stating that •.... it
is more regrettable that after thirteen years conditions in the jails are still in
contravention of constitutional standards. Despite the efforts of the parties and the court,
inmates continue to be beaten, raped, abused, and assaulted. The district court has acted
properly in fashioning new relief for an old malady." (Harris County Detention Facilities,
Texas)

39.10

·
)

State Court
CONTRABAND

U.S. District Court
STAFFING

Dennison v. Osp. 715 P.2d 88 (Ore. 1986). An inmate petitioned for a judicial review
of a finding of the superintendent of the state penitentiary that he had knowingly
engaged in conduct which constituted a substantial step toward manufa.c:turmg a weapon.
The court of appeals, 770 Or.App. 194, 712 P.2d 186. affirmed. and petition for review was
allowed in part. The Supreme Court held that the inmate did not violate the
administrative rule in question by drawing blueprints of handguns. absent evidence that
necessary products or materials were accesS1'ble or available for the manufacturer of the
weapon within the penitentiary. (State Penitentiary. Oregon)
Duran v. Anaya. 642 F.Supp. 510 (D.N.M. 1986). State prisoners sought a preHrninary
injunction to halt layoffs of staff and filling of staff vacancies. The district court held that
N~ Mexico prison inmates were entitled to a prelimin.ary injunction prolu'biting
implementation of proposed staff reductions with respect-to medical care, mental health
care, and security where th.ere was no evidence th.at staffing reductions of the magnitude
contemplated would permit the maintenance of minimal constitutional standards in those
areas; however. the court would not prohibit staff reducijons other than those relating to
medical care. mental health care and security where th.ere was no evidence that any such
proposed reductions would adversely affect the minimal constitutional rights of prisoners.
A prisoner has a right to be reasonably protect:ed from constant threats of violence and
sexual assaults from other inmates. and failure to provide an adequate level of security
staffing. which may significantly reduce the risk of such violence and assaults, constitutes
deliberate indifference to legitimate safety needs of prisoners.
The state has a con.stitutional obligation to make·available to prisonenf a level of
medical care that is reasonably designed to meet routine and emergency health care needs
of prisoners, including medical treatment for inmates' physical ills. dental care and
psychological or psychiatric care. Gross deficiencies in staffing establishes deliberate
indifference to prisoners' health needs. A lack of financing is not a defense to a failure to
satisfy minimum ccmstitlitional standards in prisons. (Department of Corrections, New
Mexico)

State Appeals Court
Fields v. State Dept, of Corrections. 498 So.2d 174 {La.App. l Cir. 1986). A
SECURITY PRACTICES correctional officer who had been employed nearly ten years with the Louisiana State
Penitentiary was terminated because he left his post without permission after twelve
hours on duty to inquire as to why his replacement was late. He was scbeduled to work
from 4:45 a.m. to 4:45 p.m. When his relief guard didn't show up at 4:50 p.m.,
he left his post and went across to a connecting dormitory to use the telephone to call as to
the whereabouts of his replacement.
The court ruled that the single incidence of misconduct of tb.e guard with permanent
status was signjficant enough to warrant dismissal because it en.dangered the safety of the
public and/or tb.e inmates themselves. Even though testimony showed that it was comm.on
practice for guards to use the nearby telephone, it was not officially approved to leave a
post with.out permission. (State Penitentiary, Louisiana)
U.S. District Court
CROWDING

STAFF

Inmates of Occoquan v. Barr;y, 650 F.Supp. 619 (D,D.C. 1986). A class of mmates
confined at state medium security facilities brought a federal civil rights action seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief for deprivation under color of state law of f"iftb. and
eighth amendment rights. The district court held.that overcrowding and systematically
deficient conditions constituted cruel and unusual pimisbrn ..ut justifying equitable relief.
Overcrowdirig and sysbemati.cally deficient conditions at state medium security
in.stitutions constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth
amendment justifying equitable relief of imposition of cap on a number of inmates at each
facility and requirement of periodic reports indicating what steps were being taken to
address deficiencies. The plaintiffs contend that an excessive inmate population,
deficiencies in environmental health ~ safety, food services, and mental health care,
alone or in combination, violate their rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution.
The classification of inmates is essential for the prison security. One critical function
of classification is the efficient identification of violent, aggressive inmates and those in
need of psychiatric care, so that they can be separated from the rest of the population.
See. e.g., Pa.lrnigiano v. Garrahy, 448 F.Sup_p, 956 (D.R.L1977). The classffication
system at Occoquan appears t.o be dangerously overtaxed by the crush of inmates in need
of classification. Idleness among inmates results in a variety of problems, including
heightened tension, frustration, and violence. The lack of adequate programs can also
have an adverse impact on inmates' chances for parole. There was no disagreement
among the expert penologist.a that inmates should be engaged in some productive
enterprise, properly supervised.. Nonetheless. enforced idleness presents a major problem
at Occoquan. The correctional officers do not supervise proper)y the sleeping areas of the
dormitories. Correctional officers do not make pati-ols on a frequent and regular basis, nor
are officers stationed in the rear of each dormitory so as to facifitate supervision of the living area when inmates are present. (Lort.on. Correctional Complex, D. C.)

39J.l

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES
TRANSFER

Jeffries v. Reed. 681 F.Supp. 1212 (E.D. Wash. 1986). A death row inmate challenged
the constitutionality of his transfer t.o the intensive management unit of the prison and
also challenged the conditions of his incarceration in that unit. On cross motions for
summa.ey judgment, the district court held that: (1) the transfer of an inmate t.o a unit on
the grounds that he inherently imposed a security risk in light of his sentence did not
deny the inmate due process; (2) inspection of the inmate's legal mail by staff of the unit
did not violate the inmate's rights of free speech or equal protection; (3) digital rectal
search which the inmate underwent prior t.o being transferred t.o the unit·and strip and
visual body-cavity searches he underwent each time he left his cell did not constitute
umeasonable searches and seizures; (4) denial of contact with other inmates did not
violate the first, sixth, or fourteen.th amendm~nts; and (5) the telephone schedule,
permitting the inmate t.o place a collect call t.o his attorney at least three times per week
between the hours of 8:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. did not deny the inmate adequate access t.o
counsel and the courts. (Intensive Management Unit, State Prison, Washington)

U.S. District Court
FIRE SAFETY

McClung v. Camp Count,v, Tex., 627 F.Supp. 528 (E.i:>.-'i'ex. 1986). District court
rules against all prisoner claims in conditions of confinement suit against jail. An
inmate who had been incarcerated in a county jail brought action against the county
and various county officials alleging that conditions in jail violated his constitutional
rights. The federal district court held that: (1) evidence supported a finding that
conditions placed on the inmate's physical exercise at the jail did not constitute a violation
of inmate's constitutional rights; (2) evidence supported a fmding that inmate's
constitutional rights were not violated by alleged failure t.o provide clean bedding, clothing
and t.oiletries; (8) evidence was sufficient t.o support a finding that jail fire safety
conditions did not violate inmate's constitutional rights; and (4) administering insulin t.o a
diabetic inmate three times daily rather than four times daily did not violate the inmate's
rights.
Evidence that a fire in the jail which resulted in an inmate's hospitalization was
started by another inmate and was not immediately.reported was sufficient t.o support a
fm.ding that jail fire safety conditions did not violate the inmate's constitutional rights.
(Camp County Jail, Texas)

U.S. District Court

Morales Feliciano v. Romero Bercelo, 672 F.Supp. 591 (D. P.R. 1986). According t.o a
federal court, prison overcrowding, inmate idleness, and the threat of violence among
inmates, combined with the continuous frustrations of reasonable expectation produced
by admini•ative inr;ompetence, resulted in an ascertainable psychological deterioration in
the Paerto Rican prison population. The psychological deterioration inflict.ed on inmates
in the prison system was an unnecessary and want.on infliction of pain in violation of
prisoners' Eighth Amendment protections against cruel and unusual punishment..
Insofar as the Puerto Rican prisori adminisb-ation was under a statutory duty t.o provide
rehabilitative programs through which inmates could earn time credits towards early
release, unavailability of any- form of useful work, study or even recreation, where none of
the physical conditions of confinement met constitutional stmidards, combined with
continuous frustrations of reSE0Dable expectations produced by administ.rative
incompet.ence, inflicted serious psychological harm on inmates, which was independently
cognizable under the Eighth Am.endmeut. When inmates' opportunities t.o study or work
within prison were taken away by irregularities in the classification system or the prison
administration's inability t.o provide a safe environment, inmates were deprived of liberty
interest implicating a statutorily creat.ed expectation that imprisonment could be
short.ened by work and study. Inmates of Puerto Rican jails were denied due process as a
result of ineff":icient, inexperienced, and often incompetent social-penal CC>UI1se)ing system,
which had a severe negative impact on inmates' opportunities t.o establish eligi"bility for
parole an.d to actually be heard in a timely manner by a parole board. C",ommingling of
pretrial detainees with convicted prisoners, in conjunction with finding that conditions
which prevailed in all institutions at which pretrial detamees were housed violated the
Eighth Amendment rights of convict.ed inmates, was a sufficient basis for holding that
pretrial detainees were being punished prior to conviction and that, therefore, they were
deprived of h"berty without due process of law. (Commonwealth of Puerto Rico)

CROWDING
PROTECTION

U.S. Appeals Court
SAFETY

Walker v. Rowe, 791 F.2d 507 (7th Cir. 1986), U.S. cert. denied in: 107 S.Ct. 597.
Appeals court rules that due process clause does not assure safe working conditions for
public employees and reverses lower court awards. On July 22, 1978, inmates of the
Pontiac Correc:tional Cez:Lt.er, a maximum security prison, were being returned to their
cells after eurcise in the courtyard. .The prisoners killed three guards, injured others,
and set fire to part of the prison. Three of the iltjured guards and the estates of the three
deceaaed guards filed suit against the director of the Illinois Department of Corrections,
and the assistant warden of Operations at Pontiac, alleging that they deprived them of
their constitatioDal right to a safe working environment.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seven.th Circuit ruled: "Because we
concl-ade that the constitution is not a code of occupational safety, we reverse the
j,1dgment." The court explained that •due process" does not mean "due care"- the

39.12

constitution is designed to prot.ect people from the state, not to ensure that the state
provide safety or comfort. A special relationship must exist before the state can be held
liable for harm to a person. If the state had forced the men.to be officers at the
correctional center, it would be required not to be indifferent to their working conditions.
But the guards enlist.ed voluntarily and were free to quit at any time. Accord,ing to the
court, "...the state must protect those it throws into the snake pits, but the state need not
guarantee that volunteer snake charmers will not be bitten. 11
The plaintiffs had argued that the corrections off'lcials had con'b.-ol of several conditions
which contributed to the attacks, including: failure to maintam metal detect.ors in
operating condition; failure to conduct enough shakedowns of inmate cells to find weapons;
failure to ''lock down" the prison although the officials knew or should have known that it
was tense; failure to immediately issue shotguns to the tactical squad and order it to quell
the disturbance. Although the court noted that the defe?Jpants had some level of control
over these issues, their actions did not amount to t!on.sti.tuti.onlil violations.
·
Additional allegations which the court concluded were not directly within the control
of the defendants included: design of the prison which created "dead spots" from guard
towers; high staff turnover, vacancies and lack of sufficient staff; overcrowded conditions
in the facility; the existence of prisoner gangs; the new phone syst.em which had defects
and was hard to use; the door and cage in the North Cell House were old and flimsy; and
guards did not receive enough training in controlling the riots, and training which was
provided was poor. {Pontiac Correctional Center, lliinois)

u.s; Supreme Court
USE OF FORCE

Whitley v. Albers, 106 S.Ct (1986). Supreme Court rules that use of lethal force
to quell a prison disturbance does not violate constitutional rights. During a
disturbance at the Oregon State Penitentiary a correctional officer was taken hostage and
placed in a cell on the upper tier of a two tier cellblock. Attempting to free the hostage,
prison officials devised a plan which called for a manager to enter the cellblock unarmed,
followed by officers armed with shotguns. The officers were instructed to fire a warning
shot, and to shoot low at m:iy inmate who attempted to climb the cellblock stairs. After
firing a warning shot, an officer shot a prisoner in the knee when he start.ed up the stairs.
The prisoner :filed suit against prison officials alleging violation of his eighth and
fourteenth amendment rights. The federal district court ruled for the defendants, finding
their "use of deadly force was justified under the unique circumsbmces of this case,• The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Nlnth Circuit reversed the lower court decision. The U.S.
Supreme Court reversed the appeals court decision, finding the use of force to be justified
in this case. ·The Court ruled that the mfliclion of pain in the course of a prison secarity
measure is only an eighth amendment violation if it is •mflict;ed unnecessarily and
wantonly." The Supreme Court found that the "deliberate indifference" standard for
evaluating eighth amendment claims which was established in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
427 (1976), is not suff'iciently broad enough to be used to analyze deadly force claims
associated with riot situations. Wantonness must consider if the force was applied as part
of a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or if it was applied maliciously or
sadistically for the purpose of causing harm, as well as efforts made to temper the severity
of tlie forceful response. (Oregon State Penitentiary)

1987
:J. Appeals Court
RELIGIOUS
ARTICLES

U.S. Appeals Court
SEGREGATION

Allen v. Toombs, 827 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1987). On appeal, the lower court decision
that upheld prison regulations was a:ff'nmed. Prison inmates of a Native American.
religion failed to establish that a state prison policy prohibiting inmate spiritual leaders
from conducting a "Pipe Ceremony" for prisoners in segregation when no outside "Pipe
Bearer" was available refused inmates access to ceremony in violatiau of their First
Amendment rights. Inmates had presented no evidence that ~ inmate in segregatiau
had been denied access to the c:erei:nO!lY because of the policy. According to the court, the
use of an ue, red hot stones and a pitchfork was reason enough for prison officials to
deey segregated inmates from attending a Native American. "Sweat Lodge" ritual. The
Court found that the "Sweat Lodge0 Ceremony posed a high secarity risk for the prison
community if inmates from segregation were allowed to attend. In addition, the Court
found that there was no evidence that inmates ~m the segregation unit had been denied
attendance of the "Pipe Ceremony." The prison can require that the "Pipe Bearer" be an
outside person rather than an inmate. (Oregon State Penitentiary)
Bailey v. SbilJjnm, 828 F.2d 651 (10th Cir. 1987). Aft.er his voluntary transfer to a
prison in another state, a Wyoming state prisoner who was serving a sentence for first
degree murder murdered another prisoner and was retarned to the Wyoming State Prison.
The warden assigned him to a muhnum secarity unit without a formal hearing. The
prisoner filed a civil rights lawsuit against the warden, alleging his due process rights had
been violated. He also charged that he was subject.eel to cruel and unusual punishment by
being deprived of exercise and fresh air. The appeals court concluded that, because of the
danger the inmate presented to other inmates and staff,

39.13

the court concluded the warden was correct in assigning the imnate to maximum security.
As to the cruel and unusual treatment charge, the court concluded that the one hour per
day of exercise and fresh ah- was "resb:-ictive" but did not violate the Eighth Amendment.
(Wyoming State Prison)

U.S. District Court
USE OF FORCE

Blair-El v. Tinsman. 666 F.Supp. 1218 (S.D.m. 1987). Use of mace which was sprayed
on an inmate was upheld by the court because it was ¥sed to restore prison security
and that it did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Aft.er the chemical was
sprayed, the inmate was offered medical treatment which he refused. (Menard
Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
RELIGIOUS

Butler-Bay v. Frey. 811 F.2d 449 (8th Cir. 1987). Inmates filed a civil rights action
alleging that they had been denied the free exercise of their religion. The appeals
court ·found in favor of prison officials when it agreed that prison rules preventing
inmates of the Moorish Science Temple of America from wearing fezes were reasonable
because the headwear could be used to conceal contraband. The court also upheld the
prison's requirements that a guard be present at meetings and that minutes and
membership lists should be provided to prison officials. The court found that the practices
and regulations were not discriminatory, and did not violate the inmates' constitutional
rights. (Missouri Eastern Correctional Center)

GROUPS

U;S, District Court
USE OF FORCE

Collins v. Ward, 652 F. Supp. 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). Prison officers subdued a violent
mmate who was armed with bottles and scissors with tear gas, Two imnates who were
nearby filed a claim. for using the tear gas without regard for their health and safety. The

disb:-ict court ruled that prison officials were reasonable in their use of tear gas because an
effort had been made to open windows and ventilate the area where the chemical was to
be thrown. The court found that using tear gas to regain control and free inmates was
proper under emergency circumstances. According to the court, the fact that alternative
methods, other. than tear gas, were available to subdue riotous prisoners did not mean
that use of tear gas constituted cruel and unusual pirnishment when prison officials
otherwise acted in good faith and employed special precautions to minirnize harmful
effects of tear gas upon innocent bystanders. (Green Haven Correctional Facility, New
York)
U.S. Appeals Court
RELIGION

Felix v. Rolan, 833 F.2d 517 (5th Cir. 1987). Religious freedom is not violat.ed when it
is required that a prisoner sign both a committed name and legal Muslim name when
entering the library. The mm.ate plaintiff argued that he had his legal name changed for
religious reasons and that use of the prior name was offensive to him. He also complained
that he was denied the supplies he needed to file this and other lawsuits by the library
supervisor. The appeals court found the complaint about lack of supplies unwarrant.ed
when evidence showed that the inmate had reqaest.ed 100 sheets of paper a week, but was
only granted 75. The court also found, since it aided in the identification of prisoners,
that the required use of the mm.ates• committed name was a reasonable regulation
adopted in the interests of order, security and adrniuisb:-ative efficiency. (Ellis Unit of the
Texas Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court

Gabel v. Est.elle, 677 F.Supp. 514 (S.D. Tex. 1987). Inmates suffered no denial of their
constitu.ti.onal rights when, as indicated in their civil rights lawsuit, they were
furnished peanut butter sandwiches as the sole nourishment during a lockdown. Prlson
officials responded to a non-violent work sb:-ike of over 150 inmates by locking all striking
inmates in their cells without notice or hearing. The court found that the lock-down was
imposed upon all striking imnates without partiality and was the kind of action prison
officials were en.titled to take in response to a confrontation with an inmate. In addition.
the court also found no constitutional violation on the mere basis of the inmates' 'distaste"
for peanut butter. It added that "the sb:-ike itself may have been the cause of the limited
fare. 11 (Wynne Unit, Teu.s Department of Corrections)

LOCK-IN

U.S. Appeals Court
STAFFING

Galloway v. State of Louisiana. 817 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir. 1987). A federal court order
iswed to correct eighth amendment violations for the benefit of the prisoners required
at least three men to be assigned to each prison disciplinary unit. This alone could not
serve as a basis for liability in a federal civil rights action for m,juries sustained by a .
corrections officer. The officer could not :recover due to his being the only guard working
· the particalar disciplinary unit at the time of his injury because the order did not create
constitutional rights, sach as would entitle the officer to do so. (Washington Correctional

Institute, Louisiana)
U.S. Appeals Court
RELIGIOUS
GROUPS
RELIGIOUS
SERVICES

Hadi v. Horn. 880 F.2d 779 (7th Cir. 1987). Muslim imnates' free exercise rights
'\1Dder the first amendment were not violated when prison officials caDCeJled Muslim
religious services due to the fact that a Muslim chaplain was unable to be present.
The inmates claimed that, when a Muslim. chaplain was UD&ble to attend, a Muslim.
inmate should be permitted to conduct services under the supervision of a non-Muslim
chaplain. Prison officials felt that conflicts might arise because inmates lacked the
39.14

requisite religious expertise to resolve issues th.at arose during religious meetings and
they also indicat.ed that security could be jeopardized by granting inmat.ea positions. of
authority as religious leaders over other inmates. The officials also expressed concern that
services led by inmates might be used for gang meetings and for dissemination of views
interfering with order in the prison. (Pontiac Correctional Center)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCHES

Hay v. Waldron, 834 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1987). Administrative segregation inmates
were subjected to body cavity strip searches each. time they entered or left their cell.
The policy required the inmate to fully disrobe in his cell and to reveal for visual
inspection the various parts of his person where a weapon or contraband might be
concealed. An inmate who was held in •dministr-ative segregation challenged this policy,
filing a federal civil rights lawsuit. The appeals court found that this policy was
constitutional and reasonably relat.ed· to legitimate secarity objectives. The court held that
strip searches must merely be reason.ably relat.ed to legitimate security interests, and
therefore reject.ed the inmate's endorsement of a "least restrictive means" or probable
cause• standard for the constitutionality of strip searches. However, the appeals court
ruled that the magistrate's finding that the prison,had not.discrimin.atorily applied its
strip-search policy against the inmate and his witnesses for bringing a civil rights action
against prison officials was premature and ordered further hearing on this matter. (Texas
Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
RELIGIOUS
ARTICLES
VISITS

Higgins v. Burroughs, 834 F.2d 76 (3rd Cir. 1987). The United States Supreme Court
recently vacat.ed an. order of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Higgins
v. Burroughs, 816 F.2d 119 (3rd Cir.), vacated, 108 S.Ct. 54 (1987). The lower court
had ruled that a state prison regulation prohibiting the wearing of rosary beads into a
visiting area violat.ed inmates' First Amendment religious freedom and was not a valid
security measare, In light of O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 107 S.Ct. 2400 (1987), in
which the court said that prison regulations which are alleged to impinge upon
constitutional rights are valid if "it is reason.ably relat.ed to legitimate penological
interests," the Supreme Court asked that the decision be reconsidered. On. remand, the
Third Circuit expressed its view that this standard should create "no difference in result,"
but remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. (Graterford State
Correctional Institute. Pennsylvania)

U.S. Appeals Court
USE OF FORCE
DISTURBANCE

Holloway v. Lockhart, 818 F.2d 874 (8th Cir. 1987). A federal appeals court disagreed
with a lower court and ruled that an inmate could bring a federal suit for being forced
to inhale tear gas sprayed by guards to subdue fellow inmates. The inmate claimed
that he, along with about 20 other inmates, was mjured while they were sleeping when
guards sprayed a barrage of the chemical ~t disruptiye inmates. This caused the fellow
inmates to be forced to inhale the substance causing them to choke, pass out, suffer
temporary blindness and breathing problems. (Maximum Security Unit, Tucker,
Arkansas)

U.S. District Court
PROTECTION
·STAFFING

Hossie v. U.S., 682 F.Supp. 23 (M.D. Pa. 1987). A federal prisoner failed to prove that
prison overcrowding or an insufficient number of guards-proximately caused the
mjuries the prisoner sustained as a result of an altercation. with fellow inmates. To
support the prisoner's expert's conclusion th.at one more guard would have prevent.ed the
assault would have reqwred the placement of a guard at the shower/bathroom at all
times. This situation would make the government an insurer of a prisoner's safety, a
standard that was not requjred. (Unit.ed States Peniten.tiary, Lewisburg, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
CONTRABAND

Jackson v. Elrod, 671 F.Supp. 1508 (N.D.m. 1987). A pretrial detainee challenged a
policy of barring the receipt of all hardcover books and failing to notify detainees of the
rejection. of these books when mailed to them by filing a federal lawsuit. A federal district
court ruled that a policy of prohil>iting all hardcover books, regardless of content or source,
could not meet a test of being reasonably relat.ed to a legitimate penological interest. The
court noted that claims th.at hardcover books provided a security problem, in th.at they
could be used to conceal contraband, had 1:o be rejected because, as the COlll"t noted, there
were no specific instances of such problems cit,ed and contraband could be concealed in
clothing or other items which inmates were allowed 1:o receive. The court also ruled that
the jail must notify inmates when books are received and rejected. The court felt this
could be done by duplicating a notice that is sent to the books' senders indicating the
rejection., and. sending 11. copy to the inmates. While the court held that the jail's
corrections head, security chief and division superint.endeuts were properly liable for
making JIDd ac:1minisf:erin these policies, it ordered further proceedings on. whether the
sheriff was liable, since the policy differed f:rom a writt.en handbook sent out by his office,
(Cook County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
MAIL
PUBLICATIONS

Murphy v. Missouri Department of Corrections, 814 F.2d 1252 (8th Cir. 1987). Inmates
brought action against prison officials because they were not allowing th.em to receive
mail and publications relating to Aryan Nations. .Prison, officlals aaid they denied the
prisoners access t.o this material because they were enforcing the policy on the basis
39.15

that UJY support of white supremacy increased tension and racial unrest, and threatened
prison security. The court ruled, however, that only those materials that advocate
violence or "are so racially mflammat.ory as to be ~asonably likely to cause violence at the
prison" may be 1'ejSl:ricted in the mail. Therefore, the broader mail policy of the prison
violated prisoner rights to free speech and to the free exercise of religion. As a result, the
court told prison officials were then told they must open, read and review each piece of
mail to det.ermme jf it advocates violence or is racially m:flammat.ory. The court
swnmarized that censorship of inmate mail must not only be justif'ied by the legitimate
need for prison security, but must also be no more restrictive than necessary to protect
prison security, (Missouri Training Center for Men)
U.S. Appeals Court
USE OF FORCE

Pressly v. Gregory, 831 F.2d 514 (4th Cir. 1987)~ Accorcling to a federal court, a
medical eummation and a photograph taken of an inmate the day aft.er an alleged
assault were sufficient evidence _to support the officers' version of the incident. The
inmate plaintiff was being transferred from one prison to another when he .resisted efforts
to be handcuffed. He alleged that five officers fell on him "en masse" and beat him
although he was offering only passive resistance. The court found that there was a need
for the application of force since the inmate even admitted that it was applied against him
only after he refused to cooperate and resisted efforts to be handcuffed. While the court
noted that force justified at its inception may still cross the boundary of constitutionality if
the level of coercion actually applied dramatically u:ceeds the amount needed to
acc:omplish legitimate goals and causes unnecessary injury, it ruled here that the force
iDflicted by the officers here was not of such an impermissible degr-. While the inmate

allepd his injuries caused pain for weeks following the incident, a medical examination
and a photograph of appellate taken the next day revealed no indication of UJY physical
mjury, (Mecklenburg County Jail, Boydton, Virginia)
U.S. District Court
HAlR LENGTH·

Reed v. Faulkner, 653 F.Supp. 965 (N.D. Ind. 1987), An inmate who claimed to belong
to a religion called Rastafarian which is a Jamaican sect that have their homeland in
Africa, :request.ed to wear his h4tir long, When an expert wi'lness revealed that wearing
long hair was more a matt.er of choice, rather than a mandate of the religion, the court
also noted that the inmate did not wear his beard long which also was a practice of his
religion. The court found reason to doubt the inmate's sincerity. Further, aside from the
question of sincerity, the court found the prison rules were supported by a security
concern. because long hair can hide contraband. Also, health and sanitation concerns of
lice and infection can be a problem in prisons, as well as the danger of long hair getting
caught in machinery and cell doors. (Indiana State Prison)

State Appeals Court
SEARCHES.
CEIL
MAIL

Rochon v. Maggio. 517 So.2d 218 (La._App. l Cir. 1987). An inmate allepd that
prison officials violated his constitutional right of access to court when they opened an
envelope the prisoner had in his possession during a shakedown search. The prisoner
had attempted t.o walk out of his cell with the envelope after being told not t.o bring
anything with him, coni:,ending that the letter was "legal mail." The court found that the
inspection of the envelope, even though no contraband was found, was justified by
suspicious actions of the prisoner.

U.S. District Court
FACIALHAIR

Ross v. Coughlin. 669 F.Supp. 1285 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). An orthodox Jewish inmate stated
a claim against New York prison officials for violatmg his First Amendment right t.o
freely exercise his religion by forcing him to cut his facial hair. according t.o a federal
district court. The beard t-,-irnrning regulation being cballenged was not reasonably related
t.o govermnental in.terest.s in identifying and controlling contraband, inmate identification,
or prison security. However, the court found that the inmate did not have a claim in
connection with his being forced to shave his hair and beard for an initial identification
photograph. (Downstate Correctional Facility. New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEGREGATION

Tyler v. Black. 811 F.2d 424 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied. 109 S.Ct. 1760. On appeal,
a federal court held that: (l) the ~ transfer of inmate to a segregation unit during
a period of prison unrest did not violate due process, but (2) double celling of inmates in
small cells with solid "boxcar" 1iYPe doors was cruel and unusual punishment in violation
of Eighth Amendment. The mass transfer of inmates to a segregation unit during a period
of prison unrest did not violate due process, where inmates were given posttransfer
hearings, the warden perceived move as a necessary emergen.cy security measure, no
punitive purpose was involved, and the transfers were purely temporary administl'ative ·
segregations. However, double celling of inmates in segregation unit in small cells with
solid "boxcar" 1iYPe doors was cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
Amendment; inmates with hist.ory of assaultive behavior were placed in closed cells for up
to 28 hours a.day for a period of several months. (Missouri State Penitentiary, Special
Man.agemeut Facility)

U.S. District Court
TELEPHONE

U.S. v. Mon.t.gomery, 675 F.Supp. 164 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 846. The
inimception and taping of a telephone caU :made by a pretrial detainee from a
correctional center did not violate Title
or the Fourth Amendment. The detainee's

m

39.1.6

use of the telephone after ample notice of the .int.erception. system amounted t.o implied
consent t.o the monit.oring under Title m. Moreover, the monit.oring of the conversation.
was a reasonable seizure, given. the ample notice t.o the detainee of the monit.oring;
·
Monit.oring and taping of pretrial deta.inee's telephone conversations did not violate his
Fifth Amendment right t.o be free of restrictions amounting t.o punishment. The detention.
center's taping and monit.oring system was related t.o legitimate governmental objective of
institutional security, and could not be regarded as punishment in. violation. of Fifth
Amendment. (Metropolitan Correction.al Center, New York)
1988

U.S. District Court
STAFFlNG
CROWDING

Albro v. Onondaga Coun.t.y. N.Y., 677 F.Supp. 697 (N.D.N.Y. 1988). The alleged
offender is afforded protection by a due process clause instead of the Eighth
Amendment, which prevents holding a detainee under conditions that would be equal
t.o punishment. A violation. of due process was found t.o exist when crowded conditions
were found at a pretrial detention facility, causing many detainees t.o sleep on cots in. the
walk.ways and creating a hazard t.o both detainees azi,_d staff. There was no operational
compensation. for overcrowding conditions such as adequate exercise time, vocational
training, or free time in. the dayroom or other open space. Detainees frequently spent only
a free hour on. a walkway or in. ."passive" recreation and were commed t.o their cells at
least 23 hours a day. The court found correctional staff insufficient t.o safely respond t.o
duties. Further, the court also concluded that inmates "have ready access t.o weapons
through the dismantling of their cots." The capacity of the facility was capped by the
court. Daily fines were levied on the county as an appropriate remedy for continuing
overcrowding at the detention facility. When.ever the inmate population exceeded its
capacity for four days or more the county was ordered t.o pay $1,000 per day if the
population reached 218-217, and up t.o $10,000 daily if the population goes over 247.
Even. though the plain.tiffs had withdrawn the motion for contempt, the court kept the
pow~ t.o punish violatiOD.S that may have occurred, or might occur in. the future, (Public
Safety Building)

State Appeals Court
CONTRABAND

Brooks v. State, 529 So.2d 818 (Fla.App. 1 Dist. 1988), The defendant was
convicted in. the.circuit court of possession of contraband by a prisoner, and he
appealed. The district court of appeal, affirmmg the decision, found that the defendant,
an inmate at a correctional institution, could be convicted for possession of con.traband by
a prison.er, even. though he was not on the grounds of the correctional institution at the
time he was observed in. possession. of marijuana. The court stated that the offense was
aimed at pm:iishing a.n. inmate for possession of contraband anywhere, and"therefore the
observation of this prison.er as possessing contraband while off. the prison grounds was a
violation. (State Correctional Institution, Florida)

U.S. Appeals Court
USEOFFORCE
VISITS
SEARCHES

Bruscino v. Carlson, 854 F.2d 162 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 3193. In a
class action suit brought against the Marion. Penitentiary in. Illinois by inmates held in
the Control Unit, the inmates claimed use of excessive force and other charges because
they were subjected t.o rectal searches every time they left or re-entered the unit. The
appeals court ruled that because inmates in. the Control Unit require greater supervision
than other prisoners, rectal searches can be legally performed on such inmates. Use of
physical restrain.ts during attorney visitation and limited out-of-cell time was also upheld
by the federal district court. The court found that extraordinary security measures
employed in a maxim.um security federal prison, such as limitation of time spent outside
cells, denial of opportunities for socialization, handcuffing, shackling, spread-eagling and
rectal searches were reasonable measures .in view of the history of violence at the prison.
and the incorrigible character of the inmates and thus it did not con.stitute cruel and
unusual pimisbrnen.t. Further, the court found that the transfer of prisoners t.o a
maximum security federal prison did not result in. :incremental deprivation so great as t.o
constitute action.able deprivation. of natural liberty and thus require a hearing. (The
United States Penitentiary in Marion., filinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
RELIGIOUS
SERVICES
REIJGIOUS
GROUPS

Cooper v. Tard, 855 F.2d 125 (3rd Cir. 1988) A federal appeals court upheld .the
constitutionality of a prison. rule that prohibited a group of Muslim inmates from
havmg unsupervised group worship in. the prison. yard. The court affirmed that
prohibiting group activity without supervision does not violate the free exercise rights
of inmates .in this instance. The court agreed that the Muslim's group prayer, kn.own
as Du'a, established a leadership structure within the prison., and authorities had valid
rational reason for not permitting in.mates t.o establish structure with.in the prison..
(Trenton. State Prison, New Jersey)

U.S. Appeals Court
PROTECTION
SEPARATION

Cortes-Qpjnones v. J"unen.ez-Nettleship, 842 F.2d 556 (1st Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109
S.Ot. 68. The death of a psychiatrically disturbed prison.er whose body was
dismembered a few months after his transfer to-a district jail was caused by the
"deliberate indifference• of prison officials t.o his health or safety problems, according t.o a
federal appeals court. The court ruled found that mformation. about the prisoner's

39.17

psychiatric history was, or should have been, in his prison. files, and that prison. officials
who approved of the transfer should have known of the inmate's psychological problem
and that there was evidence that the inmate should never have been. in the general prison
population. Accordmg to the court, it was unlikely that the inmate would have been killed
jf any of the officials had act.ed to segregate him from men.tally sound prisoners at the jail.
According to the appeals court, when prison officials intentionally place prisoners in
dangerous circumstances, when they intentionally ignore prisoners' serious medical needs,
or when they are deliberately indifferent either to a prisoner's health or safety, they
violate the constitution. {Areci'bo District Jail)

U.S. Appeals Court
Dil:n'URBANCE

Cowans v. Wyrick, 862 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1988). A prison inmate brought an. action
against a guard alleging that the guard had inflicted cruel and unusual punishmf'lln.t
upon. the inmate in violation of the inmate's eighth amendment rights. The federal
district court entered judgment on. the jury verdict fin.ding in favor of the inmate.
Additionally, because the jury did not access any damages, the court. sua sponte, awarded
nominal damages of $1 to the inmate. The guard appealed, and the Appeals Court found
that the jury instruction which allowed the jury to find for the inmate without fin.ding
that the inmate had suffered any pain, misery, angaish. or similar harm, whether capable
of estimation or not, was a reversible error. As a result, the case was reversed and
remanded for a new trial. According t.o the court, the jury is required t.o award nominal
damages t.o a prisoner bringing a civil rights suit on.ce the jury finds cruel and unusual
punishment has occurred jf the jury has not been able t.o convert int.o dollars the injury
and pain that the prisoner has suffered. However, if the jury finds that the prisoner has
suffered no pain of any kind. then the question of damages, nominal or otherwise, does not
arise. A claim of cruel and unusual punishment has not been established without a
showing of some measure of pain. The court not.ed that reason.able measures undertaken.
t.o resolve a disturbance at a prison when the disturbance indisputably poses significant
risks t.o the safety of inmates and prison staff do not rise t.o the level of cruel and unusual
punishment. {Missouri State Penitentiary)

U.S. Appeals Court
GANGS

David K. v. Lane, 889 F.2d 1265 (7th Cir. 1988). White inmates at Illinois' Pontiac
Correctional Center sued officials on. the grounds that their failure t.o aggressively halt
gang influence violated their right t.o equal protection. Inmates in protective cwrt.ody are
confined more hours each day and have less job opportwrlties. While 2 percent of the
t.otal inmate population is white, 40 percent of the white population is in protective
cust.ody compared t.o 9 percent of the black population and 18 percent of the hispanic
population. The plaintiffs alleged that the proportion. of white inmates in protective
custody st.ems from officials' failure t.o discipline non-violent displays of gang membership,
But the appeals court ruled that, even. though a policy of punishing gang 0 activity, • but
not displays of "gang membership" results in an inordinately high number of white
inmates needing protective cust.ody, prison officials aren't guilty of di.scrbnin.atio In.
ruling again.st the white inmates, the court found that they had present.eel no evidence
that "a racially-based discriminatory purpose...has shaped the Pontiac admin.ist:ration's
gang activity policy." However, even while finding that prison. officials were not guilty of
unlawful discrimination, the court criticized their policy-suggesting that display of gang
insignia or letting inmates control prison job assignments should not be permitted. The
court ruled the prison. officials t.o "take a firmer control and seek t.o ultimately eUrninatit
gang affiliation by such reason.able methods as it may develop." The court also reject.ed
the inmates' claim that Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was violated. Title VI. 42
U,S.C. Sec. 2000d, prohibits discrimination in the use of federal funds. While the prison
receives federal fan.ds for forecasting models. there was no evidence that these funds
directly benefited or relat.ed t.o the huplementation. of gang regulations and protective
cust.ody procedures. [Subsequent federal legislation. may alter future courts' analysis of
similar situations.] (Illinois' Pontiac Correctional Cen.ter)

U:S. Appeals Court
CLASSIFICATION
PROTECTION

Gardner v, Cat.o, 841 F.2d 105 (5th Cir. 1988), An inmate filed a civil rights lawsuit
against the county jail and its personnel, after he had without notice or warmn.g,
gotten. a dark liquid thrown in his face by his men.tally unstable cellmate. The court
found that placement of the prlllOn.81'. in a cell with a men.tally unstable inmate who had
access t.o cleaning chemicals at best raised an issue of negligence by the defen.dants, a
claim not seen as a violation of the Fourteen.th Amendment in a civil rights action.
Because he was given. extensive medical treatment, the court found that it was "frivolous"
t.o claim that the defend.an.ts displayed a deliberate mdifferem:e or disregard for the
inmate's rn.edical needs. (Guadalupe County Jail) ·

U.S. Appeals Court
SEPARATION
PROTECTION

Glick v. Henderson, 855 F.2d 586 (8th Cir. 1988). A civil rights suit was dismissed by
a fed.erai trial court alleging failure and refusal of various prison officials t.o protect
inmates from es.posure to AIDS, and the dismissal was upheld by the appeals court.
The plaintifts in this case claimed that at least five mmates in the facility have tested
positive for the virus which causes AIDS.· The inmates also argued that the prison. neither
test.eel inmates and personnel for a:posare to the AIDS virus nor segregat.ed all

39.18

those who did test positive. The inmates felt that the combination. of these factors, along
with the exist.ence of practicing homosexuals within the facility, placed them in immediate
danger of contracting AIDS because of the daily interactions which take
place among inmates and jail officials. Medical authorities testified that the inmates'
complaint was based on "unsubstantiated fears and ignorance, n which included allegations
that they face a risk of contracting AIDS by: (1) coming int.o contact with the sweat of
other inmates during work detail; (2) being subject.ed t.o bites from mosquitoes which have
bitten other inmates; (3) being sneezed on by known homosexuals; (4) having food
prepared by officials who are not tested for AIDS; and/or (5) the regular transfer of
prisoners from cell t.o cell throughout the facility. The court found that these means are
t.oo remote t.o provide the proper basis for a grievance. These, along with otheJ' significant
risks, which are not comprehended by medical science as creating a genuine concern for
transmission of AIDS, were insufficient t.o entail court intervention. (Arkansas
Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
RELIGIOUS
SERVICES
SAFETY
REGULATIONS
SECURITY
RESTRICTIONS

Mumin v. Phelps, 857 F.2d 1055 (5th Cir.' 1988). Islamic prisoners at a state
penitentiary brought an action challenging the refusal of prison officials t.o
transport them from out.camps where they are held t.o the main prison facility
for weekly congregational services. The U.S. District Court denied relief, and
the inmates appealed. The appeals court affirmed and found that the refusal
of the prison officials t.o transport the Muslim inmates from out.camps of the
prison t.o the main prison facility for weekly congregation.al services required
by the Islamic creed was a permissible limitation on the prisoners' exercise of their right
t.o freedom of religion. The penitentiary asserted that it was without sufficient financial
resources or adequate numbers of security personnel t.o safely transport the inmates for
weekly services, the government objective was content neutral, and there was no showing
of alternatives. The alleged peaceful and non.violent charact.eristics of Muslim inmates did
not preclude a finding that prison security was a legitimate concern for officials in denying
the request of the Muslim inmates held at out.camps t.o be transported to the main prison
for weekly religious services. (State Penitentiary, Angola, Louisiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
HAIR LENGTH

Pollock v. Marshall, 845 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 239, reh'g.
denied, 109 S.Ct. 545. An inmate at a maximum security facility f"tled a civil rights
action against the prison officials aft.er being required to cut his hair, The inmate
professed a belief in Lakota American Indians who believe hair is sacred and should not
be cut. The court found the inmate's religious beliefs t.o be sincere, but they also found
prison authorities had interests which were both legitimate and reasonably related t.o
security and sanitation. in limiting the length of prisoner's hair. (Southern Ohio
Correctional Facility)

U.S. District Court
PROTECTION
SAFETY
REGULATIONS
SECURITY
PRACTICES
STAFFING

Thomas v. Benton County. Ark., 702 F.Supp. 737 (W.D. Ark. 1988). The
parents of an arrestee who committed suicide in a county jail brought a civil
rights action against the county. On June 22, 1983, the plaintiffs' decedent.
their son, was incarcerated in the Bent.on County, Arkansas, jail. Late on the
evening of that day he tore strips from his bedding and fashioned a "ropea.
He hung himself from a light fixture in his cell, also occupied at the time by
two other inmates. These two individuals declined to come t.o his aid,
because, as expressed by them at the trial, they did not want to become involved and
perhaps be charged with a "murder rap." Instead of doing the obviously humanitarian
thing of coming t.o his aid, they claimed that they began to bang on the cell bars and yell
at the jailers that Thomas had hung himself. Although there was a dispute in the
evidence about how long it t.ook the jailers t.o respond, it is clear that several minutes
elapsed before a jailor came t.o the scene. Upon arriving at the scene, the jailor saw
Thomas hanging from the f"mure but did not enter the cell t.o aid him because of a jail
rule that prohibit.ed jailers from entering occupied cells on felony row unless at least two
jailers were present. The night of this occurrence, only two jailers, a male and fem.ale,
were on duty. The female jailer also served in the capacity of despatch.er, and another
rule prohibited her from leaving the radio. The plaintiffs, his parents and personal
representatives, claim that the existence of harmful conditions and practices and the lack
of appropriate procedures in the oper~tion of the Benton County Jail denied the decedent
his constitutional right of due process. They sought damages from the defendant, Bent.on
County, Arkansas, for pain and suffering, mental anguish, and the loss of their son's
companionship. After a verdict was entered against the parents, the parents-moved for a
new trial. The district court, d e ~ the motion., found that the iUl'Y finding that the
county did not violate the civil rights of the arrestee and did not treat him with deliberate
indifference was not against clear weight of eviden.ce. (Benton County Jail, Arkansas)

U.S. Appeals Court
DISTUBBANCE

Un.win v. Campbell, 863 F.2d 124 (1st Cir. 1988), A prison inmate sued state
and local police officers seeking damages for injuries sustained during the
quelling of a disturbance. Defendants moved for summary judgment on the grounds of
qualified immunity. The U.S. District Court denied the motion. as t.o certam.

39J.9

defendants, and they appealed. · The appeals court reversing in part and affirming in part,
found that two of the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, absent evidence that
they had m:iy contact with the defendant; but there were issues of fact, precluding
summary judgment in favor of the remaining defendants, as to the magnitude of the
disturbance in question.
Allegations of the complaint concerning the attempt to subdue a boisterous inmate did
not support the inference of a prison disturbance of such magnitu.de that it indisputably
posed •ignifiMnt -risks to the safety of the inmates and prison staff, and thus to state an
eighth amendment claim. An inmate not involved in the struggle, who was iDjured by
police action., did not have to allege that the defendant policemen and state troopers act:ed
. maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm. Allegations of the
complaint to the effect that one or more of the state troopers or police officers seriously
jn,jured the prison inmate when they 'UDjustifiably struck him several times while he was
innocently standing in the dayroom observing an isolated struggle between two inmates, if
true, would tend to show that the officers violated clearly established law and thus were
not entitled to qualified immunity: When prison officials are responding to ati outbreak of
violence, they cannot be expect.ed to measure nicely the precise amount of force necessary
to restore order. Where the instit\ltional security is not at stake, the officials' license to
use force is more limited, and to establish an eighth amendment liability, an injured
inmate need not prove malicious and sadistic intent, and liability will be imposed where
the officials' actions involved wanton and unnecessary infliclion of pain as determined by
the need for the application of force, the relationship between the need and the amount of
force used, and the enent of the injury inflic:t.ed. (Merrimack County House of Correction,
Boscawen, New Hampshire)
1989

U.S. District Court
SECURITY

PRACT1CES

VIsrrs

U.S. Appeals Court
CLOTHING

DISTURBANCE
"LOCK-IN"
USE OF FORCE

Berrios-Berrios v. Thornburg, 716 F.Supp. 987 (E.D. Ky. 1989). A lawsuit was f"lled by
a female inmate to challenge the refusal of prison officials to permit her to breast-feed
her child. She moved for a preliminary injunction allowing her to breast-feed her child
during normal visitation hours, to store breast milk in a refrigerator, and to compel the
defendants to make arrangements for the delivery of the breast milk to the child's
caretaker. The court found that the need for immediate resolution of the inmate's request
to be allowed to breast-feed her child during normal visitation hours and to st.ore the
breast milk negated requirements to exhaust administrative remedies, and that the
inmate was entitled to a preliminary injunction allowing her to breast-feed her child
during regular visitation periods. A substantial threat ezisted that the absence of an
jn,jun.ction would irreparably injure the inmate's ability to breast-feed her child and the
inmate and her child would unnecessarily be deprived of the beneficial effects of breastfeeding; the defendants failed to allege m:iy harm. However, the court ruled that the
inmate's interest in breast-feeding her child with milk st.ored in a refrigerator was
outweighed by the government's compelling interest arising out of the need for security
checks, the desire to avoid negligence claims, and the cost and burden of providing the
refrigerators and a system for the storage and delivery of the milk to caretakers, (Federal
Correctional Institution, Laington, Kentucky)

Campbell v. Grammer. 889 F.2d 797 (8th Cir, 1989). Inmates brought an action
against prison officials alleging that their constitutional and statutory rights were
violated during a prison lockdown. The U.S. District Court entered a judgment in
favor of the inmates and awarded attorneys' fees; the defendants appealed. The court
of appeals found that the supervising lieutenant's failure to issue jumpsuits pursuant to
his superiors' order after a shakedown did not rise to the level of crue1· and unusual
?UDisbmeut. The lieutenant had been assigned to supervise the adjustment center for the
5rst time on the day of the·lockdown and thus, the failure to carry out his superiors'
>rders was due to rnis1mderst;and, inexperience, oversight, inadvertence or recklessness.
Courts should ordinarily accord actions of prison officials much deference; courts
should be especially reluctant to interpose their hindsight when challenged conduct
:,cearred during a prison disturbance. When faced with the necessity of using force to
:iueU a disturbance, prison officials are compelled. to balance competing concerns of
insuring safety of inmates and staff and of using the least confining or least dangerous
cn.easure to control those who threat.en the safety of others. Given the fact that such
:lecisions are necessarily made in haste and under pressure, measures taken will not be
l:ield to be an eighth ameDdmeut violation if imposed in a good faith effort to maintain or
l'8Store c:µscipline and not maliciously and. sadistically for the very p,upose of causin&'
barm. The court found however, that the inmates had been intentionally, rather than
accidentally, sprayed with the high-powered firehoses, which resulted in an eighth
unendment violation. As a result, they upheld awards to the inmates of $750, $100 and
850. (Nebraska State Penitentiary)

39.20

U.S. District Court
PROTECTION

C.H. v. Sullivan. 718 F.Supp. 726 (D. Mum. 1989). Prisoners who were serving
sentences under a federal witness security program brought action against the Attorney
General and bis agents, ·challenging double celling. The district court found that double
celling was not cruel and unusual pimisbm..nt despite the concern that double celling
might result in the discovery of their identities by other imnates and threat.en ·their
security. The court also found that the use of a seniority system to det.erm.ine which
prisoners were double celled did not violate due process. Depriving prisoners serving
sentences under a federal witness security program of seniority, and with it a single cell,
for the violation of prison regulations did not so mfringe upon the prisoners' safety as to
constitute a violation of the fifth amendment. The seniority method was reasonably
related to valid prison objectives of discipline and relief of overcrowding. The prisoners
being disciplined were advised of charges and the facts supporting the charges and they
were given a reasonable opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence
in their defense and an investigation was conduct.ed to ensure that incompatible prisoners
were not housed together. The court is permitted to look at the challenged conditions of
confinement alone or in combination to determine whether an eighth mnendrnom.t violation
has occmTed; a particular pruron policy may not directly be a violation, but may lead to
conditions which do constitute punishment without a penological purpose. (Federal
Correctional Institution, Sandstone, Minnesota)

U.S. Appeals Court
STAFFING

de Jesus Benavides v. Santos, 888 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1989). Jail detention officers who
were injured during the course of an attempt.ed escape by jail inmates filed a federal
civil rights action against the jail officials. The officers were unarmed and on duty
when they were attacked. They claimed that the sheriff was aware of a persistent pattern
of contraband smuggling in the jail, that the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) had
specific~y warned the sheriff that a jailbreak. was "imminent," and that the sheriff act.ed
"callously and in utt.er disregard" for institutional security in failing to respond to these
problems. They also complained that the commissioners and the judge had failed to
provide sufficient funds to the jail to ensure its safe operation. The U.S. District Court
dismissed the suit, and the plaintiffs appealed. The appeals court found that the local jail
detention officers who were injured by jail mmat.es that were attempting to escape did not
have a Section 1988 action against the government officials in charge of the jail for
reckless or grossly negligent failure to prevent, adequately guard against, or protect those
injured from an attempted escape and accompaeying inmate violence, stating, "The issue
presented is whether those who, in the course of their duties as local jail detention
officers, are injured by jail inmates attempting to escape, have a second 1988 claim
against the government officials in charge of the jail where the injury would not have
occurred but for those officials' callous indifference or grossly negligent failure to prevent,
or to adequately guard against, or to protect those injured from, the attempted escape and
accompanying inmate violence. n The claim fell squarely within tt-aditional state tort law
and did not give a rise to a constitutional claim. (Webb County Jail, Texas)

U.S. Appeals Court
FACIALHAlR

Fromer v. Scully, 874 F.2d 69 (2nd Cir. 1989). An Orthodox Jewish inmate brought
action for declaratory relief challenging a prison beard l~ngth regulation. The U.S.
District Court found in favor of the imnate, and appeal was taken. The appeals court
affirmed and certiorari was granted. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded. The
court of appeals remanded without opinion. The U.S. District Court found that the
regulation violated the free ezercise clause, and appeal was taken. The appeals court, in
reversing the origin.al decision, found that a regulation forbidding inmat.es from wearing
beards in excess of one inch in length did not violate the free exercise rights of an
Orthodox Jew. According to the court, the Orthodox Jewish inmate who challenged the
beard length regulation had the burden to demonstrate that correctional concerns were
irrational. The Department of Correctional Services did not have to demonstrate a logical
connection between the one-inch beard limitation and the interest of prison officials m
identifying imnates for regulation to survive the inmat.e's free exercurt' cbaUenge. A
rational connection exist.ed between the regulation limiting the inmates' beards to one inch
in length and the ease of identification of the imnat.es' facial features and, thus, the beard
length regulation did not violate a free exercise clause. The prison officials' concerns with
bei.lig able to identify inmat.es' facial features did not require officials to choose between. a
regulation forbidding all beards or a rule permitting all beards. The regulation
prolu'biting beards in excess of one inch in length was a reasonable compromise for
purposes of the free exercise clause. According to the appeals court, the district court
failed to show proper deference to judgment of prison off'icials when the court found that
the state regulation forbidding imnates from wearing beards more than one inch long
violated the free exercise rights of Orthodox Jews; the district court's belief that there
were few Orthodox Jews in prison, unsupport.ed by record evidence, im.permissibly placed
the burden on prison officials. (New York State Prison)

ESCAPE

r.s. Appeals Court
RELIGION

Garza v. Carlson, 877 F.2d 14 (8th Cir, 1989). A Jewish inmate brought a civil rights
action against prison officials. The U.S. District Court denied relief and the inmate
appealed. The appeals court found that·the prison policy prohibiting an inmate from
39.21.

worship in a :minyan while he was in admmistraiive segregation was reasonably related to
an institutional security concern, and the Jewish inmate's rights were not violated by the
threat of receiving involuntary nourishment while he was engaged in a religious fast. The
preservation of the prisoner's health is a legitimate objective, and prison officials may take
reasonable st.eps to accomplish that goal, (United States Medical Center for Federal
Prisoners, Springfield, Missouri)

U.S. Appeals Court
MAIL
PUBIJCATIONS

Harper v. Wallingfn,;od, 877 F.2d 728 (9th Cir. 1989). An inmate brought a Section
1983 suit alleging that prison authorities had violated his first amendm,.ut rights by
withholding mail, The U.S. District Court awarded.summary judgment in. favor of the
defendants, and the inmate appealed. The appeals court, affirming the decision, found
that the imn.ate's first amendment rights were not violated when mail from an
organization espousing consensual sexual relationships between adult males and juvenile
males was withheld from him. Fact.ors to be considered in. determmmg the reasonableness
of a challenged prison regulation include: whether the regulation has a logical connection
to legitimate government interests invoked to justify it; whether alternative means of
exercising the right on which the regulation impinges remain open to prison inmates; the
impact that that accommodation of an asserted right will have on guards, other inmates,
and prison resources; and the absence of ready alternatives that fully acoomm<Xlate the
prisoner's rights at de rninirnis cost to valid penological interests. The mail in. question
was from the North American Mm:,/Boy Love Association ("NAMBLA.") and consisted of a
membership application and a copy of the organization's bulletin. The prison mail room
employees refused to deliver the material to the plaintiff and notif"ied the plaintiff of their
intentions. Prison off"icials refused to deliver the materials to the plaintiff because they
felt the material threatened prison securicy and therefore violated the Washington State
Department of Corrections Policy Directive 450.020(6)(c), The plain.tiff unsuccessfully
appealed the decision through the prison grievance system. (Washington State
Penitentiary)

U.S. Appeals Court
ESCAPE

Henn v. Perry. 866 F.2d 657 (3rd Cir. 1989). A prisoner brought a civil
rights action against a prison guard arising out of the prison guard's use of
deadly force in att.em.pting to prevent the prisoner's escape. In his complaint, the plaintiff
alleged that, while being returned to Pittsburgh from a track meet and upon arrival at
Pittsburgh and believing the off'icers in charge of him incluclin&' the defendant to be
unarmed, he proceeded to effect an escape and that thereupon "Mr. Perry commenced to
fire 5 or 6 shots at me without ordering me to st.op or that he had a weapon and would
shoot to kill. n One of the shots wounded the plaintiff in the arm. He completed his escape
but was subsequently recaptured. The U.S. District Court denied the prison guard's
motion for sunm:uu'7 judgment and the prison guard appealed. The court of appeals,
reversing and remanding with directions, found that the prison guard was entitled to
qualified im.municy from liabilicy. The appeals court stated that the use by prison guards
of deadly force on an escapee may be cruel and unusual punisbm,..nt within the meaning
of the eighth amendm,..nt but where the escapee has committ.ecl crime involving the
infliction of serious bodily harm, deadly force may be ~ as necessary to prevent an
escape and if, where feasible, some warning has been given.
Using deadly force appeared to be the "only means of preventing his escape and even
that did not actually do so, n Where an escapee has co:mmitt.ed a crime involving the
infliction of serious bodily harm, the court stated, citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S.l
(1985), such as the murder committ.ed by the prisoner, deadly force may be used if
necessary to prevent escape, and if, where feasible, some warning if given. (State
Correctional Institution, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania)

U.S. Appeals Court
RELIGIOUS

McCorkle v. Jolmson. 881 F.2d 993 (11th Cir. 1989). A state inmate brought
a civil rights action challenging a prison. policy that restricted inmate access
t.o satanic materials. The U.S. District Court dismissed .smd the inmate
appealed. The appeals court, affirming the lower court decision, found that
the policy did not violate the b:unate's first amendment rights. Even if
Satanism was a religion entitled t.o .first amendment protection and even if the state
imn.ate was a sincere believer in Satanism, a prison policy restricting the access to satanic
materials was justified by the prison officials' concern for institutional security and order,
partieularly in view of the fact that the inmate could practice Satanism without materials.
The court found that the policy adopted was valid as reasonably related to a legitimate
pen.ological ~ in institutional security and order and was an. "informed and
measured response t.o the violence inherent in Sat.am worship, and to the potential
disorder that it might cause within the prison.• (Holman Facilicy, Alabama)

Am'ICLES
"RELIGION

SATANISM

U.S. District Court
PROTECTION
SECURITY

PRACTICES

Policano v. Koehler, 715 F.Supp. 598 (S,D.N.Y, 1989). An inmate claimed that
another prisoner stole his cosmetics and, later on the same day, together with
other prisoners, assaulted and robbed him of his watch and gold cham. Both
incidents were perpetrated by inmates from another housing area who were

39.22

not supposed to be m his housing area, according to prison regulations.- The inmate sued
prison officials, claiming that the incidents result.eel from their negligence becaU&e the
corrections officer on duty was reading a newspaper at the time the alleged acts occurred.
The court dismissed the inmate's federal civil rights lawsuit, findmg that mere negligent
failure to provide adequaie security does not state a claim for violation of constitutional
rights. (Rikers Island House of Detention for Men, New York)
U.S. District Court
RELIGIOUS
SERVICES

Ra Chaka v. Franzen. 727 F.Supp. 454 (N.D. ill. 1989). A Muslim prison
inmate sued state corrections department officials, alleging violations of civil
rights when his request for prison-wide "Jumha11 religious services was denied.
In order to improve security, the prison had divided inmates into three units, based on
personality types, and prison-wide services would have mvolved an undesirable mbdng of
personnel from different units, and services were available within units. The district
court found that the granting of permission to hold such ~ did not render the
prisoner's case moot as he also claimed monetary damages for past deprivation. State
officials were not protect.ed from individual liability by the eleventh amendment. A
prohibition against services was warrant.eel on prison security grounds; even if· deprivation
were deemed not valid, officials would not be personally liable and the equal prot.ection
rights of the inmate were not violated when they allegedly did not receive a proportionate
share of the prison budget for their religious activities. The prison was merely required to
provide a "reasonable opportunity" for them to practice their religion. (Stateville
Correctional Center, Illinois)
·

U.S. District Court

Rohm.son v. Estate of Williams. 721 F.Supp. 806 (S.D.Miss. 1989). The wife of
a man who was killed by two escaped jail prisoners sued the county sheriff,
alleging that it was negligence on his part or on the part of his agents, servants or
employees that allowed them to escape, that security at the jail was dangerously
madequate and that it was negligent to fail to properly inform the public of the escape.
The court not.eel that the sheriff m Mississippi is charged with the duty to safely keep his
prisoners in the jail and to seek to prevent escape. However, as these duties are owed to
the general public, rather than to any individual person, the court found that there could
be no liability m the absence of a "special relationship" with the deceased man. The
sheriff owed no duty of care to the deceased man or his spouse. (Clarke County Jail,
Mississippi)

U.S. District Court
CLASSIFICATION

Ryan v. BurJingmT\ County. N.J., 708 F.Supp. 623 (D. N.J. 1989). A pretrial
detainee who was rendered quadriplegic as a result of an attack by a county
jail inmate brought a civil-rights action against the county board of chosen
freeholders, and various jail personnel. On the defendants' motion for
summary judgment, the district court granted the motion in part and denied
the motion in part. It found that the warden and the jail captain who
advised and assist.eel the warden were not entitled to qualified immunity, but the
corrections officers were entitled to qualified immunity. Members of the county board of
chosen freeholders were not en.titled to absolute legislative immunity because the board
knew that the county jail was overcrowded, and the board also was aware that no inmate
classification system separating known dangerous inmates from others was m place at the.
jail, Moreover, the board could not reasonably have believed that its refusal to supply the
county jail with additional security personnel was lawful.
The warden of the county jail was not entitled to qualified immunity from the pretrial
detain.ee's civil rights claim, insofar as it was based on overcrowding. The jury could
conclude that the warden neglected to attempt available solutions to overcrowding at the
jail. The court also stated that the warden and the jail captain who advised and assisted
the warden in setting procedures governing daily administration were not entitled to
qualified immunity from the pretrial detain.ee's civil rights claim arising from the inmate
assault, insofar as it was based on the failure to institute a classification system
separating pretrial detainees from dangerous inmates, Neither official took arry action
whatsoever in an attempt to establish such a system of classification. Sergeants m the
county jail were entitled to qualified immunity, insofar as it was based on overcrowding
and the failure to institute a classification system sep~ating pretrial detainees from
dangerous inmates, in view of their lack of authority to remed,y overcrowding or to
institut.e a classification system. (Burlingt.on COQD.ty Jail, New Jersey)

ESCAPE

CROWDING
PRETRIAL

DETAINEES
STAFFING

U.S. District Court
ESCAPE
USE OF FORCE

Ryan Robles v. Ot.ero de Ramos, 729 F.Supp. 920 (D,Puerto Rico 1989), An
inmate's father brought a Section 1983 action agamst a prjson guard,
administrator, and supervisors to recover for the shooting death of an escaping
inmate. 'Ibe defendants moved for S1lDUXUll'Y judgment. The district court grant.eel the
motion and found that using deadly force against a convicted, escapmg inmate was not an
,rnrece•sary and wanton infliction of pain. did not violate the eighth aJJ1endrnent, and was
within the guard's qualified immunity from Section. 1983 liability. The guard tried to
physically prevent tbe escape, and was prevent.ed from domg so by the in,mate's spear. He
warned the inmate to desist, fired a warning shot, and fired the
39.23

revolver aft.er the inmate had -jumped t.o the street outside the prison and started t.o run.
The inmate's father failed t.o establish in the Section 1983 action that the training of
guards and the use of firearms caused the death of the escaping inmate, that the policy on
the use of deadly force deprived the inmate of constitutional rights, or that the
ftdministz-at.or and a u ~ were grossly negligent or deliberately in.different. (YOUDg
Adults Institution, Miramar, Pl1ert.o Rico)
U.S. Appeals Court
ACCESS TO
A'ITORNEY
FACIALHAlR
SAFETY
REGULATIONS
SECURITY

RESTRICTIONS

Solomon v. Zant. 888 F.2d 1579 (11th Cir. 1989). The widow of an inmate
brought a civil rights action agamst a prison official who refased t.o permit the
inmate t.o leave the death row cell block t.o see his att.orney without first
complying with shaving regulations. The U.S. District Court entered a
judgment in favor of the widow, and the offici~ appealed. The appeals court,
reversing the lower court's decision, found that the shaving regulation was a
legitimate security rule, and the enforcement of the rule did not violate the
inmate's constitutional rights. The prison policy which prohibited any death
sentenced inmate from leaving the cell block unless all shaving requirements were
complied with was reasonably related t.o the government's legitimate interest in. .
main.taming security in. the penotogical institutions. Had the institution sought t.o impose
some additional punishment, then it would have been necessary for him t.o be afforded a
proper disciplinary hearing. However, refusing t.o allow him t.o leave the cellblock was
simply part of the regulation. "After finding that institutions can require that mm.at.es be
clean shaven, it is reasonable t.o conclude that compliance with the policy will not result in.
a constitutional violation,• said the court. (Federal Correctional Institution, Jackson,
Georgia)

U.S. Supreme Court
PUBLICATIONS

Thornburgh v. Abbott. 109 S.Ct. 1874 (1989). Action was brought challenging
the regulations governing the receipt of subscription publications by federal
prison imnat.es. The Federal Bureau of Prisons regulations generally permit prisoners t.o
receive publications from the "outside," but authorize wardens, pursuant t.o specified
crit.eria, t.o reject an incoming publication if it is found "to be detrimental t.o the security,
good order, or discipline of the institution or if it might facilitat.e criminal activity. 11
Wardens may not reject a publication "solely because its content is religious, philosophical,
political, social[,] sexual, or ••• unpopular or repugnant," or establish an excluded list of
publications, but must review each issue of a subscription separately. Respondents, a
class of imnat.es and certain. publishers, filed a suit in. the district court, claiming that the
regulations, both on their face and as applied t.o 46 specifically excluded publications,
violated their first amendment rights under the standard set forth in Procun:ier v.
Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 40 LEd.2d 224. The district court refrained from
adopting the Martinez standard in. favor of an approach more deferential t.o the judgment
of prison authorities, and upheld the regulations without addressing the propriety of the .
46 exclusions. The appeals court, however, utilized the Martinez standard, found the
regulations wanting; and remanded the case for an individualized determination on. the
constitutionality of the 46 exclusions. The U.S. District Court upheld the regulations.
The appeals court reversed. The Supreme Court, vacating and remanding, found that the
proper inquiry was whether the regulations were reasonably related t.o legitimat.e
penological interests, and the regulations were facially valid. According t.o the Court,
regulations such as those at issue that affect the sending of publications t.o prisoners must
be analyzed under the standard set forth in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 S.Ct.
2254, 2262, 96 L.Ed.2d 64, and are therefore "valid if [they are] reasonably related t.o
legitimate pe119logical interests. n It was found that the regulations at issue are facially
valid under the Turner standard. (Federal Bureau of Prisons, District of Columbia)

1990
U.S. Appeals Court
ESCAPE

Balter v. Lyles, 904 F.2d 925 (4th Cir. 1990). An inmat.e brought a civil rights action
again.st a warden and other corrections officials, claiming liis due process rights were
violated following a disciplinary proceeding which resulted in the inmat.e being
convicted of possessing escape contraband and of associating with other inmates in an
escape attempt. The U.S. District Court ent.ered sammary judgment in. favor of the
defendants and the imnat.e appealed. The appeals court found that the inmat.e's due
process rights were not violated when the disciplinary board convicted him of pouesaion of
escape contraband based upon undocmnent.ed hearsq of an ~ o u s in.formant, . umler
the applicable "some evidence• standard, in view of further evidence available at the time
of the fin.al decision by the warden that the inmat.e had previously escaped from prison,
that abundant work had been done t.o attain escape through an. exhaust fan in the prison's
chapel, and that escape t.ools had been redeemed in prison. (Maryland Penit.entiary)

U.S. Appeals Court
PROTECTION

Berry v. City of Muskogee, 900 F.2d 1489 (10th Cir. 1990). The widow of an. inmat.e
who was killed by fellow inmates brought a civil rights action against the city. In
vacating and l'8mandin.g the district court's decision, the appeals court stated that eighth
amendment standards, rather than due process standards that are applicable t.o

pretrial detainees, apply to incarcerat.ed persons whose guilt has been adjudicat.ed
formally but who await sent.encing. The safety and bodily int.egrity of a convict.ed prisoner
implicat.es both the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment and the fourteen.th amendment's substantive prot.ection against state
deprivation of life and h'berty without due process of law. The city cannot absolut.ely
guarantee the safety of its jailed prisoners, but it has a constitutional duty to take
reasonable st.eps to pt'btect the prisoners' safety and bodily int.egrity. A municipality is
liable under Section 1983 if there is a direct causal connection between the municipality
policies in question and the constitutional deprivation. (Muskogee City-Federal Jail,
Oklahoma)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCHES
SECURITY
.
PRACTICES

Section

Colon v. Schneider, 899 F.2d 660 (7th Cir. 1990). An inmat.e brought a
1983
action., alleging that a correctiODS official violat.ed his rights under the due process
clause of the fourt.eenth au:wndrnen.t when the official used chemical mace to .compel
him to submit to a strip search during the course of the in.mat.e's transfer from one
area of a correctional institution to another. The U.S. District Court issued an mjunclion
prohibiting the official from using 'mace solely to compel strip searches incident t.o the
transfer of in.mat.es within the institution, and the official appealed. The in.mate crossappealed, arguing that he was entitled to one dollar in compensatory damages and that
the district court erred in vacating the jury's award of punitive dam.ages. The appeals
court found that Wisconsin. regulations governing the use of mace in prisons do not creat.e
a federally-prot.ected liberty in.t.erest on behalf of inmates, and even. if such regulations did
creat.e a h'berty int.erest, the inmate failed to satisfy his burden. that he was maced in. the
absence of constitutionally required procedural safeguards. The appeals court also found
that, under the eleven.th amen.dmen.t, the district court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicat.e
the claim which was nothing more than an allegation that the prison official violat.ed stat.e
law, or to enjoin the official from engaging in the allegedly violative conduct. According to
the court, in. order for state regulations to creat.e a constitutionally and prot.ect.ed liberty
interest, the regulations must employ language of an unmistakably mandatory character,
requiring that certain. procedures •shall, n "will, n or "must" be employed, and that the
cba]Jenged action will n.ot occur absent specific substantive predicat.es. (Columbia ·
Correctional Institution, Wisconsin)

U.S. Appeals Court
FACIAL HAIR
HAIRLENGTH

Dunavant v. Moore, 907 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1990), ~ prison.er brought a civil rights
action. claiming that a prison grooming policy violat.ed his first amendment rights.
Summary judgment for the defendants was grant.ed by the U.S. District Court and the
in.mat.a appealed. The appeals court affirmed the decision., finding that the prison.
grooming policy prohibiting in.mat.a beards longer than two inches was based on legitimate
pen.ological objectives relat.ed to security because a long beard could make identification.
more difficult and help the prisoners hide contraband. The rule did n.ot violat.e the free
exercise rights of the in.mate who was a member of the Church of Jesus Christ
Christian/Aryan Nation and who believed, baaed on religious grounds, that he should n.ot
shave, cut or round the comers of his beard. {Farmingt:on Correctional Cent.er, Missouri)

U.S. Appeals Court
FACIALHAIR

Friedman v. Stat.e of Arizona, 912 F.2d 328 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 996.
Two orthodox Jewish in.mat.es filed a federal civil rights lawsuit against a state prison.
challenging a policy prohibiting beards, arguing it violat.ed their First Amendment right to
exercise their religion freely. The U.S. Court of Appeals ~pheld the prison policy agamst
the in.mate's cballenge. It found that the prison had presented evidence that the policy
was ration.ally relat.ed to legitimat.e security in.t.erests, in.eluding orderly conduct of day-t.oday activities, identification. of prisoners responsible for disturbances and apprehension of
escapees by aiding rapid and accurat.e identification. In addition, allowing someone to
have a beard was n.ot a guarant.ee that the person. would "maintain. the beard in. uactly
the same style, length or color as he had in. the photograph,• and the iden.tif'lcation.
problem thus becomu unrnanaguble. The court noted that the prison allowed the
in.mat.es participation in. other religious activities and practices, provided Kosher food and
access to a rabbi (Arizona Stat.e Prison)

U.S. Appeals Court
SAFETY

SECURITY
RESTRICTIONS

U.S. District Court
CLASSIFICATION

ESCAPE

Hatch v. Sharp, 919 F.2d 1266 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 1698. An in.mate
who was denied permission to play the stat.e lottery brought a Section. 1988 action allegin.g
violations of due process and equal protection rights. The U.S. District Court en.t.ered
judgment in. favor of the lottery and prison officials, and appeal was taken. The cour.t of
appeals found that the inmat.e's due process rights were not violat.ed by the prohibition. ·
again.st playing the lottery. Prison. officials were en.titled to draw a line at what person.al
property in.mat.es could possess or in what financial transactions they could engage in.
order to further legitimate security and safety concerns. (Nottoway Corr. Cent.er, Virginia)
Siddiqi v. Lane, 748 F.Supp. ~ (N.D. ID. 1990). An in.mate brought a Section. 1983
action. alleging a violation of equal prot.ection.. On. the defendants' motion. tCI dismiss, the
district court found that the inmate, who attempted an. escape, was n.ot denied equal
protection. by his subsequent security classification as a high escape risk, absent a
showing of intention.al or purposeful discrimination. in his security classification. (Illinois
State Prison. System)

39.25

U.S. Appeals Court
HAIR LENGTH
FACIAL HAIR

U.S. District Court

Swift v. Lewis, 901 F.2d 730 (9th Cir. 1990). Inmates appealed from a
judgment of the U.S. Distri~t Court which dismissed a civil rights action
challenging a grooming policy. The appeals court, reversing and remanding,
found that the Department of Corrections did not show that particular interests behind
the grooming policy justified treating the plaintiff inmates differently than members of
other religious groups, and the complaint stated a cause of action for damages against
another inmate who had allegedly excluded one of the plaintiff inmates from a retigious
group. Two prisoners claimed to be Christians who as part of their religion adhere to the
"Vow of the Nazarite," which prohibits, among other things, one's cutting his hair and
beard. They argued that the officials had discriminat.ed against their religion by
exempting certain religious groups, such as Sikhs and American Indians, from the policy,
but not exempting them. The appeals court found that the state Department of
Corrections did not show that the grooming policies were actually based on the need for
quick inmate identification, the prevention of sanitary problems, reducing contact between
prisoners and guards during body searches, and reducing homosexual attractiveness of
inmates or that any of those interests justified treating one group of inmates who claimed
a religious belief precluding them from cutting their hair differently than other religious
groups who made such a claim and were not subject.ed to the grooming policy prohibition
of long hair and beards. Prison officials are not required to prove that their policy is the
least restrictive method of furthering relevant penological interests, even when it infringes
on an mmate's practice of religion, but they must at least produce some evidence that
their policy is based on legitimate penological justmcations. (Arizona State PrisOll)

U.S. v. Oakley, 781 F.Supp. 1368 (S.D.Ind. 1990). A prisoner moved to

CONTRABAND
SEARCHES

suppress a controlled substance contained in balloons recovered by a digital
rectal examination and by the administration of laxatives. The district court
found that the physician's digital probe of the prisoner's rectw:n to remove balloons
containing a controlled substance could be performed without a warrant and complied
with the fourth amendment, even though the prisoner claimed that he suffered from
internal hemorrhoids. and even though the search was performed on a bed in a dry cell.
An x-ray indicated what appeared to be four or five balloons in the lower abdomen. The
balloons had been in the prisoner's digestive tract for over three weeks and contained a
lethal dosage of dilaudid; and the .fecal impaction posed an additional health risk. The
physician removed two balloons in the search. (United States Penitentiary, Terre Haute,
Indiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
PRETRIAL
DETAINEE
USE OF FORCE
CLASSIFICATION

White v. Roper, 901 F.2d 1501 (9th Cir. 1990). A pretrial detainee filed a
civil rights action against a jail sergeant and deputies for deliberate
indifference to his personal safety and excessive use of force. The U.S.
District Court granted. summary judgment for the.defendants, ..and the.
detainee appealed. The, appeals court, affirming in part, reversing in part.
and remanding, found that genuine issues of material fact existed on the deliberate
in.difference claim, but the detainee who alleged he suffered a cut wrist and bruises when
the officers attempted to subdue him when he resisted being put into another inmate's cell
failed to make a showing sufficient to establish use of force against him was excessive or
brutal. Genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether an officer was deliberately
indif£erent to a pretrial detainee's personal safety or intended to punish the pretrial
detainee by ordering him in a cell of another detainee who had a history of violent
behavior, in spite of the plaintiff inmate's protests and threats by other inmate. (San
Francisco Coimty Jail, California)

U.S. District Court
ESCAPE
USE OF FORCE

Wright v. Whiddon. 747 F.Supp. 694 (M.D. Ga. 1990) reversed 951 F.2d 297. A civil rights
action was brought to recover damages for the wrongful death of and deprivation of the
constitutional rights of a pretrial detainee, who was fatally shot while attempting to
escape, against a city police officer, a city police chief, the city, and the county sheriff. On
the defendants' motions for summary judgment, the district court found that the Fourth
Amendment, rather than the Eighth Amendment, provided the standard for analyzing a
claim that the pretrial detainee who was fatally shot while attempting to escape was
subject.ed to unconstitutional use of excess force. The pretrial detainee had the statas of a
presumptively innocent individual, so was more akin to suspect than a convicted prisoner,
and the Fourth Amendment's objective reasonableness .tandard accordingly applied. It
was also found that pnume issue of material fact aiated as to whether a reasonable
police officer could believe the pretrial detainee who was att.empting an escape posed a
serious threat, thus rendering lawful the officer's action in. fatally shooting the detainee,
so as to preclude summary judgment on the issue of whether the officer was entitled t.o
qualified immunity with respect to constitutional claims assert.eel under the civil rights
statute Section 1983. The county sheriff who ordered the city police officer to shoot the
pretrial detamee who was attempting the escape was not liable for violation of the fatally
wounded detainee's constitational rights, although it was argued that the ~
intentionally authorized the comrnissinu of the unlawful act which resalted in. the death
and violation of constitutional rights. The sheriff did zio1; have authority to ci-mrnend the
police officer, and the police officer did not act pursuant to ~ comrnand from the sheriff.
39.26

bUt in reliance on .bis own training and city policy, in deciding to draw his gun and fire at
the detainee. The appeals court reversed the lower court rulmg, finding that the officer
was entitled to qualified immunity. {Turner County, Georgia)

1991
U.S. District Court
DISTURBANCE

Friends v. Moore, 776 F.Supp. 1882 (E.D. Mo. 1991). An inmat.e brought a Section 1983
action against various prison officials. The district court found that the conditions of the
inmat.e's confinement in an outdoor rec area, wet and naked for a period of less than two
hours, did not constitut.e cru.el and unusual p,misbm.ent. The prison officials placed the
mm.at.a in the rec area not for punishment but to restore order in the prison unit. The
mm.at.a was moved from his cell to the rec area· to facilitat.e cleanup of the unit which he
necessitat.ed by setting off a sprinkler, and the duration of the conf"mement was relatively
brief. (Potosi 09?-rec:tional Cent.er, Missouri)

U.S. District Court
PROTECTION
SAFETY

Haynes v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections, 760 F.Supp. 124 (E.D. Mich. 1991), affirmed. 945
F.2d 404. A prisoner who was stabbecl by a prisoner in the adjoining cell brought a civil
rights action against various prison officials. The U.S. District Court found that the
inmat.e failed to make an Eighth Amendment claim for deliberat.e indifference against
prison officials. The mm.at.a clauned that officials ignored his report of a threat on his life,
but the officials did not recall the inm.at.e t.elling them about any threats, and the behavior
of the officials and the inm.at.e was inconsist.ent with the mm.at.e's version of even.ts. (Stat.a
Prison for Southern Michigan)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEGREGATION

Johnson v. Boreani. 946 F.2d 67 (8th Cir. 1991). An mm.at.a brought a civil rights action
against prison officials, challenging his confinement in a strip cell on three clifferent
occasions. Following remand, the U.S. District Court ent.ered summary judgment in favor
of the officials and dismissed the mm.at.e's claim for il:ijun.ctive relief, and the mm.at.a
appealed. The court of appeals found that the.prison officials did not violat.e the inmate's
clearly established Eighth Am.endm-ut rights when. they ccmfinecl the mm.at.a to a strip cell
for control purposes, entitling them to qualified immunity. The officials could reasonably
have believed that conditions in the strip cell did not subject the mm.at.a to WBJ).ton.
infliction of pain or serious physical injury, in view of the short duration of conf"mement
and absence of injury; Even if the inmat.e established that his Eighth Amendment rights
were violat.ed when. he was placed in the strip cell, the mm.at.a was not entitled to
injunctive relief prohibiting the use of the strip cell for control purposes, absent evidence
that such conduct was likely to recur unless enjoined. (Cummins Unit, Arkansas
Department of Corrections)
·

U.S. Appeals Court
ESCAPE

Martucci v. Johnson.. 944 F.2d 291 (6th Cir. 1991). A former pretrial detainee filed a
Section 1983 action alleging various constitutional violations by sheriff's department
officials in con.cert with a Stat.a Bureau of Investigation agent. The U.S. District Court
ent.ered summary judgment against the detainee, and he appealed. The court of appeals
found that conditions imposed on the pretrial detainee during his segregat.ed confinement
were reasonably relat.ed to legitimat.e governmental objectives and aborting his escape and
ensaring his presence at trial and, thus. the segregation did not amount to
unconstitutional "punishment• and, consequently, his placement in segregat.ed
confinement dici. not, in and of itself, violate due process. In addition, the pretrial detainee
was not denied procedural due process by lack of a hearing at which he could contest
reasons for his confinement, as he was not subjected to "discipline• for violation of a prison.
rule and, thus, could derive no liberty interest from a regulatory provision requiring
jailers to provide for disciplinary hearings in cases of alleged violations of prisoner con.duct
rules. It was also found that the jailers' decision to withhold both incoming and out.going
mail of the pretrial detainee who was believed to be plannin.g an escape did not violat.e the
detain.ee's First Amendment rights. AJJY size or ~ of package or envelope could have
contained information relating to an escape scheme. Withholding mail destined for a
prisoner believed to be planning an escape, the court not.ad, is "reasonably related" to the
legitimat.e penological interest of maintaining institutional security, and the jailers were
"lawfully motivat.ed" to regulat.e, on a cont.ant-neutral basis, the prisoner's ability to
correspond with people outside the jail as long as there exist.ed reason to believe that an
escape att.em.pt wu imminent. (Anderson County Jail, Tennessee)

Stat.a Court
ESCAPE

McQueen v. Williams. 587 So.2d 918 (Miss. 1991). A son of a man who was one of two
men murdered by two convicts during a burglary that took place after the two convicts
escaped from a county jail where they were being held because of overcrowded conditions,
sued the county sheriff for the wrongful death of his father. He clauned that the failure to
prevent the escape or "promptly and adequate]yll inform the public of the dangerousness of
the offenders constitut.ed n.egligenDe. The complaint:, seeking $1.5 million in damages,
claimed that the sheriff and his subordinat.es failed in a "minist.erial duty" to keep the
prisoners confined "by leaving the jail door ,:mlocked" and thereby permitting an escape.
The Mississippi Supreme Court upheld BUJD1D817 judgment for the defendant sheriff,
39.27

noting that, uni:l,er state law, the sheriff's duty to keep prisoners confined, if any, is
discretionary in nature, requjring the sheriff's personal "deliberation, decision and
individual judgment." The sheriff was entitled to qualified immunity from liability, in the
absence of any evidence that tlie sheriff exceeded bis authority or committed intentional
wrongdoing. (Mississippi)
U.S. District Court

SECURITY
PRACTICES
RELIGIOUS
SERVICES

Phelps v. Ounn 770 F.Supp. 846 (E.D. Ky. 1991). A prison inmate brought a civil rights
action alleging that his constitutional rights were violated by a deputy's decision to bar
him. from taking a leadership role in chapel services because he was gay. The U.S.
District Court found that the inmate's right to pract:ice his religion was not violat.ed by the
deputy's decision. There was strong disagreement among other inmates as to whether
gays should be allowed to participate in services, and the deputy's decision was reasonably
relat.ed to penological interests of security and rehabilitation of inmates by providing
religious programs for the inmate population as a whole. (Northpoint Training Center,
Burgin, Kentucky)

U.S. Appeals Court
DISTURBANCE
SECURITY
PRACTICES

Stewart v. McManus, 924 F.2d 138 (8th Cir. 1991). A prisoner brought a Section 1983
action asserting claims based on his disciplinary treatment by Iowa correctional
authorities after he had been transferred from Kansas. The U.S. District Court found no
Eighth Amendment violation occurred when the prisoner was placed in plastic hand cuffs
following a cell house disturbance, particularly where the prisoner's alleged wrist injury
was slight. The inmate was flu-cuffed in a good-faith effort to restore discipline after a
prison riot and only after guards ran out of ordinary handcuffs. (Iowa State Penitentiary)

U.S. Appeals Court

Young v. Lane, 922 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1991). On appeal and cross appeal from an order of
the U.S. District Court in Jewish inmates' federal civil rights action against state prison
officials, the court of appeals found that the state prison's policy of allowing Jewish ·
inmates to wear their yarmulkes only inside their cells and during religious services did
not deprive the inmates of their right to free exercise of religion, as the prison had a
strong institutional interest in limiting the effectiveness of gangs by restricting the variety
of available headgear, and that the policy operated with neutrality toward the content of
religious expression and did not deprive the inmates of all means thereof. (Dixon
Correctional Center, Illinois)

HATS

1992

manks v. Smith, 790 F.Supp. 192 (E.D. Wis. 1992).

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

An inmate brought a civil rights
action against prison officials challenging the number of searches conduct.ad during a two
week •general shakedown." He alleged that such searches were "excessive and
unreasonable" because he had no contact with other prisoners or visitors during that time.
The district court found that the inmate's allegations stated an arguable claim for relief
under the Eighth Amendment, (Waupun Correctional Institution, Wisconsixv

U.S. District Court

Cameron v. Tomes, 788 F.Supp. 1511 (D. Mass. 1992), modified, 990 F.2d 14. An
involuntarily c:ommitt.ed patient brought an action against the Commissioner of the
Department of Mental Health and the administrator of a treatment center for the sexually
dangerous, alleging that the defendants had violated his constitutional rights by f ~ to
provide him with minimally adequate treatment. The court found that transporting the
patient, who had had one leg amputated, in waist shackles and under armed guard was
unnecessary and actually harmful to his treatment. (Massachusetts Treatment Center for
the Saually Dangerous)

RESTRAINTS

U.S. District Court
FIRE

Lile v. Tippecanoe County Jail, 844 F.~pp. 1301 (N.D. Ind. 1992). It was found that a
county jail official's refusal to open windows after an jnmate start.ed a fire in a cell block
alleged]y resulting in a detainee passing out was not in.tended to punish the detainee in
violation of the Eighth Arnendment. There was no m.«:lical evidence suggesting that the
detainee suffered aey- mSury resulting from the fire or the presence of smoke in the unit.
The officials respODded to and utiDguished. the fire, and there was no indication as to the
length of time smoke was present or that any other inmates cam.plained about the
presence of smoke or suffered any discomfort or
(Tippecanoe Count,.. Jail, Indiana)

m,jur.r,

U.S. District Court

'LOOKlN"
SECURITY
PRACTICES

Miller v. Campbell, 804 F.Supp, 159 (D, Kam. 1992). An imnate brought an action alleging
cruel and unusual pnnishment during a lockdown. The defendants moved for summary
judgment. The district cwrt granted the motion, finding that the medical care of the
inmate was not cruel and unusual pllnishment, where there was a mere difference of
.opinion regarding the nature of care offered. In. addition, the brief lockdown, the
shut.down of water and electricity, m:ui the suspension bf telephone access was related to
legitimate c:orrectiona1 goals in response to inmates' throwing water-soaked trash into the
walkway and.was not cruel "and 'IUlUSWll pnnisbment. The water was turned oft to
prevent flooding m:ui was turned on at intervals to allow the use of toilets m:ui sinks. The
electricity was shutdown after inmates damaged light fmares, m:ui nothing indic.a:ted
39.28

officials' deliberate incliff~ to dangerous conditions of cm:finement. The court n.ot.ed
that these deprivations were brief and were reasonably related to legjtimate correction.al
goals. (Leavenworth County Jail, Kansas)
U.S. Appeals Court
FACIAL HAIR

Powell v. Est.elle, 959 F.2d 22 (5th Cir. 1992). Prisoners brought civil rights actions
alleging that the Texas Department of Criminal Justice's prohibition against long hair and
beards violat.ed their First Amendment right to exercise their religion freely. The u;s.
District Court found no infringement on the prisoners' First Amendment rights, m:ui the
inmates appealed. The court of appeals found that the prohibition was rationally related
to the achievement of the goal of advancing prison security by preventing the
concealment of weapons and contraband in hair and beards, and evidence support.ad the
district court's conclusion that the prolu'bition was rationally relat.ed to a security-relat.ed
goal of identifying prisoners. Evidence was also sufficient to support the district court's
conclusion that long hair and beards would have an adverse· impact on the safety of
prisoners working around industrial equipment and on the hygiene of ~ prison
population as a whole. (Teu.s Department of Criminal Justice)

U.S. Appeals Court
HAlR

Scott v. Mississippi Dept. of Corrections, 961 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1992). Mississippi State
Penitentiary inmat.es who were members of the Rastafari. religion brought a suit alleging
that a hair-grooming regulation was an unconstitutional violation of their free exercise of
religion. The U.S. District Court entered summary judgment and the in.mat.es appealed.
The court of appeals fomid that the Mississippi Department of Corrections' hair-grooming
regulation, which required short hair, did not violate the free exercise of religion rights of
Rastafari in.mat.es, even though religious beliefs included never cutting or combing one's
hair, since the regulation was reasonably related to legitimat.e penological concerns of
identification and security, other forms of expressing the inmate's religion. remained open,
and it was unliltely that penological interests could be equally well satisfied by other
alternatives proposed by the inmat.es. (Mississippi State Penitentiary, Parchman,
Mississippi)

U.S. Appeals Court
ESCAPE

U.S. v. Horr, 963 F.2d 1124 (8th Cir. 1992), A defendant was convicted in the U.S.
District Court of con.spiring to posses a firearm in prison and to escape, and attempting to
possess a firearm in prison and to escape, and he appealed. The court of appeals found
that the taped t.elephone conversations in which the prison inmat.e attempted to arrange
an escape were admissible because the inmate, who was instructed at the prison
orientation that inmate t.elephone calls were monitored and recorded, signed a form
indicating that he was aware of the prison's telephone policy, and, thus, implied to the
taping of his phone conversations. In addition., the defendant's allegations that he would
have been labeled a prison nsnitch" if he had reported to prison authorities that a fellow
inmate had threatened to kill him if he did not come up with money to buy a gun. to be
used in an escape attempt was inadequate, without more, to demonstrate that the
defendant had no reasonable opportunities to avoid the harm, as was required for a jury
instruction on law of coercion or duress in prosecution of the inmate. (Federal Medical
Center, Rochester, Minnesota)

HAIR LENGTH

TELEPHONE

U.S. Appeals Court
DISTURBANCE

SAFETY
SECURITY
PRACTICES
TRANSFER

Woodbridge v. Dahlberg, 954 F.2d 1281 (6th Cir. 1992). Prison. inmates Siled prison
officials under Section 1988 alleging th.at the conduct of the officials following a prison
protest demonstration violated their Fourth and Eighth J.mendm ..nt rights, The U.S.
District Court entered judgment on the jury verdict in favor of the prison officials, and the
inmates appealed. The court of appeals found that the prison inmates' rights under the
Fourth and Eighth Amendments were not violated by their detention in outdoor fenced
areas in 40 degree temperatures, subsequent strip searches, and removal to another
facility following the inmates' refusal to report to their cells as instructed, as the actions of
the prison officials were necessary in view of the potentiaUy dangerous situation.. (Ohio
Stat.a Reformatory)
1993

U.S. District Court
PROTECTION
SAFETY

Bragado v. City of Zion/Police Dept.. 839 F.Supp. 551 (N.D.ID. 1998). A suit was br®ght
under the Section 1988 civil rights statute, the Illinois Survival Act, and the Illinois
Wrongful Death Act seeking damages for the city's failure to person.ally inspect and
prevent the suicide of a jail prisoner. After the jury returned a verdict in favor of the
plaintiff, posttrial motions were made in which the plaintiff sought funeral expenses and
the defendant sought judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The district court found that
evidence support.ad a finding th.at jail officials acted with deliberat.e indifference to the
prisoner's rights. Inadequate personal inspections of the prisoner were done despite the
knowledge of the prisoner's suicidal tendencies, Audio and video monitoring were also
msafficient. In addition., the on-duty officer knew of the prisoner's threat of suicide, as
well as her intoxication and iD,juries to her wrists. The court also found that the jury's
verdict awarding damages for the city's wrongful failure to prevent the prisoner's suicide,
in the amount of $5,000 under the Illinois Survival Act and approximately $282,000 under
39.29

the Illinois Wrm:igfal Death Act as well as nominal damages for Section 1983 civil rights
violation, was supported by evidence and was reasonable. (City of Zion Police Station,
Zion,Dlinois)
·
U.S. Appeals Court
RESTRAlNTS

Knox v. McGhm.is, 998 F.2d 1405 (7th Cir. 1993). A prisoner brought a Section 1983
action against state corrections off'icials alleging that use of a "black box" re!Ji;raming
device while transporting segregation prisoners while outside the segregation. wrlt violated
the Eighth Amendment. The U.S. District Court grant.ed summary judgment in favor of
the defendants, and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court, aff'irming the decision,
found that the correctional officials were entitled to qualified immunity from claims for
damages against them in their individual capacities. ln addition, claims against the
defendants in their official capacities were barred by the Eleventh Amendm--ut. It was
also found that the prisoner lacked ,=1;anding to seek prospective m,junctive relief against
prison officials in their official capacities as the prisoner, who had been released from
segregation and returned to the general prison population where he was no longer subject
to use of the black box, did not make a reasonable showing that he would &pin be subject
to alleged illegality. (Stateville Correctional Center, IDinois)

U.S. District Court

Lasley v. Godinez; 883 F.Supp. 714 (N.D.m. 1993), Imnates who were found guilty of
possesaing dangerous contraband in violation of a prison rule brought a pro se Section
1983 suit alleging that their due process rights were violated. On the defendants' motions
t.o msmiss, the district court found that the administ.rative directive of the IDinois
Department of Corrections (DOC) whose purpose was to establish a procedure to insure
that a written report was completed whenever an inmate living area was searched did not
create a prot.ecti.ble h'berty interest for inmates to have their cells searched before the cells
were assigned to them. The directive contained no substantive rules which would give
rise to an entitlement. The discovery of contraband in the inmates' cells during the course
of the searches was sufficient evidence to find them guilty of violating the prison rule.
(Stateville Correctional Center, IDinois)

CONTRABAND

SEARCHES

U.S. Appeals Court
RESTRAINTS
SECURITY
PRACTICES

Moody v. Proctor, 986 F.2d 239 (8th Cir. 1993). An-inmate who claimed that he was
injured when, after undergoing medical treatment, prison guards lifted him into a prisoner
transportation van while he was restrained with handcuffs and a "black box:,• filed a civil
rights action ·agam.st security guards, correctional officers and others. The U.S. District
Court entered judgment for the defendants and the inmate appealed. The appeals court,
aff°Jrming the decision, found that the district court determination that correctional officers
lacked discretion in using the "black box" restraining device while transporting the inmate

was not clearly erroneous. Although the officers could request changes in transport
procedures to ensare the prisoner's safety and well-being, all inmates traveling outside the
institution were to be restrained using handcuffs and a black box. No changes to
restramts could occur while a prisoner was en route. In addition, the use of the black box
did not itself amount to cruel and unusual punishment. Although the black box caused
discomfort, its use was penologically justified by security considerations. Although the
inmate was m,jured as a result of the guards' handling of him while he was restrained by
the black box, there was no evidence that the guarcls acted maliciously or sadistically or
with deh'berate indifference. (Nebraska State Penitentiary)
U.S. Appeals Court
DISTOBBANCE
USE-OF FORCE

Moore v. Holbrook, 2 F.Sd 697 (6th Cir. 1993). A prisoner brought a Section 1983 action
against prison guards for an alleged assa-ult. The United States District Court dismissed
the action, and appeal was taken. The appeals court, reversing and remanding_ found
that there were genuine issues of material fact, precluding summary judgment for the
prison officials. The prisoner claimed he was assaulted by officials during a prison
distarbance and th.ere were doubts as to whether the disturbance was in progress at the
time of the assault. lf the assault occurred during the disturbance, the guards were
permitted to use greater force than normally necessary to control the prisoner. · (Southern
Ohio Correctional Facility)

U.S. District Court
ESCAPE

Spaulding v. Collins, 867 F.Supp. 499 (S.D. Tex. 1998). An inmate filed a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus complaining of discipline he received aft.er he was found guilty of
attempting to escape by originating and possessing a forged court order. The district court
found that the inmate's exclusion from. portions of the disciplinary hearing during which a
correctional officer gave testun.ony did not violate his due proceas rights. The hearing
officer found that it was necessary to exclude the inmate in order to preserve intemal
order and discipline and to maintain institutional security. The court also found that
denying the inmate permission t.o cross-enmine an informant was not a denial of
confrontation and cross-examination rights. Revealing the identity of the informant could
pose a high risk of reprisal within the prison and the right to call witnesses in prison
disciplinary proceedinp is limited. Evidence supported a fmdmg of guilt for att.empted
escape. (Alfred D. Hughes Unit, Tens Depart:men.t of Criminal Justice, Institutional
Division)

39.30

U.S. Appeals Court
SECURITY
PRACTICES

Walters v. Grossheim, 990 F.2d 381 (8th Cir. 1993). A prison mmate brought a civil rights
suit against prison officials, alleging that the officials' failure to comply with a judgment
requiring the inmate to be retarn.ed to a less restrictive environment constituted a
violation of his rights. The U.S. District Court awarded the inmate compensatory
damages of $4 per day for the time the mmate spent in Level DI custody aft.er the entry of
the state court judgment and before he was restored to Level IV, for a total of $276 in
damages; the parties cross appealed. The court of appeals, affirm.mg the decision, found
that the prison officials did not have qualified immunity for their failure to comply with
the judgment ordering them to return the inmate to a less restrictive environment,
regardless of whether the off'lcials disagreed with the order and thought it lacked proper
legal foundation. The judgment could serve as a basis for the inmate's constitutionally
protected liberty interests, thus the prison officials violated the inmate's due process rights
when they failed to carry out the• state court judgment. The prison inmate, who was the
prevailing party, was entitled to an allowance of costs although he had not requested them
in the trial court. (Iowa)
1994

U.S. District Court
SAFETY

Arnold v. South Carolina~ of Corrections, 843 F.Supp. 110 (D.S.C. 1994). A state
prison inmate who was • ·
while using faulty kitchen eqaipment brought a Section
1983 claim against prison officials based on Eighth Amendment violations. Upon the
prison officials' motion for summary judgment, the district court found that the inmate
failed to establish that the officials violat.ed the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment. The inmate offered no evidence that the officials acted
with a requisite culpable state of mind in failing to repair the equipment. Also, the
deprivation of rights was not sufficiently serious to satisfy the objective component of
violation. The proper remedy for the inmate was to f'tle for workers compensation benefits.
The court found that even if the inmate had established that prison officials violated the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment by failing to
repair the faulty st.eam pot, prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity from the
suit because it had not been clearly established that the right to properly functioning
prison equipment was of constitutional magnitude. {McCormick Correctional Institution,
South Carolina)

U.S. District Court

Barrett v. U.S.• 845 F.Supp. 774 (D,Kan. 1994). An inmate's mother brought a Federal
Tort Claims Act (FTCA) action against prison officials aft.er the inmate was fatally stabbed
at the federal penitentiary. The district court found that the failure of the prison otficials
to investigate a death threat against the inmate made by a religious group or to segregate
the inmate from. other prisoners was not the pl"CmlDate cause of the inmate's stabbing
death. The inmate's death was a result of a per80llal comlict with another inmate who
was not a member of the religious group. In addition, the prison officials had no
knowledge of that conflict and could not have been aware of that ccmfl.ict even with
reasonable diligence. (Unit.ea. States Penitentiary, Leavenworth., Kansas)

PRCYI'ECTION

U.S. Appeals Court
ESCAPE
USEOFFORCE

Brothers v. Klevenhagep. 28 F.Sd 452 (5th Cir. 1994). Family members of a pretrial
detainee who was killed while attempting to escape from custody during transport from
one holding cell to another, brought an.action in state court against the county and its
sheriff alleging a:cessive force and violation of Section 1983. The defendants removed the
action to federal court and the parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The U.S.
District Court granted summary judgment for the defendants and the plaintiffs appealed.
The appeals court, affirming the decision, found that the due process clause, rather than
the Fourth Amendm•nt, provided the constitutional standard for determblmg whether
deputies used excessive force in their treatment of the detamee. The deJ>Uties' shooting
and killing of the unarmed pretrial detainee who was escaping did not violate due process.
The sheriff's department policy allowed deadly force only when immediately necessary to
prevent escape and was designed in a good faith effort to maintain or rest.ore discipline
and not maliciously and sadistically for the purpose of causing harm. The deputies fired
at the detainee only as a last resort to prevent an escape, and the detainee would have
· escaped if the deputies had not fired upon him. (Harris County Jail, Texas)

U.S. District Court

Campbell-El v. District of Columbia. 874 F.Supp. 403 (D.D.C. 1994). A prisoner claimed
that enforcement of various·prison. security measares violated his rights under the Fifth
and Eighth Amendm,m.t and under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The district
court found that the confinement to maximum security and the enforcement of a lockdown
policy, were reasonable in light of prison secarity concerns and did not violate either the
Fifth Amendment due process or the Eighth Amendmen:t cruel and unusual pimisbment.
clauses. This is particularly true where the prisoner was in maximum security at his own
request for protective cust.ody. The court also found that, to det.ermme whether the
prisoner's rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) had been violat.ed,
further discovery was required on the prisoner's claim that ~orcement of the prohibition
againsl gathering .of more than 10 or 12 prisoners in a cellblock violated his religious

"LOCK-IN"
RELIGION

39.31

freedom rights. There was insufficient evidence in the record to show whether the
regulation was the least restrictive means for furthering compelling govermnent int.erest
in prison security, (Mummm Security Facility, Lort.on, District of Columbia)
U.S. District Court
HAJRLENGTH
REIJGIOUS
ARrICLES

Diaz v. Collins. 872 F.Supp. 858 (E.D.Tex. 1994). A Native American. inmat.e brought a
Section 1988 action complaining of ~eged violations of his right t.o practice Native
American religion. The district court found that a prison regulation requiring inmat.es t.o
cut their hair did not violat.e the Religious Freedom Best.oration Act, despit.e the Native
American inmat.e's claim that his religion requjred that he grow his hair long. Security
·concerns were compelling govermnental interests, and the regulations were the least
restrictive means available· t.o achieve these compelling int.erests. The prison's
requirement that a medicine pouch sought by the inmat.e be sent through the unit
warden's office and that the imnat.e allow visual inspection of it for contraband was
reasonable within the prison environment and did not substantially burden the inmat.e's
right t.o freely practice his religion. The prison policy of requiring that the inmat.e's
medicine pouch be stored in the inmat.e's cell did not substantially burden the inmat.e's
religious beliefs. The prison regulation governing religious headbands did not
substantially burden the practice .of the Native American religion, and was founded upon
a compelling stat.e int.erest t.o mllintab,. security and minimize carrying of contraband
within the prison. The regulation required that any headband be kept in the inmat.e's
cell. The inmat.e was ccmfined t.o his cell for 22 t.o 23 hours per day and could wear the
headband during that time. (Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional
Division. Coffield Unit)

U;S. District Court
DISCRETION
RESTRAINTS
SECURITY
REsrRICTIONS
SEGREGATION

Harrison v. Dretke. 865 F.Supp. 385 (W.D.Tex. 1994). A prisoner brought a civil rights
action against prison officials claiming that he was placed on restraint status and
"container restriction" (not allowed t.o keep cups, plates or similar it.ems in his cell) without
due process of law. The U.S. District Court dismissed the action and the imnat.e appealed.
The appeals court remanded. On remand, the district court found that prison officials did
not violat.e the prisoner's protect.eel h"berty int.erest when they placed him on restraint
status after he assault.ed another inmate. The prisoner failed t.o show that there were any
regulations that limit.ed the officers' discretion in imposing the restraint status, and any
freedom of movement inmates had beyond escort ,mder restraint was an umegulat.ed
privilege ext.ended by prison officials. In addition, the stat.e prison officials satisfied due
process requirements when they revoked the prisoner's container privileges. The prison's
classification committee reviewed the prisoner's status a little more than three weeks after
placing him on container restriction and decided t.o continue the restrictions. This review
was one of the prisoner's regularly scheduled classification hearings which must be held
every 90 days pursuant t.o segregation regulations. The mmate had a right t.o attend such
hearings and t.o present evidence. (Alfred Hughes Unit, Texas Department of Criminal
Justice, Institutional Divisicm)

U.S. Appeals Court
PROTECTION
SAFETY

Horn by Parks v. Madison County Fiscal Court, 22 F.Sd 658 (6th Cir, 1994) U.S. cert.
denied 115 S.Ct. 199. A juvenile detainee, by his lim.it.ed conservat.or, brought Section
1988 and negligence claim.. seeking: damages for injuries sustained in an att:empted
suicide. The appeals court, affirming in part and reversing in part, found that any
violation of the Juvenile Justice Act in temporarily lodging the juvenile in an. adult jail
was not the proximat.e cause of his att.empt.ed suicide because the juvenile was
scrupulously shielded from deleterious influences associat.ed with adult facilities. The
court also found that the prison officials' failure t.o take special precautions t.o protect the
juvenile detainee from. suicide was not deh'berat.e in.difference t.o his serious medical needs,
as required to establish a Fourteenth Amendment violation. Juvenile detainees were not.
as a class, particalarly vulnerable to suicide and entitled to special screening for suicidal
t.endencies. (Madison County Detention Center, Kentucky)

U.S. District Court
PROTECTION

Huffman v. Fiola, 850 F.Supp. 888 (N.D. Cal. 1994). A prisoner filed a federal civil rights
complaint agamst prison officials and police officers and sought t.o proceed in forma
pauperis, The district court found that the prisoner stated a cognizable claim against
police officers who allegedly watched and refused t.o ~sist or prevent an. alleged sexual
assault of the prisoner in a booking: cell, (Pacmc Grove Police Department and Monterey
Coun.1iY Sheriff's Department, California)
·

U.S. Appeals Court
PROTECTION
SEGREGATION

Robinson v. Cavanaugh• .20 F.Sd 892 (8th Cir. 1994). An inmate brought an. action for
damag:es against prison officials wr violating: his due process rights by failing to protect
him from. an. attack by another inmate. The U.S. District Court cUsmissed and the inmate
appealed. The appeals court, affirming the decision, found that the imnat.e's refusal t.o
identify the inmate that he feared would attack him invalidated his failure t.o protect
claim. Officials would not place the inmate in protective cust.ody without kn.owing the
identity of a pot.en.tial wailant.. (Missouri)

39.32

U.S. District Court
PROTECTION
SAFETY
SEGREGATION

Schwartz v. County of Montgomery, 843 F.Supp. 962 (E.D.Pa. 1994) affirmed 37 F.Sd
1488. An inmat.e brought claims under Section 1983 and Pennsylvania law against a
county correctional facility and its employees. 'lhe district court found that the defendants
were not deh"berat.ely indifferent to the inmat.e's constitutional rights by failing to ensure that
the facility's policies and procedures governing inmate classification and recreation were
followed. Even though failure to follow policies and procedures result.ed in the att.empt.ed
strangulation of the inmat.e by a prisoner who was known to be extremely dangerous and who
should have not been allowed to leave his cell unescort.ed. the policies and procedures did not
cause the harm suffered by the inmate. According to the court, failure to communicat.e and
follow policies and procedures did not rise above the level of negligence. Under.Pennsylvania
law, the defendants could not be held liable on the intentional tort theory for the attack, and
the defendants were immune from negligence claims. (Montgomery County Correctional
Facility, Eagleville, Pennsylvania)

U.S. Appeals Court
DISCRETION
SECURITY
PRACTICES

Sims v. Mashburn, 25 F.3d 980 (11th Cir. 1994). A prisoner brought a Sec1ian 1988 action
against stat.e prison officials, alleging that his Eighth Amendment rights were violat.ed in
connection with the stripping of his cell. 'lhe U.S. District Court entered judgment for the
prisoner and the officials appealed. 'lhe court of appeals, reversing the decision, found
that the alleged failure of a prison guard to monitor the prisoner after his cell was stripped,
which allegedly caused the prisoner to be subject to a penalty for a period longer th.an neceBBary
to achieve penal objec1ives, did not inflict cruel and unusual p1mishmen.t upon the prisoner in
violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. The official was allowed deference in determming
when the penal objective had been reached, and his conduct had been in ·compliance with
policies that were in place at the mstitution; consequently he could not be characterized as
malicious or sadistic as needed for an Eighth Amendment violation. (St. Clair Correctional
Facility, Alabama)

U.S. District Court

Taifa v. Bayh, 846 F.Supp. 728 (N.D.Ind. 1994). Prisoners brought a class action suit
challenging conditions of confinement at a prison operat.ed by the Indiana Depar1ment of
Corrections. 'lhe district court approved a settlement agreement involving assignment
and transfer of prisoners, along with improvement of various prison conditions at the
Muimum Control Complex (MCC). 'lhe state agreed on1y to assign prisoners to MCC under
specified conditions and to transfer prisoners out of MCC aft.er a specified period of time,
subject to certain conditions, and agreed to alter MCC conditions in many areas. The
agreement also provided for expanded visitation and telephone privileges. (Muimum Control
Complex, Indiana Depar1ment of Corrections, Westville, Indiana)

SECURITY PRACTICES
TEIBPHONE
VISITS

U.S. Appeals Court
STAFFING

U.S. District Court

FIRE SAFETY

Taylor v. Freeman. 84 F.3d 266 (4th Cir. 1994). State prison inmat.es filed an action
alleging that overcrowding and understaffing exposed imnat.es to an unconstitutionally
unacceptable risk of physical violence. On the inmates' motion for a preliminary injunction, the
U.S. District Court i&sµed a mandatory preliminary injunction ordering prison"officials to
reduce the total ~ t e population by 80 percent of operating capacity in two months, in
addition to ordering officials to take other remedial actions. The defendants appealed. '!he
appeals court found that, in iBBumg the mandatory preliminary injunction, the district court
exceeded the lirnit.ed remedial authority vest.ed in federal courts to direct the way in which stat.e
prison officials meet the. dictat.es of the Eighth Amendment.· '!he court's assumption of
extensive managerial control over the prison was premised upon conclusory findings regarding
the inmat.es' allegations that overcrowding and understaffing exposed the inmat.es to an
unacceptable risk of physical violence. (North Carolina's Morrison Youth Institution)
Women Prisoners v. District of Columbia, 877 F.Supp. 684 (D.D.C. 1994). A class action
was brought on behalf of female prisoners in the District of Columbia. 'lhe district court
found that the living conditions for the women prisoners violated contemporary standards of
decency and violat.ed the Eighth Amendment. 'lhe dormitories were open and crowded and
could not contain fire within any one room. '!here was only one unlocked fire exit, no fire
alarm system, no sprinkler system, and no regularly canduct.ed fire drills. (District of Columbia
Correctional Syst.em- the Lorton Minimum Security Annex, the Correctional Treatment Facility,
the Central Detention Facility)
1995

U.S. District Court
RELIGIOUS GROUPS

Abdul Jabbar-Al Samad v. Horn. 918 F.Supp. 873 (E.D.Pa. 1995). Muslim inmat.es brought a
civil rights suit against prison officials challenging a rule which prohibited inmates from
leading religious groups. 'lhe district court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss. finding
that the inmates stat.ed c:lairna for violation of their civil rights. 'lhe court found that the
inmat.es had stat.ed a claim under § 1980 and the First Amendment by alleging that the prison
rule violat.ed a t.enet of Islam that requires Muslims to choose their religious leaders from
within their congregation. The court also found that the inrnat.es stat.ed a claim under the
equal protecti.on clause of the Fourt.een.th Amendment because civic and religious prison groups
were similarly situat.ed and that it was not established that one group was fnndernentally more
dangerous than the other. (SCI-Graterford, Pennsylvania)

39.33

U.S. Appeals Court

ESCAPE

RBSTRAINTS

U.S. District Court

GANGS

U.S. District Court
FIRE SAFETY

Davidson v. Riley. 45 F.Sd sz,; (2nd Cir. 1995). An inmate filed a civil rights action
against prison officials claiming that he did.not receive a fair 1rial when. he was made to
appear and try his case while restrained by handcuffs and leg irons. The U.S. District
Court dismissed the action and the mmate appealed. The appeals court found that the district
court had the discretion to order physical restraints if necessary to main.tam safety or security,
but could impose no greater restraints than were needed to rninirnizie the resulting prejudice to
the inmate's fundamental due process right to a fair trial. The district court abused.its
discretion by delegating to the inmate's guards the decision whether security concerns
outweighed the inmate's due process right to appear without shackles or manacles, by failing to
conduct an evidentiary hearing on whether the inmate preaeuted an escape risk, and by failing
t,, roinirni:re the prejudice in having the inmate shackled while he appeared before the jury.
The errors could not be deemed harmless where the restraints affected the credi"bility of the
inmate and his wi1neaaes and where the evidence against him was not overwhelming. (New
York State Department of Correctional Services)
·
Madrid:!• Gomez. 889 F.Supp. 1146 (N.D.Cal. 1995). Inmates brought a ~ s action suit
challenging conditions of confinement at a new high-security prison complex in California. The
district court fotmd for the plaintiffs in the majority of issues presented, ordered injunctive
relief and appointed a special master to direct a remedial plan tailored to correct specific
constitutional violations. In the beginning of its lengthy opinion, the court noted that this "... is
not a case about inadequate or deteriorating physical conditions...rather, plaintiffs contend that
behind the newly-minted walls and shiny equipment lies a prison that is coldly indifferent to
the limited, but basic and elemental, rights that incarcerated peraons--including the 'worst of
the worst'--retam under•••our Constitution. n The court held that the fact that a prison may be
new does not excuse its obligation to operate it in a constitutionally acceptable manner. The
court held that prison inmates established prison officials' deliberate indifference to the use of
exceaaive force by showing that they knew that unneceaaary and grossly excessive force was
being employed against mmates on a frequent basis and that these practices posed a
substantial risk of harm to mmates. According to the court, officials consciously disregarded
the risk of harm, choosing instead to tolerate and even encourage abuses of force by deliberately
ignoring them when they occurred, tacitly accepting a code of silence, and failing to implement
adequate systems to control and regulate the use of force. The court found that officials had an
affirmative management strategy to permit the use of excessive force for the purpose of
punishment md deterrence.
'lhe court fotmd the delivery of physical and mental health services to be constitutionally
inadequate and that evidence demonstrated that officials knew that they were subjecting the
imnate population to a substantial risk of serious harm, thus violating the Eighth Amendment.
The court held that staffing levels were insufficient, training and supervision of medical staff
was almost nonexistent and screening for communicable diseases was poorly implemented.
Inmates often experienced significant delays in receiving treatment, there were no protocols or
training programs for dealing with emergencies or trauma, there was no effective procedure for
managing chronic illness, medical recordkeeping was deficient, and there were no programs of
substance to ensure that quality care was provided.
According to the court, although conditions of confinement in the security housing unit did
not violate the Eighth Amendment for all inmates, they did violate constitutional standards
when imposed on certain mmates, mcluding those who were at a particularly high risk for
suffering very serious or severe mjury to their mental health. The court found that conditions
involved extreme social isolation and reduced environmental stimulation. The court held that
prison officials had an actual subjective knowledge that conditions of isolation presented a
substantial excessive risk of harm for mentally ill and other vulnerable inrnatea, and that the
officials act.ed wantonly in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
The court ruled that the psymological pain that results from idleness in segregation is not
sufficient to implicate the Eighth Amendment, particularly where excluaion from prison
programs is not without some penological justification.
·
'lbe court found that double-celling and inmate assaults did not rise to the level of an
Eighth .Amendment violation in the absence of evidence that the overall total number of cell
fights over a three-year period wu significantly more than would be expected for a facility of
the prison's size and security designation.
'lbe court upheld the prison's efforts to identify and separate gang members, finding that
mmate's were not entitled to a hearing before a special services unit officer prior to being
transferred to a segregated housing unit because of gang membership. The inmates were given
an oppc>rtuniv to present their views to the institutional gang investigator 001) and the IOI
was the critical decision-maker m the proceaa. Also, although aome inmates who were
transferred for gang membership may not have affirmatively engaged in gang activity while
confined, the court held that evidence showed that gang members join gangs •for life," justifying
their placement. in security housing. (Pelican Bay State Prison, California)

Masonoff V:• DuBois. 899 F.Supp. 782 (D.Mass. 1995). Prison inmates filed a class action suit
against prison officials alleging that conditions of confinement violated their rights under the
Eighth .Amendment.. 'lbe district court grant.eel awnmary judgment, in part, for the inmates.
The court demed summary judgment for the prison officials with regard to fire aafecy- issues
raised by the inmates. Inmates alleged fire hazards caused by 1he lack of a functionmg
sprinkler system and the lack of automatic locks on cell doors, which are required by a state
building code. Prison o ~ responded that the facility had implemented a rigorous fire
39.34

safety program which mitigated any dangers imposed by these deficiencies. The court noted
that while it may look to state codes in its effort to def.ermine sociefi)"s standard of decency,
such standards do not necessarily reflect constitutional minima (Southeast Correctional Center,
Massachusetts)
U.S. District Court
HAIR
SEARCHES

SEGREGATION

U.S. District Court

RESTRAINTS

May v. Baldwin. 895 F.Supp. 1398 (D.Or. 1995). An inmate brought an action against prison
officials alleging violation of his civil rights. The district court held that a prison requirement
that he undo his dreadlocks in order to facilitate a •hair search did not violate the ReJigious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) or any clearly established First Amendment right, even
though the requirement did substantially burden the inmate's rights to exercise his Rastafarian
religion. The court found that the prison's requirement that any inmate who was lea$.g or
returning to the facility loosen their hair was the least restrictive means of furthering the
prison's valid security interests. The court also found that confining the inmate to his c:e1l for
less than 24 hours to undo his braids in preparation for his transfer from the facility on the
following day did not violate the inmate's rights. The court also found that requiring inmat.es in
edrninist\"ative segregation to submit to visual and body cavity searches when leaving their cells
does not violat.e the Fourth Amendrnerit.. 1he court fo1.md th.at sanctioning an inmate who
refuses to comply with valid prison regulations to one week in a disciplinary segregation unit
-· with no out.door recreation privileges is not unreasonable or arbitrary for the purposes of an
Eighth Amendment claim. (Eastern Oregan Correctional Institution)
McKinney y. Compt.on. 888 F.Supp. 75 (W.D.Tenn. 1995). An inmat.e filed a civil rights suit
against prison officials alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs and 1188 of
excessive force. The district court found that prison officials did not inflict cruel and unusual
punishment in. connection with the inmate's eye injury, and th.at a corrections officer could not
be held liable for att.ernpting to handcuff the inmate. However, the court found that the
inmate's allegations that a prison official poked him in the eye and injured him after he was
alrea~ restrained were sufficient to stat.e an Eighth Amendment claim. (West Tenn.es• High
Security Facility)

U.S. District Court
. FIRE SAFETY

Nettles v. Griffith. 883 F.Supp. 136 (E.D. Tex. 1995). A prisoner who was placed in
administrative segregation without a hearing and was injured when he exited his cell after
it was set on fire, brought a Section 1988 action against the county sheriff and other officials.
The district court found that the assignment of the prisoner to adminisb-ative segregation in a
section of the jail designed primarily for the mentally unbalanced did not violate the Eighth
Amendment's proln"bition against cruel and unusual punishment. Although the prisoner was
injured when eziting his cell after it was set on fire by other prisoners, no jail official perceived
that the prisoner was subject to a serious risk of harm from fire, since fires were ubiquitous in
the jail and had not previously caused serious injuries. (Jefferson County Detention Center,
Beaumont, Texas)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONTRABAND

Rodriguez v. Phillips. 66 F.Sd 470 (2nd Cir. 1995). A former inmate and his mother filed a

VISITS

U.S. District Court
PRETRIAL DETAINEES

PROTECTION
SECURITY PRACTICES

§

1988 action against prison officials. The district court denied summary judgment for the
defendants and they appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded in part, and
dismissed in part. The appeals court found that prison officials' belief that the inmate's three·
day administrative confinement, without the opportunity to be heard, was reasonable. 1he
court noted that the officials perceived a threat to security and safety following a report that
the inmate's mother had passed contraband in.to the prison, and that they needed time to
search the public spaces of the cell block and interview an informer. The court held that a
substantive due process right to be free from excessive force from a state act in a nonseizure,
nonprisoner context was not clearly established at the time th.at a prison officer used excessive
force on the inrnat.e'a mother. Just before a visit to her BOD, the mother had apparently leaned
against or touched the fence surrounding the prison, pausing before she continued to the
visitors reception area. An officer radioed a report to officers inside the facility that he had
seen the mother pass a small brown package through the fence to an unidentified inmate.
Inside the prison the mother was questioned by officers about the incident and she was.told she
would not be allowed to visit her son that day. While she was waiting at the bus stop
corrections officers seized her and brought her back for further questioning, police were
contacted and she was arrested. Unable to make bail she was held overnight and she was
released without ~ t i o n the next day. Two weeks later she arrived to visit her BOD and
she was not allowed to, although her visiting rights had not been formally suspended. She
alleged th.at an officer screamed at her, put both hands on her shoulders and propelled her
toward the building entrance and threw her against the front door. (Mid-Orange Correctional
Facility, New York)
St.one-El v. Sheahan, 914 F.Supp. 202 (N.D.m. 1995). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1988 civil
rights action against a sheriff, m:ecutive direct.or of the county depariment of corrections, and
the superintendent of the county jail. The detainee alleged that various conditions of his
r.nnfinernent violated his right to due process. 'lhe district court granted the defendants' motion
to cfismiBB. The court found that the defendants had not personally caused the conditions at the
jail, nor could they limit the number of pretrial detamees assigned there or appropriate funds to
improve conditions. 'lhe court also found that the det.ainee failed to allege ccm.ditians of
confinement serious enough to violate the objective component of a due process claim. '1he
detainee had assert.ed that he had slept on the floor without a mattress, that the jail was noisy,

39.35

that the jail lacked showers, that he was not able to maintain his personal hygiene, that
ventilation was poor, and that inadequate security permitted gangs to intimidate hlm. The
detainee also alleged a lack of exercise opportunities, but the court found that even dramatic
restrictions on outdoor exercise do not violate due process as long as detainees have ample
opportunities to participate in indoor activity. The court noted that the detainee failed to allege
any harm caused by the poor ventilation or any adverse health effects from the alleged lack of
exercise. (Cook County Jail, Illinois)
1996

U.S. District Court
SECURITY PRACTICES
STAFFING

U.S. Appeals Court
•LOCK-IN"
SAFETY

U.S. District Court

RESTRAINTS

U.S. ~ Court
SEGREGATION

RESTRAINTS
VISITS

U.S. District Court

PUBLICATIONS

Baker v. Lehman, 932 F.Supp. 666 (E.D.Pa. 1996). A prisoner sued prison officials alleging
they were deliberately indifferent to his Eighth Amendment right to personal safety by failing
to prot.ect him from an attack by·another inmate. The district court granted summary
judgment for the officials, fin.ding that the prisoner did not ab.ow that the officials knew of any
facts from which an inference of substantial risk of serious harm might be drawn. The court
found that given the previous absence of violence in the prison clothlng shop, the prisoner did
not show that security measures in the clothing shop posed a substantial risk. of harm. The
prisoner alleged that lack of screenmg of prisoner-workers on the basis of prior crimes, the
provision of on1y one guard for 150 inmates, and the availability of scissors created a
substantial risk ~f serious harm in the shop. (State Correctional Institution at Graterford,
Pennsylvania).

~~- Thaler. !'13 F.3d 1822 (5th Cir. 1996). A Muslim prisoner brought a§ 1983 suit against
five correctional officials alleging violations of his constitutional rights during a prison
lockdown. 1he district court granted summary judgment for the officials and the appeals court
affirmed the lower court decision. The prisoner was one of many ordered into lockdown status
for near)y 26 days following a potential]y explosive disturbance in a recreation yard. During
the lockdown the prisoner was only allowed to leave his cell for showers; meals, library books,
medical assistance and all other necessities and services were brought to inmates' cells. The
court found that the prisoner was not entitled to notice or an opportunity to be heard before
being placed in lockdown. The court ruled that the prisoner's right to practice his religion was.
not violated by the inclusion of pork in some of the meals served during the loc:kdown since
prison officials had no reason to know that the prisoner was affiliated with the Muslim faith.
1he prisoner was not denied his constitutional right of access to courts by the prison's failure to
provide him with wery legal book he requested during the lockdown; the prisoner was not
prejudiced in aey litigation as a result of the alleged denial of access to the law library and he
was only delayed in filing a § 1983 lawsuit which he filed aft.er the lockdown ended without
missing any deadlines. Prison officials were not deliberat.ely indifferent to the health and
safety of the prisoner when they permitted a gas leak to occur and did not evacuate prisoners
from their cells; officials turned on exhaust fans to draw gas fumes out of prisoners' cells.
Prison officials did not violate the prisoner's due process rights by including him in lockdown
because the prisoner's segregation from .the general population was instituted to protect the .
security and integrity of the prison unit and to protect prisoners from each other. (Smith Unit,
Texas Department of Criminal Justice-Institutional Division)
Fitts v. W'rt.kowski 920 F.Supp. 679 (D.S.C. 1996). An inmate sued corrections officials alleging
violation of his Eighth Amendment rights by the use of four-point restraints. 1he district court
held that a previous consent decree established a liberty interest in freedom from the use of
four-point restraints except 1Dlder procedures established by the decree and that there was an
issue of fact as t.o whether the defendants complied with the decree. The court noted that this
case did not involve a disturbance that threatened prison security so as to make pre-deprivation
protec:ticms impossible. 1he court found that prison officials were en.titled to qualified immunity
for due process and Eighth Amendment c:wms because the existsnce of the decree did not
clearly establish that the im:Dat.e had a h'berty int.erest against the use of four-point restraints.
(Perry Correctional Institution, South..Carolina)

Inmates who were housed m. Ill" administrative
segregation unit for their own safety brought a civil rights action against prison officials,
seeking damages and injunctive relief for alleged equal prot.ection violations. The district court
granted partial injunctive relief. The appeals court reversed the lower court's grant of
injunc:tive relief, finding that limiting the 1;ype of property in administrative segregation cells,
restricting inmates' accese t.o prison resources, and requiring that they be handcuffed while out
of their cells did not violate equal protection. Prison officials had argued that their policies
.were designed to reduce the.poH1'bili1i)' of danger by or t.o adrninist.rative segregation inmates.
lmaaias were only allowed out of their cells for three hours of recreation per week. When they
were out of the cells, inmates were handcuffed and escorted by guards. The inmates were not
allowed to attend classes, religious aervices, or group recreational activities, nor could they work
or visit the law library. lnrnatss were not allowed telephone access for personal calls, their
visitation privileges were more restrictive, and they were provided with less opportunity to
purchase items through the canteen. (Jefferson City Correctianal Cent.er. Missouri')
~ !:· Grooae. 80 F.3d 298 (8th Cir. 1996).

~ : ! · Clarke. 910 F.Supp. 469 (D.Neb. 1996). An inmate sued correctional officials and
staff alleging violations of his First Amendment rights and of the civil rights statute. The
district c:ourt granted summary judgment for the defendants, finding that their policy regarding

39.36

distribution of material designated as contraband was reasonably relat.ed to legitimate
penological interests. The inmat.e had sought to obtain a catalog which contained illustrations
depicting weapons concealed in everyday items and offering items such as lock picks for sale.
Prison officials refused to deliver the catalog to the inmate under their policy of prolu"biting
incoming mail deemed to be a threat to the safety, security or good order of the facility. An
alt.ernati.ve proposed by the imnate--restricting orders from the catalog and confining inmat.es to
a limited area in which the catalog could be read--would not prevent the risk of disorder from
prisoners who might be inspired to creat.e weapons concealed in everyday items and was not
reasonable with regard to cost, according to the district court. (Lincoln Correctional Center,
Nebr~)
U.S. Appeals Court
GANGS

U.S. Appeals Court
TELEPHONE

U.S. Appeals Court

FIRE SAFETY

U.S. Appeals Court
DISTURBANCE
USE OF FORCE
·RESTRAINTS

Pichardo~- Kinker. 73 F.3d 612 (5th Cir. 1996). A state prison inmate brought a civil rights
action against prison officials alleging his confinement in. admmistrati.ve segregation violated
his due process rights. 'flle district court dismissed the case as frivolous and the inmate
appealed. The appeals court ruled that placing the inmat.e in admmistrative segregation
because of his gang affiliation did not deprive mm of a constitutionally cognizable liberty
interest. (Coffield Unit, Texas Department of Criminal Justice)

Pope v. Hightower. 101 F.3d 1382 (11th Cir. 1996). An inmate brought an action against
prison officials challenging prison telephone restrictions that required. inmates to
designate no more than t.en individuals on telephone calling lists, with the option of changing
the lists every six months. The district·court rendered a verdict for the inmate and the officials
appealed. 'Ihe appeals court reversed, finding that the calling list requirement did not violate
the inmate's First Amendment right to communicate with family and friends. The court found
that a rational connection existed between. the restriction and a legitimate governmental
interest in reducing crimmal activity and harassment of judges and jurors. The court noted that
the inmate had alternative means of exercising his F'1rst Amendment right because he could
receive visitors and correspond with virtually anyone he wished. (Donaldson Correctional
Facility, Alabama)
Standish v. Bommel, 82 F.3d 190 (8th Cir. 1996). A form.er inmate brought a § 1983 action
against prison officials challenging bis conditions of confinement. The district court entered
judgment against the inmate and he appealed. The appeals court affirmed the lower court
decision, finding that the former inmate was not subjected to uncons1itional conditions of
confinement. The inmate alleged that unsafe con~tions at the prison included the lack of
smoke detectors in the housing unit, lack of water sprinklers, inadequate ventilation, and
insufficient emergency procedures. The court found that these conditions did not violate the
inmate's rights where the only recent fires were started when inmates set fire to mattresses or
bedding and neither the former inmate or imyone else had been injured by smoke inhalation or
fire. The court noted that prison officials had taken action to address fire hazards, such as
proln"biting smoking. The court also found that the former inmate's rights were not violated
when his housing unit leaked in bad weather, even though it forced him to move his mattress
to the floor to stay dry. (Jefferson City Correctional Facility, Missouri)
Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756 (4th Cir, 1996). An inmate filed a civil ri(hts action
claiming that correctional officers violated his constitutional rights when they sprayed him with
mace, confined him for eight hours in four-point restraints on a bare metal bed frame, refused
to allow him to wash off the mace, and denied medical care and the use of a toilet. The district·
court granted summary judgment to the prison officials and the appeals court affirmed in part
and reversed and remanded in part. The appeals court found that the correctional officers'
decision to use some force to quell a disturbance was justifiable after inmates threw water at an
officer and refused to obey a command to desist. The court ruled that the initial application of
mace was not cruel and unusual punishment, but that summary judgment was precluded for
the cJ.auns that the use of restraints and related actions violated the Eighth Amendment. The
court noted that four-point restraints can be used on a limited basis, as a last resort, without
violating the Eighth Amendment when other forms of prison discipline have failed, and that the
initial application of four-point restraints was justified. But the officers offered no evidence to
dispute the inmate's affidavit that his long confinement without being able to wash off the mace
caused "immense" pain and that the inmate pleaded with them for water to wash off the mace.
According to the court, after the immediacy of the disturbance was at an end the unnecessary
infliction of continued pain through a prolonged period of time would support the inference that
the officers were acting to punish, rather than to quell a disturbance. (Lieber Correctional
Institution, South Carolina)

1997
U.S. Appeals Court
CONTACT VISITS

Bazzetta v. McGinnis, 124 F.Sd 774 (6th Cir. 1997). Prisoners brought a class action

civil rights suit challenging prison regulations that limit.ed contact viljlits for certain
classes of prisoners. The district court denied the prisoners' motion for preliminary injunctive
relief and the prisoners appealf!(l. 'Jhe appeals court affirmed, finding that the regulations were
reasonably related to legitimate penological interests and did not violate the Eighth
Amendm&l"t. The corrections department grades its prisoners on the basis of their dangerous
39.37

propensities, from grade I (lowest risk) to grade VI (highest risk). Regulations prohibit contact
visits for grades V and VI, with rare exceptions. The regulations included restrictions on contact
visits by children, members of the general public and former prisoners. (Michigan Department
of Corrections)
U.S. District Court
RESTRAINTS
PRETRIAL DETAINEES

Casa.burro v. Giuliani, 986 F.Supp. 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). A pretrial detainee alleged that he
was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment because he was handcuffed in a holding cell
for over 7 hours. According to the detainee, he was placed in a holding cage nthat had no seats,
no water, poor ventilation/ He had notified officers that he was under a chiropractor's care for
back problems but was allegedly tightly handcuffed behind his back anyway. Aft.er he
complained he was re-handcuffed to a hook approximately 12 inches off of the floor. After
complaining about this he was allegedly cuffed to the front of the cell in a standing position.
The district court found that the detainee stated a § 1983 claim against officers, the police
department and the city. (City of New York)

U.S. District Court

Dawes v. Coughlin, 964 F.Supp. 652 (N.D.N.Y. 1997). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action
alleging that corrections officers had used excessive force against hlm, failed to provide medical
treatment, and improperly issued deprivation and restraint orders. The district court held that
the officers did not use excessive force against the prisoner during a struggle initiated by the
prisoner which resulted in an officer closing a feeder box door on the prisoner's fingers. The
court also upheld the use of force against the prisoner following his refusal to obey an order,
although the prisoner sustained a cut over his left eye and a swollen lip and right eye as a
result of the force used against him. 'Ihe court found that a prison nurse's failure to X-ray the
prisoner's ribs for nearly two months following an incident in which he was injured was not
denial of medical care in violation of the Eighth Amendment because the prisoner's needs were
not sufficiently serious to rise to the level of a constitutional violation. The court found that the
prisoner's due process rights were not violated by deprivation orders or restraining orders
because the deprivation order was reviewed daily and the restraining orders were not continued
for more than seven days without review. The orders, which limited the prisoner's recreation to
one hour at a time in .full restraints, did not violate the Eighth Amendment because safety and
security purposes required the restraints and the prisoner was still able to move around the
recreation area. (Eastern Correctional Facility, New York)

RESTRAINTS

U.S. Appeals Court
RESTRAINTS

U.S. District Court
FIRE

SAFETY

EARl'HQUAKES

Haslar v. Megerman, 104 F.3d 178 (8th Cir. 1997). A county detainee brought a§ 1983
action after a guard refused to loosen or remove shackles from his swollen leg while he
was being treated in an outside hospital. The district court dismissed the complaint and the
detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that keeping the detainee shackled
while receiving treatment at an outside facility did not display indifference to the medical needs
of the detainee, nor did it constitute punishment in violation of the detainee's Fourteenth
Amendment rights. According to the court, the shackling was necessary to prevent the detainee
from overpowering the mngle guard who was wat.c:bing him, and there were safeguards against
applying the shackles so as to cause pain and other medical problems. (Jackson County ·
Det.ention Center, Missouri)
Jones v. City and County of San Francisco, 976 F.Supp. 896 (N.D.Cal. 1997). Pretrial
detainees brought a class action against the City and County of San Francisco and various
city officials challenging the constitutionality of their conditions of confinement at a jail.
'Ihe district court granted various summ.ary judgment motions filed by the plaintiffs and the
defendants, enjoining future overcrowding based on past unconstitutional overcrowding. The
court found due process violations based on the defendants' inadequat.e response to fire safety
risks at the jail, excessive risks of harm from earthquakes, physical defects in the jail's water,
plumbing and sewage syst.ems, excessive noise levels, and poor lighting.
The court found that the detainees were not provided with reasonable safety from fire
because the defendants failed to install door assemblies or additional sprillklers and had not
responded reasonably to tire safety risks at the jail.
The detainees were exposed to excessive risks of harm from earthquakes in violation of
their due process rights, where the jail lay a quarter mile from the San Andreas fault and faced
a 50% chance of experiencing a high magnitude earthquake over the next 50 years. 1be jail
appeared structurally unable to withstand substantial seismic activity and had a
malfunctioning bar locking syst.em and inadequat.e staffing that further augmented risk by
potentially leaving inmates trapped in their cells during and aft.er an earthquake. The court
rejected the government's contention that more than 30 public buildings in the area had the
same seismic rating as the jail. The court noted that the public's alleged tolerance of risk
associated with entering a poorly-constructed library or museum for an hour did not equat.e to
tolerance for spending 100 days continuously trapped in such a facility.
The court found deliberat.e indifference to the risk of earthquakes despite the defendants'
contention that it would cost more than $33 million to upgrade the jail and efforts to gain vot.er
approval for funding for a new facility had failed. The court noted that the city could have
att.empted other funding methods and did have some funds allocated for seismic repairs but
diverted that money to other projects.
Despite some efforts to reduce noise in the jail, the detainees established a constitutional
violation in noise levels which ranged between 73 and 96 decibels, exceeding acceptable levels,
39.38

and caused increased risk of psychological harm and safety concerns due to officers' inability
to hear calls for help. The extent to which noise continued to exceed maim.um standard&
suggest.ed that previous noise reduction efforts were merely cosmetic and that far more
could be done. (San Francisco Jail No. 3, California)
U.S. District Court
Price v. Dixon. 961 F. Supp. 894 (E.D.N.C.1997). An inmate sued prison oflicials
RESTRAINTS
alleging violation of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights when he was placed
SECURITY PRACTICES in four-point restraints for 28 hours. The court granted summary judgment in favor of
the defendants, finding that they did not violate any clearly established rights of the inmate
and were entitled to qualified immunity. The court upheld the limited use ofmace to subdue
the inmate who was disruptive and who was throwing urine on prison oflicera. The inmate
had incurred more than 100 rule violations since he was admitt.ed to the facility, and on one
occasion the inmate even broke through steel handcuffa that were applied to restrain him.
The court held that denying the inmate the opportunity to wash after being sprayed with
mace did not violate any clearly establish right of the inmate. The inmate was afforded
bathroom breaks and was not totally without access to any aource of water. He was checked
every 15 minutes and was releued for regular meal times. The inmate was also evaluated by
medical personnel. (Central Prison, Baleigh, North Carolina)
U.S. Appeals Court
Rich v. Bruce. 129 F.3d 336 (4th Cir.1997). An inmate brought a§ 1983 action against a
PROTECTION
prison officer, alleging violation of bis Eighth Amendment rights in connection with an
SECURITY PRACTICES attack by another inmate. The district court ent.eredjudgment for the inmate, awarding him
$40,000 in compensatory damaps and more than $20,000 in attorneys' fees. But the appeal&
court reversed, ruling that findjngs did not support the conclusion that the officer acted with
deliberat.e indifference to a substantial risk of harm to the inmate. According to the appeals
court, the officer's violation of prison rules regarding movement of the inmat.e did not
support the conclusion that the officer acted with deliberate indift'erence. The plaintilf'
inmate was assigned to disciplinary segregation in Maryland's "Supermu" correctional
facility due to his behavior. While the plaintilf'was jn an outside recreation area, the officer
released another inmat.e from his cell for a period m the •day room" m iront of the cells. This
inmate was highly dangerous and a warmng had been issued by the prison that he should be
comndered the enemy of all inmates. This inmate had also stabbed the plaintilf' several
months earlier and was conmdered to be the plaintU!'s enemy m particular. While moving
the plaintiJf back to his cell the officer violated standard operating procedures and as a
result the other inmate had the opportunity to attack the plaintiff' with a shank. The
plaintiff required hospita&ation and surgery and has permanent scars as a result.
The officer, apparently frightened, filed a report that falsely stated that he had complied
with certam security regulations that he had m fact broken. He later admitted that he had
broken several regulations, mcluding those that: (1) required no more than one mmat.e to be
out of his cell for recreation at
given me; (2) required two officers to parmpate
takmg an inmate out of his cell; (3) requjred mmates bemg given recreation m the dayroom
to wear handcuffs; and (4) reqwred that prisoners' clothes and persons be carefuJq searched
before they leave thm cells. (Maryland Correctional Adjustment Center)

any

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES-CELL

CONTRABAND

m

ve

Robinson
996 F .Supp. 447 (E.D.Pa. 1997). A prisoner sued state officials and
employees __ __:__ violation of his rights as the result of a random prison-wide security .
search. The district court held that the prisoner's right to free access to courts was not
violated by the seizure of his legal materials, absent actual mjwy. The court also held that
the mure of the prisoner's religious materlals in the course of a random security search, no
matter how harmful the seizure might have been to the prisoner's religious practices, did
not violate the Free Exercise Clause jfit was reasonably related to the prison's legitimate
penological
The prisoner's cell was searched as part of a prison-wide search during
a declared state of emergency. During the search, the prisoner's personal property, mcludmg
legal documents and articles·ofhis IsJarnfo faith, were thrown on the floor and swept into the
trash. The prisoner~ for a receipt and was refused. He tiled a grievance and was denied
relief, but was subsequently offered $50, which he rejected. (SCI Graterford, Pennsylvania)

mterests.

U.S. Appeals Court
PUBLICATIONS

Shabazz v. Parsons, 127 F .3d 1246 (10th Cir. 1997). A prison inmate sued prison officials
under§ 1983 alleging that the ofticials violated his First Amendment right to free
exercise of religion by denying him access to issues of a :magazine. The prison had
determined that the issues would creat.e a .danger of violence by advocating racial, religious
or national hatred. The clistrict court entered judgment for the ofticials and the appeals
court affirmed, holding that the ofticials had a rational basis for-denying the inmate access
to entire issues of the rnagazjne, rather than merely redacting the oft'ending portioDS. The
ofticials offered evidence showing that the costs to implement redactmg procedures for the
magazine "Muhammad Speaks• would be prombitive. (Oklahoma)

U.S. District Court
PUBLICATIONS

W"mburn v. Bologna 979 F .Bupp. 531 (W.D.Mich. 1997). A prison inmate brought a pro se
action under § 1983 alleging that the application of a prison mail regulation to bar his
receipt of materials that advocated racial supremecy violated the First and Fourteenth
Amendments and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). The district court granted
summary judgment for the -~fticials, ~ that the application of the regulation clid not

39.89

violate the inmate's First Amendment free enrcise rights or RFRA, and that the oftieials
ware entitled to qualified immunity in any event. The mail regulation barred inmates from
receiviIJg materials advocating racial supremacy or ethmc purity or attacking a racial or
ethnic group. The court found that the regulation was reasonable and that there was no
easy alt.ernative to barring the materials. (Chippewa Correctional Facility, Michigan)
U.S. District Court
FIRESAFETY

Women Prisoners of Corrections v. Dist. of Columbia, 968 F .Bupp. 744 (D.D.C. 1997) In
an ongoing class action suit brought on behalf' of female inmates in the District of
Columbia, the District appealed a corrective order and it& subsequent modification. The
appeals court vacated in part and remanded. On rem.and, the district court required the
District to remedy environmental health problems at it.& correctional facility for women,
inclwting repairing or replacing roofs of dormitories, conducting a vermin eradication
program, replacing tom mattresses and pillows, providing adequate prisoner-controlled
lightiDg, and installing a drainage syst.em to prevent hazardous accumulations of water. The
court required the District to mstall and maintain a manual fire alarm syst.em and fire
det.ection syst.em in the women's fac:ility, and to ensure that all bed linens, blanket.& and
curtams or draperies were fire-retardant. (District of Columbia)

1998
U.S. Appeals Court
BF.STRICTIONS
WORK

Abu.Jamal v. Price, 154 F .Sd 128 (3rd Cir. 1998). A state inmate brought a § 1988
action challenging a pri&on rule that prohibited inmates from carrying on a
.
business or profession. The111JD&te mcm,d for a preliminary jzvunction which the
district court granted m part. The appeals court affirmed m part and reversed m part,
.1'8JDaDdbtg ,irith mstruclions. The appeals court held that the inmate showed that the rule,
which was enforced against him to restrict his writings, was not reasonably related to any
legitimate interests and that the inmate faced irreparable harm as the result of the prison's
investigation and enforcement of the rule. The court found that the inmate was likeJ,y to
show that the rule wu enforced due to the content of his writings, and that his writings did
not affect the allocation of prison resources, other inmates, or orderly prison administration.
But the appeals court found that the district court's iJUunction against enforcement of
'Visitation rules was not warranted on the grounds that they were imposed m retaliation for
the inmate's writinga, and that the corrections department did not violate the inmate's
access to the courts by imposing stricter visitation rules. The court found that the
department had a valid, content-neutral reason for applying stricter visitation rules to the
inmate's visitors, given evidence that the inmate's legal visitation privileges were being
abused so that he could receive more than the permitted number of social visit.&. The
department required verification that legal visitors were credentialed or employed by the
inmate's attorney. (State Correctional Institution at Greene, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court

Africa v. V1,nghan. 998 F .Bupp. 552 (E.D.Pa. 1998). A prison inmate who was
denied 'Visitation with a woman who, along with the inmat.e, was a member of an
actmst group. and who the inmate claimed was his wife, brought a § 1983 action. The
district court granted summary judgment for the defendant&, finding that the inmate failed
to &how that he and the woman were married for the purposes of Pennsylvama law;
therefore, the denial of visitation did not violate equal protection. The court found that no
statutory marriage mst.ed, where the inmate had not obtained a marriage license, and there
was no evidence that they had entered mto an agreement sufficient to create a common law

VISITS

marriage. (S.C.I. Graterford, Pennsylvania)
U.S. District Court
TELEPHONE

Amey v. Simmons, 26 F .SUpp.2d 1288 (D.Kan. 1998). Inmates brought a § 1983
action alleging constitutional violations in a syst.em for providing telephone access
to inmates. Prison restrictions on inmates' telephone acceas included a 10-person telephone
call list that could be modi5ed at 120-day intervals, monitoring of telephone calls, a
prohibition on international calls from inmate telephones, and a prohibition on the inclusion
of public ofticials on call lists. The court held that these restrictions did not violat.e inmates'
rights to freedom of speech or freedom of association because the restrictions were contentneutral and unrelat.ed to the purpose of suppressing expressions, inmates had significant
alternative means to communicate through prison visitation and correspondence,
alternatives to the restrictiop.s would haw an impact on prison resources, and there were no
obvious, easy alternatives to the restrictions. The court held that the telephone system did
not violate inmates' right of access to courts by permitting the monitoring or recording of
attorney/client telephone conversations. (Lansing Correctional Facility, Kansas)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Aziz ZarifBhabazz v.Pico, 994 F.SUpp. 460 (S.D.N.Y.1998). A prison inmate brought a§
1983 action against prison officials and employees alleging violation of his constitutional

TRANSFER

rights. The district court granted SUlilillary judgment for the defendant.-;. The court held
that the inmate failed to allega facts sufficient to support a conspiracy claim or that oflieials
had acted in retaliation for the inmate's exercise of protected right.&. The court concluded
that kicking '>f the inmate inside his ankles and feet while performing a pat frisk, while not
to be condoned, was a de rninirnis •188 of force and did not violate the Eighth .Amendment.
The court noted that at one time the inmate admitted that he bad sustained no physical

39.40

injuries. The court held that the pat frisk and strip frisk searches performed on the inmate were
permissible and did not violate the provisions of a consent decree. The court found that
performing a strip frisk on the prison inmate prior to his transfer to another facility did not
violate his right of free exercise of religion, notwithstanding the inmate's religious objections to
the requirement that he remove his clothing. According to the court. alleged verbal taunts, no
matter how inappropriate, unprofessional or reprehensible they might seem, did not support a
claim of cruel and unusual punishment absent any injury. Any psychological or emotional scars to
the inmate were found to be de roinirois lUld did not support a claim of cruel and unusual
punishment. (Green Haven Correctional Facility, New York)
U.S. Appeals Court
SAFETY

Barney L Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299 (10th Cir. 1998). Two female former inmates
who were sexually assaulted by a jailer each brought a § 1983 action against jailer,
county, sheriff and county commissioners baaed on their assault and other conditions of
confinement. The actions were consolidated and all defendants except the jailer were granted
summary judgment by the district court. The appeals court affirmed., finding that the county was
not liable on the grounds of failure to train or inadequate hiring. The court held that the inmates
did not show that the training received by the jailer was deficient and that even if it was, the
sexual assault of the inmates was not plainly the obvious consequence of a deficient training
program. The court noted that the sheriff should not have been expected to conclude that the
jailer was highly likely to inflict sexual assault on female inmates if he was hired as a correctional
officer. The court found that the sheriff and commissioners did not violate the inmates' rights by
permitting the jailer to be the sole guard on duty in the county jail. The court noted that
permitting a single officer to be on duty when a second jailer was sick or on vacation did not
impose liability on the county, where there were no previous incidents of sexual harassment or
assault of female inmates that would have given notice to the county that its oneiailer policy
would result in injuries. The court also noted that the sheriff acknowledged problems with
crowding and inadequate monitoring, and its inability to house female inmates for extended
periods of time. The county contracted out female inmates to neighboring jails that had better
facilities and limited confinement of female inmates to 24·36 hours whenever possible. According
to the appeals court the inmates failed to establish an equal protection claim. The court also found
that the sheriff and commissioners did not act with deliberate indifference to the female inmates'
health and safety with regard to conditions of confinement. The inmates' allegations regarding a
filthy cell, inadequate lighting and ventilation, lack of enclosure around a shower, unappetizing
food, and lack of access to recreational facilities, did not rise to the level of a constitutional
violation given that the inmates were confined for only 48 hours. (Box Elder County Jail, Utah)

U.S. District Court
. VISITS

Blair v. Loomis. 1 F.Supp.2d 769 (N.D.Ohio 1998). An inmate and his wife, a former correctional
officer, sued prison officials challenging their denial of visitation. The district court denied the
plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order and temporary injunction. The court held that
regulations governing visitation in Ohio prisons did not create a protectable liberty interest in a
right to visitation. The court found that the public interest in a safe and orderly prison system
outweighed the interest of the pris9ner and his wife in maintaining their family relationship and
the prisoner's interest in building a relationship that would help him to lead a law-abiding life
upon his release. The court found that it was reasonable for Ohio law to consider present or
former correctional officers to be security risks, and to exclude them from visitation for that
reason, based upon their training in security procedures and their knowledge of facility
operations. The prisoner and his wife were married while the prisoner was incarcerated, and the
wife admitted to falsifying information on her visitor application to conceal the fact that she had
been a corrections officer. (Grafton Correctional Institution, Ohio)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEGREGATION
RESTRAINTS

Buckley v. Rogerson. 133 F.3d 1125 (8th Cir. 1998). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action
against a warden and state corrections department medical director challenging the use of
restraints and segregation in a psychiatric hospital. The district court denied the medical
director's motion for summary judgment and he appealed. The appeals court affirmed., finding
that the director should have known that the prisoner had a right to medical approval of
segregation and the use of restraints. The district court had found that correctional policies
allowed facility staff to develop "treatment plans" to address the prisoner's mental illness but
rather than assigning its staff doctors to the case the facility entrusted responsibility for
·
implementing and administering many of the prisoner's treatment plans to correctional officers
who had no medical training. Part of the prisoner's "treatment" involved stripping him of his
clothes and placing him in a Spartan "quiet" or "segregation" cell. He was placed in these
conditions without a blanket, bed or mattress on at least 17 occasions. The prisoner was also
placed in restraints so that he could hardly move. (Iowa Medical and Classification Center)

U.S. Appeals Court
DRUG/ALCOHOL

Byrd L Hasty, 142 F.Sd 1395 (11th Cir. 1998). An inmate sought habeas corpus
relief after the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) denied him a sentence reduction based on his
completion of a drug treatment program. The district court denied relief and the inmate appealed;
The appeals court reversed and remanded., finding that the BOP could not rely on the.inmate's
firearm sentence enhancement to deny his application for a sentence reduction. The appeals court
held that the BOP exceeded its authority when it categorically excluded from eligibility those
inma~s who were convicted of nonviolent offenses who received sentencing enhancements for
possession of a firearm. (Federal Prison Camp at Pensacola, Florida)
39.41

U.S. District Court
STAFFING

Essex County Jail Annex Inmates v. Treffinger, 18 F.Supp.2d 445 CD.N.J. 1998). Inmates tiled a
motion to hold county corrections defendants in civil contempt for noncompliance with a consent
decree addressing unconstitutional conditions of confinement. The district court held that
monetary sanctions for civil contempt were not appropriate in light of the county's efforts to attain
full compliance by investing over $200 million in new facilities and improving existing ones. The
court concluded that contempt sanctions would be counterproductive and would impede the
county's efforts to build a new jail. The court held that it could not consider whether a
clauification plan satisfied. the consent decree until an independent analysis was conducted. The
court noted that the Special Master reported that staffing was inadequate, and as a result
inmates and staff' are exposed to danger and other problems. The court adopted the Master's
recommendation that an independent, professional staffing analysis be conducted to address staff'
training, coverage and operations. The Master also reported that there was an insufficient supply
of personal hygiene items, and the court ordered the defendants to comply with the consent
order's terms by issuing adequate amounts of personal hygiene items, including toilet paper, soap,
shampoo, toothpaste, toothbrush, comb, mirror, individual razors and shaving cream or powder.
(Essex County Jail and Essex County Jail Annex, New Jersey)

U.S. Appeals Court

Hines L South Carolina Dept. Of Corrections, 148 F.3d 353 (4th Cir. 1998). One hundred
South Carolina inmates challenged the constitutionality of a prison grooming policy that required
all male inmates to keep their hair short and their faces shaven. The district court granted
summary judgment for the defendants and the appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held
that the rule did not violat.e inmates' right to free exercise of religion, despite its incidental effect
on the religious practices of some inmates. According to the court, the policy was neutral and the
gen~rally applicable rule was implemented to maintain order in prisons, which was reasonably
related to legitimate penological int.erests. (South Carolina Department of Corrections)

HAIR
BEARDS
GROOMING

U.S. Appeals Court
SECURITY

RESTRICTIONS

U.S. District Court
DISTURBANCE

RESTRAINTS

In Re Wilkinson. 137 F.3d 911 (6th Cir. 1998). Corrections officials challenged a district
court order permitting an inmat.e to attend a pretrial deposition which was being conducted
as a part of a civil rights action brought by the inmate. The appeals court granted a writ
of mandamus which directed the district court to vacate its order. The appeals court held that the
corrections officials adequately justified their general policy against allowing an inmate from
being present at depositions in civil litigation brought by the inmate, noting that the inmate bore
the burden of showing a specialized need for his attendance at the deposition. Corrections officials
had cited five reasons for their policy: (1) maintaining staff' authority; (2) preventing
aggran~ment of inmates; (3) avoiding unnecessary tension. (4) protecting staff' morale; and (5)
preserving limited resources. <Lorain Correctional Institution, Ohio)
Jackson v. U.S., 24 F.Supp.2d 823 CW.D.Tenn. 1998). A former inmate brought an
action under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) seeking damages for injuries he suffered in a
prison riot. The district court found that the statute of limitations barred the inmate's Eighth
Amendment claims. The court denied summary judgment for the defendants, finding it was
precluded by genuine issues of material fact regarding the reasonableness of the actions of prison
employees in treating the inmate and in locking down inmates during a fire. The inmate suffered
a collapsed lung in a fire in housing units that were burning out of control during a prison riot.
Prison officials locked down inmates in the housing units, and the court ordered further inquiry
into whether delays were caused by negligence on the part of staff'. The inmate alleged that a
prison officer gave keys to another prisoner to release him during the fire, but he was never
released and subsequently inhaled carbon monoxide and suffered a collapsed lung. The court also
allowed further proceedings to determine if a federal prison physician exercised a reasonable
degree of skill, possessed by others in the medical profession, in treatment the inmate, who was
brought to the prison's front gate for evacuation to a local hospital (Federal Corr. Institution,
Memphis, Tennessee)

U.S. District Court
FREE EXPRESSION
ITEMS PERMITTED

Leitzsey v. Coombe, 998 F.Supp. 282 (W.D.N.Y. 1998). An inmate brought a § 1983
action against prison officials after he was disciplined for violating a prison rule
that prohibited possession of materials pertaining to unauthorized organizations.
The district court held that the prison rule did not violate the inmate's free speech or free exercise
rights, and that the rule was not unconstitutionally vague. According to the court, it was
reasonable and essential for prison officials to prohibit inmate participation in, and possession of,
materials relating to organizations that foster disorder and threaten the security of the
institution. (Attica Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court

Peckbpm L Wisconsin Dept. Of Corrections, 141 F.3d 694 (7th Cir. 1998). A state
prisoner brought an action against corrections officials challenging the constitutionality of strip
searches. The district court dismissed the suit and the appeals court affirmed. The appeals court
held that the strip searches violated neither the Fourth Amendment nor the Eighth Amendment.
According to the court, strip searches of a state prisoner upon his arrival at a facility, return to
the facility after medical appointments or court proceedings, and upon a general search of his cell
block, did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The court held that as long as the searches were
performed for legitimate, identifiable purposes, and not for harassment or punishment, they did
not violate the Eighth Amendment. (Taycheedah Correctional Institution, Outagamie County Jail,
Wisconsin)

SEARCHES

39.42

U.S. District Court
FACIAL HAIR
RELIGIOUS ARTICLES

Sutton v. Stewart. 22 F.Supp.2d 1097 CD.Ariz. 1998). A state prisoner sued prison
officials alleging denial of bis rights to free exercise of religion under the First
Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA}, denial of his equal protection
rights, and obstruction of bis mail. The district court granted summary judgment for the officials.
The court held that regulations that barred the inmate's possession of scented oils that he wanted
for use in a prayer ritual did not violate his free exercise rights because they were reasonable in
light of the oil's flammable nature and because possession by ollly Muslim inmates would pose
safety and security threats. The court found that a regulation that limited where the prisoner
could wear a kufi prayer cap was reasonable and did not violate his right to free exercise of
religion. The regulation restricted wearing of the cap to bis cell, designated living areas and
during religious·ceremonies, and was found reasonable by the court because the cap provided a
potential symbol of group affiliation that threatened prison security. The court also found that a
prohibition on inmate beards did not violate the inmate's rights because beards obscured inmates'
identities and thereby presented a security risk. According to the court, failing to provide clergy of
the inmate's faith did not violate equal protection. the inmate had requested that clergy
representing the Sahih variant of the Musllin faith, which was not found to be a mainstream
religion that would be in demand by other faiths. The court ruled that officials were not liable to
the inmate for obstruction of mail due to a ten·month delay in processing a brochure sent to the
inmate by his mother. According to the court, it was reasonable for officials to deny the inmate
access to a vendor with which he was not permitted to transact, and the brochure was
distinguishable from magazines other inmates received because it was exclusively devoted to the
advertisement of unauthorized items. CAriz. State Prison Complex-Winslow)

U.S. District Court
SEXUALLY ORIENT·
ED MATERIALS

Waterman v. Verniero, 12 F.Supp.2d 364 and 12 F.Supp.2d 878 (D.N.J. 1998).
Convicted sex offenders housed at a diagnostic and treatment facility sought a preliminary
injunction preventing enforcement of a statute that barred prisoners in the facility from
posseasing sexually oriented materials. The district court granted the injunction, finding that the
offenders were likely to succeed on the merits of their allegations that the statute was overbroad,
vague, and violated the First Amendment. The court noted that depiction of sexually oriented had
been permitted at the facility for over 20 years with no documented harm. The court later ordered
a permanent injunction fin.ding that the statute was overbroad and was not rationally related to
rehabilitation. (New Jersey Adult Diagnostic and Treatment Center)

U.S. District Court
RELIGION

Withrow v. Bartlett. 15 F.Supp.2d 292 CW.D.N.Y. 1998). A Muslim inmate brought
a § 1983 action claiming that a prison superintendent and correctional officers violated bis First
Amendment rights by disciplining him for participating in a group demonstrative prayer in a
recreation yard. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, finding that
prohibiting group demonstrative prayer in a prison recreational yard did not violate the inmate's
right to free exercise of religion. The court found that a group demonstrative prayer in a highly
populated prison yard posed the risk of disturbing other inmates with chanting and movements,
and that the prohibition was rationally related to a legitimate penological interest in maintaining
security. According to the court, the inmate had the option of engaging in nondemonstrative
prayer in the yard or returning to his cell for prayer. (Wende Correctional Facility, New York)
1999

. U.S, District Court
SAFETY

Baumann v. Walsh, 86 F.Supp.2d 508 (N.D.N.Y. 1999). An inmate who was injured by falling
off a top bunk and then reinjured by falling off a shelf at hie prison job sued prison officials
under § 1988. The district court dismiased all defendants from the case except the inmate's shop
supervisor. The court held that the inmate had an objectively serious medical need and that a
substantial risk of harm existed with respect to the inmate's working conditions because he was
made to climb along shelves and stand on boxes to retrieve material from the top shelves of a
storage room. The court denied summary judgment for the shop supervisor, citing material issues
of fact to be resolved regarding the supervisor's notice of unsafe work conditions and whether a
ladder was available for use by the inmate. (Franklin Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
RELIGION

Chatin v. Coombe. 186 F.3d 82 C2nd Cir. 1999). A state inmate who was disciplined for
engaging in individual prayer in a prison recreation yard brought a § 1988 action against
prison officials alleging violation of his constitutional rights. After a bench trial the district court
held that the rule under which the inmate was punished was unconstitutionally vague, and
enjoined its enforcement under similar circumstances. The appeals court affirmed, finding that
the inmate's prayer could not be viewed as a "religious service" or "religious speech" as intended
by a rule barring unauthorized services or speeches. The court found that the inmate was not
afforded adequate notice that individual, silent, demonstrative prayer was prohibited outside the
cell or other designated areas. The court held that the rule failed to provide sufficiently explicit
standards for those who applied it. (Green Haven Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
RESTRAINTS
SECURITY PRACTICES

Drummerv.LuttreU, 75F.Supp.2d 796CW.D.Tenn.1999).Aninmate brought a§ 1983 action against
corrections officials alleging that a disciplinary action violated her due process and Eigh~
Amendment rights. The district court held that strip-searching and handcuffing the inmate
during a unit search did not constitute a due process violation because the action did not impose
an atypical and significant hardship on her. The inmate had been strip-searched during a ·

39.43

shakedown of her dormitory. After squatting and coughing twice the inmate refused a direct order
to do so again and was disciplined. She then left a shower area dressed in nothing but her panties
and two male officers were called for assistance. (Shelby County Correctional Center, Tennessee)
U,S. Appeals Court

Hartsfield v. Vidor, 199 F.3d 305 (6th Cir. 1999). A state prison inmate brought a § 1983 action
alleging that he was unconstitutionally restrained. The district court dismissed the action and the
inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and remanded, finding that the officials'
alleged act of keeping the inmate in hard restraints for two eight-hour periods after he damaged
lrls cell did not amount to cruel and unusual punishment. The inmate alleged that during his
periods in the restraints he was denied food, access to fresh water and the use of a toilet. The
inmate had been placed in top-of-bed restraints for a total of eighteen hours. (Ionia Corrections
Facility, Michigan)

U.S. Appeals Court
RESTRAINTS

Key v. McKinnet 176 F.3d 1083 (8th Cir. 1999). An inmate who had been restrained in
handcuffs and leg shackles for 24 hours for throwing water in a correctional officer sued state
prison officials under§ 1983 claiming violation of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
The district entered judgment for the defendants and the appeals court affirmed. According to the
appeals court, the inmate did not suffer a serious-deprivation of life's necessities and prison
officials' conduct was not wanton. Although the shackles made it more difficult for the inmate to
sleep and relieve himself, he was not deprived of bedding, food or bathroom facilities and he was
checked by a nurse and guard at regular intervals. The record also contained references to the
handcuffs being loosened and medical conditions being considered. The court also held that the
inmate did not have any due process right to notice and an opportunity to be heard before being
restrained, noting that the inmate had no liberty interest in not being restrained. The restraints
were applied under a new policy implemented in response to inmate disturbances. Under the
policy, inmates caught spitting, throwing objects, or starting a fire were to be placed in restraints
for 24 hours. Inmates were given notice of the new policy. <Anamosa State Penitentiary, Iowa)

U.S. District Court

Pendergrass v, Hodge, 53 F.Supp.2d 838 (E.D.Va. 1999). A prisoner brought a§ 1983 action
against prison officials challenging their policy on the use of restraints. The court held that
placing a prisoner who had been assigned to restrictive housing in full restraints when he moved
about the prison did not constitute a serious deprivation of a basic human need under the Eighth
Amendment. <Riverside Regional Jail, Virginia)

U.S. District Court

Schmidt v. Odell 64 F.Supp.2d 1014 (D.Kan. 1999). A former county jail inmate, a double
amputee without legs from a point below lrls knees, brought a civil rights action against jail
officials asserting claims under the Eighth Amendment. The district court denied summary
judgment for the defendants, finding that it was precluded on all claims. The court held that
refusal to provide the inmate with a wheelchair while confined in the county jail did not violate
the Eighth Amendment since jail exits, entrances and hallways were too narrow to accommodate
wheelchairs and there were legitimate safety concerns about placing a wheelchair among the jail's
general population. The court also found that deficiencies such as plumbing problems,
overcrowding, inadequate exercise areas, and other defects during the inmate's confinement in the
county jail did not rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment; there were opportunities to
exercise in dayrooms, plumbing problems and other allegedly unsanitary conditions did not pose a
serious threat to the health, safety or well-being of the inmate, and overcrowding did not result in
denial of the minima) measures of life's necessities. But the court denied summary judgment for
jail officials on the issue of whether they were deliberately indifferent to the basic needs of the
inmate w bile he was confined at the jail. The court noted that the ability of the inmate to move
himself about in the jail, to use the toilet, to use the shower, to obtain his meals, and to obtain
suitable recreation and exercise, were a basic need that jail officials were obligated to help provide
under the Eighth Amendment. The court also noted that the fact that the inmate was able to use
most of the jail services did not preclude his Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) or
Rehabilitation Act claims against jail officials. (Cowley County Jail, Kansas)

U.S. Appeals Court
RELIGIOUS ARTICLES
RELIGIOUS GROUPS

Spies v. Voinoyich, 178 F.3d 898 (6th Cir. 1999). A Zen Buddhist inmate sued prison officials
alleging that various prison regulations violated his First Amendment free exercise righte.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the prison officials. The appeals court
affirmed with regard to all of the inmate's First Amendment claims. The appeals court held that a
prison regulation that required five documented members of a faith to be interested in forming a
faith group before such a group could be formed did not violate the inmate's free exercise rights.
The court also held that a prohibition against the inmate possessing certain religious articles in
his cell did not violate his free exercise rights. The court noted that a small statue of Buddha, an
altar cloth, a wooden fish, a picture of Buddha, and incense could be fashioned into weapons or
could be used to cover up illegal activities. The court upheld the prison's prohibition against
inmate-led groups and the prison's refusal to use the inmate's religious name. <North Central
Correctional Institution, ·Ohio)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONTRABAND

U.S. v. Allen, 190 F.8d 1208 (11th Cir. 1999). A federal inmate was convicted in federal district
court of possessing a prohibited object and he appealed. The appeals court vacated the district
court decision and remanded with instructions. The appeals court held that under the statute that
makes it unlawful for a federal inmate to possess a "prohibited object" and which defines a

RESTRAINTS

RESTRAINTS

WHEELCHAIR

39.44

"prohibited object" to include an object that is intended to be used as a weapon, the intent to use
the object as a weapon is an element of the offense and not merely a sentencing factor. The inmate
worked as a quality assurance inspector at an on·site UNICOR (federal prison industries) mattress
factory. One morning he was observed to be acting suspiciously in his conversation with another
inmate and he was searched. The search produced three nine·inch tufter needles and a wooden
dowel with a hole bored into one in and a rope wrapped around the other end. The needles
appeared to have been broken off from one of the sewing machines. The needles fit into the wooden
dowel and when assembled could be used as a shank or ice-pick tool or weapon with a lanyard. The
inmate did not contest that he possessed these objects but told his supervisor that he had intended
to give them to his supervisors privately rather than in view of other inmates. (United States
Penitentiary, Atlanta, Georgia)
U.S. District Court
TELEPHONE CALLS

U.S. v. Peoples, 71 F.Supp.2d 967 (W.D.Mo. 1999). A defendant who was charged with killing a
witness to prevent testimony moved to suppress recordings of telephone conversations and in·
person meetings that he had with a prisoner. The district court denied the motion, finding that the
recordings did not violate the Fourth Amendment rights of the defendant. According to the court, a
visitor of a prisoner did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in conversations with the
prisoner, or in telephone calls involving the prisoner. The recordings were made as part of a neral
recording program undertaken to maintain prison safety by reducing the flow of contraband into
the prison. (Corrections Corporation of America facility, Leavenworth, Kansas)

U.S. District Court
FIRE
FIRE SAFETY

White v. Cooper, 55 F.Supp.2d 848 (N.D.Ill. 1999). An inmate at a state prison brought an action
against prison officials and a construction company to recover damages for injuries he incurred in
a fire. The district court dismissed the construction company from the suit finding that the
company was not a "state actor" for the purposes of§ 1983. The court found that the inmate stated
a claim against prison officials by alleging that they failed to assist him for an unreasonable time
during a prison fire. According to the court, the allegation that state correctional officials knew the
inmate faced severe and substantial risk from fire because of inoperative fire safety and prevention
equipment, and failed to ensure that the system was operational, stated an Eighth Amendment
claim. In addition to their disregard of non-operational fire safety and prevention systems, officials
also allegedly failed to free the inmate from his burning cell (Joliet Correctional Center, Illinois)
2000

U.S. District Court
CONTRABAND
SEARCHES-CELL

Ballance v. Virginia, 130 F.Supp.2d 754 (W.D.Va. 2000). A state prison inmate who was convicted
of sexual crimes involving juveniles brought a § 1983 action against corrections officials alleging
wrongful confiscation of photographs of children from his cell. The district court held that the
confiscation complied with the First Amendment even though only a small percentage of
photographs were of seminude children. The court noted that state officials provided minimum
procedural safeguards, including notice of confiscation, provision of avenues for protest, and review
of the prisoner's allegation of a First Amendment violation by someone who was not involved with
the confiscation. The court found that the confiscation of all photographs served to further the
prison's interests in both rehabilitation and institutional security because the possible discovery of
the cache of photos by other prisoners created a potential for disturbance. According to the court, a
prisoner has no Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches of his cell because
he has no expectation of privacy in his cell. (Wallens Ridge State Prison, Virginia)

U.S. District Court
CONTRABAND
SEARCHES- CELL

Ballance v. Young; 130 F.Supp.2d 762 (W.D.Va. 2000). A state prisoner brought a prose federal
civil rights suit against prison officials, arising out of their seizure of several items of his personal
property. The district court held that the prisoner had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his
cell that would make seizure of a letter from his cell a Fourth Amendment violation that could be
addressed in a § 1983 suit. The court found that the decision by officials to confiscate the prisoner's
scrapbook and clippings, in accordance with a prison regulation that prohibited such items, was
reasonable in light of security concerns that the metal parts of scrapbooks could be used as
weapons and that razors and other contraband could be hidden in the clippings or scrapbooks, and
in light of the time-consuming or extreme nature of other alternatives, such as x·raying cells. The
court noted that the officials did not need reasonable suspicion to search prisoner cells as part of
their policy of performing random searches. The court also held that the prisoner was afforded
sufficient post-deprivation remedies to satisfy any due process concerns arising from the seizure of
an attorney's letter that contained hair samples and, allegedly, two money orders, where the
inmate did receive notice of a disciplinary hearing held under the prison regulation forbidding
abuse of mail. (Wallens Ridge State Prison, Virginia)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES-CELL

Barstow v. Kennebec County Jail, 115 F.Supp.2d 3 <D.Me. 2000). A county jail inmate brought an
action against a sheriff, detective, county commissioners and county, alleging claims under§ 1983.
The district court granted summary judgment, in part, for the defendants. The court held that the
search of the inmate's jail cell did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights or his due process
rights. The court found that the detective had probable cause to search the jail cell for evidence
that the inmate had committed the crime of terrorizing because his cell mate had informed
potential victims and the detective about the inmate's possible retaliatory plans. According to the

XIX

39.46

court, the Fourth Amendment does not require government officials to secure a search warrant
prior to searching a prison cell. <Kennebec County Jail, Maine)
U.S. District Court
RESTRAINTS

Bowman v. City ofMiddletown, 91 F.Supp.2d 644 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). An arrestee who was held for 19
days on suspicion of murder brought a § 1983 action alleging false arrest, malicious prosecution
and civil rights violations while confined. The district court held that denial of commissary
privileges for five days was not a due process violation, especially since the only deprivation
suffered was the inability to order cigarettes, which was the sole item the detainee desired from
the commissary. The court found that the jail superintendent was entitled to qualified immunity
from liability for his decision to have the pretrial detainee shackled when outside of his cell based
on the wording of the note that the detainee had sent to the superintendent complaining of his loss
of commissary privileges, because the right to complain to prison administrators was not clearly
established. The note asked "[who] do you think you are" and promised "I will see you or whomever
in court." (Orange County Jail, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
RESTRAINTS

Fuentes v. Wagner, 206 F.3d 335 (3rd Cir. 2000). An inmate who had been detained in a county
prison while awaiting sentencing sued corrections officers and prison officials under § 1983 for the
alleged use of excessive force. A district court jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants and
the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that whether the inmate was placed in a
restraint chair to stop his disruptive behavior and maintain prison order or for purposes of
punishment was a jury question and that placement of the inmate in a restraint chair for eight
hours did not violate substantive due process under the Eighth Amendment. The court noted that
the inmate was not kept in the chair any longer than was authorized, his physical condition was
checked every fifteen minutes and he was released every two hours for ten minutes to allow
stretching, exercise, and use of the toilet. He was examined by a nurse at the end of the eight-hour
period. According to the court, an inmate awaiting sentencing had the same status under the
Constitution as a pretrial detainee and the Due Process Clause protected him from the use of
excessive force amounting to punishment. (Berks County Prison, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
FACIAL HAIR
HAIR LENGTH

Jackson v. District of Columbia, 89 F.Supp.2d 48 (D.D.C. 2000). Federal prisoners and District of
Columbia prisoners who were serving their sentences in facilities operated by the Virginia
Department of Corrections challenged the Department's grooming policy. The district court held
that the policy, which required male prisoners to be clean-shaven and to keep their head hair
short, did not violate the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) nor the Free Exercise Clause
of the First Amendment, even though it substantially burdened the prisoners' sincerely held
beliefs. The court found the policy to be the least restrictive means to address the Department's
compelling interests in prison security, gang elimination, inmate identification, and health and
sanitation. (Virginia Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
RESTRAINTS
USE OF FORCE

Jackson v. Johnson, 118 F.Supp.2d 278 (N.D.N.Y. 2000). Representatives of a juvenile who was
incarcerated in a youth center sought damages for injuries sustained by the juvenile when he was
subjected to a physical restraint technique (PRT). The district court dismissed the defendants'
motions for summary judgment, finding that there were fact issues as to whether aides applied
excessive force in violation of the juvenile's substantive due process rights. The court held that the
Eighth Amendment did not apply to incarcerated juveniles, but rather that the appropriate
constitutional standard for evaluating the treatment of an adjudicated juvenile delinquent is the
substantive due process guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court denied qualified
immunity for a nurse at the center, holding that it was not objectively reasonable for her to
conclude that the juvenile was faking injury in view of his unresponsiveness and general physical
condition. A 220-pound aide had initiated a PRT on the 145-pound juvenile and was assisted by a
250-pound coworker. The PRTwas applied for approximately ten minutes before the officer of the
day arrived at the scene, by which time the juvenile had become unresponsive, clammy, was
gasping for breath and was salivating. The PRT continued to be applied for another twenty
minutes, under the supervision of the officer of the day, until the juvenile was rendered
unconscious. The facility nurse was summoned and no attempts were made to revive the juvenile
before the nurse arrived. After some treatment in the infirmary the juvenile was returned to his
housing unit. Later, the juvenile had physical difficulty while in the cafeteria which prompted
another round of PRT for more than twenty minutes. When the juvenile did not respond to
attempts to resuscitate him, he was transported to a hospital where he remained in a comatose
state for two months. The juvenile suffers from serious and permanent physical and mental
injuries as the result of the use of force. (Louis Gossett Jr. Residential Center, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
RESTRAINTS
PRETRIAL
DETAINEES

May v. Sheahan, 226 F.3d 876 (7 th Cir. 2000). A pretrial detainee who suffered from Acquired

XIX

Immune Deficiency Syndrome CAIDS) and was hospitalized brought an action against a county and
county officials. The district court denied summary judgment for the sheriff on qualified immunity
grounds and the sheriff appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the detainee stated an
equal protection claim by alleging that the sheriff, for no legitimate reason, treated hospitalized
detainees differently from jail detainees by shackling them to their beds and not taldng them to
court on their assigned court dates. The appeals court found that the allegation that the sheriff's
restrictive policies caused the.detainee to miss scheduled court appearances and impeded access to

89.46

·--...,.,l
___ -

his attorney stated a claim for violation of his right of access to court. The appeals court found that
the allegation that the sheriff implemented a policy that required him to be shackled to his bed
around the clock, despite his weakened state and despite being watched by armed guards, was
sufficient to state a substantive due process claim. (Cook County Jail, Illinois)
U.S. District Court
GANGS
SEPARATION

Miller v. Shelby County, 93 F.Supp.2d 892 (W.D.Tenn. 2000). A county jail inmate brought a§
1983 action against a county alleging injuries suffered in an attack by fellow inmates were the
result of the jail's practice of permitting inmates of different security levels to take recreation
together. The district court entered judgment for the plaintiff, finding that the jail's recreation
policy posed a substantial risk of harm and that jail officials showed deliberate indifference to the
risk posed by the policy. The court noted that whether the policy was official or not, it was
pervasive enough to be considered a de facto policy. The jail policy allowed inmates of different
security levels to take recreation together, including gang members who were allowed to mix with
protective-custody inmates. The inmate had been attacked by gang members and the court found
that jail officials had both general and specific knowledge of threats against the inmate by gang
members yet took no affirmative steps to protect the inmate, including the "readily available step
of ending [the] mixed-recreation practice." The inmate suffered permanent impairment to his
shoulder. The district court awarded $40,000 to the inmate. (Shelby County Corr'! Ctr., Tennessee)

U.S. District Court
FIRE SAFETY

Oladipupo v. Austin, 104 F.Supp.2d 643 (W.D.La. 2000). A detainee of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) who was awaiting removal from the United States brought a§ 1983
action against parish jail officials challenging the constitutionality of his conditions of confinement.
The district court found that the fact that INS detainees held at the parish jail had fewer
privileges than INS detainees held at a federal detention center did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause. The court also found that housing INS detainees with convicted prisoners did
not violate the Due Process Clause. The court denied summary judgment for the officials on the
allegation that the housing unit at the jail had serious sewage problems that created unsanitary
conditions. The court also denied summary judgment to the officials on the allegation that the jail
had an inadequate number of emergency exits. <Avoyelles Parish Jail, Louisiana)

U.S. District Court
ESCAPE
SEARCHES

Richards v. Southeast Alabama Youth Ser. Diversion, 105 F.Supp.2d 1268 (M.D.Ala. 2000). The
mother of a detainee who had committed suicide while in custody brought a civil rights action
against city and county officials. The district court denied Eleventh Amendment immunity to the
city defendants and denied summary judgment for the defendants on a deliberate indifference
claim. The district court held that summary judgment was precluded by issues of material fact as
to whether the actions of the police officer who transported the detainee to a privately-owned
facility rose above the level of mere negligence and constituted deliberate indifference, and
whether his actions were the proximate cause of the detainee's death. Despite his knowledge of the
detainee's suicidal tendencies, the officer failed to search the detainee for weapons, failed to
handcuff the detainee, and failed to inform the subsequent custodians of the detainee's suicidal
proclivities. The court also found fact issues as to whether the actions or inactions of juvenile
probation officers rose above the level of mere negligence and constituted deliberate indifference,
and whether the detainee was in the custody of the officers at the time he escaped from the
detention facility and committed suicide with a gun he had surreptitiously brought into the
facility. The detainee had been taken to a privately-operated "diversion center" and was left alone
in an intake room where he produced a gun, fled the center, walked into a wooded area and fatally
shot himself. (Southeast Alabama Youth Services Diversion Center)

U.S. District Court
CLASSIFICATION
ESCAPE

Rivera Borrero v. Rivera Correa, 93 F.Supp.2d 122 (D.Puerto Rico 2000). An inmate brought a pro
se § 1983 action against Puerto Rico corrections officials alleging that he had been unjustifiably
kept in maximum security custody for more than three years before being reclassified to medium
security. The inmate also sought to compel his reclassification to minimum security custodial
status. The district court dismissed the case, finding that the inmate's three years in maximum
security custody status was not arbitrary because the inmate had been charged with escape.
Commenting on the case, Judge Casellas opened by stating "This case is a good example of the
thicket of claims and arguments that can flourish from a prose prisoner's understandable effort to
save his complaint from doom." (Servicios Correccionales de Puerto Rico, Guayama Facility)

U.S. District Court
SEGREGATION

Valentin v. Murphy, 95 F.Supp.2d 99 CD.Conn. 2000). A pretrial detainee who was a former law
enforcement officer charged with drug crimes, challenged his pretrial conditions of confinement in
a state prison. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, finding that
placement of the detainee in a segregation unit of a special prison was not "punishment" subject to
due process. The court noted that the placement was for the detainee's own protection based on his
status as an ex·law enforcement officer and that his conditions were better overall than those
imposed on other inmates in the segregation unit. (Special Management Unit at the Walker
Reception Center, Connecticut)

U.S. Appeals Court
RESTRAINTS

Williams v. Department of Corrections, 208 F.3d 681 (8th Cir. 2000). An inmate brought a civil
rights action against the Iowa Department of Corrections and other defendants alleging that they
had retaliated against him for participating in a hearing by placing leg irons on him too tightly.

XIX

39.47

The district court dismissed the action and the inmate appealed. The appeals court held that the
inmate stated a retaliation claim against two correctional officers alleging that they placed leg
shackles too tightly on the inmate and refused to loosen or remove the shackles after he
complained. The inmate suffered intense pain, swelling and bruises. <Anamosa State Penitentiary,
Iowa)
U.S. District Court
RESTRAINTS

··•~.

Williams v. Goord, 111 F.Supp.2d 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). A state prisoner brought a§ 1983 action
against corrections officials alleging constitutional violations. The district court held that the
conditions and duration of the prisoner's 75-day confinement in a Special Housing Unit (SHU) did
not violate the prisoner's due process rights because they did not pose atypical or signilicant
hardships. The conditions of the SHU included limited exercise times that were conducted in
"cages" and limitations on the number of showers per week. The district court held that the fact
that a prison employee issued a purportedly false misconduct report against the prisoner three
days after he filed a grievance against the employee was insufficient to establish the prisoner's
retaliation claim. But the district court denied summary judgment for the defendants on the issue
of whether the officials knew that keeping the prisoner in mechanical restraints during his
exercise period violated the Eighth Amendment. The court also held that there were genuine
issues of material fact regarding whether placing the prisoner in mechanical restraints during his
one·hour exercise period caused him ''physical injury" as required by the Prison Litigation Reform
Act (PLRA) to prevail on his Eighth Amendment claim. (Sullivan Correctional Facility, New York)
2001

XIX

U.S. Appeals Court
PRETRIAL
DETAINEES
RESTRAINTS

Benjamin v. Fraser, 264 F.3d 175 (2nd Cir. 2001). A city corrections department moved for
immediate termination of consent decrees requiring judicial supervision over restrictive housing,
inmate correspondence, and law libraries at city jails, pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform
Act (PLRA). The district court vacated the decrees and pretrial detainees appealed. The appeals
court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. On remand the district court granted the
motion in part and denied it in part and the city appealed. The appeals affirmed. The appeals court
held that the detainees were not required to show actual injury when they challenged regulations
which allegedly adversely affected their Sixth Amendment right to counsel by impeding attorney
visitation. The appeals court concluded that there was a continuing need for prospective relief with
respect to the detainees' right to counsel, and the relief granted by the district court satisfied the
requirements of PLRA. The court found that detainees were experiencing unjustilied delays during
attorney visitation. The district court required procedures to be established to ensure that attorney
visits commenced within a specilied time period following arrival at the jail, and the city was
instructed to ensure the availability of an adequate number of visiting rooms that provide the
requisite degree of privacy. The appeals court held that the restraints used when moving certain
detainees within, or outside, the jail, had a "severe and deleterious effect" on the detainees given
that such restraints were often painful and could result in injury. The appeals court agreed with
the district court that detainees were entitled to reasonable after-the-fact procedural protections to
ensure that such restrictions were terminated reasonably soon if they were not justilied. These
procedures include a hearing, written decision, timely review of appeal from placement in special
restraint status, and the opportunity to seek further review based on good cause. (New York City
Department of Correction)

U.S. Appeals Court
SECURITY PRACTICES

Curley v. Perry, 246 F.3d 1278 (10th Cir. 2001). A state inmate brought a prose civil rights action
seeking to restrict inmate·to·inmate correspondence in the state's prison system. The district court
dismissed the complaint and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the
inmate failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim. The inmate had claimed that prison officials
created unconstitutional conditions of confinement by failing to prevent or monitor inmate·to·
inmate correspondence, which was allegedly used by inmates to plan violence against other
inmates. The court noted that the inmate had been placed in administrative segregation for his
own safety, precluding a showing of requisite deliberate indifference to the inmate's health and
safety. The inmate alleged that he had been targeted by members of the "Security Threat Group,"
a group of state inmates who take retaliatory actions against other inmates. (Central New Mexico
Correctional Facility)

U.S. District Court
MEDIA ACCESS

Entertainment Network, Inc. v. Lappin, 134 F.Supp.2d 1002 {S.D.Ind. 2001). An Internet content
provider sued a penitentiary warden and other government officials seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief. The plaintiff wanted to broadcast the execution of the defendant who had been
convicted of the bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City, live over the Internet. The
district court entered judgment for the defendants. The court found that the challenged prison
regulation was not subject to strict scrutiny and was reasonably related to legitimate penological
interests. The challenged regulation prohibited photographic, audio and visual recording devices at
federal executions. The court noted that the First Amendment right of the press to gather news
and information is not without limits, and that the press has no constitutional right of access to
prisons or their inmates beyond that afforded to the general public. According to the court, the
plaintiff was not being discriminated against because of the medium or means by which it sought
to broadcast the execution, although the regulation allowed written or verbal accounts of
39.48

_)

executions. (United States Penitentiary, Terre Haute, Indiana)
U.S. Appeals Court
RIOT

Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895 (9 th Cir. 2001). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against prison
officials after being shot during a prison riot The district court denied the officials' motion for
summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds and they appealed. The appeals court reversed
and remanded, finding that the officials were qualifiedly immune from civil rights liability and
were not deliberately indifferent. The court noted that prison officials had investigated rumors of
impending inmate violence before the riot and there was no evidence that they should have done
anything differently once the threat materialized. According to the court, a prison warden complied
with a statewide housing practice and he had no affirmative duty to change the policy. The inmate
had been shot in the neck during the disturbance. (California State Prison, Sacramento)

U.S. District Court
VISITS

Glaspy v. Malicoat, 134 F.Supp.2d 890 (W.D.Mich. 2001). A prison visitor sued a corrections
officer, alleging that the officer violated his constitutional rights when the officer refused the
visitor's request to use the bathroom during a visit to an inmate. The district court held that the
officer violated the visitor's substantive due process rights by refusing to permit him to use the
restroom, and awarded $5,000 in compensatory damages and $5,000 in punitive damages. The 69·
year-old visitor and the inmate he was visiting had informed the officer several times that the
visitor was in pain and that he needed urgently to use the restroom. The officer, who laughed at
the visitor's situation, was found to have been deliberately indifferent to the visitor's due process
rights. The court noted that the visitor suffered pain and discomfort for a period of time, as well as
extreme humiliation when he urinated in his pants in front of others, and inconvenience in having
to deal with his wet pants at the facility and on the way home. (Newberry Corr'! Facility, Mich.)

U.S. Appeals Court
RESTRAINTS

Hawkins v. Comparet·Cassani, 251 F.3d 1230 (9th Cir. 2001). A convicted prisoner who had a
"stun belt" placed on him, and activated, when he appeared in court for sentencing, brought a §
1983 action. The district court certified a class action and granted a preliminary injunction. The
appeals court reversed in part and remanded. The appeals court held that the class of all persons
in the custody of the county sheriff was improperly certified since the convicted prisoner could not
serve as a representative for those prisoners who had not yet been convicted. The appeals court
also found the district court injunction against the use of the belt was overbroad because it did not
allow for use of the belt to protect courtroom security, such as restricting violence or preventing
escape. But the court noted that even at sentencing, where a defendant's guilt is no longer in
dispute, shackling is inherently prejudicial and detracts from the dignity and decorum of the
proceeding, and impedes the defendant's ability to communicate with his counsel. <Los Angeles
County, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
USE OF FORCE
DISTURBANCE

Jeffers v. Gomez, 240 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2001). An inmate who was shot by a correctional officer
during a prison disturbance brought a civil rights action to receiver for alleged violations of his
constitutional rights. The district court denied summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds
for the defendants. The appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that officers were qualifiedly
immune from liability to the inmate. The court noted that the shot that one of the officers fired was
aimed at an inmate who was attacking the plaintiff with a knife but accidentally hit the plaintiff in
the neck. (California State Prison at Sacramento)

U.S. Appeals Court
RESTRAINTS

Kostrzewa v. Cityo[TroY, 247 F.3d 633 (6th Cir. 2001). An arrestee sued a city and police officers
asserting claims for use of excessive force. The district court dismissed the case but the appeals
court reversed and remanded. The appeals court held that the allegations supported a claim for
use of excessive force and that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity. The appeals
court found that the city's handcuff policy, that required all detainees to wear handcuffs, supported
a § 1983 claim of the arrestee who allegedly suffered pain and injury from being restrained with
handcuffs that were too small for his wrists, despite being arrested for a non-violent
misdemeanant offense.

U.S. Appeals Court
GANGS

Mayoral v. Sheahan, 245 F.3d 934 (7 th Cir. 2001). A pretrial detainee who was severely injured in a
gang-instigated jailhouse riot brought a civil rights suit against a county sheriff and jail officers,
alleging they were deliberately indifferent to his safety. The district court granted summary
judgment for the defendants and the detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part,
reversed in part and remanded. The appeals court held that the failure of the jail to segregate
inmates by gang affiliation was not a constitutional violation, given the high number of gang
members housed in the jail and the burden that would be placed on administrators by such a
policy. The court found that summary judgment was precluded by fact issues as to whether the
detainee had asked an officer for protective custody and was ignored, and whether an officer
delayed in summoning help when fighting broke out. (Cook County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
EMERGENCY DRILL
FIRE SAFETY

Ostrander v. Horn, 145 F.Supp.2d 614 CM.D.Pa. 2001). An inmate filed a § 1983 action concerning
his forced participation in an emergency preparedness drill. The district court held that the action
taken by correctional officers in conjunction with a drill did not rise to the level of a constitutional
violation. The officers had handcuffed the prisoner, removed him from his cell, forcefully taken him
to a temporary holding cell for a short period of time, and strip-searched him before he was

XIX

39.49

returned to his cell. According to the court, any inconvenience caused to the inmate by the
emergency preparedness and fire evacuation drill was offset by the need of prison officials and
emergency response team officers to secure the safety and security of the institution. (State
Correctional Institution, Frackville, Pennsylvania)
U.S. Appeals Court
CLOTHING

Thornton v. Phillips County, Arkansas, 240 F.3d 728 (8th Cir. 2001). A jail inmate brought a §
1983 suit against a county, police officers and paramedics based on his treatment after he was
injured in a fall that was allegedly caused by a jail jumpsuit that was too long. The district court
dismissed the action, and the appeals court affirmed the district court finding that the allegations,
including assertions that paramedics tried to put him on a stretcher while his foot was caught
between stairs, alleged no more than mere negligence. (Phillips County Jail, Arkansas)

U.S. District Court
"LOCK-IN"
LOCKDOWN

Waring v. Meachum, 175 F.Supp.2d 230 (D.Conn. 2001). Inmates brought several class actions
against prison administrators and correctional officers alleging constitutional violations during a
lockdown. The actions were consolidated and the district court granted summary judgment in
favor of the defendants. The court held that where a genuine emergency exists, officials may be
more restrictive than they otherwise may be, and certain services may be suspended temporarily
without violating the Eighth Amendment. The lockdown was precipitated by a series of prisoner
assaults on staff and other prisoners. According to the court, the provision of cold food is not, by
itself, an Eighth Amendment violation as long as it is nutritionally adequate and is prepared and
served under conditions that do not present an immediate danger to the health and well-being of
the inmates who consume it. The prisoners had been served primarily sandwiches for lunch and
dinner, and cold cereal for breakfast, during an eight-day lockdown. The court noted that the diet
was without fruits and vegetables, but that it was imposed for only a short period. According to the
court, any failure to provide religious diets during the course of the eight-day lockdown did not
violate the Eighth Amendment absent evidence of deliberate indifference. The court noted that one
inmate's first meal was confiscated but future meals were delivered, often in an untimely manner,
and that a second inmate missed two meals during the lockdown. The court held that a delay in
delivering a medically-prescribed diet for six days during the lockdown did not violate the Eighth
Amendment.The court found that refusal to allow prisoners to shower during the eight-day
lockdown did not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation, nor was failure to provide
prisoners with changes of clothing during the lockdown. (Connecticut Corr'! Institution at Somers)

U.S. District Court
EXERCISE

WJ.lliams v. Goord, 142 F.Supp.2d 416 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). An inmate who was confined in segregation
brought a§ 1983 suit alleging constitutional violations and seeking declaratory relief,
compensatory damages and punitive damages. The district court denied summary judgment for
the defendants, finding that whether handcuff and waist chain restraints may have prevented the
inmate from engaging in "meaningful exercise" for 28 days was a fact issue that needed to be
resolved. The district court noted that a prisoner may be denied out-of-cell exercise under what is
termed a "safety exception," but that a blanket policy denying such prisoners any opportunity for
out-of-cell exercise could not be justified. The court found that lower ranking prison officers, who
had no input into the development and implementation of restraint policies and believed they were
following lawful orders, were entitled to qualified immunity. (Sullivan Corr'! Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
SECURITY
RESTRICTIONS
SEPARATION

Yousefv. Reno, 254 F.3d 1214 (10 th Cir. 2001). An inmate who had been convicted of conspiracy to
blow up aircraft and for participation in the World Trade Center bombing, was placed under
"special administrative measures" (SAM) by the federal Bureau of Prisons to protect himself and
prison personnel. Under these measures his access to mail, telephone calls, and visitors was
limited, as were his privileges to carry religious materials, and opportunities for recreation and
exercise time. The inmate brought a Bivens action challenging his conditions of confinement. The
district court dismissed the claims and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed and
remanded, finding that the Bureau of Prisons had the discretionary power to implement the
measures against the inmate. (F.C.I. Administrative Maximum, Florence, Colorado)
2002

U.S. District Court
RELIGIOUS SERVICES
GANGS

XIX

Allah v. Al·Hafeez, 208 F.Supp.2d 520 (E.D.Pa. 2002). A prisoner brought a civil rights action
against prison officials. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants.
The court held that the prisoner's two-month exclusion from religious services did not violate his
First Amendment rights, in light of security and economic concerns. The prisoner had challenged a
prison chaplain about the chaplain's teaching and the two had a disagreement, resulting in his
exclusion from services for two months. The court also found no First Amendment violation in the
prison's failure to hire a minister, or appoint a prisoner as a minister, for an additional Nation of
Islam faith group, because of security and economic concerns. The court found that a prison
regulation that prohibited group calisthenics in the prison yard was reasonably related to ensuring
security and avoiding gang activity. Although the court found that there were genuine issues of
material fact concerning the potential violation of the prisoner's free exercise rights when officials
failed to provide entirely appropriate meals during Ramadan, the court concluded that the officials
were entitled to qualified immunity because they did not know at the time that their conduct
violated the prisoner's constitutional rights. The officials had attempted to observe Ramadan meal

39.50

restrictions, but failed by including beans in the menu. (State Correctional Institution at
Frackville, Pennsylvania)
U.S. District Court

MAIL

Ashker v. California Dept. of Corrections, 224 F.Supp.2d 1253 (N.D.Cal. 2002). State prisoners
brought a § 1983 action challenging a prison requirement that books received from vendors have a
special shipping label attached, alleging violation of their First Amendment rights. The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of the prisoners and held that injunctive relief was
warranted. The court held that the policy unduly burdened the prisoners' First Amendment rights,
noting that the policy was not applied to non-book packages. The court also noted that the goal of
reducing opportunities for contraband smuggling could be met by comparing a generic package
label with an invoice inside a package, and that the prison was already searching all mail for
contraband. (Security Housing Unit, Pelican Bay State Prison, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDIA ACCESS

California First Amendment Coalition v. Woodford, 299 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2002). Nonprofit
organizations, whose members included journalists who attended and reported on state executions,
brought an action against state prison officials, challenging a regulation that barred public viewing
oflethal injection procedures prior to the actual administration of the injection. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. The appeals court reversed and remanded.
On remand, the district court entered a judgment that permanently enjoined prison officials from
preventing uninterrupted viewing of executions, from the moment the condemned entered the
execution chamber through the time the condemned was declared dead. The state again appealed
and the appeals court affirmed, finding that the public has a First Amendment right to view
executions and that the prison regulation impermissibly restricted this right. (San Quentin State
Prison, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
DISTURBANCE
USE OF FORCE

Combs v. Wilkinson, 315 F.3d 548 (6th Cir. 2002). Death row inmates sued several state
corrections supervisors and officers under § 1983, alleging that they used excessive force in
quelling a disturbance in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court granted the
defendants' motions for summary judgment and dismissal, and the inmates appealed. The appeals
court affirmed in part, and reversed and remanded in part. The appeals court held that an
individual officer's use of mace was not malicious or sadistic. The court found that summary
judgment was precluded by fact questions as to whether the commander of a special response team
adequately briefed the team members, and failed to control the use of chemical agents in the
extraction of inmates. The court held that the commander was not liable under§ 1983 for failing to
admonish team members when he overheard them discussing particular inmates that they wanted
to "beat," absent any showing that the commander encouraged or directly participated in the use of
excessive force. The court found that the inmates were not entitled to an injunction requiring
corrections officers to wear name tags or other identification and to videotape cell extractions, even
though their failure to do so was a violation of state corrections policies and regulations.
<Mansfield Corr'l Institution, Ohio)

U.S. District Court
FIRE SAFETY

Derby Industries, Inc. v. Chestnut Ridge Foam, 202 F.Supp.2d 818 (N.DJnd. 2002). A
manufacturer of a mattress intended for use in prisons sued a competitor for false advertising. The
district court denied the plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction, finding that a video tape
was neither false nor misleading, and that the plaintiff manufacturer was not being irreparably
harmed. The court found that the video advertisement,. which depicted a flammability test for its
and a competitor's products, was not literally false, noting that the test was a general procedure
which could be performed in several ways. The plaintiff identified only one customer who was
confused, and their con-fusion was not substantial enough for the manufacturer to lose business.
<Derby Industries, Indiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
SECURITY PRACTICES

Fraise v. Terhune, 283 F.3d 506 (3rd Cir. 2002). State inmates brought a § 1983 action against
corrections officials challenging their classification and treatment as members of a "Security
Threat Group" (STG). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the officials and
the inmates appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the STG policy did not violate the
inmates' free exercise or equal protection rights, and that the transfer of the inmates to a STG
management unit did not deprive them of a protected liberty interest. According to the court, the
inmates' free exercise rights were not violated by the STG policies and practices because the
officials had a legitimate and neutral objective in maintaining order and security in the prison
system, and the officials had adequate grounds to conclude that the inmates were "core members"
of an STG. The court noted that the inmates had alternative means available to practice their
religion, which they call the Five Percent Nation. The inmates were recognized leaders of the Five
Percent Nation and had taken documented roles in the group's activities. The appeals court found
no violation of the inmates' equal protection rights because the inmate group had demonstrated a
greater propensity for violence, and religion did not play any role in the decision to treat the group
as an STG. The inmates were not deprived of a protected liberty interest by their transfer to the
STG Management Unit because they were not subjected to a longer period of confinement and the
transfer did not impose any atypical or significant hardships on them. (New Jersey Department of
Corrections)

XIX

39.51

U.S. District Court
MAIL

Hall v. Johnson, 224 F.Supp.2d 1058 (E.D.Va. 2002). A state prison inmate sued a state corrections
department under § 1983 claiming that a policy that limited incoming mail to one ounce per
envelope violated his First Amendment rights. The district court entered judgment for the
defendant. The court found that the regulation served a legitimate penological interest in reducing
avenues for smuggling contraband into the facility, that the aggregate amount of mail an inmate
could receive was not affected, and that there would be an adverse negative ripple effect on prison
security if the ban were to be -lifted. The court noted that no viable alternatives had been put
forward by the plaintiff. (Red Onion State Prison, Virginia)

U.S. District Court
LOCKDOWN

In Re Bayside Prison Litigation, 190 F.Supp.2d 755 <D.N.J. 2002). State prison inmates brought a
§ 1983 action against prison officials alleging numerous alleged constitutional violations. The
district denied the defendants' motion to dismiss as it pertained to those inmates who alleged that
the § 1983 actions were racially motivated, and noted that there was no available remedy for the
inmates to exhaust before filing suit. According to the court, the grievance procedures described in
the state prison's inmate handbook were not sufficiently clear, expeditious, or respected by prison
officials to constitute an "available administrative remedy" for the purposes of the requirements of
the Prison Litigation Reform At (PLRA). Noting frustration with the litigation, which "is,
incredibly, still in its initial phases almost four·and·a·half years after the first complaint was
filed," the court addressed "this latest, and presumably last Motion to Dismiss." The plaintiffs,
hundreds of inmates at a state correctional facility, alleged that following a fatal stabbing of a
corrections officer, a lockdown was ordered, during which they suffered "a panoply of injuries at
the hands of the Defendants." (Bayside State Correctional Facility, New Jersey)

U.S. Appeals Court
VISITS
SEARCHES
SECURITY
PRACTICES

Jordan Ex Rel Johnson v. Taylor, 310 F.3d 1068 (8th Cir. 2002). An action was brought on behalf
of an eight·year·old prison visitor who was subjected to a partial strip search without reasonable
suspicion. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendant, a correctional officer,
and the appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the encounter did not constitute a
partial strip "search" for which reasonable suspicion was required, where the visitor and the
grandmother who had brought the girl were told that they could leave at any time. The eight·yearold girl triggered the metal detector that was used to screen potential prison visitors. All concerned
agreed that the metal detector was probably triggered by the buttons on the girl's overalls. The girl
removed her overalls in a bathroom while a female officer watched, which the court found to be
consensual. <Pine Bluff Unit, Arkansas Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court

Oliver v. Powell, 250 F.Supp.2d 593 (E.D.Va. 2002). A prisoner brought a civil rights action
alleging various constitutional violations. The prisoner and the defendants moved for summary
judgment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all of the
prisoner's claims. The court upheld the prison policy of opening and reading inmates' incoming
general correspondence, finding it was content neutral and that it was reasonably related to
legitimate penological interests in maintaining security and discipline and in suppressing
contraband. The court also upheld the prison regulation that limited the size and weight of
incoming general correspondence, to one envelope and one ounce, finding that it did not violate the
prisoner's First Amendment rights. The court noted that the regulation was a reasonable response
to the need to expedite mail processing time, preventing a strain on prison resources, and that no
ready alternatives were presented. The court approved of the prison regulation that authorized
personnel to open, examine, and censor any outgoing prisoner mail upon reasonable suspicion of
illegal activity, noting that the regulation was narrowly drawn to reach only material that might
pose a security risk to inmates, officials, and the institution. (Southampton Corr'! Center, Virginia)

MAIL

U.S. Appeals Court
CONFIDENTIAL
INFORMATION

Peate v. McCann, 294 F.3d 879 (7 th Cir. 2002). A state prisoner brought a civil rights against a
corrections officer, alleging Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment violations in connection with a
prison fight. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the prisoner. The appeals
court reversed and remanded, finding that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary
judgment as to whether the officer acted with deliberate indifference toward the safety and health
of the inmate. The appeals court also held that the prisoner was not entitled to information
contained in a prison investigation file. The prisoner had been attacked twice by a fellow prisoner,
and blamed the officer for failing to break up the second fight. (Miami Corr'! Facility, Indiana)

U.S. Appeals Court

Rogers v. Morris, 34 Fed.Appx. 481 (7 th Cir. 2002). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action
alleging that prison regulations violated his First Amendment rights. The district court granted
summary judgment to the defendants and the appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that
prison regulations banning pornography and material that teaches or advocates behavior
consistent with a gang did not violate the prisoner's First Amendment rights. Under the
regulation, prison officials had withheld various magazines devoted to hip·hop music and culture,
and certain "internet materials" sent to him by mail. (Wisconsin)

GANGS

U.S. Appeals Court
PUBLICATIONS
XIX

Sorrels v. McKee, 290 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 2002). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against
prison officials, alleging that enforcement of a prison policy that prohibits a prisoner from receiving
publications as a gift violated his First Amendment and due process rights. The district court
granted summary judgment for the prison officials and the appeals court affirmed. The appeals

89.52

)

court held that the officials were entitled to qualified immunity because the unconstitutionality of
the ban on gift publications had not been established at the time of their actions. In an earlier
decision (Crofton v. Roe, 170 F.3d 957), the appeals court had found the policy unconstitutional
and the state corrections department changed the policy. <Airway Heights Corrections Center,
Washington)
U.S. Appeals Court
TRANSPORTATION
RESTRAINTS

Thielman v. Leean, 282 F.3d 478 (7 th Cir. 2002). An inmate housed in a medium-security
treatment facility for sexually violent persons brought a § 1983 action seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief, alleging that the facility's inmate transport policy violated his rights to
procedural due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court
dismissed the case and the in.mate _appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the inmate
had no state-created liberty interest in being free from restraint during transportation, even if the
state's statutes gave the inmate a right to the least restrictive conditions of confinement during
transport. According to the court, subjecting sexually violent persons to full restraints during
transport to and from the medium·security facility, while not subjecting mental health or other
patients to such full restraints, did not violate the inmate's equal protection rights. The inmate
had a medical condition that required him to be transported from the facility for outside medical
treatment an average of three times per month. The transport policy stated, in part, that ''Inmates
shall be placed in full and double-locked restraints, chain-belt type waist restraints with attached
handcuffs, security Blackbox, and leg restraints." (Wisconsin Resource Center)

U.S. Appeals Court
RIOT
USE OF FORCE

Torres-Viera v. Laboy-Alvarado, 311 F.3d 105 (1st Cir. 2002). A prisoner who was injured by a tear
gas canister fired by a prison officials during a disturbance, brought a § 1983 action alleging
violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. The district court dismissed the action and the prisoner
appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the force was applied in a good faith effort to
restore order, and was not malicious or sadistic. <Bayamon Correctional Institution, Puerto Rico)

U.S. Appeals Court
USE OF FORCE

Treats v. Morgan, 308 F.3d 868 (8th Cir. 2002). A state prisoner sued corrections officials under §
1983 alleging his Eighth Amendment rights were violated when he was sprayed with pepper spray
and thrown to the floor. The district court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment
and the appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that summary judgment was precluded by
a genuine issue of material fact as to whether it was reasonable for the officer to use of pepper
spray and force against the prisoner who failed to obey commands, but who had not jeopardized
any person's safety or threatened prison security. The prisoner alleged that he was sprayed in the
face without any warning by an officer, and then thrown to the floor and handcuffed by a
lieutenant. (North Center Unit, Arkansas Department of Correction)

U.S. Appeals Court
SECURITY
PRACTICES

U.S. v. Durham, 287 F.3d 1297 (11th Cir. 2002). A defendant challenged the use of an electric "stun
belt" on him during his trial; his motion was denied by the district court. The defendant was
subsequently convicted and appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded, finding that the
district court had abused its discretion by failing to make findings sufficient to justify the use of
the stun belt during the trial. According to the court, physical restraints upon a criminal defendant
at trial should be used as rarely as possible because their use tends to erode the presumption of
innocence that is an integral part of a fair trial. The court held that use of the belt may have had
an adverse impact on the defendant's ability to follow the proceedings and to take an active
interest in the presentation of his case. The appeals court held that the novelty of the technology
employed in the stun belt will likely cause the need for factual findings about the operation of the
device, addressing issues such as the criteria for triggering the belt and potential for accidental
discharge, to assess the need for its use as compared to less restrictive methods of restraint. The
appeals court noted that the district court did not, on the record, consider any less restrictive
alternatives to prevent escape and to ensure courtroom safety. The defendant had attempted to
escape from a jail and had managed to slip out of a set of leg irons using a key he had concealed on
his person. The defendant's attorney argued that the defendant would be "more concerned about
receiving such a jolt than he is about thinking about the testimony and giving me aid and
assistance in the defense of this case." The court suggested that a stun belt poses "a far more
substantial risk of interfering with a defendant's Sixth amendment right to confer with counsel
than do leg shackles. The fear of receiving a painful and humiliating shock for any gesture that
could be perceived as threatening likely chills a defendant's inclination to make any movements
during the trial·· including those movements necessary for effective communication with counsel."
The appeals court also found that "stun belts have the potential to be highly detrimental to the
dignified administration of criminal justice... If activated, the device poses a serious threat to the
dignity and decorum of the courtroom." (U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida)

U.S. District Court
SECURITY RESTRIC·
TIONS
SEGREGATION

U.S. v. Flores, 214 F.Supp.2d 1193 CD.Utah 2002). A prisoner who was indicted for alleged
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) violations, filed a writ of habeas
corpus challenging restrictions placed on his conditions of confinement. The district court denied
the petition. The court held that the secure confinement of the prisoner was justified and that
restrictions placed upon his confinement were warranted because the prisoner was a flight risk,
and a danger to others. The court upheld restrictions on the prisoner's mail that required mail to
be read for threats, conspiracy, or obstruction of justice efforts, because members of the prisoner's

XIX

39.53

gang outside the prison could act on his instructions. The court also upheld that the limitation of
one visitor per day and telephone restrictions. The court clarified that the prisoner's right of access
to counsel included investigators or other special assistants working for the prisoner's attorney.
(Utah State Prison)
U.S. Appeals Court
RESTRAINTS

Williams v. City ofLas Vegas, 34 Fed.Appx. 297 (9th Cir. 2002). An arrestee brought a suit against
a city and correctional officer alleging the use of excessive force. The district court granted
summary judgment to the defendants and the appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that
the officer's use of force and restraints when the arrestee refused to cooperate during the booking
process was not excessive under either the Eighth Amendment standard for prisoners, nor the
Fourteenth Amendment standard for pretrial detainees. The court noted that all of the officer's
conduct associated with this claim had been videotaped from three different positions by
surveillance earner-as. According to the court, the use of waist and leg restraints on the inmate in
his jail cell did not violate the Eighth Amendment, where the inmate had refused to stand still
during a frisk search and displayed erratic and seemingly uncooperative behavior. (Las Vegas
Dept. of Detention, Nevada)

U.S. District Court
TRANSPORTATION
RESTRAINTS

WilliBDJs-El v. McLemore, 213 F.Supp.2d 783 (E.D.Mich. 2002). A prisoner brought a civil rights
action seeking monetary and equitable relief. The district court denied the defendants' summary
judgment motion, in part. The court held that summary judgment was barred by genuine issues of
material fact as to: whethel' officials were deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's protection from
harm and the sufficiency of their actions to protect the prisoner from fellow inmates; and whether
the inmate was disabled in the context of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The prisoner
had a congenital deformity known as Kasabach Merritt Syndrome which caused his right hand to
be severely curled inward at the wrist and caused pain when his extremities were improperly
positioned. The prisoner alleged that prison officials failed to provide him with large handcuffs,
rather than standard handcuffs, for transportation. The prisoner had also asked prison authorities
for protection from other inmates, but was stabbed in the back five times while in a prison yard.
(Standish Maximum Security Facility, and Josephine McCallum Facility, Michigan)
2003

U.S. Appeals Court
BOOKS
PUBLICATIONS

MAIL

XIX

Ashker v. California Dept. of Corrections, 350 F.3d 917 (9th Cir. 2003). A state prisoner brought a
§ 1983 action challenging a prison policy that requires books and magazines mailed to a prison to
have approved vendor labels affixed to them. The district court granted summary judgment in
favor of the prisoner and issued a permanent injunction against the defendants. The appeals court
affirmed, finding that the policy was not rationally related to the prison's asserted interest in
security and order, and therefore violated the prisoner's First Amendment rights. The court noted
that the prison already required that books be sent directly from approved vendors, allowing
officials to reduce contraband smuggling by checking address labels and invoices, and that the
prison was still searching all mail for contraband. The court also noted that the policy was not
applied to non-book packages. (Security Housing Unit, Pelican Bay State Prison, California)

U.S. District Court
RESTRAINTS
USE OF FORCE

Bane v. Virginia Dept. of Corrections, 267 F.Supp.2d 514 <w.D.Va. 2003). An inmate brought
action against a state corrections department and prison officials, stemming from injuries
allegedly suffered while being handcuffed. The district court denied motions to dismiss and for
summary judgment. The court found that the inmate properly stated a prima facie claim under the
Rehabilitation Act by alleging that he suffered from a chronically unstable right shoulder and that
he had been issued a "cuff-front" pass by the corrections department medical personnel. The pass
required prison personnel to cuff the inmate with his hands in front to accommodate his injury, but
prison officers failed to heed the cuff pass and handcuffed the inmate's arms behind his back. The
court noted that acceptance of federal funds by the state corrections department was a waiver of
its sovereign immunity from liability under the federal Rehabilitation Act. The court ordered
further proceedings to determine if officers destroyed a posted medical order pertaining to the
inmate, whether another officer stood by as an officer handcuffed the inmate in a manner contrary
to the posted medical order, and whether the officers maliciously intended to cause harm to the
inmate. (W allens Ridge State Prison, Virginia)

U.S. District Court
FIRE SAFETY

Boyd v. Anderson, 265 F.Supp.2d 952 (N.D.lnd. 2003). Prisoners filed a complaint in state court,
alleging that state corrections officials had violated their federally·protected rights while they were
confined in a state prison. The case was removed to federal court, where some of the claims were
dismissed. The court noted that the Eight Amendment deliberate indifference standard applies to
prison conditions affecting fire safety, although not all unsafe conditions constitute punishment
under the Eighth Amendment. (Indiana State Prison)

U.S. Appeals Court
STAFFING

Cagle v. Sutherland, 334 F.3d 980 (11th Cir. 2003). The personal representative of the estate of a
pretrial detainee who hung himself in his cell brought a § 1983 action, alleging that officials failed
to prevent his suicide. The district court denied summary judgment in favor of the defendants and
they appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. The appeals court held that the county's
violation of a consent decree that arose out of a voluntary settlement of a prior jail conditions

39.54

, ___ )

lawsuit, did not establish a violation of the pretrial detainee's constitutional rights actionable
under § 1983. The consent decree required the county to provide a second nighttime jailer to staff
the jail during the hours that the detainee committed suicide, but the court noted that the prior
lawsuit was not concerned with the risk of prisoner suicides. According to the court, the county's
failure to fund the second jailer did not rise to the level of deliberate indifference to the strong
likelihood that a suicide would result. (Winston County Jail, Alabama)
U.S. Appeals Court
PRETRIAL DETAINEE
TRANSFER
TELEPHONE

Cavalieri v. Shepard, 321 F.3d 616 (7th Cir. 2003). The mother of a pretrial detainee who
attempted suicide brought a§ 1983 action against a police officer, alleging deliberate indifference
to the detainee's risk of attempting suicide. The district court denied summary judgment for the
officer and the officer appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that summary
judgment was precluded by an issue of fact as to whether the officer was aware that the detainee
was on the verge of trying to commit suicide and whether the officer was deliberately indifferent to
the detainee's safety. The court noted that the detainee's right to be free from deliberate
indifference to the risk that he would attempt suicide was clearly established. The detainee was
transferred to a county facility after a brief period of detention in a city jail. When he was admitted
to the county facility he was not placed on suicide watch, but he did ask to speak to a mental
health advisor. He was assigned to a holding cell that contained a telephone with a strong metal
cord. When the police officer called the county facility to complain about calls from the inmate,
county employees found the detainee unconscious, hanging from the wire telephone cord. The
detainee remained in a vegetative state after his unsuccessful suicide attempt. (Champaign
County Correctional Facility, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
SECURITY PRACTICES

Glenn v. Berndt, 289 F.Supp.2d 1120 (N.D.Cal. 2003). A state inmate brought a pro se § 1983
action alleging that officers let two inmates assault him when he was returning to his cell after a
lockdown. The inmate alleged that officers stood by and watched him fight with one of the inmates.
The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The court held that the
accidental opening of two cells, allowing inmates to be released, could not be characterized as the
wanton infliction of unnecessary pain in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The officers allegedly
waited for other officers to arrive before opening a door into the area in which the fight was
occurring. The court held that a reasonable officer could have believed that it was lawful to wait to
enter the area until another officer, who was inside the block, exhausted his efforts to control the
situation with a gas gun and pepper spray. <Pelican Bay State Prison, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
ITEMS PERMITTED

Kimberlin v. U.S. Dept. ofJustice, 318 F.3d 228 <D.C.Cir. 2003). Prison inmates brought an action
against the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) alleging that the BOP's ban on electric or electronic
musical instruments, except those used in connection with religious activities, violated their
constitutional rights to free expression and equal protection. The district court held that the policy
did not violate the First Amendment, but entered summary judgment in favor of the inmates on
their equal protection claim. The inmates appealed and the appeals court affirmed. The appeals
court held that the BOP reasonably interpreted a statute that banned the use of appropriated
funds for the "use or possession" of electric or electronic musical instruments, as a prohibition
against the possession of such instruments. The court noted that even if the inmates' rights of free
expression were implicated by the BOP regulation, it did not impermissibly infringe on those
rights because it was reasonably related to the legitimate interest in conserving correctional funds,
and inmates have access to alternatives such as voice and acoustic instruments. (Federal
Correctional Institution at Cumberland, Maryland)

U.S. District Court
PROTECTION
RELIGIOUS SERVICES
SEGREGATION

Lewis v. Washington, 265 F.Supp.2d 939 (N.D.Ill. 2003). State inmates filed a class action under §
1983 alleging that prison officials violated their constitutional rights while they were in protective
custody. The district court granted summary judgment for the officials, in part. The court held that
officials were entitled to qualified immunity because it was not clearly established that inmates in
temporary protective custody after they appealed denial of their requests for permanent protective
custody, had First Amendment rights to communal religious services, and Fourteenth Amendment
rights to programs and services equivalent to those offered to other inmates. (Stateville
Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
RESTRAINTS

Myers v. Milbert, 281 F.Supp.2d 859 (N.D.W.Va. 2003). A state prisoner brought a pro se action
against corrections officers, alleging that they violated his rights by inappropriately restraining
him for 20 hours on a stretcher, and feeding him a "nutra·loaf" diet for three days. The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of the officers, finding that the prisoner did not suffer
from a serious medical condition as a result of being restrained, and that the disciplinary nutra·
loaf diet did not violate the prisoner's Eighth Amendment rights. The court noted that the inmate
had assaulted a corrections officer and kicked a door. After being placed on the restraint stretcher,
called a "stokes basket," the inmate's handcuffs were loosened and he was given numerous
bathroom breaks, medications, and food and liquids. (Northern Regional Jail and Correctional
Facility, West Virginia)

XIX

39.66

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES
SEGREGATION

Skundor v. McBride, 280 F.Supp.2d 524 (S.D.W.Va. 2003). An inmate brought claims against
corrections officials, challenging visual body cavity searches. The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the defendants. The court held that the prison practice of performing visual
body cavity searches when dangerous, sequestered prisoners left a recreation area, was rationally
related to the legitimate penological objective of staff safety and did not violate the prisoners'
Fourth Amendment rights. The court noted that there was a potential for the exchange of weapons
in the recreation area, and that prisoner privacy was addressed by using only male staff to perform
the searches, and positioning the staff between the inmate and anyone else who might view him.
According to the court, the searches were an efficient way to steadily process the large number of
inmates seeking recreation, and there were no readily available alternatives to the recreation yard
searches. (Mount Olive Correctional Center, West Virginia)

U.S. Appeals Court
TELEPHONE

U.S. v. Gangi, 57 Fed.Appx. 809 (10th Cir. 2003) [unpublished]. A defendant who was convicted for
bank fraud challenged the taping of his jail telephone calls. The appeals court held that it was not
objectively reasonable for the detainee to have any expectation of privacy in his outgoing calls from
jail, and that the detainee impliedly consented to the taping of his calls from jail. The court noted
that the detainee was cognizant of detention settings, which permitted a strong inference that he
fully understood the fact that jail telephones were monitored. According to the court, the detainee
was a "keen observer of detail" and was presumed to have seen signs above other telephones that
provided notice of telephone monitoring. The court held that the Fourth Amendment is not
triggered by the routine taping of outgoing jail calls. (Uinta County Detention Center, Wyoming)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEX OFFENDER

West v. Schwebke, 333 F.3d 745 (7th Cir. 2003). Civilly committed sex offenders brought a§ 1983
action against employees of a state treatment facility, alleging that therapeutic seclusion as
practiced at the facility violated their due process rights. The district court denied summary
judgment for some of the employees and they appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that
the offenders were entitled, as a matter of due process, to the exercise of professional judgment as
to the needs of residents and that due process requires that the conditions and duration of
involuntary civil confinement bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the persons
are committed. The court found that summary judgment was precluded by fact issues as to
whether employees' use of seclusion against the offenders, for at least 20 days and as much as 82
consecutive days in one case, could be justified on either security or treatment grounds. The court
noted that civil detention institutions may employ both incapacitation and deterrence to reduce
violence within their walls, but if mental limitations render a detainee insensible to punishment,
the only appropriate goal would be incapacitation. (Wisconsin Resource Center, Sand Ridge Secure
Tre!l,tment Center)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Wood v. Hancock County, 245 F.Supp.2d 231 (D.Me. 2003). A misdemeanor arrestee brought a civil
rights action against a county and county officials, alleging he was subjected to unconstitutional
strip searches while in jail. The district court denied the defendants' motions for judgment on the
pleadings or for summary judgment. The court held that the arrestee stated a claim, precluding
judgment on the pleadings. The court found that summary judgment was precluded by genuine
issues of fact as to whether the jail policy of strip searching misdemeanor arrestees after contact
visits was reasonable, and whether the jail had a custom of conducting strip searches upon
admission. The court noted that further proceedings were needed to determine ifit was a "custom"
to strip search misdemeanor arrestees without reasonable suspicion that an arrestee harbored
contraband or weapons, and that evidence suggested that officers did not comply with recording
requirements for strip searches. (Hancock County Jail, Maine)
2004

U.S. District Court
CONTRABAND
SEARCHES

Allegheny County Prison Emp. v. County ofAllegh., 315 F.Supp.2d 728 (W.D.Pa. 2004). Employees
at a county jail brought a suit challenging its employee search policy, which involved random pat·
down searches by same sex employees of all areas of the searched employee's body. including the
abdomen and groin, as well as the removal of outer clothing, shoes and belts. The employees moved
for a preliminary injunction. The district court denied the motion, finding that the employees failed
to demonstrate the lil!:elihood of success on their Fourth Amendment or equal protection claims.
The court noted that the county had a strong government interest in controlling the flow of
contraband into prisons, and that employees had a diminished expectation of privacy because they
worked in a correctional facility. The search policy was uniformly applied to all employees and
visitors who had contact with inmates. {Allegheny County Prison, Pennsylvania)

U.S. Appeals Court
CLASSIFICATION
SUPER MAX
SECURITY RESTRICTIONS

Austin v. Wilkinson, 372 F.3d 346 (6 th Cir. 2004). State inmates housed at a supermaximum
security prison facility brought a class action against corrections officials under § 1983, alleging
violations of their procedural due process rights. The district court ruled that officials had violated
the inmates' due process right and granted injunctive relief. The court ordered the adoption of a
revised version of placement regulations and the officials appealed. The appeals court affirmed in
part, reversed in part and remanded. The appeals court held that state inmates enjoyed a due
process protected liberty interest in not being placed at a supermaximum facility, but that the
district court did not have the power to order state officials to modify their predicates. The appeals

XIX

39.56

'
\, ___ )

court upheld the procedural modifications made by the district court to the state's placement and
retention policies, which included increased notice requirements and changes to the administrative
appellate procedure. The court noted past erroneous and haphazard placements at the facility, and
the availability of administrative segregation to ensure the state's interest in safety. The appeals
court found that the proper comparison was within the state's prison system, not between other
supermaximum facilities in other states. The court held that confinement at the supermaximum
facility imposed an atypical and significant hardship, given the extreme isolation visited upon
inmates, lack of outdoor recreation, limitations on personal property rights and access to telephone
and counsel, and ineligibility for parole. (Ohio State Penitentiary. Youngstown)
U.S. Appeals Court
lvlAIL

Bahrampour v. Lampert, 356 F.3d 969 (9th Cir. 2004). A state prisoner sued prison officials under
§ 1983, challenging a prison regulation that prohibited prisoners from receiving certain types of
publications. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the prison officials and the
prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated and remanded in part. The appeals
court held that the state regulation that prohibited prisoners from receiving sexually explicit
materials, and a regulation that prohibited the receipt of"role playing" materials, were related to
legitimate penological interests and were not vague or overly broad. The regulations were found to
be neutral because they targeted the effect of certain types of materials. The court found that a
body-building magazine received by the prisoner contained prohibited sexually explicit material,
including an advertisement for a video depicting "Painful Erotic Domination." According to the
court, the role-playing prohibition was intended to prevent prisoners from placing themselves in
fantasy roles that reduced accountability and substituted raw power for legitimate authority. The
court noted that such games often contained dice, which were prohibited gambling paraphernalia.
The appeals court found that state prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity on the
prisoner's claim that a regulation prohibiting materials by bulk mail was unconstitutional.
Although an appeals court established that the prohibition of commercial bulk mail was
unconstitutional, the officials could not be expected to have known this at the time of the incidents.
Officials had rejected the inmate's receipt of a Green Lantern comic book because it was delivered
by bulk mail. (Snake River Correctional Institution, Oregon)

U.S. Appeals Court
TRANSPORTATION

Brown v. Missouri Dept. of Corrections, 353 F.3d 1038 (8th Cir. 2004). A state inmate brought a§
1983 action, alleging that officials were liable for injuries he received in an accident while en route
to a correctional facility, for denying post-accident care, and for providing inadequate care. The
district court dismissed the action and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part,
reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that the inmate had sufficiently alleged § 1983
claims for deliberate indifference to his safety and deliberate indifference to his medical needs. The
inmate alleged that he asked officials to fasten his seatbelt and they refused, and that he was
unable to do it himself because he was shackled. The inmate also alleged that he asked
correctional officers of three occasions to let him see medical staff, claiming he was having severe
complications from the accident, including difficulty seeing and standing and shaky legs, but his
requests were ignored. (Jefferson City Correctional Center, Missouri)

U.S. District Court
CLASSIFICATION
SEPARATION

Carmichael v. Richards, 307 F.Supp.2d 1014 (S.D.lnd. 2004). A county jail prisoner who was
injured by his cellmate brought a§ 1983 action against a sheriff in his individual and official
capacities, claiming that the sheriff failed to take reasonable measures to ensure his physical
safety, and did not provide necessary medical care. The district court granted summary judgment
in favor of the defendants. The court held that the sheriff could not be held individually liable for
failing to ensure the physical safety of a medium security inmate who was injured by a maximum
security inmate, absent evidence that the sheriff knew of a substantial risk that the inmate would
be harmed, or evidence of a causal link between the policy of mixing of medium and maximum
security prisoners and the increased risk of violence. The court also found that the sheriff was not
liable in his official capacity. The jail had three types of cell classifications: maximum, medium and
minimum security. Inmates are classified by the shift leader who is on duty at the time an inmate
arrives at the jail. (Johnson County Jail, Indiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
USE OF FORCE
RESTRAINTS

Guerra v. Drake, 371 F.3d 404 (8 th Cir. 2004). A pretrial detainee brought civil rights claims
seeking damages from correctional officers, alleging they used excessive force and left him in a
"restraint" chair for prolonged periods. The district court entered judgment against a Captain for
$1,500 on the restraint chair claim and against another officer for $500 on the excessive force
claim. The district court refused to award punitive damages and the detainee appealed. The
appeals court affirmed, finding that the district court's refusal to award punitive damages was not
an abuse of discretion. The inmate had alleged that during his first six days of detention he was
subjected to unprovoked beatings and was placed in a "torture chair" for long periods. (Benton
County Detention Center, Arkansas)

U.S. Appeals Court
FIRE SAFETY

Hadix v. Johnson, 367 F.3d 513 (6 th Cir. 2004). State inmates filed a class action under§ 1983
alleging that their conditions of confinement violated their constitutional rights. Their claims were
settled by a consent decree. The district court denied prison officials' motion to terminate the
consent decree and issued an injunction ordering the departmentalization of facilities as a fire
safety remedy. The officials appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and

XIX

89.57

remanded. The appeals court held that the consent decree encompassed the cell blocks in question
but that the district court judge abused his discretion when he found that current conditions
violated the Eighth Amendment, because the court incorporated its principal findings from two
years earlier, despite the fact that a number of issues had since been resolved. The appeals court
also noted that the district court did not state the standard it was applying to find that conditions
relating to fire safety and fire prevention were inadequate, and failed to identify the point at which
certain fire safety deficiencies ceased being mere deficiencies and instead became constitutional
violations. (State Prison of Southern Michigan, Central Complex)
U.S. Appeals Court
SAFETY

Hall v. Bennett, 379 F.3d 462 (7 th Cir. 2004). An inmate brought a § 1983 claim against prison
supervisors alleging deliberate indifference following an incident in which the inmate received a
severe electrical shock while working as an electrician at the prison. The district court granted
summary judgment for the supervisors and the inmate appealed. The appeals court vacated and
remanded. The appeals court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of
material fact as to whether the supervisors knew that the inmate could suffer a severe shock as a
consequence of working on a live wire without protective gloves. (Correctional Industrial Facility,
Pendleton, Indiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
STAFFING

McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2004). A former inmate of a county jail brought a§
1983 Eighth Amendment action against a county, alleging improper failure to treat his emergency
medical condition. The inmate also asserted negligence claims against the jail's health services
subcontractor and against a nurse employed by the subcontractor. The district court dismissed the
claims against the subcontractor and nurse and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed.
The court held that the county jail's staffing problems, allegedly resulting from the county board's
custom of inadequate budgeting for the sheriff's office and jail, did not satisfy the "custom or
policy" requirement of the inmate's § 1983 action. The inmate alleged that the county failed to
transport him to a hospital during a medical emergency. The court noted that the jail had a policy
to call an ambulance to transport inmates with emergency medical needs if jail personnel were
unable to do so. The inmate's transport to the hospital emergency room was delayed by nearly
twelve hours as jail staff accomplished other transports. By the time the inmate arrived at the
hospital he was experiencing paralysis in his legs. (Dekalb County Jail, Georgia, and Wexford
Health Sources, Inc.)

U.S. Appeals Court
WHEELCHAIR

Miller v. King, 384 F.3d 1248 (11 th Cir. 2004). A paraplegic state prisoner brought a § 1983 action
alleging Eighth Amendment and Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) violations. The district
court granted summary judgment for the defendants on most of the claims, and following a jury
trial entered judgment for a disciplinary hearing officer on the remaining claims. The prisoner
appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded. The appeals court
held that fact issues, as to whether the prisoner was afforded basic levels of humane care and
hygiene, precluded summary judgment on the prisoner's § 1983 claims for monetary damages and
injunctive relief under the Eighth Amendment. According to the court, the prisoner was "disabled"
within the meaning of ADA and had standing to seek injunctive relief against a prison warden.
The prisoner was due to remain in isolation for over eight years as the result of more than 180
disciplinary reports. Able-bodied inmates in disciplinary isolation are housed in less stringent
units than the building in which the prisoner was housed. Because of the small cell size in his unit,
prison policy calls for beds to removed daily so that wheelchair-bound inmates have some minimal
area within with to move around in their cells. The prisoner alleged that there was no room in his
cell, making him immobile and restrained for long periods of time, and that prison staff failed to
remove the bed from his cell daily. The prisoner also alleged that the showers in the housing unit
are not wheelchair-accessible. (Georgia State Prison)

U.S. Appeals Court
SAFETY

Reynolds v. Powell, 370 F.3d 1028 (10th Cir. 2004). A state inmate brought a pro se § 1983 action
alleging that he was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment by being exposed to a hazardous
condition in the prison shower area. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the
defendants and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the alleged slippery
floors resulting from a standing water problem in the prison shower area did not rise to the level of
a condition that posed a substantial risk of serious harm, even though the inmate was on crutches
and had warned officials that he was at a heightened risk of falling. (Uinta IV Maximum Security
Facility, Utah)

U.S. District Court
STAFFING

Thompson v. Spears, 336 F.Supp.2d 1224 (S.D.Fla. 2004). A prisoner brought an action against a
county and a jail official, alleging deliberate indifference to his safety, negligent supervision, and
negligent infliction of emotional distress. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
the defendants. The court held that a lack of monitoring devices in jail cells did not pose an
objectively substantial risk of harm to the inmate, particularly in light of the fact the state Model
Jail Standards did not require cameras. The court found that the inmate presented no evidence
that the officer posts were located so far that officers could not hear calls for help. The court held
that the county was not liable under§ 1983, even if jail officers did not actually follow the county
policy of making hourly walk·throughs to monitor cells, where there was no evidence that the
county had officially sanctioned or ordered the officers to disregard the county policy. The prisoner

XIX

39.68

---'\
}

had been temporarily transferred from a state prison to the county jail in order to be involved in a
family court matter. The inmate, who was from Jacksonville, Florida, alleged that he was severely
beaten by other inmates for over two hours, after the Miami Dolphins beat the Jacksonville
Jaguars in a football game. (Pretrial Detention Center, Miami·Dade County, Florida)
U.S. Appeals Court
ESCAPE

U.S. v. Sack, 379 F.3d 1177 (10th Cir. 2004). A defendant who had been ordered to reside in a
halfway house following his arrest but failed to return after a day of work, pled guilty to escape.
The inmate appealed and the appeals court held that the defendant was in custody, within the
meaning of the escape statute, while he was ordered to reside in the halfway house. <La Pasada
Halfway House, New Mexico)

U.S. District Court
RESTRAINTS

Watson v. Riggle, 315 F.Supp,2d 963 (N.D.lnd. 2004). A state prison inmate brought a prose§
1983 Eighth Amendment action against corrections officers, alleging use of excessive force in
connection with the removal of handcuffs. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
the officers, finding that the officers who restrained the inmate's wrists in order to remove the
handcuffs following the inmate's refusal to allow the removal, used reasonable force, given the
inmate's argumentative nature and minimal injuries. The court noted that the inmate's
argumentative nature could have led to a greater disturbance, and that a medical examination
found only a cut on one hand and swelling in the wrist, with the full range of motion, and no
further treatment was required. <Miami Correctional Facility, Indiana)

U.S. District Court
"LOCK-IN"

Wrinkles v. Davis, 311 F.Supp.2d 735 (N.D.lnd. 2004). Death row inmates at a state prison
brought a § 1983 action in state court, alleging that a 79-day lockdown of the death row area
violated their constitutional rights. The lockdown had been implemented after a death row inmate
was killed during recreation, apparently by other death row inmates. The court held that ceasing,
for security reasons, allowing religious volunteers into the death row unit for group religious
services and for spiritual discussions during the lockdown did not violate the inmates' First
Amendment right to practice their religion. The court also found no violation for the alleged denial
of inmates' access to telephones for 55 days, to hygiene services for 65 days, to hot meals for 30
days, and to exercise equipment. According to the court, suspending all personal visits to death
row inmates for the first 54 days of the lockdown did not violate the inmates' First Amendment
rights, where visitation privileges were a matter subject to the discretion of prison officials.
(Indiana State Prison)

_.)
·.~/

2005
U.S. District Court
TRANSPORTATION
WHEELCHAIR

Allah v. Goard, 405 F.Supp.2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). A state inmate who used a wheelchair brought
a pro se action alleging failure of corrections officials to safely transport him to and from outside
medical providers. The district court granted the defendant's motions for dismissal in part, and
denied in part. The court held that the inmate's allegations with respect to the state corrections
department were sufficient to establish a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act CADA).
According to the court, corrections officials were not entitled to qualified immunity from liability
under§ 1983 for injures sustained while being transported in an unsafe van, where their conduct
amounted to more than an ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner's safety. The court held that
their decision to place the inmate back in a wheelchair after he fell once demonstrated complete
disregard for his safety. The inmate alleged that he suffered a "serious injury (to) his head, neck
and back" when he fell to the floor of the van in question and suffered "unnecessary pain and
discomfort, permanent disability, and mental distress." The van driver allegedly speeded and then
stopped short on more than one occasion, and other wheelchair-using inmates had been injured in
the same manner during transport. (Green Haven Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
FIRE SAFETY
PUBLICATIONS

Banks v. Beard, 399 F.3d 134 (3rd Cir. 2005). A state inmate brought a free speech challenge to a
state corrections policy on behalf of himself and other similarly situated inmates. The policy
restricted access to newspapers, magazines, and photographs by inmates who are placed in a
prison's long·term segregation unit. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
state and the inmate appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that a valid,
rational connection did not exist between the policy and a stated rehabilitation objective, nor
prison security concerns. The court noted that confinement in the unit was not based on a specific
rule infraction or for a specific duration, and that an inmate could remain in the unit under the
publication ban indefinitely. According to the court, there was no evidence that inmates misused
periodicals or photographs in ways described by corrections officials, such as to fuel fires or as
crude weapons. There was no evidence regarding the effect of the ban on the frequency of fires, and
inmates were permitted to possess other items that could be used for the purposes that were
supposedly targeted by the policy. The court noted that inmates had no alternative means to
exercise their First Amendment right of access to a reasonable amount of newspapers, magazines
and photographs. The court described alternative policies, such as establishing reading periods in
which periodicals could be delivered to inmates' cells and later collected, establishing a limit on the
number of photographs that an inmate could have in his cell at one time, or escorting inmates to a
secure mini·law library to read periodicals of their choosing. The policy bans all newspapers and
magazines from a publisher or prison library, or from any source, unless the publication is

XIX

· 39.59

religious or legal in nature. (State Correctional Institution at Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania)
U.S. Appeals Court
VISITS

Bazzetta v. McGinnis, 423 F.3d 557 (6th Cir. 2005). A class of state prisoners challenged
restrictions on visitation. The district court entered judgment for the plaintiffs and the appeals
court affirmed. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed and remanded. On remand, the district court
declined to dissolve its injunctive order of compliance and the state corrections department
appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that the department regulation that
restricted visitation did not, on its face, violate procedural due process. The court noted that
prisoners do not have a protected liberty interest in visitation. The regulation indefinitely
precluded visitation from persons other than attorneys or clergy for prisoner with two or more
substance abuse violations. The appeals court opened its decision by stating ''This case marks
another chapter in a ten·year controversy between incarcerated felons, their visitors, and the
Michigan Department of Corrections." (Michigan Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
DISTRIBURANCE
PRETRIAL DETAINEE
RESTRAINTS
USEOFFORCE

Birdine v. Gray, 375 F.Supp.2d 874 (D.Neb. 2005). A pretrial detainee brought a§ 1983 action
against jail employees claiming violation of his right to be free of punishment and his right to
privacy. The district court dismissed the complaint. The court held that the detainee did not have a
privacy right that would allow him to cover the window of his cell with towels, noting that the cell
contained a privacy wall which allowed for partial privacy while using the toilet. The court found
that the inmate's privacy rights were not violated when he was moved from one cell to another,
naked. The inmate had removed all of his clothes and refused to put them back, and jail staff
moved him unclothed to a cell closer to their station where he could be constantly watched. The
court found no violation when the inmate was placed in a restraint chair because he was confined
as a last resort when all other restraint options proved ineffective. According to the court, the
detainee was monitored, the chair was not used to punish, and the detainee was offered the
opportunity to be released in return for acting appropriately. The court found no due process
violation when a stun gun was applied to the detainee two times, after he engaged in violent
actions as jail officers attempt to settle him into a cell to which he was being transferred. The court
found that the detainee's conduct was an immediate threat to institutional safety, security and
efficiency. (Lancaster County Jail, Nebraska)

U.S. Appeals Court
BOOKS
RELIGION

Borzych v. Frank, 439 F.3d 388 (7th Cir. 2006). An inmate sued state prison officials under § 1983
and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), challenging a ban on
books the inmate deemed necessary for the practice of his Odinist religion. The district court
entered summary judgment for the officials and the inmate appealed. The appeals court held that, ·., - __)_--even if the state substantially burdened the inmate's religious exercise by banning books he
____ _
deemed necessary to practice his Odinist religion, the ban on such books was the least restrictive
means to promote a compelling state interest in safety, and thus did not violate the Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The court noted that the books promoted
violence to exalt the status of whites and demean other races, and that redaction of offensive
material was not a realistic option. According to the court, a state prison procedure that prohibited
activities and literature that advocate racial or ethnic supremacy or purity was not overbroad, in
violation of free speech guarantees or RLUIPA, where the overbreadth of the regulation was not
substantial in relation to its proper applications. Officials had refused to allow the inmate to
possess the books Creed ofIron, Temple of Wotan, and The NPKA Book ofBlotar, which he said
were necessary to practice his religion. The inmate identified his religion as Odinism (or Odinic
Rite), which like Asatru and Wotanism entails the worship of Norse gods. The inmate maintained
that the books were religious texts. The officials conceded that Odinism is a religion. (Wisconsin
Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
USE OF FORCE

Bozeman v. Orum, 422 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 2005). The representative of the estate of a pretrial
detainee who had died during a struggle with county correctional officers brought a§ 1983 suit
alleging use of excessive force and deliberate indifference to medical needs. The district court
granted summary judgment for several defendants but denied summary judgment for corrections
officers. The officers appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the officers' alleged
conduct in subduing the detainee was actionable as excessive force and that the officers were not
entitled to qualified immunity. The court also held that the officers' alleged conduct following the
struggle·· waiting 14 minutes before summoning medical assistance even though the detainee
appeared lifeless·- was actionable as deliberate indifference and the officers were not entitled to
qualified immunity. The court noted that the law defining excessive force was clearly established
at the time of the incident, and the officers should have known that continuing to apply force to the
unruly detainee after he had given up his struggle was not acceptable. (Montgomery County
Detention Facility, Alabama)

U.S. District Court
PROTECTION

Collins v. County ofKern, 390 F.Supp.2d 964 (E.D.Cal. 2005). An inmate brought a§ 1983 action
against a county and a sheriffs department, stemming from an attack by other inmates while he
was incarcerated. A fight had erupted in a jail housing unit between Black and Hispanic inmates
and the inmate was injured. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendants. The court held that inmate failed to establish that department officials knew of and
disregarded a risk of attack when they moved the inmate to another jail unit. At the time of the

XIX

39.60

)

move, the inmate did not inform anyone of safety concerns or segregation issues due to a purported
gang affiliation. The court found that officials took prompt action to stop the fight, secure the area,
and ensure prompt medical treatment for the inmate. The court noted that a "prison official need
not believe to [a] moral certainty that one inmate intends to attack another at [a] given place at
time certain before he is obligated to prevent such an assault." According to the court, before being
required to take action, an official must have more than a mere suspicion that an attack will occur.
(Lerdo Pre·Trial Facility, Kern County, California)
U.S. District Court
CONTRABAND
SEARCHES

Fraternal Order ofPolice/Dept. v. Washington, 394 F.Supp.2d 7 (D.D.C. 2005). A police labor
committee and correctional officers in leadership positions with the committee sued a corrections
department, challenging the constitutionality of searches of their lockers and automobiles during a
shakedown of the detention facility. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendants. The court held that the checkpoint seizure of correctional officers' cars at the entrance
to a jail's parking lot were not unconstitutional, where the officers were requested to sign consent
forms to have their vehicles searched or to park elsewhere. The court noted that the jail was a
maximum ·security facility and keeping contraband out of the jail was an imperative, and the
purpose of the checkpoint was to afford an opportunity to inform officers of the activity, present
consent forms, and search the vehicles of who consented. The court held that the searches of cars
were not unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment where the officers consented to the
searches by signing consent forms that stated in clear and unambiguous language that the officers
could deny the search at any time. According to the court, searches of correctional officers' lockers
were not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, where the searches were conducted in the
early morning hours by correctional officers of the same gender as the officers whose lockers were
being searched, and the lockers were provided by the corrections department for the convenience of
correctional officers. The court noted that the assigned officer and Director of the department had
keys to each locker, and that locker assignments could be changed without notice by the Director.
Prison regulations clearly stated that a condition of employment was that all personnel submit to a
search of their person, or automobile, or place of assignment on government property, when such a
search was required by department officials. (Central Detention Facility, District of Columbia)

U.S. Appeals Court

Harbin·Bey v. Rutter, 420 F.3d 571 (6th Cir. 2005). A state prisoner filed a pro se § 1983 action
alleging that his designation as a member of a security threat group without a hearing violated his
constitutional rights. The district court dismissed the case and the prisoner appealed. The appeals
court affirmed, finding that the prisoner's designation without a hearing did not violate equal
protection due process, or the prisoner's right of access to the courts. Although the designation
caused the prisoner to be excluded from community placement and placed on visitor restrictions,
the court found that his designation was not based on his religious beliefs but rather was due to
his gang affiliation. The court upheld the state's policy directive regarding classification of inmates
as security threat group members, finding it was rationally related to the legitimate state interest
of maintaining order in the prison. According to the court, identifying, reclassifying and separating
prisoners who are members of groups that engage in the planning or commitment of unlawful acts
or acts of misconduct "targets a core threat to the safety of both prison inmates and officials." The
court held that the alleged censorship of the prisoner's periodicals did not violate the inmate's First
Amendment rights. The prison policy prohibited prisoners from receiving mail depicting gang
symbols or signs and required that the magazine be accepted or rejected as a whole. The court
noted that the inmate's contention that officials should go through each magazine and remove all
prohibited material would be unduly burdensome. The inmate's subscription was ultimately
terminated by the publisher, and the prison rejected only a single issue. (Alger Maximum Security
Facility, Michigan)

GANGS

,_)

U.S. Appeals Court
LOCKDOWN
SEARCHES· CELL

Hart v. Sheahan, 396 F.3d 887 (7 th Cir. 2005). Female pretrial detainees brought an action against
a county and jail superintendent alleging deprivation of liberty without due process. The district
court dismissed the case and the detainees appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded,
finding that the detainees stated a claim upon which relief could be granted. The detainees alleged
that during monthly lockdown searches of the jail, they were confined for 48 to 50 hours at a time
to their cells, where they were not under observation or within hailing distance of correctional
officers. The detainees alleged that serious injuries resulted from their inability to get the officers'
attention during a crisis. The court noted that an alternative procedure was available to the jail
that would allow inmates in each locked tier to be released from their cells after that tier was
searched, resulting in shorter lockdown periods. (Cook County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCHES
PRETRIAL DETAINEE

Hicks v. Moore, 422 F.3d 1246 (11th Cir. 2005). A former pretrial detainee brought an action
challenging strip search practices at a county jail. The district court denied immunity for the
defendants and they appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
The court held that the mere fact that a detainee was to be placed in the jail's general population
did not justify a strip search, but that reasonable suspicion existed for the plaintiffs strip search
because he had been charged with a family violence battery offense. The court noted that battery is
a crime of violence that would permit the inference that the detainee might be concealing weapons
or contraband. (Habersham County Jail, Georgia)

XIX

39.61

U.S. District Court
FIRE SAFETY
CONTRABAND

Howard v. Snyder, 389 F.Supp.2d 589 (D.Del. 2005). A state prison inmate brought a § 1983 action
against corrections officials, alleging that legal papers were missing from a box of personal effects
that were seized from his cell as contraband, when the box was returned. The inmate alleged that
his access to court was hindered. The district court granted summary judgment to the officials,
finding that the "two box rule" under which the materials were confiscated, served legitimate
penological interests. According to the court, the regulation promoted fire safety and limited the
access to contraband. The court noted'that the inmate had continual access to the prison's law
library and that he could have obtained approval for an extra box. (Delaware Correctional Center)

U.S. District Court
SAFETY

Littlejohn v. Moody, 381 F.Supp.2d 507 (E.D.Va. 2005). A federal prisoner brought a prose action
against prison officials, seeking injunctive relief and monetary damages. The inmate alleged
violation of his constitutional rights when he was shocked by an electrical surge because a buffing
machine that he was using did not have a ground·prong in its plug. The district court granted the
defendants' motion to dismiss. The court held that one official did not know of a substantial risk of
harm at the time the prisoner was shocked because he had sent the buffer to be repaired when it
had shocked prisoners in the past, and he reasonably assumed that the machine was safe when it
returned. Although the court found that allegations supported a deliberate indifference claim
against a prison safety manager and electrical shop foreman, the court granted them qualified
immunity because the right to be protected from a significant risk of injury was not clearly
established at the time of the incident. (Federal Bureau of Prisons, Virginia)

U.S. Dist1·ict Court
RELIGIOUS SERVICES
SEARCHES

McRoy v. Cook County Dept. of Corrections, 366 F.Supp.2d 662 (N.D.Ill. 2005). A Muslim inmate
at a county correctional facility brought a civil rights action under§ 1983, alleging that his
opportunities to practice his faith were restricted in violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The
court held that the inmate's free exercise rights were not violated by the cancellation of Muslim
services during lockdowns, staff shortages, and when no volunteer imams were available to preside
over services. The court noted that inmates should not be granted authority as religious leaders
over other inmates, and cancellation of services when volunteer imams were not available was
warranted. The court found that the policy of limiting the number of Muslim services to three each
week did not violate the inmate's free exercise rights, nor was a policy that limited the number of
inmates who could attend Muslim services at the same time. The court also found no violation in
the policy of strip·searching inmates when they were leaving or returning to an inmate area,
noting that the inmate could choose not to attend a service because of the policy and could pray in
his cell or common area instead. The court upheld the facility's decision not to create a Muslim·
only living unit. The court noted that the inmate was permitted to pray in his cell using religious
materials he was allowed to keep there, as well as being allowed to pray in the common area of his
living unit. (Cook County Department of Corrections, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
BOOKS
FIRE SAFETY

Neal v. Lewis, 414 F.3d 1244 (10th Cir. 2005). A Shiite Muslim prisoner filed a pro se action
seeking injunctive relief and damages under § 1983, alleging that prison officials violated his civil
rights by interfering with his religious observance. The district court granted summary judgment
in favor of the defendants and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held
that the officials did not violate the prisoner's First Amendment rights by enforcing a prison
regulation that limited the number of books that could be kept in a cell. The court also found no
violation of the prisoner's due process or equal protection rights. The regulation limited prisoners
to the possession of twelve books, plus one dictionary, one thesaurus, and the primary religious
text for their declared religion. The court noted that nothing prevented the prisoner from stocking
his cell with twelve religious texts. According to the court, the regulation was applied equally to all
inmates, and it promoted legitimate administrative and penological objectives including fire safety,
institutional security, control of the source and flow of property in prison, and the effective
establishment of a behavior-incentive program. The court noted that the prisoner failed to choose
any of the options available to him. (El Dorado Correctional Facility, Kansas)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCHES
VISITS

Neumeyer v. Beard, 421 F.3d 210 (3 rd Cir. 2005). Prison visitors filed a § 1983 action seeking a
declaration that the prison's practice of subjecting visitors' vehicles to random searches violated
their constitutional rights. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants
and the visitors appealed. The appeals court affirmed, holding that the prison's practice of
engaging in suspicionless searches of prison visitors' vehicles was valid under the special needs
doctrine. According to the court, the relatively minor inconvenience of the searches, balanced
against the prison officials' special need to· maintain the security and safety of the prison, rose
beyond their general need to enforce the law. The court noted that some inmates have outside
work details and may have access to the vehicles. The prison had posted large signs at all
entranceways to the prison and immediately in front of the visitors' parking lot that stated " ... all
persons, vehicles and personal property entering or brought on these grounds are subject to
search ... n Visitors are asked to sign a Consent to Search Vehicle form before a search is conducted
and if they refuse they are denied entry into the prison and are asked to leave the premises. (State
Correctional Institution at Huntingdon, Pennsylvania)·

XIX

39.62

U.S. Appeals Court
SEGREGATION

Peoples v. CCA Detention Centers, 422 F.3d 1090 (10th Cir. 2005). A pretrial detainee who was

U.S. District Court
RESTRAINTS

Perez Olivo v. Gonzalez, 384 F.Supp.2d 536 (D.Puerto Rico 2005). An inmate brought a Bivens
action against correctional officers, stemming from the alleged use of restraints on him during an
escorted medical trip. The district court dismissed the case. The court held that the use of
restraints did not violate the inmate’s clearly established rights and that the leg irons, as placed,
did not violate the inmate’s rights. According to the court, the officers exercised their best
correctional judgment in applying the leg iron restraints and did not deliberately inflict pain. The
court found that the agency’s alleged failure to respond in a timely manner to the inmate’s
complaints did not violate due process. The inmate alleged that he was submitted to unnecessary
punishment and discomfort for three hours, resulting in bruised ankles and pain for a period of
eight days. (Federal Bureau of Prisons, Metropolitan Detention Center, Guaynabo, Puerto Rico)

U.S. District Court
TELEPHONE CALLS
VISITS

U.S. v. Ali, 396 F.Supp.2d 703 (E.D.Va. 2005). A pretrial detainee who was charged with terrorism-

U.S. Appeals Court
HAIR LENGTH

Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2005). A Native American inmate sued state

U.S. Appeals Court
GANGS
TRANSFER

Westefer v. Snyder, 422 F.3d 570 (7th Cir. 2005). State prisoners brought a § 1983 action
challenging their transfers to a higher-security prison. The district court granted summary
judgment for the defendants and the prisoners appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part,
reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that the prisoners’ suit challenging transfers to a
high security prison was not subject to dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies as
required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), where the transfer review process was not
available to prisoners in disciplinary segregation, and the prisoners’ grievances were sufficient to
alert the prison that the transfer decisions were being challenged. The court held that the alleged
change in a prison policy that required transferring gang members to a high security facility did
not constitute an ex post facto violation. The court ruled that the prisoners stated a claim for
denial of due process, where the conditions at the high security prison were arguably different
enough to give the prisoners a liberty interest in not being transferred there, and there was a
dispute as to whether the state provided sufficient pre- and post-transfer opportunities for the

housed at a detention center operated by a private contractor under a contract with the United
States Marshals Service brought actions against the contractor and its employees, alleging Fifth
and Eighth Amendment violations. The district court dismissed the action and the inmate
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the employees did not punish
the pretrial detainee in violation of his due process rights when they placed him in segregation
upon his arrival at the center and kept him in segregation for approximately 13 months without a
hearing. The detainee was first placed in segregation because the center lacked bed space in the
general population, and he remained in segregation due to his plot to escape from his previous
pretrial detention facility. According to the court, the detention center has a legitimate interest in
segregating individual inmates from the general population for nonpunitive reasons, including
threats to the safety and security of the institution. (Corrections Corporation of America,
Leavenworth, Kansas)

related offenses filed a motion for relief from conditions of confinement. The district court denied
the motion, finding that the measures imposed did not violate due process. The court also found
that judicial relief was not available because the detainee did not exhaust available administrative
remedies, even though the detainee completed an inmate request form seeking permission to
receive regular phone calls to his family and lawyers, and visits from his family. According to the
court, the detainee did not pursue succeeding options available to him when his request was
denied. The court held that the “Special Administrative Measures” (SAM) imposed on the detainee
at the request of the Attorney General did not violate the detainee’s due process rights, where the
SAMs were imposed to further the legitimate and compelling purpose of preventing future terrorist
acts. The measures prevented the detainee from receiving regular phone calls from his family and
lawyers, and from receiving visits from his family. According to the court, there was no alternative
means to prevent the detainee from communicating with his confederates, and the special
accommodations sought by the detainee would have imposed unreasonable burdens on prison and
law enforcement personnel. The court noted that the measures did not restrict the detainee’s
ability to help prepare his own defense. (Alexandria Detention Center, Virginia)

corrections officials challenging a prison hair grooming policy that required male inmates to
maintain hair no longer than three inches, alleging it violated his rights under the Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The district court denied the inmate’s request for
a preliminary injunction and the inmate appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded,
finding that the policy imposed a substantial burden on the inmate’s religious practice and that
the policy was not the least restrictive alternative to achieve the state’s interest in prison security.
The court noted that the inmate was not physically forced to cut his hair, but that he was
subjected to punishments including confinement to his cell, imposition of additional duty hours,
and reclassification into a less desirable work group. The court also noted that the state failed to
explain why its women’s prisons did not adhere to an equally strict grooming policy. The court
concluded that the inmate faced the possibility of irreparable injury absent the issuance of an
injunction and the balance of hardships favored the inmate. (Adelanto Community Correctional
Facility, California)

39.63
XX

prisoners to challenge the propriety of the transfers. The court held that the transfers did not
violate the gang members’ First Amendment associational rights, noting that prisoners had no
right to associate with gangs. (Tamms Correctional Center, Illinois)
U.S. District Court
TRANSPORTATION

Young v. Hightower, 395 F.Supp.2d 583 (E.D.Mich. 2005). A state prison inmate brought a pro se

civil rights action against prison officials, alleging they were deliberately indifferent to his safety
when they refused to buckle his seatbelt when he was transported in chains in a prison van and
when the vehicle was then involved in a collision that resulted in injuries to the inmate. The
district court held that the inmate had satisfied the exhaustion requirement of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) even though he did not return a document requested in response to
his completed step III grievance form. The court found that prison policy did not require specific
documents to be filed with the step III form and the request for documents suggested that the
request was procedural rather than substantive. According to the court, when an inmate takes the
prison grievance procedure to its last step, the PLRA exhaustion requirement has been satisfied if
the state forgoes an opportunity to decide matters internally. (Chippewa Correctional Facility,
Michigan)
2006

U.S. District Court
TRANSPORTATION
RESTRAINTS

Anderson-Bey v. District of Columbia, 466 F.Supp.2d 51 (D.D.C. 2006). Prisoners transported

U.S. District Court
SUPERMAX
TRANSFER

Austin v. Wilkinson, 502 F.Supp.2d 675 (N.D.Ohio 2006). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action

U.S. District Court
SUPERMAX
TRANSFER

Austin v. Wilkinson, 502 F.Supp.2d 660 (N.D.Ohio 2006). State inmates in a super maximum

between out-of-state correctional facilities brought a civil rights action against the District of
Columbia and corrections officers, alleging common law torts and violation of their constitutional
rights under First and Eighth Amendments. The prisoners had been transported in two groups,
with trips lasting between 10 and 15 hours. The defendants brought motions to dismiss or for
summary judgment which the court denied with regard to the District of Columbia. The court held
that: (1) a fact issue existed as to whether the restraints used on prisoners during the prolonged
transport caused greater pain than was necessary to ensure they were securely restrained; (2) a
fact issue existed as to whether the officers acted with deliberate indifference to the prisoners’
health or safety in the transport of the prisoners; (3) a causal nexus existed between the protected
speech of the prisoners in bringing the civil lawsuit against the corrections officers and subsequent
alleged retaliation by the officers during the transport of prisoners; (4) a fact issue existed as to
whether the officers attempted to chill the prisoners’ participation in the pending civil lawsuit
against the officers; and (5) a fact issue existed as to whether conditions imposed on the prisoners
during the transport were justified by valid penological needs. The court found that the denial of
food during a bus ride that lasted between 10 and 15 hours was insufficiently serious to state a
stand-alone cruel and unusual punishment civil rights claim under the Eighth Amendment. The
court also found that the denial of bathroom breaks during the 10 to 15 hour bus trip, did not,
without more, constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. The court
stated that the extremely uncomfortable and painful shackles applied for the numerous hours
during transports, exacerbated by taunting, threats, and denial of food, water, medicine, and
toilets, was outrageous conduct under District of Columbia law, precluding summary judgment on
the prisoners’ intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against the corrections officers.
(District of Columbia)

alleging that the procedure for transferring him to a super maximum security prison violated due
process. The inmate moved to compel the state to reduce his security placement level. The district
court granted the motion. The court held that the process used by the state to increase the
inmate's security placement level after he killed his cellmate violated due process, even though the
prison's rules infraction board found insufficient evidence that the inmate acted solely in selfdefense, where the prison's classification committee recommended that the inmate's security
placement remain unchanged, the inmate was not given notice of the warden's decision to override
the committee's recommendation or opportunity to argue his position and submit evidence, the
inmate was not given a hearing on administrative appeal, the board's finding was subject to review
by the committee, and the inmate was transferred to a super maximum security prison before the
review process was complete. According to the court, due process required that the warden and the
state's administrative appeals board provide adequate reasoned statements to justify their
decisions to override the prison's classification committee's recommendation that the inmate's
security placement remain unchanged after he killed his cellmate. The court held that the state
prison system was required to provide an individualized review of the security risk presented by
an inmate following his transfer to a super maximum security prison, and thus the state's use of a
boilerplate checklist violated the inmate's due process rights, where the inmate received no
meaningful review of his situation or of the events leading to his transfer. (Ohio State
Penitentiary)
security prison facility brought a class action against corrections officials under § 1983 alleging
that procedures for transferring them to, and retaining them at, the prison violated due process.
The district court ruled that the procedures denied due process and ordered modifications. Prison
officials appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded. Certiorari

39.64
XX

was granted. The United States Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.
On remand, the inmates moved for an order extending the court's jurisdiction over due process
issues for one year, and the officials' moved to terminate prospective relief. The district court
granted the inmates’ motion and denied the officials’ motion. (Ohio State Penitentiary)
U.S. District Court
FIRE SAFETY

Duquin v. Dean, 423 F.Supp.2d 411 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). A deaf inmate filed an action alleging that

U.S. District Court
FIRE SAFETY

Figueroa v. Dean, 425 F.Supp.2d 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). A state prisoner who was born deaf brought

U.S. Appeals Court
SEGREGATION

Freeman v. Berge, 441 F.3d 543 (7th Cir. 2006). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against prison
officials, alleging cruel and unusual punishment. After a jury returned a verdict in favor of the
inmate, the district court granted judgment as a matter of law for the defendants, and the inmate
appealed. The court of appeals affirmed. The court held that the prison's feeding rule requiring
that, when meals were delivered to an inmate's cell, the inmate had to be wearing trousers or gym
shorts, was a reasonable condition to the receipt of food in light of security issues and respect for
female security officers' privacy. The court found that prison officials' withholding of food from the
inmate when he refused to put on trousers or shorts did not constitute the use of food deprivation
as punishment, for the purposes of the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment. The court found that prison officials' withholding of food from the inmate when he
wore a sock on his head when meals were delivered to his cell was a reasonable condition to the
receipt of the food, in light of security issues presented by the possibility that a sock could be used
as a weapon if something was inside it. According to the court, withholding of food from the inmate
when he refused to remove the sock from his head did not constitute the use of food deprivation as
punishment. Inmates in the Supermax are fed their three meals a day in their cells. The prison's
feeding rule requires that the prisoner stand in the middle of his cell, with the lights on, when the
meal is delivered and that he be wearing trousers or gym shorts. If the inmate does not comply
with the rule, the meal is not served to him. The inmate wanted to eat in his underwear, so on a
number of occasions over a two-and-a-half-year period he refused to put on pants or gym shorts
and as a result was not served. Because he skipped so many meals he lost 45 pounds. (Wisconsin
Maximum Security Facility, “Supermax”)

U.S. Appeals Court
RESTRAINTS

Hanks v. Prachar, 457 F.3d 774 (8th Cir. 2006). A former county jail detainee brought a § 1983
action against county jail officials, alleging violation of his due process rights in connection with
the use of restraints and confinement, requesting damages and injunctive relief. The district court

prison officials violated his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Rehabilitation
Act, and a consent decree by failing to provide qualified sign language interpreters, effective visual
fire alarms, use of closed-captioned television sets, and access to text telephones (TTY). Officials
moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted in their favor. The court held that
the officials at the high-security facility complied with the provision of a consent decree requiring
them to provide visual fire alarms for hearing-impaired inmates, even if the facility was not always
equipped with visual alarms, where corrections officers were responsible for unlocking each cell
door and ensuring that inmates evacuate in emergency situations. The court held that the deputy
supervisor for programs at the facility was not subject to civil contempt for her failure to fully
comply with the provision of consent decree requiring the facility to provide access to text
telephones (TTY) for hearing-impaired inmates in a manner equivalent to hearing inmates' access
to telephone service, even though certain areas within the facility provided only limited access to
TTY, and other areas lacked TTY altogether. The court noted that the deputy warden made
diligent efforts to comply with the decree, prison staff responded to the inmate's complaints with
temporary accommodations and permanent improvements, and repairs to broken equipment were
made promptly. The court found that the denial of the inmate's request to purchase a thirteen-inch
color television for his cell did not subject the deputy supervisor for programs to civil contempt for
failing to fully comply with the provision of a consent decree requiring the facility to provide
closed-captioned television for hearing-impaired inmates, despite the inmate's contention that a
closed-caption decoder would not work on commissary televisions. The court noted that the facility
policy barred color televisions in cells and that suppliers confirmed that there was no technological
barrier to installing decoders in televisions that were available from the commissary. (Wende
Correctional Facility, New York)

an action against a superintendent of programs at a prison, alleging failure to provide interpreters,
visual fire alarms, access to text telephone, and a television with closed-captioned device in
contempt of a consent order in class action in which the court entered a decree awarding
declaratory relief to prohibit disability discrimination against hearing impaired prisoners by state
prison officials. The superintendent moved for summary judgment and the district court granted
the motion. The court held that the exhaustion requirement of Prison Litigation Reform Act
(PLRA) did not apply to an action seeking exclusively to enforce a consent order. The court found
that the superintendent was not in contempt of the consent order, noting that sign language
interpreters were provided at educational and vocational programs and at medical and counseling
appointments for hearing-impaired inmates as required by consent decree, the prison was
equipped with visual fire alarms that met the requirements of the decree, and diligent efforts were
being made to comply with the consent decree regarding access to text telephones. (Wende
Correctional Facility, New York)

39.65
XX

granted summary judgment in favor of the officials and the former detainee appealed. The appeals
court affirmed the grant of summary judgment on the claims for injunctive relief, reversed the
grant of summary judgment on the claims for damages, and remanded for further proceedings. The
court held that the detainee's claim for injunctive relief was rendered moot by detainee's release
from jail. The court found that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material
fact as to whether the detainee was restrained in shackles and chains or confined in a padded unit
for the purpose punishment, or for valid reasons related to legitimate goals. The detainee alleged
he was placed in four-point restraints, chained to a wall in a “rubber room,” forced to shower in
waist chains and shackles, and denied hearings before being punished. The detainee was 17 years
old when he was admitted to the jail. (St. Louis County Jail, Minnesota)
U.S. District Court
EXERCISE
LOCK DOWN
RIOT

Hayes v. Garcia, 461 F.Supp.2d 1198 (S.D.Cal. 2006). A state prisoner brought a pro se § 1983
action against a warden, alleging that he was denied outdoor exercise in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. The warden moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion,
holding that the denial of outdoor exercise was not the result of the warden’s deliberate
indifference, and thus did not violate the defendant’s Eighth Amendment rights, in that
restrictions on exercise were instituted for the primary purpose of preventing further race-based
attacks, injuries, and homicides. The prisoner was denied outdoor exercise for a period of just over
nine months following racial tension, rioting, and other racial violence in the prison. (Calipatria
State Prison, California)

U.S. District Court
LOCKDOWN

Hurd v. Garcia, 454 F.Supp.2d 1032 (S.D.Cal. 2006). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging
that conditions of his confinement during a lock down violated his constitutional rights. The court
held that suspension of outdoor exercise at the state prison for 150 days was not motivated by
prison officials' deliberate indifference or malicious and sadistic intent to harm or punish the
inmate, and thus did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of Eighth
Amendment. The court noted that the entire unit was locked down as the result of a riot between
African-American and Caucasian inmates, and restrictions on outdoor exercise were instituted for
the primary purpose of preventing further race-based attacks, injuries, and homicides. (Calipatria
State Prison, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
MAIL

Jones v. Brown, 461 F.3d 353 (3d Cir. 2006). State prisoners brought an action against prison

U.S. Appeals Court
MAIL
GANGS

Koutnik v. Brown, 456 F.3d 777 (7th Cir. 2006). A state prisoner brought a pro se § 1983 action,

officials, claiming that a policy of opening and inspecting their legal mail outside of their presence
violated their First Amendment rights. The district court granted judgment for the prisoners and
the officials appealed. Another district court on similar claims granted judgment for the officials
and the prisoners in that case also appealed. The cases were consolidated on appeal. The court
entered judgment for the prisoner, finding that the policy of opening legal mail outside the
presence of the addressee prisoner impinged upon the prisoner's right to freedom of speech under
the First Amendment, and that the legal mail policy was not reasonably related to the prison's
legitimate penological interest in protecting the health and safety of prisoners and staff. The court
held that reasonable prison administrators would not have realized that they were violating the
prisoners' First Amendment free speech rights by opening prisoners' legal mail outside of the
prisoners' presence, entitling them to qualified immunity. The court noted that although the
administrators maintained the policy after three relatively uneventful years had passed after the
September 11 terrorist attacks and subsequent anthrax concerns, the policy was reasonable when
it was established. (New Jersey Department of Corrections)

challenging the confiscation of his outgoing letter, which contained a swastika and a reference to
the Ku Klux Klan. The prisoner alleged violations of his First Amendment free speech rights, and
his due process rights. The district court dismissed the due process claim, and granted summary
judgment in favor of defendants on remaining claim. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The court held that the prison regulation, prohibiting prisoners from possessing
symbolism that could be associated with any inmate group not approved by the warden, was not
impermissibly vague, for the purpose of determining whether the regulation was facially violative
of the prisoner's First Amendment free speech rights. According to the court, although the
regulation gave some discretion and flexibility to prison officials, the prison setting required it to
ensure order and safety. The appeals court deferred to state prison officials' assessment of
whether a swastika and a reference to the Ku Klux Klan in the prisoner's outgoing letter were
gang-related symbols, for the purpose of the prisoner's claim that seizure of the letter by prison
officials violated his First Amendment right to free speech, where knowledge of gang symbolism
was acquired primarily through interaction with and observation of prisoners, and the symbolism
was constantly changing. According to the court, the confiscation of the prisoner's outgoing letter
furthered the substantial governmental interest in prisoner rehabilitation, and thus, it did not
violate the prisoner's First Amendment free speech rights. The court noted that the letter was an
attempt to express the prisoner's affiliation with racially intolerant groups, which thwarted the
state's goals of encouraging the prisoner to live crime-free when released from custody, and
fostering the prisoner's ability to resolve conflicts without violence. (Wisconsin Secure Program
Facility)

39.66
XX

U.S. District Court
CELL SEARCH
GANGS

Navarro v. Adams, 419 F.Supp.2d 1196 (C.D.Cal. 2006). A state prisoner filed a pro se petition for
a writ of habeas corpus, challenging his state court conviction and his sentence for first degree
murder. The district court held that a deputy sheriff's search of his cell and seizure of attorneyclient privileged documents did not warrant federal habeas relief because it did not substantially
prejudice the prisoner's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The court noted that the prisoner’s cell
was searched to locate evidence regarding gang activity and threats to witnesses, not to interfere
with his relationship with his defense counsel, and the information seized was turned over to the
trial court for an in-camera review without being viewed by any member of the prosecution team.
(California)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES- CELL
PUBLICATIONS

Pepper v. Carroll, 423 F.Supp.2d 442 (D.Del. 2006). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging
that prison officials violated his constitutional rights. The court granted the officials’ motion for
summary judgment. The court found that the officials' decision to “shake down” the inmate's cell
was not in retaliation for his having filed a civil rights action, and thus did not violate the inmate's
First Amendment right to access courts, where shakedowns were routine, and the inmate was
thought to have prohibited materials in his cell. The court also held that the officials did not
violate the inmate's First Amendment free speech rights by refusing the word puzzles sent by the
inmate's family through regular mail and by disallowing catalogs for magazines or books, where
there was no allegation that the inmate had been denied actual magazines or books, and word
puzzles were not permitted under prison regulations. According to the court, the prison officials'
denials of several privileges while the inmate was voluntarily housed in a security housing unit,
including extra visits, reading material, exercise, television, cleaning tools, boiling water, ice,
razors, and additional writing utensils, were not a sufficiently serious deprivation to support the
inmate's claim that the denials constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
Amendment. (Delaware Correctional Center)

U.S. Appeals Court
SECURITY PRACTICES
STAFFING

Pinkston v. Madry, 440 F.3d 879 (7th Cir. 2006). A state inmate brought § 1983 action against two

U.S. District Court
TRANSPORTATION

Roe v. Crawford, 439 F.Supp.2d 942 (W.D. Mo. 2006). An inmate brought a class action against

U.S. District Court
RELIGIOUS ARTICLES

Sample v. Lappin, 424 F.Supp.2d 187 (D.D.C. 2006). An inmate brought suit for declaratory and

correctional officers, alleging that they violated his Eighth Amendment rights in allowing another
prisoner to assault him and thereafter refusing to assist him in receiving adequate medical care.
The district court granted the officers' motion for judgment on partial findings and the inmate
appealed. The court of appeals held that the inmate did not show that the two correctional officers
failed to protect him by allowing a fight between the inmate and another prisoner, given the
testimony of three witnesses that a correctional officer, acting alone, could not have operated a
locking mechanism so as to open the inmate's cell door, thereby allowing the fight to occur. The
court noted an absence of evidence that bolstered the inmate's contention that an officer could have
opened the cell door by himself, and an absence of evidence that another officer was present who
could have assisted the first officer in opening the cell door. (Indiana Department of Corrections
Maximum Control Complex, Westville, Indiana)
corrections officials, challenging a policy prohibiting transportation of pregnant inmates off-site to
provide abortion care for non-therapeutic abortions. The district court held that the policy violated
inmates' Due Process rights and the policy violated the Eighth Amendment. The court noted that
inmates who chose to terminate a pregnancy and had to be transported outside of the prison for
that purpose posed no greater security risk than any other inmate requiring outside medical
attention. The court held that a Missouri law prohibiting the use of State funds to assist with an
abortion did not encompass transport to the location where the procedure was to take place, there
was no alternative way for an inmate to obtain a non-therapeutic abortion, and abortion out counts
had no measurable impact on the ongoing prison need to schedule and reschedule medical
appointments. (Women's Eastern Reception, Diagnostic and Correctional Center, Missouri)
injunctive relief, claiming that a denial of his request for wine violated the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA) and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA),
and that the Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) Director failed to train, supervise, and promulgate policies
requiring his subordinates to comply with RFRA and RLUIPA. The defense moved to dismiss, and
the parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The district court held that genuine issues of
material fact existed as to whether an outright ban on an inmate's consumption of wine was the
least restrictive means of furthering the government's compelling interest in controlling
intoxicants. The inmate described himself as “an observant Jew” who “practiced Judaism before
his incarceration and continues his practice of Judaism while confined,” and who “sincerely
believes that he must drink at least 3.5 ounces of red wine (a reviit) while saying Kiddush, a
prayer sanctifying the Sabbath, during Friday night and Saturday shabbos services.” The court
found that the inmate exhausted his administrative remedies, as required by the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (PLRA), with respect to his request for wine, regardless of whether he asked that a
rabbi, a chaplain, or a Bureau of Prisons (BOP) staff member administer the wine to him.
According to the court, the inmate's obligation to exhaust his administrative remedies did not
require that he posit every conceivable alternative means by which to achieve his goal, which was
the unburdened exercise of his sincere religious belief. (Federal Correctional Institution,
Beaumont, Texas)

39.67
XX

U.S. Appeals Court
SECURITY PRACTICES

Scarver v. Litscher, 434 F.3d 972 (7th Cir. 2006). A state prisoner brought a civil rights action

U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCHES- CELLS

Serna v. Colorado Dept. of Corrections, 455 F.3d 1146 (10th Cir. 2006). A prisoner brought
excessive force and inadequate medical care claims against various officers and officials. A state
prison director moved for summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity. The district
court denied summary judgment and director appealed. The court of appeals reversed and
remanded. The court held that: (1) the director’s authorizing the use of a special team was not
personal involvement that could form the basis for supervisory liability; (2) the director’s receipt of
periodic reports about the team’s progress was not direct participation that could give rise to
liability; (3) the director’s conduct did not constitute failure to supervise; and (4) the director was
not deliberately indifferent to the rights of inmates. The director had, at a warden’s request,
authorized a special team to conduct cell invasions to find a loaded gun. (Colorado Territorial
Corrections Facility)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEGREGATION
PROTECTION

Smith v. Cummings, 445 F.3d 1254 (10th Cir. 2006). A prisoner brought civil rights claims and

U.S. District Court
PUBLICATIONS

Smith v. Miller, 423 F.Supp.2d 859 (N.D.Ind. 2006). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action

U.S. District Court
GANGS

Stewart v. Alameida, 418 F.Supp.2d 1154 (N.D.Cal. 2006). A state prison inmate brought a § 1983
action against California corrections officials alleging violation of his First and Fourteenth
Amendment associational and due process rights, claiming that his validation as a gang associate
kept him in a secure housing unit. Officials moved for summary judgment and the district court
granted the motion. The court held that state regulations providing for gang validation based on
association bore a rational relation to a penological interest in institutional security and that the
full accommodation of inmate's associational rights would seriously hinder security and
compromise safety. According to the court, an interview after he was gang-validated afforded the
inmate an adequate procedural remedy consistent with due process. The court found that any of
three photographs of the inmate posing with inmates, some of whom were validated gang
associates and one of whom was a validated gang member, supported the inmate's gang validation
consistent with due process. (San Quentin Adjustment Center, California)

U.S. District Court
EVACUATION

Tate v. Gusman, 459 F.Supp.2d 519 (E.D.La. 2006). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action
against a sheriff, arising from conditions of confinement following a hurricane. The district court
held that the detainee failed to state a nonfrivolous claim upon which relief could be granted and
dismissed the action. The detainee alleged that the manner and timing of his evacuation from a
flooded prison system medical unit following a hurricane constituted cruel and unusual

against officials at a “supermax” prison, alleging that his conditions of confinement had aggravated
his mental illness. The district court granted summary judgment for the officials and the prisoner
appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the officials did not unconstitutionally subject
the prisoner to cruel and unusual punishment, absent evidence that they knew that the conditions
were making his mental illness worse. According to the court, prison authorities must be given
considerable latitude in the design of measures for controlling homicidal maniacs without
exacerbating their manias beyond what is necessary for security. The prisoner alleged that the
heat in the cells in the Summer interacted with the his antipsychotic drugs and caused him
extreme discomfort, and that the constant illumination of the cells also disturbs psychotics. The
prisoner alleged that the low level of noise, without audiotapes, a radio, or any source of sound,
prevented him from stilling the voices in his head. (Wisconsin Secure Program Facility)

state law claims against a former prison officer and prison officials. The district court entered
judgment against the prison officer and summary judgment in favor of the other defendants. The
appeals court affirmed in part and remanded in part. The court held that prison officials did not
violate the Eighth Amendment by failing to clear an area through which segregated inmates
passed, of all inmates from the regular population, when escorting segregated inmates to and from
the protective housing unit, absent a showing of conditions posing a serious risk of harm or
evidence of deliberate indifference. The court noted that no segregated inmate was ever assaulted
on these occasions, other precautions were taken by the officials, and the officials acted promptly
in response to the inmate's particular safety concerns once alerted. (Lansing Correctional Facility,
Kansas)

challenging prison officials' decision to confiscate his anarchist materials. The officials moved for
summary judgment. The district court held that fact issues remained as to whether mere
possession of anarchist literature presented a clear and present danger to prison security. The
court opened its opinion by stating: “The issue of anarchism has raised its ugly face again, this
time in a prison context…The question here focuses on whether or not prison officials at the
Indiana State Prison are authorized to confiscate anarchist materials from inmates incarcerated
there…While the question presented here is a very close one, and it may be one on which the
prison authorities will later prevail….there needs to be a more extensive factual record.” The court
noted that if a trial were to be held, the court would attempt to appoint counsel for the plaintiff
and make every effort to keep the case as narrowly confined as possible. According to the court,
“Although it is a close case, there is enough here, if only barely enough, to keep the courthouse
doors open for this claim which necessarily involves overruling and denying the defendants'
motion.” (Indiana State Prison)

39.68
XX

punishment, but the court found that the detainee did not allege that the sheriff personally acted with deliberate
indifference to the detainee’s safety. The court noted that the detainee did not allege that he suffered any physical injury
as a result of any of the conditions or lack of medical attention. (Orleans Parish Prison, Louisiana)
U.S. Appeals Court
TELEPHONE CALLS

U.S. v. Morin, 437 F.3d 777 (8th Cir. 2006). A defendant was convicted in district court and he appealed. The appeals
court affirmed, finding that recordings of the defendant's jailhouse telephone calls were admissible for sentencing
purposes. The court found that the defendant impliedly consented to the warrantless tape-recording of his jailhouse
telephone calls, and thus, the recordings were admissible for sentencing purposes. The defendant had been given a
prisoners' handbook that informed him that his jailhouse calls would be monitored, and there were signs above the
phones in the prison informing him of that fact. (North Dakota)

U.S. Appeals Court
PUBLICATIONS
BOOKS
ITEMS PERMITTED

Wardell v. Duncan, 470 F.3d 954 (10th Cir. 2006). A state prisoner brought a pro se § 1983 action against prison
officials, alleging that a prison policy that required prisoners to purchase all hobby materials, legal materials, books,
and magazines from their prison accounts, and prohibiting gifts to prisoners of such materials from unauthorized
sources, violated his due process rights, his right of access to the courts, and his First Amendment rights. The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of the officials. The prisoner appealed. According to the court, the
confiscation of documents mailed to the prisoner which were purchased by a person who was a visitor of another
inmate, did not violate the prisoner's First Amendment rights, where the ban was content neutral, it was rationally
related to the penological interest of preventing bartering, extortion, possession of contraband, and other criminal
activity by prisoners, the prisoner was still able to purchase the same materials himself using funds from his prison
account, and he had access to the same materials in the prison law library. The court noted that permitting such thirdparty gifts and then trying to control the resultant security problems through reactive efforts of prison officers would
impose an undue burden on prison staff and resources. The court held that the inmate’s proposed accommodation,
allowing third party gifts if third parties provided relevant information, such as the source, amount, and manner of
payment, would entail data collection, processing, and substantial staff resources. The suit was prompted by prison
officials' interception of three parcels mailed to plaintiff. The first contained books from a “Mystery Guild” book club;
the other two contained legal documents from the Colorado State Archives and the Library of Congress which had been
purchased for the plaintiff by a third party who was listed as another inmate's visitor and, thus, fell within a Colorado
Department of Corrections (CDOC) prohibition on gifts from unauthorized sources. The court also held that denial of
the prisoner's access to courts claim that challenged the prison policy restricting receipt of his legal mail, was
warranted, absent a showing that the prisoner's failure to receive his legal mail actually frustrated, impeded, or hindered
his efforts to pursue a legal claim. (Fremont Correctional Facility, Colorado)

U.S. District Court
STAFFING
PROTECTION

Wilson v. Maricopa County, 484 F.Supp.2d 1015 (D.Ariz. 2006). Survivors of an inmate who had died after being
assaulted by other inmates while they were held in a jail known as “Tent City,” brought a § 1983 action against a
sheriff, alleging Eight Amendment violations. Following denial of the survivors' motion for summary judgment and
denial of the sheriff's motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, and following appeal by the sheriff,
the sheriff moved to stay the litigation and the survivors moved to certify the appeal as frivolous. The district court
granted the survivors’ motion, finding that the sheriff’s appeal was frivolous. The court held that, for purposes of
qualified immunity, the law was clearly established in July 2003 that the sheriff's alleged conduct of housing inmates in
tents without adequate staffing, while being deliberately indifferent to the danger of inmate-on-inmate assaults, would
violate the Eighth Amendment. The survivors presented evidence that the sheriff had for many years been aware that
the conditions at Tent City were likely to create a substantial risk of serious harm to inmates. The conditions include a
lack of security inherent in the use of tents, inadequate staffing, officers abandoning their posts and making off-yard
shift changes, intentionally harsh inmate living conditions, and a lack of officer training. The survivors’ asserted that
these problems were known to the sheriff through a variety of sources, including consultant reports, concerns expressed
by a county risk manager, and a prior state court case in which the county and sheriff were held liable under § 1983 for
an inmate assault at Tent City. The state court case affirmed a jury verdict against the sheriff and held that the lack of
supervision and security measures at Tent City supported the jury's finding of deliberate indifference. (Maricopa
County jail known as “Tent City,” Arizona)
2007

U.S. Appeals Court
SAFETY

XXI

Ambrose v. Young, 474 F.3d 1070 (8th Cir. 2007). The personal representative for the estate of a state prisoner who
was electrocuted while on a prison work detail brought a § 1983 action against state corrections officials. The district
court denied the officials’ motion for summary judgment and they appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and
reversed in part. The court held that: (1) the deliberate indifference standard applied; (2) the corrections officer in
charge of the prisoner’s work crew was deliberately indifferent to the serious risk of the prisoner’s electrocution; (3) the
corrections officer was not entitled to qualified immunity; (4) the supervisory official for the DOC was not deliberately
indifferent; and (5) the warden was not deliberately indifferent to the lack of training of the corrections officer in
charge of the work crew. The court noted that the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment applies to the
conditions of confinement, and that prison work assignments fall under the ambit of conditions of confinement.
According to the court, the Eighth Amendment forbids knowingly compelling an inmate to perform labor that is
beyond an inmate’s strength, dangerous to his or her life or health, or unduly painful, and requires supervisors to
supervise and train subordinates to prevent the deprivation of the inmate’s constitutional rights. The prisoner was on an
Emergency Response Team (ERT) when he was killed. ERTs are comprised of minimum-security inmates from South
Dakota’s four state penitentiaries. The ERTs are dispatched to natural disaster clean-up sites, where they assist in
removing downed trees and other debris. The inmates are required to comply with correctional officers’ orders and
conduct themselves appropriately. The only training the inmate received was watching a chainsaw safety training
video. The court held that qualified immunity will be defeated in a § 1983 claim if a government official knew or
reasonably should have known that the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the
constitutional rights of the plaintiff, or if he took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of
constitutional rights or other injury. It is enough that the official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a

39.69

substantial risk of serious harm. The court found that the corrections officer had the opportunity to deliberate and think
before the electrocution incident occurred. The prisoner was electrocuted by a downed power line and the officer knew
that the dangling, live power line created a substantial risk of harm, and despite the risk, the officer told the prisoner
and other inmates to stomp out a non-threatening fire within arms reach of the line. The court held that the corrections
officer was not entitled to qualified immunity for his deliberately indifferent conduct, in ordering the prisoner and other
inmates to stomp out a fire near a dangling live power line, where the law was clearly established at the time of the
electrocution incident that knowingly compelling a prisoner to perform labor that was dangerous to his life or health
violated the Eighth Amendment. Although a supervisory official knew about the downed power line, and allegedly
failed to call 911 emergency services and did not tell the prisoners to stay away from it, any failure to call 911 did not
contribute to the electrocution incident. Everyone present knew that the power line was dangerous, and the official was
not near the power line when another supervisory official ordered the prisoner and other inmates to stomp out a fire that
was near the line. According to the court, a state prison warden was not deliberately indifferent to an alleged lack of
training of the corrections officers because previous accidents involving the prison work crew resulted in only minor
injuries, it was not the prison’s policy to have prisoners go near live power lines, and there was no showing that the
corrections officer in charge would not have ordered prisoner and other inmates to put out the fire near the downed
power line if he had any additional training. (South Dakota Department of Corrections)
U.S. District Court
SAFETY

Graham v. Poole, 476 F.Supp.2d 257 (W.D.N.Y. 2007). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against prison
officials. The officials moved to dismiss and the district court granted the motion. The court held that the prisoner's
allegations that he slipped and fell as he was leaving the shower due to the failure of prison employees to provide nonslip mats on the floor in and near the shower amounted to nothing more than negligence, and thus was insufficient to
state an Eighth Amendment claim against the employees. The court found that the prisoner failed to allege that a prison
superintendent was personally involved in any alleged Eighth Amendment violation, as required to state a § 1983 claim
against the superintendent. The prisoner alleged that following his accident, the superintendent instituted a policy
providing an additional towel to each cell to be utilized for a bath mat, but did not allege that the superintendent was
aware of any hazardous condition prior to prisoner's accident. (Five Points Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
GANGS
PUBLICATIONS

Greybuffalo v. Kingston, 581 F.Supp.2d 1034 (W.D.Wis. 2007). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action for declaratory
and injunctive relief, challenging, on First Amendment grounds, prison officials' actions in confiscating two documents
as “gang literature” and disciplining him for possessing the documents. One document was a publication of the
“American Indian Movement” (AIM). The other was a code of conduct for a prisoner group that was created to enable
“self-protection of Native Americans.” The court held that interpreting the prison regulation to prohibit inmates from
possessing literature of any group that had not been sanctioned by prison officials was an exaggerated response to
legitimate security interests that violated the First Amendment. The court found that the history of the civil rights
organization referenced in the seized document did not permit the reasonable conclusion that the inmate's possession of
the document implicated a legitimate interest in preventing gang activity or prison security. The court ordered the
expungement from prison records of the finding that the inmate's possession of the document violated prison rules. The
court held that officials could reasonably conclude that the inmate's possession of a code of conduct for a prisoner
group that was created to enable “self-protection” of Native American prisoners could lead to future security problems
and that the officials did not violate the inmate's free speech rights when it prohibited and disciplined the inmate for
possessing the code of conduct. (Waupun Correctional Institution, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
SAFETY

Heredia v. Doe, 473 F.Supp.2d 462 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). An inmate filed a § 1983 action against county jail officials
alleging that he slipped and fell at a jail, and was denied proper medical treatment. The officials moved to dismiss the
complaint and the district court granted the motion. The court held that the inmate’s claim that he injured his back
when he slipped and fell at the county jail was nothing more than a claim for negligence, for which there was no cause
of action under § 1983. The inmate alleged he slipped and fell while walking to his cell and in the process injured his
back “to the point it swelled up and was in a lot of pain.” The court also found that officials were not deliberately
indifferent to the inmate’s medical needs, despite a one-day delay in providing treatment, where the jail medical
department took X-rays and provided pain medication. (Sullivan Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONTRABAND
PUBLICATIONS

Jones v. Salt Lake County, 503 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2007). County jail prisoners and a legal publication for prisoners
filed § 1983 suits against county jails, county officials, and a state Department of Corrections (DOC), challenging the
constitutionality of mail regulations in the jails and state prisons. The district court dismissed the actions and the
plaintiffs appealed. The two actions were consolidated for appeal. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part,
and remanded. The court held that: (1) a jail regulation banning prisoners' receipt of technical and sexually explicit
publications did not violate the First Amendment; (2) the jail regulation barring prisoners from ordering books from the
outside did not violate the First Amendment; and (3) the prison's refusal to accept legal publications did not amount to
a violation of prisoners' First Amendment or due process rights where the refusal to accept the magazines was not
based on any prison policy, but was due to a prison mailroom personnel's negligence. The court remanded the case to
the district court to conduct a four-part Turner analysis of the validity of the county jail's ban on prisoners' receipt of all
catalogs. The court held that the regulation banning ordering books from outside was reasonably related to the jail's
legitimate penological goal of security, as it prevented contraband from being smuggled into the jail, and that prisoners
had access to thousands of paperbacks through the jail library, prisoners could request permission to order books
directly from a publisher, prisoners could also obtain paperback books donated to them through a program at local
bookstore, prisoners had access to other reading materials such as newspapers and certain magazines. The court noted
that allowing prisoners to have unrestricted access to books from all outside sources would significantly impact jail
resources. (Utah State Prison, Salt Lake County Jail and San Juan County Jail, Utah)

U.S. District Court
CELL CAPACITY
CONTRABAND
GANGS
SEARCHES-CELL
STAFFING

Jurado Sanchez v. Pereira, 525 F.Supp.2d 248 (D.Puerto Rico 2007). A prisoner's next of kin brought a civil rights
action under § 1983 against prison officials, seeking to recover damages for the prisoner's death while he was
incarcerated, and alleging constitutional rights violations, as well as state law claims of negligence. The officials moved
for summary judgment on the cause of action under § 1983. The district court denied the motion, finding that summary
judgment was precluded by the existence of genuine issues of material fact on the failure to protect claim and as to
whether the officials had qualified immunity. According to the court, genuine issues of material fact existed as to

XXI

39.70

whether there were enough guards at the prison when the prisoner was killed by another inmate, and whether officials
were mandated to perform weekly or monthly searches of cells, which could have prevented the accumulation of
weapons used in the incident in which the prisoner was killed. Bayamon 308, an intake center, was considered
minimum security with some limitations. The inmate capacity at Bayamon 308 is 144. Although the capacity was not
exceeded, some cells, despite being originally built for one inmate, housed two inmates. According to the court,
Bayamon 308 does not comply with the 55 square footage minimum requirements for each cell in a continuing federal
consent order. Therefore, the individual cell gates are left continuously open, like an open dormitory. At the time of the
incident officials did not take gang affiliation into consideration when segregating prisoners. The prisoner did not
identify himself as a gang member, nor inform officials that he feared for his life. The facility was under court order to
follow a staffing plan that stated the minimum amount of staff, the optimum amount, the fixed positions and the
movable positions, pursuant to a lawsuit. Fixed positions, such as control units, cannot be changed under any
circumstances, but the movable positions may be modified depending on necessity due to the type of inmate at the
facility. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants did not comply with the staffing plan, while the defendants insisted
that they did comply. (Bayamon 308 Facility, Puerto Rico)
U.S. Appeals Court
HAIR LENGTH

Longoria v. Dretke, 507 F.3d 898 (5th Cir. 2007). A prisoner brought a pro se action against prison officials, claiming
his right to exercise his religion was denied when they denied him permission to grow his hair. The district court
dismissed the action and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the prison's grooming
policy did not violate the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and did not violate equal
protection. The court noted that even if the grooming policy created a substantial burden on the prisoner's religious
exercise, the policy served the prison's compelling interest in maintaining order and safety in the prison, since long hair
facilitated the transfer of contraband and weapons and long hair could allow escaped prisoners to more easily alter their
appearance. The court held that the policy was the least restrictive means to achieve that interest. According to the
court, although female prisoners were not subject to the same grooming policy, the policy applied to all prisoners
incarcerated in the male prison, and the application of different grooming regulations to male and female inmates did
not implicate equal protection concerns. (Robertson Unit, Texas Department of Criminal Justice-Institutional Division)

U.S. District Court
PUBLICATIONS

Moses v. Dennehy, 523 F.Supp.2d 57 (D.Mass. 2007). Prison inmates sued a department of corrections, claiming that a
regulation banning possession of sexually explicit materials violated their First Amendment rights. The department
moved for summary judgment. The district court entered judgment for the department. The court held that there was a
rational relationship between the regulation banning inmates' possession of sexually explicit materials and a legitimate
interest in prison security. According to the court, the regulation satisfied the First Amendment requirement that
alternative means of expression be provided because inmates were afforded an opportunity to receive materials on a
wide range of subjects, other than those involving sexuality or nudity, and there was even an exception allowing for
nude images having medical, educational, or anthropological content. According to the court, the possibility of harm to
other inmates supported the validity of the regulation. The court concluded that the administration of the regulation did
not violate the First Amendment, where publications known always to feature sexually explicit materials were banned
outright, and others were banned following prison staff inspection of individual issues. (Massachusetts Department of
Correction)

U.S. District Court
CONTRACT
SERVICES
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
MALPRACTICE

Primus v. Lee, 517 F.Supp.2d 755 (D.S.C. 2007.) A prisoner brought a pro se medical malpractice action against a
prison surgeon, prison physician, and the director of the state Department of Corrections. The defendants moved to
dismiss, and the prisoner moved for leave to amend. The district court dismissed the action without prejudice and
granted the plaintiff’s motion to amend. The court held that the allegations did not state an Eighth Amendment claim
for deliberate indifference, and that the prisoner's proposed amendment would not be futile. According to the court, the
allegations that a prison surgeon negligently performed surgery, which resulted in the unwanted removal of the
prisoner's testicle, did not state a § 1983 claim for deliberate indifference to the prisoner's serious medical needs under
the Eighth Amendment. The prisoner's proposed amendment, alleging that the surgeon contracted with the state
corrections department to provide surgical treatment, and that the surgeon unnecessarily and maliciously removed the
prisoner's testicle in retaliation for the prisoner's lack of cooperation, could state a § 1983 claim for deliberate
indifference under the Eighth Amendment. The court noted that when a physician cooperates with the state and
assumes the state's constitutional obligation to provide medical care to its prisoners, he or she acts “under color of state
law,” for purpose of a § 1983 action. (Lee Correctional Institution, South Carolina)

U.S. Appeals Court
GANGS
PROTECTION
TRANSFER

Rodriguez v. Secretary for Dept. of Corrections, 508 F.3d 611 (11th Cir. 2007). A Florida prisoner brought a § 1983
suit against two prison officials, alleging that they violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment. The prisoner was assaulted by a fellow prisoner hours after his release from administrative
segregation and reentry into the general prison population. The prisoner had asked to be transferred to another
institution or to be placed in protective custody. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the chief of
prison security, and judgment as a matter of law in favor of an assistant warden, and the prisoner appealed. The appeals
court vacated and remanded. The court held summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact
existed as to whether the defendants had subjective knowledge that the prisoner faced a substantial risk of serious harm
from his former gang members. The court ruled that it was a jury question as to whether the prison security chief's
actions “caused” the Eighth Amendment violation. There was evidence that the prisoner told the security chief that he
was a former gang member who decided to renounce his membership, that gang members had threatened to kill him
when he returned to the compound in retaliation for his renunciation, and that the prison compound was heavily
populated with gang members. (Everglades Correctional Institution, Florida)

U.S. District Court
CLOTHING
RELIGIOUS
ARTICLES

Singh v. Goord, 520 F.Supp.2d 487 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). An inmate who professed a belief in the Sikh faith brought an
action against various officials of the New York State Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) under the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, the
New York State Constitution, and various other constitutional provisions. The DOCS moved for summary judgment.
The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the inmate failed to exhaust

XXI

39.71

administrative remedies, as required under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), with respect to his free exercise
clause claim regarding his right to wear a Kacchera, which was a religious undergarment. The court found that
summary judgment for the defendants was precluded by an issue of fact as to whether the inmate received the decision
of the Superintendent, but failed to appeal it.
The court also found that the inmate sincerely believed that he was required to possess a second Kanga, which was a
Sikh religious comb, and therefore the prison's policy of limiting the inmate to a single Kanga placed a substantial
burden on his religious beliefs under RLUIPA. Summary judgment was denied because of fact issues regarding the
security risk posed by the Kara, which was a steel bracelet worn by Sikhs, and whether there was a compelling
governmental interest to allow the Sikh inmate to only wear the Kara for 30 minutes at a time during meals. The court
held that the inmate established a First Amendment free exercise claim with respect to his free exercise clause claim
regarding his right to use a reading lamp at night for prayer purposes. The court concluded that the DOCS speculation
that the beliefs of the inmate might not be sincere and could instead be “partly” motivated by his resistance to the
prison environment was insufficient to defeat the inmate's motion for summary judgment on his free exercise clause
claim. According to the court, given that the Sikh inmate would be unable to tie his turban in one of the traditional
ways, in a manner sufficient to cover his head using a cloth that was merely 30 inches by 36 inches, the inmate
established that the prison's policy regarding cloth length substantially burdened his religious beliefs. The court also
found that because the inmate was required to shower with his turban, and to wash his turban every day, the limitation
of two turbans was a substantial burden on the inmate's religious practice. The inmate also challenged several other
prison policies that involved his hair, separate storage of his religious materials, and other restrictions. (Fishkill
Correctional Facility, New York)
U.S. Appeals Court
RELIGION

Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2007). An inmate brought a civil rights action against prison officials to
recover for alleged violation of his free exercise rights under the First Amendment and under the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), based on prison officials' denial of requests for religious accommodations
allegedly associated with his practice of Odinism. The district court granted the officials' motion for summary
judgment, and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the term “appropriate relief,” as
used in section of RLUIPA creating a private cause of action in favor of prison inmates whose free exercise rights are
violated, and further providing that, if the inmate successfully sues, then he/she may “obtain appropriate relief,” is
broad enough to include monetary damages, but the provision could not be construed as creating a private right of
action against individual prison officials in their personal capacity for award of monetary damages. The court found
that the inmate's practice of Odinism constituted a “religious exercise” for purposes of the RLUIPA, but decisions by
the prison officials did not substantially burden the inmate's free exercise rights. Prison officials provided the inmate
with a secure location in which to practice the rites of his religion and did not allow him to observe these rites in
general prison area. They denied his request for a small fire pit and instead provided only a candle to represent “pine
fire of purification.” (Religious Activities Review Committee of the Alabama Department of Corrections, Limestone
Correctional Facility, Alabama)

U.S. District Court
BOOKS
RELIGION

Wares v. Simmons, 524 F.Supp.2d 1313 (D.Kan. 2007). A prisoner brought suit pursuant to § 1983, claiming violations
of the Fifth Amendment and the free exercise clause of the First Amendment, arising from the prison defendants'
prohibition on his possession of certain religious texts. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants.
The court held that the prisoner's exercise of his religion was not substantially burdened by prison regulations
preventing him from possessing a Psalm book (which he had in another form) and a book of teachings by a particular
rabbi, and therefore his rights under the free exercise clause of the First Amendment were not violated. According to
the court, by virtue of the other religious materials and items that the prisoner was permitted to possess and ceremonies
that he was permitted to engage in, his religious conduct or expression was not significantly inhibited or constrained, he
remained able to express adherence to his faith, and he had a reasonable opportunity to exercise his sincerely-held
religious beliefs. The court found that even if the prisoner's exercise of his religion was substantially burdened by the
prison regulations, prison administrators did not violate the prisoner's First Amendment rights since they identified
legitimate penological interests in security, safety, rehabilitation, and sound correctional management that justified the
impinging conduct, and alternative means of achieving the prisoner's right to freely exercise his religion were available.
(Hutchinson Correctional Facility, Kansas)

U.S. Appeals Court
BOOKS
RELIGION

Washington v. Klem, 497 F.3d 272 (3rd Cir. 2007). A prisoner filed a pro se action against a Department of Corrections
(DOC), pursuant to § 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), alleging the
DOC's policy of only allowing ten books in a prisoner's cell violated his religious exercise. The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of the DOC and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The
court held that the policy “substantially burdened” the prisoner's religious exercise under RLUIPA, since the prisoner
could not practice his religion in the absence of reading 4 books per day about Africa and African people and then
proselytizing about what he had read. The court noted that the DOC allowed only one weekly visit to the prison library
which precluded the prisoner from reading 4 books daily, or 28 books per week, that the DOC provided no evidence
that the prisoner could freely trade books located inside the prison, and that the DOC forced the indigent prisoner to
have outsiders continuously mail books to him which severely inhibited his ability to read 4 new books daily. The court
found that the valid interests of the DOC in the safety and health of prisoners and DOC employees were not furthered
by the DOC's policy of limiting the prisoner to 10 books in his cell, as required to uphold the policy against the
prisoner's claim that the policy violated RLUIPA by substantially burdening his religious exercise. The court concluded
that the book limitation policy did not decrease the likelihood of fire or hiding places for contraband in a cell, given the
DOC's permission for the prisoner to have magazines and newspapers in addition to the 10 books. The court also held
that the policy was not the least restrictive means of achieving the DOC's valid interests in safety and health, as
required to uphold the policy against the prisoner's challenge, given the DOC's other policies allowing the prisoner to
have 4 storage boxes of personal property in his cell and permitting more than 10 books if approved for educational
purposes. According to the court, the least restrictive means would have been to allow the prisoner to choose what
property he could keep in his storage units, as long as the property did not violate a prison policy for an independently
legitimate reason. (State Correctional Institution-Retreat, Pennsylvania)

XXI

39.72

2008
U.S. District Court
CLASSIFICATION
SAFETY
SEGREGATION

Basciano v. Lindsay, 530 F.Supp.2d 435 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). A pretrial detainee petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus
seeking an order lifting special administrative measures governing his confinement and releasing him from a special
housing unit back into the general prison population. The district court denied the petition. The court held that the
restrictive conditions of pretrial confinement which removed the detainee from the general prison population, did not
amount to punishment without due process. The court noted that there was substantial evidence of the detainee's
dangerousness, a rational connection between the conditions and a legitimate purpose of protecting potential victims,
and the existence of an alternative means for the detainee to exercise his right to communicate with others and with
counsel. (Metropolitan Detention Center, Brooklyn, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
SAFETY
TRANSPORTATION

Brown v. Fortner, 518 F.3d 552 (8th Cir. 2008). A former inmate brought a § 1983 action against correction officers
alleging deliberate indifference by failing to provide safe transportation. The district court denied the officers' claims of
qualified immunity and denied their motions for summary judgment. The officers appealed. The appeals court affirmed
in part, reversed in part and remanded. The court held that evidence that a correction officer transporting inmates as
part of a convoy refused to fasten the inmate's seatbelt knowing that he could not do so himself because of his shackles,
and drove recklessly while ignoring requests to slow down, was sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that the
officer manifested deliberate indifference for the inmate's safety in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The court
found that another correction officer who was driving a vehicle as part of the convoy who drove too fast and followed
the lead vehicle too closely did not act with deliberate indifference for the safety of the inmate passenger in the lead
vehicle, even though the officer's driving proximately caused a multiple vehicle rear-end accident which resulted in the
inmate's injuries, absent evidence that the officer was asked to slow down and refused, or that the officer knew that the
inmate had been denied a seatbelt. (Missouri Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Bullock v. Sheahan, 568 F.Supp.2d 965 (N.D.Ill. 2008). Two county inmates who were ordered released after being
found not guilty of the charges against them brought an action individually and on behalf of a class against a county
sheriff and county, challenging the constitutionality of a policy under which male inmates, in the custody of the Cook
County Department of Corrections (CCDC), were subjected to strip searches upon returning to CCDC after being
ordered released. The district court held that male inmates in the custody of CCDC who were potentially discharged
were similarly situated to female potential discharges, as supported the male inmates' claim that the county's policy of
strip searching all male discharges and not all female discharges violated the Equal Protection Clause. The court noted
that the two groups of inmates were housed within the same facility, there were varying security classifications within
each group that corresponded to each other, statistics concerning inmate violence clearly indicated that it took place
among female as well as male inmates, and the county's primary justification for distinguishing between male and
female discharges, namely, its alleged inability to hold them in a receiving, classification, and diagnosis center (RCDC)
while their records were reviewed, was a logistical rather than a security concern. The court found that the county's
blanket strip search policy for male discharged inmates was not substantially related to the achievement of important
governmental objectives--jail safety and security--and thus the policy deprived male discharges of their constitutional
right to equal protection. The court noted that female discharges were just as capable of importing contraband into the
jail as their male counterparts. (Cook County Dept. of Corrections, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
CONTRABAND
VISITS

Carter v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 579 F.Supp.2d 798 (W.D.Tex. 2008). A prison visitor filed an action against the
federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) and the United States Department of Justice under the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA) claiming wrongful denial of inmate visitation. The district court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. The court held that the United States had to be named as a defendant in an action under the Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA) and that the plaintiff visitor had to provide grounds for relief under Texas law in order to recover.
The plaintiff had traveled from Illinois to the Greater El Paso area “for the purpose of visiting her husband,” who at the
time was a prisoner at the BOP’s Federal Satellite Low La Tuna facility. She alleged that upon arriving at La Tuna, a
BOP agent selected her for contraband testing pursuant to a mandate from the Director and testing was accomplished
using a device called the Ion Spectrometer. The test was positive and the plaintiff was denied visitation with her
husband. (Low La Tuna Facility, Federal Bureau of Prisons, Texas)

U.S. District Court
CONTRABAND
SEARCHES

Collins v. Knox County, 569 F.Supp.2d 269 (D.Me. 2008). A female arrestee brought a § 1983 action against a county,
sheriff, and corrections officers, alleging an unconstitutional policy and/or custom and practice of conducting a strip
search and visual body cavity search of every person taken into custody at the jail. The district court granted summary
judgment for the defendants. The court held that the county did not have an unconstitutional strip search policy or
custom at the county jail, and that the sheriff did not acquiesce to a policy or practice of unconstitutional strip searches.
The court found that there was no evidence of an unconstitutional policy and/or custom and practice of conducting a
strip search and visual body cavity search of every person taken into custody at the county jail, as required for the
arrestee to establish a § 1983 claim against the county. The court found that the strip search of the female arrestee upon
her admission to jail after self-surrendering on an outstanding felony arrest warrant was reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. The court found that the search was based on a drug charge in her inmate file, the fact that she made a
planned admission to jail which provided the opportunity to conceal contraband, and that she was going to be housed
overnight at the jail, which had a problem with contraband. The search was performed by a female officer in the
changing area of the shower stall adjacent to the booking area, which was mostly shielded from view by a plastic
curtain. (Knox County Jail, Maine)

U.S. District Court
LOCK DOWN
SEARCHES
TRANSPORTATION
VISITS

Davis v. Peters, 566 F.Supp.2d 790 (N.D.Ill. 2008). A detainee who was civilly committed pursuant to the Sexually
Violent Persons Commitment Act sued the current and former facility directors of the Illinois Department of Human
Services' (DHS) Treatment and Detention Facility (TDF), where the detainee was housed, as well as two former DHS
Secretaries, and the current DHS Secretary. The detainee claimed that the conditions of his confinement violated his
constitutional rights to equal protection and substantive due process. After a bench trial, the district court held that: (1)
the practice of searching the detainee prior to his visits with guests and attorneys violated his substantive due process
rights; (2) the practice of using a “black-box” restraint system on all of the detainee's trips to and from court over a 15-

XXI

39.73

month period violated his substantive due process rights; and (3) the detainee would be awarded compensatory
damages in the amount of $30 for each hour he wore the black box in violation of his rights. The court found that a 21day lockdown following an attempt at organized resistance by a large number of detainees at the facility, shortly after
the breakout of several incidents of violence, was not outside the bounds of professional judgment for the purposes of a
substantive due process claim asserted by the detainee. The court noted that strip searches of a detainee prior to his
court appearances and upon his return to the institution did not violate substantive due process, where detainees were
far more likely to engage in successful escapes if they could carry concealed items during their travel to court, and
searches upon their return were closely connected with the goal of keeping contraband out of the facility. The court
held that the practice of conducting strip searches of the detainee prior to his visits with guests and attorneys was not
within the bounds of professional judgment, and thus, violated the detainee's substantive due process rights, where the
only motivation for such searches appeared to be a concern that a detainee would bring a weapon into the meeting, and
most weapons should have been detectable through a pat-down search. (Treatment and Detention Facility, Illinois)
U.S. Appeals Court
FACIAL HAIR
HAIR LENGTH
RELIGION

Fegans v. Norris, 537 F.3d 897 (8th Cir. 2008). A state inmate sued prison officials, alleging that they violated the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), as well as his free exercise and equal protection
rights, by enforcing a grooming policy and denying him Kosher meals. The district court entered judgment for the
inmate with respect to the Kosher meals, but entered judgment for the prison officials with respect to the grooming
policy. The inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the prison policy prohibiting male inmates
from wearing hair below their collar, which prevented the inmate, who followed the Assemblies of Yahweh, from
leaving his hair untrimmed, did not violate RLUIPA. Prison officials gave examples of inmates using hair to conceal
contraband and to change their appearance after escaping, and, although the officials allowed shoulder-length hair in
the women's barracks, the women were housed in a single unit and thus had less opportunity to obtain and transport
contraband. The court also found that the policy did not violate the inmate’s free exercise rights. According to the
court, the policy did not violate the inmate's equal protection rights, inasmuch as differences in security risks between
male and female inmates was a valid reason for differing hair-length rules for men and women, and the policy was
reasonably related to the state's legitimate, penological interests of safety and security.
The court noted that the district court's finding that the corrections department director's expert testimony that male
inmates presented greater security risks than female inmates was credible, and was not clearly erroneous. The court
found that a policy that generally prohibits inmates from wearing beards, which prevented the inmate from refraining
from “rounding the corners” of his beard, did not violate RLUIPA, even though inmates with medical conditions were
allowed to have a quarter-inch beard. The court ruled that safety and security concerns constituted a compelling penological interest, and the prohibition was the least restrictive means available to further that interest. The court found
that the beard policy did not violate the inmate’s free exercise or equal protection rights. The appeals court held that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding nominal damages, as limited by PLRA, of $1,500 for the prison
officials' constitutional violation of failing to provide Kosher meals, which amounted to $1.44 for each constitutional
violation. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to award punitive damages
for the prison officials' constitutional violation of failing to provide Kosher meals. The district court accurately stated
the legal standard for the award of punitive damages, but found that prison officials did not act with malice, and that
punitive damages were not warranted to deter future unlawful conduct, because the officials already had instituted a
policy for providing Kosher meals. (East Arkansas Regional Unit of the Arkansas Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
RELIGIOUS
ARTICLES
RELIGIOUS
SERVICES
SAFETY
STAFFING

Fowler v. Crawford, 534 F.3d 931 (8th Cir. 2008). A state prisoner brought an action against prison officials, alleging
that the officials' refusal to grant him access to a sweat lodge in which to practice his Native American faith violated
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The district court granted summary judgment to
the prison officials. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the prohibition on the sweat
lodge on the grounds of a maximum-security prison was in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest, and that
the ban was the least restrictive means by which to further that compelling interest. The court noted that serious safety
and security concerns arose due to the burning of embers and hot coals, blunt instruments such as split wood and large
scalding rocks, sharper objects such as shovels and deer antlers, and an enclosed area inaccessible to outside view, and
the sweat lodge would have drained prison security's manpower over the 6 to 7 hour duration of the ceremony. The
court noted that even though another prison within the state had previously operated a sweat lodge, ordering every
prison to do so would result in a requirement that every institution within the jurisdiction accommodate inmates of the
Native American faith, which would discourage officials from accommodating other religious practices, knowing that
all institutions would likely have to accommodate the same practices. Prison officials had suggested alternatives to, and
sought a compromise with, the prisoner to no avail, offering him an outdoor area where he could smoke a ceremonial
pipe and practice other aspects of his faith in open view. The prisoner rejected anything short of a sweat lodge with a
minimum of 17 times per year. (Jefferson City Correctional Center, Missouri)

U.S. Appeals Court
RELIGIOUS
SERVICES

Greene v. Solano County Jail, 513 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2008). A former prisoner sued a county jail official asserting
statutory and constitutional challenges to the county jail's policy of prohibiting maximum security prisoners from
participating in group worship. The district court entered summary judgment for the official and the prisoner appealed.
The appeals court reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court held that the religious exercise at issue in
the prisoner's suit under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) was engaging in group
worship, not practicing his religion as a whole. Therefore, even if the ban on group worship did not place a substantial
burden on the prisoner's practice of Christianity, such fact would not ensure that ban was in compliance with RLUIPA.
According to the court, the jail's policy of prohibiting the maximum security prisoner from attending group religious
worship services substantially burdened the prisoner’s ability to exercise his religion as required for the ban to violate
RLUIPA. The court found that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the
jail's policy was the least restrictive means of maintaining security. (Solano County Jail, Claybank Facility, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
CLASSIFICATION
GANGS

Howard v. Waide, 534 F.3d 1227 (10th Cir. 2008). An inmate brought claims against several Colorado Department of
Corrections (CDOC) employees and a grievance officer pursuant to § 1983, alleging deliberate indifference in violation
of the Eighth Amendment. The district court granted the grievance officer's motion to dismiss and granted the other
defendants' motions for summary judgment, and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in

XXI

39.74

part, and remanded. The court held that the inmate established an objective substantial risk of serious harm, as
required for his Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim, by alleging that he had previously been targeted
by a notorious prison gang because of his build and sexual orientation, that he was threatened, sexually assaulted,
and prostituted against his will by members of this gang, and was later transferred to a different facility for his own
safety, and, that after arriving at the new facility, he was identified by a member of the same prison gang who had
assaulted him in the past and was housed in a less-restrictive area of the prison where it was easier for gang members
to assault him. The court found that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to
whether the corrections' employees had subjective knowledge of a significant risk of substantial harm to the inmate.
The court also found that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the
employees responded to the known risk to the inmate by a prison gang in a reasonable manner. (Sterling
Correctional Facility, Colorado)
U.S. District Court
HAIR LENGTH
RELIGION

Johnson v. Collins, 564 F.Supp.2d 759 (N.D.Ohio 2008). A state prisoner brought a civil rights suit against a prison
warden and others, seeking injunctive relief against the enforcement of a prison policy that banned the wearing of
shoulder-length dreadlocks. The district court denied the warden’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court
held that the possibility that the prisoner could show that the warden, by adhering to a prison policy that prohibited
the wearing of shoulder-length dreadlocks for security reasons, was continuing to violate the prisoner’s federal rights
under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) by substantially burdening the exercise of
his Rastafarian religion, precluding the Eleventh Amendment from barring the suit seeking injunctive relief against
the warden in his official capacity. The court found that the warden was not entitled to qualified immunity as a
government official performing discretionary functions on the claim that he substantially burdened the prisoner's
rights under RLUIPA to practice his Rastafarian religion. The court held that the prisoner's suit for injunctive relief
against ongoing enforcement of the prison policy banning the wearing of shoulder-length dreadlocks was not mooted
by his transfer to another prison within the same state system, nor did a change in the prison grooming code to allow
for religious-based exemptions. (Madison Correctional Institution, Toledo Correctional Institution, Mansfield
Correctional Institution, Lebanon Correctional Institution, Ohio)

U.S. District Court
PUBLICATIONS

Johnson v. Raemisch, 557 F.Supp.2d 964 (W.D.Wis. 2008). An inmate sued prison officials under § 1983,
contending that their censorship of a newsletter violated his First Amendment right to free speech. The district court
held that the challenged censorship was not logically connected to a legitimate penological interest and therefore
violated the inmate's First Amendment rights. The court found that many of the proffered reasons for the censorship
suggested that it was the critical nature of the newsletter that prompted the decision, rather than any true interest in
security or rehabilitation. According to the court, to the extent that there was a true concern for security or
rehabilitation, censorship of the newsletter, which did not advocate violence or any other unlawful activity, was an
exaggerated response to those concerns. The court held that the appropriate injunctive relief for a violation of the
inmate's First Amendment rights in the officials' blocking the inmate's subscription to a newsletter addressing
prisoner rights issues was to provide the inmate with a copy of the newsletter. (Waupun Correctional Institution,
Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Jones v. Murphy, 567 F.Supp.2d 787 (D.Md. 2008). A male arrestee brought a class action, alleging that a booking
facility's policy of frisking female arrestees while searching male arrestees down to their underwear violated the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment for the arrestee,
finding that the booking facility's gender-differentiated search policy was not reasonably related to a legitimate
penological interest in preventing arrestees from bringing weapons into the booking facility, and thus violated the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court noted that the additional staff needed to more
thoroughly search female arrestees was not overly burdensome, and searching all arrestees to their last layer of
clothing was a readily available constitutional alternative. (Baltimore City Central Booking, Maryland)

U.S. District Court
CONTRABAND
VISITS

King v. Caruso, 542 F.Supp.2d 703 (E.D. Mich. 2008). The wife of a state prison inmate brought suit against prison
officials alleging violation of her First Amendment rights, her Equal Protection rights, and her Fourteenth
Amendment due process rights when her visitation rights were withdrawn for attempting to smuggle a cell phone
into an institution. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The court held that termination
of the spouse's visitation rights did not violate her First Amendment right to freedom of association nor did it
infringe upon any liberty interest for purposes of procedural or substantive due process. The court noted that a
hearing on the cutoff of visitor's rights could be conducted by a division of the Department of Corrections and that
hearing procedures did not deny the spouse procedural due process with respect to any liberty interest she might
possess. The court found that the termination was reasonably related to penological interests and did not violate
equal protection. (Chippewa Correctional Facility, Michigan)

U.S. Appeals Court
GANGS
PROTECTION
SEPARATION

Klebanowski v. Sheahan, 540 F.3d 633 (7th Cir. 2008). A detainee who was being held for trial brought a § 1983
action against a sheriff, a jail and its officers, alleging deliberate indifference to risks of housing gang members with
non-gang members, which caused attacks on the detainee by gang members. The detainee had suffered two attacks at
the hands of his fellow prisoners. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the
motion and the detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the allegation by the detainee that
his attack by gang members was brought on by the jail's policy of housing gang members with non-gang members,
allowing them weapons, and periodically leaving them unattended, did not sufficiently establish an unconstitutional
policy, for purposes of establishing deliberate indifference in violation of due process in his § 1983 action.
According to the court, the detainee submitted no evidence showing an express endorsement of the claimed policies,
that any policymaker caused the circumstances of which he complained, or any evidence to establish the existence of
a widespread practice by the jail. The court found that jail officers were not deliberately indifferent to the detainee in
violation of due process by not taking steps to protect the detainee from attack by gang members. The court held that
the detainee's statements to officers prior to the attack, that he was afraid for his life, were not sufficient to alert the

39.75
XXII

officers to a specific threat as he did not provide specific identities of those who had threatened him, did not tell
officers he had actually been threatened with future violence, nor that the attack had been inflicted due to his nongang status. (Cook County Jail, Illinois)
U.S. District Court
CLOTHING
RELIGIOUS ARTICLES

Lewis v. Ollison, 571 F.Supp.2d 1162 (C.D.Cal. 2008). A state prisoner filed a § 1983 action against prison officials,
alleging violation of the First Amendment and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA).
The court held that a temporary shower policy of escorting prisoners from their cells to the shower room and back
wearing only boxer shorts and shower shoes, which was adopted by the prison due to security concerns, created at
most an inconvenience, but not a significant interference with the Islamic religious clothing requirement. The
clothing requirement directs Muslim men to exercise modesty by covering their “awrah,” which is a portion of the
body from the navel to the knee, from others' gaze. The court found that the policy did not violate RLUIPA, since
Muslims did not have to shower every day to practice their religion and the prisoner could have cleansed himself in
his cell sink. The court also found that the policy was reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest in
maintaining prison safety and security. The court held that the rights of the Muslim prisoner under RLUIPA to
practice his religion of Islam had not been subjected to a substantial burden by the policy that limited the prisoner to
the possession of no more than 12 ounces of scented oil in his cell, and limited him to buying no more than 8 ounces
of scented oil per purchase order. According to the court, the rule had been drafted after consultation with a Muslim
imam and permitted prisoners to be in the possession of religious prayer oil that served their religious purposes for
many weeks, if not many months. (Ironwood State Prison, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
RELIGIOUS SERVICES
STAFFING

Mayfield v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, 529 F.3d 599 (5th Cir. 2008). A state prisoner, who practiced the
Odinist/Asatru faith, brought claims pursuant to § 1983 against a state criminal justice department and prison
officials, alleging First Amendment violations, as well as violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA). The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, and appeal was
taken. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that the
claims brought by the prisoner pursuant to the § 1983 action alleging First Amendment violations and pursuant to
RLUIPA seeking declaratory relief as well as a permanent injunction against prison officials in their official capacity
were not barred by sovereign immunity. The court found that the prisoner's claims for compensatory damages
against prison officials in their official capacity on claims brought pursuant to § 1983 alleging First Amendment
violations and RLUIPA violations were barred by the provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA)
prohibiting actions for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical
injury. According to the court, a state criminal justice department's regulation of not allowing an Odinist group to
assemble for religious services in the absence of an outside volunteer was reasonably related to a legitimate
penological interest, for the purposes of determining whether the regulation encroached on the prisoner's First
Amendment right to free exercise. The court noted that officials asserted justifications for the volunteer requirement
that involved prison security concerns, as well as staff and space limitations. The court held that summary judgment
for the state was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to the neutrality of the prison's enforcement of the
policy of not allowing religious groups to assemble for religious services in the absence of an outside volunteer. The
court also found that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether rune
literature was banned from the prison library, as to whether the prison's policy of not allowing the Odinist group to
assemble for religious services in the absence of an outside volunteer imposed a substantial burden on the prisoner's
religious exercise, and as to whether the prison's policy of preventing the possession of runestones substantially
burdened the prisoner's religious exercise. (Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Hughes Unit)

U.S. District Court
EXERCISE

Norwood v. Woodford, 583 F.Supp.2d 1200 (S.D.Cal. 2008). A state inmate filed an action alleging that prison
officials deprived him of outdoor exercise, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and retaliated against him for
asserting his right to be free from harm, in violation of the First Amendment. The officials moved to dismiss the
complaint. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the allegation that the
inmate was deprived of outdoor exercise for 39 days was sufficient to satisfy the objective component of his Eighth
Amendment claim. According to the court, the issue of whether state prison officials acted with deliberate
indifference when they denied the inmate any outdoor exercise for a 39-day period during an alleged emergency
lockdown situation involved fact questions that could not be resolved on a motion to dismiss. The court noted that it
was clearly established at the time of the deprivation that state prison officials' denial of outdoor exercise for inmates
for an extended period of time could constitute an Eighth Amendment violation, and thus the officials were not
entitled to qualified immunity from liability. (Calipatria State Prison, California)

U.S. District Court
RELIGIOUS SERVICES

Pugh v. Goord, 571 F.Supp.2d 477 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). State prisoners sued prison officials, alleging violations of their
constitutional and statutory rights to free exercise of Shi'a Islam and to be free from the establishment of Sunni
Islam. Following remand from the appeals court, the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment. The district court
granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that one prisoner's claim for injunctive relief qualified
for a “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception, and therefore was not rendered moot by his transfer to
another facility. The court noted that the corrections department had the ability to freely transfer the prisoner
between facilities prior to the full litigation of his claims, and there was a reasonable expectation that the prisoner
would be subject to the same action again, given that the department's policies were applicable to all of its prison
facilities. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the
corrections department's regulations relating to Shi'ite prisoners, which failed to provide for Friday prayer services
independent of Sunni participation, were reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. The court also held
that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the corrections department was able to accommodate Shi'ite
prisoners so as not to violate their rights under the Establishment Clause at de minimis cost. The court held that
summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the Shi'ite prisoners' religious
beliefs were substantially burdened by attendance at a Sunni-led, Sunni-dominated Friday Jumah service, and/or use
of a Zohr prayer as a substitute for attending Jumah services. According to the court, summary judgment was
precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether a prison policy denying Shi'ite prisoners Friday prayer

39.76
XXII

services independent of Sunni participation was the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling government
interest, precluding summary judgment in the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The
court held that the state did not waive immunity under the Eleventh Amendment as to money damages by accepting
federal funds pursuant RLUIPA. The court found that Shi'ite prisoners' right to a reasonable opportunity to worship
by way of separate Jumah services for Shi'ites and Sunnis was clearly established, for the purposes of determining
whether prison officials were qualifiedly immune from the prisoners' free exercise claim. (New York State
Department of Correctional Services, Mid-Orange Correctional Facility and Fishkill Correctional Facility)
U.S. District Court
EXERCISE
SEARCHES

Sanchez Rodriguez v. Departamento de Correccion y Rehabilitacion, 537 F.Supp.2d 295 (D.Puerto Rico 2008). An
inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that Puerto Rico prison officials denied him his constitutional right to enjoy
daily recreational time outside of his cell because he refused to submit to visual body cavity searches. After
dismissal of his complaint, the inmate filed a motion for reconsideration. The district court denied the motion. The
court held that the searches did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. According to the court, the requirement
that inmates submit to visual body cavity searches in order to leave their cells for recreation was needed to preserve
internal order and institutional security, and thus did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth Amendment. (Maximum Security Prison, Ponce, Puerto Rico)

U.S. District Court
FIRE SAFETY

Shine v. Hofman, 548 F.Supp.2d 112 (D.Vt. 2008). A federal pretrial detainee in the custody of the Vermont
Department of Corrections brought a pro se action, alleging violation of his constitutional rights. The district court
dismissed in part. The court found that allegations by the detainee that state officials failed to provide adequate fire
sprinklers or access to fire extinguishers stated a claim for violation of the detainee's due process rights. The court
held that the detainee’s allegations that he was subjected to segregation, and that the conditions of segregation
included a small cell with no windows and no opportunity to interact with other human beings, did not state a claim
for violation of the due process clause. The court noted that prisons may impose restrictions on pretrial detainees so
long as those restrictions are related to a non-punitive governmental purpose. (Vermont Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
RELIGIOUS ARTICLES
RELIGIOUS SERVICES

Sisney v. Reisch, 533 F.Supp.2d 952 (D.S.D. 2008). A state inmate brought an action under § 1983 and the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), alleging corrections officials refused to make various
accommodations for his practice of the Jewish religion. The district court held that the State of South Dakota, by
accepting Federal prison funding, waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity in claims for monetary damages under
RLUIPA. The court found that the officials' denial of the inmate's request for a permanent space for Jewish inmates'
religious services did not impose a substantial burden on his exercise of the inmate’s religion. The court noted that
the inmate admitted that Jewish inmates had sufficient space for their services and that lack of a permanently
designated room for their services did not prevent him from practicing his religion.
The court also found that summary judgment was precluded by fact issues as to whether officials' denial of the
inmate's request, that Jewish inmates be given additional time to conduct group Torah, Kabalistic and language
studies, was the least restrictive means of furthering any legitimate penological interest. The court found that
officials' denial of the inmate's request to possess and use a lightbulb diffuser and to use oils and burn herbs in his
cell appeared to be the least restrictive means for furthering a compelling governmental interest, where diffusers
posed a serious fire hazard, other inmates and staff might be allergic to the fumes or find the aroma offensive, and
they could be used to conceal prohibited activities such as smoking. (South Dakota State Penitentiary)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Streeter v. Sheriff of Cook County, 576 F.Supp.2d 913 (N.D.Ill. 2008). Current or former pretrial detainees filed a
class action under § 1983 against a county sheriff and the county, challenging a strip search policy at the county jail,
alleging it violated their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court denied summary judgment for
the defendants. The court held that the detainees stated a claim for violation of their Fourth Amendment rights in
connection with group strip searches that were allegedly conducted in an unreasonably intrusive manner and went on
longer than penologically necessary. The court also found that the detainees stated a claim for violation of their
rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in connection with group strip searches that were
allegedly conducted in a manner intended to humiliate and embarrass the detainees, and that went on longer than
necessary. (Cook County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
CONFIDENTIAL
INFORMATION
SEX OFFENDER

Swift v. Tweddell, 582 F.Supp.2d 437 (W.D.N.Y. 2008). An inmate brought a pro se § 1983 action against a sheriff,
deputies, and jail employees. The district court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court
found that the jail employees were not deliberately indifferent to the inmate's serious medical needs, in violation of
the Eighth Amendment, in connection with a delay in prescribing the inmate's “mental health” medications. The
court noted that on the day that the inmate submitted a request for mental health clinic services, the jail nurse
referred the request to the county Mental Health Department (MHD) pursuant to standard practice at the jail, but
because the inmate did not appear to be an emergency case and because he made no further requests for mental
health services, he was not seen by a psychiatrist from MHD for more than two months. He was prescribed Prozac
but did not, according to the court, suffer serious adverse effects as a result of the temporary gap between his request
for mental health care and his psychiatric examination. The court found that jail officials did not act with deliberate
indifference to the inmate's safety, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, in connection with a corrections officer's
alleged disclosure to other inmates that the inmate had been charged with rape. The court noted that following the
disclosure, the inmate spoke with a captain who agreed to, and did remove another inmate who had allegedly taunted
him about the rape charge from the inmate's housing unit. The inmate was not harmed, or placed in imminent
danger, as a result of the disclosure. According to the court, disclosure to other inmates that the inmate had been
charged with rape did not violate any of the inmate's privacy rights, since the information was not privileged or
otherwise protected, and the inmate was also a sentenced offender under the authority of the New York State
Department of Correctional Services. (Steuben County Jail, New York)

39.77
XXII

U.S. District Court
LIGHTING

Walker v. Woodford, 593 F.Supp.2d 1140 (S.D.Cal. 2008). A state prisoner filed a civil rights action against a prison
and its personnel alleging that prison officials violated his Eighth Amendment rights by refusing to turn off the lights
in their cells. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court
held that the prisoner had to present evidence showing that the prison's 24-hour illumination policy was the cause of
his insomnia or related problems before the prison could be required to explain why legitimate penological interests
justified it. According to the court, the prisoner's testimony did not establish that the illumination caused the
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, or that prison personnel were deliberately indifferent to his serious
medical needs in not modifying the illumination policy. The court found that prison officials were not plainly
incompetent in requiring low-level lighting in prison cells 24 hours per day for security purposes. (Calipatria State
Prison, California)

U.S. District Court
CONTRABAND
SAFETY

Warren v. Goord, 579 F.Supp.2d 488 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). An inmate brought a § 1983 suit against corrections officials
for failure to protect him from harm from other prisoners, in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. The district
court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The court held that the officials' failure to install metal
detectors at the entrance to a recreation yard where an inmate was assaulted by other prisoners would not support the
imposition of § 1983 liability on the inmate's Eighth Amendment claim, absent evidence that the officials did not
take reasonable measures to address the risk that prisoners would carry weapons into the yard or that the presence of
metal detectors would have significantly alleviated the risk. The court noted that other security measures were in
place to address the dangers of attacks in the yards, including random frisks and metal detector screenings, more
extensive screenings when alerted to specific dangers, and placement of prison officers in the yard during exercise
periods. (Green Haven Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
SECURITY PRACTICES

Washpon v. Parr, 561 F.Supp.2d 394 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). An arrestee brought an action under § 1983 against court
officers alleging false arrest, illegal search, malicious prosecution, denial of equal protection, excessive force, and
violation of free speech. The district court granted summary judgment for the officers in part and denied in part. The
court held that any restrictions on the arrestee's speech inside the courthouse were reasonable under the First
Amendment in light of her admitted failure to pass through security or to comply with officers' orders to leave the
building, absent evidence that government regulation of speech inside the courthouse amounted to viewpoint
discrimination. At one point during the incident the arrestee allegedly “proceeded to speak in a loud manner, using
profanity.” (Bronx County Criminal Court, New York)

U.S. District Court
CONTRABAND
SEARCHES

Williams v. Fitch, 550 F.Supp.2d 413 (W.D.N.Y. 2008). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that
corrections officers sexually abused him. The district court dismissed the case. The court held that the officers did
not violate the inmate's Eighth Amendment rights by searching and handling his penis on three occasions while
searching for contraband. The court noted that X-rays showed the presence of a metal object in the foreskin of the
inmate's penis, and the searches were undertaken in a private location, without undue physical intrusion, humiliation,
or physical injury. (Attica Correctional Facility, New York)
2009

U.S. District Court
RESTRAINTS
SECURITY PRACTICES
SEGREGATION

Bowers v. Pollard, 602 F.Supp.2d 977 (E.D.Wis. 2009). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against correctional
facility officials, challenging the conditions of his confinement. The court held that the correctional facility's
enforcement of a behavior action plan that regularly denied the inmate a sleeping mattress, occasionally required him
to wear only a segregation smock or paper gown, and subjected him to frequent restraint did not deny the inmate the
minimal civilized measure of life's necessities and was targeted at his misconduct, and thus the plan did not violate
the inmate's Eighth Amendment rights. The court noted that the inmate's cell was heated to 73 degrees, he was
generally provided some form of dress, he was granted access to hygiene items, and he was only denied a mattress
and other possessions after he used them to perpetrate self-abusive behavior, covered his cell with excrement and
blood, and injured facility staff. The court held that the state Department of Corrections' regulations governing
procedures for placing an inmate on observational status to ensure his safety and the safety of others, and the
procedures for utilizing restraints for inmate safety were sufficient to protect the inmate's liberty interest in avoiding
an erroneous determination that his behavior required such measures. The procedures governing observational status
required the inmate to be orally informed of the reasons for placement on the status and prohibited placement for
more than 15 days without an evidentiary hearing. The procedures governing restraints prohibited restraining an
inmate for more than a 12-hour period. (Green Bay Correctional Institution, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES
SECURITY PRACTICES

Bullock v. Dart, 599 F.Supp.2d 947 (N.D.Ill. 2009). Inmates filed a § 1983 action challenging the constitutionality a
county's policies of performing blanket strip searches on male, but not female, inmates returning to county jail from
court hearings at which charges against them were dismissed, and of providing privacy screens for female discharges
but not male discharges. After entry of summary judgment in the inmates' favor, the defendants moved for
reconsideration. The district court granted the motion in part. The court held that male inmates were similarly
situated to female potential discharges. The court found that fact issues remained as to whether the county's policies
were justified, and whether security considerations prevented the county from segregating inmates against whom
charges had been dismissed before they returned to their divisions. The defendants asserted that the much greater
number of male inmates in county custody and the differences in the nature and frequency of dangerous incidents in
each population justified the policy. The court held that the county's policy and practice of segregating female
possible discharges from the remainder of female court returns, such that female actual returns could elect to avoid
strip searches, but not segregating male possible discharges in a similar manner, was not gender-neutral on its face,
for the purposes of the Equal Protection Clause. (Cook County Department of Corrections, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
ITEMS PERMITTED
SEARCHES-CELL
TELEPHONE

Cox v. Ashcroft, 603 F.Supp.2d 1261 (E.D.Cal. 2009). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against the United States
Attorney General, several federal prosecutors, and the owner and employees of a privately-owned federal facility in
which the prisoner was incarcerated, alleging constitutional violations arising from his arrest, prosecution, and
incarceration. The district court dismissed the action. The court held that the prisoner did not have any Fourth
Amendment rights to privacy in his cell, and thus did not suffer any constitutional injury as a result of the search of

39.78
XXII

his cell and the confiscation of another inmate's legal materials. The court found that the prisoner lacked standing to
bring a claim against the warden of a privately-owned federal prison facility, alleging that paying the prisoner at a
rate below minimum wage violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The court noted that prisoners were not
“employees” within the meaning of FLSA. (Taft Corr. Institution, Wackenhut Corrections Corporation, California)
U.S. District Court
SAFETY
REGULATIONS
SECURITY PRACTICES
STAFFING

Estate of Gaither ex rel. Gaither v. District of Columbia, 655 F.Supp.2d 69 (D.D.C. 2009). The personal
representative of the estate of a prisoner, who was killed while incarcerated, brought a § 1983 action against the
District of Columbia and several individual officials and jail employees, alleging negligence, deliberate and reckless
indifference to allegedly dangerous conditions at a jail, and wrongful death. The district court granted summary
judgment in part and denied in part. The court found that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of
material fact as to: (1) whether the District of Columbia's inmate and detainee classification policies, procedures, and
practices were inadequate; (2) whether the District of Columbia's jail staffing policies, procedures, and practices
were inadequate; (3) whether the security policies, procedures, and practices were inadequate; (4) whether the
District of Columbia adequately trained Department of Corrections officials; and (5) whether officials provided
adequate supervision of inmates. (District of Columbia Central Detention Facility)

U.S. District Court
RELIGIOUS SERVICES
SEARCHES

Forde v. Zickefoose, 612 F.Supp.2d 171 (D.Conn. 2009). A federal prisoner petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus,
alleging that she was being denied freedom of religious expression, in violation of the First and Fourth Amendments
and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). The district court granted the government's motion for
summary judgment in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by issues of fact
as to: (1) whether the prisoner’s exercise of her religion was substantially burdened by the prison's non-emergency
cross-gender pat-down search policy; (2) whether the prisoner’s exercise of her religion was substantially burdened
by the prison's policy of requiring her to carry an identification photograph that showed her without a hijab to cover
her head; and, (3) whether the prisoner’s exercise of her religion was substantially burdened by the prison's failure to
provide an imam during Ramadan. The court held that the prison's non-emergency cross-gender pat-down search
policy did not violate the prisoner’s limited right, under the Fourth Amendment, to bodily privacy. According to the
court, although the prisoner made a sufficient showing of a subjective expectation of privacy, the expectation would
not be considered reasonable by society, since the prison had a legitimate penological interest in security and in
providing equal employment opportunities to both male and female staff, and no available further accommodation
was reasonable under the circumstances. (Federal Correctional Institution, Danbury, Connecticut)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDIA ACCESS

Hammer v. Ashcroft, 570 F.3d 798 (7th Cir. 2009). A federal prisoner who was formerly on death row and was
housed in a special confinement unit, filed a pro se lawsuit against various officials of the Bureau of Prisons (BOP),
alleging that they violated his First Amendment and equal protection rights by enforcing a policy that prevented
prisoners in a special confinement unit from giving face-to-face interviews with the media. The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held
that the BOP policy that prevented prisoners in special confinement units at maximum security prisons from giving
face-to-face or video interviews with the media did not violate the equal protection clause. According to the court,
although the BOP did not prevent such media interviews with other prisoners in a less secure confinement, the policy
was rationally related to the BOP's need for greater security in situations involving prisoners in special confinement
units in maximum security prisons, since media attention could increase tensions among prisoners, leading to an
increased risk of violence among the more violent prisoners. The court found that the BOP did not violate the
prisoner’s free speech rights where the policy was rationally related to the prison's need for greater security in
situations involving prisoners in special confinement units in maximum security prisons, since media attention could
increase tensions among prisoners, glamorize violence, and promote celebrity, leading to an increased risk of
violence. The court noted that the BOP did allow correspondence from prisoners in special confinement units to
media representatives, prisoners were free to file lawsuits, and correspondence sent to courts and attorneys by
prisoners could not be censored. (“Special Confinement Unit,” U.S. Penitentiary, Terre Haute, Indiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
RELIGIOUS SERVICES
SECURITY PRACTICES

Jova v. Smith, 582 F.3d 410 (2nd Cir. 2009). Prisoners brought a pro se action against prison officials alleging
violation of their rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of officials. The prisoners appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated
in part, and remanded. The appeals court held that the prison's restrictions on the prisoners' practice of the Tulukeesh
religion, which limited the practice to the privacy of the prisoner's cell and keeping a holy book with the prison
chaplain from whom the prisoners' could seek permission to read it, served prison officials' compelling security and
administrative interests, for the purposes of the prisoners' action alleging violation of their rights under RLUIPA.
The court held that prison officials' restrictions which allowed a prisoner to serve as a facilitator of meetings only if
the religion was known outside of the prison and prohibited the prisoners' demand to spar and receive professional
martial arts training, was the least restrictive means of furthering their compelling interests of safety and institutional
security, for the purposes of prisoners' action alleging violation of their rights under RLUIPA. According to the
court, the restriction struck a delicate balance between allowing prisoners to participate in congregational activities
while ensuring the meetings did not serve as proxies for gang recruitment and organization, while furthering the
officials' compelling interests in safety and institutional security. (Shawangunk Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
CONTRABAND
MAIL
TELEPHONE CALLS

Loret v. Selsky, 595 F.Supp.2d 231 (W.D.N.Y. 2009). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against state correctional
officials and employees, alleging procedural due process violations in connection with a prison disciplinary action.
The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants in part and denied in part. The court held that
summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether there were legitimate security
reasons for the correctional facility officials' denial of the inmate's request for a recording or transcript of the
telephone conversation between him and his son. The conversation formed part of the basis for disciplinary charges
against the inmate for conspiracy to smuggle contraband into the facility and for telephone abuse. A package
addressed to the inmate had been opened by corrections employees, and was found to contain a quantity of
marijuana and some small bottles of liquor. The package was later identified as having been sent to the plaintiff by

39.79
XXII

his adult son. The court held that the superintendent of the correctional facility was not liable in his individual
capacity to the inmate under § 1983 for any due process violations in connection with disciplinary proceedings
against the inmate, absent a showing that the superintendent was personally involved in the alleged constitutional
deprivation. (Wyoming Correctional Facility, New York)
U.S. District Court
SEARCHES
TRANSFER

Miller v. Washington County, 650 F.Supp.2d 1113 (D.Or. 2009). Inmates brought a class action against county and
sheriff, alleging that the county's policy of strip searching inmates was unconstitutional. The parties cross-moved for
summary judgment, and the inmates additionally moved for class certification. The district court held that summary
judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the county's blanket policy of strip
searching all individuals transported from another correctional or detention facility was justified by the need for
institutional security. The court denied class certification, finding that the county's strip search policy regarding
arrestees did not present common questions of law or fact. The court stayed the action, noting that the appellate court
was reviewing a city’s strip search policy at the time. (Washington County Jail, Oregon)

U.S. District Court
EXERCISE
LOCK DOWN
RIOT

Norwood v. Woodford, 661 F.Supp.2d 1148 (S.D.Cal. 2009). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action against prison
officials alleging violation of his Eighth Amendment rights when he was denied outdoor exercise for five weeks.
The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The court held that the inmate's denial of outdoor
exercise for a period of five consecutive weeks during a lockdown at the prison supported the objective component
of an Eighth Amendment claim for cruel and unusual punishment, but failed to meet the subjective component since
the officials did not act with deliberate indifference to his needs. The court noted that the lockdown was instituted
after an inmate's death in a prison riot involving the attempted murder of prison staff. According to the court, even
though the inmate was transferred to the facility after the riot and was not a participant, the lockdown of all prisoners
was necessary to ensure immediate and long-lasting safety to inmates and staff. (California State Prison, Corcoran)

U.S. District Court
LOCKS

Rodriguez-Borton v. Pereira-Castillo, 593 F.Supp.2d 399 (D.Puerto Rico 2009). Relatives of a deceased pretrial
detainee brought a § 1983 action against prison officials, requesting damages for constitutional violations
culminating in the detainee's death. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants in part and
denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by fact issues as to the lack of adequate inmate
supervision and malfunctioning cell locks and cell lights. The court also found an issue of material fact as to whether
the Administrator of the Puerto Rico Administration of Corrections (AOC) failed to act with regard to security risks,
including malfunctioning door locks, in the annex within which the pretrial detainee was found hanged.
The court also found a genuine issue of material fact as to the prison annex superintendent's failure to remedy
supervision problems in housing units where he knew inmates were able to and did move freely in and out of their
cells due to malfunctioning door locks. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of
material fact as to a correctional officer's failure to patrol the living area of the annex within which the pretrial
detainee was found hanged while he knew inmates were able to freely move around. The court denied qualified
immunity to the defendants because it was clearly established at the time of the alleged inaction, and a reasonable
prison official working in the system would have known that a lack of supervision, combined with the knowledge
that cell locks did not function, would create an obvious and undeniable security risk. (Administration of
Corrections of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and Annex 246)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONTRABAND
SEARCHES

Sanchez v. Pereira-Castillo, 590 F.3d 31 (1st Cir. 2009). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 claims against
correctional officials, a prison warden, a prison's correctional officer, and a physician, and medical battery and
medical malpractice claims against the physician, relating to strip searches, x-rays, rectal examinations, and
exploratory surgery to detect and recover suspected contraband. The district court dismissed the suit and the prisoner
appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part and remanded. The appeals court held that the digital
rectal examinations were not unreasonable where the procedures were the direct culmination of a series of searches
that began when a metal detector used to scan the prisoner's person gave a positive reading, the prisoner had two
normal bowel movements before the searches were conducted, a physician examined him upon arrival at the hospital
and found him to be asymptomatic, and several lab tests were found to be “within normal limits.” The court noted
that the searches were carried out by medical professionals in the relatively private, sanitary environment of a
hospital, upon suspicion that the prisoner had contraband, namely a cell phone, in his rectum, and with no abusive or
humiliating conduct on the part of the law enforcement officers or the doctors.
But the court found that the exploratory surgery of the abdomen of the prisoner was unreasonable where the
surgery required total anesthesia, surgical invasion of the abdominal cavity, and two days of recovery in the hospital.
The court noted that the surgery was conducted despite several indications of the absence of contraband, including
the results of two monitored bowel movements and two rectal examinations. According to the court, an x-ray, as a
much less invasive procedure, could have confirmed the results.
The court held that the prisoner's signed consent form for the exploratory surgery of his abdomen did not preclude
the prisoner's claim that he was deprived of his Fourth Amendment rights, where the prisoner was pressured and
intimidated into signing the consent, had been under constant surveillance for more than a day prior to the surgery,
had been forced to submit to searches, x-rays, and invasive rectal examinations prior to his signing the consent form,
and had twice been forced to excrete on a floor in the presence of prison personnel.
The court held that the prisoner's allegations against correctional officers were sufficient to allege that the officers
caused the hospital's forced exploratory surgery on the prisoner, as required to state a § 1983 claim against the
officers. The prisoner alleged that the officers were directly involved in all phases of the search for contraband and in
the ultimate decision to transport the prisoner to the hospital for a rectal examination or a medical procedure to
remove the foreign object purportedly lodged in the prisoner's rectum.
According to the court, the prisoner's allegation that correctional officers exerted pressure on hospital physicians
that examined the prisoner was sufficient to allege the state compulsion necessary to state a claim of § 1983 liability
against a surgeon. The court found that correctional officers' conduct, in forcing the prisoner to undergo an invasive
abdominal surgery, was a violation of a clearly established constitutional right, such that the officers were not
entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 liability. (Bayamón 501 Unit of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
Administration of Corrections, and Río Piedras Medical Center)

39.80
XXII

U.S. District Court
SEPARATION
TRANSFER

Savage v. Judge, 644 F.Supp.2d 550 (E.D.Pa. 2009). Prison inmates brought a civil rights action against prison officials for allegedly violating their civil rights in connection with reassignment of the inmates to different cells and
assaults allegedly committed upon them. Inmates not only asserted unlawful retaliation claims, but claimed that
officials exercised excessive force in violation of their Eighth Amendment rights and unlawfully conspired to violate
their rights. The officials moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in
part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether prison
officials, in separating the cellmates from each other and in transferring one to another facility, were retaliating
against the cellmates for their pursuit of grievances, or were taking necessary action to prevent the cellmates from
engaging in homosexual activity in a cell. The court also found a genuine issue of material fact as to how an inmate
sustained an injury to his face while he was being transferred to another cell. (Graterford L-Unit- RHU, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONTRABAND
SEARCHES

Serna v. Goodno, 567 F.3d 944 (8th Cir. 2009). A patient of a state mental hospital, involuntarily civilly committed
as a sexually dangerous person pursuant to a Minnesota sex offender program, brought a § 1983 action against a
program official and against the head of the state's Department of Human Services. The patient alleged that visual
body-cavity searches performed on all patients as part of a contraband investigation violated his Fourth Amendment
rights. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, and the patient appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The court held that visual body-cavity searches performed on all patients of a state mental hospital, as part
of a contraband investigation following the discovery of a cell-phone case in a common area, did not infringe upon
the Fourth Amendment rights of the patient involuntarily civilly committed to the facility as a sexually dangerous
person. According to the court, even though facility-wide searches may have constituted a disproportionate reaction,
cell phones presented a security threat in the context of sexually violent persons, there was a history of patients' use
of phones to commit crimes, and the searches were conducted in a private bathroom with no extraneous personnel
present and in a professional manner with same-sex teams of two. (Minnesota Sex Offender Program, Moose Lake,)

U.S. Appeals Court
RELIGIOUS ARTICLES

Singson v. Norris, 553 F.3d 660 (8th Cir. 2009). A prisoner brought an action against a state department of corrections, alleging its policy prohibiting in-cell use of tarot cards violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA). The prisoner was a follower of Wiccan and asserted that tarot cards were part of his religious practices. Following a trial, the district court ruled in favor of the department of corrections. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the policy did not violate RLUIPA, where the potential effect
of in-cell use of tarot cards on the guards and allocation of prison resources outweighed the restrictions felt by any
interested inmate-users. (Arkansas Department of Correction)

U.S. Appeals Court
RELIGIOUS SERVICES
SECURITY PRACTICES

Sossamon v. Lone Star State of Texas, 560 F.3d 316 (5th Cir. 2009). A prison inmate brought a civil rights action
challenging prison officials' refusal to allow him to participate in religious services while he was on cell restriction,
and refusal to make a chapel available for religious services due to security concerns allegedly presented by holding
such services in the chapel. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants and the inmate appealed. The appeals court dismissed as moot in part, reversed in part, affirmed in part and remanded. The court held
that the state-wide cessation, in all correctional facilities in Texas, of the policy of preventing general-population
prisoners on cell restriction from attending religious services had the effect of mooting the civil rights claim. The
court found that the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) did not create an individualcapacity cause of action in favor of the prison inmate against prison officials who had denied him access to a prison
chapel. According to the court, RLUIPA did not provide clear notice that, by accepting federal funds, the state was
waiving its sovereign immunity from liability for such monetary damages. The court held that summary judgment
was precluded by genuine issues of material fact on the inmate's claims for injunctive relief challenging the denial of
access to a chapel. The inmate alleged that his exercise of religion was substantially burdened because he could not
use the prison chapel where he could kneel in front of an alter in view of a cross, and due to his being able to attend
religious services only at other locations in the prison that were not specifically designed for Christian worship.
(Robertson Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division)

U.S. Appeals Court
ACCESS TO
ATTORNEY
SECURITY
RESTRICTIONS

U.S. v. Mikhel, 552 F.3d 961 (9th Cir. 2009). An alien inmate convicted of capital offenses moved to allow attorneyclient access without special administrative measures (SAM) restrictions that allegedly violated the Due Process
Clause and Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of appellate counsel. The appeals court held that modification of the SAM was warranted to permit the attorney to use a translator in a meeting with the inmate, and modification of the SAM was warranted to allow the attorney's investigators to disseminate the inmate's communications.
The court also found that modification of the SAM was warranted to allow the attorney's investigator to meet with
the inmate. The court found that the SAM was an exaggerated response to the prison's legitimate security interests
and unacceptably burdened the inmate's due process and Sixth Amendment rights. (Central District, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
RESTRAINTS

Vallario v. Vandehey, 554 F.3d 1259 (10th Cir. 2009). County jail inmates sued a county sheriff and a county's administrator of jail operations in their official capacities, alleging disregard of risks to inmates from restraint chairs
and other devices, and the denial of access to psychiatric care for indigent inmates. The district court granted the
inmates' motion for class certification and the defendants petitioned for interlocutory appeal. The appeals court
granted the petition and remanded the case. The court held that the district court abused its discretion by misconstruing the complaint as alleging that denial of adequate mental health treatment affected all inmates, and abused its
discretion by refraining from any consideration whatsoever of the action's merits. (Garfield County Jail, Colorado)
2010

U.S. District Court
MAIL
SECURITY
RESTRICTIONS
XXIII

Akers v. Watts, 740 F.Supp.2d 83 (D.D.C. 2010). A federal inmate brought a civil rights action against various officials, employees, and agents of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), United
States Attorney's Office for the District of Kansas, and the United States Marshals Service (USMS) in their individual capacities, alleging, among other things, that the defendants conspired to violate his constitutional rights by restricting his communications with persons outside the prison. The district court granted the federal defendants motion to dismiss. The court held that it did not have personal jurisdiction in the federal inmate's civil rights action

39.81

against the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) officials, employees, and agents, a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agent,
a Kansas Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA), or the United States marshals, where the complaint made no
allegations that such defendants had any personal connection with District of Columbia other than their federal employment, and the mere fact that the defendants were federal government employees, affiliated with agencies that
were headquartered or maintained offices in the District of Columbia, was insufficient to render them subject to suit
in their individual capacities. The court held that restrictions imposed upon, and the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) interferences with, the correspondence of federal inmate, who had initiated fraudulent schemes from prison on more than
one occasion and used the mail in furtherance of his efforts, served a legitimate penological interest by limiting the
inmate's ability to manipulate or swindle others, and thus did not violate the inmate's First Amendment rights. The
court noted that the inmate had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his non-legal mail, and therefore restrictions
placed upon the inmate’s correspondence following his repeated efforts to initiate new fraudulent schemes while
incarcerated did not violate the Fourth Amendment. (Admin. Max., Florence, Colorado, Fed. Bureau of Prisons)

XXIII

U.S. District Court
LOCK DOWN
PRETRIAL DETAINEES
USE OF FORCE

Castro v. Melchor, 760 F.Supp.2d 970(D.Hawai‘I 2010). A female pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against
correctional facility officials and medical staff, alleging the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious
medical needs resulting in the delivery of a stillborn child. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the correctional facility's medical staff subjectively knew the pretrial
detainee's complaints of vaginal bleeding presented a serious medical need. The court held that the staff’s failure to
ensure the detainee received an ultrasound and consultation was no more than gross negligence, and the medical staff
did not deny, delay, or intentionally interfere with the pretrial detainee's medical treatment. According to the court,
summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the correctional facility officials'
actions and inactions in training the facility's medical staff resulted in the alleged deprivation of the pretrial detainee's right to medical treatment and whether the officials consciously disregarded serious health risks by failing to
apply the women's lock-down policies. Following a verbal exchange with a guard, two officers physically forced the
detainee to the ground from a standing position. While she was lying on the ground on her stomach, the officers
restrained her by holding their body weights against her back and legs and placing her in handcuffs. The detainee
was approximately seven months pregnant at the time. (Oahu Community Correctional Center, Hawai’i)

U.S. District Court
LOCK DOWN
RELIGIOUS SERVICES

Chappell v. Helder, 696 F.Supp.2d 1021 (W.D.Ark. 2010). An inmate brought a § 1983 suit claiming that religious
presentations in a dayroom during lockout times contravened the Free Exercise Clause of the Constitution. The court
held that the presentations contravened the inmate's rights under the Free Exercise Clause. The court noted that although he was not told to sit and listen, nor was he forced to participate, there was a forced inculcation in the fact that
he was unable to remove himself to a place where he did not have to hear the presentations. The court found that
allowing only the “Holy Bible” to be possessed by inmates during a morning lockout violated the inmate's rights
under the Establishment Clause, but the inmate's right of meaningful access to the courts was not violated. (Washington County Detention Center, Arkansas)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXPOSURE TO
CHEMICALS
CLEANING SUPPLIES

Christian v. Wagner, 623 F.3d 608 (8th Cir. 2010). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against jail officials
and employees, alleging a due process violation arising out of his exposure to a cleaning solvent. After a jury found
in favor of the defendants, the district court denied the detainee's motion for a new trial or judgment as a matter of
law. The detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the jury could reasonably find
that the detainee failed to show that a physician or other medical personnel had diagnosed him with a serious medical need while incarcerated, as would support a finding that such need was objectively serious. The court noted that
medical personnel who examined the detainee found no objective evidence supporting a diagnosis, and the record
did not contain a medical order to jail employees. The court also held that evidence supported the finding that the
detainee's need for medical attention was not so obvious that a layperson must have recognized it, as would support a
finding that such need was objectively serious. According to the court, the detainee's testimony that he informed jail
employees that he coughed up blood and experienced difficulty breathing was corroborated only by his mother,
whereas several jail employees testified they did not observe the detainee suffering adverse reactions to cleaning
solutions and had no recollection of his complaining of a medical problem. (Johnson County Jail, Iowa)

U.S. District Court
BOOKS
RELIGIOUS SERVICES

Ciempa v. Jones, 745 F.Supp.2d 1171 (N.D.Okla. 2010). An inmate brought claims against state prison officials
under § 1983 for alleged violations of the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments and the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The officials moved for summary judgment. The district court granted
the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that prison officials did not violate the inmate's First Amendment right to free exercise of religion, RLUIPA, the inmate’s due process rights, or equal protection, by denying him
access to particular issues of a religious publication based on guidelines prohibiting publications that advocate terrorism, criminal behavior, racial, religious, or national hatred. According to the court, the guidelines were reasonably
related to the legitimate penological goal of maintaining order and security, individual review of incoming publications was a rational means of achieving that goal and did not deprive the inmate of all means of exercising his religion, and allowing such materials would have a significant negative impact on other inmates and guards.
The court also found no violation from the officials’ denial of access to a book containing instructions for scaling
walls, traveling under or over barbed wire, and combat techniques, since preventing the book was the least restrictive
means of ensuring that the inmate did not receive information that would facilitate violence or escape.
But the court held that the officials failed to meet their burden to show that prohibiting a book about the warrior
ethos and the history of stoicism in the military was the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling interest, as
required for summary judgment on the inmate's RLUIPA claim. The court found that prison officials did not violate
the inmate's First Amendment rights by denying him meeting space and time in a prison chapel to conduct religious
classes or meetings, based on a state-wide policy of denying meeting space and time to the religious group due to the
racial and hate filled nature of the materials and doctrine of the group. But the court found that the officials failed to
meet their burden to show that banning the religious group from the chapel was the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling interest, as required for summary judgment on the inmate's RLUIPA claim.

39.82

According to the court, prison officials' failure to provide the inmate with a Halal diet did not violate his rights
under First Amendment or RLUIPA, where the inmate failed to establish that such failure imposed a substantial
burden on his religious exercise, since the inmate stated that his religious needs could be satisfied by the provision of
a Kosher diet. (Dick Conner Correctional Center, Jess Dunn Correctional Center, Oklahoma)
U.S. District Court
BOOKS

Couch v. Jabe, 737 F.Supp.2d 561 (W.D.Va. 2010). An inmate, proceeding pro se, brought a § 1983 action claiming
that prison officials violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights when they applied a Virginia Department of
Corrections (VDOC) regulation to exclude the books Ulysses and Lady Chatterley's Lover from the prison library
and prevented him from ordering those books from a private, approved vendor. The parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The district granted the inmate’s motion, finding that the regulation violated the First Amendment,
and that injunctive relief was warranted. The court held that the regulation was not reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests, and thus, was overbroad, in violation of the First Amendment. The court noted that legitimate
government interests in security, discipline, good order and offender rehabilitation were not rationally related to the
regulation, which forbid all “explicit ... descriptions of sexual acts” including “sexual acts in violation of state or
federal law,” and encompassed much of the world's finest literature, but did not extend to “soft core” pornography.
According to the court, while the inmate had no right to a general purpose reading library under the First Amendment, where the Virginia Department of Corrections (VDOC) decided to provide a general literary library to offenders, VDOC officials were constrained by the First Amendment in how they regulated the library. The court concluded that the appropriate remedy following a determination that the First Amendment was violated by a prison regulation, which excluded the books Ulysses and Lady Chatterley's Lover from a prison library, was injunctive relief
against the enforcement and application of the regulation. (Augusta Correctional Center, Virginia)

U.S. District Court
ESCAPE
SECURITY PRACTICES

Dean v. Walker, 743 F.Supp.2d 605 (S.D.Miss. 2010). Motorists injured when a squad car commandeered by an e
scapee collided with their vehicle brought a § 1983 action in state court against a county sheriff and deputy sheriffs,
in their individual and official capacities, the county, and others, asserting various claims under federal and state law.
The case was removed to federal court where the court granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion for
summary judgment. The defendants moved to alter or amend. The court denied the motion. The court held that the
“public duty” doctrine did not relieve the county of tort liability to the motorists under the Mississippi Tort Claims
Act (MTCA). The court found that the county sheriff and deputy sheriffs who were in vehicular pursuit of the escaped jail inmate when the escapee's vehicle crashed into the motorists' vehicle owed a duty to the motorists as fellow drivers, separate and apart from their general duties to the public as police officers, and thus the “public duty”
doctrine did not relieve the county of tort liability in the motorists' claims under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act
(MTCA). (Jefferson–Franklin Correctional Facility, Mississippi)

U.S. District Court
DISTURBANCE
SEX OFFENDER
USE OF FORCE

Enriquez v. Kearney, 694 F.Supp.2d 1282 (S.D.Fla. 2010). A civil detainee brought a pro se civil rights action
against correctional facility officers and physicians, asserting claims for excessive force. The officers and physicians
moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that officers did not use excessive force against the civil detainee in violation of his due process rights by spraying him with pepper spray, handcuffing him, and escorting him from a detention unit in restraints, where the detainee did not sustain any serious
injury, and the decision to use pepper spray was only made after officers attempted for more than one hour to verbally convince the detainee to cooperate and leave the unit where his interaction with officers was causing a disturbance. The court noted that there was no indication that the force was imposed as punishment rather than in a good
faith effort to further the need to maintain order and security on a unit where numerous sexually violent predators
(SVPs) were held. (Florida Civil Commitment Center, Arcadia, Florida)

U.S. Appeals Court
PUBLICATIONS

Farid v. Ellen, 593 F.3d 233 (2nd Cir. 2010). A state prisoner brought suit against correctional officials under § 1983,
alleging that he was deprived of rights protected by the First Amendment when he was disciplined by prison officials
for possessing and distributing a booklet of which he was the principal author. The district court granted in part and
denied in part the parties' summary judgment motions. The parties appealed and cross-appealed. The appeals court
affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part. The court held that the prison disciplinary rule prohibiting contraband was unconstitutionally vague as applied to the state prisoner. The prisoner was disciplined for possessing
and distributing a brochure that violated an inmate group's internal bylaws by not having been approved by the
group's staff advisor. The court noted that the bylaws did not indicate that violation of the group's bylaws constituted
a violation of the prison contraband rule, thus exposing the prisoner to far greater penalties than the group could
have imposed, and prison rules conferred almost complete enforcement discretion on prison officials. According to
the court, the prisoner's right to not be punished under prison rules for violation of an inmate group's internal bylaws
was clearly established, weighing against the prison officials' claim of qualified immunity in the § 1983 action. The
court noted that the essence of constitutional prohibitions on vagueness was that the rules must give notice of conduct that they, rather than another set of rules, prohibit and must constrain discretion of officials who apply them.
The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether state prison
officials actually intended to punish the prisoner under the prison's contraband rule or for violating an internal bylaw
of an inmate group. (Woodbourne Correctional Facility, Clinton Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
RELIGION
SEARCHES
STAFFING

Forde v. Baird, 720 F.Supp.2d 170 (D.Conn. 2010). A federal inmate petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging
that she was being denied freedom of religious expression, in violation of the First Amendment and the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, in part, and
denied in part. The court held that the Muslim inmate's right to free exercise of religion was substantially burdened,
as required to support her claim under RFRA, by a prison policy allowing for non-emergency pat searches of female
inmates by male guards, despite prison officials' claim that the inmate's belief was not accurate. The court found that
the choice offered the inmate, of violating her understanding of the precepts of Islam, or refusing a search and risking punishment, constituted a substantial burden. The court found that the prison's interest in maintaining safety and
security of the female prison through the use of cross-gender pat searches was not compelling, as required to justify
a substantial burden on the inmate's right of free exercise of religion under RFRA, where the prison's arguments

39.83

regarding how and why the cross-gender pat searches promoted safety and security at the prison were actually related to the staffing of the facility, not to its safety and security. According to the court, the prison's interest in avoiding
staffing and employment issues at the female prison through the use of cross-gender pat searches was not compelling, as required to justify a substantial burden on the inmate's right of free exercise of religion under RFRA. The
court noted that even if the prison's interests in maintaining safety and security and avoiding staffing and employment issues were compelling, cross-gender pat searches were not the least restrictive means of addressing these interests, as required to justify the substantial burden on an inmate's right of free exercise of religion under RFRA,
absent evidence that the prison considered and rejected less restrictive practices to cross-gender pat searches. (Federal Correctional Institution in Danbury, Connecticut)
U.S. District Court
DISTURBANCE
RELIGIOUS SERVICES
SECURITY
RESTRICTIONS

Gordon v. Caruso, 720 F.Supp.2d 896 (W.D.Mich. 2010). An inmate sued corrections officials under § 1983 and the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), claiming that they violated his rights by preventing
him from engaging in group worship services with other adherents of his faith. Following denial of a defense motion
for summary judgment, officials moved for reconsideration. The appeals court held that summary judgment was
precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether prison officials' ban on Asatru group worship was the least
restrictive means of furthering their interest in maintaining prison security. The court found that prison officials who
banned Asatru group worship had a rational basis for treating members of the Asatru faith differently from other
groups that promoted racist and supremacist teachings, based on a demonstrated connection between the practice of
Asatru and violence and racial conflict in the prison setting, and thus, there was no violation of the inmate's equal
protection rights. The court noted that the other groups that were allowed to engage in group activity were not shown
to present similar security concerns. (Michigan Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
RELIGIOUS SERVICES

Green v. Tudor, 685 F.Supp.2d 678 (W.D.Mich. 2010). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action against four employees at a prison for claims arising from his access to a prison law library and the adequacy of the prison's food service.
The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the inmate
failed to exhaust administrative remedies prior to bringing his claim against an assistant librarian alleging denial of
access to courts through a denied “call-out” request. The court found that the assistant librarian did not engage in
retaliatory conduct against the inmate and did not deny the inmate equal protection. The court held that the assistant
food service director did not coerce the inmate, an Orthodox Muslim, into participating in Jewish religious practices,
and did not take any actions establishing a state religion, so as to violate the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment. The court held that the alleged denial by the prison's assistant food service director of adequate advance notice of meal substitutions, hot meals during non-daylight hours during a religious holiday, and adequate
nutritional calories to the Muslim inmate was rationally related to legitimate governmental and penological interests
of prison security and fiscal budgetary discipline, and thus the denials did not violate the inmate's First Amendment
free exercise rights. The court noted that the inmate retained alternative means for practicing his Muslim faith, and
granting requests for specialized diets would be expensive and would divert resources from other penological goals.
(Muskegon Correctional Facility, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
RESTRAINTS
SAFETY

Gruenberg v. Gempeler, 740 F.Supp.2d 1018 (E.D.Wis. 2010). A prisoner, proceeding pro se, filed a § 1983 action
against various prison officials, guards and medical staff, alleging violations of the Eighth Amendment. The district
court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court held that the prisoner did not have a clearly
established right to not be continually restrained without clothing or cover in a cell following his ingestion of a
handcuff key, a master key for belt restraints and one of the keys used for opening cell doors, and therefore, prison
officials were entitled to qualified immunity in the prisoner's § 1983 action alleging violations of the Eighth
Amendment. According to the court, continuous restraint of the prisoner without clothing or cover in a cell did not
violate the prisoner's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights, where the prisoner was not restrained for a disciplinary reason, but to ensure prison staff was able to regain possession of a handcuff key, a master key for belt restraints and one of the keys used for opening cell doors following the prisoner's ingestion of them. (Waupun Correctional Institution, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
CONTRABAND
SEARCHES
USE OF FORCE

Hanson v. U.S., 712 F.Supp.2d 321 (D.N.J. 2010). An inmate brought a Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) action,
alleging that a Bureau of Prisons (BOP) officer slammed his head on the floor and choked him in an attempt to force
the inmate to spit out contraband that the inmate was attempting to swallow. The government filed a motion for
summary judgment and the district court denied the motion. The court held, for the purposes of the inmate's FTCA
claim, under New Jersey law the BOP officers employed unreasonable force while attempting to search the inmate
for contraband. According to the court, summary judgment was precluded by material issues of fact regarding
whether the BOP officers used reasonable force in holding and searching the inmate. (Federal Correctional Facility
in Fort Dix, New Jersey)

U.S. District Court
SAFETY
TRANSFER

Hartry v. County of Suffolk, 755 F.Supp.2d 422 (E.D.N.Y.2010). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against a sergeant and a county, alleging failure to protect him from harm and deliberate indifference to his health and safety.
The district court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court held that the inmate's transfer
from one county prison to another county prison deprived him of a meaningful opportunity to pursue his administrative remedies following an attack by another inmate, and therefore, his failure to exhaust administrative remedies
prior to bringing his § 1983 action against the sergeant and the county was excused. The court noted that the inmate
handbook permitted an inmate five days to file a grievance, and the inmate was transferred within two days of the
attack. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
inmate faced a real and significant threat of harm from other inmates, and whether the prison sergeant was aware of
a substantial risk of harm to the inmate from other inmates. The court also found a genuine issue of material fact as
to whether moving an inmate only in response to a direct threat, within or outside of the jail, was a reasonable protective measure. (Suffolk County Correctional Facility, New York)

39.84

U.S. District Court
RELIGIOUS ARTICLES
SATANISM

Indreland v. Yellowstone County Bd. of Comr's, 693 F.Supp.2d 1230 (D.Mont. 2010). A state prisoner brought a §
1983 action against a county board of commissioners and prison officials, alleging, among other things, that the
defendants' actions, including denying him access to satanic materials and holding him in maximum security, interfered with his free exercise of religion in violation of First Amendment and Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA). The court held that prison officials' denial of access to his satanic medallion did not interfere
with his free exercise of religion in violation of First Amendment and RLUIPA, where the officials had a legitimate
penological interest in denying the prisoner a chain that the officials believed could be used to strangle another inmate. According to the court, prison officials segregated the prisoner because he was involved in fights with other
inmates, and not solely on account of his alleged satanic religion, and thus the prisoner's segregation did not interfere
with his free exercise of religion in violation of First Amendment and RLUIPA. The court held that the county detention facility was not required under the First Amendment or RLUIPA to purchase religious materials for the prisoner at its own expense. But the court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact
as to whether the prison chaplain was working in conjunction with prison staff to deny the prisoner, who claimed to
practice satanism, his free exercise of religion, and therefore, whether the chaplain was state actor. (Yellowstone
County Detention Facility, Montana)

U.S. District Court
DISTURBANCE
USE OF FORCE

Johnson v. Roberts, 721 F.Supp.2d 1017 (D.Kan. 2010). A former county jail inmate brought an action against a
deputy, sheriff, and county board of commissioners, alleging use of excessive force when the deputy used a stun gun
on the inmate. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court held that the use of
a stun gun to subdue the county jail inmate was reasonable and did not violate the inmate's Eighth Amendment
rights. The court noted that the inmate had placed a towel in front of a security camera in violation of a jail rule, and
when deputies responded to the inmate's cell to confiscate the towel and the inmate's property box, the inmate refused to hand over the box and either dropped or threw the box to the floor and refused an order to pick it up, placing
the deputy in the position of bending down to retrieve the box from directly in front of the noncompliant inmate. The
court found that the use of a stun gun was not a clearly established violation of the Eighth Amendment at the time of
the incident and thus the deputy, sheriff, and county board of commissioners were entitled to qualified immunity.
The court noted that the deputy used the stun gun to ensure the inmate's compliance with orders and not to punish the
inmate. (Miami County Jail, Kansas)

U.S. District Court
MAIL
RELIGIOUS ARTICLES
USE OF FORCE

Kendrick v. Faust, 682 F.Supp.2d 932 (E.D. Ark. 2010). A female state prison inmate brought a § 1983 action
against employees of the Arkansas Department of Correction (ADC), alleging various violations of her constitutional
rights. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in
part. The court held that the inmate failed to allege that she sustained an actual injury or that an Arkansas Department of Correction (ADC) official denied her the opportunity to review her mail prior to its being confiscated, as
required to support a claim that the official violated the inmate's constitutional right of access to the courts and her
First Amendment right to send and receive mail. The court found that an ADC employee's use of force against the
inmate was justified by the inmate's disruptive behavior during the search of her cell and thus did not give rise to the
ADC employee's liability on an excessive force claim. The inmate alleged that the ADC employee grabbed her by
the arm, dragged her from her cell, and threw her into the shower. The court note that there was no medical evidence
that the ADC employee's use of handcuffs caused any permanent injury to the inmate as required to support a claim
that the employee used excessive force against the inmate. The court found that summary judgment was precluded
by genuine issues of material fact as to whether there was a legitimate penological interest for the alleged destruction
of the prison inmate's bible, precluding summary judgment as to whether ADC employees violated the inmate's right
to freedom of religion by destroying her bible. (Arkansas Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES
VISITS

Mashburn v. Yamhill County, 698 F.Supp.2d 1233 (D.Or. 2010). A class action was brought on behalf of juvenile
detainees against a county and officials, challenging strip-search procedures at a juvenile detention facility. The
parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The court held that the scope of an admission strip-search policy applied to juvenile detainees was excessive in relation to the government's legitimate interests, in contravention of the
Fourth Amendment. According to the court, notwithstanding the county's general obligation to care for and protect
juveniles, the searches were highly intrusive, the county made no effort to mitigate the scope and intensity of the
searches, and less intrusive alternatives existed. The court found that county officials failed to establish a reasonable
relationship between their legitimate interests and post-contact visit strip-searches performed on juvenile detainees,
as required under the Fourth Amendment. The court noted that the searches occurred irrespective of whether there
was an individualized suspicion that a juvenile had acquired contraband, and most contact visits occurred between
juveniles and counsel or therapists. (Yamhill County Juvenile Detention Center, Oregon)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXERCISE
LOCK DOWN

Norwood v. Vance, 591 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2010). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action, alleging that corrections
officials violated the Eighth Amendment by depriving him of outdoor exercise. The district court denied the officials’ motion for summary judgment and, following a jury award of nominal and punitive damages, made an award
of attorney's fees. The officials appealed. The appeals court reversed and vacated the award of attorney’s fees. The
appeals court held that the district court erred in failing to include in jury instructions requested language regarding
the deference due to correction officials' decisions, and that the error was prejudicial. According to the court, failure
to give additional guidance on deference rendered the instruction incomplete and misleading, and jurors might well
have reached a different conclusion if properly instructed. The court held that correction officials were entitled to
qualified immunity in the inmate's § 1983 action alleging that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated by restrictions placed on his outdoor exercise during prison lockdowns. According to the court, given the extraordinary
violence gripping the prison, it would not have been clear to a reasonable official that denying outdoor exercise was
unlawful, particularly since officials had a duty to keep inmates safe and their judgments as to how to do that were
entitled to wide-ranging deference. The court noted that while exercise is one of the basic human necessities protected by the Eighth Amendment, a temporary denial of outdoor exercise with no medical effects is not a substantial
deprivation. (California State Prison, Sacramento, California)

39.85

U.S. Appeals Court
CONTRABAND
SEARCHES

Nunez v. Duncan, 591 F.3d 1217 (9th Cir. 2010). A federal inmate brought a pro se Bivens action against prison officials, alleging he was subjected to a random strip search in violation of his First, Fourth, and Eighth Amendment
rights. The district court entered summary judgment for the officials, and the inmate appealed. The appeals court
affirmed, finding that the strip search of the inmate pursuant to a policy authorizing strip searches of inmates returning from outside work detail was reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest in controlling contraband
within the prison, and did not violate the inmate's Fourth Amendment rights. (Fed.Prison Camp, Sheridan, Oregon)

U.S. Appeals Court
VIDEO SURVEILLANCE

Pourmoghani-Esfahani v. Gee, 625 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2010). A female pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action
against a deputy sheriff, alleging excessive force and deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The district court denied the deputy's motion for summary judgment and the deputy appealed. The appeals court affirmed in
part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that the deputy sheriff was not qualifiedly immune from the
pretrial detainee's § 1983 excessive force claim, since the deputy's alleged actions, including slamming the detainee's
head to the floor seven to eight times while she was restrained, if proven, were obviously beyond what the Constitution would allow under the circumstances. The appeals court accepted the depiction of events from closed-circuit
television cameras placed throughout jail, rather than crediting the detainee's account of the altercation, where the
video obviously contradicted the detainee's version of the facts. But the court noted that video failed to convey spoken words or tone and sometimes failed to provide unobstructed views of the events, and the court credited the detainee's version where no obviously contradictory video evidence was available. (Hillsborough Co. Jail, Florida)

U.S. Appeals Court
CLASSIFICATION
EXERCISE
LOCK DOWN

Richardson v. Runnels, 594 F.3d 666 (9th Cir. 2010). An African-American state prisoner brought a § 1983 action
against a prison warden and correctional officers, among others, alleging that he was subjected to racial discrimination during prison lockdowns, and that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his need to exercise, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The district court held that summary judgment
was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether reasonable men and women could differ regarding the
necessity of state prison officials' racial classification in response to prison disturbances that were believed to have
been perpetrated or planned by prisoners who were African-American, and whether the officials' lockdown of all
African-American prisoners in the unit containing high-risk prisoners following disturbances was narrowly tailored
to further a compelling government interest. The court also found that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether state prison officials were deliberately indifferent to the need for exercise of a
prisoner who was subjected to prison lockdowns. (High Desert State Prison, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
PUBLICATIONS
SAFETY REGULATIONS

Singer v. Raemisch, 593 F.3d 529 (7th Cir. 2010). An inmate, whose books, magazines and manuscript about the
fantasy role-playing game Dungeons and Dragons were confiscated by prison officials under a prison's policy banning fantasy games, filed a § 1983 action alleging violation of his First Amendment right to free speech. The district
court granted the defendants summary judgment. The inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held
that despite the inmate's contention that a fantasy role-playing game had never incited prison violence or motivated
devotees to form stereotypical street or prison gangs in the past, prison officials were rational in their belief that, if
left unchecked, fantasy role-playing games could lead to gang behavior among inmates and undermine prison security in the future. The court also found that, despite the inmate's contention that fantasy role-playing games had a positive rehabilitative effect on prisoners, prison officials were rational in their belief that fantasy role-playing games
could impede inmates' rehabilitation, lead to escapist tendencies or result in more dire consequences, and thus the
prison ban on fantasy role-playing games did not violate the inmate's First Amendment free speech rights. The court
noted that officials were concerned about potential inmate obsession with escape, both figurative and literal and
based the ban on the possibility that games could foster inmates' obsession with escaping from both real life and the
correctional environment, placing legitimate penological goals of prison security and inmate rehabilitation in peril.
According to the court, the prison policy prohibiting possession of fantasy role-playing game manuals, strategy
guides, character novellas, and other related materials was rationally related to the goal of preventing susceptible
inmates from embarking upon a dangerous escapist path, and thus confiscation of the inmate's role-playing books,
magazines and manuscript did not violate his First Amendment free speech rights. The court found that prison officials' ban on fantasy role-playing games and publications met the requirement that inmates have alternative means of
exercising a restricted right, under the Turner test for reviewing the reasonableness of prison regulations impacting
constitutional rights, since the inmate whose fantasy role-playing game materials were confiscated could express
himself by writing another work of fiction, could possess other reading materials, or could engage with other inmates
in allowable games. (Waupun Correctional Institution, Wisconsin)

U.S. Appeals Court
EVACUATION

Spotts v. U.S., 613 F.3d 559 (5th Cir. 2010). High-security inmates at a federal prison, who were not evacuated in the
aftermath of damage to the prison and the surrounding area caused by a hurricane, brought an action against the
United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The district court dismissed on jurisdictional grounds as
barred by the “discretionary function” exception to the FTCA. The inmates appealed. The appeals court affirmed.
The court held that the decision on the part of a regional director of the Bureau of Prisons (BOP), not to evacuate
high-security inmates from the prison when damage caused by the hurricane deprived the facility of electricity and
potable water for an extended period of time, was the type of policy decision protected by the “discretionary function” exception to the FTCA. (Federal Correctional Complex, United States Penitentiary, Beaumont, Texas)

U.S. District Court
SEGREGATION
TRANSFER
USE OF FORCE

Tafari v. McCarthy, 714 F.Supp.2d 317 (N.D.N.Y. 2010). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against employees of the New York State Department of Correctional Services (DOCS), alleging, among other things, that the employees violated his constitutional rights by subjecting him to excessive force, destroying his personal property,
denying him medical care, and subjecting him to inhumane conditions of confinement. The employees moved for
summary judgment, and the prisoner moved to file a second amended complaint and to appoint counsel. The court
held that a state prison correctional officer's alleged throwing of urine and feces on the prisoner to wake him up,
while certainly repulsive, was de minimis use of force, and was not sufficiently severe to be considered repugnant to
the conscience of mankind, and thus the officer's conduct did not violate the Eighth Amendment. The court found

39.86

that officers who were present in the prisoner's cell when another officer allegedly threw urine and feces on the prisoner lacked a reasonable opportunity to stop the alleged violation, given the brief and unexpected nature of the incident, and thus the officers present in the cell could not be held liable for failing to intervene.
The court found that even if a correctional officers' captain failed to thoroughly investigate the alleged incident in
which one officer threw urine and feces on the prisoner to wake him up, such failure to investigate did not violate the
prisoner's due process rights, since the prisoner did not have due process right to a thorough investigation of his
grievances. According to the court, one incident in which state correctional officers allegedly interfered with the
prisoner's outgoing legal mail did not create a cognizable claim under § 1983 for violation of the prisoner's First and
Fourteenth Amendment rights, absent a showing that the prisoner suffered any actual injury, that his access to courts
was chilled, or that his ability to legally represent himself was impaired. The court held that there was no evidence
that the state prisoner suffered any physical injury as result of an alleged incident in which a correctional officer spit
chewing tobacco in his face, as required to maintain an Eighth Amendment claim based on denial of medical care.
The court found that, even if a state prisoner's right to file prison grievances was protected by the First Amendment, a restriction limiting the prisoner's filing of grievances to two per week did not violate the prisoner's constitutional rights, since the prisoner was abusing the grievance program. The court noted that the prisoner filed an exorbitant amount of grievances, including 115 in a two-month period, most of which were deemed frivolous.
The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether state correctional officers used excessive force against the prisoner in the course of his transport to a different facility. The
court held that state correctional officers were not entitled to qualified immunity from the prisoner's § 1983 excessive force claim arising from his alleged beating by officers during his transfer to a different facility, where a reasonable juror could have concluded that the officers knew or should have known that their conduct violated the prisoner's Eighth Amendment rights, and it was clearly established that prison official's use of force against an inmate for
reasons that did not serve penological purpose violated the inmate's constitutional rights. The inmate allegedly suffered injuries, including bruises and superficial lacerations on his body, which the court found did not constitute a
serious medical condition. The court held that state prison officials' alleged retaliatory act of leaving the lights on in
the prisoner's cell in a special housing unit (SHU) 24 hours per day did not amount to cruel and unusual treatment, in
violation of the Eighth Amendment. According to the court, the prisoner failed to demonstrate a causal connection
between his conduct and the adverse action of leaving the lights on 24 hours per day, since the illumination policy
applied to all inmates in SHU, not just the prisoner, and constant illumination was related to a legitimate penological
interest in protecting both guards and inmates in SHU. (New York State Department of Correctional Services, Eastern New York Correctional Facility)
U.S. Appeals Court
EXERCISE
SEGREGATION

Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2010). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against prison officials,
alleging violations of the Eighth Amendment. The district court granted the officials' motion for summary judgment
and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that the prison officials knew
that a serious risk of harm existed for the prisoner, who was denied exercise for nearly 14 months, as required for the
prisoner's § 1983 action. According to the court, officials made and reviewed a decision to keep the prisoner confined without out-of-cell exercise, and the prisoner submitted repeated written and oral complaints. The court found
that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether prison officials acted reasonably in confining the prisoner for nearly 14 months. The court noted that officials may be more restrictive than
they otherwise may be if a genuine emergency exists, and certain services may be suspended temporarily, but the
court found that even where security concerns might justify a limitation on permitting a prisoner to mingle with the
general prison population, such concerns do not explain why other exercise arrangements are not made. (Salinas
Valley State Prison, California)

U.S. District Court
SAFETY
SEARCHES

U.S. v. Ghailani, 751 F.Supp.2d 508 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). A defendant, an alleged member of Al Qaeda charged with
conspiring to kill Americans abroad, moved for an order directing the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to cease from employing visual inspection of his rectal area when entering or leaving a correctional center for court appearances. The
district court denied the motion, finding that the search policy was justified by a legitimate governmental interest in
protecting the safety of prison and court personnel and other inmates. The court noted that the policy was adopted at
the national level in recognition of the substantial danger that inmates will secrete weapons or other contraband in
body cavities, that the government made a credible showing that ready alternatives were not available to protect this
important security interest, and that the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights would be protected adequately by existing procedures. (Metropolitan Correctional Center, Manhattan, New York)

U.S. District Court
CLOTHING
SECURITY
RESTRICTIONS

Williams v. Ozmint, 726 F.Supp.2d 589 (D.S.C. 2010). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against correctional facility officials, alleging violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The officials filed a motion for summary
judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that sanctions imposed upon an inmate who committed sexual misconduct offenses while imprisoned, including wearing a pink jumpsuit for 90 days and eating meals
earlier, were rationally related to penological interests, and therefore, did not violate equal protection. According to
the court: (1) the jumpsuit provided visual identification to officials, especially female officers; (2) that the inmate
had a recent history of sexual misconduct; (3) activity and movement restrictions lessened the risk of the inmate
committing another offense that could result in transmission of blood-borne pathogens; and (4) the jumpsuit served
as disincentive to engage in the conduct in the first instance. The court found that the requirement that an inmate
who committed sexual misconduct offenses while imprisoned wear a pink jumpsuit did not create an objectively
intolerable risk of harm in violation of the Eighth Amendment, where the policy was not applied maliciously and
sadistically, and absent an imminent and substantial risk of serious harm. (Ridgeland Corr'l Inst., South Carolina)

U.S. District Court
RELIGIOUS SERVICES
SEGREGATION
EXERCISE

Young v. Ericksen, 758 F.Supp.2d 777 (E.D.Wis. 2010). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action claiming correctional officers and staff violated his constitutional rights by refusing to allow him to exercise outside his cell for
almost an entire year and that they violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Person Act (RLUIPA) by
refusing to allow him to attend religious services and meet with an Imam. The district court denied the defendants’
motion for summary judgment. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material

39.87

fact as to whether prison officials fairly denied the state prisoner out-of-cell exercise. According to the court, for the
purposes of the prison officials' claim of qualified immunity from the state prisoner's § 1983 claim, it was clearly
established that denying a prisoner out-of-cell exercise for almost an entire year without legitimate penological concerns would constitute a violation of the prisoner's Eighth Amendment rights. The court held that summary judgment
was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether denying the state prisoner, who was on protective
confinement (PC) status, the opportunity to attend public worship services was reasonably related to the prison's
interest in protecting the prisoner and maintaining overall security. (Green Bay Correctional Institution, Wisconsin)
2011
U.S. Appeals Court
USE OF FORCE
VIDEO
SURVEILLANCE

Alspaugh v. McConnell, 643 F.3d 162 (6th Cir. 2011). A state prisoner filed a civil rights action alleging excessive
force and deliberate indifference against numerous state and private defendants. The district court granted summary
judgment against the prisoner. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The
appeals court held that the prisoner's request for a videotape of a fight was of the nature that it would have changed
legal and factual deficiencies of his civil rights action alleging excessive force, and thus the prisoner was entitled to
production of it, since the videotape would have shown how much force had been used in subduing the prisoner.
But the court held that the prisoner who was alleging excessive force and deliberate indifference was not entitled to
the production of his medical records before considering the state's motion for summary judgment, where the state
and private defendants produced enough evidence to demonstrate that medical personnel were not deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. (Ionia Maximum Security Correctional Facility, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
CLASSIFICATION
SECURITY
RESTRICTIONS
TELEPHONE CALLS

Aref v. Holder, 774 F.Supp.2d 147 (D.D.C. 2011). A group of prisoners who were, or who had been, incarcerated in
communication management units (CMU) at federal correctional institutions (FCI) designed to monitor high-risk
prisoners filed suit against the United States Attorney General, the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), and BOP officials, alleging that CMU incarceration violated the First, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments. Four additional prisoners
moved to intervene and the defendants moved to dismiss. The district court denied the motion to intervene, and
granted the motion to dismiss in part and denied in part. The court held that even though a federal prisoner who had
been convicted of solicitation of bank robbery was no longer housed in the federal prison's communication management unit (CMU), he had standing under Article III to pursue constitutional claims against the Bureau of Prisons
(BOP) for alleged violations since there was a realistic threat that he might be redesignated to a CMU. The court
noted that the prisoner had originally been placed in CMU because of the nature of his underlying conviction and
because of his alleged efforts to radicalize other inmates, and these reasons for placing him in CMU remained.
The court found that the restrictions a federal prison put on prisoners housed within a communication management unit (CMU), which included that all communications be conducted in English, that visits were monitored and
subject to recording, that each prisoner received only eight visitation hours per month, and that prisoners' telephone
calls were limited and subjected to monitoring, did not violate the prisoners' alleged First Amendment right to family
integrity, since the restrictions were rationally related to a legitimate penological interest. The court noted that prisoners assigned to the unit typically had offenses related to international or domestic terrorism or had misused approved communication methods while incarcerated. The court found that prisoners confined to a communication
management unit (CMU), stated a procedural due process claim against the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) by alleging that
the requirements imposed on CMU prisoners were significantly different than those imposed on prisoners in the
general population, and that there was a significant risk that procedures used by the BOP to review whether prisoners
should initially be placed within CMU or should continue to be incarcerated there had resulted in erroneous deprivation of their liberty interests. The court noted that CMU prisoners were allowed only eight hours of non-contact
visitation per month and two 15 minute telephone calls per week, while the general population at a prison was not
subjected to a cap on visitation and had 300 minutes of telephone time per month. The court also noted that the administrative review of CMU status, conducted by officials in Washington, D.C., rather than at a unit itself, was allegedly so vague and generic as to render it illusory. The court held that the conditions of confinement experienced
by prisoners housed within a communication management unit (CMU), did not deprive the prisoners of the “minimum civilized measure of life's necessities” required to state an Eighth Amendment claim against the Bureau of
Prisons (BOP), since the deprivation did not involve the basics of food, shelter, health care or personal security.
The court found that a federal prisoner stated a First Amendment retaliation claim against the Bureau of Prisons
(BOP) by alleging: (1) that he was “an outspoken and litigious prisoner;” (2) that he had written books about improper prison conditions and filed grievances and complaints on his own behalf; (3) that his prison record contained
“no serious disciplinary infractions” and “one minor communications-related infraction” from 1997; (4) that prison
staff told him he would be “sent east” if he continued filing complaints; and (5) that he filed a complaint about that
alleged threat and he was then transferred to a high-risk inmate monitoring communication management unit (CMU)
at a federal correctional institution. (Communication Management Units at Federal Correctional Institutions in Terre
Haute, Indiana and Marion, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
GANGS
CLASSIFICATION
SEPARATION

Baker v. Kernan, 795 F.Supp.2d 992 (E.D.Cal. 2011.) A state inmate filed a § 1983 action against a prison official
alleging that a policy of separating members of rival prison gangs denied him equal protection, due process, and the
right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. The official moved for summary judgment. The district court
granted the motion. The court held that the state's policy of separating members of rival prison gangs did not deny
the inmate due process or violate his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, where the program was a
rational response to a legitimate security concern, and it preserved the inmate's ability to exercise regularly outside,
be considered for a job, use the facilities off the main yard, meet with a prison chaplain, and see visitors. The court
also found that the state's classification of prisoners by their gang affiliation did not violate the inmate's equal protection rights, even if members of a larger gang fared slightly better in some aspects of confinement, where the classification was not based on race. The court noted that there was a long history of gang members immediately attacking
members of rival gangs, and the policy of identifying and separating members of rival gangs advanced safety and
order by preventing them from violently attacking each other. (California State Prison, Sacramento)

39.88

U.S. District Court
SAFETY
USE OF FORCE

Bridgewater v. Taylor, 832 F.Supp.2d 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). A New York state prisoner brought a § 1983 action
against prison officials and correctional officers, alleging excessive force, failure to protect, and failure to supervise
and properly train in violation of the Eighth Amendment. After the prisoner's motion for summary judgment against
an officer was preliminarily denied, the prisoner moved for reconsideration and the former prison superintendent and
another officer moved to dismiss. The district court denied the motion for reconsideration and granted the motion to
dismiss. The court held that the prisoner did not properly serve the complaint on the officer or superintendent and
that the prisoner failed to state a failure to protect claim against the officer. The court held that summary judgment
was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the correctional officer acted with malice or wantonness toward the prisoner necessary to constitute an Eighth Amendment violation, or whether he was applying force
in a good–faith effort to maintain discipline. The court also found that summary judgment was precluded by genuine
issues of material fact as to whether the correctional officer's use of physical force against the prisoner was more
than de minimus. (Sing Sing Correctional Facility New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONTRABAND
GANGS
VISITS

Bustos v. A & E Television Networks, 646 F.3d 762 (10th Cir. 2011). An inmate brought an action against a television
network, alleging defamation. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the network and the inmate
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the television network's statement in a broadcast
that the inmate was a member of the Aryan Brotherhood prison gang was not materially false, and therefore, was not
actionable for defamation under Colorado law, where the inmate engaged in recreation yard conversations with gang
members, engaged in a drug smuggling conspiracy with the gang in which he would receive drug filled balloons
from a visitor and distribute them to the gang, and the inmate sent a handwritten apology to the gang leader apologizing after the conspiracy failed and referred to leader repeatedly as “bro.” (Supermax, Florence, Colorado)

U.S. District Court
LOCKS

Byron v. Dart, 825 F.Supp.2d 958 (N.D.Ill. 2011). A pretrial detainee who was stabbed in the head by an unknown
inmate who opened the detainee's cell door from outside without a key brought a § 1983 action against the county
sheriff, jail administrators, and a corrections officer, alleging that the defendants failed to protect him in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment. The officials moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court denied the
motion. The court held that the detainee's allegations in his complaint stated a “sufficiently serious injury” as required for a Fourteenth Amendment failure to protect claim against the prison administrators. The court also found
that the detainee's allegations in his complaint were sufficient to state a “deliberate indifference” element of the detainee's Fourteenth Amendment failure to protect claim against prison administrators. The detainee alleged that the
problem of malfunctioning cell doors was “pervasive,” “well-documented,” and “expressly noted by prison officials
in the past,” that work orders to repair cell doors were never executed, and that he complained about his door, but it
was never repaired. According to the court, the detainee became aware, from his own observations and in speaking
with other detainees, that numerous cells were “in a state of disrepair and/or had malfunctioned,” and that specifically, the doors of the cells could be “popped” open by detainees from the outside without a key. (Cook County Jail,
Illinois)

U.S. District Court
ESCAPE
SECURITY PRACTICES

Dean v. Walker, 764 F.Supp.2d 824 (S.D.Miss. 2011). Vehicular accident victims brought an action against a county, sheriff and deputies, stemming from a head-on collision with an escaped inmate whom the defendants were chasing. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court held that the accident victims failed to establish a pattern of unconstitutional conduct by county, as required to maintain a claim for municipal
liability under § 1983. The court noted that the victims introduced no evidence at all with respect to other police
pursuits in the county or other instances where inmates were not made to wear handcuffs. According to the court, the
victims failed to establish that the sheriff acted with an intent to harm, unrelated to his pursuit of the inmate, as required to maintain a substantive due process claim. The court noted that the sheriff's pulling in front of the inmate in
an attempt to stop him, even if reckless, was consistent with the sheriff's legitimate interest in apprehending the inmate. (Jefferson–Franklin Correctional Facility, Mississippi)

U.S. Appeals Court
STAFFING
SAFETY

Fields v. Abbott, 652 F.3d 886 (8th Cir. 2011). A female jailer brought a § 1983 action against a county, sheriff,
county commissioners, and several other defendants, alleging violations of her substantive due process rights. The
district court denied the sheriff's and commissioners' motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity and the defendants appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that the defendants' failure to act
was not deliberate indifference as to the safety of the jailer. According to the court, the sheriff's and county commissioners' awareness of potentially dangerous conditions in the jail, including that the jail was understaffed and that the
drunk tank had an interior-mounted door handle, and failure to take action regarding those conditions, which resulted
in the jailer being attacked and taken hostage by two inmates, was not deliberate indifference as to the safety of the
jailer, as would violate the jailer's Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights on a state created danger
theory. The court found that the defendants’ failure to act was at most gross negligence, rather than deliberate indifference, and the jailer was aware of the conditions as she had been injured previously due to the handle and staffing
issue, such that she could take these issues into account in interacting with inmates. (Miller County Jail, Missouri)

U.S. Appeals Court
PUBLICATIONS

Hrdlicka v. Reniff, 631 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2011). A publisher and his criminal justice publication brought two suits
claiming that their First Amendment rights were being violated by the mail policies at two county jails in California
that refused to distribute unsolicited copies of the publication to inmates. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, and the plaintiffs appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that
summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the jails were justified in refusing
to distribute unsolicited copies of the publication to inmates. According to the court, the facts to be considered included the degree to which allowing distribution of the publication would produce additional clutter in cells or otherwise adversely affect jail security, the extent to which the jails would be forced to expend additional resources to
deliver the publication, and whether the publisher could effectively reach inmates by delivery only upon request.
(Sacramento County, Butte County, California)

39.89

U.S. District Court
MAIL
SECURITY PRACTICES

Hughbanks v. Dooley, 788 F.Supp.2d 988 (D.S.D. 2011.) A prisoner brought a § 1983 action alleging that the state
Department of Corrections' correspondence policy prohibiting the delivery of bulk-rate mail was unconstitutional.
The prisoner moved for preliminary injunctive relief and asked the court to invalidate portions of the policy. The
district court denied the motion. The court found that the prisoner's mere allegation that his First Amendment rights
were violated by the prison's denial of bulk-rate mail established the threat of irreparable harm, in determining
whether to grant the prisoner a preliminary injunction seeking to invalidate the prison's bulk-rate mail policy, but the
balance of hardships favored the prison in determining whether to grant the prisoner's request. The court noted that
the bulk-rate mail policy was a state policy, and suspension of the policy for all inmates in the state would compromise the safety and security of every institution in the state. The court found that the policy was rationally-related to
the prison's penological purpose of maintaining security and order, that prisoners could review catalogs in a prison
property office and could pre-pay postage on any catalog to have it mailed first or second class, that the challenged
policy was statewide and any accommodation would have a significant effect on state inmates and prison staff, and
the policy was not an exaggerated response to security and other concerns. Similarly, the court found that the prisoner's allegation that his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights were being violated by the prison's failure to notify
him when prohibited bulk-rate mail was not delivered established the threat of irreparable harm, in determining
whether to grant the prisoner a preliminary injunction requiring the prison to notify the intended recipient and sender
when bulk-rate correspondence was confiscated. The court again found that the balance of hardships favored the
prison, where the prison would have to expend substantial prison resources to implement the requested policy, and
the current policy was implemented to preserve a prison resource. (Mike Durfee State Prison, South Dakota)

U.S. Appeals Court
FACIAL HAIR
RELIGION
SECURITY PRACTICES

Kuperman v. Wrenn, 645 F.3d 69 (1st Cir. 2011). A Jewish former state inmate brought a § 1983 action against prison officials, alleging a prison regulation prohibiting inmates from growing facial hair longer than one quarter of an
inch violated his First Amendment exercise of religion rights, as well as Fourteenth Amendment equal protection
and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Person Act (RLUIPA). The district court granted summary judgment for the officials and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the regulation was reasonably related to the penological interests of prison safety and security and did not prohibit the inmate from alternative
means of exercising his rights. The court found that accommodating the inmate's desire to grow a beard would adversely impact prison resources and that there was no ready alternative to the prison regulation. According to the
court, the regulation did not violate the inmate’s Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights, and the regulation
furthered the compelling government interest of prison safety and security in the least restrictive means of doing so.
(New Hampshire State Prison)

U.S. District Court
TRANSFER
RESTRAINTS
USE OF FORCE

Maraj v. Massachusetts, 836 F.Supp.2d 17 (D.Mass. 2011). The mother of a deceased inmate brought an action, as
administratrix of the inmate's estate, against the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, a county sheriff's department, a
county sheriff, and corrections officers, alleging that the defendants violated the inmate's Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights. She also brought common law claims of wrongful death, negligence, and assault and battery.
The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state claim. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in
part. The court held that the Commonwealth, in enacting legislation effectuating the assumption of county sheriff's
department by the Commonwealth, did not waive sovereign immunity as to § 1983 claims filed against the Commonwealth, the department, and corrections officers in their official capacities after the transfer took effect.
The court found that the correction officers who were no longer participating in the transfer of the inmate at the
time inmate first resisted and the officers who took the first responsive measure by “double locking” the inmate's
handcuffs were not subject to liability in their individual capacities as to the § 1983 substantive due process claim
brought by inmate's mother arising from the inmate's death following the transfer.
According to the court, corrections officers who applied physical force to the resisting inmate during the transfer
of the inmate, or were present when the inmate was unresponsive and requiring medical attention, were subject to
liability, in their individual capacities, as to the § 1983 substantive due process claim brought by the inmate's mother.
The court held that the county sheriff and corrections officers who participated in the transfer of the inmate, who
died following the transfer, were immune from negligence and wrongful death claims brought by the inmate's mother under the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act (MTCA) provision which categorically protected public employees
acting within the scope of their employment from liability for “personal injury or death” caused by their individual
negligence. But the court found that the mother properly alleged that county corrections officers' contact with the
inmate amounted to excessive force, and that a supervisor instructed the use of excessive force, as required to state a
claim for assault and battery, under Massachusetts law, against the officers. (South Bay House of Correction, Suffolk
County, Massachusetts)

U.S. Appeals Court
CLASSIFICATION
WORK

Milligan v. Archuleta, 659 F.3d 1294 (10th Cir. 2011). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that prison officials took away his prison employment in retaliation for his grievance regarding his designation as a potential escape
risk, and in violation of his equal protection rights. The district court dismissed the complaint on its own motion and
the inmate appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The appeals court held that the district court erred in
dismissing the equal protection claim, even though the complaint was deficient because it did not plead facts sufficient to show that the inmate's classification as an escape risk lacked a rational basis or a reasonable relation to a
legitimate penological interest. According to the court, amendment of the complaint would not necessarily be futile,
and the claim was not based on an indisputably meritless legal theory. The court noted that the fact that the state
inmate did not have a constitutional right to employment did not foreclose his retaliation claim against the prison
official arising from loss of his prison job after he filed a grievance. (Colorado Territorial Correctional Facility)

U.S. District Court
PUBLICATIONS
RELIGION
VISITS
WORK

Murphy v. Lockhart, 826 F.Supp.2d 1016 (E.D.Mich. 2011). An inmate at a maximum correctional facility in Michigan brought a § 1983 action against various Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) employees alleging that
his placement in long-term and/or indefinite segregation was unconstitutional, that he was prohibited from communicating with his friends and family, and that his ability to practice his Christian religion was being hampered in
violation of his First Amendment rights. The inmate also alleged that the MDOC's mail policy was unconstitutional.
The defendants moved for summary judgment and for a protective order. The court held that the prisoner's state-

39.90

ments in a published magazine article discussing an escape attempt were protected speech, and that a fact issue precluded summary judgment on the retaliation claims against the other facility's warden, resident unit manager, and
assistant resident unit supervisor stemming from the prisoner's participation in that article. The Esquire Magazine
article discussed security flaws at the correctional facility, detailing the prisoners' escape plan and revealing which
prison staff he manipulated and how he obtained and built necessary tools to dig a tunnel. The court noted that the
prisoner's statements were not directed to fellow inmates, and rather he spoke on issues relating to prison security
and was critical of the conduct of Michigan Department of Corrections personnel, which resulted in his nearsuccessful prison break. The court found that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact,
as to whether the defendants' proffered legitimate grounds for removing the prisoner from his coveted administrative
segregation work assignment as a porter/painter/laundry worker--discovery that he possessed contraband--were a
pretext to retaliate for his protected speech in the published magazine article. The court found that the alleged violation of the prisoner's right to free exercise of his religion from the rejection of a claimed religious publication, Codex
Magica, was justified by the prison's legitimate penological interest in limiting prisoners' access to books that included instructions on how to write in code. According to the court, because the prison had a valid penological interest in restricting access to the publication, which contained instructions on how to write in code, the prisoner mail
regulation used to censor that book could not be unconstitutional as applied on the ground that it prevented the prisoner's access to that publication. (Ionia Maximum Correctional Facility, Kinross Correctional Facility, Standish
Correctional Facility, Michigan)
U.S. Appeals Court
EXERCISE
RIOT
LOCK DOWN
SECURITY PRACTICES

Noble v. Adams, 646 F.3d 1138 (9th Cir. 2011). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action against prison officials who
were responsible for a post-riot lockdown of a prison, alleging that the lockdown resulted in denial of his Eighth
Amendment right to outdoor exercise. The district court denied the officials' motion for summary judgment and
subsequently denied the officials' motion for reconsideration. The officials appealed. The appeals court reversed and
remanded with instructions. The appeals court held that the state prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity
from the inmate's § 1983 claim that the post-riot lockdown of prison resulted in denial of his Eighth Amendment
right to outdoor exercise because it was not clearly established at the time of the lockdown, nor was it established
yet, precisely how or when a prison facility housing problem inmates must return to its normal operations, including
outdoor exercise, during and after a state of emergency called in response to a major riot. (Corcoran State Prison,
California)

U.S. Appeals Court
MAIL

Perry v. Secretary, Florida Dept. of Corrections, 664 F.3d 1359 (11th Cir. 2011). An individual who operated two
pen pal services that solicited pen pals for prisoners, as well as another pen pal service, brought a civil rights action
challenging the constitutionality of a Florida Department of Corrections (FDOC) rule prohibiting inmates from soliciting pen pals. The district court granted the FDOC's motion for summary judgment and the plaintiffs appealed. The
appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the plaintiffs, whose interests as publishers in accessing prisoners
had been harmed, had standing to bring their claims, but that the FDOC rule at issue was rationally related to a legitimate penological interest. The court found that the plaintiffs had a liberty interest in accessing inmates and they
were afforded constitutionally required due process. The court noted that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
Procunier v. Martinez set forth a three-part test to decide whether there are proper procedural safeguards for inmate
correspondence of a personal nature: (1) the inmate must receive notice of the rejection of a letter written by or addressed to him, (2) the author of the letter must be given reasonable opportunity to protest that decision, and (3)
complaints must be referred to a prison official other than the person who originally disapproved the correspondence. (Florida Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
RESTRAINTS
SAFETY
TRANSPORTATION

Reynolds v. Dormire, 636 F.3d 976 (8th Cir. 2011). A state prisoner filed a pro se § 1983 action against a prison
warden and correctional officers (COs), asserting Eighth Amendment claims arising from refusal to remove the
prisoner's restraints on a day-long journey to a medical appointment, and from his alleged injuries from falling five
feet into a sally port pit designed to facilitate visual inspections of vehicle undercarriages at an entryway into the
prison. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The prisoner appealed. The appeals
court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The appeals court held that the prisoner's complaint was devoid of any allegation suggesting that correctional officers acted with deliberate indifference to the prisoner's safety
in restraining him throughout the day, as required to support an Eighth Amendment claim in his § 1983 action, since
the complaint merely alleged that the officers refused to remove the prisoner's restraints. But the court held that the
prisoner's complaint sufficiently alleged claims of deliberate indifference to his safety in violation of the Eighth
Amendment by two correctional officers, but not the other three officers who were simply on duty in the vicinity of
the prisoner's accident in which he fell five feet into a sally port pit. According to the court, the complaint sufficiently pleaded that the two officers were aware of a substantial risk to the prisoner's safety but recklessly disregarded
that risk. The prisoner alleged that one officer parked the prison van about three feet from edge of the pit, that the
prisoner was obliged to back out of the van, using a stool to descend from the vehicle, with his legs shackled and his
arms secured by a black box restraint, that the second officer supervising the prisoner's exit started backing away
rather than assisting the prisoner, and that officers knew about the hazard because another prisoner had fallen into
the same pit on the same day. (Northeast Correctional Center, Missouri)

U.S. Appeals Court
SECURITY PRACTICES
PROTECTION

Shields v. Dart, 664 F.3d 178 (7th Cir. 2011). A pretrial detainee brought a pro se § 1983 action against prison officials who allegedly were deliberately indifferent in failing to protect him from an attack by other inmates at a county
jail. The prison officials moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion and the detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the officials were unaware of a substantial risk of serious
injury to the pretrial detainee, and thus the officials were not deliberately indifferent in failing to protect the detainee
from the attack. According to the court, a corrections officer on duty during the two inmates' attack did not act with
deliberate indifference by failing to enter a day room where the attack was occurring. The officer verbally commanded the inmates to stop the attack. The officer was alone, intervened by promptly calling for back-up and monitoring the fight from a secure area until other officers arrived, and was not required to put herself in significant jeopardy by attempting to break up fight herself. (Cook County Jail, Illinois)

39.91

U.S. Appeals Court
WORK
PROTECTION
SAFETY

Smith v. Peters, 631 F.3d 418 (7th Cir, 2011). A state prisoner brought an action against prison employees, alleging
that the employees violated the Eighth Amendment by forcing him to work at hard labor in dangerous conditions,
and violated the First Amendment by penlizing him for questioning the propriety of the work assignment and preparing to sue. The district court dismissed the complaint. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that the prisoner stated a claim against prison employees for violating his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment by forcing him to work at hard labor in dangerous conditions. The prisoner alleged that he was assigned to uproot tree stumps in cold weather, without being given any protective gear, that he developed blisters from handling heavy tools in the cold without gloves, and that he was subjected to the risk of getting hit by the blades of the tools because they slipped from their handles as prisoners hacked
away without proper training. The court found that the prisoner stated a claim against prison employees for violating
his First Amendment right to free speech, by alleging that the employees penalized him for questioning the propriety
of his work assignment and preparing to sue. (Branchville Correctional Facility, Indiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONTRABAND

U.S. v. Franco, 632 F.3d 880 (5th Cir. 2011). An inmate in a privately owned and operated county jail, who had paid
a corrections officer to bring contraband into a county correctional facility, was convicted after a district court jury
trial of aiding and abetting in the bribery of a public official. The defendant appealed. The appeals court affirmed.
The court held that it was constitutional to apply the federal bribery statute to the defendant, even though he used his
own money, and not federal funds, to pay the corrections officer. The officer had been paid a total of $425 over a
period of time to bring peanut butter, tuna fish, and other small food items, a cell phone, enchiladas and a box containing marijuana. (Ector County Correctional Center, Texas)

U.S. Appeals Court
PUBLICATIONS

Van den Bosch v. Raemisch, 658 F.3d 778 (7th Cir. 2011). The publisher of a newsletter about the Wisconsin state
prison system and a pro se state prisoner who wrote an article for that newsletter brought separate actions challenging a regulation imposed by the Wisconsin Department of Corrections (DOC) on distribution of incoming prisoner
mail. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the DOC officials. The plaintiffs appealed and the
actions were consolidated for appeal. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the officials' decision to bar
distribution of the newsletter to prisoners did not violate the First Amendment and the officials' refusal to deliver
copies of the article that the state prisoner had written to the newsletter did not violate the prisoner's First Amendment rights. The court noted that one newsletter article described the Wisconsin parole commission as totalitarian
and abusers of prisoners, and another urged its readers to employ any and all tactics to bring about change in prison
life, so that it was reasonable for the officials to perceive the newsletter articles as posing a potential threat to rehabilitation and security. (Wisconsin Department of Corrections, Green Bay Correctional Institution)
2012

U.S. Appeals Court
PUBLICATIONS
SECURITY PRACTICES

Al-Owhali v. Holder, 687 F.3d 1236 (10th Cir. 2012). A federal inmate brought a suit against the Attorney General,
the Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), a prison warden, and the FBI, alleging that several special
administrative measures imposed upon him violated his First and Fifth Amendment rights. The inmate had been
convicted of several terrorism-related offenses stemming from the 1998 bombing of the United States embassy in
Nairobi, Kenya. The district court dismissed the complaint and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The
appeals court held that: (1) the inmate failed to address whether the ban on his communications with his nieces and
nephews was supported by a rational penal interest; (2) the measure preventing the inmate's subscription to two Arabic–language newspapers fell within the warden's broad discretion to limit incoming information, and was rationally
related to a penal interest to prevent the inmate from acting upon contemporary information or receiving coded messages; and (3) the inmate offered only a vague allegation regarding the measure that purportedly barred him from
obtaining a book authored by former President Jimmy Carter, where the inmate offered no factual context to show
that the measure was unrelated to any legitimate penal interest, and instead merely implied the existence of a secret
list of banned publications. (United States Penitentiary, Administrative Maximum, Florence, Colorado)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONTRABAND
SAFETY
SECURITY RESTRICTIONS
TELEPHONE CALLS

Beaulieu v. Ludeman, 690 F.3d 1017 (8th Cir. 2012). Patients who were civilly committed to the Minnesota Sex
Offender Program (MSOP) brought a § 1983 action against Minnesota Department of Human Services (DHS) officials and Minnesota Department of Corrections (DOC) officials, alleging that various MSOP policies and practices
relating to the patients' conditions of confinement were unconstitutional. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the patients appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that:
(1) the MSOP policy of performing unclothed body searches of patients was not unreasonable; (2) the policy of
placing full restraints on patients during transport was not unreasonable; (3) officials were not liable for using excessive force in handcuffing patients; (4) the officials' seizure of televisions from the patients' rooms was not unreasonable; (5) the MSOP telephone-use policy did not violate the First Amendment; and (6) there was no evidence that
officials were deliberately indifferent to the patients' health or safety. According to the court, the MSOP identified
reasons for its policy requiring 13–inch clear-chassis televisions or 17– to 19–inch flat-screen televisions--that the
shelves in patients' rooms could safely hold those televisions, and that a clear-chassis or flat-screen television would
reduce contraband concealment. According to the court, those justifications implicated both patient safety and
MSOP's interest in maintaining security and order at the institution and making certain no contraband reached patients. The court also found that the (MSOP) telephone-use policy did not violate the First Amendment free speech
rights of patients who were civilly committed to MSOP. According to the court, the policy of monitoring patients'
non-legal telephone calls and prohibiting incoming calls was reasonably related to MSOP's security interests in detecting and preventing crimes and maintaining a safe environment. The court upheld the 30-minute limit on the
length of calls, finding it was reasonably related to the legitimate governmental interest of providing phone access to
all patients, and that patients had viable alternatives by which they may exercise their First Amendment rights, including having visitors or sending or receiving mail, and patients had abused telephone privileges prior to implementation of the policy by engaging in criminal activity or other counter-therapeutic behavior by phone. (Minnesota Sex
Offender Program)

39.92

U.S. District Court
HAIR LENGTH
RELIGION

Benning v. Georgia, 864 F.Supp.2d 1358 (M.D.Ga. 2012). A Jewish inmate brought an action against the State of
Georgia, the Georgia Board of Corrections, the Georgia Department of Corrections (GDC), and its Commissioner, in
his official capacity, alleging that the defendants violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA) by refusing to allow him to grow earlocks in accordance with his religious beliefs. The court held that:
(1) the inmate's religious belief that he was forbidden from shaving his earlocks was sincerely held; (2) the inmate's
religious beliefs were substantially burdened by the defendants' refusal to allow him to grow earlocks; (3) uniformity
was not a compelling government interest justifying the defendants' refusal to allow the inmate to grow earlocks; and
(4) the defendants failed to prove that banning earlocks completely was the least restrictive means of furthering
compelling governmental interests. (Autry State Prison, Georgia)

U.S. District Court
RELIGIOUS ARTICLES

Davis v. Powell, 901 F.Supp.2d 1196 (S.D.Cal. 2012). A state prisoner who was a Muslim brought a pro se § 1983
action against a prison warden and other prison employees for claims arising out of the prison's ban on prayer oil.
The court held that allegations that a prison warden issued an addendum to a Department Operations Manual (DOM)
that implemented a policy that only orders for certain religious items would be counted under the quarterly package
program was sufficient to state First Amendment retaliation claim against warden. The court noted that: (1) the policy made it more burdensome to obtain items required for the inmate to practice his religion or practice it as easily as
inmates of different faiths; (2) that there existed a causal link between the policy and his faith; (3) that his required
religious oil was banned approximately five months after the inmate appealed the policy; (4) that the policy would
chill a person of ordinary firmness from practicing his religion, and (5) that a legitimate penological interest was not
furthered by the policy. The court found that the inmate’s allegation that a prison warden enacted a policy which
considered special orders for religious packages to be counted as quarterly packages for inmates, because of its adverse effects on plaintiffs of a particular religion, stated an equal protection claim. According to the court, the articles listed in the policy were those ordered by only prisoners of that religion. The court held that the warden and
officials were not entitled to qualified immunity from the inmate's claim alleging a violation of the Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), where a reasonable person in the position of the prison warden and
related officials would believe that his or her conduct in enacting a policy banning the purchase and receipt of prayer
oil by inmates for 14 months violated inmates' First Amendment right to freely exercise his or her religion and of the
inmate’s Equal Protection rights. (Calipatria State Prison, California)

U.S. District Court
CLASSIFICATIONS
GANGS
SECURITY PRACTICES

Facey v. Dickhaut, 892 F.Supp.2d 347 (D.Mass. 2012). A prisoner at a state correctional institution filed a pro se §
1983 action against the prison and officials alleging his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment was violated when officials knowingly placed him in danger by assigning him to a housing unit where
he was violently attacked by members of a rival gang. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted
the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the complaint stated a claim against the deputy superintendent and an assistant for violation of the Eighth Amendment, by alleging that officials were aware of the feud between two rival prison gangs, that the prisoner was a known member of one of the gangs, that despite this knowledge
officials had assigned the prisoner to a section of the prison where a rival gang was housed, and as a result he was
violently attacked and sustained permanent injuries. The court found that the official who had instituted the gang
housing policy could not be held personally liable, since he did not implement the policy, nor was he deliberately
indifferent in supervising or training those who did. According to the court, state prison officials who had placed the
prisoner known to be a gang member in danger by assigning him to a housing unit where he was violently attacked
by members of a rival gang, were not entitled to qualified immunity in the prisoner's § 1983 suit. The court noted
that clearly established law provided that the Eighth Amendment was violated if officials disregarded a known, substantial risk to an inmate's health or safety, and the officials had disregarded this risk, as well as violated a prison
policy, by placing rival gang members in same housing unit. (Souza Baranowski Correctional Center, Mass.)

U.S. District Court
PRETRIAL
DETAINEES
VIDEO
SURVEILLANCE

Ferencz v. Medlock, 905 F.Supp.2d 656 (W.D.Pa. 2012). A mother, as administrator for her son’s estate, brought
deliberate indifference claims under a wrongful death statute against prison employees, and the prison's medical
services provider, following the death of her son when he was a pretrial detainee in a county prison. The employees
and provider moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The district court
held that under Pennsylvania law, the mother lacked standing to bring wrongful death and survival actions in her
individual capacity against several prison employees for her son's death while he was in prison, where the wrongful
death and survival statutes only permitted recovery by a personal representative, such as a mother in her action as
administratrix of her son's estate, or as a person entitled to recover damages as a trustee ad litem. The court found
that the mother's claims that a prison's medical services provider had a policy, practice, or custom that resulted in her
son's death were sufficient to overcome the provider's motion to dismiss the mother's § 1983 action for the death of
her son while he was in prison. Upon admission to the facility, the detainee had been evaluated and scored a 12 on a
scale, which was to have triggered classification as suicidal (a score of 8 or more). The Classification Committee
subsequently did not classify the detainee as suicidal as they were required to do under the jail classification policy,
and no member of the Committee communicated to medical contractor staff or correctional officers responsible for
monitoring the detainee that he was suicidal and going through drug withdrawal. At the time, the jail was equipped
with an operational and working video surveillance system and there was a video camera in the detainee’s cell. The
video surveillance of the cell was broadcast on four different television monitors throughout the jail, all of which
were working and manned by officers. Additionally, the work station thhhattt was located around the corner from the
cell, approximately 20 feet away, was equipped with one of the four television monitors. The monitor was situated
on the wall above the desk at the work station, such that it would be directly in front of the officer manning the station if he was sitting facing his desk.
The detainee attempted suicide by trying to hang himself with his bed sheet from the top of the cell bars, which
took several minutes and was unsuccessful. After the attempt, however, the detainee left the bed sheet hanging from
the top of his cell bars and started to pace in his cell in visible mental distress. This suicide attempt, as well as the
hanging bedsheet were viewable from the nearby work station video surveillance monitor as well as the other three
monitors throughout the jail. A few minutes later the detainee attempted to commit suicide a second time by hanging

39.93

himself with his bed sheet from the top of his cell bars. This suicide attempt took several minutes, was unsuccessful,
and was viewable from the work station video surveillance monitor as well as the other three monitors throughout
the jail. A few minutes later, the detainee attempted to commit suicide a third time by hanging himself with his bed
sheet. This time, he hung himself from his bed sheet for over twenty minutes, without being noticed by any of the
four officers who were manning the four video surveillance monitors. In fact, one officer admitted he was asleep at
his work station at the time. By the time another officer noticed the hanging, nearly 30 minutes had passed. The
detainee was cut down and transported to a local hospital where he was subsequently pronounced dead due to asphyxiation by hanging. (Fayette County Prison, Pennsylvania, and PrimeCare Medical, Inc.)
U.S. District Court
PUBLICATIONS
RELIGION
SAFETY

Forter v. Geer, 868 F.Supp.2d 1091 (D.Or. 2012). A state inmate, who was a member of the Christian Identity Faith
and proceeding pro se, brought a § 1983 action against department of corrections (DOC) employees, alleging violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA). The defendants filed a motion to dismiss and for summary judgment. The district court granted the motions. The court held that the inmate did not file grievances for most claims, even though such procedures were
available to him, and he did not appeal those grievances that he did file, and therefore failed to exhaust his administrative remedies under the provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995.
The court held that withholding of a religious poster did not substantially burden the religious exercise of the
inmate, who was a member of the Christian Identity Faith, as would violate the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The court also held that size restrictions which prevented the inmate from possessing
the religious poster did not violate his First Amendment free exercise rights, where the regulations prevented any
items, except subscription newspapers, over a certain size. According to the court, prison officials withholding of
certain religious pamphlets from the mail of the inmate, was validly and rationally connected to a legitimate interest
in ensuring order and safety, for the purposes of the inmate's § 1983 claim alleging that the withholding violated his
First Amendment free exercise and Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights. The court noted that the pamphlets contained racially inflammatory material and that the prison population was racially mixed. (Oregon Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
HAIR LENGTH
RELIGIOUS GROUPS

Grayson v. Schuler, 666 F.3d 450 (7th Cir. 2012). A former state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a correctional officer, alleging the forcible shearing of his dreadlocks violated the free exercise clause of the First Amendment. The defendant moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The former prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The appeals court held that while the prisoner's Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) claim against the correctional officer in his official capacity was
barred by the state's sovereign immunity, the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity. The court noted that the
Act does not create a cause of action against state employees in their personal capacity. The court held that the taking of a Nazirite vow, which barred the cutting of hair, by the state prisoner who was a member of the orthodox
African Hebrew Israelites of Jerusalem was religiously motivated, for purposes of the prisoner's claim that prison
officials failed to accommodate his religious beliefs and thus violated the free exercise clause of the First Amendment. The court found that the officer was not entitled to quality immunity because there was no suggestion that the
officer who ordered shearing of prisoner's dreadlocks due to a reasonable belief that the prisoner was insincere in his
religious beliefs, or was a security threat. (Big Muddy Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
CLOTHING
KEYS
RESTRAINTS
SECURITY PRACTICES

Gruenberg v. Gempeler, 697 F.3d 573 (7th Cir. 2012). A state prisoner, proceeding pro se, filed a § 1983 action
against various prison officials, guards, and medical staff, alleging violations of the Eighth Amendment. The district
court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals
court held that: (1) the prisoner did not have a clearly established right to not be continually restrained without clothing or cover in a cell for five days following his ingestion of a handcuff key, the master key for belt restraints, and
the key used for opening cell doors, where restraint had been imposed to keep the prisoner from re-ingesting those
keys; (2) the continuous restraint of the prisoner without clothing or cover in a cell for five days did not violate his
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights; (3) the prisoner's Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claims were barred; and (4) the district court did not abuse its discretion by ruling that the prisoner was competent to advance his case and was not entitled to appointed counsel. (Waupun Correction Institution,
Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
CONTRABAND
EXERCISE
LOCK DOWN
RIOT
SECURITY
PRACTICES

Hayes v. Dovey, 914 F.Supp.2d 1125 (S.D.Cal. 2012). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a prison's
former warden, chief deputy warden, and associate warden alleging they deprived him of outdoor exercise for approximately nine months in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The
district court granted the motion. The court held that prison officials did not act with deliberate indifference when
they precluded outdoor exercise for nine months, and that prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity. Officials had stopped providing outdoor exercise for general population prisoners during a state of emergency at the
facility following a major riot. During this time, the prisoner was allowed to work in a program office for approximately 30 hours per week. The court noted that the riot involved a concerted and organized attack on prison officials,
the lockdown was imposed to investigate and prevent continued violence, and despite the lockdown and exercise
restrictions there were many instances of violence, including two incidents of attempted murder on a peace officer,
20 incidents of battery on a peace officer or prison staff member, and 46 instances of inmates in possession of weapons or metal stock. According to the court, it was not clearly established at the time of the lockdown precisely how
or when a prison that houses problem inmates must return to its normal operations, including outdoor exercise, during and after a state of emergency called in response to a major riot. (Calipatria State Prison, California)

U.S. District Court
RELIGIOUS SERVICES

Jones v. Hobbs, 864 F.Supp.2d 808 (E.D.Ark. 2012). A prisoner brought an action against various state department
of correction (DOC) officials, alleging violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. The
district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by
genuine issues of material fact as to: (1) whether officials impeded the prisoner's efforts to secure a diet which comported with the dictates of his religion; (2) whether fiscal and security concerns were rationally connected to the

39.94

denial of a religious diet; (3) whether the prisoner had a sufficient alternative means to practice his religion; (4)
whether there was an alternative way to accommodate the prisoner's request for a vegan meal at de minimis cost to
valid penological interests; and (5) whether the prisoner's right to a diet suiting his religious beliefs was clearly established. (Arkansas Department of Correction)
U.S. District Court
RELIGIOUS ARTICLES
RELIGIOUS SERVICES

Joseph v. Fischer, 900 F.Supp.2d 320 (W.D.N.Y. 2012). A state prisoner who observed the Nation of Gods and
Earths (NGE) faith brought an action against correctional officials, alleging that the officials violated his right to
practice his religion, denied his right of access to courts, and retaliated against him. The prisoner sought declaratory
and injunctive relief, as well as money damages. The officials moved for judgment on the pleadings. The district
court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the issue of whether correctional officials'
restrictions on NGE activities were adequately justified by legitimate security concerns, as required under the First
Amendment and RLUIPA, could not be resolved on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, since it was not possible, based solely on the pleadings, to determine whether the actions of the officials had unjustifiably burdened the
prisoner's religious exercise. The court held that individual correctional officials were qualifiedly immune from the
prisoner's claim for damages based on the officials' preventing the prisoner from participating in such activities,
where the rights of the prisoner, who observed the NGE faith, to hold study group classes, wear certain articles of
clothing or emblems, and observe NGE holy days, were not clearly established First Amendment rights, given that
department of corrections protocols did not specifically protect such religious activities. The court found that the
prisoner's allegations, that he was denied access to courts due to a correctional official's confiscation or destruction
of documents, failed to state a claim for denial of access to courts, where the allegations were conclusory, and the
prisoner failed to show what prejudice he suffered as a result of the official's alleged actions. (Attica Correctional
Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
RELIGIOUS ARTICLES
SAFETY REGULA
TIONS

McFaul v. Valenzuela, 684 F.3d 564 (5th Cir. 2012). A prisoner brought a pro se civil rights action against prison
officials who had denied his request for a religious medallion to use in Celtic Druid ceremonies. The district court
entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding
that the prison's prohibitions on nonconforming neo-Pagan medallions and medallions costing more than $25 did not
violate the prisoner's First Amendment right to free exercise of religion, and the prisoner failed to meet his burden of
showing that the prohibitions substantially burdened his ability to practice his religion, in violation of the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The appeals court also held that enforcement of the prohibitions against the prisoner did not violate equal protection. Officials had prevented the prisoner from having a black
onyx pentagram for use in Celtic Druid ceremonies, and the court found that the prohibitions were reasonably related
to penological interests, including safety, security, and discipline, did not discriminate against nontraditional religions, and did not prevent the prisoner from performing some religious rituals. The court noted that permitting prisoners to possess nonconforming medallions would have forced guards to determine whether the items were permitted religious medallions or contraband items. (Preston Smith Unit, Texas Department of Criminal Justice)

U.S. Appeals Court
RELIGION

Moussazadeh v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, 703 F.3d 781 (5th Cir. 2012). A Jewish state prisoner brought an
action against the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, alleging that the defendant denied his grievances and requests for kosher meals in violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and the
Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendant and the
prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that the state Jewish prisoner exhausted
his administrative remedies with respect to his claim that a prison's failure to provide him with kosher meals violated
RLUIPA, where the prisoner went through the state's entire grievance process before filing suit. The court found that
sufficient evidence established that the prisoner's religious beliefs were sincere, as required to support a claim
against state's department of criminal justice for violation of RLUIPA, where the prisoner stated that he was born
and raised Jewish and had always kept a kosher household, the prisoner offered evidence that he requested kosher
meals from the chaplain, kitchen staff, and the department, and while at another prison, he ate kosher meals provided
to him from the dining hall. The court noted that the prisoner was harassed for his adherence to his religious beliefs
and for his demands for kosher food, and that the department transferred the prisoner for a time so he could receive
kosher food. The court held that the prisoner was denied a generally available benefit because of his religious beliefs,
and thus, the state's department of criminal justice imposed a substantial burden on the prisoner's religious exercise
under RLUIPA, where every prisoner in the department's custody received a nutritionally sufficient diet, every observant Jewish prisoner at the designated prison received a kosher diet free of charge, and the Jewish prisoner at
issue was forced to pay for his kosher meals. The court found that there was no evidence of a compelling government interest in forcing the Jewish prisoner to pay for all of his kosher meals. The court also found that summary
judgment was precluded by a general dispute of material fact as to whether the state's department of criminal justice
employed the least restrictive means of minimizing costs and maintaining security by forcing the Jewish prisoner to
pay for all of his kosher meals. (Eastham Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions
Division)

U.S. District Court
RELIGIOUS ARTICLES

Native American Council of Tribes v. Weber, 897 F.Supp.2d 828 (D.S.D. 2012). A Native American organization
and inmates brought an action against the Secretary of the South Dakota Department of Corrections, alleging the
Department's policy banning all tobacco from its facilities violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA). The district court found that the inmates' use of tobacco was a religious exercise protected
under RLUIPA, that the policy placed a substantial burden on the inmates' exercise of their religious beliefs, and the
policy was not supported by a compelling governmental interest where there was little evidence that tobacco from
the Native American religious ceremonies created a security or safety risk. According to the court, the Native American inmates' use of tobacco in pipes, tobacco ties, and prayer flags was a religious exercise protected under
RLUIPA, notwithstanding the use of red willow bark instead of tobacco by other members of their tribe. The court
noted that the inmates used tobacco prior to their incarceration as part of traditional healing and other religious ceremonies. (South Dakota Department of Corrections)

39.95

U.S. District Court
GANGS
RELIGIOUS ARTICLES
RELIGIOUS SERVICES

Panayoty v. Annucci, 898 F.Supp.2d 469 (N.D.N.Y. 2012). Inmates in a state prison who were affiliated with the
religious group Nation of Gods and Earth filed a § 1983 action against prison officials seeking declarative and injunctive relief concerning constraints the prison placed on the practice of their religion, which allegedly violated the
First Amendment and Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), as well as the equal protection clause of Fourteenth Amendment. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the
motion in part and denied in part. The court found that the inmates' practice of congregating with each other and
wearing crowns, as part of their affiliation with the Nation of Gods and Earth group, was religious in the inmates'
scheme of beliefs, and sincerely held, as required to demonstrate a prima facie showing of First Amendment free
exercise and RLUIPA violations against the prison officials who had established protocols prohibiting such practices. The court noted that one inmate had a twelve-year history of the religious practice, dating back to before he was
incarcerated, another inmate's practice extended back 25 years, and both expressed that the Nation of Gods and Earth
religion had helped them draw closer to a life of righteousness and had shaped their character. The court held that
there was no evidence that the inmates' practice of displaying the Nation of Gods and Earth's Universal Flag, symbols, and texts in their cells, as part of their affiliation with the group, was religious in the inmates' scheme of beliefs,
and sincerely held, and the inmates failed to adequately assert First Amendment free exercise and RLUIPA violations against prison officials. Although the inmates asserted that the prison's prohibition of this practice required
them to live under a shroud of secrecy, members of the group were required to register with the facility deputy superintendent for programs, so their practice was well known.
The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the prison
prohibition on the practice of congregating with each other and wearing religious crowns was reasonably related to
security concerns that the religion was affiliated with gang activity, and whether the measures were the least restrictive means of accomplishing security concerns. (New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision, Mid–Orange Correctional Facility, Riverview Correctional Facility)

U.S. District Court
MEDIA ACCESS

Philadelphia Inquirer v. Wetzel, 906 F.Supp.2d 362 (M.D.Pa. 2012). A newspaper brought an action against the
secretary of a state department of corrections (DOC), alleging the First Amendment guaranteed the right to observe a
prisoner's execution without obstructions. The newspaper moved for a preliminary injunction. The district court
granted the motion. The court held that the historical practice in Pennsylvania indicated that the public and press
traditionally enjoyed a right of access to executions and that permitting the press to view an entire execution without
visual or auditory obstruction contributed to the proper functioning of the execution process. The court found that
the state's significant interest in protecting the identities of employees taking part in lethal injections did not outweigh the newspaper's right of access to observe executions, and that the newspaper demonstrated that granting a
preliminary injunction would not result in harm to the state. The court noted that “… allowing the press to report on
the entire method of execution may promote a more informed discussion of the death penalty… and it may promote
the public perception of fairness and transparency concerning the death penalty, which can only be achieved by
permitting full public view of the execution…. Allowing the press to view the entire execution also provides significant community therapeutic value, as well as exposes the execution process to public scrutiny.” (Pennsylvania Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
BOOKS
SAFETY REGULA
TIONS
SECURITY
RESTRICTIONS

Prison Legal News v. Livingston, 683 F.3d 201 (5th Cir. 2012). A non-profit publisher of a magazine about prisoners'
rights filed a § 1983 suit claiming violation of the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause by the Texas Department of Criminal Justice's (TDCJ) book censorship policy and procedures, as applied to the publisher that was
prohibited from distributing five books to prisoners. The district court granted the TDCJ summary judgment. The
publisher appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the TDCJ book censorship policy that prohibited
the publisher's distribution of two books graphically depicting prison rape was rationally related to a legitimate
penological goal of protecting prisoners from a threat to safety and security by use of descriptions as templates to
commit similar rapes, and thus, the policy as applied to the publisher's distribution of the two books to prisoners did
not contravene the publisher's First Amendment right to free speech. According to the court, the TDCJ book censorship policy that prohibited the publisher's distribution of a book containing racial slurs and advocating overthrow of
prisons by riot and revolt was rationally related to the legitimate penological goal of protecting the prison's safety
and security from race riots, and thus, the policy as applied to the publisher's distribution of book to prisoners did not
contravene the publisher's First Amendment right to free speech. The court also noted that the prison had a legitimate
penological goal of protecting prisoners from the threat of violence due to the existence of race-based prison gangs
and the prevalence of racial discord. The court found that the TDCJ book censorship policy that formerly prohibited
the publisher's distribution of a book recounting sexual molestation of a young child was rationally related to the
legitimate penological goal of protecting the prison from impairment of the rehabilitation of sex offenders and from
disruptive outbursts by prisoners who were similarly victimized, and thus, the policy as applied to the publisher's
distribution of the book to prisoners did not contravene the publisher's First Amendment right to free speech. The
court noted that the TDCJ policy left prisoners and the publisher with ample alternatives for exercising their free
speech rights by permitting prisoners to read the publisher's newsletter and the majority of books that the publisher
distributed. (Prison Legal News, Texas Department of Criminal Justice)

U.S. District Court
SECURITY PRACTICES
DISCRETION

Sledge v. U.S., 883 F.Supp.2d 71 (D.D.C. 2012). A federal inmate's relatives brought an action under the Federal
Tort Claims Act (FTCA) against the United States, alleging claims for personal injury and wrongful death based on
the failure of Bureau of Prisons (BOP) employees to prevent or stop an attack on the inmate. The attack resulted in
the inmate’s hospitalization and death. The relatives also sought to recover for emotional distress that the inmate and
his mother allegedly suffered when BOP employees denied bedside visitation between the mother and the inmate.
Following dismissal of some of the claims, the United States moved to dismiss the remaining claims based on
FTCA's discretionary function exception. The district court granted the motion. The court found that a correction
officer's decision to position himself outside the housing unit, rather than in the sally port, to smoke a cigarette during a controlled move was discretionary, and thus the United States was immune from liability under the Federal
Tort Claims Act's (FTCA) discretionary function exception. The court noted that the prison lacked mandatory guidelines that required correctional staff to follow a particular course of action regarding supervision of inmates during
controlled moves, and the officer's decision implicated policy concerns, in that it required consideration of the risks

39.96

posed by inmates moving throughout prison, and required safety and security calculations. The court held that the
mother of the deceased federal inmate failed to state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, under
Missouri law, arising from the Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) denial of bedside visitation between the mother and inmate,
absent allegations that the BOP should have realized that its failure to complete a visitation memorandum involved
an unreasonable risk of causing distress, or facts necessary to demonstrate that the mother's emotional distress was
“medically diagnosable” and was of sufficient severity as to be “medically significant.”
The court found that the Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) alleged decision not to allow the mother of federal inmate,
who was in coma after being severely beaten by a fellow inmate, to visit her son after the BOP allegedly failed to
complete a visitation memorandum, was not so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond
all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in civilized community, thus
precluding the mother's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim under Missouri law. (Federal Correctional
Institution, Allenwood, Pennsylvania)
U.S. District Court
RELIGIOUS GROUPS
RELIGIOUS SERVICES
SECURITY PRACTICES

Sweet v. Northern Neck Regional Jail, 857 F.Supp.2d 595 (E.D.Va. 2012). An inmate, proceeding in forma pauperis,
brought a § 1983 action against a sergeant and a jail, alleging that a prohibition against speaking in Arabic during
prayer violated his First Amendment rights. The district court dismissed the case. The court held that the jail policy
requiring prayers or services be spoken in English when inmates from different housing units and classification levels congregated, but allowing prayers to be offered in Arabic within individual housing units, was reasonably related
to legitimate penological interests of security and did not substantially burden inmates' right to free exercise of their
First Amendment rights. The court noted that the jail was concerned about inmates plotting riots or escapes while
congregating with other units, jail officers did not speak Arabic, and inmates could gather within their housing units
and pray in Arabic. (Northern Neck Regional Jail, Virginia)

U.S. Appeals Court
BOOKS
GANGS

Toston v. Thurmer, 689 F.3d 828 (7th Cir. 2012). A state prison inmate brought a pro se civil rights complaint under
§ 1983 against prison officials, alleging that his rights of free speech and due process were violated when a disciplinary proceeding found him guilty of possession of gang literature and sentenced him to 90 days confinement in segregation. The inmate's due process claim was dismissed, and the district court granted summary judgment for officials on the free speech claim. The inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and vacated in part. The
appeals court held that the limitation of the state prison inmate's right of free speech, as a result of a disciplinary
proceeding that found him guilty of possession of gang literature, was adequately justified by prison officials' legitimate concern that the inmate copied from a prison library book a ten-point program by the founder of a hate group's
predecessor in order to show it to others that the inmate hoped to enlist in a prison gang, with the program to serve as
the gang's charter. The court noted that a prison librarian's decision that on the whole a book is not gang literature
does not preclude disciplinary proceedings against an inmate who copies incendiary passages from it. The inmate
had purchased, with prison permission, “To Die for the People: The Writings of Huey P. Newton” the founder of the
Black Panthers, and he had checked out two books from the prison library about the Black Panthers. The court vacated the district court decision regarding the alleged due process violation. The inmate alleged that his due process
rights were violated because he had no notice that copying passages from prison library books or a book he had been
allowed to purchase could subject him to a sentence of 90 days' confinement in segregation for possessing gang
literature. The appeal court ordered the district court to determine whether a 90–day sentence to segregation was, or
was not, a deprivation of liberty. (Waupun Correctional Institution, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
SECURITY PRACTICES
SEGREGATION
TRANSFER

U.S. v. Bout, 860 F.Supp.2d 303 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). A federal prisoner convicted of multiple conspiracies to kill United States nationals, kill officers and employees of the United States, acquire, transfer, and use anti-aircraft missiles,
and provide material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization, who had been held in solitary confinement, moved to be transferred to the general prison population. The motion was construed as a habeas petition. The
district court held that continued solitary confinement violated the prisoner's Eighth Amendment rights. According to
the court, the decision of the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to indefinitely hold the federal prisoner in solitary
confinement was not rationally related to any legitimate penological objectives and thus violated the prisoner's
Eighth Amendment rights. The court found that although the BOP argued that the prisoner's release from solitary
confinement would pose a high security risk, there was no evidence that the prisoner had a direct affiliation with any
member of a terrorist organization, or that he personally engaged in violent acts. The court concluded that the prisoner did not present an unusually high risk of escape or harm to others, any involvement that the prisoner had with
the former Liberian dictator, Charles Taylor, occurred several years ago and was not the basis of his criminal conviction, and the prisoner's release into the general population would have minimal impact on guards, other inmates, and
prison resources. (Special Housing Unit, Metropolitan Correctional Center, New York)

U.S. District Court
MAIL

U.S. v. Ligambi, 886 F.Supp.2d 492 (E.D.Pa. 2012). A detainee who was charged with various crimes, including
racketeering, moved to suppress an outgoing prison letter seized by prison officials. The district court denied the
motion. The court held that the defendant, who was in prison while charged with various crimes, including racketeering, did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his outgoing non-privileged mail. The court noted that
prison regulations permitted officials to seize correspondence when it might contain information concerning criminal
activities, it was established practice to inspect non-privileged mailings to promote discipline in the institution, and
the defendant had a reputation for involvement with organized crime. (South Woods State Prison, Southern State
Correctional Facility, New Jersey)

U.S. Appeals Court
ESCAPE

U.S. v. Tyerman, 701 F.3d 552 (8th Cir. 2012). A defendant was convicted in district court of being a felon in possession of a firearm and he appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. After a trial, the defendant was convicted in the district court of being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, and possession of a stolen
firearm. His motion for acquittal or new trial was denied and the defendant appealed. The appeals court affirmed.
The court held that the government's passive conduct in receiving information regarding the location of the defendant's gun, from the defendant's counsel, did not violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment right-to-counsel. The court
found that the defendant's conduct in creating handcuff keys and practicing the use of them constituted a substantial

39.97

step, as an element of attempt, with respect to escaping from pretrial incarceration, for purposes of using attempted
escape as the basis for a sentence enhancement for obstruction of justice. At sentencing, a U.S. Marshal testified that
prison guards discovered two homemade handcuff keys in the defendant’s cell. According to the Marshal, during the
investigation, other inmates revealed the defendant’s plans to escape from jail and his use of the law library (which
lacked surveillance) to practice removing handcuffs. Finding the Marshal credible, the district court applied a twolevel adjustment for obstruction of justice based on the attempted escape, sentencing the defendant 72 months' imprisonment. (U. S. District Court, Iowa)
U.S. Appeals Court
CLASSIFICATION
SECURITY PRACTICES
SUPERMAX
TRANSFER

Westefer v. Neal, 682 F.3d 679 (7th Cir. 2012). Past and present inmates in the custody of the Illinois Department of
Corrections (IDOC), who had been incarcerated in a supermax prison, brought a § 1983 action against IDOC officials and employees, alleging that defendants violated their right to procedural due process by employing unconstitutionally inadequate procedures when assigning inmates to the supermax prison, and seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. The district court granted injunctive relief, and the defendants appealed. The appeals court vacated and
remanded with instructions. The appeals court held that the scope and specificity of the district court's injunction
exceeded what was required to remedy a due-process violation, contrary to the terms of the Prison Litigation Reform
Act (PLRA) and cautionary language from the Supreme Court about remedial flexibility and deference to prison
administrators. The court held that the IDOC's ten–point plan should be used as a constitutional baseline, revising the
challenged procedures and including a detailed transfer-review process. According to the court, this would eliminate
the operational discretion and flexibility of prison administrators, far exceeding what due process required and violating the mandate of the PLRA. The court found that, under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), injunctive
relief to remedy unconstitutional prison conditions must be narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to
remedy the constitutional violation, and use the least intrusive means to correct the violation of the federal right. The
court noted that informal due process, which is mandatory for inmates transferred to a supermax prison, requires
some notice of the reasons for the inmate's placement and enough time to prepare adequately for the administrative
review. The court found that, to satisfy due process regarding inmates transferred to a supermax prison, only a single
prison official is needed as a neutral reviewer, not necessarily a committee, noting that informal due process requires
only that the inmate be given an opportunity to present his views, not necessarily a full-blown hearing. Similarly, the
informal due process does not necessarily require a written decision describing the reasons for an inmate's placement, or mandate an appeal procedure. (Closed Maximum Security Unit, Tamms Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
CONTRABAND
PRETRIAL DETAINEES
SAFETY REGULA
TIONS
SECURITY PRACTICES

Wilkins v. District of Columbia, 879 F.Supp.2d 35 (D.D.C. 2012). A pretrial detainee in a District of Columbia jail
who was stabbed by another inmate brought an action against the District. The district court entered judgment as a
matter of law in favor of the District and the detainee moved for reconsideration. The district court granted the motion and ordered a new trial. The court held that the issue of whether the failure of District of Columbia jail personnel to follow national standards of care for inmate access to storage closets and monitoring of inmate movements
was the proximate cause of the detainee's stabbing by a fellow inmate was for the jury, in the detainee's negligence
action, under District of Columbia law. Another inmate who was being held at the D.C. Jail on charges of firstdegree murder attacked the detainee. The inmate had received a pass to go to the jail's law library, unaccompanied.
Apparently he did not arrive at the library but no one from the library called the inmate’s housing unit to report that
he had not arrived. An expert retained by the detainee asserted that failure to monitor inmate movements violated
national standards for the operation of jails. En route to the jail mental health unit, the detainee saw the inmate enter
a mop closet. The inmate, along with another inmate, approached the detainee and stabbed him nine times with a
knife. During court proceedings there was testimony that the inmates had hidden contraband in the mop closets. The
closets are supposed to be locked at all times, other than when the jail is being cleaned each afternoon. But there was
evidence from which the jury could infer that all inmates except those who did not have jobs cleaning in the jail had
access to them. According to the detainee’s expert witness, keeping mop closets locked at times when the general
inmate population is permitted to be in the vicinity of the closets is in accordance with national standards of care for
the operation of detention facilities. According to the district court, “In sum, the circumstantial evidence of Mr.
Foreman's [inmate who attacked the detainee] freedom of movement is enough to have allowed a jury to conclude
that the District's negligence was a proximate cause of Mr. Wilkins's injury…”. (District of Columbia Central Detention Facility)

U.S. District Court
PRETRIAL DETAINEES
SAFETY
TRANSPORTATION
WHEELCHAIR

Woods v. City of Utica, 902 F.Supp.2d 273 (N.D.N.Y. 2012). A wheelchair-using, paraplegic arrestee sued a city,
police officer, a county, a former sheriff, and county corrections officers, bringing federal causes of action for violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act, and Fourteenth Amendment equal protection and due process. The arrestee alleged that he was lifted out of his wheelchair and placed on the floor of a
sheriff's van, forcing him to maneuver himself onto a bench seat which caused his pants and underwear to fall, exposing his genitals, that he was not secured to the bench with a seatbelt, causing him to be thrown about the passenger compartment and suffer leg spasms during his ride to the jail, that he was forced to urinate into an empty soda
bottle and handle his sterile catheter with his hands that were dirty from moving himself around the floor of the van,
and that the county corrections officers stood by as he struggled to maneuver himself out of the van and into his
wheelchair while other inmates watched. The city and county defendants moved for summary judgment. The district
court held that: (1) the city did not fail to accommodate the arrestee's disability, for purposes of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims; (2) summary judgment was precluded by fact issues as to whether the arrestee was denied the
benefit of safe and appropriate transportation by the county on the day of his arrest when he was moved from a police station to a county jail; (3) the county was entitled to summary judgment to the extent the arrestee's claims involved his transportation from the jail to court proceedings on two other dates; (4) fact issues existed as to whether
the county defendants were deliberately indifferent to the paraplegic inmate's known medical need for suppositories
every other day, in violation of due process, but they were not deliberately indifferent to his need for catheters and
prescription pain medication; and (5) the county defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity. The court noted
that while the county defendants disputed the arrestee's version of the facts, corrections officers all denied receiving
any training regarding how to transport disabled inmates. (Utica Police Dept., Oneida Co. Corr’l. Facility, N.Y.)

39.98

2013
U.S. District Court
SAFETY
REGULATIONS

Alvarado-David v. U.S., 972 F.Supp.2d 210 (D.Puerto Rico 2013). A prisoner brought an action against the United
States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), alleging he fell out of his bunk and hit a toilet bowl, breaking his
frontal teeth and upper lip because the United States' failed to provide prisoners with ladders to climb to their bunks.
The United States moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under the FTCA's discretionary function
exception. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the decision by Bureau of Prisons (BOP) personnel not to provide ladders or other equipment for the prisoners to climb to their bunks fit within the discretionary
function exception to the FTCA. The court noted that no rules or regulations governed the use of ladders or bunk
beds in correctional facilities, and the decision not to provide ladders in correctional facilities for safety reasons, as
ladders could be broken off and used as weapons or escape devices, was grounded in considerations of public policy.
(Metropolitan Detention Center, Guaynabo, Puerto Rico)

U.S. District Court
SECURITY
RESTRICTIONS

Aref v. Holder, 953 F.Supp.2d 133 (D.D.C. 2013). Current and former prisoners brought an action against the Bureau of Prisons (BOP), BOP officials, and the Attorney General, claiming that their First and Fifth Amendment
rights were violated when they were placed in Communications Management Units (CMUs), in which their ability to
communicate with the outside world was seriously restricted. Following dismissal of all but the procedural due process and First Amendment retaliation claims, the defendants moved to dismiss the First Amendment claims. The
district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that: (1) the prisoner's release from BOP
custody rendered moot his official-capacity claims for equitable relief; (2) a second prisoner sufficiently alleged a
First Amendment retaliation claim; but (3) the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) barred the prisoners' individual-capacity claims against a BOP official for mental or emotional injury. (Federal Correctional Institutions in Terre
Haute, Indiana, and Marion, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCHES
SEX OFFENDER
VIDEO
SURVEILLANCE

Arnzen v. Palmer, 713 F.3d 369 (8th Cir 2013). Patients at a state Civil Commitment Unit for Sex Offenders
(CCUSO) brought a § 1983 complaint against CCUSO administrators, challenging placement of video cameras in
CCUSO restrooms, and moved for a preliminary injunction to stop their use. The district court denied the motion as
to cameras in “dormitory style restrooms” but granted an injunction ordering that cameras in “traditional style bathrooms” be pointed at a ceiling or covered with lens cap. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that
CCUSO conducted a “search” by capturing images of patients while occupying single-user bathrooms, and that
CCUSO did not conduct a reasonable search by capturing patients' images, thereby constituting a Fourth Amendment violation. The appeals court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in issuing preliminary injunctive relief. The court noted that the patients had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a single-person bathroom
when there was no immediate indication it was being used for purposes other than those ordinarily associated with
bathroom facilities, and that involuntarily civilly committed persons retain the Fourth Amendment right to be free
from unreasonable searches that is analogous to the right retained by pretrial detainees. According to the court, the
facility did not conduct a reasonable search of its involuntarily committed patients by capturing images of patients
while they occupied single-user bathrooms in a secure facility, thereby constituting a violation of Fourth Amendment, where the cameras did not provide administrators with immediate alerts concerning patient safety or prevent
assaults or dangerous acts, and less intrusive methods were available for administrators to use to prevent illicit activities by patients. (Iowa Civil Commitment Unit for Sex Offenders)

U.S. Appeals Court
LOCKS
PRETRIAL DETAINEES
SAFETY

Baker v. RR Brink Locking Systems, Inc., 721 F.3d 716 (5th Cir. 2013). A pretrial detainee brought an action against
the manufacturer of allegedly faulty locks on cell doors that permitted another inmate to enter the detainee's cell and
assault and rape him. The manufacturer moved for summary judgment. The district court denied the motion and then
denied reconsideration. The manufacturer moved for permission to file an appeal before the case had been adjudicated. The motion was granted in part. The appeals court affirmed, allowing the case to continue. (RR Brink, Harrison
County Detention Center, Mississippi)

U.S. Appeals Court
CLASSIFICATION
GANGS

Castro v. Terhune, 712 F.3d 1304 (9th Cir. 2013). A state inmate brought an action challenging his validation as an
“associate” of a recognized prison gang on due process grounds. The district court granted the defendants' motion for
summary judgment. The appeals court reversed and remanded. On remand, the district court again entered summary
judgment for the defendants. The appeals court again reversed and remanded. Following a bench trial on remand, the
district court granted the inmate prospective relief, requiring prison officials to determine whether an inmate was a
gang associate under a new validation procedure. After officials validated the inmate as a “prison-gang associate” for
a second time, the district granted the defendants' motion to terminate the case. The inmate appealed. The appeals
court affirmed. The appeals court held that the California prison regulation relating to validation of inmates as prison
gang affiliates was not facially vague. The court found that the district court erred by not evaluating whether “some
evidence” supported the inmate's validation, but because the record contained “some evidence” that inmate was
involved with a gang, remand was not warranted. (SHU at Pelican Bay State Prison, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONTACT VISITS
CONTRABAND
RESTRAINTS

Chappell v. Mandeville, 706 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2013). A state prison inmate brought a § 1983 action against prison
officials, alleging violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity and the district court granted summary judgment as to some, but not all,
of the claims. The defendants appealed. The appeals court reversed. The appeals court held that: (1) it was not clearly established that subjecting the prison inmate to a contraband watch violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment, and thus prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity on the Eighth
Amendment claim; (2) the contraband watch was not such an extreme change in conditions of confinement as to
trigger due-process protection; and (3) it was not clearly established whether a state-created liberty interest existed
with regard to the contraband watch, and thus officials were entitled to qualified immunity on the claim that the
inmate's right to due process was violated because he was not provided with an opportunity to be heard by the official who ordered contraband watch. The inmate’s fiancée had visited him, and when she entered the prison she was

39.99

wearing a ponytail hairpiece. The next day the hairpiece was discovered in a trash can near the visiting room. Prison
officials then searched the entire visiting area and found spandex undergarments in the women's bathroom. Both the
hairpiece and the undergarments tested positive for cocaine residue. Prison staff conducted a search of the inmate’s
cell, during which they notified him that they believed that someone had introduced drugs through a hairpiece. The
officials discovered three unlabelled bottles of what appeared to be eye drops in the inmate’s cell. The liquid in the
bottles tested positive for methamphetamine. The inmate was then placed on a contraband watch. The contraband
watch conditions included 24-hour lighting, mattress deprivation, taping the inmate into two pairs of underwear and
jumpsuits, placing him in a hot cell with no ventilation, chaining him to an iron bed, shackling him at the ankles and
waist, and forcing him to eat “like a dog.” (California State Prison, Sacramento)
U.S. District Court
CLOTHING
PRETRIAL DETAINEES
SEARCHES
USE OF FORCE

Clay v. Woodbury County, Iowa, 982 F.Supp.2d 904 (N.D.Iowa 2013). A female arrestee brought a § 1983 action
against a city, an arresting officer, county, county sheriff, and jail officers, alleging, among other things, that jail
officers “strip searched” her without reasonable suspicion and in unconstitutional manner, and did so in retaliation
for her vociferous complaints about her detention and the search of her purse and cell phone. The defendants moved
for summary judgment, and the arrestee moved to exclude expert testimony. The district court held that the expert's
reference to an incorrect standard for the excessive force claim did not warrant excluding his opinions in their entirety, although portions of the expert's report were inadmissible.
The court found that the incident in which male and female county jail officers forcibly removed the female arrestee's under-wire bra and changed her into jail attire was not a “strip search” within the meaning of the Iowa law
which defined a “strip search” as “having a person remove or arrange some or all of the person's clothing so as to
permit an inspection of the genitalia, buttocks, female breasts or undergarments of that person or a physical probe by
any body cavity,” where there was no indication that the officers inspected the arrestee's private parts or physically
probed any of her body cavities. The court also found that the arrestee whose clothing was forcibly removed in the
presence of male and female county jail officers in a holding cell after the arrestee refused to answer questions during the booking process and to remove her clothing herself, was not subjected to a “strip search” requiring reasonable suspicion under the Fourth Amendment. According to the court, the officers did not violate the arrestee’s privacy
rights under the Fourth Amendment where the officers' reason for removing the arrestee's bra-- institutional safety-was substantially justified, and the scope of the intrusion was relatively small. The court also found that the officers
were entitled to qualified immunity from the female arrestee's § 1983 unlawful search claim, where the officers neither knew, nor reasonably should have known, that their actions would violate the arrestee's privacy rights.
The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the
amount of force used by female county jail officers during the booking process to forcibly remove the female arrestee's under-wire bra and change her into jail attire after the arrestee refused to answer questions, became disruptive, and refused to remove her clothing herself, was reasonable. The officers allegedly threw the arrestee onto the
cell bunk, causing her to bang her head against the bunk or cell wall. The court found that male county jail officers
did not use excessive force, within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, in restraining the female arrestee in a
holding cell after the female officers had allegedly thrown the arrestee onto a cell bunk, causing her to bang her head
against bunk or cell wall, in an effort to forcibly remove the arrestee's clothing and to change her into jail attire.
(Woodbury County Jail, Iowa)

U.S. District Court
CROWDING

Coleman v. Brown, 922 F.Supp.2d 1004 (E.D.Cal. 2013). State prison inmates brought Eighth Amendment challenges to the adequacy of mental health care and medical health care provided to mentally ill inmates and the general
prison population, respectively. The inmates moved to convene a three-judge panel of the district court to enter a
population reduction order that was necessary to provide effective relief. The motions were granted and the cases
were assigned to same panel, which ordered the state to reduce the prison population to 137.5% of its design capacity. The state moved to vacate or modify the population reduction order. The district court denied the motion. The
three-judge panel of the district court held that: (1) the state's contention that prison crowding was reduced and no
longer a barrier to providing inmates with care required by the Eighth Amendment did not provide the basis for a
motion to vacate the order on the ground that changed circumstances made it inequitable to continue applying the
order; (2) the state failed to establish that prison crowding was no longer a barrier to providing inmates with care
required by the Eighth Amendment; and (3) the state failed to establish it had achieved a durable remedy to prison
crowding. (Calif. Dept. of Rehabilitation and Corrections)

U.S. District Court
CROWDING

Coleman v. Brown, 960 F.Supp.2d 1057 (E.D.Cal. 2013). California prisoners with serious mental disorders brought
a class action against a Governor, alleging that due to prison overcrowding, they received inadequate mental health
care, in violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. Separately, California
prisoners with serious medical conditions brought a class action asserting constitutional claims similar to those in the
other action. In the case concerning mental health care, the district court found Eighth Amendment violations and
appointed a special master to oversee the development and implementation of a remedial plan. In the case concerning medical care, the State stipulated to a remedial injunction, and, after the State failed to comply with that injunction, the district court appointed a receiver to oversee remedial efforts. A three judge district court panel consolidated
the two cases and the panel entered a remedial order requiring the State to reduce its prison population to 137.5 percent of design capacity within two years. The Governor appealed. The United States Supreme Court affirmed the
population reduction order. The district court subsequently denied the defendants' motion to vacate or modify the
population reduction order, and directed the defendants to comply with the population reduction order. The defendants' moved to stay the order directing compliance pending appeal to the United States Supreme Court. The district
court denied the motion, finding that: (1) the State was not likely to succeed on the merits of the prisoners' lawsuit
challenging prison conditions; (2) the State would not be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) issuance of a stay
would substantially injure the prisoners; and (4) the public interest favored denying the stay. (California)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONTRABAND
SEARCHES-CELL

Denny v. Schultz, 708 F.3d 140 (3rd Cir. 2013). A federal prisoner petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus challenging
findings made by Disciplinary Hearing Officer (DHO) that he had possessed weapons in violation of a prison regulation and sanctioned him with forfeiture of 40 days of good time credit and the imposition of 60 days in disciplinary

39.100

segregation. The district court dismissed the petition and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The
appeals court held that the DHO did not violate the federal prisoner's due process rights when it found that the prisoner had committed the prohibited act of “Possession of a Weapon,” on the basis that two homemade shanks had
been found in a cell that he shared with another prisoner. The court noted that, although those weapons may have
belonged to his cellmate, all prisoners had an affirmative responsibility to keep their “area” free from contraband and
the collective responsibility theory applied. (Federal Correctional Institution, Fairton, New Jersey)
U.S. Appeals Court
FIRE SAFETY
SAFETY
REGULATIONS
ITEMS PERMITTED
SEARCHES- CELL

Devbrow v. Gallegos, 735 F.3d 584 (7th Cir. 2013). A prisoner brought a § 1983 claim against two prison officials,
claiming that the officials denied him access to the courts by confiscating and then destroying his legal papers in
retaliation for a prior lawsuit he filed. The district court granted the prison officials' motion for summary judgment,
and denied the prisoner's motion for reconsideration. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals
court held that the prisoner failed to authenticate a purported e-mail from a prison official to a law librarian supervisor, where there was no circumstantial evidence that supported the authenticity of the e-mail, and no evidence that
the prisoner or anyone else saw the official actually compose or transmit the purported e-mail. The court held that
the official's removal of the prisoner's excessive legal materials from his cell, to eliminate a fire hazard and to make
it easier for officials to conduct searches and inventories of the prisoner's property during prison searches, was not
retaliation for the prisoner's filing of a prior lawsuit. According to the court, the prisoner's speculation regarding the
officials' motive could not overcome the officials' sworn statements on the motion for summary judgment. (Westville
Correctional Facility, Indiana)

U.S. District Court
GANGS
PROTECTION
SAFETY

Dunn v. Killingsworth, 984 F.Supp.2d 811 (M.D.Tenn. 2013). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against prison
officials, alleging that the officials violated his Eighth Amendment rights by not providing him with adequate protection from gang-related violence. The district court conducted an initial review of the prisoner’s complaint, pursuant
to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The court held that the prisoner's allegations: (1) that a gang member
threatened his personal safety: (2) that the prisoner's family paid other inmates for the prisoner's personal safety; (3)
that the prisoner repeatedly requested to be placed in protective custody; and (4) that prison officials denied such
requests, were sufficient to state the serious deprivation prong of his claim for violation of his Eighth Amendment
rights. The court also found that the prisoner's allegations that prison officials denied his requests for protection
despite the stabbing of prisoners and a guard at the prison, and that prison officials failed to take any effective steps
to provide better protection for all inmates, were sufficient to state a deliberate indifference prong of his claim for
violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. (South Central Correctional Center, Tennessee)

U.S. District Court
CELL CAPACITY
CROWDING
PRETRIAL DETAINEE

Duran v. Merline, 923 F.Supp.2d 702 (D.N.J. 2013). A former pretrial detainee at a county detention facility brought
a pro se § 1983 action against various facility officials and employees, the company which provided food and sanitation services to the facility, and the medical services provider, alleging various constitutional torts related to his
pretrial detention. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motions in part and
denied in part. The district court held that fact issues precluded summary judgment on: (1) the conditions of confinement claim against a former warden in his official capacity; (2) an interference with legal mail claim against a
correctional officer that alleged that the facility deliberately withheld the detainee's legal mail during a two-week
period; (3) a First Amendment retaliation claim based on interference with legal mail; and (4) a claim for inadequate
medical care as to whether the detainee's Hepatitis C condition was a serious medical condition that required treatment and whether the provider denied such treatment because it was too costly. The detainee asserted that overcrowding at the county detention facility, which allegedly led to the detainee being forced to sleep and eat his meals
next to open toilet, and led to inmate-on-inmate violence, contributed to his assault by another inmate. According to
the court, the long-standing conditions of confinement whereby the county detention facility was overcrowded for at
least 24 years and facility officials “triple-celled” inmates, allegedly leading to unsanitary conditions, amounted to a
“custom” for the purposes of the former detainee's § 1983 Fourteenth Amendment conditions of confinement claim
against a former warden in his official capacity. The court held that the food service provider's serving the detainee
cold meals for a 45-day period while the kitchen in the county detention facility was being renovated, was not “punishment,” as would support the inmate's § 1983 Fourteenth Amendment conditions of confinement claim against the
provider, absent evidence that the food served to the detainee was spoiled or contaminated, that a significant portion
of the detainee's diet consisted of such food, or that the food service caused more than a temporary discomfort. The
court also held that the alleged actions of the food service provider in serving the detainee one food item when another ran out, failing to serve bread with the inmate's meal, serving the inmate leftovers from days before, serving
juice in a dirty container on one occasion, serving milk after its expiration date, and serving meals on cracked trays
that caused the detainee to contract food poisoning, did not amount to a substantial deprivation of food sufficient to
amount to unconstitutional conditions of confinement, as would violate the inmate's due process rights. (Atlantic
County Justice Facility, New Jersey)

U.S. District Court
CROWDING
PRETRIAL DETAINEES
SAFETY
SAFETY
REGULATIONS

E.A.F.F. v. U.S., 955 F.Supp.2d 707 (W.D.Tex. 2013). Unaccompanied alien minors brought an action against Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) officials, alleging they were physically and sexually abused while they were in
detention awaiting final adjudication of their immigration status. The officials moved for partial summary judgment.
The district court granted the motions. The court noted that a person detained for deportation is equivalent to a pretrial detainee, and a pretrial detainee's constitutional claims are considered under the Due Process Clause. The court
held that the officials could not be held liable for due process violations that occurred when the unaccompanied alien
minors were physically and sexually abused as a result of alleged overcrowding at a detention facility, where they
were being held while awaiting final adjudication of their immigration status, and where there was no evidence that
the officials were responsible for decisions regarding the facility's capacity. According to the court, isolated incidents
of physical and sexual abuse by staff members at the detention facility were insufficient to put the officials on notice
of a substantial risk of future abuse, as required to hold the officials liable for deliberate indifference in failing to
protect the minors' safety in violation of their due process rights. The court noted that other incidents of alleged
abuse were investigated by the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services and did not result in any abuse
findings. The court found that officials' failure to systematically interview minors concerning their abuse allegations

39.101

did not amount to deliberate indifference to their safety in violation of their due process rights, where officials spoke
to some of the minors during their monitoring visits, and clinicians were on-site and available to speak with the minors on a regular basis. The court held that the officials could not be held liable in their supervisory capacities on a
theory of failure to train or supervise, for due process violations arising from alleged physical and sexual abuse by
staff members at the detention facility, where staff members received training in behavior management and de-escalation techniques, officials responded to reports of abuse by recommending or providing further training, officials
adopted safety policies designed to prevent abuse, and officials recommended that staff members work in pairs and
they were unaware that staff members were working individually. (Nixon Facility, Away From Home, Inc., Texas)
U.S. Appeals Court
ITEMS PERMITTED

Earl v. Racine County Jail, 718 F.3d 689 (7th Cir. 2013). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against a county jail and
various jail officers, asserting claims for denial of due process and deliberate indifference to his serious medical
condition. The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, and the inmate appealed. The
appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the inmate's five days on suicide watch were neither long enough
nor harsh enough to deprive him of a due-process-protected liberty interest, where: (1) the only changes to the inmate's meals were that trays upon which food was served were disposable foam rather than plastic; (2) eating utensils were quickly removed after each meal; (3) the inmate was not denied bedding but was given a mattress and a
blanket; (4) the inmate was denied writing materials for only the first 48 hours; and (5) rather than being prohibited
human contact, deputies were assigned to closely and personally monitor the inmate to ensure his safety. The court
found that jail officers were not deliberately indifferent to the inmate's allergic reaction to suicide garments in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The court noted that after the inmate told an officer about his allergic reaction to a
suicide gown, the officer called a nurse who immediately examined the inmate and gave him cream and medication,
and the officers appropriately deferred to the nurse's medical decision that the inmate did not need different garments
because there was no sign of rash or bumps on the inmate. (Racine County Jail, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
CLEANING SUPPLIES
SAFETY

Florio v. Canty, 954 F.Supp.2d 227 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). A prisoner, proceeding pro se, brought a § 1983 action against
a warden and a corrections officer, alleging violations of the Eighth Amendment. The defendants moved to dismiss.
The district court granted the motion. The court held that the prisoner's exposure to human waste on two occasions,
for a total of less than a few hours, did not give rise to a serious risk of substantial harm. The prisoner alleged that
prison officials waited 10 to 30 minutes after two separate incidents of a toilet overflowing to release the prisoner
from his cell and having the prisoner clean the cell with inadequate cleaning gear and without training, allegedly
resulting in the prisoner developing a foot fungus. The court held that this was not deliberate indifference to a substantial risk to his health and safety, as would violate the Eighth Amendment. The court noted that officials acted to
alleviate the unsanitary conditions, the overflow also occurred in approximately 20 other cells, and the prisoner was
not prevented from bathing or washing his clothes after the incidents. (Anna M. Kross Center, Rikers Island, New
York City Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
TRANSPORTATION

Fluker v. County of Kankakee, 741 F.3d 787 (7th Cir. 2013). An inmate and his wife filed a § 1983 action against a
county and the county sheriff's office to recover for injuries the inmate suffered when a correctional officer who was
driving a jail transport vehicle was required to brake suddenly, causing the inmate to hurtle forward and hit his head
on a metal divider. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The plaintiffs appealed. The
appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the district court had the ability, in the interests of judicial economy and finality, to address the merits of the suit once it determined that the inmate had not exhausted his remedies
under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). (Kankakee County, Jerome Combs Detention Center, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
TRANSPORTATION

Fluker v. County of Kankakee, 945 F.Supp.2d 972 (C.D.Ill. 2013). An inmate and his wife filed a § 1983 action in
state court against a county and the county sheriff's office to recover for injuries the inmate suffered when a correctional officer who was driving his prison transport vehicle was required to brake suddenly, causing the inmate to
hurtle forward and hit his head on a metal divider. The case was removed to federal court. The district court granted
the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court held that: (1) the officials' failure to fasten the inmate’s
seatbelt did not violate the Eighth Amendment; the official's alleged driving above the posted speed limit did not
violate the Eighth Amendment; and the officials' failure to immediately call for an ambulance did not violate the
Eighth Amendment. The court noted that the officials, who were not medically trained, called a supervisor for guidance within one minute of the accident, and were told to continue to the jail where a trained first responder immediately assessed the inmate and cleaned and bandaged a laceration on his head when the transport van arrived 7 to 10
minutes later. The inmate was transported to a hospital within 10 to 15 minutes of arriving at the jail. (Jerome
Combs Detention Center, Kankakee County, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
FACIAL HAIR
RELIGION
SECURITY PRACTICES

Garner v. Kennedy, 713 F.3d 237 (5th Cir. 2013). A Muslim state prisoner brought an action against prison officials
alleging the Texas Department of Criminal Justice's (TDCJ) policy of prohibiting prisoners from wearing beards for
religious reasons violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and his constitutional
rights. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court
affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. On remand, and after a bench trial, the district court granted declaratory and injunctive relief in favor of the prisoner. The defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals
court held that TDCJ's no-beard policy was not the least restrictive means of advancing the compelling government
interest in controlling costs, and the no-beard policy was not the least restrictive means of advancing the compelling
government interest in security. According to the court, although prison officials testified that there would be additional costs from allowing prisoners to wear quarter-inch beards for religious reasons due to the construction of barbershops, the purchase of barbering supplies, or the creation of new identification cards, almost all of that testimony
was speculative, the officials admitted that no specific studies of costs had been done, and there was no evidence that
TDCJ, which already imposed limits on hair length, would encounter greater or added difficulty if it enforced a onequarter-inch as opposed to a clean-shaven rule. Although TDCJ presented evidence that allowing inmates to have
beards hindered inmate identification, TDCJ allowed inmates to shave their heads, and there was testimony that
shaved heads posed just as many identification problems as allowing prisoners to grow and shave beards. (Texas
Department of Criminal Justice, McConnell Unit, Beeville, Texas)

39.102

U.S. Appeals Court
AUDIO
COMMUNICATION

Goodman v. Kimbrough, 718 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 2013). The wife of a pretrial detainee who suffered from dementia
and who was severely beaten by his cellmate filed a § 1983 action against jail officials in their individual capacities
for alleged violation of the Due Process Clause by deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of harm to the detainee. The wife also asserted a supervisory liability claim against the sheriff in his official capacity and a state law
claim for loss of support and consortium. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The wife
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that there was no evidence that jail officials were subjectively
aware of a risk of serious harm to which the pretrial detainee was exposed from his severe beating by a cellmate, and
that the officials deliberately disregarded that risk, as required to support the detainee's § 1983 claim of deliberate
indifference in violation of the Due Process Clause. According to the court, the officers' failure to conduct cell
checks and head counts and their deactivation of emergency call buttons constituted negligence but did not justify
constitutional liability under § 1983. According to the court, jail officials' policy violations by failing to enter every
cell in conducting head counts and in deactivating emergency call buttons did not constitute a custom so settled and
permanent as to have the force of law. (Clayton County Jail, Georgia)

U.S. District Court
PUBLICATIONS
SECURITY PRACTICES

Gray v. Cannon, 974 F.Supp.2d 1150 (N.D.Ill. 2013). State inmates brought an action against prison officials, alleging that the officials' refusal to let them receive mail that included photographs depicting nudity and sexual activity
violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment, and that grievance procedures for challenging the refusals
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court granted the officials’ motion for
summary judgment. The court held that a state prison regulation preventing inmates from obtaining nude or sexually
explicit photographs was reasonably related to legitimate penological interests, and thus did not violate the inmates'
First Amendment rights. The court noted that: (1) the regulation was expressly aimed at protecting prison security;
(2) the regulation permitted withholding reading materials only if it furthered interests in security, good order, or
discipline, and there existed a valid and rational connection between the regulation and prison security; (3) the prison
left open alternative means of exercising the restricted right by permitting inmates to receive a wide range of publications; (4) the restrictions fell within the broad limits of deference to prison officials regarding what was detrimental to security; and (5) the inmates did not point to an alternative that fully accommodated inmates' rights at a de
minimus cost to valid penological interests. The court found that there was no evidence regarding how the state prison's grievance and appeal procedures operated, as required to support the inmates’ claim that they were provided
with insufficient opportunities to challenge prison's rejections of sexually explicit photographs and publications sent
to them, in violation of due process. (Stateville Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
CHEMICAL AGENTS

Hannon v. Beard, 979 F.Supp.2d 136 (D.Mass. 2013). Twenty-seven state inmates filed a § 1983 action against the
Massachusetts Department Of Correction (MDOC), UMass Correctional Health (UMCH), the governor, and prison
officials, alleging violations of their right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment by exposing them to harmful
environmental conditions, First Amendment rights by retaliating against them for filing grievances and law suits,
fundamental right of access to courts, and due process and equal protection rights. The officials moved to dismiss.
The district court granted the motion, finding that the Eleventh Amendment barred claims against MDOC and
UMCH, and that the inmates failed to state plausible Eighth Amendment claims and First Amendment retaliation
claims. According to the court, the inmates' allegations that they were exposed to unsafe levels of toxins at a facility
were not enough to show that the alleged deprivation was objectively serious, and thus were insufficient to state a
plausible Eighth Amendment claim. The court noted that the inmates did not allege specific facts that would support
a finding that environmental toxins were actually present, that the inmates were actually exposed to those substances, and that exposure caused injury. (UMass Correctional Health, and Massachusetts Dept. of Correction, Souza
Baranowski Correctional Center)

U.S. Appeals Court
LOCKS
PRETRIAL DETAINEES
SAFETY
SECURITY PRACTICES

Junior v. Anderson, 724 F.3d 812 (7th Cir. 2013). A pretrial detainee brought a suit under § 1983 against a guard
who allegedly failed to protect him from an attack by other inmates. The district court granted summary judgment in
favor of the guard, and the detainee appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The appeals court held that
summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the guard acted with a conscious
disregard of a significant risk of violence to the detainee, when she noted that two cells in the corridor where she was
posted were not securely locked, but only noted that this was a “security risk” in her log. The guard then let several
of the inmates who were supposed to remain locked up out of their cells, let them congregate in a darkened corridor,
and then left her post, so that no guard was present to observe more than 20 maximum-security prisoners milling
about. The court found that the detainee was entitled to appointed counsel in his § 1983 suit against a prison guard.
According to the court, although the case was not analytically complex, its sound resolution depended on evidence to
which detainee in his distant lockup had no access, and the detainee needed to, but could not, depose the guard in
order to explore the reason for her having left her post and other issues. (Cook County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
BOOKS
JEWELRY
RELIGIOUS ARTICLES
SAFETY
REGULATIONS
SECURITY PRACTICES

Kaufman v. Pugh, 733 F.3d 692 (7th Cir. 2013). A state prisoner brought an action against prison officials, challenging their refusal to permit a weekly atheist study group, their refusal to allow the prisoner to wear a “knowledge
thought ring” that he regarded as a religious symbol, and their failure to make atheist books that he donated available
in the prison library. The prisoner asserted claims under the Free Exercise Clause, the Establishment Clause, and the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The district court granted summary judgment to
the prison officials. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The
appeals court held that summary judgment was precluded by fact issue as to how many prisoners in the state prison
would be interested in forming a weekly atheism study group.
The court found that refusal to allow the prisoner to wear a “knowledge thought ring” did not discriminate against
atheism. The court noted that the prisoner conceded that the ring was an individualized symbol, thereby admitting
that his inability to wear the ring did not impose a substantial burden on his ability to practice atheism. According to
the court, the prison officials were entitled to draw a distinction between, on the one hand, religious emblems that
were common to members of other umbrella religious groups, easy to recognize, and difficult to abuse as a gang
symbol, and on the other hand, emblems that were unique to each prisoner and that posed a potential security risks.

39.103

According to the court, prison officials' refusal to allow the state prisoner to form a weekly atheism study group did
not violate the prisoner's rights under the Free Exercise Clause or the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), in the absence of evidence that the prisoner would be unable to practice atheism effectively
without the benefit of a weekly study group. The court found that the alleged failure of state prison officials to make
available in the prison library three used books on atheism that had been mailed to the prisoner, did not violate the
prisoner's rights under the Free Exercise Clause and the RLUIPA, absent evidence of a substantial burden on the
prisoner's ability to follow his atheistic beliefs. (Stanley Correctional Facility, Wisconsin)
U.S. District Court
STAFFING

Kelly v. Wengler, 979 F.Supp.2d 1104 (D.Idaho 2013). Prisoners brought a civil contempt action against a private
prison contractor, alleging the contractor violated a settlement agreement that required it to comply with the staffing
pattern specified in its contract with the Idaho Department of Correction. The district court found that the contractor
was in civil contempt for violating the settlement agreement, that the contractor's non-compliance with staffing requirements were significant, and the contractor did not promptly take all reasonable steps to comply with settlement
agreement. The court held that a two-year extension of the consent decree was a proper sanction for the contractor's
civil contempt in willfully violating the settlement agreement, where the contractor's failure to comply with a key
provision of the settlement agreement had lasted nearly as long as the duration of the agreement. According to the
court, the use of an independent monitor to ensure the private prison contractor's compliance with the settlement
agreement was an appropriate resolution, where such duty was most fairly handled by a monitor with a direct obligation to the district court and to the terms of the settlement agreement. The court noted that “…it is clear that there
was a persistent failure to fill required mandatory positions, along with a pattern of CCA staff falsifying rosters to
make it appear that all posts were filled.” The state assumed operation of the facility in July 2014, changing the
name to the Idaho State Correctional Center. (Corrections Corp. of America, Idaho Correctional Center)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONTRABAND
HAIR LENGTH
RELIGION
SAFETY
REGULATIONS
SECURITY PRACTICES

Knight v. Thompson, 723 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2013). Native American inmates brought an action against the Alabama Department of Corrections, challenging its short-hair policy under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The district court entered judgment for the Department and the inmates appealed. The
appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the Department’s short-hair policy for male inmates furthered
compelling governmental interests in security, discipline, hygiene, and safety, as required to survive a challenge
under RLUIPA by inmates who wished to wear their hair long in accordance with dictates of their Native American
religion. The court noted that long hair was used to conceal weapons and contraband, it concealed inmates' fungus
outbreaks, sores, cysts, and tumors, and it impeded the ability of prison staff to identify inmates. According to the
court, allowing an exception for Native American inmates would not eliminate the Department's concerns, as inmates could manipulate searches of their own hair to conceal weapons, and it would do nothing to assuage the Department's concerns about hair-pulling during fights. The court held that the Department’s short-hair policy, which
applied to all male inmates without exception, did not discriminate on the basis of race or religion in violation of the
Native American inmates' equal protection rights. (Alabama Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
BOOKS
CONTRABAND
PRETRIAL DETAINEES
RELIGIOUS ARTICLES
SAFETY
REGULATIONS
SECURITY
RESTRICTIONS

Kramer v. Conway, 962 F.Supp.2d 1333 (N.D.Ga. 2013). A pretrial detainee at a county jail brought an action
against the jail, the jail administrator, and a county sheriff, alleging that conditions of his confinement violated his
right to practice his Orthodox Jewish faith, that the defendants violated his right to possess legal reference books,
and that the defendants failed to accommodate his physical disabilities. The detainee moved for a preliminary and a
permanent injunction and moved for leave to file a second amendment to his verified complaint. The defendants
moved for summary judgment. The district court denied the motions in part and granted the motion in part. The court
held that the pretrial detainee’s allegation that the county jail denied him books needed to practice his Orthodox
Jewish religious faith failed to establish a violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA), absent evidence that the county jail received federal funds in connection with its policies limiting the
number and type of books allowed in cells. The court held that the county jail's policy of limiting the number of
religious books that the pretrial detainee, an Orthodox Jew, could keep in his cell, but providing him access to others
that were not in his cell, was based on legitimate penological interests, and thus, did not violate the detainee's rights
under the Free Exercise Clause. According to the court, a uniformly applied books-in-cell limitation was reasonable
in a facility that housed 2,200 inmates, the limitation was applied in a neutral way and the expressive content of
books was not considered, books in sufficient quantities could be used as weapons and presented fire and obstacle
hazards, access to other books was made by exchanging out titles and by allowing the copying of parts or all of a
text, and the detainee was not denied access to nine religious books he claimed were required in practicing his faith,
but rather, argued only that access was required to be more convenient.
The court found that the jail's policy of prohibiting hard cover books in cells, including limiting religious texts
to those that did not have hard covers, was based on legitimate penological interests, and thus, did not violate rights
of the pretrial detainee, an Orthodox Jew, under the Free Exercise Clause. The court noted that evidence at hearing
on the detainee's motion for injunctive relief showed that hardcover books posed safety and security risks because
hard covers could be used to conceal contraband and because of their potential use as weapons, the policy was applied in a neutral way, and the expressive content of books was not considered. The court found that the jail's policy
of limiting package mail to four pounds was based on legitimate penological interests, and thus, did not violate rights
as applied to the pretrial detainee, an Orthodox Jew, under the Free Exercise Clause when the jail rejected one of
detainee's packages that contained more than four pounds of books. The court noted that the jail received a large
volume of mail and other items each day, all of which had to be searched for contraband and threats their contents
could pose to the safety and security of inmates and jail officials, the policy was applied in a neutral way, and the
expressive content of books was not considered. The court held that the jail's policy that limited the number and type
of books allowed in a cell did not violate the pretrial detainee's Due Process rights, where there was no evidence that
the policy was intended to punish the detainee, the jail's policies prohibiting hard cover books and limiting the number of books allowed in a cell were reasonably related to legitimate penological interests, and the jail gave the detainee substantial access to legal materials by increasing the time he was allowed in the library and liberally allowing
him to copy legal materials to keep in his cell. The court held that the jail, the jail administrator, and the county sheriff's denial of a typewriter in the pretrial detainee's cell to accommodate his alleged handwriting disability did not

39.104

violate the detainee's rights under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The court noted that the
detainee was able to write by hand, although he stated he experienced pain when doing so. According to the court, if
the detainee chose to avoid writing by hand he had substantial access to a typewriter in the jail's law library, there
was no permanent harm from the handwriting he performed, there was no evidence the detainee was not able to
adequately communicate with lawyers and jail officials without a typewriter in his cell, and the accommodation of an
in-cell typewriter would impose an undue burden on jail personnel because metal and moving parts of typewriter
could be used as weapons. (Gwinnett County Jail, Georgia)
U.S. Appeals Court
HAIR LENGTH
RELIGION

Lewis v. Sternes, 712 F.3d 1083 (7th Cir. 2013). A state prisoner brought an action against prison officials under §
1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), alleging removal of his dreadlocks
violated his religious rights and denied him equal protection. The district court granted the defendants' motion for
summary judgment. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that there was no
evidence that the prison did not need to regulate hair length or hairstyle, or that the need was not great enough to
warrant interference with the inmate's religious observance. (Dixon Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
RESTRAINTS
USE OF FORCE

Maraj v. Massachusetts, 953 F.Supp.2d 325 (D.Mass. 2013). The estate of a deceased inmate brought a § 1983 excessive-force action against county corrections officers and others, alleging that they used excessive force and were
deliberately indifferent to the inmate’s medical needs, in violation of the Constitution. The district court partially
granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss and the defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court
granted the motion. The defendants allegedly caused the inmate's death by using an emergency restraint belt and
delaying medical treatment, but a prison medical examiner determined that the inmate had a pre-existing heart condition that ultimately led to the inmate's cardiac arrest, and the manner of death could not be determined. (Suffolk
County House of Correction, Massachusetts)

U.S. Appeals Court
CLOTHING
PUBLICATIONS
SEARCHES

Mays v. Springborn, 719 F.3d 631 (7th Cir. 2013). A former state prisoner brought an action against prison officials,
asserting claims based on strip searches at prisons and alleging retaliation for his complaints about the searches,
denial of his request for a dietary supplements which he considered to be religious necessities, inadequacy of his
diet, failure to issue certain winter clothing items, and censorship of pages in a magazine mailed to him. The district
granted summary judgment in favor of the officials on the claims about prison food and clothing and granted the
officials judgment as a matter of law on the claims about strip searches, retaliation, and censorship. The prisoner
appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated the judgment with respect to the strip searches, and remanded.
On remand, the district court entered judgment, upon a jury verdict, in favor of the officials as to the strip search
claims, and the prisoner again appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The appeals court held that: (1)
even if there was a valid penological reason for the strip searches conducted on a prisoner, the manner in which the
searches were conducted was itself required to pass constitutional muster, and (2) a jury instruction requiring the
prisoner to negate the possibility that strip searches would have occurred even if there had been no retaliatory motive
was plain error. (Stateville Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
PUBLICATIONS

Prison Legal News v. Babeu, 933 F.Supp.2d 1188 (D.Ariz. 2013). A non-profit organization that produced and distributed a monthly journal and books to inmates brought an action against county jail officers and mailroom employees, alleging that the defendants violated its First Amendment and due process rights by failing to deliver its materials to its subscribers at the jail. The parties cross-moved for partial summary judgment. The court granted the motions in part, denied in part, and deferred in part. The court held that the jail's policy limiting incoming inmate correspondence to one-page and postcards did not violate the First Amendment, where there was an apparent commonsense connection between the jail's goal of reducing contraband and limiting the number of pages a particular piece
of correspondence contained, and sufficient alternative avenues of communication remained open for publishers who
wished to communicate with inmates at the jail. But the court held that the jail’s failure to give the non-profit organization notice and the opportunity to appeal the jail's refusal to deliver its materials to inmates violated the organization's procedural due process rights. The court ruled that the blanket ban on newspapers and magazines violated
clearly established law, and therefore neither the county jail mailroom employees nor their supervisors were entitled
to qualified immunity from the § 1983 First Amendment claim arising from employees' failure to deliver the organization's materials to inmates. According to the court, the law was clear that blanket bans on newspapers and magazines in prisons violated the First Amendment, and it was objectively unreasonable for the employees to throw away
mail, or refuse to deliver it, based upon a perceived blanket ban on newspapers and magazines. Because the county
jail mailroom uniformly enforced the unconstitutional county policy and allowed books from only four publishers,
the county was subject to liability for First Amendment violations in § 1983 action. The court held that there was no
evidence that mailroom employees, their supervisors, or command staff at the county jail were motivated by evil
motive or intent when they violated the non-profit publisher's First Amendment and due process rights by discarding
publisher's materials without providing the publisher opportunity to contest or appeal the non-deliverability decision,
or that those individuals' unconstitutional actions involved reckless or callous indifference to the publisher's federally
protected rights, as would support an award of punitive damages against the individuals in the publisher's § 1983
action. (Pinal County Jail, Arizona)

U.S. District Court
PUBLICATIONS

Prison Legal News v. Columbia County, 942 F.Supp.2d 1068 (D.Or. 2013). A publisher filed a § 1983 action alleging that a county and its officials violated the First Amendment by rejecting dozens of its publications and letters
mailed to inmates incarcerated in its jail and violated the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to provide it or the inmates with the notice of, and opportunity to, appeal the jail's rejection of its publications and letters. A bench trial
was held, resulting in a judgment for the publisher. The court held that: (1) the policy prohibiting inmates from receiving mail that was not on a postcard violated the First Amendment; (2) the county had a policy of prohibiting
inmates from receiving magazines; (3) the county failed to provide adequate notice of withholding of incoming mail
by jail authorities; (4) entry of a permanent injunction prohibiting officials from enforcing the postcard-only policy
was warranted; and (5) a permanent injunction prohibiting officials from enforcing the prohibition against magazines
was not warranted. (Columbia County Jail, Oregon)

39.105

U.S. District Court
PROTECTION
SAFETY
SEGREGATION
USE OF FORCE

Randle v. Alexander, 960 F.Supp.2d 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). An African-American state inmate with a history of serious mental illness brought an action against officials of the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS), correctional officers, and mental health personnel, alleging under § 1983 that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs and that he was retaliated against, in violation of
his First Amendment rights, among other claims. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the
motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the correctional officers' alleged actions in forcing the inmate
to fight a fellow inmate, and threatening to beat the inmate with a baton and engage in a joint cover-up if the two
inmates did not “finish” their fight within a specified area of the prison, which ultimately resulted in the fellow inmate sustaining fatal injuries in the fight, had no legitimate penological purpose, and was far afield of the species of
force employed to restore or maintain discipline. The court held that the alleged actions reflected indifference to
inmate safety, if not malice toward the inmate, as supported the inmate's § 1983 Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim. According to the court, the alleged forced fight between the inmate and a fellow inmate, orchestrated,
condoned, and covered up by correctional officers was an objectively serious violation of the inmate's Eighth
Amendment right to reasonably safe conditions of confinement, and the intent evinced by such activity was, at the
very least, one of indifference to inmate safety, supporting the inmate's § 1983 Eighth Amendment conditions of
confinement claim against the officers.
The court held that the African-American state inmate's allegations in his complaint that a correctional officer
arranged inmates in his company so that white inmates were close to officers' posts, whereas black inmates were
placed further away, that white inmates were given superior jobs, that the officer's efforts in forcing a fight between
the inmate and a fellow inmate were done purposefully for his amusement because both inmates were black, and that
the officer's treatment of the inmate and other black inmates was motivated by his intent to discriminate on the basis
of race and malicious intent to injure inmates, stated a § 1983 equal protection claim against the officer.
The court ruled that the correctional officers were not entitled to qualified immunity from the inmate's § 1983
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims because inmates had a clearly established right to remain incarcerated in
reasonably safe conditions, and it was objectively unreasonable to threaten inmates until they agreed to fight each
other in front of prison officials. The court found that the inmate stated an Eighth Amendment inadequate medical
care claim against mental health personnel. The inmate alleged that he had a history of serious mental illness, that his
symptoms increased following a forced fight with a fellow inmate, that the inmate attempted suicide on three occasions, two of which required his hospitalization, that prison mental health personnel evidenced deliberate indifference to his medical needs, as they recklessly disregarded the risk the inmate faced as result of special housing unit
(SHU) confinement, and that the inmate was confined to SHU despite a recommendation that he be placed in a lessrestrictive location. (Green Haven Corr'l. Facility, Protective Custody Unit, N.Y. State Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
TRANSPORTATION
RESTRAINTS
SAFETY

Rogers v. Boatright, 709 F.3d 403 (5th Cir. 2013). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against corrections officers and their supervisor, alleging that he was seriously injured when the prison van in which he was riding stopped
abruptly, and that he was provided with inadequate and untimely medical care for his injuries. The district court
dismissed the suit. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The
appeals court held that the prisoner stated a non-frivolous claim that an officer acted with deliberate indifference to
his safety in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The prisoner alleged that he sustained a serious injury while being
transported in a prison van because a corrections officer operated the van recklessly and had to brake suddenly to
avoid hitting another vehicle, that he was shackled in leg irons and handcuffs and was not provided with a seatbelt
and thus could not protect himself when the prison van stopped abruptly, and that the officer had told another officer
that other inmates similarly had been injured the prior week and during other incidents. A dissenting appeals judge
asserted that “…there is no constitutional requirement that inmates be buckled with seatbelts during transportation.
Nearly all courts have rejected such claims, because the use of seatbelts on shackled prisoners presents inevitable,
non-trivial security concerns for other passengers and the guards.” The appeals court held that the corrections officers transporting the prisoner to a hospital in a prison van did not show deliberate indifference to the prisoner's serious
medical needs, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, when, after the prisoner was injured, the officers proceeded to
the hospital, had the prisoner checked by a physician, but then failed to take the prisoner to the emergency room for
treatment of his bleeding wounds as that physician had directed, but instead brought the prisoner to the prison's medical facility, where he was treated some five hours later. (Eastham Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice,
Correctional Institutions Division)

U.S. District Court
SAFETY
REGULATIONS
SECURITY
RESTRICTIONS
SEGREGATION
TELEPHONE CALLS
VISITS
VIDEO
SURVEILLANCE

Royer v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 933 F.Supp.2d 170 (D.D.C. 2013). A federal prisoner brought an action against
Bureau of Prisoners (BOP), alleging classification as a “terrorist inmate” resulted in violations of the Privacy Act
and the First and Fifth Amendments. The BOP moved for summary judgment and to dismiss. The district court
granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that BOP rules prohibiting contact visits and limiting
noncontact visits and telephone time for federal inmates labeled as “terrorist inmates”, more than other inmates, had
a rational connection to a legitimate government interest, for the purpose of the inmate's action alleging the rules
violated his First Amendment rights of speech and association. According to the court, the prison had an interest in
monitoring the inmate's communications and the prison isolated inmates who could pose a threat to others or to the
orderly operation of the institution. The court noted that the rules did not preclude the inmate from using alternative
means to communicate with his family, where the inmate could send letters, the telephone was available to him, and
he could send messages through others allowed to visit. The court found that the inmate's assertions that the prison
already had multiple cameras and hypersensitive microphones, and that officers strip searched inmates before and
after contact visits, did not establish ready alternatives to a prohibition on contact visits for the inmate and limits on
phone usage and noncontact visits due to being labeled as a “terrorist inmate.” The court noted that increasing the
number of inmates subject to strip searches increased the cost of visitation, and microphones and cameras did not
obviate all security concerns that arose from contact visits, such as covert notes or hand signals.
The court held
that the inmate's allegations that he was segregated from the prison's general population for over six years, that he
was subject to restrictions on recreational, religious, and educational opportunities available to other inmates, that
contact with his family was limited to one 15 minute phone call per week during business hours when his children

39.106

were in school, and that he was limited to two 2-hour noncontact visits per month, were sufficient to plead harsh and
atypical conditions, as required for his Fifth Amendment procedural due process claim. According to the court, the
inmate's allegations that he was taken from his cell without warning, that he was only provided an administrative
detention order that stated he was being moved due to his classification, that he was eventually told he was classified
as a “terrorist inmate,” that such classification imposed greater restrictions upon his confinement, and that he was
never provided with a hearing, notice of criteria for release from conditions, or notice of a projected date for release
from conditions were sufficient to plead denial of due process, as required for his claim alleging violations of the
Fifth Amendment procedural due process. (Special Housing Units at FCI Allenwood and USP Lewisburg, CMU at
FCI Terre Haute, SHU at FCI Greenville, Supermax facility at Florence, Colorado, and CMU at USP Marion)
U.S. Appeals Court
CLASSIFICATION
SEPARATION

Smith v. Sangamon County Sheriff's Dept., 715 F.3d 188 (7th Cir. 2013). A pretrial detainee filed suit under § 1983
against a sheriff's department to recover for injuries sustained when he was severely beaten by another inmate
housed in a maximum-security cellblock. The district court entered summary judgment for the sheriff's department,
and the detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the detainee failed to establish that the
security classification policy used by the sheriff's department to assign inmates to cellblocks within the jail was deliberately indifferent to inmate safety in violation of his due-process rights. The court noted that: (1) the detainee
presented no evidence that the classification policy created a serious risk of physical harm to inmates, much less that
the sheriff's department knew of it and did nothing; (2) the attack by the detainee's cellmate was not enough to establish that the policy itself systematically exposed inmates like the detainee to a serious risk of harm; and (3) it was
unclear that a policy strictly segregating those accused of nonviolent crimes from those accused of violent crimes
would do a better job of ensuring inmate safety than the multiple-factor classification system used by the sheriff's
department. The detainee claimed that the Department's approach to classifying inmates for cellblock placement
ignored serious risks to inmate safety because the security classification policy fails to separate “violent” from “nonviolent” inmates and thus fails to protect peaceful inmates from attacks by inmates with assaultive tendencies. The
appeals court described the classification practices: “A classification officer interviews each new detainee and reviews a range of information, including the inmate's age, gender, gang affiliation, medical concerns, current charge,
criminal history, behavioral and disciplinary history within the jail, and any holds due to parole violations. Pursuant
to standards recommended by the American Correctional Association, the classification policy assigns point values
within these categories, with higher point values corresponding to lower security risks.” (Sangamon County Detention Facility, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
LOCK DOWN

Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 2013). An Illinois prisoner serving a life sentence brought a § 1983 action
against prison officials, alleging that the prisoner and other inmates classified as low-aggression offenders in the
prisoner's cellhouse were subject to lockdowns for more than 50 percent of the days in a 33-month period. The district court dismissed the complaint at the screening stage for prisoner civil actions and the prisoner appealed. The
appeals court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The appeals court held that the prisoner had exhausted his administrative remedies. The court found that frequent unit-wide prison lockdowns for substantial periods of time
deprived him of exercise and caused him various health issues, such as irritable bowel syndrome, severe stress,
headaches, and tinnitus, stated a claim for an Eighth Amendment violation. According to the court, the prisoner
sufficiently alleged prison officials' deliberate indifference to physical and psychological injuries, as required to state
a claim for an Eighth Amendment violation, based on excessive prison lockdowns. The court noted that the prisoner
alleged that he had filed multiple grievances about prison conditions, including a grievance specifically challenging
small cells, and that the prison was the subject of numerous past lawsuits, including one specifically ordering a remedial plan for overcrowding, small cells, and lack of adequate medical care and hygiene. (Menard Correctional
Center, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONTRABAND
SAFETY
SECURITY PRACTICES

U.S. Dept. of Justice Federal Bureau of Prisons Federal Correctional Complex Coleman, Fla. v. Federal Labor
Relations Authority 737 F.3d 779 (D.C.Cir. 2013). The Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) petitioned for review, and
the BOP and the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) cross-applied for enforcement of FLRA's order stating
that the BOP was required to bargain with a labor union over proposals relating to the BOP's use of metal detectors
at a high security prison. The BOP moved to dismiss on the grounds of mootness. The appeals court denied the motion, granted a motion to vacate in part, and granted a motion to enforce, and remanded. The court held that the decision to use the federal prison's compound metal detectors to screen only those inmates suspected of carrying contraband did not render moot the FLRA decision stating that the BOP was required to bargain with the employee union
over proposals relating to safety issues arising out of the prison's use of metal detectors, absent a showing that there
was no reasonable expectation that the union's safety concerns would not recur. The court found that the FLRA's
determination that the BOP was required, under the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Act (FSLMRA),
to bargain with the labor union over a proposal that prison management have inmates turn in all watches that did not
clear the compound metal detector, treat such watches as contraband, and assure that watches sold in the prison store
would not set off the metal detectors, in order to avoid bottlenecks of inmates at the entrance to the compound/detector area, was eminently reasonable and supported by the record. According to the court, the proposal was
sufficiently tailored to target employees likely to be harmed by the installation of outdoor metal detectors, was intended to reduce nuisance alarms triggered by prohibited watches, thereby moving inmates through the compounddetector bottlenecks more quickly, and would not excessively interfere with the BOP's management rights.
The court found that the FLRA determination that the labor union's proposal requiring construction of a block
and mortar officer's station near one of the prison's two metal detectors was non-negotiable as a whole under
FSLMRA. (Federal Bureau of Prisons Federal Correctional Complex Coleman, Florida)

U.S. Appeals Court
CLEANING SUPPLIES
CROWDING
SAFETY

Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119 (2nd Cir. 2013). An inmate, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brought a §
1983 action against a warden and various other prison officials and employees, alleging violations of the Eighth
Amendment. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The inmate appealed. The appeals court
affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court held that the prisoner's allegations were sufficient to plead
that he was deprived of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities and was subjected to unreasonable health

39.107

and safety risks, as required to state a § 1983 claims against prison officials for violations of the Eighth Amendment.
The prisoner alleged that: (1) for approximately 28 months he was confined in a cell with five other men with inadequate space and ventilation; (2) the heat was stifling in the summer and it was freezing in the winter; (3) urine and
feces splattered the floor; (4) there were insufficient cleaning supplies; (5) the mattress was too narrow for him to lie
on flat; and (6) noisy and crowded conditions made sleep difficult and created a constant risk of violence. The court
also found that the prisoner's allegations were sufficient to plead that prison officials knew of and disregarded excessive risks to his health and safety, as required to find that the officials were deliberately indifferent. The prisoner
alleged that officials knew of overcrowding in his cell, that he spoke with some officials about the conditions, that
officials were aware noise was loud and constant, that they were aware of temperature issues, that the prisoner informed officials that his bed was too narrow, that one official failed to issue cleaning supplies, and that conditions
did not change despite his complaints. (Federal Correctional Institution, Ray Brook, New York)
2014
U.S. Appeals Court
EXPOSURE TO
CHEMICALS

Cantley v. West Virginia Regional Jail and Correctional Facility Authority, 771 F.3d 201 (4th Cir. 2014). Two arrestees brought a § 1983 action for damages and declaratory and injunctive relief against a regional jail authority and
three of its former or current executive directors, challenging the constitutionality of visual strip searches and delousing of the arrestees. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. An arrestee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that: (1) the post-arraignment visual strip search of one arrestee did not violate
the Fourth Amendment; (2) the pre-arraignment visual strip search of the other arrestee did not violate a clearly
established right where the arrestee was strip-searched in a private room, and he was to be held until the next morning in a holding cell where he might interact with up to 15 other arrestees; (3) delousing of the arrestees did not violate a clearly established right; and (4) declaratory and injunctive relief would be premature. The court noted that the
delousing was done in a private room with only one officer, who was of the same sex as the arrestees, and it did not
entail the officer himself touching either arrestee. (West Virginia Regional Jail and Correctional Facility Authority)

U.S. Appeals Court
GANGS
SEX OFFENDER

Danser v. Stansberry, 772 F.3d 340 (4th Cir. 2014). A federal inmate who was attacked in a recreation cage brought
a Bivens action alleging that officials were deliberately indifferent to his safety. The district court denied the officials' motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The officials appealed. The appeals court vacated
and remanded with instructions. The court held that a corrections officer did not disregard an excessive risk to the
safety of the inmate in violation of the Eighth Amendment when he placed the inmate, a convicted sex offender, in a
recreation cage with a fellow inmate, a violent gang member, and left the recreation area unsupervised, during which
time the gang member attacked the inmate. According to the court, the officer was not aware that the inmate was a
sex offender or that he was required to check prison databases in which that information was contained, there were
no orders issued requiring that the inmate and gang member be separated from each other, and the officer's dereliction of duty in leaving the recreation area did not constitute anything other than negligence. (Federal Correctional
Institution, Butner, North Carolina)

U.S. District Court
VIDEO
SURVEILLANCE

Dilworth v. Goldberg, 3 F.Supp.3d 198 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). In a county jail detainees' action against a county, the detainees moved for spoliation sanctions based on the county's alleged failure to preserve capital project plans that
allegedly showed surveillance camera locations, and videos from a surveillance camera in the housing area where
one detainee was allegedly beaten. “Spoliation” is the destruction or significant alteration of evidence, or the failure
to preserve property for another's use as evidence in pending or reasonably foreseeable litigation. The district court
denied the motion, finding that the detainees failed to show that the capital project plans existed, and failed to show
that a surveillance camera in the housing area existed. The court noted that ambiguous statements made by a jail
official that he was not sure if such plans existed but that they might indicate camera locations, and a speculative
expert opinion stating that it was customary for a system installer to provide an “as built” floor plan detailing camera
placement, were insufficient to show that such plans in fact existed for the jail. (Westchester County Department of
Corrections, New York)

U.S. District Court
LOCKS
SECURITY PRCTICES

Freeland v. Ballard, 6 F.Supp.3d 683 (S.D.W.Va. 2014). A prisoner brought an action against prison officials, alleging the officials were deliberately indifferent to serious security breaches and failed to protect him from another
inmate who escaped a segregation cell and attacked him with a piece of metal. The officials moved to dismiss. The
district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the prisoner's allegation that there was
at least one prior incident when an inmate repeatedly beat on his door until it became unsecured and permitted the
inmate to escape from the cell and assault another prisoner, did not give rise to a plausible claim that prison officials
had actual knowledge of a substantial risk of harm to the prisoner and disregarded that risk in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. But the court found that the prisoner's allegations, that an inmate escaped a segregation cell and attacked prisoner with a piece of metal but prison officials did nothing to intervene to stop the attack when they had
the opportunity to do so, and that the officials were aware of prior incidents of inmates beating their doors open and
attacking other inmates, were sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim. (Mount Olive Corr'l. Complex, W. V.)

U.S. Appeals Court
CLASSIFICATION
GANGS
SEGREGATION
TRANSFER

Griffin v. Gomez, 741 F.3d 10 (9th Cir. 2014). A state inmate filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging
his placement in a security housing unit (SHU). After the writ was issued, the district court ordered the state to release the inmate from segregated housing conditions, and the state appealed. The appeals court vacated, reversed,
and remanded. The appeals court held that the district court abused its discretion by finding that the state had violated its order issuing a writ of habeas corpus requiring the state to release the inmate from the facility's security housing unit (SHU). According to the court, the state subsequently placed the inmate in the facility's administrative segregation unit (ASU) and then in another facility's SHU. The court noted that the inmate had been released into federal custody before the order was issued, his placement in ASU after he was released from federal custody pending
evaluation of his gang status was standard procedure, and the inmate was validated as an active gang member and
placed in other SHU. According to the court, the district court improperly impeded state prison management. (Pelican Bay State Prison, California)

39.108

U.S. Appeals Court
PROTECTION
SAFETY
SECURITY PRACTICES
WEAPON

Harrison v. Culliver, 746 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2014). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against prison officials, relating to an inmate-on-inmate assault with a box cutter, and asserting an Eighth Amendment violation based
on deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm. The district court granted summary judgment to the
prison officials and denied the prisoner's motion to proceed in forma pauperis. The prisoner appealed. The appeals
court affirmed. The appeals court held that: (1) past incidents of inmate-on-inmate violence involving weapons did
not constitute a substantial risk of serious harm; (2) the prison's policies for monitoring a back hallway in which the
prisoner was attacked did not create a substantial risk of serious harm; (3) lack of oversight of the prison's hobby
craft shop did not create a substantial risk of serious harm; and (4) prison officials were not deliberately indifferent
with respect to oversight of the hobby shop. (W.C. Holman Correctional Facility, Alabama)

U.S. Appeals Court
ITEMS PERMITTED

Johnson v. Conner, 754 F.3d 918 (11th Cir. 2014). The mother and personal representative of a mentally ill inmate
who committed suicide by hanging himself with bed sheet while in custody at a county jail filed suit against corrections personnel working at the jail at the time of the suicide, as well as various county entities. The mother alleged
that jailers were responsible for administering her son’s medication daily, and failed to do so, that her son had previously attempted to commit suicide with a bed sheet while incarcerated, and that the jailers failed to take appropriate
precautions with her son following that suicide attempt. The district court denied immunity to the jailers and the
jailers appealed. The appeals court certified questions to the Alabama Supreme Court, which the Supreme Court
declined to answer. The appeals court held that the statute extending immunity to county jailers did not apply retroactively to conduct which occurred prior to its enactment. (Barbour County Jail, Alabama)

U.S. Appeals Court
LOCKS

Lakin v. Barnhart, 758 F.3d 66 (1st Cir. 2014). State inmates filed § 1983 actions alleging that prison officials acted
with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk that inmates would use padlocks issued to them by the prison to
assault fellow inmates, in violation of the Eighth Amendment and the Maine Civil Rights Act. The district court
entered summary judgment in the officials' favor, and the inmates appealed. The appeals were consolidated, and the
appeals court affirmed. The court held that the inmates did not face a substantial risk of being assaulted with padlocks by their fellow inmates, and thus the prison officials did not violate the Eighth Amendment by failing to discontinue the practice of providing padlocks to inmates to secure their personal items, where annual occurrences of
padlock assaults at the prison had generally been few, both in absolute number and as a percentage of total inmate
violence. (Maine State Prison)

U.S. District Court
LOCK DOWN

Little v. Municipal Corp., 51 F.Supp3d 473 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). State inmates brought a § 1983 action against a city
and city department of correction officials, alleging Eighth Amendment and due process violations related to conditions of their confinement and incidents that occurred while they were confined. The defendants moved to dismiss
for failure to state a claim. The district court granted the motion, finding that: (1) the inmates failed to state a municipal liability claim; (2) locking the inmates in cells that were flooding with sewage was not a sufficiently serious
deprivation so as to violate the Eighth Amendment; (3) the inmates failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim based
on the deprivation of laundry services; (4) the inmates failed to state that officials were deliberately indifferent to
their conditions of confinement; (5) the inmates’ administrative classification did not implicate their liberty interests
protected by due process; and (6) cell searches did not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. The court
noted that the cells flooded with sewage for up to eight-and-a-half hours, during which they periodically lacked
outdoor recreation and food, was undeniably unpleasant, but it was not a significantly serious deprivation so as to
violate the inmates’ Eighth Amendment rights. According to the court, there was no constitutional right to outdoor
recreation, and the inmates were not denied food entirely, but rather, were not allowed to eat during periods of lockdown. (N.Y. City Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
RESTRAINTS

Reid v. Donelan, 2 F.Supp.3d 38 (D.Mass. 2014). Following the grant of a detainee's individual petition for habeas
corpus, and the grant of the detainee's motion for class certification, the detainee brought a class action against,
among others, officials of Immigration & Customs Enforcement (ICE), challenging the detention of individuals who
were held in immigration detention within the Commonwealth of Massachusetts for over six months and were not
provided with an individualized bond hearing. The detainee also moved, on his own behalf, for a permanent injunction prohibiting the defendants from shackling him during immigration proceedings absent an individualized determination that such restraint was necessary. The defendants cross-moved for summary judgment. The district court
granted the defendants’ motion. The court held that an individual assessment is required before a detainee may be
shackled during immigration proceedings, but that the individual assessment performed by ICE satisfied the detainee's procedural due process rights, such that an assessment by an independent Immigration Judge was unnecessary in
the detainee's case. The court denied the motion for an injunction, finding that the detainee would not suffer irreparable harm absent a permanent injunction. The court noted that the detainee had an interest in preservation of his
dignity, but ICE had safety concerns about his immigration proceedings, including the logistical issues of escorting
the detainee through multiple floors and public hallways, and an Immigration Judge would be unlikely to overturn a
decision by ICE to shackle the detainee, given the detainee's extensive criminal history. (Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, Massachusetts)

U.S. Appeals Court
PRETRIAL DETAINEES
PROTECTION
SAFETY REGULATIONS
USE OF FORCE
RESTRAINTS

Shreve v. Franklin County, Ohio, 743 F.3d 126 (6th Cir. 2014). A detainee brought an action against a county, its
sheriff, and sheriff's deputies, alleging that the deputies used excessive force against him when they subdued him
with a stun gun while he was in custody. The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment.
The detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the sheriff's deputies did not act with
deliberate indifference towards the detainee's federally protected rights when they subdued the detainee with a stun
gun while he was in custody, and therefore the deputies did not use excessive force against the detainee under the
Fourteenth Amendment. According to the court: (1) the deputies tried to handcuff the detainee several times before
using the stun gun, showing that they sought to minimize the stun gun's use; (2) the deputies also warned the detainee that the stun gun would hurt and that he did not want to have the gun used on him, which showed that they
were trying to avoid unnecessary harm; and (3) the deputies faced an ongoing danger with the detainee thrashing
about on the cell floor with a loose handcuff, as the deputies had been trained never to lose control of an inmate with

39.109

a loose handcuff because it could be used as a weapon. The court held that the incident, in which the detainee lunged
towards a sheriff's deputy with his hands raised after a hospital examination, was a rapidly evolving, fluid, and dangerous predicament which precluded the luxury of a calm and reflective pre-response deliberation, and therefore the
detainee was required to show that the deputy's actions involved force employed maliciously and sadistically for the
very purpose of causing harm, rather than in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, in order to establish
the use of excessive force under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court noted that the detainee lunged toward the
deputy after asking the deputy “Do you want a piece of me?” and the deputy explained that he had “no way of retreating” because of the cramped quarters and the detainee's position over him while standing on the hospital bed.
(Franklin County Corrections Center II, Ohio)
U.S. District Court
RELIGIOUS GROUPS

Thompson v. Smeal, 54 F.Supp.3d 339 (M.D.Pa. 2014). A state prisoner brought a case against prison officials, alleging that denial of his request that Christian inmates be granted communal feasts on Christmas and Easter violated
his religious and equal protection rights, and violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA). The district court granted the officials’ motion for summary judgment and the inmate appealed. The
appeals court vacated and remanded. On remand, the officials again moved for summary judgment, and the inmate
moved for partial summary judgment. The district court denied the motions. The court held that summary judgment
on the prisoner’s First Amendment claim was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to: (1) whether the
prison’s policy of refusing to provide Christmas and Easter communal meals for Christians only, with a group prayer
over the food, was legitimately and neutrally applied; (2) whether the prison’s penological interests were served by
allowing some religious meals and not others; and (3) whether there were alternative means of exercising the prisoner’s right to free religious expression. According to the court, summary judgment on the RLUIPA claim was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether denying communal meals to Christian inmates at the state
prison was the least restrictive means to achieve the prison’s alleged compelling interests of security, space limitations, and food safety concerns. (State Correctional Institution in Camp Hill, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
CLASSIFICATION
GANGS
PROTECTION

Thornton v. Jackson, 998 F.Supp.2d 1365 (N.D.Ga. 2014). An inmate and his wife brought a § 1983 action against
various prison employees and officials, alleging violations of the Eighth Amendment, as well as negligence and
intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court
granted the motion. The court held that the inmate, who was housed at the prison as a visiting-inmate while testifying against another member of the inmate's gang, was not incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of
harm, as required to establish the objective requirement for his § 1983 claim against various prison officials and
employees. The inmate alleged violation of the Eighth Amendment after he was assaulted by three other inmates.
The inmate claimed that his different color jumpsuit identified him as snitch and as a target for violence. The court
noted that the prison's inmates did not have a history of attacking visiting inmates, the prison had an order requiring
the inmate be kept separate from one other inmate, but did not require protective custody or isolation, the inmate did
not have problems with anybody for seven days, and the inmate saw some other inmates talking and reported that he
suspected that they were talking about him, but he did not hear what they were saying. (Fulton County Jail, Atlanta)

U.S. District Court
TRANSPORTATION

Torres v. Amato, 22 F.Supp.3d 166 (N.D.N.Y. 2014). The administrator of a pretrial detainee's estate brought a §
1983 action against corrections officers, a sheriff, government officials, and a county, alleging deliberate indifference to the serious risk of harm in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and various state claims. The defendants
moved for summary judgment. The district court denied the motion. The court held that: (1) disputes of material fact
as to whether the door to a transport van was improperly latched or the officer was operating the van in a reckless
manner precluded summary judgment on the deliberate indifference claim against the officers; (2) a dispute of material fact as to the personal involvement of government officials in the alleged conduct precluded summary judgment
on deliberate indifference claim against the officials and the county; and (3) the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity from the § 1983 claim. The court noted that the detainee's right to be free from deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of harm was clearly established at the time the detainee suffered fatal injuries after falling
out of transport van driven by corrections officers, and thus, officers and government officials were not entitled to
qualified immunity from the § 1983 claim of deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of harm in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. (Montgomery County Sheriff's Department, New York)

U.S. District Court
WHEELCHAIR
TRANSPORTATION

Turner v. Mull, 997 F.Supp.2d 985 (E.D.Mo. 2014). An inmate, who suffered from a demyelinating neurological
disorder of unknown etiology, brought an action against a correctional officer, a warden, a transportation officer, and
a health services administrator, alleging violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Rehabilitation Act. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court
granted the motion. The district court held that: (1) the prison's policy that inmates were not permitted to be transported in a handicapped-accessible van unless they appeared at the pickup area in a wheelchair did not violate the
inmate's rights; (2) the warden failing to take action in response to letters by the inmate was not deliberate indifference; (3) a correctional officer and a transportation officer who did not transport the inmate in a handicappedaccessible van were not deliberately indifferent; (4) a supervisor was not deliberately indifferent; (5) the alleged
exposure to urine and vomit during a van ride did not violate the Eighth Amendment; (6) the prison did not discriminate against inmate based on his disability by not transporting the inmate in a handicapped-accessible vehicle; and
(7) the administrator did not discriminate against the inmate. (Eastern Reception Diagnostic Correctional Center,
Missouri)

U.S. Appeals Court
ESCAPE

U.S. v. Batts, 758 F.3d 915 (8th Cir. 2014). A defendant pleaded guilty in the district court to escape of a prisoner in
custody. He appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the prison camp from which the defendant walked
away was not a non-secure facility, as required in order to make the defendant eligible for a sentence reduction on
such basis at sentencing. (Federal Correctional Institution, Forrest City, Arkansas)

39.110

U.S. District Court
RELIGIOUS SERVICES
SECURITY PRACTICES

Walker v. Artus, 998 F.Supp.2d 18 N.D.N.Y. 2014). A Muslim inmate housed in a state prison special housing unit
(SHU) brought a § 1983 action alleging that state prison officials deprived him of his rights in violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.
The officials moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that denial of the
inmate's requests to participate in congregate religious services by audio or video feed was reasonably related to
legitimate security and cost concerns, and the inmate had adequate means to exercise his burdened right, including
weekly visits from an Imam, and thus denial of the inmate's requests did not violate the inmate's free exercise rights
under the First Amendment. The court also found that the officials' denial furthered compelling government interests
of promoting prison security and managing costs, and the burden placed on the inmate was the least restrictive
means necessary to serve those interests, and thus denial of inmate's requests did not violate RLUIPA. (Clinton Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
RELIGIOUS SERVICES
SECURITY PRACTICES
SEGREGATION
STAFFING

Yellowbear v. Lampert, 741 F.3d 48 (10th Cir. 2014). A state prisoner brought an action against individual prison
officials, seeking prospective injunctive relief against them for violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The district court granted summary judgment for the officials and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. The appeals court held that summary judgment was precluded by a
factual issue as to whether preventing the state prisoner from exercising his sincerely held religious belief --using a
sweat lodge -- served a compelling governmental interest, and that it was the least restrictive means of furthering that
interest. The appeals court began its opinion by stating: “Andrew Yellowbear will probably spend the rest of his life
in prison. Time he must serve for murdering his daughter. With that much lying behind and still before him, Mr.
Yellowbear has found sustenance in his faith. No one doubts the sincerity of his religious beliefs or that they are the
reason he seeks access to his prison's sweat lodge—a house of prayer and meditation the prison has supplied for
those who share his Native American religious tradition. Yet the prison refuses to open the doors of that sweat lodge
to Mr. Yellowbear alone, and so we have this litigation.” The prison's sweat lodge is located in the general prison
yard and Yellowbear was housed in a special protective unit because of threats against him, not because of any disciplinary infraction he had committed. Prison officials asserted that the cost of providing the necessary security to
take the prisoner from the special protective unit to the sweat lodge and back was “unduly burdensome.” (Wyoming
Medium Correctional Institution)
2015

U.S. District Court
RELIGIOUS GROUPS

Ajala v. West, 106 F.Supp.3d 976 (W.D. Wisc. 2015). An inmate brought an action against prison officials for alleged violation of his rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), the Free
Exercise Clause, the Establishment Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause. The inmate challenged a prison policy
that allegedly prohibited the inmate from wearing a “kufi,” a head covering worn by some Muslims, unless he was in
his cell or participating in congregate services. The prison officials moved for summary judgment, and the inmate
moved for an extension. The district court held that: (1) the policy imposed a substantial burden on the inmate’s
religious exercise; (2) the policy was not the least restrictive means of furthering the prison’s interest of preventing
prisoners from using a religious head covering as a potential gang identifier; (3) the policy was not the least restrictive means of furthering the prison’s interest in preventing prisoners from hiding contraband; (4) the policy was not
the least restrictive means of furthering the prison’s interest in preventing prison violence; and (5) prison officials
were entitled to qualified immunity from the inmate’s constitutional claims. The court noted that the law was not
clearly established that the inmate had a constitutional right to wear a kufi at all times. (Wisconsin Secure Program
Facility)

U.S. District Court
CONTRABAND

Barouch v. United States Department of Justice, 87 F.Supp.3d 10 (D.C.D.C, 2015). A prisoner who was convicted
of bribing a public official and conspiracy to commit bribery moved for acquittal. The district court denied the motion, finding that evidence was sufficient to establish that the prisoner induced a prison official to assist in smuggling
contraband. According to the court, the prisoner found a lucrative business opportunity in the institution’s ban on
tobacco and cell phones. He paid a prison nurse to smuggle this contraband into the prison and to look the other way
when it came to reporting his illegal possessions to other prison authorities. The prisoner and nurse were eventually
caught and prosecuted. Following a two-day jury trial, the prisoner was convicted. (Federal Bureau of Prisons, United States Penitentiary–Lee County, Virginia)

U.S. District Court
ITEMS PERMITTED

Cavanagh v. Taranto, 95 F.Supp.3d 220 (D. Mass. 2015). A pretrial detainee’s son brought an action under § 1983
against correctional officers who were on duty the day of the detainee’s suicide, alleging the officers violated the
detainee’s due process rights. The officers moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The
court held that the officers were not deliberately indifferent to the detainee’s mental health history and safety, to her
safety through inadequate cell checks, or to her safety by failing to remove a looped shoelace from her cell. The
court noted that the detainee was not identified as a suicide risk, the officers did not have access to the detainee’s
medical records, the officers were not trained to make suicide assessments, and the detainee’s risk of suicide was not
so obvious that someone other than a professional could have recognized the risk. (Suffolk County House of Correction, Massachusetts)

U.S. Appeals Court
RESTRAINTS

Coley v. Lucas County, Ohio, 799 F.3d 530 (6th Cir. 2015). The administrator of a pretrial detainee’s estate brought a
state court action against a county, county sheriff, police officer and police sergeant, alleging § 1983 violations of
the detainee’s constitutional rights and various state law claims. The district court denied the defendants’ motions to
dismiss and denied individual defendants’ requests for qualified immunity. The defendants appealed. The appeals
court affirmed. The court held that a police officer’s act of shoving a fully restrained pretrial detainee in a jail booking area, causing the detainee to strike his head on the wall as he fell to the cement floor without any way to break
his fall, constituted “gratuitous force” in violation of the detainee’s Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from
excessive force. The court noted that the detainee’s state of being handcuffed, in a belly chain and leg irons, led to a
reasonable inference that the officer’s actions were a result of his frustration with the detainee’s prior restraint be-

39.111

havior, since the detainee was not in any condition to cause a disruption that would have provoked the officer to use
such force. The court held that the police officer was on notice that his actions were unconstitutional, and therefore
he was not entitled to qualified immunity from liability under § 1983. According to the court, the officer’s attempts
to cover up the assault by filing false reports and lying to federal investigators following the death of the detainee led
to a reasonable conclusion that the officer understood that his actions violated the detainees’ clearly established right
not to be gratuitously assaulted while fully restrained and subdued.
The court held that a police sergeant’s continued use of a chokehold on the unresisting, fully-shackled pre-trial
detainee, after hearing the detainee choke and gurgle, and when a fellow officer was urging him release his chokehold, was objectively unreasonable, in violation of the detainee’s Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from excessive force. The court noted that the sergeant’s subsequent acts of telling other officers to leave the medical cell
after the detainee was rendered unconscious, failing to seek medical help, and refusing to mention the use of a
chokehold in incident reports, led to the inference the that sergeant was aware he violated the law and sought to
avoid liability. According to the court, the police sergeant was on notice that his actions were unconstitutional, and
therefore, he was not entitled to qualified immunity under § 1983.
The court found that the county sheriff could be held personally liable under § 1983, based on his failure to train
and supervise employees in the use of excessive force, the use of a chokehold and injuries derived therefrom, and to
ensure that the medical needs of persons in the sheriff’s custody were met. According to the court, evidence that the
sheriff helped his employees cover up their unconstitutional actions by making false statements to federal officials
about his knowledge of his employees’ assault, chokehold, and deliberate failure to provide medical attention to the
detainee demonstrated that the sheriff at least implicitly authorized, approved or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending employees. The court noted that under Ohio law, allegations by the estate of the
pretrial detainee that the county sheriff had full knowledge of the assault but intentionally and deliberately made
false statements to federal officials were sufficient to state a claim that the sheriff ratified the conduct of his officers
and, thus, was potentially personally liable for his officers’ actions. The court concluded that the officers’ use of
excessive force, failure to provide medical care, assault and battery, and wrongful death could be imputed to the
sheriff in his official capacity since the sheriff’s false statements to federal investigators were a position that was
inconsistent to non-affirmance of the officers’ actions. (Lucas County Jail, Ohio)
U.S. Appeals Court
RESTRAINTS
SECURITY PRACTICES

Cortez v. Skol, 776 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 2015). The mother of a state inmate who suffered severe brain damage, after
he was attacked by two fellow prisoners while being escorted through an isolated prison passage by a corrections
officer, brought an action alleging a § 1983 Eighth Amendment claim against the officer and a gross negligence
claim against the state. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the mother appealed. The appeals court reversed, finding that summary judgment was precluded by issues of material fact as to
whether the corrections officer exposed the high-security inmate to a substantial risk of serious injury when he: (1)
escorted the inmate and two fellow high-security prisoners through the isolated prison passage by himself; (2) did
not require the prisoners to wear leg restraints; and (3) failed to physically intervene once the prisoners attacked the
inmate. The court also found fact issues as to whether the officer was subjectively aware of the risk involved in the
escort and acted with deliberate indifference to the inmate’s safety. The court held that the mother was not the prevailing party for purposes of awarding attorney’s fees. (Morey Unit, Lewis Prison Complex, Arizona)

U.S. District Court
STAFFING
PROTECTION

Cotta v. County of Kings, 79 F.Supp.3d 1148 (E.D.Cal. 2015). An inmate’s mother, individually and as representative of the inmate’s estate, as well as the prisoner’s two daughters, brought an action against a county, and county
jail officials, alleging that inadequate safety at the jail violated the inmate’s constitutional rights and ultimately led to
his death when he was killed by a cellmate. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted
the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that: (1) the inmate’s due process right to protection from violence was violated; (2) the jail’s staffing policy on the night the inmate was murdered was not lacking, such that any
need to remedy the staffing policy was not obvious; (3) an official’s decision to house the inmate together with the
cellmate was a ministerial determination that was not entitled to immunity; (4) an official did not breach her duty of
care to protect the inmate from any foreseeable harm; and (5) summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of
material fact as to whether the county’s lack of a policy requiring its employees to report safety risks was the cause
of the inmate’s murder and whether the county’s conduct shocked the conscience. (Kings County Jail, California)

U.S. District Court
PUBLICATIONS

Crime, Justice & America, Inc. v. Honea, 110 F.Supp.3d 1027 (E.D. Cal. 2015). The publisher of a magazine intended for newly arrested county jail detainees awaiting trial brought an action against a county alleging violation of
the right to free speech protected under the First Amendment after the county barred general distribution of unsolicited paper products to detainees. After a bench trial, the district court held that: (1) the county jail’s policy of limiting
written publications was rationally related to legitimate a penological interest in preventing inmates from using paper
to conduct illicit activity; (2) electronic touch-screen kiosks that displayed the publisher’s magazine in the jail were
sufficient alternative means; (3) the impact of accommodating the asserted right weighed in favor of the county policy; and (4) the policy was not an exaggerated response. The court found that a corrections officer’s testimony regarding the nefarious uses of paper in county jails, including that he could not recall a time when the publisher’s
law-oriented magazine had been used by detainees for such purposes was not, without more, sufficient to refute the
county’s explanation that its policy limiting detainee’s access to paper was rationally related to a legitimate
penological interest. The court ruled that the publisher’s proposal to provide two copies of the publisher’s laworiented magazine in the county jail law library, standing alone, was not a sufficient alternative means for the publisher to communicate the existence of the magazine to county jail detainees, where most inmates would likely have
left the jail before they would receive it from the library. (Butte County Jail, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
RESTRAINTS
SECURITY PRACTICES

Davis v. Wessel, 792 F.3d 793 (7th Cir. 2015). A civil detainee brought a pro se action under § 1983 against security
guards employed at civil detention facility for sexually violent persons, operated by the Illinois Department of Human Services. The detainee alleged violation of his rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court entered judgment on a jury verdict in favor of the detainee and the security guards appealed.
The appeals court vacated and remanded. The court held that the issue of whether security guards employed at the

39.112

civil detention facility refused to remove the detainee’s handcuffs with the intent of humiliating him, by preventing
him from using the restroom and forcing him to urinate on himself, was for a jury to decide. The court found that the
security guards were not entitled to qualified immunity from the claim by the detainee under § 1983 alleging excessive use of restraints in violation of the Due Process Clause after the guards refused to remove the detainee’s handcuffs because it was clearly established at the time the detainee requested to use the restroom, which had no windows, that keeping the handcuffs on was not rationally related to a legitimate non-punitive purpose absent an indication that the detainee was a security risk. (Illinois
Department of Human Services, Rushville Treatment and Detention Facility)
U.S. District Court
GANGS
CLASSIFICATION
PROTECTION

Facey v. Dickhaut, 91 F.Supp.3d 12 (D.Mass. 2014). A prisoner at a state correctional institution filed a pro se §
1983 action against corrections officials, alleging that the officials knowingly placed him in danger by assigning him
to a housing unit where he was violently attacked by members of a rival gang, in violation of his Eighth Amendment
right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Both parties filed motions to strike, and the officers moved for
summary judgment. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by issues of fact as to whether corrections
officials knew that the prisoner faced a substantial risk of serious harm, and whether the officials violated clearly
established rights (Souza–Baranowski Correctional, Massachusetts)

U.S. Appeals Court
LOCKDOWN

Harrington v. Scribner, 785 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 2015). An African-American inmate brought a § 1983 action against
state prison officials, alleging that a race-based lockdown at the prison violated his equal protection rights, and that
he suffered injuries related to shower restrictions in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court entered
judgment on a jury verdict in favor of the officials. The inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed
in part, and remanded. The court noted that racial classifications in prisons are immediately suspect and subject to
strict scrutiny, for equal protection purposes, which requires the government to prove that the measures are narrowly
tailored to further a compelling government interest. The court found that the jury instructions erroneously diluted
the narrow tailoring requirement for the strict scrutiny test that applied to the race-based Equal Protection claim.
(California State Prison–Corcoran)

U.S. Appeals Court
GANGS

Hinojosa v. Davey, 803 F.3d 412 (9th Cir. 2015). A state prisoner petitioned for federal habeas relief, challenging a
state statutory amendment modifying the credit-earning status of prison-gang members and associates in segregated
housing, so that such prisoners could no longer earn any good-time credits that would reduce their sentences. The
district court denied the petition and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded with instructions to the district court. The court held that the amendment disadvantaged the offenders it affected by increasing
the punishment for their crimes, an element for an ex post facto violation. The court noted that even if a prisoner
could easily opt out of his prison gang, a prisoner who continued doing what he was doing before the statute was
amended would have his prison time effectively lengthened. (Special Housing Unit, Corcoran State Prison, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
VISITS

Jackson v. Humphrey, 776 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2015). A wife brought an action under § 1983 against corrections
officials, claiming that revocation of her visitation privileges with her incarcerated husband who was on a hunger
strike violated the First Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment, based on qualified immunity, in
favor of the officials, for their decision to terminate the wife’s visitation privileges during the time of hunger strike.
The court denied summary judgment to the officials for the period following the end of the hunger strike, ruling that
the question of whether the officials continued to enjoy qualified immunity after the hunger strike ended was one for
a jury. The officials appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that the officials were entitled to
qualified immunity. According to the court, the officials’ decision had been motivated by lawful considerations even
though it had consequences in the future, where the husband had a considerable amount of influence over other prisoners and considered himself, and was viewed by others, to be the leader of the hunger strike. The court noted that
evidence suggested that the wife had urged her husband to prolong that strike after the strike had ended, and the
officials were legitimately concerned that the strike might spread, about the disruption caused by the strike, and
about the security and safety of staff and inmates. (Georgia Department of Corrections, Georgia Diagnostic and
Classification Prison Special Management Unit)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONTRABAND
CELL PHONE

Johnson v. American Towers, LLC, 781 F.3d 693 (4th Cir. 2015). Prison guard who was shot multiple times in his
home at the direction of an inmate who ordered the attack using a contraband cellular telephone, together with his
wife, brought a state-court action for negligence and loss of consortium against several wireless service providers
and owners of cell phone towers, asserting that they were liable for the guard’s injuries because they were aware that
their services facilitated the illegal use of cell phones by inmates and yet failed to take steps to curb that use. Following removal to federal court and denial of the plaintiffs’ motion to remand, the defendants filed a joint motion to
dismiss. The district court granted the motion and the plaintiffs appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals
court held the plaintiffs failed to allege sufficient facts to set forth a plausible claim for relief. The court noted that
although the complaint contained a bare assertion that “an inmate at the prison using a cell phone ordered a coconspirator outside of the prison to kill [the guard],” the plaintiffs failed to offer any further factual enhancement to
support their claims, such as by identifying the wireless service provider that carried the alleged call or when the
alleged call occurred, such that a wireless service provider would likely be unable to determine whether it carried the
alleged call without more identifying information. (Lee Correctional Institution, South Carolina)

U.S. District Court
VISITS
SEARCHES

Knight v. Washington State Department of Corrections, 147 F.Supp.3d 1165 (W.D. Wash. 2015). A prison visitor
who suffered from a seizure disorder, and was subjected to a strip search and pat-down searches, brought an action
against the state Department of Corrections (DOC) and DOC officials, alleging that the searches violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion, finding that: (1)the strip search and pat-down searches did not violate ADA; (2) guards did not act with deliberate indifference in conducting a strip search; (3) the prison was not a place of public accommodation, under the
Washington Law Against Discrimination, as to visitors participating in an extended family visitation program; (4)

39.113

the guards' conduct was not sufficiently extreme to support an outrage claim; and (5) the guards' conduct did not
support a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. According to the court, there was no showing that the
guards proceeded in conscious disregard of a high probability of emotional distress when ordering the strip search,
as the visitor suggested the strip search as an alternative to a pat search and the guards followed this suggestion, and
all visitors were subjected to pat-down searches, which were justified on safety grounds. (Monroe Correctional
Complex, Washington)
U.S. District Court
BOOKS

Minton v. Childers, 113 F.Supp.3d 796 (D. Md. 2015). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against prison officials,
seeking injunctive relief, along with nominal and punitive damages, after the officials barred his receipt of used
books pursuant to prison directives. The officials and the prisoner both filed motions for summary judgment. The
district court granted the officials’ motion and denied the prisoner’s motion. The court held that the prisoner failed to
exhaust administrative remedies under Maryland law prior to filing the § 1983 action in federal court, in violation of
the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The court found that a prison directive banning inmate possession of
incoming used books not sent directly by a publisher was reasonably related to legitimate penological interests, as
required by due process. The court noted that the prisoner was allowed to receive new books sent directly from a
publisher, the ban was expressly aimed at advancing jail security and protecting the safety of jail personnel and other
inmates, the ban was logically connected to those goals, to allow inmates to possess used books from stores or ecommerce companies could have had significant impact on the safety and security of prison personnel and other
inmates. The court noted that the prisoner did not point to an alternative that fully accommodated his rights while at
same time imposed de minimis cost to valid penological interests. (Eastern Correctional Institution, Maryland)

U.S. Appeals Court
CELL PHONE

Santiago-Lugo v. Warden, 785 F.3d 467 (11th Cir. 2015). A prisoner filed a habeas corpus petition, seeking relief on
due process grounds for disciplinary sanctions he received for possession of a cellular telephone, which included
revocation of his good time credits. The district court denied the prisoner’s petition and the prisoner appealed. The
appeals court affirmed, finding that the prisoner was given sufficient notice of the charges against him, as required
by due process. (Federal Correctional Complex at Coleman Medium Prison, Florida)

U.S. Appeals Court
RELIGIOUS ARTICLES

Schlemm v. Wall, 784 F.3d 362 (7th Cir. 2015). A prisoner, a Navajo Tribe member, brought an action under the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) against the Wisconsin Department of Corrections,
seeking an order requiring the state prison system to accommodate some of his religious practices. The district court
granted the prison’s summary judgment motion. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether
the prisoner’s inability to eat game meat for a religious feast substantially burdened his religious exercise, and as to
whether the prisoner’s inability to wear a multicolored headband while praying in his cell and during group religious
ceremonies substantially burdened his religious exercise, and whether prison had a compelling justification for prohibiting multicolored headbands. (Wisconsin Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
SECURITY PRACTICES

Shepard v. Hansford County, 110 F.Supp.3d 696 (N.D. Tex. 2015). A husband brought an action against a county
and a county jail employee under § 1983 alleging deliberate indifference to detainee health in violation of the right to
provision of adequate medical treatment under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, following his
wife’s suicide while in the county jail. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the
motion in part and denied in part. The court held that: (1) the jail employee was entitled to qualified immunity; (2)
summary judgment was precluded by a fact issue as to whether the jail employee violated the detainee’s rights, (3)
the county had an adequate suicide risk prevention training policy, where employees were required to attend training
to learn about suicide risk detection and prevention methods, and were required to read the county’s policy on conducting face-to-face suicide checks with detainees; (4) the county adequately trained employees on cell entry; but (5)
a fact issue existed as to whether the county had an unwritten policy of understaffing the jail, precluding summary
judgment. The court noted that it was not clearly established at the time of the suicide that an employee was required to abandon other duties to ensure that suicide watch checks were completed, and it was not clearly established
that the employee was prohibited from providing a detainee with a towel in a cell with “tie-off points,” since the
employee was not aware of any other suicides in that cell. According to the court, the jail cell entry policy prohibiting jail employees from entering a cell alone did not amount to training employees to be deliberately indifferent to
the needs of detainees, and was not causally related to the detainee’s death, and thus the county was not liable under
§ 1983 for deliberate indifference to detainee health. (Hansford Co. Jail, Texas)

U.S. District Court
RESTRAINTS
USE OF FORCE

Shuford v. Conway, 86 F.Supp.3d 1344 (N.D.Ga. 2015). Pretrial detainees brought a § 1983 action against a sheriff
and other county jail officials and employees, alleging excessive force in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion, finding that the jail employees
did not apply force maliciously and sadistically against any detainee. According to the court, in shooting the pretrial
detainee with a non-lethal chemical agent projectile, taking him to the floor, and placing him in restraint chair, the
employees did not apply force maliciously and sadistically. The court noted that the detainee had hit a wall and metal partition, creating a risk of self-harm, the restraints reduced or eliminated the detainee’s ability to inflict harm
against himself, and the detainee did not suffer serious or permanent injuries. (Gwinnett County Jail, Georgia)

U.S. Appeals Court
WHEELCHAIR
TRANSPORTATION

Turner v. Mull, 784 F.3d 485 (8th Cir. 2015). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that correctional officials
violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA), and Rehabilitation Act by failing to transport him in wheelchair-accessible van, exposing him to unsanitary conditions in the van, and retaliating against him for filing a complaint. The district court entered summary
judgment in the officials’ favor and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the
officials were not deliberately indifferent to the inmate’s serious medical needs when they precluded him from using
a wheelchair-accessible van, even if the inmate was required to crawl into the van and to his seat. The court noted
that the inmate was able to ambulate, stand, and sit with the use of leg braces and crutches, the inmate did not ask to
use a readily available wheelchair, no physician ordered or issued a wheelchair for the inmate, and improperly using
or standing on a lift was considered dangerous due to the possibility of a fall. According to the court, officials were

39.114

not deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of the inmate in violation of Eighth Amendment when they
required him to be transported and to crawl in an unsanitary van, where the inmate was exposed to unsanitary conditions on a single day for a combined maximum of approximately six hours. The court found that prison officials did
not discriminate against the inmate on the basis of his disability, in violation of the Rehabilitation Act, when they
refused to transport him in a wheelchair-accessible van, where the prison’s wheelchair-users-only policy was rooted
in concerns over undisputed safety hazards associated with people standing on or otherwise improperly using a lift,
and the inmate did not use a wheelchair or obtain a physician’s order to use a wheelchair-accessible van. (Eastern
Reception Diagnostic Correctional Center, Missouri)
U.S. Appeals Court
ESCAPE

U.S. v. Goad, 788 F.3d 873 (8th Cir. 2015). After a federal district court denied a motion to dismiss an indictment,
the defendant conditionally pled guilty to escape from custody. The defendant appealed. The appeals court affirmed,
finding that the defendant was in “custody” at a residential reentry center, such that his unauthorized departure from
the center constituted an escape from custody. The court noted that a person may be in custody for the purposes of a
statute prohibiting escape from custody, even though the physical restraints upon him are minimal and even though
the custody may be deemed constructive, rather than actual. (Gerald R. Hinzman Residential Reentry Center, Iowa)

U.S. District Court
SEGREGATION
SECURITY RESTRICTIONS

U.S. v. Mohamed, 103 F.Supp.3d 281 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). A defendant who was indicted for murder of an internationally protected person and attempted murder of an internationally protected person, filed a motion to vacate or modify
special administrative measures governing conditions of his pretrial detention. The district court denied the motion,
finding that the measures were rationally connected to the legitimate government objective of preventing the detainee from coordinating violent attacks. The detainee had been placed in a special housing unit and limitations on
communications between him and people inside or outside the prison were limited. The court noted that the detainee
had admitted allegiance to terrorist organizations, had previously broken out of prison two times, one escape was
allegedly coordinated between the defendant and a terrorist organization, and three prison guards had been killed
during one escape. (Metropolitan Correctional Center, Manhattan, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
RESTRAINTS

U.S. v. Sanchez-Gomez, 798 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 2015). Defendants filed challenges to a federal district court policy,
adopted upon the recommendation of the United States Marshals, to place defendants in full shackle restraints for all
non-jury proceedings, with the exception of guilty pleas and sentencing hearings, unless a judge specifically requests
the restraints be removed in a particular case. The district court denied the challenges. The defendants appealed. The
appeals court vacated and remanded. The appeals court found that the defendants’ challenges to the shackling policy
were not rendered moot by the fact that they were no longer detained. The court held that there was no adequate
justification of the necessity for the district court’s generalized shackling policy. According to the court, although the
Marshals recommended the policy after some security incidents, coupled with understaffing, created strains in the
ability of the Marshals to provide adequate security for a newly opened, state-of-the-art courthouse, the government
did not point to the causes or magnitude of the asserted increased security risk, nor did it try to demonstrate that
other less restrictive measures, such as increased staffing, would not suffice. (Southern District of California, United
States Marshals, San Diego Federal Courthouse)

U.S. District Court
ACCESS TO ATTORNEY
ITEMS PERMITTED
SECURITY PRACTICES

United States v. Rivera, 83 F.Supp.3d 1154 (D.Colo. 2015). A prisoner moved for a standing order directing the
Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to permit counsel and a defense investigator to bring laptop computers into the facility
during the remaining pendency of his criminal action. The district court denied the motion. The court held that the
BOP reasonably refused to allow defense counsel and defense investigators to bring their laptop computers into the
maximum security facility, and instead permitted them to download materials from their own computers onto the
BOP’s “clean” computer that did not store downloaded information. The court noted that the increased staff and
equipment necessary to thoroughly inspect every laptop for weapons and other contraband to ensure the security of
staff and inmates would be a burden. The court noted that counsel could print a hard copy of any materials that
could not readily be downloaded onto a clean computer. (Administrative Maximum Facility Florence, and FCI Englewood, Federal Bureau of Prisons, Colorado)

U.S. Appeals Court
WHEELCHAIR
TRANSPORTATION

Wagoner v. Lemmon, 778 F.3d 586 (7th Cir. 2015). A paraplegic inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that a state
department of corrections and its commissioner failed to properly accommodate his disability, in violation of his
constitutional rights, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Rehabilitation Act. The district court entered summary judgment in the defendants’ favor and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court
found that the officials did not violate the paraplegic inmate’s rights under Title II of ADA or the Rehabilitation Act
as a result of their failure to provide him with an adequate wheelchair backrest or a wheelchair-ready van, despite the
inmate’s allegation that he was inconvenienced with longer waits and humiliation, as when he had to crawl off a
regular van because it did not accommodate his wheelchair. The court noted that the inmate did not assert that he
was denied all access to some programs and activities, or that his access to others was severely limited, and the state
provided the inmate with a new wheelchair before he filed his grievance about the backrest. (Indiana Dept. of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXERCISE
WEAPON

Williams v. Hampton, 797 F.3d 276 (5th Cir. 2015). Inmates and parents of a deceased inmate, as wrongful death
beneficiaries, brought a § 1983 action against a state correctional officer for the death of one inmate and the injuries
of two other inmates arising out of an inmate-on-inmate attack. The district court entered judgment against the officer and she appealed. The appeals court reversed, finding that the corrections officer who was guarding a prison
exercise yard was not deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of inmate-on-inmate violence when she failed to
ascertain if her single-shot, nonlethal block gun was loaded and later took two rubber bullets for the gun with her
back into the prison building and did not give them to the officer who relieved her. According to the court, although
three inmates were subsequently attacked by other inmates who escaped from their exercise pens, there was no evidence that the officer realized that the gun was unloaded, that she knew there was a risk that inmates could escape
from the pens, or that a loaded block gun could have prevented the assaults. (State Penitentiary in Parchman, Mississippi)

39.115

39.116

U.S. Appeals Court
RODENTS/PESTS

Gates v. Cook, 376 F.3d 323 (5th Cir. 2004). A death row prisoner brought a suit on behalf of himself and other prisoners
confined to death row, alleging that certain conditions of confinement on death row violated the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The district court found that a number of conditions violated the Eighth
Amendment and issued an injunction designed to alleviate the conditions. The defendants appealed. The appeals court
affirmed in part and vacated in part. The court found an Eighth Amendment violation due to mosquito infestation coupled
with insufficient screen gauge, which exacerbated the heat problems by deterring death row inmates from opening their
windows to increase circulation. The court noted that pest infestation problems were linked to chronic sleep deprivation,
which exacerbated the symptoms of mental illness. The court found a violation due to "ping-pong" toilets, and that corrections officials were deliberately indifferent to the risk of harm that these toilets presented to death row inmates. Experts
established that a serious health hazard resulted when the feces of one inmate bubbled up in the neighboring cell, and that
this was exacerbated when toilets overflowed. According to the court, the State Department of Health warned corrections
officials every year for the past eleven years that the malfunctioning toilets were a critical public health problem that
required immediate attention. (Mississippi Department of Corrections, Unit 32-C, State Penitentiary in Parchman)

U.S. District Court
TOILETS

Masonoff v. Dubois, 336 F.Supp.2d 54 (D.Mass. 2004). State inmates filed a class action under § 1983 alleging that
conditions of their confinement violated their Eighth Amendment rights. The district court granted summary judgment for
the defendants in part, and denied it in part. The court held that the facility’s superintendent and administrator were not
entitled to qualified immunity because a prisoner’s right to adequate and hygienic means to dispose of his bodily wastes
was clearly established in 1991. The court noted that a state court had required prison officials to inspect toilets at least
twice per month and issued specific directions regarding their inspection, cleaning and replacement. The officials
allegedly did nothing to alleviate obvious sanitation problems associated with the cleaning and maintenance of the toilets.
(Southeast Correctional Center, Massachusetts)
2005

U.S. District Court
WATER

Brown v. Williams, 399 F.Supp.2d 558 (D.Del. 2005). A detainee brought an in forma pauperis action against prison
officials alleging unconstitutional conditions of confinement. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
officials. The court held that the detainee was not exposed to unreasonably high levels of contaminated water, although
water from his cell sink was allegedly discolored, and the detainee fainted shortly after he drank the water. A sample of
the water was taken to a laboratory for independent testing and it met or exceeded requisite standards. (Howard R. Young
Correctional Institution, Delaware)

U.S. Appeals Court
CELLS
SINKS
TOILETS
WATER

Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2005). A state prison inmate brought a § 1983 action alleging violation of his
Eighth Amendment rights related to an attack in prison, and inhumane conditions in a disciplinary segregation unit. The
district court dismissed the action and the inmate appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that
the inmate’s allegations stated a claim that conditions were sufficiently serious to form the basis for an Eighth
Amendment violation. The inmate alleged that there was a lack of drinkable water in the prison yard, where temperatures
exceeded one hundred degrees. The inmate also alleged that conditions in disciplinary segregation created serious health
hazards, including toilets that did not work, sinks that were rusted, and stagnant pools of water that were infested with
insects. (Calipatria State Prison, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
CELLS
TOILETS
WATER

Surprenant v. Rivas, 424 F.3d 5 (1st Cir. 2005). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against a county jail and jail
personnel, alleging that he was falsely accused of an infraction, deprived of due process in disciplinary proceedings, and
subjected to unconstitutional conditions of confinement. A jury found the defendants liable on three counts and the district
court denied judgment as a matter of law for the defendants. The defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The
court held conditions of confinement were shown to be constitutionally deficient, where the detainee was placed in
around-the-clock segregation with the exception of a five-minute shower break every third day, all hygiene items were
withheld from him, he could only access water--including water to flush his toilet--at the discretion of individual officers,
and was subjected daily to multiple strip searches that required him to place his unwashed hands into his mouth.
(Hillsborough County Jail, New Hampshire)
2006

U.S. District Court
FOOD SERVICE

Carr v. Whittenburg, 462 F.Supp.2d 925 (S.D.Ill. 2006). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against prison officials,
alleging retaliation for filing a prison grievance regarding food handling by the security staff and the inmate cell house
workers. The court held that genuine issues of material fact as to the intent and motive of the prison officials precluded
summary judgment. The grievance alleged that the Unit Superintendent allowed his security staff and the inmate cell
house workers to act as food handlers in the absence of required medical staff approval and appropriate sanitation apparel,
in violation of Illinois Department of Corrections policies. (Menard Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
CELLS

Keel v. Dovey, 459 F.Supp.2d 946 (C.D.Cal. 2006). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that prison officials
violated her civil rights by placing her in administrative segregation pending the investigation of a disciplinary charge
against her, and by conducting a disciplinary hearing that violated her procedural due process rights. Officials moved for
summary judgment. The district court granted the motion.. The court held that the administrative segregation the inmate
endured pending disciplinary investigation was not an atypical and significant hardship in relation to the ordinary
incidents of prison life. According to the court, even if her cell was unsanitary, birds and mice were present in inmate
cells, and she lost her prison job and her ability to participate in religious ceremonies, the inmate did not suffer forfeiture
of time credits, she had non-contact visits of one hour in length, and there was no evidence regarding conditions of cells
outside of administrative segregation. (California Institution for Women, Chino)

40.19
XXI

U.S. District Court
RODENTS/PESTS
CELLS

Murray v. Edwards County Sheriff's Dept., 453 F.Supp.2d 1280 (D.Kan. 2006). A former pretrial detainee at a county jail
brought a § 1983 action against a county sheriff's department, sheriff, undersheriff, and county attorney, alleging various
constitutional violations. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court held that
alleged inadequate temperature-control and ventilation, the presence of insects, and a lack of cleaning at the county jail
did not violate the due process rights of pretrial detainee, where jail cells were heated and cooled by air conditioning that
was on the same ventilation system as the rest of the courthouse in which the jail was located, detainees had the ability to
open cell windows and had fans to use in the Summer, detainees were allowed additional blankets in Winter, the jail and
courthouse were treated for insects on a monthly basis, and cleaning materials were provided to detainees to use in their
cells. (Edwards County Jail, Kansas)

U.S. District Court
CELLS
RODENTS/PESTS

Poole v. Taylor, 466 F.Supp.2d 578 (D.Del. 2006). A former pretrial detainee filed a § 1983 action alleging unconstitutional conditions of confinement, and that he was denied adequate medical care. The district court granted the defendants’
motion for summary judgment. The court held that the detainee’s due process rights were not violated when he was required to sleep on a mattress on the floor for over six months in an overcrowded facility that experienced sporadic hot and
cold temperatures and insect and rodent infestations. The court noted that the officials had issued numerous work orders
for temperature repairs and pest control, the detainee was not denied access to toilet facilities, the officials determined that
triple-celling pretrial detainees was a method to deal with their overcrowded facilities, and there was no evidence of intention on the officials’ part to punish the detainee. (Multi-Purpose Criminal Justice Facility, Delaware)
2007

U.S. District Court
SHOWERS
BEDDING
RODENTS/PESTS

Banks v. York, 515 F.Supp.2d 89 (D.D.C. 2007). A detainee in a jail operated by the District of Columbia Department of
Corrections (DOC), and in a correctional treatment facility operated by the District's private contractor, brought a § 1983
action against District employees and contractor's employees alleging negligent supervision under District of Columbia
law, over-detention, deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, harsh living conditions in jail, and extradition to
Virginia without a hearing. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss in part and denied in part.
According to the court, the alleged conditions from overcrowding at a District of Columbia jail-- showers infested with
bacteria, standing water, various diseases and hundreds of unsanitary and defective mattresses, some of which contained
roaches and other insects, did not constitute the deprivation of basic human needs, as required for jail overcrowding to
constitute cruel and unusual punishment. (Central Detention Facility. D.C. and Correctional Treatment Facility operated
by the Corrections Corporation of America)

U.S. District Court
WATER
SINKS

Desroche v. Strain, 507 F.Supp.2d 571 (E.D.La. 2007). A pre-trial detainee brought a pro se, in forma pauperis action
against prison officials, alleging improper conditions of confinement, negligent medical treatment, invasion of privacy,
and excessive force. The district court dismissed the action. The court held that the alleged conditions of the detainee's
confinement, including being required to sleep on the floor of an overcrowded holding tank, being deprived of a mattress,
and being provided with water only in a dirty sink, if proven, did not violate his Eighth Amendment or due process rights,
given that he experienced such conditions for only ten days, and that use of sink did not cause him to suffer disease or
other serious harm. (River Parish Correction Center, Louisiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
KITCHEN
FOOD SERVICE

George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605 (7th Cir. 2007). A state prisoner sued prison officials under § 1983, alleging deprivations
of his speech rights and deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The district court dismissed some of the
claims and granted summary judgment for the defendants on the remaining claims. The prisoner appealed. The appeals
court affirmed. The court held that the prisoner's allegation that his health was placed at risk by an allegedly
malfunctioning dishwasher that left particles of food on his plate at dinner failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim.
The court found that the prisoner's allegations that a prison employee had failed to provide a purported atlas that he had
ordered, on security grounds, were insufficient to state a First Amendment violation where the prisoner did not provide a
description, title or other identifying information for the book. The court held that the prisoner's allegation that the prison
refused to allow him to speak to the public at large by placing advertisements in newspapers was insufficient to state a
claim for violation of his First Amendment free speech rights where the prisoner did not provide the content of the
advertisements. (Wisconsin)

U.S. Appeals Court
SHOWERS

Polanco v. Hopkins, 510 F.3d 152 (2nd Cir. 2007). A prisoner filed a pro se § 1983 action against several correctional
employees claiming violations of his First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments rights for his alleged exposure to mold in
a gym shower and for unjust discipline. The district court denied the prisoner's motion to proceed in forma pauperis and
granted the defendants' motion to dismiss. The prisoner appealed, and the appeals court dismissed the appeal. The appeals
court held that the prisoner was not in imminent danger of a serious physical injury as required for in forma pauperis
status under the exception to the three-strikes rule of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The court found that the
imminent danger exception does not violate equal protection and that the in forma pauperis statute is not overbroad.
(Auburn Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
TOILETS
CELLS
SEWERAGE

Vinning-El v. Long, 482 F.3d 923 (7th Cir. 2007). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against two prison officers, alleging
that they violated his Eighth Amendment rights by subjecting him to inhumane conditions of confinement in a
disciplinary-segregation unit. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the officers based on qualified
immunity, and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that summary judgment was
precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the officers were deliberately indifferent to a serious condition.
The prisoner alleged that, after a fight with his cellmate, he was stripped of his clothing and placed in a cell in the
disciplinary-segregation unit where he was not permitted to take any personal property with him. The prisoner asserted
that the floor of the cell was covered with water, the sink and toilet did not work, and the walls were smeared with blood
and feces. He was allegedly forced to remain in the cell without a mattress, sheets, toilet paper, towels, shoes, soap,
toothpaste, or any personal property, for six days. (Menard Correctional Center, Illinois)

40.20
XXI

2008

XXIII

U.S. District Court
SEWERAGE
TOILETS

Cockcroft v. Kirkland, 548 F.Supp.2d 767 (N.D.Cal. 2008). A state inmate brought a pro se § 1983 action against prison
officials, alleging Eighth Amendment violations related to toilet and cleaning supply problems. The district court
dismissed the action in part. The court held that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity from claims that
they refused to give the inmate adequate supplies and tools to sanitize his toilet in response to a widespread backflushing
toilet problem caused by a design defect, in which sewage would rise up in the toilet of a cell when the toilet in an
adjoining cell was flushed. According to the court, the officials' conduct, as alleged, violated the prisoner's clearly
established rights under the Eighth Amendment to a minimum level of cleanliness and sanitation. The court found that the
official was not entitled to qualified immunity from the state prisoner's § 1983 claim that the official was deliberately
indifferent to his safety. The court held that the prisoner's § 1983 claim that a prison official was deliberately indifferent to
his safety, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, was not barred by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) provision
that a prisoner may not bring an action for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing
of physical injury, even though the prisoner never suffered any physical injury as a result of the official's alleged acts. The
prisoner alleged that the official disclosed to three other inmates that they had been placed on his enemy list at his request,
and that this caused him to be considered an informant, which in turn caused him to place nine more inmates on his
enemy list. (Pelican Bay State Prison, California)

U.S. District Court
HOUSEKEEPING
SHOWERS

Dolberry v. Levine, 567 F.Supp.2d 413 (W.D.N.Y. 2008). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against prison officials
asserting his constitutional rights were violated in a number of ways. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The
court granted summary judgment for the defendants in part and denied in part. The court held that denial of showers and
cleaning supplies for several weeks did not give rise to a violation under the Eighth Amendment. The court found that a
skin rash suffered by the prisoner, allegedly due to the lack of showers, was a de minimis injury insufficient to satisfy the
“physical injury” requirement for a prisoner bringing a civil action for a mental or emotional injury under the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). (Wyoming Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
BEDDING
CROWDING

Hubbard v. Taylor, 538 F.3d 229 (3rd Cir. 2008). Pretrial detainees filed suit under § 1983, challenging conditions of their
confinement on Fourteenth Amendment due process grounds. The district court granted the defendants' motion for
summary judgment and the detainees appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. On remand the district court
granted the defendants’ renewed motions for summary judgment and the detainees again appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The court held that triple-celling of the pretrial detainees was rationally related to prison officials' legitimate
governmental interest in trying to manage overcrowding conditions at the prison, for the purposes of the detainees' claim
that triple-celling violated their Fourteenth Amendment due process right. The court found that requiring the detainees to
sleep on a mattress on the floor of their cells for a period of three to seven months did not violate the detainees' Fourteenth
Amendment due process rights. The court noted that although many pretrial detainees did spend a substantial amount of
time on floor mattresses, they also had access to 3,900 square foot dayrooms, there was no evidence that the use of the
floor mattresses resulted in disease or the splashing of human waste upon the detainees, and over $2.8 million dollars had
been spent on capital improvements during the past five years to maintain or elevate the living conditions for prisoners.
The court noted that even if the detainees' due process constitutional rights were violated by requiring them to sleep on
mattresses on the floor, the law was not sufficiently clear so that a reasonable official would understand that what he was
doing violated a constitutional right, entitling the prison officials to qualified immunity in the detainees' suit under § 1983
challenging conditions of their confinement. (Multi-Purpose Criminal Justice Facility, Delaware)

U.S. Appeals Court
RODENTS/PESTS
SANITATION

Sain v. Wood, 512 F.3d 886 (7th Cir. 2008). A civilly-committed sex offender brought a § 1983 action alleging that his
conditions of confinement violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of some defendants and denied a motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity for the
clinical director of a detention facility. The clinical director appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court
found that the offender’s alleged conditions of confinement did not amount to inhumane treatment in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The conditions purportedly included unpleasant odors, lack of air conditioning, peeling paint and
the presence of cockroaches which, according to the court, did not amount to inhumane treatment. The court noted that
although the alleged conditions were unpleasant, they were not so objectively serious that they could establish a
constitutional violation. (Joliet Treatment and Detention Facility, Illinois Department of Human Services)

U.S. District Court
SANITATION
TOILETS

Spotts v. U.S., 562 F.Supp.2d 46 (D.D.C. 2008). Federal inmates brought an action against the United States under the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), alleging that Bureau of Prisons (BOP) officials acted negligently by failing to evacuate
the prison prior to the landfall of a hurricane. The government moved to transfer venue and the district court transferred
the venue to the Eastern District of Texas. The court noted that although the BOP resided in the District of Columbia, the
decision to keep the prisoners at the prison before and during the hurricane was made by the BOP's Regional Director in
Texas, and sufficient activities giving rise to the inmates' tort claims did not occur in the District of Columbia. The
inmates alleged that the warden failed to respond to their concerns about the hurricane, that prison officers handed out
plastic bags for the inmates to fill with human waste, that prison officials denied the inmates access to food and medical
attention, and that prison staff discouraged the filing of tort claims. The inmates also alleged that BOP agents failed to
properly supply the prison during the month that followed the hurricane, and that during that time inmates were forced to
live in substandard conditions and suffered various physical and emotional injuries as a result. (United States Penitentiary
in Beaumont, Texas)

U.S. District Court
BEDDING
HOUSEKEEPING
TOILETS

Wesolowski v. Kamas, 590 F.Supp.2d 431 (W.D.N.Y. 2008). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against correction
officers and a superintendent, alleging that the defendants subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment and denied him
equal protection of the law, in violation of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court granted the
defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court held that the prisoner's rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments were not violated by a soiled mattress, the plexiglass shield over the front of his cell, another inmate's
overflowed toilet, the use of a single slot to pass objects through a cell door, the denial of his preferred cleaning materials
when other suitable materials were made available to him, or a single two-week period during which the plaintiff's cell

40.21

was not cleaned. The court noted that the prisoner's complaints related principally to his personal preferences as to the
cleanliness of his cell. Prison officials did not display deliberate indifference to the prisoner's complaints, but instead
responded quickly and appropriately, in that the prisoner received a new mattress within two days of his request, and he
was moved to a new cell without a plexiglass cover within five days of his complaint. (Southport Corr'l Facil., New York)
2009
U.S. District Court
SANITATION

Graves v. Arpaio, 633 F.Supp.2d 834 (D.Ariz. 2009). Pretrial detainees in a county jail system brought a class action
against a county sheriff and a county board of supervisors, alleging violation of the detainees' civil rights. The parties
entered into a consent decree which was superseded by an amended judgment entered by stipulation of the parties. The
defendants moved to terminate the amended judgment. The district court entered a second amended judgment which
ordered prospective relief for the pretrial detainees. The amended judgment provided relief regarding the following:
population/housing limitations, dayroom access, natural light and windows, artificial lighting, temperature, noise, access
to reading materials, access to religious services, mail, telephone privileges, clothes and towels, sanitation, safety,
hygiene, toilet facilities, access to law library, medical care, dental care, psychiatric care, intake areas, mechanical
restraints, segregation, outdoor recreation, inmate classification, visitation, food, visual observation by detention officers,
training and screening of staff members, facilities for the handicapped, disciplinary policy and procedures, inmate
grievance policy and procedures, reports and record keeping, security override, and dispute resolution. The detainees
moved for attorney's fees and nontaxable costs. The district court held that the class of detainees was the prevailing party
entitled to attorney's fees. (Maricopa County Sheriff and Maricopa County Board of Supervisors, Arizona)

U.S. District Court
SHOWERS

Gray v. Hernandez, 651 F.Supp.2d 1167 (S.D.Cal. 2009). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action, seeking damages and
declaratory and injunctive relief, against an acting warden, captain, and two employees in a prison library. The prisoner
alleged he was placed in administrative segregation pending the investigation of rule violation charges filed by the two
employees, accusing him of attempting to extort money from them by offering to settle his potential suit against them.
The district court held that the prisoner sufficiently alleged a chilling of his First Amendment right to file grievances and
pursue civil rights litigation by alleging that his placement in administrative segregation caused him mental and financial
harms. The court held that the prisoner's allegations that his placement in administrative segregation forced him to endure
24-hour lock-down, lack of medical treatment, only one shower every three days, and lack of exercise did not constitute
an allegation of a dramatic departure from the standard conditions of confinement, as would invoke procedural due
process protections. The court noted that an inmate does not have a liberty interest, for purposes of procedural due
process, in being housed at a particular institution or in avoiding isolation or separation from the general prison
population, unless the proposed transfer will subject the inmate to exceptionally more onerous living conditions, such as
those experienced by inmates at a “Supermax” facility. (Mule Creek State Prison, High Desert State Prison, Donovan
State Prison, California)

U.S. District Court
WATER

Jackson v. Goord, 664 F.Supp.2d 307 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). A state prisoner brought an action against correctional staff and
officials, alleging that the defendants had violated his constitutional rights. After granting summary judgment for the
defendants with respect to all of the prisoner's claims, except for his environmental claims, the defendants filed a
supplemental motion for summary judgment on the environmental claims. The district court denied the motion. The court
held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to conditions in the prison auto body
shop when the inmate worked there, the risk that the toxic materials in the shop created, and whether the inmate's alleged
headaches, nosebleed, and nausea were related to his work at the auto body shop. The court also found that summary
judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the prisoner was exposed to asbestos for four to
five hours a day over an extended period of time, and whether there was a risk to his health as a result of such exposure.
According to the court, summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the prisoner
was exposed to an unreasonable risk of serious harm from the prison's water quality or from exposure to cigarette smoke,
and whether the prison defendants knew that the prisoner faced substantial risks of serious harm and disregarded those
risks by failing to take reasonable measures to abate the risks. The court also found a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the prison superintendent knew of the allegedly ongoing constitutional violations and had the authority to correct
the problems and failed to do so. (Green Haven Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
BEDDING
RODENTS/PESTS
WATER

Johnson v. Boyd, 676 F.Supp.2d 800 (E.D. Ark. 2009). A state prisoner filed a civil rights action against a detention
center and its personnel alleging several violations. The defendants moved for summary judgment and the district court
granted the motion in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether detention center personnel failed to protect the prisoner from an attack by another prisoner. The court held that a
substantial risk of harm to the prisoner's health or safety did not result from the prisoner's detention, where, among other
things, a professional exterminator routinely sprayed the facility for rodents and bugs, exposed wires from ceiling light
fixtures that had been pulled down by inmates were not hazardous or were not located in cells where the prisoner had
been confined, the ventilation system was operational and only temporarily malfunctioned when inmates put paper and
other materials in vents, fresh water was located in coolers in pods and was brought to the prisoner's cell several times per
day, and the prisoner had been provided with a concrete sleeping slab and extra blankets. (Crittenden County Detention
Center, Arkansas)
2010

U.S. District Court
SEWERAGE
SHOWERS

XXIII

Antonetti v. Skolnik, 748 F.Supp.2d 1201 (D.Nev. 2010). A prisoner, proceeding pro se, brought a § 1983 action against
various prison officials, alleging various constitutional claims, including violations of the First, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments. The district court dismissed in part. The court held that the prisoner's allegations were factually
sufficient to state a colorable § 1983 claim that prison officials violated the Eighth Amendment by depriving him of
needed medical care. The prisoner alleged that he was housed in segregation/isolation, leading to a mental health
breakdown, and: (1) that he was seen by mental health professionals eight times over a five year period instead of every
90 days as required by administrative regulations; (2) that mental health professionals recommended he pursue art and
music for his mental health but that prison officials denied him the materials; (3) and that the officials' actions resulted in

40.22

the need to take anti-psychotic and anti-depression medications due to suffering from bouts of aggression, extreme
depression, voices, paranoia, hallucinations, emotional breakdowns and distress, unreasonable fear, and systematic
dehumanization. The court held that the prisoner's allegations were sufficient to state a colorable § 1983 claim that he was
deprived of personal hygienic items and sanitary conditions in violation of the Eighth Amendment, where the prisoner
alleged he was regularly deprived of toilet paper and soap, that he was only allowed to shower twice a week, that he was
made to strip in dirty showers full of filth and insects, that the unit in which he resided was littered with food and urine
and contained open sewers, and that he suffered illness as a result. The court found that the prisoner's allegations that the
food he was provided lacked nutritional value and was of lesser quality than food provided to other inmates, that officers
made trays of food from dirty food carts located next to inmate showers and that birds picked at the inmate's food while
the carts were outside were factually sufficient to state a colorable § 1983 Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement
claim. The court found that the prisoner's allegations were sufficient to state a colorable § 1983 Eighth Amendment claim
for violation of his right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment where the prisoner alleged the exercise provided to
him was to stand in a completely enclosed cage alone, in extreme heat or cold without water, shade, exercise equipment or
urinals, and that as a result he suffered sunburns, cracked and bleeding lips and a lack of desire to exercise, resulting in a
loss of physical and mental health. (High Desert State Prison, Nevada)
U.S. Appeals Court
COMMON AREAS
SANITATION

Duvall v. Dallas County, Tex., 631 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2010). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against a county
for personal injuries stemming from a staph infection that he contracted while incarcerated in the county's jail. At the
conclusion of a jury trial in the district court the detainee prevailed. The county appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The
court held that: (1) sufficient evidence supported the finding that the county's actions in allowing the infection were more
than de minimis; (2) sufficient evidence existed to support the finding that the county had an unconstitutional custom or
policy in allowing the infection to be present; and (3) sufficient evidence supported the finding that the detainee
contracted the infection while in jail. The court noted that physicians testified that there was a “bizarrely high incidence”
of the infection and that they were not aware of a jail with a higher percentage of the infection than the county's jail.
According to the court, there was evidence that jail officials had long known of the extensive infection problem yet
continued to house inmates in the face of the inadequately controlled staph contamination, and that the county was not
willing to take the necessary steps to spend the money to take appropriate actions. The court noted that there was evidence
that the jail had refused to install necessary hand washing and disinfecting stations and had failed to use alcohol-based
sanitizers, which were the recommended means of hand disinfection. (Dallas County, Texas)

U.S. District Court
PLUMBING
RODENTS/PESTS

Mitchell v. Dodrill, 696 F.Supp.2d 454 (M.D.Pa. 2010). A federal prisoner initiated a Bivens-type action against the
Bureau of Prisons (BOP) employees, making several complaints about various conditions of his former place of
confinement. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants in part, and denied in part. The court held
that, absent any evidence that the alleged conditions of the prisoner's cell caused harm to the prisoner, and that the Bureau
of Prisons (BOP) defendants were deliberately indifferent to that harm, cell conditions did not violate the Eighth
Amendment. The prisoner alleged that his cell was in poor condition, with poor welding and rust erosion present at the
base of the walls, had inadequate plumbing, was infested with “cockroaches, spiders, worms, mice and other unknown
insects,” and lacked ventilation. The court held that double celling of the prisoner did not violate the Eighth Amendment
where the prisoner did not allege that he was singled out for double-celling or that his health or life was endangered by the
condition. The court noted that double celling inmates is not per se unconstitutional, and that considerations that are
relevant in determining if double celling violates the Eighth Amendment include the length of confinement, the amount of
time prisoners spend in their cells each day, sanitation, lighting, bedding, ventilation, noise, education and rehabilitation
programs, opportunities for activities outside the cells, and the repair and functioning of basic physical facilities such as
plumbing, ventilation, and showers. (Special Management Unit, United States Penitentiary, Lewisburg, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
FOOD SERVICE
KITCHEN

Smith-Bey v. CCA/CTF, 703 F.Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010). A District of Columbia inmate brought a § 1983 action against a
prison, the private corporation that ran the prison, and a food services company, alleging the prison's kitchen was so
poorly maintained and infested with vermin that being forced to eat food prepared there amounted to cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The
district court granted the motion. The court held that the two instances in which the inmate discovered cockroaches in his
food, "while certainly unpleasant," did establish an Eighth Amendment violation. (Correctional Treatment Facility,
Washington, D.C.)
2011

U.S. District Court
RODENTS/PESTS

Solomon v. Nassau County, 759 F.Supp.2d 251 (E.D.N.Y. 2011). A pretrial detainee brought an action against a county,
jail, sheriff, and undersheriff, alleging that his civil rights were violated when he was bitten by a rodent in his jail cell. The
defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held
that because the sheriff and undersheriff were not “personally involved” in any alleged failure to maintain a safe prison
environment, they were not subject to § 1983 liability for the injury to the pretrial detainee who was bitten by a rodent in
his jail cell. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the
pretrial detainee was exposed to a substantial risk of contracting rabies or another dangerous disease from a rodent bite,
and whether the county was aware of the substantial risk of serious harm. According to the court, although protection of
inmates from harmful chemicals and the need to prevent inmates from using poisons, glue traps, or door sweeps as
weapons were legitimate penological interests that supported the reasonableness of the jail's pest control plan, a genuine
issue of fact existed as to whether the county was adequately complying with the plan, and whether the lack of
compliance could have resulted in the alleged substantial risk of harm. (Nassau County Correctional Center, New York)

40.23

2012
U.S. Appeals Court
CLOTHING
ISOLATION
RESTRAINTS

Gruenberg v. Gempeler, 697 F.3d 573 (7th Cir. 2012). A state prisoner, proceeding pro se, filed a § 1983 action against
various prison officials, guards, and medical staff, alleging violations of the Eighth Amendment. The district court granted
summary judgment for the defendants. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that: (1)
the prisoner did not have a clearly established right to not be continually restrained without clothing or cover in a cell for
five days following his ingestion of a handcuff key, the master key for belt restraints, and the key used for opening cell
doors, where restraint had been imposed to keep the prisoner from re-ingesting those keys; (2) the continuous restraint of
the prisoner without clothing or cover in a cell for five days did not violate his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights;
(3) the prisoner's Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claims were barred; and (4) the
district court did not abuse its discretion by ruling that the prisoner was competent to advance his case and was not
entitled to appointed counsel. (Waupun Correction Institution, Wisconsin)
2013

U.S. District Court
HOUSEKEEPING
RODENTS/PESTS
SANITATION

Ames v. Randle, 933 F.Supp.2d 1028 (N.D.Ill. 2013). An inmate brought § 1983 Eighth Amendment claims against
various employees of the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) who allegedly were responsible for the conditions of
the inmate's confinement. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss. The court denied the motion, finding that the inmate
adequately pled that Illinois prison officials were deliberately indifferent, as required to state a § 1983 Eighth Amendment
claim. According to the court, the inmate alleged that he repeatedly advised the official about the prison's detrimental
living conditions and that the official did not make an effort to remedy the conditions, that he informed another official
about the intolerable living conditions and that this official did not make an effort to remedy the conditions, and that he
discussed the intolerable living conditions with other officials, each of whom also failed to make any efforts to remedy the
living conditions. The inmate claimed that he was subjected to unsanitary conditions, a lack of ventilation, and continuous
lighting that interfered with his sleep. He also alleged that his housing area had dried bodily fluids on the wall of his cell
and a strong odor of ammonia from his uncleaned toilet, that there was pest infestation accompanied by filth and feces,
and that there was a complete lack of basic cleaning supplies or even garbage bags. He also cited filthy soiled bedding,
missing or dilapidated, and sometimes dangerously damaged cell furniture and fixtures, and badly peeling toxic paint. The
inmate suffered from endocarditis, an infection of the lining of the heart, which he claimed was due to the conditions of
his confinement, and from which his “numerous, almost constant, fungal infections” stemmed. (Stateville Correctional
Center, Illinois Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
CROWDING

Coleman v. Brown, 922 F.Supp.2d 1004 (E.D.Cal. 2013). State prison inmates brought Eighth Amendment challenges to
the adequacy of mental health care and medical health care provided to mentally ill inmates and the general prison
population, respectively. The inmates moved to convene a three-judge panel of the district court to enter a population
reduction order that was necessary to provide effective relief. The motions were granted and the cases were assigned to
same panel, which ordered the state to reduce the prison population to 137.5% of its design capacity. The state moved to
vacate or modify the population reduction order. The district court denied the motion. The three-judge panel of the district
court held that: (1) the state's contention that prison crowding was reduced and no longer a barrier to providing inmates
with care required by the Eighth Amendment did not provide the basis for a motion to vacate the order on the ground that
changed circumstances made it inequitable to continue applying the order; (2) the state failed to establish that prison
crowding was no longer a barrier to providing inmates with care required by the Eighth Amendment; and (3) the state
failed to establish it had achieved a durable remedy to prison crowding. (California Department of Rehabilitation and
Corrections)

U.S. District Court
BEDDING
CELLS
CROWDING
FOOD SERVICE
SANITATION

Duran v. Merline, 923 F.Supp.2d 702 (D.N.J. 2013). A former pretrial detainee at a county detention facility brought a
pro se § 1983 action against various facility officials and employees, the company which provided food and sanitation
services to the facility, and the medical services provider, alleging various constitutional torts related to his pretrial
detention. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part.
The district court held that fact issues precluded summary judgment on: (1) the conditions of confinement claim against a
former warden in his official capacity; (2) an interference with legal mail claim against a correctional officer that alleged
that the facility deliberately withheld the detainee's legal mail during a two-week period; (3) a First Amendment
retaliation claim based on interference with legal mail; and (4) a claim for inadequate medical care as to whether the
detainee's Hepatitis C condition was a serious medical condition that required treatment and whether the provider denied
such treatment because it was too costly.
The detainee asserted that overcrowding at the county detention facility, which allegedly led to the detainee being
forced to sleep and eat his meals next to open toilet, and led to inmate-on-inmate violence, contributed to his assault by
another inmate. According to the court, the long-standing conditions of confinement whereby the county detention facility
was overcrowded for at least 24 years and facility officials “triple-celled” inmates, allegedly leading to unsanitary
conditions, amounted to a “custom” for the purposes of the former detainee's § 1983 Fourteenth Amendment conditions of
confinement claim against a former warden in his official capacity.
The court held that the food service provider's serving the detainee cold meals for a 45-day period while the kitchen in
the county detention facility was being renovated, was not “punishment,” as would support the inmate's § 1983 Fourteenth
Amendment conditions of confinement claim against the provider, absent evidence that the food served to the detainee
was spoiled or contaminated, that a significant portion of the detainee's diet consisted of such food, or that the food
service caused more than a temporary discomfort. The court also held that the alleged actions of the food service provider
in serving the detainee one food item when another ran out, failing to serve bread with the inmate's meal, serving the
inmate leftovers from days before, serving juice in a dirty container on one occasion, serving milk after its expiration date,
and serving meals on cracked trays that caused the detainee to contract food poisoning, did not amount to a substantial
deprivation of food sufficient to amount to unconstitutional conditions of confinement, as would violate the inmate's due
process rights. (Atlantic County Justice Facility, New Jersey)

40.24

U.S. District Court
HOUSEKEEPING
SANITATION
TOILETS

Florio v. Canty, 954 F.Supp.2d 227 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). A prisoner, proceeding pro se, brought a § 1983 action against a
warden and a corrections officer, alleging violations of the Eighth Amendment. The defendants moved to dismiss. The
district court granted the motion. The court held that the prisoner's exposure to human waste on two occasions, for a total
of less than a few hours, did not give rise to a serious risk of substantial harm. The prisoner alleged that prison officials
waited 10 to 30 minutes after two separate incidents of a toilet overflowing to release the prisoner from his cell and
having the prisoner clean the cell with inadequate cleaning gear and without training, allegedly resulting in the prisoner
developing a foot fungus. The court held that this was not deliberate indifference to a substantial risk to his health and
safety, as would violate the Eighth Amendment. The court noted that officials acted to alleviate the unsanitary conditions,
the overflow also occurred in approximately 20 other cells, and the prisoner was not prevented from bathing or washing
his clothes after the incidents. (Anna M. Kross Center, Rikers Island, New York City Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
HOUSEKEEPING
TOILETS

Nelson v. District of Columbia, 928 F.Supp.2d 210 (D.D.C. 2013). A detainee brought a § 1983 claim against the District
of Columbia arising from his stay in jail. The defendant moved to dismiss and the district court granted the motion. The
court held that denial of one telephone call and access to stationery during the detainee's five-day stay in a “Safe Cell,”
which was located in the jail's infirmary, did not implicate his First Amendment right of free speech or right of access to
courts. The court found that the detainee's alleged exposure to “dried urine on the toilet seat and floor” and garbage during
his five-day stay, along with the denial of a shower, did not rise to the level of a Fifth Amendment due process violation.
According to the court, placement of detainee in a Safe Cell was not motivated by a desire to punish the detainee, but
rather by a nurse's desire to attend to the detainee's ailments after his “legs and back gave out” twice. The court noted that
denial of the detainee’s request to have the cell cleaned was for the non-punitive reason that the detainee would not be in
the cell that long. (D.C. Jail, District of Columbia)

U.S. Appeals Court
BEDDING
CROWDING
HOUSEKEEPING

Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119 (2nd Cir. 2013). An inmate, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brought a § 1983
action against a warden and various other prison officials and employees, alleging violations of the Eighth Amendment.
The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part,
vacated in part, and remanded. The court held that the prisoner's allegations were sufficient to plead that he was deprived
of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities and was subjected to unreasonable health and safety risks, as
required to state a § 1983 claims against prison officials for violations of the Eighth Amendment. The prisoner alleged
that: (1) for approximately 28 months he was confined in a cell with five other men with inadequate space and ventilation;
(2) the heat was stifling in the summer and it was freezing in the winter; (3) urine and feces splattered the floor; (4) there
were insufficient cleaning supplies; (5) the mattress was too narrow for him to lie on flat; and (6) noisy and crowded
conditions made sleep difficult and created a constant risk of violence. The court also found that the prisoner's allegations
were sufficient to plead that prison officials knew of and disregarded excessive risks to his health and safety, as required
to find that the officials were deliberately indifferent. The prisoner alleged that officials knew of overcrowding in his cell,
that he spoke with some officials about the conditions, that officials were aware noise was loud and constant, that they
were aware of temperature issues, that the prisoner informed officials that his bed was too narrow, that one official failed
to issue cleaning supplies, and that conditions did not change despite his complaints. (Fed. Corr. Inst. Ray Brook, N.Y.)

U.S. District Court
HOUSEKEEPING
SEWERAGE

Washington v. Afify, 968 F.Supp.2d 532 (W.D.N.Y. 2013). A Muslim inmate, proceeding pro se, brought an action
against the department of correctional services (DOCS) employees, alleging violations of the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments. The employees moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The
district court held that: (1) ordering the inmate to clean up human waste did not violate the Eighth Amendment; (2)
housing the inmate with a cellmate who allegedly exposed the inmate to pornographic images and prevented him from
reciting his daily prayers with necessary humility and tranquility did not violate the inmate's First Amendment free
exercise right; (3) the inmate's allegations that he was denied two religious breakfast meals and one evening meal during a
Muslim holy month unless he signed up to work in the mess hall were insufficient to state a claim; (4) the Muslim
inmate's allegations that he was singled out in being ordered to clean up feces, being transferred to a different cell, and
transferred to new prison job were insufficient to state a claim for violations of Fourteenth Amendment equal protection.
The court held that the inmate's allegations that he was charged with disobeying a direct order after he refused to clean
feces, that he was found guilty by a biased hearing officer, and that the hearing officer called the inmate a “little monkey”
and warned that there was “more retaliation on the way” were sufficient to state a § 1983 claim for violations of
Fourteenth Amendment due process against the hearing officer. The court also found that the inmate's allegations that he
filed a grievance against a prison employee, that the employee told the inmate he was “nuts” and that the inmate “was
playing with the wrong one,” and that the employee issued a false misbehavior report against the inmate the next day,
were sufficient to state a § 1983 retaliation claim in violation of the First Amendment. (Southport Corr. Facility, N.Y.)
2014

U.S. District Court
FOOD SERVICE
RODENTS/PESTS
TOILETS
WATER

Cano v. City of New York, 44 F.Supp.3d 324 (E.D.N.Y. 2014). Pretrial detainees brought an action against a city and
police officers, alleging that inhumane conditions at a detention facility violated due process. The city and the officers
moved to dismiss. The district court denied the motion, finding that the detainees alleged objectively serious conditions
that deprived them of basic human needs, that the officers and the city were deliberately indifferent to conditions at the
facility, and that there was punitive intent. The detainees alleged that, over a 24-hour period, they were subjected to
overcrowded cells, insects, rodents, extreme temperatures, unsanitary conditions, sleep deprivation, lack of adequate food
and water, lack of access to bathroom facilities, and lack of protection from the conduct of other inmates. (Brooklyn
Central Booking, New York)

U.S. District Court
WATER
TOILETS

Imhoff v. Temas, 67 F.Supp.3d 700 (W.D.Pa. 2014). A pretrial detainee brought an action against employees of a county
correctional facility, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical need, violation of his rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment with regard to conditions of his confinement, and excessive force in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. The employees moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The
detainee had initially been refused admission to the jail because he displayed signs of a drug overdose and he was

40.25

admitted to a local hospital. After hospital personnel determined he was stable he was admitted to the jail. At one point in
his confinement, the detainee acted out and banged his cell door with a plastic stool. This resulted in the retrieval of the
stool by jail officers and, while he was held down by one officer, he was kicked in the face by another officer. When he
yelled for help, an officer responded by choking the detainee and then spraying him with pepper spray, and he was not
permitted to shower to remove the pepper spray for thirty minutes. The court found that the detainee’s allegations against
the employees in their individual capacities regarding the intentional denial of medical treatment, excessive use of force,
and violation of his rights under Fourteenth Amendment with regard to conditions of his confinement were sufficient to
set forth a plausible claim for punitive damages. The detainee alleged that he was denied basic human needs such as
drinking water, access to a toilet and toilet paper, and toiletries such as soap and a toothbrush. (Washington County
Correctional Facility, Pennsylvania)
U.S. District Court
TOILETS
SEWERAGE

Little v. Municipal Corp., 51 F.Supp3d 473 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). State inmates brought a § 1983 action against a city and
city department of correction officials, alleging Eighth Amendment and due process violations related to conditions of
their confinement and incidents that occurred while they were confined. The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to
state a claim. The district court granted the motion, finding that: (1) the inmates failed to state a municipal liability claim;
(2) locking the inmates in cells that were flooding with sewage was not a sufficiently serious deprivation so as to violate
the Eighth Amendment; (3) the inmates failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim based on the deprivation of laundry
services; (4) the inmates failed to state that officials were deliberately indifferent to their conditions of confinement; (5)
the inmates’ administrative classification did not implicate their liberty interests protected by due process; and (6) cell
searches did not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. The court noted that the cells flooded with sewage
for up to eight-and-a-half hours, during which they periodically lacked outdoor recreation and food, was undeniably
unpleasant, but it was not a significantly serious deprivation so as to violate the inmates’ Eighth Amendment rights.
According to the court, there was no constitutional right to outdoor recreation, and the inmates were not denied food
entirely, but rather, were not allowed to eat during periods of lock-down. (N.Y. City Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
PESTS/RODENTS

Sherley v. Thompson, 69 F.Supp.3d 656 (W.D.Ky. 2014). A state prisoner filed a pro se § 1983 action against the
Commissioner of the Kentucky Department of Corrections (DOC), a prison warden, and other prison officials, alleging
that his conditions of confinement violated his Eighth Amendment rights, that he was deprived of medical treatment in
violation of the Eighth Amendment, and was subjected to race discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
The district court dismissed the case, in part. The court held that the prisoner stated claims against the warden and prison
administrators for violation of his equal protection rights and his conditions of confinement. According to the court, the
prisoner stated an Eighth Amendment claim against one prison nurse by alleging that the nurse failed to provide him with
appropriate medical treatment for ant bites he sustained, due to his inability to pay for treatment. (Little Sandy
Correctional Complex, Green River Correctional Complex, Kentucky)
2015

U.S. District Court
SEWERAGE
HOUSEKEEPING

Barnes v. County of Monroe, 85 F.Supp.3d 696 (W.D.N.Y. 2015). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action against a
county, county officials, and correctional officers, alleging that the officers used excessive force against him and that he
was subjected to unconstitutional conditions of confinement during his pretrial detention. The defendants moved for
judgment on the pleadings. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the former
pretrial detainee’s allegation that a county correctional officer used excessive force when he responded to a fight between
the detainee and fellow inmates, and jumped on the detainee’s back, striking him in face and knocking out a tooth, and
that the officer was not merely using force to maintain or restore discipline but that the entire incident was
“premeditated,” stated a § 1983 excessive force claim against officer under the Due Process Clause. According to the
court, the former detainee’s allegations that county correctional officers used excessive force when they pushed him facefirst into a glass window, pushed him to the floor, kicked, stomped on and punched him, and used handcuffs to inflict
pain, that as a result of the altercation, the inmate urinated and defecated on himself and experienced dizziness and a
concussion, and that the force used on him was in response to his reaching for legal papers and attempting to steady
himself, stated a § 1983 excessive force claim against the officers under the Due Process Clause. The court found that the
former detainee’s allegations that, after he was released from a special housing unit (SHU), county correctional officers
placed him in a poorly ventilated cell where he was exposed to human excrement and bodily fluids over the course of
multiple days, and that he was subjected to extreme conditions in the SHU by way of 24-hour lighting by the officers,
stated a § 1983 conditions-of-confinement claim against the officers under the Due Process Clause. (Upstate Correctional
Facility and Monroe County Jail, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
SHOWERS
HOUSEKEEPING

Brauner v. Coody, 793 F.3d 493 (5th Cir. 2015). A state prisoner, who was a paraplegic, brought an action against a prison
medical director, assistant warden, and prison doctors, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical condition.
The district court denied the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. The defendants appealed. The appeals court
reversed, finding that: (1) prison doctors were not deliberately indifferent to the prisoner’s serious medical needs by
failing to provide him with adequate pain management; (2) officials were not deliberately indifferent by subjecting the
prisoner to unsanitary showers; and (3) doctors did not fail to provide adequate training and supervision regarding proper
wound care, even if the prisoner’s wound care by nurses and other subordinates was occasionally sporadic, where the
doctors were active in managing it, and they regularly changed the prescribed frequency of the bandage changes based on
the changing condition of the prisoner’s wounds, and also prescribed antibiotic therapy regimens to assist with healing.
The court noted that it was undisputed that the showers were cleaned twice per day with bleach, that the prisoner was
given a disinfectant spray bottle for his personal use, and that the prisoner was permitted to enter the showers before the
other prisoners so that he could clean himself without interference, and there was no showing that the prisoner was ever
prohibited from using the showers. (R.E. Barrow Treatment Center, Louisiana)

40.26

U.S. District Court
RODENTS/PESTS
CROWDING

Cano v. City of New York, 119 F.Supp.3d 65 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). Pretrial detainees temporarily housed in a booking facility
brought an action against a city and city officials under § 1983 alleging deliberate indifference to detainee health in
violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The defendants moved for summary judgment and the
district court granted the motion. The court held that: (1) temporarily subjecting detainees to overcrowded jail cells was
not deliberate indifference; (2) failure to provide sleeping equipment, such as beds, cots, pillows, blankets, or bedding was
not deliberate indifference; (3) availability of only one toilet for 24 hours in each overcrowded holding cell was not
deliberate indifference; (4) alleged failure to provide food and water was not deliberate indifference; (5) police officers
were not subjectively aware of a risk to the detainees; (6) police officers did not act with punitive intent; (7) placement of
pretrial detainees in jail cells with alleged rodent and insect infestations was not deliberate indifference; (8) placement of
pretrial detainees in jail cells with alleged violent offenders that had limited police supervision, allegedly leading to fights,
thefts, and bullying, was not deliberate indifference to detainee health; and (9) alleged exposure of pretrial detainees to
extreme hot or cold temperature conditions in unventilated jail cells was not deliberate indifference to detainee health that
would violate the right to provision of adequate medical treatment under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The court noted that the detainees were not kept in the cells for more than 24 hours, and were not harmed by
the alleged overcrowding. (Brooklyn Central Booking, City of New York Police Department, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
WATER
CLOTHING
HYGIENE ITEMS

Chavarriaga v. New Jersey Dept. of Corrections, 806 F.3d 210 (3d Cir. 2015). A former prisoner brought a § 1983 action
in state court against the New Jersey Department of Corrections (NJDOC), the former New Jersey Attorney General, the
New Jersey Commissioner of Corrections, a correctional sergeant, and various other correctional officers. The prisoner
alleged that the defendants violated her constitutional rights when they transferred her from one place of confinement to
another where they denied her potable water, clothing, sanitary napkins, and subjected her to an unlawful body cavity
search. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Attorney General, Commissioner of Corrections, and
correctional sergeant, and dismissed the remaining claims. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and
reversed in part and remanded. The appeals court held that: (1) allegations that correctional officers deprived the prisoner
of potable water were sufficiently serious so as to reach level of an Eighth Amendment violation; and (2) allegations that
she was denied her sanitary napkins and medication for migraine headaches and menstrual cramps were sufficiently
serious so as to reach the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. The court noted that a state has broad authority to
confine an inmate in any of its institutions, and thus, courts recognize that a state’s authority to place inmates anywhere
within the prison system is among a wide spectrum of discretionary actions that traditionally have been the business of
prison administrators rather than of the federal courts. (Garrett House Residential Community Release Facility, Edna
Mahan Correctional Facility, New Jersey)

U.S. District Court
BEDDING
CLOTHING
WATER
SHOWERS

Fant v. City of Ferguson, 107 F.Supp.3d 1016 (E.D. Mo. 2015). City residents brought a class action lawsuit against a
city, asserting claims under § 1983 for violations of Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments based on allegations that
they were repeatedly jailed by the city for being unable to pay fines owed from traffic tickets and other minor offenses.
The residents alleged that pre-appearance detentions lasting days, weeks, and in one case, nearly two months, in allegedly
poor conditions, based on alleged violations of a municipal code that did not warrant incarceration in the first instance,
and which were alleged to have continued until an arbitrarily determined payment was made, violated their Due Process
rights. The residents alleged that they were forced to sleep on the floor in dirty cells with blood, mucus, and feces, were
denied basic hygiene and feminine hygiene products, were denied access to a shower, laundry, and clean undergarments
for several days at a time, were denied medications, and were provided little or inadequate food and water. The plaintiffs
sought a declaration that the city’s policies and practices violated their constitutional rights, and sought a permanent injunction preventing the city from enforcing the policies and practices. The city moved to dismiss; the district court
granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that: (1) allegations that residents were jailed for failure to
pay fines without inquiry into their ability to pay and without any consideration of alternative measures of punishment
were sufficient to state a claim that the city violated the residents’ Due Process and Equal Protection rights; (2) the residents plausibly stated a claim that the city’s failure to appoint counsel violated their Due Process rights; (3) allegations of
pre-appearance detentions plausibly and conditions of confinement were sufficient to state a plausible claims for Due
Process violations; and (4) the residents could not state an Equal Protection claim for being treated differently, with
respect to fines, than civil judgment debtors. The court noted that the residents alleged they were not afforded counsel at
initial hearings on traffic and other offenses, nor were they afforded counsel prior to their incarceration for failing to pay
court-ordered fines for those offenses. (City of Ferguson, Mo.)

U.S. District Court
HOUSEKEEPING

Montoya v. Newman, 115 F.Supp.3d 1263 (D. Colo. 2015). A former county jail detainee brought a § 1983 action against
a sheriff, jail detention officer, and jail medical staff member, and a physician, alleging deliberate indifference to his
serious medical needs. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and
denied in part. The court held that the summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
a county jail detention officer was aware of the detainee’s serious medical need and was deliberately indifferent to that
need when he failed to arrange for the detainee to see a doctor for at least two days, despite knowing that the detainee was
coughing up bloody phlegm, had trouble breathing, and was not eating. The officer was also allegedly told by two other
detainees, as well as the detainee’s sister, and the detainee himself, the detainee needed to see a doctor. The court found
that evidence did not support the detainee’s § 1983 municipal liability claim based on failure to abate unsanitary
conditions and disease in the county jail, where there was no evidence that, prior to the detainee’s incarceration in the
county jail, the sheriff was aware of a mold or sanitation problem in the jail that presented a serious risk to the health of
detainee or other inmates, that the sheriff was deliberately indifferent to those conditions, or that those conditions were a
cause of the detainee’s illness. (Huerfano County Jail, Colorado)

U.S. District Court
CELLS
HOUSEKEEPING
CLOTHING

Shorter v. Baca, 101 F.Supp.3d 876 (C.D. Cal. 2015). A pretrial detainee brought an action against a county, sheriff, and
deputies, alleging under § 1983 that the defendants denied her medical care, subjected her to unsanitary living conditions,
deprived her of food, clean clothes, and access to exercise, and conducted overly invasive searches. The detainee had been
classified as mentally ill and housed in a mental health unit at the detention facility. The defendants moved for summary
judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was

40.27

precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to what policies governed classification of pretrial detainees who were
mentally ill. The court found that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether jail
conditions imposed on the detainee, including permitting the detainee, who was incarcerated for 32 days, to shower only
three times, only permitting the detainee outside of her cell for recreation on one occasion, failing to clean her cell, failing
to provide the detainee with clean clothing, and depriving the detainee of food, amounted to punishment. (Century
Regional Detention Facility, Los Angeles County, California)
U.S. Appeals Court
WATER
RODENTS/PESTS

Smith v. Dart, 803 F.3d 304 (7th Cir. 2015). A pretrial detainee brought action under § 1983 against a county alleging
deliberate indifference to his health in violation of the right to the provision of adequate medical treatment under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as failure to pay adequate wages under the Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA) for his job in the jail’s laundry room. The district court dismissed the case and the detainee appealed. The
appeals court held that the detainee sufficiently alleged that the food he received was “well below nutritional value,” as
required to state a claim under § 1983 for deliberate indifference to his health in violation of the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. The court held that the detainee failed to allege harm stemming from the presence of spider
nests, cockroaches, and mice, and thus failed to state a claim under § 1983 for deliberate indifference to his health in
violation of the right to provision of adequate medical treatment under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The court noted that the detainee did not allege that pests were present in his cell, or that pests had ever
come into contact with his person or his property, or that he’d been bitten or stung or otherwise suffered physical or
psychological harm, or that his property had been damaged. The court found that the detainee’s claims that prison water
contained cyanide, lead, and “alpha and beta radiation,” if true, were sufficient to allege deprivation of drinkable water, as
required to state a claim under § 1983 for deliberate indifference to his health in violation of the right to provision of
adequate medical treatment under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Cook County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
HOUSEKEEPING

Turner v. Mull, 784 F.3d 485 (8th Cir. 2015). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that correctional officials
violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA), and Rehabilitation Act by failing to transport him in wheelchair-accessible van, exposing him to unsanitary
conditions in the van, and retaliating against him for filing a complaint. The district court entered summary judgment in
the officials’ favor and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the officials were not
deliberately indifferent to the inmate’s serious medical needs when they precluded him from using a wheelchairaccessible van, even if the inmate was required to crawl into the van and to his seat. The court noted that the inmate was
able to ambulate, stand, and sit with the use of leg braces and crutches, the inmate did not ask to use a readily available
wheelchair, no physician ordered or issued a wheelchair for the inmate, and improperly using or standing on a lift was
considered dangerous due to the possibility of a fall. According to the court, officials were not deliberately indifferent to
the serious medical needs of the inmate in violation of Eighth Amendment when they required him to be transported and
to crawl in an unsanitary van, where the inmate was exposed to unsanitary conditions on a single day for a combined
maximum of approximately six hours. (Eastern Reception Diagnostic Correctional Center, Missouri)

U.S. Appeals Court
CELLS
SEWERAGE

Willey v. Kirkpatrick, 801 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2015). A state prisoner brought an action under § 1983 against a prison
superintendent, a corrections sergeant, and corrections officers, alleging unsanitary conditions, theft of legal documents,
harassment, malicious prosecution, and false imprisonment. The district court granted summary judgment to the
defendants. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court vacated the district court’s decision and remanded the case for
further proceedings. The court held that remand was required for the district court to address issue in first instance of
whether the prisoner had a right under the First, Fifth, Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendments to refuse to provide false
information to a corrections officer. The court held that the prisoner stated a claim of unsanitary conditions of
confinement against the defendants by alleging that while being kept naked, he had been exposed, at a minimum, to seven
days of human waste in a shielded cell that would have “exponentially amplified the grotesquerie of odor” of the
accumulating waste, which resulted in mental-health problems and attempted suicide. (Wende Correctional Facility, New
York)

40.28

XIX

XIX

XIX

XIX

XIX

XIX

warrant.” (U.S. District Court, Nevada)
U.S. Appeals Court
PAROLEE

U.S. v. Trujillo, 404 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 2005). A parolee whose home was searched sought to

suppress evidence from the search, which resulted in his conviction of being a felon in possession
of a firearm and ammunition. His motion was denied and he appealed. The appeals court
affirmed, finding that the parolee’s parole agreement was still in effect after he had been placed
under arrest, so the warrantless search of his residence did not violate the Fourth Amendment’s
prohibition against unreasonable searches. (West Valley City Police Department, Utah)
2006

U.S. District Court
STRIP SEARCH
PRIVACY

Beasley v. City of Sugar Land, 410 F.Supp.2d 524 (S.D.Tex. 2006). An arrestee sued a city under
§ 1983, claiming she was subjected to a strip search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The
city moved for summary judgment and the district court entered summary judgment for the city.
The court held that the municipality's policy of authorizing strip searches only when an official
had reasonable suspicion that an arrestee was a threat to facility security, did not violate the
Fourth Amendment. The arrestee was cited for driving her mother's car with no driver's license,
no current motor vehicle inspection or registration, no insurance, and no license plate light, a few
days after her eighteenth birthday. She was summoned to appear in court but mistakenly
appeared five days late. She was arrested at her house on a warrant for failure to appear and she
was allowed to put on shoes and socks, but was taken to jail in the clothes she was wearing-pajama pants and a cotton shirt with no bra. On the way to the city jail the arresting officer
radioed for a female officer to meet him at the jail to perform a search. At the jail a female police
officer told the arrestee to stand with her hands against a wall. She instructed the arrestee to lift
her shirt and the officer lifted Beasley's breasts to feel beneath them. The officer then instructed
the arrestee to drop her pants while continuing to hold up her shirt. The officer pulled the
arrestee’s panties taut and did a quick two-finger swipe across Beasley's vagina. The male
arresting officer allegedly witnessed this search. The arrestee initially alleged that she was
subjected to a “strip search and body cavity search,” but the court found that her description of
the events did not indicate that a body cavity search occurred. (City of Sugar Land, Texas)

U.S. District Court
STRIP SEARCH
PRETRIAL DETAINEE

Dare v. Knox County, 465 F.Supp.2d 17 (D.Me. 2006). In a class action, persons strip-searched by
jail officials agreed to a consent decree. The district court approved the agreement, issuing an
injunction ensuring compliance with the Fourth Amendment law governing strip searches of
certain arrestees. The court enjoined the county from strip searching any persons charged with a
crime that does not involve weapons, violence or controlled or scheduled substances during the
jail admission process, while they are being held awaiting bail or a first court appearance, or after
being arrested on a default or other warrant, unless the officer or person conducting the strip
search has reasonable suspicion to believe the person does possess a weapon, controlled or
scheduled substances, or other contraband. The court ordered the sheriff and his successors to
keep a written log that records every instance in which a newly-admitted individual is subject to
a strip search procedure, with the following information: (1) the date and time of the search
procedure; (2) the name of each officer participating in the search procedure; (3) a brief statement
of facts found to constitute “reasonable suspicion” for a strip search, to include the crime with
which the individual was charged; and (4) the name of the officer who made the determination
that “reasonable suspicion” warranted a strip search and who approved the search. The
agreement also provided for monetary compensation of persons who had been improperly stripsearched. (Knox County Jail, Maine)

U.S. District Court
STRIP SEARCH

Gilanian v. City of Boston, 431 F.Supp.2d 172 (D.Mass. 2006). A detainee brought a civil rights
action against a municipality, county, sheriff, and corrections officers alleging that strip searches
violated her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The
district court denied the detainee’s motion, finding that fact issues as to whether the strip search
of the detainee was justified and whether the search was conducted in a reasonable manner,
precluded summary judgment. The case challenged two strip-searches of the detainee conducted
while she was held in pretrial detention, and asserted claims against the City of Boston, Suffolk
County, Suffolk County Sheriff Richard Rouse, and two unidentified Suffolk County corrections
officers. The court suggested that the trial should focus primarily on the question of whether
there was a less restrictive alternative. The court posed questions, including: could the policy
change, from strip-searching to segregation, have been implemented at the time of the detainee’s
second strip-search; what changes, if any, in staffing, space allocation, and budget were necessary
for the jail to switch to segregation after the Roberts decision; what less restrictive alternatives,
other than segregation, might have been available to the Jail in March 2000; if the switch to
segregation was possible in 2001, how far back in time is it proper to assume that the same
switch could have been made? (Nashua Street Jail, Suffolk County, Massachusetts)

U.S. Appeals Court
STRIP SEARCH

In re Nassau County Strip Search Cases, 461 F.3d 219 (2d Cir. 2006). Arrestees brought an action
against a county and others, challenging the county correctional center's blanket strip search
policy for newly-admitted, misdemeanor detainees. The district court denied the plaintiffs' class
41.63

XX

certification motions, and the plaintiffs appealed. The appeals court reversed in part and
remanded in part. The court held that common issues predominated over individual issues as to
liability in this case, and the class action device was a superior litigation mechanism as to the
issue of liability. (Nassau County Correctional Center, New York)
U.S. District Court
STRIP SEARCH

Jean-Laurent v. Wilkerson, 438 F.Supp.2d 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). A detainee in a state facility sued
officers and supervisors under § 1983, claiming that he was searched in violation of his due
process rights. The district court held that the detainee stated a claim of unconstitutional strip
search, under the Fourth Amendment, when he alleged that officers, having conducted a
legitimate search in connection with prison-wide strip searches, took him out of his cell and
subjected him to a second search, even though he had been in their custody ever since the first
search, precluding any hiding of contraband on his person. The court also found that the detainee
stated claim that the second of two strip searches violated his First Amendment rights as a
Muslim, to avoid being seen naked. The court noted that while first search was in furtherance of a
compelling government need to maintain order, allowing the search despite religious objection,
there was no compelling government need for the second search. The court held that the detainee
stated a claim that officers imposed a substantial burden on the religious exercise of the Muslim
inmate, in violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), by
forcing him to submit to the second strip search. (George Motchan Det. Center, New York City)

U.S. District Court
STRIP SEARCHES

Johnson v. District of Columbia, 461 F.Supp.2d 48 (D.D.C. 2006). Pre-presentment arrestees

U.S. Appeals Court
URINE TEST
DRUG/ALCOHOL
TESTING

Louis v. Department of Correctional Services of Nebraska, 437 F.3d 697 (8th Cir. 2006). Inmates
and former inmates brought an action against a state corrections department and various
department officials alleging that the method of collecting and testing urine samples for drug use
violated their constitutional right to procedural due process. The district court entered judgment
in favor of defendants and the inmates appealed. The appeals court found that due process in
connection with testing of the inmates' urine for drugs did not require that the inmates sign and
seal the specimens after collection, absent evidence that the collection protocols requiring that the
collector label and seal the specimens resulted in erroneous deprivations of inmates' good-time
credits. According to the court, even if collection procedures did not eliminate all possibility of
mislabeled samples, they conformed to the practices used in private-sector workplace drug
testing, and were adequate to ensure reasonably reliable results. The court concluded that the
refusal of the corrections department to fund confirmatory drug testing of a prisoner's urine
sample after initial testing yielded a positive result, when the prisoner denied using illicit drugs,
did not violate a prisoner's due process rights. The court noted that the initial testing was 95
percent accurate and that a prisoner had the opportunity to obtain confirmatory testing at an
independent laboratory at his own expense. The appeals court upheld the refusal of the
corrections department to allow inmates to call lab technicians as witnesses at disciplinary
hearings to testify about procedures used for drug testing of inmates' urine samples, finding that
this practice did not violate a prisoner's due process rights. The court noted that inmates could
present urinalysis laboratory reports prepared by the lab technicians, and the exclusion of
technicians’ testimony was justified by the department’s need to manage the environment of the
prison and maximize the productivity of lab technicians. (Nebraska State Penitentiary)

U.S. District Court
STRIP SEARCH

Marriott v. County of Montgomery, 426 F.Supp.2d 1 (N.D.N.Y. 2006.) Arrestees brought suit,

brought a § 1983 action against the District of Columbia, U.S. Marshal’s Service, and former U.S.
Marshal, alleging that arrestees were subject to blanket strip searches and visual cavity searches
without a reasonable individualized suspicion that the arrestees were concealing weapons or
contraband. The government defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The court
denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The district court held that: (1) arrestees’ allegations
that the District of Columbia knew, or should have known, that marshals were unconstitutionally
strip searching arrestees supported a § 1983 claim as to the District of Columbia; (2) the alleged
policy under a former U.S. Marshal, if true, violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments; (3) the
right to be free from a blanket strip-search policy was clearly established; and (4) allegations that
a former marshal and District of Columbia acted in concert in developing a policy stated a claim
that the marshal was “state actor.” The arrestees alleged that there were blanket strip searches
and visual cavity searches at Superior Court without a reasonable individualized suspicion, that
subjected all female arrestees, but not male arrestees, to blanket strip searches. (District of
Columbia and U.S. Marshal for the D.C. Superior Court)

individually and on behalf of a class of others similarly situated, against a county sheriff's
department, county sheriff, county undersheriff, former county undersheriff, a jail administrator
and a lieutenant, challenging the constitutionality of the search policy of the county jail. The
district court held that the policy, pursuant to which arrestees being admitted to a county jail
were effectively subjected to strip searches, violated the Fourth Amendment and that the
arrestees were entitled to permanent injunctive relief. The court found that the arrestees were
the “prevailing parties” entitled to an award of attorney fees. According to the court, the Fourth
Amendment precludes officials from performing strip searches and/or body cavity searches of
arrestees charged with misdemeanors or other minor offenses unless the officials have a

41.64
XX

reasonable suspicion that the arrestee is concealing weapons or other contraband based on the
crime charged, the particular characteristics of the arrestee, and/or the circumstances of the
arrest. The court held that the indiscriminate strip-searching of misdemeanor arrestees is
unconstitutional. The policy required arrestees to remove their clothing in front of a corrections
officer (CO) and take a shower, regardless of the nature of their crime and without any
determination that there was a reasonable suspicion that they possessed contraband. The court
found that the policy violated the Fourth Amendment, despite the claim that the written policy
did not involve either a command for the arrestee to undress completely or a command for the CO
to inspect the naked arrestee. The court noted that the procedure that was followed in fact by the
COs required all admittees to remove their clothes, submit to a visual examination by the CO,
and shower. The court held that the arrestees were entitled to a permanent injunction prohibiting
county jail officials from conducting a strip search, as set forth in the jail's “change out”
procedure. (Montgomery County Jail, New York)
U.S. District Court
CELL SEARCH

Navarro v. Adams, 419 F.Supp.2d 1196 (C.D.Cal. 2006). A state prisoner filed a pro se petition for
a writ of habeas corpus, challenging his state court conviction and his sentence for first degree
murder. The district court held that a deputy sheriff's search of his cell and seizure of attorneyclient privileged documents did not warrant federal habeas relief because it did not substantially
prejudice the prisoner's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The court noted that the prisoner’s
cell was searched to locate evidence regarding gang activity and threats to witnesses, not to
interfere with his relationship with his defense counsel, and the information seized was turned
over to the trial court for an in-camera review without being viewed by any member of the
prosecution team. (California)

U.S. District Court
CELL SEARCH

Pepper v. Carroll, 423 F.Supp.2d 442 (D.Del. 2006). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging
that prison officials violated his constitutional rights. The court granted the officials’ motion for
summary judgment. The court found that the officials' decision to “shake down” the inmate's cell
was not in retaliation for his having filed a civil rights action, and thus did not violate the
inmate's First Amendment right to access courts, where shakedowns were routine, and the
inmate was thought to have prohibited materials in his cell. (Delaware Correctional Center)

U.S. Appeals Court
STRIP SEARCH
JUVENILE

Smook v. Minnehaha County, 457 F.3d 806 (8th Cir. 2006). Former detainees at a county juvenile

U.S. District Court
STRIP SEARCH

Tardiff v. Knox County, 425 F.Supp.2d 190 (D.Me. 2006). A class action suit was brought against
a county, its sheriff, and unidentified jail correctional personnel under § 1983, claiming that the
Fourth Amendment rights of detainees alleged to have committed non-violent, non-weapons, and
non-drug felonies, and detainees alleged to have committed misdemeanors, were violated when
they were subjected to strip searches without reasonable suspicion that they were harboring
contraband on or within their bodies. Summary judgment was granted in part and denied in part
to the plaintiffs, and the defendants filed a motion for reconsideration. The district court held
that: (1) evidence, including booking logs at the county jail, demonstrated that corrections officers
routinely strip searched misdemeanor detainees without reasonable suspicion; (2) a jail
administrator's letter was highly probative of what municipal policymakers knew about ongoing
strip search practices at the jail; (3) intake and release log evidence provided proof that, for at
least some corrections officers, strip searching was customary; and (4) the actions taken by the
county in response to the unconstitutional practice of strip searching misdemeanor detainees
amounted to acquiescence in it. According to the court, a county jail inspection report provided
information about the circumstances surrounding search practices at the jail, as well as the
knowledge of the county policymakers before the commencement of the class period, and, thus,

detention center brought a § 1983 class action against a county and individual county officials,
challenging the center's policy of strip-searching all juveniles admitted to the facility regardless of
the seriousness of the charged offense or the existence of suspicion. The district court entered
partial summary judgment for the former detainees, finding that the searches violated the
minors' constitutional rights, and that the officials were not qualifiedly immune from the minors'
claims. The county and officials appealed the denial of qualified immunity. The appeals court
reversed and remanded, finding that requiring a juvenile to strip to her undergarments upon
admission to the facility was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. A juvenile female had
been brought to the center for a curfew violation. A female staff person took her to a private
restroom, directed her to remove her shorts, t-shirt, and sandals, but allowed her to remain
attired in her undergarments. The staff person touched her to look under her arms, between her
toes, and through her hair and scalp. The court held that the search was reasonable under Fourth
Amendment in light of the state's responsibility to act in loco parentis with respect to juveniles in
lawful state custody, and that the special needs for such a search outweighed the invasion of
personal privacy. The court held that the officials were entitled to qualified immunity where there
was no appellate decision from the Supreme Court or any federal circuit ruling on such an issue,
and, although many courts had concluded that the strip search of adult offenders without
individualized suspicion was unreasonable, those cases did not consider interests involved when
state had responsibility to act in loco parentis. (Minnehaha County Juvenile Detention Center,
South Dakota)

41.65
XX

was relevant in the class action suit. (Knox County Jail, Maine)
U.S. District Court
BODY CAVITY SEARCH

Thompson v. County of Cook, 428 F.Supp.2d 807 (N.D.Ill. 2006). A detainee held for civil

contempt brought an action against a county and a sheriff, alleging civil rights violations due to
invasive search procedures. Following a jury verdict for the defendants, the detainee moved for a
new trial. The district court held that a jury's verdict as to an unreasonable body cavity search
was against the manifest weight of evidence. The court noted that, notwithstanding the detainee's
purported intermingling with others who were incarcerated, he was not charged with any crime,
and there was no evidence that deputies noticed anything suspicious about detainee which would
have otherwise justified a search. The detainee was subjected to an invasive urethral swabbing
procedure without his consent. The detainee had been held in civil contempt and ordered held in
custody after he refused to sign certain documents related to his pending divorce proceedings.
Upon arrival at the jail, the detainee was processed along with approximately 250 other new
inmates. After spending some time in a holding pen, the detainee and others were photographed
and given identification cards. An employee from Cermak Health Services, the agency responsible
for administering medical treatment to detainees at the jail, then asked Thompson a number of
medical screening questions. During the interview, the detainee responded to the questions on a
standard form concerning his medical history and signed the following “consent for treatment”
portion of the form: I consent to a medical and mental health history and physical including

screening for tuberculosis and sexually transmitted diseases as part of the intake process of the
Cook County Jail. I also consent to ongoing medical treatment by Cermak Health Services staff
for problems identified during this process. I understand I may be asked to sign forms allowing
other medical treatments. I understand that every effort will be made by CHS staff to keep my
medical problems confidential. I understand the policy of CHS regarding access to health care at
Cook County Jail. The defendants presented evidence at trial that during the interview, an
employee informed the detainee of his right to refuse the medical screening, but the detainee
denied that anyone informed him of his right to refuse to consent. Following the medical
screening interview, his personal property was inventoried and then he and other inmates then
underwent a urethral swabbing procedure. He claimed that he felt pain both during and after the
procedure. (Cook County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
PAROLEES

U.S. v. Massey, 461 F.3d 177 (2d Cir. 2006). A parolee was convicted in the district court of
unlawful possession of a firearm, and the parolee appealed. The appeals court affirmed, holding
that the search of the apartment where the parolee was living, during a home visit, was
reasonable. The court noted that the parolee agreed to home visits as a condition of parole, the
parolee was living in his mother's apartment, the officer designated the bedroom assigned to
parolee as the room she wished to visit and immediately upon entering the apartment the officer
requested to see the bedroom and proceeded directly to it, and the bedroom was the only room the
officer visited during the home visit until after she discovered weapons. (New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
STRIP SEARCH
BODY CAVITY
SEARCH

Way v. County of Ventura, 445 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2006). A female arrestee who had undergone a

U.S. District Court
PATDOWN
STRIP SEARCH
X-RAY
VISITOR SEARCH

Zboralski v. Monahan, 446 F.Supp.2d 879 (N.D.Ill. 2006). A visitor to a state treatment and
detention facility brought a § 1983 action against facility officers, alleging that she was illegally
searched prior to visits. The visitor moved to proceed in forma pauperis, and the district court
granted the motion. The court held that the visitor stated Fourth Amendment claims based on
unreasonable patdowns and “Rapiscan” scans, an invasion of privacy claim, and an assault and
battery claim. The visitor alleged that she was illegally searched prior to visits, claiming invasion
of privacy under Illinois law based on intrusion upon seclusion, alleging that her virtual naked
image was captured through the Rapiscan machine, kept, and viewed hours later by officers. The
court noted that the visitor was neither a patient nor under any criminal investigation. The
visitor also alleged that an officer caused her to reasonably believe that she would place her
fingers in the visitor's vaginal area, and physically touched her in such a manner at least four
times. (Illinois Department of Human Services Treatment and Detention Facility, Joliet, Illinois)

strip search with body cavity inspection upon booking on a misdemeanor charge of being under
the influence of a controlled substance, brought § 1983 Fourth Amendment action against a
county sheriff and against the deputy who had performed the search. The district court granted
summary judgment for the arrestee, and defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part
and reversed in part. The court held that a suspicionless strip search conducted solely on basis of
the county's blanket policy for controlled-substance arrestees offended the Fourth Amendment,
where the intrusiveness of the search was extreme, the county did not show any link between the
policy and legitimate security concerns for persons spontaneously arrested and detained
temporarily on under-the-influence charges, and the arrestee was detained only until bail was
posted and never entered the jail's general population. The court held that the defendants were
entitled to qualified immunity because the appellate court in the county's federal circuit had
never previously addressed the constitutionality of a body cavity search policy premised on the
nature of drug offenses, and had held that the nature of offense alone may sometimes provide
reasonable suspicion. (Ventura County Sheriff's Department, California)

41.66
XX

2007
U.S. District Court
RELEASE
STRIP SEARCHES

Bullock v. Sheahan, 519 F.Supp.2d 760 (N.D.Ill. 2007). Male former inmates of a county jail brought a class
action against a county and a sheriff, alleging that the defendants had a policy and/or practice of subjecting male
inmates to strip-searches prior to their release, and that such differing treatment of male inmates violated their
rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The defendants moved to strike the plaintiffs' expert. The
district court denied the motion, finding that the expert’s testimony was admissible. According to the court, the
expert testimony of a registered architect who specialized in the design of prisons and jails, concerning whether
there was adequate space in the jail for the construction of additional bullpens to hold male detainees was
relevant and reliable. The court noted that while the expert did not review all of the written discovery in the case,
the expert reached his opinions after a tour of the jail and after reviewing other expert reports, jail floor plans, a
sheriff's status report and charts summarizing certain computer records on male detainees. (Cook County
Department of Corrections, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
RELEASE
STRIP SEARCHES

Bullock v. Sheahan, 519 F.Supp.2d 763 (N.D.Ill. 2007). Male jail inmates brought a class action against a county
and county sheriff alleging violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments based on an alleged policy
and/or practice under which male inmates were subjected to strip searches upon returning to a county department
of corrections for out-processing after having been ordered released. The sheriff and county moved to strike
certain portions of the inmates' motion for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and
denied in part. The court held that the sheriff and county had notice of the male jail inmates' claims challenging
the policy and practice, despite allegations that the claims regarding the inmates having to strip in a large nonprivate group setting came as a surprise to the county and the sheriff because they were never addressed by
inmates during fact or expert discovery. The court found that factual allegations contained in the complaint
satisfied the notice pleading standards with respect to all claims, and that the county and sheriff did not provide
specific evidence of any misrepresentations or sandbagging other than an affidavit stating that discovery did not
focus on the privacy issue. (Cook County Department of Corrections, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
PRIVACY
BODY CAVITY SEARCH
STRIP SEARCHES

Campbell v. Miller, 499 F.3d 711 (7th Cir. 2007). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action against a police officer and
city, alleging that a strip search violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The district court entered judgment, upon
jury verdict, in favor of the defendants and denied the arrestee's motion for judgment as a matter of law. The
arrestee appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded. The court held that
evidence was sufficient to support a jury verdict that police officers had reasonable suspicion to believe that the
arrestee was concealing contraband, as would justify a strip search and body cavity search of the arrestee, for the
purpose of the arrestee's § 1983 unreasonable search claim. The court noted that the plaintiff was arrested for
narcotics possession, when an officer first encountered the arrestee the officer reasonably believed that the
plaintiff fit the description of a man who had just engaged in a drug transaction. The officer testified that he saw
the arrestee drop a bag of marijuana and then disregard repeated commands to stop moving away. But the court
found that a strip and body cavity search conducted on the arrestee in an open backyard was not reasonable, and
thus, the search violated the arrestee's Fourth Amendment rights. The search involved nudity and visual
inspection of the anal area, the backyard was exposed to the neighbors, the arrestee's friend was able to watch the
search and others could have watched as well, and no exigency justified such a public exposure. The court
concluded that the city was not liable under § 1983 for the arresting officer's unreasonable conduct. Although the
city had a policy that any officer making an arrest had to conduct a body search of the prisoner, there was no
policy requiring the search to be conducted in public, the decision to conduct the search in an open and exposed
area was what rendered the search unconstitutional, and that decision was made by the officer. (City of
Indianapolis, Indiana)

U.S. District Court
STRIP SEARCHES

Doe v. Balaam, 524 F.Supp.2d 1238 (D.Nev. 2007). A transsexual arrestee, who was strip searched at a county
jail, brought an action against the county and county sheriff seeking damages, attorney fees, and a permanent
injunction prohibiting the defendants from conducting certain strip searches. The defendants moved for summary
judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that deputies at the county jail had a reasonable
suspicion, based on specific articulated facts coming directly from the transsexual arrestee concealing a sock in
his crotch area, that the arrestee was carrying or concealing contraband, so as to justify a strip search of the
arrestee prior to being housed in the general jail population. The court noted that the arrestee had turned himself
in for a misdemeanor destruction of property charge, and even though he had told deputies that he was a
transsexual and that he had a rolled-up sock concealed in his crotch area, the deputies had no way of knowing
whether the arrestee was truthful about what he was, in fact, concealing. According to the court, even if there
had been a violation of the arrestee's Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures, the
transsexual arrestee failed to allege that the county sheriff knew of and failed to act or prevent any alleged
violation, or that any individual employees acted pursuant to an official county policy or custom, as required to
state a cognizable § 1983 claim against the sheriff and county for alleged constitutional violations. (Washoe
County, Nevada)

U.S. District Court
STRIP SEARCHES
PRETRIAL DETAINEES

Doe No. 1 v. Balaam, 494 F.Supp.2d 1173 (D.Nev. 2007). Arrestees who were subjected to strip searches when
they self-surrendered at a county jail and were then released on their own recognizance, pursuant to the sheriff
department's contraband control policy, brought an action against the county and county sheriff. The arrestees
sought damages, attorney fees, and a permanent injunction prohibiting the defendants from conducting certain
strip searches, prohibiting the defendants from engaging in similar unconstitutional conduct in the future, and
requiring and ordering the defendants to institute proper training and policy changes. The inmates moved for
partial summary judgment and the district court granted the motion. The court held that the county's policy of

41.67
XXII

strip searching all arrestees who self-surrendered to the county jail, absent reasonable suspicion that any arrestee
was smuggling contraband, was unreasonable, and thus amounted to deliberate indifference to the arrestees'
Fourth Amendment rights, especially given that all of the arrestees were booked and then released on their own
recognizance without ever being housed with the general jail population. (Washoe County Detention Facility,
Nevada)
U.S. Appeals Court
BODY CAVITY SEARCH
STRIP SEARCH

Hutchins v. McDaniels, 512 F.3d 193 (5th Cir. 2007). A prison inmate who was subjected to strip and cavity
searches by a prison officer brought suit under § 1983 to recover for alleged violation of his Fourth Amendment
rights. The district court entered an order dismissing the complaint and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court
reversed and remanded. The court held that the inmate’s allegations regarding strip and cavity searches to which
he was subjected by a prison officer who never accused him of possessing contraband during the search, and
who was allegedly wearing a “lewd smile” during the procedure, were sufficient to state a claim for violation of
the inmate's Fourth Amendment rights. The court noted that the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) prohibits
a prisoner from recovering compensatory damages in any federal civil action absent a showing of physical
injury. According to the court, the inmate's failure to allege that he had sustained any physical injury as a result
of a strip and cavity search, prevented him from asserting a claim for recovery of compensatory damages for
emotional or mental injuries that he allegedly suffered. The court noted that the inmate did not have to allege any
physical injury in order to state a claim for recovery of nominal or punitive damages for the officer's alleged
violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. (California Men’s Colony East)

U.S. Appeals Court
CELL SEARCHES
STRIP SEARCHES

Hydrick v. Hunter, 500 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2007). Sexual offenders who were civilly confined in a state
psychiatric hospital under California's Sexually Violent Predators Act (SVP) filed a class action against various
state officials under § 1983, challenging the conditions of their confinement. The district court denied the
defendants' motion to dismiss, and the defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed in
part. The court held that the First Amendment claims brought against state hospital officials were based on
clearly established law for qualified immunity purposes insofar as they challenged retaliation for filing lawsuits,
however, officials had qualified immunity to the extent that the plaintiffs' claim relied on a First Amendment
right not to participate in treatment sessions. The court found that the plaintiffs stated a § 1983 claim for
violations of their Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The court
concluded that hospital officials were entitled to qualified immunity with regard to procedural due process
claims, but not substantive due process claims. The offenders alleged that they were subjected to public strip
searches, to retaliatory searches of their possessions and to arbitrary seizure of their personal belongings, that
they were placed in shackles during transport to the hospital and during visits from family and friends, that they
were subjected to restraint even if they did not pose any physical risk, and that they were force-medicated. On
appeal to the United States Supreme Court (129 S.Ct. 2431) the court vacated the decision. (Atascadero State
Hospital, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
PRETRIAL DETAINEES

Tabbaa v. Chertoff, 509 F.3d 89 (2nd Cir. 2007). United States citizens brought an action alleging that the
Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officials violated their constitutional and statutory rights by
detaining and searching them at a border when they returned from an Islamic conference in Canada. The district
court entered summary judgment in the government's favor, and the plaintiffs appealed. The appeals court
affirmed, finding that the suspicionless searches of the plaintiffs did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The
court found that the burden placed on the plaintiffs' associational rights as the result of the CBP searches and
detention was sufficiently significant to implicate First Amendment protections, but the searches and detention
constituted the least restrictive means to protect the nation from terrorism. (U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border
Protection, Buffalo, New York)

U.S. District Court
CELL SEARCH

Teahan v. Wilhelm, 481 F.Supp.2d 1115 (S.D.Cal. 2007). An indigent state prisoner brought a § 1983 action
against two correctional officers, challenging the conditions of his confinement. The court dismissed the action.
The court held that the prisoner's allegations that prison officials searched his cell numerous times over the
course of one evening, resulting in several items of the prisoner's property being seized, did not state a claim of
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of Eighth Amendment. (Centinela State Prison, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
STRIP SEARCH
BODY CAVITY SEARCH

U.S. v. Barnes, 506 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 2008). The government appealed an order of the United States District
Court for the District of Rhode Island suppressing cocaine seized from a defendant pursuant to a visual body
cavity search. The appeals court vacated and remanded. The court held that the strip search for contraband and
weapons was justified given the defendant's arrest for a drug trafficking crime, but that the arresting officer did
not have individualized suspicion that the arrestee was “cheeking” drugs, as required to justify a visual body
cavity search. According to the court, the evidence before the officer was that the arrestee was a suspected drug
dealer in possession of narcotics and that some drug dealers concealed drugs between their buttocks.
(Woonsocket Police Department, Rhode Island)

U.S. Appeals Court
DNA

U.S. v. Kriesel, 508 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2007). The government petitioned to revoke supervised release of a felon
who refused to submit a DNA sample. In response, the convicted felon challenged the constitutionality of the
Justice for All Act, which expanded coverage of the DNA Act to require DNA samples from all convicted felons
on supervised release. The felon also challenged the regulation issued pursuant to the Justice for All Act. The
district court upheld the constitutionality of the Justice for All Act and the validity of the regulation. The felon
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that requiring a convicted felon on supervised release to
provide a DNA sample, even through drawing of blood, did not constitute an illegal search. The court found that
the government's significant interests in identifying supervised releasees, preventing recidivism, and solving past
crimes outweighed the diminished privacy interests of the convicted felon. (United States District Court for the
Western District of Washington)

41.68
XXII

U.S. District Court
BODY CAVITY
USE OF FORCE

Vasquez v. Raemisch, 480 F.Supp.2d 1120 (W.D.Wis. 2007). A prisoner sought leave to proceed under the in
forma pauperis statute in a proposed civil rights action for declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief brought
against prison officials and corrections officers. The district court held that, with respect to three body cavity
search incidents, the prisoner would be permitted proceed with his Eighth Amendment excessive force claims
against each correctional officer who he alleged was either directly involved in the use of force or was present
and either encouraged or failed to stop it. The prisoner alleged that there was no need for force in connection
with the first search, that his constitutional rights were violated in connection with the second search when
several officers, who lacked legitimate security reasons for conducting a manual body cavity search, made
contact with his genitals while conducting a strip search as a means of obtaining sexual gratification or
humiliating him, and other officers who were present failed to intervene, and that, with respect to the third
search, an officer used a taser against the prisoner when he posed no threat. (Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
PAROLEES

Willis v. Mullins, 517 F.Supp.2d 1206 (E.D.Cal. 2007.) An arrestee brought a § 1983 action against law
enforcement officers and a parole officer, alleging Fourth Amendment violations. The defendants moved for
summary judgment. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that the
warrant-less entry into a motel room by the officers violated the arrestee's Fourth Amendment rights and that a
genuine issue of material fact precluded summary judgment on qualified immunity. The court found that the
officers' search of a briefcase did not violate the Fourth Amendment, and that the arrestee failed to state a claim
against the officers upon which relief could be granted for violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act. (Kern County, California)

U.S. District Court
DNA-Deoxy Ribonucleic
Acid
PRIVACY

Wilson v. Wilkinson, 608 F.Supp.2d 891 (S.D.Ohio 2007). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against state
officials, challenging the constitutionality of a state statute requiring the collection of DNA specimens from
convicted felons. The parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The district court held that the collection of a
DNA specimen was not an unreasonable search and seizure, and that a DNA sample did not implicate the
prisoner's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The court noted that law enforcement's interest
in obtaining DNA for a database to solve past and future crimes outweighed the prisoner's diminished privacy
rights. According to the court, the prisoner did not have a fundamental privacy interest protected by substantive
due process in the information contained in a DNA sample and the profile obtained pursuant to the state statute.
The court noted that the prisoner, as a convicted felon, did not enjoy the same privacy rights as did ordinary
citizens. (Ross Correctional Institution, Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction)
2008

U.S. District Court
VISITOR SEARCHES

Adeyola v. Gibon, 537 F.Supp.2d 479 (W.D.N.Y. 2008). An inmate brought a pro se action against a sheriff and
correctional facility officials, alleging that they violated his constitutional rights by refusing to allow females to
visit him unless they removed their head scarves for a search or presented proof that they were practicing
Muslims. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the sheriff and officials. The court held that
the inmate failed to allege any injury in fact and thus lacked standing. The court held that the allegations, even if
proven, did not violate any First Amendment right of the inmate to have visitors, in that it was reasonable for
officials to require visitors to remove scarves to determine that they were not attempting to bring in contraband,
and he was not denied visitors, given that visitors were simply required to agree to certain conditions before
being allowed to see an inmate. (Erie County Holding Center, N.Y. State Department of Correctional Services)

U.S. Appeals Court
OPPOSITE SEX
STRIP SEARCHES

Archuleta v. Wagner, 523 F.3d 1278 (10th Cir. 2008). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action against a jailer and
others alleging her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when she was strip searched. The
district court denied the jailer's request for qualified immunity and the jailer appealed. The appeals court
affirmed the district court decision. The court held that the jailer was not justified in conducting the strip search
during booking, following the arrest pursuant to an arrest warrant for harassment, where the arrestee never
intermingled with the general jail population but rather was confined in a cell by herself for several hours while
awaiting bail. The court noted that three pat down searches had been performed on the arrestee prior to booking,
the arrestee was wearing shorts and a sleeveless blouse at the time of booking, the jailer saw that the arrestee did
not have any tattoos or moles indicating that she was the culprit, and the crime of harassment was not a crime of
violence. The court found that the arrestee had a right not to be strip searched during booking when she was not
going to intermingle with the general prison population. She had already been through a pat-down search, and
there was no reasonable suspicion that she had a weapon. According to the court, the jailer who conducted the
strip search was not entitled to qualified immunity because at the time of this incident it was clearly established
that a strip search could be justified if there was a reasonable suspicion that the detainee possessed weapons and
the detainee intermingled with the general jail population. The 46-year-old mother of nine had been riding in a
family van with some of her children when she was stopped by an officer because there was an extra child in the
back seat. The officer arrested her with the belief that she was the person for whom a warrant had been issued.
After being booked at the jail it became apparent that she was not the person named in the warrant because she
did not have the tattoos and moles that were described in the file. Knowing that the plaintiff was not the person
named in the warrant, a jail officer nonetheless continued to process and strip search her. As she was standing
naked, she began to lactate. She tried to cover herself but was told by the officer to put her arms down. She was
mocked continually by the officer and a male officer during this incident. (Jefferson County Detention Facility,
Colorado)

U.S. District Court
PRETRIAL DETAINEES
STRIP SEARCHES

Brazier v. Oxford County, 575 F.Supp.2d 265 (D.Me. 2008). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action against a
county and corrections officers, alleging that strip searches performed upon her during two post-arrest
confinements at a county jail, both relating to her driving privileges, were unconstitutional. The district court
held that the strip searches violated the county's written policy, and thus the county was subject to liability under

41.69
XXII

§ 1983. The court noted that the county's written policy prohibited strip searches of inmates charged with
misdemeanor crimes unless there was reasonable suspicion to believe that an inmate was hoarding evidence to a
crime, weapons, drugs, or contraband. (Oxford County Jail, Maine)
U.S. District Court
STRIP SEARCHES

Bullock v. Sheahan, 568 F.Supp.2d 965 (N.D.Ill. 2008). Two county inmates who were ordered released after
being found not guilty of the charges against them brought an action individually and on behalf of a class against
a county sheriff and county, challenging the constitutionality of a policy under which male inmates, in the
custody of the Cook County Department of Corrections (CCDC), were subjected to strip searches upon returning
to CCDC after being ordered released. The district court held that male inmates in the custody of CCDC who
were potentially discharged were similarly situated to female potential discharges, as supported the male
inmates' claim that the county's policy of strip searching all male discharges and not all female discharges
violated the Equal Protection Clause. The court noted that the two groups of inmates were housed within the
same facility, there were varying security classifications within each group that corresponded to each other,
statistics concerning inmate violence clearly indicated that it took place among female as well as male inmates,
and the county's primary justification for distinguishing between male and female discharges, namely, its alleged
inability to hold them in a receiving, classification, and diagnosis center (RCDC) while their records were
reviewed, was a logistical rather than a security concern. The court held that the CCDC exhibited discriminatory
intent in strip searching all male inmates who were potentially discharged and not all female discharges, as
supported the male inmates' claim that the county's strip search policy violated the Equal Protection Clause. The
court found that the county's blanket strip search policy for male discharged inmates was not substantially related
to the achievement of important governmental objectives--jail safety and security--and thus the policy deprived
male discharges of their constitutional right to equal protection. The court noted that female discharges were just
as capable of importing contraband into the jail as their male counterparts.
According to the court, the fact that there were a greater number of male inmates in a county jail did not
legitimize an equal protection violation resulting from the county's blanket strip search policy for male
discharged inmates. The court found that the county's policy of exempting male discharged inmates from
obtaining privacy screens for use during strip searches violated the Equal Protection Clause. The court found that
potentially discharged male inmates, for whom there was no longer any basis for detention, had a privacy
interest with regard to strip searches which was arguably greater than that of pretrial detainees. According to the
court, the county's policy of strip searching all male discharged inmates in large group settings in which inmates
were placed at approximately an arm's length apart when searched violated the Fourth Amendment. The court
found that the county sheriff was not acting as an arm of the state insofar as requiring strip searching of
discharged male inmates, and thus was not entitled to qualified immunity. The court noted that an Illinois
Administrative Code (IAC) provision stating that “detainees permitted to leave the confines of the jail
temporarily, for any reason, shall be thoroughly searched prior to leaving and before re-entering the jail” did not
mandate strip searches, just that inmates be “thoroughly searched.” (Cook Co. Dept. of Corrections, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
BODY CAVITY SEARCH
STRIP SEARCHES

Collins v. Knox County, 569 F.Supp.2d 269 (D.Me. 2008). A female arrestee brought a § 1983 action against a
county, sheriff, and corrections officers, alleging an unconstitutional policy and/or custom and practice of
conducting a strip search and visual body cavity search of every person taken into custody at the jail. The district
court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The court held that the county did not have an
unconstitutional strip search policy or custom at the county jail, and that the sheriff did not acquiesce to a policy
or practice of unconstitutional strip searches. The court found that there was no evidence of an unconstitutional
policy and/or custom and practice of conducting a strip search and visual body cavity search of every person
taken into custody at the county jail, as required for the arrestee to establish a § 1983 claim against the county.
The court noted that it’s prior determination in an unrelated case, that the county maintained an unconstitutional
policy of strip searching all misdemeanor detainees, concerned a period several years prior to the time that the
arrestee was detained. The court found that the strip search of the female arrestee upon her admission to jail after
self-surrendering on an outstanding felony arrest warrant was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The
search, in which the arrestee was required to run her fingers through her hair, extend her arms out straight, open
her mouth for visual inspection, spread her toes, lift each of her breasts, expose her vagina, squat on her
haunches with her back to the officer and, while squatting, cough violently several times, at which time she
expelled menstrual fluid, caused the arrestee humiliation and embarrassment. The court found that the search
was based on a drug charge in her inmate file, the fact that she made a planned admission to jail which provided
the opportunity to conceal contraband, and that she was going to be housed overnight at the jail, which had a
problem with contraband. The search was performed by a female officer in the changing area of the shower stall
adjacent to the booking area, which was mostly shielded from view by a plastic curtain. (Knox Co. Jail, Maine)

U.S. District Court
STRIP SEARCHES

Craft v. County of San Bernardino, 624 F.Supp.2d 1113 (C.D.Cal. 2008). County jail inmates brought a class
action alleging that a county's practice of routinely strip-searching inmates without probable cause or reasonable
suspicion that the inmates were in possession of weapons or drugs violated the Fourth Amendment. After the
court granted the inmates’ motion for partial summary judgment, the parties entered into private mediation and
reached a settlement agreement providing for, among other things, a class fund award of $25,648,204. The
inmates moved for the award of attorney's fees and costs. The district court held that class counsel were entitled
to an attorney's fees award in the amount of 25% of the settlement fund plus costs. The court noted that counsel
obtained excellent pecuniary and nonpecuniary results in a complex and risky case involving 150,000 class
members, 20,000 claims, and five certified classes, each of which presented unsettled legal issues. According to
the court, tens or hundreds of thousands of future inmates benefited from policy changes brought about by the
suit, and the attorneys were highly experienced and highly regarded civil rights lawyers with extensive class
action experience. (San Bernardino County Jail, California)

41.70
XXII

U.S. District Court
STRIP SEARCHES
VISITS

Davis v. Peters, 566 F.Supp.2d 790 (N.D.Ill. 2008). A detainee who was civilly committed pursuant to the
Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act sued the current and former facility directors of the Illinois
Department of Human Services' (DHS) Treatment and Detention Facility (TDF), where the detainee was housed,
as well as two former DHS Secretaries, and the current DHS Secretary. The detainee claimed that the conditions
of his confinement violated his constitutional rights to equal protection and substantive due process. After a
bench trial, the district court held that: (1) the practice of searching the detainee prior to his visits with guests and
attorneys violated his substantive due process rights; (2) the practice of using a “black-box” restraint system on
all of the detainee's trips to and from court over a 15-month period violated his substantive due process rights;
(3) requiring the detainee to sleep in a room illuminated by a night light did not violate the detainee's substantive
due process rights; (4) a former director was not protected by qualified immunity from liability for the
constitutional violations; and (5) the detainee would be awarded compensatory damages in the amount of $30 for
each hour he wore the black box in violation of his rights. The court noted that strip searches of a detainee prior
to his court appearances and upon his return to the institution did not violate substantive due process, where
detainees were far more likely to engage in successful escapes if they could carry concealed items during their
travel to court, and searches upon their return were closely connected with the goal of keeping contraband out of
the facility. The court held that the practice of conducting strip searches of the detainee prior to his visits with
guests and attorneys was not within the bounds of professional judgment, and thus, violated the detainee's
substantive due process rights, where the only motivation for such searches appeared to be a concern that a
detainee would bring a weapon into the meeting, and most weapons should have been detectable through a patdown search. (Treatment and Detention Facility, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
OPPOSITE SEX
PRIVACY
STRIP SEARCHES

Graham v. Van Dycke, 564 F.Supp.2d 1305 (D.Kan. 2008). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against medical
providers working at a state correctional facility, alleging violations of her Eighth Amendment due process rights
arising from a strip search conducted by a male officer. She also challenged her mental health confinement. The
district court granted summary judgment for the medical providers. The court found that removal of the female
inmate from her cell into administrative segregation and removal of her clothing, after she became agitated and
demanded psychotropic drugs, did not violate her privacy or Eighth Amendment due process rights, even though
officers who performed such tasks were all male. According to the court, the inmate was on suicide watch,
which required removal of clothing to avoid self-injury, removal was done pursuant to established procedure and
was videotaped, and a staffing shortage rendered it impractical to include a female officer on the removal team.
(Topeka Correctional Facility, Kansas)

U.S. District Court
STRIP SEARCHES
USE OF FORCE

Hart v. Celaya, 548 F.Supp.2d 789 (N.D.Cal. 2008). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against corrections
officers, alleging excessive force and deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The district court
granted summary judgment for the defendants. The court held that the officers did not use excessive force in
releasing pepper-spray into the prisoner's holding cell after he refused to submit to an unclothed body search.
The court noted that the officer released pepper-spray into the cell only after the prisoner refused to comply with
the direct orders of three different officers of increasingly higher rank to submit to the search, after the officer
explained to the prisoner that all inmates entering administrative segregation were required to submit to an
unclothed body search, after the prisoner began yelling and pushing up against his cell door causing it to shake
and rattle, and after the officers were concerned that the prisoner would either harm himself or break out of his
cell and endanger others. The court found that the officer did not use excessive force in requiring the prisoner to
lift his genitals during an unclothed body search, even though the prisoner had pepper spray on his hands. The
court held that officers did not use excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment when they allegedly
attempted to trip the prisoner, pushed him into the frame of a holding cell door, and twisted and pulled his wrists
as they put him in leg restraints in order to move the prisoner from the cell to an outside area where he could be
decontaminated from the officer's use of pepper-spray. The court noted that the prisoner's medical evaluations,
prior to and after the incident indicated that the prisoner did not sustain any injuries, such as cuts, abrasions,
swelling or bruises. (Salinas Valley State Prison, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
STRIP SEARCHES

Hartline v. Gallo, 546 F.3d 95 (2nd Cir. 2008). An arrestee brought § 1983 and 1985 claims against a police
department and others alleging her Fourth Amendment rights were violated when she was subjected to a strip
search. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the arrestee appealed. The
appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court held that there was no reasonable
suspicion that the arrestee was hiding drugs on her person as required to justify the strip search and the officers
were not entitled to qualified immunity. The court found that summary judgment was precluded by an issue of
material fact regarding whether the jail's surveillance system telecast the strip search. (Southampton Police
Department, New York)

U.S. District Court
STRIP SEARCHES

Jean-Laurent v. Wilkinson, 540 F.Supp.2d 501 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). A prisoner in a state correctional facility
brought a civil rights action against officers and supervisors claiming violation of his rights under the First,
Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants in
part and denied in part. The court held that striking the prisoner in the face several times while he was standing
naked in a stairwell surrounded by several officers, absent any indication that the prisoner posed a threat, was not
within the corrections officer's asserted good-faith effort to maintain order, discipline, and security due to a
stabbing that recently had occurred within the prison. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a
fact issue as to whether the prisoner was under constant supervision by corrections officers and to what
proximity he was to other inmates so as to determine whether he could have acquired contraband. The court also
found summary judgment was precluded by a fact issue as to whether senior corrections officers were grossly
negligent in supervising a junior officer who allegedly violated the prisoner's Fourth Amendment rights through
a strip search, and as to whether the Fourth Amendment rights of the prisoner were violated during a second strip
search and alleged use of excessive force. (George Motchan Det. Center, N.Y. City Department of Correction)

41.71
XXII

U.S. District Court
BODY CAVITY
SEARCHES
STRIP SEARCHES

Johnson v. Government of District of Columbia, 584 F.Supp.2d 83 (D.D.C. 2008). Female former arrestees filed
a class action against the District of Columbia and a former United States Marshal for the Superior Court of
District of Columbia, under § 1983, claiming violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. The arrestees
alleged that the marshal strip searched all females awaiting presentment to a superior court judge, without
reasonable and particularized suspicion that any female was carrying contraband on her person and without strip
searching any male arrestees. The District of Columbia moved for summary judgment and the district court
granted the motion. The court held that the former United States Marshal for the Superior Court of the District of
Columbia was a federal official who was not amenable to suit, under § 1983, as an employee, servant, agent, or
actor under the control of the District of Columbia, precluding the female former arrestees' class action. The
court noted that the marshal was empowered to act under the color of the federal Anti-Drug Abuse Act, and a
District of Columbia law provided that the marshal acted under the supervision of the United States Attorney
General. According to the court, the District of Columbia lacked authority to control the conduct of the former
United States Marshal, precluding the female former arrestees' class action under § 1983. The arrestees were
held for presentment for an offense that did not involve drugs or violence, but they were subjected to a blanket
policy of a strip, visual body cavity search and/or squat search without any individualized finding of reasonable
suspicion or probable cause that they were concealing drugs, weapons or other contraband. (District of
Columbia, Superior Court Cellblock)

U.S. District Court
FRISK SEARCH
PAT DOWN SEARCH

Jones v. Murphy, 567 F.Supp.2d 787 (D.Md. 2008). A male arrestee brought a class action, alleging that a
booking facility's policy of frisking female arrestees while searching male arrestees down to their underwear
violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment
for the arrestee, finding that the booking facility's gender-differentiated search policy was not reasonably related
to a legitimate penological interest in preventing arrestees from bringing weapons into the booking facility, and
thus violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court noted that the additional staff
needed to more thoroughly search female arrestees was not overly burdensome, and searching all arrestees to
their last layer of clothing was a readily available constitutional alternative. (Baltimore City Central Booking,
Maryland)

U.S. Appeals Court
DNA- Deoxy Ribonucleic
Acid

Kaemmerling v. Lappin, 553 F.3d 669 (D.C.Cir. 2008). A federal prisoner sought to enjoin application of the
DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act (DNA Act), alleging the Act violated his rights under the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments. The district court dismissed the
action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The
court held that the prisoner’s allegation that DNA collection burdened his free exercise of religion failed to state
a claim under the First Amendment and RFRA. The court found that the potential criminal penalty for failure to
cooperate with the collection of a DNA sample did not violate RFRA. According to the court, the collection of
prisoner DNA furthers a compelling government interest using the least restrictive means. The court also found
that the DNA Act does not violate equal protection despite the fact that it requires collection of DNA only from
felons who are incarcerated or on supervised release, rather than those who are no longer under the supervision
of the Bureau of Prisons (BOP), where the BOP's measure of control over supervised and incarcerated felons
makes it significantly easier to collect their DNA samples. The court noted that the extraction, analysis, and
storage of the prisoner's DNA information did not call for the prisoner to modify his religious behavior in any
way, did not involve any action or forbearance on the prisoner's part, and did not interfere with any religious act
in which the prisoner was engaged. (Federal Correctional Institution, Seagoville, Texas)

U.S. Appeals Court
URINE TEST

Levine v. Roebuck, 550 F.3d 684 (8th Cir. 2008). A state inmate brought § 1983 claims against a correctional
officer and nurses alleging that they violated his Fourth and Eighth Amendment rights by forcing him to undergo
catheterization to avoid prison discipline when he could not provide a urine sample for a random drug test. The
district court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment and the inmate appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The court held that the prison nurses' actions in attempting catheterization of the inmate were
objectively reasonable and did not violate the inmate's Eighth Amendment rights against brutality. The court
noted that the nurses were following a request from a correctional officer, and the inmate had undergone
voluntary catheterization in the past when he was unable to urinate. (Western Missouri Correctional Center)

U.S. District Court
BODY CAVITY
SEARCHES
STRIP SEARCHES

McCabe v. Mais, 602 F.Supp.2d 1025 (N.D.Iowa 2008). County jail detainees brought a § 1983 action against a
county jail officer, alleging that the officer conducted illegal strip searches and visual body cavity searches.
Following a jury trial, the district court granted the officer's motion reduce the jury’s damages award, and after
the detainees refused to accept the reduced damages award, ordered a new trial on the issue of damages. After a
jury returned a verdict in favor of the detainees in the amount of $55,804, the detainees moved for new trial. The
court held that a new trial on damages was not warranted and that the damages award was not so inadequate as
to shock the conscience. The court noted that there was no evidence that the detainees were subjected to repeated
violations of their Fourth Amendment rights, or that the illegal searches were conducted in a violent or mocking
way, and detainees' own descriptions of their emotional distress was not compelling. (Linn County Jail, Iowa)

U.S. District Court
STRIP SEARCHES

Munyiri v. Haduch, 585 F.Supp.2d 670 (D.Md. 2008). A motorist who was arrested for driving around a police
roadblock and subsequently failing to stop when signaled by a pursuing squad car brought a civil rights action
against an arresting officer, police commissioner and warden at central booking facility to which she was
transported. She alleged she was subjected to unlawful strip and visual body cavity searches. The defendants
moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that allegations
in the motorist's complaint were sufficient to state a supervisory liability claim against the Secretary of the
Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services (DPSCS) and the warden at a central booking
facility, for intrusive searches to which she was subjected. The court found that the allegations in the offender's
complaint-- that she was improperly subjected to a strip search and to a visual body cavity search as the result of

41.72
XXII

a policy implemented by the Secretary of the Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services
(DPSCS) and by a warden at the central booking facility-- adequately pleaded the minimum facts necessary to
state a supervisory liability claim against the Secretary and the warden under § 1983. The policy allegedly
authorized strip searches and visual body cavity searches of all persons admitted to the facility, regardless of the
charges filed against them or circumstances surrounding their arrest. (Baltimore Central Booking and Intake
Facility, Maryland)
U.S. District Court
PAROLEES

Portentoso v. Kern, 532 F.Supp.2d 920 (N.D.Ohio 2008). A parolee brought a § 1983 action against a state
parole authority and officers, stemming from an alleged illegal search of his residential property and his arrest.
The defendants moved for dismissal and for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and
denied in part. The court held that the state parole officers had probable cause to search the parolee's barn, for the
purposes of the parolee's Fourth Amendment claim alleging warrantless and illegal search, since the parolee's exwife had reported to officers that her daughter told her there were weapons in the barn. The court held that
summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact, regarding whether the parolee consented to
the state parole officers' search of his house after searching the barn for weapons. The court found that the state
parole officers had probable cause to arrest the parolee after finding ammunition in his house, since possession
of ammunition contravened the parolee's conditions of supervision. (Ohio)

U.S. District Court
BODY CAVITY
SEARCHES

Sanchez Rodriguez v. Departamento de Correccion y Rehabilitacion, 537 F.Supp.2d 295 (D.Puerto Rico 2008).
An inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that Puerto Rico prison officials denied him his constitutional right to
enjoy daily recreational time outside of his cell because he refused to submit to visual body cavity searches.
After dismissal of his complaint, the inmate filed a motion for reconsideration. The district court denied the
motion. The court held that the searches did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. According to the court,
the requirement that inmates submit to visual body cavity searches in order to leave their cells for recreation was
needed to preserve internal order and institutional security, and thus did not constitute cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Maximum Security Prison, Ponce, Puerto Rico)

U.S. District Court
STRIP SEARCHES

Streeter v. Sheriff of Cook County, 576 F.Supp.2d 913 (N.D.Ill. 2008). Current or former pretrial detainees filed
a class action under § 1983 against a county sheriff and the county, challenging a strip search policy at the
county jail, alleging it violated their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court denied
summary judgment for the defendants. The court held that the detainees stated a claim for violation of their
Fourth Amendment rights in connection with group strip searches that were allegedly conducted in an
unreasonably intrusive manner and went on longer than penologically necessary. The court also found that the
detainees stated a claim for violation of their rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
in connection with group strip searches that were allegedly conducted in a manner intended to humiliate and
embarrass the detainees, and that went on longer than necessary. (Cook County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
BODY CAVITY
SEARCHES
STRIP SEARCHES

Tardiff v. Knox County, 567 F.Supp.2d 201 (D.Me. 2008). An arrestee who was subjected to a strip and visual
body cavity search brought a § 1983 action against a county for alleged violations of her Fourth Amendment
rights. She brought the action after opting out of a class action against the county in which her claim had initially
moved forward and in which she was named as class representative. The county asserted counterclaims for
breach of contract and equitable estoppel and the parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The district court
held that the settlement agreement in a prior class action did not contain an implied term that the arrestee, as
named class representative, would not opt out of the agreement. (Knox County Jail, Maine)

U.S. District Court
BODY CAVITY SEARCH
PRETRIAL DETAINEES
STRIP SEARCHES

Tardiff v. Knox County, 573 F.Supp.2d 301 (D.Me. 2008). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action against a county
alleging a strip and visual body cavity search violated the Fourth Amendment. The district court granted
summary judgment for the plaintiff, in part. The court held that jail personnel did not have individualized
reasonable suspicion that the arrestee was concealing contraband or weapons, as required to perform a strip and
visual body cavity search of the arrestee who had been arrested for felony witness tampering. The court noted
that the arrestee was not arrested for a violent felony, spending a night in jail did not implicate sufficiently
serious security concerns to warrant a search, the county failed to show the underlying facts of the crime
provided individualized reasonable suspicion, and the county failed to establish that the arrestee's conduct
required the search. According to the court, a felony categorization alone does not obviate the requirement of
individualized reasonable suspicion for a strip and visual body cavity search of an arrestee. (Knox County Jail,
Maine)

U.S. District Court
BODY SEARCHES
CONTRABAND
PRIVACY

Williams v. Fitch, 550 F.Supp.2d 413 (W.D.N.Y. 2008). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that
corrections officers sexually abused him. The district court dismissed the case. The court held that the officers
did not violate the inmate's Eighth Amendment rights by searching and handling his penis on three occasions
while searching for contraband. The court noted that X-rays showed the presence of a metal object in the
foreskin of the inmate's penis, and the searches were undertaken in a private location, without undue physical
intrusion, humiliation, or physical injury. (Attica Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
DNA
PRIVACY

Wilson v. Collins, 517 F.3d 421 (6th Cir. 2008). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against state officials
challenging the constitutionality of Ohio's DNA Act that required the collection of DNA specimens from
convicted felons. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants and the prisoner appealed. The
appeals court affirmed. The court held that collection of a DNA specimen pursuant to the statute was not an
unreasonable search and seizure and that the prisoner did not have a fundamental privacy interest in the
information contained in a DNA specimen. (Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction)

41.73
XXII

U.S. District Court
PRIVACY
VISITOR SEARCHES
X-RAY

Zboralski v. Monahan, 616 F.Supp.2d 792 (N.D.Ill. 2008). The wife of a civilly committed resident of a state
treatment and detention facility brought an action against facility employees, in their individual and official
capacities, alleging claims under § 1983 for violations of her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, as well
as claims for invasion of privacy and assault and battery, in connection with a series of searches the employees
performed on her when she was visiting a resident. The court denied the employees’ motion for summary
judgment, in part. The court held that a hearing was required in order to develop the record on the issue of the
reasonableness of the searches. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by fact issues as to
whether the wife agreed to undergo a scan each and every time she entered the facility, and as to whether one
employee intentionally touched the wife's vaginal area during pat-down searches. The court denied immunity to
the employee and found that, as a matter of first impression, requiring the wife to submit to a scan in order to
visit her husband amounted to an unconstitutional condition. The facility employed X-ray technology to conduct
a body search of visitors. The court noted that questions to be addressed at a hearing included how the machine
actually worked and the quality of the images it produced, and how reasonable persons would feel being
subjected to such a scan. According to the court, to determine whether a body scan of a prison visitor is akin to a
pat-down or strip search, the key factor is the level of embarrassment and intrusion that the visitor searched feels.
(Illinois Department of Human Services' Treatment and Detention Facility, Joliet, Illinois)
2009

U.S. District Court
STRIP SEARCHES

Allison v. GEO Group, Inc., 611 F.Supp.2d 433 (E.D.Pa. 2009). Arrestees detained in state custodial facilities
managed by a private corporation brought a class action against the corporation, alleging the facilities' blanket
policy of mandatory strip searches without individualized suspicion violated the Fourth Amendment. The
corporation moved for judgment on the pleadings for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted
and the district court denied the motion. The court held that the arrestees stated a § 1983 claim for a Fourth
Amendment violation. The court noted that strip searches in a custodial facility differ qualitatively from other
intake procedures which entail some incidental nudity but do not involve visual inspection of the naked body.
The court said that the exposure of the naked body to scrutiny by government officers is what makes strip
searches more invasive than other admission procedures at a custodial facility. According to the court, the
searches involved visual inspection of the arrestees’ naked bodies, the searches of named arrestees were not
based on reasonable suspicion, and the purported class consisted of arrestees who were either charged with
minor offenses or non-violent offenses that did not involve drugs. (George W. Hill Corr. Facility, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
STRIP SEARCHES

Bullock v. Dart, 599 F.Supp.2d 947 (N.D.Ill. 2009). Inmates filed a § 1983 action challenging the
constitutionality a county's policies of performing blanket strip searches on male, but not female, inmates
returning to county jail from court hearings at which charges against them were dismissed, and of providing
privacy screens for female discharges but not male discharges. After entry of summary judgment in the inmates'
favor, the defendants moved for reconsideration. The district court granted the motion in part. The court held that
male inmates were similarly situated to female potential discharges. The court found that fact issues remained as
to whether the county's policies were justified, and whether security considerations prevented the county from
segregating inmates against whom charges had been dismissed before they returned to their divisions. The
defendants asserted that the much greater number of male inmates in county custody and the differences in the
nature and frequency of dangerous incidents in each population justified the policy. The court held that the
county's policy and practice of segregating female possible discharges from the remainder of female court
returns, such that female actual returns could elect to avoid strip searches, but not segregating male possible
discharges in a similar manner, was not gender-neutral on its face, for the purposes of the Equal Protection
Clause. (Cook County Department of Corrections, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
STRIP SEARCHES

Chehade Refai v. Lazaro, 614 F.Supp.2d 1103 (D.Nev. 2009). A German citizen, who was detained by
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) officials at a Nevada airport, and later transferred to a local jail, after
his name had been erroneously placed on a watch list, brought an action against the United States, DHS officials,
a police department, a city, and a police chief, alleging various constitutional violations. The district court
granted the DHS and United States motions to dismiss in part, and denied in part. The court held that DHS
officials could not bypass constitutional requirements for strip searches and body-cavity searches of nonadmitted aliens at a border by sending the German citizen to a detention facility where they allegedly knew strip
searches occurred in the absence of reasonable suspicion under circumstances in which the DHS officials could
not perform the strip search themselves. According to the court, regardless of any reasonable suspicion that
detention center officials had for a strip search, federal officials at the border needed reasonable suspicion for a
strip search. The court found that the Fourth Amendment right of a non-admitted alien to be free from a noninvasive, non-abusive strip search absent suspicion to conduct such a search was clearly established in 2006,
when the German citizen was detained at an airport, and thus, a DHS officer was not entitled to qualified
immunity. The court held that the German citizen who was detained after arriving at a United States airport and
was asked to spy for the United States government in order to obtain an entry visa was not subjected to
“involuntary servitude” in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment, where the German citizen never actually
spied for the United States. The court found that the German citizen adequately alleged that the defendant's
actions constituted extreme and outrageous conduct, as required to state claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress under Nevada law, where he alleged that DHS officials told him that if he did not spy for the
United States government, he would never be able to return to the United States where his daughter and
grandchild lived. According to the court, the detained German citizen's negligence claim, alleging that the United
States owed him a duty of care not to cause him to be detained in a local jail when he had not been and was
never charged with any criminal offense, was not barred by the discretionary function exception to the Federal
Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The court noted that although the government claimed that immigration officials had
discretion in choosing where to house aliens, under an Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)

41.74
XXII

memorandum, the alien should never have been booked into local jail. (North Las Vegas Detention Center,
Nevada)
U.S. District Court
CELL SEARCHES

Cox v. Ashcroft, 603 F.Supp.2d 1261 (E.D.Cal. 2009). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against the United
States Attorney General, several federal prosecutors, and the owner and employees of a privately-owned federal
facility in which the prisoner was incarcerated, alleging constitutional violations arising from his arrest,
prosecution, and incarceration. The district court dismissed the action. The court held that the prisoner did not
have any Fourth Amendment rights to privacy in his cell, and thus did not suffer any constitutional injury as a
result of the search of his cell and the confiscation of another inmate's legal materials. The court found that the
prisoner did not have any liberty or property interest in employment while in prison, and thus the prisoner did
not suffer any violation of his due process right related to his termination from his prison job as a result of
discipline arising from the search of his cell, precluding liability on the part of facility owner and its employees
under § 1983. (Taft Correctional Institution, Wackenhut Corrections Corporation, California)

U.S. District Court
OPPOSITE SEX
PAT DOWN SEARCH
PRIVACY

Forde v. Zickefoose, 612 F.Supp.2d 171 (D.Conn. 2009). A federal prisoner petitioned for a writ of habeas
corpus, alleging that she was being denied freedom of religious expression, in violation of the First and Fourth
Amendments and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). The district court granted the government's
motion for summary judgment in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded
by issues of fact as to: (1) whether the prisoner’s exercise of her religion was substantially burdened by the
prison's non-emergency cross-gender pat-down search policy; (2) whether the prisoner’s exercise of her religion
was substantially burdened by the prison's policy of requiring her to carry an identification photograph that
showed her without a hijab to cover her head; and, (3) whether the prisoner’s exercise of her religion was
substantially burdened by the prison's failure to provide an imam during Ramadan. The court held that the
prison's non-emergency cross-gender pat-down search policy did not violate the prisoner’s limited right, under
the Fourth Amendment, to bodily privacy. According to the court, although the prisoner made a sufficient
showing of a subjective expectation of privacy, the expectation would not be considered reasonable by society,
since the prison had a legitimate penological interest in security and in providing equal employment
opportunities to both male and female staff, and no available further accommodation was reasonable under the
circumstances. (Federal Correctional Institution, Danbury, Connecticut)

U.S. District Court
STRIP SEARCHES
USE OF FORCE

Jackson v. Gerl, 622 F.Supp.2d 738 (W.D.Wis. 2009). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a warden and
other prison officials, alleging that the use of a stinger grenade to extract him from his cell constituted excessive
force in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and that an abusive strip search following the deployment of the
grenade also violated the Eighth Amendment. The defendants moved for summary judgment and the district
court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that a prison lieutenant's extraction of the
prisoner from inside his cell by means of a stinger grenade, which when detonated created a bright flash of light,
emitted a loud blast accompanied by smoke, and fired rubber balls, was not “de minimis,” as would bar a claim
for excessive force under the Eighth Amendment. The court found that summary judgment was precluded by
genuine issues of material fact as to whether the extraction of the prisoner from his cell by means of a stinger
grenade was malicious and sadistic, or whether the use was in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore
discipline. The court found that the officials' alleged failure to give the prisoner an opportunity to strip down on
his own so that officials could perform a visual inspection of his person rather than be subject to a manual strip
search was for a legitimate penological purpose, and thus did not violate the Eighth Amendment as a wanton
infliction of psychological pain. The officials decided to manually strip search the prisoner after he had resisted
following orders along every step of the way. The court noted that the performance of the strip search in front of
a cell, rather than inside a cell, was not done to demean and humiliate the plaintiff, where the cell was not in an
area widely visible to prisoners, but rather was at the end of a hall with no cell across from it. (Wisconsin Secure
Program Facility)

U.S. District Court
BODY CAVITY SEARCH
PRIVACY
STRIP SEARCHES

Lopez v. Youngblood, 609 F.Supp.2d 1125 (E.D.Cal. 2009). Plaintiffs brought a class action against a county,
sheriff, and former sheriff, seeking injunctive relief and damages for alleged violations of his federal and state
constitutional rights resulting from strip and/or visual body cavity searches of detainees and inmates of the
county jail. The district granted summary judgment in part and denied in part. The court held that the policy of
the county sheriff's office of subjecting to strip search all pretrial detainees who are ordered released as a result
of court appearances, upon their return from the courthouse and prior to their being returned to the county jail's
general population for administrative reasons pending release, violated the detainees' Fourth Amendment rights.
The court found that there was no evidence that pretrial detainees at the county jail were subjected to strip
searches in small groups as a means of punishment, as required to establish that the strip searches violated the
detainees' due process rights. According to the court, pre-arraignment arrestees were not similarly situated to
post-arraignment detainees, such that the practice of providing privacy for pre-arraignment strip and/or visual
body cavity searches, but not for such searches of post-arraignment detainees, did not violate equal protection,
notwithstanding the contention that the interest in maintaining the privacy of one's body cavities was the same
for both arrestees and detainees. The court held that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because,
at the time the county sheriff's office maintained the policy allowing for group strip and visual body cavity
searches of post-arraignment detainees of the county jail, it was not clearly established that such searches
violated the detainees' Fourth Amendment rights. (Kern County Sheriff's Department, Central Receiving
Facility, Ridgecrest, Mojave, and Lerdo facilities, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
STRIP SEARCHES

Mays v. Springborn, 575 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2009). A prisoner brought an action against prison officials, asserting
claims based on strip searches at prisons and alleged retaliation for his complaints about the searches, denial of
his request for dietary supplements which he considered to be religious necessities, alleged inadequacy of his
diet, failure to issue certain winter clothing items, and censorship of pages in a magazine mailed to him. The

41.75
XXII

district court granted summary judgment in favor of the officials on the claims about prison food and clothing
and granted the officials judgment as a matter of law on the claims about strip searches, retaliation, and
censorship. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court
held that whether strip searches were conducted in a harassing manner intended to humiliate and cause
psychological pain, and whether guards subjected the prisoner to a non-routine search in retaliation for his
complaints about strip searches, were questions for the jury. (Stateville Correctional Center, Illinois)
U.S. District Court
STRIP SEARCHES

Miller v. Yamhill County, 620 F.Supp.2d 1241 (D.Or. 2009). Three inmates of a county correction facility
brought a class action against a county and sheriff alleging their policy of strip searching inmates at the facility
without reasonable suspicion that they were carrying contraband or weapons was a violation of the Fourth
Amendment. The defendants moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the motion. The court
held that the sheriff supervising the deputies who conducted allegedly unconstitutional searches was not liable
under § 1983, where the sheriff was not personally involved in any of the searches at issue, and there was no
causal connection between any conduct of the sheriff and the alleged violations.
The court held that the strip search of an inmate at the facility, who was arrested for threatening someone
with a knife and a cane, was reasonable upon the inmate's entry into the general jail population following his
completion of a drug treatment program, in light of the underlying menacing charge. The court noted that the
inmate was returning to the jail at the time of his choosing and therefore had knowledge that he would be
entering the jail, and the inmate was returning from a drug treatment facility because of his possession and use of
contraband. According to the court, the strip search of another inmate at the facility, who had been arrested on
charges of driving while suspended and the felony of attempt to elude, was reasonable, in light of one of the
charges being a felony, and the fact that the inmate had eluded arrest earlier in the day, and therefore knew that
the police were looking for him and that he would likely be entering the jail population.
The court found that the strip search of a third inmate at the facility, who had been arrested on driving under
the influence of intoxicants (DUII) charges, was reasonable, noting that after her arrest, the inmate managed to
remove and conceal her handcuffs in her underwear, and after an extended search of the patrol car and booking
area, and repeated denials that she had the handcuffs, the inmate removed the handcuffs from her pants, and
deputy concluded that a strip search was necessary on the basis that inmate might be concealing other
contraband. (Yamhill County Corrections Facility, Oregon)

U.S. District Court
STRIP SEARCHES

Miller v. Washington County, 650 F.Supp.2d 1113 (D.Or. 2009). Inmates brought a class action against county
and sheriff, alleging that the county's policy of strip searching inmates was unconstitutional. The parties crossmoved for summary judgment, and the inmates additionally moved for class certification. The district court held
that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the county's
blanket policy of strip searching all individuals transported from another correctional or detention facility was
justified by the need for institutional security. The court denied class certification, finding that the county's strip
search policy regarding arrestees did not present common questions of law or fact. The court stayed the action,
noting that the appellate court was reviewing a city’s strip search policy at the time. (Washington County Jail,
Oregon)

U.S. District Court
CELL SEARCHES

Proctor v. Applegate, 661 F.Supp.2d 743 (E.D.Mich. 2009). State prisoners brought a § 1983 action against
Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) employees and multiple prison facilities, alleging violations of
their constitutional rights. The defendants moved to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds and for failure to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part.
The court held that state prison regulations which permitted the confiscation of certain types of mail and
prohibited “copyrighting” of names served a legitimate and neutral government purpose, and thus did not violate
the prisoners' constitutional rights. The court held that allegations in the prisoner's complaint that an MDOC
employee would frequently shake down his cell looking for prohibited Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)
materials, and that the employee would leave the cell in disarray, failed to state a § 1983 claim against the
employee for violation of the prisoner's constitutional rights, given that the prisoner failed to even allege that
any legal materials were confiscated. (Michigan Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
PRIVACY
STRIP SEARCHES

Quinones-Ruiz v. Pereira-Castillo, 607 F.Supp.2d 296 (D.Puerto Rico 2009). A state inmate brought a pro se §
1983 action for injunctive and monetary relief against state prison officials, alleging that the requirement that he
squat over a mirror set on the floor in order to have his anus examined when moved to different areas of the
facility was conducted in a hostile and denigrating manner, and that it humiliated and frustrated him. The district
court dismissed the action. The court found that the inmate's complaint failed to provide any details which could
lead the court to conclude that the prison's requirement was unreasonable, or that the inmate was an inmate being
held for a minor offense or one that did not involve drugs, weapons, or other forms of contraband, as required to
state a § 1983 claim for a violation of the inmate's right against unreasonable searches and seizures or cruel and
unusual punishment. (Las Cucharas Correctional Facility, Puerto Rico)

U.S. District Court
PRETRIAL DETAINEES
STRIP SEARCHES

Reinhart v. City of Schenectady Police Dept., 599 F.Supp.2d 323 (N.D.N.Y. 2009). An arrestee brought a § 1983
action against a city, police department and officers, alleging Fourth Amendment violations following her arrest
for allegedly making harassing telephone calls. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants.
The court held that probable cause existed to commence the criminal action and perform the arrest, and that the
suspicionless seizure of the arrestee's brassiere while incarcerated qualified as a “special need” for Fourth
Amendment purposes. The court noted that the police department had a policy of seizing brassieres purely as a
safety measure to preclude their use as a suicide tool, and the policy was implemented in a manner reasonably
designed to reduce intrusion on the arrestee's privacy by allowing her to remove the brassiere without disrobing.
(Schenectady Police Department, New York)

41.76
XXII

U.S. Appeals Court
BODY CAVITY
SEARCH
PRIVACY

Sanchez v. Pereira-Castillo, 590 F.3d 31 (1st Cir. 2009). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 claims against
correctional officials, a prison warden, a prison's correctional officer, and a physician, and medical battery and
medical malpractice claims against the physician, relating to strip searches, x-rays, rectal examinations, and
exploratory surgery to detect and recover suspected contraband. The district court dismissed the suit and the
prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part and remanded.
The appeals court held that the digital rectal examinations were not unreasonable where the procedures
were the direct culmination of a series of searches that began when a metal detector used to scan the prisoner's
person gave a positive reading, the prisoner had two normal bowel movements before the searches were
conducted, a physician examined him upon arrival at the hospital and found him to be asymptomatic, and several
lab tests were found to be “within normal limits.” The court noted that the searches were carried out by medical
professionals in the relatively private, sanitary environment of a hospital, upon suspicion that the prisoner had
contraband, namely a cell phone, in his rectum, and with no abusive or humiliating conduct on the part of the
law enforcement officers or the doctors. But the court found that the exploratory surgery of the abdomen of the
prisoner was unreasonable where the surgery required total anesthesia, surgical invasion of the abdominal cavity,
and two days of recovery in the hospital. The court noted that the surgery was conducted despite several
indications of the absence of contraband, including the results of two monitored bowel movements and two
rectal examinations. According to the court, an x-ray, as a much less invasive procedure, could have confirmed
the results. The court held that the prisoner's signed consent form for the exploratory surgery of his abdomen did
not preclude the prisoner's claim that he was deprived of his Fourth Amendment rights, where the prisoner was
pressured and intimidated into signing the consent, had been under constant surveillance for more than a day
prior to the surgery, had been forced to submit to searches, x-rays, and invasive rectal examinations prior to his
signing the consent form, and had twice been forced to excrete on a floor in the presence of prison personnel.
The court held that the prisoner's allegations against correctional officers were sufficient to allege that the
officers caused the hospital's forced exploratory surgery on the prisoner, as required to state a § 1983 claim
against the officers. The prisoner alleged that the officers were directly involved in all phases of the search for
contraband and in the ultimate decision to transport the prisoner to the hospital for a rectal examination or a
medical procedure to remove the foreign object purportedly lodged in the prisoner's rectum. According to the
court, the prisoner's allegation that correctional officers exerted pressure on hospital physicians that examined
the prisoner was sufficient to allege the state compulsion necessary to state a claim of § 1983 liability against a
surgeon. The court found that correctional officers' conduct, in forcing the prisoner to undergo an invasive
abdominal surgery, was a violation of a clearly established constitutional right, such that the officers were not
entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 liability. (Bayamón 501 Unit of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
Administration of Corrections, and Río Piedras Medical Center)

U.S. Appeals Court
PRIVACY
STRIP SEARCHES

Schmidt v. City of Bella Villa, 557 F.3d 564 (8th Cir. 2009). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action against a police
chief and city, alleging the chief's photographing of her tattoo violated her rights. The defendants moved for
summary judgment and the district court granted the motion. The arrestee appealed. The appeals court affirmed.
The court held that the chief's photographing of the arrestee's tattoo was not an unreasonable search and did not
violate due process, and the photographing of the arrestee's tattoo did not amount to a strip search under
Missouri strip search law. The court found that the action of photographing the tattoo did not violate the Fourth
Amendment, despite the fact that the arrestee was required to unzip her pants for the photograph and that the
photograph was taken by male officer. The court concluded that the photograph served legitimate law
enforcement purposes, the chief told the arrestee that photograph was needed for identification purposes, and the
photograph was taken in private. The court noted that the arrestee gave a false date of birth and social security
number. She was arrested for making a false declaration and for being a minor in possession of alcohol. (City of
Bella Villa, Missouri)

U.S. Appeals Court
BODY CAVITY
SEARCH
CONTRABAND
PRIVACY
SAME-SEX SEARCH

Serna v. Goodno, 567 F.3d 944 (8th Cir. 2009). A patient of a state mental hospital, involuntarily civilly
committed as a sexually dangerous person pursuant to a Minnesota sex offender program, brought a § 1983
action against a program official and against the head of the state's Department of Human Services. The patient
alleged that visual body-cavity searches performed on all patients as part of a contraband investigation violated
his Fourth Amendment rights. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, and the patient
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that visual body-cavity searches performed on all patients
of a state mental hospital, as part of a contraband investigation following the discovery of a cell-phone case in a
common area, did not infringe upon the Fourth Amendment rights of the patient involuntarily civilly committed
to the facility as a sexually dangerous person. According to the court, even though facility-wide searches may
have constituted a disproportionate reaction, cell phones presented a security threat in the context of sexually
violent persons, there was a history of patients' use of phones to commit crimes, and the searches were conducted
in a private bathroom with no extraneous personnel present and in a professional manner with same-sex teams of
two. (Minnesota Sex Offender Program, Moose Lake, Minnesota)

U.S. District Court
FEMALES
STRIP SEARCHES

Tardiff v. Knox County, 598 F.Supp.2d 115 (D.Me. 2009). After granting a detainee's motion for summary
judgment on liability under § 1983 for a strip search she underwent at a county jail, the county moved to exclude
the detainee's evidence of lost income or profits allegedly caused by her mental distress growing out of the strip
search. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the detainee's tardy
pretrial disclosure of economic loss information did not prejudice the county's ability to investigate so as to
warrant the exclusion of evidence of the detainee's evidence of lost income or profits. The court found that
damages for economic loss based upon a lost future contract were not recoverable in the civil rights suit seeking
damages allegedly caused by the detainee's mental distress, since the jury would have to speculate in order to
determine whether the detainee suffered an economic loss on a future contract and, if so, how much. (Knox
County Jail, Maine)

41.77

U.S. Appeals Court
PAROLES
SEARCH WARRANT

U.S. v. Warren, 566 F.3d 1211 (10th Cir. 2009). Following a warrantless search of his residence, a parolee was
convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm and possessing with intent to distribute cocaine base. The
parolee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that a police officer's warrantless search of
the parolee's residence was justified under the special-needs exception to the warrant and probable cause
requirements, as well as under Colorado law, where the officer searched the residence at the direction of a parole
officer. The parolee had signed a written agreement which required him to allow the parole officer to search his
person, residence, any premises under his control, or his vehicle. (Colorado)

U.S. District Court
PRETRIAL DETAINEES
PRIVACY
STRIP SEARCHES

Young v. County of Cook, 616 F.Supp.2d 834 (N.D.Ill. 2009). Pretrial detainees brought an action against a
county, sheriff, and current and former directors of the county department of corrections, on behalf of
themselves and two certified classes, alleging that the county jail's strip search policy for new detainees violated
their rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court granted the parties’ motions for
summary judgment in part and denied in part. The court held that: (1) the strip search of detainees charged with
misdemeanor offenses not involving drugs or weapons violated the Fourth Amendment; (2) the strip searches of
members of a class of males who were subjected to a strip search as new detainees before privacy screens were
installed violated the Fourth Amendment; (3) issues of material fact precluded summary judgment on the Fourth
Amendment claims for the time period after privacy screens were installed; and (4) strip searches before privacy
screens were installed violated due process. According to the court, there was no evidence that blanket strip
searches were necessary with respect to these class members, and there was no evidence that the strip search of
individual class members was required. The court noted that although intermingling with general prisoners may
be one factor in evaluating the reasonableness of a prison's strip search policy with respect to new pretrial
detainees, that fact standing alone is not enough to justify strip searches of pretrial detainees in the absence of
individualized reasonable suspicion. (Cook County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
PRETRIAL DETAINEES
PRIVACY
STRIP SEARCHES

Young v. County of Cook, 616 F.Supp.2d 856 (N.D.Ill. 2009). Pretrial detainees charged with misdemeanors
brought a civil rights class action under § 1983 against a county, a former county sheriff, and sheriff's
employees, alleging that the jail's blanket strip search policy violated their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the detainees on the issue of liability and the
defendants moved for reconsideration. The district court denied the defendants’ motion for reconsideration. The
court held that the county could have forfeited its claim to raise the issue that the details of 2,000 contraband
reports revealed 832 instances where persons purportedly charged with misdemeanors were found to have
contraband money during strip search process, where the county failed to properly bring this evidence to the
court's attention during the summary judgment briefing process. According to the court, the deference accorded
to the jail's expertise in matters of institutional security did not preclude the court from determining whether the
evidence supported the application of the jail's policy of subjecting newly arriving misdemeanor detainees to a
blanket policy of strip/body cavity searches. The court noted that the defendants asserted that the district court
had “ignored ... downplayed, and ... distorted” the evidence. In its decision, the court responded “Not so. With
their submissions, defendants submitted volumes of exhibits that, if stacked up, create a pile over fifteen inches
high.” (Cook County Jail, Illinois)
2010

U.S. District Court
BODY CAVITY
SEARCHES
OPPOSITE SEX
PRIVACY

Antonetti v. Skolnik, 748 F.Supp.2d 1201 (D.Nev. 2010). A prisoner, proceeding pro se, brought a § 1983 action
against various prison officials, alleging various constitutional claims, including violations of the First, Fifth,
Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court dismissed in part. The court held that the prisoner's
allegations were factually sufficient to state a colorable § 1983 claim that prison officials violated the Eighth
Amendment by depriving him of needed medical care. The prisoner alleged that he was housed in
segregation/isolation, leading to a mental health breakdown, and: (1) that he was seen by mental health
professionals eight times over a five year period instead of every 90 days as required by administrative
regulations; (2) that mental health professionals recommended he pursue art and music for his mental health but
that prison officials denied him the materials; (3) and that the officials' actions resulted in the need to take antipsychotic and anti-depression medications due to suffering from bouts of aggression, extreme depression, voices,
paranoia, hallucinations, emotional breakdowns and distress, unreasonable fear, and systematic dehumanization.
The court held that the prisoner's allegations were factually sufficient to state a colorable § 1983 claim for
violations of his Fourth Amendment right to be free of unlawful searches and Eighth Amendment right to be free
of cruel and unusual punishment. The prisoner alleged that whenever he was moved from his cell to any other
location he was made to stand in a brightly lit shower in full view of female employees, made to strip naked,
place his bare feet on a filthy floor covered in insects and scum, spread his buttocks, lift his penis, then put his
fingers in his mouth without any opportunity to wash his hands, and that the process was unnecessary because
inmates were in full restraints, escorted and solitary at all times. The court found that the prisoner's allegations
were sufficient to state a colorable § 1983 Eighth Amendment claim for violation of his right to be free of cruel
and unusual punishment where the prisoner alleged the exercise provided to him was to stand in a completely
enclosed cage alone, in extreme heat or cold without water, shade, exercise equipment or urinals, and that as a
result he suffered sunburns, cracked and bleeding lips and a lack of desire to exercise, resulting in a loss of
physical and mental health. (High Desert State Prison, Nevada)

U.S. District Court
BODY CAVITY
SEARCHES
PRETRIAL DETAINEE
STRIP SEARCHES

Cantley v. West Virginia Regional Jail and Correctional Facility Authority, 728 F.Supp.2d 803 (S.D.W.Va.
2010). A pretrial detainee who was strip searched and deloused brought a class action against a regional jail
authority, challenging its strip search and delousing policies. The jail authority moved to dismiss. The district
court denied the motion. The court held that the detainee stated a claim in regard to the strip search policy and in
regard to the delousing policy. The court found that a jail authority official sued in his individual capacity was
not entitled to qualified immunity. The detainee alleged that the jail had a blanket policy of conducting visual
cavity strip searches of all pretrial detainees charged with misdemeanors or other minor crimes, regardless of

41.78

whether the detainees were intermingled with the general population of the jail, and that there was no reasonable
suspicion that he harbored weapons or contraband. The court ruled that whether the jail's delousing policy, which
allegedly applied to all pretrial detainees, was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment could not be decided on
a motion to dismiss. The court noted that the detainee who brought the action against a regional jail authority for
alleged civil rights violations was not required to exhaust his administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (PLRA), where he was no longer an inmate at the time he filed suit. (West Virginia Regional Jail
and Correctional Facility Authority, Western Regional Jail)
U.S. Appeals Court
STRIP SEARCHES
PRETRIAL DETAINEE

Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of County of Burlington, 621 F.3d 296 (3rd Cir. 2010). Affirmed 132
S.Ct. 1510 (2012). A non-indictable arrestee brought a class action pursuant to § 1983 against two jails, alleging
a strip search violated the Fourth Amendment. After granting the motion for class certification, the district court
granted the arrestee's motion for summary judgment, denied his motion for a preliminary injunction and denied
the jails' motions for qualified and Eleventh Amendment immunity. The jails appealed. The appeals court
reversed and remanded. The appeals court held that as a matter of first impression in the circuit, the jails' policy
of conducting strip searches of all arrestees upon their admission into the general prison population was
reasonable. The court found that jails were not required to provide evidence of attempted smuggling or
discovered contraband as justification for the strip search policy. According to the court, the decision to conduct
strip searches, rather than use a body scanning chair, was reasonable. The court noted that the chair would not
detect non-metallic contraband like drugs, and there was no evidence regarding the efficacy of the chair in
detecting metallic objects. The appeals court decision was affirmed by the United States Supreme Court in 2012
(132 S.Ct. 1510). (Burlington County Jail, Essex County Correctional Facility, New Jersey)

U.S. District Court
CROSS GENDER
PAT DOWN SEARCH

Forde v. Baird, 720 F.Supp.2d 170 (D.Conn. 2010). A federal inmate petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus,
alleging that she was being denied freedom of religious expression, in violation of the First Amendment and the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, in
part, and denied in part. The court held that the Muslim inmate's right to free exercise of religion was
substantially burdened, as required to support her claim under RFRA, by a prison policy allowing for nonemergency pat searches of female inmates by male guards, despite prison officials' claim that the inmate's belief
was not accurate. The court found that the choice offered the inmate, of violating her understanding of the
precepts of Islam, or refusing a search and risking punishment, constituted a substantial burden. The court found
that the prison's interest in maintaining safety and security of the female prison through the use of cross-gender
pat searches was not compelling, as required to justify a substantial burden on the inmate's right of free exercise
of religion under RFRA, where the prison's arguments regarding how and why the cross-gender pat searches
promoted safety and security at the prison were actually related to the staffing of the facility, not to its safety and
security. According to the court, the prison's interest in avoiding staffing and employment issues at the female
prison through the use of cross-gender pat searches was not compelling, as required to justify a substantial
burden on the inmate's right of free exercise of religion under RFRA. The court noted that even if the prison's
interests in maintaining safety and security and avoiding staffing and employment issues were compelling, crossgender pat searches were not the least restrictive means of addressing these interests, as required to justify the
substantial burden on an inmate's right of free exercise of religion under RFRA, absent evidence that the prison
considered and rejected less restrictive practices to cross-gender pat searches. (Federal Correctional Institution in
Danbury, Connecticut)

U.S. Appeals Court
STRIP SEARCHES
USE OF FORCE

Forrest v. Prine, 620 F.3d 739 (7th Cir. 2010). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against a police officer
alleging the officer used excessive force against him when he used a stun gun in a holding cell. The district court
entered summary judgment for the officer. The detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held
that the officer did not violate the pretrial detainee's right to be free of illegal search and seizure when he used a
stun gun on the detainee while attempting to conduct a strip search in a holding cell following the detainee’s
arrest. The court held that the officer's decision to use the stun gun on the detainee did not violate the detainee’s
due process guarantees, where the officer was aware that the detainee had attacked another officer earlier in the
night, and the detainee appeared to be intoxicated. The court noted that the detainee was a relatively large man
confined in an enclosed space of relatively small area, and he was facing the officer, pacing in the cell, clenching
his fists, and yelling obscenities in response to orders to comply with the strip search policy. (Rock Island
County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
CONTRABAND
USE OF FORCE

Hanson v. U.S., 712 F.Supp.2d 321 (D.N.J. 2010). An inmate brought a Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) action,
alleging that a Bureau of Prisons (BOP) officer slammed his head on the floor and choked him in an attempt to
force the inmate to spit out contraband that the inmate was attempting to swallow. The government filed a
motion for summary judgment and the district court denied the motion. The court held, for the purposes of the
inmate's FTCA claim, under New Jersey law the BOP officers employed unreasonable force while attempting to
search the inmate for contraband. According to the court, summary judgment was precluded by material issues
of fact regarding whether the BOP officers used reasonable force in holding and searching the inmate. (Federal
Correctional Facility in Fort Dix, New Jersey)

U.S. Appeals Court
CELL SEARCHES

Harvey v. Jordan, 605 F.3d 681 (9th Cir. 2010). An inmate brought a suit alleging that prison officials' use of
pepper spray to extract him from his cell during a building-wide search of all prisoners' cells constituted
excessive force and that his right to due process was denied in connection with a disciplinary charge stemming
from his refusal to comply with the search. The district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The inmate appealed.
The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that the inmate exhausted
administrative process, as required by PLRA, for the claim that he was denied due process in connection with a
disciplinary charge when prison officials purported to grant relief that resolved his grievance to his satisfaction, a
hearing and access to a videotape. The court noted that the inmate was not required to appeal that decision.
(Salinas Valley State Prison, California)

41.79

U.S. District Court
STRIP SEARCHES

In re Nassau County Strip Search Cases, 742 F.Supp.2d 304 (E.D.N.Y. 2010). Arrestees brought a class action
against a county, among others, challenging the county correctional center's blanket strip search policy for newly
admitted, misdemeanor detainees. The defendants conceded liability, and following a non-jury trial on the issue
of general damages, the district court held that each arrestee was entitled to the same dollar amount per new
admit strip search by way of the general damages award, that it would exclude any information concerning the
effect that the searches had upon arrestees in awarding general damages, and an award of $500 in general
damages to each arrestee was appropriate. (Nassau County, New York)

U.S. District Court
PRIVACY
STRIP SEARCHES

Jones v. Price, 696 F.Supp.2d 618 (N.D.W.Va. 2010). A male inmate brought a § 1983 action against a
correctional officer alleging that the officer violated his constitutional rights by requiring him to undergo a strip
search in a non-private area in front of a female booking clerk. The district court denied the officer’s motion for
summary judgment. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as
to whether the correctional officer conducted the strip search in a reasonably necessary manner. The court noted
that the inmate’s right to keep his genitals private from unreasonable exposure to members of the opposite sex
was clearly established at the time of the search. (Tygart Valley Regional Jail, West Virginia)

U.S. District Court
CELL SEARCHES
USE OF FORCE

Kendrick v. Faust, 682 F.Supp.2d 932 (E.D. Ark. 2010). A female state prison inmate brought a § 1983 action
against employees of the Arkansas Department of Correction (ADC), alleging various violations of her
constitutional rights. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part
and denied in part. The court held that the inmate failed to allege that she sustained an actual injury or that an
Arkansas Department of Correction (ADC) official denied her the opportunity to review her mail prior to its
being confiscated, as required to support a claim that the official violated the inmate's constitutional right of
access to the courts and her First Amendment right to send and receive mail. The court found that an ADC
employee's use of force against the inmate was justified by the inmate's disruptive behavior during the search of
her cell and thus did not give rise to the ADC employee's liability on an excessive force claim. The inmate
alleged that the ADC employee grabbed her by the arm, dragged her from her cell, and threw her into the
shower. The court note that there was no medical evidence that the ADC employee's use of handcuffs caused any
permanent injury to the inmate as required to support a claim that the employee used excessive force against the
inmate. The court found that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether
there was a legitimate penological interest for the alleged destruction of the prison inmate's bible, precluding
summary judgment as to whether ADC employees violated the inmate's right to freedom of religion by
destroying her bible. (Arkansas Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
CROSS GENDER
STRIP SEARCHES

McIllwain v. Weaver, 686 F.Supp.2d 894 (E.D.Ark. 2010). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action against a city,
county, and law enforcement officers challenging his strip search. The defendants moved for summary
judgment, and the arrestee moved for partial summary judgment. The district court granted the motions in part
and denied in part. The court held that special circumstances justified the presence of a male sheriff's deputy
during the strip search of the female arrestee who was being booked into jail, and thus, the male deputy's
presence during the strip search did not violate the arrestee's Fourth Amendment rights. The court noted that the
male deputy came to the cell in which the arrestee was being searched only after the arrestee began physically
resisting the efforts of a female officer to perform the strip search, and the female officer called for help. The
court found that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to what the county
policy or custom was with respect to strip searches of arrestees, and as to the adequacy of the county's training
procedures for strip searches. (Sharp County Jail, Arkansas)

U.S. Appeals Court
STRIP SEARCHES

Nunez v. Duncan, 591 F.3d 1217 (9th Cir. 2010). A federal inmate brought a pro se Bivens action against prison
officials, alleging he was subjected to a random strip search in violation of his First, Fourth, and Eighth
Amendment rights. The district court entered summary judgment for the officials, and the inmate appealed. The
appeals court affirmed, finding that the strip search of the inmate pursuant to a policy authorizing strip searches
of inmates returning from outside work detail was reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest in
controlling contraband within the prison, and thus did not violate the inmate's Fourth Amendment rights.
(Federal Prison Camp, Sheridan, Oregon)

U.S. Appeals Court
VEHICLES

True v. Nebraska, 612 F.3d 676 (8th Cir. 2010). A former correctional facility employee brought a § 1983 action
against the Nebraska Department of Correctional Services (DCS) and correctional officials, alleging violations
of his First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
the defendants and the employee appealed. The appeals court reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded.
The appeals court held that the former employee had standing to bring the § 1983 action against the Department
and correctional officials, where the employee lost his job due to enforcement of a department policy of
randomly searching employee vehicles, and the employee sought reinstatement, lost pay and an injunction
prohibiting enforcement of the policy. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue
of material fact as to the circumstances of inmate access to the correctional facility parking lot. The employee
was terminated because he refused to permit a search of his vehicle. The court held that the Department’s policy
of random, suspicionless searches of only employees' vehicles, rather than including visitors' vehicles, was
rationally related to a legitimate state interest of institutional security, contraband interdiction and administrative
efficiency. The court noted that employees' vehicles were at the facility daily, making it easier to smuggle
contraband. (Lincoln Correctional Center, Nebraska)

U.S. District Court
BODY CAVITY
SEARCHES

U.S. v. Ghailani, 751 F.Supp.2d 508 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). A defendant, an alleged member of Al Qaeda charged
with conspiring to kill Americans abroad, moved for an order directing the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to cease
from employing visual inspection of his rectal area when entering or leaving a correctional center for court
appearances. The district court denied the motion, finding that the search policy was justified by a legitimate
governmental interest in protecting the safety of prison and court personnel and other inmates. The court noted
that the policy was adopted at the national level in recognition of the substantial danger that inmates will secrete

41.80

weapons or other contraband in body cavities, that the government made a credible showing that ready
alternatives were not available to protect this important security interest, and that the defendant's Sixth
Amendment rights would be protected adequately by existing procedures. (Metropolitan Correctional Center,
Manhattan, New York)
2011
U.S. District Court
STRIP SEARCHES
PRETRIAL DETAINEES

Augustin v. Jablonsky, 819 F.Supp.2d 153 (E.D.N.Y. 2011). Arrestees brought a class action against a county
challenging the county correctional center's blanket strip search policy for newly admitted, misdemeanor
detainees. After the county admitted liability, the plaintiffs' class action involving more than 17,000 members
was certified for the issue of general damages and the district court awarded general damages of $500 per strip
search. The county moved to decertify the class for purposes of determining the issue of arrestees' special
damages. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the resolution of special damages could not
proceed on a class-wide basis, since questions of law or fact common to the class no longer predominated over
questions affecting individuals. (Nassau County Correctional Center, New York)

U.S. District Court
CELL SEARCHES
USE OF FORCE

Bailey v. Hughes, 815 F.Supp.2d 1246 (M.D.Ala. 2011). A state prisoner brought an action against a county
sheriff's department, a sheriff, corrections officers, and others, alleging unconstitutional deprivations of his rights
while in custody in a county jail. The defendants moved to dismiss and for an award of attorney fees. The district
court granted the motions. The district court held that: (1) neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Fourth
Amendment's excessive force prohibition applied to the sentenced offender; (2) the sheriff and supervisory
officials were entitled to qualified immunity; (3) allegations did not state an Eighth Amendment claim based on
jail overcrowding; (4) the officers' alleged conduct in tasering the prisoner did not violate the Eighth
Amendment; (5) allegations did not state a § 1983 claim for an unconstitutional strip search; (6) placement of the
prisoner alone in closet-sized cell for eight hours after the alleged incident did not amount to unconstitutional
confinement; and (7) the officers' alleged conduct in searching the prisoner's cell did not amount to retaliation for
prisoner's prior lawsuit. The court noted that the prisoner admitted that he repeatedly refused the officers' verbal
commands and fled his cell, he was repeatedly warned that he would be shocked if he did not comply with the
officers' commands, and he was shocked by a taser only once before he fled his cell and then two to three times
after he did so. (Houston County Jail, Alabama)

U.S. District Court
PRETRIAL DETAINEES
STRIP SEARCHES

Bame v. Dillard, 637 F.3d 380 (D.C.Cir. 2011). Arrestees, who were arrested while protesting International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank policies in the District of Columbia, brought a Bivens action against a
former United States Marshal, alleging that they had been subjected to unconstitutional strip searches upon being
processed into holding cells at a courthouse. The arrestees moved for summary judgment as to liability, and the
Marshal moved for summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity. The district court denied those
motions. On appeal, the appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that there was no clearly
established constitutional prohibition of strip searching arrestees without individualized, reasonable suspicion.
According to the court, strip searching of all male arrestee demonstrators or protestors engaged in civil
disobedience, in a locality that had a persistent problem with contraband being smuggled into a cellblock, prior
to their commingled placement in holding cells, without individualized, reasonable suspicion had not been
prohibited by the Fourth Amendment at the time of the incident, and therefore the supervising United States
Marshal was entitled to qualified immunity. (U. S. Marshal for the Superior Court of the District of Columbia)

U.S. Appeals Court
EMPLOYEE

Braun v. Maynard, 652 F.3d 557 (4th Cir. 2011). Prison employees brought a § 1983 action against prison
officials, alleging that a search using a portable ion scanning machine violated their Fourth Amendment rights.
The district court granted the officials' motion to dismiss and the employees appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The court held that it was not clearly established that the use of an ion scanning machine to detect
drugs and other chemicals could not create reasonable suspicion to justify a strip search, and therefore, prison
officials were entitled to qualified immunity from the § 1983 action by prison employees alleging that a strip
search following a positive scan violated the Fourth Amendment. The court found that it was not clearly
established that the Fourth Amendment was violated by strip searches of prison employees conducted in a
restroom with a same-sex prison officer following a positive test from an ion scanning machine that could detect
drugs and other chemicals, and therefore, officers and officials were entitled to qualified immunity in the
employee's § 1983 action. (Maryland Correctional Training Center)

U.S. Appeals Court
OPPOSITE SEX
PRETRIAL DETAINEE
STRIP SEARCHES

Byrd v. Maricopa County Sheriff's Dept., 629 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 2011). A male pretrial detainee, proceeding pro
se, brought a § 1983 action against a female cadet and a sheriff's department, alleging violations of the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court entered judgment in favor of the defendants. The ruling was
affirmed on appeal. After granting a rehearing en banc, the appeals court reversed and remanded. The appeals
court held that the strip search of the male pretrial detainee by a female cadet was unreasonable in violation of
the Fourth Amendment, where the cadet touched the detainee's inner and outer thighs, buttocks and genital area
with her latex gloved hand through very thin boxer shorts, the female cadet moved the detainee’s penis and
scrotum in the process of conducting the search, the cadet wore only jeans and a white t-shirt without any
identification other than a name printed on the back of the shirt, ten to fifteen non-participating officers watched
the search, and at least one person videotaped the search. (Maricopa County Sheriff, Arizona)

U.S. District Court
STRIP SEARCHES

Johnson v. Government of Dist. of Columbia, 780 F.Supp.2d 62 (D.D.C. 2011). Female arrestees, who were
arrested for non-drug and non-violent offenses, brought an action against the District of Columbia and a former
United States Marshal for the Superior Court, among others, alleging that the defendants' blanket policy of
subjecting them to “drop, squat, and cough” strip searches before presentment to a judicial official violated their
rights to be free from unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment, and their rights to equal protection

41.81

under the Fifth Amendment. The marshal moved for summary judgment. The court granted the motion in part
and denied in part. The court held that the Marshal was entitled to qualified immunity from the Fourth
Amendment claim and that there was no evidence that the Marshal implemented a policy that directed the
blanket practice of strip searching female arrestees, as would support a Fifth Amendment claim, nor that the
Marshal knew of a blanket practice of strip searching female arrestees. The court noted that the law at the time of
the searches did not clearly establish that strip searching female arrestees prior to presentment to a judicial
official violated the Fourth Amendment. (U.S. Marshal for the Superior Court of the District of Columbia)
U.S. District Court
STRIP SEARCHES

Rattray v. Woodbury County, Iowa, 788 F.Supp.2d 839 (N.D.Iowa 2011.) A detainee sued a county, claiming
that her civil rights were violated by a strip search conducted by jail employees. Following a jury verdict
awarding substantial damages, the county moved for a new trial or for a reduction of the jury’s award. The court
granted the motion. The court held that a new trial was warranted because it was impossible to determine why
the jury, in its first verdict, awarded $5,000 for past emotional distress, and then a few minutes later awarded her
$250,000 for past emotional distress in a second verdict. The court noted that, after the jury learned it could not
award $250,000 in nominal damages, it drastically increased its initial award of $5,000 for past emotional
distress to $250,000 in the second verdict, and while the jury may have intended the $250,000 award as punitive
damages, such damages were not pled, and the jury had been instructed that such damages could not be awarded.
(Woodbury County Jail, Iowa)
2012

U.S. Appeals Court
STRIP SEARCHES

Beaulieu v. Ludeman, 690 F.3d 1017 (8th Cir. 2012). Patients who were civilly committed to the Minnesota Sex
Offender Program (MSOP) brought a § 1983 action against Minnesota Department of Human Services (DHS)
officials and Minnesota Department of Corrections (DOC) officials, alleging that various MSOP policies and
practices relating to the patients' conditions of confinement were unconstitutional. The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the patients appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals
court held that: (1) the MSOP policy of performing unclothed body searches of patients was not unreasonable;
(2) the policy of placing full restraints on patients during transport was not unreasonable; (3) officials were not
liable for using excessive force in handcuffing patients; (4) the officials' seizure of televisions from the patients'
rooms was not unreasonable; (5) the MSOP telephone-use policy did not violate the First Amendment; and (6)
there was no evidence that officials were deliberately indifferent to the patients' health or safety. (Minnesota Sex
Offender Program)

U.S. Appeals Court
STRIP SEARCHES

Davis v. Prison Health Services, 679 F.3d 433 (6th Cir. 2012). A homosexual state inmate, proceeding pro se and
in forma pauperis, brought an action against prison health services, the health unit manager, the public works
supervisor, and a corrections officer, alleging that he was improperly removed from his employment in a prison
public-works program because of his sexual orientation. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to
state a claim and the inmate appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that the inmate
stated an equal protection claim against prison personnel by alleging that: (1) public-works officers supervising
his work crew treated him differently than other inmates, ridiculed and belittled him, and “made a spectacle” of
him when they brought him back to the correctional facility after a public-works assignment because of his
sexual orientation; (2) the officers did not want to strip search him because he was homosexual and would make
“under the breath” remarks when selected to do so; and there were similarly situated, non-homosexual, insulindependent diabetic inmates who participated in the public-works program and who were allowed to continue
working in the program after an episode in which the inmate believed he was experiencing low blood sugar,
which turned out to be a false alarm, while the inmate was removed from the program. (Florence Crane Corr’l
Facility, Michigan)

U.S. Appeals Court
CELL SEARCHES

Kendrick v. Pope, 671 F.3d 686 (8th Cir. 2012). A female state inmate brought a civil rights action against a
corrections officer who allegedly confiscated religious items during a cell shakedown. The district court
dismissed the inmate's claims and she appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that genuine
issues of material fact precluded summary judgment. According to the court, summary judgment was precluded
by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the corrections officer confiscated the inmate's Catholic Bible,
rosary beads, and other religious materials during a cell shakedown, and subsequently failed to return those
items. (McPherson Unit, Arkansas Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
PAT DOWN SEARCHES
PRIVACY
STRIP SEARCHES

Knows His Gun v. Montana, 866 F.Supp.2d 1235 (D.Mont. 2012). Native American state prisoners brought an
action against a state, the state department of corrections (DOC), a private prison facility, and wardens, alleging
violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). Defendants filed motion to
dismiss. The district court held that: (1) the allegations were sufficient to plead the searches were a substantial
burden on their religious exercise; (2) the allegations were sufficient plead the confiscations and prohibitions
were a substantial burden on their religious exercise; (3) the allegations about relieving a prisoner from the pipe
carrier position were sufficient to plead it was a substantial burden on his religious exercise; (4) transferred
prisoners did not have standing for claims for injunctive and declaratory relief; (5) the private facility was a state
actor; and (6) the private facility was an instrumentality of the state. The Native American prisoners' alleged that
the prison subjected them to en masse strip searches before and after sweat lodge ceremonies, that the searches
sometimes occurred in a hallway where other inmates could see them and at least one occurred in a gym with
video cameras monitored by a female guard, and that some inmates declined to participate in the ceremony due
to the degrading nature of the searches. According to the court, the prisoners' allegations that sacred items were
confiscated or prohibited by the prison for their sweat lodge ceremonies, including smudge tobacco and antlers,
and that the items were essential for the ceremony to be meaningful and proper were sufficient to plead
confiscations and prohibitions were a substantial burden on their religious exercise, as required for their claims

41.82

under RLUIPA. The prisoner also alleged that they were subject to pat down searches before and after entering
the ceremonial sweat lodge grounds, that they were provided insufficient water and toilet facilities, that the size
of the sweat lodge and the frequency of the ceremonies was inadequate, and that they were not provided a Native
American spiritual advisor. (Montana Department of Corrections; Corrections Corporation of America;
Crossroads Correctional Center)
U.S. District Court
PRETRIAL DETAINEES
STRIP SEARCHES

Rattray v. Woodbury County, Iowa, 908 F.Supp.2d 976 (N.D.Iowa 2012). Misdemeanor arrestees brought a civil
rights action against a county and law enforcement officials, alleging that their Fourth Amendment rights were
violated when they were searched pursuant to a “blanket” policy authorizing strip searches of all arrestees facing
serious misdemeanor or more serious charges. Following the grant of summary judgment, in part, in favor of the
arrestees, the county moved for reconsideration. The court granted the motion, in part. The court held that the
recent Supreme Court decision in Florence, which held that reasonable suspicion was generally not required to
strip search pretrial detainees, subject to possible exceptions, was an intervening change in the law, justifying
reconsideration. According to the court, the county's strip search policy was reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment, regardless of whether arrestees would be put into the general population. But the court found that
summary judgment was precluded on the arrestee's claim that the manner of a strip search was unreasonable.
(Woodbury County Jail, Iowa)

U.S. District Court
DNA- Deoxy Ribonucleic
Acid
PRIVACY

U.S. v. Fricosu, 844 F.Supp.2d 1201 (D.Colo. 2012). A defendant moved for an order requiring that the DNA
sample taken when she presented herself to the United States Marshal for processing and any DNA profiles
developed from it be destroyed. The district court denied the motion. The court held that the defendant's Fourth
Amendment rights were not violated when the sample was taken and was later furnished to the FBI for analysis
and inclusion in a Combined DNA Index System. The court noted that although a vast amount of sensitive
information could be mined from the defendant's DNA, the statute authorizing the taking of the sample specified
for the limited purposes for which the DNA profile could be used. (United States Marshal, Denver, Colorado)

U.S. Appeals Court
PAT DOWN SEARCHES
STRIP SEARCHES
USE OF FORCE

Washington v. Hively, 695 F.3d 641 (7th Cir. 2012). A federal pretrial detainee filed a § 1983 action alleging that
a county jail guard improperly touched him during a pat down and strip search. The detainee alleged that while
patting him down, the guard spent five to seven seconds gratuitously fondling the plaintiff's testicles and penis
through the plaintiff's clothing and then while strip searching him fondled his nude testicles for two or three
seconds, contrary to a jail policy which forbids touching the inmate in the course of a strip search, and again
without any justification. The district court entered summary judgment in the guard's favor, and the detainee
appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The appeals court held that: (1) the detainee's allegation that
the guard touched his private parts to humiliate him or to gratify the guard's sexual desires was sufficient to state
a claim, whether or not the force exerted by the guard was significant; (2) fact issues remained as to the guard's
subjective intent in conducting the pat down and strip search; and (3) a statute barring federal civil actions by
prisoners for mental or emotional injuries absent a showing of physical injury did not bar the pretrial detainee
from seeking both nominal and punitive damages in his § 1983 action, even though the detainee did not claim to
have suffered any physical injury. (Waukesha County Jail, Wisconsin)
2013

U.S. Appeals Court
CELL SEARCHES
CONTRABAND
DRUG TEST

Chappell v. Mandeville, 706 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2013). A state prison inmate brought a § 1983 action against
prison officials, alleging violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The defendants moved for
summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity and the district court granted summary judgment as to
some, but not all, of the claims. The defendants appealed. The appeals court reversed. The appeals court held
that: (1) it was not clearly established that subjecting the prison inmate to a contraband watch violated the Eighth
Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, and thus prison officials were entitled to
qualified immunity on the Eighth Amendment claim; (2) the contraband watch was not such an extreme change
in conditions of confinement as to trigger due-process protection; and (3) it was not clearly established whether a
state-created liberty interest existed with regard to the contraband watch, and thus officials were entitled to
qualified immunity on the claim that the inmate's right to due process was violated because he was not provided
with an opportunity to be heard by the official who ordered contraband watch.
The inmate’s fiancée had visited him, and when she entered the prison she was wearing a ponytail
hairpiece. The next day the hairpiece was discovered in a trash can near the visiting room. Prison officials then
searched the entire visiting area and found spandex undergarments in the women's bathroom. Both the hairpiece
and the undergarments tested positive for cocaine residue. Prison staff conducted a search of the inmate’s cell,
during which they notified him that they believed that someone had introduced drugs through a hairpiece. The
officials discovered three unlabelled bottles of what appeared to be eye drops in the inmate’s cell. The liquid in
the bottles tested positive for methamphetamine. The inmate was then placed on a contraband watch. The
contraband watch conditions included 24-hour lighting, mattress deprivation, taping the inmate into two pairs of
underwear and jumpsuits, placing him in a hot cell with no ventilation, chaining him to an iron bed, shackling
him at the ankles and waist, and forcing him to eat “like a dog.” (California State Prison, Sacramento)

U.S. District Court
RETALIATION
PRETRIAL DETAINEES
STRIP SEARCHES
USE OF FORCE

Clay v. Woodbury County, Iowa, 982 F.Supp.2d 904 (N.D.Iowa 2013). A female arrestee brought a § 1983
action against a city, an arresting officer, county, county sheriff, and jail officers, alleging, among other things,
that jail officers “strip searched” her without reasonable suspicion and in unconstitutional manner, and did so in
retaliation for her vociferous complaints about her detention and the search of her purse and cell phone. The
defendants moved for summary judgment, and the arrestee moved to exclude expert testimony. The district court
held that the expert's reference to an incorrect standard for the excessive force claim did not warrant excluding
his opinions in their entirety, although portions of the expert's report were inadmissible.
The court found that the incident in which male and female county jail officers forcibly removed the female

41.83

arrestee's under-wire bra and changed her into jail attire was not a “strip search” within the meaning of the Iowa
law which defined a “strip search” as “having a person remove or arrange some or all of the person's clothing so
as to permit an inspection of the genitalia, buttocks, female breasts or undergarments of that person or a physical
probe by any body cavity,” where there was no indication that the officers inspected the arrestee's private parts
or physically probed any of her body cavities. The court also found that the arrestee whose clothing was forcibly
removed in the presence of male and female county jail officers in a holding cell after the arrestee refused to
answer questions during the booking process and to remove her clothing herself, was not subjected to a “strip
search” requiring reasonable suspicion under the Fourth Amendment. According to the court, the officers did not
violate the arrestee’s privacy rights under the Fourth Amendment where the officers' reason for removing the
arrestee's bra-- institutional safety-- was substantially justified, and the scope of the intrusion was relatively
small. The court also found that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity from the female arrestee's §
1983 unlawful search claim, where the officers neither knew, nor reasonably should have known, that their
actions would violate the arrestee's privacy rights. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by
genuine issues of material fact as to whether the amount of force used by female county jail officers during the
booking process to forcibly remove the female arrestee's under-wire bra and change her into jail attire after the
arrestee refused to answer questions, became disruptive, and refused to remove her clothing herself, was
reasonable. The officers allegedly threw the arrestee onto the cell bunk, causing her to bang her head against the
bunk or cell wall. The court found that male county jail officers did not use excessive force, within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment, in restraining the female arrestee in a holding cell after the female officers had
allegedly thrown the arrestee onto a cell bunk, causing her to bang her head against bunk or cell wall, in an effort
to forcibly remove the arrestee's clothing and to change her into jail attire. (Woodbury County Jail, Iowa)
U.S. District Court
EVIDENCE
RETALIATION
SEARCH WARRANT

Donahoe v. Arpaio, 986 F.Supp.2d 1091 (D.Ariz. 2013). A former member of a county board of supervisors
brought an action against the sheriff of Maricopa County, Arizona, a former county attorney, and deputy county
attorneys, asserting claims under § 1983 and state law for wrongful institution of civil proceedings, malicious
prosecution, false imprisonment and arrest, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and unlawful search. The
parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The district court denied the plaintiff's motion, and granted in part
and denied in part the defendants’ motions. The court held that summary judgment for the defendants was
precluded by fact issues: (1) with respect to the malicious prosecution claims; (2) as to whether
misrepresentations and omissions of evidence in a search warrant affidavit were material; (3) as to unlawful
search claims against the sheriff and deputy county attorneys; (4) with respect to the false arrest claim; and (5)
with respect to the claim for wrongful institution of civil proceedings. The court noted that a reasonable
magistrate would not have issued a search warrant based on the accurate and complete representation of known
evidence. The court held that the retaliatory animus of the county sheriff and prosecutors would chill a person of
ordinary firmness from criticizing the sheriff and prosecutors and from vigorously litigating against them.
According to the court, fact issues as to whether the county sheriff and prosecutors acted outrageously and either
intended the arrestee harm, or were recklessly indifferent to whether their actions would infringe on his rights
and cause him severe distress, precluded summary judgment for the defendants with regard to the claim for
punitive damages in the action for unlawful search, false arrest, malicious prosecution, and First Amendment
violations. (Maricopa County Sheriff and County Attorneys, Arizona)

U.S. District Court
PAT DOWN SEARCH
USE OF FORCE

Gwathney v. Warren, 930 F.Supp.2d 1313 (M.D.Ala. 2013). An inmate filed a Bivens suit against a prison
officer and others for use of excessive force during a pat-down search, alleging violation of the Eighth
Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, and other claims. All claims except the excessive
use of force claim were dismissed. The officer filed a renewed motion to dismiss on the grounds of qualified
immunity, or in the alternative for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
the officer. The court held that evidence did not create a fact issue as to whether the prison official maliciously
or sadistically inflicted pain on the inmate while conducting a pat-down search, as required for the inmate to
survive summary judgment on the defense of qualified immunity. According to the court, when the officer
entered the inmate's cubicle, he observed the inmate rise from his bunk, turn, and place his hand down front of
his pants, which typically signaled that an inmate was trying to conceal an object. The inmate was facing away
from the officer when the officer began the pat-down and thus, the inmate could not observe any expression or
movement suggesting that the officer had any malicious motive in touching the inmate's shoulders. Even after
the inmate fell to his knees from post-surgery shoulder pain, the officer's statement “[o]h, you still can't raise
your arm” did not indicate malice for the sole purpose of inflicting pain, but rather supported an inference that
the officer still did not believe the inmate's assertion about shoulder surgery and that he could not raise his arm.
(Federal Prison Camp, Montgomery, Alabama)

U.S. District Court
PRETRIAL DETAINEES
STRIP SEARCHES

Haas v. Burlington County, 955 F.Supp.2d 334 (D.N.J. 2013). Arrestees filed a proposed class action under §
1983 alleging that their constitutional rights were violated when they were strip searched at a county jail. The
district court granted the arrestees' motion for leave to file an amended complaint, and the county appealed. The
district court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held that the arrestees' proposed amendment to their
complaint, in which they alleged that they were arrested for minor offenses, that they either were held, or could
have been held, outside of the general jail population, and that they were subjected to strip searches pursuant to
the county's blanket policy before their detentions had been reviewed by a judicial officer, stated plausible
claims for violation of their rights under Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Burlington Co.Jail, New Jersey)

U.S. District Court
PRETRIAL DETAINEES
STRIP SEARCH

In re Nassau County Strip Search Cases, 958 F.Supp.2d 339 (E.D.N.Y. 2013). Arrestees brought a class action
against county officials and others, challenging a county correctional center's blanket strip search policy for
newly admitted, misdemeanor detainees. The defendants moved for reconsideration and to vacate a prior order
granting summary judgment in favor of the arrestees on the liability issue. The district court granted the motion
in part and denied the motion in part. The court held that: (1) the defendants' concession of liability did not, in

41.84

and of itself, divest the court of discretion to reconsider its prior order granting summary judgment in favor of
the arrestees on the issue of liability; (2) the Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders decision was an
intervening change in the controlling federal law, justifying the district court's reconsideration of a prior order
granting summary judgment in favor of the arrestees on their federal claim; and (3) the Florence decision did not
justify reconsideration of a prior grant of summary judgment on the New York state constitutional claim.
(Nassau County Correctional Center, New York)
U.S. Appeals Court
STRIP SEARCHES
QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY

Johnson v. Government of Dist. of Columbia, 734 F.3d 1194 (D.C. Cir. 2013). Female arrestees who were forced
to endure strip searches while awaiting presentment at hearings at the District of Columbia Superior Court filed a
class action against the District of Columbia and a former United States Marshal for the Superior Court, alleging
that such searches violated the Fourth Amendment. They also alleged a violation of the Fifth Amendment’s
equal protection guarantee, where men were not similarly strip searched. The district court granted summary
judgment to the District and the Marshal. The arrestees appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court
found that the former marshal who administered the Superior Court cellblock was at all times a federal official
acting under the color of federal law, and, thus, the District of Columbia could not be held liable under § 1983
for the marshal's conduct. The court noted that the statutory scheme gave the District of Columbia no power to
exercise authority over, or to delegate authority to, the marshal, and lacked the discretion to stop sending prepresentment arrestees to the marshal. According to the court, any Fourth Amendment right that the former
United States Marshal may have violated by subjecting detainees arrested on minor charges to blanket strip
searches was not clearly established at the time of any violation, and therefore the marshal was entitled to
qualified immunity on the detainees' claims alleging violations of their Fourth Amendment rights. The court also
found no evidence that the marshal purposefully directed that women should be treated differently than men with
respect to the strip-search policy at the Superior Court cellblock, in violation of the Fifth Amendment's equal
protection guarantee. (District of Columbia, United States Marshal for the Superior Court)

U.S. Appeals Court
STRIP SEARCHES

Mays v. Springborn, 719 F.3d 631 (7th Cir. 2013). A former state prisoner brought an action against prison officials, asserting claims based on strip searches at prisons and alleging retaliation for his complaints about the
searches, denial of his request for a dietary supplements which he considered to be religious necessities, inadequacy of his diet, failure to issue certain winter clothing items, and censorship of pages in a magazine mailed to
him. The district granted summary judgment in favor of the officials on the claims about prison food and clothing and granted the officials judgment as a matter of law on the claims about strip searches, retaliation, and censorship. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated the judgment with respect to the strip
searches, and remanded. On remand, the district court entered judgment, upon a jury verdict, in favor of the
officials as to the strip search claims, and the prisoner again appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded.
The appeals court held that: (1) even if there was a valid penological reason for the strip searches conducted on a
prisoner, the manner in which the searches were conducted was itself required to pass constitutional muster, and
(2) a jury instruction requiring the prisoner to negate the possibility that strip searches would have occurred even
if there had been no retaliatory motive was plain error. (Stateville Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
STRIP SEARCHES
PRIVACY

McCreary v. Richardson, 738 F.3d 651 (5th Cir. 2013). A Muslim state inmate brought an action against a prison
captain in his individual capacity, alleging that the captain ordered an unconstitutional strip search and prevented
him from attending religious services in violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Person's Act
(RLUIPA), and the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court denied the inmate's motion for
default judgment and granted the captain's motion for summary judgment. The inmate appealed. The appeals
court affirmed. The appeals court held that: (1) the inmate was not entitled to monetary damages against a
correctional officer under the provisions of RLUIPA; (2) the strip search did not violate the inmate's Fourth
Amendment rights; (3) a reasonable officer would not know that a lengthy strip search in the presence of female
officers violated clearly established law, and thus the captain was entitled to qualified immunity; and (4) the
captain did not act in an objectively unreasonable manner by refusing to permit the inmate to attend a religious
service after the search, where the inmate had created a disturbance during the search. According to the court, the
inmate’s potentially provocative questions in a public hallway constituted a disturbance, where during the strip
search, the inmate asked the captain why he was singling out Muslims and subjecting them to harassment in a
hallway with several other Muslim inmates who were waiting to attend a religious service. (H.H. Coffield Unit,
Texas Department of Criminal Justice)

U.S. District Court
PAROLEES

Nelson v. District of Columbia, 953 F.Supp.2d 128 (D.D.C., 2013). A jury ruled in favor of an apartment
resident in her and an arrestee's action against a police officer for false arrest and imprisonment and Fourth
Amendment violations stemming from a search of the residence she shared with the arrestee. The officer moved
for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL). The court held that the officer violated the resident's Fourth
Amendment rights by detaining and handcuffing her for two hours while executing a weapons search of the
apartment. According to the court, the evidence was sufficient to support the conclusion that the police officer
lacked sufficient safety or efficacy concerns to justify under the Fourth Amendment detaining and handcuffing
the resident's hands behind her back for two hours. The court noted that the officer did not assert that the arrestee
was a gang member or express any concern that an armed cohort of the arrestee might be present, the arrestee
was in jail at the time of the search, and the resident was at home alone and in underwear when the police
arrived. (District of Columbia)

U.S. District Court
STRIP SEARCHES

Page v. Mancuso, 999 F.Supp.2d 269 (D.D.C. 2013). A pretrial detainee brought an action in the Superior Court
for the District of Columbia, against the District of Columbia and a police officer, alleging unlawful arrest in
violation of the Fourth Amendment, and deliberate indifference to the arrestee's over-detention and strip search.
The detainee also alleged that the District maintained a custom and practice of strip searches in violation of the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments. The defendants removed the action to federal court and filed a partial motion to

41.85

dismiss. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the detainee's complaint failed to allege that
the District of Columbia was deliberately indifferent to Fourth and Fifth Amendment violations jail officials
inflicted upon the detainee when they subjected him to “over-detention” and strip searches, as required to state a
claim against District for Fourth and Fifth Amendment violations under the theory of municipal liability. (D.C.
Jail)
U.S. District Court
OPPOSITE SEX
PRETRIAL DETAINEES
PRIVACY
QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY
STRIP SEARCHES

Shaw v. District of Columbia, 944 F.Supp.2d 43 (D.D.C. 2013). A former pretrial detainee, a transgender
woman, who underwent sex reassignment surgery and had her sex legally changed to female, brought an action
against the United States Marshals Service (USMS), USMS marshals, District of Columbia, a police chief, and
police officers, alleging under § 1983 that the defendants violated her Fourth Amendment rights in connection
with her arrests, and asserting claims under the District of Columbia Human Rights Act and tort law. The police
chief, officer, and USMS defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied
in part. The district court held that the USMS marshals were not entitled to qualified immunity from the
unlawful search claim, where a reasonable officer would have known that a cross-gender search of a female
detainee by male USMS employees that included intimate physical contact, exposure of private body parts, and
verbal harassment, all in front of male detainees and male USMS employees, in the absence of an emergency,
was unreasonable. The court also found that the USMS marshals and the police officer were not entitled to
qualified immunity from a § 1983 Fifth Amendment conditions of confinement claim brought by the pretrial
detainee, arising from the defendants' actions in holding the detainee with male detainees and otherwise treating
her as if she were male. According to the court, a reasonable officer would know that treating the female
detainee as the detainee was treated exposed her to a substantial risk of serious harm, and, therefore, would know
that those actions violated the detainee's due process rights. (District of Columbia Metropolitan Police
Department, Sixth District Police Station and MPD's Central Cellblock, and United States Marshals Service)

U.S. Appeals Court
STRIP SEARCHES

Stoudemire v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections, 705 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2013). A female former prisoner brought an
action against the Michigan Department of Corrections (DOC), a warden, and other DOC-associated officers,
doctors, and nurses, asserting violations of § 1983, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), and
state law. The prisoner alleged that she underwent three separate amputations as a result of inadequate health
care by the defendants and was subjected to a strip search that served no legitimate penological purpose. The
district court denied summary judgment to the warden and a corrections officer on their qualified immunity
defenses to the § 1983 claims against them, and they appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in
part, and remanded. The appeals court held that the district court did not properly evaluate the warden's qualified
immunity defense to the prisoner's Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference to her serious medical
needs, when it denied summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds to “defendants.,” The court held that
remand was warranted for the court to conduct a particularized analysis of whether the warden was deliberately
indifferent to the conditions of the prisoner's confinement while in quarantine. The court noted that the district
court did not mention any facts in the record that specifically pertained to the warden, nor did the court make any
findings regarding the warden's knowledge or mental state.
According to the court, the prisoner established, for qualified immunity purposes, that the corrections officer
violated her Fourth Amendment rights by conducting a strip search of her in her cell in view of other inmates
and prison personnel. The court noted that the officer received a reprimand for violating Department of
Corrections (DOC) rules by conducting the strip search in view of those not assisting in the search, the officer
allegedly refused to tell the prisoner her reasons for initiating the search, and smirked during the search, which
suggested personal animus and implicated the prisoner's dignitary interest. The court found that the female
prisoner's right not to be subjected to a suspicionless strip search in full view of others absent a legitimate
penological justification was clearly established, for purposes of the female corrections officer's qualified
immunity defense. (Huron Valley Women's Correctional Facility, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
BODY CAVITY
SEARCH
CONTRABAND
QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY
STRIP SEARCHES

Vollette v. Watson, 937 F.Supp.2d 706 (E.D.Va. 2013). Former food service and medical care contractors who
worked at a city jail brought an action against a sheriff, who oversaw the jail, and sheriff's deputies, alleging
under § 1983 that their being required to undergo strip searches at the jail violated their Fourth Amendment
rights, and that they were retaliated against, in violation of the First Amendment. The defendants moved for
summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary
judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to what triggered the strip searches of contractors
who worked at city jail, the nature of such searches, and the factual predicate for revocation of the contractors'
security clearances. According to the court, at the time the contractors were strip searched, it was clearly
established, for qualified immunity purposes in the contractors' § 1983 Fourth Amendment unlawful search
action against the sheriff and sheriff's deputies, that prison employees did not forfeit all privacy rights when they
accepted employment, and thus, that prison authorities were required to have reasonable and individualized
suspicion that employees were hiding contraband on their person before performing a “visual body cavity
search.” The court also found that summary judgment as to the contractors’ claims for false imprisonment and
battery was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to what triggered the strip searches. (Aramark and
Correct Care Solutions, Contractors, Portsmouth City Jail, Virginia)

U.S. District Court
EMPLOYEE

Vollette v. Watson, 978 F.Supp.2d 572 (E.D.Va. 2013). Employees of private contractors providing services to
inmates housed at a jail brought a § 1983 action against a sheriff and deputy sheriffs, alleging that they were
subjected to unlawful strip and visual body cavity searches at the jail. The next business day after the suit was
filed, the sheriff issued a blanket order revoking the security clearances of the contractor's employees who were
still working at the jail. The district court denied the employees' motion for a preliminary injunction ordering the
sheriff to reinstate their security clearances at the jail pending the outcome of the litigation. The district court
also partially granted and partially denied the defendants' summary judgment motion. A jury decided the
constitutionality of the strip searches. This left the First Amendment retaliation claim by six of the nine

41.86

plaintiffs. The district court entered summary judgment for the plaintiffs on the retaliation claim. The court held
that: (1) the contractor's employees suffered irreparable injury from the sheriff's revocation of their security
clearances for which there was no adequate remedy at law; (2) the balance of hardships plainly weighed in favor
of a permanent injunction; (3) the public interest would be enhanced by the entry of a permanent injunction; and
(4) the plaintiffs demonstrated violation of their First Amendment rights, and the sheriff had to reinstate their
security clearances and update any relevant internal jail records to reflect the same. The court noted that the
sheriff's candid statements that he felt betrayed by the federal lawsuits filed by the employees who were
subjected to strip searches for contraband, and that the suits “pushed [him] over the edge” were an admission
that the adverse employment action of revoking the employees' security clearances was taken against them in
response to their exercise of their First Amendment constitutional rights to free speech and to petition the
government for redress of grievances. (Portsmouth City Jail, Virginia)
2014
U.S. District Court
STRIP SEARCHES
OPPOSITE SEX

Baggett v. Ashe, 41 F.Supp.3d 113 (D.Mass. 2014). A former female inmate and current female inmates brought
a class action against a sheriff and an assistant superintendent pursuant to § 1983, alleging that the policy of
permitting male officers to videotape female inmates being strip-searched violated the Fourth Amendment. The
defendants moved for summary judgment and the plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment. The district
court granted the inmates’ motion and denied the defendants’ motion. The court held that strip searches of
female inmates being transferred to a segregation unit while male officers conducted videotaping in the vicinity
were unreasonable in violation of the Fourth Amendment, regardless of whether the officers actually viewed the
inmates, where the inmate being searched was fully aware that a male officer was videotaping her, the officer
was within the inmate's view just a few feet away, the inmate was required to strip and manipulate her body in
the officer's presence, including lifting her breasts and spreading her legs, and the videotaping by male officers
was not limited to urgent situations. The court found that the policy did not have a reasonable relationship with a
legitimate penological interest, and therefore, the policy was unconstitutional in violation of the Fourth
Amendment as applied to the inmates, regardless of whether the officers actually viewed the inmates. The court
noted that the policy of using males to tape searches applied to all strip searches upon transfer, not just
emergencies, the prison did not have staffing problems, permitting males to tape the searches did not enhance
employment opportunities, and the policy did not provide for alternatives. According to the court, clearly
established law prohibited male officers from viewing female inmates during a strip search, and therefore, the
sheriff and assistant superintendent were not entitled to qualified immunity in female inmates' § 1983 class
action. (Western Regional Women's Correctional Center, Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
CELL SEARCHES

Ballard v. Johns, 17 F.Supp.3d 511 (E.D.N.C. 2014). A civil detainee being considered for certification as a
sexually dangerous person brought an action against federal employees, in their official capacities and in their
individual capacities under Bivens, challenging various conditions of his detention, including claims concerning
due process violations and inability to attend religious services. The employees moved to dismiss or for
summary judgment and the detainee moved to overrule objections to requests for document production. The
district court granted the employees’ motion and denied the detainee’s motion. The court held that: (1) the
detainee did not show that federal employees, by following Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) regulations and
policies, violated his constitutional rights; (2) the detainee was properly subjected to restrictions and disciplinary
consequences of the BOP commitment and treatment program; (3) denial of the detainee's request to attend or
receive religious services while in disciplinary segregation did not unduly burden his free exercise of religion;
and (4) the employees did not violate detainee's right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures by
searching his cell and seizing his property. (Federal Correctional Institution at Butner, North Carolina)

U.S. District Court
STRIP SEARCHES
JUVENILES

Benjamin v. Fassnacht, 39 F.Supp.3d 635 (E.D.Pa. 2014). The parents of a juvenile, who was arrested and
charged with summary offenses and committed to a youth detention facility after he threatened several girls in
his neighborhood, brought an action on his behalf against state troopers, a county, and county officials, asserting
claims under § 1983 and state law. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the
motions in part and denied in part. The court held that: (1) county officials did not have the right to conduct
blanket strip searches of juveniles upon admission to detention facility; (2) detention facility officials who strip
searched the juvenile were not entitled to summary judgment on the unreasonable search claims; (3) county
officials were not entitled to qualified immunity from the unreasonable search claims; and (4) the county was not
entitled to summary judgment on the unreasonable search claims. The court found that summary judgment of the
Fourth Amendment claims were precluded by fact issues as to whether the county and the facility's director had a
policy, practice, or custom of conducting blanket strip searches and acted with deliberate indifference to the
rights of the juveniles being detained at the facility. (Lancaster County Youth Detention Center, Pennsylvania)

U.S. Appeals Court
STRIP SEARCHES
PRETRIAL DETAINEES

Cantley v. West Virginia Regional Jail and Correctional Facility Authority, 771 F.3d 201 (4th Cir. 2014). Two
arrestees brought a § 1983 action for damages and declaratory and injunctive relief against a regional jail
authority and three of its former or current executive directors, challenging the constitutionality of visual strip
searches and delousing of the arrestees. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. An
arrestee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that: (1) the post-arraignment visual strip search of
one arrestee did not violate the Fourth Amendment; (2) the pre-arraignment visual strip search of the other
arrestee did not violate a clearly established right where the arrestee was strip-searched in a private room, and he
was to be held until the next morning in a holding cell where he might interact with up to 15 other arrestees; (3)
delousing of the arrestees did not violate a clearly established right; and (4) declaratory and injunctive relief
would be premature. The court noted that the delousing was done in a private room with only one officer, who
was of the same sex as the arrestees, and it did not entail the officer himself touching either arrestee. (West
Virginia Regional Jail and Correctional Facility Authority)

41.87

U.S. District Court
STRIP SEARCHES

Coley v. Harris, 30 F.Supp.3d 428 (D.Md. 2014). An inmate brought a pro se action under § 1983 against
correctional facility officers in their individual capacities for common law battery and violations of his Fourth
and Eighth Amendment rights after he was allegedly beaten following a disagreement with one of the officers.
The officers moved for summary judgment. The district court denied the motion. The court held that summary
judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a strip search of the inmate was
reasonable or motivated by punitive intent. (Eastern Correctional Institution, Maryland)

U.S. District Court
STRIP SEARCHES

Hebshi v. U.S., 32 F.Supp.3d 834 (E.D.Mich. 2014). After she was forcibly removed from an airliner, detained,
and subjected to a strip-search, a passenger brought a civil rights action against federal agents and airport law
enforcement officers, alleging discrimination based on race, ethnicity, or national origin, and violations of the
Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The airline law enforcement officers moved for partial judgment on
the pleadings. The district court denied the motion. The court held that the passenger stated claims for
unreasonable seizure and unreasonable search, and that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity. The
court held that the passenger's allegations that she was forced off an airplane by armed officers, handcuffed,
briefly questioned on the tarmac, transported to a jail, locked in a guarded cell under video surveillance, detained
for four hours, and strip-searched, before being extensively questioned about her involvement in other
passengers' alleged suspicious activity, were sufficient to allege that the seizure was a de facto arrest made
without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment. According to the court, the passenger's
allegations that she was arrested, detained for four hours, strip-searched by airport law enforcement officers,
based on her alleged involvement in suspicious activities by two other passengers, that the officers made no
effort to verify her identity or corroborate any connection between her and the other passengers, and that the
strip-search was not conducted promptly, were sufficient to state a claim for unreasonable search under the
Fourth Amendment. (Frontier Airlines, Federal Law Enforcement Agents, Wayne County Airport Authority Law
Enforcement Agents, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
STRIP SEARCHES
VISITOR SEARCHES

Hernandez v. Montanez, 36 F.Supp.3d 202 (D.Mass. 2014). A prison visitor brought a civil rights action against
corrections officers, alleging that a strip-search violated § 1983, the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act (MCRA),
and the Massachusetts Privacy Act (MPA). The corrections officers moved for summary judgment. The district
court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the officers did not have reasonable
suspicion to strip-search the female prison visitor based on an anonymous tip by an inmate on the prison hotline
that another inmate would be receiving drugs from an unidentified visitor. The court noted that the officers had
no knowledge of the source of the single anonymous tip or how the source had received his information, and
there was no evidence that the anonymous tipster or hotline had provided reliable information in the past. The
court found that an objectively reasonable prison official would not have believed that he had reasonable
suspicion to strip-search the visitor, and thus the prison official and the corrections officers were not entitled to
qualified immunity from visitor's Fourth Amendment claim arising from the strip-search. The court noted that
the officers knew that the inmate had enemies in the prison and that inmates often used the hotline to harass
other prisoners, and there was no evidence that the visitor was involved in drug activity. (Souza–Baranowski
Correctional Center, Massachusetts)

U.S. Appeals Court
DRUG/ALCOHOL
TESTING

Holland v. Goord, 758 F.3d 215 (2nd Cir. 2014). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that prison officials
burdened his religious exercise, in violation of Free Exercise Clause and Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), when they ordered him to provide a urine sample while he fasted in
observance of Ramadan, breached his due process rights, and retaliated against him. The district court entered
summary judgment in the officials' favor, and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in
part, and remanded. The court held that state prison officials substantially burdened the Muslim inmate's free
exercise rights, in violation of the First Amendment, when they ordered him to drink water in order to provide a
urine sample while he fasted in observance of Ramadan. The court noted that breaking his fast prior to sunset
would have been a grave sin, regardless of whether atonement was possible.
The court found that a hearing officer at a prison disciplinary hearing did not violate the inmate's right to due
process when he refused to permit the inmate to call his imam as a witness to establish that, as a practicing
Muslim, the inmate was unable to drink water at the time he was ordered to provide a urine sample, where the
inmate had already testified to that fact and the hearing officer did not discredit his statement. (Wende
Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
STRIP SEARCHES
PRETRIAL DETAINEES

In re Nassau County Strip Search Cases, 12 F.Supp.3d 485 (E.D.N.Y. 2014). Arrestees brought a class action
against county officials and others, challenging the county correctional center's blanket strip search policy for
newly admitted, misdemeanor detainees. Following a bench trial, the district court awarded general damages of
$500 per strip search for the 17,000 persons who comprised the class. Subsequently, the arrestees moved for
attorney fees in the amount of $5,754,000 plus costs and expenses of $182,030. The court held that it would
apply the current, unadjusted hourly rates charged by the various attorneys in determining counsel fees using the
lodestar method as a cross-check against the percentage method. The court found that the lodestar rates were
$300 for all associates, with two exceptions for requested rates below $300, and $450 for all partners. The court
awarded $3,836,000 in counsel fees, which was equivalent to 33 1/3 % of the total amount recovered on behalf
of the class, and $182,030.25 in costs and expenses. (Nassau County Correctional Center, New York)

U.S. District Court
CELL SEARCHES
PAT DOWN SEARCHES
STRIP SEARCHES

Karsjens v. Jesson, 6 F.Supp.3d 916 (D.Minn. 2014). Patients who were civilly committed to the Minnesota Sex
Offender Program (MSOP) brought a § 1983 class action against officials, alleging various claims, including
failure to provide treatment, denial of the right to be free from inhumane treatment, and denial of the right to
religious freedom. The patients moved for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, and the officials moved to
dismiss. The district court granted the defendants’ motion in part and denied in part, and denied the plaintiffs’
motions. The court found that the patients stated a § 1983 unreasonable search and seizure claim under the

41.88

Fourth Amendment with allegations that, taken together with the patients' other allegations surrounding the
punitive nature of their confinement, state officials violated their Fourth Amendment rights through their search
policies, procedures, and practices, and that they were subjected to cell searches, window checks, strip searches,
and random pat downs. (Minnesota Sex Offender Program)
U.S. District Court
CELL SEARCHES

Little v. Municipal Corp., 51 F.Supp3d 473 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). State inmates brought a § 1983 action against a
city and city department of correction officials, alleging Eighth Amendment and due process violations related
to conditions of their confinement and incidents that occurred while they were confined. The defendants moved
to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court granted the motion, finding that: (1) the inmates failed to
state a municipal liability claim; (2) locking the inmates in cells that were flooding with sewage was not a
sufficiently serious deprivation so as to violate the Eighth Amendment; (3) the inmates failed to state an Eighth
Amendment claim based on the deprivation of laundry services; (4) the inmates failed to state that officials were
deliberately indifferent to their conditions of confinement; (5) the inmates’ administrative classification did not
implicate their liberty interests protected by due process; and (6) cell searches did not rise to the level of an
Eighth Amendment violation. The court noted that the cells flooded with sewage for up to eight-and-a-half
hours, during which they periodically lacked outdoor recreation and food, was undeniably unpleasant, but it was
not a significantly serious deprivation so as to violate the inmates’ Eighth Amendment rights. According to the
court, there was no constitutional right to outdoor recreation, and the inmates were not denied food entirely, but
rather, were not allowed to eat during periods of lock-down. (N.Y. City Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
DRUG TEST
OBSERVATION BY
STAFF

Meeks v. Schofield, 10 F.Supp.3d 774 (M.D.Tenn. 2014). A state prisoner, who allegedly suffered from
paruresis, a mental anxiety disorder that made it difficult to urinate without complete privacy, brought an action
against the Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Correction, its Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) officer, a housing unit supervisor, a grievance board chairman, and a warden, asserting § 1983 claims for
First Amendment retaliation and violation of his right to privacy, and alleging violations of the ADA and Title
VII. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the
prisoner failed to establish retaliation claims against the ADA officer, the housing unit supervisor, and the
warden. The court found that the prisoner, who was assisting other inmates with their legal work, was not
engaged in “protected conduct,” as required to establish a First Amendment retaliation claim against the housing
unit supervisor, where the prisoner was not authorized to help other inmates with legal work, and thus was in
violation of department policy. According to the court, the state prison's decision to remove exterior bathroom
doors and refusal to put at least one door back to accommodate the prisoner, who allegedly suffered from
paruresis, a mental anxiety disorder that made it difficult to urinate without complete privacy, was not
intentionally discriminatory and did not violate the ADA.
The court held that the transfer of the prisoner to a medical housing unit did not result in denial of access to
prison programs and services available to the general population, so as to support an ADA claim of
discrimination on the basis of a perceived disability. The court noted that the transfer was intended to
accommodate the prisoner's complaints about bathroom doors being removed in the general housing unit, and the
prisoner was allowed to continue his prison job, have access to the law library, and participate in the same
activities he was allowed to participate in while he was housed with the general population. (Lois M. DeBerry
Special Needs Facility, Tennessee)

U.S. District Court
X-RAY

Rahman v. Schriro, 22 F.Supp.3d 305 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against a
state prison commissioner, warden, deputy warden, deputy of security, and officers, alleging they violated the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause by forcing him to go through a radiation-emitting X-ray security
screening machine in order to get to and from his daily work assignment. The defendants moved to dismiss for
failure to state a claim. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the
detainee sufficiently alleged a serious present injury or future risk of serious injury, as required to state a
deliberate indifference claim against prison officials under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, by
alleging that he was subjected to at least two full-body X-ray scans each day, that each scan exposed him to a
level of radiation that was 10 to 50 times higher than that emitted by airport scanners, that radiation damages
cells of the body and that even low doses of radiation increase an individual's risk of cancer, and that federal
regulations prohibited prison officials from using even non-repetitive X-ray examinations for security purposes
unless the device was operated by licensed practitioner and there was reasonable suspicion that the inmate had
recently secreted contraband. According to the court, the detainee's allegations that a prison officer intentionally
subjected him to a higher dose of radiation through a full-body X-ray screening machine while calling him a
“fake Muslim, homosexual, faggot” were sufficient to allege that the force was not applied to maintain or restore
discipline, as required to state an excessive force claim under Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The
court held that the alleged force exerted by a prison officer on the detainee by setting the full-body X-ray
screening machine to a higher radiation dose on one occasion was not excessive in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause. The court noted that the alleged force was de minimis, and the use of a higher
setting of radiation, which was designed to produce a better image, in a situation where detainee expressed
resistance to the scanning process and could have been conceivably hiding contraband was not the type of force
repugnant to the conscience of mankind. (Anna M. Kross Center, Rikers Island, N.Y. City Dept. of Correction)

U.S. Appeals Court
JUVENILE
STRIP SEARCHES

T.S. v. Doe, 742 F.3d 632 (6th Cir. 2014). Parents, on behalf of their minor children, brought a § 1983 action
against the superintendent of a juvenile detention center, correctional officers, and other administrators, claiming
that the suspicionless strip search of the juveniles, as part of the intake process of the detention center, violated
the juveniles' Fourth Amendment rights. The district court granted summary judgment for the parents. The
defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that the
right of juvenile detainees held on minor offenses to be free from suspicionless strip searches was not clearly
established at time the two juveniles arrested for underage drinking were strip searched, and thus, correctional

41.89

officers who conducted searches were protected by qualified immunity from liability in the § 1983 action arising
from the searches. The court noted that prior court decisions had recognized that a strip search of a person
arrested for a minor offense was unreasonable, given that subsequent court decisions had found that state's
enhanced responsibility for juveniles supported strip searches, and a recent Supreme Court decision had
concluded that the Fourth Amendment did not prohibit strip search of all adult criminal detainees. The court
found that under Kentucky law, the correctional officers' strip searches of the two juveniles, as part of the intake
process of a juvenile detention center, were ministerial acts, and thus, the officers were not eligible for qualified
official immunity from liability on the juveniles' claims of negligence, invasion of privacy, assault, false
imprisonment, grossly negligent infliction of emotional distress, and arbitrary action in violation of state
constitution, even if officers were both acting in good faith and within scope of their employment. (Breathitt
Regional Juvenile Detention Center, Kentucky)
U.S. Appeals Court
STRIP SEARCHES
PRETRIAL DETAINEES

West v. Murphy, 771 F.3d 209 (4th Cir. 2014). Arrestees brought a civil rights action under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments against a mayor, municipal council, police department, and current and former wardens
of a central booking and intake center for alleged mistreatment of persons arrested and taken to the center for
booking and processing. The district court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment on the
grounds of qualified immunity. The arrestees appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the law
on strip searches of arrestees in jail in a dedicated search room with compelling security justifications was not
clearly established at the time that the searches were conducted. (Baltimore Central Booking/Intake Center, Md.)
2015

U.S. Appeals Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE
BODY CAVITY
SEARCH

Chavarriaga v. New Jersey Dept. of Corrections, 806 F.3d 210 (3d Cir. 2015). A former prisoner brought a §
1983 action in state court against the New Jersey Department of Corrections (NJDOC), the former New Jersey
Attorney General, the New Jersey Commissioner of Corrections, a correctional sergeant, and various other
correctional officers. The prisoner alleged that the defendants violated her constitutional rights when they
transferred her from one place of confinement to another where they denied her potable water, clothing, sanitary
napkins, and subjected her to an unlawful body cavity search. The district court granted summary judgment in
favor of the Attorney General, Commissioner of Corrections, and correctional sergeant, and dismissed the
remaining claims. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded.
The appeals court held that the prisoner plausibly alleged that a correctional officer maliciously searched her
body cavities, as required to state a claim against the officer for using excessive force in violation of the Eighth
Amendment, where the prisoner alleged facts demonstrating that a cavity search was not routine, that the cavity
search was conducted in a manner that violated New Jersey regulations, and alleged that the cavity search was so
painful that during the search prisoner cracked a molar while clenching her teeth. The court noted that a state has
broad authority to confine an inmate in any of its institutions, and thus, courts recognize that a state’s authority
to place inmates anywhere within the prison system is among a wide spectrum of discretionary actions that
traditionally have been the business of prison administrators rather than of the federal courts. (Garrett House
Residential Community Release Facility, Edna Mahan Correctional Facility, New Jersey)

U.S. Appeals Court
DNA- Deoxy Ribonucleic
Acid

Crabbs v. Scott, 786 F.3d 426 (6th Cir. 2015). An acquitted defendant brought an action against a sheriff in his
official capacity under § 1983 for violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, arising out of the
sheriff’s requiring him to submit to a cheek swab for a DNA sample before he could be released from jail, after
he was acquitted of felony charges by a jury. The district court denied the sheriff’s motion for summary
judgment based on sovereign immunity and the sheriff appealed. The appeal court affirmed, finding that the
sheriff was generally considered a county official and thus not afforded immunity as a state actor, and the sheriff
was not required by state law to the collect defendant’s DNA prior to releasing him from jail following his
acquittal, and thus the sheriff was acting as a county official and not entitled to immunity. (Franklin Co., Ohio)

U.S. Appeals Court
STRIP SEARCHES
JUVENILE

J. B. ex rel. Benjamin v. Fassnacht, 801 F.3d 336 (3d Cir. 2015). Parents of a juvenile, who was arrested and
charged with summary offenses and committed to a youth detention facility after he threatened several girls in
his neighborhood, brought an action on his behalf against state troopers, a county, and county officials, asserting
claims under § 1983 for false arrest, unreasonable search, false imprisonment, and violations of due process. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, in part, and denied summary judgment on
the unreasonable search claim. The officials appealed, challenging the denial of summary judgment as to the
unreasonable search claim. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court found that held that the strip
searches conducted by the juvenile detention center as a standard part of the intake process for juvenile detainees
before their admission to general population were reasonable. The searches required detainees to remove all
clothing for close visual inspection, but did not involve any touching by an inspecting officer. According to the
court, although the searches were intrusive and juvenile detainees had an enhanced right to privacy, the
detainees’ privacy interests were outweighed by the center’s penological interests in addressing the risk of
introducing contagious infections and diseases into the general population, detecting contraband, and identifying
potential gang members. The court found that the searches promoted the center’s responsibility to screen
juvenile detainees for signs of abuse in their home and self-mutilation. (Lancaster County Juvenile Probation,
Lancaster County Youth Intervention Center, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
VISITOR SEARCH
STRIP SEARCH
PAT DOWN SEARCH

Knight v. Washington State Department of Corrections, 147 F.Supp.3d 1165 (W.D. Wash. 2015). A prison
visitor who suffered from a seizure disorder, and was subjected to a strip search and pat-down searches, brought
an action against the state Department of Corrections (DOC) and DOC officials, alleging that the searches
violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district
court granted the motion, finding that: (1)the strip search and pat-down searches did not violate ADA; (2) guards
did not act with deliberate indifference in conducting a strip search; (3) the prison was not a place of public

41.90

accommodation, under the Washington Law Against Discrimination, as to visitors participating in an extended
family visitation program; (4) the guards' conduct was not sufficiently extreme to support an outrage claim; and
(5) the guards' conduct did not support a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. According to the
court, there was no showing that the guards proceeded in conscious disregard of a high probability of emotional
distress when ordering the strip search, as the visitor suggested the strip search as an alternative to a pat search
and the guards followed this suggestion, and all visitors were subjected to pat-down searches, which were
justified on safety grounds. (Monroe Correctional Complex, Washington)
U.S. District Court
CELL SEARCH
RETALIATION

Quiroz v. Horel, 85 F.Supp.3d 1115 (N.D.Cal. 2015). A state prisoner brought an action against prison officials,
alleging that the officials retaliated against him for filing a prior federal civil rights complaint and for
participating in another inmate’s civil rights suit. The officials moved for summary judgment. The district court
granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine
issues of material fact as to: (1) whether the official had a retaliatory motive for issuing a Rules Violation Report
(RVR) against the prisoner; (2) whether officials had a retaliatory motive when they searched the prisoner’s cell;
and (3) whether prison officials had an agreement to retaliate against the prisoner by searching his cell,
confiscating his paperwork, and issuing a Rules Violation Report (RVR) against him. (Pelican Bay State Prison,
California)

U.S. District Court
VISUAL BODY
CAVITY
USE OF FORCE

Shorter v. Baca, 101 F.Supp.3d 876 (C.D. Cal. 2015). A pretrial detainee brought an action against a county,
sheriff, and deputies, alleging under § 1983 that the defendants denied her medical care, subjected her to
unsanitary living conditions, deprived her of food, clean clothes, and access to exercise, and conducted overly
invasive searches. The detainee had been classified as mentally ill and housed in a mental health unit at the
detention facility. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part
and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as
to what policies governed classification of pretrial detainees who were mentally ill. The court also found fact
issues as to whether the county sheriff’s deputies’ manner of conducting a visual body cavity search of the
female pretrial detainee on three occasions exhibited exaggerated and excessive force, and was vindictive or
harassing, precluding summary judgment on the detainee’s § 1983 Fourth Amendment unlawful search claim
against the deputies. (Century Regional Detention Facility, Los Angeles County, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
BODY CAVITY
SEARCH
PRIVACY

Story v. Foote, 782 F.3d 968 (8th Cir. 2015). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against four corrections officers
for violation of his Fourth Amendment rights arising from a visual body-cavity search that allegedly took place
in view of a female officer and other inmates, during which the officer allegedly called the inmate a derogatory
name. The district court dismissed the case and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held
that the visual body-cavity inspection search after the inmate returned to the correctional facility from outside the
institution did not violate a clearly established right, as would preclude the qualified immunity defense, and the
manner in which the search was conducted did not violate a clearly established right. According to the court,
such a search was not unreasonable considering the serious security dangers inherent at a correctional institution
and the institution’s strong interest in preventing and deterring the smuggling of contraband into the prison.
The court noted that the manner in which the search was conducted did not violate the inmate’s rights. The
inmate alleged that a female officer observed the search on a video screen in a master control room, that the
search was conducted in the presence of other inmates, and that the officer called him a “monkey” during the
search. According to the court, there was a rational connection between the sex-neutral visual surveillance of
inmates and the goal of prison security. The court found that the staffing adjustments that would have been
necessary to prevent the female officer from viewing the search would have interfered with the female officer’s
equal employment opportunities and burdened the prison. The court noted that the inmate did not allege that a
more private, equally secure, and cost-effective means of conducting the search was available away from other
inmates, and a single use of a term with potential racial overtones was not unconstitutional race discrimination.
(Williams Correctional Facility, Arkansas)

41.91

41.92

his constitutional right of access to the courts. The court found that the delay in the inmate's
obtaining of paper, envelopes and copies of legal documents, was not a violation of his rights, and
denied the petition for a preliminary injunction. The court noted that the inmate's right of access
to the courts did not encompass a right to an immediate and unlimited supply of pre-paid
envelopes and other supplies, without any requirement that he balance his need for these items
against other commissary purchases when determining how to spend his available funds. The
inmate had challenged an indigency policy that requires an inmate to have less than $5.00 in his
inmate account for ninety days before being considered indigent, and thereby receive free mailing
services. (Connecticut Department of Correction)
2004
U.S. District Court
LIBRARY

Cline v. Fox, 319 F.Supp.2d 685 (N.D.W.Va. 2004). A federal district court determined that a West
Virginia Department of Corrections policy that prohibits inmates from receiving or possessing
obscene material was not unconstitutional as it was applied to the inmate. The inmate then
alleged that the policy on its face violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments because it was
used to purge the prison library of certain books. The district court held that the inmate had
standing to challenge the policy, and that the policy was not reasonably related to a legitimate
penological interest in promoting security, preventing sexual assaults, and furthering
rehabilitation. The court ordered the prison to amend its publication policy and screen purged
books under the revised policy before restoring them to library shelves. According to the court, the
policy did not define explicit sexual activity in terms of its capacity to sexually arouse. The court
noted that the policy prohibited material that contained even one depiction of sexual intercourse,
regardless of its context, while it allowed certain commercial pornography. (St. Mary's Correctional
Center, West Virginia)

U.S. District Court
LIBRARY

Tyler v. McCaughtry, 293 F.Supp.2d 920 (E.D.Wis. 2003). A state prisoner filed a petition for a

writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his due process rights were violated when a prison
disciplinary committee revoked his good time credits. The state moved to dismiss and the district
court denied the motion. The court held that the summary judgment was precluded by a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether the correctional facility's legal resources were the cause for the
petitioner's default of federal claims in state court. (Dodge Correctional Institution, Wisconsin)
2005

U.S. Appeals Court
TELEPHONE

Gilmore v. County of Douglas, State of Neb., 406 F.3d 935 (8th Cir. 2005). The relative of a former
jail inmate brought a § 1983 action alleging that a 45% commission, paid to the county by the jail’s
telecommunications providers on surcharged collect telephone calls from inmates, constituted a tax
on inmates’ relatives that violated the Equal Protection Clause. The district court granted the
county’s motion to dismiss and the relative appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the
relative was similarly situated to recipients of collect calls from non-inmates. The court held that
the contract which called for the commission was aimed at generating revenues to defray the costs
of providing inmates with telephone service, not at treating the recipients of inmates’ calls
differently from others, and therefore had a rational basis. The court noted that a 15-minute
inmate-initiated call from the jail cost $2.30. (Douglas County Corrections Center, Nebraska)

U.S. District Court
IDLENESS

Little v. Shelby County, Tenn., 384 F.Supp.2d 1169 (W.D.Tenn. 2005). An inmate brought a § 1983

U.S. Appeals Court
COMMISSARY

Purcell ex rel. Estate of Morgan v. Toombs County, 400 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2005). The mother of a

action against a county and sheriff, alleging that he had been raped in jail in violation of his
Eighth Amendment rights. The county stipulated to liability and an order of injunctive relief was
issued. Later, the district court found the county in contempt, and the county sought to purge itself
of the contempt finding. The court entered a purgation order. The court praised the county, noting
that it had adopted a focused, systemic and information-driven structural reform based on critical
exert assessment of essential institutional functions. The county adopted a 14-point remedial
scheme that included implementing direct supervision management of inmate cellblocks,
improving population management, collecting and utilizing data, and installing an objective
inmate classification system. (Shelby County Jail, Tennessee)

county jail inmate who died after he was beaten and injured by three other inmates brought a §
1983 action against a sheriff and jail administrator. The district court denied qualified immunity
for the defendants, and Eleventh Amendment immunity for the sheriff, and they appealed. The
appeals court reversed. The court held that the conditions at the county jail did not pose a
“substantial risk of serious harm” as required to show an Eighth Amendment violation. The
inmate was beaten by three other inmates in his cell over an alleged money dispute. Inmates were
allowed to keep money in their cells, play cards and gamble, the jail had a history of inmate-oninmate assaults, and the jail’s layout presented some difficulty in the continuous observation of
inmates. But the court noted that inmates were segregated based on particularized factors,
including the kind of crime committed and personal conflicts, the jail was not understaffed at the
time of the attack, serious inmate-on-inmate violence was not the norm, fights that did occur were

42.9
XX

not linked to any recurring specific cause, and jailers had a history of punishing inmate violence.
The sheriff had directed that a new commissary system be instituted to manage inmate funds so
that inmates would not have to keep money on their persons, but the system had not been put in
place by the day of the incident. (Toombs County Jail, Georgia)
U.S. District Court
LIBRARY

Rickenbacker v. U.S., 365 F.Supp.2d 347 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). After pleading guilty to credit card fraud
and being sentenced to 24 months of imprisonment, a defendant moved to vacate, set aside, or
correct the sentence. The district court denied the motion. The court held that defense counsel was
not deficient in failing to move for a downward departure of the defendant’s sentence based on
perceived hardships the defendant endured while being detained prior to sentencing. According to
the court, the alleged substandard conditions, consisting of being served food that the defendant
believed had been accessed by rodents, and not being provided with a fully stocked library, were
not conditions that rose to the level that would warrant a downward departure. The defendant had
been served bread that rodents had apparently partially eaten, and in one instance a mouse had
created a tunnel inside of the bread. (Nassau County Correctional Center, New York)
2006

U.S. District Court
TELEPHONE

Harrison v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 464 F.Supp.2d 552 (E.D.Va. 2006). A federal inmate
brought an action against the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) and prison officials under Bivens

U.S. Appeals Court
LIBRARY

Myron v. Terhune, 457 F.3d 996 (9th Cir. 2006). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against
several correctional officers and medical personnel at a prison. The district court dismissed the
action and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that a state
regulation governing the security classification of prisoners did not give the state prisoner a liberty
interest, protected by the due process clause, in the security level to which he was classified, noting
that the regulation provided that prison officials retained discretion in making placement
decisions. The court found that a state regulation governing prison publications did not give the
prisoner a liberty interest, protected by the due process clause, in participating in the publication
and distribution of an inmate publication, where the regulation granted unfettered discretion to
prison officials to restrict prisoner publications. According to the court, a regulation governing
library services in prisons did not give the prisoner a liberty interest, protected by the due process
clause, in library access hours. The court noted that while the regulation may have created a
liberty interest in requiring prison officials to have a law library, the warden was vested with
discretion to regulate access to library facilities. (Salinas Valley State Prison, California)

U.S. District Court
COMMISSARY

Pepper v. Carroll, 423 F.Supp.2d 442 (D.Del. 2006). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging
that prison officials violated his constitutional rights. The court granted the officials’ motion for
summary judgment. According to the court, the prison officials' denials of several privileges while
the inmate was voluntarily housed in a security housing unit, including extra visits, reading
material, exercise, television, cleaning tools, boiling water, ice, razors, and additional writing
utensils, were not a sufficiently serious deprivation to support the inmate's claim that the denials
constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. The court found that the
inmate had no constitutionally protected right to purchase food or other items as cheaply as
possible through the prison commissary, and therefore prison officials did not violate the inmate’s
Eighth Amendment rights by allegedly overcharging for commissary products. (Delaware
Correctional Center)

U.S. District Court
TELEPHONE

Tucker v. Hardin County, 448 F.Supp.2d 901 (W.D.Tenn. 2006). Deaf detainees and their deaf
mother sued a county and a city, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court held that a
county court did not violate the ADA's Title II, which prohibits discrimination in public services, by
asking the deaf mother to serve as interpreter for her deaf sons at their plea hearing, despite her
contention that the request deprived her of her right to participate as a spectator. The court noted

and various federal statutes, challenging an increase in the long-distance telephone rate. The court
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court held that: (1) the telephone rate
increase did not implicate the inmate’s First Amendment rights; (2) the inmate’s procedural due
process rights were not violated: (3) the inmate failed to state an equal protection violation; (4)
BOP’s increase in the telephone rates was not subject to judicial review; (5) the inmate failed to
state a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA); and (6) the inmate’s Freedom of
Information Act (FIOA) claim would be transferred to another court. According to the court,
prisoners have no per se First Amendment right to use a telephone and are not entitled to a
specific rate for their telephone calls. The court found that the three-cent increase in the longdistance telephone rate charged to the federal inmate, from twenty cents per minute to twentythree cents per minute, did not implicate the inmate’s First Amendment rights. Although
prisoners have a due process property interest in the funds held in their prison accounts, the court
noted that the post-deprivation proceeding of the normal grievance process was available. The
court also ruled that the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) precluded a judicial review of the
BOP increase in telephone rates. (Federal Bureau of Prisons, Virginia)

42.10
XX

that the mother expressed no reservations to the court about serving as an interpreter, that she could have refused the request, and, even if the court were somehow responsible for her service as an interpreter, its request was based on her skill
in lip-reading and sign language, not on her disability. According to the court, assuming that overnight incarceration was
covered by the ADA's Title II which prohibits discrimination in public services, and assuming that placing a phone call
was an “aid, benefit, or service” within the meaning of an ADA regulation prohibiting public entities from providing a
disabled person aid, benefit, or service that was not as effective as that provided to others, the county did not violate ADA
in using relay operators and notes to allow the deaf detainees to communicate with their mother, rather than providing
them with a teletypewriter (TTY) telephone. The court noted that information was transmitted and received, which was
the same benefit non-disabled person would have received. While in custody, the two brothers communicated with officers through written notes. The jail was not equipped with a teletypewriter (TTY) telephone. Instead, the officers acted as
relay operators, using paper and pencil, as they spoke with an operator acting on their behalf to complete the call, which
lasted 45 minutes. (Hardin County Jail, and the City of Savannah Police Department, Tennessee)
2007
U.S. Appeals Court
TELEPHONE

Robertson v. Las Animas County Sheriff's Dept., 500 F.3d 1185 (10th Cir. 2007). A deaf pretrial detainee brought suit
under § 1983 and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) against deputies and a sheriff, claiming wrongful arrest and
failure to accommodate his disability. The district court dismissed all claims against the defendants on their motion for
summary judgment and the detainee appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that a fact issue
as to whether the totally deaf detainee with a surgically implanted cochlear implant was substantially limited in his ability
to hear, precluded summary judgment as to whether he was a qualified individual under ADA. The court also found that
summary judgment was precluded by fact issues as to whether the jail knew, or should have been aware of, the deaf inmate's limitations. The court found that the detainee was qualified to receive benefits and services of the county jail,
within the meaning of ADA, with respect to phone services and televised closed-circuit viewing of his probable cause
hearing, as such services were available to all inmates. (Las Animas County Jail, Colorado)
2008

U.S. District Court
TELEPHONE

Bryant v. Cortez, 536 F.Supp.2d 1160 (C.D.Cal. 2008). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that prison officials
violated his due process rights and state law by placing him in an administrative segregation unit (ASU) for eighteen
months pending resolution of a disciplinary charge against him. The district court granted the officials’ motion for summary judgment. The court held that the inmate's loss of telephone privileges did not constitute a due process violation,
given the availability of alternative means of communication by mail or in person. (Calif. State Prison, Los Angeles
County)

U.S. District Court
TELEPHONE

Douglas v. Gusman, 567 F.Supp.2d 877 (E.D.La. 2008). A deaf prisoner brought a civil rights suit alleging violation of
his equal protection rights, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Eighth Amendment as the result of his
limited access to a telephone typewriter (TTY) device for phone calls, lack of access to closed captioning for television,
and verbal abuse from officers. The district court dismissed the action. The court held that the prisoner’s civil rights
claims arising from denial of full access to a telephone typewriter (TTY) and denial of closed captioning on a television in
a parish prison accrued each time he was denied access to a TTY or captioning or was threatened or assaulted for requesting access. The court found that the differential treatment permitting other inmates unlimited telephone access, while
permitting the deaf inmate only limited access, did not violate the deaf inmate's equal protection rights where the deaf
inmate, who required the use of telephone typewriter (TTY) device for the deaf in a separate office, failed to show that
limited access burdened a fundamental right. The court found that the deaf prisoner was not similarly situated to hearing
inmates who could use inmate telephones, as required to support an equal protection claim based on failure to afford him
the same access that hearing inmates received to the phone system.
The court concluded that the limited access provided to the deaf prisoner was rationally related to legitimate security
interests of the prison, where a deputy was required to escort the prisoner outside his housing area each time the prisoner
used the phone, precluding the claim that he was denied equal protection based on the greater phone privileges afforded to
hearing inmates who had access to phones in the housing tier. The court held that failure to provide a telephone typewriter
(TTY) device on the deaf prisoner's housing tier, while providing unlimited access to phones to other prisoners, did not
discriminate against the disabled inmate in violation of Title II of the ADA. According to the court, allowing the prisoner
twice daily use of a TTY device on a prison facility phone outside the housing tier was meaningful access, and lack of a
TTY in the housing tier affected disabled persons in general, precluding a finding of specific discrimination against the
inmate in particular. (Orleans Parish Prison, Louisiana)

U.S. District Court
COMMISSARY

Kole v. Lappin, 551 F.Supp.2d 149 (D.Conn. 2008). A Jewish inmate filed a complaint against federal prison officials
alleging that a reduction in the number of kosher-for-Passover food items available to inmates for purchase for the Passover holiday violated her First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court entered judgment in favor of the
defendants. The court held that the prison's limitation on the number of supplemental kosher-for-Passover foods available
for purchase by Jewish inmates did not substantially burden the plaintiff's religious practice in violation of the First
Amendment, where the prison provided her with two Seder dinners during Passover, and otherwise provided her with
three kosher-for-Passover meals and a box of Matzoh each day during the eight days of the holiday. The court found that
the differences between food available for inmate purchase on a special holiday list available between Thanksgiving and
Christmas and the more limited list of kosher-for-Passover food available for purchase did not violate the plaintiff's right
to equal protection. The court noted that the prison's stated penological interests in limiting a small group of inmates' access to special goods to avoid hoarding and illegal trade, and in the efficient financial operation of the prison commissary,
were logically advanced by offering a smaller number of “best sellers” for sale on Passover. (Federal Correction Institution, Danbury, Connecticut)

XXIII

42.11

U.S. Appeals Court
TELEPHONE

Tucker v. Tennessee, 539 F.3d 526 (6th Cir. 2008). Deaf and mute arrestees and their deaf mother sued a city and county,
alleging that denial of an interpreter or other reasonable accommodations during criminal proceedings violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The district court granted the county's motion for summary judgment and the plaintiffs
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the county's use of the deaf mother's services as an interpreter
during her deaf sons' dispositional hearing on criminal charges did not violate Title II of the ADA, which prohibits discrimination in public services. The court noted that the mother voluntarily served as the interpreter and that her service
was requested in light of her sign language skills, not for any discriminatory purpose. The court found that the deaf and
mute arrestees were not denied a “service, program, or activity” when the city failed to provide an interpreter during a
domestic disturbance call which resulted in their arrest, and the city thus was not liable under ADA's Title II. According
to the court, the arrests were made not because the arrestees were disabled, but because the arrestees assaulted police
officers, individual citizens, or attempted to interfere with a lawful arrest. The court concluded that the arresting officers
were able to effectively communicate with the arrestees. The court held that the county did not violate Title II of the
ADA, which prohibits discrimination in public services, by using relay operators to allow the deaf arrestees to communicate with their mother, rather than providing them with a teletypewriter (TTY) telephone. Jailers assisted the arrestees in
making their requested phone call by utilizing relay operators, the phone call lasted nearly forty-five minutes, and the
Department of Justice (DOJ) provisions did not mandate the presence of a TTY telephone. (City of Savannah Police Department , Hardin County Jail, Tennessee)

U.S. Appeals Court
TELEPHONE

U.S. v. Novak, 531 F.3d 99 (1st Cir. 2008). In an attorney's prosecution for endeavoring to obstruct justice and two counts
of money laundering, he moved to suppress intercepted telephone calls with a prospective client, made while that client
was in pretrial detention. The district court granted the motion, and the government appealed. The appeals court reversed.
The court held that the Fourth Amendment was not violated by the jail's monitoring of the detainee's telephone calls to his
attorney. According to the court, a telephone call can be monitored and recorded without violating the Fourth Amendment
so long as one participant in the call consents to the monitoring. By placing the calls after being informed that they would
be monitored and recorded, the detainee consented to such monitoring. The court decision begins by stating that “…the
government in this case brings an extraordinary appeal: It asks us to reverse a district court ruling barring from evidence
recordings of phone calls made between an attorney and his client. These calls were recorded in clear violation of state
and federal regulations.” The court noted that the attorney had not raised a Sixth Amendment challenge, and for Fourth
Amendment purposes, his client consented to the monitoring of his calls. The court held that “On these narrow facts, we
reverse the determination of the district court that the calls must be excluded.” (Barnstable County Jail, Massachusetts)
2009

U.S. District Court
TELEPHONE

Cox v. Ashcroft, 603 F.Supp.2d 1261 (E.D.Cal. 2009). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against the United States Attorney General, several federal prosecutors, and the owner and employees of a privately-owned federal facility in which the
prisoner was incarcerated, alleging constitutional violations arising from his arrest, prosecution, and incarceration. The
district court dismissed the action. The court held that the prisoner did not have any Fourth Amendment rights to privacy
in his cell, and thus did not suffer any constitutional injury as a result of the search of his cell and the confiscation of another inmate's legal materials. According to the court, the prison facility's imposition of a 30-day suspension of the prisoner's telephone privileges related to a disciplinary action arising from the search of his cell and the confiscation of another inmates' legal papers, did not constitute an unreasonable limitation on the prisoner's First Amendment rights. The
court noted that prisoners have a First Amendment right to telephone access, subject to reasonable limitations. (Taft Correctional Institution, Wackenhut Corrections Corporation, California)

U.S. District Court
COMMISSARY
COMMISSION
TELEPHONE

Harrison v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 611 F.Supp.2d 54 (D.D.C. 2009). A federal prisoner brought an action against the
Bureau of Prisons, alleging that the Bureau's conduct in adopting telephone rates and commissary prices violated his constitutional due process and equal protection rights. The district court granted the Bureau’s motion to dismiss in part. The
court noted that the prisoner had previously litigated claims against the Bureau of Prisons arising from an increase in telephone rates, and barred the prisoner from bringing additional claims based on that same cause of action, regardless of
whether the prisoner's claim invoked different provision of the Administrative Procedure Act. The court held that the
prisoner did not have a constitutionally protected property or liberty interest in commissary pricing, as required to state a
claim for the violation of due process based on allegedly unfair prices. The court noted that an inmate has no federal constitutional right to purchase items from a prison commissary. According to the court, the Bureau of Prisons used the same
mark-up guidelines in all of its institutions to set commissary prices, and thus there was no evidence that commissary
prices violated the federal prisoner's equal protection rights. (Federal Bureau of Prisons, Virginia)

U.S. District Court
TELEPHONE

Johnson v. Boyd, 676 F.Supp.2d 800 (E.D. Ark. 2009). A state prisoner filed a civil rights action against a detention center and its personnel alleging several violations. The defendants moved for summary judgment and the district court
granted the motion in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether detention center personnel failed to protect the prisoner from an attack by another prisoner. The court held that
the prisoner stated a free exercise of religion claim under the First Amendment by alleging that detention center personnel
prevented him from practicing the central tenet of his faith of regularly reading his Bible for 19 days while he was in protective custody. According to the court, the prisoner's First Amendment freedom of association and speech rights had not
been violated by denial of his visitation, phone, and mailing privileges for two days as the direct result of the prisoner
committing a disciplinary infraction while he was in protective custody. (Crittenden County Detention Center, Arkansas)

U.S. Appeals Court
LIBRARY

Mason v. Correctional Medical Services, Inc., 559 F.3d 880 (8th Cir. 2009). A state prisoner brought an action against the
manager of his prison housing unit and the director of prison medical services, alleging that they violated his Eighth
Amendment rights by failing to facilitate or render adequate medical treatment. The prisoner also brought an action
against the Missouri Department of Corrections (MDOC), alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the director and the MDOC. Following a jury verdict in
favor of the manager, the district court denied the prisoner's post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law. The pris-

XXIII

42.12

oner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court found that recreational activities, medical services, and educational
and vocational programs at state prisons are “benefits” within the meaning of the ADA, and qualified individuals with a
disability are entitled to meaningful access to such benefits. The court held that the blind prisoner was provided with
meaningful access to prison benefits, including library benefits, which required him to read and write, as required by the
ADA. According to the court, given the sufficiency of the accommodations provided, the prison was not required to provide alternative accommodations such as Braille materials or computer software that would read written materials aloud.
The prisoner was provided with an inmate reader, who was available to read to the prisoner in person and to create audio
tapes of written material at the prisoner's request. The prisoner was also granted access to audio materials by mail and to a
tape recorder. The court found that the prison did not deprive the blind prisoner of meaningful access to the prison's exercise and recreation facilities, in violation of the ADA, where the prison provided the inmate an assistant who walked with
the prisoner, and the prisoner chose not to engage in other activities, such as weightlifting. (Northeast Corr'l Center,
Missouri)
U.S. District Court
TELEPHONE

Shariff v. Coombe, 655 F.Supp.2d 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). Disabled prisoners who depended on wheelchairs for mobility
filed an action against a state and its employees asserting claims pursuant to Title II of the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA), Title V of Rehabilitation Act, New York State Correction Law, and First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part.
According to the court, the inaccessibility of telephones throughout a state prison, inaccessibility of a family reunion site,
inaccessibility of a law library, and malfunctioning of a school elevator, that did not cause any physical harm or pain to
disabled prisoners who depended on wheelchairs for mobility, were not the kind of deprivations that denied a basic human
need. (New York State Department of Correctional Services, Green Haven Correctional Facility)

U.S. District Court
LIBRARY

Zulu v. Botta, 613 F.Supp.2d 391 (W.D.N.Y. 2009). A state inmate brought a pro se § 1983 suit against the director of a
city library, who was not a state corrections department employee. The director moved for summary judgment and the
district court granted the motion. The court held that the director was not involved in any of the alleged violations of the
inmate's rights. The court found that while there were some issues over the inmate's excessive book requests, there was no
evidence that the director had anything to do with that matter, and that there was no evidence that the director conspired
with corrections employees to file a false misbehavior report against the inmate in retaliation for his filing of a grievance.
(Geneva Free Library, Geneva, New York)
2010

U.S. District Court
LIBRARY

Couch v. Jabe, 737 F.Supp.2d 561 (W.D.Va. 2010). An inmate, proceeding pro se, brought a § 1983 action claiming that
prison officials violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights when they applied a Virginia Department of Corrections (VDOC) regulation to exclude the books Ulysses and Lady Chatterley's Lover from the prison library and prevented
him from ordering those books from a private, approved vendor. The parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The
district granted the inmate’s motion, finding that the regulation violated the First Amendment, and that injunctive relief
was warranted. The court held that the regulation was not reasonably related to legitimate penological interests, and thus,
was overbroad, in violation of the First Amendment. The court noted that legitimate government interests in security,
discipline, good order and offender rehabilitation were not rationally related to the regulation, which forbid all “explicit ...
descriptions of sexual acts” including “sexual acts in violation of state or federal law,” and encompassed much of the
world's finest literature, but did not extend to “soft core” pornography. According to the court, while the inmate had no
right to a general purpose reading library under the First Amendment, where the Virginia Department of Corrections
(VDOC) decided to provide a general literary library to offenders, VDOC officials were constrained by the First Amendment in how they regulated the library. The court concluded that the appropriate remedy following a determination that
the First Amendment was violated by a prison regulation, which excluded the books Ulysses and Lady Chatterley's Lover
from a prison library, was injunctive relief against the enforcement and application of the regulation. (Augusta Correctional Center, Virginia)

U.S. Appeals Court
COMMISSARY

Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178 (10th Cir. 2010). A state prisoner, proceeding pro se, brought a § 1983 action against
prison officials, alleging violations of the First, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court dismissed the
complaint with prejudice. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The
court held that the prisoner's allegations that a prison official intentionally confiscated and destroyed letters sent to him by
persons outside the prison “under the guise” of sticker and perfume violations, for the purpose of harassing him, were
sufficient to plead violations of his First Amendment speech rights. The court also found that the prisoner's allegations
that a prison official returned to him outgoing letters that had “appropriate postage affixed without reason” for failure to
mail them, were sufficient to plead a violation of the prisoner's First Amendment speech rights. The court found an alleged First Amendment speech rights violation with the prisoner's allegations that he was given a letter from his sister and
that it was confiscated from him due to his incommunicado status, but that it was never returned to him. The court held
that the prisoner's allegations that prison officials confiscated canteen items, deprived him of hygiene items for 25 hours
and incarcerated him for four weeks in an isolation cell with limited outdoor recreation and lack of access to hygiene
items, were insufficient to state a § 1983 claim for violations of the Eighth Amendment. (Wyoming State Penitentiary)

U.S. District Court
COMMISSARY
TELEPHONE

Harrison v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 681 F.Supp.2d 76 (D.D.C. 2010). A federal prisoner brought an action against the
Bureau of Prisons (BOP), alleging that BOP's adoption of telephone rates and commissary prices violated his due process
and equal protection rights, as well as the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). He also alleged violations of the Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA) and Privacy Act. After BOP's motion to dismiss and for summary judgment was granted in
part and denied in part, the prisoner moved for reconsideration, and the BOP moved for summary judgment on remaining
FOIA claims. The district court granted the BOP’s motion. The court found no prejudicial error from the court's dismissal
of his claims in connection with BOP's adoption of telephone rates and commissary prices, as would warrant reconsideration. The court held that an investigation memorandum prepared by a warden concerning a tort claim brought by the prisoner against the BOP was exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) exemption for inter-

42.13

agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in
litigation with the agency. The court found that BOP conducted a reasonable and adequate search for records concerning
the prisoner's disability checks, and for records concerning the cost of and profits from inmates' copy cards, as required
under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). (Federal Bureau of Prisons, Washington, D.C.)
U.S. District Court
COMMISSARY

Hopkins v. Grondolsky, 759 F.Supp.2d 97 (D.Mass. 2010). A prisoner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The
Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) filed a motion to dismiss. The district court dismissed the case, finding that the loss of
90 days of commissary privileges as a disciplinary action was not a loss of any protected liberty interest, and allegations
were insufficient to plead prison regulations unreasonably burdened the prisoner’s constitutional rights. (Federal Bureau
of Prisons, Sex Offender Management Program, FMC Devens, Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
COMMISSARY

Mitchell v. Dodrill, 696 F.Supp.2d 454 (M.D.Pa. 2010). A federal prisoner initiated a Bivens-type action against the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) employees, making several complaints about various conditions of his former place of confinement. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants in part, and denied in part. The court held that,
absent any evidence that the alleged conditions of the prisoner's cell caused harm to the prisoner, and that the Bureau of
Prisons (BOP) defendants were deliberately indifferent to that harm, cell conditions did not violate the Eighth Amendment. The prisoner alleged that his cell was in poor condition, with poor welding and rust erosion present at the base of
the walls, had inadequate plumbing, was infested with “cockroaches, spiders, worms, mice and other unknown insects,”
and lacked ventilation. The court found that the prisoner's allegation, that as a special management unit inmate, he was not
given the same commissary privileges as a general population inmate, did not rise to the level of a sufficiently serious
constitutional deprivation to give rise to an Eighth Amendment claim. The court held that double celling of the prisoner
did not violate the Eighth Amendment where the prisoner did not allege that he was singled out for double-celling or that
his health or life was endangered by the condition. The court noted that double celling inmates is not per se
unconstitutional, and that considerations that are relevant in determining if double celling violates the Eighth Amendment
include the length of confinement, the amount of time prisoners spend in their cells each day, sanitation, lighting, bedding,
ventilation, noise, education and rehabilitation programs, opportunities for activities outside the cells, and the repair and
functioning of basic physical facilities such as plumbing, ventilation, and showers. (Special Management Unit, United
States Penitentiary, Lewisburg, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
TELEPHONE

Paulone v. City of Frederick, 718 F.Supp.2d 626 (D.Md. 2010). An arrestee, a deaf woman, brought an action against a
state, a county board, and a sheriff alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation
Act, and related torts. The state and sheriff moved to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. The district
court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that the arrestee failed to allege that any program or
activity she was required to complete following her arrest for driving under the influence (DUI) and during her subsequent
probation, received federal funds, as required to state Rehabilitation Act claims against the state for discriminating against
her and denying her benefits because of her deafness. The court found that the arrestee stated an ADA claim with her
allegations that, after her arrest and during her detention, police officers denied her the use of a working machine that
would have allowed her to make a telephone call, help in reading and understanding forms, and access to a sign language
interpreter. (Frederick County Board of County Commissioners, Frederick County Adult Detention Center, Maryland)
2011

U.S. District Court
TELEPHONE

Aref v. Holder, 774 F.Supp.2d 147 (D.D.C. 2011). A group of prisoners who were, or who had been, incarcerated in
communication management units (CMU) at federal correctional institutions (FCI) designed to monitor high-risk prisoners filed suit against the United States Attorney General, the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), and BOP officials, alleging
that CMU incarceration violated the First, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments. Four additional prisoners moved to intervene
and the defendants moved to dismiss. The district court denied the motion to intervene, and granted the motion to dismiss
in part and denied in part. The court held that even though a federal prisoner who had been convicted of solicitation of
bank robbery was no longer housed in the federal prison's communication management unit (CMU), he had standing under Article III to pursue constitutional claims against the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) for alleged violations since there was a
realistic threat that he might be redesignated to a CMU. The court noted that the prisoner had originally been placed in
CMU because of the nature of his underlying conviction and because of his alleged efforts to radicalize other inmates, and
these reasons for placing him in CMU remained. The court found that the restrictions a federal prison put on prisoners
housed within a communication management unit (CMU), which included that all communications be conducted in English, that visits were monitored and subject to recording, that each prisoner received only eight visitation hours per month,
and that prisoners' telephone calls were limited and subjected to monitoring, did not violate the prisoners' alleged First
Amendment right to family integrity, since the restrictions were rationally related to a legitimate penological interest. The
court noted that prisoners assigned to the unit typically had offenses related to international or domestic terrorism or had
misused approved communication methods while incarcerated.
The court found that prisoners confined to a
communication management unit (CMU), stated a procedural due process claim against the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) by
alleging that the requirements imposed on CMU prisoners were significantly different than those imposed on prisoners in
the general population, and that there was a significant risk that procedures used by the BOP to review whether prisoners
should initially be placed within CMU or should continue to be incarcerated there had resulted in erroneous deprivation of
their liberty interests. The court noted that CMU prisoners were allowed only eight hours of non-contact visitation per
month and two 15 minute telephone calls per week, while the general population at a prison was not subjected to a cap on
visitation and had 300 minutes of telephone time per month. The court also noted that the administrative review of CMU
status, conducted by officials in Washington, D.C., rather than at a unit itself, was allegedly so vague and generic as to
render it illusory. (Communication Management Units, Federal Correctional Inst. in Terre Haute, Indiana and Marion, Ill.)

U.S. District Court
TELEPHONE

Hill v. Donoghue, 815 F.Supp.2d 583 (E.D.N.Y. 2011). An inmate, proceeding pro se, brought an action against an
Assistant United States Attorneys (AUSA) and the United States, asserting various claims under Bivens and the Wiretap
Act in relation to his jailhouse phone calls. The defendants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, which the district
court granted. The court held that the AUSAs were entitled to absolute immunity from claims relating to their use of the
tapes. The but court found that an AUSA was not entitled to absolute immunity for ordering the recordings, where the

42.14

alleged order to make warrantless recordings of the inmate's jailhouse phone calls was investigative, rather than
prosecutorial, and therefore, the AUSA was not entitled to absolute immunity from the inmate's Wiretap Act or Bivens
Fourth Amendment claims. The court found that the inmate did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
jailhouse phone calls, and therefore, the warrantless recording of his calls did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights.
The court noted that the jail telephones played a recorded warning that calls might be recorded and monitored, and the
inmate's use of a jailhouse phone after hearing the warning constituted implied consent to the recording of his calls.
(Eastern District of New York, Nassau County Correctional Center, New York)
U.S. District Court
IDLENESS

Johnson v. Florida Dept. of Corrections, 826 F.Supp.2d 1319 (N.D.Fla. 2011). A hard-of-hearing inmate at a state prison,
who had allegedly been denied the benefit of television and radio services provided to other inmates, filed suit against the
state department of corrections seeking accommodation in the form of volume-boosting listening devices, and alleging
violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act, and the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The defendant moved to dismiss. The district court denied the motion. The court held that even
though the inmate was transferred to a different prison after filing grievances and prior to filing suit, he sufficiently
exhausted his administrative remedies under PLRA, since officials had been alerted to his problem and had the
opportunity to resolve it before being sued. The court noted that even though the prison to which the inmate had been
transferred would require him to have different adaptive technology than the type which he had originally sought, his
claim arose from the same continuing failure of the prison to provide him with access to television and radio audio. (Polk
Correctional Institution, Florida)

U.S. Appeals Court
COMMISSARY

Tenny v. Blagojevich, 659 F.3d 578 (7th Cir. 2011). Seven inmates incarcerated at a state prison sued current and former
officials in the Illinois Department of Corrections, and the former Governor, for marking up the price of commissary
goods beyond a statutory cap. The district court dismissed the cases for failure to state a claim and the inmates appealed.
The appeals court affirmed and remanded with instructions. According to the appeals court, even if a statutory cap on the
mark-up of the price of prison commissary goods created a protected property interest, the prisoners did not state a procedural due process claim based on the Department of Corrections' alleged cap violation where they did not allege that postdeprivation remedies were inadequate to satisfy constitutional due process requirements. (Stateville Corr'l. Center, Ill.)
2012

U.S. Appeals Court
TELEPHONE

Beaulieu v. Ludeman, 690 F.3d 1017 (8th Cir. 2012). Patients who were civilly committed to the Minnesota Sex Offender
Program (MSOP) brought a § 1983 action against Minnesota Department of Human Services (DHS) officials and
Minnesota Department of Corrections (DOC) officials, alleging that various MSOP policies and practices relating to the
patients' conditions of confinement were unconstitutional. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendants and the patients appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that: (1) the MSOP policy of
performing unclothed body searches of patients was not unreasonable; (2) the policy of placing full restraints on patients
during transport was not unreasonable; (3) officials were not liable for using excessive force in handcuffing patients; (4)
the officials' seizure of televisions from the patients' rooms was not unreasonable; (5) the MSOP telephone-use policy did
not violate the First Amendment; and (6) there was no evidence that officials were deliberately indifferent to the patients'
health or safety. The court found that the (MSOP) telephone-use policy did not violate the First Amendment free speech
rights of patients who were civilly committed to MSOP. According to the court, the policy of monitoring patients' nonlegal telephone calls and prohibiting incoming calls was reasonably related to MSOP's security interests in detecting and
preventing crimes and maintaining a safe environment. The court upheld the 30-minute limit on the length of calls,
finding it was reasonably related to the legitimate governmental interest of providing phone access to all patients, and that
patients had viable alternatives by which they may exercise their First Amendment rights, including having visitors or
sending or receiving mail, and patients had abused telephone privileges prior to implementation of the policy by engaging
in criminal activity or other counter-therapeutic behavior by phone. (Minnesota Sex Offender Program)

U.S. Appeals Court
LIBRARY

Munson v. Gaetz, 673 F.3d 630 (7th Cir. 2012). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that prison officials violated
his constitutional rights by barring him from personally possessing books he had shipped to a prison. The district court
dismissed the complaint, and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the decision to prohibit
the inmate from personally possessing books containing drug-related information did not violate the First Amendment, the
Eighth Amendment or due process. According to the court, the state prison officials had a legitimate and neutral
governmental objective of restricting prisoner access to drug-related information, despite the inmate's contention that he
wanted the books to educate himself about his prescribed medications, where the prison officials made an individualized
determination, and the books were available in prison library. (Illinois Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
LIBRARY

Toston v. Thurmer, 689 F.3d 828 (7th Cir. 2012). A state prison inmate brought a pro se civil rights complaint under §
1983 against prison officials, alleging that his rights of free speech and due process were violated when a disciplinary
proceeding found him guilty of possession of gang literature and sentenced him to 90 days confinement in segregation.
The inmate's due process claim was dismissed, and the district court granted summary judgment for officials on the free
speech claim. The inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and vacated in part. The appeals court held that the
limitation of the state prison inmate's right of free speech, as a result of a disciplinary proceeding that found him guilty of
possession of gang literature, was adequately justified by prison officials' legitimate concern that the inmate copied from a
prison library book a ten-point program by the founder of a hate group's predecessor in order to show it to others that the
inmate hoped to enlist in a prison gang, with the program to serve as the gang's charter. The court noted that a prison
librarian's decision that on the whole a book is not gang literature does not preclude disciplinary proceedings against an
inmate who copies incendiary passages from it. The inmate had purchased, with prison permission, “To Die for the
People: The Writings of Huey P. Newton” the founder of the Black Panthers, and he had checked out two books from the
prison library about the Black Panthers. The court vacated the district court decision regarding the alleged due process
violation. The inmate alleged that his due process rights were violated because he had no notice that copying passages
from prison library books or a book he had been allowed to purchase could subject him to a sentence of 90 days'

42.15

confinement in segregation for possessing gang literature. The appeal court ordered the district court to determine whether
a 90–day sentence to segregation was, or was not, a deprivation of liberty. (Waupun Correctional Institution, Wisconsin)
2013
U.S. District Court
TELEPHONE

Berke v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 942 F.Supp.2d 71 (D.D.C. 2013). A deaf federal inmate brought an action alleging
that the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) and its director discriminated against him in violation of the Rehabilitation Act by
failing to adequately accommodate his deafness. After the court granted, in part, the inmate's motion for a preliminary
injunction, the inmate moved for attorney fees and costs. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part.
The court held that the inmate was the prevailing party, and that a forty percent reduction in the attorney fee award was
warranted, where the court did not order the BOP to install videophones, only to investigate whether such a system could
reasonably be installed, and the BOP had not yet decided whether the system was feasible. (Federal Bureau of Prisons,
ADMAX Satellite Camp, Tucson, Arizona)

U.S. District Court
COMMISSARY

Borkholder v. Lemmon, 983 F.Supp.2d 1013 (N.D.Ind. 2013). A prisoner brought an action against state prison officials
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to challenge the officials' decision to revoke his vegan diet. Both parties moved
for summary judgment. The district court denied the officials’ motion, granted the prisoner’s motion, and entered an
injunction. The court held that the fact that the prisoner's vegan diet had been restored did not render moot his declaratory
judgment action against state prison officials, in which he alleged that they violated his religious rights by revoking his
vegan diet for purchasing chicken-flavored ramen noodles, because no vegetarian noodles were available to him, and his
vegan diet was subject to revocation anytime he ordered ramen noodles, regardless of whether he consumed the seasoning
packet containing chicken. The court found that the prisoner demonstrated a substantial burden to his religious practice,
satisfying his initial burden under The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), where the
prisoner held a religious belief that required him to adhere to a vegan diet, he purchased chicken-flavored ramen noodles
from the state prison commissary, the commissary did not carry a vegetarian noodle option, the prisoner did not eat the
meat flavoring packet but instead discarded it, and the prisoner's vegan diet was revoked solely due to his noodle
purchase. According to the court, prison officials' revocation of the prisoner's vegan diet was not the least restrictive
means to further a compelling governmental interest, and thus the officials did not meet their burden under RLUIPA to
justify such action,. The court noted that although the state prison policy dictated that personal preference diet cards could
be confiscated if a prisoner abused or misused the privilege by voluntarily consuming self-prohibited foods, and such
policy was legitimately geared toward weeding out insincere requests, the prisoner's purchase of noodles with a meat
seasoning packet did not mean that his beliefs were insincere. The district court decision opened by stating: “It is not
every day that someone makes a federal case out of ramen noodles. But unfortunately that's what Joshus Borkholder had
to do.” (Miami Correctional Facility, Indiana)

U.S. District Court
COMMISSARY

Johns v. Lemmon, 980 F.Supp.2d 1055 (N.D.Ind. 2013). An inmate, who was an Observant Jew, brought an action against
a prison superintendent and a commissioner of the department of corrections (DOC), alleging that denial of food on
Friday to consume on the Sabbath violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The
parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the plaintiff’s motion and denied the defendants’
motion. The court held that the prison's failure to provide food on Friday to the inmate was a substantial burden on his
religious exercise, and that the practice did not serve a compelling governmental interest of food safety. The inmate
sought to have food provided on Friday to consume on the Sabbath, and the prison’s refusal required him to buy his
Sabbath food from the commissary. The court noted that the inmate's preferred practice was permitted for a period of
about five months and during that time the inmate stored meals in a cooler for a day, which other prisoners were permitted
to do. (Miami Correctional Facility, Indiana Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
TELEPHONE

Nelson v. District of Columbia, 928 F.Supp.2d 210 (D.D.C. 2013). A detainee brought a § 1983 claim against the District
of Columbia arising from his stay in jail. The defendant moved to dismiss and the district court granted the motion. The
court held that denial of one telephone call and access to stationery during the detainee's five-day stay in a “Safe Cell,”
which was located in the jail's infirmary, did not implicate his First Amendment right of free speech or right of access to
courts. The court found that the detainee's alleged exposure to “dried urine on the toilet seat and floor” and garbage during
his five-day stay, along with the denial of a shower, did not rise to the level of a Fifth Amendment due process violation.
According to the court, placement of detainee in a Safe Cell was not motivated by a desire to punish the detainee, but
rather by a nurse's desire to attend to the detainee's ailments after his “legs and back gave out” twice. The court noted that
denial of the detainee’s request to have the cell cleaned was for the non-punitive reason that the detainee would not be in
the cell that long. (D.C. Jail, District of Columbia)

U.S. District Court
INDIGENT
INMATES

Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon, 989 F.Supp.2d 1122 (W.D.Wash. 2013). Indigent criminal defendants brought a class
action in state court against two cities, alleging the public defense system provided by the cities violated their Sixth
Amendment right to counsel. The district court entered judgment for the plaintiffs, finding that the defendants were
deprived of their Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and that the deprivation was caused by deliberate choices of the city
officials who were in charge of the public defense system. The court noted that the cities were appointing counsel in a
timely manner, but the public defenders were assigned so many cases that the defendants often went to trial or accepted
plea bargains without meeting with counsel. The court required the cities to re-evaluate their public defender contracts and
to hire a public defense supervisor to ensure indigent criminal defendants received their Sixth Amendment right to
counsel. (City of Mount Vernon and City of Burlington, Washington)
2014

U.S. District Court
TELEPHONE

Houston v. Cotter, 7 F.Supp.3d 283 (E.D.N.Y. 2014). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against corrections officers and
a county, alleging a due process violation in connection with his placement on a suicide watch while incarcerated at a
county correctional facility. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court denied the motions,

42.16

finding that summary judgment was precluded by fact issues as to whether a protected liberty interest was implicated. The
inmate alleged that the county had a policy or custom permitting classification officers to keep an inmate on suicide watch
as a form of punishment, after mental health personnel had deemed a continued suicide watch unnecessary. The inmate
remained on suicide watch for eight days after a psychiatrist and a social worker recommended his removal from the
suicide watch. The court also found a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the inmate's conditions of
confinement while he was placed on suicide watch imposed an atypical and significant hardship on him in relation to the
ordinary incidents of prison life, such that it implicated a protected liberty interest. While on suicide watch, officials took
away the inmate’s clothing and required him to wear a suicide-safe garment-- a sleeveless smock made of a coarse, tearresistant material and Velcro. He was not allowed to wear underwear, socks, or any other undergarment with the smock.
He was housed in a stripped cell in the Behavioral Modification Housing Unit. The cell contained a bare mattress and a
blanket made out of the same coarse material as the smock. Corrections officers situated immediately in front of the
Plexiglass cell window constantly supervised the inmate. According to the county, suicide watch inmates have access to
the yard, a plastic spoon, a rubberized pen, the law library, showers, razors, and medical and mental health services, but
the inmate claimed that he had no showers, telephone calls, prescription medications, food, or access to the law library
while in the BMHU. (Suffolk County Correctional Facility, New York)
U.S. District Court
TELEPHONE
RIGHT TO
TREATMENT

Karsjens v. Jesson, 6 F.Supp.3d 916 (D.Minn. 2014). Patients who were civilly committed to the Minnesota Sex Offender
Program (MSOP) brought a § 1983 class action against officials, alleging various claims, including failure to provide
treatment, denial of the right to be free from inhumane treatment, and denial of the right to religious freedom. The patients
moved for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, and the officials moved to dismiss. The district court granted the
defendants’ motion in part and denied in part, and denied the plaintiffs’ motions. The court found that the patients’
allegations that, based on policies and procedures created and implemented by state officials, patients spent no more than
six or seven hours per week in treatment, that their treatment plans were not detailed and individualized, that treatment
staff was not qualified to treat sex offenders, and that staffing levels were often far too low, sufficiently stated a § 1983
substantive due process claim based on the officials' failure to provide adequate treatment.
According to the court, the patients stated a § 1983 First Amendment free exercise claim against state officials with
allegations that MSOP's policies, procedures, and practices caused the patients to be monitored during religious services
and during private meetings with clergy, did not permit patients to wear religious apparel or to possess certain religious
property, and did not allow patients to “communally celebrate their religious beliefs by having feasts,” and that such
policies and practices were not related to legitimate institutional or therapeutic interests. The court also found that the
patients’ allegations that state officials limited their phone use, limited their access to certain newspapers and magazines,
and removed or censored articles from newspapers and magazines, stated a § 1983 First Amendment claim that officials
unreasonably restricted their right to free speech. (Minnesota Sex Offender Program)

U.S. District Court
COMMISSARY

Winder v. Maynard, 2 F.Supp.3d 709 (D.Md. 2014). An inmate, proceeding pro se, brought a § 1983 action against a
prison official, asserting that the official hindered his religious practice. The official filed a motion to dismiss or, in the
alternative, for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The district court held that denial of the inmate's
request for pork products for a Wiccan ceremonial meal did not substantially impede the inmate’s ability to practice his
religious beliefs in violation of the Free Exercise Clause or the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA). The court noted that the inmate's request for a religious ceremonial meal had been approved and he was
directed that while the requested pork products could not be provided through the dietary department or prepared in
Department of Corrections (DOC) kitchen facilities, pork products could nevertheless be purchased through the
commissary and consumed at the ceremonial meal. According to the court, the prison's accommodation of other religious
prisoners through the adoption of a religious diet while allegedly refusing to provide pork products for Wiccan
practitioners did not violate the equal protection rights of the inmate because: (1) the kosher Jewish diet demanded certain
food preparation and food choices not required for Wiccan inmates; (2) neither Jewish nor Muslim inmates received
ritually slaughtered meat; (3) no pork was prepared in Department of Corrections (DOC) kitchens in order to respect the
religious dietary requirements of Jewish and Muslim inmates; (4) the prison was unable to provide pork through dietary
services due to legitimate penological goals regarding budget and security; (5) the prisoner was free to purchase pork
products through the commissary; and (6) prison meal plans were created in order to see that the needs of all religious
groups are accommodated. (Jessup Correctional Institution, Maryland)
2015

U.S. District Court
COMMISSARY

Carter v. James T. Vaughn Correctional Center, 134 F.Supp.3d 794 (D. Del. 2015). A state prisoner filed a pr se
complaint under § 1983 seeking injunctive relief against a prison. The district court dismissed the action. The court held
that the prisoner's claims that the prison's business office miscalculated and deducted incorrect sums of money from his
prison account when making partial filing fee payments, that there was poor television reception, and that he was not
allowed to purchase canteen items from the commissary, were not actionable under § 1983, where all of the claims were
administrative matters that should be handled by the prison. The court found that the prisoner's claims that he was being
electronically monitored through a “microwave hearing effect eavesdropping device” and electronic control devices were
fantastical and/or delusional and therefore were insufficient to withstand screening for frivolity in filings by an in forma
pauperis prisoner, in the prisoner's § 1983 action. (James T. Vaughn Correctional Center, Smyrna, Delaware)

U.S. District Court
LIBRARY

Crime, Justice & America, Inc. v. Honea, 110 F.Supp.3d 1027 (E.D. Cal. 2015). The publisher of a magazine intended for
newly arrested county jail detainees awaiting trial brought an action against a county alleging violation of the right to free
speech protected under the First Amendment after the county barred general distribution of unsolicited paper products to
detainees. After a bench trial, the district court held that: (1) the county jail’s policy of limiting written publications was
rationally related to legitimate a penological interest in preventing inmates from using paper to conduct illicit activity; (2)
electronic touch-screen kiosks that displayed the publisher’s magazine in the jail were sufficient alternative means; (3) the
impact of accommodating the asserted right weighed in favor of the county policy; and (4) the policy was not an
exaggerated response. The court found that a corrections officer’s testimony regarding the nefarious uses of paper in

42.17

county jails, including that he could not recall a time when the publisher’s law-oriented magazine had been used by
detainees for such purposes was not, without more, sufficient to refute the county’s explanation that its policy limiting
detainee’s access to paper was rationally related to a legitimate penological interest. The court ruled that the publisher’s
proposal to provide two copies of the publisher’s law-oriented magazine in the county jail law library, standing alone, was
not a sufficient alternative means for the publisher to communicate the existence of the magazine to county jail detainees,
where most inmates would likely have left the jail before they would receive it from the library. (Butte Co. Jail, Calif.)
U.S. Appeals Court
COMMISSARY
TELEPHONE

DeBrew v. Atwood, 792 F.3d 118 (D.C. Cir. 2015). A federal inmate brought an action alleging that the Bureau of
Prison’s (BOP) response to his request for documents violated the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), that the BOP and
its officials violated the Takings and Due Process Clauses by retaining interest earned on money in inmates’ deposit
accounts, and that officials violated the Eighth Amendment by charging excessively high prices for items sold by the
prison commissary and for telephone calls. The district court entered summary judgment in the BOP’s favor and the
inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court held that the BOP did not
violate FOIA by failing to produce recordings of the inmate’s telephone conversations and that the inmate’s failure to
exhaust his administrative remedies precluded the court from reviewing whether the BOP conducted an adequate search.
The court found that the Bureau of Prisons’ (BOP) alleged practice of charging excessively high prices for items sold by
prison commissary and for telephone calls did not violate Eighth Amendment. (Fed. Bur. of Prisons, Washington, D.C.)

U.S. District Court
LIBRARY

Koger v. Dart, 114 F.Supp.3d 572 (N.D. Ill. 2015). A county jail inmate brought a § 1983 action against a county and the
county sheriff, alleging that the county jail’s absolute ban on newspapers was unconstitutional under the First
Amendment. The inmate moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the
absolute ban on newspapers for inmates was rationally connected to jail security, where newspapers were flammable, they
could cause sanitation problems because inmates could use them to clog toilets and they were issued with greater
frequency than other publications, thus increasing the volume of material to be disposed, newspapers could be fashioned
into weapons using paper mâché, and they could cause violence by informing inmates about the nature of other inmates’
charges or outside gang activity. But the court held that the county jail’s absolute ban on newspapers for inmates was not
reasonably related to the jail’s legitimate interest in security, and thus the ban violated the inmate’s First Amendment free
speech rights. According to the court, an absolute ban was the most extreme response available, as it completely
extinguished the inmate’s ability to exercise his right to read newspapers, and the ban was an exaggerated response to
security concerns, as there were obvious, easy alternatives that would accommodate the inmate’s right with de minimis
impact on the jail, such as permitting newspapers only in the jail library to reduce waste generated, and not purchasing
local papers to limit the risk of violence from inmates learning of local gang activity. (Cook County, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
COMMISSARY

Montalvo v. Lamy, 139 F.Supp.3d 597 (W.D.N.Y. 2015). An inmate brought an action against a sheriff, prison officials
and a commissary, alleging that he was a diabetic and that, while incarcerated, he was not provided with a medically
appropriate diet, was not permitted to purchase food items from the prison commissary, and was the subject of false
misbehavior reports when he complained about his dietary issues. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court
granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the inmate failed to allege that the prison commissary,
operated by a private company, was acting under the color of state law, as required to state constitutional claims against
the commissary. The court noted that the inmate did not allege that the commissary had a policy of denying commissary
access to diabetic prisoners or had the authority to override the prison's policy with respect to inmates with dietary
restrictions, and instead, alleged that the prison maintained a policy of limiting commissary access for prisoners with
dietary restrictions. The court found that the inmate did not state a First Amendment retaliation claim against a sergeant
who allegedly would not process the inmate's grievance related to his inability to purchase snacks from the prison
commissary, where the sergeant was acting in compliance with a state regulation, which required him, as the Grievance
Coordinator, to return grievances regarding issues outside the authority of the chief administrative officer to control, such
as medical decisions made by health care professionals. The court held that the inmate adequately alleged that the food
provided to him by the prison was not nutritionally adequate with respect to his status as a diabetic and that the diet he
was provided presented an immediate danger to his health and well-being, and thus, the inmate met the objective
component of an Eighth Amendment claim for medical indifference. (Erie County Holding Center, New York)

U.S. District Court
TELEPHONE
COMMISSION

Prison Legal News v. U.S. Dept. of Homeland Sec., 113 F.Supp.3d 1077 (W.D. Wash. 2015). A requester brought a
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) action against the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) for information related to prison telephone practices and policies, including those at ICE’s
federal immigration detention centers. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court granted
the requestor’s motion. The court held that the performance incentive rate of the phone services contractor for federal
immigration detention centers was not exempt from disclosure. According to the court, the phone services contractor was
not likely to suffer substantial competitive harm if the performance incentive rate from its successful bid for federal
immigration detention centers was disclosed, and thus that rate, which reflected the percentage of revenue set aside in
escrow and only paid to the contractor upon the government’s determination that the contractor performed successfully,
was not exempt from disclosure. (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement)

U.S. District Court
TELEPHONE

Smith v. Securus Technologies, Inc., 120 F.Supp.3d 976 (D. Minn. 2015). Consumers brought a putative class action
against the provider of inmate telephone services, alleging violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA)
and the Minnesota Automatic Dialing-Announcing Devices Law (ADAD), based on claims that the provider made
automated calls with prerecorded messages to their cellular phones without their prior consent. The provider moved for
summary judgment. The district court granted the motion, finding that the provider did not “make” calls as required to be
liable under TCPA and ADAD and the platform used for inmates’ calls was not an automatic telephone dialing system.
The plaintiffs alleged that each call allegedly informed them about the name of the inmate trying to contact them, the
name of the correctional facility from which the call was being made, and instructions on how to accept or decline the
call. They argued that they did not consent to receiving any of these non-emergency calls. (Securus Technologies, Inc.,
and Minnesota ADAD Law)

42.18

U.S. Appeals Court
COMMISSARY

Sorrentino v. Godinez, 777 F.3d 410 (7th Cir. 2015). Two inmates purchased several items from a prison’s commissary,
but the prison later forbade the inmates to possess those items in their cells. Their property was removed, as the new rule
required. They responded by filing a proposed class action in the district court, alleging that confiscation of their property
was an unconstitutional taking and a breach of contract. The district court dismissed the action. The appeals court held
that the district court was correct to dismiss the action, although the dismissal should have been without prejudice. One
inmate had purchased a fan and signed a “personal property contract” which obligated him to follow all Department of
Corrections (DOC) rules related to use, ownership, and possession of the fan. The other inmate purchased a typewriter
and a fan, and he also signed a personal property contract for his fan. When a new policy banned these items from
prisoners’ cell, the new policy offered several options for inmates who owned the newly prohibited types of property.
Inmates with typewriters could have them destroyed, give them to visitors, ship them to someone outside the prison at no
cost, store them in “offender personal property” which is returned to inmates upon release from prison, or donate them to
the prison library. Fans were simply placed in storage as “offender personal property.” (Stateville Correctional Facility,
Illinois)

42.19

42.20

with the notice and comment rulemaking requirements of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). The court
found that the BOP reasonably interpreted the statutes as giving it discretion to limit transfers to a statutory
minimum period. The court found that the retroactive application of the policy did not violate the Ex Post Facto
Clause. (Federal Corr’l Institution, Otisville, N.Y.)
U.S. District Court
SENTENCE

Rickenbacker v. U.S., 365 F.Supp.2d 347 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). After pleading guilty to credit card fraud and being
sentenced to 24 months of imprisonment, a defendant moved to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence. The
district court denied the motion. The court held that defense counsel was not deficient in failing to move for a
downward departure of the defendant’s sentence based on perceived hardships the defendant endured while being
detained prior to sentencing. According to the court, the alleged substandard conditions, consisting of being served
food that the defendant believed had been accessed by rodents, and not being provided with a fully stocked library,
were not conditions that rose to the level that would warrant a downward departure. The defendant had been served
bread that rodents had apparently partially eaten, and in one instance a mouse had created a tunnel inside of the
bread. (Nassau County Correctional Center, N.Y.)

U.S. Appeals Court
CREDIT

U.S. v. Barfield, 396 F.3d 1144 (11th Cir. 2005). A defendant appealed a district court order that lifted a stay on the
execution of her sentence. The district court affirmed, finding that the defendant was not entitled to credit for time
spent erroneously at liberty when there was a delay in executing her sentence, and that an eight-year delay in the
enforcement of her sentence did not violate due process. The court noted that the government was acting under the
belief, based on representations by the defendant, that her death was imminent when it delayed enforcement to
allow her to spend time with her family. (U.S. District Court, Middle District, Florida)

U.S. District Court
PLACE OF IMPRISONMENT
RECOMMENDATION

U.S. v. Guerrette, 289 F.Supp.2d 10 (D.Me. 2005). An offender was designated to be incarcerated at a certain
facility and he moved to amend the judgment and to recommend incarceration at another facility that would be
closer to his family. The district court denied the motion, finding that a sentencing court’s recommendation to the
Bureau of Prisons regarding the place of imprisonment is both non-binding and non-reviewable. The court noted
that the federal Bureau of Prisons retains the statutory authority and responsibility to choose the place of
imprisonment of a federal prisoner. (Federal Prison Camp, Fort Dix, New Jersey)

U.S. District Court
RECOMMENDATION

U.S. v. Paige, 369 F.Supp.2d 1257 (D.Mont. 2005). A federal prisoner filed a habeas petition challenging the
Bureau of Prisons (BOP) policy that precluded his placement in a community corrections center, as recommended
by the sentencing court. The district court granted the petition, finding that the prisoner was not required to first
exhaust his administrative remedies before the court could consider the petition, because by the time the inmate
exhausted every available administrative remedy he would nearly be done serving his entire sentence. The court
held that the statutes governing placement of inmates in prerelease custody did not authorize the BOP policy, under
which inmates were designated to a community corrections center only for the lesser of six months or ten percent
of their sentence. The court ordered the BOP to consider the appropriateness of transferring the inmate to a
community confinement center. (Federal Correctional Center, Florence, Colorado)

U.S. Appeals Court
LIBERTY INTEREST
GOOD-TIME

Wilson v. Jones, 430 F.3d 1113 (10th Cir. 2005). A state inmate petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, challenging
on due process grounds a misconduct conviction that caused him to be demoted to a non-credit-earning prisoner.
The district court denied the petition and the inmate appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded, ordering
the issuance of a writ on remand. The court held that the misconduct conviction reduced the inmate’s credit-earning
class in a manner that inevitably affected the direction of his sentence and therefore deprived the inmate of a liberty
interest. According to the court, officials violated the inmate’s due process rights by convicting him without any
evidence. (Great Plains Correctional Facility, Oklahoma)
2006

U.S. District Court
PAROLE
EX POST FACTO

Michael v. Ghee, 411 F.Supp.2d 813 (N.D.Ohio 2006). Ohio “old law” inmates serving indeterminate sentences
brought a § 1983 action, alleging that the state's parole system was unconstitutional. The state moved to dismiss
and for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment for the state. The court held that the
inmates had no valid procedural due process claim and that the state had rational reasons, satisfying equal
protection, for requiring “old law” inmates to continue to serve their indeterminate sentences, subject to parole
board determinations, after the law was changed to provide for exact sentences and the elimination of parole.
According to the court, the parole guidelines promulgated in 1998 had a rational basis and the parole guidelines
were not laws, subject to the ex post facto clause. The court noted that state law makes parole discretionary, and
therefore inmates do not have a due process liberty interest in parole under state law. Since the inmates did not
have a liberty interest in parole itself, they could not have a liberty interest in parole consideration or other aspects
of parole procedures, and thus had no procedural due process claim. The court found that the state had several
rational reasons, satisfying equal protection, for requiring so-called “old law” inmates to continue to serve their
indeterminate sentences. The reasons included the desire to avoid retroactive legislation and alteration of sentences,
to give “old law” inmates an incentive to obey prison regulations, and to acknowledge the seriousness of the
convicted offenses. (Ohio Adult Parole Authority and Chillicothe Correctional Institution)

U.S. District Court
EX POST FACTO
PAROLE
EQUAL PROTECTION

Pennsylvania Prison Society v. Rendell, 419 F.Supp.2d 651 (M.D.Pa. 2006). An advocacy group brought an action
in state court challenging the legality of proposed changes to the state constitution with regard to pardoning powers
and the state Board of Pardons. Following approval of the changes by the electorate, the defendants removed the
action to federal court. After state-law claims were remanded and the defendants prevailed on appeal before the
state supreme court, the group filed an amended complaint, alleging that the constitutional amendments violated the
Due Process Clause, the Ex Post Facto Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, the Eighth Amendment, and the
Guarantee Clause. The parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The district court held that including a crime

43.45
XXI

victim on a state pardon board, even when the recommendation for a pardon or commutation must be unanimous
before it may be considered by the governor, does not violate due process. The court found that the retroactive
application of the amendments providing for the inclusion of a crime victim on the Board of Pardons did not violate
the Ex Post Facto Clause, but the court held that the retroactive application of the amendments requiring a
unanimous vote for the Board of Pardons to recommend a commutation violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. The
ballot question that proposed the amendments read: Shall the Pennsylvania Constitution be amended to require a
unanimous recommendation of the Board of Pardons before the Governor can pardon or commute the death
sentence of an individual sentenced in a criminal case to death or life imprisonment, to require only a majority vote
of the Senate to approve the Governor's appointments to the Board, and to substitute a crime victim for an attorney
and a corrections expert for a penologist as Board members? (Penn. Board of Pardons)
U.S. District Court
GUIDELINES

U.S. v. Shelton, 431 F.Supp.2d 675 (E.D.Tex. 2006). An inmate was convicted of forcibly assaulting a correctional
officer, and a sentencing hearing was held. The district court held that a sentence of 36 months' imprisonment,
exceeding the sentencing guidelines range of 12 to 18 months, was warranted for the inmate’s conviction for
forcibly assaulting a correctional officer by throwing feces and urine that struck the officer in the head, face, and
chest. The court noted that the inmate’s conduct was more than mere physical contact, and subjected the officer to
the risk of a host of infectious diseases. The officer had to be treated with a cocktail of drugs to protect against such
diseases, and the court held that the need for adequate deterrence was important due to prevalence of such assaults
by prisoners. (Texas)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEX OFFENDERS
EX POST FACTO

Weems v. Little Rock Police Dept,, 453 F.3d 1010 (8th Cir. 2006). A registered sex offender brought a civil rights
suit challenging the provisions of the Arkansas Sex Offender Registration Act that required sex offenders to register, and the provision of the statute that prohibited certain registered sex offenders from living within two thousand
feet of a school or a daycare center. The district court denied the offenders’ motion for class certification and dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim. The offender appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held: (1)
the residency restriction did not violate substantive due process; (2) the residency restriction did not violate equal
protection by treating the high-risk offenders who did not own property differently from the property-owning high
risk offenders or from low-risk offenders; (3) the restrictions did not violate a constitutional right to travel; (4) the
restriction did not constitute an unconstitutional ex post facto law as applied to the offenders who sustained convictions prior to the enactment of the statute; and (5) the offenders were not deprived of any liberty interest in
avoiding a risk assessment without procedural due process. The court held that the statute rationally advanced a
legitimate government purpose of protecting children from the most dangerous sex offenders by reducing their
proximity to the locations frequented by children, that the statute was intended to be regulatory and non-punitive,
and was not punitive in effect. (Arkansas General Assembly, Sex and Child Offender Registration Act)
2007

U.S. District Court
EX POST FACTO
PAROLE

Edwards v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 523 F.Supp.2d 462 (E.D.Pa. 2007). A prisoner filed a § 1983 suit, seeking
injunctive and declaratory relief against a Board of Probation and Parole, claiming violations of the Ex Post Facto
Clause and Eighth Amendment, and asserting that his parole was denied in retaliation for exercising his constitutional rights. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the board. The court noted that the Ex Post
Facto Clause applies to a statute or policy change that alters the definition of criminal conduct or increases the
penalty by which a crime is punishable. Under Pennsylvania law, although parole is an alteration of the terms of
confinement, a parolee continues to serve his unexpired sentence until its conclusion. According to the court, under
Pennsylvania law, a “parole” is not an act of clemency but a penological measure for the disciplinary treatment of
prisoners who seem capable of rehabilitation outside of prison walls; parole does not set aside or affect the sentence, and the convict remains in the legal custody of the state and under the control of its agents, subject at any
time for breach of condition to be returned to the penal institution. The court held that denial of the prisoner's reparole by Board of Probation and Parole, after his conviction as a parole violator, was not re-imposition of the
prisoner's unexpired life sentence, in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause, but rather, under Pennsylvania law, the
prisoner's sentence was not set aside by his parole. According to the court, the prisoner remained in the legal custody of the warden until expiration of his sentence, and the prisoner had no protected liberty interest beyond that of
any other prisoner eligible to be considered for parole while serving out the remainder of a maximum sentence. The
court held that changes to the Pennsylvania Parole Act did not create a significant risk of increasing the prisoner's
punishment in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause, based on the Board of Probation and Parole's denial of the
prisoner's re-parole due to factors of prior parole failures and lack of remorse, since the relative weight of such
factors in the parole calculus of amendments to the Parole Act did not change, and the prisoner produced no evidence that the change in the Parole Act had any effect on the Board's decision. (Pennsylvania Board of Probation
and Parole)

U.S. Appeals Court
EX POST FACTO
EQUAL PROTECTION

Michael v. Ghee, 498 F.3d 372 (6th Cir. 2007). Inmates in Ohio correctional facilities who were sentenced prior to
Ohio's enactment of a revised sentencing system on July 1, 1996, brought an action in state court claiming that lack
of retroactivity of the new sentencing scheme and the implementation of the 1998 parole guidelines violated the Ex
Post Facto, Due Process, and Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitution, as well as various provisions of state
law. After the case was removed to federal district court, the court granted the state defendants' motion for
dismissal and for summary judgment. The inmates appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the
state's decision not to apply the new sentencing law retroactively and to adopt new parole guidelines had a rational
basis, and the retroactive application of the 1998 Ohio parole guidelines did not violate the Ex Post Facto
Clause.(Ohio Adult Parole Authority)

43.46
XXI

U.S. Appeals Court
PARDON

Pennsylvania Prison Soc. v. Cortes, 508 F.3d 156 (3rd Cir. 2007). State prisoners, several non-profit advocacy
and prisoner rights groups, and several state voters and qualified taxpayers brought an action challenging
amendments to the Pennsylvania constitution changing the composition of Board of Pardons and voting
requirements for obtaining a pardon or commutation of sentence. The district court granted in part and denied in
part the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. The parties appealed. The appeals court dismissed and
remanded. The court held that the parties did not have standing. According to the court, evidence tended to show
that the absolute number of Board of Pardon recommendations for commutations had decreased after
amendments to the Pennsylvania constitution changed the composition of the Board and voting requirements for
obtaining a pardon or commutation of sentence, but this failed to meet the causation element for standing to
challenge the constitutionality of amendments, where the decrease had begun two years prior to the amendments.
(Pennsylvania Board of Pardons)

U.S. Appeals Court
FINES
INDIGENCY

Powers v. Hamilton County Public Defender Com'n, 501 F.3d 592 (6th Cir. 2007). A former prisoner filed a
putative § 1983 class action, alleging that his constitutional rights were violated by the county public defender's
policy or custom of failing to seek indigency hearings on behalf of criminal defendants facing jail time for
unpaid fines. The district court granted the motion for class certification, and granted summary judgment in
favor of the arrestee on the issue of liability. The defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part,
reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that: (1) the alleged automatic incarceration of the arrestee for his
failure to pay fine, without conducting an indigency hearing to determine his ability to pay the fine, violated due
process; (2) the public defender's failure to request an indigency hearing was the moving force behind prisoner's
failure to receive an indigency hearing; (3) the public defender acted under the color of state law; and (4) fact
issues precluded summary judgment. (Hamilton County Public Defender Office and Hamilton County Public
Defender Commission, Ohio)

U.S. District Court
CREDIT
ORIGINAL SENTENCE
PROBATIONREVOCATION

Thompson v. District of Columbia Dept. of Corrections, 511 F.Supp.2d 111 (D.D.C. 2007). A federal prisoner
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that his custody, based on a parole violator warrant issued by
the United States Parole Commission, unlawfully extended his sentence beyond the expiration date. The district
court denied the petition. The court held that the prisoner's custody did not unlawfully extend his sentence
beyond the expiration date. According to the court, the Commission did not usurp a judicial function in violation
of the separation of powers when it rescinded the prisoner's street-time credit upon each of his parole
revocations. The court noted that the number of days he spent on parole was properly rescinded for each of his
revocations, and therefore the days no longer counted towards the service of his prison term. (District of
Columbia Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
SUPERVISED RELEASECONDITIONS

U.S. v. Betts, 511 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2007). A defendant appealed the sentence imposed by the district court for
conspiracy, challenging various conditions of supervised release. The appeals court vacated the sentence and
remanded the case. The court held that the conditions of supervised release improperly delegated to a probation
officer the decision as to how much of any windfall received by defendant would be applied to his restitution
obligation. The court also found that the condition of supervised release prohibiting the defendant from drinking
alcohol was improper, where there was nothing in the record to suggest that the judge thought there was any past
abuse of alcohol or any relationship between alcohol and the defendant's crime. (United States District Court for
the Central District of California)

U.S. Appeals Court
SUPERVISED RELEASE

U.S. v. Kriesel, 508 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2007). The government petitioned to revoke supervised release of a felon
who refused to submit a DNA sample. In response, the convicted felon challenged the constitutionality of the
Justice for All Act, which expanded coverage of the DNA Act to require DNA samples from all convicted felons
on supervised release. The felon also challenged the regulation issued pursuant to the Justice for All Act. The
district court upheld the constitutionality of the Justice for All Act and the validity of the regulation. The felon
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that requiring a convicted felon on supervised release to
provide a DNA sample, even through drawing of blood, did not constitute an illegal search. The court found that
the government's significant interests in identifying supervised releasees, preventing recidivism, and solving past
crimes outweighed the diminished privacy interests of the convicted felon. (United States District Court for the
Western District of Washington)

U.S. District Court
RESTITUTION

U.S. v. Young, 533 F.Supp.2d 1086 (D.Nev. 2007). A federal prisoner who had been ordered to pay restitution in
the amount of $457,740 and a penalty assessment in the amount of $3,300 moved to set aside the schedule of
payments. The district court denied the motion. The court held that the defendant's participation in the federal
Bureau of Prison’s (BOP) Inmate Financial Responsibility Program (IFRP), which allowed the BOP to withhold
$50 per month from the defendant's account, was not under duress, and that withholding 21 percent of the
defendant's monthly income was not egregious or unreasonable. The court noted that the prisoner earns
approximately $57 while imprisoned and that he typically receives a bonus of approximately $28 per month,
bringing his total monthly earnings to approximately $85. The prisoner also receives approximately $150 per
month from family members, making his total monthly income $235. (Nevada)
2008

U.S. District Court
PAROLE
CREDIT

Garner v. Caulfield, 584 F.Supp.2d 167 (D.D.C. 2008). A parolee filed a habeas petition to challenge his
detention following revocation of his parole. The district court denied the petition. The court held that the
parolee was not entitled to credit toward service of his sentence for his stay at a residential program akin to
placement in a halfway house, which was a condition of parole. The court found that the Parole Commission

43.47
XXII

issued a valid parole violator warrant before the date on which the petitioner would have reached his full-term
expiration date, and therefore it was authorized to revoke the petitioner's parole. (United States Parole
Commission, District of Columbia)
U.S. District Court
CREDIT
EXPIRATION

Huff v. Sanders, 632 F.Supp.2d 903 (E.D.Ark. 2008). A federal prison inmate brought a habeas corpus petition,
challenging the government's designation of the date of commencement of his sentence, and seeking additional
presentence detention credit. The district court granted the petition in part and denied in part. The court held that:
(1) the inmate satisfied the administrative exhaustion requirement even though he failed to comply with the
Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) demands as to the form of the documents; (2) the federal sentence commenced on the
date that the inmate was sentenced for federal charges and remanded to the custody of United States Marshal; (3)
the inmate was entitled to credit against his federal sentence for all of his presentence incarceration; but (4) the
inmate was not entitled to presentence detention credit for time spent in a residential drug treatment center.
(Federal Detention Center, Houston, Texas, and Federal Correctional Institution, Oakdale, Louisiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
LIBERTY INTEREST
ORIGINAL SENTENCE

Jenkins v. Currier, 514 F.3d 1030 (10th Cir. 2008). A state prisoner brought a pro se § 1983 action against state
officials alleging that the officials violated his constitutional rights and state law when they took him into
custody without a warrant or a probable cause hearing, and transferred him to a correctional facility in order for
him to serve his previously imposed sentence. The district court dismissed the prisoner's claims with prejudice.
The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court noted that under Oklahoma law, a convicted
defendant who is at liberty without having served his sentence may be arrested as on escape and ordered into
custody on the unexecuted judgment. According to the court, state officials did not violate the Fourth
Amendment when they seized the state prisoner without a warrant, after having been released from federal
custody erroneously, so that he could serve the remainder of his unfinished state sentence. The court noted that
the officials had reason to believe that the prisoner had not completed serving his state sentences and there were
no special circumstances that would have made his otherwise permissible arrest unreasonable. The court also
found that the prisoner had no due process right to a hearing when he was taken back into custody. (Oklahoma)

U.S. District Court
RESTITUTION

Johnson v. Bredesen, 579 F.Supp.2d 1044 (M.D.Tenn. 2008). Convicted felons who had served their sentences
brought an action against state and local officials seeking to invalidate portions of a Tennessee Code that
conditioned the restoration of their voting rights upon their payment of certain financial obligations, including
restitution and child support. The district court granted judgment on the pleadings to the defendants. The court
held that the statutory provision: (1) did not create a suspect classification; (2) did not violate equal protection;
(3) did not violate the Twenty-Fourth Amendment; and (4) did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. According
to the court, the state had an interest in protecting the ballot box from felons who continued to break the law by
not abiding by enforceable court orders, the state had a strong public policy interest in encouraging the payment
of child support and thereby promoting the welfare of children, and the state had a legitimate interest in
encouraging convicted felons to complete their entire sentences, including the payment of restitution. The court
also noted that there was no evidence that the state of Tennessee's re-enfranchisement scheme for convicted
felons had traditionally been regarded as punitive, rather than civil, so as to violate the federal or Tennessee Ex
Post Facto Clause. (Tennessee)

U.S. District Court
EX POST FACTO
PAROLE

Sellmon v. Reilly, 551 F.Supp.2d 66 (D.D.C. 2008). District of Columbia inmates, each of whom committed his
crime and was sentenced prior to the date when the United States Parole Commission (USPC) took over
responsibility from the District of Columbia Parole Board for conducting parole hearings for D.C. Code
offenders, brought a § 1983 action against the USPC chairman and its commissioners. The inmates alleged that
USPC retroactively applied its own parole guidelines and practices in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause of
the Constitution. The district court held that the inmates established a prima facie case of an ex post facto
violation resulting from the retroactive application of the USPC parole regime, rather than the D.C. parole
regime, to their parole applications. But the court held that only those inmates who demonstrated that the
practical effect of the new policies was to substantially increase the risk that they each would serve lengthier
terms of incarceration were entitled to relief on their ex post facto claims. (District of Columbia)

U.S. District Court
REDUCTION OF
SENTENCE

Sheppard v. U.S., 537 F.Supp.2d 785 (D.Md. 2008). A detainee brought an action against the federal Bureau of
Prisons (BOP) claiming negligence pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) for his illegal detention for
over nine months. The district court denied the government’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction or, in the
alternative, for summary judgment. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of
material fact as to the role and duties of BOP personnel who were allegedly responsible for the continued
confinement of the detainee during his false imprisonment. The BOP asserted that the employees were
“investigative or law enforcement officers” for the purposes of the government's waiver of sovereign immunity.
The detainee had been sentenced to 121 months of incarceration in a federal prison in Leavenworth, Kansas. The
district court granted the request of the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia to reduce his
sentence to time served and ordered his release. The detainee was not released for approximately ten months
after the court’s order. (District of Columbia, and U.S. Penitentiary, Leavenworth, KS)

U.S. Appeals Court
COMMUTATION
EX POST FACTO
LIBERTY INTEREST

Snodgrass v. Robinson, 512 F.3d 999 (8th Cir. 2008). A state prisoner brought a suit against the Iowa Board of
Parole, the Board's members and the governor of Iowa alleging that her constitutional rights were violated by
applying laws and regulations governing commutation requests, even though the laws were passed after her
conviction. The district court granted a motion to dismiss and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed.
The court held that the retroactive application of an amendment to the Iowa commutation provisions did not
violate the Ex Post Facto Clause and that the state prisoner had no liberty interest in commutations. The court
noted that the retroactive application of the amendment to Iowa Code did not raise a significant risk that the
state prisoner would be denied a commutation she otherwise would have received from the governor given the

43.48
XXII

unpredictability of the wholly discretionary grant of a governor's commutation. The court noted that the new
provisions limited a Class A felon serving a life sentence to commutation applications no more frequently than
once every ten years rather than previous standards which provided for regular review. (Iowa Board of Parole)
U.S. District Court
RESTITUTION

Stern v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 537 F.Supp.2d 178 (D.D.C. 2008). A federal inmate brought an action
against the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), challenging the BOP's statutory authority to promulgate a
regulation through which it had established restitution payment schedules. The district court denied the BOP
motion to dismiss. The court held that the inmate stated a cognizable claim under the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA). The court held that the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA) rendered invalid the BOP
regulation that established payment schedules for orders of restitution, because only the courts could set payment
schedules for restitution. (Federal Correctional Institution, Jesup, Georgia)

U.S. Appeals Court
GOOD-TIME

Tablada v. Thomas, 533 F.3d 800 (9th Cir. 2008). A federal inmate sought a writ of habeas corpus, challenging
the Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) calculation of good time credits in determining the length of time left to serve on
his 20-year sentence. The district court denied the petition and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed.
The court held that the BOP's program statement, calculating good time credits based on time served rather than
the sentence imposed, reasonably interpreted the good time credit statute, despite the invalidity of a regulation
with an identical methodology. According to the court, the inmate's good time credits were required to be
calculated based on time served rather than the sentence imposed. (Fed. Correctional Institute, Sheridan, Oregon)
2009

XXIII

U.S. District Court
EQUAL PROTECTION
SENTENCE

Bowdry v. Ochalla, 605 F.Supp.2d 1009 (N.D.Ill. 2009). A former state prison inmate brought a § 1983 action
against attorneys employed by a county public defender's office, alleging that the attorneys' respective failure to
notice and correct a mittimus error had resulted in the inmate's incarceration for an extra three months, asserting
violations of due process, equal protection, and the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment. The district court dismissed the action. The court held that the attorneys had not acted under the
color of state law in failing to correct the mittimus error, where the review of mittimus fell within the scope of a
lawyer's traditional functions, contrary to the defendant's contention that it was “essentially administrative.”
(Cook County Public Defenders, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONSECUTIVE
SENTENCES

Espinoza v. Sabol, 558 F.3d 83 (1st Cir. 2009). A federal prisoner convicted for drug offenses petitioned for a
writ of habeas corpus. The district court denied the petition and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The court held that the prisoner was not entitled to credit for the 14-month period that he was at liberty
after federal authorities inadvertently released him prior to the expiration of his sentence, and that the prisoner's
sentence for escape, imposed approximately 10 years after he was sentenced on federal drug charges, was
subject to the statutory presumption that the sentence should run consecutively. The court noted that the
erroneous release happened only because the prisoner had escaped from his halfway house, causing the need to
process him again when he was apprehended, and there was no showing that the government acted arbitrarily or
intentionally to prolong the prisoner's sentence. According to the court, giving the prisoner credit for the time he
was free would amount to rewarding him for his escape. (Federal Bureau of Prisons, Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
PRESENTENCE REPORT
SEX OFFENDERS

Gilmore v. Bostic, 636 F.Supp.2d 496 (S.D.W.Va. 2009). A state prison inmate brought an action against a
probation officer, the state parole board, and state correctional facility employees, asserting that his
constitutional rights were violated by allegedly false information in his presentence report for a burglary
conviction and in the prison file which resulted in the inmate's classification in the state penal system at a higher
level than was appropriate and in a sex offender designation. The district court held that: (1) the board was
entitled to absolute immunity; (2) employees were not liable in their official capacities on claims for
compensatory relief but the employees sued in their individual capacities were liable; (3) the inmate stated a
violation of a protected liberty interest in parole release under the state constitution; (4) the inmate stated a claim
under the state constitution for violation of a protected liberty interest in not being required to undergo sex
offender treatment; and (5) the inmate adequately alleged a physical injury required to recover for mental or
emotional injury. (Kanawha County Adult Probation Department, West Virginia Board of Probation and Parole,
Huttonsville Correctional Center, West Virginia)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXPIRATION

Hart v. Hodges, 587 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2009). A former federal prisoner brought an action against a state
prosecutor, the general counsel of the Georgia Department of Corrections (DOC) and the warden of a Georgia
prison, alleging violations of his constitutional rights by having him transferred from federal to state custody at
the end of his federal sentence. The district court granted the defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings
on the ground they were entitled to absolute immunity. The plaintiff appealed. The appeals court affirmed in
part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court held that the prosecutor was entitled to absolute immunity for his
role in the plaintiff's transfer. But the court held that the general counsel of the Georgia Department of
Corrections (DOC) and the warden of a Georgia prison were not entitled to absolute immunity from liability
under § 1983 and state law for causing the issuance of a second state warrant against the prisoner prior to his
release from federal prison, and issuing a notice of surrender to the prisoner and threatening further prosecution
following his release. The court noted that the general counsel's role as legal advisor to the DOC and the
warden's role as chief jailer of the prison where the prisoner was incarcerated were not roles intimately
associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process. (Jackson State Prison, Georgia Department of
Corrections)

43.49

U.S. District Court
EX POST FACTO
GUIDELINES
SENTENCE TO PAROLE

Smith v. Reilly, 604 F.Supp.2d 124 (D.D.C. 2009). An inmate brought a § 1983 suit against members of the
United States Parole Commission (USPC), asserting an ex post facto challenge to the application of the USPC's
parole guidelines. The district court granted the summary judgment for the defendants. The court held that the
Ex Post Facto Clause barred application of the new parole guidelines, which increased the risk that the inmate
would serve a longer period of incarceration. According to the court, the new USPC guidelines, but not the old
ones, prevented a candidate who, like the inmate, had committed a crime of violence resulting in death, from
even being found suitable for parole when he first became eligible after serving a minimum sentence. The new
guidelines also translated disciplinary infractions directly into additional months of incarceration, and considered
all disciplinary infractions were considered. (District of Columbia Board of Parole)

U.S. Appeals Court
REVOCATION
SUPERVISED RELEASE

U.S. v. Anderson, 583 F.3d 504 (7th Cir. 2009). The Government separately petitioned to revoke the supervised
release of three defendants. The district court entered revocation orders and imposed new terms of imprisonment
with recommendations to the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) that each defendant be placed in a halfway house during
the last six months of his sentence. The defendants appealed, and the cases were consolidated for appeal. The
appeals court remanded. The appeals court held that the district court had the authority to impose halfway-house
confinement as a condition of supervised release. According to the court, the district courts had the authority to
impose halfway-house confinement as a condition of supervised release under the catch-all provision of the
supervised release statute which conferred broad discretion on district courts to fashion appropriate conditions of
supervised release that complied with the broad goals of sentencing, notwithstanding the exclusion of halfwayhouse confinement from the statutory list of permissible conditions of supervised release. (Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
SUPERVISED RELEASECONDITIONS

U.S. v. Bender, 566 F.3d 748 (8th Cir. 2009). Following revocation of supervised release, the district court
imposed an 18-month sentence and special conditions on a 10-year supervised release term. The defendant
appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The appeals court held that: (1) the district court did not
abuse its discretion by imposing a special condition of supervised release banning the defendant's use of
computers and internet access; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a special condition
requiring the defendant to submit to “lifestyle restrictions” imposed by a therapist; (3) the district court did not
provide sufficient individualized findings to support the imposition of a special condition banning sexually
stimulating materials; (4) as a matter of first impression, the district court abused its discretion by imposing a
special condition banning the defendant from entering any library; and (5) a special condition barring the
defendant from frequenting places where minors were known to frequent without prior approval and then only in
the presence of a responsible adult, imposed a greater deprivation of liberty than was reasonably necessary.
(Missouri)

U.S. Appeals Court
SUPERVISED RELEASE

U.S. v. Perez, 565 F.3d 344 (7th Cir. 2009). Following violation of his conditions of supervised release, the
district court imposed sentence. The defendant appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. The court
held that the district court judge lacked jurisdiction to reopen the revocation of supervised release proceedings to
make a substantive change to the sentence, and remand was required since the sentence was unclear as to
whether the judge intended to impose a sentence of 12 months imprisonment regardless of the sentence imposed
by another judge, or whether the judge intended the defendant to stay in jail for a total of 36 months in light of
the other judge's sentence. (United States Attorney, Chicago, Illinois)
2010

U.S. Appeals Court
EX POST FACTO
HOUSE ARREST
LIBERTY INTEREST

XXIII

Gonzalez-Fuentes v. Molina, 607 F.3d 864 (1st Cir. 2010). A class of prisoners convicted of murder, who had
been released pursuant to an electronic supervision program (ESP), filed a complaint under § 1983, seeking a
preliminary injunction against their re-incarceration pursuant to a regulation which became effective after their
releases. The district court granted a preliminary injunction and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico appealed.
Another class of prisoners who had been re-incarcerated filed a separate petition for a writ of habeas corpus and
the district court granted the petition. The district court consolidated the two cases, and denied the
Commonwealth's motion to dismiss. The commonwealth appealed. The appeals court reversed in part, vacated in
part, and remanded. The court held that re-incarceration of the prisoners convicted of murder under a new
regulation eliminating the ESP program for prisoners convicted of murder, did not violate the ex post facto
clause, where the prisoners had committed their crimes of conviction at times predating the creation of the ESP,
so that Puerto Rico's decision to disqualify prisoners from participating in the ESP had no effect on the
punishment assigned by law. The court also held the re-incarceration of the prisoners convicted of murder did
not violate substantive due process. The court found that although the impact of re-incarceration on the prisoners
was substantial, Puerto Rico had a justifiable interest in faithfully applying the new statute which barred
prisoners convicted of murder from the ESP program. According to the court, there was no showing that Puerto
Rico acted with deliberate indifference or that re-imprisonment was conscience-shocking.
But the court found that the prisoners convicted of murder, who had been released for several years pursuant
to the ESP, had a protected due process liberty interest in their continued participation in the ESP program,
despite the fact that their releases were premised on lower court determination, which was later overturned, that
the statute eliminating such prisoners from the program violated the ex post facto clause. The prisoners were
serving out the remainder of their sentences in their homes, where they lived either with close relatives,
significant others, or spouses and children, and although they were subject to monitoring with an electronic
tracking anklet, and routine drug and alcohol testing, they were authorized to work at a job or attend school.
The court also found that the re-incarceration of the prisoners deprived them of procedural due process, where
the prisoners were not given any pre-hearing notice as to the reason their ESP status was revoked, and the
prisoners had to wait two weeks after their arrest before receiving any opportunity to contest it.
The court concluded that the prisoners whose procedural due process rights were violated by their reincarceration or their imminent future re-incarceration after determination that they had been unlawfully

43.50

admitted into the ESP were not entitled to either habeas relief, for those already re-imprisoned, or preliminary
injunctive relief for those yet to be re-imprisoned, where the subsequent Puerto Rico statute provided a valid,
independent, constitutional basis for the prisoners' re-incarceration. (Puerto Rico Department of Justice, Puerto
Rico Administration of Corrections)
U.S. Appeals Court
PARDON

PA Prison Soc. v. Cortes, 622 F.3d 215 (3rd Cir. 2010). State prisoners, several non-profit advocacy and prisoner
rights groups, and several state voters and qualified taxpayers brought an action challenging an amendment to
the Pennsylvania constitution changing the composition of the Board of Pardons and the voting requirements for
obtaining a pardon or commutation of sentence. The district court granted in part, and denied in part, the parties'
cross-motions for summary judgment, and they appealed. The appeals court remanded. On remand, the district
court ruled that one of the groups had standing to challenge the constitutionality of the amendment and reinstated
its prior summary judgment ruling, and appeal was again taken. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The
appeals court held that the prisoner advocacy group had organization standing to challenge the constitutionality
of the amendment, but the amendment did not violate the ex post facto clause. The court noted that allegations
that the changes in the law have produced some ambiguous sort of disadvantage, or affected a prisoner's
opportunity to take advantage of provisions for early release, are not sufficient grounds for bringing an ex post
facto claim. According to the court, there is no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be
conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence. (Pennsylvania Board of Pardons)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEX OFFENDER
LIBERTY INTEREST

Renchenski v. Williams, 622 F.3d 315 (3rd Cir. 2010). A state inmate, who was serving a life sentence without
the possibility of parole for first-degree murder, brought a pro se § 1983 action against prison officials and
personnel, alleging that his forced participation in sex offender treatment therapy violated his constitutional
rights. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The inmate appealed. The appeals court
affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held that sex offender conditions may be imposed on an inmate
who has not been convicted of a sexual offense only after due process has been afforded. The court found that
the inmate had an independent liberty interest in not being labeled as a sex offender and forced into treatment,
and thus was entitled to adequate process before prison officials took such actions. (Pennsylvania's Sex Offender
Treatment Program, State Correctional Institution at Coal Township, Pennsylvania)
2011

U.S. Appeals Court
REVIEW

Alston v. Read, 663 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 2011). A former state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against
corrections officials, alleging that he was over-detained in violation of his due process rights and the Eighth
Amendment. The district court denied the officials' motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified
immunity and the officials appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that the officials
did not have a clearly established duty to seek out court records in response to the prisoner's unsupported
assertion that he was being over-detained, and thus, the officials were entitled to qualified immunity. The court
noted that the officials relied on state law and the prisoner's institutional file in calculating the prisoner's
sentence, the prisoner offered no documentation to put officials on notice that his sentence had been
miscalculated, and no caselaw established that the officials were required to examine any other records.
(Offender Management Office of Hawaii's Department of Public Safety)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEX OFFENDER
PROBATIONCONDITIONS
EQUAL PROTECTION

Brown v. Montoya, 662 F.3d 1152 (10th Cir. 2011). A probationer, who had been convicted of false
imprisonment under New Mexico law, brought § 1983 claims against a probation officer and the New Mexico
Secretary of Corrections, alleging that he was wrongly directed to register as a sex offender and was wrongly
placed in a sex offender probation unit, in violation of his rights to substantive due process, procedural due
process, and equal protection. The district court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss and the defendants
appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that the complaint
was insufficient to overcome the Secretary's qualified immunity defense, but the probation officer's alleged
actions, if proven, denied the probationer of a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. According to
the court, the probation officer's alleged actions of placing the probationer in a sex offender probation unit and
directing him to register as a sex offender, after the probationer had been convicted of false imprisonment under
New Mexico law, if proven, denied the probationer of a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. The
court noted that false imprisonment was not a sex offense in New Mexico unless the victim was a minor. (New
Mexico Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
CLEMENCY
LEGAL COSTS

Link v. Luebbers, 830 F.Supp.2d 729 (E.D.Mo. 2011). After federal habeas proceedings were terminated,
federally-appointed counsel filed vouchers seeking payment under the Criminal Justice Act (CJA), for work
performed on a prisoner's executive clemency proceedings and civil cases challenging Missouri's execution
protocol. The district court held that counsel were entitled to compensation for pursuing the prisoner's § 1983
action for declaratory and injunctive relief alleging denial of due process in his clemency proceedings, but that
counsel were not entitled to compensation for work performed in the § 1983 action challenging Missouri's
execution protocol. The court noted that the prisoner's § 1983 action challenging Missouri's execution protocol
was not integral to the prisoner's executive clemency proceedings. (Missouri)

U.S. District Court
HOUSE ARREST
LIBERTY INTEREST

McBride v. Cahoone, 820 F.Supp.2d 623 (E.D.Pa. 2011). A state prisoner filed § 1983 action against his
probation officer, and others, alleging violation of his constitutional rights after he was sent to prison for 83 days
without a hearing for violation of his electronic monitoring program. The defendants moved to dismiss. The
district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that: (1) the state prisoner had a due
process liberty interest in serving his sentence in home confinement; (2) his claim was not barred by Heck v.
Humphrey; (3) the prisoner had standing to seek injunctive and declaratory relief; (4) the claim against the
director of the state probation and parole department was not barred by the Eleventh Amendment; (5) the
probation officer was not entitled to qualified immunity; (6) the probation officer was not entitled to quasi-

43.51

judicial immunity; and (7) the director of the state probation and parole department was not entitled to quasijudicial immunity. The court noted that the prisoner pled guilty after a judge advised him repeatedly that if he
accepted the government's plea offer, he would not serve any time in prison, but would carry out his sentence in
electronically-monitored home confinement. (Delaware County Office of Adult Probation and Parole Services,
Pennsylvania)
U.S. Appeals Court
LIBERTY INTEREST
ORIGINAL
SENTENCE
PROBATION

Persechini v. Callaway, 651 F.3d 802 (8th Cir. 2011). A state prisoner filed a § 1983 action against prison
officials for alleged deprivation of his due process rights by terminating him from long-term substance abuse
treatment program that resulted in the mandatory execution of his 15-year sentence and his ineligibility for
probation. The district court dismissed the claim for failure to a state claim. The prisoner appealed. The appeals
court affirmed. The court held that the prisoner lacked a liberty interest in: (1) the outcome of a disciplinary
proceeding; (2) the outcome of the action taken by a program review committee; and (3) the outcome of
termination from a treatment program. The court noted that the sanction imposed by the disciplinary committee
for stealing a towel, confinement to his room for ten days and referral to program review committee, was neither
atypical nor significant hardships in relation to ordinary incidents of prison life. (Ozark Corr'l Center, Missouri)

U.S. Appeals Court
GUIDELINES
LIBERTY INTEREST
ORIGINAL
SENTENCE

Stein v. Ryan, 662 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2011). A former prisoner brought an action in state court against the state
and prison officials, alleging claims for negligence and violations of his civil rights, and seeking damages for the
time he spent in prison pursuant to an illegal sentence. Following removal to the federal court, the district court
dismissed the complaint. The former prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed, holding that the officials had
no duty to discover that an Arizona court imposed an illegal sentence, they did not violate the former prisoner's
right to due process, and the officials were not deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's liberty interest, as would
violate his Eighth Amendment rights. (Arizona Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
MINIMUM SENTENCE

U.S. v. Dresbach, 806 F.Supp.2d 1039 (E.D.Mich. 2011.) A defendant moved for reduction in his sentence. The
district court held that the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) properly exercised its discretion in considering the
medical condition of the defendant's wife and daughter in denying his request for compassionate release.
According to the court, the BOP had noted that the sentencing court was aware of the developing medical
conditions of the prisoner's wife and daughter at the time of sentencing, and that the prisoner was presumably
eligible for home confinement in eight months and release six months thereafter. According to the court, the
BOP has the authority to consider reasons other than a defendant's own medical condition in determining
whether compassionate release is warranted. (Federal Bureau of Prisons, Michigan)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELAY

U.S. v. Ferreira, 665 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 2011). After denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment based on
violation of his Sixth Amendment speedy trial right, a defendant pled guilty in district court to conspiracy to
distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine. The defendant appealed. The appeals court reversed and
remanded. The court held that a thirty-five month delay between an indictment charging conspiracy to distribute
500 grams or more of methamphetamine and the defendant's guilty plea was sufficient to trigger an analysis of
the defendant's claim that his Sixth Amendment speedy trial rights were violated. The court found that the thirtyfive month delay was caused solely by the government's gross negligence, for the purposes of determining
whether such a delay violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to speedy trial. The defendant was serving
a term of imprisonment of 110 months following his guilty plea. (U.S. Marshals Service, Bartow County, Cobb
County, Georgia)

U.S. Appeals Court
GUIDELINES
SUPERVISED
RELEASECONDITIONS

U.S. v. Mike, 632 F.3d 686 (10th Cir. 2011). A defendant, who was sentenced for assault resulting in serious
bodily injury, appealed a district court order that overruled his objections to special conditions of supervised
release based on his prior sex offense. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The
court held that the condition calling for monitoring of the defend ant's computer usage did not constitute an
abuse of discretion, but the condition was impermissibly vague. The court also found that a condition prohibiting
the defendant from engaging in an occupation with access to children was improper, where the court failed to
make findings required by the Sentencing Guidelines that an occupational restriction was the minimum
restriction necessary. (U.S. District Court, New Mexico)
2012

U.S. Appeals Court
SEX OFFENDERS
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
EX POST FACTO

American Civil Liberties Union of Nevada v. Masto, 670 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 2012). The United States District
Court for the District of Nevada, issued a permanent injunction prohibiting the retroactive application of an
Assembly Bill expanding the scope of sex offender registration and notification requirements, and a Senate Bill
imposing, among other things, residency and movement restrictions on certain sex offenders. The State of
Nevada appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, dismissed as moot in part, and remanded.
The court held that the requirements of the Nevada law expanding the scope of sex offender registration and
notification requirements did not constitute retroactive punishment in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause or
the Double Jeopardy Clause. The court noted that the intent of the Nevada legislature in passing the law was to
create a civil regulatory regime with the purpose of enhancing public safety, and the law was not so punitive in
effect or purpose that it negated the Nevada legislature's intent to enact a civil regulatory scheme. The court
found that the question of the constitutionality of retroactive application to sex offenders of the residency and
movement restrictions of the Nevada law was moot. (State of Nevada)

U.S. District Court
REVIEW
SUPERVISED
RELEASE

Bentley v. Dennison, 852 F.Supp.2d 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). Parolees, on behalf of themselves and a presumed
class, brought a § 1983 action against officials at a state's department of corrections and department of parole,
alleging that the officials subjected them to unlawful custody by continuing to impose terms of post-release
supervision (PRS) that had been declared unlawful, and arresting and re-incarcerating them for technical
violations of those terms. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court denied the motion, finding that the

43.52

officials were not entitled to qualified immunity at the motion to dismiss stage, and that the parolees stated a §
1983 claim against each individual official. The officials' contended that the appeals court decision that found the
practice to be unlawful created confusion about the appropriate remedy for parolees who had been given the
terms unlawfully. The court held that the appeals court decision clearly established that the administrative
imposition of mandatory PRS was unconstitutional, that the court clearly explained that the remedy for such a
legal infirmity was that the term of PRS should be vacated and the state should be given the opportunity to seek
appropriate resentencing, and the officials had an obligation to treat the appeals court decision as binding on all
terms of administratively imposed PRS. (New York State Dept. of Correctional Services, Department of Parole)
U.S. District Court
PLACE OF
IMPRISONMENT

Shah v. Danberg, 855 F.Supp.2d 215 (D.Del. 2012). A state inmate who pled guilty but mentally ill to a charge of
first degree murder filed a § 1983 action against a state judge and prison officials alleging that his placement in a
correctional center, rather than in a psychiatric center, violated his constitutional rights. The court held that the
state judge was entitled to absolute judicial immunity from liability in inmate's § 1983 action despite the inmate's
contention that the judge's incorrect application of a state statute resulted in violation of his constitutional rights,
where there were no allegations that the judge acted outside the scope of her judicial capacity, or in the absence
of jurisdiction. The could ruled that the state inmate failed to establish the likelihood of success on the merits of
his claim and thus was not entitled to a preliminary injunction ordering his transfer, despite the inmate's
contention that he was mentally unstable and had repeatedly caused himself physical injury during his suicide
attempts, where medical records the inmate submitted were ten years old, and a state supreme court recognized
that prison officials had discretion to house inmates at facilities they chose. The court ordered the appointment of
counsel, noting that the inmate was unable to afford legal representation, he had a history of mental health
problems, and the matter presented complex legal issues. (James T. Vaughn Corr'l. Center, Smyrna, Delaware)

U.S. Appeals Court
CREDIT

Sudler v. City of New York, 689 F.3d 159 (2nd Cir. 2012). Inmates of state and city prison systems brought an
action against corrections defendants, alleging violations of their due process rights when they were imprisoned
for periods of time longer than their judicially imposed sentences. The district court dismissed the claims against
some defendants, and granted summary judgment as to the remaining defendants. The prisoners appealed. The
appeals court affirmed, finding that state prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity on the inmates'
claim that their procedural due process rights were violated when prison officials failed to promptly afford them
PJT (parole jail time) credits for the time served in local custody on sentences ordered to run concurrently with
undischarged parole revocation sentences. (New York State, New York City prisons)

U.S. District Court
GUIDELINES
ORIGINAL
SENTENCE

Sweat v. Grondolsky, 898 F.Supp.2d 347 (D.Mass. 2012). An inmate filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
against a warden, alleging that the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) had failed to give him credit for time he
served in state custody. The warden moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The
court held that the BOP was bound by a federal court's express designation that the inmate's federal sentence
should run consecutively to the state sentence, and the inmate's claim that the sentencing judge incorrectly
construed the facts of his case, and therefore misapplied the provisions of a sentencing guideline, had to be
brought in a motion to vacate the sentence before the sentencing court. (Federal Medical Center, Devens,
Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
RESTITUTION

U.S. v. Beulke, 892 F.Supp.2d 1176 (D.S.D. 2012). After a defendant was convicted of embezzlement, sentenced
to prison, and ordered to pay restitution, the Government moved to enforce collection and to order the defendant
to apply all of his pension payments while in prison to the restitution order. The district court granted the motion
in part. The court held that, pursuant to the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), the Government could
seize the defendant's interest in his 401(k) and that any interest the defendant's wife had in his 401(k) account
was subject to the Government's perfected lien. The court decided to exercise its statutory discretion so as to
allow garnishment of 25% of the defendant's net monthly pension, while allowing his estranged wife to continue
to receive half of the pension payments during the pendency of their divorce. (South Dakota)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEX OFFENDERS
PROBATIONCONDITIONS

U.S. v. Juvenile Male, 670 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 2012). Three juvenile defendants, each of whom was a member of
an Indian tribe and who pleaded true to a charge of aggravated sexual abuse with children in the district court,
appealed their conditions of probation or supervision requiring registration under the Sex Offender Registration
and Notification Act (SORNA). The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the SORNA registration
requirement as applied to certain juvenile delinquents in cases of aggravated sexual abuse superseded the
conflicting confidentiality provisions of the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act (FJDA), and that the SORNA
registration requirement did not violate the juveniles' constitutional rights. (Fort Peck Tribes, Montana)

U.S. Appeals Court
GUIDELINES
SUPERVISED
RELEASE
CONDITIONS

U.S. v. Taylor, 679 F.3d 1005 (8th Cir. 2012). Following release from prison, the district court sentenced a
defendant to 24 months in prison after he admitted to violating two conditions of supervised release. The
defendant appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded, finding that consideration of the defendant's
eligibility to participate in a rehabilitation program for sentencing purposes was plain error. The district court
had considered the defendant's eligibility to participate in a 500–hour drug program available from the Bureau of
Prisons when sentencing the defendant to 24 months for violation of supervised release. The appeals court held
that this affected the defendant’s rights in a manner that seriously affected fairness, integrity, or public reputation
of judicial proceedings, and thus amounted to plain error. The court noted that the advisory guideline range was
6 to 12 months, and the district court may have imposed a lesser sentence if it had not focused on a particular
drug treatment program within a federal institution. The defendant had failed to report to a residential facility
where he was to spend 120 days and admitted to consuming alcohol. (Nebraska)

43.53

U.S. Appeals Court
INSANITY

U.S. v. Thornberg, 676 F.3d 703 (8th Cir. 2012). Following his apprehension more than six years after escaping
from federal prison camp, a defendant pled not guilty, by reason of insanity, to the charge of escape from
custody. The district court granted the defendant's first motion for a psychiatric evaluation, denied his second
motion for a psychiatric evaluation, and sentenced him to 30 months in prison upon his conviction by a jury for
escape. The defendant appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court found that although a forensic
psychologist from the federal Bureau of Prisons did not review the indigent defendant's full medical history, a
psychiatric evaluation determining that the defendant did not suffer from a severe mental defect was not
deficient, precluding his claim of deprivation of due process by a single evaluation performed by a psychologist
rather than psychiatrist, and by denial of his request for a second evaluation to assess his competency to stand
trial. The court noted that the psychologist reviewed defendant's medical records dating from the time of his
escape and concluded that his feelings of persecution from his family that allegedly coerced him to escape from
prison were not evidence that he had delusions, as those feelings disappeared immediately after he escaped, and
that his attempts to evade detection after escape could be seen as evidence of his understanding of the
wrongfulness of his conduct. (Federal Prison Camp, Duluth, Minnesota)

U.S. Appeals Court
ORIGINAL
SENTENCE

U.S. v. Tyerman, 701 F.3d 552 (8th Cir. 2012). A defendant was convicted in district court of being a felon in
possession of a firearm and he appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. After a trial, the defendant
was convicted in the district court of being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, and possession of
a stolen firearm. His motion for acquittal or new trial was denied and the defendant appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The court held that the government's passive conduct in receiving information regarding the location
of the defendant's gun, from the defendant's counsel, did not violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment right-tocounsel. The court found that the defendant's conduct in creating handcuff keys and practicing the use of them
constituted a substantial step, as an element of attempt, with respect to escaping from pretrial incarceration, for
purposes of using attempted escape as the basis for a sentence enhancement for obstruction of justice. At
sentencing, a U.S. Marshal testified that prison guards discovered two homemade handcuff keys in the
defendant’s cell. According to the Marshal, during the investigation, other inmates revealed the defendant’s
plans to escape from jail and his use of the law library (which lacked surveillance) to practice removing
handcuffs. Finding the Marshal credible, the district court applied a two-level adjustment for obstruction of
justice based on the attempted escape, sentencing the defendant 72 months' imprisonment. (U. S. District Court,
Iowa)

U.S. Appeals Court
EX POST FACTO
GOOD- TIME

Waddell v. Department of Correction, 680 F.3d 384 (4th Cir. 2012). A district court dismissed a prisoner’s
habeas petition as time-barred, and, in the alternative, denied the petition on its merits, and the petitioner
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the state corrections department's practice of
applying earned good time credits for certain identified purposes, but not for the purpose of reducing a prisoner's
life sentence did not give rise to a due process protected liberty interest in a life sentence reduced by good time
credits. The court also held that the corrections department's failure to utilize the prisoner's good time credits to
reduce his life sentence under the eighty-year rule did not give rise to an ex post facto claim. (North Carolina
Department of Correction)

U.S. District Court
INVOLUNTARY
COMMITMENT
REVIEW

Wiley v. Buncombe County, 846 F.Supp.2d 480 (W.D.N.C. 2012). A pretrial detainee brought an action under §
1983 and § 1985 against a county, sheriff, jail, and court official, alleging that the defendants unlawfully
subjected him to multiple periods of involuntary commitment and failed to take proper action on a state habeas
corpus petition that he filed challenging the periods of commitment. The defendants moved to dismiss. The
district court granted the motion. The court held that: (1) the detainee could not maintain a § 1983 action
challenging the terms of his confinement; (2) the clerk had quasi-judicial immunity from the pretrial detainee's §
1983 claim; (3) the jail was not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983; (4) the county could not be liable to the
pretrial detainee under § 1983 for the actions of the sheriff; and (5) the county could not be liable to the pretrial
detainee under § 1983 for the actions of the county clerk. The court noted that under North Carolina law, the
county had no control over the sheriff's employees and/or control over the jail, and therefore county could not be
liable to the detainee under § 1983 for the actions of the sheriff or those of his detention officers for events that
occurred at a jail operated by the sheriff. (Buncombe County Detention Facility, North Carolina)
2013

U.S. District Court
LIBERTY INTEREST
SEX OFFENDERS

Allen v. Clements, 930 F.Supp.2d 1252 (D.Colo. 2013). Inmates in the Colorado Department of Corrections
(CDOC) who had been sentenced to indeterminate terms of imprisonment under the Colorado Sex Offender
Lifetime Supervision Act (SOLSA) brought a class action against CDOC officials, alleging under § 1983 that the
officials were arbitrarily denying them sex offender treatment and interfering with their access to counsel and
courts. The officials moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court granted the motion. The
court held that: (1) the inmates failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim; (2) terminating one inmate's
treatment because of polygraphs did not violate due process; (3) denial of re-enrollment requests did not
implicate the inmates' liberty interests; (4) termination procedures comported with procedural due process; and
(5) the inmates failed to state a substantive due process claim. The court found that terminating two inmates'
treatment because one had a rash and the other reported a telephone call in which his cousin mentioned seeing
his children implicated the inmates' liberty interests protected by due process because the reasons for termination
were not reasonably related to the goals of their treatment. But the court noted that there was no indication that
the alleged deprivation extended the inmates' sentences, and that procedures providing for a treatment waitlist
and for state judicial review of CDOC termination decisions existed, and the two inmates had already been able
to re-enroll in treatment multiple times. (Colorado Department of Corrections)

43.54

U.S. District Court
SEX OFFENDERS
SENTENCE

Armato v. Grounds, 944 F.Supp.2d 627 (C.D.Ill. 2013). A former inmate, a sex offender, brought an action
against Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) employees, alleging under § 1983 that the employees violated
his rights under Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment by allowing him to be held beyond the term of his
incarceration, and asserting a claim for false imprisonment under state law. The employees moved for summary
judgment. The district court allowed the motion. The court held that the employees complied with the terms of a
state court judge's handwritten sentencing order and the employees were not deliberately indifferent in allegedly
allowing the inmate to be held beyond his release date. (Lake County Jail, Robinson Correctional Center, Illinois
Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
REVIEW
CONSECUTIVE
SENTENCES

Harrison v. Michigan, 722 F.3d 768 (6th Cir. 2013). A prisoner filed an action against a state and state officers
seeking damages and injunctive relief stemming from his unlawful confinement in a prison system. The district
court dismissed the action. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The appeals court
found that the statute of limitations applicable to the prisoner's § 1983 complaint had not been triggered until the
state court of appeals issued its holding that the prisoner had been improperly sentenced to consecutive terms for
his convictions and remanded the case for entry of a corrected judgment. The court noted that although the
prisoner apparently had learned that he was being held unlawfully while still in prison, he did not have
knowledge of his injury until the state court of appeals established that he had suffered such an injury. (Michigan
Department of Corrections, Michigan Parole Board)

U.S. Appeals Court
GUIDELINES
REDUCTION OF
SENTENCE

In re Morgan, 713 F.3d 1365 (11th Cir. 2013). A prisoner serving a life sentence without parole, based on
conduct committed while he was a juvenile, filed an application for leave to file a second or successive motion to
vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence. The appeals court denied the motion. The appeals court held that
although a decision of the Supreme Court established a new rule of constitutional law, in that it determined for
the first time in Miller that the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison
without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders, the rule was not made retroactive to cases on collateral
review, as would warrant granting leave to the prisoner to file a second or successive motion to vacate, set aside,
or correct his sentence. (Florida)

U.S. Appeals Court
ORIGINAL SENTENCE
REVIEW

In re Pendleton, 732 F.3d 280 (3rd Cir. 2013). Prisoners who were convicted as juveniles applied for leave to file
second or successive habeas petitions based on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on
collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable. The appeals court granted the
applications. The court held that prisoners made a prima facie showing that the new constitutional rule regarding
imposition of life sentences on juvenile offenders was retroactive. (Pennsylvania Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
EX POST FACTO
PROBATION-CONDITIONS
SEX OFFENDERS

John Does 1-4 v. Snyder, 932 F.Supp.2d 803 (E.D.Mich. 2013). Sex offenders filed suit challenging the
constitutionality of the Michigan Sex Offender Registry Act (SORA). The state defendants moved to dismiss the
complaint. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that: (1) SORA did not
violate the Ex Post Facto Clause; (2) SORA's quarterly reporting requirement did not offend due process or
substantially burden registrants' rights to interstate or intrastate travel; (3) SORA did not implicate registrants'
due process right to engage in common occupations of life; (4) the registrants satisfactorily alleged that SORA's
loitering prohibition, which did not contain any exemption for parental activities, could be proven to infringe
upon their fundamental due process right to direct and participate in their children's education and upbringing;
(5) a jury question was presented as to whether retroactively extending the registration period of sex offenders
from twenty-five years to life was justified by a legitimate legislative purpose; and (6) jury questions were
presented as to whether provisions of SORA requiring sex offenders to report information about their online
accounts and activities violated their First Amendment rights. (Mich. Sex Offender Registry Act)

U.S. Appeals Court
CLEMENCY
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

Mann v. Palmer, 713 F.3d 1306 (11th Cir. 2013). A death row inmate filed a civil rights action, challenging the
method of execution in Florida as cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment. The district court dismissed
the complaint for failure to state a claim. The inmate moved for a stay of execution and expedited consideration
of his appeal of the dismissal of his complaint. The appeals court denied the motions. The court held that the
inmate failed to establish the likelihood of success on the merits of his Eighth Amendment claim, and that the
process which the inmate received in his clemency hearing satisfied due process. The court noted that Florida's
substitution of pentobarbital for sodium pentothal in its method of execution did not constitute a significant
alteration to the method of execution in Florida so as to commence running of a new period of limitations on the
death row inmate's claim challenging the method of execution in Florida. (Florida State Prison)

U.S. Appeals Court
CLEMENCY
DEATH PENALTY

Schad v. Brewer, 732 F.3d 946 (9th Cir. 2013). A prisoner scheduled for execution moved to enjoin his clemency
hearing and stay his execution, alleging that the Arizona Clemency board was biased and subject to undue
pressure by the Governor, in violation of due process. The district court denied the motion. The prisoner
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that due process concerns were not implicated in Arizona's
clemency proceedings. According to the court, the fact that members of Arizona's Clemency Board who had
recommended clemency were not reappointed by the governor did not raise due process concerns. (Arizona
Board of Executive Clemency)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEX OFFENDERS
SUPERVISED
RELEASE

U.S. v. Crowder, 738 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 2013). The United States District Court for the District of Montana
revoked an offender’s supervised release, imposed for failure to register under the Sex Offender Registration and
Notification Act (SORNA), and sentenced the offender to two terms of 14 months' imprisonment to run
concurrently, and to a lifetime term of supervised release. The defendant appealed. The appeals court affirmed,
finding that reduction of a renewed lifetime term of supervised release by the length of time spent in prison for
the violation was not warranted. (Montana)

43.55

2014
U.S. District Court
SEX OFFENDER
PROBATION-CONDITIONS
PAROLE-CONDITIONS

Reinhardt v. Kopcow, 66 F.Supp.3d 1348 (D.Colo. 2014). Inmates, parolees, and probationers, as well their
family members, brought a § 1983 action against various employees of the Colorado Department of Corrections
(CDOC) and members of the state’s Sex Offender Management Board, alleging that the state’s treatment of
persons convicted of sex crimes violated their rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment.
The plaintiffs sought monetary damages and injunctive and declaratory relief. The defendants moved to dismiss.
The district court granted the motion in part and a denied in part. The court held that the potential penalty
resulting from a Colorado policy that requires inmates in the state’s sex offender treatment program to admit to
prior acts, was so severe as to constitute compulsion to testify, and would violate their privilege against selfincrimination. The court noted that inmates who chose to participate in the program would be compelled to make
incriminating statements that could be used against them during any retrial. The court found that individuals
classified as sex offenders, both imprisoned and on probation, sufficiently alleged that Colorado policies
restricting their contact with family members, and particularly with their children, were not rationally related to
any legitimate penological interest, as required to support their claims that these policies violated their First and
Fourteenth Amendment rights related to familial association and due process. The court noted that some of these
individuals were not convicted of sex offenses involving children, and some of them were not convicted of any
sex offense at all. The court held that CDOC employees were entitled to qualified immunity from liability, where
the rights of individuals classified as sex offenders that were purportedly violated by Colorado policies
restricting their contact with family members were not clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.
(Colorado Dept. of Corrections, Sex Offender Management Board)

U.S. Appeals Court
HOUSE ARREST

Thornton v. Brown, 757 F.3d 834 (9th Cir. 2014). A state parolee filed a civil rights action against the Governor
of the State of California, Secretary of Corrections, and parole personnel to challenge the imposition and
enforcement of a residency restriction and a requirement that he submit to electronic monitoring using a Global
Positioning System (GPS) device as conditions of his parole. The district court dismissed the action. The parolee
appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that: (1) neither absolute nor qualified
immunity barred the parolee's civil rights claims against the State of California, Secretary of Corrections, and
parole personnel that were limited to injunctive relief; (2) absolute immunity barred the state parolee's civil
rights claims for damages against his parole officers for imposing allegedly unconstitutional parole conditions;
(3) absolute immunity did not extend to the state parolee's civil rights claim that parole officers enforced
conditions of his parole in an unconstitutionally arbitrary or discriminatory manner; and (4) the parolee could
challenge a condition of parole under § 1983 if his or her claim, if successful, would neither result in speedier
release from parole nor imply, either directly or indirectly, the invalidity of criminal judgments underlying that
parole term. (California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation)

U.S. Appeals Court
REDUCTION

U.S. v. Batts, 758 F.3d 915 (8th Cir. 2014). A defendant pleaded guilty in the district court to escape of a prisoner
in custody. He appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the prison camp from which the defendant
walked away was not a non-secure facility, as required in order to make the defendant eligible for a sentence
reduction on such basis at sentencing. (Federal Correctional Institution, Forrest City, Arkansas)

U.S. Appeals Court
CLEMENCY
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

Winfield v. Steele, 755 F.3d 629 (8th Cir. 2014). A death row inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that state
actors violated his right to due process of law by obstructing efforts to secure a grant of clemency from the
governor. The district court stayed execution, and the state appealed. The appeals court vacated the stay, finding
that the inmate failed to demonstrate a significant possibility of success on his claim, where the Department of
Corrections furnished staff member's signed declaration in support of clemency to the governor. (Potosi
Correctional Center, Missouri)
2015

U.S. Appeals Court
EX POST FACTO

Hinojosa v. Davey, 803 F.3d 412 (9th Cir. 2015). A state prisoner petitioned for federal habeas relief, challenging
a state statutory amendment modifying the credit-earning status of prison-gang members and associates in
segregated housing, so that such prisoners could no longer earn any good-time credits that would reduce their
sentences. The district court denied the petition and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and
remanded with instructions to the district court. The court held that the amendment disadvantaged the offenders
it affected by increasing the punishment for their crimes, an element for an ex post facto violation. The court
noted that even if a prisoner could easily opt out of his prison gang, a prisoner who continued doing what he was
doing before the statute was amended would have his prison time effectively lengthened. (Special Housing Unit,
Corcoran State Prison, California)

U.S. District Court
GOOD TIME
EQUAL PROTECTION

Linton v. O’Brien, 142 F.Supp.3d 215 (D. Mass. 2015). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against the
Commissioner of the Massachusetts Department of Corrections and prison officials, alleging that prison
personnel violated his due process, equal protection, and 8th Amendment rights by not providing rehabilitative
educational programs that awarded good time credits. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court
granted the motion, dismissing the complaint. The court held that prison officials' refusal to allow the inmate,
who was housed in a disciplinary unit, an opportunity to participate in educational and rehabilitative programs in
order to earn good time credits to reduce his sentence, did not violate the inmate's due process rights. According
to the court, the inmate did not demonstrate that the officials' exercise of discretion to not provide good time
credit opportunities to inmates in a disciplinary unit constituted an imposition of an atypical and significant
hardship not normally within range of confinement expected for an inmate serving an indeterminate term. The
court noted that the exercise of discretion by the Department of Corrections in imposing different classifications
upon inmates, with respect to restricting the ability of an inmate housed in a prison disciplinary unit to earn good

43.56

time credits to reduce his sentence, did not lack a rational basis, was not otherwise based on suspect
classification, and thus did not violate the inmate's equal protection rights. The court found that the DOC had a
legitimate public purpose in allocating limited resources available for earned good time credit programs to
inmates who were motivated to make best use of them by improving their chances for successful return to
society and as an inducement to control and reduce those inmates' tendencies towards violence. (MCI—Cedar
Junction, Massachusetts)
U.S. District Court
SUPERVISED
RELEASE
REVOCATION

Malloy v. Gray, 79 F.Supp.3d 53 (D.D.C. 2015). A District of Columbia felony offender brought a Bivens action
in the District of Columbia Superior Court against the District of Columbia’s mayor, the District’s contractor for
operation of a correctional mental health treatment facility, and the United States Parole Commission (USPC).
The offender sought damages for an Eighth Amendment violation based on allegations that the offender was
detained beyond the USPC-imposed term of imprisonment following revocation of his supervised release. The
case was moved to federal court and the defendants filed motions for dismissal or summary judgment. The
district court granted the motions, finding that the mayor and the contractor lacked statutory authority to
participate in the proceedings for revocation of supervised release, and a 12-month term of imprisonment, upon
revocation of supervised release, was within the authority of the USPC. (District of Columbia, Corrections
Corporation of America, Correctional Treatment Facility)

U.S. District Court
RESTITUTION

Ngemi v. County of Nassau, 87 F.Supp.3d 413 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). A father brought a § 1983 action against a
county, alleging he was denied due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment in being arrested and
incarcerated for failing to meet his child support obligations. The county moved to dismiss for failure to state a
claim. The district court granted the motion, finding that the father received ample process prior to his arrest.
The court noted that father was present at the hearing where his failure to comply with the order of support was
addressed, an order of disposition was mailed to his home after the hearing and warned him that failure to
comply would result in imprisonment, the order afforded the father the opportunity to object, the order of
commitment was also mailed to the father and advised him of his ability to appeal, the father never contested the
orders, and the father never claimed over the course of four years that he could not pay his child support arrears.
(Nassau County Family Court, Nassau County Correctional Center, New York)

43.57

43.58

XIX

XIX

prone to abusing VFOIA request provisions and that such frivolous requests would unduly burden state resources, or
that inmates had less need to access public records because their confinement greatly limited the amount of contact
they had with state government. (Red Onion State Prison, Virginia)
U.S. Appeals Court
STATE STANDARDS

Grayson v. Ross, 454 F.3d 802 (8th Cir. 2006). The personal representative of the estate of a pretrial detainee who
died following self-mutilation while incarcerated in a jail, brought a civil rights action against the county sheriff, the
arresting police officer, and jailers in their individual and official capacities alleging violation of the pretrial
detainee’s right to medical treatment and to due process. The district court granted judgment for the defendants and
the estate appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part. The court held that: (1) the detainee did not have an
objectively serious medical need on intake from the perspective of the arresting police officer, as a layperson; (2) the
arresting police officer did not subjectively know that the detainee required medical attention; (3) a reasonable police
officer would not have known on intake that the pretrial detainee had an objectively serious medical need; (4) the
detainee did not have an objectively serious medical need on intake from the perspective of the jailer, as a layperson;
(5) the jailer did not subjectively know that the detainee required medical attention; (6) a reasonable jailer would not
have known on intake that the pretrial detainee had an objectively serious medical need; (7) the county did not have
an official practice of booking inmates who were hallucinating without providing medical care; and (8) the district
court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the Arkansas State Jail Standards from evidence in the trial, as the jail
standards did not represent minimum constitutional standards. (Crawford County Detention Center, Arkansas)

U.S. Appeals Court
STATE STANDARDS

Kaucher v. County of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418 (3rd Cir. 2006). A corrections officer filed suit under § 1983 against a
county and several county employees responsible for the operation of a correctional facility, alleging violation of his
substantive due process rights, contending he contracted a Methicilin Resistant Stapylococcus Aureus (MRSA)
infection as a result of the defendants’ conscience-shocking behavior in creating unsanitary and dangerous
conditions at the facility. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and the officer
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that: (1) the alleged inadequate remedial and preventative
measures to stop the spread of MRSA within the correctional facility did not rise to a level of deliberate indifference
that could be characterized as conscience shocking, and (2) the facility’s alleged failure to act affirmatively to
improve conditions at the jail and alleged failure to act affirmatively to educate and warn inmates and corrections
officers about MRSA infections and to train them in infection prevention were not the cause of the corrections
officer’s infection. The court noted that the state corrections department found the jail to be substantially in
compliance with state standards, giving the defendants reason to believe their measures were adequate, only two of
170 corrections officers tested positive for colonization of the infection, and the facility had in place policies and
procedures to ensure sanitary conditions in the jail, including requirements that cells be regularly cleaned with an allpurpose detergent and that showers be disinfected with a bleach and water solution. (Bucks County Correctional
Facility, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
STATE STATUTES

Michael v. Ghee, 411 F.Supp.2d 813 (N.D.Ohio 2006). Ohio “old law” inmates serving indeterminate sentences
brought a § 1983 action, alleging that the state's parole system was unconstitutional. The state moved to dismiss and
for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment for the state. The court held that the inmates
had no valid procedural due process claim and that the state had rational reasons, satisfying equal protection, for
requiring “old law” inmates to continue to serve their indeterminate sentences, subject to parole board
determinations, after the law was changed to provide for exact sentences and the elimination of parole. According to
the court, the parole guidelines promulgated in 1998 had a rational basis and the parole guidelines were not laws,
subject to the ex post facto clause. The court noted that state law makes parole discretionary, and therefore inmates
do not have a due process liberty interest in parole under state law. Since the inmates did not have a liberty interest
in parole itself, they could not have a liberty interest in parole consideration or other aspects of parole procedures,
and thus had no procedural due process claim. The court found that the state had several rational reasons, satisfying
equal protection, for requiring so-called “old law” inmates to continue to serve their indeterminate sentences. The
reasons included the desire to avoid retroactive legislation and alteration of sentences, to give “old law” inmates an
incentive to obey prison regulations, and to acknowledge the seriousness of the convicted offenses. (Ohio Adult
Parole Authority and Chillicothe Correctional Institution)

U.S. District Court
STATE STATUTES

Rentz v. Spokane County, 438 F.Supp.2d 1252 (E.D.Wash. 2006). The personal representatives of the estate of a
pretrial detainee, who was murdered by two fellow pretrial detainees in a county jail, sought recovery of damages
from county defendants under Washington's wrongful death and survival statutes. Parents and siblings, as beneficiaries of the estate, also sought recovery of damages. The court granted partial summary judgment for the defendants.
The court held that neither the parents nor the siblings could recover under Washington's wrongful death and survival statutes, but that the parents could seek recovery from the county defendants under § 1988 for violations of the
detainee's constitutional rights. The court also held that the parents were entitled to assert Fourteenth Amendment
substantive due process causes of action against the county defendants to vindicate their constitutional rights for loss
of companionship with their adult son, but the siblings were not. The court allowed the plaintiffs to amend their
complaint to include the jail officers and a jail nurse because they were allegedly involved with the placement of the
detainee in the same jail dormitory as the individuals who murdered him. (Spokane County Jail, Washington)

U.S. District Court
STATE STATUTES

Sickles v. Campbell County, Kentucky, 439 F.Supp.2d 751 (E.D.Ky. 2006). Inmates, former inmates, and relatives
and friends of inmates brought a § 1983 action against counties, alleging that the methods used by the counties to
collect fees imposed on prisoners for the cost of booking and incarceration violated the Due Process Clause. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court held that the Kentucky statute
authorizing county jailers to adopt prisoner fee and expense reimbursement policies did not require that prisoners be
sentenced before fees could be imposed, and that due process did not require a pre-deprivation hearing before prison

44.15
XXI

fees were assessed. According to the court, the First Amendment rights of non-prisoners who contributed funds to
prisoners' accounts were not violated. The court noted that the statute authorized jails to begin to impose fees, and to
deduct them from prisoners' canteen accounts, as soon as prisoners' were booked into the jail. (Campbell County
and Kenton County, Kentucky)
2007
U.S. District Court
STATE REGULATIONS

Edwards v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 523 F.Supp.2d 462 (E.D.Pa. 2007). A prisoner filed a § 1983 suit, seeking
injunctive and declaratory relief against a Board of Probation and Parole, claiming violations of the Ex Post Facto
Clause and Eighth Amendment, and asserting that his parole was denied in retaliation for exercising his
constitutional rights. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the board. The court noted that the Ex
Post Facto Clause applies to a statute or policy change that alters the definition of criminal conduct or increases the
penalty by which a crime is punishable. Under Pennsylvania law, although parole is an alteration of the terms of
confinement, a parolee continues to serve his unexpired sentence until its conclusion. According to the court, under
Pennsylvania law, a “parole” is not an act of clemency but a penological measure for the disciplinary treatment of
prisoners who seem capable of rehabilitation outside of prison walls; parole does not set aside or affect the sentence,
and the convict remains in the legal custody of the state and under the control of its agents, subject at any time for
breach of condition to be returned to the penal institution. The court held that denial of the prisoner's re-parole by
Board of Probation and Parole, after his conviction as a parole violator, was not re-imposition of the prisoner's
unexpired life sentence, in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause, but rather, under Pennsylvania law, the prisoner's
sentence was not set aside by his parole. According to the court, the prisoner remained in the legal custody of the
warden until expiration of his sentence, and the prisoner had no protected liberty interest beyond that of any other
prisoner eligible to be considered for parole while serving out the remainder of a maximum sentence. The court held
that changes to the Pennsylvania Parole Act did not create a significant risk of increasing the prisoner's punishment
in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause, based on the Board of Probation and Parole's denial of the prisoner's reparole due to factors of prior parole failures and lack of remorse, since the relative weight of such factors in the
parole calculus of amendments to the Parole Act did not change, and the prisoner produced no evidence that the
change in the Parole Act had any effect on the Board's decision. (Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole)

U.S. District Court
STATE STATUTES

Hendon v. Ramsey, 528 F.Supp.2d 1058 (S.D.Cal. 2007). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that prison
medical officials involuntarily administered anti-psychotic medications without following proper procedures and in
deliberate indifference to his medical needs. The officials moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in
part and denied in part. The court held that the involuntary administration of anti-psychotic medications to the inmate did not demonstrate deliberate indifference to the inmate's serious medical needs, as required to establish an
Eighth Amendment violation, where the officials administered the drugs in an attempt to treat the inmate's mental
health crisis. But the court held that the post-deprivation remedies available to the California inmate after the officials forcibly administered anti-psychotic drugs were insufficient to protect the inmate's due process liberty interest
in being free from involuntary medication. According to the court, although state law established procedural safeguards before inmates could be involuntarily medicated, the prison officials allegedly disregarded their duty to comply with those established pre-deprivation procedures. The court found that the inmate's right to be free from arbitrary administration of anti-psychotic medication was clearly established by existing case law in 2002, the time of
this incident, and therefore state prison officials were not entitled to qualified immunity from liability. (California
State Prison-Sacramento)

U.S. District Court
STATE STATUTES

Jackson v. Russo, 495 F.Supp.2d 225 (D.Mass. 2007). A prisoner brought a suit against prison officials claiming that
compensation and good time credits awarded to him for participation in a barber program violated his due process
and equal protection rights. The prisoner moved for summary judgment, and the defendants moved to dismiss for
failure to state a claim. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part as moot. The court held that
the prisoner had no constitutionally created right to conduct business while incarcerated or to receive payment by the
prison for services he provided to other inmates as part of a barber vocational program. According to the court,
Massachusetts statutes that authorize the corrections commissioner to provide for education, training and
employment programs and to establish a system of inmate compensation did not create a protected property interest
for inmates in any job or in compensation for a job, for the purposes of a due process claim. The court noted that
authorization was dependent on several contingencies, including appropriation of funds, and conferred complete
discretion upon the commissioner over programs. The court held that the corrections commissioner's refusal to
award additional good time credits to the inmate who enrolled in the barber school, beyond awards granted in 2.5
day increments for participation in various programs, did not create an atypical prison hardship, so as to give rise to
an interest protected by due process. The court noted that the prisoner was not unfairly denied the opportunity to
participate in other prison activities that might have earned him more credits. According to the court, the prisoner
had no constitutional, statutory, or regulatory right to good time credits. The court found that a rational basis existed
for differences in levels of compensation received by state prison barbers and kitchen workers in prison vocational
programs, based on difficulties in recruiting prisoners, hours, and the demanding nature of the culinary arts program,
such that the lesser compensation received by the prisoner enrolled in the barber training program and providing
services to other inmates did not violate equal protection. (Souza Baranowski Correctional Center, Massachusetts)

U.S. Appeals Court
STATE STATUTES

Pennsylvania Prison Soc. v. Cortes, 508 F.3d 156 (3rd Cir. 2007). State prisoners, several non-profit advocacy and
prisoner rights groups, and several state voters and qualified taxpayers brought an action challenging amendments to
the Pennsylvania constitution changing the composition of Board of Pardons and voting requirements for obtaining a
pardon or commutation of sentence. The district court granted in part and denied in part the parties' cross-motions for
summary judgment. The parties appealed. The appeals court dismissed and remanded. The court held that the parties
did not have standing. According to the court, evidence tended to show that the absolute number of Board of Pardon
recommendations for commutations had decreased after amendments to the Pennsylvania constitution changed the

44.16
XXI

composition of the Board and voting requirements for obtaining a pardon or commutation of sentence, but this failed
to meet the causation element for standing to challenge the constitutionality of amendments, where the decrease had
begun two years prior to the amendments. (Pennsylvania Board of Pardons)
U.S. Appeals Court
STATE STATUTES

Pruett v. Harris County Bail Bond Bd., 499 F.3d 403 (5th Cir. 2007). Bail bondsmen brought a civil rights action
challenging a Texas statute restricting solicitation of potential customers, claiming it was a denial of their First
Amendment rights. The district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the bondsmen and awarded
$50,000 in attorney fees. The defendants appealed and the bondsmen cross-appealed the award of fees, requesting
more. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court held that: (1) the
court could consider evidence generated after enactment of the statute; (2) the provision of the statute that restricted
solicitation by bail bondsmen of persons subject to an unexecuted arrest warrant by preventing solicitation unless the
bondsman had a prior relationship with the party violated the First Amendment; (3) the provision of the statute that
prohibited bail bondsmen from calling potential customers for 24 hours after an offender's arrest violated the First
Amendment; (4) the provision of the statute that prohibited bail bondsmen from contacting potential customers
between 9:00 p.m. and 9:00 a.m. did not violate the First Amendment; (5) the provision of the statute that prohibited
bail bondsmen from contacting potential customers between 9:00 p.m. and 9:00 a.m. was not unconstitutionally
vague; and (6) the defendants failed to show special circumstances warranting reduction or preclusion of the attorney
fee award. (Harris County Bail Bond Board, Texas)

U.S. District Court
FEDERAL STATUTES

U.S. v. Carta, 503 F.Supp.2d 405 (D.Mass. 2007). The government sought an order against federal inmates whose
sentences had expired, finding that they were sexually dangerous and committing them to the custody of the
Attorney General. The inmates moved to dismiss, arguing that the commitment regime was facially unconstitutional.
The district court dismissed the motions, finding that the statute was a valid exercise of legislative power, did not
violate the Equal Protection Clause, was civil rather than criminal in nature, and did not violate the Due Process
Clause. (Federal Bureau of Prisons)

U.S. District Court
STATE STATUTES

Wilson v. Wilkinson, 608 F.Supp.2d 891 (S.D.Ohio 2007). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against state
officials, challenging the constitutionality of a state statute requiring the collection of DNA specimens from
convicted felons. The parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The district court held that the collection of a
DNA specimen was not an unreasonable search and seizure, and that a DNA sample did not implicate the prisoner's
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The court noted that law enforcement's interest in obtaining
DNA for a database to solve past and future crimes outweighed the prisoner's diminished privacy rights. According
to the court, the prisoner did not have a fundamental privacy interest protected by substantive due process in the
information contained in a DNA sample and the profile obtained pursuant to the state statute. The court noted that
the prisoner, as a convicted felon, did not enjoy the same privacy rights as did ordinary citizens. (Ross Correctional
Institution, Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction)
2008

U.S. District Court
STATE STATUTES

Bullock v. Sheahan, 568 F.Supp.2d 965 (N.D.Ill. 2008). Two county inmates who were ordered released after being
found not guilty of the charges against them brought an action individually and on behalf of a class against a county
sheriff and county, challenging the constitutionality of a policy under which male inmates, in the custody of the
Cook County Department of Corrections (CCDC), were subjected to strip searches upon returning to CCDC after
being ordered released. The district court held that male inmates in the custody of CCDC who were potentially
discharged were similarly situated to female potential discharges, as supported the male inmates' claim that the
county's policy of strip searching all male discharges and not all female discharges violated the Equal Protection
Clause. The court held that the CCDC exhibited discriminatory intent in strip searching all male inmates who were
potentially discharged and not all female discharges, as supported the male inmates' claim that the county's strip
search policy violated the Equal Protection Clause. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether delays of eight and eight-and-a-half hours in releasing inmates from
CCDC after they received court-ordered discharges were reasonable. The court noted that an Illinois Administrative
Code (IAC) provision stating that “detainees permitted to leave the confines of the jail temporarily, for any reason,
shall be thoroughly searched prior to leaving and before re-entering the jail” did not mandate strip searches, just that
inmates be “thoroughly searched.” (Cook County Department of Corrections, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
STATE STATUTES

Fraternal Order of Police Barkley Lod. v. Fletcher, 618 F.Supp.2d 712, (W.D.Ky. 2008). A police union, union
local, and current and past corrections officers at the Kentucky State Penitentiary filed a complaint alleging
violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), the Portal to Portal Act (PPA) and mandatory career retention
programs provisions under state statutes. The action was brought against a former Kentucky Governor, the
Department of Corrections Commissioner, and three wardens, all in their individual and official capacities. The
district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss in part and denied in part. The court held that state officials
and public employees can be liable as “employers” under FLSA. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants exempted
and continued to deny overtime compensation to them in violation of FLSA. (Kentucky State Penitentiary)

U.S. Appeals Court
STATE STATUTE

Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298 (4th Cir. 2008). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against the director of
a state Department of Corrections challenging the constitutionality of the statutory exclusion of prisoners from
making requests for public records under the Virginia Freedom of Information Act (VFOIA). The district court
dismissed the action and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the allegations were
insufficient to state a claim for facial violation of the equal protection clause and were insufficient to state a claim for
an “as-applied” violation of the equal protection clause. According to the court, denial of the prisoner's request for
records did not violate his right to access the courts. (Red Onion State Prison, Virginia)

44.17
XXII

U.S. District Court
STATE STANDARDS

Hall v. Eichenlaub, 559 F.Supp.2d 777 (E.D.Mich. 2008). A federal prisoner filed a § 2241 petition for a writ of
habeas corpus, challenging the Parole Commission's decision to impose successive terms of special parole after the
prisoner's original special term of parole was revoked. The district court granted the petition, finding that the Parole
Commission could not reimpose a successive term of special parole. The court noted that special parole is different
from regular parole in three aspects: (1) it follows the term of imprisonment, while regular parole entails release
before the end of the prison term; (2) it is imposed, and its length is selected by the sentencing judge, rather than by
the Parole Commission; and (3) if the conditions of special parole are violated, the parolee is returned to prison to
serve the entire parole term, and he does not receive credit for the time spent in non-custodial supervision. (Federal
Correctional Institution in Milan, Michigan)

U.S. Appeals Court
STATE REGULATIONS

Hervey v. County of Koochiching, 527 F.3d 711 (8th Cir. 2008). A female jail administrator brought an action under
Title VII and the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), alleging that her employer and her supervisors
discriminated against her on the basis of her gender and retaliated against her for participation in a protected activity.
The plaintiff also alleged that her employer was liable for violations of the Minnesota Government Data Practices
Act (MGDPA). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, and the plaintiff appealed.
The appeals court affirmed and remanded with directions to modify the final judgment so as to dismiss the MGDPA
claim without prejudice, so that it may be considered, if at all, by the courts of Minnesota. The court held that the
female jail administrator failed to demonstrate that her supervisors took away many of her major responsibilities and
twice suspended her without pay because of her gender, in violation of Title VII and the Minnesota Human Rights
Act (MHRA). The court noted that although the supervisors allegedly changed the management structure of the
sheriff's office without approval of county board, nothing about this change in management structure supported the
inference that subsequent action taken by a new management team were based on gender. The court found that the
administrator failed to establish that similarly situated male employees were not punished as severely for their
misconduct as she was, and that this differential treatment constituted a submissible case of discrimination based on
sex under Title VII or the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA). The court noted that the administrator's alleged
misconduct in recently lying to a supervisor about leaving a voicemail on his telephone when she was going to be
absent from work was not similar to the acts of misconduct that she cited in support of her sex discrimination claim,
one of which involved a supervisor allegedly lying on his application to become a licensed police officer some 25
years earlier, and the others of which involved alleged off-duty misconduct or misconduct that was not shown to
have been reported to supervisors. The court held that the administrator failed to show that her alleged harassment by
her supervisors was based on sex, as required to establish her claim of hostile work environment under Title VII and
the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA). According to the court, although the administrator claimed that
supervisors created a hostile work environment by, among other things, constantly criticizing her, requiring her to
report to the under-sheriff, and yelling at her on several occasions, she did not produce any evidence that she was the
target of harassment because of her sex and that the offensive behavior was not merely non-actionable, vulgar
behavior. The court held that the record did not support a reasonable inference that the administrator's supervisors
retaliated against her, in violation of Title VII and the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), for filing a claim with
the state human rights department. The court noted that the administrator's conduct in filing a claim was protected,
but the administrator was accused of insubordination before she notified her employer of her protected activity.
(Koochiching County Jail, Minnesota)

U.S. Appeals Court
STATE REGULATIONS

Jenkins v. Currier, 514 F.3d 1030 (10th Cir. 2008). A state prisoner brought a pro se § 1983 action against state
officials alleging that the officials violated his constitutional rights and state law when they took him into custody
without a warrant or a probable cause hearing, and transferred him to a correctional facility in order for him to serve
his previously imposed sentence. The district court dismissed the prisoner's claims with prejudice. The prisoner
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court noted that under Oklahoma law, a convicted defendant who is at
liberty without having served his sentence may be arrested as on escape and ordered into custody on the unexecuted
judgment. According to the court, state officials did not violate the Fourth Amendment when they seized the state
prisoner without a warrant, after having been released from federal custody erroneously, so that he could serve the
remainder of his unfinished state sentence. The court noted that the officials had reason to believe that the prisoner
had not completed serving his state sentences and there were no special circumstances that would have made his
otherwise permissible arrest unreasonable. The court also found that the prisoner had no due process right to a
hearing when he was taken back into custody. (Oklahoma)

U.S. District Court
STATE STATUTES

Johnson v. Bredesen, 579 F.Supp.2d 1044 (M.D.Tenn. 2008). Convicted felons who had served their sentences
brought an action against state and local officials seeking to invalidate portions of a Tennessee Code that conditioned
the restoration of their voting rights upon their payment of certain financial obligations, including restitution and
child support. The district court granted judgment on the pleadings to the defendants. The court held that the
statutory provision: (1) did not create a suspect classification; (2) did not violate equal protection; (3) did not violate
the Twenty-Fourth Amendment; and (4) did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. According to the court, the state
had an interest in protecting the ballot box from felons who continued to break the law by not abiding by enforceable
court orders, the state had a strong public policy interest in encouraging the payment of child support and thereby
promoting the welfare of children, and the state had a legitimate interest in encouraging convicted felons to complete
their entire sentences, including the payment of restitution. The court also noted that there was no evidence that the
state of Tennessee's re-enfranchisement scheme for convicted felons had traditionally been regarded as punitive,
rather than civil, so as to violate the federal or Tennessee Ex Post Facto Clause. (Tennessee)

U.S. District Court
STATUTES

Jones v. Oakland County, 585 F.Supp.2d 914 (E.D.Mich. 2008). The personal representative of an arrestee's estate
brought an action against a county and two employees of the jail where the arrestee died of heart failure. The arrestee
had been brought to the jail on a bench warrant for failing to appear at a court proceeding. Two days after her
admission she was found unresponsive in her cell and could not be revived. It was subsequently determined that she
died of heart failure (ischemic cardiomyopathy). The defendants moved for summary judgment and the district court

44.18
XXII

granted the motion. The court held that neither a jail interviewer, whose only contact with the arrestee was a classification interview lasting between five and fifteen minutes, nor a jail nurse, who first came into contact with the arrestee when she was summoned to assist in CPR and other efforts to revive the arrestee after she was found unresponsive in her jail cell, were deliberately indifferent to the arrestee's serious medical needs. According to the court,
neither employee perceived a substantial risk to the arrestee's health and well-being and yet disregarded that risk, and
any purported negligence in the interviewer's assessment of the arrestee's medical needs did not rise to the level of
deliberate indifference. The court held that the conduct of the interviewer, whose only contact with the arrestee was
a classification interview lasting between five and fifteen minutes, did not amount to “gross negligence” within the
meaning of Michigan's governmental immunity statute, and therefore she was not liable for failing to secure immediate medical treatment for a condition that shortly would result in the arrestee's death. (Oakland Co. Jail, Michigan)
U.S. District Court
ACCREDITATION
PROFESSIONAL
STANDARDS

Osterback v. McDonough, 549 F.Supp.2d 1337 (M.D.Fla. 2008). Inmates sued corrections officials, alleging that
conditions of close management (CM) status amounted to cruel and unusual punishment. Following the grant of the
inmates' motion to certify the class, and issuance of an order entering the officials' revised offer of judgment (ROJ),
the officials moved to terminate the ROJ pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The district court
granted the motion. The court held that corrections officers were deliberately indifferent in violation of the 8th
Amendment when inmates on close management (CM) status who truly were suicidal or otherwise suffered from
severe psychological distress declared psychological emergencies. According to the court, the officers failed to
summon mental health staff, and inmates thereafter attempted to commit suicide or otherwise harmed themselves, or,
in one case, actually committed suicide. The court held that accreditation reports for correctional institutions were
inadmissible hearsay in the inmates' action. The court held that termination of the revised offer of judgment (ROJ),
which was previously adopted by the district court as a final order and judgment, was appropriate under the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) in that isolated instances of prison staff's failure to appropriately respond to a bona
fide psychological emergency of inmates in close management status did not create a current and ongoing violation
of the class members' Eighth Amendment rights. (Everglades Correctional Institution, Florida)

U.S. District Court
STATE STATUTES

Petzak v. Nevada ex rel. Department of Corrections, 579 F.Supp.2d 1330 (D.Nev. 2008). A 74-year-old correctional
officer brought a § 1983 action against his supervisor, alleging that statutory stress electrocardiogram (EKG) testing
for officers over the age of 40 violated equal protection. The district court granted summary judgment for the supervisor in part and denied in part. The court held that the differential treatment of correctional officers violated equal
protection, but the supervisor was entitled to qualified immunity from damages. According to the court, the differential treatment of correctional officers over and under the age of forty, under Nevada's statutory electrocardiogram
(EKG) testing requirements, was not rationally related to a legitimate government interest, and thus, violated equal
protection. (Nevada Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
STATE STATUTES

Presley v. City of Blackshear, 650 F.Supp.2d 1307 (S.D.Ga. 2008). A mother brought an action against a city police
officer and a county paramedic, arising out of her son's death while detained in a county jail after his arrest. The
district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court held that the arresting officer was not
deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of the detainee who died of an apparent drug overdose after
being arrested on drug charges and placed into custody at a county jail, absent evidence that the arresting officer
actually saw the detainee swallow any drugs that allegedly led to his death. The court held that the county paramedic
who responded to the jail was not deliberately indifferent despite any alleged negligence in the paramedic's original
diagnosis. The court noted that the paramedic promptly responded to both calls from county jail concerning the detainee, and, each time, examined the detainee to determine whether further medical treatment was needed. According
to the court, the paramedic's alleged bad judgment and negligence in caring for the pretrial detainee who died of an
apparent drug overdose, was insufficient to show a lack of good faith for the purposes of statutory immunity from
negligence or malpractice liability under Georgia law. (City of Blackshear and Pierce County Jail, Georgia)

U.S. Appeals Court
STATE STATUTE

Snodgrass v. Robinson, 512 F.3d 999 (8th Cir. 2008). A state prisoner brought a suit against the Iowa Board of Parole, the Board's members and the governor of Iowa alleging that her constitutional rights were violated by applying
laws and regulations governing commutation requests, even though the laws were passed after her conviction. The
district court granted a motion to dismiss and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that
the retroactive application of an amendment to the Iowa commutation provisions did not violate the Ex Post Facto
Clause and that the state prisoner had no liberty interest in commutations. The court noted that the retroactive application of the amendment to Iowa Code did not raise a significant risk that the state prisoner would be denied a
commutation she otherwise would have received from the governor given the unpredictability of the wholly discretionary grant of a governor's commutation. The court noted that the new provisions limited a Class A felon serving a
life sentence to commutation applications no more frequently than once every ten years rather than previous standards which provided for regular review. (Iowa Board of Parole)

U.S. Appeals Court
STATE STATUTE

Wilson v. Collins, 517 F.3d 421 (6th Cir. 2008). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against state officials challenging the constitutionality of Ohio's DNA Act that required the collection of DNA specimens from convicted felons. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The court held that collection of a DNA specimen pursuant to the statute was not an unreasonable search
and seizure and that the prisoner did not have a fundamental privacy interest in the information contained in a DNA
specimen. (Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction)
2009

U.S. District Court
STATE STATUTES

XXIII

Fross v. County of Allegheny, 612 F.Supp.2d 651 (W.D.Pa. 2009). A group of convicted sex offenders brought a
civil rights action against a county, alleging that a county ordinance that restricted the residency of sex offenders
violated their constitutional rights, the Fair Housing Act (FHA), and state law. The district court granted summary
judgment for the plaintiffs, finding that the ordinance was preempted by state law. The ordinance barred offenders
from residing within 2,500 feet of any child care facility, community center, public park or recreation facility, or

44.19

school. According to the court, the ordinance was contradictory to and inconsistent with various provisions of state
law, and interfered with the state's express objectives of rehabilitating and reintegrating offenders, diverting appropriate offenders from prison, and establishing a uniform, statewide system the for supervision of offenders. (Allegheny County, Pennsylvania)
U.S. Appeals Court
STATE STATUTES

Roubideaux v. North Dakota Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 570 F.3d 966 (8th Cir. 2009). North Dakota
prison inmates, representing a certified class of female inmates, brought a sex discrimination suit under § 1983 and
Title IX, alleging that a state prison system provided them with unequal programs and facilities as compared to male
inmates. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the inmates appealed. The
appeals court affirmed. The court held that North Dakota's gender-explicit statutes, allowing the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to place female inmates in county jails and allowing the Department to place female
inmates in “grade one correctional facilities” for more than one year, was substantially related to the important governmental objective of providing adequate segregated housing for female inmates, and thus the statutes were facially
valid under heightened equal protection review. According to the court, even if the decision to house them at the
women’s center was based on economic concerns, where the female prison population as a whole was much smaller
than the male population, sufficient space to house the female prisoners was becoming an issue as the entire prison
population increased. Female inmates were in need of a separate facility to better meet their needs, and statutes expressly required the Department to contract with county facilities that had adequate space and the ability to provide
appropriate level of services and programs for female inmates. The court held that the female inmates, by expressing
an assertion before the district court that they were not challenging the programming decisions made by Department
of Corrections and Rehabilitation upon transfer to county jails for housing, abandoned an “as-applied” challenge to
the gender-explicit statutes facilitating such transfers. The court held that North Dakota's “prison industries” program
offered at a women's correction and rehabilitation center, under contract between several counties and the state, was
not an “educational program” subject to Title IX protections, even though the program provided on-the-job training.
The court noted that the program was primarily an inmate work or employment program, providing female inmates
with paying jobs and enabling them to make purchases, pay restitution, or support their families, and the contract
between the counties and state distinctly separated inmate employment and educational programs.
According to the court, vocational training offered at the center was not discriminatorily inferior to those offered
to male inmates at state facilities, as required for a claim under Title IX. Although locational differences existed, like
male inmates, female inmates had access to a welding class and classes in basic parenting, social skills, speech, and
healthy lifestyles. (Southwest Multi-County Correctional Center, North Dakota)

U.S. Appeals Court
STATE STATUTES

Simmons v. Galvin, 575 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2009). Incarcerated felons brought an action challenging the validity of an
amendment to the Massachusetts constitution disqualifying currently incarcerated inmates from voting in all Massachusetts elections. The district court denied the Commonwealth's motion for the entry of judgment on the pleadings
on the inmates' Voting Rights Act (VRA) claim but granted the Commonwealth's motion for summary judgment on
the inmates' Ex Post Facto Clause claim. Both the Commonwealth and inmates appealed. The appeals court affirmed
in part, reversed in part and remanded. The appeals court held that the vote denial claim challenging the amendment
that would disenfranchise incarcerated felons was not cognizable under the Voting Rights Act (VRA). According to
the court, the Act was not meant to proscribe the authority of states to disenfranchise imprisoned felons. The court
found that the amendment did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause where the amendment did not impose any affirmative disability or restraint, physical or otherwise, and felon disenfranchisement had historically not been regarded as
punitive in the United States. The court noted that there was a rational non-punitive purpose for the disenfranchisement. (Massachusetts)

U.S. Appeals Court
STATE STATUTES

Straley v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 582 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2009). A prisoner brought a habeas petition challenging the
constitutionality of Utah's indeterminate sentencing scheme. The district court dismissed the petition and the prisoner
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that Utah's indeterminate sentencing scheme did not
violate the prisoner’s due process rights and Utah parole statutes did not create a liberty interest entitling the prisoner
to federal due process protections. (Utah Board of Pardons)
2010

XXIII

U.S. Appeals Court
STATE STATUTES

El-Tabech v. Clarke, 616 F.3d 834 (8th Cir. 2010). A Muslim inmate, who was awarded attorney fees in a civil rights
action in which he prevailed on his request for kosher meals, moved for an order directing prison officials to pay the
fee award and to increase the post-judgment interest rate payable on that award. The district court granted the motion
and the state appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that the award of post-judgment
interest at a punitive rate of 14% on the attorney fees awarded to the inmate's counsel in the civil rights suit was an
abuse of discretion, where most of the delay in the state's payment of the fee award was due to the inmate's refusal to
file a claim under state statutes governing payment of federal court judgments. According to the court, there were no
extraordinary circumstances warranting departure from the statutory post-judgment interest rate. (Tecumseh State
Correctional Institution, Nebraska)

U.S. Appeals Court
STATE STATUTES

Farrakhan v. Gregoire, 623 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2010). Convicted felons filed a suit challenging the State of Washington's felon disenfranchisement law, alleging that it violated the Voting Rights Act (VRA) by denying the right to
vote on account of race. The district court granted Washington summary judgment, and the felons appealed. The
appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. On remand, the district court again granted Washington summary judgment. The felons appealed again. The appeals court found that a VRA challenge to the felon
disenfranchisement law requires intentional discrimination in the criminal justice system, and Washington's disenfranchisement law did not violate the VRA. (State of Washington)

44.20

XXIII

U.S. District Court
STATE STATUTES

Fields v. Smith, 712 F.Supp.2d 830 (E.D.Wis. 2010). Wisconsin Department of Corrections (DOC) inmates, who
were diagnosed with Gender Identity Disorder (GID), brought a § 1983 action against DOC officials, alleging,
among other things, that the officials violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by enforcing a statutory provision preventing DOC medical personnel from providing hormone therapy or sexual reassignment surgery to inmates with GID, and from evaluating inmates with GID for possible hormone therapy. The inmates sought a permanent injunction barring enforcement of the statute against them and other inmates. The court held that: (1) GID or
transsexualism was a “serious medical need” for the purposes of the Eighth Amendment; (2) as matter of first
impression, enforcement of the statute against the inmates violated the Eighth Amendment; (3) as matter of first
impression, the statute was facially unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment; (4) the possibility that certain
inmates seeking treatment for gender issues might have had conditions not requiring hormone therapy did not repel a
facial challenge to the statute; and (5) as matter of first impression, the statute violated the Equal Protection Clause
both as applied to the inmates and on its face. The district court granted the motion, issuing a “…permanent injunction that restrains the defendants from enforcing or attempting to enforce the provisions of Wis. Stat. § 302.386(5m),
by direct, indirect or other means, against any prisoner to whom the statute would otherwise apply and specifically
against the plaintiffs.” (Wisconsin Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
STATE STATUTE

Gonzalez-Fuentes v. Molina, 607 F.3d 864 (1st Cir. 2010). A class of prisoners convicted of murder, who had been
released pursuant to an electronic supervision program (ESP), filed a complaint under § 1983, seeking a preliminary
injunction against their re-incarceration pursuant to a regulation which became effective after their releases. The
district court granted a preliminary injunction and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico appealed. Another class of
prisoners who had been re-incarcerated filed a separate petition for a writ of habeas corpus and the district court
granted the petition. The district court consolidated the two cases, and denied the Commonwealth's motion to dismiss. The commonwealth appealed. The appeals court reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court
held that re-incarceration of the prisoners convicted of murder under a new regulation eliminating the ESP program
for prisoners convicted of murder, did not violate the ex post facto clause, where the prisoners had committed their
crimes of conviction at times predating the creation of the ESP, so that Puerto Rico's decision to disqualify prisoners
from participating in the ESP had no effect on the punishment assigned by law.
The court also held the re-incarceration of the prisoners convicted of murder did not violate substantive due process. The court found that although the impact of re-incarceration on the prisoners was substantial, Puerto Rico had a
justifiable interest in faithfully applying the new statute which barred prisoners convicted of murder from the ESP
program. According to the court, there was no showing that Puerto Rico acted with deliberate indifference or that reimprisonment was conscience-shocking.
But the court found that the prisoners convicted of murder, who had been released for several years pursuant to
the ESP, had a protected due process liberty interest in their continued participation in the ESP program, despite the
fact that their releases were premised on lower court determination, which was later overturned, that the statute
eliminating such prisoners from the program violated the ex post facto clause. The prisoners were serving out the
remainder of their sentences in their homes, where they lived either with close relatives, significant others, or
spouses and children, and although they were subject to monitoring with an electronic tracking anklet, and routine
drug and alcohol testing, they were authorized to work at a job or attend school.
The court also found that the re-incarceration of the prisoners deprived them of procedural due process, where the
prisoners were not given any pre-hearing notice as to the reason their ESP status was revoked, and the prisoners had
to wait two weeks after their arrest before receiving any opportunity to contest it.
The court concluded that the prisoners whose procedural due process rights were violated by their re-incarceration or their imminent future re-incarceration after determination that they had been unlawfully admitted into the
ESP were not entitled to either habeas relief, for those already re-imprisoned, or preliminary injunctive relief for
those yet to be re-imprisoned, where the subsequent Puerto Rico statute provided a valid, independent, constitutional
basis for the prisoners' re-incarceration. (Puerto Rico Dept. of Justice, Puerto Rico Administration of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
STATE STATUTES

Johnson v. Bredesen, 624 F.3d 742 (6th Cir. 2010). Several convicted felons brought action against Tennessee's
governor and secretary of state, state coordinator of elections, and several county elections administrators, alleging
that, by conditioning restoration of felons' voting rights on payment of court-ordered victim restitution and child
support obligations, Tennessee's voter re-enfranchisement statute violated the Equal Protection Clause, the TwentyFourth Amendment, and the Ex Post Facto and Privileges and Immunities Clauses of the federal and state constitutions. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings and the felons appealed. The
appeals court affirmed. The court held that Tennessee had rational basis for the challenged provisions of the state's
re-enfranchisement statute, the challenged provisions of the state's re-enfranchisement statute did not violate the
Twenty-Fourth Amendment or Privileges and Immunities Clause, and the challenged provisions were not punitive in
nature, and thus did not violate the state's Ex Post Facto Clause. The court noted that the felons, having lost their
voting rights upon being convicted of felonies, lacked any fundamental interest in their right to vote, and wealthbased classifications did not constitute discrimination against any suspect class. According to the court, Tennessee's
interests in encouraging payment of child support and compliance with court orders, and in requiring felons to complete their entire sentences, including paying victim restitution, supplied a rational basis sufficient for the challenged
provisions to pass equal protection muster. (Shelby County, Madison County, and Davidson County, Tennessee)

U.S. Appeals Court
STATE STATUTES

PA Prison Soc. v. Cortes, 622 F.3d 215 (3rd Cir. 2010). State prisoners, several non-profit advocacy and prisoner
rights groups, and several state voters and qualified taxpayers brought an action challenging an amendment to the
Pennsylvania constitution changing the composition of the Board of Pardons and the voting requirements for obtaining a pardon or commutation of sentence. The district court granted in part, and denied in part, the parties' crossmotions for summary judgment, and they appealed. The appeals court remanded. On remand, the district court ruled
that one of the groups had standing to challenge the constitutionality of the amendment and reinstated its prior summary judgment ruling, and appeal was again taken. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The appeals court held

44.21

that the prisoner advocacy group had organization standing to challenge the constitutionality of the amendment, but
the amendment did not violate the ex post facto clause. The court noted that allegations that the changes in the law
have produced some ambiguous sort of disadvantage, or affected a prisoner's opportunity to take advantage of provisions for early release, are not sufficient grounds for bringing an ex post facto claim. According to the court, there is
no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid
sentence. (Pennsylvania Board of Pardons)
U.S. Appeals Court
FEDERAL
STANDARDS
INTERNATIONAL
STANDARDS
UNITED NATIONS
STANDARDS

Serra v. Lappin, 600 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2010). Current and former federal prisoners brought an action against various prison officials, alleging that the low wages they were paid for work performed in prison violated their rights
under the Fifth Amendment and international law. The district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, and
the prisoners appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that current and former federal prisoners did not
have a legal entitlement to payment for work performed while incarcerated for federal crimes, and thus prison officials did not violate the prisoners' Fifth Amendment due process rights by allegedly paying them inadequate wages
for work performed in prison, absent an allegation that wages paid were less than applicable regulations required.
The court found that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) conferred no judicially
enforceable rights, and thus did not provide current and former federal prisoners a legal claim or remedy against
prison officials in their action alleging that low wages inmates were paid for work performed in prison violated their
rights under international law. The court noted that ICCPR was ratified on the express understanding that it was not
self-executing. Similarly, the court held that the United Nations' document entitled Standard Minimum Rules for the
Treatment of Prisoners conferred no judicially enforceable rights, and thus did not provide current and former
federal prisoners a legal claim or remedy against prison officials in their action. The court noted that the document
was not binding on the United States, did not purport to serve as a source of private rights, and even if it were a selfexecuting treaty, did not specify what wages would qualify as equitable remuneration of prisoners' work.
According to the court, the current and former federal prisoners failed to establish that any statute conferred jurisdiction over their claim that customary international law entitled them to higher wages for work performed in prison,
and thus the district court did not have jurisdiction over prisoners' “law of nations” claim. The court held that the
current and former federal prisoners had no constitutional right to be paid for work performed while in prison, as
would be required to state a claim against prison officials in their individual capacities for money damages based on
alleged inadequacy of the prisoners' earnings. (Fed. Prison Industries, Fed. Bureau of Prisons)

U.S. District Court
STATE STATUTES

Sexton v. Kenton County Detention Center, 702 F.Supp.2d 784 (E.D.Ky. 2010). Two female detainees brought a §
1983 action against a county detention center and officials, alleging deliberate indifference with respect to hiring and
supervision of a deputy who sexually assaulted them while they awaited arraignment. The defendants moved for
summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the detainees failed to establish deliberate indifference with respect to the center's hiring of the deputy. The court noted that none of the deputy's prior
misdemeanor offenses, including his driving infractions and domestic assault, demonstrated a propensity to commit
rape. The court found that the detainees failed to demonstrate a causal link between the center's alleged policy of not
terminating employees with excessive absenteeism and the deputy's conduct. The court noted that "...Absent evidence of prior complaints of sexual assault, the mere fact that a male guard supervises a female inmate does not lead
to the conclusion that the inmate is at a great risk of being sexually assaulted by the guard."
According to the court, the detainees failed to establish that the county detention center was deliberately indifferent to their constitutional rights by not effectively monitoring surveillance equipment, and thus they could not recover in their § 1983 action against the center, where there was no evidence that the center had a policy or custom of
ineffective surveillance. The detainees argued that only one person monitored the 89 cameras that were used
throughout the Detention Center and that they were mainly monitored only for ingress and egress of secured doors.
They asserted that the county should have had cameras in the video arraignment room for the inmates' protection.
The court noted that state jail regulations do not require constant monitoring of video surveillance cameras or dictate
where the cameras are to be placed inside a detention facility. (Kenton County Detention Center, Kentucky)

U.S. Appeals Court
STATE STATUTES

Ward v. Ryan, 623 F.3d 807 (9th Cir. 2010). A state inmate who was serving a 197-year sentence brought a § 1983
action against the director of the Arizona Department of Corrections, alleging the Department's withholding of a
portion of his prison wages for “gate money,” to be paid to him upon his release from incarceration, violated his
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights since it was unlikely he would be released from prison prior to his death.
The appeals court reversed the dismissal of the claim. The district court subsequently denied the inmate injunctive
relief and granted summary judgment in favor of the director. The inmate appealed. The appeals court held that the
inmate did not have a current possessory property interest in wages withheld in a dedicated discharge account, as
required to establish a violation of the Takings Clause. The court noted that Arizona statutes creating a protected
property interest in prison inmate wages did not give inmates full and unfettered right to their property. (Arizona
Department of Corrections)
2011

U.S. District Court
STATE STATUTES

XXIII

Cryer v. Massachusetts Dept. of Correction, 763 F.Supp.2d 237 (D.Mass.2011). A Native American inmate brought
a civil rights action against the Massachusetts Department of Correction and officials, challenging denial of access to
ceremonial tobacco to be used for religious purposes. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact, regarding whether the correctional anti-smoking policy which banned tobacco in all
forms including ceremonial tobacco, created a substantial burden on the Native American inmate's religious practice,
in violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The court found that the conduct of state correctional officials in denying the Native American inmate's access to ceremonial tobacco did not
violate a clearly established federal right of which a reasonable officer would have known, entitling the officials to
qualified immunity on the inmate's § 1983 claim under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The court

44.22

noted that the policy of state correctional officials in denying the Native American inmate's access to ceremonial
tobacco did not contravene a Massachusetts statute governing smoking in public workplaces, since the provision
stated that smoking “may be permitted” in specifically enumerated places and circumstances, including religious
ceremonies where smoking was part of a ritual. (Souza–Baranowski Correctional Center, Massachusetts)
U.S. Appeals Court
STATE STATUTES

Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 550 (7th Cir. 2011). Wisconsin Department of Corrections (DOC) inmates, who were diagnosed with Gender Identity Disorder (GID), brought a § 1983 action against DOC officials, alleging, among other
things, that the officials violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by enforcing a statutory provision preventing DOC medical personnel from providing hormone therapy or sexual reassignment surgery to inmates with
GID, and from evaluating inmates with GID for possible hormone therapy. The inmates sought a permanent injunction barring enforcement of the statute against them and other inmates. The district court granted judgment on behalf
of the plaintiffs and the defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that: (1) enforcement of the statute constituted deliberate indifference to the inmates' serious medical needs; (2) the statute facially
violated the Eighth Amendment; (3) deference to prison administrators in implementing the ban was not warranted;
and (4) the district court did not abuse its discretion in enjoining the entirety of the Wisconsin Inmate Sex Change
Prevention Act. (Wisconsin Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
STATE STATUTES

Gilman v. Schwarzenegger, 638 F.3d 1101(9th Cir. 2011). California state prisoners serving life imprisonment sentences with the possibility of parole filed a class action under § 1983, alleging that a provision of California's Victims' Bill of Rights Act of 2008, which reduced the availability and frequency of parole hearings for prisoners initially found not suitable for parole, violated the Ex Post Facto Clause and prisoners' substantive due process rights.
The prisoners moved for a preliminary injunction to bar enforcement of the Act, and the state moved to dismiss. The
district court granted preliminary injunctive relief in part, and the State appealed. The appeals court reversed. The
appeals court held that, even assuming that the Act threatened to create the risk of prolonged incarceration for those
convicted prior to its enactment, the prisoners' ability to apply for expedited hearings remedied any possible Ex Post
Facto violation and warranted denial of the inmates' request for a preliminary injunction. (California)

U.S. Appeals Court
FEDERAL STATUTES

Jordan v. Sosa, 654 F.3d 1012 (10th Cir. 2011). A federal inmate brought an action against Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) officials challenging the constitutionality of a statutory and regulatory ban on the use of federal funds to
distribute to federal prisoners commercially published materials that were sexually explicit or which featured nudity.
The district court entered judgment in the government's favor and the inmate appealed. The appeals court dismissed
the action, finding that the action was rendered constitutionally moot by the inmate's transfer to another facility and
the action was rendered prudentially moot by the transfer. (Administrative Maximum Security Facility, Federal Bureau of Prisons, Florence, Colorado)

U.S. District Court
STATE STANDARDS

Smith v. Atkins, 777 F.Supp.2d 955 (E.D.N.C. 2011). The mother of a schizophrenic inmate who committed suicide
at a jail and the mother of the inmate's children brought a § 1983 action in state court against a county deputy sheriff,
jail officials, a medical contractor, and a nurse employed by the contractor, alleging that the defendants violated the
inmate's Eighth Amendment rights in failing to provide adequate medical care. The defendants removed the action to
federal court and moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motions. The court held that the deputy sheriff who happened to be at the jail delivering a prisoner when the inmate, who had been diagnosed with
schizophrenia, committed suicide, did not know that the inmate was at a substantial risk of committing suicide or
intentionally disregarded such risk. The court found that the deputy was not liable under § 1983 where the deputy
did not know the inmate or anything about him, or have any responsibilities associated with the inmate's custody.
The court held that jail officials' mere failure to comply with a state standard and a jail policy requiring a four-time
per hour check on any prisoner who had ever been on a suicide watch did not violate the Eighth Amendment rights
of the inmate. (Bertie–Martin Regional Jail, North Carolina)

U.S. Appeals Court
STATE STATUTES

Tenny v. Blagojevich, 659 F.3d 578 (7th Cir. 2011). Seven inmates incarcerated at a state prison sued current and
former officials in the Illinois Department of Corrections, and the former Governor, for marking up the price of
commissary goods beyond a statutory cap. The district court dismissed the cases for failure to state a claim and the
inmates appealed. The appeals court affirmed and remanded with instructions. According to the appeals court, even
if a statutory cap on the mark-up of the price of prison commissary goods created a protected property interest, the
prisoners did not state a procedural due process claim based on the Department of Corrections' alleged cap violation
where they did not allege that post-deprivation remedies were inadequate to satisfy constitutional due process
requirements. (Stateville Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
FEDERAL STATUTES

U.S. v. Broncheau, 645 F.3d 676 (4th Cir. 2011). Former federal prisoners, who had been certified, pursuant to the
Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, as sexually dangerous persons and were being detained pending
hearings on the government's petitions for their commitment, moved to dismiss those petitions. The district court
granted the motions and denied the government's motion for a stay. The government appealed. The appeals court
vacated and remanded. The appeals court held that the district court improperly ordered the government to release
from the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) custody prisoners who had upcoming terms of supervised release, and whom the
government had certified as sexually dangerous under the civil commitment provisions of the Adam Walsh Child
Protection and Safety Act, and that the district court further improperly required the government to first seek a commitment order under a competency statute before seeking civil commitment under the Adam Walsh Act. The court
noted that although the prisoners' sentences included terms of supervised release, they fell within the class of persons
in the custody of the BOP subject to certification as being sexually dangerous, and the competency statute did not
provide for a commitment on the basis of the prisoners' sexual dangerousness. (Federal Bureau of Prisons, Adam
Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006)

44.23

U.S. Appeals Court
FEDERAL
STANDARDS

U.S. v. Franco, 632 F.3d 880 (5th Cir. 2011). An inmate in a privately owned and operated county jail, who had paid
a corrections officer to bring contraband into a county correctional facility, was convicted after a district court jury
trial of aiding and abetting in the bribery of a public official. The defendant appealed. The appeals court affirmed.
The court held that it was constitutional to apply the federal bribery statute to the defendant, even though he used his
own money, and not federal funds, to pay the corrections officer. The officer had been paid a total of $425 over a
period of time to bring peanut butter, tuna fish, and other small food items, a cell phone, enchiladas and a box containing marijuana. (Ector County Correctional Center, Texas)
2012

U.S. District Court
STATE STATUTES

Blalock v. Eaker, 845 F.Supp.2d 678 (W.D.N.C. 2012). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against prison
officials, alleging they lost his legal mail. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
The court held that when prison staff ignored the detainee's subpoenas it did not violate his right of access to the
courts. The court noted that the detainee was represented by counsel, the subpoenas were invalid as the detainee was
a criminal defendant who had no right under North Carolina common law to pretrial discovery, North Carolina
statutes did not authorize the use of subpoenas “duces tecum” as a criminal discovery tool, and North Carolina law
did not allow criminal defendants to depose witnesses. (Lincoln County Detention Center, North Carolina)

U.S. Appeals Court
STATE STATUTES

Burnette v. Fahey, 687 F.3d 171 (4th Cir. 2012). State prisoners filed an action against members of the Virginia
Parole Board in their official capacities, contending that the Board had adopted policies and procedures with respect
to parole-eligible inmates imprisoned for violent offenses that violated the Due Process and Ex Post Facto Clauses.
The district court dismissed the action and denied a motion to amend. The plaintiffs appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The appeals court held that Virginia had created a limited due process liberty interest in being considered
for parole at a specified time, and in being furnished with a written explanation for denial of parole, through passage
of its parole statute. But the court held that the prisoners’ complaint supported an inference, at most, that the parole
board was exercising its discretion, but that in doing so the board was taking a stricter view towards violent
offenders than it had in past, which did not implicate the Ex Post Facto Clause. According to the court, the mere fact
that the parole board had implemented procedural changes during the same multi-year period that the rate of release
decreased did not produce a plausible inference of a causal connection to an alleged Ex Post Facto Clause violation
due to a significant risk of extended punishment. (Virginia Parole Board)

U.S. District Court
STATE STATUTES

Doe v. Caldwell, 913 F.Supp.2d 262 (E.D.La. 2012). Offenders convicted of violating Louisiana's Crime Against
Nature by Solicitation statute filed a class action against state officials, challenging the enforcement of Louisiana's
sex offender registry law. State officials moved to dismiss, and the offenders moved for class certification and for
summary judgment. The district court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss. The court held that allegations that a
provision of the sex offender registry law requiring individuals convicted of violating Louisiana's Crime Against
Nature by Solicitation statute to register as sex offenders, but not requiring individuals convicted under the Louisiana
Prostitution statute to register as sex offenders, was without any rational basis, and stated a § 1983 equal protection
claim. (Louisiana Crime Against Nature by Solicitation Statute)

U.S. District Court
STATE STATUTES

Doe v. Jindal, 851 F.Supp.2d 995 (E.D.La. 2012). Individuals convicted of violating Louisiana's Crime Against
Nature by Solicitation (CANS) statute brought a § 1983 action against Louisiana's Governor, Attorney General, and
other state and municipal officials, challenging the statute's requirement that they register as sex offenders under
Louisiana's sex offender registry law. The individuals moved for summary judgment and the district court granted
the motion. The court held that the individuals were treated differently than those convicted of engaging in the same
conduct under the solicitation provision of Louisiana's prostitution statute, which did not require registration as sex
offender, and thus the provision of the sex offender registry law requiring individuals convicted of CANS to register
as sex offenders deprived the individuals of equal protection of laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
(Crime Against Nature by Solicitation Statute, Louisiana)

U.S. District Court
STATE STATUTES

Doe v. Jindal, 853 F.Supp.2d 596 (M.D.La. 2012). Registered sex offenders brought an action seeking a declaration
that the Louisiana statute precluding registered sex offenders from using or accessing social networking websites,
chat rooms, and peer-to-peer networks was unconstitutional, and seeking injunctive relief. The district court entered
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, finding that the statute was facially overbroad and the statute was void for
vagueness. The court found that a department of corrections regulation did not cure deficiencies in the statute where
the regulation only applied to sex offenders who were under supervision by state probation officers, which was a
limited segment of the class of persons otherwise subject to the statute. The court concluded: “Although the Act is
intended to promote the legitimate and compelling state interest of protecting minors from internet predators, the
near total ban on internet access imposed by the Act unreasonably restricts many ordinary activities that have
become important to everyday life in today's world. The sweeping restrictions on the use of the internet for purposes
completely unrelated to the activities sought to be banned by the Act impose severe and unwarranted restraints on
constitutionally protected speech. More focused restrictions that are narrowly tailored to address the specific conduct
sought to be proscribed should be pursued.” (Louisiana)

U.S. District Court
STATE STATUTES

Doe v. Nebraska, 898 F.Supp.2d 1086 (D.Neb. 2012). Sex offenders who were required to register under the
Nebraska Sex Offender Registration Act and the offenders' family members brought an action against a state
alleging that portions of the Act violated the First Amendment, the Due Process Clause, the Ex Post Facto Clause,
and the Fourth Amendment. The district court held that: (1) the statute criminalizing registrants' use of social
networking web sites, instant messaging, and chat room services accessible by minors was not narrowly tailored; (2)
the statute criminalizing registrants' use of web sites was overbroad; (3) the statute requiring registrants' disclosure of
domain names and blog sites used was not narrowly tailored; (4) the statute criminalizing registrants' use of web
sites was vague under the Due Process Clause; and, (5) the statutes violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. The court

44.24

noted that a statute is “narrowly tailored” to regulate content-neutral speech under the First Amendment, if it targets
and eliminates no more than the exact source of the evil it seeks to remedy. The district court opened its opinion with
the following: “Earlier I paraphrased Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes and observed that if the people of Nebraska
wanted to go to hell, it was my job to help them get there. By that, I meant that it is not my prerogative to secondguess Nebraska's policy judgments so long as those judgments are within constitutional parameters. Accordingly, I
upheld many portions of Nebraska's new sex offender registration laws even though it was my firm personal view
that those laws were both wrongheaded and counterproductive. However, I had serious constitutional concerns about
three sections of Nebraska's new law…. I have decided that the remaining portions of Nebraska's sex offender
registry laws are unconstitutional.” (Nebraska)
U.S. District Court
STATE STATUTES

Doe v. Raemisch, 895 F.Supp.2d 897 (E.D.Wis. 2012). Two offenders, one from Connecticut and one from Florida,
who were subject to Wisconsin's sex offender registration and notification statutes, sued the Wisconsin Department
of Corrections (DOC), its Secretary, and the Director of the DOC's Sex Offender Program, alleging that application
and enforcement of registration requirements violated their constitutional and statutory rights. The parties crossmoved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that:
(1) the registration requirement was not punitive; but, (2) a provision authorizing the imposition of a $100 annual fee
violated the Ex Post Facto Clause; (3) the statutes did not violate the offenders' constitutional equal protection rights;
(4) the statutes did not violate the offenders' equal protection or substantive due process rights by denying them an
individualized, risk-determination-based judicial system; (5) the registration law did not constitute an
unconstitutional legislative impairment of the offenders' plea agreements; (6) the offenders had no First Amendment
cause of action regarding requirements to provide e-mail addresses and websites they maintained; and (7) the
defendant officials were entitled to qualified immunity. The court noted that, except for an annual fee requirement,
Wisconsin's sex offender registration law was reasonable in light of its non-punitive objective, and thus did not
violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, and the fact that the registration law might deter sex offenders from violating the
law did not establish that the registration requirement itself was punitive, and the fact that offenders had to travel to
specified law enforcement facilities to have their photographs taken and to be fingerprinted was not sufficiently
severe to transform an otherwise non-punitive measure into a punitive one. (Wisconsin Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
STATE STATUTES

Ferencz v. Medlock, 905 F.Supp.2d 656 (W.D.Pa. 2012). A mother, as administrator for her son’s estate, brought
deliberate indifference claims under a wrongful death statute against prison employees, and the prison's medical
services provider, following the death of her son when he was a pretrial detainee in a county prison. The employees
and provider moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The district court
held that under Pennsylvania law, the mother lacked standing to bring wrongful death and survival actions in her
individual capacity against several prison employees for her son's death while he was in prison, where the wrongful
death and survival statutes only permitted recovery by a personal representative, such as a mother in her action as
administratrix of her son's estate, or as a person entitled to recover damages as a trustee ad litem. The court found
that the mother's claims that a prison's medical services provider had a policy, practice, or custom that resulted in her
son's death were sufficient to overcome the provider's motion to dismiss the mother's § 1983 action for the death of
her son while he was in prison.
Upon admission to the facility, the detainee had been evaluated and scored a 12 on a scale, which was to have
triggered classification as suicidal (a score of 8 or more). The Classification Committee subsequently did not classify
the detainee as suicidal as they were required to do under the jail classification policy, and no member of the
Committee communicated to medical contractor staff or correctional officers responsible for monitoring the detainee
that he was suicidal and going through drug withdrawal. At the time, the jail was equipped with an operational and
working video surveillance system and there was a video camera in the detainee’s cell. The video surveillance of the
cell was broadcast on four different television monitors throughout the jail, all of which were working and manned
by officers. Additionally, the work station thhhattt was located around the corner from the cell, approximately 20
feet away, was equipped with one of the four television monitors. The monitor was situated on the wall above the
desk at the work station, such that it would be directly in front of the officer manning the station if he was sitting
facing his desk.
The detainee attempted suicide by trying to hang himself with his bed sheet from the top of the cell bars, which
took several minutes and was unsuccessful. After the attempt, however, the detainee left the bed sheet hanging from
the top of his cell bars and started to pace in his cell in visible mental distress. This suicide attempt, as well as the
hanging bedsheet were viewable from the nearby work station video surveillance monitor as well as the other three
monitors throughout the jail. A few minutes later the detainee attempted to commit suicide a second time by hanging
himself with his bed sheet from the top of his cell bars. This suicide attempt took several minutes, was unsuccessful,
and was viewable from the work station video surveillance monitor as well as the other three monitors throughout
the jail. A few minutes later, the detainee attempted to commit suicide a third time by hanging himself with his bed
sheet. This time, he hung himself from his bed sheet for over twenty minutes, without being noticed by any of the
four officers who were manning the four video surveillance monitors. In fact, one officer admitted he was asleep at
his work station at the time. By the time another officer noticed the hanging, nearly 30 minutes had passed. The
detainee was cut down and transported to a local hospital where he was subsequently pronounced dead due to
asphyxiation by hanging. (Fayette County Prison, Pennsylvania, and PrimeCare Medical, Inc.)

U.S. Appeals Court
STATE STATUTES

Fields v. Henry County, Tenn., 701 F.3d 180 (6th Cir. 2012). An arrestee filed a civil rights action alleging that a
county had violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from excessive bail and his Fourteenth Amendment right
to procedural due process. The district court granted summary judgment for the county and the arrestee appealed.
The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that setting the arrestee's bail at the same amount as other
defendants facing domestic-assault charges through the county's use of a bond schedule without particularized
examination of his situation did not violate the arrestee's Eighth Amendment right to be free from excessive bail. The
court noted that the mere use of a bond schedule does not itself pose a constitutional problem under the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition of excessive bail, since a schedule is aimed at assuring the presence of a defendant, and the

44.25

bond schedule represents an assessment of what bail amount would ensure the appearance of the average defendant
facing such a charge. The court found that a liberty interest protected by due process had not been implicated by the
county's policy of automatically detaining domestic-assault defendants for 12 hours without bail. The court noted
that a Tennessee statute providing that a person could not “be committed to prison” until he had a hearing before a
magistrate did not create a liberty interest, and release on personal recognizance under Tennessee law lacked
explicitly mandatory language needed to create a liberty interest. (Henry County Sherriff's Office and Henry County
Jail, Tennessee)
U.S. District Court
STATE STATUTES

Hampton v. Sabie, 891 F.Supp.2d 1014 (N.D.Ill. 2012). A former inmate at a juvenile correctional facility brought a
§ 1983 action against a correctional officer and the facility superintendent, alleging that the officer sexually assaulted
him and that the superintendent was deliberately indifferent to the inmate's constitutional rights by failing to protect
him from the assault. The superintendent moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion. The court held that
the inmate's § 1983 claim was governed by the state's general two-year limitations period for personal injury claims,
rather than the state's six-year statute applicable to sexual assaults against a child. (Illinois Youth Center)

U.S. Appeals Court
STATE
REGULATIONS

Moussazadeh v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, 703 F.3d 781 (5th Cir. 2012). A Jewish state prisoner brought an
action against the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, alleging that the defendant denied his grievances and
requests for kosher meals in violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and
the Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendant and
the prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that the state Jewish prisoner
exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to his claim that a prison's failure to provide him with kosher
meals violated RLUIPA, where the prisoner went through the state's entire grievance process before filing suit. The
court found that sufficient evidence established that the prisoner's religious beliefs were sincere, as required to
support a claim against state's department of criminal justice for violation of RLUIPA, where the prisoner stated that
he was born and raised Jewish and had always kept a kosher household, the prisoner offered evidence that he
requested kosher meals from the chaplain, kitchen staff, and the department, and while at another prison, he ate
kosher meals provided to him from the dining hall. The court noted that the prisoner was harassed for his adherence
to his religious beliefs and for his demands for kosher food, and that the department transferred the prisoner for a
time so he could receive kosher food. The court held that the prisoner was denied a generally available benefit
because of his religious beliefs, and thus, the state's department of criminal justice imposed a substantial burden on
the prisoner's religious exercise under RLUIPA, where every prisoner in the department's custody received a
nutritionally sufficient diet, every observant Jewish prisoner at the designated prison received a kosher diet free of
charge, and the Jewish prisoner at issue was forced to pay for his kosher meals. The court found that there was no
evidence of a compelling government interest in forcing the Jewish prisoner to pay for all of his kosher meals. The
court also found that summary judgment was precluded by a general dispute of material fact as to whether the state's
department of criminal justice employed the least restrictive means of minimizing costs and maintaining security by
forcing the Jewish prisoner to pay for all of his kosher meals. (Eastham Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal
Justice, Correctional Institutions Division)

U.S. Appeals Court
STATE
REGULATIONS

Poole v. Isaacs, 703 F.3d 1024 (7th Cir. 2012). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action against prison officials,
alleging that a required $2.00 copayment for dental care furnished at a correctional center violated his Eighth
Amendment rights. The district court allowed the action to proceed against the center's healthcare administrator after
screening the complaint, but then granted summary judgment for the administrator. The inmate appealed. The
appeals court held that the imposition of a modest fee for medical services provided to inmates with adequate
resources to pay the fee, standing alone, does not violate the United States Constitution. According to the court, the
issue of whether the inmate should have been given the benefit of an exemption from the required copayment was
state-law question that could not be pursued under § 1983. (Big Muddy River Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
STATE STATUTES

Shah v. Danberg, 855 F.Supp.2d 215 (D.Del. 2012). A state inmate who pled guilty but mentally ill to a charge of
first degree murder filed a § 1983 action against a state judge and prison officials alleging that his placement in a
correctional center, rather than in a psychiatric center, violated his constitutional rights. The court held that the state
judge was entitled to absolute judicial immunity from liability in inmate's § 1983 action despite the inmate's
contention that the judge's incorrect application of a state statute resulted in violation of his constitutional rights,
where there were no allegations that the judge acted outside the scope of her judicial capacity, or in the absence of
jurisdiction. The could ruled that the state inmate failed to establish the likelihood of success on the merits of his
claim and thus was not entitled to a preliminary injunction ordering his transfer, despite the inmate's contention that
he was mentally unstable and had repeatedly caused himself physical injury during his suicide attempts, where
medical records the inmate submitted were ten years old, and a state supreme court recognized that prison officials
had discretion to house inmates at facilities they chose. The court ordered the appointment of counsel, noting that the
inmate was unable to afford legal representation, he had a history of mental health problems, and the matter
presented complex legal issues. (James T. Vaughn Correctional Center, Smyrna, Delaware)

U.S. District Court
PROFESSIONAL
STANDARDS

Wilkins v. District of Columbia, 879 F.Supp.2d 35 (D.D.C. 2012). A pretrial detainee in a District of Columbia jail
who was stabbed by another inmate brought an action against the District. The district court entered judgment as a
matter of law in favor of the District and the detainee moved for reconsideration. The district court granted the
motion and ordered a new trial. The court held that the issue of whether the failure of District of Columbia jail
personnel to follow national standards of care for inmate access to storage closets and monitoring of inmate
movements was the proximate cause of the detainee's stabbing by a fellow inmate was for the jury, in the detainee's
negligence action, under District of Columbia law. Another inmate who was being held at the D.C. Jail on charges of
first-degree murder attacked the detainee. The inmate had received a pass to go to the jail's law library,
unaccompanied. Apparently he did not arrive at the library but no one from the library called the inmate’s housing
unit to report that he had not arrived. An expert retained by the detainee asserted that failure to monitor inmate

44.26

movements violated national standards for the operation of jails. En route to the jail mental health unit, the detainee
saw the inmate enter a mop closet. The inmate, along with another inmate, approached the detainee and stabbed him
nine times with a knife. During court proceedings there was testimony that the inmates had hidden contraband in the
mop closets. The closets are supposed to be locked at all times, other than when the jail is being cleaned each
afternoon. But there was evidence from which the jury could infer that all inmates except those who did not have
jobs cleaning in the jail had access to them. According to the detainee’s expert witness, keeping mop closets locked
at times when the general inmate population is permitted to be in the vicinity of the closets is in accordance with
national standards of care for the operation of detention facilities. According to the district court, “In sum, the
circumstantial evidence of Mr. Foreman's [inmate who attacked the detainee] freedom of movement is enough to
have allowed a jury to conclude that the District's negligence was a proximate cause of Mr. Wilkins's injury…”.
(District of Columbia Central Detention Facility)
2013
U.S. District Court
STATE STATUTE

Ayotte v. Barnhart, 973 F.Supp.2d 70 (D.Me. 2013). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that prison
officials failed to protect him from a padlock assault by a fellow prisoner, and retaliated against him for filing
complaints about prison conditions. The officials moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the
motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the decision by state prison officials to provide inmates with
padlocks to secure their personal belongings did not demonstrate deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of
serious harm, as required to establish an Eighth Amendment violation, despite the history of padlocks being used as
weapons by some prisoners. The court noted that a state statute required officials to provide inmates with a
reasonably secure area for their personal belongings, and there were generally only one or two padlock assaults per
year. The court found that verbal abuse, threats, and two strip-searches of the inmate by a prison guard were not de
minimis, and thus were sufficiently adverse to support the inmate's First Amendment retaliation claim against the
guard. Because inmates; rights against retaliatory action by prison officials for filing complaints about their
treatment were clearly established, the court ruled that the prison guards were not entitled to qualified immunity
from liability in the inmate's § 1983 First Amendment retaliation action. (Maine State Prison)

U.S. District Court
ACCREDITATION
PROFESSIONAL
STANDARDS

Davidson v. Bureau of Prisons, 931 F.Supp.2d 770 (E.D.Ky. 2013). A federal prisoner brought a Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) suit against the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) seeking the results of an audit of his prison
that had been conducted by the American Correctional Association. Following dismissal of his suit, the prisoner
moved for reconsideration and for an award of costs. The court held that the prisoner was not entitled to judicial
relief given that the BOP had compiled the responsive documents and was awaiting only payment of the $33
copying charge. The court found that the prisoner had substantially prevailed and was thus eligible to recover his
litigation costs, and that the prisoner was only entitled to recover his $350 filing fee. There had been a two-year
delay in the BOP's response. (Federal Medical Center, Lexington, Kentucky)

U.S. District Court
STATE STATUTE

Ezell v. Darr, 951 F.Supp.2d 1316 (M.D.Ga. 2013). Female county deputy sheriffs brought an action against a
sheriff and a city consolidated government, alleging under § 1983 that the sheriff retaliated against them for their
political support of a former sheriff's reelection bid, and that they were denied promotion and demoted because of
their gender. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied
in part. The court held that under Georgia law, loyalty to an individual sheriff and the goals and policies he sought to
implement through his office was an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of a deputy sheriff, and
thus the sheriff did not violate the First Amendment by transferring deputies who did not support him in an election.
The court held that the newly-elected male sheriff's proffered legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for transferring
the female deputy from the position of jail commander to a clerk of the Recorder's Court-- that the sheriff was
dissatisfied with the way jail had been operating under the deputy and he felt that members of the deputy's staff were
unprofessional-- was not a pretext for gender discrimination. (Muscogee County Sheriff, Muscogee County Jail,
Georgia)

U.S. District Court
STATE STATUTE

John Does 1-4 v. Snyder, 932 F.Supp.2d 803 (E.D.Mich. 2013). Sex offenders filed suit challenging the
constitutionality of the Michigan Sex Offender Registry Act (SORA). The state defendants moved to dismiss the
complaint. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that: (1) SORA did not
violate the Ex Post Facto Clause; (2) SORA's quarterly reporting requirement did not offend due process or
substantially burden registrants' rights to interstate or intrastate travel; (3) SORA did not implicate registrants' due
process right to engage in common occupations of life; (4) the registrants satisfactorily alleged that SORA's loitering
prohibition, which did not contain any exemption for parental activities, could be proven to infringe upon their
fundamental due process right to direct and participate in their children's education and upbringing; (5) a jury
question was presented as to whether retroactively extending the registration period of sex offenders from twentyfive years to life was justified by a legitimate legislative purpose; and (6) jury questions were presented as to
whether provisions of SORA requiring sex offenders to report information about their online accounts and activities
violated their First Amendment rights. (Mich. Sex Offender Registry Act)

U.S. Appeals Court
FEDERAL
STANDARDS

Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2013). Aliens subject to detention pursuant to federal immigration
statutes brought a class action against Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and others, challenging
prolonged detention without individualized bond hearings and determinations to justify their continued detention.
The district court entered a preliminary injunction requiring the holding of bond hearings before an immigration
judge (IJ). The government appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that: (1) the statute authorizing the
Attorney General to take into custody any alien who is inadmissible or deportable by reason of having committed
certain offenses for as long as removal proceedings are “pending” cannot be read to authorize mandatory detention
of criminal aliens with no limit on the duration of imprisonment; (2) aliens subject to prolonged detention were
entitled to bond hearings before IJs; (3) irreparable harm was likely to result from the government's reading of the

44.27

immigration detention statutes as not requiring a bond hearing for aliens subject to prolonged detention; and, (4) the
public interest would benefit from a preliminary injunction. The court ruled that the class was comprised of all noncitizens within the Central District of California who: (1) are or were detained for longer than six months pursuant to
one of the general immigration detention statutes pending completion of removal proceedings, including judicial
review, (2) are not and have not been detained pursuant to a national security detention statute, and (3) have not been
afforded a hearing to determine whether their detention is justified. (Los Angeles Field Office of ICE, California)
U.S. Appeals Court
PROFESSIONAL
STANDARDS

Smith v. Sangamon County Sheriff's Dept., 715 F.3d 188 (7th Cir. 2013). A pretrial detainee filed suit under § 1983
against a sheriff's department to recover for injuries sustained when he was severely beaten by another inmate
housed in a maximum-security cellblock. The district court entered summary judgment for the sheriff's department,
and the detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the detainee failed to establish that the
security classification policy used by the sheriff's department to assign inmates to cellblocks within the jail was
deliberately indifferent to inmate safety in violation of his due-process rights. The court noted that: (1) the detainee
presented no evidence that the classification policy created a serious risk of physical harm to inmates, much less that
the sheriff's department knew of it and did nothing; (2) the attack by the detainee's cellmate was not enough to
establish that the policy itself systematically exposed inmates like the detainee to a serious risk of harm; and (3) it
was unclear that a policy strictly segregating those accused of nonviolent crimes from those accused of violent
crimes would do a better job of ensuring inmate safety than the multiple-factor classification system used by the
sheriff's department. The detainee claimed that the Department's approach to classifying inmates for cellblock
placement ignored serious risks to inmate safety because the security classification policy fails to separate “violent”
from “nonviolent” inmates and thus fails to protect peaceful inmates from attacks by inmates with assaultive
tendencies. The appeals court described the classification practices: “A classification officer interviews each new
detainee and reviews a range of information, including the inmate's age, gender, gang affiliation, medical concerns,
current charge, criminal history, behavioral and disciplinary history within the jail, and any holds due to parole
violations. Pursuant to standards recommended by the American Correctional Association, the classification policy
assigns point values within these categories, with higher point values corresponding to lower security risks.”
(Sangamon County Detention Facility, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
STATE STATUTE

Vuncannon v. U.S., 711 F.3d 536 (5th Cir. 2013). A county and the medical corporation that treated a county inmate
sought reimbursement of medical expenses from the provider of workers' compensation insurance under the
Mississippi Workers' Compensation Act (MWCA). The inmate was in a county work program under the sheriff's
supervision, for which services he earned $10 per day to be credited “toward any and all charges of F.T.A/cash
bonds owed to the county.” He was seriously injured in a forklift accident while helping law enforcement officials
conduct a “drug bust” pursuant to that program. The inmate’s treatment cost more than $640,000. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of provider. The county appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held
that the inmate did not qualify for reimbursement of medical expenses under MWCA. The appeals court noted that
the county inmate was not an employee working under contract of hire, and therefore, did not qualify for
reimbursement of medical expenses from the provider of workers' compensation insurance under the Mississippi
Workers' Compensation Act (MWCA) after he was injured in a county work program. According to the court, there
was no express, written contract between the inmate and the county, the inmate did not sign a document transmitted
by the sheriff to a county justice court stating that the inmate was placed on a work detail, the document was
transmitted after he began working for the county, and inmates were required to work under Mississippi law.
(Tippah County Jail, Mississippi)
2014

U.S. District Court
STANDARDS

Alvarado v. Westchester County, 22 F.Supp.3d 208 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). Jail inmates, who were addicted to heroin
before being taken into custody, brought a pro se § 1983 action against a county, the provider of on-site medical
services at a jail, and county officials, alleging refusal to accept a grievance deprived them of First Amendment right
to petition the government for redress, deliberate indifference to serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments, and deliberate indifference to risk of inadequate medical care at the jail. The defendants
moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that: (1) the
inmates had no First Amendment right to have grievances processed or investigated in any particular manner; (2) the
mere receipt of the inmates' grievance by an assistant warden and the county executive was insufficient to establish
their personal involvement; (3) the inmate's allegations established a deputy commissioner's personal involvement;
(4) the allegations supported the inmates' § 1983 claim that the provider was deliberately indifferent; and (5) the
allegations satisfied Monell's policy or custom requirement to support a § 1983 claim against county. The court
noted that the inmates alleged that the county had knowledge of and acquiesced into a pattern of deliberate
indifference to the risk that the provider of on-site medical services at jail was providing inadequate medical care
where: the inmate sent a letter to county officials stating the provider was not issuing methadone to inmates who
were using heroin; the inmates were experiencing withdrawal symptoms; the letter came less than three years after
Department of Justice issued a report identifying areas of medical care provided at jail which fell below
constitutionally required standards. (Correct Care Solutions Medical Services P.C., and Westchester County Jail,
New York)

U.S. District Court
STATE STATUTE

Amos v. Higgins, 996 F.Supp.2d 810 (W.D.Mo. 2014). Fiancees of prisoners brought an action against a county
recorder of deeds, in her official capacity, asserting that a state law's requirement that a marriage license applicant
must sign the application in the presence of a recorder was unconstitutional, as applied in instances when one or both
applicants could not appear in person, or when an applicant was incarcerated. The fiancees moved for a preliminary
injunction prohibiting the recorder from requiring prisoners to execute or sign their marriage license applications in
her presence. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the Missouri statute requiring both applicants
to execute and sign a marriage license in presence of the issuing recorder was unconstitutional as applied, and an

44.28

issuance of a permanent injunction was warranted. The court noted that the “in presence” statutory requirement
significantly interfered with the fiancees' exercise of their fundamental right to marry, and it was not closely tailored
to solely effectuate a sufficiently important state interest, given that the identity of incarcerated marriage license
applicants could be verified through other means without requiring them to sign a marriage license application in the
recorder's physical presence. (Moniteau County Recorder of Deeds, Tipton Correctional Center, Missouri)
U.S. District Court
STATE STATUTES

Hernandez v. County of Monterey, 70 F.Supp.3d 963 (N.D.Cal. 2014). Current and recently released inmates from a
county jail brought an action against the county, the sheriff’s office, and the private company that administered all
jail health care facilities and services, alleging, on behalf of a class of inmates, that substandard conditions at the jail
violated the federal and state constitutions, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act, and a
California statute prohibiting discrimination in state-funded programs. The inmates sought declaratory and injunctive
relief. The defendants filed motions to dismiss. The district court denied the motions. The court held that both
current and recently released inmates had standing to pursue their claims against the county and others for allegedly
substandard conditions at the jail, even though the recently released inmates were no longer subject to the conditions
they challenged. The court noted that the short average length of stay of inmates in the proposed class, which was
largely made up of pretrial detainees, was approximately 34 days, and that short period, coupled with the plodding
speed of legal action and the fact that other persons similarly situated would continue to be subject to the challenged
conduct, qualified the plaintiffs for the “inherently transitory” exception to the mootness doctrine.
The court found that the inmates sufficiently alleged that the private company that administered all jail health care
facilities and services operated a place of public accommodation, as required to state a claim for violation of ADA
Title III. The court noted that: “The complaint alleges a litany of substandard conditions at the jail, including:
violence due to understaffing, overcrowding, inadequate training, policies, procedures, facilities, and prisoner
classification; inadequate medical and mental health care screening, attention, distribution, and resources; and lack
of policies and practices for identifying, tracking, responding, communicating, and providing accessibility for
accommodations for prisoners with disabilities.” (Monterey County Jail, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
STATE STATUTE

Morris v. Livingston, 739 F.3d 740 (5th Cir. 2014). A state inmate, proceeding pro se, brought a § 1983 action
against a governor, challenging the constitutionality of a statute requiring inmates to pay a $100 annual health care
services fee when they receive medical treatment. The district court dismissed the action. The inmate appealed. The
appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that: (1) the governor was entitled to Eleventh Amendment sovereign
immunity where the state department of criminal justice was the agency responsible for administration and
enforcement of the statute; (2) allegations were insufficient to plead deliberate indifference where the inmate did not
allege he was denied medical care or that he was forced to choose between medical care or basic necessities; (3) the
inmate received sufficient notice that he would be deprived of funds; and (4) it was not unreasonable for the prison
to take funds from the state inmate's trust fund account to pay for medical care. The court noted that the prison
posted notices about the statute, the notices informed inmates of the fee and what it covered, and a regulation was
promulgated that provided additional notice. (Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Stevenson Unit, Cuero, Texas)

U.S. Appeals Court
STATE STATUTE

Mueller v. Raemisch, 740 F.3d 1128 (7th Cir. 2014). Two convicted sex offenders brought an action challenging
Wisconsin's statutory scheme of sex offender registration, notification, and monitoring, alleging violation of the
prohibition against states enacting ex post facto laws. The district court ruled that the act's $100 annual registration
fee was unconstitutional, but upheld other provisions of the act. The parties appealed. The appeals court affirmed in
part, modified in part, and reversed in part. The appeals court held that: (1) the sex offenders had standing to
challenge the registration requirement, even though they did not intend to ever return to the state; (2) the sex
offenders did not have standing to challenge provisions of a monitoring requirement relating to working with and
photographing minors because the offenders no longer resided in the state; (3) the sex offenders did not have
standing to challenge Wisconsin's prohibition against a sex offender changing his name, where neither offender had
expressed the intent to change his name; (4) the sex offenders had standing to challenge monitoring of the act's
requirements of continual updating of information supplied to the sex offender registry; (5) the monitoring act's
requirements that sex offenders continually update information supplied to the sex offender registry were not
punitive and therefore did not trigger the constitutional prohibition of ex post factor laws; (6) the $100 annual
registration fee was not punitive; and (7) allowing the sex offenders to litigate pseudonymously was not warranted
where the sex offenders' convictions were matters of public record and both sex offenders were currently registered
in Wisconsin, making their names and other information freely available. The court noted that the annual fee was
intended to compensate the state for the expenses of maintaining the sex offender registry, and since the offenders
were responsible for the expense, there was nothing “punitive” about making them pay for it. (Wisconsin)

U.S. Appeals Court
STATE STATUTE

Wilson v. Montano, 715 F.3d 847 (10th Cir. 2013). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action against a county sheriff,
several deputies, and the warden of the county's detention center, alleging that he was unlawfully detained, and that
his right to a prompt probable cause determination was violated. The district court denied the defendants' motion to
dismiss. The defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded in part. The
detainee had been held for 11 days without a hearing and without charges being filed. The appeals court held that the
defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity from the claim that they violated the arrestee's right to a prompt
post-arrest probable cause determination, where the Fourth Amendment right to a prompt probable cause
determination was clearly established at the time. The court held that the arrestee sufficiently alleged that the
arresting sheriff's deputy was personally involved in the deprivation of his Fourth Amendment right to a prompt
probable cause hearing, as required to support his § 1983 claim against the deputy. The arrestee alleged that he was
arrested without a warrant, and that the deputy wrote out a criminal complaint but failed to file it in any court with
jurisdiction to hear a misdemeanor charge until after he was released from the county's detention facility, despite
having a clear duty under New Mexico law to ensure that the arrestee received a prompt probable cause
determination. The court held that the arrestee sufficiently alleged that the county sheriff established a policy or
custom that led to the arrestee's prolonged detention without a probable cause hearing, and that the sheriff acted with

44.29

the requisite mental state, as required to support his § 1983 claim against the sheriff, by alleging that: (1) the sheriff
allowed deputies to arrest people and wait before filing charges, thus resulting in the arrest and detention of citizens
with charges never being filed; (2) the sheriff was deliberately indifferent to ongoing constitutional violations
occurring under his supervision and due to his failure to adequately train his employees; (3) routine warrantless
arrest and incarceration of citizens without charges being filed amounted to a policy or custom; and (4) such policy
was the significant moving force behind the arrestee's illegal detention. (Valencia County Sheriff's Office, Valencia
County Detention Center, New Mexico)
2015
U.S. District Court
STATE STANDARDS

Brown v. Moore, 93 F.Supp.3d 1032 (W.D. Ark. 2015). An inmate, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis,
brought a § 1983 action against a sheriff and jail officials, alleging that his constitutional rights were violated. The
defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part.
The court held that summary judgment was precluded by an issue of fact as to whether the inmate’s being housed
with a prisoner who had a staph infection constituted deliberate indifference. The court found that the inmate’s
assertion that his diet was not approved on a yearly basis by a dietician in compliance with Arkansas Jail Standards
did not equate to a constitutional violation under the Eighth Amendment. (Boone County Detention Center,
Arkansas)

U.S. Appeals Court
STATE STATUTES

Doe v. Cook County, Illinois, 798 F.3d 558 (7th Cir. 2015). Detainees at a county juvenile detention center brought a
class action against the center and the county, alleging that some employees at the center violated their constitutional
rights by abusing their charges. The facility administrator, who was appointed to run the detention center as part of a
settlement between the parties, proposed to terminate the employment of 225 direct-care employees and require them
to apply to fill the new positions. The union for the employees intervened to oppose the administrator’s plan, arguing
that the proposal violated Illinois employment law by overriding the collective bargaining and arbitration statutes.
The district court authorized the administrator to implement the plan. The union appealed. The appeals court
reversed and remanded. The appeals court held that the district court’s approval of the administrator’s plan was not a
simple enforcement of the order appointing the administrator, and thus the district court was required pursuant to the
Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) to make findings that the relief requested by the administrator was narrowly
drawn, extended no further than necessary to correct the violation of a federal right, and was the least intrusive
means. (Cook County Juvenile Temporary Detention Center, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
PROFESSIONAL
STANDARDS

Hernandez v. County of Monterey, 110 F.Supp.3d 929 (N.D. Cal. 2015). The plaintiffs, current and recently released
jail inmates seeking relief on behalf of a class, brought an action against the county, the sheriff’s office, and the
private company that administered jail health care facilities and services, alleging that substandard conditions
constituted deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and failure to
accommodate in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The plaintiffs moved for a preliminary
injunction. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the
merits in their action, alleging that county jail conditions constituted deliberate indifference in violation of Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments and failure to accommodate in violation of ADA. According to the court, there was
significant evidence that the jail’s policies and practices with regard to tuberculosis (TB) screening, suicide and selfharm prevention, alcohol and drug withdrawal, and continuing medical prescriptions, were noncompliant with
contemporary standards and guidelines, placing inmates at risk and constituting deliberate indifference to their
serious medical needs. The court noted that there was significant evidence that inmates with disabilities were
excluded from access to exercise, religious services, and other meetings that were conducted in inaccessible
locations, or from sign language interpreters, in violation of ADA. The court found that the plaintiffs were likely to
suffer irreparable harm, absent preliminary injunctive relief, where the jail continued to fail to provide proper
tuberculosis (TB) identification, isolation, diagnosis and treatment, to eliminate potential suicide hazards for
unstable mentally ill patients, to continue community medications, and to properly treat inmates withdrawing from
drugs and alcohol, and inmates with disabilities would continue to suffer access exclusion and lack of sign language
interpreters. (Monterey County Jail, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
STATE STATUTES

Hubbs v. Suffolk County Sheriff’s Dept., 788 F.3d 54 (2nd Cir. 2015). A county jail detainee brought a § 1983 action
against a county sheriff’s department, and sheriff’s deputies, alleging that he was severely beaten by the deputies
while in a holding cell at a courthouse. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants
based on the detainee’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The detainee appealed. The appeals court vacated
and remanded, finding that the affidavit of a county jail grievance coordinator, along with a handbook detailing a
grievance procedure, did not establish that the detainee had an available administrative remedy, and neither the
handbook nor the affidavit demonstrated that the county or sheriff’s department, or any official, handled grievances
arising from occurrences in the courthouse holding cells or whether remedies for such grievances were actually
available. According to the court, the deputies forfeited any arguments that statutory remedies were available to the
county jail detainee where the deputies failed to identify in the district court or on appeal any statutes or regulations
showing that administrative remedies were available for events that took place in the courthouse holding facility.
(Suffolk County Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
STATE STATUTES

Jamal v. Kane, 105 F.Supp.3d 448 (M.D. Pa 2015). Inmates who engaged in written and oral advocacy, prisoner
advocacy groups, and entities that relied on prisoners’ speech brought an action seeking a declaratory judgment that
the Pennsylvania Revictimization Relief Act, which authorized civil actions seeking injunctive and other relief when
an offender engaged in any conduct which perpetuated the continuing effect of the crime on the victim, violated the
First and Fifth Amendment. The plaintiffs also sought preliminary and permanent injunctive relief. The actions were
consolidated. After a bench trial the district court granted the requested relief. The court held that: (1) the Act was
content based; (2) the Act impermissibly infringed on free speech; (3) the Act was unconstitutionally vague; (4) the

44.30

Act was unconstitutionally overbroad; and (5) a permanent injunction enjoining enforcement of the Act was
warranted. The court noted that the Act did not define the term “offender,” and the public thus could not know
whose conduct the Act regulated. According to the court, the Act’s prohibition on “conduct that causes a temporary
or permanent state of mental anguish” offered no guidance to state courts in determining whether a victim was
entitled to relief, and did not specify whether reactions to such conduct would be measured by an objective or
subjective standard, or what level of anguish would constitute a violation. (Revictimization Relief Act,
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Attorney General)
U.S. District Court
ACCREDITATION
PROFESSIONAL
STANDARDS

Simmons v. Corizon Health, Inc., 122 F.Supp.3d 255 (M.D.N.C. 2015).The guardians and conservators of a county
jail inmate, who suffered a catastrophic hypoxic brain injury after going into cardiac arrest caused by excessive
internal bleeding from a perforated ulcer, brought an action against the jail medical provider, the county, the sheriff,
and the local government excess liability fund, asserting claims for deliberate indifference, negligence, and loss of
consortium. The provider moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and the remaining defendants moved to
dismiss for failure to state a claim and for lack of personal jurisdiction. The district court granted the motions in part
and denied in part. The court held that the medical provider’s alleged violation of its contract with the county, which
required it to comply with standards set by the National Commission on Correctional Health Care, with respect to its
treatment of the county jail inmate could not serve as a basis for the inmate’s negligence claim under North Carolina
law. According to the court, the fact that the county allegedly contracted out to the private medical provider did not
preclude its obligation to provide inmates with medical care and the county could be held liable under § 1983 for the
provider’s allegedly constitutionally inadequate medical care of the inmate. The court noted that the provider was
allegedly delegated some final policymaking authority and the county allegedly failed to review the provider’s
policies, such that some of the provider’s policies became those of the county. (Corizon Health, Inc., and Guilford
County Jail, North Carolina)

U.S. District Court
STANDARDS

Stojcevski v. County of Macomb, 143 F.Supp.3d 675 (E.D. Mich. 2015). A former county jail inmate, individually
and as the administrator of the estate of his brother, who died after being incarcerated at the same jail, brought an
action against a county, county officials and employees, the jail's private medical provider, and the provider's
employees, alleging deliberate indifference to medical needs and municipal liability under § 1983 and gross
negligence under state law. The defendants moved to dismiss. The court held that the employees' delegation of
medical care of the inmate to an outside contractor did not entitle them to qualified immunity on Eighth Amendment
deliberate indifference claims arising from the inmate's death. According to the court, regardless of the county's
reliance on the contractor, if the employees were aware of a risk to the inmate's health, drew the inference that a
substantial risk of harm to the inmate existed, and consciously disregarded that risk, they too would be liable for the
inmate's injuries under § 1983. The court found that allegations by the administrator of the estate were sufficient to
state a Monell claim against the county and the jail's private medical provider for municipal liability under § 1983.
The court noted that although many of the policies and procedures set forth by the administrator in support of his
claim, such as failure to adhere to national standards, did not state a constitutional violation, the examples of where
such standards were not followed were factual allegations supporting his assertion that inmates at the jail were not
afforded adequate medical treatment. (Macomb County Jail, Michigan)

44.31

44.32

XIX

XIX

XIX

XIX

XIX

XIX

U.S. District Court
CELL CHECKS
FAILURE TO SUPERVISE

Perez v. Oakland County, 380 F.Supp.2d 830 (E.D.Mich. 2005). The father and personal

representative of the estate of an inmate brought a suit under § 1983, alleging that the
defendants violated the inmate’s Eighth Amendment rights by failing to provide appropriate
mental health treatment or monitoring when the inmate was being held in the county jail,
leading to the inmate’s suicide. The district court held that the county did not act with deliberate
indifference in allowing the inmate caseworker, who allegedly lacked sufficient medical
background or expertise, to make decisions affecting the health care needs of the inmate. The
court noted that the challenged practice was widespread, with the “vast majority” of county jails
allowing employees who were not psychiatrists, but who had been trained in suicide detection and
prevention, to make determinations whether inmates were suicidal or potentially suicidal. The
court found that the father failed the establish that deputies actually perceived that the inmate
faced a substantial risk of serious harm if they conducted their rounds 16 minutes further apart
than mandated under jail policy. The court held that the father failed to establish that a deputy
actually perceived a risk of placing the inmate in a single cell. The inmate had been placed in a
single cell and no special watch status had been ordered by the inmate caseworker, who was
responsible for cell assignments. The court held that the caseworker was entitled to qualified
immunity because it was not established at the time of the inmate’s suicide that the caseworker’s
actions of making determinations concerning the inmate’s cell assignments, without first
consulting the inmate’s physician or psychiatrist, would violate the inmate’s Eighth Amendment
rights. According to the court, the jail psychiatrist did not disregard a known and serious medical
need, where evidence demonstrated that even though the psychiatrist knew that the inmate was
not taking his medication, he determined through his own direct evaluation that the inmate was
suicidal. The court found that allegations that the sheriff failed to ensure that the county’s
deputies enforced and followed the law could not sustain a § 1983 claim absent evidence that the
sheriff himself engaged in active unconstitutional behavior by directly participating, encouraging,
authorizing, or acquiescing in the allegedly offending conduct of the sheriff’s deputy. (Oakland
County Jail, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
INADEQUATE SUPERVISION

Rivera-Quinones v. Rivera-Gonzalez, 397 F.Supp.2d 334 (D.Puerto Rico 2005). Relatives of an
inmate who died while incarcerated in a Puerto Rico state prison brought a § 1983 claim alleging
failure to provide the inmate with adequate protection from attacks by other inmates. The district
court denied the defendant prison officials’ motion to dismiss. The court held that the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) exhaustion requirement did not apply to the § 1983 action brought
by relatives of the inmate, since the inmate was no longer confined for the purposes of PLRA. The
court held that the relatives stated a § 1983 claim based on deliberate indifference to the inmate’s
security and medical needs. The inmate was forcibly intoxicated with morphine by fellow
prisoners that eventually caused his death by overdose. According to the court, prison officials’
failure to classify prisoners to avoid harm, and inadequate supervision, allowed practices that
resulted in danger to the lives and body integrity of prisoners. The officials allegedly had
sufficient information from which an inference of substantial risk of serious harm to prisoners
could be drawn, and there was a shortage of medical staff and equipment. (Puerto Rico)

U.S. Appeals Court
CELL CHECKS
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCE

Velez v. Johnson, 395 F.3d 732 (7th Cir. 2005). A county jail detainee brought a § 1983 action

against a county correctional officer, alleging that the officer failed to protect him from an assault
by another inmate by failing to adequately respond and investigate the situation when the
detainee pushed the emergency call button in his cell. The detainee had unsuccessfully attempted
to alert the officer who checked the cell during his rounds, but his cellmate was holding a razor to
his neck at the time. After the officer left the area, the detainee pushed the emergency call button
in his cell, hoping for help. The detainee had to choose his words carefully and said he was “not
getting along” with his cellmate. The officer did not investigate the situation nor ask the other
officers to do so. The detainee was raped by his cellmate, bitten on his back several times, and cut
on his neck. The district court denied the officer’s motion for summary judgment on the basis of
qualified immunity and the officer appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the
detainee need not show that the officer had a specific awareness that an assault would occur, but
that it was sufficient to show that the officer failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial
risk of harm. The court held that the detainee had a clearly established Fourteenth Amendment
right to be free from the officer’s deliberate indifference to an assault by another inmate.
(Milwaukee County Jail, Wisconsin)
2006

U.S. Appeals Court
CELL CHECKS

Drake ex rel. Cotton v. Koss, 445 F.3d 1038 (8th Cir. 2006). The legal guardian for an
incapacitated person who attempted to commit suicide while he was a pretrial detainee in a
county jail, and a state department of human services sued a county and various officials in their
individual and official capacities under § 1983, alleging violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments, and asserted a state law claim for negligence. The district court granted the
defendants' motion for summary judgment and the guardian appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. On rehearing, the appeals court held that county jailers' actions did not constitute
deliberate indifference, and the jailers' decision not to assign a special need classification to the
45.27

XX

pretrial detainee was a discretionary decision protected by official immunity. According to the
court, the jailers' actions of conducting well-being checks of the pretrial detainee only every 30
minutes, failing to remove bedding and clothing, and failing to fill the detainee's anti-anxiety
prescription in a timely manner did not constitute deliberate indifference. The court found that
the jailers' view of the risk was shaped by the diagnosis and recommendations of a psychiatrist,
who indicated that the detainee was not suicidal but simply manipulative. The court noted that
the jailers' decision not to assign a special need classification to the pretrial detainee, that would
have required more frequent observation, was a discretionary decision rather than a ministerial
duty, protected by official immunity. The detainee was discovered hanging by a bed sheet from a
ceiling vent in his cell. He was not breathing and the jailers immediately set to work resuscitating
him and then transported him to a nearby hospital. He survived, but suffered serious brain
injuries as a result of the suicide attempt. (McLeod County Jail, Minnesota)
U.S. District Court
INADEQUATE
SUPERVISION

Herrin v. Treon, 459 F.Supp.2d 525 (N.D.Tex. 2006). The mother of a prisoner who committed

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO
SUPERVISE

Serna v. Colorado Dept. of Corrections, 455 F.3d 1146 (10th Cir. 2006). A prisoner brought
excessive force and inadequate medical care claims against various officers and officials. A state
prison director moved for summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity. The district
court denied summary judgment and director appealed. The court of appeals reversed and
remanded. The court held that: (1) the director’s authorizing the use of a special team was not
personal involvement that could form the basis for supervisory liability; (2) the director’s receipt
of periodic reports about the team’s progress was not direct participation that could give rise to
liability; (3) the director’s conduct did not constitute failure to supervise; and (4) the director was
not deliberately indifferent to the rights of inmates. The director had, at a warden’s request,
authorized a special team to conduct cell invasions to find a loaded gun. (Colorado Territorial
Corrections Facility)

U.S. Appeals Court
CELL CHECKS
ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCE

Short v. Smoot, 436 F.3d 422 (4th Cir. 2006). The wife and administrator of the estate of a
detainee who committed suicide in jail brought a § 1983 action against a county and sheriff's
deputies alleging deliberate indifference to a substantial risk that the detainee would commit
suicide. The district court denied summary judgment for the defendants and they appealed. The
appeals court held that jailers who placed the detainee in a cell under video surveillance were
entitled to qualified immunity, but the jailer who observed the detainee in the cell by video
surveillance was not entitled to qualified immunity. According to the court, the jailers who placed
the detainee in a cell under video surveillance were entitled to qualified immunity even though
they did not remove the detainee's clothing and shoelaces, because the detainee did not have the
right to have his jailers take precautions against his suicide beyond placing him in a cell under
video surveillance. The court found that the jailer who observed the detainee in his cell by video
surveillance was not entitled to qualified immunity because the jailer observed the detainee
remove his shoelaces, tie them to a bar, place a noose around his neck, and test the weight of his
rope. The jail policy and procedures manual in effect at the time addressed the proper treatment
of potentially suicidal inmates and required custodial officers to remove all potential tools such as
sheets, blankets, and shoelaces, to conduct inmate checks at random intervals at least twice per
hour, and to make reports of any unusual occurrences. The jail used surveillance cameras to
monitor inmate activity. The court reviewed the videotape taken from the surveillance camera
that recorded the detainee’s activity and it showed the detainee removing the laces from his
shoes, tying them together and climbing from his bed to the bars of his cell. (Warren Co. Jail, Va.)

U.S. District Court
STAFFING LEVELS

Smith v. Brevard County, 461 F.Supp.2d 1243 (M.D.Fla. 2006). The personal representative of

suicide while imprisoned brought suit against multiple corrections officers pursuant to § 1983,
alleging multiple Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment violations. On defendants’ motion for
summary judgment the district court held that: (1) fact issues precluded summary judgment for
corrections officers in the Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim alleging that officers
failed to properly react when finding the inmate hanging or attempting to hang himself; (2) there
was no evidence that indicated that any corrections officer was responsible for the initial decision
to send the inmate to administrative segregation, where the inmate subsequently committed
suicide; (3) there was no evidence that corrections officers actually intentionally murdered the
inmate; (4) there was no evidence that the prison warden and executive director were in any way
responsible for promulgating or enforcing a do-not-enter policy with respect to the inmate; (5)
claims could not be brought under the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause; and (6) there
was no evidence that corrections officers were personally involved in any policy-making or
training, or that the officers had any special knowledge concerning the inmate and his suicidal
propensities. The mother alleged that, in spite of the inmate’s threats of suicide, he was placed in
an improperly equipped administrative segregation cell in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
(Allred Unit, Texas Department of Criminal Justice)

the estate of pretrial detainee who hung himself in his cell, brought a § 1983 action on behalf of
the survivors of the estate, against a county sheriff, officers, and a non-profit corporation which
was under contract to provide mental health services to the prisoners at detention center. The
sheriff, officers and corporation moved to dismiss and the district court granted the motion in

45.28
XX

part, and denied in part. The court held that allegations by the estate that, prior to the detainee’s hanging himself
in his cell, his family members and friends called and went to the detention center in person to inform the nonprofit corporation that the detainee was suicidal, were sufficient to satisfy the deliberate indifference test in the
suit. After receiving knowledge of the detainee’s suicidal tendency, the corporation failed to provide adequate
mental health care to the detainee. According to the court, knowledge that the detainee was actually threatening
to commit suicide was certainly enough to show knowledge of a substantial risk of suicide, rather than just a
mere possibility. The court held that the estate stated a cause of action under § 1983 against the county sheriff, in
his official capacity, for violating the detainee’s Fourteenth Amendment rights. According to the court, violation
of the detainee’s constitutional rights was the result of the sheriff’s failure to provide adequate staffing and safe
housing for suicidal inmates, and in light of the sheriff’s knowledge that inmate suicide was a problem, his
failure to address any policies that were causing suicides constituted deliberate indifference to the constitutional
rights of inmates. (Brevard County Detention Center, Florida)
U.S. District Court
PRISONER CHECKS

Taylor v. Wausau Underwriters Ins. Co., 423 F.Supp.2d 882 (E.D.Wis. 2006). The estate of a

U.S. Appeals Court
INADEQUATE SUPERVISION
STAFFING LEVELS

Triestman v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471 (2nd Cir. 2006). A pro se federal prisoner,

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO
SUPERVISE
INADEQUATE
SUPERVISION
STAFFING LEVELS

Wilson v. Maricopa County, 463 F.Supp.2d 987 (D.Ariz. 2006). In a civil rights suit arising from a

pretrial detainee who had committed suicide in jail brought § 1983 claims against a county
corrections officer, alleging deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, a claim against the
county alleging that the county maintained an unconstitutional informal policy of allowing
inmates on suicide watch to turn out their lights, and a state law wrongful death claim against
the officer and county. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the officer and
county. The court held that the county was not liable for a due process violation under § 1983 for
deliberate indifference to the detainee’s serious medical needs absent evidence that the officer's
delay in turning on the detainee's light after the detainee had turned it off, during which time the
detainee hanged himself, was a standard practice or an aberration. According to the court, even if
the jail's unofficial policy of allowing inmates on suicide watch access to light switches was the
cause of the detainee's suicide, in that it compromised corrections officers' ability to supervise the
detainee, the county was not deliberately indifferent to the detainee's serious medical needs in
violation of his due process rights. The court found that the jail's classification of the detainee as
a suicide risk did not indicate he was actually a suicide risk, the fact that the detainee was a
former corrections officer charged with heinous crimes did not indicate a substantial suicide risk,
and, even if suicide risk was indicated by facts that the detainee stole a razor, that there were
scratches on his wrists, and that he removed elastic from his underwear, the county placed him
on suicide watch and thus was not indifferent. The court noted that the absence of mental illness
in an inmate who commits suicide is not fatal to a claim for deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs. The detainee was a former correctional officer charged with attempted murder,
kidnapping, and sexual assault of a minor. He was admitted to jail where he was placed on a
suicide watch in a cell with constant camera surveillance. (Fond du Lac County Jail, Wisconsin)
who was injured when he was attacked by his roommate in a locked cell, brought an action
against the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) and the United States under the Federal Tort Claims
Act (FTCA). The district court partially dismissed the complaint and the prisoner appealed. The
appeals court vacated and remanded. The court held that the suit was not barred by the
discretionary function exception to the FTCA, as the complaint's allegations could be read to refer
to negligence of the officer on duty by failing to patrol or respond diligently. The court noted that
the BOP had in place a program statement which provided that “[s]ignaling devices will be
available for inmate use in all locked housing units that do not have continuous staff coverage,”
and that “[i]nmates will not be left unattended in locked areas unless a signaling device is
available to them for emergencies.” According to the court, the language of this program
statement makes it clear that prison officials must provide “continuous staff coverage” to, and
may not leave “unattended,” any inmate in a locked housing unit who does not have access to an
emergency “signaling device.” The prisoner, a first-time, non-violent inmate, had originally been
“designated a low security inmate and initially housed [in a] low security facility.” But due to
overcrowding, he was transferred to a “medium/high security prison” and was assigned to share a
cell with an inmate who, the prisoner argued, “was known to the [BOP] to be a violent criminal
and sexual predator.” He was assaulted by his cellmate, dislocating his shoulder and having his
hand burned with lit cigarettes. Despite his shouts for help, no officer responded, and during that
time the prisoner was at the mercy of his cellmate, and in excruciating pain and fear. (Federal
Correctional Institution at Ray Brook, New York)

fatal assault on a county jail inmate by other inmates, the county defendants filed motions for
summary judgment on all claims. The plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration of the court’s
order that had dismissed the county sheriff’s office. The summary judgment motions were
granted in part and denied in part; the motion for reconsideration was denied. The court held that summary
judgment on Eighth Amendment liability for the fatal assault on the inmate was precluded by genuine issues of
material fact as to: (1) whether the county, through its final policy maker the sheriff, implemented policies,
customs, and practices with the requisite subjective intent of deliberate indifference; (2) whether the county,
through the sheriff, failed to act in the face of obvious omissions and likely constitutional violations; and (3)

45.29
45.29
XXII

whether that failure to act caused a constitutional violation. The court held that the estate sufficiently alleged a §
1983 claim against the sheriff in his individual capacity by alleging that the sheriff was directly liable under §
1983 for being deliberately indifferent in failing to supervise and train jail officers in appropriate, lawful, and
constitutional policies and procedures for providing a safe environment for inmates. The court also found that
the estate sufficiently alleged a claim that the sheriff was deliberately indifferent in fostering, encouraging, and
knowingly accepting formal and informal jail policies condoning brutality among the inmates and indifference to
proper supervision. According to the court, a jail supervisor could be found to have been deliberately indifferent
to the safety of the inmate if he knew that not having an officer on the ground in the jail yard posed a risk of
violence among the inmates and nonetheless allowed an officer to cover both the yard and another post, which
required the officer to leave the yard unattended for a significant period of time. (Maricopa County Facility,
known as “Tent City”, Phoenix, Arizona)
U.S. District Court
STAFFING LEVELS
FAILURE TO SUPERVISE

Wilson v. Maricopa County, 484 F.Supp.2d 1015 (D.Ariz. 2006). Survivors of an inmate who had died after
being assaulted by other inmates while they were held in a jail known as “Tent City,” brought a § 1983 action
against a sheriff, alleging Eight Amendment violations. Following denial of the survivors' motion for summary
judgment and denial of the sheriff's motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, and following
appeal by the sheriff, the sheriff moved to stay the litigation and the survivors moved to certify the appeal as
frivolous. The district court granted the survivors’ motion, finding that the sheriff’s appeal was frivolous. The
court held that, for purposes of qualified immunity, the law was clearly established in July 2003 that the sheriff's
alleged conduct of housing inmates in tents without adequate staffing, while being deliberately indifferent to the
danger of inmate-on-inmate assaults, would violate the Eighth Amendment. The survivors presented evidence
that the sheriff had for many years been aware that the conditions at Tent City were likely to create a substantial
risk of serious harm to inmates. The conditions include a lack of security inherent in the use of tents, inadequate
staffing, officers abandoning their posts and making off-yard shift changes, intentionally harsh inmate living
conditions, and a lack of officer training. The survivors’ asserted that these problems were known to the sheriff
through a variety of sources, including consultant reports, concerns expressed by a county risk manager, and a
prior state court case in which the county and sheriff were held liable under § 1983 for an inmate assault at Tent
City. The state court case affirmed a jury verdict against the sheriff and held that the lack of supervision and
security measures at Tent City supported the jury's finding of deliberate indifference. (Maricopa County jail
known as “Tent City,” Arizona)
2007

U.S. District Court
CELL CHECKS
INADEQUATE SUPERVISION

Branton v. City of Moss Point, 503 F.Supp.2d 809 (S.D.Miss. 2007). The son of a pre-trial detainee who had
committed suicide while in custody, filed suit against the city and jail officers asserting claims pursuant to the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments for failure to train, failure to adopt a policy for safe custodial care of
suicidal detainees, and failure to adopt a policy of furnishing medical care to suicidal detainees. The detainee
was detained on suspicion of drunk driving and was resistant during the booking process. During the booking
process the detainee answered a series of questions. When he was asked, “Have you ever attempted suicide or
are you thinking about it now?” he responded, “No.” He was taken to a cell that was designated for intoxicated
or combative prisoners, given a sheet and a blanket, and was locked in the cell at 3:30 a.m. While conducting a
jail check at approximately 5:30 a.m., an officer discovered the detainee kneeling in a corner of the cell with the
sheet around his neck. He was unable to be revived. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district
court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether jail officers had actual knowledge of a substantial risk of suicide by
the detainee, and that fact issues precluded summary judgment in the claim against the city and officers in their
official capacities. On appeal (261 Fed.Appx. 659), the appeals court reversed and remanded. (City of Moss
Point, Mississippi)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
STAFFING LEVELS

Chambers v. NH Prison, 562 F.Supp.2d 197 (D.N.H. 2007). A state prisoner brought a civil rights suit alleging
that prison officials had denied him necessary dental care in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. The
district court granted the prisoner’s motion for a preliminary injunction. The court found that the prisoner
demonstrated the likelihood of success on merits where his allegations were sufficient to state a claim for
supervisory liability against some defendants. The prisoner alleged that officials were deliberately indifferent to
his serious medical needs in refusing to provide care for a cavity for approximately one year due to a staffing
shortage. According to the court, the prisoner’s allegations that prison supervisors and a prison dentist knew of
the prisoner's pain as the result of an unfilled cavity, but nevertheless failed to take steps to ensure that care was
provided to him within a reasonable time period, provided the minimal facts necessary to state a claim for
supervisory liability under § 1983 for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs under the Eighth
Amendment. (New Hampshire State Prison)

U.S. Appeals Court
CELL CHECKS

Forgan v. Howard County, Tex., 494 F.3d 518 (5th Cir. 2007). The family of a county jail inmate who
committed suicide brought an action against the county, county sheriff's department, and various jail officers,
alleging deliberate indifference under § 1983 and claims under the Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA). The inmate
was arrested for driving while intoxicated and possession of marijuana. During the booking process, the inmate
indicated that he was medicated for a number of mental ailments, including depression, but that he was not
thinking about killing himself at the time. Based on this and other information, a jail officer classified the inmate
as a “risk” for suicide, meaning that he would be checked every fifteen minutes. The inmate was issued a pair of
trousers and a shirt to wear, and he was placed in a holding cell. After approximately one hour, the inmate was
found hanging from his jail-issued trousers. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants
and the family appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that providing a county jail inmate
with non-defective trousers, which the inmate later used to commit suicide, did not equate to “use of property”

45.30
45.30
XXII

by the county, within the meaning of the TTCA, and that the county was not liable under § 1983. According to
the court, the county was not liable in the § 1983 deliberate indifference claim absent a showing that the county
lacked an adequate suicide prevention policy for jail inmates, or that the county failed to adequately train its jail
officials in suicide prevention. The court noted that proof of a single incident generally will not support a finding
of inadequate training as a matter of custom or policy, for the purpose of establishing § 1983 municipal liability.
(Howard County Jail, Texas)
U.S. District Court
STAFF ASSIGNMENT
STAFFING LEVELS

Jurado Sanchez v. Pereira, 525 F.Supp.2d 248 (D.Puerto Rico 2007). A prisoner's next of kin brought a civil
rights action under § 1983 against prison officials, seeking to recover damages for the prisoner's death while he
was incarcerated, and alleging constitutional rights violations, as well as state law claims of negligence. The
officials moved for summary judgment on the cause of action under § 1983. The district court denied the motion,
finding that summary judgment was precluded by the existence of genuine issues of material fact on the failure
to protect claim and as to whether the officials had qualified immunity. According to the court, genuine issues of
material fact existed as to whether there were enough guards at the prison when the prisoner was killed by
another inmate, and whether officials were mandated to perform weekly or monthly searches of cells, which
could have prevented the accumulation of weapons used in the incident in which the prisoner was killed.
Bayamon 308, an intake center, was considered minimum security with some limitations. The inmate capacity at
Bayamon 308 is 144. Although the capacity was not exceeded, some cells, despite being originally built for one
inmate, housed two inmates. According to the court, Bayamon 308 does not comply with the 55 square footage
minimum requirements for each cell in a continuing federal consent order. Therefore, the individual cell gates
are left continuously open, like an open dormitory. At the time of the incident officials did not take gang
affiliation into consideration when segregating prisoners. The prisoner did not identify himself as a gang
member, nor inform officials that he feared for his life. The facility was under court order to follow a staffing
plan that stated the minimum amount of staff, the optimum amount, the fixed positions and the movable
positions, pursuant to a lawsuit. Fixed positions, such as control units, cannot be changed under any
circumstances, but the movable positions may be modified depending on necessity due to the type of inmate at
the facility. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants did not comply with the staffing plan, while the defendants
insisted that they did comply. (Bayamon 308 Facility, Puerto Rico)

U.S. District Court
ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCE

Justus v. County of Buchanan, 517 F.Supp.2d 810 (W.D.Va. 2007). The administrator of a pretrial detainee's
estate filed a § 1983 action against a sheriff and county jail employees arising out of the detainee's jail suicide.
The detainee had a history of schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, anxiety, paranoia, and delusions and had been
hospitalized for these conditions several times in the three years prior to his suicide. His treatment records show
that he was hospitalized because family members reported suicidal ideation and bizarre, violent, and sexually
inappropriate behavior. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion.
The court held that the sheriff's deputies' failure to provide the pretrial detainee with prompt medical care after
they discovered him hanging in his cell did not amount to deliberate indifference to the detainee's serious bodily
injuries, in violation of the detainee's due process rights. The court noted that, even though the detainee was still
alive when they took him down approximately 13 minutes after discovering him, there was no showing of an
affirmative causal link between their inaction and the detainee's death from hypoxic brain injury.
The court found that the sheriff was not deliberately indifferent to the pretrial detainee's suicidal nature, and
thus was not subject to liability under § 1983 for failing to take steps to prevent his suicide, even though a
notation on an incident report two months before the detainee's suicide indicated that another prisoner reported
that the detainee “was threatening suicide”. The court found no proof that the report did not simply inadvertently
escape the sheriff's knowledge. The court held that a reasonable sheriff would not have understood from existing
law that the absence of an operating video surveillance system in the county jail would violate a suicidal pretrial
detainee's constitutional rights, and thus the sheriff was entitled to qualified immunity from liability under §
1983, even though the jail policy and procedure manual required immediate repair of any defective security
equipment, and the sheriff was aware that the equipment had not been operating for some time. According to the
court, under Virginia law, the deputies' failure to provide the pretrial detainee with prompt medical care after
they discovered him hanging in his cell did not amount to gross negligence as required to overcome their
immunity from tort liability. (Buchanan County, Virginia)

U.S. Appeals Court
CROSS GENDER
SUPERVISION

Piercy v. Maketa, 480 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir. 2007). A female former employee with a county sheriff's office
brought suit against the sheriff's office, sheriff, and board of county commissioners alleging sex discrimination
and retaliation in violation of Title VII. The employee alleged that her supervisors began an investigation of her
violation of personnel policies after she notified her superiors at the county sheriff's office that she planned to
pursue formal discrimination charges. She was fired after the investigation was completed. The court found that
her allegations were sufficient to establish the causation element of a prima facie claim of retaliation for filing a
complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) under Title VII. Civil Rights Act of
1964. The district court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment, and the former employee
appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The appeals court held that the
employee's failure to obey orders, departure from the truth, and violation of uniform requirements by wearing a
tongue ring constituted a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for her discharge. According to the court, the
reason offered by the sheriff was not a pretext for retaliation in violation of Title VII. The court noted that the
decision to recommend dismissal of the employee was made only after completion of the internal affairs
investigation and nothing suggested the under-sheriff acted in bad faith in ordering the termination of employee
or that the sheriff acted in bad faith in sustaining the dismissal. The appeals court held that the sheriff's office
policy of not allowing female deputies to take jobs at a maximum-security facility housing only male inmates
was facially discriminatory under Title VII. According to the court, differences in duties between a mixed gender
jail and a maximum security facility which housed only male inmates were sufficiently substantial that any
transfer of the employee from the former to the latter would not have been purely lateral, so that denying a

45.31
45.31
XXII

transfer to the female employee would be an adverse employment action supportive of a sex discrimination
claim under Title VII. The court held that the sheriff's office shift-bidding policies, that required certain
numbers of female and male officers to be available at jail, were a mere inconvenience and did not constitute an
adverse employment action, as required for former employee's sex discrimination claim under Title VII. In her
motion for summary judgment, the employee asserted that the policy preventing women from taking jobs at the
Metro facility discriminated on its face and thus only a “bona fide occupational qualification” [BFOQ] under 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) could justify such facial discrimination. Officials suggested two reasons for the policy that
restricted the employee from bidding for a shift at Metro: (1) at the time, there were not enough female officers
available to staff the female ward at CJC; and (2) privacy and safety considerations required sufficient female
staff at CJC. The appeals court found that while these reasons may be adequate to support EPSO's policy as a
bona fide occupational qualification that permits discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e), the district court
did not address this question. The appeals court remanded the case to the district court with instructions to make
a decision on this question. (El Paso County Sheriff's Office, Colorado)
U.S. District Court
CELL CHECKS
FAILURE TO SUPERVISE

Rigano v. County of Sullivan, 486 F.Supp.2d 244 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). An inmate brought § 1983 and negligence
claims against a county, county sheriff, jail administrator, corrections officers and fellow inmates, alleging that
he was harassed and beaten by the inmate defendants while serving his sentence at the county jail, in violation of
the Eighth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The court held that the
county jail's procedure for determining where and in what manner new inmates were to be housed did not
amount to deliberate indifference to the inmate's safety, as would violate the Eighth Amendment, despite the fact
that the inmate was allegedly harassed and physically assaulted by other inmates in the cell block where he was
placed. The court noted that, pursuant to the jail's placement procedure, corrections officers asked each inmate a
series of questions to assist in placing them, including questions about any enemies the inmate had in the current
prison population, the inmate failed to indicate when asked any reason why he should not be placed in the
general prison population, and the officers had no reason to know that the inmate would be harassed and
assaulted by other inmates. The court found that physical checks of the jail inmate by corrections officers were
adequate and did not amount to “deliberate indifference” to the inmate's safety, as would violate Eighth
Amendment, despite the fact that the inmate was allegedly harassed and physically assaulted by other inmates in
the cell block where he was placed. The officers made visual inspections from outside the cell tier every fifteen
minutes and conducted head counts. The inmate never informed the officers of the harassment, and once the
officers knew the inmate was being assaulted, they immediately removed him from the tier and provided him
with medical attention. The court noted that the Eighth Amendment does not guarantee an assault-free prison
environment; it promises only reasonable good faith protection. (Sullivan County Jail, New York)

U.S. District Court
CELL CHECKS
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
STAFFING LEVELS

Thomas v. Sheahan, 499 F.Supp.2d 1062 (N.D.Ill. 2007). A special administrator filed a § 1983 suit against a
county, sheriff, county board, correctional officers, supervisors, and a correctional medical technician, on behalf
of a pretrial detainee who died at a county jail from meningitis and pneumonia. The administrator alleged
violations of the detainee’s constitutional rights and state law claims for wrongful death, survival action, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress. The defendants moved for summary judgment and to strike
documents. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court did not strike all of the
plaintiff's summary judgment submissions, for allegedly failing to disclose witnesses or individuals with relevant
information who submitted affidavits, given that the plaintiff had disclosed witnesses prior to discovery deadline.
Summary judgment was also precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the county was
deliberately indifferent to: (1) its widespread practice of understaffing correctional officers at the county jail; (2)
its widespread practice of failing to repair broken video monitoring systems for inmate surveillance at the jail;
and, (3) its widespread policy or practice of falsifying daily logs to cover up missed security checks on inmates.
(Cook County Jail, Illinois).

U.S. Appeals Court
FEMALE STAFF

Tipler v. Douglas County, Neb., 482 F.3d 1023 (8th Cir. 2007). A female correctional officer brought a gender
discrimination action against a county jail employer, alleging violation of § 1983 and Title VII. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the employer and the correctional officer appealed. The appeals court
affirmed, finding that reassignment of female officer to a different shift, pursuant to county jail's gender-based
staffing policy, did not violate Title VII. The court also held that the reassignment did not violate the equal
protection clause. The appeals court noted that where the employer is a prison [jail], a bona fide occupational
qualification analysis (BFOQ) under Title VII is unnecessary if the policy requiring female-only supervision of
female inmates is reasonable, and if such a policy imposes only a minimal restriction on the employee.
According to the court, when the state [county] makes a classification based on gender, under the equal
protection clause the state must show at least that the challenged classification serves important governmental
objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives. The court held that the jail's reassignment of the female correctional officer to a different shift did not
violate the equal protection clause because the reassignment was substantially related to important governmental
objectives, including compliance with state law, and proper jail administration. (Douglas County Correctional
Center, Nebraska)
2008

U.S. Appeals Court
INADEQUATE
SUPERVISION

Brumfield v. Hollins, 551 F.3d 322 (5th Cir. 2008). The daughter of a detainee who hung himself while confined
in a “drunk tank” of a county jail brought a § 1983 action against the county, and a sheriff and deputies in their
individual and official capacities. The district court awarded summary judgment to each defendant sued in his
individual capacity on the basis of qualified immunity, but denied summary judgment to individual defendants in
their official capacities and to the county. After a trial, the district court directed a verdict in favor of all officers
and the county. The daughter appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the sheriff was protected

45.32
45.32
XXII

by qualified immunity and that the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding expert testimony
indicating that the detainee was alive when paramedics arrived at the jail. The court found that the county was
not liable under § 1983. According to the court, the sheriff was entitled to qualified immunity from the claim that
he failed to adopt any written policy pertaining to inmate supervision or medical care, where verbal policies
existed concerning inmate supervision and medical care. The court found that the sheriff's efforts in training and
supervising deputies were not deliberately indifferent, as required for the sheriff to be liable under § 1983 for the
suicide of a drunk driving detainee. The court noted that the deputies did receive training, and that there was no
evidence of a pattern of similar violations or evidence that it should have been apparent that a constitutional
violation was the highly predictable consequence of an alleged failure to train. The court found that while the
deputies' conclusion that the detainee who had hung himself was already dead, and their resulting failure to make
any attempt to save his life, were arguably negligent, this conduct alone did not amount to deliberate
indifference, nor was any county custom or policy the moving force behind the deputies' conduct, as required for
the county to be liable under § 1983 for denial of reasonable medical care. (Marion County Jail, Mississippi)
U.S. Appeals Court
INADEQUATE
SUPERVISION

Douglas v. Yates, 535 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2008). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against prison officials
alleging his Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated. The district court dismissed the
complaint and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The
appeals court held that the district court had the authority under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) to
dismiss without prejudice the prisoner's § 1983 complaint against prison officials requesting damages for
emotional injury, where the complaint disclosed that the prisoner was requesting damages for emotional injury
without a prior showing of a physical injury. The court found that the prisoner's allegations that his family had
informed a prison supervisor of ongoing misconduct by the supervisor's subordinates, and that the supervisor
failed to stop the misconduct, supported the prisoner's § 1983 claim of retaliation against the supervisor.
According to the court, the allegations allowed a reasonable inference that the supervisor knew that the
subordinates would continue to engage in the unconstitutional misconduct but failed to stop them from doing so.
(Bay Correctional Facility, Florida)
2009

XXIII

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
INADEQUATE
SUPERVISION
STAFFING LEVELS

Boyd v. Nichols, 616 F.Supp.2d 1331 (M.D.Ga. 2009). A female, who had been housed in a jail for violation of
her probation, brought an action against a former jailer, county, and former sheriff, under § 1983 and state law,
relating to the sexual assault of the inmate by the jailer. The county and sheriff moved for summary judgment
and the district court granted the motions. The court held that the sheriff was not “deliberately indifferent” to a
substantial risk of serious harm to the inmate under the Eighth Amendment or the Georgia constitution in failing
to protect the inmate from sexual assaults by a jailer, absent evidence that the sheriff had knowledge or
indication that the jailer was a threat or danger to inmates, or that male guards, if left alone with female inmates,
posed a risk to the inmates' health and safety. The court noted that the sheriff's actions in calling for an
investigation and terminating the jailer's employment upon learning of the jailer's actions was not an “indifferent
and objectively unreasonable response” to the inmate's claims, and thus, there was no violation of the inmate's
rights. The court held that the jail's staffing did not pose a “substantial risk of serious harm” to the inmate who
was sexually assaulted by a jailer, as required to show violation of the Eighth Amendment and Georgia
constitution, absent evidence that the jail was inadequately staffed. According to the court, the county did not
have a policy or custom of underfunding and understaffing the jail, as would constitute deliberate indifference to
a substantial risk of serious harm to the inmate, and thus the county could not be liable under § 1983 to the
inmate who was sexually assaulted by a jailer. The court found that the sheriff's failure to train deputies and
jailers in proper procedures for escorting and handling female inmates did not support supervisory liability on
the § 1983 claim of the inmate, where the sheriff had no knowledge of any prior sexual assaults at the jail or any
problems with jailers improperly escorting and handling female inmates, and the jailer who committed the
assault had been trained previously on how to interact with inmates and knew it was improper to have intimate
contact with inmates. During the time period in question, the county did not have a policy prohibiting a male
jailer from escorting a female inmate within the Jail. The court held that the county and sheriff had sovereign
immunity from the state law claims of the inmate, absent evidence that such immunity had been waived by an
act of the General Assembly. (Berrien County Jail, Georgia)

U.S. District Court
INADEQUATE
SUPERVISION

Estate of Gaither ex rel. Gaither v. District of Columbia, 655 F.Supp.2d 69 (D.D.C. 2009). The personal
representative of the estate of a prisoner, who was killed while incarcerated, brought a § 1983 action against the
District of Columbia and several individual officials and jail employees, alleging negligence, deliberate and
reckless indifference to allegedly dangerous conditions at a jail, and wrongful death. The district court granted
summary judgment in part and denied in part. The court found that summary judgment was precluded by
genuine issues of material fact as to: (1) whether the District of Columbia's inmate and detainee classification
policies, procedures, and practices were inadequate; (2) whether the District of Columbia's jail staffing policies,
procedures, and practices were inadequate; (3) whether the security policies, procedures, and practices were
inadequate; (4) whether the District of Columbia adequately trained Department of Corrections officials; and (5)
whether officials provided adequate supervision of inmates. (District of Columbia Central Detention Facility)

U.S. District Court
STAFFING LEVELS

Flynn v. Doyle, 672 F.Supp.2d 858 (E.D.Wis. 2009). Female inmates filed a class action alleging that medical,
dental, and mental health care provided to prisoners at a state facility violated the Eighth Amendment, Equal
Protection Clause, Title II of Americans with Disabilities Act, and Rehabilitation Act. The officials moved for
partial summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that
summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether there were systemic and
gross deficiencies in staffing, facilities, and procedures at the state correctional facility that resulted in provision
of inadequate medical care for female inmates. The court also found that summary judgment was precluded on

45.33

the inmates' claim that the state violated Title II of ADA by failing to provide access to programs to inmates with
mobility, visual, and hearing disabilities. The court found a genuine issue of material fact as to the effectiveness
of accommodations offered to disabled inmates at a state correctional facility. (Taycheedah Correctional
Institution, Wisconsin)

XXIII

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
INADEQUATE
SUPERVISION
STAFFING LEVELS

Hardy v. District of Columbia, 601 F.Supp.2d 182 (D.D.C. 2009). Pretrial detainees, allegedly assaulted by
fellow inmates, brought a suit against the former Director of the District of Columbia Department of Corrections
and a former jail warden in both their official and individual capacities, and against the District of Columbia.
The detainees sought damages under § 1983 for alleged Fifth and Eighth Amendment violations. The district
court dismissed the case in part. The court held that the detainees' § 1983 official capacity claims against the
former Director and former jail warden were redundant to the claims against the District of Columbia,
warranting dismissal. The court noted that claims brought against government employees in their official
capacity are treated as claims against the employing government and serve no independent purpose when the
government is also sued. The detainees alleged that before the scalding attacks that injured them, one of the very
assailants had committed a similar scalding attack using water heated in an unguarded microwave, and that the
locations where their assaults occurred were inadequately staffed with corrections officers and resulted in the
assaults taking place without any officers in the vicinity. The court held that these allegations were sufficient to
plead conditions of detention that posed a substantial risk of serious harm, as required to state a failure-to-protect
claim against the Director of the District of Columbia Department of Corrections and the jail warden. The
detainees alleged that on the day of one of their scalding assaults by a fellow inmate, officials were present at a
council hearing at which testimony described significant and multiple instances of violence in unguarded
locations occurring in the jail, that the previous scalding assaults had occurred by the same inmate in question,
and that despite such knowledge, the officials refused to take measures to protect inmates. The court found that
the detainees' allegation that the Director and jail warden were deliberately indifferent to negligent supervision
of correctional officers and lack of staff training, was sufficient to state a § 1983 failure to train claim violative
of their due process rights. The detainees alleged that the warden and Director were at the top of the “chain of
command” at the jail, that they had been aware of violence issues for many years, and that they had been
instructed to take action against violence on numerous occasions. The district court denied qualified immunity
for the Director and jail warden, noting that the detainees' due process rights against deliberate indifference were
clearly established at the time of violent scalding attacks by fellow inmates. (District of Columbia Jail)

U.S. Appeals Court
INADEQUATE
SUPERVISION
STAFFING LEVELS

Mosher v. Nelson, 589 F.3d 488 (1st Cir. 2009). The administrator of the estate of a pretrial detainee who was
killed at a state mental health hospital by another patient brought an action against the superintendent of the
hospital, the commissioner of the state department of corrections (DOC), and other state officials, alleging civil
rights violations and state-law claims. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants.
The administrator appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the superintendent of the state
mental health hospital and the commissioner of the state department of corrections were entitled to qualified
immunity from § 1983 liability on the deliberate indifference claim. According to the court, although the patient
was able to strangle the detainee while the detainee was visiting the patient in his room, the hospital had a longstanding policy that allowed patients to visit in each others' rooms during the short period during the end of the
morning patient count and lunch. The court noted that there was no history of violence or individualized threats
made by any patient, and reasonable officials could have believed that allowing the visiting policy to continue
and maintaining the current staffing levels at the hospital would not cause a substantial risk of harm.
(Bridgewater State Hospital, Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
INADEQUATE
SUPERVISION

Rodriguez-Borton v. Pereira-Castillo, 593 F.Supp.2d 399 (D.Puerto Rico 2009). Relatives of a deceased pretrial
detainee brought a § 1983 action against prison officials, requesting damages for constitutional violations
culminating in the detainee's death. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants in part and
denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by fact issues as to the lack of adequate
inmate supervision and malfunctioning cell locks and cell lights. The court also found an issue of material fact as
to whether the Administrator of the Puerto Rico Administration of Corrections (AOC) failed to act with regard to
security risks, including malfunctioning door locks, in the annex within which the pretrial detainee was found
hanged. The court also found a genuine issue of material fact as to the prison annex superintendent's failure to
remedy supervision problems in housing units where he knew inmates were able to and did move freely in and
out of their cells due to malfunctioning door locks. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a
genuine issue of material fact as to a correctional officer's failure to patrol the living area of the annex within
which the pretrial detainee was found hanged while he knew inmates were able to freely move around. The court
denied qualified immunity to the defendants because it was clearly established at the time of the alleged inaction,
and a reasonable prison official working in the system would have known that a lack of supervision, combined
with the knowledge that cell locks did not function, would create an obvious and undeniable security risk.
(Administration of Corrections of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and Annex 246)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
INADEQUATE
SUPERVISION

Zimmerman v. Schaeffer, 654 F.Supp.2d 226 (M.D.Pa. 2009). Current and former inmates at a county jail
brought a § 1983 action against the county, corrections officers, and prison officials, alleging that they were
abused by officials during their incarceration in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The defendants moved for
summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary
judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to: (1) whether corrections officers and prison
officials knew or should have known that an officer would apply excessive force to the inmate by shocking him
when he was restrained and whether they could have prevented the officer's excessive use of force; (2) whether
the inmates exhausted administrative remedies by filing grievances regarding use of a restraint chair, lack of
mattresses, inability to shower, cell conditions, and issues with mail; (3) whether the use of mechanical restraints

45.34

against the inmates constituted wanton infliction of pain in violation of the Eighth Amendment; (4) whether an
inmate complied with officials when extracted from a cell, rendering the use of oleoresin capsicum spray
excessive and unjustified; (5) whether cell conditions posed a substantial risk of harm to inmates and whether
corrections officers and prison officials were deliberately indifferent to that risk; and (6) whether the warden of
the county jail was aware of and condoned the use of excessive force against inmates at jail. (Mifflin County
Correctional Facility, Lewistown, Pennsylvania)
2010

XXIII

U.S. District Court
CROSS GENDER
SUPERVISION

Ambat v. City and County of San Francisco, 693 F.Supp.2d 1130 (N.D.Cal. 2010). Sheriff's deputies brought an
action against a city and county, alleging various claims including retaliation, and that a gender based staffing
policy violated Title VII and California's Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). Cross-motions for
summary judgment were filed. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants in part, and
denied in part. The court held that the sheriff's department policy that only female deputies would be assigned to
female-only housing units was implemented to protect the interests that amount to the essence of the Sheriff's
business, including safety and privacy, as required to establish a bona fide occupational qualification as a
defense to the deputies' claims of employment discrimination under Title VII and California's Fair Employment
and Housing Act (FEHA). The court noted that the policy was implemented to prevent sexual misconduct and
inappropriate relationships between male deputies and female inmates, to alleviate male deputies' fears of false
accusations of misconduct resulting in a reluctance to supervise female inmates closely, which created
opportunities for smuggling and use of contraband, and to prevent female inmates from being required to dress
and undress in front of male deputies.
The court found that the sheriff was entitled to deference in his policy judgment to implement the department
policy that only female deputies would be assigned to female-only housing units and in determining whether the
policy was reasonably necessary to achieve issues of safety and privacy and to ensure normal operation of the
jails, as required to establish a bona fide occupational qualification as a defense to the deputies' claims of
employment discrimination under Title VII and California's Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). The
court noted that, despite not conducting formal studies or seeking consultation, the policy was based upon the
sheriff's experience and observations over thirty years as sheriff and conversations with senior officials and jail
commanders over several months. The court noted that suggested non-discriminatory alternatives to the sheriff's
department policy, including cameras and additional training, were not feasible alternatives that furthered the
objectives of safety, security and privacy. Installation of cameras in the units was cost-prohibitive and did not
address privacy concerns or the fact that misconduct took place outside of the units, additional training would
not eliminate sexual abuse since deputies already knew it was forbidden, and there was no effective testing or
screening method to identify deputies who might engage in sexual misconduct.
The court found that the fact that the deputy made statements to the National Academy of Arbitrators,
alleging that the sheriff was influenced by financial contributions and nepotism and that the sheriff's general
counsel had engaged in sex tourism was a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason to terminate the deputy under Title
VII and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act. (San Francisco Sheriff's Department, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
FAILURE TO SUPERVISE

Brown v. North Carolina Dept. of Corrections, 612 F.3d 720 (4th Cir. 2010). An inmate brought a § 1983 suit
against correctional officers and the North Carolina Department of Corrections, claiming that they violated his
Eighth Amendment rights by being deliberately indifferent to the serious harm he suffered at the hands of a
fellow inmate. The district court dismissed the action and the inmate appealed. The appeals court vacated and
remanded. The court held that the prisoner, who suffered significant physical injuries as the result of another
inmate's attack, sufficiently alleged a § 1983 claim of deliberate indifference to his Eighth Amendment rights
against an officer who allegedly observed the altercation and failed to respond, and another officer who allegedly
was aware of the other inmate's grudge but still sent the prisoner into a housing block to pick up supplies. The
court found that the inmate stated a § 1983 claim against a corrections officer of deliberate indifference by
alleging that an officer was in “the Block” when the assault occurred, and a reasonable person could infer from
that statement that the officer was aware of the attack, and that his failure to intervene represented deliberate
indifference to a serious risk of harm. (Alexander Correctional Institute, North Carolina)

U.S. Appeals Court
CELL CHECKS

Clouthier v. County of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232 (9th Cir. 2010). The estate of a pretrial detainee brought a §
1983 action against a county, mental health specialist, and two sheriff's deputies alleging they violated the
detainee’s due process rights by failing to prevent his suicide while he was confined. The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the estate appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part,
reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that the estate had to show that the detainee was confined under
conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm and that correction officers were deliberately indifferent to
that risk. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
the mental health specialist at the jail, who was on notice of the pretrial detainee's suicidal condition, was
deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of harm to the detainee when she removed the detainee from an
observation log and told deputies that the detainee could be given regular clothes and bedding. According to the
court, it was clearly established at the time of detention that a reasonable mental health professional would not
have removed key suicide prevention measures put in place by a prior mental health staff member, and therefore
the specialist was not entitled to qualified immunity.
The court found that the estate failed to establish that a sheriff's deputy at the jail knew that moving the
detainee to the general population in the jail posed a substantial risk of serious harm to the detainee, where the
deputy only knew that the detainee had missed meals and free time, and that the detainee had been taken off an
observation log. The court noted that the deputy spoke to the detainee all weekend and noted he had a positive
outlook on wanting to get out of the room, and earlier that day the mental health specialist found that the
detainee was not actively suicidal at the time.

45.35

The court held that the estate failed to establish that another sheriff’s deputy knew that the detainee was
suicidal and deliberately ignored that risk, where the deputy knew only that the detainee was suicidal and needed
to be on 15-minute checks and the mental health specialist told the deputy to give the detainee his regular clothes
and bedding. The court noted that nothing indicated that the deputy saw the detainee's knotted sheet.
According to the court, the county did not have a longstanding custom or practice of moving pretrial
detainees from an observation cell into the general population without consultation with mental health staff, or a
longstanding practice of miscommunication between mental health staff and custodial staff. The court found no
pattern of repeated wrongful conduct by county staff, and nothing that indicated another suicide resulted from
the improper transfer of a detainee. The court found that the affidavit of the estate's expert, who opined that
custodial staff and mental health staff did not work together as a team, was speculative and conclusory, and thus
was insufficient to avoid summary judgment. The court noted that the factual basis for the expert's declaration
was limited to a sequence of events and statements of participants surrounding the detainee's transfer to the
general population in the jail, and the report did not address the key question of whether the alleged disconnect
was so obvious as to have been deliberate indifference. (Contra Costa Co. Martinez Det. Facility, California)

XXIII

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
FAILURE TO SUPERVISE

Cummings v. Harrison, 695 F.Supp.2d 1263 (N.D.Fla. 2010). A Black Muslim state prisoner brought a civil
rights action against a prison warden and correctional officers, alleging, among other things, that the defendants
used excessive force against him in violation of the Eighth Amendment and retaliated against him, in violation of
First Amendment, for submitting grievances. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court
denied the motion. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to
whether correctional officers' repeated verbal threats, including death threats, combined with physical assaults,
against the Black Muslim prisoner caused the prisoner extreme psychological harm, and as to whether the
officers maliciously and sadistically used force against the prisoner because he was black or because he practiced
the Muslim faith. The court also found that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact
as to whether the prison warden had the ability to remove the Black Muslim prisoner from the supervision of the
correctional officer who was allegedly verbally and physically abusing him, but refused to do so, and denied the
prisoner's request for protective custody. (Taylor Correctional Institution, Florida)

U.S. District Court
STAFFING LEVELS

Forde v. Baird, 720 F.Supp.2d 170 (D.Conn. 2010). A federal inmate petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus,
alleging that she was being denied freedom of religious expression, in violation of the First Amendment and the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, in
part, and denied in part. The court held that the Muslim inmate's right to free exercise of religion was
substantially burdened, as required to support her claim under RFRA, by a prison policy allowing for nonemergency pat searches of female inmates by male guards, despite prison officials' claim that the inmate's belief
was not accurate. The court found that the choice offered the inmate, of violating her understanding of the
precepts of Islam, or refusing a search and risking punishment, constituted a substantial burden.
The court found that the prison's interest in maintaining safety and security of the female prison through the
use of cross-gender pat searches was not compelling, as required to justify a substantial burden on the inmate's
right of free exercise of religion under RFRA, where the prison's arguments regarding how and why the crossgender pat searches promoted safety and security at the prison were actually related to the staffing of the facility,
not to its safety and security. According to the court, the prison's interest in avoiding staffing and employment
issues at the female prison through the use of cross-gender pat searches was not compelling, as required to
justify a substantial burden on the inmate's right of free exercise of religion under RFRA. The court noted that
even if the prison's interests in maintaining safety and security and avoiding staffing and employment issues
were compelling, cross-gender pat searches were not the least restrictive means of addressing these interests, as
required to justify the substantial burden on an inmate's right of free exercise of religion under RFRA, absent
evidence that the prison considered and rejected less restrictive practices to cross-gender pat searches. (Federal
Correctional Institution in Danbury, Connecticut)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO SUPERVISE

Hawkins v. Brooks, 694 F.Supp.2d 434 (W.D.Pa. 2010.) A state prisoner brought a pro se § 1983 action against
various prison officials and corrections officers, alleging retaliation, harassment, due process violations,
defamation of character, and mental anguish. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the
motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the prisoner's conduct of pressing charges against a
corrections officer who the prisoner claimed raped and impregnated her and complaining about other officers'
alleged harassment amounted to a “constitutionally protected activity,” as required for the prisoner to state a §
1983 retaliation claim. The court found that corrections officers' alleged conduct of withholding the prisoner's
incoming and outgoing mail in retaliation for the prisoner's pressing rape charges against an officer at another
prison amounted to an “adverse action,” as required to establish a prima facie pro se § 1983 retaliation claim
against the officers. But the court found that a prison official's alleged conduct of reassigning the prisoner to a
different unit in the same prison did not rise to the level of an “adverse action,” as required to establish a prima
facie pro se § 1983 retaliation claim.
The court found that the prisoner had no liberty interest in her place of confinement, transfer, or
classification, and thus, prison officials' alleged refusal to have the prisoner transferred to an out-of-state
institution did not violate her due process rights.
The court found that the prisoner's assertions that she made supervisory prison officials aware of the
harassment and retaliation she allegedly suffered at the hands of correctional officers as a result of her pressing
rape charges against a correctional officer at another facility, and that none of the supervisory officials offered
assistance or took any corrective action, were sufficient to state a claim for supervisory liability, in her § 1983
retaliation action. (State Correctional Institution at Cambridge Springs, Pennsylvania)

45.36

XXIII

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
FAILURE TO SUPERVISE

Mitchell v. Rappahannock Regional Jail Authority, 703 F.Supp.2d 549 (E.D.Va. 2010). A female inmate brought
an action against a regional jail authority and correctional officers who held the ranks of colonel, lieutenant,
captain, sergeant, and corporal, alleging under § 1983 that the defendants violated the Eighth Amendment, and
asserting state-law claims for assault and battery, gross negligence, and negligent retention. The district court
denied the defendants' motion to dismiss. The court held that the inmate's allegations in her complaint: (1) of
over ten instances of sexual assaults by a correctional officer, under circumstances where his superiors were in a
position to have knowledge of what was happening at various times; (2) that each named superior witnessed or
participated in several of those actions; (3) that all superiors had direct knowledge of the officer's personal
remarks to the inmate; (4) and that the officer's obsession with the inmate was a matter of commentary among all
correctional staff, were sufficient to state a § 1983 Eighth Amendment claim for supervisory liability against the
superiors. The inmate also alleged that each superior witnessed several incidents where the officer followed the
inmate into a storage room and assaulted her. The inmate also alleged that a corporal, who was in charge of
inmate workers, witnessed the correctional officer, in violation of jail regulations, approach her several times
while working in the kitchen, and that the corporal told the inmate not to be rude to the officer or she would be
fired from her job after the inmate asked the corporal to prevent the officer from moving behind the counter.
(Rappahannock Jail Authority, Rappahannock Regional Jail, Virginia)

U.S. Appeals Court
VIDEO SURVEILLANCE

Pourmoghani-Esfahani v. Gee, 625 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2010). A female pretrial detainee brought a § 1983
action against a deputy sheriff, alleging excessive force and deliberate indifference to her serious medical needs.
The district court denied the deputy's motion for summary judgment and the deputy appealed. The appeals court
affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that the deputy sheriff was not qualifiedly
immune from the pretrial detainee's § 1983 excessive force claim, since the deputy's alleged actions, including
slamming the detainee's head to the floor seven to eight times while she was restrained, if proven, were
obviously beyond what the Constitution would allow under the circumstances. The court held the deputy sheriff's
alleged actions or inactions following her altercation with the pretrial detainee, if proven, did not constitute
deliberate indifference to the detainee's serious medical needs, where: the detainee alleged that the deputy
dispatched her to her cell directly after the altercation; the nurse saw her within approximately two minutes of
her arrival in the cell; the nurse informed the deputy that the detainee had a possible nose injury but that her nose
was not broken; the nurse and an officer then attended to the detainee within approximately five minutes of the
detainee's cellmate's first signals for help; and, the detainee then received continuous medical care until she was
taken to hospital. The court noted that no preexisting law clearly established that an approximately two-to-fiveminute delay of medical care, either while the detainee moved from a waiting room to her cell following an
altercation or while her cellmate waited for the guard to respond to her signaling, was a constitutional violation.
The appeals court accepted the depiction of events from recordings from closed-circuit video cameras placed
throughout jail, rather than crediting the detainee's account of the altercation, where the video obviously
contradicted the detainee's version of the facts. But the court noted that video failed to convey spoken words or
tone and sometimes failed to provide unobstructed views of the events, and the court credited the detainee's
version where no obviously contradictory video evidence was available. (Hillsborough County Jail, Florida)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
STAFF ASSIGNMENT

Qasem v. Toro, 737 F.Supp.2d 147 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). A female inmate brought a § 1983 suit against corrections
officials regarding injuries suffered by the inmate at the hands of a corrections officer alleged to have sexually
assaulted the inmate. The superintendent and deputy superintendent for security moved to dismiss claims that
they were deliberately indifferent to the inmate's personal safety. The district court denied the motion. The court
held that the inmate's allegations against the superintendent and deputy superintendent for security, claiming that
they were deliberately indifferent to her rights and were responsible for creating or maintaining policies or
practices that failed to prevent her from being repeatedly raped and assaulted by a corrections officer, stated a
claim for Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment violations. The court noted that the complaint alleged that the
officials were responsible for determining where inmates were to be housed and the assignment of guards, and in
conjunction with another official, investigation and response to complaints of staff misconduct. The court found
that the superintendent and deputy superintendent for security were not entitled to qualified immunity, given the
extent of the alleged sexual abuse, the numerous warning signs alleged, and the number of questionable, if not
unintelligible, decisions made with respect to the inmate during the course of an investigation. (Taconic
Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCE

Sexton v. Kenton County Detention Center, 702 F.Supp.2d 784 (E.D.Ky. 2010). Two female detainees brought a
§ 1983 action against a county detention center and officials, alleging deliberate indifference with respect to
hiring and supervision of a deputy who sexually assaulted them while they awaited arraignment. The defendants
moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the detainees failed to
establish deliberate indifference with respect to the center's hiring of the deputy. The court noted that none of the
deputy's prior misdemeanor offenses, including his driving infractions and domestic assault, demonstrated a
propensity to commit rape. The court found that the detainees failed to demonstrate a causal link between the
center's alleged policy of not terminating employees with excessive absenteeism and the deputy's conduct. The
court noted that "...Absent evidence of prior complaints of sexual assault, the mere fact that a male guard
supervises a female inmate does not lead to the conclusion that the inmate is at a great risk of being sexually
assaulted by the guard." According to the court, the detainees failed to establish that the county detention center
was deliberately indifferent to their constitutional rights by not effectively monitoring surveillance equipment,
and thus they could not recover in their § 1983 action against the center, where there was no evidence that the
center had a policy or custom of ineffective surveillance. The detainees argued that only one person monitored
the 89 cameras that were used throughout the Detention Center and that they were mainly monitored only for
ingress and egress of secured doors. They asserted that the county should have had cameras in the video
arraignment room for the inmates' protection. The court noted that state jail regulations do not require constant
monitoring of video surveillance cameras or dictate where the cameras are to be placed inside a detention
facility. (Kenton County Detention Center, Kentucky)

45.37

XXIII

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
PRISONER CHECKS

Silvera v. Connecticut Dept. of Corrections, 726 F.Supp.2d 183 (D.Conn. 2010). The representative of a pretrial
detainee's estate filed a § 1983 action alleging that state prison officials' decision to house the detainee with a
convicted inmate and their failure to provide adequate mental health care caused the detainee's suicide death.
The officials moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held
that allegations that prison medical staff ignored abundant evidence demonstrating that the pretrial detainee was
an acute suicide risk were sufficient to state a claim of deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, in
violation of the Due Process Clause. The court noted that evidence included a judge's instructions to keep him on
suicide watch, the detainee's prior medical records, contemporaneous complaints and behavior, and examinations
by medical staff, all of whom concluded that the detainee suffered from severe mental health issues.
Nonetheless, officials placed him in a cell by himself, rather than in specialized housing, with access to materials
with which he could hang himself, failed to check on him regularly, and ignored signs that his mental condition
had deteriorated. The court found that a state prison supervisor was not liable under § 1983 for the pretrial
detainee's suicide death, even if the supervisor had some training with regards to caring for mentally ill
detainees, and his subordinates failed to properly oversee the detainee's activities. The court noted that the
detainee was placed in the general prison population based on a mental health professional's recommendation,
the supervisor was not aware that the detainee posed an excessive risk of suicide, and subordinates were given
proper orders to keep the detainee under constant surveillance and interact with him at frequent, irregular
intervals. The court described the change in the detainee’s conditions of confinement prior to his suicide.
“Inmates housed in the Charlie Unit—apparently unlike those in the specialized housing unit where Mr. Lyle
was held from May 11 until May 15—have the ability to turn the cell's lights on and off at will. Additionally, the
Charlie Unit has bunk-style beds, which are outfitted with standard-issue sheets and pillow case—both of which
would play a role in Mr. Lyle's suicide. Once transferred to the Charlie Unit, Mr. Lyle was given standard DOC
clothing, whereas previously he had been given only a ‘suicide gown.’ ”
According to the court, the pretrial detainee's right to due process was not violated merely because he was
forced to share a cell with a convicted prisoner, absent an allegation that the detainee suffered an injury from
being housed with a convicted inmate, or that placement with the convicted inmate was intended to punish the
detainee. (Garner Correctional Institute, Connecticut)

U.S. District Court
ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCE

Silverstein v. Federal Bureau Of Prisons, 704 F.Supp.2d 1077 (D.Colo. 2010). A federal inmate brought a civil
rights action against the Bureau of Prisons and correctional officers, challenging conditions of his confinement.
The district court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss in part. The court held that the allegation that the
inmate was indefinitely placed in solitary confinement, isolated from other inmates and correctional facility staff,
and subjected to continuous lighting and camera surveillance, was sufficient to allege a liberty interest in
conditions of his confinement. The court found that the allegation that the inmate was subjected to solitary
confinement for more than two decades was sufficient to state claim under the Eighth Amendment against the
Bureau. But, according to the court, the inmate did not have a liberty interest in avoiding transfer to
administrative segregation facility. (U.S. Penitentiary, Administrative Maximum facility, Florence, Colorado)

U.S. Appeals Court
CELL CHECKS
INADEQUATE
SUPERVISION

Smith v. County of Lenawee, 600 F.3d 686 (6th Cir. 2010). A female detainee's estate brought an action against a
county, sheriff, on-call physician, police officers, and parole agent, under § 1983 and state law, arising out of the
detainee's death while in the county's custody. The district court denied the parole agent's motion for summary
judgment on a gross negligence claim. The agent filed interlocutory appeal. The appeals court reversed. The
court held that the parole agent's failure to intercede on behalf of the detainee in county custody, upon arriving at
the jail to serve the detainee a notice of parole violation charges and determining that the detainee was unable to
be transported or served, was not the “proximate cause” of the detainee's death, so as to entitle the agent to
governmental immunity from gross negligence liability under Michigan law. The court noted that the detainee
was in the custody of county jail officials in the hours leading up to her death, the parole agent worked for the
state Department of Corrections, not the county, the detainee had been experiencing delirium tremens (DT)
symptoms for close to 48 hours prior to arrival at the jail, a physician had been notified of the detainee's
condition and told jail officials to monitor the detainee, the agent was present at the jail for a matter of minutes
only, and county jail officials failed to check the detainee until 40 minutes after the agent left the jail. (Lenawee
County Sheriff’s Department, and Michigan Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
CELL CHECKS
FAILURE TO SUPERVISE

Teague v. St. Charles County, 708 F.Supp.2d 935 (E.D.Mo. 2010). The mother of a detainee who committed
suicide in a cell in county detention center brought an action against the county and corrections officials,
asserting claims for wrongful death under § 1983 and under the Missouri Wrongful Death Statute. The county
and the commanding officer moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court granted in the
motion, in part. The court held that the mother failed to allege that the detention center's commanding officer
personally participated. The court found that the mother's allegations that her son was demonstrating that he was
under the influence of narcotics at the time of his detention, that her son had expressed suicidal tendencies, and
that jail employees heard or were told of choking sounds coming from her son's cell but took no action, were
sufficient to state a Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference claim under § 1983.
The court held that the mother's allegation that the county unconstitutionally failed to train and supervise its
employees with respect to custody of persons with symptoms of narcotics withdrawal and suicidal tendencies
was sufficient to state a failure to train claim against the county, under § 1983, arising out of the death of her son
who committed suicide while housed as a pretrial detainee. The detainee had used a bed sheet to hang himself
and the mother alleged that the county failed to check him every 20 minutes, as required by jail policy. (St.
Charles County Detention Center, Missouri)

45.38

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
PRISONER CHECKS

Wells v. Bureau County, 723 F.Supp.2d 1061 (C.D.Ill. 2010). The estate of a 17-year-old pretrial detainee who
committed suicide while in custody at a county jail brought an action against the county, county sheriff, and
corrections officers, alleging claims pursuant to § 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the
Rehabilitation Act. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part
and denied in part. The court held that the fact that the pretrial detainee, who committed suicide while in custody
at a county jail, did not need a mental health professional when he was booked at the jail after being arrested on
charges of illegal consumption of alcohol by a minor and possession of drug paraphernalia, was not dispositive
of whether the detainee presented a serious need when he was booked at the jail approximately two weeks later
after being arrested on charges of contributing to the delinquency of a minor.
The court held that information received by booking officers after pretrial detainee's suicide, including
information that the detainee had been kicked out of his father's house, that the detainee was living in a tent, that
the detainee and his girlfriend had a suicide pact, and that the detainee had commented to other inmates that if he
was going to prison he would “shoot himself,” was irrelevant to establishing what was in the officers' minds at
time they were alleged to have been deliberately indifferent to the risk that the detainee would commit suicide.
According to the court, the corrections officers lacked actual knowledge of a significant likelihood that the
detainee would imminently seek to take his own life, or even of facts that would promote the inference of a
subjective awareness of such a substantial risk, and thus the officers did not act with deliberate indifference to
that risk in violation of due process, despite any alleged negligence in assessing and observing the detainee prior
to his suicide. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the county sheriff's policy that correctional officers not personally observe prisoners during the
overnight shift was constitutionally inadequate. From 10 PM to 6:30 AM, detainees are locked in their cells.
During the overnight period from 11 PM on June 8, 2007, to 5 AM on June 9, 2007, Officer Keefer did eleven
cell checks on Cellblock 2. While standing in the guard walkway, officers are able to look into two of the four
cells and observe detainees in those cells, but officers are unable to see the detainees in the other two cells in the
cellblock. During her checks, Officer Keefer personally observed the detainees in two of the cells in Cellblock 2
because she could see them from the guard walkway, but did not observe Wells in his cell because she was
unable to see into his cell from the guard walkway. At 6:45 AM, when another officer let the detainees in
Cellblock 2 out of their cells for breakfast, he discovered Wells hanging in his cell. (Bureau County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
PRISONER CHECKS

Wereb v. Maui County, 727 F.Supp.2d 898 (D.Hawai‘i 2010). Parents of a pretrial detainee, a diabetic who died
in custody, brought an action against a county and county police department employees, alleging under § 1983
that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to the detainee's medical needs, and asserting a claim for
wrongful death under state law. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the
motion in part and denied in part. The detainee died in a 2-cell police lockup. The court held that county police
officers and public safety aids who did not interact with or observe the pretrial detainee not moving in his cell
were not subjectively aware of the serious medical need of the detainee, and thus those officers and aids were not
deliberately indifferent to that need, in violation of the detainee's due process rights. The court held that
summary judgment as to the § 1983 Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference claim was precluded by a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether county police officers who interacted with the pretrial detainee
and/or a county public safety aid who did not see the detainee move around in his cell while she monitored him
over video had subjective knowledge of the serious medical need of detainee, precluding summary judgment.
The court found that neither county police officers who interacted with the pretrial detainee, nor a county
public safety aid who did not see the detainee move around in his cell while she monitored him over video, were
entitled to qualified immunity from the § 1983 Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference claim brought by
the detainee's parents, where at the time of the detainee's death, it was clearly established that officers could not
intentionally deny or delay access to medical care. The court held that summary judgment was precluded on the
§ 1983 municipal liability claim by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the county adequately trained its
employees to monitor the medical needs of the pretrial detainees, and, if so, as to whether the county's
inadequate training of its employees was deliberately different, and as to whether inadequate training “actually
caused” the death of the pretrial detainee. (Lahaina Police Station, Maui County, Hawaii)
2011

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO SUPERVISE

Bridgewater v. Taylor, 832 F.Supp.2d 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). A New York state prisoner brought a § 1983 action
against prison officials and correctional officers, alleging excessive force, failure to protect, and failure to
supervise and properly train in violation of the Eighth Amendment. After the prisoner's motion for summary
judgment against an officer was preliminarily denied, the prisoner moved for reconsideration and the former
prison superintendent and another officer moved to dismiss. The district court denied the motion for
reconsideration and granted the motion to dismiss. The court held that the prisoner did not properly serve the
complaint on the officer or superintendent and that the prisoner failed to state a failure to protect claim against
the officer. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to
whether the correctional officer acted with malice or wantonness toward the prisoner necessary to constitute an
Eighth Amendment violation, or whether he was applying force in a good–faith effort to maintain discipline. The
court also found that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the
correctional officer's use of physical force against the prisoner was more than de minimus. (Sing Sing
Correctional Facility New York)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
STAFFING LEVELS

Estate of Gaither ex rel. Gaither v. District of Columbia, 833 F.Supp.2d 110 (D.D.C. 2011). The personal
representative of a detainee's estate brought a § 1983 action against the District of Columbia, department of
corrections officials, and corrections officers, seeking damages in connection with the detainee's fatal stabbing
while he was incarcerated pending sentencing for felony distribution of cocaine. The corrections officers moved
for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion, finding that the officers were entitled to qualified
immunity. According to the court, at the time of the detainee's death it was not clearly established that

45.39

corrections officers were acting with deliberate indifference by exposing inmates, including the detainee, to a
substantial threat of inmate-on-inmate attack by understaffing a unit, and thus corrections officers were entitled
to qualified immunity. (District of Columbia, Central Detention Facility)
U.S. District Court
PRISONER CHECKS
INADEQUATE
SUPERVISION

Hawkins v. County of Lincoln, 785 F.Supp.2d 781 (D.Neb. 2011.) The personal representative of a hospital
patient brought a § 1983 action against the hospital, a county, a city, and related defendants for claims arising
when the patient was brought to the hospital at the time of his arrest, was released by the hospital to a county jail,
and subsequently hanged himself at the jail. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court
granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine
issues of material fact as to whether prison officials were objectively aware that the prisoner posed a risk of harm
to himself that included a risk of suicide. According to the court, although the prisoner had serious medical needs
in connection with his risk of suicide, no prison correctional officers, jailers, and/or law enforcement officers
were deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's needs, even though it might have been negligent for individual
defendants to take the prisoner off a suicide watch without having him evaluated by a physician or other
professional. According to the court, the defendants' conduct was not more blameworthy than mere negligence.
The court also held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
county acted with deliberate indifference by failing to have a specific policy for determining when an inmate
could be removed from a suicide watch and placed in a situation that could increase the likelihood of a
successful suicide attempt. (Lincoln County Jail, Nebraska)

U.S. District Court
INADEQUATE
SUPERVISION

Pauls v. Green, 816 F.Supp.2d 961 (D.Idaho 2011). A female pretrial detainee brought an action against a
county, county officials, and a jail guard, alleging that she was coerced into having inappropriate sexual contact
with the guard. The defendants moved to dismiss and for summary judgment, and the plaintiff moved to compel
discovery and for sanctions. The district court granted the motions, in part. The court held that the detainee was
not required to file grievances after being transferred to a state prison before filing her § 1983 action, in order to
satisfy the administrative exhaustion requirement under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The court
noted that the county jail grievance procedures were not available to detainees after they transferred, and the
county did not offer any assistance to the detainee after learning of the alleged assaults. The court found that
neither the county nor the county sheriff was deliberately indifferent in failing to train or supervise county jail
guards to not sexually assault jail detainees, and thus, the female detainee could not demonstrate that the county
or sheriff was liable under § 1983. According to the court, the guards did not need specific training to know that
they should refrain from sexually assaulting detainees, and there was no showing that the general training
program for guards was deficient or that there was a pattern of prior abuses at county jail. The court held that the
summary judgment affidavit of the pretrial detainee's expert, containing the opinion that county officials
exhibited deliberate indifference to the rights and safety of jail detainees in training or supervising jail staff, and
that sexual improprieties on the part of staff were easily accomplished and rarely punished, was insufficient to
avoid summary judgment, where the affidavit was conclusory, and without factual predicate. The court found
that the detainee was entitled to the sanction of an adverse jury instruction against the county for the destruction
of recordings of interviews conducted by police during the investigation of the county jail guard's contact with
the detainee. (Adams County Jail, Idaho)

U.S. District Court
PRISONER CHECKS
INADEQUATE
SUPERVISION

Smith v. Atkins, 777 F.Supp.2d 955 (E.D.N.C. 2011). The mother of a schizophrenic inmate who committed
suicide at a jail and the mother of the inmate's children brought a § 1983 action in state court against a county
deputy sheriff, jail officials, a medical contractor, and a nurse employed by the contractor, alleging that the
defendants violated the inmate's Eighth Amendment rights in failing to provide adequate medical care. The
defendants removed the action to federal court and moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the
motions. The court held that the deputy sheriff who happened to be at the jail delivering a prisoner when the
inmate, who had been diagnosed with schizophrenia, committed suicide, did not know that the inmate was at a
substantial risk of committing suicide or intentionally disregarded such risk. The court found that the deputy was
not liable under § 1983 where the deputy did not know the inmate or anything about him, or have any
responsibilities associated with the inmate's custody. The court held that jail officials' mere failure to comply
with a state standard and a jail policy requiring a four-time per hour check on any prisoner who had ever been on
a suicide watch did not violate the Eighth Amendment rights of the inmate. The court found that the mother of
the inmate failed to show a direct causal link between a specific deficiency in training and an alleged Eighth
Amendment violation, as required to sustain the mother's § 1983 Eighth Amendment claim against jail officials
based on their alleged failure to train jail employees. (Bertie–Martin Regional Jail, North Carolina)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO SUPERVISE

Tookes v. U.S., 811 F.Supp.2d 322 (D.D.C. 2011). An arrestee brought an action under the Federal Tort Claims
Act (FTCA) against the United States, alleging assault and battery, false imprisonment, and negligent training
and supervision. The United States filed a motion for partial summary judgment. The district court granted the
motion in part, and denied in part. The court held that the training and supervision of Deputy United States
Marshals was a discretionary function, and therefore, the discretionary function exception to FTCA precluded
subject matter jurisdiction of the arrestee's negligent training and supervision claims, following an alleged attack
by marshals. The court noted that there were no statutes, regulations, or policies that specifically prescribed how
to train or oversee marshals, and decisions involved social, economic, and political policy in that decisions had
to balance budgetary constraints, public perception, economic conditions, individual backgrounds, office
diversity, experience, public safety, and employee privacy rights, as well as other considerations. According to
the court, there was no evidence that the arrestee should have known she could be diagnosed as suffering from
post-traumatic stress disorder following an alleged false imprisonment by United States marshals, and therefore,
the arrestee was not limited from seeking greater damages for her emotional injuries than the amount claimed in
her administrative form, in her FTCA claim. The court found that summary judgment was precluded by a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the United States marshals falsely imprisoned the arrestee by
bringing her back into a courthouse. (United States Marshals Services, District of Columbia)

45.40

2012
U.S. District Court
CROSS GENDER
SUPERVISION
FEMALE STAFF

Ard v. Rushing, 911 F.Supp.2d 425 (S.D.Miss. 2012). A female inmate brought an action against a sheriff and a
deputy asserting claims under § 1983 and § 1985 for violation of the Fourth, Fifth and Eighth Amendments, and
also alleging a state law claim for negligence, relating to an incident in which she was sexually assaulted by the
deputy while she was incarcerated. The sheriff moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the
motion. The court held that the sheriff was not deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of harm to the female
jail inmate as would have violated the Eighth Amendment, where the sheriff had established safeguards to
ensure the safety of female prisoners, including a female-only, camera-monitored area in which female inmates
were housed, a policy that male jailers could not enter the female-only area without a female jailer, and a policy
that a female jailer was to cover each shift. The court noted that past allegations that the deputy had engaged in
unwanted sexual contact with female inmates had been investigated and found not to be substantiated. The court
found that the inmate failed to show that the sheriff had knowledge of the deputy's disregard of the sheriff's
policy to ensure the safety of female prisoners, which included a requirement that male jailers could not enter the
female-only area without a female jailer, or to show that the sheriff was deliberately indifferent to the need for
more or different training, as required to establish an Eighth Amendment failure to train/supervise claim.
(Lincoln County Jail, Mississippi)

U.S. District Court
INADEQUATE
SUPERVISION

Edmond v. Clements, 896 F.Supp.2d 960 (D.Colo. 2012). A parolee brought a civil rights action alleging that his
constitutional rights were violated when he failed to receive a $100 cash payment upon his release from a state
prison to parole, and by state corrections officials' failure to perform a proper sex offender evaluation, which
resulted in the parolee being improperly ordered to participate in sex offense treatment that included a
requirement that he have no contact with his children. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court
granted the motion. The district court held that: (1) the private sex offender treatment program that contracted
with the state and its employees did not qualify as “state actors,” and thus, could not be liable in the parolee's §
1983 claim; (2) the claim against the executive director of the state department of corrections in his official
capacity for recovery of a cash payment was barred by the Eleventh Amendment; (3) the executive director was
not personally liable for the cash payable to the parolee upon release; (4) the officials were not liable under §
1983 for their alleged negligent supervision, failure to instruct or warn, or failure to implement proper training
procedures for parole officers; (5) the parolee's equal protection rights were not violated; and (6) the allegations
stated a due process claim against corrections officials. According to the court, allegations by the parolee that
Colorado department of corrections officials failed to perform a proper sex offender evaluation prior to releasing
him on parole, as required by Colorado law, which allegedly resulted in a parole condition that he have no
contact with his children, stated a due process claim against the corrections officials. (Bijou Treatment &
Training Institute, under contract to the Colorado Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
PRISONER CHECKS

Estate of Miller, ex rel. Bertram v. Tobiasz, 680 F.3d 984 (7th Cir. 2012). The minor siblings of an inmate who
committed suicide brought a § 1983 action against correctional facility staff members, alleging deliberate indifference to the inmate's serious medical condition involving a long history of suicide attempts, self-harm, and
mental illness. The district court granted qualified immunity to the management-level defendants and others, but
denied qualified immunity to an intake nurse, psychology associate, and prison guards. The defendants who were
denied qualified immunity appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the inmate's siblings adequately alleged that the intake nurse and a psychology associate were subjectively aware that the inmate
was a suicide risk, as required to state a claim alleging deliberate indifference to the inmate's serious medical
condition. The court found that the inmate's siblings adequately alleged that prison guards were subjectively
aware that the inmate was a suicide risk. According to the court, the siblings adequately alleged that the intake
nurse and psychology associate failed to take reasonable steps to prevent the harm from the inmate's suicidal
tendencies, and that prison guards failed to take reasonable steps to prevent the harm from the inmate's suicidal
tendencies. The court held that the intake nurse, psychology associate, and prison guards were not entitled to
qualified immunity. The court noted that the guards allegedly knew or should have known of the inmate's mental
illness and suicide attempts because he was adjudicated mentally ill, he had court-ordered medications he refused to take the night he died, and he had a well-documented history of suicidal behavior. The inmate was
housed in a unit where inmates in need of greater supervision were placed. The guards allegedly failed to call for
medical attention despite finding the inmate with no pulse and not breathing on the floor of his cell with a white
cloth wrapped around his neck, and waited to assemble an entry team and then applied restraints to the inmate
before removing the ligature from around his neck. (Columbia Correctional Institute, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO SUPERVISE

Facey v. Dickhaut, 892 F.Supp.2d 347 (D.Mass. 2012). A prisoner at a state correctional institution filed a pro se
§ 1983 action against the prison and officials alleging his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment was violated when officials knowingly placed him in danger by assigning him to a housing
unit where he was violently attacked by members of a rival gang. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district
court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the complaint stated a claim against the
deputy superintendent and an assistant for violation of the Eighth Amendment, by alleging that officials were
aware of the feud between two rival prison gangs, that the prisoner was a known member of one of the gangs,
that despite this knowledge officials had assigned the prisoner to a section of the prison where a rival gang was
housed, and as a result he was violently attacked and sustained permanent injuries. The court found that the
official who had instituted the gang housing policy could not be held personally liable, since he did not
implement the policy, nor was he deliberately indifferent in supervising or training those who did. According to
the court, state prison officials who had placed the prisoner known to be a gang member in danger by assigning
him to a housing unit where he was violently attacked by members of a rival gang, were not entitled to qualified
immunity in the prisoner's § 1983 suit. The court noted that clearly established law provided that the Eighth
Amendment was violated if officials disregarded a known, substantial risk to an inmate's health or safety, and the

45.41

officials had disregarded this risk, as well as violated a prison policy, by placing rival gang members in same
housing unit. (Souza Baranowski Correctional Center, Massachusetts)
U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
PRISONER CHECK
VIDEO
SURVEILLANCE

Ferencz v. Medlock, 905 F.Supp.2d 656 (W.D.Pa. 2012). A mother, as administrator for her son’s estate, brought
deliberate indifference claims under a wrongful death statute against prison employees, and the prison's medical
services provider, following the death of her son when he was a pretrial detainee in a county prison. The
employees and provider moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The
district court held that under Pennsylvania law, the mother lacked standing to bring wrongful death and survival
actions in her individual capacity against several prison employees for her son's death while he was in prison,
where the wrongful death and survival statutes only permitted recovery by a personal representative, such as a
mother in her action as administratrix of her son's estate, or as a person entitled to recover damages as a trustee
ad litem. The court found that the mother's claims that a prison's medical services provider had a policy, practice,
or custom that resulted in her son's death were sufficient to overcome the provider's motion to dismiss the
mother's § 1983 action for the death of her son while he was in prison.
Upon admission to the facility, the detainee had been evaluated and scored a 12 on a scale, which was to have
triggered classification as suicidal (a score of 8 or more). The Classification Committee subsequently did not
classify the detainee as suicidal as they were required to do under the jail classification policy, and no member of
the Committee communicated to medical contractor staff or correctional officers responsible for monitoring the
detainee that he was suicidal and going through drug withdrawal. At the time, the jail was equipped with an
operational and working video surveillance system and there was a video camera in the detainee’s cell. The
video surveillance of the cell was broadcast on four different television monitors throughout the jail, all of which
were working and manned by officers. Additionally, the work station thhhattt was located around the corner
from the cell, approximately 20 feet away, was equipped with one of the four television monitors. The monitor
was situated on the wall above the desk at the work station, such that it would be directly in front of the officer
manning the station if he was sitting facing his desk.
The detainee attempted suicide by trying to hang himself with his bed sheet from the top of the cell bars,
which took several minutes and was unsuccessful. After the attempt, however, the detainee left the bed sheet
hanging from the top of his cell bars and started to pace in his cell in visible mental distress. This suicide
attempt, as well as the hanging bedsheet were viewable from the nearby work station video surveillance monitor
as well as the other three monitors throughout the jail. A few minutes later the detainee attempted to commit
suicide a second time by hanging himself with his bed sheet from the top of his cell bars. This suicide attempt
took several minutes, was unsuccessful, and was viewable from the work station video surveillance monitor as
well as the other three monitors throughout the jail. A few minutes later, the detainee attempted to commit
suicide a third time by hanging himself with his bed sheet. This time, he hung himself from his bed sheet for
over twenty minutes, without being noticed by any of the four officers who were manning the four video
surveillance monitors. In fact, one officer admitted he was asleep at his work station at the time. By the time
another officer noticed the hanging, nearly 30 minutes had passed. The detainee was cut down and transported to
a local hospital where he was subsequently pronounced dead due to asphyxiation by hanging. (Fayette County
Prison, Pennsylvania, and PrimeCare Medical, Inc.)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
INADEQUATE
SUPERVISION

Harris v. Hammon, 914 F.Supp.2d 1026 (D.Minn. 2012). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a county
and various officials with the state department of corrections (DOC), alleging violations of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments, as well as state law claims for false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional
distress (IIED), and negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED). The defendants moved for summary
judgment and for judgment on the pleadings. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The
court held that there was no evidence of a continuing, widespread pattern of misconduct on account of county
employees in not releasing prisoners pursuant to court orders, as required for the prisoner's § 1983 failure-totrain claims against the county for alleged violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The prisoner
had been held for more than five days after a judge ordered his release pending his appeal.
According to the court, the former prisoner's allegations were sufficient to plead that department of
corrections (DOC) employees were deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's liberty rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment, as required to state a § 1983 claim for violations of his due process rights based on his continued
detention after a court ordered his release. The prisoner alleged that he had a court order for his release but he
was returned to prison, that a judge faxed and mailed the release order to the prison after being contacted by the
prisoner's attorney the next day, that the judge's clerk also telephoned employees to inform them that the prisoner
was to be released, that one employee did not respond to calls from the prisoner's attorney, that another
employee told the attorney he would have to hand deliver a certified copy of order by the end of her shift in three
minutes so that the prisoner could be released before the weekend, and that employees told the attorney several
days later that they might not be able to release the prisoner because the order could be invalid. The court also
held that the prisoner's allegations were sufficient to plead that his continued detention, after his release was
ordered by a judge, violated a clearly established right, as required to overcome qualified immunity for
department of corrections (DOC) employees. (Lino Lakes Correctional Facility, Ramsey County Jail,
Minnesota)

U.S. District Court
CELL CHECKS
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
PRISONER CHECKS

Ponzini v. Monroe County, 897 F.Supp.2d 282 (M.D.Pa. 2012). Survivors of a pretrial detainee sued prison
officials, medical care providers and a corrections officer under § 1983 and state tort law, claiming that they
were deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of the detainee, who committed suicide. The detainee
allegedly did not receive his medication during his confinement. The survivors noted that one of the medications,
Paxil, has “a short half-life and leaves a user's system very quickly,” and that its withdrawal symptoms include
“worsening of underlying anxiety or depression, headache, tremor or ‘shakes', gastrointestinal distress and
fatigue-, all of which were allegedly present in detainee during his incarceration.” The detainee had also been
taking Trazadone. The survivors alleged that during the period in which the detainee was incarcerated at the

45.42

facility, officers were aware that the detainee should have been monitored closely and placed on a suicide watch.
The survivors asserted that, although the detainee was not on a suicide watch, the inmate housed in an adjacent
cell was on such a watch. An officer was expected to pass the neighboring cell, and by virtue of its location, the
detainee’s cell, every fifteen minutes. The survivors alleged that the officer falsified documents demonstrating
that he properly made his rounds every fifteen minutes, and that officer failure to properly maintain a suicide
watch on the detainee’s neighbor facilitated the detainee’s own suicide. The detainee killed himself by
swallowing shreds of his own t-shirt. The court held that the survivors stated a § 1983 claim under the
Fourteenth Amendment against prison officials for deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of the
detainee, who committed suicide allegedly as a result of a lack of daily medication necessary to treat depression
and other psychological issues. According to the court, the complaint raised the possibility that prison officials
knew that the detainee suffered from a severe medical condition and did not attempt to provide appropriate,
necessary care in a timely manner. The court held that the survivors also stated a § 1983 claim under the
Fourteenth Amendment against the corporate medical provider for deliberate indifference. (PrimeCare Medical,
Inc., and Monroe County Correctional Facility, Pennsylvania)
U.S. Appeals Court
PRISONER CHECKS

Rice ex rel. Rice v. Correctional Medical Services, 675 F.3d 650 (7th Cir. 2012). Following a pretrial detainee's
death while incarcerated, his parents, representing his estate filed suit pursuant to § 1983, alleging among other
things that jail officials and medical personnel had deprived the pretrial detainee of due process by exhibiting
deliberate indifference to his declining mental and physical condition. The district court entered summary
judgment against the estate. The estate filed a second suit reasserting the state wrongful death claims that the
judge in the first suit had dismissed without prejudice after disposing of the federal claims. The district court
dismissed that case on the basis of collateral estoppel, and the estate appealed both judgments. The appeals court
affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The appeals court held that summary judgment was precluded
by genuine issues of material fact as to whether jail officials were deliberately indifferent to the pretrial
detainee's conditions of confinement, and whether his conditions of confinement were sufficiently serious to
support his Fourteenth Amendment due process claim. The court noted that whether the detainee himself created
the unsanitary conditions was a fact relevant to the claim, but given detainee's mental condition, it did not
foreclose the claim. The court found that neither jail guards or supervisors were deliberately indifferent to the
risk that the mentally ill pretrial detainee might engage in a behavior such as compulsive water drinking that
would cause him to die within a matter of hours and did not consciously disregarded that risk, and therefore they
were not liable for his death under § 1983. According to the court, while a fact-finder might conclude that the
guards exhibited a generalized recklessness with respect to the safety of the inmates housed in the administrative
segregation unit by failing to conduct hourly checks of the unit, there was no evidence that the guards or
supervisors were subjectively aware of the possibility that the detainee might injure himself to the point of death
before anyone could intervene. (Elkhart County Jail, Indiana)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO SUPERVISE

Rogers v. District of Columbia, 880 F.Supp.2d 163 (D.D.C. 2012). A former prisoner brought an action against
the District of Columbia, alleging he was over-detained and asserting claims for negligent training and
supervision. The district moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied
in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to when the
prisoner was to be released. The district court began its opinion as follows: “Our saga begins with the tale of
plaintiff's numerous arrests. Plaintiff was arrested on four different charges in 2007: two felony charges for
violating the Bail Reform Act, one felony charge for Possession with Intent to Distribute a Controlled Substance
and one misdemeanor charge for carrying an open can of alcohol without a permit.” During the prisoner’s time
in jail he was sentenced for all of the remaining charges. The prisoner claimed he was over-detained by
approximately two months, and that this was the direct result of the D.C. Jail's negligent training and supervision
of its employees with regard to calculating jail credits. (District of Columbia Jail)

U.S. Appeals Court
PRISONER CHECKS

Shelton v. Arkansas Dept. of Human Services, 677 F.3d 837 (8th Cir. 2012). The administratrix of the estate of a
mental health patient brought an action against various public officials and health professionals, alleging
shortcomings in the way the medical professionals responded after the patient hanged herself while a patient at
the facility. The district court dismissed the action. The administratrix appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The
court held that the state actors' discovery of an unconscious voluntary mental health patient hanged in her room
did not trigger duties related to involuntary commitment nor did it give rise to a constitutional-level duty of care.
According to the court, after the state actors discovered the patient, she was no different than any unconscious
patient in an emergency room, operating room, or ambulance controlled by the state actors, and, in such
circumstances, the state actors owed patients state-law duties of care based upon standards for simple or
professional negligence. The court found that the physician's decision to remove the mental health patient from a
suicide watch was a medical-treatment decision, and therefore a claim based on that decision could not be
brought pursuant to either the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) or the Rehabilitation Act, absent any
allegation that the removal from suicide watch was influenced by anything other than the physician's judgment.
(Arkansas State Hospital)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO SUPERVISE

Smith v. Knox County Jail, 666 F.3d 1037 (7th Cir. 2012). A pretrial detainee brought a pro se action against a
county jail under § 1983, alleging that jail officials violated the Eighth Amendment because they were
deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs after a fellow inmate attacked him. The district court
dismissed the case and the detainee appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. The court held that the
detainee stated a claim for deliberate indifference under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
with his allegations that while he was asleep in his cell a guard opened the door and allowed another inmate to
attack him, that he requested medical attention after the attack but received none for five days, and that the guard
knew of his “obvious blood,” dizziness, throwing up, blind spots, severe pain, and loss of eye color. (Knox
County Jail, Illinois)

45.43

U.S. Appeals Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2012). A state death-row inmate brought a § 1983 action for
declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief against prison officials and medical personnel, alleging, among other
things, deliberate indifference to his medical needs in violation of his rights under the Eighth Amendment. The
district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed in
part, reversed in part and remanded. The court held that: (1) factual issues precluded summary judgment for the
defendants on the issue of whether denial of a recommended treatment violated the inmate's Eighth Amendment
rights; (2) factual issues precluded summary judgment for the defendants on the ground that the decision to treat
the inmate pharmacologically, rather than surgically, was a mere difference of opinion over the course of
treatment that did not establish deliberate indifference; (3) factual issues precluded summary judgment for the
warden and the assistant warden on the claim for deliberate indifference to the inmate's serious medical needs;
(4) factual issues precluded summary judgment for the head of the prison's utilization review panel on the claim
for deliberate indifference to the inmate's serious medical needs; (5) the Eleventh Amendment applied to bar the
claim against the state and the state corrections department for monetary damages based on the alleged custom
or policy of refusing to provide certain types of medical care to inmates; and (6) factual issues precluded
summary judgment for the defendants on the inmate's Eighth Amendment claim for injunctive relief. (Ely State
Prison, Nevada Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
INADEQUATE
SUPERVISION
VIDEO SURVEILLANCE

Solivan v. Dart, 897 F.Supp.2d 694 (N.D.Ill. 2012). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against a county,
corrections officers, and a sheriff, alleging deliberate indifference to undue punishment. The defendants moved
to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the detainee's §
1983 complaint stated a claim against a correctional officer for deliberate indifference to a serious need in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, where the complaint alleged facts that indicated that the officer left
inmates visually and audibly unsupervised for hours, knowing that a substantial risk of harm was present. The
complaint further alleged that there were no light bulbs in the detainee's cell, no intercoms or emergency call
buttons in cells, and no overhead cameras on his tier of the jail. According to the court, the complaint stated that
the harm the detainee suffered at the hands of other inmates was significant, including severe injuries to his right
eye and bleeding from his ear, and the complaint alleged that the detainee was the only person of Hispanic origin
housed in the maximum security tier, while a significant majority of other inmates were African American, and
that these circumstances put the detainee in an identifiable group of prisoners who were singled out for attack.
(Division One, Cook County Department of Corrections, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
CELL CHECKS
VIDEO SURVEILLANCE

Stanfill v. Talton, 851 F.Supp.2d 1346 (M.D.Ga. 2012). The father of a pretrial detainee who died while in
custody at a county jail brought a § 1983 action individually, and as administrator of the detainee's estate, against
a county sheriff and others, alleging that the defendants violated the detainee's rights under the Eighth and
Fourteenth amendments. The county defendants moved for summary judgment, and the father cross-moved for
partial summary judgment and for sanctions. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment. The court held that the father failed to establish that the county defendants had a duty to preserve any
video of the detainee in his cells, as would support sanctions against the defendants in the father's civil rights
action. The court noted that the defendants did not anticipate litigation resulting from the detainee's death, the
father did not file suit until almost two years after the detainee's death, and there was no indication that the father
requested that the defendants impose a litigation hold or provided the defendants any form of notice that
litigation was imminent or even contemplated until the lawsuit was actually filed.
The court also held that the officers' continued restraint of the detainee in the restraint chair was not
excessive, as would violate the Fourteenth Amendment where the officers were aware of detainee's history of
self-mutilation, the detainee posed a serious risk of harm to himself, and the particular circumstances confronting
the officers justified the continued use of restraints until the officers were reasonably assured that the situation
had abated. According to the court, even if the history of the detainee as a “cutter” constituted a serious medical
need, there was no evidence that the county correctional officers were deliberately indifferent to that need, in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, where the only risk of harm the officers were subjectively aware of was
the detainee's potential to injure himself. Despite the detainee's refusal to speak with medical staff upon arrival at
jail, he was immediately classified as a suicide risk due to his self-destructive history and was placed on a
suicide watch, and for two days, the detainee remained on suicide watch in jail custody, whereby he was
observed at least every 15 minutes, without incident. The court held that the father failed to show, by way of
medical evidence, that an alleged six-minute delay of a correctional officer in performing resuscitation efforts
once the detainee was found unresponsive, was the cause of the detainee's death, as would support the father's
Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against the county defendants.
The court ruled that “All parties can agree that Stanfill's death was unfortunate, and that in hindsight, perhaps
more could have been done. Hindsight, however, is not an appropriate lens through which to view the
Defendants' actions. The Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of proving that the Defendants violated Stanfill's
constitutional rights. The Defendants are therefore entitled to qualified immunity.” (Houston County Detention
Center, Georgia)

U.S. Appeals Court
STAFFING LEVELS

Strutton v. Meade, 668 F.3d 549 (8th Cir. 2012). A civilly-committed sex offender brought a civil rights action
challenging the adequacy of his treatment at the Missouri Sexual Offender Treatment Center. The district court
entered judgment in favor of the defendants, and the plaintiff appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court
found that the offender had standing to bring the due process challenge to the adequacy of Missouri's four-phase
treatment program for such offenders, where he demonstrated that his alleged injury of not advancing in
treatment was not due solely to his own recalcitrance and could have been due to the lack of adequate treatment
resources. But according to the court, the treatment received by offender did not shock the conscience, in
violation of substantive due process. The court noted that although budget shortfalls and staffing shortages
resulted in treatment modifications that were below standards set in place by the center's directors, temporary
modifications in the treatment regimen of eliminating psychoeducational classes and increasing the size of

45.44

process groups was neither arbitrary nor egregious, and the center sought to maintain essential treatment services
in light of the challenges it faced.
The court found that the treatment center's use of the “restriction table” and the later use of a restriction
area in treating the civilly-committed sex offender did not shock the conscience, and thus did not violate
offender's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. A resident assigned to the Restriction Table, which was
located near a nurses' station, was not permitted to speak to another person unless that person was also seated at
the table, and was only allowed to leave the table for meals, classes, process groups, and for an hour of exercise.
Residents would remain at the table from early morning until late evening. Despite its name, residents assigned
to the Restriction Table were not physically restrained and were allowed to stand, stretch, get a drink of water, or
use the restroom as needed. Use of the table was discontinued and it was replaced with a “Restriction Area.”
According to the court, residents assigned to a restriction table or restriction area retained a comparatively free
range of movement and activities, including the ability to get up and stretch, to leave to attend group sessions
and meetings, to converse with other residents, to work on homework or legal issues, and to play cards.
(Missouri Sexual Offender Treatment Center)
U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO SUPERVISE
FEMALE OFFICERS

Wood v. Beauclair, 692 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2012). A male state prisoner filed a civil rights action alleging sexual
abuse by a female prison guard in violation of the First, Fourth, and Eighth Amendments. The district court
granted summary judgment to the defendants and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part,
reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that: (1) the prisoner established non-consent; (2) sexual abuse of
the prisoner by a prison guard constituted malicious and sadistic use of force; (3) the sexual assault on the
prisoner by the prison guard was deeply offensive to human dignity and was completely void of penological
justification; (4) supervisory prison officials were not on notice that the prison guard presented a substantial risk
to the prisoner through sexual abuse; and (5) prison officials did not retaliate against the prisoner for filing a
grievance. According to the court, the prisoner established non-consent for purposes of surviving summary
judgment, where the prisoner and guard were in a consensual relationship that involved hugging and kissing,
then they were involved in a disagreement and the prisoner told the guard to “back off” and that they had to
“stop” seeing each other for a while, and then the initial sexual encounter that gave rise to the action occurred.
(Idaho Correctional Institution of Orofino)
2013

U.S. Appeals Court
VIDEO SURVEILLANCE
ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCE

Arnzen v. Palmer, 713 F.3d 369 (8th Cir 2013). Patients at a state Civil Commitment Unit for Sex Offenders
(CCUSO) brought a § 1983 complaint against CCUSO administrators, challenging placement of video cameras
in CCUSO restrooms, and moved for a preliminary injunction to stop their use. The district court denied the
motion as to cameras in “dormitory style restrooms” but granted an injunction ordering that cameras in
“traditional style bathrooms” be pointed at a ceiling or covered with lens cap. The appeals court affirmed. The
appeals court held that CCUSO conducted a “search” by capturing images of patients while occupying singleuser bathrooms, and that CCUSO did not conduct a reasonable search by capturing patients' images, thereby
constituting a Fourth Amendment violation. The appeals court found that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in issuing preliminary injunctive relief. The court noted that the patients had a reasonable expectation
of privacy in a single-person bathroom when there was no immediate indication it was being used for purposes
other than those ordinarily associated with bathroom facilities, and that involuntarily civilly committed persons
retain the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches that is analogous to the right retained
by pretrial detainees. According to the court, the facility did not conduct a reasonable search of its involuntarily
committed patients by capturing images of patients while they occupied single-user bathrooms in a secure
facility, thereby constituting a violation of Fourth Amendment, where the cameras did not provide administrators
with immediate alerts concerning patient safety or prevent assaults or dangerous acts, and less intrusive methods
were available for administrators to use to prevent illicit activities by patients. (Iowa Civil Commitment Unit for
Sex Offenders)

U.S. District Court
PRISONER CHECKS
STAFFING LEVELS

Christie ex rel. estate of Christie v. Scott, 923 F.Supp.2d 1308 (M.D.Fla. 2013). An estate brought a § 1983
action against a private prison health services provider and corrections officers following the death of a detainee
after he was pepper-sprayed over 12 times in 36 hours. The provider moved for summary judgment. The district
court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by
genuine issues of material fact as to: (1) whether failure of the nurses to inspect the detainee after each time he
was pepper-sprayed constituted deliberate indifference; (2) whether the sheriff knew that corrections officers
were using pepper spray nearly indiscriminately; (3) whether corrections officers were deliberately indifferent to
the detainee's physical and medical needs; and (4) whether corrections officers' repeated pepper-spraying of the
detainee while he was restrained naked in a chair was malicious and sadistic to the point of shocking the
conscience. The estate alleged that the nurses' failed to evaluate the detainee after each time he was peppersprayed, failed to follow their employer’s policy by not monitoring the detainee every 15 minutes for the periods
he was restrained, and failed to offer the detainee fluids or a bedpan while he was restrained. The nurses
allegedly checked the inmate only two times during the five hours he was restrained. The court found that the
health services provider did not have a policy of understaffing that constituted deliberate indifference to the
detainee’s health, as required to support a § 1983 claim against the private provider. (Lee County Jail, Florida)

U.S. Appeals Court
PRISONER CHECKS

Earl v. Racine County Jail, 718 F.3d 689 (7th Cir. 2013). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against a county jail
and various jail officers, asserting claims for denial of due process and deliberate indifference to his serious
medical condition. The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, and the inmate
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the inmate's five days on suicide watch were
neither long enough nor harsh enough to deprive him of a due-process-protected liberty interest, where: (1) the
only changes to the inmate's meals were that trays upon which food was served were disposable foam rather than

45.45

plastic; (2) eating utensils were quickly removed after each meal; (3) the inmate was not denied bedding but was
given a mattress and a blanket; (4) the inmate was denied writing materials for only the first 48 hours; and (5)
rather than being prohibited human contact, deputies were assigned to closely and personally monitor the inmate
to ensure his safety. The court found that jail officers were not deliberately indifferent to the inmate's allergic
reaction to suicide garments in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The court noted that after the inmate told an
officer about his allergic reaction to a suicide gown, the officer called a nurse who immediately examined the
inmate and gave him cream and medication, and the officers appropriately deferred to the nurse's medical
decision that the inmate did not need different garments because there was no sign of rash or bumps on the
inmate. (Racine County Jail, Wisconsin)
U.S. District Court
SUPERVISORY
LIABILITY

Estate of Prasad ex rel. Prasad v. County of Sutter, 958 F.Supp.2d 1101 (E.D.Cal. 2013). The estate of a
deceased pretrial detainee brought an action against jail employees and officials, as well as medical staff,
alleging violations of the Fourteenth Amendment. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted
the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that: (1) although the detainee died at a hospital, liability for
the jail employees and officials was not precluded, where the jail employees and officials could have
contributed to detainee's death despite the transfer to the hospital; (2) allegations were sufficient plead deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs by the deputies and medical staff; (3) allegations were sufficient to state a
claim for supervisory liability; (4) allegations were sufficient to state a claim for supervisory liability against the
corrections officers in charge; (5) allegations were sufficient to state a claim against the county; (6) allegations
were sufficient to state a claim for wrongful death under California law; and (7) the health care provider was a
state actor. According to the court, allegations that the county maintained customs or practices whereby no
medical staff whatsoever were at the jail for one-sixth of every day, that the staff lacked authority to respond to
emergency and critical inmate needs, and that the jail records system withheld information from affiliated health
care providers, were sufficient to state a § 1983 claim against the county, alleging violations of the Fourteenth
Amendment after the pretrial detainee died.
The court held that allegations that deficiencies in medical care at the jail, including lack of 24-hour
emergency care, were longstanding, repeatedly documented, and expressly noted by officials in the past., and
that the doctor who was employed by the health care provider that contracted with the prison was aware of the
deficiencies, and that the doctor discharged the pretrial detainee to the jail were sufficient to plead deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs, as required to state a § 1983 action against the doctor for violations of the
Fourteenth Amendment after the detainee died. (Sutter County Jail, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
INADEQUATE
SUPERVISION
CELL CHECKS
AUDIO
COMMUNICATION

Goodman v. Kimbrough, 718 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 2013). The wife of a pretrial detainee who suffered from
dementia and who was severely beaten by his cellmate filed a § 1983 action against jail officials in their
individual capacities for alleged violation of the Due Process Clause by deliberate indifference to a substantial
risk of harm to the detainee. The wife also asserted a supervisory liability claim against the sheriff in his official
capacity and a state law claim for loss of support and consortium. The district court granted summary judgment
for the defendants. The wife appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that there was no evidence
that jail officials were subjectively aware of a risk of serious harm to which the pretrial detainee was exposed
from his severe beating by a cellmate, and that the officials deliberately disregarded that risk, as required to
support the detainee's § 1983 claim of deliberate indifference in violation of the Due Process Clause. According
to the court, the officers' failure to conduct cell checks and head counts and their deactivation of emergency call
buttons constituted negligence but did not justify constitutional liability under § 1983. According to the court,
jail officials' policy violations by failing to enter every cell in conducting head counts and in deactivating
emergency call buttons did not constitute a custom so settled and permanent as to have the force of law. (Clayton
County Jail, Georgia)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
INADEQUATE
SUPERVISION

Grimes v. District of Columbia, 923 F.Supp.2d 196 (D.D.C. 2013). A juvenile detainee's mother filed a § 1983
action against the District of Columbia for violation of the Eighth Amendment and negligent hiring, training, and
supervision, after the detainee was attacked and killed by other detainees. After the district court ruled in the
District's favor, the appeals court vacated and remanded. On remand, the District moved for summary judgment.
The district court granted the motion. The court held that officials at the juvenile detention facility were not
deliberately indifferent to a known safety risk, and thus their failure to protect the detainee from an attack by
another detainee did not violate the Eighth Amendment. According to the court, there was no evidence of a
history of assaults on youth at the facility, such that any facility employee knew or should have known that a
fight between the detainee and another youth was going to take place, or that the youth who fought with the
detainee had a history of assaultive behavior while at the facility. The court also found no evidence that a
municipal custom, policy, or practice caused any such violation. The court also held that the mother’s failure to
designate an expert witness barred her claim. (Oak Hill Detention Facility, District of Columbia)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Hahn v. Walsh, 915 F.Supp.2d 925 (C.D.Ill. 2013). The estate of a diabetic pretrial detainee brought an action
against a city, police officers, a county, the county sheriff, and a jail medical provider, alleging under § 1983 that
the defendants were deliberately indifferent to the detainee's serious medical needs. The defendants moved for
summary judgment. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that a city
police officer at the scene of the arrest who had no involvement with the diabetic detainee could not be held
liable under § 1983 for being deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of detainee, who died from
diabetic ketoacidosis after she was taken to a county jail. The court also found that city police officers who
transported the detainee to the county jail, rather than a hospital, were not deliberately indifferent to the serious
medical needs of the detainee, where the officers were entitled to defer to the judgment of the paramedics on the
scene. According to the court, there was no evidence that the county sheriff knew of a serious risk to the health
of the diabetic pretrial detainee and consciously disregarded that risk, that any prior deaths at the jail involved
medical care provided to an inmate, much less that medical care involved an inmate with diabetes, or that the

45.46

sheriff's decisions about certification of the jail's medical contractor had any adverse effect on the detainee, as
would subject the sheriff to liability under § 1983, in his individual capacity, for his alleged deliberate
indifference to the detainee's serious medical needs.
The court found that the county's actions in shutting off water to the mentally ill, diabetic pretrial detainee's
cell when the inmate was stuffing clothing into the cell's toilet did not violate the detainee's Fourteenth
Amendment rights. According to the court, the estate's claim against the county that the detainee, who died of
diabetic ketoacidosis after allegedly refusing diabetic treatment and food while incarcerated, was not properly
treated for her mental illness and diabetes was not actionable under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
or the Rehabilitation Act. (Champaign County Jail, Illinois)
U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO
SUPERVISE
INADEQUATE
SUPERVISION

Junior v. Anderson, 724 F.3d 812 (7th Cir. 2013). A pretrial detainee brought a suit under § 1983 against a guard
who allegedly failed to protect him from an attack by other inmates. The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the guard, and the detainee appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The
appeals court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the
guard acted with a conscious disregard of a significant risk of violence to the detainee, when she noted that two
cells in the corridor where she was posted were not securely locked, but only noted that this was a “security risk”
in her log. The guard then let several of the inmates who were supposed to remain locked up out of their cells, let
them congregate in a darkened corridor, and then left her post, so that no guard was present to observe more than
20 maximum-security prisoners milling about. The court found that the detainee was entitled to appointed
counsel in his § 1983 suit against a prison guard. According to the court, although the case was not analytically
complex, its sound resolution depended on evidence to which detainee in his distant lockup had no access, and
the detainee needed to, but could not, depose the guard in order to explore the reason for her having left her post
and other issues. (Cook County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
VIDEO
SURVEILLANCE

Keith v. Koerner, 707 F.3d 1185 (10th Cir. 2013). A female former prison inmate who was impregnated as a
result of her vocational-training instructor's unlawful sexual acts brought a § 1983 action against a former
warden and other Kansas Department of Corrections employees. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district
court granted the motion in part, but denied qualified immunity for the former warden, who appealed. The
appeals court affirmed. The court held that the former prison inmate adequately alleged that the former warden
violated a clearly established constitutional right, precluding qualified immunity for the warden in the § 1983
action alleging that the warden was deliberately indifferent to sexual abuse by the vocational-training instructor.
According to the court, the inmate alleged that the warden had knowledge of the abuse but failed to properly
investigate or terminate staff when abuse allegations were substantiated, and that the prison's structural policy
problems contributed to abuse by failing to address known problems with the vocational program or to use
cameras to monitor inmates and staff. (Topeka Correctional Facility, Kansas)

U.S. District Court
STAFFING LEVELS

Kelly v. Wengler, 979 F.Supp.2d 1104 (D.Idaho 2013). Prisoners brought a civil contempt action against a
private prison contractor, alleging the contractor violated a settlement agreement that required it to comply with
the staffing pattern specified in its contract with the Idaho Department of Correction. The district court found
that the contractor was in civil contempt for violating the settlement agreement, that the contractor's noncompliance with staffing requirements were significant, and the contractor did not promptly take all reasonable
steps to comply with settlement agreement. The court held that a two-year extension of the consent decree was a
proper sanction for the contractor's civil contempt in willfully violating the settlement agreement, where the
contractor's failure to comply with a key provision of the settlement agreement had lasted nearly as long as the
duration of the agreement. According to the court, the use of an independent monitor to ensure the private prison
contractor's compliance with the settlement agreement was an appropriate resolution, where such duty was most
fairly handled by a monitor with a direct obligation to the district court and to the terms of the settlement
agreement. The court noted that “…it is clear that there was a persistent failure to fill required mandatory
positions, along with a pattern of CCA staff falsifying rosters to make it appear that all posts were filled.” The
state assumed operation of the facility in July 2014, changing the name to the Idaho State Correctional Center.
(Corrections Corporation of America, Idaho Department of Correction, Idaho Correctional Center)

U.S. District Court
STAFFING LEVELS

Kelly v. Wengler, 979 F.Supp.2d 1237 (D.Idaho 2013). Prisoners moved for discovery and a hearing on the issue
of whether a private prison contractor should be held in civil contempt for violating the parties' settlement
agreement. The district court held that it had the power to enforce the settlement agreement, and that the
prisoners were entitled to a hearing and to discovery on the issue of whether the private prison contractor should
be held in civil contempt. The prisoners alleged that the contractor had been falsifying staffing records, and the
district court ordered discovery, noting that prisoners had offered affidavits from current and former employees
of the contractor, all alleging more unfilled posts than contractor had admitted to. (Corrections Corporation of
America, Idaho Department of Correction, Idaho Correctional Center)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO
SUPERVISE
STAFF ASSIGNMENT

Lemire v. California Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 726 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2013). The estate, parents,
and daughter of a mentally ill inmate who died in custody brought a § 1983 action against the California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), CDCR officials, and prison staff. The plaintiffs sought to
recover damages for alleged violations of the Eighth Amendment, based on the inmate's right to be free from
cruel and unusual punishment, and the Fourteenth Amendment, based on the family's substantive due process
right of familial association. The district court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs. The appeals court
affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by
genuine issues of material fact as to whether: (1) withdrawal of all floor staff from a prison building which
housed mentally ill inmates, for up to three and a half hours, created an objectively substantial risk of harm to the
unsupervised inmates in the building; (2) the captain who called staff meetings, and a warden, who purportedly
authorized the meetings, were aware of risks posed by withdrawing all floor officers from the building for over

45.47

three hours; (3) any risk of harm could have been prevented with adequate supervision; and (4) the actions of the
warden and the captain shocked the conscience.
The court also found genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether (1) floor officers who were the first
prison personnel to arrive in the cell of the mentally ill inmate who apparently committed suicide were
deliberately indifferent to the inmate's serious medical needs when they failed to provide cardiopulmonary
resuscitation (CPR), despite being trained to administer it; (2) the officers' failure to provide medical care caused
the inmate's death; and (3) the officers' actions shocked the conscience, precluding summary judgment as to the
§ 1983 Eighth Amendment medical claim brought by the inmate's family against officers and family's
substantive due process claim against the officers. (California State Prison at Solano)
U.S. District Court
VIDEO SURVEILLANCE
ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCE

Royer v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 933 F.Supp.2d 170 (D.D.C. 2013). A federal prisoner brought an action
against Bureau of Prisoners (BOP), alleging classification as a “terrorist inmate” resulted in violations of the
Privacy Act and the First and Fifth Amendments. The BOP moved for summary judgment and to dismiss. The
district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that BOP rules prohibiting contact
visits and limiting noncontact visits and telephone time for federal inmates labeled as “terrorist inmates”, more
than other inmates, had a rational connection to a legitimate government interest, for the purpose of the inmate's
action alleging the rules violated his First Amendment rights of speech and association. According to the court,
the prison had an interest in monitoring the inmate's communications and the prison isolated inmates who could
pose a threat to others or to the orderly operation of the institution. The court noted that the rules did not
preclude the inmate from using alternative means to communicate with his family, where the inmate could send
letters, the telephone was available to him, and he could send messages through others allowed to visit.
The court found that the inmate's assertions that the prison already had multiple cameras and hypersensitive
microphones, and that officers strip searched inmates before and after contact visits, did not establish ready
alternatives to a prohibition on contact visits for the inmate and limits on phone usage and noncontact visits due
to being labeled as a “terrorist inmate.” The court noted that increasing the number of inmates subject to strip
searches increased the cost of visitation, and microphones and cameras did not obviate all security concerns that
arose from contact visits, such as covert notes or hand signals.
The court held that the inmate's allegations that he was segregated from the prison's general population for
over six years, that he was subject to restrictions on recreational, religious, and educational opportunities
available to other inmates, that contact with his family was limited to one 15 minute phone call per week during
business hours when his children were in school, and that he was limited to two 2-hour noncontact visits per
month, were sufficient to plead harsh and atypical conditions, as required for his Fifth Amendment procedural
due process claim. According to the court, the inmate's allegations that he was taken from his cell without
warning, that he was only provided an administrative detention order that stated he was being moved due to his
classification, that he was eventually told he was classified as a “terrorist inmate,” that such classification
imposed greater restrictions upon his confinement, and that he was never provided with a hearing, notice of
criteria for release from conditions, or notice of a projected date for release from conditions were sufficient to
plead denial of due process, as required for his claim alleging violations of the Fifth Amendment procedural due
process. (Special Housing Units at FCI Allenwood and USP Lewisburg, CMU at FCI Terre Haute, SHU at FCI
Greenville, Supermax facility at Florence, Colorado, and CMU at USP Marion)

U.S. District Court
INADEQUATE
SUPERVISION

Spicer v. District of Columbia, 916 F.Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013). A prisoner in the District of Columbia detention
center brought an action against correctional officers and a supervisor, alleging that he was assaulted by the
officers while in custody. The supervisor moved to dismiss, and the defendants moved for partial judgment on
the pleadings. The district court denied the supervisor’s motion and granted the defendant’s motion. The court
held that allegations by the prisoner that the supervising lieutenant was negligent in failing to adequately
supervise the other correctional officers who allegedly assaulted the prisoner and that due to the lack of adequate
supervision, the officers attacked the prisoner and broke his foot, stated a negligent supervision claim against the
lieutenant. (Central Detention Facility, District of Columbia)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
FAILURE TO
SUPERVISE

Wilson v. Montano, 715 F.3d 847 (10th Cir. 2013). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action against a county sheriff,
several deputies, and the warden of the county's detention center, alleging that he was unlawfully detained, and
that his right to a prompt probable cause determination was violated. The district court denied the defendants'
motion to dismiss. The defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
in part. The detainee had been held for 11 days without a hearing and without charges being filed. The appeals
court held that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity from the claim that they violated the
arrestee's right to a prompt post-arrest probable cause determination, where the Fourth Amendment right to a
prompt probable cause determination was clearly established at the time. The court held that the arrestee
sufficiently alleged that the arresting sheriff's deputy was personally involved in the deprivation of his Fourth
Amendment right to a prompt probable cause hearing, as required to support his § 1983 claim against the deputy.
The arrestee alleged that he was arrested without a warrant, and that the deputy wrote out a criminal complaint
but failed to file it in any court with jurisdiction to hear a misdemeanor charge until after he was released from
the county's detention facility, despite having a clear duty under New Mexico law to ensure that the arrestee
received a prompt probable cause determination. The court held that the arrestee sufficiently alleged that the
county sheriff established a policy or custom that led to the arrestee's prolonged detention without a probable
cause hearing, and that the sheriff acted with the requisite mental state, as required to support his § 1983 claim
against the sheriff, by alleging that: (1) the sheriff allowed deputies to arrest people and wait before filing
charges, thus resulting in the arrest and detention of citizens with charges never being filed; (2) the sheriff was
deliberately indifferent to ongoing constitutional violations occurring under his supervision and due to his failure
to adequately train his employees; (3) routine warrantless arrest and incarceration of citizens without charges
being filed amounted to a policy or custom; and (4) such policy was the significant moving force behind the
arrestee's illegal detention. (Valencia County Sheriff's Office, Valencia County Detention Center, New Mexico)

45.48

2014
U.S. Appeals Court
CROSS GENDER SUPERVISION

Ambat v. City and County of San Francisco, 757 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 2014). Current and former sheriff's deputies
brought an action against a city and county, alleging various claims including retaliation and that a policy
prohibiting male deputies from supervising female inmates in housing units of jails operated by the county
violated Title VII and California's Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). The district court granted the
defendants' motion on gender discrimination claims and denied the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration. The
plaintiffs appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated in part, and dismissed the
appeal in part. The court held that the county was not entitled to summary judgment based on a bona fide
occupational qualification (BFOQ) defense, in light of fact issues as to whether a reasoned decision-making
process, based on available information and experience, led to the sheriff's adoption of the policy such that the
policy would be entitled to deference. The court also found fact issues as to whether the policy of excluding male
deputies because of their sex was a legitimate proxy for reasonably necessary job qualifications. The court noted
that the primary justification for the policy was to protect the safety of female inmates by reducing the possibility
of sexual harassment and abuse by male deputies, a secondary justification was that employing male deputies in
female housing pods posed a threat to jail security because of a threat of manipulation, a tertiary justification was
protecting the privacy interests of female inmates, and the final justification was promoting female inmates'
rehabilitation. (San Francisco Sheriff's Department, California)

U.S. District Court
INADEQUATE SUPERVISION
CROSS GENDER SUPERVISION
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE

Castillo v. Bobelu, 1 F.Supp.3d 1190 (W.D.Okla. 2014). Five female inmates brought a § 1983 action against
state officials and employees, alleging they were subjected to sexual abuse while working outside a community
corrections center in which they were housed, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The inmates were
participating in the Prisoner Public Works Program (“PPWP”) that allowed offenders to work off-site at different
state offices. They were working during the day doing grounds maintenance at the Oklahoma Governor's
Mansion, where they were supervised by a groundskeeper and his immediate supervisor. When inmates work at
places such as the Governor's Mansion, the DOC does not have a guard stay with the women at the work site.
Instead, they are supervised by state workers employed at the work site, who function like guards. These
individuals go through an eight hour training program. The inmate claimed that they were sexually harassed and
sexually assaulted by the groundskeeper and by a cook employed at the Governor's Mansion. The defendants
moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held
that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to (1) whether prison guards were
deliberately indifferent. The court held that: (1) the prison district supervisor did not have knowledge of a
substantial risk of harm to the inmates because the supervisor did not know that the inmates were working only
with males while off-site; (2) the supervisor was not deliberately indifferent; (3) the prison supervising case
manager was not deliberately indifferent; and (4) there was no evidence that the employee had supervisory
authority over the inmate. The court noted that the inmate did not return to the work assignment where she was
allegedly abused by state employees or have contact with the alleged abusers, as required for the continuing
violation doctrine to apply to her § 1983 action that alleged violations of the Eighth Amendment. According to
the court, despite the supervisor being aware of misconduct by a groundskeeper under his supervision, the
supervisor was aware that the groundskeeper violated certain policies, but did not have knowledge of the sexual
assaults, and he investigated the groundskeeper's conduct and counseled the groundskeeper. The court also found
that the prison supervising case manager, who oversaw the off-site public works program, was not deliberately
indifferent to the excessive risk of sexual assaults of female inmates working at the governor's mansion as part of
the program, where the inmates did not complain to the manager and the manager was never informed of
misconduct. (Hillside Comm. Corr. Center, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO SUPERVISE

Danser v. Stansberry, 772 F.3d 340 (4th Cir. 2014). A federal inmate who was attacked in a recreation cage
brought a Bivens action alleging that officials were deliberately indifferent to his safety. The district court denied
the officials' motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The officials appealed. The appeals
court vacated and remanded with instructions. The court held that a corrections officer did not disregard an
excessive risk to the safety of the inmate in violation of the Eighth Amendment when he placed the inmate, a
convicted sex offender, in a recreation cage with a fellow inmate, a violent gang member, and left the recreation
area unsupervised, during which time the gang member attacked the inmate. According to the court, the officer
was not aware that the inmate was a sex offender or that he was required to check prison databases in which that
information was contained, there were no orders issued requiring that the inmate and gang member be separated
from each other, and the officer's dereliction of duty in leaving the recreation area did not constitute anything
other than negligence. (Federal Correctional Institution, Butner, North Carolina)

U.S. Appeals Court
INADEQUATE SUPERVISION
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

Finn v. Warren County, Kentucky, 768 F.3d 441 (6th Cir. 2014). The administrator of an inmate's estate and the
guardian of the inmate's minor children brought a § 1983 action against a county, a jail's health care provider,
and various jail employees, alleging violation of the inmate's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to
receive adequate medical care while incarcerated. The district court granted summary judgment to some parties,
and a jury returned verdicts for the remaining defendants on the remaining claims. The plaintiffs appealed. The
appeals court reversed and remanded in part and affirmed in part. The court held that a supervisory jailer was not
entitled to qualified immunity for his ministerial acts of training deputy jailers to follow a written emergency
medical services (EMS) policy and to enforce that policy as written. When the inmate’s condition worsened,
cellmates threw objects at a speaker in the top of the cell to activate the intercom to get the guards' attention. The
cellmates reported to the guards ten to fifteen times that something was wrong with the inmate and that he
needed to be taken to the hospital. According to the inmates, the guards ignored their pleas for help and turned
off the television in their housing unit. A senior supervisor’s incident report alleged that he checked on the
inmate several times, while the jail's observation log showed that he checked on the inmate only twice: at 5:27
a.m. and at 6:28 a.m. Later the inmate died in the cell, and although he was found dead in his cell, a deputy
entered on the observation log “appears to be okay.” (Warren County Regional Jail, Kentucky)

45.49

U.S. District Court
CROSS GENDER SUPERVISION

Gethers v. Harrison, 27 F.Supp.3d 644 (E.D.N.C. 2014). A female employee of a county detention center
brought Title VII gender discrimination and retaliation claims against her employer after she was terminated for
allegedly being untruthful regarding a situation in which she was present while a male detainee on suicide watch
used the shower. The county moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion, finding that
the employee failed to demonstrate that she was meeting job expectations or that she was engaged in a protected
activity. The employee had been demoted for violating a detention center policy by being present while a male
detainee on suicide watch showered naked despite the presence of two male officers, and for extracting the
detainee from his cell by herself, creating a risk of danger. The court noted that the male detention officers who
assisted male detainees on a suicide watch to shower were not similarly situated to the female detention officer
who was also present, under the detention center's policy prohibiting officers of the opposite sex from being
present while a detainee showered; the court noted that the proper comparison would be a male officer remaining
in a shower area while a female prisoner showered, and there was no indication that such male officer would not
also be punished. (Wake County Sheriff's Office, Detention Center, N. C.)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO SUPERVISE

Goodvine v. Ankarlo, 9 F.Supp.3d 899 (W.D.Wis. 2014). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against Wisconsin
Department of Corrections (WDOC) officials and psychologists, as well as an admissions officer at a mental
health facility operated by the Wisconsin Department of Health Services (DHS), alleging that the defendants
failed to prevent him from engaging in acts of self-harm, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The defendants
moved for summary judgment. The court held that: (1) the psychologists were not deliberately indifferent to the
inmate's need for protection against self-harm; (2) officers who interacted with the inmate during meal-tray
pickup were not deliberately indifferent to his need for protection against self-harm; (3) a psychologist was not
deliberately indifferent in failing to alert security staff after the inmate advised him that he was having “cutting
urges;” and, (4) an admissions coordinator was not deliberately indifferent to the inmate's need for adequate
mental health care. The court also held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact
as to whether the sergeant who failed to contact the prison's psychological services unit (PSU) after the inmate
told the officer that he was “feeling unsafe” and needed to go to an observation area for additional monitoring
“immediately” was aware that the inmate presented a serious risk of self-harm, but failed to take reasonable
measures to protect him. Fact issues precluding summary judgment were also found by the court as to whether
correctional officers who escorted mentally ill inmates to appointments with psychological services unit (PSU)
and medical staff were deliberately indifferent to the mentally-ill inmate's need for protection against self-harm
when they failed to summon PSU staff or a supervisory official after the inmate, who had a history of cutting
himself with sharp objects, expressed thoughts of self-harm. (Columbia Correctional Institution, Wisconsin)

U.S. Appeals Court
CELL CHECKS

Grenning v. Miller-Stout, 739 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 2014). A state prisoner brought an action against prison
officials, claiming that exposing him to constant lighting for 13 days violated the Eighth Amendment's bar
against cruel and unusual punishment. The district court granted summary judgment for the officials and the
prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court found that summary judgment was
precluded by factual issues as to: (1) the brightness of the continuous lighting in the prisoner's special
management unit cell; (2) the effect on the prisoner of the continuous lighting; and (3) whether prison officials
were deliberately indifferent. The inmate was housed in the Special Management Unit (SMU), an administrative
segregation unit with single-cells that are continuously illuminated for twenty-four hours a day. Each cell in the
SMU has three, four-foot-long fluorescent lighting tubes in a mounted light fixture. A cell occupant can use a
switch inside the cell to turn off two of the tubes, but the center tube is always on. The tube is covered by a blue
light-diffusing sleeve. Institution policy requires welfare checks in the SMU to be conducted every thirty
minutes, which is more frequent than checks for the general prison population. Officials asserted that continuous
illumination allows officers to “assess the baseline behavior of offenders to ensure they are not at risk of harming
themselves or making an attempt to harm staff, cause property damage or incite problem behavior from other
offenders.” The officials stated that turning the cell lights on and off every thirty minutes would be disruptive to
the cell occupants. The prisoner alleged that the light was so bright he could not sleep, even with “four layers of
towel wrapped around his eyes.” He alleged that the lighting gave him “recurring migraine headaches” and that
he could not distinguish between night and day in the cell. (Airway Heights Corrections Center, Washington)

U.S. Appeals Court
INADEQUATE SUPERVISION
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE

Harrison v. Culliver, 746 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2014). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against prison
officials, relating to an inmate-on-inmate assault with a box cutter, and asserting an Eighth Amendment violation
based on deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm. The district court granted summary
judgment to the prison officials and denied the prisoner's motion to proceed in forma pauperis. The prisoner
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that: (1) past incidents of inmate-on-inmate
violence involving weapons did not constitute a substantial risk of serious harm; (2) the prison's policies for
monitoring a back hallway in which the prisoner was attacked did not create a substantial risk of serious harm;
(3) lack of oversight of the prison's hobby craft shop did not create a substantial risk of serious harm; and (4)
prison officials were not deliberately indifferent with respect to oversight of the hobby shop. (W.C. Holman
Correctional Facility, Alabama)

U.S. District Court
STAFFING LEVELS

Hernandez v. County of Monterey, 70 F.Supp.3d 963 (N.D.Cal. 2014). Current and recently released inmates
from a county jail brought an action against the county, the sheriff’s office, and the private company that
administered all jail health care facilities and services, alleging, on behalf of a class of inmates, that substandard
conditions at the jail violated the federal and state constitutions, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the
Rehabilitation Act, and a California statute prohibiting discrimination in state-funded programs. The inmates
sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The defendants filed motions to dismiss. The district court denied the
motions. The court held that both current and recently released inmates had standing to pursue their claims
against the county and others for allegedly substandard conditions at the jail, even though the recently released

45.50

inmates were no longer subject to the conditions they challenged. The court noted that the short average length
of stay of inmates in the proposed class, which was largely made up of pretrial detainees, was approximately 34
days, and that short period, coupled with the plodding speed of legal action and the fact that other persons
similarly situated would continue to be subject to the challenged conduct, qualified the plaintiffs for the
“inherently transitory” exception to the mootness doctrine. The court found that the inmates sufficiently alleged
that the private company that administered all jail health care facilities and services operated a place of public
accommodation, as required to state a claim for violation of ADA Title III. The court noted that: “The complaint
alleges a litany of substandard conditions at the jail, including: violence due to understaffing, overcrowding,
inadequate training, policies, procedures, facilities, and prisoner classification; inadequate medical and mental
health care screening, attention, distribution, and resources; and lack of policies and practices for identifying,
tracking, responding, communicating, and providing accessibility for accommodations for prisoners with
disabilities.” (Monterey County Jail, California)
U.S. Appeals Court
INADEQUATE SUPERVISION

Keller v. U.S., 771 F.3d 1021 (7th Cir. 2014). A federal inmate brought an action under the Federal Tort Claims
Act (FTCA), alleging that federal prison employees negligently failed to protect him from being attacked by
another inmate. The government moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion and the
inmate appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that summary judgment was
precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the prison intake psychologist failed to comply with
mandatory regulations by not examining all of the inmate's medical records before releasing the inmate into the
general prison population, and whether prison guards violated post orders by failing to attentively monitor their
assigned areas of the prison yard. (United States Penitentiary, Terre Haute, Indiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
CELL CHECKS
INADEQUATE SUPERVISION

Laganiere v. County of Olmsted, 772 F.3d 1114 (8th Cir. 2014). The trustee for a state inmate's heirs and next of
kin filed a § 1983 action alleging that officials at a county adult detention center deliberately disregarded the
inmate's medical needs. The district court entered summary judgment in the defendants’ favor, and the trustee
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that a deputy at the county adult detention center did not
deliberately disregard the inmate's serious medical needs, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, even though
another inmate had told jail guards to check on him, and the deputy failed to prevent the inmate's death from a
methadone overdose. The court noted that there was no evidence that the deputy was aware of the other inmate's
statement, and the deputy checked on the inmate every half hour, observed the inmate asleep in his cell instead
of engaged in the morning routine at the center, and did not observe anything unusual. (Olmstead County Adult
Detention Center, Minnesota)

U.S. Appeals Court
VIDEO SURVEILLANCE

Maus v. Baker, 747 F.3d 926 (7th Cir. 2014). A pretrial detainee filed a § 1983 action against personnel at a
county jail, alleging that they had used excessive force against him. The detainee alleged that the defendants
used excessive force in response to him covering the lens of the video camera in his jail cell. In the first incident,
the detained alleged that his arms were twisted, he was pinned against the wall, and he was choked. In the
second incident, the detainee alleged that a taser was used to gain his compliance in transferring him to a
separate cell. Following a jury trial, the district court entered judgment for the defendants and denied the
detainee's motions for new trial. The detainee appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that
the court’s errors in failing to conceal the detainee's shackles from jury, and in requiring the detainee to wear
prison clothing while the defendants were allowed to wear uniforms were not harmless. According to the court
there was no indication that concealment of the restraints would have been infeasible, and visible shackling of
the detainee had a prejudicial effect on the jury. The court noted that there would have been no reason for the
jury to know that the plaintiff was a prisoner, and being told that the plaintiff was a prisoner and the defendants
were guards made a different impression than seeing the plaintiff in a prison uniform and the defendants in guard
uniforms. (Langlade County Jail, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO SUPERVISE

Morales v. U.S., 72 F.Supp.3d 826 (W.D.Tenn. 2014). A federal prisoner brought an action against the United
States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), alleging the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) breached its duty of
care, resulting in his assault and injury by another prisoner. The district court held that: (1) the prisoner’s
administrative claim satisfied FTCA’s notice requirements; (2) the BOP breached its duty of care to the prisoner
by placing him in a recreation cage with a prisoner with whom he was in “keep-away” status; and (3) the
prisoner was entitled to damages under FTCA in the amount of $105,000. The court noted that officers were not
monitoring the recreation cage at the time of attack, and, as a result of such failures, the prisoner suffered 14 stab
wounds, nerve damage, and psychological harm. (Federal Bureau of Prisons, FCI- Memphis, Tennessee)

U.S. District Court
INADEQUATE SUPERVISION
FAILURE TO SUPERVISE
PRISONER CHECKS

Nagle v. Gusman, 61 F.Supp.3d 609 (E.D.La. 2014). Siblings of a mentally ill pretrial detainee who committed
suicide brought an action against numerous employees of a parish sheriff’s office, alleging a due process
violation under § 1983, and asserting claims for wrongful death and negligence under state law. The siblings
moved for partial summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that: (1) a deputy had
a duty to take reasonable measures to protect the detainee from self-inflicted harm; (2) the deputy breached his
duty by failing to observe the detainee for long periods of time; (3) the deputy’s abandonment of his post was the
cause of the detainee’s suicide; (4) the sheriff was vicariously liable; and (5) the deputy’s repeated decision to
abandon his post violated the detainee’s due process right to adequate protection from his known suicidal
impulses. According to the court, the detainee was suffering from psychosis and was suicidal while in custody,
the detainee was placed on a suicide watch, suicide watch policies and training materials of the sheriff’s office
explicitly required officers to continuously monitor detainees on a suicide watch and to document that they had
done so, and it was during one of the deputy’s extended absences that the detainee succeeded in killing himself.
The officer left his post at least three times during his suicide watch shift, to help another employee distribute
meals to other inmates, to take a restroom break, and to visit the nurses’ station. During these absences, the
detainee went unobserved for an hour and a half, fifteen minutes, and two hours respectively. No other staff took

45.51

the officer’s place observing the detainee during the times when the officer abandoned his post. During the
officer’s final absence, an inmate notified an on-duty officer that the detainee was lying on the floor of his cell,
unresponsive. It was later determined that the detainee had asphyxiated after his airway became blocked by a
wad of toilet paper. (Orleans Parish Sheriff’s Office, House of Detention at Orleans Parish Prison, Louisiana)
U.S. District Court
INADEQUATE SUPERVISION
STAFFING LEVELS

Poore v. Glanz, 46 F.Supp.3d 1191 (N.D.Okla. 2014). A juvenile female held as an inmate in the medical unit of
a county jail brought an action against the county and the county sheriff in his individual capacity under § 1983
alleging deliberate indifference to her health in violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishment, based on an alleged failure to prevent a detention officer's repeated sexual assaults. The
defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court denied the motion. The court held that summary
judgment was precluded by genuine disputes of material fact as to whether the county sheriff was aware of the
risk of sexual assault by detention officers as to female inmates housed in the medical unit of the county jail, and
whether he failed to take steps to alleviate that risk. The court also found a genuine dispute of material fact as to
whether the county jail had a policy and practice of housing juvenile female inmates in a wing of the medical
unit which was not under direct supervision and was frequently single-staffed, such that it placed those inmates
at a substantial risk of sexual assault by jail staff. (Tulsa County Jail, also called the David L. Moss Criminal
Justice Center, Oklahoma)

U.S. District Court
VIDEO SURVEILLANCE
PRISONER CHECKS
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE
FAILURE TO SUPERVISE

Rogge v. City of Richmond, Tex., 995 F.Supp.2d 657 (S.D.Tex. 2014). The parents of an arrestee who committed
suicide while in police custody brought a § 1983 and state law action in state court against the city and two
police officers. The defendants removed the action to federal court and moved for summary judgment. The
district court granted the motion. The court held that the arresting police officer was unaware of the arrestee’s
risk of self harm. The arrestee committed suicide in a police station holding cell, and thus, by not checking on
the arrestee for several hours, the officer did not act with deliberate indifference to the arrestee's obvious need
for protection from self harm, so as to violate his due process rights. The court noted that the arrestee was calm
and that he cooperated with the officer during their interaction, and although he said he was terminated from his
job, admitted drinking, and said he was on medication for anxiety, he did not express an interest in hurting
himself or appear distraught. The message that the officer received from the arrestee's father did not raise
suspicion of a risk of suicide, and the officer believed that all dangerous personal items had been taken from the
arrestee and that the dispatch officer would monitor him via a video feed. The court found that the police
dispatch officer who was monitoring the video feed from the police station holding cell was unaware of the
arrestee’s risk of self harm, and thus, the officer did not act with deliberate indifference to the arrestee's obvious
need for protection from self harm, so as to violate his due process rights. The arrestee slept on bench in the cell
for most of the two and a half hours he was in the cell before hanging himself, and the officer did not observe on
the video monitor any behavior on the arrestee's part that suggested he was a suicide risk. The officer observed
that the arrestee did not have items of personal property considered to be suicide implements, and although the
arrestee's father came to the station and told the officer that he and his wife were worried, he did not indicate the
arrestee might be suicidal. (Richmond City Jail, Texas)

U.S. District Court
INADEQUATE SUPERVISION

Shepherd v. Powers, 55 F.Supp.3d 508 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). An inmate at a county jail brought a § 1983 action
against a first correction officer, a second correction officer, and a county, asserting excessive force in violation
of the Eighth Amendment, malicious prosecution, and denying or interfering with the inmate’s religious rights.
The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court denied the motion. The court held that
summary judgment was precluded by a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the force a correction
officer at the county jail used in grabbing and squeezing the inmate’s testicles was applied maliciously or
sadistically to cause harm, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The court also found fact issues as to whether
the correction officer’s conduct, including throwing the inmate to the floor, was objectively malicious and
sadistic. According to the court, fact issues existed as to whether the county had a custom and practice of using
excessive force or failed to adequately train or supervise correction officers in the use of force, precluding
summary judgment on the inmate’s § 1983 claim against the county. (Westchester County Jail, New York)

U.S. District Court
INADEQUATE SUPERVISION

Taylor v. Swift, 21 F.Supp.3d 237 (E.D.N.Y. 2014). A pro se prisoner brought a § 1983 action against city jail
officials, alleging that officials failed to protect him from an assault from other inmates, and that officials used
excessive force in uncuffing the prisoner after escorting him from showers to his cell. The officials moved to
dismiss based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and the motion was converted to a motion for
summary judgment. The district court denied the motion. The court held that it was objectively reasonable for
the prisoner, to conclude that no administrative mechanism existed through which to obtain remedies for the
alleged attack, and thus the prisoner was not required under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) to exhaust
administrative remedies before bringing his claim. The court noted that the jail's grievance policy stated that
“allegation of assault…by either staff or inmates” was non-grievable, the policy stated that an inmate complaint
“is grievable unless it constitutes assault, harassment or criminal misconduct,” the prisoner alleged that officials
committed criminal misconduct in acting with deliberate indifference toward him, and although the prisoner did
not complain of the assault by officials, the prisoner would not have been required to name a defendant in filing
a grievance. According to the court, even if city jail officials would have accepted the prisoner's failure-toprotect grievance, the prisoner's mistake in failing to exhaust administrative procedures was subjectively
reasonable. The prisoner claimed indifferent supervision of jail officers, when members of the Crips gang served
him and other non-gang members “tiny food portions while serving gang members large food portions.” The
prisoner complained to officials and this resulted in the Crips gang members being admonished and chided. The
day after this chiding, the prisoner alleged that he and two other non-Crips-affiliated inmates “were victims of
gang assault where [plaintiff] & [another inmate] got cut & stabbed.” According to the inmate, while the attack
was occurring, a corrections officer allowed the Crips to act with impunity and waited 20 to 30 minutes to press
an alarm, and another officer failed to open a door that would lead the prisoner to safety, and failed to use mace
to break up the alleged gang assault. (New York City Department of Correction, Riker’s Island)

45.52

2015
U.S. District Court
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

Carter v. James T. Vaughn Correctional Center, 134 F.Supp.3d 794 (D. Del. 2015). A state prisoner filed a pr se
complaint under § 1983 seeking injunctive relief against a prison. The district court dismissed the action. The
court held that the prisoner's claims that the prison's business office miscalculated and deducted incorrect sums
of money from his prison account when making partial filing fee payments, that there was poor television
reception, and that he was not allowed to purchase canteen items from the commissary, were not actionable
under § 1983, where all of the claims were administrative matters that should be handled by the prison. The
court found that the prisoner's claims that he was being electronically monitored through a “microwave hearing
effect eavesdropping device” and electronic control devices were fantastical and/or delusional and therefore were
insufficient to withstand screening for frivolity in filings by an in forma pauperis prisoner, in the prisoner's §
1983 action. (James T. Vaughn Correctional Center, Smyrna, Delaware)

U.S. District Court
CELL CHECKS
PRISONER CHECKS

Cavanagh v. Taranto, 95 F.Supp.3d 220 (D. Mass. 2015). A pretrial detainee’s son brought an action under §
1983 against correctional officers who were on duty the day of the detainee’s suicide, alleging the officers
violated the detainee’s due process rights. The officers moved for summary judgment. The district court granted
the motion. The court held that the officers were not deliberately indifferent to the detainee’s mental health
history and safety, to her safety through inadequate cell checks, or to her safety by failing to remove a looped
shoelace from her cell. The court noted that the detainee was not identified as a suicide risk, the officers did not
have access to the detainee’s medical records, the officers were not trained to make suicide assessments, and the
detainee’s risk of suicide was not so obvious that someone other than a professional could have recognized the
risk. (Suffolk County House of Correction, Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
STAFFING LEVELS
STAFF ASSIGNMENT
FAILURE TO SUPERVISE

Cotta v. County of Kings, 79 F.Supp.3d 1148 (E.D.Cal. 2015). An inmate’s mother, individually and as
representative of the inmate’s estate, as well as the prisoner’s two daughters, brought an action against a county,
and county jail officials, alleging that inadequate safety at the jail violated the inmate’s constitutional rights and
ultimately led to his death when he was killed by a cellmate. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The
district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that: (1) the inmate’s due process right
to protection from violence was violated; (2) the jail’s staffing policy on the night the inmate was murdered was
not lacking, such that any need to remedy the staffing policy was not obvious; (3) an official’s decision to house
the inmate together with the cellmate was a ministerial determination that was not entitled to immunity; (4) an
official did not breach her duty of care to protect the inmate from any foreseeable harm; and (5) summary
judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the county’s lack of a policy requiring
its employees to report safety risks was the cause of the inmate’s murder and whether the county’s conduct
shocked the conscience. (Kings County Jail, California)

U.S. District Court
SUPERVISION
MONITORING
VIDEO
INADEQUATE SUPERVISION
CELL CHECKS
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

Frary v. County of Marin, 81 F.Supp.3d 811 (N.D.Cal. 2015). A deceased detainee’s wife, mother, daughter, and
estate brought an action against a county and certain county jail employees, alleging that the employees were
deliberately indifferent to the detainee’s serious medical needs while he was in custody. The defendants moved
for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The district court held
that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to: (1) whether a deputy was aware
of a substantial risk to the detainee’s serious medical needs and disregarded that risk by failing to monitor the
detainee more closely; (2) whether another deputy knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to the detainee’s
health when she failed to ascertain the circumstances of the detainee’s prolonged unconsciousness, and when she
falsely radioed another deputy falsely suggesting that the detainee had consciously refused breakfast; (3) whether
a nurse recognized a serious risk to the detainee’s health from ingesting street morphine pills and then failed to
take reasonable precautionary steps to protect the detainee from that risk; (4) whether the sheriff’s duties with
respect to the county jail were causally connected to the alleged violations of the detainee’s due process rights;
(5) whether the county’s policy and practice of indirect monitoring at the county jail was a moving force behind
the alleged violation of the detainee’s due process rights; and (6) whether the county’s failure to implement
policies at the county jail about how to monitor detainees with medical needs was the moving force behind the
alleged violation of the due process rights of the detainee. The plaintiffs alleged that the Jail’s regular practice
and operating procedure was only to observe inmates indirectly, using “tower checks” where deputies looked out
the tower window to observe the inmates from dozens of feet away, or listening to inmates through intercoms in
their cells. (Marin County Jail, California)

U.S. District Court
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

Hughes v. Judd, 108 F.Supp.3d 1167 (M.D. Fla. 2015). Several juveniles, as representatives of other juveniles
similarly situated, brought a § 1983 action asserting that the sheriff of a Florida county and the health care
provider retained by the sheriff violated the juveniles’ rights under the Fourteenth Amendment during the
juveniles’ detention at the county jail. The district court held that the plaintiffs failed to prove that either the
sheriff or the health care provider was deliberately indifferent to any substantial risk of serious harm during the
juveniles’ detention, or that their policies or customs effected any other constitutional violation. According to the
court, at most, the juveniles showed only that two persons, each of whom was qualified to testify as an expert,
disfavored some of the sheriff’s past or present managerial policies and practices and advocated the adoption of
others they felt were superior for one reason or another. The court found that the juvenile detainees’ challenges
to particular conditions of confinement at the jail were mooted by changes, which included elimination of a
“holding cage,” elimination of the holding area for even temporary suicide watches, installation of cameras in
each sleeping cell with monitors posted above each dorm, updating of the physical facility, relocation of the
classrooms, a 48-hour review for juveniles in isolation, and installation of a radio frequency identification
(RFID) system. (Polk County Central County Jail, Florida, and Corizon Health, Inc.)

45.53

U.S. Appeals Court
INADEQUATE SUPERVISION
VIDEO SURVEILLANCE
CELL CHECKS

Letterman v. Does, 789 F.3d 856 (8th Cir. 2015). Parents of a deceased prisoner, who died from injuries suffered
while in jail, brought a § 1983 action against a prison sergeant, lieutenant, and case manager, alleging that the
employees were indifferent to the prisoner’s medical needs. The prisoner had been arrested for possession of
marijuana and was given a 120 “shock sentence” in confinement. He became suicidal and was transferred to a
padded cell at the request of mental health personnel. He was to have been personally observed every 15 minutes
by staff and procedure required the prisoner to give a verbal response each time. After a shift chance, the
oncoming officer decided to monitor the prisoner via closed circuit television rather than making the required inperson rounds. During the shift, the prisoner injured himself in the cell and eventually died from his injuries. The
district court denied the employees’ motion for summary judgment, based on assertions of qualified immunity.
The employees appealed. The appeals court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of
material fact as to whether a prison sergeant, who was in charge of the unit where prisoner was kept, and a
lieutenant, were deliberately indifferent to the risk of harm to the prisoner who died from injuries allegedly
sustained in a padded cell. (Missouri Western Reception, Diagnostic and Correction Center)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO SUPERVISE

Shaidnagle v. Adams County, Miss., 88 F.Supp.3d 705 (S.D.Miss. 2015). After a detainee committed suicide
while being held in a county jail, his mother, individually, on behalf of the detainee’s wrongful death
beneficiaries, and as administratrix of the detainee’s estate, brought an action against the county, sheriff, jail
staff, and others, asserting claims for deprivation of civil rights, equitable relief, and declaratory judgment. The
defendants brought a § 1988 cross-claim for attorney fees and costs against the plaintiff, and subsequently
moved for summary judgment. The court held that neither the sheriff nor another alleged policymaker could be
held liable on a theory of supervisory liability for failure to train or supervise, where the mother did not show
that the training jail staff received was inadequate, and the policy in place to determine whether the detainee was
a suicide risk was not the “moving force” behind a constitutional violation. The court held that the correct legal
standard was not whether jail officers “knew or should have known,” but whether they had gained actual
knowledge of the substantial risk of suicide and responded with deliberate indifference. The court held that
neither party was entitled to attorney fees as the “prevailing party.” (Adams County Jail, Mississippi)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO SUPERVISE
STAFFING LEVELS

Shepard v. Hansford County, 110 F.Supp.3d 696 (N.D. Tex. 2015). A husband brought an action against a
county and a county jail employee under § 1983 alleging deliberate indifference to detainee health in violation of
the right to provision of adequate medical treatment under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, following his wife’s suicide while in the county jail. The defendants moved for summary judgment.
The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that: (1) the jail employee was
entitled to qualified immunity; (2) summary judgment was precluded by a fact issue as to whether the jail
employee violated the detainee’s rights, (3) the county had an adequate suicide risk prevention training policy,
where employees were required to attend training to learn about suicide risk detection and prevention methods,
and were required to read the county’s policy on conducting face-to-face suicide checks with detainees; (4) the
county adequately trained employees on cell entry; but (5) a fact issue existed as to whether the county had an
unwritten policy of understaffing the jail, precluding summary judgment. The court noted that it was not clearly
established at the time of the suicide that an employee was required to abandon other duties to ensure that
suicide watch checks were completed, and it was not clearly established that the employee was prohibited from
providing a detainee with a towel in a cell with “tie-off points,” since the employee was not aware of any other
suicides in that cell. (Hansford County Jail, Texas)

U.S. Appeals Court
STAFFING LEVELS

U.S. v. Sanchez-Gomez, 798 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 2015). Defendants filed challenges to a federal district court
policy, adopted upon the recommendation of the United States Marshals, to place defendants in full shackle
restraints for all non-jury proceedings, with the exception of guilty pleas and sentencing hearings, unless a judge
specifically requests the restraints be removed in a particular case. The district court denied the challenges. The
defendants appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. The appeals court found that the defendants’
challenges to the shackling policy were not rendered moot by the fact that they were no longer detained. The
court held that there was no adequate justification of the necessity for the district court’s generalized shackling
policy. According to the court, although the Marshals recommended the policy after some security incidents,
coupled with understaffing, created strains in the ability of the Marshals to provide adequate security for a newly
opened, state-of-the-art courthouse, the government did not point to the causes or magnitude of the asserted
increased security risk, nor did it try to demonstrate that other less restrictive measures, such as increased
staffing, would not suffice. (Southern District of California, United States Marshals, San Diego Federal
Courthouse)

U.S. District Court
CELL CHECKS
INADEQUATE SUPERVISION

Woodson v. City of Richmond, Virginia, 88 F.Supp.3d 551 (E.D.Va. 2015). A city jail inmate brought an action
against city, sheriff, and deputies, alleging deliberate indifference to the inmate’s medical needs during a severe
heat wave. The sheriff moved for summary judgment. The district court held that summary judgment was
precluded by genuine issues of material fact as: (1) whether the sheriff instituted a policy of confining inmates
with medical issues to their cells during mealtime, denying the inmates access to air conditioning in the dining
hall; (2) whether the sheriff’s decisions to keep inmates confined would qualify as a policy; (3) whether the
sheriff was subjectively aware that conditions at the jail posed a substantial risk of harm to inmates; (4) whether
the sheriff was subjectively aware that his response to the risks posed to inmates by excessive heat was
inadequate; (5) whether the sheriff’s policy caused the inmate’s injuries; (6) whether the sheriff’s alleged failure
to investigate two instances of heat-related deaths at the jail, was not persistent and widespread; and (7) whether
the sheriff had at least a constructive knowledge of his deputies’ alleged failure to perform required 30-minute
security checks at a flagrant and widespread level. (Richmond City Jail, Virginia)

45.54

2016
U.S. Appeals Court
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

Belleau v. Wall, 811 F.3d 929 (7th Cir. 2016). A citizen, who had previously been convicted of second degree
sexual assault of a child but was no longer under any form of court-ordered supervision, brought an action
against Wisconsin state officials, alleging that a Wisconsin statute, requiring certain persons who had been
convicted of serious child sex offenses to wear global positioning system (GPS) tracking devices for the rest of
their lives, violated his rights under the Ex Post Facto Clause and the Fourth Amendment. The district court
entered summary judgment in the citizen’s favor. The appeals court reversed the decision. The court held that the
statute did not violate the Fourth Amendment, where the loss of privacy from the requirement to wear the
device-- that the Department of Corrections used device to map the wearer’s whereabouts so that police would
be alerted to the need to conduct an investigation if the wearer was present at a place where a sex crime was
committed-- was very slight compared to the societal gain of deterring future offenses by making persons who
were likely to commit offenses aware that they were being monitored. According to the court, the statute did not
impose punishment, and thus did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. (Wisconsin Department of Corrections)

45.55

45.56

XIX

XIX

44-year-old detainee had told facility staff at the time of admission that he had sustained a head
injury a month earlier. (Calhoun County Correctional Facility, Michigan)
U.S. District Court
TRAINING

Niemyjski v. City of Albuquerque, 379 F.Supp.2d 1221 (D.N.M. 2005). An arrestee brought a state

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO
TRAIN
MEDICAL
SCREENING

Woloszyn v. County of Lawrence, 396 F.3d 314 (3rd Cir. 2005). The administratrix of a pretrial
detainee who committed suicide in jail brought a § 1983 action and wrongful death claims against
and county and corrections officers. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendants and the administratrix appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the
administratrix failed to establish that the corrections officers were aware of the detainee’s
vulnerability to suicide. The court noted that even though a captain said he would put the
detainee on five-minute checks, he also said that he would follow a nurse’s advice. The nurse
found the detainee to be polite, cooperative and alert, and cleared the detainee for one-hour
checks for signs of alcohol withdrawal. The detainee told a booking officer he was not suicidal and
appeared to be in good spirits. The court also held that the fact that a breathing mask was not in
its designated location did not constitute deliberate indifference. Upon finding the detainee
hanging by a sheet, officers immediately initiated CPR without waiting for the protective mask to
arrive, they continued CPR until a protective breathing mask arrived, and the administratrix did
not claim that immediate use of the protective mask would have prevented the detainee’s death.
The court found that the administratrix’s expert failed to identify what specific type of training
would have alerted officers to the fact that the detainee was suicidal. (Lawrence County
Correctional Facility, Pennsylvania)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO
TRAIN

Ziemba v. Armstrong, 430 F.3d 623 (2nd Cir. 2005). A state prison inmate brought a civil rights
action alleging that prison officials failed to provide constitutionally-adequate health care, failed
to protect him from the use of excessive force, and used excessive force. The district court granted
summary judgment for the officials, in part, and they appealed. The appeals court affirmed in
part, reversed in part and remanded. The court held that evidence was sufficient to establish that
a state corrections commissioner exhibited deliberate indifference to the inmate’s constitutional
rights or was grossly negligent in training subordinates, and that evidence was sufficient to
impose supervisory liability on a prison warden. The inmate was allegedly placed in four-point
restraints for 22 hours, beaten, and denied medical care. The court found that summary judgment
was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a prison nurse and medic were
deliberately indifference to the inmate’s serious medical needs. (Connecticut State Prison)

court action against a city, alleging that police officers committed a civil rights violation in
connection with his arrest and detention. The action was removed to federal court, where the
district court granted summary judgment for the city and remanded state law claims. The court
held that the arrestee failed to show that a municipal custom or policy contributed to the alleged
violations. The court noted that the city’s policy manual stated that staff were required to
received training in the legitimate use of force and restraints, and that no correctional officer was
permitted to work with inmates until and unless such training was successfully completed. The
arrestee had been placed in a holding cell. When he was denied the opportunity to make a
telephone call he protested by refusing to have his photograph taken. Because of his resistance,
jail officers used force to position him to take his photograph. The arrestee and the officers later
traded racial insults. He was taken up stairs rather than an elevator, and he fell down and
alleged that officers punched and kicked him resulting in an injury to his ribs. He was released
less than 24 hours after his arrest on a warrant. (Bernalillo County Det. Center, New Mexico)

2006
U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO
TRAIN

Buchanan v. Maine, 417 F.Supp.2d 24 (D.Me. 2006). The personal representative of a mentally ill
suspect who had been fatally shot by a deputy sheriff brought an action against a state, county,
and various officials and officers, alleging civil rights violations. The county and officers moved
for summary judgment, which the district court granted. The court held that the deputy sheriffs'
warrantless entry of a mentally ill suspect's home was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment,
pursuant to the emergency doctrine. According to the court, the deputies had reasonable belief
that the suspect posed an immediate threat to his own safety, and developing circumstances at
the scene, the late time of day, winter conditions, and the remote location of the suspect's
residence made it more reasonable for deputies to enter the home immediately instead of
obtaining a warrant. The court found that the personal representative failed to establish that a
reasonable officer would have understood his conduct in entering the suspect's home without a
warrant contravened clearly established law, and thus the deputies were entitled to qualified
immunity as to the Fourth Amendment claim. The court concluded that the deputies would have
had reasonable grounds to believe that the protective custody criteria under state law were met.
According to the court, a deputy sheriff's shooting of a mentally ill suspect after he had stabbed
another deputy did not constitute excessive force, and thus was reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. The other deputy was attacked after attempting to take the suspect into protective
custody, and the deputy who shot the suspect had reasonable belief that the other deputy was
threatened with death or serious physical injury. The court held that the personal representative

46.31
XX

failed to demonstrate that the county had a custom or policy relating to mentally ill persons that
resulted in deprivation of Fourth Amendment rights, as required to establish the county's
municipal liability under § 1983. According to the court, there was no evidence that the county's
alleged failure to train officers constituted a well-settled and widespread custom or practice, and
that there was no need for increased training in proper methods for making warrantless arrests
or for engaging mentally ill and potentially combative persons when the deputy was hired.
(Lincoln County, Maine)
U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO
TRAIN
MEDICAL CARE

Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir. 2006). The widow of an inmate in a county

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO
TRAIN

Plemmons v. Roberts, 439 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2006). A county jail inmate who had been arrested
for failing to pay child support brought a § 1983 action against a county, county sheriff, and
corrections officers, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The district
court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment and they appealed. The court of
appeals held that genuine issues of material fact as to whether the county jail inmate suffered
from a serious heart condition, whether jail officials were notified of the inmate's history of heart
problems, whether officials failed to recognize that the inmate was suffering from the symptoms
of a heart attack that would be obvious to a lay person, whether the officials acted promptly to
obtain necessary medical help, and whether the officials were properly trained to deal with such a
medical emergency, precluded summary judgment in favor of the defendants. According to the
court, the corrections officers’ alleged delay in providing medical care to the inmate who was
having a heart attack constituted conduct that violated clearly established law, and therefore the
officers were not entitled to qualified immunity in the inmate's § 1983 Eighth Amendment
deliberate indifference claim. The inmate alleged that two officers inexcusably delayed in
summoning an ambulance even though he had told them that he had a history of heart trouble.
The court noted that the medical intake form completed by one of the officers did not contain any
mention of heart problems. (Pulaski County Jail, Missouri)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO
TRAIN

Stephens v. Correctional Services Corp., 428 F.Supp.2d 580 (E.D.Tex. 2006). A pretrial detainee

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO
TRAIN

Walker v. City of Orem, 451 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2006). Two separate actions were brought
against a county and individual officers arising out of a police shooting and the subsequent
detention of witnesses to the shooting. The district court granted the officers’ motion for summary
judgment based on qualified immunity. The appeals court held that the 90-minute detention of
witnesses to a police shooting was not reasonable for investigative purposes under the Fourth
Amendment, but that the constitutional rights of the witnesses to a police shooting to not be
detained for 90 minutes following the shooting was not clearly established at the time. According
to the court, the witnesses to the shooting failed to establish the county’s policy or custom to train
its officers concerning the constitutional limitations on detention of witnesses in connection with
the police shooting investigations. (Utah County Sheriff’s Office, Utah)

jail brought a § 1983 action in state court against the county and others, alleging failure to
adequately train jail medical staff, leading to the denial of adequate medical care which resulted
in the inmate's death. Following removal to federal court, the district court granted the county's
motion for summary judgment and the widow appealed. The court of appeals reversed and
remanded, finding that a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding whether the county's
policy of relying on medical professionals, without offering training on how to implement
procedures for documenting, monitoring, and assessing inmates in the medical unit of the jail,
amounted to deliberate indifference to the inmates’ serious medical needs. The court also found
that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the
county's failure to implement specific policies regarding the treatment of inmates in the medical
unit of the jail amounted to a failure to train the jail's medical staff on how to treat inmates, and
whether the policies were the moving force behind the inmate's death. The 71-year-old inmate
was serving a 120-day jail sentence, and he suffered from congestive heart failure and other
ailments. Over a period of eighteen days his medical condition deteriorated, and although nurses
saw him several times during that period, there is no record of a doctor's examination until the
morning of the 18th day, hours before he died of cardiac arrest. (Los Angeles Co. Jail, California)

brought an action against a private jail corporation, alleging civil rights violations and common
law negligence stemming from an attack while he was incarcerated. The corporation moved for
dismissal. The district court held that the corporation was not entitled to state sovereign
immunity and that the corporation was potentially liable under § 1983. The court found that the
detainee properly stated a negligence claim, and also a viable claim for failure to train and/or
supervise. The court noted that although the establishment and maintenance of jails were
“governmental functions” under state law, jail services provided by a private entity were not. The
detainee alleged that the corporation had a duty to protect his well-being and to ensure his
reasonable safety while incarcerated, and that the corporation breached such duty by not properly
segregating him from violent inmates who threatened his life. He alleged that he informed
officials of the death threats and they took no action, and that he was severely beaten by three
prisoners and suffered life-threatening injuries. (Jefferson County Corrections Facility, Texas)

46.32
XX

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN

Wilson v. Maricopa County, 463 F.Supp.2d 987 (D.Ariz. 2006). In a civil rights suit arising from a fatal assault
on a county jail inmate by other inmates, the county defendants filed motions for summary judgment on all
claims. The plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration of the court’s order that had dismissed the county
sheriff’s office. The summary judgment motions were granted in part and denied in part; the motion for
reconsideration was denied. The court held that summary judgment on Eighth Amendment liability for the fatal
assault on the inmate was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to: (1) whether the county, through its
final policy maker the sheriff, implemented policies, customs, and practices with the requisite subjective intent
of deliberate indifference; (2) whether the county, through the sheriff, failed to act in the face of obvious
omissions and likely constitutional violations; and (3) whether that failure to act caused a constitutional
violation. The court held that the estate sufficiently alleged a § 1983 claim against the sheriff in his individual
capacity by alleging that the sheriff was directly liable under § 1983 for being deliberately indifferent in failing
to supervise and train jail officers in appropriate, lawful, and constitutional policies and procedures for providing
a safe environment for inmates. The court also found that the estate sufficiently alleged a claim that the sheriff
was deliberately indifferent in fostering, encouraging, and knowingly accepting formal and informal jail policies
condoning brutality among the inmates and indifference to proper supervision. According to the court, a jail
supervisor could be found to have been deliberately indifferent to the safety of the inmate if he knew that not
having an officer on the ground in the jail yard posed a risk of violence among the inmates and nonetheless
allowed an officer to cover both the yard and another post, which required the officer to leave the yard
unattended for a significant period of time. (Maricopa County Facility, known as “Tent City”, Phoenix, Arizona)
2007

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN

Banks v. York, 515 F.Supp.2d 89 (D.D.C. 2007). A detainee in a jail operated by the District of Columbia
Department of Corrections (DOC), and in a correctional treatment facility operated by the District's private
contractor, brought a § 1983 action against District employees and contractor's employees alleging negligent
supervision under District of Columbia law, over-detention, deliberate indifference to serious medical needs,
harsh living conditions in jail, and extradition to Virginia without a hearing. The district court granted the
defendants’ motion to dismiss in part and denied in part. The court held that the detainee sufficiently alleged that
the Director of District of Columbia Department of Corrections (DOC) was directly involved in violations of the
detainee's constitutional rights, as required to state a claim under § 1983 against a government official in his
individual capacity. The detainee alleged that the Director refused to transfer the detainee from the jail to a
correctional treatment facility and failed to train DOC employees under his supervision in such a way as to
prevent the detainee's over-detention (detention beyond proper release date). The court found that the Director of
District of Columbia Department of Corrections (DOC) could not be liable in his individual capacity, under the
theory of respondeat superior, to the jail detainee for allegedly unconstitutional actions or omissions of his
subordinates. The appeals court found that the detainee's allegation that policies or practices of the District of
Columbia Department of Corrections (DOC) pertaining to training, supervision and discipline of employees
responsible for the detainees' release from DOC custody resulted in his untimely release from jail, in violation of
his constitutional rights, stated a claim for municipal liability under § 1983. The court found that the detainee's
allegations that the Director of the Department of Corrections (DOC), despite his actual and constructive
knowledge that DOC employees were engaged in conduct that posed a pervasive and unreasonable risk of
constitutional injury through over-detention, failed to train, monitor, and discipline DOC employees with regard
to the timely release of inmates from DOC custody, and that the Director's deliberate failure to do so caused
detainee's over-detention, were sufficient when construed liberally to state a claim under § 1983 for violation of
due process and violation of protection against cruel and unusual punishment. The court noted that the detainee
had a clearly established constitutional protection against over-detention and thus, the Director was not entitled
to qualified immunity. (Central Detention Facility. D.C. and Correctional Treatment Facility operated by the
Corrections Corporation of America)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN
MEDICAL CARE
MEDICAL
SCREENING

Branton v. City of Moss Point, 503 F.Supp.2d 809 (S.D.Miss. 2007). The son of a pre-trial detainee who had
committed suicide while in custody, filed suit against the city and jail officers asserting claims pursuant to the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments for failure to train, failure to adopt a policy for safe custodial care of
suicidal detainees, and failure to adopt a policy of furnishing medical care to suicidal detainees. The detainee
was detained on suspicion of drunk driving and was resistant during the booking process. During the booking
process the detainee answered a series of questions. When he was asked, “Have you ever attempted suicide or
are you thinking about it now?” he responded, “No.” He was taken to a cell that was designated for intoxicated
or combative prisoners, given a sheet and a blanket, and was locked in the cell at 3:30 a.m. While conducting a
jail check at approximately 5:30 a.m., an officer discovered the detainee kneeling in a corner of the cell with the
sheet around his neck. He was unable to be revived. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district
court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether jail officers had actual knowledge of a substantial risk of suicide by
the detainee, and that fact issues precluded summary judgment in the claim against the city and officers in their
official capacities. On appeal (261 Fed.Appx. 659), the appeals court reversed and remanded. (City of Moss
Point, Mississippi)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN

Jenkins v. DeKalb County, Ga., 528 F.Supp.2d 1329 (N.D.Ga. 2007). Survivors of a county jail detainee who
had died as the result of an apparent beating by a fellow inmate brought a § 1983, Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendment action against a county sheriff in his individual capacity, and against corrections officers. The
defendants moved for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The district court granted the motion.
The 71 year old pretrial detainee suffered from multiple mental illnesses including schizophrenia and dementia,

46.33
XXII

which reportedly manifested themselves in theform of delusions, paranoia, bizarre thoughts and behavior,
physical violence, and verbal outbursts that included racial epithets. The court held that county corrections
officers' putting the inmate into a cell different from the one to which he had been assigned, allegedly leading to
the beating death of a pretrial detainee who shared the same cell, did not violate the detainee's right against cruel
and unusual punishment. The court noted that even though the action violated a jail policy, the policy was
created primarily to keep track of inmates' placement, not to maintain inmate safety, and there was no evidence
of widespread inmate-on-inmate violence due to the misplacement of inmates. The court found that the plaintiffs
failed to show that the sheriff's alleged poor training and supervision of corrections officers led to the officers'
allegedly inadequate reaction to the incident between the jail inmates, which ended with the beating death of one
inmate. The court also found that the sheriff's failure to comply with a court order to transfer the pretrial detainee
to a mental health facility did not show supervisory liability because the purpose of the transfer order was likely
to get the detainee treatment for mental illness, not to protect him. The court held that the county corrections
officers were acting within the scope of their duties when they mistakenly placed a fellow inmate in the same
cell with a pretrial detainee, and thus the officers were eligible for qualified immunity in the detainee’s survivors'
§ 1983 Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment action. The court noted that the fact that the mistake violated jail
policies or procedures did not mean that the officers were not exercising discretionary authority. (DeKalb
County Jail, Georgia)
U.S. District Court
MEDICAL
SCREENING

Thomas v. Sheahan, 499 F.Supp.2d 1062 (N.D.Ill. 2007). A special administrator filed a § 1983 suit against a
county, sheriff, county board, correctional officers, supervisors, and a correctional medical technician, on behalf
of a pretrial detainee who died at a county jail from meningitis and pneumonia. The administrator alleged
violations of the detainee’s constitutional rights and state law claims for wrongful death, survival action, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress. The defendants moved for summary judgment and to strike
documents. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that summary
judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the detainee's illness was an
objectively serious medical need, and whether correctional officials and a correctional medical technician were
aware of the detainee's serious medical symptoms. The court also found that summary judgment was precluded
on the issue of causation due to a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the county was deliberately
indifferent to its widespread practice of failing to train its employees on how to handle inmate medical requests
at the county jail. (Cook County Jail, Illinois).

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Thomas v. Sheahan, 514 F.Supp.2d 1083 (N.D.Ill. 2007). A special administrator filed a § 1983 suit against a
county, sheriff, county board, correctional officers, supervisors and correctional medical technician on behalf of
a pretrial detainee who died at a county jail from meningitis and pneumonia, alleging violations of constitutional
rights and state law claims for wrongful death, survival action, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The court held that the administrator's failure to produce documentary evidence of lost wages or child support
payments did not preclude her from introducing evidence at trial. The court found that the physician was not
qualified to testify as to the manifestations of meningitis absent evidence that the physician was an expert on
meningitis or infectious diseases. According to the court, a jail operations expert's proposed testimony that the
county did not meet minimum standards of the conduct for training of correctional staff was inadmissible. The
court also found that evidence of jail conditions was relevant and thus admissible, where the administrator of the
detainee's estate argued that county officials should have known the detainee was sick because he was throwing
up in his cell and in a day room. (Cook County, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN
MEDICAL CARE

Wakat v. Montgomery County, 471 F.Supp.2d 759 (S.D.Tex 2007). The estate of inmate who died in a county
jail brought a § 1983 action against the county, jail physician, and other county personnel. The defendants
moved for summary judgment. The district court held that the county was not liable based on a county policy,
the county was not liable for failure to train or supervise county jail personnel, and a physician did not act with
deliberate indifference to the inmate's serious medical needs. The court found that the county did not act with
deliberate indifference in its training and supervision of county jail personnel in dealing with inmates' medical
needs, absent a showing of a pattern or a recurring situation of tortuous conduct by inadequately trained
employees. (Montgomery County Jail, Texas)
2008

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN
MEDICAL CARE

Anglin v. City of Aspen, Colo., 552 F.Supp.2d 1205 (D.Colo. 2008). A pretrial detainee brought a civil rights
action, alleging that a county sheriff, county jailers, and others violated her rights to due process and free speech,
as well as her right to be free from unreasonable seizure, by forcibly injecting her with antipsychotic medication
while in custody at a county jail. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants in part. The
court held that a county sheriff's deputy personally participated in the decision to sedate the detainee and
therefore the deputy could be liable in his individual capacity under § 1983. The court found that the training of
county jail personnel by the county sheriff and other officials with respect to forcible sedation of pretrial
detainees in the county jail, was not deliberately indifferent to the due process rights of the detainees, and
therefore the sheriff and county officials were not liable under § 1983 for failure to properly train. The training
required personnel to call the paramedics and let the paramedics, with the advice of a physician, make the
decision as to whether or not to sedate. (Pitkin County Jail, Colorado)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN
MEDICAL CARE

Anglin v. City of Aspen, 562 F.Supp.2d 1304 (D.Colo. 2008). A jail inmate brought a civil rights action under §
1983 against a city, former and current police officers, and a police chief, alleging that the defendants violated
her rights to due process and free speech, as well as her right to be free from unreasonable seizure, by forcibly
injecting her with antipsychotic medication while she was in custody at a county jail. The district court granted
summary judgment for the defendants. The court held that officers did not deprive the inmate of due process by

46.34
XXII

restraining her while paramedics forcibly sedated her and that the officers' act of restraining the inmate while she
was sedated did not amount to excessive use of force. The court found that the police chief was not liable for
failure to train and/or supervise officers, where the training reflected the sound conclusion that medical
professionals, rather than law enforcement personnel, were the individuals most qualified to determine whether
sedation was appropriate. According to the court, absent a policy of sedating detainees, the city was not
municipally liable under § 1983. The court held that the officers’ act of restraining the inmate while paramedics
forcibly administered antipsychotic medication to her was not substantially motivated as a response to her
exercise of allegedly constitutionally protected conduct, as would support the inmate's First Amendment free
speech retaliation claim against the officers, where the physician, not the officers, had legal authorization to
decide whether an emergency existed that justified the inmate's forced sedation, and the officers did not
participate in making the decision to forcibly sedate the inmate. (City of Aspen, Colorado)
U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN

Brumfield v. Hollins, 551 F.3d 322 (5th Cir. 2008). The daughter of a detainee who hung himself while confined
in a “drunk tank” of a county jail brought a § 1983 action against the county, and a sheriff and deputies in their
individual and official capacities. The district court awarded summary judgment to each defendant sued in his
individual capacity on the basis of qualified immunity, but denied summary judgment to individual defendants in
their official capacities and to the county. After a trial, the district court directed a verdict in favor of all officers
and the county. The daughter appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the sheriff was protected
by qualified immunity and that the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding expert testimony
indicating that the detainee was alive when paramedics arrived at the jail. The court found that the county was
not liable under § 1983. According to the court, the sheriff was entitled to qualified immunity from the claim that
he failed to adopt any written policy pertaining to inmate supervision or medical care, where verbal policies
existed concerning inmate supervision and medical care. The court found that the sheriff's efforts in training and
supervising deputies were not deliberately indifferent, as required for the sheriff to be liable under § 1983 for the
suicide of a drunk driving detainee. The court noted that the deputies did receive training, and that there was no
evidence of a pattern of similar violations or evidence that it should have been apparent that a constitutional
violation was the highly predictable consequence of an alleged failure to train. The court found that while the
deputies' conclusion that the detainee who had hung himself was already dead, and their resulting failure to make
any attempt to save his life, were arguably negligent, this conduct alone did not amount to deliberate
indifference, nor was any county custom or policy the moving force behind the deputies' conduct, as required for
the county to be liable under § 1983 for denial of reasonable medical care. (Marion County Jail, Mississippi)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN

Buckley v. Barbour County, Ala., 624 F.Supp.2d 1335 (M.D.Ala. 2008). An inmate brought § 1983, Eighth
Amendment and due process claims, as well as state law claims, against a county and a work-crew supervisor,
alleging that his back was injured as the result of a failure to train him in equipment safety before he cleared
trees as part of a prison work crew. The county and supervisor filed separate motions to dismiss. The district
court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that the inmate's allegations that the county
failed to train him and another inmate in equipment operations safety, that they were ordered while part of a
community work squad to use chainsaws to cut a large oak tree to clear it from a roadway, and that the tree
rolled onto the inmate, breaking his back, were sufficient to plead a causal connection between the county's
practice or custom of failing to train and the inmate's injury. The court noted that the inmate was not required to
allege a specific practice or custom of failing to train inmates to avoid falling trees. The court held that the
inmate's allegations were also sufficient to show the county's awareness of facts from which an inference of a
substantial risk of harm could be drawn, as required to plead a deliberate indifference § 1983 Eighth Amendment
claim. According to the court, the inmate's allegations that a prison work-crew supervisor was aware that the
inmate was not trained in equipment safety and felt unqualified to use a chainsaw, yet still ordered the inmate to
use a chainsaw to cut a fallen tree hanging over a ditch, were sufficient to plead a § 1983 Eighth Amendment
claim against the supervisor. The court also denied qualified immunity from the inmate’s allegations. According
to the court, under Alabama law, the inmate's allegations that the work-crew supervisor ordered him and another
inmate to cut a tree hanging over a ditch with chainsaws, with the knowledge they were not trained in equipment
safety, and that the tree rolled onto the inmate breaking his back, were sufficient to plead willful negligence by
the supervisor. (Barbour County Community Work Squad, Alabama)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN

Dean v. City of Fresno, 546 F.Supp.2d 798 (E.D.Cal. 2008). The widow and children of a detainee who died
from complications of cocaine ingestion while incarcerated in a county jail, brought an action in state court
against a city and two police officers. After removal to federal court, the defendants moved for summary
judgment on all claims. The district court granted the motion in part and remanded. The court found that the
officers violated the detainee's Fourteenth Amendment right to medical care when they did not obtain medical
aid for the detainee after he vomited in the patrol car and rock cocaine was found in the vomit. According to the
court, a rational jury could conclude that the officers knew that the detainee had swallowed rock cocaine and had
a serious medical condition, and that the officers did not render care themselves, did not call for paramedics, did
not take the detainee to the hospital, and did not report the discovery of the rock cocaine in the vomit to the jail
nurse. The court found that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity where the detainee, who did not
exhibit signs of being high as his detention progressed and who was previously communicative of his symptoms,
gave an inaccurate reason to explain his condition and never requested medical treatment. The court held that
the plaintiffs failed to show that the city failed to adequately train the officers. According to the court, the
undisputed evidence showed that Fresno police officers receive police academy training, field training programs,
on the job training, advanced officer courses, and various classes and seminars. The court noted that Fresno
police officers are particularly trained: (1) to conduct evaluations to determine if a person is under the influence
of a controlled substance, including rock cocaine (for those officers involved in narcotics investigations); (2) to
request aid for persons in need of medical care; (3) to recognize an arrestee's need for medical care and provide
such care; (4) to be aware of efforts that suspects may make to hide controlled substances, including putting such

46.35
XXII

substances in their mouths; (5) to render medical aid, contact emergency medical services or transport the
suspect to the hospital if they have a reasonable belief that a suspect has swallowed a controlled substance, such
as rock cocaine; (6) to know that ingestion of cocaine can cause death; (7) to know that arrested persons may
have evidence in their mouth; (8) to know that persons arrested on drug charges may attempt to conceal the
illegal drugs on their person; and (9) to be suspicious of those arrested and what the arrestees say. (City of
Fresno and Fresno County Jail, California)
U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE
NEGLIGENCE

Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225 (4th Cir. 2008). The estate and family of a deceased inmate brought a § 1983 survival
and wrongful death action against correctional officers, alleging violations of the inmate's Eighth Amendment
rights. The district court granted, in part, the officers' motion for summary judgment. The officers appealed. The
appeals court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held that an officer violated the deceased inmate's
Eighth Amendment right to be free from excessive force, arising from the inmate's death after his extraction
from his cell involving the use of pepper spray, and thus the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity on §
1983 claims. The court found there was no question that some dispersal of pepper spray was warranted in
carrying out the extraction. But the officer’s final burst of pepper spray was deployed after the inmate had laid
down on the floor, and the officer and members of the extraction team never changed the inmate's clothing or
removed the spit mask covering his nose and mouth and never secured medical treatment for the inmate.
Although the inmate proffered his hands through the door pursuant to the officer's order, albeit in front of rather
than behind him, the officer deployed several additional bursts of pepper spray even after the inmate attempted
to comply with the order, and the inmate never reacted violently. The court held that correction officers were
deliberately indifferent to the medical needs of the deceased inmate in violation of the inmate's Eighth
Amendment right to adequate medical care, and thus were not entitled to qualified immunity on § 1983 claim
brought by the inmate's estate and family. According to the court, the officers' training required decontamination
after the use of pepper spray, the state's medical examiner credited pepper spray as contributing to the inmate's
death, a lay person would have inferred from the inmate's collapse that he was in need of medical attention, the
officers witnessed the inmate's collapse, caught him, and directed him into a wheelchair, and yet the inmate
received no medical treatment. The officers argued that the inmate did not appear fazed by the pepper spray and
that the inmate's opportunity to breathe fresh air while he was wheeled from the medical room was an adequate
alternative to receiving actual medical care. (Western Correctional Institution, Maryland)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN

Jones v. Taylor, 534 F.Supp.2d 475 (D.Del. 2008). A state prisoner brought a civil rights action alleging that a
corrections officer used excessive force against him, another officer did not protect him, and a former
commissioner and a former warden did not properly train and supervise officers in dealing with prisoners. The
district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court held that the supervisors were not
the driving force behind the alleged use of excessive force by the corrections officer and were not deliberately
indifferent to the plight of the state prisoner. The court denied the prisoner’s claim for improper training, noting
that the officer received training prior to his employment and that he attened annual refresher courses. The court
noted that the officer had never been disciplined. The court held that the officer did not use excessive force
against the prisoner, where the officer, alone in a small space with the prisoner who was not handcuffed,
perceived a threat from the prisoner, and used minimal force, which included an A-frame chokehold. The court
noted that the prisoner was handcuffed once he was under control, received only minimal injury and never
sought follow-up medical treatment after his initial visit with a nurse. The use of force was investigated and
approved by the officer's supervisor, and the prisoner was found guilty of disorderly and threatening behavior
with regard to the incident. (Sussex Correctional Institute, Delaware)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN

Parker v. Bladen County, 583 F.Supp.2d 736 (E.D.N.C. 2008). The administratrix of a detainee's estate brought
a § 1983 action in state court against county defendants, alleging that they used excessive force when they used
tasers on her. The defendants removed the action to federal court. The county and sheriff's department moved to
dismiss. The district court granted the motion. According to the court, under North Carolina law, the sheriff, not
the county encompassing his jurisdiction, has final policymaking authority over hiring, supervising, and
discharging personnel in the sheriff's office. The court found that the sheriff's deputies' alleged use of excessive
force in attempting to control the detainee by use of tasers, and the sheriff's department's alleged failure to train
and supervise its employees as to the use of tasers, could not be attributed to the county, so as to subject it to §
1983 liability for the detainee's death. The court held that the county sheriff's department lacked the legal
capacity, under North Carolina law, to be sued under § 1983 liability for the detainee's death. (Bladen County
Sheriff’s Department, North Carolina)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN
MEDICAL CARE
MEDICAL
SCREENING
NEGLIGENCE

Phillips v. Roane County, Tenn., 534 F.3d 531 (6th Cir. 2008). A representative of the estate of a pretrial detainee
who died in a county jail of untreated diabetes brought an action against correctional officers, a jail doctor, and
paramedics, alleging deliberate indifference to the detainee's serious medical condition under § 1983 and
asserting state law medical malpractice claims. The district court denied the defendants' motion for summary
judgment and the defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
The court held that the alleged conduct of the correctional officers in observing and being aware of the
detainee's serious medical condition, which included signs of nausea, vomiting blood, swelling, lethargy, and
chest pains, and in allegedly disregarding jail protocols, which required the officers to transport the detainee to a
hospital emergency room for evaluation upon complaints of chest pain, amounted to deliberate indifference to
the detainee's serious medical condition, in violation of the detainee’s due process rights.
The court found that the paramedic's conduct in allegedly disregarding a jail protocol which required the
paramedic to transport detainees to a hospital emergency room when they complained of chest pains, by failing
to transport the detainee upon responding to an incident in which the detainee allegedly lost consciousness, had
no pulse, and complained of chest pain and nausea after she regained consciousness, amounted to deliberate
indifference to the detainee's serious medical condition, in violation of her due process rights. The court found

46.36
XXII

that county officials were not liable under § 1983 for their alleged failure to properly train jail officers as to the
proper protocols for obtaining medical treatment for the detainee, absent a showing that any individual official
encouraged, authorized, or knowingly acquiesced to the officers' alleged deliberate indifference. Because the
detainee had a clearly established right under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to receive
medical treatment to address serious medical needs, the court found that jail officials were not entitled to
qualified immunity for their alleged conduct in failing to provide the diabetic detainee with medical treatment.
(Roane County Jail, Tennessee)
U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN

Walker v. Sheahan, 526 F.3d 973 (7th Cir. 2008). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against county
correctional officers, a county sheriff, and a county, alleging that the officers used excessive force against him,
deprived him of access to medical care, and retaliated against him. The district court granted summary judgment
in favor of the defendants. The detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded. The court held that the sheriff’s office was not liable under § 1983 because the detainee failed to
demonstrate that the sheriff's office had a pattern of widespread use of excessive force, inadequate investigation
and training regarding use of force, or a code of silence. The court noted that although 783 complaints of
excessive force were made against the sheriff's office over a five-year period, none resulted in an indictment, the
the training the officers received imposed limitations on the amount of force they could use, and that officers
weredisciplined for the use of excessive force. The court held that summary judgment for the officers was
precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the injuries sustained by the detainee were consistent
with his account of the restraint incident involving county corrections officers. (Cook County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN

Whitt v. Stephens County, 529 F.3d 278 (5th Cir. 2008). The father of a pretrial detainee who purportedly hanged
himself while incarcerated at a county jail brought a § 1983 action against a county, the county sheriff, and
unknown jail officials. The district court granted summary judgment in part in favor of jail officials and the
sheriff in their individual capacities. The father appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The district court denied
the father's motion for leave to amend the complaint to identify the unknown jail officials, and granted summary
judgment in favor of the defendants on remaining claims. The father again appealed. The appeals court affirmed.
The court held that the amended complaint to substitute named county jail officials for unknown jail officials did
not relate back to the original complaint, for the purpose of avoiding a statute of limitations bar. The court held
that the county was not liable under § 1983 for the detainee's purported suicide, where the county had adequate
policies and procedures for detainees who posed an obvious risk of suicide, the detainee did not indicate that he
was suicidal on an intake form or otherwise exhibit obvious suicidal tendencies, and the county was not
deliberately indifferent in failing to train or supervise county jail officials. The court noted that in the specific
context of jail suicide prevention, municipalities must provide custodial officials with minimal training to detect
the obvious medical needs of pretrial detainees with known, demonstrable, and serious medical disorders, but a
failure to train custodial officials in screening procedures to detect latent suicidal tendencies does not rise to the
level of a constitutional violation. The court found that in the absence of manifest signs of suicidal tendencies, a
city may not be held liable for a pretrial detainee's jailhouse suicide in a § 1983 suit based on a failure to train.
(Stephens County Jail, Texas)
2009

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN

Boyd v. Nichols, 616 F.Supp.2d 1331 (M.D.Ga. 2009). A female, who had been housed in a jail for violation of
her probation, brought an action against a former jailer, county, and former sheriff, under § 1983 and state law,
relating to the sexual assault of the inmate by the jailer. The county and sheriff moved for summary judgment
and the district court granted the motions. The court held that the sheriff was not “deliberately indifferent” to a
substantial risk of serious harm to the inmate under the Eighth Amendment or the Georgia constitution in failing
to protect the inmate from sexual assaults by a jailer, absent evidence that the sheriff had knowledge or
indication that the jailer was a threat or danger to inmates, or that male guards, if left alone with female inmates,
posed a risk to the inmates' health and safety. The court noted that the sheriff's actions in calling for an
investigation and terminating the jailer's employment upon learning of the jailer's actions was not an “indifferent
and objectively unreasonable response” to the inmate's claims, and thus, there was no violation of the inmate's
rights. The court held that the jail's staffing did not pose a “substantial risk of serious harm” to the inmate who
was sexually assaulted by a jailer, as required to show violation of the Eighth Amendment and Georgia
constitution, absent evidence that the jail was inadequately staffed. According to the court, the county did not
have a policy or custom of underfunding and understaffing the jail, as would constitute deliberate indifference to
a substantial risk of serious harm to the inmate, and thus the county could not be liable under § 1983 to the
inmate who was sexually assaulted by a jailer. The court found that the sheriff's failure to train deputies and
jailers in proper procedures for escorting and handling female inmates did not support supervisory liability on
the § 1983 claim of the inmate, where the sheriff had no knowledge of any prior sexual assaults at the jail or any
problems with jailers improperly escorting and handling female inmates, and the jailer who committed the
assault had been trained previously on how to interact with inmates and knew it was improper to have intimate
contact with inmates. During the time period in question, the county did not have a policy prohibiting a male
jailer from escorting a female inmate within the Jail. The court held that the county and sheriff had sovereign
immunity from the state law claims of the inmate, absent evidence that such immunity had been waived by an
act of the General Assembly. (Berrien County Jail, Georgia)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN

Chester v. Beard, 657 F.Supp.2d 534 (M.D.Pa. 2009). Pennsylvania death-row inmates brought a class action
under § 1983 against Pennsylvania Department of Corrections officials, seeking a permanent injunctive relief
against alleged violations of their right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment and their right to due
process, arising from Pennsylvania's use of lethal injection as an execution method. The district court denied the
defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court held that the inmates had Article III standing to bring a § 1983

46.37
XXII

challenge to the state's use of lethal injection as an execution method, seeking permanent injunctive relief, even
if the inmates were not under active death warrants. The court noted that the fact that the inmates were subject to
the death sentence conferred a sufficient personal stake in the action to satisfy the standing requirements. The
court held that the death-row inmates stated a § 1983 claim against the DOC by alleging that the state's use of
lethal injection as an execution method, in the absence of adequate training for those conducting the executions,
exposed the inmates to the risk of extreme pain and suffering. (Pennsylvania Department of Corrections)
U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN

Estate of Gaither ex rel. Gaither v. District of Columbia, 655 F.Supp.2d 69 (D.D.C. 2009). The personal
representative of the estate of a prisoner, who was killed while incarcerated, brought a § 1983 action against the
District of Columbia and several individual officials and jail employees, alleging negligence, deliberate and
reckless indifference to allegedly dangerous conditions at a jail, and wrongful death. The district court granted
summary judgment in part and denied in part. The court found that summary judgment was precluded by
genuine issues of material fact as to: (1) whether the District of Columbia's inmate and detainee classification
policies, procedures, and practices were inadequate; (2) whether the District of Columbia's jail staffing policies,
procedures, and practices were inadequate; (3) whether the security policies, procedures, and practices were
inadequate; (4) whether the District of Columbia adequately trained Department of Corrections officials; and (5)
whether officials provided adequate supervision of inmates. (District of Columbia Central Detention Facility)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN

Francis ex rel. Estate of Francis v. Northumberland County, 636 F.Supp.2d 368 (M.D.Pa. 2009). The
administrator of the estate of a detainee who committed suicide while in a county prison brought an action
against the county and prison officials, asserting claims for Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment reckless
indifference and Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment under § 1983. The administrator also alleged
wrongful death under state law. The county defendants brought third-party claims against a psychiatrist who
evaluated the detainee, and the psychiatrist counter-claimed. The county defendants and psychiatrist moved
separately for summary judgment. The court held that the County, which paid $360,000 in exchange for a release
of claims brought by the estate of the detainee, would be entitled to indemnity on third-party claims against the
psychiatrist who evaluated the detainee if a jury determined that the psychiatrist was at fault in the detainee's
suicide. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to: (1)
whether the evaluating psychiatrist knew the pretrial detainee was a suicide risk and failed to take necessary and
available precautions to prevent the detainee's suicide as would show deliberate indifference to the detainee's
medical needs; (2) whether the evaluating psychiatrist was an employee of the county prison entitled to
immunity under the Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Tort Claim Act (PSTCA) or was an independent
contractor excluded from such immunity; (3) whether the evaluating psychiatrist's failure to appropriately
document the pretrial detainee's medical records led to the detainee's removal from a suicide watch; (4) whether
the recordation of the pretrial detainee's suicide watch level was customary, precluding summary judgment as to
whether the evaluating psychiatrist had a duty to record this information; (5) whether the evaluating
psychiatrist's failure to communicate the appropriate suicide watch level to county prison officials resulted in the
pretrial detainee's suicide; and (6) whether the evaluating psychiatrist communicated the appropriate suicide
watch level for the pretrial detainee to county prison officials and whether the psychiatrist was required to record
the watch level in the detainee's medical records.
The court found that the county prison had an effective suicide policy in place and thus the psychiatrist who
evaluated the pretrial detainee had no viable Fourteenth Amendment inadequate medical care and failure to train
counterclaims under § 1983 against the county. According to the court, while at least one individual at the prison
may have failed to carry out protocols for the diagnosis and care of suicidal detainees, the policy would have
been effective if properly followed as was customary at the prison. The court held that the county prison warden
adequately trained subordinates with regard to protocols for the care and supervision of suicidal inmates and
adequately supervised execution of these protocols, and thus the psychiatrist who evaluated the pretrial detainee
had no viable counterclaim under § 1983 against the warden for failure to adequately train or supervise under the
Fourteenth Amendment. (Northumberland County Prison, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN
MEDICAL CARE

Hamilton v. Lajoie, 660 F.Supp.2d 261 (D.Conn. 2009). An inmate filed a pro se § 1983 action against the State
of Connecticut, a warden, and correctional officers, seeking compensatory and punitive damages for head
trauma, abrasions to his ear and shoulder, and post-traumatic stress due to an officers' alleged use of
unconstitutionally excessive force during a prison altercation. The inmate also alleged inadequate supervision,
negligence, and willful misconduct. The court held that the inmate's factual allegations against correctional
officers, in their individual capacities, were sufficient for a claim of excessive force in violation of the inmate's
Eighth Amendment rights. The officers allegedly pinned the inmate to the ground near his cell, following an
inspection for contraband, and purportedly sprayed the inmate in the face with a chemical agent despite his
complaints that he had asthma. The court found that the inmate's allegations against the warden in his individual
capacity were sufficient for a claim of supervisory liability, under § 1983, based on the warden's specific conduct
before and after the altercation between the inmate and correctional officers. The inmate alleged that the warden
was responsible for policies that led to his injuries and for procedures followed by medical staff following the
incident, and the warden failed to properly train officers, to adequately supervise medical staff, to review video
evidence of the incident, and to order outside medical treatment of the inmate's injuries even though a
correctional officer received prompt medical care at an outside hospital for his head injury sustained in the
altercation. (Corrigan-Radgowski Correctional Center, Connecticut)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN

Hardy v. District of Columbia, 601 F.Supp.2d 182 (D.D.C. 2009). Pretrial detainees, allegedly assaulted by
fellow inmates, brought a suit against the former Director of the District of Columbia Department of Corrections
and a former jail warden in both their official and individual capacities, and against the District of Columbia.
The detainees sought damages under § 1983 for alleged Fifth and Eighth Amendment violations. The district
court dismissed the case in part. The court held that the detainees' § 1983 official capacity claims against the

46.38
XXII

former Director and former jail warden were redundant to the claims against the District of Columbia,
warranting dismissal. The court noted that claims brought against government employees in their official
capacity are treated as claims against the employing government and serve no independent purpose when the
government is also sued. The detainees alleged that before the scalding attacks that injured them, one of the very
assailants had committed a similar scalding attack using water heated in an unguarded microwave, and that the
locations where their assaults occurred were inadequately staffed with corrections officers and resulted in the
assaults taking place without any officers in the vicinity. The court held that these allegations were sufficient to
plead conditions of detention that posed a substantial risk of serious harm, as required to state a failure-to-protect
claim against the Director of the District of Columbia Department of Corrections and the jail warden. The court
found that the detainees' allegation that the Director and jail warden were deliberately indifferent to negligent
supervision of correctional officers and lack of staff training, was sufficient to state a § 1983 failure to train
claim violative of their due process rights. The detainees alleged that the warden and Director were at the top of
the “chain of command” at the jail, that they had been aware of violence issues for many years, and that they had
been instructed to take action against violence on numerous occasions. The district court denied qualified
immunity for the Director and jail warden, noting that the detainees' due process rights against deliberate
indifference were clearly established at the time of violent scalding attacks by fellow inmates. (District of
Columbia Jail)

XXIII

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN

Jackson v. Gerl, 622 F.Supp.2d 738 (W.D.Wis. 2009). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a warden and
other prison officials, alleging that the use of a stinger grenade to extract him from his cell constituted excessive
force in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and that an abusive strip search following the deployment of the
grenade also violated the Eighth Amendment. The defendants moved for summary judgment and the district
court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that a prison lieutenant's extraction of the
prisoner from inside his cell by means of a stinger grenade, which when detonated created a bright flash of light,
emitted a loud blast accompanied by smoke, and fired rubber balls, was not “de minimis,” as would bar a claim
for excessive force under the Eighth Amendment. The court found that summary judgment was precluded by
genuine issues of material fact as to whether the extraction of the prisoner from his cell by means of a stinger
grenade was malicious and sadistic, or whether the use was in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore
discipline. The court held that the prison security director's authorization of the prisoner's extraction by means of
a stinger grenade was not malicious and sadistic, as required to establish excessive force under the Eighth
Amendment. According to the court, the director was aware that the prisoner was refusing to cooperate, the
prisoner had invited officials to “suit up” to “come in and play,” and had covered his window and had put water
on the floor. The director knew that tasers and incapacitating agents could not be used against the prisoner, and
relied on the lieutenant's statements that she had been trained and was certified in the use of the grenade, having
never used one himself. According to the court, the prison's training captain and the commander of the
emergency response unit did not provide inadequate training on the use of a stinger grenade, with a deliberate or
reckless disregard to the prisoners' Eighth Amendment rights against excessive force, as required to subject the
captain to § 1983 liability, even though the captain advised trainees that stinger grenades could be used in a cell
and did not tell them of the danger of using the grenade in the presence of water. The captain lacked knowledge
that using the grenade in a cell or in the presence of water would likely be an excessive use of force even where
immediate weapons would otherwise be justified. (Wisconsin Secure Program Facility)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN

Lewis v. City of West Palm Beach, Fla., 561 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2009). The survivor of a detainee who had died
in police custody brought a § 1983 action against a city and against individual officers, alleging use of excessive
force. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants and the survivor appealed. The appeals
court affirmed. The court held that the detainee's right not to be restrained via “hobbling” and being “hogtied”
was not clearly established. The detainee became unconscious and died during detention. According to the court,
the officers' conduct was not so egregious as to be plainly unlawful to any reasonable officer, given the
detainee's agitated state when first detained and given his continued uncooperative and agitated state, presenting
a safety risk to himself and others, during restraint. After handcuffing the detainee did not prevent his continued
violent behavior, the officers attached an ankle restraint to the handcuffs with a hobble cord (also known as
“TARP,” the total appendage restraint position). The hobble was tightened so that Lewis's hands and feet were
close together behind his back in a “hogtied” position. The court held that the city was not potentially liable for
failure to train officers in the use of restraints, where the need for training in the application of “hobble”
restraints did not rise to the level of obviousness that would render the city potentially liable under § 1983 for
deliberate indifference based on the failure to administer such training. The court noted that hobble restraints did
not have the same potential flagrant risk of constitutional violations as the use of deadly firearms. (West Palm
Beach Police Department, Florida)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN
MEDICAL CARE

Parlin v. Cumberland County, 659 F.Supp.2d 201 (D.Me. 2009). A female former county jail inmate brought an
action against jail officers, a county, and a sheriff, under § 1983 and Maine law, alleging deliberate indifference
to her serious medical needs, negligence, and excessive force. The district court granted summary judgment for
the defendants in part and denied in part. The court held that: (1) the officers were not deliberately indifferent to
a serious medical need; (2) an officer who fell on the inmate did not use excessive force; (3) the county was not
liable for deprivation of medical care; and (4) the county was not liable for failure to train. The court held that
the officers were not entitled to absolute immunity from excessive force claims where a genuine issue of
material fact existed as to whether the officers used excessive force in transferring the jail inmate between cells.
According to the court, there was no evidence that jail officers were subjectively aware of the jail inmate's
serious medical condition, where the inmate made no mention of her shoulder injury to the officers other than
crying out “my shoulder” after she had fallen. (Cumberland County Jail, Maine)

46.39

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN
MEDICAL CARE
SCREENING

Powers-Bunce v. District of Columbia, 659 F.Supp.2d 173 (D.D.C. 2009). A mother, for herself and as the
personal representative of an arrestee who hanged himself in a holding cell at a police precinct shortly after he
was arrested by the United States Secret Service, brought an action against the District of Columbia and several
police and Secret Service officers. The District of Columbia moved for judgment on the pleadings, or in the
alternative, for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that: (1) the District of
Columbia did not violate the Fifth Amendment right of the arrestee to be free from deliberate indifference to his
substantial risk of committing suicide; (2) the District of Columbia could not be held liable for a police officers'
failure to attempt to revive the arrestee; and (3) the District of Columbia could not be held liable for officers'
inadequate training and supervision. The court held that inadequate training and supervision of District of
Columbia police officers, who failed to follow police department procedures when they did not attempt to revive
the arrestee who had hanged himself in his cell, failed to expeditiously obtain assistance from Emergency
Medical Services, and failed to maintain and operate the video surveillance system, did not reflect a deliberate or
conscious choice by the District of Columbia, as required to hold the District of Columbia liable under § 1983
for the detainee's death. (District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department, Third District Precinct)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN

Wilson v. Taylor, 597 F.Supp.2d 451 (D.Del. 2009). The mother of a deceased prisoner, who died in his solitary
cell as a result of asphyxia due to hanging after an apparent attempt to feign suicide, brought a § 1983 action
against Delaware Corrections officials. The district court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
The court held that fact issues precluded summary judgment on the mother’s § 1983 claim, custom or policies
claim, deliberate indifference claim, qualified immunity grounds, wrongful death claim, and claim for punitive
damages. The court found genuine issues of material fact as to: (1) whether the prisoner's detention was valid at
the time of his death; (2) whether Delaware Corrections officials failed to train and or maintain customs,
policies, practices, or procedures, relating to the prisoner's repeated release inquiry; (3) whether Delaware
Corrections officials' ignored the prisoner's risk of hurting himself to get the attention of guards as to his
repeated release inquiries; (4) whether a correctional officer acted in good faith and without gross or wanton
negligence in throwing the prisoner against a bench in his cell while holding his throat and threatening him
verbally; and (5) whether Delaware Corrections officials' conduct in ignoring the prisoner's repeated release
inquiries was a proximate cause of the prisoner's ultimate death. The court also found that fact issues existed as
to whether Delaware Corrections officials acted outrageously and with reckless indifference to the rights of
others, precluding summary judgment on the mother's § 1983 claim for punitive damages. (Delaware
Correctional Center)
2010

XXIII

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN
MEDICAL CARE

Beatty v. Davidson, 713 F.Supp.2d 167 (W.D.N.Y. 2010). A former pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action
against a county, jail officials, and a nurse, alleging that the defendants denied him adequate medical care while
he was a pretrial detainee, in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights. The defendants moved for summary
judgment. The district court denied the motion. The court held that the detainee's diabetic condition was a
serious medical condition and that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the nurse was
deliberately indifferent to the detainee's diabetic condition, precluding summary judgment for the nurse. The
court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether jail officials
were grossly negligent in supervising subordinates who allegedly violated the former pretrial detainee's
constitutional rights. According to the court, a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the county
lacked a system at its jail for managing chronically ill inmates and failed to train and properly supervise its staff,
precluding summary judgment for the county on the former pretrial detainee's municipal liability claim under §
1983. (Erie County Holding Center, Pennsylvania)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN
MEDICAL CARE

Brown v. Callahan, 623 F.3d 249 (5th Cir. 2010). The estate of a pretrial detainee, who died of a gastrointestinal
hemorrhage while in pretrial custody, brought a § 1983 action against a county sheriff in his individual and
official capacity for failure to train and supervise the jail's medical employees and for maintaining an
unconstitutional policy of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. The district court denied the sheriff's
motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The sheriff appealed. The appeals court reversed.
The court held that the county sheriff was not deliberately indifferent to a known or obvious risk of inadequate
medical care toward pretrial detainees arising from the supervising jail physician's unpleasant attitude or practice
of intimidation toward jail nurses, which allegedly discouraged nurses from calling the physician or sending
patients to the emergency room. The court noted that the detainee’s gastrointestinal hemorrhage was neither
referred for treatment by a hospital emergency room nor treated by the jail's supervising physician. According to
the court, despite the physician's bad temper, despite one nurse's expressed fear of an “ass-chewing” from the
physician had she sent the detainee to the emergency room, and even though the nurses and physician had
disagreed in two instances on whether inmates should be sent to an emergency room, the two nurses had
previously decided to send inmates to the emergency room over the physician's objections. The sheriff had
reportedly counseled the physician and ordered the nurses to act appropriately notwithstanding the physician’s
distemper, and there was no prior instance in which the sheriff's instruction to the nurses was not followed.
(Wichita County Jail, Texas)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Castro v. Melchor, 760 F.Supp.2d 970(D.Hawai‘I 2010). A female pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action
against correctional facility officials and medical staff, alleging the defendants were deliberately indifferent to
his serious medical needs resulting in the delivery of a stillborn child. The defendants moved for summary
judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment
was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the correctional facility's medical staff
subjectively knew the pretrial detainee's complaints of vaginal bleeding presented a serious medical need. The
court held that the staff’s failure to ensure the detainee received an ultrasound and consultation was no more than

46.40

gross negligence, and the medical staff did not deny, delay, or intentionally interfere with the pretrial detainee's
medical treatment. According to the court, summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact
as to whether the correctional facility officials' actions and inactions in training the facility's medical staff
resulted in the alleged deprivation of the pretrial detainee's right to medical treatment and whether the officials
consciously disregarded serious health risks by failing to apply the women's lock-down policies. Following a
verbal exchange with a guard, two officers physically forced the detainee to the ground from a standing position.
While she was lying on the ground on her stomach, the officers restrained her by holding their body weights
against her back and legs and placing her in handcuffs. The detainee was approximately seven months pregnant
at the time. (Oahu Community Correctional Center, Hawai’i)
U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN

Davis v. Oregon County, Missouri, 607 F.3d 543 (8th Cir. 2010). A pretrial detainee brought an action under §
1983 and various state law authority against a county, county sheriff's department, and a sheriff, alleging the
defendants violated his rights in failing to ensure his safety after a fire broke out at the county jail. The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed.
The court held that the county jail's smoking policy did not demonstrate that the sheriff acted with deliberate
indifference in violation of the due process rights of the detainee caught in his cell during a jail fire, even if a
jailer supplied cigarettes to inmates, since the jail had an anti-smoking policy in effect at all relevant times. The
court noted that the jailer who allegedly supplied the cigarettes to the inmates had retired nine months before the
fire occurred, and jail officials made sweeps for contraband as recently as five days before the fire. The court
held that any failure of the sheriff to engage his officers in more exhaustive emergency training did not amount
to deliberate indifference in violation of the due process rights of the detainee caught in his cell during a fire,
even if the officers' lack of training presented a substantial safety risk. The court noted that the officers' actions
in removing inmates from their cells after they discovered the fire demonstrated that they did not disregard the
risk. (Oregon County Jail, Missouri)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN
MEDICAL CARE

Estate of Crouch v. Madison County, 682 F.Supp.2d 862 (S.D.Ind. 2010). An inmate's estate brought a § 1983
suit against a county and corrections officers, claiming that the officers were deliberately indifferent to the
inmate's serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and that the county was liable for failure
to train its officers or establish policies regarding the medical care of inmates. The defendants moved for
summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the inmate did not show signs of
an objectively serious need for medical attention prior to 3:00 a.m. on the day of his death from a drug overdose,
at which time he was found unresponsive. According to the court, the Indiana Tort Claims Act entitled the
corrections officers and county to immunity on state law negligence claims arising from the inmate's death,
which occurred while he was assigned to a community corrections program maintained under the supervision of
a governmental entity. (Madison County Community Justice Center, Indiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN

Parrish v. Ball, 594 F.3d 993 (8th Cir. 2010). A female detainee filed a § 1983 suit against a sheriff and a deputy,
individually and in their official capacities, alleging failure to train the deputy, who had sexually assaulted the
detainee. After bench trial the district court granted in part and denied in part the sheriff’s motion for summary
judgment. The sheriff and the detainee cross-appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded. The court held that the sheriff in his official capacity was not liable for the deputy's inadequate
training, and that the sheriff in his individual capacity was entitled to qualified immunity from the failure to train
claim. The court noted that although the deputy received minimal training at best for his law enforcement
position, the inadequacy of his training was not so likely to result in violation of the constitutional rights of the
detainee, so that the county could reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need for
training, especially when the county had no notice at all that a sexual assault was likely. According to the court,
there was no patently obvious need to train the deputy not to sexually assault women, and the sexual assault was
a consequence too remote to conclude that failure to train the deputy caused him to sexually assault the detainee.
(Hot Spring County Sheriff's Department and Jail, Arkansas)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN

Stack v. Karnes, 750 F.Supp.2d 892 (S.D.Ohio 2010). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against a county and
the county Board of Commissioners, alleging violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The
defendants filed a motion to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court
held that the county was not entitled to immunity afforded under Ohio law to counties. The court found that the
inmate's allegations that the county historically had a policy, custom, and practice of failing to implement
adequate training programs for jail personnel, and that he was denied medical treatment for his diabetes, were
sufficient to state a Monell claim against the county for violation of the Eighth Amendment . According to the
court, the county Board of Commissioners had no duty to keep a safe jail, and therefore, could not be liable in
the inmate's § 1983 action alleging he was denied adequate medical care in violation of the Eighth Amendment,
where the sheriff was the entity in charge of the jail, rather than the Board. (Franklin County Corrections Center,
Ohio)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN
MEDICAL
SCREENING

Teague v. St. Charles County, 708 F.Supp.2d 935 (E.D.Mo. 2010). The mother of a detainee who committed
suicide in a cell in county detention center brought an action against the county and corrections officials,
asserting claims for wrongful death under § 1983 and under the Missouri Wrongful Death Statute. The county
and the commanding officer moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court granted in the
motion, in part. The court held that the mother failed to allege that the detention center's commanding officer
personally participated. The court found that the mother's allegations that her son was demonstrating that he was
under the influence of narcotics at the time of his detention, that her son had expressed suicidal tendencies, and
that jail employees heard or were told of choking sounds coming from her son's cell but took no action, were
sufficient to state a Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference claim under § 1983. The court held that the

46.41

mother's allegation that the county unconstitutionally failed to train and supervise its employees with respect to
custody of persons with symptoms of narcotics withdrawal and suicidal tendencies was sufficient to state a
failure to train claim against the county, under § 1983, arising out of the death of her son who committed suicide
while housed as a pretrial detainee. The detainee had used a bed sheet to hang himself and the mother alleged
that the county failed to check him every 20 minutes, as required by jail policy. (St. Charles County Detention
Center, Missouri)
U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
MEDICAL
SCREENING

Wereb v. Maui County, 727 F.Supp.2d 898 (D.Hawai‘i 2010). Parents of a pretrial detainee, a diabetic who died
in custody, brought an action against a county and county police department employees, alleging under § 1983
that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to the detainee's medical needs, and asserting a claim for
wrongful death under state law. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the
motion in part and denied in part. The detainee died in a 2-cell police lockup. The court held that county police
officers and public safety aids who did not interact with or observe the pretrial detainee not moving in his cell
were not subjectively aware of the serious medical need of the detainee, and thus those officers and aids were not
deliberately indifferent to that need, in violation of the detainee's due process rights. The court held that
summary judgment as to the § 1983 Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference claim was precluded by a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether county police officers who interacted with the pretrial detainee
and/or a county public safety aid who did not see the detainee move around in his cell while she monitored him
over video had subjective knowledge of the serious medical need of detainee, precluding summary judgment.
The court found that neither county police officers who interacted with the pretrial detainee, nor a county
public safety aid who did not see the detainee move around in his cell while she monitored him over video, were
entitled to qualified immunity from the § 1983 Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference claim brought by
the detainee's parents, where at the time of the detainee's death, it was clearly established that officers could not
intentionally deny or delay access to medical care. The court held that summary judgment was precluded on the
§ 1983 municipal liability claim by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the county adequately trained its
employees to monitor the medical needs of the pretrial detainees, and, if so, as to whether the county's
inadequate training of its employees was deliberately different, and as to whether inadequate training “actually
caused” the death of the pretrial detainee. (Lahaina Police Station, Maui County, Hawaii)
2011

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN
MEDICAL
SCREENING

Coscia v. Town of Pembroke, Mass., 659 F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 2011). The estate of a detainee who committed suicide
after being released from custody brought a § 1983 action against police officers, their supervisors, and a town,
alleging that the officers and supervisors were deliberately indifferent to the arrestee's medical needs and that the
town failed to train the officers to prevent detainee suicides. The district court denied the individual defendants'
motion for judgment on the pleadings and they appealed. The appeals court reversed. The appeals court held that
the estate failed to state a claim for deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to health under
the Fourteenth Amendment. According to the court, the estate failed to allege facts sufficient to demonstrate a
causal relationship between the police officers' failure to furnish medical care to the detainee during a seven-hour
period of custody and the detainee's act of committing suicide by walking in front of a train 14 hours after his
release from custody. The court noted that the detainee had been thinking about suicide at the time he was
arrested, the detainee was thinking about suicide at the time he was released from custody, and when the police
released the detainee from custody they placed him in no worse position than that in which he would have been
had they not acted at all. The court found that in the absence of a risk of harm created or intensified by a state
action, there is no due process liability for harm suffered by a prior detainee after release from custody in
circumstances that do not effectively extend any state impediment to exercising self-help or to receiving
whatever aid by others may normally be available. The twenty-one-year-old detainee had been involved in a
one-car accident, he was arrested about eleven o'clock in the morning and brought to the police station. On the
way there he said he intended to throw himself in front of a train, and he continued to utter suicide threats at the
station house accompanied by self-destructive behavior, to the point of licking an electrical outlet. As a
consequence, the police did not lock him in a cell, but placed him in leg restraints and followed an evaluation
protocol that showed a high suicide risk. He was not examined by a doctor, but was released on his own
recognizance about six o'clock that evening. (Town of Pembroke, Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN

Morse v. Regents of University of California, Berkeley, 821 F.Supp.2d 1112 (N.D.Cal. 2011). A journalist
arrested while covering a demonstration at a university sued the university's board of regents, its police
department and various officers on the department, asserting § 1983 claims for violation of the First
Amendment, the Fourth Amendment, and the Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth Amendment, as well as a
claim for violation of the Privacy Protection Act. The defendants filed a partial motion to dismiss. The district
court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the journalist stated a § 1983 claim for
violation of the Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth Amendment on the theory that the defendants added
unsupported charges for the sole purpose of increasing his bail. The court found that the theory was viable under
the Excessive Bail Clause, despite the indirect means the defendants allegedly used to obtain the higher bail, and
the intervening actions of the judicial officer who actually set bail. The court found that the journalist stated a §
1983 claim against the police chief in his individual capacity where the journalist asserted that the chief failed to
train or supervise those individuals who directly deprived the journalist of his constitutional rights and that, by
his policy decisions, he set in motion the acts that deprived the journalist of his constitutional rights. The court
held that the journalist’s claims that he was wrongfully arrested by university police and that his property was
subject to searches and seizures without proper cause and without the proper warrants, stated a claim under the
Privacy Protection Act (PPA) against the university police chief for failure to screen, train, and supervise. The
court noted that the journalist's claim related specifically to the statutory provisions of the PPA, that he alleged
sufficient facts to support his claim of a causal connection between the police chief's conduct and the statutory

46.42

violation, and liability was not limited to those personally involved in the statutory violation. (University of
California, Berkeley)
U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN
MEDICAL CARE
MEDICAL
SCREENING

Newbrough v. Piedmont Regional Jail Authority, 822 F.Supp.2d 558 (E.D.Va. 2011). The administrator of an
immigration detainee's estate brought an action against the federal government, a regional jail authority and
various of its employees, and several agents of the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE),
alleging § 1983 claims in relation to medical treatment received by detainee while in jail, and a claim for
wrongful death. The defendants moved to dismiss and the plaintiff moved for a stay. The court held that the
stricter deliberate indifference standard, rather than the professional judgment standard, applied to the § 1983
denial–of–medical–care claims brought by the administrator, where immigration detention was more similar to
pretrial detention rather than the involuntary commitment of psychiatric patients, in that immigration detention
served to secure the detainee's appearance at future proceedings and to protect the community, and pre–removal
detention was generally limited in duration. The court held that the allegations of the administrator were
sufficient to allege that a prison nurse deliberately denied, delayed, or interfered with the detainee's medical care
with knowledge of his serious condition, as required to state a § 1983 denial–of–medical–care claim under
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The administrator alleged that the nurse visited the detainee while
he was held in isolation in a medical segregation unit with an apparent inability to walk or stand, and yet
withheld medication because the detainee was unwilling to stand up and walk to the door to receive that
medication. The court noted that the nurse acknowledged that not giving the detainee his medication could cause
severe problems. The court found that the administrator sufficiently alleged that the regional jail authority and
its superintendent failed to adequately train jail staff, as required to state a § 1983 policy–or–custom claim in
relation to the detainee's medical care under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The administrator
alleged that prison officers regularly refused to refer requests for medical attention unless a request was in
writing, regardless of the urgency of a detainee's need, that prison staff either failed to recognize symptoms of
grave illness or ignored them, and that, even in the face of the detainee's potentially fatal infection, staff provided
no more than an over–the–counter pain reliever. The court found that the administrator’s allegations were
sufficient to allege that the jail's superintendent, even if newly hired, was aware of the shortcomings in his
facility's medical care, as required to state a § 1983 supervisory liability claim, where the administrator alleged
that numerous public investigations and media coverage reported the poor quality of the jail's health services and
the superintendent failed to act to improve those services. (Piedmont Regional Jail Authority, Virginia, and U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
FAILURE TO TRAIN

Palmer v. Board of Com'rs for Payne County Oklahoma, 765 F.Supp.2d 1289 (W.D.Okla. 2011). A former
pretrial detainee in a county detention center filed a § 1983 action against a sheriff, deputy sheriff, and county
jail administrator for alleged deliberate indifference to the detainee's serious medical needs in violation of the
Due Process Clause. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part
and denied in part. The court held that a deputy sheriff was not deliberately indifferent to the pretrial detainee's
serious medical needs, in violation of the Due Process Clause, due to a bacterial infection that required surgical
excision of three gangrenous areas of the detainee's body, but rather, he took active and reasonable steps to abate
any harm to the detainee. According to the court, there was no evidence of inadequate training of jailers as to the
passing on of doctor's instructions for inmates, as required to establish the deliberate indifference of the county
sheriff to the serious medical needs of the pretrial detainee who contracted a bacterial infection, in violation of
due process,. (Payne County Jail, Oklahoma)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN

Pauls v. Green, 816 F.Supp.2d 961 (D.Idaho 2011). A female pretrial detainee brought an action against a
county, county officials, and a jail guard, alleging that she was coerced into having inappropriate sexual contact
with the guard. The defendants moved to dismiss and for summary judgment, and the plaintiff moved to compel
discovery and for sanctions. The district court granted the motions, in part. The court held that the detainee was
not required to file grievances after being transferred to a state prison before filing her § 1983 action, in order to
satisfy the administrative exhaustion requirement under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The court
noted that the county jail grievance procedures were not available to detainees after they transferred, and the
county did not offer any assistance to the detainee after learning of the alleged assaults. The court found that
neither the county nor the county sheriff was deliberately indifferent in failing to train or supervise county jail
guards to not sexually assault jail detainees, and thus, the female detainee could not demonstrate that the county
or sheriff was liable under § 1983. According to the court, the guards did not need specific training to know that
they should refrain from sexually assaulting detainees, and there was no showing that the general training
program for guards was deficient or that there was a pattern of prior abuses at county jail. (Adams County Jail,
Idaho)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN
TRAINING

Porter v. Epps, 659 F.3d 440 (5th Cir. 2011). A prisoner who was detained for 15 months beyond his release date
as the result of a mistake by employees of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC) brought suit
under § 1983 to recover for alleged violation of his due process rights. The district court denied a motion for
judgment as a matter of law filed by the Commissioner of the MDOC on a qualified immunity theory, and the
Commissioner appealed. The appeals court reversed, finding that the prisoner did not satisfy the burden of
showing that failure on the part of the Commissioner of the MDOC to promulgate a policy to prevent such
mistakes by his subordinates was objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law. The court found
that the prisoner failed to satisfy burden of showing that failure on the part of the Commissioner of the MDOC to
train employees to prevent such mistakes was objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law, and
the Commissioner was qualifiedly immune from liability under § 1983 on a failure-to-train theory, given
evidence that the employees of the MDOC's records department had all attended training sessions with a lawyer
to ensure that they better understood court orders. According to the court, the fact that an employee erred in one
instance did not show that the Commissioner's alleged actions in failing to train were objectively unreasonable.
(Mississippi Department of Corrections, Intensive Supervision Program)

46.43

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN
MEDICAL CARE

Smith v. Atkins, 777 F.Supp.2d 955 (E.D.N.C. 2011). The mother of a schizophrenic inmate who committed
suicide at a jail and the mother of the inmate's children brought a § 1983 action in state court against a county
deputy sheriff, jail officials, a medical contractor, and a nurse employed by the contractor, alleging that the
defendants violated the inmate's Eighth Amendment rights in failing to provide adequate medical care. The
defendants removed the action to federal court and moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the
motions. The court held that the deputy sheriff who happened to be at the jail delivering a prisoner when the
inmate, who had been diagnosed with schizophrenia, committed suicide, did not know that the inmate was at a
substantial risk of committing suicide or intentionally disregarded such risk. The court found that the deputy was
not liable under § 1983 where the deputy did not know the inmate or anything about him, or have any
responsibilities associated with the inmate's custody. The court held that jail officials' mere failure to comply
with a state standard and a jail policy requiring a four-time per hour check on any prisoner who had ever been on
a suicide watch did not violate the Eighth Amendment rights of the inmate. The court found that the mother of
the inmate failed to show a direct causal link between a specific deficiency in training and an alleged Eighth
Amendment violation, as required to sustain the mother's § 1983 Eighth Amendment claim against jail officials
based on their alleged failure to train jail employees. (Bertie–Martin Regional Jail, North Carolina)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN

Tookes v. U.S., 811 F.Supp.2d 322 (D.D.C. 2011). An arrestee brought an action under the Federal Tort Claims
Act (FTCA) against the United States, alleging assault and battery, false imprisonment, and negligent training
and supervision. The United States filed a motion for partial summary judgment. The district court granted the
motion in part, and denied in part. The court held that the training and supervision of Deputy United States
Marshals was a discretionary function, and therefore, the discretionary function exception to FTCA precluded
subject matter jurisdiction of the arrestee's negligent training and supervision claims, following an alleged attack
by marshals. The court noted that there were no statutes, regulations, or policies that specifically prescribed how
to train or oversee marshals, and decisions involved social, economic, and political policy in that decisions had
to balance budgetary constraints, public perception, economic conditions, individual backgrounds, office
diversity, experience, public safety, and employee privacy rights, as well as other considerations. According to
the court, there was no evidence that the arrestee should have known she could be diagnosed as suffering from
post-traumatic stress disorder following an alleged false imprisonment by United States marshals, and therefore,
the arrestee was not limited from seeking greater damages for her emotional injuries than the amount claimed in
her administrative form, in her FTCA claim. The court found that summary judgment was precluded by a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the United States marshals falsely imprisoned the arrestee by
bringing her back into a courthouse. (United States Marshals Services, District of Columbia)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN
MEDICAL CARE

Wereb v. Maui County, 830 F.Supp.2d 1026 (D.Hawai‘i 2011). The parents of a diabetic pretrial detainee who
died in custody brought an action against a county and county police department employees, alleging under §
1983 that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to the detainee's medical needs, and asserting a claim for
wrongful death under state law. The district granted summary judgment, in part, in favor of the defendants. The
county moved for reconsideration. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held
that summary judgment was precluded by fact issues on the claim that the county failed to train jail employees to
monitor detainees' serious medical needs. The court found that the county and its police department were not
liable for their alleged failure to train employees on the risks and symptoms of alcohol withdrawal. According to
the court, assuming that the detainee died from alcohol withdrawal, no other prisoner in the county jail had
suffered injury from alcohol withdrawal for more than 17 years before the detainee's death, so that such a failure
to train did not constitute deliberate indifference. (Lahaina, Maui, Police Station, Hawai’i)
2012

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN
NEGLIGENCE

Ard v. Rushing, 911 F.Supp.2d 425 (S.D.Miss. 2012). A female inmate brought an action against a sheriff and a
deputy asserting claims under § 1983 and § 1985 for violation of the Fourth, Fifth and Eighth Amendments, and
also alleging a state law claim for negligence, relating to an incident in which she was sexually assaulted by the
deputy while she was incarcerated. The sheriff moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the
motion. The court held that the sheriff was not deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of harm to the female
jail inmate as would have violated the Eighth Amendment, where the sheriff had established safeguards to
ensure the safety of female prisoners, including a female-only, camera-monitored area in which female inmates
were housed, a policy that male jailers could not enter the female-only area without a female jailer, and a policy
that a female jailer was to cover each shift. The court noted that past allegations that the deputy had engaged in
unwanted sexual contact with female inmates had been investigated and found not to be substantiated. The court
found that the inmate failed to show that the sheriff had knowledge of the deputy's disregard of the sheriff's
policy to ensure the safety of female prisoners, which included a requirement that male jailers could not enter the
female-only area without a female jailer, or to show that the sheriff was deliberately indifferent to the need for
more or different training, as required to establish an Eighth Amendment failure to train/supervise claim.
(Lincoln County Jail, Mississippi)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN
NEGLIGENCE

Edmond v. Clements, 896 F.Supp.2d 960 (D.Colo. 2012). A parolee brought a civil rights action alleging that his
constitutional rights were violated when he failed to receive a $100 cash payment upon his release from a state
prison to parole, and by state corrections officials' failure to perform a proper sex offender evaluation, which
resulted in the parolee being improperly ordered to participate in sex offense treatment that included a
requirement that he have no contact with his children. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court
granted the motion. The district court held that: (1) the private sex offender treatment program that contracted
with the state and its employees did not qualify as “state actors,” and thus, could not be liable in the parolee's §
1983 claim; (2) the claim against the executive director of the state department of corrections in his official
capacity for recovery of a cash payment was barred by the Eleventh Amendment; (3) the executive director was

46.44

not personally liable for the cash payable to the parolee upon release; (4) the officials were not liable under §
1983 for their alleged negligent supervision, failure to instruct or warn, or failure to implement proper training
procedures for parole officers; (5) the parolee's equal protection rights were not violated; and (6) the allegations
stated a due process claim against corrections officials. According to the court, allegations by the parolee that
Colorado department of corrections officials failed to perform a proper sex offender evaluation prior to releasing
him on parole, as required by Colorado law, which allegedly resulted in a parole condition that he have no
contact with his children, stated a due process claim against the corrections officials. (Bijou Treatment &
Training Institute, under contract to the Colorado Department of Corrections)
U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN

Facey v. Dickhaut, 892 F.Supp.2d 347 (D.Mass. 2012). A prisoner at a state correctional institution filed a pro se
§ 1983 action against the prison and officials alleging his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment was violated when officials knowingly placed him in danger by assigning him to a housing
unit where he was violently attacked by members of a rival gang. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district
court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the complaint stated a claim against the
deputy superintendent and an assistant for violation of the Eighth Amendment, by alleging that officials were
aware of the feud between two rival prison gangs, that the prisoner was a known member of one of the gangs,
that despite this knowledge officials had assigned the prisoner to a section of the prison where a rival gang was
housed, and as a result he was violently attacked and sustained permanent injuries. The court found that the
official who had instituted the gang housing policy could not be held personally liable, since he did not
implement the policy, nor was he deliberately indifferent in supervising or training those who did. According to
the court, state prison officials who had placed the prisoner known to be a gang member in danger by assigning
him to a housing unit where he was violently attacked by members of a rival gang, were not entitled to qualified
immunity in the prisoner's § 1983 suit. The court noted that clearly established law provided that the Eighth
Amendment was violated if officials disregarded a known, substantial risk to an inmate's health or safety, and the
officials had disregarded this risk, as well as violated a prison policy, by placing rival gang members in same
housing unit. (Souza Baranowski Correctional Center, Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN

Gooding v. Ketcher, 838 F.Supp.2d 1231(N.D.Okla. 2012). A musician brought an action against a marshal of
the Cherokee Nation and a deputy county sheriff, sheriff, casino employees, county police officer, jail
employees, and a nurse, alleging false imprisonment, assault and battery, and violation of his First, Fourth, and
Fourteenth Amendment rights, and seeking declaratory judgment that Oklahoma law governing flag burning and
desecration was unconstitutional. The musician had been arrested and detained at a local county jail. The
defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that
the musician's allegations that his use of an American flag during his performance at a casino was a
constitutionally protected activity, that the county sheriff failed to train his deputies as to the constitutional
nature of the activity, and that the sheriff adopted an unconstitutional policy and/or custom which led to the
musician's arrest and imprisonment, stated a § 1983 claim against the sheriff in his individual capacity as a
supervisor for violations of the musician's First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
The court found that the musician's allegations that the county sheriff was, at all times relevant to the
musician's claims related to his arrest and imprisonment, a commissioned law enforcement officer and the dulyelected sheriff and chief policy maker for county sheriff's office, that the deputy sheriff was a commissioned law
enforcement officer acting as a marshal for Cherokee Nation and a deputy sheriff for the county's sheriff's office,
and that the deputy sheriff was acting as the sheriff's employee during events giving rise to the musician's claims,
were sufficient to demonstrate that the sheriff was responsible for the deputy's training and supervision, as
required for the musician's § 1983 inadequate training claim against county sheriff in his official capacity. The
court held that the musician's allegations that the seizure and search of his person were unconstitutional because
the underlying conduct for which he was seized was legal and did not provide lawful grounds upon which to
base his arrest and the subsequent searches of his person, stated a § 1983 claim against the county sheriff in his
official capacity. (Cherokee Casino, Rogers County Jail, Oklahoma)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN
NEGLIGENCE

Harris v. Hammon, 914 F.Supp.2d 1026 (D.Minn. 2012). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a county
and various officials with the state department of corrections (DOC), alleging violations of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments, as well as state law claims for false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional
distress (IIED), and negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED). The defendants moved for summary
judgment and for judgment on the pleadings. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The
court held that there was no evidence of a continuing, widespread pattern of misconduct on account of county
employees in not releasing prisoners pursuant to court orders, as required for the prisoner's § 1983 failure-totrain claims against the county for alleged violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The prisoner
had been held for more than five days after a judge ordered his release pending his appeal. According to the
court, the former prisoner's allegations were sufficient to plead that department of corrections (DOC) employees
were deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's liberty rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, as required to state
a § 1983 claim for violations of his due process rights based on his continued detention after a court ordered his
release. The prisoner alleged that he had a court order for his release but he was returned to prison, that a judge
faxed and mailed the release order to the prison after being contacted by the prisoner's attorney the next day, that
the judge's clerk also telephoned employees to inform them that the prisoner was to be released, that one
employee did not respond to calls from the prisoner's attorney, that another employee told the attorney he would
have to hand deliver a certified copy of order by the end of her shift in three minutes so that the prisoner could
be released before the weekend, and that employees told the attorney several days later that they might not be
able to release the prisoner because the order could be invalid. The court also held that the prisoner's allegations
were sufficient to plead that his continued detention, after his release was ordered by a judge, violated a clearly
established right, as required to overcome qualified immunity for department of corrections (DOC) employees.
(Lino Lakes Correctional Facility, Ramsey County Jail, Minnesota)

46.45

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN

Livers v. Schenck, 700 F.3d 340 (8th Cir. 2012). Two pretrial detainees, who were arrested for murder, but who
were subsequently released after their charges were dropped, brought a § 1983 action against a county sheriff
and investigating officers, alleging violations of their Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The
district court entered an order denying the defendants' motions for summary judgment, and they appealed. The
appeals court affirmed in part, denied in part, and remanded. The court held that summary judgment was
precluded by fact issues as to whether a detainee's confession was coerced, and whether officers fabricated
evidence. The court held that the sheriff could not be liable under § 1983 for his alleged failure to train
investigating officers not to fabricate evidence, since any reasonable officer would know that fabricating
evidence was unacceptable. (Cass County Sheriff's Office, Nebraska)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN
MEDICAL CARE

Luckert v. Dodge County, 684 F.3d 808 (8th Cir. 2012). The personal representative of the estate of her deceased
son, who committed suicide while detained in a county jail, filed a § 1983 action against the county and jail
officials for allegedly violating due process by deliberate indifference to the detainee's medical needs. Following
a jury trial, the district court entered judgment for the personal representative, awarding actual and punitive
damages as well as attorney fees and costs. The jury awarded $750,000 in compensatory damages and $100,000
in punitive damages. The district court denied the defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law and the
defendants appealed. The appeals court reversed the denial of the defendants’ motion and vacated the awards.
The appeals court held that while the detainee had a constitutional right to protection from a known risk of
suicide, the jail nurse and the jail director were protected by qualified immunity, and the county was not liable.
According to the court, the county jail nurse's affirmative but unsuccessful measures to prevent the pretrial
detainee's suicide did not constitute deliberate indifference to his risk of suicide, where the nurse assessed the
detainee twice after learning from his mother that he had recently attempted suicide, the nurse arranged for the
detainee to have two appointments with the jail's psychiatrist, including an appointment on the morning of the
detainee's suicide, the nurse contacted the detainee's own psychiatrist to gather information about the detainee's
condition, she reviewed the detainee's medical records, and she responded in writing to each of the detainee's
requests for medical care. The court held that the county jail director's actions and omissions in managing jail's
suicide intervention practices did not rise to the level of deliberate indifference to the pretrial detainee's risk of
suicide, even though the director delegated to the jail nurse significant responsibility for suicide intervention
before formally training her on suicide policies and procedures, and the jail's actual suicide intervention practices
did not comport with the jail's written policy. The court noted that the jail had a practice under the director's
management of identifying detainees at risk of committing suicide, placing them on a suicide watch, and
providing on-site medical attention, and the detainee remained on suicide watch and received medical attention
including on the day of his suicide. The court held that the county lacked a custom, policy, or practice that
violated the pretrial detainee's due process rights and caused his suicide, precluding recovery in the § 1983
action. The court found that, even though the county had flaws in its suicide intervention practices, the county
did not have a continuing, widespread, and persistent pattern of constitutional misconduct regarding prevention
of suicide in the county jail. (Dodge County Jail, Fremont, Nebraska)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN
MEDICAL CARE

Manning v. Sweitzer, 891 F.Supp.2d 961 (N.D.Ill. 2012). An arrestee brought an action against various village
police officers and a village alleging unreasonable search and seizure of her vehicle, denial of the right to
counsel, cruel and unusual punishment, conspiracy under § 1985, failure to train, unlawful detention, and several
state law claims. The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court granted the
motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the detainee's allegation that she was offered medication
for her unnamed mental ailment while incarcerated, but that she declined to accept the medication “for fear of
overmedication or a harmful interaction,” failed to establish that she was subjected to inhumane conditions or
that the police were deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need, as required to support her claim that she
was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process
Clause. According to the court, the arrestee's failure to allege any other incidents of wrongdoing by the village,
combined with her failure to show that the unconstitutional consequences of the village's alleged failure to train
its police officers were patently obvious, precluded her claim against the village. (Village of Park Forest Police
Department, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN
MEDICAL CARE

Olaniyi v. District of Columbia, 876 F.Supp.2d 39 (D.D.C. 2012). A pretrial detainee brought an action against
the District of Columbia and the United States, asserting claims under § 1983 and the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA), arising from his detention and a separate incident involving a traffic stop. The defendants moved for
summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that past alleged deficiencies in
medical services at the District of Columbia jail that were unrelated to unconstitutional forced medication of
inmates could not have put the District on notice of the need for training to avoid an alleged due process
violation arising from the detainee's being forcibly injected with a psychoactive drug while residing in the jail's
mental health unit, and thus could not sustain a finding of deliberate indifference necessary to hold the District
liable under § 1983 for an alleged due process violation. The court also held that the detainee failed to establish a
pattern of similar due process violations by untrained or inadequately trained jail employees that could have put
the District on notice of a need for more training with respect to forced medication of inmates, thus precluding
the detainee's § 1983 due process claim against the District based on a failure to train theory. (Mental Health
Unit of the District of Columbia Jail)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN
NEGLIGENCE

Rogers v. District of Columbia, 880 F.Supp.2d 163 (D.D.C. 2012). A former prisoner brought an action against
the District of Columbia, alleging he was over-detained and asserting claims for negligent training and
supervision. The district moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied
in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to when the
prisoner was to be released. The district court began its opinion as follows: “Our saga begins with the tale of
plaintiff's numerous arrests. Plaintiff was arrested on four different charges in 2007: two felony charges for

46.46

violating the Bail Reform Act, one felony charge for Possession with Intent to Distribute a Controlled Substance
and one misdemeanor charge for carrying an open can of alcohol without a permit.” During the prisoner’s time
in jail he was sentenced for all of the remaining charges. The prisoner claimed he was over-detained by
approximately two months, and that this was the direct result of the D.C. Jail's negligent training and supervision
of its employees with regard to calculating jail credits. (District of Columbia Jail)
U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN

Schwartz v. Lassen County ex rel. Lassen County Jail (Detention Facility), 838 F.Supp.2d 1045 (E.D.Cal. 2012).
The mother of a deceased pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action on behalf of herself and as successor in
interest against a county, sheriff, city, police department, and several officers, alleging violations of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part
and denied in part. The court held that allegations that: (1) the undersheriff knew the pretrial detainee from
various encounters with the county, including his diverticulitis and congenital heart condition that required a
restricted diet; (2) the undersheriff gave testimony to set bail for the detainee at $150,000 on a misdemeanor
offense; (3) the detainee's doctor sent a letter explaining the detainee should be put on house arrest as opposed to
detention because of his medical condition; (4) the detainee had to be admitted to a hospital for emergency
surgery during a previous confinement; (5) the detainee's mother requested he be released for medical attention;
(6) the detainee lost over 40 pounds during two weeks of detention; (7) the detainee requested to see a doctor but
was told to “quit complaining;” and (8) the undersheriff personally knew the detainee was critically ill, were
sufficient to plead that the undersheriff knew of and failed to respond to the detainee's serious medical condition,
as would be deliberate indifference required to state a § 1983 claim alleging violations of Fourteenth
Amendment due process after the detainee died. The court found that allegations that the undersheriff owed the
pretrial detainee an affirmative duty to keep the jail and prisoners in it, and that he was answerable for their
safekeeping, were sufficient to plead a duty, as required to state a claim of negligent infliction of emotional
distress (NIED) under California law against the undersheriff after the detainee died. (Lassen County Adult
Detention Facility, California)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN
MEDICAL CARE

Woods v. City of Utica, 902 F.Supp.2d 273 (N.D.N.Y. 2012). A wheelchair-using, paraplegic arrestee sued a
city, police officer, a county, a former sheriff, and county corrections officers, bringing federal causes of action
for violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act, and Fourteenth Amendment
equal protection and due process. The arrestee alleged that he was lifted out of his wheelchair and placed on the
floor of a sheriff's van, forcing him to maneuver himself onto a bench seat which caused his pants and underwear
to fall, exposing his genitals, that he was not secured to the bench with a seatbelt, causing him to be thrown
about the passenger compartment and suffer leg spasms during his ride to the jail, that he was forced to urinate
into an empty soda bottle and handle his sterile catheter with his hands that were dirty from moving himself
around the floor of the van, and that the county corrections officers stood by as he struggled to maneuver himself
out of the van and into his wheelchair while other inmates watched. The city and county defendants moved for
summary judgment. The district court held that: (1) the city did not fail to accommodate the arrestee's disability,
for purposes of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims; (2) summary judgment was precluded by fact issues as
to whether the arrestee was denied the benefit of safe and appropriate transportation by the county on the day of
his arrest when he was moved from a police station to a county jail; (3) the county was entitled to summary
judgment to the extent the arrestee's claims involved his transportation from the jail to court proceedings on two
other dates; (4) fact issues existed as to whether the county defendants were deliberately indifferent to the
paraplegic inmate's known medical need for suppositories every other day, in violation of due process, but they
were not deliberately indifferent to his need for catheters and prescription pain medication; and (5) the county
defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity. The court noted that while the county defendants disputed
the arrestee's version of the facts, corrections officers all denied receiving any training regarding how to
transport disabled inmates. (Utica Police Department, Oneida County Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN
MEDICAL CARE

Wright v. County of Franklin, Ohio, 881 F.Supp.2d 887 (S.D.Ohio 2012). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983
action against a county, sheriff, deputy, medical staff, and physician, alleging deliberate indifference to his
serious medical needs in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and state common law claims. The defendants
moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held
that the pretrial detainee who had abdominal pain had a serious medical need, as required to support a § 1983
claim against the county, sheriff, deputy, medical staff, and physician for deliberate indifference to his serious
medical need in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. According to the court, as a result of the delay in
diagnosis and treatment, the detainee was later rushed to a hospital, diagnosed with a small bowel obstruction
and a mass in his colon, and subjected to emergency surgery. The court found that summary judgment was
precluded by a genuine issues of material fact as to: (1) whether a nurse failed to exercise judgment and instead
chose to ignore serious symptoms that ultimately led to the pretrial detainee with abdominal pain having to
undergo multiple major surgeries; (2) whether nurses did basically nothing in the face of the pretrial detainee's
alarming symptoms, including vomiting blood and severe abdominal pain, which later proved to be precursor to
a serious gastrointestinal issue. The court found that there was no evidence that the county or sheriff had a policy
or custom of recklessly training medical staff who were contracted to work at the prison, as required to support
the pretrial detainee's § 1983 claim for failure to train. The court noted that the detainee's claim was based on
little more than the argument that the Sheriff's Office and the county did not do enough to ensure that nurses
were familiar with policies applicable to inmates who need medical care. (Franklin County Correctional Center,
Correctional Care Plus, Ohio)

46.47

2013
U.S. Appeals Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
MEDICAL CARE
MEDICAL
SCREENING

Belbachir v. County of McHenry, 726 F.3d 975 (7th Cir. 2013). The administrator of the estate of a female
federal detainee who committed suicide in a county jail filed suit against the county, county jail officials, and
employees of the medical provider that had a contract with the county to provide medical services at the jail,
alleging violation of the detainee's due process rights and Illinois tort claims. The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of all county defendants. The administrator appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part,
reversed in part, and remanded. The appeals court found that the jail inmate who was detained by federal
immigration authorities pending her removal hearing was in the same position as a lawfully arrested pretrial
detainee. The court noted that a pretrial detainee was entitled, pursuant to the due process clause, to at least as
much protection during her detention as convicted criminals were entitled to under the Eighth Amendment-namely protection from harm caused by a defendant's deliberate indifference to the inmate's safety or health. The
court asserted that persons who have been involuntarily committed are entitled, under the due process clause, to
more considerate treatment during detention than criminals whose conditions of confinement are designed to
punish. According to the court, the county sheriff's and county jail director's failure to provide annual training to
jail staff on how to recognize the risk of suicide in detainees, and their failure to implement a suicide prevention
policy, did not render the county liable under § 1983 for the detainee's suicide during her detention at the jail,
absent a showing that such failures caused the detainee's suicide. (McHenry County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN
MEDICAL CARE
RESTRAINTS

Christie ex rel. estate of Christie v. Scott, 923 F.Supp.2d 1308 (M.D.Fla. 2013). An estate brought a § 1983
action against a private prison health services provider and corrections officers following the death of a detainee
after he was pepper-sprayed over 12 times in 36 hours. The provider moved for summary judgment. The district
court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by
genuine issues of material fact as to: (1) whether failure of the nurses to inspect the detainee after each time he
was pepper-sprayed constituted deliberate indifference; (2) whether the sheriff knew that corrections officers
were using pepper spray nearly indiscriminately; (3) whether corrections officers were deliberately indifferent to
the detainee's physical and medical needs; and (4) whether corrections officers' repeated pepper-spraying of the
detainee while he was restrained naked in a chair was malicious and sadistic to the point of shocking the
conscience. The estate alleged that the nurses' failed to evaluate the detainee after each time he was peppersprayed, failed to follow their employer’s policy by not monitoring the detainee every 15 minutes for the periods
he was restrained, and failed to offer the detainee fluids or a bedpan while he was restrained. The nurses
allegedly checked the inmate only two times during the five hours he was restrained. The court found that the
health services provider did not have a policy of understaffing that constituted deliberate indifference to the
detainee’s health, as required to support a § 1983 claim against the private provider. (Lee County Jail, Florida)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN

Eason v. Frye, 972 F.Supp.2d 935 (S.D.Miss. 2013). A pretrial detainee brought a pro se § 1983 action against
an officer and a sheriff, alleging that the officer used excessive force by releasing his canine while responding to
a fight between the detainee and another inmate, and that he did not receive immediate medical attention after
the incident. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The district
court held that: (1) the detainee failed to allege that the sheriff was personally involved in the dog bite incident,
as required for § 1983 liability; (2) the officer did not use excessive force; (3) prison officials were not
deliberately indifferent to the detainee's serious medical needs where there was no evidence that the officials
refused to treat the detainee, ignored his complaints, or intentionally treated him incorrectly; (4) the detainee
failed to state a § 1983 failure to train or supervise claim; (5) the sheriff was entitled to qualified immunity from
the failure to train claim, where the detainee made no specific allegations about how the sheriff was
unreasonable in his training and supervising methods; and (6) the detainee could not maintain a claim for mental
or emotional suffering. The court noted that the detainee refused to stop fighting when the officer ordered him to
stop, thus causing an obvious threat to security. In response, the officer applied the amount of force necessary to
restore order on the tier, and as soon as the detainee went to the ground and stopped fighting, the officer ordered
the dog to release its grip. The detainee suffered a minor injury when he was bitten by the dog. According to the
court, the detainee made no specific allegations regarding how the training and supervision program at the
detention facility was inadequate or defective, he contended that his numerous complaints and grievances went
unanswered but provided no evidence of inadequate training or supervision, and he made no allegation of an
official policy that caused the allegedly inadequate training and supervision. (Harrison County Adult Detention
Center, Mississippi)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN
MEDICAL CARE

Holscher v. Mille Lacs County, 924 F.Supp.2d 1044 (D.Minn. 2013). Trustees for the next-of-kin of a pretrial
detainee who committed suicide while incarcerated at a county jail brought an action against the county, alleging
under § 1983 that the county provided inadequate medical care to the detainee, in violation of his due process
rights. The trustees also asserted related claims for negligence and wrongful death under state law. The county
moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held
that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the county had actual
knowledge of the pretrial detainee's risk of suicide, as to whether the county was deliberately indifferent to that
risk, and as to whether the detainee's death was the result of an unconstitutional custom. The court also held that
summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the county's training of its jail
employees on proper implementation of its suicide prevention policy was adequate, as to whether the county was
deliberately indifferent in failing to revise its training, and as to whether any inadequate training on the part of
the county caused the pretrial detainee's suicide. (Mille Lacs County Jail, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN

Konah v. District of Columbia, 915 F.Supp.2d 7 (D.D.C. 2013). A Liberian female formerly employed as a
Licensed Practical Nurse (LPN) by a private health care corporation that contracted with the District of
Columbia to provide medical treatment to inmates in a penitentiary, whose employment was terminated after she

46.48

reported alleged harassment and assault and battery by inmates while administering medication to them, sued the
District and a correctional officer, claiming they violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, Title VII, the
District of Columbia Human Rights Act (DCHRA), and common laws. The district court partially granted the
defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The employer and correctional officer moved for
summary judgment, and the District of Columbia moved for judgment on the pleadings. The district court
granted the motions in part. The court held that under District of Columbia law, the correctional officer did not
assault, batter, or intentionally inflict emotional distress on the nurse absent evidence he delayed opening the
front gate to a corridor outside the unit, in response to the LPN's request so she could get away from inmates
making lewd and sexually threatening comments, with the intention that she suffer assault, battery or emotional
distress. According to the court, the reason for his delay was that there were inmates in the sally port who would
have been able to escape confinement if he opened gate.
The court found that the private health care corporation was not liable for a hostile work environment
allegedly created for the LPN when on one occasion inmates made lewd and sexually threatening comments
toward her and one grabbed her buttocks while she was administering medication to them. The court found that
the corporation took reasonable and appropriate corrective steps to prevent harassment and to ensure that the
environment for its nurses at the detention facility would be a safe and non-hostile job situation in a jail requiring
direct contact with inmates could be, and the LPN knew of escort policy and a sick call room policy and was
apparently in violation of those policies when the incident in question took place.
But the court found that the District of Columbia was not entitled to judgment on the pleadings with regard to
the LPN's allegations that the District did not sufficiently train its employees in the Department of Corrections to
ensure that nurses employed by the private health care corporation which was contracted to provide medical care
for inmates at the detention facility were not subjected to constant gender-based lewd and nasty catcalls or acts
by inmates. The court held that the LPN's allegations were sufficiently clear and detailed to make out a § 1983
cause of action based on Monell liability for a policy or custom, and importantly, the LPN had alleged sufficient
facts to state a claim that District officials knew of the problem and that their failure to address it was
deliberately indifferent. (Unity Health Care, Inc., Central Detention Facility, District of Columbia)
U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Morris v. Dallas County, 960 F.Supp.2d 665 (N.D.Tex. 2013) The parents of a detainee who died while in custody at a county jail brought a § 1983 action in state court against the county, the county jail medical staff, and
officials, alleging violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and constitutional violations. The
action was removed to federal court. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted
the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment for the defendants was precluded
by fact issues with regard to: (1) the nurses who were defendants; (2) the claim that the county failed to monitor
the detainee’s health; and (3) failure to train officers on how to observe and assess the jail detainees' medical
needs and respond to those needs. The court noted that the way the jail infirmary was structured, including the
lack of direct access between the detainees and the nursing staff, and the absence of procedures for communication between the nurses and the correctional officers concerning emergent medical symptoms, were a county
custom. According to the court, whether that custom was adopted or continued, even though it was obvious that
its likely consequence would be a deprivation of medical care for the detainees, precluded summary judgment in
favor of the county in the § 1983 deliberate indifference claim brought against the county. (Dallas Co. Jail, Tex.)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN

Poche v. Gautreaux, 973 F.Supp.2d 658 (M.D.La. 2013). A pretrial detainee brought an action against a district
attorney and prison officials, among others, alleging various constitutional violations pursuant to § 1983,
statutory violations under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act (RA), as well
as state law claims, all related to her alleged unlawful detention for seven months. The district attorney and
prison officials moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court
held that the detainee sufficiently alleged an official policy or custom, as required to establish local government
liability for constitutional torts, by alleging that failures of the district attorney and the prison officials to
implement policies designed to prevent the constitutional deprivations alleged, and to adequately train their
employees in such tasks as processing paperwork related to detention, created such obvious dangers of
constitutional violations that the district attorney and the prison officials could all be reasonably said to have
acted with conscious indifference. The court found that the pretrial detainee stated a procedural due process
claim against the district attorney and the prison officials under § 1983 related to her alleged unlawful detention
for seven months, by alleging that it was official policy and custom of the officials to skirt constitutional
requirements related to procedures for: (1) establishing probable cause to detain; (2) arraignment; (3) bail; and
(4) appointment of counsel, and that the officials' policy and custom resulted in a deprivation of her liberty
without due process. The court held that the detainee stated an equal protection claim against the prison officials
under § 1983, by alleging that the officials acted with a discriminatory animus toward her because she was
mentally disabled, and that she was repeatedly and deliberately punished for, and discriminated against, on that
basis. (East Baton Rouge Prison, Louisiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN

Wilson v. Montano, 715 F.3d 847 (10th Cir. 2013). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action against a county sheriff,
several deputies, and the warden of the county's detention center, alleging that he was unlawfully detained, and
that his right to a prompt probable cause determination was violated. The district court denied the defendants'
motion to dismiss. The defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
in part. The detainee had been held for 11 days without a hearing and without charges being filed. The appeals
court held that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity from the claim that they violated the
arrestee's right to a prompt post-arrest probable cause determination, where the Fourth Amendment right to a
prompt probable cause determination was clearly established at the time. The court held that the arrestee
sufficiently alleged that the arresting sheriff's deputy was personally involved in the deprivation of his Fourth
Amendment right to a prompt probable cause hearing, as required to support his § 1983 claim against the deputy.
The arrestee alleged that he was arrested without a warrant, and that the deputy wrote out a criminal complaint

46.49

but failed to file it in any court with jurisdiction to hear a misdemeanor charge until after he was released from
the county's detention facility, despite having a clear duty under New Mexico law to ensure that the arrestee
received a prompt probable cause determination. According to the court, under New Mexico law, the warden of
the county's detention facility and the county sheriff were responsible for policies or customs that operated and
were enforced by their subordinates, and for any failure to adequately train their subordinates. The court noted
that statutes charged both the warden and the sheriff with responsibility to supervise subordinates in diligently
filing a criminal complaint or information and ensuring that arrestees received a prompt probable cause hearing.
The court found that the arrestee sufficiently alleged that the warden promulgated policies that caused the
arrestee's prolonged detention without a probable cause hearing, and that the warden acted with the requisite
mental state, as required to support his § 1983 claim against the warden, regardless of whether the arrestee ever
had direct contact with the warden. The arrestee alleged that the warden did not require filing of written criminal
complaints, resulting in the detainees' being held without receiving a probable cause hearing, and that the warden
acted with deliberate indifference to routine constitutional violations at the facility.
The court held that the arrestee sufficiently alleged that the county sheriff established a policy or custom that
led to the arrestee's prolonged detention without a probable cause hearing, and that the sheriff acted with the
requisite mental state, as required to support his § 1983 claim against the sheriff, by alleging that: (1) the sheriff
allowed deputies to arrest people and wait before filing charges, thus resulting in the arrest and detention of
citizens with charges never being filed; (2) the sheriff was deliberately indifferent to ongoing constitutional
violations occurring under his supervision and due to his failure to adequately train his employees; (3) routine
warrantless arrest and incarceration of citizens without charges being filed amounted to a policy or custom; and
(4) such policy was the significant moving force behind the arrestee's illegal detention. (Valencia County
Sheriff's Office, Valencia County Detention Center, New Mexico)
2014
U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
FAILURE TO TRAIN

Awalt v. Marketti, 74 F.Supp.3d 909 (N.D.Ill. 2014). The estate and the widow of a pretrial detainee who died in
a county jail brought civil rights and wrongful death actions against jail personnel and medical care providers
who serviced the jail. The county defendants and the medical defendants moved for summary judgment. The
district court held that: (1) the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable juror to find that the correctional officers
and a jail superintendent were deliberately indifferent to the detainee’s medical needs; (2) summary judgment
was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the officers knew that the detainee was suffering
seizures while in jail and failed to take appropriate action; (3) a reasonable juror could have found that neither a
physician nor a nurse made a reasoned medical judgment not to prescribe a particular anti-seizure drug for the
detainee; and, (4) in the Seventh Circuit, private health care workers providing medical services to inmates are
not entitled to assert qualified immunity. The court also found that summary judgment was precluded by genuine
issues of material fact concerning whether failure of the sheriff’s office and the jail’s medical services provider
to provide adequate medical training to correctional officers caused the detainee’s death.(Grundy County Jail,
Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN
MEDICAL CARE

Finn v. Warren County, Kentucky, 768 F.3d 441 (6th Cir. 2014). The administrator of an inmate's estate and the
guardian of the inmate's minor children brought a § 1983 action against a county, a jail's health care provider,
and various jail employees, alleging violation of the inmate's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to
receive adequate medical care while incarcerated. The district court granted summary judgment to some parties,
and a jury returned verdicts for the remaining defendants on the remaining claims. The plaintiffs appealed. The
appeals court reversed and remanded in part and affirmed in part. The court held that a supervisory jailer was not
entitled to qualified immunity for his ministerial acts of training deputy jailers to follow a written emergency
medical services (EMS) policy and to enforce that policy as written. When the inmate’s condition worsened,
cellmates threw objects at a speaker in the top of the cell to activate the intercom to get the guards' attention. The
cellmates reported to the guards ten to fifteen times that something was wrong with the inmate and that he
needed to be taken to the hospital. According to the inmates, the guards ignored their pleas for help and turned
off the television in their housing unit. A senior supervisor’s incident report alleged that he checked on the
inmate several times, while the jail's observation log showed that he checked on the inmate only twice: at 5:27
a.m. and at 6:28 a.m. Later the inmate died in the cell, and although he was found dead in his cell, a deputy
entered on the observation log “appears to be okay.” (Warren County Regional Jail, Kentucky)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN
MEDICAL CARE

Graham v. Hodge, 69 F.Supp.3d 618 (S.D.Miss. 2014). The spouse of a pretrial detainee who died of cardiac
arrhythmia brought a wrongful death action against a sheriff and a county alleging deliberate indifference to the
detainee’s medical care under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as failure to train
under § 1983. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court
held that a nurse was not deliberately indifferent to the detainee’s medical needs, notwithstanding that the nurse
waited 13 days to fax a medical authorization to a care center, that she sent the detainee to a medical clinic that
had no cardiologist, that she was not aware for several months that the detainee was not taking necessary heart
medication, and that the detainee ultimately died of cardiac arrhythmia. According to the court, the nurse
regularly treated the detainee, which included providing him with his medication once she was made aware of its
necessity, and the detainee’s death was not proximately caused by the months-long lack of medicine. The court
found that the detainee’s death was not a highly predictable consequence of failing to train the jail nurse. (Jones
County Adult Detention Facility, Mississippi)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN

Hernandez v. County of Monterey, 70 F.Supp.3d 963 (N.D.Cal. 2014). Current and recently released inmates
from a county jail brought an action against the county, the sheriff’s office, and the private company that
administered all jail health care facilities and services, alleging, on behalf of a class of inmates, that substandard
conditions at the jail violated the federal and state constitutions, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the

46.50

Rehabilitation Act, and a California statute prohibiting discrimination in state-funded programs. The inmates
sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The defendants filed motions to dismiss. The district court denied the
motions. The court held that both current and recently released inmates had standing to pursue their claims
against the county and others for allegedly substandard conditions at the jail, even though the recently released
inmates were no longer subject to the conditions they challenged. The court noted that the short average length
of stay of inmates in the proposed class, which was largely made up of pretrial detainees, was approximately 34
days, and that short period, coupled with the plodding speed of legal action and the fact that other persons
similarly situated would continue to be subject to the challenged conduct, qualified the plaintiffs for the
“inherently transitory” exception to the mootness doctrine.
The court found that the inmates sufficiently alleged that the private company that administered all jail health
care facilities and services operated a place of public accommodation, as required to state a claim for violation of
ADA Title III. The court noted that: “The complaint alleges a litany of substandard conditions at the jail,
including: violence due to understaffing, overcrowding, inadequate training, policies, procedures, facilities, and
prisoner classification; inadequate medical and mental health care screening, attention, distribution, and
resources; and lack of policies and practices for identifying, tracking, responding, communicating, and providing
accessibility for accommodations for prisoners with disabilities.” (Monterey County Jail, California)
U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN

Kitchen v. Dallas County, Tex., 759 F.3d 468 (5th Cir. 2014). The widow of a pretrial detainee who died of
asphyxiation while he was being extracted from his jail cell brought a § 1983 action against the county, detention
officers, and others, alleging that the defendants used excessive force and acted with deliberate indifference to
the detainee's medical needs. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the
motion in its entirety, and the plaintiff appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded in part, and affirmed
in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to both the
timing and the degree of force used in extracting the detainee from his jail cell. According to the court, the
widow failed to establish that the county failed to provide proper training to personnel located in the facility's
North tower, where the detainee was being held when he died, where the widow pointed to no pattern of past
constitutional violations bearing a sufficient resemblance to the events surrounding the death of detainee. (Dallas
County Jail, Texas)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Nam Dang v. Sheriff of Seminole County, Fla., 38 F.Supp.3d 1333 (M.D.Fla. 2014). A pretrial detainee brought
a § 1983 action against a county sheriff, county jail medical staff, and others, alleging that he was deprived of his
constitutional right to receive adequate medical care for his meningitis, resulting in multiple strokes and severe
brain damage. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court denied the motions, finding that the pretrial
detainee had serious medical needs, his allegations stated a claim against jail nurses for deliberate indifference to
his serious medical needs, and the detainee stated a § 1983 claim against the county sheriff. The detainee
allegedly experienced severe and increasing neck and back pain, minimal neck rotation, fever, and bouts of
unconsciousness and was eventually diagnosed with meningitis, and ended up suffering multiple strokes and
brain damage. The inmate alleged that the nurses who regularly attended to the detainee over a period of weeks
were well aware of his increasing symptoms and declining health, that the nurses allegedly put him on muscle
relaxants and returned him repeatedly to the general population, that the nurses allegedly made no meaningful
effort to diagnose or treat his condition, until he passed out in a wheelchair, could not sit up, and became
unresponsive. The court held that the detainee’s allegations that the lack of meaningful health care training of
county jail personnel was the result of the county sheriff's deliberate cost-cutting efforts, and that the lack of
such training was reckless and created an obvious risk that the detainee's constitutional right to adequate medical
care for his serious medical need of meningitis would be violated, stated a § 1983 claim against county sheriff.
(John E. Polk Correctional Facility, Seminole County, Florida)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN

Robinson v. Keita, 20 F.Supp.3d 1140 (D.Colo. 2014). An arrestee brought an action against a city, city police
officers, a county, and sheriff's deputies, alleging under § 1983 that he was unreasonably arrested and incarcerated for a 12-day period. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in
part and denied in part. The court held that: (1) a front desk officer was entitled to qualified immunity from
unlawful arrest claim; (2) the deputies who transported the arrestee from a police station across the street to a
detention facility, and assisted in the arrestee's booking, were entitled to qualified immunity from a substantive
due process claim; (3) there was no evidence that the city's alleged policy of relying on the state court to schedule a hearing after promptly being advised of a warrant arrest was substantially certain to result in a constitutional violation; but (4) summary judgment was precluded by fact issues as to whether the city had actual or
constructive notice that its failure to train as to how to process conflicting information during the process of
“packing” an arrest warrant for distribution was substantially certain to result in a constitutional violation, and as
to whether the city substantially chose to disregard the risk of harm. (City and County of Denver, Colorado)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN

Rowlery v. Genesee County, 54 F.Supp.3d 763 (E.D.Mich. 2014). A detainee brought an action against a county
and officers and deputies in the county sheriff’s department, alleging that he was assaulted by deputies on two
occasions when he was lodged at the county jail. The defendants moved for partial summary judgment. The
district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The district court held that summary judgment was
precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to: (1) whether the county adequately trained officers and
deputies regarding the use of force; (2) whether certain officers and deputies came into physical contact with the
detainee; (3) whether certain officers and deputies failed to act reasonably when they did not act to prevent or
limit other deputies’ use of force on the detainee; and (4) whether the alleged failure of certain officers and
deputies to put a stop to other deputies’ use of force on the detainee was the proximate cause of the detainee’s
injuries. (Genesee County Jail, Michigan)

46.51

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN

Shepherd v. Powers, 55 F.Supp.3d 508 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). An inmate at a county jail brought a § 1983 action
against a first correction officer, a second correction officer, and a county, asserting excessive force in violation
of the Eighth Amendment, malicious prosecution, and denying or interfering with the inmate’s religious rights.
The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court denied the motion. The court held that
summary judgment was precluded by a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the force a correction
officer at the county jail used in grabbing and squeezing the inmate’s testicles was applied maliciously or
sadistically to cause harm, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The court also found fact issues as to whether
the correction officer’s conduct, including throwing the inmate to the floor, was objectively malicious and
sadistic. According to the court, fact issues existed as to whether the county had a custom and practice of using
excessive force or failed to adequately train or supervise correction officers in the use of force, precluding
summary judgment on the inmate’s § 1983 claim against the county. (Westchester County Jail, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN

Thomas v. Cumberland County, 749 F.3d 217 (3rd Cir. 2014). Following an attack by other inmates at a county
correctional facility, an inmate brought an action against the county and corrections officers at the facility
pursuant to § 1983 and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, alleging failure to train, failure to protect, failure to
intervene, and incitement. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the county and an officer.
The inmate's claims against the other officer proceeded to trial, and a jury found in favor of the officer. The
inmate appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in the county's favor on the § 1983 failure to
train claim. The appeals court vacated. The court held that a triable issue remained as to whether the county
exhibited deliberate indifference to the need for pre-service training for officers in conflict de-escalation and
intervention and whether the lack of such training caused the inmate's injuries. (Cumberland County
Correctional Facility, New Jersey)
2015

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE
FAILURE TO TRAIN

Brauner v. Coody, 793 F.3d 493 (5th Cir. 2015). A state prisoner, who was a paraplegic, brought an action
against a prison medical director, assistant warden, and prison doctors, alleging deliberate indifference to his
serious medical condition. The district court denied the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. The
defendants appealed. The appeals court reversed, finding that: (1) prison doctors were not deliberately indifferent
to the prisoner’s serious medical needs by failing to provide him with adequate pain management; (2) officials
were not deliberately indifferent by subjecting the prisoner to unsanitary showers; and (3) doctors did not fail to
provide adequate training and supervision regarding proper wound care, even if the prisoner’s wound care by
nurses and other subordinates was occasionally sporadic, where the doctors were active in managing it, and they
regularly changed the prescribed frequency of the bandage changes based on the changing condition of the
prisoner’s wounds, and also prescribed antibiotic therapy regimens to assist with healing. The court noted that it
was undisputed that the showers were cleaned twice per day with bleach, that the prisoner was given a
disinfectant spray bottle for his personal use, and that the prisoner was permitted to enter the showers before the
other prisoners so that he could clean himself without interference, and there was no showing that the prisoner
was ever prohibited from using the showers. (R.E. Barrow Treatment Center, Louisiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN

Coley v. Lucas County, Ohio, 799 F.3d 530 (6th Cir. 2015). The administrator of a pretrial detainee’s estate
brought a state court action against a county, county sheriff, police officer and police sergeant, alleging § 1983
violations of the detainee’s constitutional rights and various state law claims. The district court denied the
defendants’ motions to dismiss and denied individual defendants’ requests for qualified immunity. The
defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that a police officer’s act of shoving a fully
restrained pretrial detainee in a jail booking area, causing the detainee to strike his head on the wall as he fell to
the cement floor without any way to break his fall, constituted “gratuitous force” in violation of the detainee’s
Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from excessive force. The court noted that the detainee’s state of being
handcuffed, in a belly chain and leg irons, led to a reasonable inference that the officer’s actions were a result of
his frustration with the detainee’s prior restraint behavior, since the detainee was not in any condition to cause a
disruption that would have provoked the officer to use such force. The court held that the police officer was on
notice that his actions were unconstitutional, and therefore he was not entitled to qualified immunity from
liability under § 1983. According to the court, the officer’s attempts to cover up the assault by filing false reports
and lying to federal investigators following the death of the detainee led to a reasonable conclusion that the
officer understood that his actions violated the detainees’ clearly established right not to be gratuitously
assaulted while fully restrained and subdued. The court found that the county sheriff could be held personally
liable under § 1983, based on his failure to train and supervise employees in the use of excessive force, the use
of a chokehold and injuries derived therefrom, and to ensure that the medical needs of persons in the sheriff’s
custody were met. (Lucas County Jail, Ohio)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN

Ewing v. Cumberland County, 152 F.Supp.3d 269 (D. N.J. 2015). A former arrestee brought a § 1983 action,
bringing claims against county correctional officers, police officers, and a number of municipal entities for use
of excessive force and other constitutional violations. The defendants filed nine motions for summary judgment.
The district court held that (1) issues of fact existed as to whether the force used on detainee was imposed
maliciously and sadistically to cause harm; (2) issues of fact existed as to whether two officers who were not in
the room when excessive force was allegedly used on the pre-trial detainee knew of and failed to intervene in the
assault; (3) issues of fact existed as to whether five correctional officers conspired to cover up their actions; (4)
issues of fact existed as to whether the police officer who had taken the detainee back to the jail after a trip to the
hospital had reason to believe that the detainee's safety was in jeopardy when the officer left the jail, and (5)
genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the county trained its correctional officers on the use of
force, whether the other trainings that took place were inadequate and untimely, whether that failure to train
amounted to deliberate indifference, and whether there was a causal link between that lack of training and the

46.52

injuries the detainee sustained at the hands of correction officers, precluding summary judgment for the
defendants in the failure to train claim. According to the court, the detainee, while unarmed, suffered lifethreatening injuries while in an isolated room with five officers, and that none of the officers were injured,
indicated that the officers used force beyond what was necessary to take down the detainee, in a manner intended
to inflict pain. The court noted that it was clearly established, at the time of the incident, that prisoners were
protected from excessive force and wanton beatings that exceed good-faith efforts to maintain discipline and
order, and a reasonable officer would have known that the force used was excessive. (Cumberland County
Correctional Facility and Vineland Police Department, New Jersey)
U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN
MEDICAL CARE
NEGLIGENCE

Shadrick v. Hopkins County, Ky., 805 F.3d 724 (6th Cir. 2015). The mother of deceased inmate brought a § 1983
action against a county and a medical provider, which contracted with county to provide medical services to
county inmates, alleging that the medical provider’s failure to train and supervise its nurses violated the inmate’s
constitutional right to adequate medical care and that the medical provider was negligent under state law. The
twenty-five year old inmate had entered the jail to serve a short sentence for a misdemeanor offense. He died
three days later from complications of an untreated methicillin-resistant staphylococcus aureas (MRSA)
infection. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the medical provider. The mother appealed.
The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine
issues of material fact as to whether the medical provider’s training program was inadequate, whether the
inadequacy resulted from its deliberate indifference to inmate’s right to adequate medical care, and whether the
inadequacy caused, or was closely related to, the inmate’s death. The court noted that the nurses were required to
make professional judgments outside their area of medical expertise, and unless training was provided, the
nurses lacked knowledge about the constitutional consequences of their actions or inactions in providing medical
care to inmates. The court found that the medical provider did not derive its existence and status from the
county, and thus was not entitled to share the county’s governmental immunity on a Kentucky negligence claim.
The court noted that nearly all of the inmate’s medical conditions-- high blood pressure, rheumatoid arthritis,
gout, osteoporosis, and staph infection-- had been diagnosed by a private physician as mandating treatment, and
deputy jailers could tell that the inmate needed prompt medical treatment even though they did not have the
same medical training as the nurses who were employed at the county jail. (Hopkins County Detention Center,
Southern Health Partners, Inc., Kentucky)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN

Shaidnagle v. Adams County, Miss., 88 F.Supp.3d 705 (S.D.Miss. 2015). After a detainee committed suicide
while being held in a county jail, his mother, individually, on behalf of the detainee’s wrongful death
beneficiaries, and as administratrix of the detainee’s estate, brought an action against the county, sheriff, jail
staff, and others, asserting claims for deprivation of civil rights, equitable relief, and declaratory judgment. The
defendants brought a § 1988 cross-claim for attorney fees and costs against the plaintiff, and subsequently
moved for summary judgment. The court held that neither the sheriff nor another alleged policymaker could be
held liable on a theory of supervisory liability for failure to train or supervise, where the mother did not show
that the training jail staff received was inadequate, and the policy in place to determine whether the detainee was
a suicide risk was not the “moving force” behind a constitutional violation. The court held that the correct legal
standard was not whether jail officers “knew or should have known,” but whether they had gained actual
knowledge of the substantial risk of suicide and responded with deliberate indifference. The court held that
neither party was entitled to attorney fees as the “prevailing party.” (Adams County Jail, Mississippi)

U.S. District Court
MENTAL HEALTH
MEDICAL CARE

Shepard v. Hansford County, 110 F.Supp.3d 696 (N.D. Tex. 2015). A husband brought an action against a
county and a county jail employee under § 1983 alleging deliberate indifference to detainee health in violation of
the right to provision of adequate medical treatment under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, following his wife’s suicide while in the county jail. The defendants moved for summary judgment.
The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that: (1) the jail employee was
entitled to qualified immunity; (2) summary judgment was precluded by a fact issue as to whether the jail
employee violated the detainee’s rights, (3) the county had an adequate suicide risk prevention training policy,
where employees were required to attend training to learn about suicide risk detection and prevention methods,
and were required to read the county’s policy on conducting face-to-face suicide checks with detainees; (4) the
county adequately trained employees on cell entry; but (5) a fact issue existed as to whether the county had an
unwritten policy of understaffing the jail, precluding summary judgment. The court noted that it was not clearly
established at the time of the suicide that an employee was required to abandon other duties to ensure that
suicide watch checks were completed, and it was not clearly established that the employee was prohibited from
providing a detainee with a towel in a cell with “tie-off points,” since the employee was not aware of any other
suicides in that cell. According to the court, the jail cell entry policy prohibiting jail employees from entering a
cell alone did not amount to training employees to be deliberately indifferent to the needs of detainees, and was
not causally related to the detainee’s death, and thus the county was not liable under § 1983 for deliberate
indifference to detainee health. (Hansford County Jail, Texas)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN

Young v. District of Columbia, 107 F.Supp.3d 69 (D.D.C. 2015). A pretrial detainee who was shot in the back
by a police officer brought an action against the municipal police department and the officer, alleging under §
1983 that the defendants violated his Fourth Amendment rights by seizing him without probable cause and using
excessive force. The defendants moved for partial dismissal for failure to state claim. The district court granted
the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity from the
claim that handcuffing and shackling of the detainee during hospital treatment violated his due process rights,
where the law regarding use of handcuffs and shackles on a pretrial detainee during hospital treatment was not
clearly established at the time of the incident in question. The court held that the detainee failed to state a § 1983
claim based on the municipality’s alleged failure to train the officer, absent allegations regarding any specific
policy or custom, the enforcement of which caused the detainee’s injury, or any particular deficiency in training

46.53

or supervision resulting in the officer’s allegedly shooting an unarmed man with his hands raised. (District of
Columbia and D.C. Metropolitan Police Department)

46.54

U.S. Appeals Court
OTHER STATE
PRIVATE FACILITY

Overturf v. Massie, 385 F.3d 1276 (10th Cir. 2004). State prison inmates who had been

transferred from Hawaii to a privately owned correctional facility in another state sought federal
habeas relief, alleging they should have been transferred when the private facility was
purchased by the state. The district court dismissed the action, finding that inmates have no
protected liberty interest in the location of their confinement. The court also held that the
transferor state did not lose jurisdiction over the inmates, and that the original transfer did not
constitute “banishment” in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Dominion Correction Services,
Oklahoma)

2005
U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

McCray v. First State Medical System, 379 F.Supp.2d 635 (D.Del. 2005). A prisoner brought a §

U.S. Appeals Court
RETALIATION

Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559 (9th Cir. 2005). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action
against prison officials, alleging that they retaliated against him for exercising his First
Amendment rights to file prison grievances. The district court dismissed the action for failure to
state a claim and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court
held that the fact that the prisoner undertook exhaustive efforts to remedy a myriad of alleged
violations of his First Amendment rights did not demonstrate that his rights were not violated at
all. The court noted that adoption of such a theory would subject prisoners to a “Catch 22” by
establishing a rule that, by virtue of an inmate having fulfilled the requirements necessary to
pursue a cause of action in federal court, he would be precluded from prosecuting the very claim
he was forced to exhaust. According to the court, the prisoner presented the “very archetype of a
cognizable First Amendment retaliation claim” in alleging that prison officials: (1) arbitrarily
confiscated, withheld and eventually destroyed his property, threatened to transfer him to
another facility, and ultimately assaulted him; (2) because he; (3) exercised his First Amendment
rights to file prison grievances and otherwise seek access to the legal process, and that; (4)
beyond imposing those tangible harms, the officers’ actions chilled the prisoner’s First
Amendment rights; and (5) were not undertaken in narrowly tailored furtherance of legitimate
penological purposes. The court noted that the prisoner’s conflict with the officers “has its
genesis in the most unlikely of places: the servicing of his Canon typewriter.” (California Corr’l
Inst., Tehachapi, California)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Scott v. Garcia, 370 F.Supp.2d 1056 (S.D.Cal. 2005). An inmate brought a suit against a state
corrections department alleging violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and
against individual department employees for violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants in part and denied it in part. The
court held that summary judgment was precluded on a claim that members of the prison’s
classification committee violated the inmate’s Eighth Amendment rights by not recommending
his transfer to a facility with acute hospital care, and on a claim that the prison system violated
ADA by not allowing him a longer time to eat his meals or by allowing him to eat small frequent
meals. (High Desert State Prison, Centinela State Prison, California)

U.S. District Court
RETALIATION

Shaheed-Muhammad v. Dipaolo, 393 F.Supp.2d 80 (D.Mass. 2005). A prisoner brought a civil
rights action against employees of a state corrections department alleging violation of his right to
practice his Muslim religion. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendants in part, and denied it in part. The court held that the defendant failed to establish
that the prisoner’s religious beliefs were not sincerely held, noting that although the prisoner
had a long history of pro se litigation, he might have been both litigious and religiously
observant. According to the court, the fact that the prisoner first sought a pork-free diet and four
months later sought a vegetarian diet could have suggested an evolution of his beliefs, and not
“backsliding” or nonobservance of religious tenets. The court found that the prisoner failed to
establish that prison officials retaliated against him by transferring him from one facility to
another after he attempted to exercise his First Amendment rights. According to the court,
although there were inconsistencies in the officials’ arguments, they presented evidence of two
disciplinary infractions that preceded the transfer which conceivably could have provided a basis
for the transfer, and there was an indication that the prisoner had “numerous enemies” at the
first facility. (Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Cedar Junction)

1983 action against the state prison system’s health care provider, alleging deliberate
indifference to his medical needs. The district court granted the provider’s motion to dismiss. The
court held that the claim was subject to the exhaustion requirement of the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (PLRA) and that the prisoner failed to exhaust remedies. The prisoner attributed his
failure to file a grievance to his blood sugar level being out of control at the time of the incident.
The court also held that the prisoner failed to state a cause of action with his claim that his
rights were violated by a 2-hour commute to another prison facility. Officials had transferred the
prisoner to another prison for a medical procedure, rather than using a local hospital. (Gander
Hill Correctional Institution, and Delaware Correctional Center, Delaware)

47.35
XX

U.S. Appeals Court
RETALIATION

Siggers-El v. Barlow, 412 F.3d 693 (6th Cir. 2005). A state prisoner brought an action against a

U.S. Appeals Court
ACCESS TO COURT
MAIL

Simkins v. Bruce, 406 F.3d 1239 (10th Cir. 2005). A prisoner brought a pro se § 1983 action
alleging that corrections officials failed to forward his mail to him while he was temporarily
housed in another facility, causing him to lose a lawsuit. The district court granted summary
judgment for the officials and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded.
The court held that a prison mail room supervisor’s conduct of holding the prisoner’s mail rather
than forwarding it to him constituted intentional conduct that violated the prisoner’s right of
access to the courts. The court noted that a prisoner’s right to receive his legal mail was clearly
established. (Hutchinson Correctional Facility, Kansas)

U.S. District Court
COURT TRANSFER
RESTRAINTS
SEARCHES

Thiel v. Wisconsin, 399 F.Supp.2d 929 (W.D.Wisc. 2005). A detainee held under the Wisconsin

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS

Torres Garcia v. Puerto Rico, 402 F.Supp.2d 373 (D.Puerto Rico 2005). A prisoner filed a civil
rights suit claiming violations of his constitutional rights. The district court granted the
defendants’ motions to dismiss in part, and denied in part. The court held that the prisoner
stated a due process claim against prison officials based on his transfer from a minimum security
unit to a maximum security unit in violation of a prison rule that required a timely post-transfer
hearing, but noted that the prisoner could only seek prospective injunctive relief. The court found
that the prisoner’s expectations of prison employment did not amount to a property or liberty
interest entitled to due process protection, noting that earning wages while incarcerated was a
privilege, not a right. The court held that the inmate failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim
that prison officials failed to afford him adequate protection from an attack by other inmates,
absent an allegation that he had sustained any injury at their hands. (Puerto Rico Department of
Corrections, Bayamon Institutions Nos. 292 and 501)

U.S. Appeals Court
DUE PROCESS

Westefer v. Snyder, 422 F.3d 570 (7th Cir. 2005). State prisoners brought a § 1983 action
challenging their transfers to a higher-security prison. The district court granted summary
judgment for the defendants and the prisoners appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part,
reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that the prisoners’ suit challenging transfers to a
high security prison was not subject to dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies
as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), where the transfer review process was
not available to prisoners in disciplinary segregation, and the prisoners’ grievances were
sufficient to alert the prison that the transfer decisions were being challenged. The court held
that the alleged change in a prison policy that required transferring gang members to a high
security facility did not constitute an ex post facto violation. The court ruled that the prisoners
stated a claim for denial of due process, where the conditions at the high security prison were
arguably different enough to give the prisoners a liberty interest in not being transferred there,
and there was a dispute as to whether the state provided sufficient pre- and post-transfer
opportunities for the prisoners to challenge the propriety of the transfers. The court held that the
transfers did not violate the gang members’ First Amendment associational rights, noting that
prisoners had no right to associate with gangs. (Tamms Correctional Center, Illinois)

prison block officer, alleging that the officer transferred him to another prison in retaliation for
exercising his First Amendment rights when he complained to the officer’s supervisors that the
officer had failed to authorize disbursements of money from his prison account to pay his lawyer
to review his appellate brief and file. The district court denied the officer’s motion for summary
judgment and the officer appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the prisoner
engaged in protected conduct when he informed the officer’s supervisor about the refusal to
release funds, for the purposes of his First Amendment retaliation claim. The court found that
the officer took an adverse action against the prisoner even though the officer’s action simply
made the prisoner eligible for a routine transfer, and the violation involved a clearly established
right of which a reasonable officer would have been aware. (Michigan Department of Corrections)

Sexually Violent Persons Law (WSVPL) brought a § 1983 action alleging due process violations
in connection with his commitment. The district court denied the detainee’s motion to proceed in
forma pauperis and dismissed the action. The court held that no due process liberty interests
were implicated by the manner in which the detainee was treated, either in regard to his
commitment, or in regard to trips outside the facility to a county jail for court proceedings. The
court found that the maximum security classification imposed on the detainee was an ordinary
incident of such confinement and did not pose atypical or significant hardships. The court found
no violations with the manner in which the detainee was strip searched, dressed in prison
clothes and placed in restraints before being transported to a county jail for court proceedings.
(Sand Ridge Secure Treatment Center, Wisconsin)

47.36
XX

2006
U.S. District Court
RESTRAINTS
TRANSPORTATION
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
PUNISHMENT
RETALIATION

Anderson-Bey v. District of Columbia, 466 F.Supp.2d 51 (D.D.C. 2006). Prisoners transported

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS

Austin v. Wilkinson, 502 F.Supp.2d 675 (N.D.Ohio 2006). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS

Austin v. Wilkinson, 502 F.Supp.2d 660 (N.D.Ohio 2006). State inmates in a super maximum

U.S. District Court
INTERSTATE
COMPACT

Daniels v. Crosby, 444 F.Supp.2d 1220 (N.D.Fla. 2006). An inmate brought a § 1983 suit against
corrections officials, alleging that they violated his due process rights by unconstitutionally
depriving him of wages, occupational training, and other benefits. The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court held that the inmate had no liberty or
property interest in wages for his work in prison, possession of particular items of personal
property, or involvement in rehabilitative programs. The court noted that the Kentucky inmate,
incarcerated in Florida for a Kentucky offense pursuant to an interstate corrections compact, had
no liberty or property interest, and that while Kentucky officials may have owed a legal duty to
the inmate to provide such benefits, Florida corrections officials did not. The inmate had argued
that Kentucky pays prisoners for work they do in prison at the rate of $1 per day and that
Florida owed him these back wages. He claimed entitlement to pay, to possess the same kind of

between out-of-state correctional facilities brought a civil rights action against the District of
Columbia and corrections officers, alleging common law torts and violation of their constitutional
rights under First and Eighth Amendments. The prisoners had been transported in two groups,
with trips lasting between 10 and 15 hours. The defendants brought motions to dismiss or for
summary judgment which the court denied with regard to the District of Columbia. The court
held that: (1) a fact issue existed as to whether the restraints used on prisoners during the
prolonged transport caused greater pain than was necessary to ensure they were securely
restrained; (2) a fact issue existed as to whether the officers acted with deliberate indifference to
the prisoners’ health or safety in the transport of the prisoners; (3) a causal nexus existed
between the protected speech of the prisoners in bringing the civil lawsuit against the corrections
officers and subsequent alleged retaliation by the officers during the transport of prisoners; (4) a
fact issue existed as to whether the officers attempted to chill the prisoners’ participation in the
pending civil lawsuit against the officers; and (5) a fact issue existed as to whether conditions
imposed on the prisoners during the transport were justified by valid penological needs. The
court found that the denial of food during a bus ride that lasted between 10 and 15 hours was
insufficiently serious to state a stand-alone cruel and unusual punishment civil rights claim
under the Eighth Amendment. The court also found that the denial of bathroom breaks during
the 10 to 15 hour bus trip, did not, without more, constitute cruel and unusual punishment
under the Eighth Amendment. The court stated that the extremely uncomfortable and painful
shackles applied for the numerous hours during transports, exacerbated by taunting, threats,
and denial of food, water, medicine, and toilets, was outrageous conduct under District of
Columbia law, precluding summary judgment on the prisoners’ intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim against the corrections officers. (District of Columbia)

alleging that the procedure for transferring him to a super maximum security prison violated
due process. The inmate moved to compel the state to reduce his security placement level. The
district court granted the motion. The court held that the process used by the state to increase
the inmate's security placement level after he killed his cellmate violated due process, even
though the prison's rules infraction board found insufficient evidence that the inmate acted
solely in self-defense, where the prison's classification committee recommended that the inmate's
security placement remain unchanged, the inmate was not given notice of the warden's decision
to override the committee's recommendation or opportunity to argue his position and submit
evidence, the inmate was not given a hearing on administrative appeal, the board's finding was
subject to review by the committee, and the inmate was transferred to a super maximum
security prison before the review process was complete. According to the court, due process
required that the warden and the state's administrative appeals board provide adequate
reasoned statements to justify their decisions to override the prison's classification committee's
recommendation that the inmate's security placement remain unchanged after he killed his
cellmate. The court held that the state prison system was required to provide an individualized
review of the security risk presented by an inmate following his transfer to a super maximum
security prison, and thus the state's use of a boilerplate checklist violated the inmate's due
process rights, where the inmate received no meaningful review of his situation or of the events
leading to his transfer. (Ohio State Penitentiary)

security prison facility brought a class action against corrections officials under § 1983 alleging
that procedures for transferring them to, and retaining them at, the prison violated due process.
The district court ruled that the procedures denied due process and ordered modifications. Prison
officials appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded. Certiorari
was granted. The United States Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.
On remand, the inmates moved for an order extending the court's jurisdiction over due process
issues for one year, and the officials' moved to terminate prospective relief. The district court
granted the inmates’ motion and denied the officials’ motion. (Ohio State Penitentiary)

47.37
XX

personal property (typewriter, television, stereo receiver, ice chest, hot pot, bed linen) he was
allowed to possess in Kentucky, and to enroll in a vocational trade as he was allowed to do in
Kentucky. (Florida Department of Corrections)
U.S. District Court
TRANSPORTATION

Dukes v. Georgia, 428 F.Supp.2d 1298 (N.D.Ga. 2006). A pretrial detainee brought an action
against state and county defendants as well as jail personnel, alleging deliberate indifference to
a serious medical need, violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the
Rehabilitation Act, and medical malpractice. The defendants filed motions for summary
judgment. The court held that jail personnel did not violate the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) or the Rehabilitation Act when an officer and others allegedly told other inmates of the
detainee's status as an HIV infected person, where the detainee did not show that such
disclosure denied him the benefits of any program or service or that it discriminated against him.
The court also found no ADA or Rehabilitation Act violation when an officer did not place a mask
on the detainee when he was being transported to the hospital, where the failure to place a mask
on the detainee did not deny him the benefits of any program or service or discriminate against
him. The court noted that transportation can be construed as a “program or service provided by
the public entity” for the purposes of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).
According to the court, even if a physician's failure to diagnose the pretrial detainee's
cryptococcus was negligent or even severely negligent, her actions and treatment of the detainee
did not constitute deliberate indifference to the detainee's serious medical needs in violation of
due process where the detainee was receiving treatment for his symptoms and his underlying
illness, HIV, and while in hindsight it appeared that a lesion shown by the x-rays was in fact
cryptococcus, there was no showing that indicated that the physician was ever aware of that
severe risk. The court held that a jail nurse was not deliberately indifferent to the detainee's
serious medical needs in violation of the due process clause, where she responded to all requests
for medical service and conveyed the requests and relevant information to a physician, and did
not have substantial knowledge of a serious medical risk when she observed that the detainee
was not moving about, was urinating on his mat, and was cursing at the staff. (Coweta County
Jail, Georgia)

U.S. Appeals Court
INTERSTATE
COMPACT

Garcia v. Lemaster, 439 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2006). A New Mexico inmate housed in California

pursuant to an Interstate Corrections Compact (ICC) filed a civil rights action against New
Mexico defendants challenging his classification and denial of recreation in California. The
district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and the
inmate appealed. The court of appeals affirmed, finding that the inmate was required to bring
his civil rights suit challenging the conditions of his confinement against his California
custodians, and that the inmate did not have a state-created liberty interest in conditions of
confinement in accord with New Mexico regulations when he was housed in another state.
According to the court, an inmate incarcerated in another state pursuant to the ICC had no
liberty interest entitling him to the application of the sending state's classification and recreation
rules while confined in the receiving state. The court also found that the inmate had no statutory
right under the ICC to be classified and afforded recreation pursuant to New Mexico regulations,
noting that the ICC specifically provided that such inmates were entitled to treatment equal to
that afforded similar inmates of the receiving state. (New Mexico State Penitentiary, New
Mexico Dept. of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
LIBERTY INTEREST

Gilmore v. Goord, 415 F.Supp.2d 220 (W.D.N.Y. 2006). A prisoner brought a civil rights action

U.S. District Court
ACCESS TO COURT
RETALIATION

Mark v. Gustafson, 482 F.Supp.2d 1084 (W.D.Wis. 2006). A state prison inmate sued a prison
and individuals, alleging that “magic seals” were removed from the interior of his prison cell in
violation of his religious rights, and that officials conspired to transfer him to another facility.
The district court entered judgment for the defendants. The court found that the absence of any
evidence that officials made any kind of concerted effort to send the inmate to a state prison that
lacked adequate legal research facilities precluded his claim that his transfer was the result of a
conspiracy to deny his right to pursue legal remedies, rather than the stated purposes of sending
him closer to home to ease his return to the outside world. (Oakhill Correctional Institution,
Wisconsin)

U.S. Appeals Court
RETALIATION

Morris v. Powell, 449 F.3d 682 (5th Cir. 2006). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against prison

against prison officials and employees, claiming that they violated his constitutional rights in
connection with an administrative segregation hearing. The defendants moved for summary
judgment and the district court granted the motion. The court held that the inmate's
administrative segregation for nineteen days did not implicate a protected liberty interest, nor
did his transfer from a medium-security facility to maximum-security facility. The court found
that the prisoner had no protected liberty interest in parole, and no justifiable expectation that
he would be incarcerated in any particular prison within a state, and therefore, transfers from
one facility to another generally do not implicate any due process-protected liberty interest, even
if the transfer involves a change in security classification as well. (Wyoming Corr’l Facil., N.Y.)

officials, alleging that they retaliated against him for exercising his First Amendment right to

47.38
XX

use the prison grievance system. Following denial of the defendants' first motion for summary judgment, the
appeals court remanded for consideration of whether an inmate's retaliation claim must allege more than a de
minimis adverse act. On remand, the district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The
inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court held that: (1)
when addressing an issue of apparent first impression for the court, prisoners bringing § 1983 retaliation claims
against prison officials must allege more than an inconsequential or de minimis retaliatory act to establish a
constitutional violation; (2) the officials' alleged actions in moving the inmate to a less desirable job within the
prison did not rise to the level of an actionable retaliation; (3) the inmate's claim that he was transferred to an
inferior and more dangerous prison satisfied the de minimis threshold; and (4) the defendants were entitled to
qualified immunity on the inmate's job transfer claim. The court noted that although the inmate's official job
classification was switched from the commissary to the kitchen for about six weeks, he was actually made to
work in the kitchen for only a week at most, and he spent just one day in the “pot room,” which was evidently an
unpleasant work station, after which he was moved to the butcher shop, about which he raised no complaints.
(Telford Unit, Texas Department of Criminal Justice)
U.S. District Court
PURPOSE
RETALIATION

Price v. Wall, 428 F.Supp.2d 52 (D.R.I. 2006). An inmate brought a § 1983 suit against corrections officials,
alleging that he was intentionally transferred to the facility where he was confined in an effort to frustrate his
rehabilitation, in retaliation for his filing of a motion to compel compliance with a state court order, in violation
of the First Amendment. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court held that the inmate stated a First
Amendment retaliation claim where he alleged that corrections officials intentionally transferred him to the
facility in retaliation for his court action. According to the court, the question was not whether the defendants
had a right to transfer the inmate, but whether such action was accomplished for an unlawful purpose. The
inmate had been required, as a condition of his sentence, to complete certain rehabilitative programs, including
psychological and psychiatric treatment while incarcerated. After not receiving any of the court-mandated
treatment, the inmate filed a motion in the state courts seeking to compel the Department of Corrections to
comply with the state court order. After several skirmishes, the Department of Corrections agreed to provide the
inmate with the court-mandated treatment. The parties further agreed that if the inmate successfully completed
the first round of treatment, the Department of Corrections would upgrade his classification status, permitting
him to participate in further rehabilitative treatment as mandated by the state court. The inmate successfully
completed his first round of treatment and appeared before a classification board for review of his classification
status. Based on his successful completion of the initial round of treatment and pursuant to the agreement
between the inmate and the Department, the board recommended that the inmate’s classification be upgraded.
But the defendants refused to permit an upgrade and instead launched no less than three separate, unrelated
investigations into various matters, delaying the inmate’s classification status upgrade and prohibiting him from
participating in further rehabilitation. (Rhode Island Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
OTHER STATE
RETALIATION

Price v. Wall, 464 F.Supp.2d 90 (D.R.I. 2006). A state prisoner brought a pro se civil rights action under § 1983
against various prison officials, alleging the officials retaliated against him in violation of his First Amendment
rights. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court held that: (1) the
prisoner’s transfer to an out-of-state correctional system was not adverse; (2) the prisoner’s classification while
confined in the out-of-state correctional facility to a restrictive or harsh classification was not adverse, for the
purposes of his First Amendment retaliation claim; (3) the prisoner’s transfer was not in retaliation for his legal
activities; and (4) the officials were not liable for retaliation based on the prisoner’s classification while confined
in the out-of-state correctional facility. The court noted that the prisoner’s classification was not significantly
more severe than his classification while confined at the in-state correctional facility. (Rhode Island Department
of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
RETALIATION

Senty-Haugen v. Goodno, 462 F.3d 876 (8th Cir. 2006). A civilly-committed sex offender brought an action
against the Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Human Services, other Department officials, and sex
offender program employees, alleging violations of federal and state law for being placed in isolation, receiving
inadequate medical attention, and being retaliated against. The district court entered summary judgment in favor
of the defendants and the offender appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court found that the offender's
transfer was not in retaliation for his alleged advocacy for another patient, so as to violate the offender's speech
rights, where the sex offender program officials indicated that they transferred the offender to lessen his contact
with the patient, whom the offender was suspected of exploiting, and where the offender failed to present any
evidence that the transfer took place for any other reason. (Minnesota Sex Offender Program, Minnesota
Department of Human Services)

U.S. District Court
RETALIATION

Siggers-El v. Barlow, 433 F.Supp.2d 811(E.D.Mich. 2006). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that a
prison official transferred him in retaliation for his exercising his First Amendment rights. After a jury verdict in
the inmate's favor, the official filed a motion for a new trial, and the inmate moved for costs and attorney fees.
The district court held that the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA) that prohibited inmates
from recovering mental or emotional damages in the absence of a the physical injury, did not bar the inmate's
claim for emotional damages and that evidence supported the award of punitive damages. According to the
court, the jury's award of punitive damages against the prison official was supported by evidence that the official
transferred the inmate in retaliation for the inmate's exercise of his First Amendment free speech rights in
complaining to the official's superiors about the official's misconduct, even though the official was aware that the
transfer would prevent the inmate from seeing his attorney, from paying his attorney, and from seeing his
emotionally-disabled daughter. The court found that the jury did not improperly use punitive damages to
compensate the inmate for the prison official's misconduct because the amount of economic damages, $4,000,

47.39
XXII

was too low. The court held that the prison official's conduct in transferring the inmate was sufficiently
reprehensible to warrant a punitive damages award of $200,000, even though prisoner transfers were routine, and
the inmate suffered only $4,000 in economic damages. According to the court, a lesser award would have
encouraged bad behavior by prison officials. (Michigan Department of Corrections)
U.S. District Court
LIBERTY INTEREST

Tanner v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 433 F.Supp.2d 117 (D.D.C. 2006). An inmate brought an action against
the federal Bureau of Prisons, alleging that his pending transfer to another facility would deprive him of
participation in vocational training programs. The inmate moved for a preliminary injunction. The district court
denied the motion. The court held that the inmate failed to demonstrate the likelihood of success on his due
process claim, as required to obtain a preliminary injunction preventing his transfer, where removal from
programs did not constitute an atypical or significant deprivation of the inmate's rights, nor did it affect the
duration of his sentence, as may have impaired his protected liberty interests. But the court found that the
inmate demonstrated that he would suffer an irreparable injury if injunctive relief were not granted, as required
to obtain a preliminary injunction, because the transfer was certain to result in the loss of access to an
aquaculture program in which he was employed, loss of pay grade and loss of eligibility for a cable technician
program. (Federal Correctional Institution Fairton, New Jersey, United States Penitentiary Leavenworth, Kansas)

U.S. Appeals Court
OTHER STATE

U.S. v. Garcia, 470 F.3d 1001 (10th Cir. 2006). Following criminal convictions for drug conspiracy and related
crimes, several defendants moved for transfer to a detention facility located closer to their families. The district
court denied the motions and the defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that a request for a
change in place of confinement was required to be brought pursuant to Bivens, since the request was a challenge
to the conditions of confinement. (Moshannon Valley Correctional Center, Phillipsburg, Pennsylvania)
2007

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
LIBERTY INTEREST

Banks v. York, 515 F.Supp.2d 89 (D.D.C. 2007). A detainee in a jail operated by the District of Columbia
Department of Corrections (DOC), and in a correctional treatment facility operated by the District's private
contractor, brought a § 1983 action against District employees and contractor's employees alleging negligent
supervision under District of Columbia law, over-detention, deliberate indifference to serious medical needs,
harsh living conditions in jail, and extradition to Virginia without a hearing. The district court granted the
defendants’ motion to dismiss in part and denied in part. The court held that the detainee sufficiently alleged that
the Director of District of Columbia Department of Corrections (DOC) was directly involved in violations of the
detainee's constitutional rights, as required to state a claim under § 1983 against a government official in his
individual capacity. The detainee alleged that the Director refused to transfer the detainee from the jail to a
correctional treatment facility and failed to train DOC employees under his supervision in such a way as to
prevent the detainee's over-detention (detention beyond proper release date). The court found that the Director of
District of Columbia Department of Corrections (DOC) could not be liable in his individual capacity, under the
theory of respondeat superior, to the jail detainee for allegedly unconstitutional actions or omissions of his
subordinates. The court held that the alleged refusal of officials of Department of Corrections (DOC) to transfer
the detainee to a correctional treatment facility at which conditions were far less restrictive did not implicate a
due process liberty interest. The court noted that an inmate has no due process liberty interest in a particular
place of confinement or a particular level of security. (Central Detention Facility. D.C. and Correctional
Treatment Facility operated by the Corrections Corporation of America)

U.S. District Court
LIBERTY INTEREST
MEDICAL CARE
DUE PROCESS

Farmer v. Kavanagh, 494 F.Supp.2d 345 (D.Md. 2007). A state prison inmate sued officials, claiming her
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights and her Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment were violated when she was transferred from a medium to a maximum security facility. The
defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court entered judgment for the officials on the federal
claims and dismissed the state law claim. The court held that the inmate had a liberty interest in not being sent to
a maximum security prison, as required in order to bring a claim that transfer to maximum security facility
without prior notice and an opportunity to be heard, was a violation of her Fourteenth Amendment rights. The
court noted that the maximum security prison's strict control over every aspect of an inmate's life, and almost
virtual isolation from any human contact, imposed conditions of confinement far worse than her previous
situation in the general population of a medium security prison. But the court found that the officials had
qualified immunity from the inmate's due process claim because, at the time of the transfer, it was not clearly
established that an inmate could have a liberty interest in not being transferred to a maximum security prison.
The court held that the officials’ alleged difference in access to health care providers, between the medium
security prison and the maximum security prison to which the inmate was transferred, was insufficient to support
a determination that prison officials showed deliberate indifference to her medical needs by transferring her. The
court noted that the inmate’s delivery of drugs required for AIDS treatment was delayed and intermittently
interrupted, but the patient's file did not reflect the seriousness of her condition, and when one maximum security
prison employee was found derelict in making deliveries of medications, the employee was fired. (Maryland
Correctional Adjustment Center [“Supermax”])

U.S. District Court
RETALIATION FOR
LEGAL ACTION

Kaufman v. Schneiter, 474 F.Supp.2d 1014 (W.D.Wis. 2007). An inmate at a supermaximum security prison
filed a § 1983 action alleging that prison officials violated his constitutional rights. The inmate filed a motion
seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The
court held that the inmate’s claim that he was transferred to a maximum security facility in retaliation for his
decision to name a warden as a defendant in a civil rights action was not frivolous, and thus the inmate was
entitled to proceed in forma pauperis in his § 1983 action, where fact issues remained as to whether the lawsuit
motivated the warden’s decision to transfer the inmate. (Wisconsin Secure Program Facility)

47.40
XXII

U.S. District Court
LAW LIBRARY
MAIL
RETALIATION

Kaufman v. Schneiter, 524 F.Supp.2d 1101 (W.D.Wis. 2007). A former state inmate sued prison officials for
declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, alleging that he was subjected to retaliatory transfer and that his
rights under the First and Eighth Amendments and Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA) were violated. The court granted the officials’ motion for summary judgment.The court held that the
warden was not involved in the inmate's transfer to a maximum security institution, precluding the warden's
liability on the claim alleging that he transferred the inmate in retaliation for the inmate's filing of an earlier
lawsuit against him. The court found that there was no evidence that any of the prison officials sued by the
inmate were personally involved in denying delivery to the inmate of the letter underlying his free speech claim,
and therefore the officials could not be held liable under § 1983. According to the court, there were no facts in
evidence that the former state inmate was prevented from ordering publications about his religion of atheism
while incarcerated at a maximum security facility, was in the facility's step program, or was in any other way
injured by the step program's no-publications policy, and therefore the former inmate lacked standing to litigate
his claim that the policy violated his free exercise rights and rights under Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The court held that the former state inmate did not show that while he
was incarcerated at a maximum security facility, he ever chose to use out-of-cell time to visit the law library, as
opposed to out-of-door exercise, and thus to show an injury-in-fact required for the former inmate to have
standing to challenge the prison official's policy of requiring inmates to choose between out-of-cell exercise time
and law library time under the Eighth Amendment. (Wisconsin Secure Program Facility)

U.S. District Court
TRANSPORTATION
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
PUNISHMENT

Malik v. District of Columbia, 512 F.Supp.2d 28 (D.D.C. 2007). An inmate sued the District of Columbia, a
correctional services company retained by the District, and a transportation company claiming violations of the
Eighth Amendment during a 40-hour bus ride transferring the inmate between two facilities. The defendants
moved for summary judgment. The court held that the inmate failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to
the claims against the District and the correctional services company. On appeal (574 F.3d 781), the appeals
court held that the prisoner did not have administrative remedies for the inmate to exhaust. The court ruled that
genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether he exhausted any administrative remedies available to him
under the transportation company's informal grievance policy, precluding summary judgment. (District of
Columbia, Corrections Corporation of America, TransCor, CCA's Northeast Ohio Correctional Center,
Youngstown, Ohio, and CCA Central Arizona Detention Center)

U.S. District Court
RETALIATION

Montoya v. Board of County Com'rs, 506 F.Supp.2d 434 (D.Colo. 2007). A jail inmate brought civil rights and
civil rights conspiracy claims against sheriffs, a deputy sheriff, and officials of two counties alleging violation of
his constitutional rights when he was tasered by a correctional officer and later transferred and placed in
segregation in alleged retaliation for complaining to the press about the tasering incident. The defendants moved
for summary judgment and the district court granted the motion. The court held that a civil rights claim was not
stated against counties and sheriffs in their official capacities for the inmate's transfer and placement in
segregated confinement in alleged retaliation for his complaints to press, given the inmate's complete failure to
allege any specific facts suggesting that segregation was the result of a custom or policy, rather than being
simply a single act of deprivation disconnected from any wider scheme. According to the court, the county
sheriffs were entitled to qualified immunity on individual capacity claims involving conspiracy to transfer and
place jail inmate in protective, segregated confinement in retaliation for the exercise of his First Amendment
rights, absent any indication that the sheriffs, who never communicated with each other about the transfer, were
personally involved in the decision, exercised discretionary control over the decision, or failed to supervise jail
administrators who actually made the transfer. (Chaffee and Park Counties, Colorado)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Price v. Correctional Medical Services, 493 F.Supp.2d 740 (D.Del. 2007). An inmate brought a § 1983 action
against a prison's medical services provider and prison officials, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious
medical needs. The provider moved to dismiss, and the inmate moved for appointment of counsel. The district
court denied the motions. The court held that the prisoner stated a claim under § 1983 against the prison's
medical services provider for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. The prisoner alleged that the refusal of prompt medical care to his recently surgically repaired
wrists, upon his transfer from another facility, by employees of the prison's medical services provider, was, or
could have been, partially responsible for the permanent damage to his wrists that was independently verified by
an outside doctor. The court noted that the seriousness of the prisoner’s medical need was so obvious, from the
condition he arrived in, his description of the events to nurses, and from the obvious pain he was under for a
period of weeks, that any lay person would have recognized the need for a doctor. (Delaware Corr’l Center)
2008

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
TRANSPORTATION

Brown v. Fortner, 518 F.3d 552 (8th Cir. 2008). A former inmate brought a § 1983 action against correction
officers alleging deliberate indifference by failing to provide safe transportation. The district court denied the
officers' claims of qualified immunity and denied their motions for summary judgment. The officers appealed.
The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded. The court held that evidence that a correction
officer transporting inmates as part of a convoy refused to fasten the inmate's seatbelt knowing that he could not
do so himself because of his shackles, and drove recklessly while ignoring requests to slow down, was sufficient
for a reasonable jury to conclude that the officer manifested deliberate indifference for the inmate's safety in
violation of the Eighth Amendment. The court found that another correction officer who was driving a vehicle as
part of the convoy who drove too fast and followed the lead vehicle too closely did not act with deliberate
indifference for the safety of the inmate passenger in the lead vehicle, even though the officer's driving
proximately caused a multiple vehicle rear-end accident which resulted in the inmate's injuries, absent evidence
that the officer was asked to slow down and refused, or that the officer knew that the inmate had been denied a
seatbelt. (Missouri Department of Corrections)

47.41
XXII

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
MEDICAL CARE
TRANSPORTATION

Dantone v. Bhaddi, 570 F.Supp.2d 167 (D.Mass. 2008). A prisoner brought an action against the United States
under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and against a prison doctor under Bivens, seeking to recover for
injuries allegedly sustained when the seat of a van in which he was being transported collapsed. The district
court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss. The court held that the prisoner's allegations that prison staff
breached its duty of care in their transportation of him by failing to properly install, maintain, and inspect the
seating in a transport van, and that this breach resulted in the collapse of the seat, which resulted in the injuries to
his head and neck, and ongoing pain, were sufficient facts to state a negligence claim against the United States
under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The court found that the prisoner's allegations that he received no meaningful
medical care following the accident, that the magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) which he eventually received
six months after the accident was untimely, and that, to date, he had been unable to obtain any medical
information about the results of his tests, all despite repeated complaints to the prison doctor, were sufficient to
state a claim against the doctor of deliberate indifference to his medical needs in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. (Federal Medical Center, Devens, Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Estate of Harvey ex rel. Dent v. Roanoke City Sheriff's Office, 585 F.Supp.2d 844 (W.D.Va. 2008). The
administrator of a pretrial detainee's estate brought a civil rights action under §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986 and
Virginia law, against a city sheriff's department, sheriff, deputies, and prison health providers, alleging excessive
use of force, failure to train, assault, battery, conspiracy, breach of a non-delegable fiduciary duty, intentional
infliction of emotional distress and wrongful death. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district
court granted the motions. The court held that the estate of the pretrial detainee who died following cardiac arrest
after transfer from a jail to a hospital could not sustain a deliberate indifference claim under the Fourteenth
Amendment against the employees of a prison health provider, absent evidence that they actually knew of and
disregarded a serious risk of harm to the detainee, or that they actually knew of and ignored a serious need for
medical care. The court noted that the city sheriff and sheriff's deputies did not knowingly disregard a substantial
risk of harm to the pretrial detainee in violation of Fourteenth Amendment when they relied on medical
personnel's decisions as to the appropriate course of treatment for the detainee's medical needs. (Roanoke City
Jail, Virginia)

U.S. Appeals Court
INTERSTATE COMPACT
LAW LIBRARY
RETALIATION

Hannon v. Beard, 524 F.3d 275 (1st Cir. 2008). A prisoner who was formerly incarcerated in Pennsylvania and
transferred to Massachusetts brought an action against the Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections, alleging that he was transferred out-of-state in retaliation for prior lawsuits. The previous lawsuits
were against a Pennsylvania prison librarian, who allegedly denied his requests for legal materials, and against
numerous Massachusetts prison officials. The district court dismissed the action and the prisoner appealed. The
appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings regarding the
Secretary of the Department of Corrections. The court held that the conduct by the Secretary of the Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections, in authorizing, directing, and arranging the Pennsylvania prisoner's transfer from a
Pennsylvania prison to a Massachusetts prison, pursuant to an Interstate Corrections Compact, was sufficient to
constitute the “transaction of business” in Massachusetts, as would support the exercise of personal jurisdiction
by the district court. The court found that the prison librarian's conduct in responding to requests for legal
materials by the prisoner incarcerated in Massachusetts was insufficient to constitute the “transaction of
business” in Massachusetts, within the meaning of the Massachusetts long-arm statute. The court noted that the
prisoner “…has been the quintessential ‘jailhouse lawyer,’ pursuing post-conviction relief and filing numerous
grievances and lawsuits on behalf of himself and other prisoners challenging their conditions of confinement.”
The prisoner estimated that he had represented “thousands” of his fellow inmates in proceedings. He alleged that
the Pennsylvania DOC grew tired of his lawsuits and agitation and, in order to prevent him from filing more
lawsuits and in retaliation for the actions he had already taken, began a strategy of transferring him to out-ofstate prisons. (Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, Massachusetts Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Jarecke v. Hensley, 552 F.Supp.2d 261 (D.Conn. 2008). A prisoner who suffered from antisocial personality and
borderline personality disorders challenged his mental health treatment and an attempt to transfer him to a
correctional facility with dormitory housing, alleging violation of the Eighth Amendment. The prisoner moved
for a preliminary injunction to prevent his transfer and to be prescribed lithium and assigned to a single cell. The
district court denied the motion. The court found that the prisoner did not have a likelihood of success on the
merits of his claim, and that the prisoner would not suffer irreparable harm without an injunction. The court
noted that the prisoner's medical treatment was adequate, as lithium was generally not used to treat such
disorders, and that no medical diagnosis precluded his transfer to a dormitory setting or required confinement in
single cell. (Connecticut)

U.S. Appeals Court
INTERSTATE COMPACT
MEDICAL CARE
TRANSPORTATION

Kinslow v. Pullara, 538 F.3d 687 (7th Cir. 2008). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action against prison officials at
the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) and the New Mexico Department of Corrections (NMDOC), and
against a private transportation company and its employees. The inmate alleged violation of his constitutional
right to adequate medical treatment during his transfer between institutions, resulting in the failure of
chemotherapy for his advanced liver disease from hepatitis C. The district court dismissed the claims against the
NMDOC, and dismissed the claimsagainst the remaining parties after settlement. The inmate appealed. The
appeals court affirmed. The court held that NMDOC officials lacked sufficient contacts with Illinois for the
exercise of personal jurisdiction. The court noted that New Mexico officials had only arranged and planned the
inmate's transfer by a handful of phone calls, but did not purposefully avail themselves of the privileges of
conducting activities in Illinois, and had not deliberately engaged in significant activities or created continuing
obligations in Illinois. The inmate’s transfer took place in October 2004. The court noted that although the
inmate’s bus trip to New Mexico could have been completed in less than 24 hours, the route that the private
transport company (TransCor) chose lasted six days. Moreover, while the Illinois and New Mexico prison
officials were all well aware of the inmate’s prescribed treatment and of how strictly it had to be followed, they

47.42
XXII

failed to establish procedures that would ensure proper medical care for the inmate during the trip. According to
the court, “During his transfer, everything that could go wrong with [the inmate’s] treatment, did.” (Illinois
Department of Corrections, New Mexico Department of Corrections, TransCor America, LLC)
U.S. Appeals Court
DUE PROCESS
LAW LIBRARY
MENTAL HEALTH

Obriecht v. Raemisch, 517 F.3d 489 (7th Cir. 2008). A state prisoner filed a pro se § 1983 action against prison
officials alleging that he was denied procedural due process when transferred to a state facility and when he was
forced to take psychotropic medications. The district court granted summary judgment to the officials and denied
motions for reconsideration. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the prisoner failed
to exhaust challenges to the transfers and forced medication. The court also found that the prisoner forfeited the
argument that exhaustion should be excused because of an inadequate law library because that issue had not
been raised in the district court. The court noted that a prisoner's exhaustion of administrative remedies before
filing a § 1983 claim is required even if the prisoner believes his efforts in securing relief will be futile or if the
administrative authority has no power to grant the requested relief. (Wisconsin Resource Center and the
Wisconsin Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
RETALIATION

Piggie v. Riggle, 548 F.Supp.2d 652 (N.D.Ind. 2008). A prisoner brought a pro se action against a prison
official, alleging that she transferred him to another facility because he filed grievances and lawsuits against
prison staff. The district court denied summary judgment for the defendants. The court held that summary
judgment was precluded by fact issues as to whether: the official was personally involved in the transfer; the
asserted reasons for the transfer were pretextual; and the prisoner exhausted remedies under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (PLRA). (Miami Correctional Facility, Pendleton Correctional Facility, Indiana)

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
EQUAL PROTECTION
TRANSFER

Pugh v. Goord, 571 F.Supp.2d 477 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). State prisoners sued prison officials, alleging violations of
their constitutional and statutory rights to free exercise of Shi'a Islam and to be free from the establishment of
Sunni Islam. Following remand from the appeals court, the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment. The district
court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that one prisoner's claim for injunctive relief
qualified for a “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception, and therefore was not rendered moot by his
transfer to another facility. The court noted that the corrections department had the ability to freely transfer the
prisoner between facilities prior to the full litigation of his claims, and there was a reasonable expectation that
the prisoner would be subject to the same action again, given that the department's policies were applicable to all
of its prison facilities. (New York State Department of Correctional Services, Mid-Orange Correctional Facility
and Fishkill Correctional Facility)

U.S. District Court
PURPOSE

Shilling v. Crawford, 536 F.Supp.2d 1227 (D.Nev. 2008). A Washington prisoner who was being housed in
Nevada brought an action against prison officials, claiming violation of his rights under the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The district court granted the officials’ motion for summary
judgment. The court held that prison authorities imposed a substantial burden on the prisoner's religious beliefs
when they conditioned the prisoner's receipt of a kosher meal on his relinquishment of the benefits of living in a
lower-security facility. But the court held that even if the prisoner could bring an individual capacity claim
against prison officials under RLUIPA, the officials would be entitled to qualified immunity since it would not
have been clear to a reasonable official in April 2004 that offering the prisoner a transfer to a higher security
prison to accommodate his religious diet would violate his rights under RLUIPA. (High Desert State Prison,
Nevada, and Washington Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
PUNISHMENT
OTHER STATE

Stutes v. Tipto, 540 F.Supp.2d 516 (D.Vt. 2008). A Vermont inmate incarcerated in Oklahoma in a privatelyowned facility brought an action against Vermont prison officials and facility employees claiming cruel and
unusual punishment. The inmate alleged that his time spent outdoors in cold weather exposed him to “the
potential of hypothermia, frostbite, and cold-related infections such as influenza, ear infections, upper respiratory
infections, bronchitis and more.” Shortly after his exposure to the cold, he began suffering from flu-like
symptoms. The district court dismissed the action. The court held that a state corrections commissioner was not
subject to liability under § 1983 for alleged mistreatment of the inmate, even though the inmate sent a letter to
the commissioner asking for protection from retaliation, and submitted a formal grievance form to the
commissioner after the alleged mistreatment, where there was no indication that the commissioner was
responsible for a policy or custom that led to the wrongdoing, or that he failed to properly supervise employees
who committed the allegedly wrongful acts. (North Fork Correctional Facility, Oklahoma, Corrections
Corporation of America)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN

Whitt v. Stephens County, 529 F.3d 278 (5th Cir. 2008). The father of a pretrial detainee who purportedly hanged
himself while incarcerated at a county jail brought a § 1983 action against a county, the county sheriff, and
unknown jail officials. The district court granted summary judgment in part in favor of jail officials and the
sheriff in their individual capacities. The father appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The district court denied
the father's motion for leave to amend the complaint to identify the unknown jail officials, and granted summary
judgment in favor of the defendants on remaining claims. The father again appealed. The appeals court affirmed.
The court held that the amended complaint to substitute named county jail officials for unknown jail officials did
not relate back to the original complaint, for the purpose of avoiding a statute of limitations bar. The court found
that the county sheriff was not liable under § 1983 for the death of the pretrial detainee, where the sheriff was not
present at the jail until after the detainee was found dead, and there was no showing that the sheriff played any
part in the detainee's death, or that the sheriff was deliberately indifferent in failing to attempt to resuscitate the
detainee or obtain additional medical care for the detainee. The court held that the county was not liable under §
1983 for the detainee's purported suicide, where the county had adequate policies and procedures for detainees
who posed an obvious risk of suicide, the detainee did not indicate that he was suicidal on an intake form or
otherwise exhibit obvious suicidal tendencies, and the county was not deliberately indifferent in failing to train

47.43
XXII

or supervise county jail officials. The court noted that in the specific context of jail suicide prevention,
municipalities must provide custodial officials with minimal training to detect the obvious medical needs of
pretrial detainees with known, demonstrable, and serious medical disorders, but a failure to train custodial
officials in screening procedures to detect latent suicidal tendencies does not rise to the level of a constitutional
violation. The court found that in the absence of manifest signs of suicidal tendencies, a city may not be held
liable for a pretrial detainee's jailhouse suicide in a § 1983 suit based on a failure to train. (Stephens County Jail,
Texas)
2009
U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
LIBERTY INTEREST
MENTAL INSTITUTION

Bailey v. Pataki, 636 F.Supp.2d 288 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). Convicted sex offenders brought an action against state
officials, alleging that their involuntary psychiatric commitment deprived them of constitutional due process
protections. The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, or, in the alternative, for a stay pending
resolution of certain pending state court proceedings. The district court denied the motion. The court held that
the allegations of the convicted sex offenders were sufficient to state a procedural due process claim against state
officials for deprivation of the offenders' liberty interests in not being confined unnecessarily for medical
treatment. The offenders alleged that: (1) they were involuntarily transferred to state-run mental institutions
based on the certification of doctors designated by the New York State Office of Mental Health and the New
York Department of Correctional Services, instead of independent, court-appointed doctors; (2) that some were
never served with a notice of petition for their involuntary commitment; (3) that notice was not provided to any
of the offenders' friends and family; (4) and that they were not provided an opportunity to request a precommitment hearing and an opportunity to be heard. The court found that the procedural due process rights of
the convicted sex offenders, to certain pre-transfer procedural safeguards, including notice, an opportunity to be
heard, and a psychiatric evaluation by court-appointed doctors, was clearly established at the time of their
involuntary commitment and transfer from prison to a mental hospital, so as to preclude any claim of qualified
immunity on the part of New York officials. The court noted that the offenders were certified for involuntary
commitment after being examined for short periods of time lasting no more than 20 minutes, and once certified,
all six offenders were transported in handcuffs and shackles where they were broadly evaluated for treatment.
(New York State Office of Mental Health, New York Department of Correctional Services)

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
RETALIATION

Brown v. Corsini, 657 F.Supp.2d 296 (D.Mass. 2009). Inmates brought a pro se § 1983 action against prison
officials, alleging retaliatory transfer, deliberate indifference and due process violations. The district court
granted the officials’ motion for summary judgment. The court held that the inmates failed to demonstrate that
they would not have been transferred to a new prison but for the prison officials' retaliatory motive, for filing
grievances about being required to install security screens on other prisoners' windows. The court noted that the
inmates had refused to perform work assignments in the prison's maintenance shop in violation of prison
regulations. According to the court, prison officials were not deliberately indifferent to the inmates' safety in
violation of the Eighth Amendment by refusing to reassign them to new jobs despite their fear of retribution by
other prisoners. The prisoners had installed security screens on other prisoners' windows as part of their job
duties. The court noted that there was no evidence that the inmates were subjected to ominous threats or violence
by other prisoners. (Bay State Correctional Center, Massachusetts)

U.S. Appeals Court
DUE PROCESS

Hart v. Hodges, 587 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2009). A former federal prisoner brought an action against a state
prosecutor, the general counsel of the Georgia Department of Corrections (DOC) and the warden of a Georgia
prison, alleging violations of his constitutional rights by having him transferred from federal to state custody at
the end of his federal sentence. The district court granted the defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings
on the ground they were entitled to absolute immunity. The plaintiff appealed. The appeals court affirmed in
part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court held that the prosecutor was entitled to absolute immunity for his
role in the plaintiff's transfer. But the court held that the general counsel of the Georgia Department of
Corrections (DOC) and the warden of a Georgia prison were not entitled to absolute immunity from liability
under § 1983 and state law for causing the issuance of a second state warrant against the prisoner prior to his
release from federal prison, and issuing a notice of surrender to the prisoner and threatening further prosecution
following his release. The court noted that the general counsel's role as legal advisor to the DOC and the
warden's role as chief jailer of the prison where the prisoner was incarcerated were not roles intimately
associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process. (Jackson State Prison, Georgia Department of
Corrections)

U.S. District Court
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
PUNISHMENT
DISCIPLINE
DUE PROCESS
EQUAL PROTECTION
TRANSFER

Holland v. Taylor, 604 F.Supp.2d 692 (D.Del. 2009). A state prisoner brought a pro se § 1983 action against a
Department of Correction (DOC) and DOC officials, alleging violations of his constitutional rights to equal
protection and due process, deliberate indifference, cruel and unusual punishment, and false imprisonment. The
prisoner moved to appoint counsel, and the defendants brought a renewed motion for summary judgment. The
district court granted the motion for summary judgment and denied the motion to appoint counsel. The court
found that neither Delaware law nor Delaware Department of Correction regulations create a liberty interest, the
denial of which would constitute a due process violation, in a prisoner's classification within an institution. The
court found that the state prisoner had no constitutionally protected right to work release, and thus, neither the
alleged failure of a multi-disciplinary team (MDT) member to inform the inmate of a disciplinary review
meeting regarding his alleged work release program violation, nor the prisoner's transfer following completion of
the sentence imposed in connection with the disciplinary meeting, to another facility to await return to the workrelease facility, violated the prisoner's due process rights, absent any atypical or significant hardship by being
housed at the other facility as compared to a work-release facility. (Delaware Correctional Center)

47.44
XXII

XXIII

U.S. District Court
ACCESS TO COURT
DUE PROCESS
INTERSTATE COMPACT

Kim v. Veglas, 607 F.Supp.2d 286 (D.Mass. 2009). A prisoner, who was initially convicted and incarcerated in
Maine, brought an action against various prison officials in Massachusetts and Maine alleging that his transfer to
a Massachusetts corrections facility violated a variety of his constitutional and statutory rights. The district court
dismissed the case in part. The court held that a Maine prison law librarian was subject to Massachusetts' longarm statute, for the purposes of a claim of denial of access to the courts brought by the prisoner. The court noted
that, in a letter to the prisoner in response to his request for legal materials, the librarian stated that he was the
individual to contact for Maine legal materials, and that he required the prisoner to provide “exact citations” for
requested legal materials. The prisoner contended that this requirement essentially prohibited him from acquiring
Maine legal materials, and thus caused his constitutional injury. The court held that the prisoner’s allegations
were sufficient to satisfy the relatedness requirement for exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over the
librarian, consistent with due process. According to the court, the librarian's alleged conduct was both the “butfor” and proximate cause of the prisoner's inability to access the courts, and the foreseeable result of the letter the
librarian sent into Massachusetts was that it would prevent the prisoner from having meaningful access to legal
materials. The court held that the exercise by the Massachusetts court of personal jurisdiction over the Maine
prison law librarian would be reasonable, as required to comply with due process. The court found that
Massachusetts had an interest in adjudicating the dispute because: (1) the Commonwealth would be less willing
to accept inmates pursuant to the New England Interstate Corrections Compact if the prisoners it accepted must
bring suit in Maine; (2) the prisoner had a great interest in accessing the federal courts in Massachusetts, given
that he had adequate access to Massachusetts legal materials; (3) litigating in Massachusetts would promote
judicial economy because the prisoner had already been appointed pro bono counsel and the case was pending in
Massachusetts for several years; and (4) the suit would promote a substantive social policy of ensuring that
interstate transfers of prisoners were not used as a means of cutting off inmates' ability to access the courts to
seek redress for injuries suffered at the hands of donor states. (Maine State Prison, Massachusetts Correctional
Institution-Cedar Junction)

U.S. District Court
FOREIGN COUNTRIES
NOTIFICATION

Kiyemba v. Obama, 561 F.3d 509 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Nine detainees at the United States naval base at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. The detainees requested interim relief requiring
the government to provide 30 days' notice to the court and counsel before transferring them from the naval base,
asserting fears that they would be transferred to a country where they might be tortured or further detained. The
district court entered requested orders and the government appealed. The appeals court vacated. The court held
that the district court could exercise jurisdiction over claims related to the detainees' potential transfer.
According to the court, a provision of the Military Commissions Act (MCA) eliminating jurisdiction over nonhabeas actions against the United States or its agents relating to any aspect of a detainees’ transfer did not apply
to preclude jurisdiction over the detainees' claims for notice of transfer. But the court found that a writ of habeas
corpus was not available to bar the detainee's transfer based upon the likelihood of a detainee being tortured in
recipient country. The district court could not issue a writ of habeas corpus to bar the transfer of a detainee based
upon the expectation that the recipient country would detain or prosecute the detainee. (United States Naval
Base, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Miller v. Washington County, 650 F.Supp.2d 1113 (D.Or. 2009). Inmates brought a class action against county
and sheriff, alleging that the county's policy of strip searching inmates was unconstitutional. The parties crossmoved for summary judgment, and the inmates additionally moved for class certification. The district court held
that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the county's blanket policy of strip searching all individuals transported from another correctional or detention facility was justified by the need for institutional security. The court denied class certification, finding the county's strip search
policy regarding arrestees did not present common questions of law or fact. The court stayed the action, noting
that the appellate court was reviewing a city’s strip search policy at the time. (Washington Co. Jail, Oregon)

U.S. Appeals Court
EQUAL PROTECTION
FACILITY
STATE STATUTE

Roubideaux v. North Dakota Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 570 F.3d 966 (8th Cir. 2009). North
Dakota prison inmates, representing a certified class of female inmates, brought a sex discrimination suit under §
1983 and Title IX, alleging that a state prison system provided them with unequal programs and facilities as
compared to male inmates. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the
inmates appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that North Dakota's gender-explicit statutes,
allowing the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to place female inmates in county jails and allowing
the Department to place female inmates in “grade one correctional facilities” for more than one year, was
substantially related to the important governmental objective of providing adequate segregated housing for
female inmates, and thus the statutes were facially valid under heightened equal protection review. According to
the court, even if the decision to house them at the women’s center was based on economic concerns, where the
female prison population as a whole was much smaller than the male population, sufficient space to house the
female prisoners was becoming an issue as the entire prison population increased. Female inmates were in need
of a separate facility to better meet their needs, and statutes expressly required the Department to contract with
county facilities that had adequate space and the ability to provide appropriate level of services and programs for
female inmates. The court held that the female inmates, by expressing an assertion before the district court that
they were not challenging the programming decisions made by Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
upon transfer to county jails for housing, abandoned an “as-applied” challenge to the gender-explicit statutes
facilitating such transfers. (Southwest Multi-County Correctional Center, North Dakota)

U.S. District Court
RETALIATION

Savage v. Judge, 644 F.Supp.2d 550 (E.D.Pa. 2009). Prison inmates brought a civil rights action against prison
officials for allegedly violating their civil rights in connection with reassignment of the inmates to different cells
and assaults allegedly committed upon them. Inmates not only asserted unlawful retaliation claims, but claimed
that officials exercised excessive force in violation of their Eighth Amendment rights and unlawfully conspired
to violate their rights. The officials moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part
and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as

47.45

to whether prison officials, in separating the cellmates from each other and in transferring one to another facility,
were retaliating against the cellmates for their pursuit of grievances, or were taking necessary action to prevent
the cellmates from engaging in homosexual activity in a cell. The court also found a genuine issue of material
fact as to how an inmate sustained an injury to his face while he was being transferred to another cell.
(Graterford L-Unit- RHU, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections)
U.S. District Court
FOREIGN COUNTRIES

Simmons v. Wolff, 594 F.Supp.2d 6 (D.D.C. 2009). A prison inmate filed a pro se § 1983 action, alleging that the
denial of his requests to serve his sentence in Canada constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
Amendment. The district court dismissed the complaint. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain
claims against federal government officials, in their official capacities, where the government was sued for
damages for constitutional torts. The court found that the prison inmate was not subjected to such “extreme
deprivations” as to support a claim for cruel and unusual punishment, based on not being allowed to serve his
sentence in Canada, which made it difficult for his family to visit him, and not being allowed, as a foreigner, to
participate in certain rehabilitation programs. (Federal Bureau of Prisons)

U.S. District Court
DENIAL
RETALIATION

Skinner v. Holman, 672 F.Supp.2d 657 (D.Del. 2009). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against prison
employees, alleging he was retaliated against for having filed a prison grievance. The defendants moved to
dismiss the claims as frivolous and the district court denied the motion. The court held that the inmate's
allegations that he was denied transfer to a minimum security prison, was prevented from working, and was kept
in disciplinary confinement for several months as a result of a grievance he had filed were sufficient to state a
claim of retaliation for the exercise of his First Amendment rights by prison employees. (James T. Correctional
Center, Delaware)

U.S. District Court
EQUAL PROTECTION
FACILITY
TRANSFER

Walker v. Gomez, 609 F.Supp.2d 1149 (S.D.Cal. 2009). A prisoner brought an action against the California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, alleging violations of their settlement agreement with the prisoner
that resulted from a prior complaint, discrimination based on race as a policy, and retaliation. The prisoner
moved to enforce the settlement agreement and for monetary sanctions. The court held that the prison officials'
conduct of placing the prisoner under lockdown for a period of 10 days following incidents of riots and
attempted murder was not a severe restriction on the prisoner's activities amounting to a breach of the terms of
the prior settlement agreement. The court held that a prison counselor's conduct of asking the prisoner if he
wished to transfer to another prison that would cater to his “sensitive needs” was not in retaliation in violation of
the settlement agreement. The court noted that the act of asking the prisoner if he would like to volunteer for a
transfer was simply because a new facility was in place and inmates were needed to successfully operate it, and,
moreover, the counselor testified that she asked the same question of other inmates and she posted a sign on her
office window conveying the same inquiry she posed to prisoner, and, further, the prisoner was never
transferred. (Calipatria State Prison, California)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
TRANSPORTATION

Wilbert v. Quarterman, 647 F.Supp.2d 760 (S.D.Tex. 2009). A state prisoner, proceeding pro se, brought a §
1983 action alleging that two correctional officers violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment when they allowed him to be transported without seatbelts, resulting in injuries following
the vehicle's sudden stop. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. Although the court held
that the prisoner stated a claim of deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment, the prisoner did
not timely file a grievance and therefore the prisoner did not satisfy the exhaustion of the administrative
remedies requirement of the Prison Litigation Reform Act. The prisoner alleged that he had requested a seatbelt
and was denied, that he was not properly seated in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) transport
van, that the van was traveling at an unsafe speed, and that he was injured when the van suddenly stopped.
(Texas Department of Criminal Justice, McConnell Unit)
2010

U.S. Appeals Court
LIBERTY INTEREST

XXIII

Colvin v. Caruso, 605 F.3d 282 (6th Cir. 2010). A state prisoner brought pro se action against prison officials,
asserting that the prison's 16–day denial of kosher meals, multiple mistakes in administering the kosher-meal
program, and the lack of Jewish services and literature at the prison, violated his constitutional rights and the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The district court denied the prisoner's motion
for a preliminary injunction, and subsequently granted summary judgment in favor of the officials. The prisoner
appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court held that the prisoner's
pro se claims for injunctive and declaratory relief under RLUIPA, challenging a particular prison's kosher meal
program and the alleged denial of Jewish services and literature at the prison, were rendered moot by the
prisoner’s transfer to another prison. The court noted that the claims were directed specifically at the particular
prison's policies and procedures, not at the state prison system's programs as a whole. The court found that the
prisoner's First Amendment right of freedom of religion was not violated by the prison's lack of Jewish services
and literature, and thus, the prisoner could not prevail in his § 1983 First Amendment claim on that basis. The
court noted that the prisoner was the only inmate requesting Jewish services and literature, that prison policies
reasonably required a minimum number of inmates to request religious services before they would be held, and
there was no showing that the prisoner was restricted from practicing Judaism privately or that the prison
prevented him from requesting religious literature. The appeals court held that the prisoner's pro se claims for
injunctive and declaratory relief under RLUIPA, challenging his removal from a kosher meal program and his
failure to be reinstated into the kosher meal program, were not rendered moot by his transfer to another prison,
noting that the prisoner's non-kosher status traveled with him to the transferee prison. The court held that the
prisoner’s amended claims against prison officials, challenging his removal from a kosher meal program and his
failure to be reinstated into the kosher meal program following his transfer to a different prison, were not futile,
for the purpose of the prisoner's motion to amend. The court noted that the prisoner consistently stated his
religious preference as Jewish throughout his incarceration, and he submitted numerous grievances concerning

47.46

alleged violations of kosher practice by prison kitchen staff. (Michigan Department of Corrections, Alger
Maximum Correctional Facility)

XXIII

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
TRANSPORTATION

Hartmann v. Carroll, 719 F.Supp.2d 366 (D.Del. 2010). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that prison
officials failed to provide professional prevention, diagnosis, and treatment for his thyroid disease and failed to
provide medical transportation. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The
court held that the officials were not liable for failing to provide a medical transfer, where the officials had no
personal involvement in the transfer decision, and were not aware of the risk of serious injury that could have
occurred to the inmate and purposefully failed to take appropriate steps. The court found that a state prison
medical official was not deliberately indifferent to the inmate's thyroid disease, in violation of the Eighth
Amendment, where the inmate received medical care for his throat complaints and his thyroid condition. (James
T. Vaughn Correctional Center, Delaware)

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
LIBERTY INTEREST
OTHER STATE

Hawkins v. Brooks, 694 F.Supp.2d 434 (W.D.Pa. 2010.) A state prisoner brought a pro se § 1983 action against
various prison officials and corrections officers, alleging retaliation, harassment, due process violations,
defamation of character, and mental anguish. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the
motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the prisoner's conduct of pressing charges against a
corrections officer who the prisoner claimed raped and impregnated her and complaining about other officers'
alleged harassment amounted to a “constitutionally protected activity,” as required for the prisoner to state a §
1983 retaliation claim. The court found that corrections officers' alleged conduct of withholding the prisoner's
incoming and outgoing mail in retaliation for the prisoner's pressing rape charges against an officer at another
prison amounted to an “adverse action,” as required to establish a prima facie pro se § 1983 retaliation claim
against the officers. But the court found that a prison official's alleged conduct of reassigning the prisoner to a
different unit in the same prison did not rise to the level of an “adverse action,” as required to establish a prima
facie pro se § 1983 retaliation claim. The court found that the prisoner had no liberty interest in her place of
confinement, transfer, or classification, and thus, prison officials' alleged refusal to have the prisoner transferred
to an out-of-state institution did not violate her due process rights. The court found that the prisoner's assertions
that she made supervisory prison officials aware of the harassment and retaliation she allegedly suffered at the
hands of correctional officers as a result of her pressing rape charges against a correctional officer at another
facility, and that none of the supervisory officials offered assistance or took any corrective action, were sufficient
to state a claim for supervisory liability, in her § 1983 retaliation action. (State Correctional Institution at
Cambridge Springs, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Lin Li Qu v. Central Falls Detention Facility Corp., 717 F.Supp.2d 233 (D.R.I. 2010). A federal immigration
detainee's widow sued the Government under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), asserting claims arising out
of the detainee's care while he was detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). The government
moved to dismiss. The district court denied the motion. The court held that the widow met the FTCA's notice
requirement and that her FTCA claims were not barred by the independent contractor defense. The court held
that the widow stated negligence claims actionable under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), when she alleged
that after the Government was aware, or should have been aware, of the detainee's deteriorating medical
condition, it acted negligently when it ordered the transfers of the detainee to different facilities and when it
improperly reviewed the basis for his custody and detention. (Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Wyatt
Detention Center, Rhode Island, Franklin County House of Corrections, Greenfield, Massachusetts, Franklin
County Jail, Vermont)

U.S. District Court
EQUAL PROTECTION
RETALIATION
SEARCHES

Rupe v. Cate, 688 F.Supp.2d 1035 (E.D.Cal. 2010). A state prisoner brought an action against prison officials for
violation of his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), alleging that the officials failed to accommodate his Druid religious
practices and retaliated against him for protected activities. The officials moved to dismiss. The district court
granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court found that the prisoner's claims for injunctive relief
based on the California Department of Corrections' (DOC) alleged systemic discrimination against those
practicing the Pagan religion were not moot, even though he had been transferred from the prison where many of
the alleged violations of his rights occurred, where he was still incarcerated in a prison run by the DOC. The
court held that the prisoner's claims for damages under RLUIPA against state prison officials in their official
capacity were barred by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, since RLUIPA did not provide a clear
statement requiring states to waive immunity from liability for money damages. The court found that the
prisoner stated claim for retaliation by prison officials for conduct protected by the Free Exercise Clause by
alleging that he was strip-searched as harassment for writing letters to prison and government officials in which
he complained about the lack of accommodations for his religion. The prisoner also alleged that officials
conspired to place him in administrative segregation and ultimately to transfer him to requite his complaints
about their previous adverse actions against him, and that the actions taken against him were motivated solely by
the officials' desire to inhibit his religious worship. The court found that the prisoner stated a claim against
prison officials for violation of his right to equal protection by alleging that he and other Pagans were denied
opportunities to practice their religion that were available to mainstream religions and that the officials engaged
in a pattern of discrimination against Pagan practitioners. (Mule Creek State Prison, Calif. Dept. of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
LIBERTY INTEREST

Silverstein v. Federal Bureau Of Prisons, 704 F.Supp.2d 1077 (D.Colo. 2010). A federal inmate brought a civil
rights action against the Bureau of Prisons and correctional officers, challenging conditions of his confinement.
The district court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss in part. The court held that the allegation that the
inmate was indefinitely placed in solitary confinement, isolated from other inmates and correctional facility staff,
and subjected to continuous lighting and camera surveillance, was sufficient to allege a liberty interest in
conditions of his confinement. The court found that the allegation that the inmate was subjected to solitary
confinement for more than two decades was sufficient to state claim under the Eighth Amendment against the

47.47

Bureau. But, according to the court, the inmate did not have a liberty interest in avoiding transfer to
administrative segregation facility. (United States Penitentiary, Administrative Maximum facility, Florence,
Colorado)
U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
MEDICAL CARE

Tafari v. McCarthy, 714 F.Supp.2d 317 (N.D.N.Y. 2010). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against
employees of the New York State Department of Correctional Services (DOCS), alleging, among other things,
that the employees violated his constitutional rights by subjecting him to excessive force, destroying his personal
property, denying him medical care, and subjecting him to inhumane conditions of confinement. The employees
moved for summary judgment, and the prisoner moved to file a second amended complaint and to appoint
counsel. The court held that a state prison correctional officer's alleged throwing of urine and feces on the
prisoner to wake him up, while certainly repulsive, was de minimis use of force, and was not sufficiently severe
to be considered repugnant to the conscience of mankind, and thus the officer's conduct did not violate the
Eighth Amendment. The court found that officers who were present in the prisoner's cell when another officer
allegedly threw urine and feces on the prisoner lacked a reasonable opportunity to stop the alleged violation,
given the brief and unexpected nature of the incident, and thus the officers present in the cell could not be held
liable for failing to intervene. The court found that even if a correctional officers' captain failed to thoroughly
investigate the alleged incident in which one officer threw urine and feces on the prisoner to wake him up, such
failure to investigate did not violate the prisoner's due process rights, since the prisoner did not have due process
right to a thorough investigation of his grievances.
According to the court, one incident in which state correctional officers allegedly interfered with the
prisoner's outgoing legal mail did not create a cognizable claim under § 1983 for violation of the prisoner's First
and Fourteenth Amendment rights, absent a showing that the prisoner suffered any actual injury, that his access
to courts was chilled, or that his ability to legally represent himself was impaired. The court held that there was
no evidence that the state prisoner suffered any physical injury as result of an alleged incident in which a
correctional officer spit chewing tobacco in his face, as required to maintain an Eighth Amendment claim based
on denial of medical care. The court found that, even if a state prisoner's right to file prison grievances was
protected by the First Amendment, a restriction limiting the prisoner's filing of grievances to two per week did
not violate the prisoner's constitutional rights, since the prisoner was abusing the grievance program. The court
noted that the prisoner filed an exorbitant amount of grievances, including 115 in a two-month period, most of
which were deemed frivolous.
The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether state
correctional officers used excessive force against the prisoner in the course of his transport to a different facility.
The court held that state correctional officers were not entitled to qualified immunity from the prisoner's § 1983
excessive force claim arising from his alleged beating by officers during his transfer to a different facility, where
a reasonable juror could have concluded that the officers knew or should have known that their conduct violated
the prisoner's Eighth Amendment rights, and it was clearly established that prison official's use of force against
an inmate for reasons that did not serve penological purpose violated the inmate's constitutional rights. The
inmate allegedly suffered injuries, including bruises and superficial lacerations on his body, which the court
found did not constitute a serious medical condition.
The court held that state prison officials' alleged retaliatory act of leaving the lights on in the prisoner's cell in
a special housing unit (SHU) 24 hours per day did not amount to cruel and unusual treatment, in violation of the
Eighth Amendment. According to the court, the prisoner failed to demonstrate a causal connection between his
conduct and the adverse action of leaving the lights on 24 hours per day, since the illumination policy applied to
all inmates in SHU, not just the prisoner, and constant illumination was related to a legitimate penological
interest in protecting both guards and inmates in SHU. (New York State Department of Correctional Services,
Eastern New York Correctional Facility)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
TRANSPORTATION

Whitson v. Stone County Jail, 602 F.3d 920 (8th Cir. 2010). A female prisoner initiated a pro se § 1983 suit,
alleging that two officers failed to protect her from a sexual assault by a male prisoner, and that others failed to
properly train and supervise the officers responsible for her safety. The district court granted summary judgment
for the defendants and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The appeals court held
that summary judgment was precluded by a fact issue as to whether the officers were deliberately indifferent to
the safety of the female prisoner who was placed in the back of a dark van for transport with two male inmates
and allegedly raped by one of them. (Stone County Jail, Missouri)
2011

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
LIBERTY INTEREST
RETAILATION

XXIII

Aref v. Holder, 774 F.Supp.2d 147 (D.D.C. 2011). A group of prisoners who were, or who had been,
incarcerated in communication management units (CMU) at federal correctional institutions (FCI) designed to
monitor high-risk prisoners filed suit against the United States Attorney General, the federal Bureau of Prisons
(BOP), and BOP officials, alleging that CMU incarceration violated the First, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments.
Four additional prisoners moved to intervene and the defendants moved to dismiss. The district court denied the
motion to intervene, and granted the motion to dismiss in part and denied in part. The court held that even
though a federal prisoner who had been convicted of solicitation of bank robbery was no longer housed in the
federal prison's communication management unit (CMU), he had standing under Article III to pursue
constitutional claims against the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) for alleged violations since there was a realistic threat
that he might be redesignated to a CMU. The court noted that the prisoner had originally been placed in CMU
because of the nature of his underlying conviction and because of his alleged efforts to radicalize other inmates,
and these reasons for placing him in CMU remained.
The court found that the restrictions a federal prison put on prisoners housed within a communication
management unit (CMU), which included that all communications be conducted in English, that visits were
monitored and subject to recording, that each prisoner received only eight visitation hours per month, and that

47.48

prisoners' telephone calls were limited and subjected to monitoring, did not violate the prisoners' alleged First
Amendment right to family integrity, since the restrictions were rationally related to a legitimate penological
interest. The court noted that prisoners assigned to the unit typically had offenses related to international or
domestic terrorism or had misused approved communication methods while incarcerated. The court found that a
federal prisoner stated a First Amendment retaliation claim against the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) by alleging: (1)
that he was “an outspoken and litigious prisoner;” (2) that he had written books about improper prison conditions
and filed grievances and complaints on his own behalf; (3) that his prison record contained “no serious
disciplinary infractions” and “one minor communications-related infraction” from 1997; (4) that prison staff told
him he would be “sent east” if he continued filing complaints; and (5) that he filed a complaint about that alleged
threat and he was then transferred to a high-risk inmate monitoring communication management unit (CMU) at a
federal correctional institution. (Communication Management Units at Federal Correctional Institutions in Terre
Haute, Indiana and Marion, Illinois)
U.S. Appeals Court
OTHER STATE
RETALIATION

Hannon v. Beard, 645 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2011). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action against the secretary of a state
department of corrections, alleging that he was transferred to an out-of-state prison in retaliation for his
advocacy on behalf of himself and other convicts. The district court entered summary judgment in the secretary's
favor, and denied the inmate's motion for reconsideration. The inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The
court held that the decision by the secretary to transfer the inmate to an out-of-state maximum security prison
was not in retaliation for the inmate's advocacy on behalf of himself and other convicts, and thus did not violate
the inmate's First Amendment free speech rights, even though the inmate had not received any misconduct
reports in the fourteen years before transfer, and posed no danger to staff or other prisoners. According to the
court, the initial decision to transfer the inmate was made three years before the secretary assumed his current
position, the inmate had accumulated a large number of legitimate separations while incarcerated in the state
prison system, and the transfer did not violate any standard prison policies or procedures. (Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
MEDICAL CARE
RESTRAINTS

Maraj v. Massachusetts, 836 F.Supp.2d 17 (D.Mass. 2011). The mother of a deceased inmate brought an action,
as administratrix of the inmate's estate, against the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, a county sheriff's
department, a county sheriff, and corrections officers, alleging that the defendants violated the inmate's Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendment rights. She also brought common law claims of wrongful death, negligence, and
assault and battery. The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state claim. The district court granted the
motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the Commonwealth, in enacting legislation effectuating the
assumption of county sheriff's department by the Commonwealth, did not waive sovereign immunity as to §
1983 claims filed against the Commonwealth, the department, and corrections officers in their official capacities
after the transfer took effect. The court found that the correction officers who were no longer participating in the
transfer of the inmate at the time inmate first resisted and the officers who took the first responsive measure by
“double locking” the inmate's handcuffs were not subject to liability in their individual capacities as to the §
1983 substantive due process claim brought by inmate's mother arising from the inmate's death following the
transfer. According to the court, corrections officers who applied physical force to the resisting inmate during the
transfer of the inmate, or were present when the inmate was unresponsive and requiring medical attention, were
subject to liability, in their individual capacities, as to the § 1983 substantive due process claim brought by the
inmate's mother. The court held that the county sheriff and corrections officers who participated in the transfer of
the inmate, who died following the transfer, were immune from negligence and wrongful death claims brought
by the inmate's mother under the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act (MTCA) provision which categorically
protected public employees acting within the scope of their employment from liability for “personal injury or
death” caused by their individual negligence. But the court found that the mother properly alleged that county
corrections officers' contact with the inmate amounted to excessive force, and that a supervisor instructed the use
of excessive force, as required to state a claim for assault and battery, under Massachusetts law, against the
officers. (South Bay House of Correction, Suffolk County, Massachusetts)
2012

U.S. Appeals Court
PURPOSE

Bader v. Wrenn, 675 F.3d 95 (1st Cir. 2012). A state prisoner filed an action against a Department of Corrections
under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The district court denied the
prisoner's motion for a preliminary injunction and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that
RLUIPA did not constrain prison transfers based on disadvantages at the transferee prison that were not
themselves of the government's creation. According to the court, transfer of the state prisoner for reasons that
had not been based on the prisoner's religious practice did not violate RLUIPA although the transfer had the
result of restricting his religious opportunities. (Northern Correctional Facility, New Hampshire)

U.S. Appeals Court
RESTRAINTS
TRANSPORTATION

Beaulieu v. Ludeman, 690 F.3d 1017 (8th Cir. 2012). Patients who were civilly committed to the Minnesota Sex
Offender Program (MSOP) brought a § 1983 action against Minnesota Department of Human Services (DHS)
officials and Minnesota Department of Corrections (DOC) officials, alleging that various MSOP policies and
practices relating to the patients' conditions of confinement were unconstitutional. The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the patients appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals
court held that: (1) the MSOP policy of performing unclothed body searches of patients was not unreasonable;
(2) the policy of placing full restraints on patients during transport was not unreasonable; (3) officials were not
liable for using excessive force in handcuffing patients; (4) the officials' seizure of televisions from the patients'
rooms was not unreasonable; (5) the MSOP telephone-use policy did not violate the First Amendment; and (6)
there was no evidence that officials were deliberately indifferent to the patients' health or safety. (Minnesota Sex
Offender Program)

47.49

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
NOTIFICATION

Coffey v. U.S., 870 F.Supp.2d 1202 (D.N.M. 2012). The mother of a deceased inmate brought an action against
the government under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), alleging, among other things, that Bureau of Indian
Affairs (BIA) was negligent in failing to medically screen the inmate prior to his transfer to a different facility.
The government moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state claim or, in the
alternative, for summary judgment. The district court denied the motion for summary judgment. The court held
that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact: (1) as to whether the Bureau of Indian
affairs (BIA), which transferred custody of the inmate with a heart condition to a county jail, where he died,
engaged in conduct that breached its duty to conduct some screening of the inmate's condition; (2) as to whether
BIA's conduct caused the inmate's death; (3) as to whether BIA engaged in conduct that breached its duty to take
some steps to ensure that the jail would learn of his condition; (4) as to whether BIA's conduct caused the
inmate's death; (5) as to whether BIA engaged in conduct that breached its duty to take some steps to ensure that
the inmate's medical needs were addressed when it chose to transfer him; and (6) as to whether BIA engaged in
conduct that breached its duty to act reasonably in terms of sending the inmate to the jail. (Reno Sparks Indian
Colony, Nevada, and Washoe County Jail, Nevada)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO
PROTECT
MEDICAL CARE

Coffey v. U.S., 906 F.Supp.2d 1114 (D.N.M. 2012). The mother of a decedent, a Native American who died in a
county correctional institution, brought actions on behalf of her son and his children against the government,
alleging wrongful death and negligence claims arising from his treatment while in the institution. After a twoday bench trial, the district court found that: (1) the notice provided to the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) in the
mother's administrative claim was sufficient, thereby providing jurisdiction over the mother's wrongful death and
negligence claims; (2) the BIA's decision whether to screen and transfer the inmate were not choices susceptible
to policy analysis, and thus, the discretionary-function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) did not
preclude jurisdiction; (3) the mother's negligent screening claims were precluded; (4) the mother's negligent
transfer claims were precluded; and (5) the mother's wrongful death claims, arising under FTCA, were
precluded. The mother had filed a standard two-page form and submitted it to Indian Health Services and the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), claiming that her son was denied medication, and that he was
transferred by BIA to another correctional facility. The district court concluded that the United States
Government was not liable for the detainee’s death. (U.S. Department of the Interior-Bureau of Indian Affairs,
McKinley County Detention Center, Nevada)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
TRANSPORTATION

Curtis v. TransCor America, LLC, 877 F.Supp.2d 578 (N.D.Ill. 2012). A prisoner's son brought a wrongful death
action against a prisoner transport company, alleging that the company was liable for damages resulting from the
death of the prisoner while in the company's custody. The district court held that it was necessary and proper for
the court to resolve a narrow question of fact prior to trial for choice of law purposes, that Illinois law, rather
than the law of Indiana, governed the issue of compensatory damages, and that the prisoner's son would be
allowed to pursue punitive damages. The prisoner suffered a stroke that was allegedly caused, at least in part, by
excessive temperatures in the prisoner compartment of the transport vehicle. According to the court, even though
the complaint for wrongful death of the prisoner during a ride in a bus with a broken air conditioning unit had
not requested punitive damages, the plaintiff could seek such damages against the prisoner transport company at
trial. The court noted that although the company faced increased liability exposure, allegations suggesting that
the employees ignored indications that the prisoner was in distress went beyond mere negligence. (TransCor
America, LLC, Transport from Leavenworth, Kansas to the Federal Cor'l. Complex in Terre Haute, Indiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE
RETALIATION

Gomez v. Randle, 680 F.3d 859 (7th Cir. 2012). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging excessive force,
deliberate indifference to his serious medical condition, and retaliation for filing a grievance. After appointing
counsel for the inmate and allowing him to proceed in forma pauperis, the district court granted an attorney's
motion to withdraw and dismissed the case. The inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in
part, and remanded. The court held that the statutory period for the inmate to file a § 1983 action alleging that an
unidentified corrections officer who fired two rounds from shotgun into the inmate population violated an Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against excessive force was tolled while the inmate completed the administrative
grievance process. The court held that the issue of when the inmate completed the prison's grievance process
with regard to his claim involved fact issues that could not be resolved on a motion to dismiss. The court found
that the inmate's allegations that he used the prison's grievance system to address his injury and lack of treatment
he received following his injury, that he was transferred to a correctional center where he had known enemies
when he refused to drop his grievance, and that there was no other explanation for his transfer, were sufficient to
state a claim of retaliation in violation of his First Amendment right to use a prison grievance system. (Illinois
Department of Corrections, Stateville Correctional Center)

U.S. Appeals Court
DISCIPLINE
DUE PROCESS
TRANSPORTATION

Jabbar v. Fischer, 683 F.3d 54 (2nd Cir. 2012). A state prison inmate brought an action against prison officials
alleging that his constitutional rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments were violated when he was
transported on a bus without a seatbelt and was injured when thrown from his seat. The defendants moved to
dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court granted the motion and the inmate appealed. The appeals
court affirmed. The court held that the failure of prison officials to provide inmates in transport with seatbelts
does not, without more, violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment or the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court noted that a bus seatbelt for a prison inmate in
transport is not a life necessity, the deprivation of which constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the
Eighth Amendment. According to the court, a correctional facility's use of vehicles without seatbelts to transport
prison inmates, when based on legitimate penological concerns rather than an intent to punish, is reasonable
under the Eighth Amendment. (Woodbourne Correctional Facility, Ulster Correctional Facility, New York)

47.50

U.S. District Court
PRIVATE FACILITY
SEARCHES

Knows His Gun v. Montana, 866 F.Supp.2d 1235 (D.Mont. 2012). Native American state prisoners brought an
action against a state, the state department of corrections (DOC), a private prison facility, and wardens, alleging
violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). Defendants filed motion to
dismiss. The district court held that: (1) the allegations were sufficient to plead the searches were a substantial
burden on their religious exercise; (2) the allegations were sufficient plead the confiscations and prohibitions
were a substantial burden on their religious exercise; (3) the allegations about relieving a prisoner from the pipe
carrier position were sufficient to plead it was a substantial burden on his religious exercise; (4) transferred
prisoners did not have standing for claims for injunctive and declaratory relief; (5) the private facility was a state
actor; and (6) the private facility was an instrumentality of the state. The Native American prisoners' alleged that
the prison subjected them to en masse strip searches before and after sweat lodge ceremonies, that the searches
sometimes occurred in a hallway where other inmates could see them and at least one occurred in a gym with
video cameras monitored by a female guard, and that some inmates declined to participate in the ceremony due
to the degrading nature of the searches. According to the court, the prisoners' allegations that sacred items were
confiscated or prohibited by the prison for their sweat lodge ceremonies, including smudge tobacco and antlers,
and that the items were essential for the ceremony to be meaningful and proper were sufficient to plead
confiscations and prohibitions were a substantial burden on their religious exercise, as required for their claims
under RLUIPA. The prisoner also alleged that they were subject to pat down searches before and after entering
the ceremonial sweat lodge grounds, that they were provided insufficient water and toilet facilities, that the size
of the sweat lodge and the frequency of the ceremonies was inadequate, and that they were not provided a Native
American spiritual advisor. (Montana Department of Corrections; Corrections Corporation of America;
Crossroads Correctional Center)

U.S. Appeals Court
MENTAL HEALTH
DUE PROCESS
FACILITY

Miller v. Harbaugh, 698 F.3d 956 (7th Cir. 2012). The mother of a minor who hanged himself while incarcerated
at a state youth detention facility, on her own behalf and as the minor's representative, brought a § 1983 action
against state officials, alleging deliberate indifference to the minor's serious mental illness. The 16-year-old
youth had a history of mental illness and was known to have attempted suicide at least three times. The district
court granted summary judgment for the officials. The mother appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals
court held that, even assuming that state supervisory officials' decision to use metal bunk beds in rooms of a
youth detention facility that were occupied by residents who were mentally disturbed but did not appear to be
imminently suicidal, amounted to deliberate indifference to the residents' serious medical needs, the law was not
then so clearly established as to defeat the officials' defense of qualified immunity to the due process claim. The
court found that a psychologist at the state youth detention facility, who had authorized the minor's transfer after
learning of minor's unsuccessful participation in the facility's drug abuse program, was not deliberately
indifferent to the minor's serious medical needs, in violation of due process. According to the court, even if he
knew that the minor, who had mental health issues, presented a suicide risk and that the transferee facility was
using metal bunk beds like that which the minor thereafter used to hang himself. The court found that the
psychologist's involvement with the minor was minimal, the decision to make the transfer was made after the
psychologist met with the facility's entire treatment staff, and the psychologist did not know which room at the
transferee facility the minor would be given or that the facility's other suicide prevention measures would prove
inadequate. (Illinois Youth Center, IYC Kewanee, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
DUE PROCESS
FACILITY
LIBERTY INTEREST

Rezaq v. Nalley, 677 F.3d 1001 (10th Cir. 2012). Federal inmates, who were convicted of terrorism-related
offenses, brought an action against the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) and BOP officials, alleging that they
had a liberty interest in avoiding transfer without due process to the Administrative Maximum Prison (ADX).
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The inmates appealed. The appeals
court held that the action was not moot, even though the inmates were currently housed in less-restrictive
facilities when compared to ADX, where the inmates' transfers to less-restrictive facilities did not completely
and irrevocably eradicate the effects of the alleged violation because the inmates were never returned to their
pre-ADX placements, and some prospective relief remained available. The court found that the inmates did not
have a liberty interest in avoiding conditions of confinement at Administrative Maximum Prison (ADX), and
thus the inmates were not entitled to due process in the BOP's transfer determination. According to the court, the
inmates' segregated confinement related to and furthered by the BOP's legitimate penological interests in prison
safety and national security, conditions of confinement at ADX, although undeniably harsh, were not extreme,
inmates' placements at ADX did not increase the duration of their confinement, and the inmates' placements at
ADX were not indeterminate, as the inmates were given regular reevaluations of their placements in the form of
twice-yearly program reviews. (Administrative Maximum Prison, Florence, Colorado)

U.S. Appeals Court
MENTAL INSTITUTION

Rosario v. Brawn, 670 F.3d 816 (7th Cir. 2012). The father of a detainee who committed suicide while in police
custody brought a § 1983 action against police officers, alleging deliberate indifference to the detainee's risk of
suicide in violation of the detainee's right to due process under Fourteenth Amendment. The district court
granted summary judgment to the police officers, and the father appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court
held that the police officers did not intentionally disregard a substantial risk that the detainee would commit
suicide, as required for liability on a due-process claim alleging deliberately indifferent treatment of the detainee.
The detainee committed suicide while being transported to a mental health facility after exhibiting selfdestructive behavior. The officers failed to discover the detainee's razor blade, which he used to commit suicide.
According to the court, their overall actions toward the detainee showed protection and compassion by searching
the detainee, arranging for assessment of his mental condition, ensuring his comfort during transportation, and
personally administering first aid despite his resistance. (Washington County Sheriff, Wisconsin)

U.S. Appeals Court
ACCESS TO COURT
RETALIATION

Surles v. Andison, 678 F.3d 452 (6th Cir. 2012). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that prison officials
had confiscated his legal papers and computer disks on multiple occasions, damaged or destroyed legal and
religious papers and property, taken actions to deprive him of access to courts, violated his First Amendment
rights, retaliated against him by filing false misconduct charges and transferring him to other prisons, and

47.51

conspired against him to violate his rights. The district court entered summary judgment in the officials' favor,
and the inmate appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that summary judgment was
precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the state inmate exhausted his administrative
remedies, and whether prison officials prevented the inmate from filing grievances and exhausting his
administrative remedies. (Michigan Department of Corrections, Gus Harrison Correctional Facility)
U.S. Appeals Court
DUE PROCESS
NOTIFICATION

Westefer v. Neal, 682 F.3d 679 (7th Cir. 2012). Past and present inmates in the custody of the Illinois Department
of Corrections (IDOC), who had been incarcerated in a supermax prison, brought a § 1983 action against IDOC
officials and employees, alleging that defendants violated their right to procedural due process by employing
unconstitutionally inadequate procedures when assigning inmates to the supermax prison, and seeking injunctive
and declaratory relief. The district court granted injunctive relief, and the defendants appealed. The appeals court
vacated and remanded with instructions. The appeals court held that the scope and specificity of the district
court's injunction exceeded what was required to remedy a due-process violation, contrary to the terms of the
Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) and cautionary language from the Supreme Court about remedial
flexibility and deference to prison administrators. The court held that the IDOC's ten–point plan should be used
as a constitutional baseline, revising the challenged procedures and including a detailed transfer-review process.
According to the court, this would eliminate the operational discretion and flexibility of prison administrators,
far exceeding what due process required and violating the mandate of the PLRA. The court found that, under the
Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), injunctive relief to remedy unconstitutional prison conditions must be
narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to remedy the constitutional violation, and use the least
intrusive means to correct the violation of the federal right. The court noted that informal due process, which is
mandatory for inmates transferred to a supermax prison, requires some notice of the reasons for the inmate's
placement and enough time to prepare adequately for the administrative review. The court found that, to satisfy
due process regarding inmates transferred to a supermax prison, only a single prison official is needed as a
neutral reviewer, not necessarily a committee, noting that informal due process requires only that the inmate be
given an opportunity to present his views, not necessarily a full-blown hearing. Similarly, the informal due
process does not necessarily require a written decision describing the reasons for an inmate's placement, or
mandate an appeal procedure. (Closed Maximum Security Unit, Tamms Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
EQUAL PROTECTION
MEDICAL CARE
PRETRIAL DETAINEE
TRANSPORTATION

Woods v. City of Utica, 902 F.Supp.2d 273 (N.D.N.Y. 2012). A wheelchair-using, paraplegic arrestee sued a
city, police officer, a county, a former sheriff, and county corrections officers, bringing federal causes of action
for violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act, and Fourteenth Amendment
equal protection and due process. The arrestee alleged that he was lifted out of his wheelchair and placed on the
floor of a sheriff's van, forcing him to maneuver himself onto a bench seat which caused his pants and underwear
to fall, exposing his genitals, that he was not secured to the bench with a seatbelt, causing him to be thrown
about the passenger compartment and suffer leg spasms during his ride to the jail, that he was forced to urinate
into an empty soda bottle and handle his sterile catheter with his hands that were dirty from moving himself
around the floor of the van, and that the county corrections officers stood by as he struggled to maneuver himself
out of the van and into his wheelchair while other inmates watched. The city and county defendants moved for
summary judgment. The district court held that: (1) the city did not fail to accommodate the arrestee's disability,
for purposes of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims; (2) summary judgment was precluded by fact issues as
to whether the arrestee was denied the benefit of safe and appropriate transportation by the county on the day of
his arrest when he was moved from a police station to a county jail; (3) the county was entitled to summary
judgment to the extent the arrestee's claims involved his transportation from the jail to court proceedings on two
other dates; (4) fact issues existed as to whether the county defendants were deliberately indifferent to the
paraplegic inmate's known medical need for suppositories every other day, in violation of due process, but they
were not deliberately indifferent to his need for catheters and prescription pain medication; and (5) the county
defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity. The court noted that while the county defendants disputed
the arrestee's version of the facts, corrections officers all denied receiving any training regarding how to
transport disabled inmates. (Utica Police Department, Oneida County Correctional Facility, New York)
2013

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
RETALIATION
TRANSFER
TRANSPORTATION

Benton v. Rousseau, 940 F.Supp.2d 1370 (M.D.Fla. 2013). A pretrial detainee, who alleged that he was beaten
by drivers while being transported to prison, brought a § 1983 action against drivers of a private company which
was in the business of transporting prisoners throughout the State of Florida. The district court held that the
inmate established a § 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim and a § 1983 Fourteenth Amendment excessive
force claim. According to the court: (1) the prisoner engaged in constitutionally protected speech because he
complained about conditions of his confinement in the transport vehicle; (2) the driver of transport vehicle
engaged in adverse or retaliatory conduct by pulling the inmate out of the van and onto the ground and beating
and kicking the inmate; and (3) there was a causal connection between the driver's retaliatory action and inmate's
protected speech, in that the incident would not have occurred but for the inmate's complaints regarding
conditions of his confinement. The court noted that the inmate's injuries included headaches and facial scars, and
his injuries, although perhaps not serious, amounted to more than de minimis injuries. The court ruled that the
inmate was entitled to $45,012 in compensatory damages because the inmate had scarring on his face and
suffered from headaches and numbness in his side, he suffered the loss of a $12 shirt, and he suffered mental and
emotional anguish as a result of actions of drivers of transport van, who kicked and beat him. The court held that
the inmate was entitled to punitive damages in the amount of $15,000 based on the violation of his First and
Fourteenth Amendment rights by the drivers. The court noted that although the drivers were no longer employed
by their private employer, the employer did not investigate after the incident nor did it punish the drivers for
their actions, and imposition of punitive damages would deter the drivers from taking similar actions in the
future. (United States Prisoner Transport, Hernando County Jail, Florida)

47.52

U.S. Appeals Court
DENIAL

Blackmon v. Sutton, 734 F.3d 1237 (10th Cir. 2013). A former juvenile pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action
against various members of a juvenile detention center's staff, alleging they violated the Fourteenth Amendment
rights guaranteed to him as a pretrial detainee. The district court denied the defendants' motion for summary
judgment based on qualified immunity. The defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, and
reversed in part. The court held that the eleven-year-old pretrial detainee's right to be free from punishment
altogether was clearly established at the time the staff allegedly used a chair bearing wrist, waist, chest, and
ankle restraints to punish detainee, for the purposes of the juvenile detention center's staff's qualified immunity
defense. According to the court, the senior correctional officer approved a decision by one of his subordinates, a
fully grown man, to sit on the chest of the eleven-year-old without any penological purpose. The court found that
the detainee’s Fourteenth Amendment due process rights were violated when employees allegedly failed to
provide the eleven-year-old detainee with any meaningful mental health care despite his obvious need for it. The
court noted that prison officials who assumed a “gate keeping” authority over the prisoner’s access to medical
professionals were deliberately indifferent to the detainee's medical needs when they denied or delayed access to
medical care. But the court also held that the detainee's alleged right to be placed in a particular facility of his
choice while awaiting trial was not clearly established at the time the director failed to transfer detainee to a
nearby shelter, for purposes of the juvenile detention center director's qualified immunity defense.. The court
stated: “Weeks before eleven-year-old, 4'11," 96–pound Brandon Blackmon arrived at the juvenile detention
center in Sedgwick, Kansas, officials there made a new purchase: the Pro–Straint Restraining Chair, Violent
Prisoner Chair Model RC–1200LX. The chair bore wrist, waist, chest, and ankle restraints. In the months that
followed, the staff made liberal use of their new acquisition on the center's youngest and smallest charge.
Sometimes in a legitimate effort to thwart his attempts at suicide and self-harm. But sometimes, it seems, only to
punish him. And that's the nub of this lawsuit.” (Juvenile Residential Facility, Sedgwick County, Kansas)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
PRETRIAL DETAINEES

Estate of Prasad ex rel. Prasad v. County of Sutter, 958 F.Supp.2d 1101 (E.D.Cal. 2013). The estate of a
deceased pretrial detainee brought an action against jail employees and officials, as well as medical staff,
alleging violations of the Fourteenth Amendment. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted
the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that: (1) although the detainee died at a hospital, liability for
the jail employees and officials was not precluded, where the jail employees and officials could have
contributed to detainee's death despite the transfer to the hospital; (2) allegations were sufficient plead deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs by the deputies and medical staff; (3) allegations were sufficient to state a
claim for supervisory liability; (4) allegations were sufficient to state a claim for supervisory liability against the
corrections officers in charge; (5) allegations were sufficient to state a claim against the county; (6) allegations
were sufficient to state a claim for wrongful death under California law; and (7) the health care provider was a
state actor. The court found that a statement by health care providers, in an attachment to the complaint, that
even if the detainee had been transferred to the hospital sooner, it “probably” would not have changed his death,
was possibly self serving, and did not contradict the complaint's allegations that the detainee's death was
unnecessary and unavoidable.
According to the court, allegations that the county maintained customs or practices whereby no medical staff
whatsoever were at the jail for one-sixth of every day, that the staff lacked authority to respond to emergency
and critical inmate needs, and that the jail records system withheld information from affiliated health care
providers, were sufficient to state a § 1983 claim against the county, alleging violations of the Fourteenth
Amendment after the pretrial detainee died. The court held that allegations that deficiencies in medical care at
the jail, including lack of 24-hour emergency care, were longstanding, repeatedly documented, and expressly
noted by officials in the past., and that the doctor who was employed by the health care provider that contracted
with the prison was aware of the deficiencies, and that the doctor discharged the pretrial detainee to the jail were
sufficient to plead deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, as required to state a § 1983 action against
the doctor for violations of the Fourteenth Amendment after the detainee died. (Sutter County Jail, California)

U.S. District Court
TRANSPORTATION
FAILURE TO PROTECT
MEDICAL CARE

Fluker v. County of Kankakee, 945 F.Supp.2d 972 (C.D.Ill. 2013). An inmate and his wife filed a § 1983 action
in state court against a county and the county sheriff's office to recover for injuries the inmate suffered when a
correctional officer who was driving his prison transport vehicle was required to brake suddenly, causing the
inmate to hurtle forward and hit his head on a metal divider. The case was removed to federal court. The district
court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court held that: (1) the officials' failure to
fasten the inmate’s seatbelt did not violate the Eighth Amendment; the official's alleged driving above the posted
speed limit did not violate the Eighth Amendment; and the officials' failure to immediately call for an ambulance
did not violate the Eighth Amendment. The court noted that the officials, who were not medically trained, called
a supervisor for guidance within one minute of the accident, and were told to continue to the jail where a trained
first responder immediately assessed the inmate and cleaned and bandaged a laceration on his head when the
transport van arrived 7 to 10 minutes later. The inmate was transported to a hospital within 10 to 15 minutes of
arriving at the jail. (Jerome Combs Detention Center, Kankakee County, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
MEDICAL CARE
RESTRAINTS
TRANSPORTATION

McKinney v. U.S., 950 F.Supp.2d 923 (N.D.Tex. 2013). A 79-year-old federal prisoner, who allegedly had been
injured while being transported to a medical center, filed suit against the United States pursuant to the Federal
Torts Claim Act (FTCA). The district court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss, holding that the prisoner's
tort claim was not barred under the discretionary function exception to FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity.
The court noted that a prisoner has the right to bring a cause of action under FTCA for a breach of the duty
prescribed by federal statute requiring the Bureau of Prisons to provide for the safekeeping, care, and subsistence
of all federal prisoners. The prisoner alleged that he was injured when officials failed to assist him on stairs when
he was exiting an airplane, while he was fully restrained in handcuffs, shackles, and a belly chain. According to
the court, there were no legitimate policy considerations at play in the officials' choice not to assist a fully
restrained, elderly, ill, and outnumbered prisoner on the stairs of an airplane. The prisoner alleged that, due to his

47.53

fall, he suffered intense pain, has reoccurring medical issues, must now use a walker to get around, continues to
need medication for pain, and requires counseling to address the mental and emotional stress he has suffered.
(FCI–Fort Worth, Texas, and Federal Medical Center, Butner, North Carolina)
U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
INTERSTATE
COMPACT

Payne v. Friel, 919 F.Supp.2d 1185 (D.Utah 2013). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action against prison
officials, certain members of the state board of pardons and paroles, and lawyers working under contract with the
prison to provide limited legal services to inmates, alleging numerous constitutional violations. The district court
dismissed the complaint, and inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, dismissed in part, and
remanded. On remand, the district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court held
that the inmate's initial placement in administrative segregation did not violate his due process rights, where the
inmate was promptly evaluated by proper officials and was assigned to ad-seg based on legitimate safety and
security concerns, and given the reason for the inmate's return to the state-- termination of his interstate compact
placement following his conviction for murdering another inmate while in ad-seg there-- there could be little
doubt that officials were justified in initially placing the inmate in the most secure housing available pending
future review. The court noted that the inmate promptly received a thorough evaluation under the prison's
standard review procedures which included a reasoned examination of his assignment. The court found that the
inmate was not entitled to a formal hearing regarding the implementation of an Executive Director Override
(EDO) and that the former director's failure to personally review the EDO for an 18-month period did not violate
due process. (Utah State Prison)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
MEDICAL CARE
RETALIATION

Robinson v. Phelps, 946 F.Supp.2d 354 (D.Del. 2013). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against prison
officials alleging excessive force and failure to protect. The district court held that the prisoner stated cognizable
and non-frivolous claims for excessive force, failure to protect, and denial of medical care. The prisoner alleged
that on one occasion a sergeant assaulted him and that a lieutenant arrived during the assault and that he
sustained injuries but was denied medical care by these officers and other prison personnel, that another sergeant
shoved and pushed him when he was taken to a medical grievance hearing, making his injuries worse, that this
sergeant shoved him to the ground while escorting him to the shower, and then dragged him when he could not
get up, requiring that he be taken away by stretcher, and that other officers later choked him until he lost
consciousness. The court found that the prisoner also stated cognizable and non-frivolous Eighth Amendment
claims against a prison physician for denial or delay of medical treatment; the prisoner alleged that after he was
assaulted by a corrections officer, he was seen by the physician, who would not prescribe pain medication and
advised the prisoner that he would be x-rayed within seven to ten days, but the x-rays were not taken for a month
and a half, and he alleged that some months later he was taken to an outside facility for a magnetic resonance
imaging (MRI) of the neck and back.
According to the court, the prisoner's allegations were sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim that the
physicians denied his requests for medically necessary accommodations. The prisoner alleged that medical
officials did not authorize his housing on a lower bunk and, as a result, he slept on the floor, that an officer later
moved him to an upstairs cell even though he knew that the prisoner required lower housing due to his neck and
back injuries, and that the prisoner showed the officer a memo from a superior officer indicating the prisoner
needed the housing, (James T. Vaughn Correctional Center, Delaware)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
MEDICAL CARE
RESTRAINTS
TRANSPORTATION

Rogers v. Boatright, 709 F.3d 403 (5th Cir. 2013). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against corrections
officers and their supervisor, alleging that he was seriously injured when the prison van in which he was riding
stopped abruptly, and that he was provided with inadequate and untimely medical care for his injuries. The
district court dismissed the suit. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded. The appeals court held that the prisoner stated a non-frivolous claim that an officer acted with
deliberate indifference to his safety in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The prisoner alleged that he sustained
a serious injury while being transported in a prison van because a corrections officer operated the van recklessly
and had to brake suddenly to avoid hitting another vehicle, that he was shackled in leg irons and handcuffs and
was not provided with a seatbelt and thus could not protect himself when the prison van stopped abruptly, and
that the officer had told another officer that other inmates similarly had been injured the prior week and during
other incidents. A dissenting appeals judge asserted that “…there is no constitutional requirement that inmates be
buckled with seatbelts during transportation. Nearly all courts have rejected such claims, because the use of
seatbelts on shackled prisoners presents inevitable, non-trivial security concerns for other passengers and the
guards.” The appeals court held that the corrections officers transporting the prisoner to a hospital in a prison van
did not show deliberate indifference to the prisoner's serious medical needs, in violation of the Eighth
Amendment, when, after the prisoner was injured, the officers proceeded to the hospital, had the prisoner
checked by a physician, but then failed to take the prisoner to the emergency room for treatment of his bleeding
wounds as that physician had directed, but instead brought the prisoner to the prison's medical facility, where he
was treated some five hours later. (Eastham Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional
Institutions Division)
2014

U.S. District Court
TRANSPORTATION

Best v. New York City Dept. of Correction, 14 F.Supp.3d 341 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). A pretrial detainee filed a § 1983
action alleging that state prison officials denied him due process at an infraction hearing, improperly placed him
in segregated housing, and failed to protect him while being transported to court. The officials moved to dismiss.
The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the issues of whether the
detainee's placement in segregated housing following the infraction hearing was administrative or punitive in
nature, and whether he was provided the opportunity to call a witnesses at a hearing involved fact issues that
could not be resolved on a motion to dismiss the detainee's claim that prison officials' denied him procedural due
process at the hearing. According to the court, the officials' failure to provide the detainee with a seat belt while

47.54

he was being transported to court with his hands handcuffed behind his back did not demonstrate deliberate
indifference to the detainee's safety. Plaintiff alleges that, some time after he was placed in segregated housing,
“while being transported to court, handcuffs [were] placed behind [Plaintiff's] back and [he was] “placed in a
cage with no seatbelt or a way to protect [himself] in case of a sudden stop or accident.” and that, “while riding[,
he sat] on a slippery seat that cause[d] [him] to continuously slide.” According to the detainee, “On [his] way to
court, the bus kept stopping short and [Plaintiff] continued to bump [his] head on the gate in front of [him].” The
detainee complained to the driver and after he returned to the detention facility he was taken to the medical
center where his injuries were assessed and an injury report was filed. The detainee claims that, as a result of the
injuries that he sustained during this trip, his neck and shoulders were injured, and that “he now has to take
medication for migraine headaches. (Metropolitan Detention Center, Brooklyn, N.Y.)
U.S. District Court
PRIVATE FACILITY

Dean v. Corrections Corporation of America, 108 F.Supp.3d 702 (D. Ariz. 2014). A state prisoner, who was an
adherent of the Essene faith, brought a § 1983 action against a private prison management company, warden, and
the State of Hawai’i Department of Public Safety, alleging that, following his assignment to a prison in Arizona,
he was denied a raw-food, vegetarian diet that had been requested, consistent with his religious beliefs, in
violation of the First Amendment and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The
district court granted the defendants’ motion for a change of venue to the District of Arizona. The defendants
moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion, finding that: (1) material fact issues existed
as to the sincerity of the prisoner’s beliefs and whether those beliefs were substantially burdened; (2) the
potential perception of preferential treatment was not a compelling interest to justify a burden on the prisoner’s
religious practice under RLUIPA; (3) an inconsistency with simplified food service and additional costs
presented a compelling interest to justify the burden on the prisoner’s religious practice under RLUIPA; (4)
rejecting the prisoner’s requested diet was the least restrictive means to further a compelling government
interest; and (5) refusing the prisoner’s requested diet did not violate his First Amendment rights. (Saguaro
Correctional Center, operated by Corrections Corporation of America, Arizona)

U.S. District Court
TRANSPORTATION
FAILURE TO PROTECT

Fouch v. District of Columbia, 10 F.Supp.3d 45 (D.D.C. 2014). A detainee, who allegedly suffered severe
injuries from collision between two police vehicles, one of which he was riding in, handcuffed behind the back
and without a seat belt or harness, while being transported between police stations for processing of a
misdemeanor threat charge, brought an action against the District of Columbia and the two officers who had
been driving the vehicles. After the court dismissed claims against the officer who had been driving the other
vehicle, the District and the remaining officer filed a motion for partial dismissal. The district court granted the
motion for partial dismissal in part and denied in part without prejudice. The court held that the District of
Columbia could not be held liable for damages under § 1983. (District of Columbia Metropolitan Police
Department, Central Booking Division)

U.S. Appeals Court
HABEAS CORPUS
PURPOSE

Griffin v. Gomez, 741 F.3d 10 (9th Cir. 2014). A state inmate filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
challenging his placement in a security housing unit (SHU). After the writ was issued, the district court ordered
the state to release the inmate from segregated housing conditions, and the state appealed. The appeals court
vacated, reversed, and remanded. The appeals court held that the district court abused its discretion by finding
that the state had violated its order issuing a writ of habeas corpus requiring the state to release the inmate from
the facility's security housing unit (SHU). According to the court, the state subsequently placed the inmate in the
facility's administrative segregation unit (ASU) and then in another facility's SHU. The court noted that the
inmate had been released into federal custody before the order was issued, his placement in ASU after he was
released from federal custody pending evaluation of his gang status was standard procedure, and the inmate was
validated as an active gang member and placed in other SHU. According to the court, the district court
improperly impeded state prison management. (Pelican Bay State Prison, California)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
TRANSPORTATION

Mori v. Allegheny County, 51 F.Supp.3d 558 (W.D.Pa. 2014). An inmate who was seven and one-half months
into a “high risk” pregnancy brought an action under § 1983 against a county for deliberate indifference to her
health in violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, and survival and
wrongful death claims for violations of the Fourteenth Amendment, after the loss of the child following a
placental abruption. The county moved to dismiss. The district court denied the motion. The court held that the
prisoner: (1) stated an Eighth Amendment claim based on failure to monitor the unborn child after the prisoner
complained of vaginal bleeding; (2) stated a claim against the county based on custom and practice; (3)
sufficiently alleged a causal link between the policies and the loss of the child; (4) stated a claim against county
officials for individual liability; and (5) stated wrongful death and survivor claims for the death of the child. The
inmate alleged that individual policy makers, including the chief operating officer of the county jail’s health
services, and the jail’s nursing supervisor, were responsible for the policies that led to failure to provide adequate
medical treatment. The prisoner also alleged that she was made to wait over 24 hours before being sent to a
hospital after her vaginal bleeding started, that she was transported by a police cruiser rather than ambulance,
that it was well known that bleeding late in pregnancy often indicated serious medical issues, that the child was
alive during birth, and that the delay in medical treatment contributed to the injuries during birth and the death of
the child shortly after birth. (Allegheny County Jail, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
MENTAL HEALTH

Thomas v. Adams, 55 F.Supp.3d 552 (D.N.J. 2014). Civilly-committed sexually violent predators (SVP) brought
an action against corrections officials, and other defendants, challenging the adequacy of treatment after they
were transferred to a new facility for SVPs. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the
motions in part and denied in part. The inmate’s claimed that he was diagnosed as a sexually violent predator
(SVP) requiring treatment, and after he was transferred to a different facility his prescribed amount of therapy
was reduced, and eventually denied without any mental health evaluation. The inmate alleged that the denials
were based on his placement in a segregated housing unit (SHU). The court held that the inmate sufficiently

47.55

alleged a substantive due process challenge against high-ranking, supervising corrections officers involved in the
decision to transfer SVPs to a new facility, despite the contention that the officials played no role in the inmate’s
day-to-day affairs. (N.J. Sexually Violent Predator Act, Special Treatment Unit at East Jersey State Prison)
U.S. District Court
MENTAL HEALTH

Trueblood v. Washington State Dept. of Social and Health Services, 73 F.Supp.3d 1311 (W.D.Wash. 2014).
Pretrial detainees brought a class action against the Washington Department of Social and Health Services and
two state hospitals, alleging that in-jail waiting times for court-ordered competency evaluations and restoration
services violated their Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The detainees moved for summary judgment.
The district court granted the motion, finding that in-jail waiting times for court-ordered competency evaluations
and restoration services violated the Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights of mentally
incapacitated pretrial detainees. The court noted that detainees were incarcerated for many weeks, not because
they were convicted, found to be dangerous, or posed a flight risk, but because Department of Social and Health
Services and state hospitals did not have sufficient bed space or available staff to provide the services they were
required to provide. Some detainees were held in solitary confinement due to space issues, exacerbating any
mental illness, and the rate of medication compliance was lower in jail. (Washington State Department of Social
and Health Services, Western State Hospital and Eastern State Hospital)
2015

U.S. Appeals Court
LIBERTY INTEREST

Chavarriaga v. New Jersey Dept. of Corrections, 806 F.3d 210 (3d Cir. 2015). A former prisoner brought a §
1983 action in state court against the New Jersey Department of Corrections (NJDOC), the former New Jersey
Attorney General, the New Jersey Commissioner of Corrections, a correctional sergeant, and various other
correctional officers. The prisoner alleged that the defendants violated her constitutional rights when they
transferred her from one place of confinement to another where they denied her potable water, clothing, sanitary
napkins, and subjected her to an unlawful body cavity search. The district court granted summary judgment in
favor of the Attorney General, Commissioner of Corrections, and correctional sergeant, and dismissed the
remaining claims. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded.
The appeals court held that NJDOC’s policies regarding custodial placements and the Due Process Clause did
not give the prisoner a liberty interest in being housed in a particular institution, as required to support a due
process claim based on the prisoner’s transfers among custodial facilities. The court noted that a state has broad
authority to confine an inmate in any of its institutions, and thus, courts recognize that a state’s authority to place
inmates anywhere within the prison system is among a wide spectrum of discretionary actions that traditionally
have been the business of prison administrators rather than of the federal courts. (Garrett House Residential
Community Release Facility, Edna Mahan Correctional Facility, New Jersey)

U.S. District Court
PURPOSE
DUE PROCESS

Collazo-Perez v. Puerto Rico, 100 F.Supp.3d 88 (D.P.R. 2015). A Puerto Rico prisoner brought a pro se § 1983
action against the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the head of a prison’s security, and others, alleging his prison
transfer violated his civil rights. The prisoner sought $75,000 to compensate him for damages suffered. The
defendants moved to dismiss and the district court granted the motion. The court held that the prisoner’s
allusions to negligence on the part of prison’s head of security in immediately transferring the prisoner to
another institution, after confidential information about which the prisoner was the author was disseminated to
the penal population, were insufficient to state a due process claim that the security head and others endangered
the prisoner. According to the court, the prison’s head of security had sovereign immunity from the prisoner’s §
1983 suit, where the head of security was at all times acting within the scope of his employment, and in his
official capacity. (Bayamon Penal Complex, Puerto Rico)

U.S. Appeals Court
TRANSPORTATION
RESTRAINTS

King v. McCarty, 781 F.3d 889 (7th Cir. 2015). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a county sheriff
and two jail guards, alleging the jail’s use of a transparent jumpsuit during his transfer to a state prison, which
exposed the prisoner’s genitals, violated the prisoner’s rights under the Fourth and Eighth Amendments. The
district court dismissed the prisoner’s Eighth Amendment claim for failure to state a claim and granted the
defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to the Fourth Amendment claim. The prisoner appealed. The
appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that: (1) the prisoner was required to direct his grievance to
the jail, not the state prison, in order to satisfy the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s (PLRA) exhaustion
requirement; (2) the jail’s grievance procedure was not “available,” within the meaning of PLRA; (3) allegations
were sufficient to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment; and (4) the jail’s requirement that the prisoner
wear a transparent jumpsuit did not violate the Fourth Amendment. (Illinois Department of Corrections,
Livingston County Jail)

U.S. Appeals Court
FACILITY
LIBERTY INTEREST

King v. Zamiara, 788 F.3d 207 (6th Cir. 2015). A prisoner brought an action against prison officials under §
1983, alleging First Amendment retaliation arising from his transfer to a higher security prison due to his
participation in a state-court class action against the prison officials. After a bench trial, the district court found
in favor of the prison officials. The appeals court reversed with respect to three officials. On remand, the district
court entered judgment in favor of the prisoner and ordered compensatory damages and attorney fees, but denied
the prisoner’s request for punitive damages and injunctive relief. Both parties appealed. The appeals court
vacated and remanded. The court held that: (1) the district court properly awarded prisoner compensatory
damages; (2) the district court’s award of compensatory damages to equal $5 a day for each day he was kept in a
higher security prison was not a reversible error; (3) the district court relied on an incorrect legal standard in
concluding that the prisoner was not entitled to punitive damages; (4) the prisoner was not entitled to injunctive
relief requiring the department of corrections to remove certain documents from his file that allegedly violated
his due process rights; and (5) the district court abused its discretion in failing to charge up to 25% of the
attorney fees awarded to the prisoner against his compensatory damages award. (Conklin Unit at Brooks
Correctional Facility, Chippewa Correctional Facility, Michigan)

47.56

U.S. District Court
EQUAL PROTECTION

Sassman v. Brown, 99 F.Supp.3d 1223 (E.D. Cal. 2015). A male prisoner filed a civil rights action against the
Governor of California and the Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
(CDCR), alleging that the exclusion of male prisoners from California’s Alternative Custody Program (ACP),
under which female prisoners were allowed to apply for release from prison to serve the last 24 months of their
sentence in the community, violated the Equal Protection Clause. The male prisoner moved for summary
judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that California’s ACP violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the provision excluding male prisoners from applying to
the ACP would be stricken to expand the ACP to male prisoners. (California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation)

U.S. District Court
OTHER COUNTRIES

Sluss v. United States Department of Justice, 78 F.Supp.3d 61 (D.D.C. 2015). A federal prisoner sought to
compel the Department of Justice (DOJ) to transfer him, pursuant to an international treaty, to his birthplace of
Canada to carry out the remainder of his sentence. The DOJ moved to dismiss. The district court granted the
motion. The court held that decisions regarding the international transfer of prisoners constituted an agency
action, which was committed to agency discretion by law, and thus the decisions were not reviewable under the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA). (Federal Correctional Center, Petersburg, Virginia)

U.S. Appeals Court
TRANSPORTATION

Turner v. Mull, 784 F.3d 485 (8th Cir. 2015). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that correctional
officials violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), and Rehabilitation Act by failing to transport him in wheelchair-accessible van,
exposing him to unsanitary conditions in the van, and retaliating against him for filing a complaint. The district
court entered summary judgment in the officials’ favor and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The
appeals court held that the officials were not deliberately indifferent to the inmate’s serious medical needs when
they precluded him from using a wheelchair-accessible van, even if the inmate was required to crawl into the van
and to his seat. The court noted that the inmate was able to ambulate, stand, and sit with the use of leg braces and
crutches, the inmate did not ask to use a readily available wheelchair, no physician ordered or issued a
wheelchair for the inmate, and improperly using or standing on a lift was considered dangerous due to the
possibility of a fall. According to the court, officials were not deliberately indifferent to the serious medical
needs of the inmate in violation of Eighth Amendment when they required him to be transported and to crawl in
an unsanitary van, where the inmate was exposed to unsanitary conditions on a single day for a combined
maximum of approximately six hours. The court found that prison officials did not discriminate against the
inmate on the basis of his disability, in violation of the Rehabilitation Act, when they refused to transport him in
a wheelchair-accessible van, where the prison’s wheelchair-users-only policy was rooted in concerns over
undisputed safety hazards associated with people standing on or otherwise improperly using a lift, and the
inmate did not use a wheelchair or obtain a physician’s order to use a wheelchair-accessible van. (Eastern
Reception Diagnostic Correctional Center, Missouri)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT

U.S. v. Mujahid, 799 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 2015). A federal prisoner was convicted in the district court for
aggravated sexual abuse and abusive sexual contact against other prisoners while in custody in a state prison,
awaiting transfer to a federal prison. The prisoner appealed his conviction. The appeals court affirmed. The
appeals court held that the question of whether or not a contract to house federal prisoners existed between the
United States Marshals Service and the state department of corrections was a question of law that was within the
district court’s authority to decide. The appeals court found that a district court may determine as a matter of law
whether the facility at which an alleged crime took place was the one in which the persons were held in custody
by direction of, or pursuant to, a contract or agreement with the head of any federal department or agency.
(Anchorage Correctional Complex, U.S. Marshals Service)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

White v. Bukowski, 800 F.3d 392 (7th Cir. 2015). A pregnant county prisoner brought a civil rights action under §
1983 against a county sheriff’s office, alleging violation of her Eighth Amendment rights, alleging deliberate
indifference to her need for proper prenatal care and prompt transport to a hospital for delivery of her baby while
she was in their temporary custody. The county moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion and the
prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that no administrative remedies were
available, and thus the prisoner did not fail to exhaust administrative remedies under the requirements of the
Prison Litigation Reform Act. The prisoner alleged that the delay in her transport to the hospital contributed to
her baby’s birth defects. According to the court, the prisoner had no opportunity to grieve the delay in transport
until after the harm was done, the prisoner was uninformed about any deadline for filing a grievance, the
prisoner would not have known that she would be transferred to another jail four days after returning from the
hospital, and the prisoner could not have filed a grievance after she was transferred. (Kankakee Co. Jail, Illinois)
2016

U.S. Appeals Court
RETALIATION
MENTAL HEALTH

Saylor v. Nebraska, 812 F.3d 637 (8th Cir. 2016). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that prison
officials retaliated against him by transferring and reclassifying him, that the transfer and classification review
process violated his due process rights, and that officials were deliberately indifferent to his post–traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD). The district court denied the officials’ motion for summary judgment, and they appealed. The
appeals court reversed. The court held that the prison’s medical officials were not deliberately indifferent to the
inmate’s post–traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), in violation of Eighth Amendment, despite the inmate’s
contention that treatment that occurred after his treating psychiatrist left the prison rose to the level of cruel and
unusual punishment. The court noted that officials attempted to provide the inmate with another psychiatrist at
the facility, ultimately found him another psychiatrist at a different facility, continued medication as they saw fit
within their independent medical judgment, and gave him his requested private cell. The court found that the
officials’ decision to transfer the inmate to another facility and to place him in administrative segregation was

47.57

not in retaliation for his complaints about his medical care, in violation of the First Amendment, where the
reason for the transfer was to provide the inmate with necessary psychiatric care after his treating psychiatrist’s
contract with the state ended and the inmate refused to meet with the facility’s other psychiatrist. The court noted
that the inmate was placed in administrative segregation because he refused to share a cell within any other
prisoners, and there were no other private cells. (Nebraska Department of Correctional Services, Nebraska State
Penitentiary, Tecumseh State Correctional Institution)

47.58

XIX

XIX

XIX

XIX

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Thomsen v. Ross, 368 F.Supp.2d 961 (D.Minn. 2005). A detainee brought a § 1983 civil rights

U.S. Appeals Court
BRUTALITY
EXCESSIVE FORCE
FAILURE TO PROTECT

U.S. v. Serrata, 425 F.3d 886 (10th Cir. 2005). Former correctional officers who were convicted in

U.S. Appeals Court
BRUTALITY
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Watts v. McKinney, 394 F.3d 710 (9th Cir. 2005). A state inmate filed a civil rights action alleging

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Willis v. Youngblood, 384 F.Supp.2d 883 (D.Md. 2005). An inmate sued correctional officers under
§ 1983 alleging excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Following a jury trial and
the entry of a verdict against two officers, the officers renewed their motion for judgment as a
matter of law. The district court granted the motion, finding that evidence that the inmate
suffered more than a de minimis injury was insufficient to submit to the jury. According to the
court, there was no evidence at trial indicating any physical injury resulting from the officers’
alleged actions of shoving the inmate against a wall and throwing him in a chair. The court noted
that not every push or shove, “even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s
chambers,” violates a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment right to be free of excessive force. (Western
Correctional Institution, Maryland)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE
RESTRAINTS

Ziemba v. Armstrong, 430 F.3d 623 (2nd Cir. 2005). A state prison inmate brought a civil rights
action alleging that prison officials failed to provide constitutionally-adequate health care, failed to
protect him from the use of excessive force, and used excessive force. The district court granted
summary judgment for the officials, in part, and they appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part,
reversed in part and remanded. The court held that evidence was sufficient to establish that a
state corrections commissioner exhibited deliberate indifference to the inmate’s constitutional
rights or was grossly negligent in training subordinates, and that evidence was sufficient to impose
supervisory liability on a prison warden. The inmate was allegedly placed in four-point restraints
for 22 hours, beaten, and denied medical care. The court found that summary judgment was
precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a prison nurse and medic were
deliberately indifference to the inmate’s serious medical needs. (Connecticut State Prison)

action against a county and county employees, alleging he was wrongfully strip searched and
suffered a broken hand after he arrested on driving under the influence (DUI) charges. The district
court granted summary judgment for the defendants in part, and denied it in part. The court found
that even if a police officer grabbed the detainee and threw him to the floor, his actions did not
amount to the use of excessive force in violation of due process, absent evidence that the officer’s
actions caused the detainee’s lost tooth and broken hand. The court found that the detainee’s
broken hand was not a serious medical need, such that a 48-hour delay by county employees in
taking the detainee to a hospital could amount to deliberate indifference to his serious medical
needs, absent evidence that a red and swollen hand was a critical or escalating situation requiring
immediate attention, or that the delay jeopardized the detainee’s prognosis. The court noted that
employees took the detainee to the hospital on the on the evening he made the written request for
treatment. (Crow Wing County Jail, Minnesota)

federal court of offenses related to an assault on an inmate and subsequent obstruction of justice
appealed their convictions. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The
court held that evidence was sufficient to support the conviction of one officer for failing to
intervene to prevent an assault. Four eyewitnesses testified that the officer stood within arm’s
reach and watched another officer attack an inmate who was lying defenseless on the floor with his
hands cuffed behind his back. The inmate was examined by a physician who observed that he was
groggy, had abrasions on his head, neck, back, ear and eye, and had a black boot scuff mark on the
right side of his head. The inmate lost consciousness and was taken to a hospital, but he suffered
no permanent physical injuries or impairments as a result of the attack. The court held that the
boots worn by an officer when he kicked or stomped on an inmate’s head constituted dangerous
weapons. The appeals court found that the district court abused its discretion in granting a
downward departure under sentencing guidelines based on extraordinary family circumstances,
employment records and community service. One officer was sentenced to 51 months, another to 24
months, and a third to 78 months imprisonment. (Lea County Correctional Facility, New Mexico)

that a prison guard violated his Eighth Amendment rights. The district court denied summary
judgment for the guard and he appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the guard was
not entitled to qualified immunity from liability. The court held that a reasonable prison guard
would have reasonably believed that kicking a helpless prisoner’s genitals was cruel and unusual
conduct. The court noted that “to suppose that any reasonable person, let alone a trained prison
officer, would not know that kicking a helpless prisoner’s genitals was cruel and unusual
punishment is beyond belief. The Supreme Court did not need to create of a catalogue of all acts by
which cruel and sadistic purpose to harm another would be manifest; but if it had, such act would
be near the top of the list. The case must go to trial.” (Pelican Bay State Prison, California)

2006
U.S. District Court
RESTRAINTS

Anderson-Bey v. District of Columbia, 466 F.Supp.2d 51 (D.D.C. 2006). Prisoners transported

between out-of-state correctional facilities brought a civil rights action against the District of
Columbia and corrections officers, alleging common law torts and violation of their constitutional

48.63
XX

rights under First and Eighth Amendments. The prisoners had been transported in two groups,
with trips lasting between 10 and 15 hours. The defendants brought motions to dismiss or for
summary judgment which the court denied with regard to the District of Columbia. The court held
that: (1) a fact issue existed as to whether the restraints used on prisoners during the prolonged
transport caused greater pain than was necessary to ensure they were securely restrained; (2) a
fact issue existed as to whether the officers acted with deliberate indifference to the prisoners’
health or safety in the transport of the prisoners; (3) a causal nexus existed between the protected
speech of the prisoners in bringing the civil lawsuit against the corrections officers and subsequent
alleged retaliation by the officers during the transport of prisoners; (4) a fact issue existed as to
whether the officers attempted to chill the prisoners’ participation in the pending civil lawsuit
against the officers; and (5) a fact issue existed as to whether conditions imposed on the prisoners
during the transport were justified by valid penological needs. The court found that the denial of
food during a bus ride that lasted between 10 and 15 hours was insufficiently serious to state a
stand-alone cruel and unusual punishment civil rights claim under the Eighth Amendment. The
court also found that the denial of bathroom breaks during the 10 to 15 hour bus trip, did not,
without more, constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. The court
stated that the extremely uncomfortable and painful shackles applied for the numerous hours
during transports, exacerbated by taunting, threats, and denial of food, water, medicine, and
toilets, was outrageous conduct under District of Columbia law, precluding summary judgment on
the prisoners’ intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against the corrections officers.
(District of Columbia)
U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Avratin v. Bermudez, 420 F.Supp.2d 1121 (S.D.Cal. 2006). A prisoner who was involved in a fight
with another inmate brought a civil rights action against a corrections officer, alleging that the
officer used excessive force in attempting to stop the fight. The officer moved for summary
judgment and the district court granted the motion. The court held that the officer's alleged
conduct of firing a wooden projectile from a launcher directly at an unarmed prisoner involved in a
fight with another inmate, causing a severe injury to the inmate's leg, violated the prisoner's
Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. The court noted that no
correctional officers, prison personnel or other inmates were at immediate risk during the fight
and the officer failed to use any lesser degree of force before firing his launcher. However, the court
found that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity for his alleged conduct because it would
not be clear to a reasonable officer that the alleged conduct was unlawful, as a reasonable officer
could conclude that the fight posed a risk of serious bodily injury, the officer aimed at the
prisoner's leg, virtually eliminating the risk that the prisoner would suffer a life-threatening
injury, the fight occurred in a heightened security setting with many other inmates present in the
yard, and the prisoner and other inmate refused orders to desist. (Centinela State Prison, Calif.)

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Buchanan v. Maine, 417 F.Supp.2d 24 (D.Me. 2006). The personal representative of a mentally ill

U.S. Appeals Court
RESTRAINTS
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Calvi v. Knox County, 470 F.3d 422 (1st Cir. 2006). A female arrestee brought a § 1983 action

suspect who had been fatally shot by a deputy sheriff brought an action against a state, county,
and various officials and officers, alleging civil rights violations. The county and officers moved for
summary judgment, which the district court granted. The court held that the deputy sheriffs'
warrantless entry of a mentally ill suspect's home was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment,
pursuant to the emergency doctrine. According to the court, the deputies had reasonable belief that
the suspect posed an immediate threat to his own safety, and developing circumstances at the
scene, the late time of day, winter conditions, and the remote location of the suspect's residence
made it more reasonable for deputies to enter the home immediately instead of obtaining a
warrant. The court found that the personal representative failed to establish that a reasonable
officer would have understood his conduct in entering the suspect's home without a warrant
contravened clearly established law, and thus the deputies were entitled to qualified immunity as
to the Fourth Amendment claim. The court concluded that the deputies would have had reasonable
grounds to believe that the protective custody criteria under state law were met. According to the
court, a deputy sheriff's shooting of a mentally ill suspect after he had stabbed another deputy did
not constitute excessive force, and thus was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The other
deputy was attacked after attempting to take the suspect into protective custody, and the deputy
who shot the suspect had reasonable belief that the other deputy was threatened with death or
serious physical injury. The court held that the personal representative failed to demonstrate that
the county had a custom or policy relating to mentally ill persons that resulted in deprivation of
Fourth Amendment rights, as required to establish the county's municipal liability under § 1983.
According to the court, there was no evidence that the county's alleged failure to train officers
constituted a well-settled and widespread custom or practice, and that there was no need for
increased training in proper methods for making warrantless arrests or for engaging mentally ill
and potentially combative persons when the deputy was hired. (Lincoln County, Maine)
against a city, city officers, a county, and county officers alleging excessive force. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the plaintiff appealed. The appeals
court affirmed. The court held that an officer who handcuffed the arrestee in the customary
manner by cuffing her hands behind her back did not use excessive force, even if the officer knew

48.64
XX

that the arrestee had a hand deformity. The court noted that the officer's decision to not deviate
from the standard practice of placing handcuffs behind the back was a judgment call. The arrestee
had told the officer to be gentle because she was frail and had recently undergone elbow surgery.
The officer double-locked the handcuffs behind her back so that they would not tighten. He then
marched her outside, deposited her in his cruiser, and belted her in for transport to the jail. Upon
arriving at the lockup, the arrestee was transferred to the custody of a jail officer, who unlocked
the handcuffs, patted her down, and placed her in a holding cell. After other required aspects of the
booking process had been completed, another jail officer fingerprinted the arrestee, who claimed
that the officer who fingerprinted her repeatedly pushed her fingers down hard, in spite of being
told that she had a hand deformity. She also claimed that the fingerprinting caused injuries to her
wrist and her surgically repaired middle finger. (Knox County Jail, Maine)
U.S. District Court
CELL EXTRACTION
PEPPER SPRAY

Davis v. Township of Paulsboro, 421 F.Supp.2d 835 (D.N.J. 2006). The parents of an arrestee

U.S. District Court
RESTRAINTS

Hadix v. Caruso, 461 F.Supp.2d 574 (W.D.Mich. 2006). State prisoners filed a class action under §

U.S. Appeals Court
RESTRAINTS

Hanks v. Prachar, 457 F.3d 774 (8th Cir. 2006). A former county jail detainee brought a § 1983
action against county jail officials, alleging violation of his due process rights in connection with
the use of restraints and confinement, requesting damages and injunctive relief. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the officials and the former detainee appealed. The appeals
court affirmed the grant of summary judgment on the claims for injunctive relief, reversed the
grant of summary judgment on the claims for damages, and remanded for further proceedings. The
court held that the detainee's claim for injunctive relief was rendered moot by detainee's release
from jail. The court found that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material
fact as to whether the detainee was restrained in shackles and chains or confined in a padded unit
for the purpose punishment, or for valid reasons related to legitimate goals. The detainee alleged
he was placed in four-point restraints, chained to a wall in a “rubber room,” forced to shower in
waist chains and shackles, and denied hearings before being punished. The detainee was 17 years
old when he was admitted to the jail. (St. Louis County Jail, Minnesota)

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE
RESTRAINTS

Jenkins v. Wilson, 432 F.Supp.2d 808 (W.D.Wis. 2006). A pretrial detainee brought a civil rights

brought a federal civil rights claim against a county, a township, and various law enforcement
officers, arising from arrestee's death which occurred after he had been struck in the head by a
bottle during a fight and then taken into police custody. The defendants moved for summary
judgment and the district court granted the motion. The court held that the officers did not use
excessive force in spraying the suspect with pepper spray, where he was visibly agitated, was
acting aggressively, was yelling profanities, banged walls in his house, and shoved an officer three
times, and no lasting injury occurred. According to the court, the officers did not use excessive
force in waiting to wash the pepper spray from the suspect's eyes until after he had been
transported from the site of the spraying to a police station because the suspect continued to
physically resist officers and persisted in yelling and cursing after being sprayed. The court found
that an officer did not use excessive force in removing the arrestee from his cell, where the officer
nudged the arrestee several times on his lower leg in an attempt to rouse him, stepped into the cell
and grabbed the arrestee by the arm, smoothly pulled the suspect by the arm off the bench and
onto his hands and knees, pulled him a few feet across the floor, and placed handcuffs on him. The
court held that Township officers were not deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of
the arrestee who had been hit on the head with a bottle in a fight prior to arrest, and thus due
process principles were not violated, where an ambulance arrived to transport the arrestee to a
hospital within minutes of the arrestee's arrival at police headquarters, a doctor examined the
arrestee and determined he was fit for incarceration, and the arrestee was periodically checked
once back at the police station. According to the court, the fact that the arrestee vomited and was
still bleeding upon his return to the police station did not establish deliberate indifference.
(Gloucester County Sheriff's Department, Township of Paulsboro, New Jersey)
1983 in 1980, alleging that conditions of their confinement violated their constitutional rights.
Following settlement of claims by consent decree, and termination of the enforcement of mental
health provisions of the consent decree, a prisoner moved to reopen the judgment regarding mental
health care and for the issuance of preliminary injunction. The district court granted the motion.
The court held that reopening the mental health provisions of the consent decree was warranted
where many recurrent problems noted by physicians concerned “cracks” between medical and
mental health care. The court found that the prison’s use of mechanical in-cell restraints, including
“top of the bed” restraints consisting of chaining a prisoner’s hands and feet to a concrete slab, as
disciplinary method and/or control mechanism constituted torture and violated the Eighth
Amendment, notwithstanding a six-hour limit on bed restraints but which did not prohibit the use
of other dangerous restraint devices at end of the six-hour period. (Southern Michigan State
Prison, Jackson)

claim alleging that jail officers used excessive force. The district court held that a genuine issue of
fact, as to whether deputies were justified in hitting the pretrial detainee about the head in
attempting to handcuff him and transport him to segregation, precluded summary judgment.
(Dane County Jail, Wisconsin)

48.65
XX

U.S. Appeals Court
CELL EXTRACTION
EXCESSIVE FORCE
PEPPER SPRAY

Johnson v. Blaukat, 453 F.3d 1108 (8th Cir. 2006). A female inmate brought claims against

U.S. Appeals Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Johnson v. Hamilton, 452 F.3d 967 (8th Cir. 2006). A state prisoner who was involved in a physical

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Moore v. Morales, 445 F.Supp.2d 1000 (N.D.Ill. 2006). The administrator of the estate of a
detainee who died in police custody brought a § 1983 action against arresting officers, and other
officers and employees of a police department who had processed the detainee at a police station,
alleging that the defendants either had used excessive force on the detainee, ultimately leading to
his death, or had been deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. The defendants moved for
summary judgment and the district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court
held that the summary judgment was precluded by fact issues as to the degree of force used on the
detainee, and whether some police officers failed to stop the infliction of injuries on the detainee by
fellow officers. The court found that the police had not shown deliberate indifference to the
condition of the detainee and that there was no cover-up of the use of excessive force. (Chicago
Police Department, 12th District Police Station, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
BRUTALITY
DOGS
USE OF FORCE

Rasul v. Rumsfeld, 414 F.Supp.2d 26 (D.D.C. 2006). Former detainees at a military facility in
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, sued the Secretary of Defense and commanding officers, alleging they
were tortured. The defendants moved to dismiss and the district court granted the motion in part,
and deferred in part. The court held that military personnel supervising the interrogation of
detainees at the facility had qualified immunity from a claim that they promoted or condoned
torture in violation of Fifth and Eighth Amendment rights of detainees, because the question as to
whether the detainees had rights under the constitution had not been resolved by high courts and
therefore personnel could not have known that their conduct was wrongful. The court noted that
District of Columbia law applied to the question of whether military personnel at Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba, were acting within the scope of their employment when they allegedly tortured
detainees. The prisoners alleged various forms of torture, including hooding, forced nakedness,
housing in cages, deprivation of food, forced body cavity searches, subjection to extremes of heat
and cold, harassment in the practice of their religion, forced shaving of religious beards, placing
the Koran in the toilet, placement in stress positions, beatings with rifle butts, and the use of
unmuzzled dogs for intimidation. The court found “most disturbing” their claim that executives of
the United States government were directly responsible for the “depraved conduct the plaintiffs
suffered over the course of their detention.” (U.S. Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba)

correctional officers, supervisors, and a county alleging that her constitutional rights were violated
by the alleged use of excessive force. The district court entered summary judgment on the claims
and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part.
The court held that: (1) genuine issues of fact precluded summary judgment on the claim that
officers used excessive force in violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause; (2) the
supervisor’s actions in allegedly using a racial epithet against another inmate and in allegedly
removing feminine hygiene products from the cell was not cruel and unusual punishment; and (3)
the purported violation of county policies that were not alleged to be unconstitutional provided no
basis for civil rights liability for the county. According to the court, genuine issues of material fact
as to whether correctional officers used excessive force in tackling and using pepper spray on the
inmate when they entered her cell to subdue a cellmate precluded summary judgment on the
Eighth Amendment claim; questions included whether their acts were defensive in nature or
motivated by frustration or anger, whether the force applied was necessary to maintain order and
was commensurate with the situation, whether the inmate failed to comply with the officers’
orders and was actively resisting them, whether a verbal warning was issued before the
application of pepper spray, and whether the inmate suffered actual injuries. The court found that
the correctional officers’ alleged violation of county policies regarding the use of force and the use
of pepper spray could not give rise to civil rights liability on the part of the county, absent any
allegation the policies themselves were unconstitutional. The inmate had testified that her head
was slammed down on the floor, her hair was pulled, and that an officer sprayed mace on her face
and eyes. She claimed that she sustained injuries from the incident, including bruising and
lacerations on her arms, a broken thumb, and two black eyes. The inmate admitted that after the
incident an officer gave her a cold towel and she was taken to the shower. (Jasper County
Detention Center)
altercation with corrections officers brought a § 1983 action, alleging violation of his Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendants. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court found that the officers’
use of force against the prisoner was reasonable. The prisoner pushed and punched one officer in
response to an attempt to restrain him and examine his earring to determine whether the earring
violated the prison rules. The prisoner continued to assault the officers even after he was
restrained. The court noted that the injuries suffered by the officers were much more serious than
any suffered by the prisoner, and the prisoner was criminally prosecuted and convicted as a result
of his conduct during the altercation. (Jefferson City Correctional Center, Missouri)

48.66
XX

U.S. Appeals Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Serna v. Colorado Dept. of Corrections, 455 F.3d 1146 (10th Cir. 2006). A prisoner brought
excessive force and inadequate medical care claims against various officers and officials. A state
prison director moved for summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity. The district
court denied summary judgment and director appealed. The court of appeals reversed and
remanded. The court held that: (1) the director’s authorizing the use of a special team was not
personal involvement that could form the basis for supervisory liability; (2) the director’s receipt of
periodic reports about the team’s progress was not direct participation that could give rise to
liability; (3) the director’s conduct did not constitute failure to supervise; and (4) the director was
not deliberately indifferent to the rights of inmates. The director had, at a warden’s request,
authorized a special team to conduct cell invasions to find a loaded gun. (Colorado Territorial
Corrections Facility)

U.S. District Court
CHEMICAL AGENTS
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Thomas v. Walton, 461 F.Supp.2d 786 (S.D.Ill. 2006). A state prisoner brought civil rights claims

U.S. Appeals Court
RESTRAINTS

Tibbs v. City of Chicago, 469 F.3d 661 (7th Cir. 2006). An arrestee brought § 1983 action against
an arresting officer and city, alleging Fourth Amendment violations. The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of the defendants, and the arrestee appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The court held that a police officer acted reasonably, and thus, did not violate the
arrestee's Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizure, when he made an arrest on an
outstanding traffic warrant. The court held that the police officer did not use an unreasonable
amount of force, in violation of the Fourth Amendment, by putting tight handcuffs on the arrestee
and leaving them on for approximately 30 minutes until the arrestee was taken to a lockup at a
police station. The arrestee complained only once to the officer that the handcuffs were too tight,
he offered the officer no indication of the degree of pain caused by the handcuffs, he suffered
minimal, if any, injury, other than redness on his wrists for less than two days, and he sought no
medical care for any wrist injury. The arrestee was held in custody for two days. About twenty to
twenty-five minutes after arriving at the station, the arrestee was taken to a lockup where his
handcuffs were removed. (City of Chicago, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE
PEPPER SPRAY

U.S. v. Gonzales, 436 F.3d 560 (5th Cir. 2006). Following a jury trial, deportation officers were

U.S. Appeals Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE
CELL EXTRACTION

Valdes v. Crosby, 450 F.3d 1231 (11th Cir. 2006). The estate of a death-row inmate who died in

against correctional officials, alleging use of excessive force, deliberate indifference to medical
needs, and retaliation in violation of his First Amendment rights. The defendants’ motion for
partial summary judgment was granted in part and denied in part. The district court held that a
one-day delay in providing access to a mental health professional following the prisoner’s suicide
attempt did not involve deliberate indifference and that a 10-day delay in providing medical
attention was not deliberate indifference. The court found that the prisoner’s repeated refusal to
comply with an order to submit to a strip search during a cell inspection justified spraying him
with the chemical agent. The court found that the spraying did not involve the use of excessive
force, where the chemical was not used in a quantity greater than necessary to subdue the
prisoner, secure his compliance with the order, and assure the safety of the officers. The court
noted that the prisoner was being held in segregation in a maximum security prison and had a
history of assaults on correctional officers. (Tamms Correctional Center, Illinois)

convicted of deprivation of civil rights and one defendant appealed. The appeals court held that
evidence was sufficient to support a finding that the defendant willfully sprayed a detainee, who
had a broken neck, with pepper spray and that the use of pepper spray resulted in bodily injury.
The court noted that a detention officer testified that while the defendant was carrying the
detainee to the bus, he said “Let's Mace the fucker and see if he budges” and two other detention
officers remembered a similar statement, and when the defendant exited the bus, he was coughing,
smirking sarcastically, and claiming that there had been an “accidental discharge.” After the
pepper spray was used, the detainee's mouth was foaming, he complained of stinging pain, and his
eyes were swollen shut for at least three hours. The court found that the force that caused this
pain and that the pepper spray was applied when the detainee was paralyzed, handcuffed, and
lying on the floor of the bus. The detainee made his injury known to the defendant, screaming
“they broke me...” and in response to his pleas the officers taunted him and invited people to wipe
their feet on him. Two of the defendants dragged his limp body from a house to the van, dragged
him off the van onto a bus, and witnessed his reaction to being pepper sprayed. According to the
court, by moving the detainee without stabilizing him, the officers exposed him to a risk of harm.
The detainee was left alone on the bus floor, handcuffed, eyes swollen shut, and foaming at the
mouth, despite the officers’ training that, due to the risk of potentially fatal asphyxiation, those
who had been pepper sprayed should be continually monitored and placed upright, never in a
prone position. (San Antonio Division of the Immigration and Naturalization Service [INS] and
Brazos County Jail, Texas)
prison after an alleged beating by prison guards brought § 1983 and state law actions against
prison officials and prison nurses, alleging Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment violations. The
inmate’s estate alleged that several guards beat the inmate during a cell extraction, and that the
inmate did not resist or act aggressively and no weapons were visible in his cell. The inmate was
on death row for having killed a guard at another facility during an escape attempt. Evidence

48.67
XX

indicated that the inmate’s death was not due to injuries sustained repeatedly throwing himself off
the bunk onto the concrete floor, as the officers reported, but was due to a massive physical beating
that occurred within five to ten minutes of his death. The district court granted the defendants’
motions for summary judgment in part and denied in part. A former warden appealed. The appeals
court affirmed. The court held that the plaintiff sufficiently stated a claim that prison guards beat
the inmate and that the plaintiff created triable issues as to: (1) whether the prison had a history
of widespread abuse of the inmates; (2) whether the warden established customs and policies that
resulted in deliberate indifference to constitutional violations; and (3) whether the warden failed to
take reasonable measures to correct the alleged deprivations. The court noted that, at the time of
the inmate’s death, it was clearly established that a warden could face liability under § 1983 when,
faced with a history of widespread abuse, he failed to take reasonable steps or he adopted policies
or customs that resulted in deliberate indifference. Evidence showed that the prison had a
notorious reputation for inmate abuse, the warden’s predecessor warned him about abusive
guards, yet the warden promoted one such guard and had him work on the wing where inmates
with the most serious disciplinary problems were housed. Evidence also showed that the warden
discontinued the practice of videotaping guards extracting prisoners from cells, and that the
warden did not read the inmates’ abuse of force complaints, but gave them to his secretary to
handle. The court found that the warden was on notice of the need to correct or to stop the abuse
by the officers. (Florida State Prison)
U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE
RESTRAINTS

Ziemba v. Armstrong, 433 F.Supp.2d 248 (D.Conn. 2006). A prison inmate sued a correctional
officer under § 1983, seeking actual damages of $100,000 and punitive damages of $150,000, for
injuries incurred when excessive force was used to place the inmate in a four-point restraint. A
jury returned a verdict against one officer, who moved for judgment as matter of law and a new
trial. The district court denied the motions, finding that the officer was not entitled to qualified
immunity and that the jury could find that the officer had the requisite state of mind when he
attacked the inmate. The court found that compensatory damages did not shock the conscience and
that punitive damages of $150,000 were warranted. The jury found that the officer hit the inmate
in the face, knelt on him and otherwise inflicted pain in the course of securing the inmate in a fourpoint restraint, where he remained for 22 hours. The court noted that the officer engaged in
reprehensible conduct by hitting the inmate after the inmate was secured, and that punitive
damages were only 50% higher than compensatory damages. (Connecticut Department of
Corrections)
2007

U.S. District Court
STUN BELT

Adams v. Bradshaw, 484 F.Supp.2d 753 (N.D.Ohio 2007). After his convictions for aggravated
murder and other offenses were affirmed, an offender sought a writ of habeas corpus. The district
court held that, even if a due process violation occurred, the improper use of a stun belt placed on
the defendant his during trial was a harmless error because the evidence of guilt was
overwhelming. The court noted that due process prohibits the use of shackles on a defendant
during a criminal trial, unless there exists an essential state interest, such as the interest in
courtroom security. (Trumbell County, Ohio)

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Allaway v. McGinnis, 473 F.Supp.2d 378 (W.D.N.Y. 2007). A state inmate brought a pro se § 1983

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Allen v. City of New York, 480 F.Supp.2d 689 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). A prison inmate sued a city and
corrections officers, claiming violation of the Eighth Amendment, false arrest, and malicious
prosecution arising from a beating administered by the officers while being escorted to his cell. The
district court granted summary judgment for the defendants in part, and denied in part. The court
held that summary judgment was precluded by fact issues regarding whether officers
accompanying inmate could and should have intervened to keep one officer from banging the
inmate's head against a wall, whether the officer who allegedly banged the inmate's head against a
wall used excessive force, whether an officer who filed a criminal assault complaint against the
inmate committed malicious prosecution, and whether that officer was entitled to qualified
immunity. (Rikers Island, New York City Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Clarke v. Blais, 473 F.Supp.2d 124 (D.Me. 2007). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action
against jail officers, alleging they subjected him to excessive force, and against a physician’s
assistant for allegedly failing to give him proper treatment for his physical and mental health
issues. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in
part and denied in part. The court held that questions as to whether jail officers used excessive

action against employees of the New York Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) alleging
inadequate medical care and use of excessive force. The employees moved for summary judgment.
The district court granted the motion. The court held that the inmate’s refusal to come out of his
exercise pen necessitated the use of some force, the force was used only when the inmate ignored
repeated pleas to come out, and when the door was opened he not only resisted the officers but
charged toward them, and the four punches delivered by an officer did not rise to level of
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. (Southport Correctional Facility, New York)

48.68
XX

force in restraining the detainee and whether qualified immunity was available as a defense precluded summary
judgment in the detainee’s § 1983 action. (Knox County Jail, Maine)
U.S. Appeals Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Cockrell v. Sparks, 510 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2007). An inmate who was injured when he was shoved by a deputy while
incarcerated in a county jail, brought a § 1983 action against a sheriff and deputy, alleging that the use of excessive
force violated his civil rights. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants and the inmate appealed.
The appeals court affirmed. The court held that a deputy's open-handed push of the inmate, who was drunk and creating
a disturbance, in an effort to quiet him so that the deputy could relocate a different prisoner who had attempted suicide,
was not so egregious that it shocked the conscience, even though it resulted in the inmate falling, breaking his hip and
wrist, and lacerating his ear. (Polk County Jail, Georgia)

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Collins v. Kearney, 495 F.Supp.2d 466 (D.Del. 2007). A state prisoner brought a civil rights action under § 1983
against a prison warden, sergeant, corrections officers, nurse, and a physician, alleging claims for excessive force,
assault and battery, and deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. The district court granted summary judgment
for the defendants in part, and denied in part. The district held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues
of material fact as to whether the prisoner lunged toward a corrections officer, whether the amount of force used by
officers was reasonably related to the need, and whether corrections officers' use of force against prisoner was applied
in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the purpose of causing harm.
The court also held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a sergeant
failed to protect the prisoner when the prisoner was allegedly attacked by other corrections officers. (Sussex
Correctional Institute, Delaware)

U.S. District Court
PEPPER SPRAY

Danley v. Allyn, 485 F.Supp.2d 1260 (N.D.Ala. 2007). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against jail officers,
alleging that he was subjected to excessive force and then denied medical treatment when they sprayed him with pepper
spray. The district court denied the defendants' motions to dismiss and they appealed. The court of appeals vacated and
remanded. On the remand, the district court again denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court held that the
officers were not entitled to qualified immunity from the detainee's claim that the officers subjected him to excessive
force, in violation of Fourteenth Amendment, by pepper spraying him in response to a dispute over toilet paper. The
court noted that the officers had fair warning that to employ pepper spray as punishment, or for the sadistic pleasure of
the sprayers, as distinguished from what was reasonably necessary to maintain prisoner control, was constitutionally
prohibited. The court found that the detainee' allegations that a jail administrator and sheriff created an atmosphere or
practice under which the defendant officers operated in allegedly subjecting the detainee to excessive force and then
denying him medical treatment when they sprayed him with pepper spray, were sufficient, if proven, to create
supervisory liability under § 1983. (Lauderdale Detention Center, Alabama)

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE
PEPPER SPRAY

Giles v. Kearney, 516 F.Supp.2d 362 (D.Del.2007). An inmate sued prison officials under § 1983, alleging
constitutional violations arising from an alleged use of excessive force at a correctional institution. The district court
entered judgment for the defendants. The court held that the incidents in which pepper spray was used against the
inmate did not constitute excessive force. According to the court, a corrections officer's use of pepper spray against the
inmate was justified in response to the inmate's defiant and argumentative behavior, as well as his repeated refusals to
obey orders. Noting that the officer was alone in a shower facility as the inmate continued to yell and defy orders, the
court concluded that the officer's use of pepper spray to calm the increasingly volatile situation and prevent injury was
a measured and reasonable response. The court also found that the physical force used by the corrections officer after
the inmate struck the officer following the officer's use of pepper spray was not excessive considering the evolving
series of events. The officer sat on top of the inmate's back, trying to control the inmate as well as the unfolding
situation, and the court concluded that the force he used was not maliciously or sadistically applied to cause pain. The
court found that there was no deliberate indifference to the inmate's medical needs following incidents in which he was
sprayed with pepper spray. The court noted that the inmate received medical care and assessment following each of the
events at issue and there was no evidence that defendants obstructed, neglected or prevented him from receiving care or
ignored his requests for medication or medical treatment. (Sussex Correctional Institution, Delaware)

U.S. Appeals Court
RESTRAINTS

Hydrick v. Hunter, 500 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2007). Sexual offenders who were civilly confined in a state psychiatric
hospital under California's Sexually Violent Predators Act (SVP) filed a class action against various state officials
under § 1983, challenging the conditions of their confinement. The district court denied the defendants' motion to
dismiss, and the defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held that the
First Amendment claims brought against state hospital officials were based on clearly established law for qualified
immunity purposes insofar as they challenged retaliation for filing lawsuits, however, officials had qualified immunity
to the extent that the plaintiffs' claim relied on a First Amendment right not to participate in treatment sessions. The
court found that the plaintiffs stated a § 1983 claim for violations of their Fourth Amendment rights to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures. The court concluded that hospital officials were entitled to qualified immunity with
regard to procedural due process claims, but not substantive due process claims. The offenders alleged that they were
subjected to public strip searches, to retaliatory searches of their possessions and to arbitrary seizure of their personal
belongings, that they were placed in shackles during transport to the hospital and during visits from family and friends,
that they were subjected to restraint even if they did not pose any physical risk, and that they were force-medicated. On
appeal to the United States Supreme Court (129 S.Ct. 2431) the court vacated the decision. (Atascadero State Hospital,
California)

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Long v. Morris, 485 F.Supp.2d 1247 (D.Kan. 2007). An inmate brought a pro se suit against a sheriff's deputy, alleging
that by using excessive force the deputy violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment. The district court held that the deputy was not entitled to qualified immunity. The court held that
the law was clearly established that the alleged actions of the deputy violated the inmate's rights under the Eighth

48.69
XXII

Amendment, such that the deputy was not entitled to qualified immunity on the inmate's excessive force claim.
According to the court, the record supported an inference that while the inmate was shackled at the wrists, waist and
ankles, the deputy took him to the ground, hit his head on the floor hard enough to require stitches, and displaced his
collar bone. (Johnson County Adult Detention Center, Kansas)
U.S. Appeals Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Marvin v. City of Taylor, 509 F.3d 234 (6th Cir. 2007). An arrestee brought an action against police officers under §
1983 and state law alleging excessive force. The district court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment
and they appealed. The appeals court reversed. The court held that even if an officer pushed the arrestee, who was
drunk, to the ground as he exited the police vehicle upon arrival at the police station, the officer did not use excessive
force. The court noted that the arrestee was on the ground outside of the vehicle for less than fifteen seconds, and as
soon as the arrestee ended up on the ground the officer closed the vehicle's door, joined another officer in helping
arrestee to his feet, and walked the arrestee inside to the booking room. The court found that the officers did not use
excessive force in the booking room when they moved the arrestee's arms behind him and over his head for less than
twenty seconds after the arrestee refused to keep his hands on a bench and struck out at an officer with closed-fist
swing. According to the court, the officers did not use excessive force outside of the cell in which they attempted to
place the arrestee when they restrained the arrestee on the floor for approximately thirty seconds after the arrestee fell.
(City of Taylor Police Department, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
STUN GUN

Montoya v. Board of County Com'rs, 506 F.Supp.2d 434 (D.Colo. 2007). A jail inmate brought civil rights and civil
rights conspiracy claims against sheriffs, a deputy sheriff, and officials of two counties alleging violation of his
constitutional rights when he was tasered by a correctional officer and later transferred and placed in segregation in
alleged retaliation for complaining to the press about the tasering incident. The defendants moved for summary
judgment and the district court granted the motion. The court held that a civil rights claim was not stated against
counties and sheriffs in their official capacities for the inmate's transfer and placement in segregated confinement in
alleged retaliation for his complaints to press, given the inmate's complete failure to allege any specific facts suggesting
that segregation was the result of a custom or policy, rather than being simply a single act of deprivation disconnected
from any wider scheme. According to the court, the county sheriffs were entitled to qualified immunity on individual
capacity claims involving conspiracy to transfer and place jail inmate in protective, segregated confinement in
retaliation for the exercise of his First Amendment rights, absent any indication that the sheriffs, who never
communicated with each other about the transfer, were personally involved in the decision, exercised discretionary
control over the decision, or failed to supervise jail administrators who actually made the transfer. (Chaffee and Park
Counties, Colorado)

U.S. Appeals Court
RESTRAINTS

Norris v. Engles, 494 F.3d 634 (8th Cir. 2007). A county jail detainee, who had been diagnosed with manic bipolar
depression, sued a jail official under § 1983, alleging due process violations arising from his physical restraint. The
district court denied the official's motion for summary judgment based upon qualified immunity. The official appealed.
The appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that the official's alleged conduct of cuffing the detainee to a floorgrate toilet in an uncomfortable manner for approximately three hours, if proven, did not violate the detainee's
substantive due process rights. According to the court, the official’s alleged actions did not shock the conscience and
thus did not violate the detainee's substantive due process rights, inasmuch as official took such action after the
detainee, who had been diagnosed with manic bipolar depression, had threatened to pull out her own peripherally
inserted central catheter (PICC) so that she would bleed to death, and after the detainee had shown that having her
hands handcuffed behind her back was alone not an adequate form of restraint. (Independence County Jail, Arkansas)

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Stewart v. Beaufort County, 481 F.Supp.2d 483 (D.S.C. 2007). A pretrial detainee brought an action in state court
against a county, county sheriff's department, and deputy, alleging claims for assault and battery against the deputy,
gross negligence against the sheriff's department, and, pursuant to § 1983, violation of his constitutional rights.
Following removal to federal court, the defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court denied the motion.
The court held that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the deputy's use of force in transporting the
pretrial detainee to a detention center was excessive, precluding summary judgment for deputy on the basis of qualified
immunity. The court noted that, at the time of the alleged violation, a pretrial detainee's right to be free from excessive
force was clearly established. (Beaufort County Detention Center, South Carolina)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

U.S. v. Miller, 477 F.3d 644 (8th Cir. 2007). A supervisor at a county detention center was convicted in the district
court of depriving two prisoners of their Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. The
supervisor appealed and the appeals court affirmed. The court held that there was sufficient evidence that the supervisor
acted maliciously and sadistically toward the prisoner, in violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment, even though the supervisor could have inflicted even greater injuries upon the prisoner.
Evidence indicated that the supervisor punched the prisoner when there was no legitimate reason to do so, kicked the
prisoner, and stomped on the prisoner while he was lying on the ground. The court noted that the assailing officer's
ability to inflict greater injuries upon a prisoner does not make an attack any less malicious or sadistic, for the purposes
of the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The court held that the prisoner's medical
records, which did not identify the supervisor as the individual responsible for the prisoner's injuries, were admissible
under the medical treatment or diagnosis exception to the hearsay records. (Craighead County Det. Facility, Arkansas)

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Vasquez v. Raemisch, 480 F.Supp.2d 1120 (W.D.Wis. 2007). A prisoner sought leave to proceed under the in forma
pauperis statute in a proposed civil rights action for declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief brought against prison
officials and corrections officers. The district court held that, with respect to three body cavity search incidents, the
prisoner would be permitted proceed with his Eighth Amendment excessive force claims against each correctional
officer who he alleged was either directly involved in the use of force or was present and either encouraged or failed to
stop it. The prisoner alleged that there was no need for force in connection with the first search, that his constitutional
rights were violated in connection with the second search when several officers, who lacked legitimate security reasons

48.70
XXII

for conducting a manual body cavity search, made contact with his genitals while conducting a strip search as a means
of obtaining sexual gratification or humiliating him, and other officers who were present failed to intervene, and that,
with respect to the third search, an officer used a taser against the prisoner when he posed no threat. (Wisconsin)
2008
U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Adams v. Bouchard, 591 F.Supp.2d 1191 (W.D.Okla. 2008). A jail inmate brought a § 1983 action against sheriff's
deputies and a sheriff, alleging the deputies assaulted him, used excessive force, and that the sheriff failed to properly
supervise the deputies. The defendants moved for summary judgment and qualified immunity. The district court
granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues
of material fact as to whether the inmate properly exhausted administrative remedies prior to bringing the federal
action. The court found that the inmate's efforts towards exhausting his § 1983 excessive force claim against sheriff's
deputies were insufficient to satisfy the exhaustion requirement under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) as to
his claim that the sheriff failed to supervise the deputies. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by
genuine issues of material fact as to whether the force used by the sheriff's deputies against the inmate was necessary.
According to the court, the sheriff's deputies were not entitled to qualified immunity from the inmate's Eighth
Amendment excessive force claim because it was clearly established at the time of the alleged excessive force that
prison officials could not maliciously and sadistically inflict injury for the very purpose of causing harm. (Oklahoma
County Detention Center, Oklahoma)

U.S. District Court
DEADLY FORCE
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Alvarado v. Battaglia, 539 F.Supp.2d 1022 (N.D.Ill. 2008). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a warden
and corrections officers arising from an alleged incident in which an officer discharged a firearm in the direction of the
prisoner and other inmates from a guard tower that overlooked the inmates' recreation yard. The district court held that
the prisoner stated an excessive force claim against the officer who allegedly discharged the firearm but failed to state a
claim against the warden. According to the court, the prisoner's allegations that the corrections officer discharged a
firearm in the direction of the prisoner and other inmates in response to the inmates' banter were sufficient to state an
excessive force claim, so as to overcome the officer's qualified immunity defense. The court found that the prisoner's
allegations that prison officials knew that the corrections officer who allegedly discharged the firearm was mentally
unstable, yet allowed her to continue working, were insufficient to establish that the warden acted with deliberate
indifference, as required for the warden to be held liable under § 1983 for the officer's actions. (Stateville Correctional
Center, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Anglin v. City of Aspen, 562 F.Supp.2d 1304 (D.Colo. 2008). A jail inmate brought a civil rights action under § 1983
against a city, former and current police officers, and a police chief, alleging that the defendants violated her rights to
due process and free speech, as well as her right to be free from unreasonable seizure, by forcibly injecting her with
antipsychotic medication while she was in custody at a county jail. The district court granted summary judgment for the
defendants. The court held that officers did not deprive the inmate of due process by restraining her while paramedics
forcibly sedated her and that the officers' act of restraining the inmate while she was sedated did not amount to
excessive use of force. The court found that the police chief was not liable for failure to train and/or supervise officers,
where the training reflected the sound conclusion that medical professionals, rather than law enforcement personnel,
were the individuals most qualified to determine whether sedation was appropriate. According to the court, absent a
policy of sedating detainees, the city was not municipally liable under § 1983. The court held that the officers’ act of
restraining the inmate while paramedics forcibly administered antipsychotic medication to her was not substantially
motivated as a response to her exercise of allegedly constitutionally protected conduct, as would support the inmate's
First Amendment free speech retaliation claim against the officers, where the physician, not the officers, had legal
authorization to decide whether an emergency existed that justified the inmate's forced sedation, and the officers did
not participate in making the decision to forcibly sedate the inmate. (City of Aspen, Colorado)

U.S. District Court
RESTRAINING
CHAIR
RESTRAINTS

Antoine v. County of Sacramento, 566 F.Supp.2d 1045 (E.D.Cal. 2008). A pretrial detainee brought a civil rights action
against corrections officers based upon the officers' use of a “grating” restraint practice. After a jury verdict in favor of
the detainees, the officers moved for a new trial. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The
court held that it was proper to permit an expert witness to express his opinions regarding the propriety of the “grating”
practice in the context of whether the officers' decision to employ that practice rather than the “prostraint” restraining
chair was appropriate. The court found that the detainee's attorneys' argument that the detainee was “hogtied” by the
defendant corrections officers did not constitute misconduct warranting a new trial, where testimony indicated that the
detainee's feet were shackled together and his hands were shackled together behind his back, but that his feet were not
shackled to his hands. (Sacramento County, California)

U.S. District Court
CELL EXTRACTION
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Burns v. Trombly, 624 F.Supp.2d 185 (N.D.N.Y. 2008). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against prison
employees, alleging that his constitutional rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments were violated when the
employees used excessive force during an attempt to move him to a different prison cell, and when they were
deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs arising from that use of excessive force. The employees moved for
partial summary judgment and the district court granted the motion. The court held that the assertion in the prisoner's
complaint was insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact with regard to an employee's personal involvement
in the alleged use of excessive force. According to the court, the prison employee who videotaped the alleged use of
excessive force was not deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's serious medical needs arising from that incident, where
the prisoner did not explain to the employee why he needed to go to the medical clinic, the employee did not hear the
prisoner's request, and the employee did not witness any alleged loss of consciousness or facial swelling while standing
outside the prisoner's cell door. The court held that the state prisoner's letter complaining to a superintendent was too
brief to place prison employees on notice that any constitutional violation had actually occurred, and thus was
insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact with regard to the employees' personal involvement in the alleged
use of excessive force and deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs arising from that use of excessive force.
(Upstate Correctional Facility, New York)

48.71
XXII

U.S. Appeals Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE
PEPPER SPRAY

Danley v. Allen, 540 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2008). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against jailers, alleging that
he was subjected to excessive force and then denied medical treatment when they sprayed him with pepper spray. The
district court entered orders denying the defendants' motions to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds, and the
defendants appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. On remand, the district court again denied the motion to
dismiss, and defendants again appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the use of pepper spray to
subdue the unruly detainee who had twice ignored a jailer's instructions for him to return to his cell did not itself
represent the application of excessive force in violation of the detainee's Fourteenth Amendment rights. But the court
found that allegations in the detainee's complaint, regarding his subsequent confinement without being allowed to
properly clean himself and remove pepper spray from his clothing, in a small, poorly-ventilated cell, were sufficient to
state an excessive force claim. According to the court, the entire incident, consisting of both the initial pepper-spraying
and the detainee’s subsequent confinement in a small, poorly-ventilated cell, could be treated as a single alleged
incident of use of excessive force. The court noted that the detainee’s eyes nearly swelled shut, he had difficulty
breathing, and he nearly passed out, while jail officials allegedly failed to take any, and then only inadequate, steps to
alleviate his suffering but instead mocked and ridiculed him. The court found that the alleged mocking of the detainee
while he suffered, by jailers who parodied his choking, was circumstantial evidence of their malicious intent. The court
found that the allegations were sufficient to state a claim for officials' deliberate indifference to the detainee’s serious
medical needs. The court determined that the jailers were not entitled to qualified immunity on the detainee's deliberate
indifference claim and that the detainee stated a claim against the sheriff and the jail administrator to hold them
personally liable under § 1983 for alleged excessive force and deliberate indifference by the jailers. The detainee was
allegedly diagnosed with chemical conjunctivitis and bronchospasms as the result of the delay in treatment. The court
noted that this, along with the fact that another prisoner allegedly recognized the detainee's distress and was ultimately
successful in obtaining a brief shower for him, was sufficient to show the seriousness of his medical need. (Lauderdale
County Detention Center, Alabama)

U.S. District Court
RESTRAINTS

Davis v. Peters, 566 F.Supp.2d 790 (N.D.Ill. 2008). A detainee who was civilly committed pursuant to the Sexually
Violent Persons Commitment Act sued the current and former facility directors of the Illinois Department of Human
Services' (DHS) Treatment and Detention Facility (TDF), where the detainee was housed, as well as two former DHS
Secretaries, and the current DHS Secretary. The detainee claimed that the conditions of his confinement violated his
constitutional rights to equal protection and substantive due process. After a bench trial, the district court held that: (1)
the practice of searching the detainee prior to his visits with guests and attorneys violated his substantive due process
rights; (2) the practice of using a “black-box” restraint system on all of the detainee's trips to and from court over a 15month period violated his substantive due process rights; (3) requiring the detainee to sleep in a room illuminated by a
night light did not violate the detainee's substantive due process rights; (4) a former director was not protected by
qualified immunity from liability for the constitutional violations; and (5) the detainee would be awarded compensatory
damages in the amount of $30 for each hour he wore the black box in violation of his rights. The court found that a 21day lockdown following an attempt at organized resistance by a large number of detainees at the facility, shortly after
the breakout of several incidents of violence, was not outside the bounds of professional judgment for the purposes of a
substantive due process claim asserted by the detainee. (Treatment and Detention Facility, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Estate of Harvey ex rel. Dent v. Roanoke City Sheriff's Office, 585 F.Supp.2d 844 (W.D.Va. 2008). The administrator
of a pretrial detainee's estate brought a civil rights action under §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986 and Virginia law, against a
city sheriff's department, sheriff, deputies, and prison health providers, alleging excessive use of force, failure to train,
assault, battery, conspiracy, breach of a non-delegable fiduciary duty, intentional infliction of emotional distress and
wrongful death. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motions. The court found
that the city sheriff's deputies did not act with deliberate indifference when, in an attempt to transfer the detainee to a
hospital for treatment, they forcibly removed the detainee from his cell, placed him face down on a stretcher, and
covered him with a blanket to stop him from spitting and throwing feces at the deputies. According to the court, there
was no evidence that the deputies knew that the detainee suffered from an excited delirium or serious heart condition.
The court noted that the detainee was naked, slick with feces and urine, spitting, yelling, being combative, threatening
to throw more bodily fluids, trying to bite, and was HIV and Hepatitis C positive. (Roanoke City Jail, Virginia)

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE
PEPPER SPRAY

Fields v. Roswarski, 572 F.Supp.2d 1015 (N.D.Ind. 2008). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action against city police
officers, alleging they used excessive force when arresting him, and against custody officers at a county jail, alleging
they used excessive force by unnecessarily spraying the inmate with pepper spray for an unreasonable period of time.
The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, finding that the inmate failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies. According to the court, the inmate failed to comply with the requirement, under the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), of exhausting his administrative remedies before bringing a § 1983 action, because
after denial of his belated grievance, he failed to appeal from the denial of the grievance, and the jail's grievance policy
would have allowed such an appeal. (Tippecanoe County Jail, Indiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE
RESTRAINTS

Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567 (6th Cir. 2008). A state prisoner, proceeding pro se, brought §§ 1981 and 1983 actions
against prison officials, alleging violations of his right to due process, right to equal protection, and Eighth Amendment
rights. The district court dismissed the action and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed
in part. The court held that the prisoner had no due process liberty interest in freedom from use of four-point restraints
or in having a prison nurse arrive before corrections officers placed the prisoner in the restraints. According to the
court, such restraints were expected adverse consequences of confinement, the prisoner had been accused of hitting a
corrections officer, and officers entered the prisoner's cell to conduct an investigation. (Kentucky State Penitentiary)

U.S. District Court
CELL EXTRACTION
EXCESSIVE FORCE
PEPPER SPRAY

Hart v. Celaya, 548 F.Supp.2d 789 (N.D.Cal. 2008). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against corrections
officers, alleging excessive force and deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The district court granted
summary judgment for the defendants. The court held that the officers did not use excessive force in releasing pepperspray into the prisoner's holding cell after he refused to submit to an unclothed body search. The court noted that the
officer released pepper-spray into the cell only after the prisoner refused to comply with the direct orders of three

48.72
XXII

different officers of increasingly higher rank to submit to the search, after the officer explained to the prisoner that all
inmates entering administrative segregation were required to submit to an unclothed body search, after the prisoner
began yelling and pushing up against his cell door causing it to shake and rattle, and after the officers were concerned
that the prisoner would either harm himself or break out of his cell and endanger others. The court found that the officer
did not use excessive force in requiring the prisoner to lift his genitals during an unclothed body search, even though
the prisoner had pepper spray on his hands. The court held that officers did not use excessive force in violation of the
Eighth Amendment when they allegedly attempted to trip the prisoner, pushed him into the frame of a holding cell
door, and twisted and pulled his wrists as they put him in leg restraints in order to move the prisoner from the cell to an
outside area where he could be decontaminated from the officer's use of pepper-spray. The court noted that the
prisoner's medical evaluations, prior to and after the incident indicated that the prisoner did not sustain any injuries,
such as cuts, abrasions, swelling or bruises. The court found that the prisoner did not suffer from a “serious medical
need” within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment when he was pepper-sprayed in his cell, allegedly roughly handled
by corrections officers as they took him to an outside area for decontamination and required him to kneel on a concrete
surface for approximately 45 minutes during decontamination. After decontamination the prisoner was examined by a
medical technician who listed no evidence of injury and documented the prisoner's decontamination from pepper-spray.
A physician's subsequent examination found no long-term or lasting skin, knee, shoulder or pepper-spray related
injuries. (Salinas Valley State Prison, California)
U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Hurt v. Birkett, 566 F.Supp.2d 620 (E.D.Mich. 2008). A state inmate brought an action against prison employees under
§ 1983, alleging conspiracy, racial discrimination, retaliation, deliberate indifference, excessive force, and failure to
report in connection with an incident in which the inmate's arm was broken. The district court dismissed the action. The
court held that the inmate’s allegations, that state prison employees engaged in a campaign of harassment based on
race, failed to state an equal protection claim. The court noted that a single allegation was insufficient to raise the
inmate's right to relief above the speculative level. The court found that the inmate's allegations that prison employees
conspired to deny him medical care after his arm was broken, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, failed to state a
claim of conspiracy against the employees, absent details and allegations of specific acts made in furtherance of such
conspiracy. The court held that prison employees were not liable for excessive force for breaking the inmate's arm,
where a video of the incident in which the inmate's arm was broken showed the inmate starting an altercation and
needing to be subdued, and it was clear that the force applied by the employees was applied in a good-faith effort to
restore discipline. (Marquette Branch Prison, Michigan)

U.S. Appeals Court
CELL EXTRACTION
EXCESSIVE FORCE
PEPPER SPRAY

Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225 (4th Cir. 2008). The estate and family of a deceased inmate brought a § 1983 survival and
wrongful death action against correctional officers, alleging violations of the inmate's Eighth Amendment rights. The
district court granted, in part, the officers' motion for summary judgment. The officers appealed. The appeals court
affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held that an officer violated the deceased inmate's Eighth Amendment
right to be free from excessive force, arising from the inmate's death after his extraction from his cell involving the use
of pepper spray, and thus the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity on § 1983 claims. The court found there
was no question that some dispersal of pepper spray was warranted in carrying out the extraction. But the officer’s final
burst of pepper spray was deployed after the inmate had laid down on the floor, and the officer and members of the
extraction team never changed the inmate's clothing or removed the spit mask covering his nose and mouth and never
secured medical treatment for the inmate. Although the inmate proffered his hands through the door pursuant to the
officer's order, albeit in front of rather than behind him, the officer deployed several additional bursts of pepper spray
even after the inmate attempted to comply with the order, and the inmate never reacted violently. The court held that
correction officers were deliberately indifferent to the medical needs of the deceased inmate in violation of the inmate's
Eighth Amendment right to adequate medical care, and thus were not entitled to qualified immunity on § 1983 claim
brought by the inmate's estate and family. According to the court, the officers' training required decontamination after
the use of pepper spray, the state's medical examiner credited pepper spray as contributing to the inmate's death, a lay
person would have inferred from the inmate's collapse that he was in need of medical attention, the officers witnessed
the inmate's collapse, caught him, and directed him into a wheelchair, and yet the inmate received no medical
treatment. The officers argued that the inmate did not appear fazed by the pepper spray and that the inmate's
opportunity to breathe fresh air while he was wheeled from the medical room was an adequate alternative to receiving
actual medical care. (Western Correctional Institution, Maryland)

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Jean-Laurent v. Wilkinson, 540 F.Supp.2d 501 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). A prisoner in a state correctional facility brought a
civil rights action against officers and supervisors claiming violation of his rights under the First, Fourth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants in part and denied in part.
The court held that striking the prisoner in the face several times while he was standing naked in a stairwell surrounded
by several officers, absent any indication that the prisoner posed a threat, was not within the corrections officer's
asserted good-faith effort to maintain order, discipline, and security due to a stabbing that recently had occurred within
the prison. The court found that the objective condition for a Fourteenth Amendment excessive force civil rights claim
was satisfied where the corrections officer, without reason or provocation, struck the prisoner several times across his
face, causing swelling on the left side of his face, a cut to the inside of his mouth, his ear to bleed, and a hearing
impairment. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a fact issue as to whether the prisoner was under
constant supervision by corrections officers and to what proximity he was to other inmates so as to determine whether
he could have acquired contraband. The court also found summary judgment was precluded by a fact issue as to
whether senior corrections officers were grossly negligent in supervising a junior officer who allegedly violated the
prisoner's Fourth Amendment rights through a strip search, and as to whether the Fourth Amendment rights of the
prisoner were violated during a second strip search and alleged use of excessive force. (George Motchan Detention
Center, New York City Department of Correction)

48.73
XXII

U.S. District Court
CELL EXTRACTION
USE OF FORCE

Johnston v. Maha, 584 F.Supp.2d 612 (W.D.N.Y. 2008). A pretrial detainee brought an action against employees of a
county jail, alleging violations of his constitutional rights under § 1983 and violations of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA). The defendants moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the motion. The
court held that the inmate failed to exhaust administrative remedies for the purposes of the Prison Litigation Reform
Act (PLRA) as to some of his § 1983 and Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) claims against employees of the
county jail, where the inmate either did not pursue appeals at all, or did not pursue appeals to the final step. According
to the court, evidence was insufficient to show that the inmate was injured, or that whatever force was used by
correctional officers, who removed the inmate from his cell during his transfer to segregation, was more than necessary,
as would have supported the inmate's § 1983 claim for alleged violation of his rights under the Eighth Amendment. The
court held that evidence was insufficient to show that medical staff at the county jail acted with deliberate indifferent to
the inmate's medical needs as to requested dental care, as required to support his § 1983 claim for violation of the
Eighth Amendment. The court noted that although the inmate had to wait two months to see a dentist, the dentist filled
the inmate's cavities and took x-rays related to that treatment. (Genesee County Jail, New York)

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE
RESTRAINTS

Jones v. Taylor, 534 F.Supp.2d 475 (D.Del. 2008). A state prisoner brought a civil rights action alleging that a
corrections officer used excessive force against him, another officer did not protect him, and a former commissioner
and a former warden did not properly train and supervise officers in dealing with prisoners. The district court granted
the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court held that the supervisors were not the driving force behind
the alleged use of excessive force by the corrections officer and were not deliberately indifferent to the plight of the
state prisoner. The court denied the prisoner’s claim for improper training, noting that the officer received training prior
to his employment and that he attened annual refresher courses. The court noted that the officer had never been
disciplined. The court held that the officer did not use excessive force against the prisoner, where the officer, alone in a
small space with the prisoner who was not handcuffed, perceived a threat from the prisoner, and used minimal force,
which included an A-frame chokehold. The court noted that the prisoner was handcuffed once he was under control,
received only minimal injury and never sought follow-up medical treatment after his initial visit with a nurse. The use
of force was investigated and approved by the officer's supervisor, and the prisoner was found guilty of disorderly and
threatening behavior with regard to the incident. (Sussex Correctional Institute, Delaware)

U.S. District Court
DISTURBANCE
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Kounelis v. Sherrer, 529 F.Supp.2d 503 (D.N.J. 2008). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action alleging that various prison
officers violated his Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The court held that the prison defendants
were under a duty to preserve the digital video recording of an altercation between the prisoner and prison staff, where
the surveillance footage was relevant, not only to the prisoner's § 1983 action against the prison, but also to the
prisoner's pending disciplinary proceeding. The court noted that the defendants were aware that a disciplinary hearing
was imminent following the disputed altercation, that the prisoner had made repeated requests for the production of the
evidence, and that the defendants should have been able to foresee the harm or prejudice that would have been caused
by the non-preservation of the evidence. The court found that spoliation of evidence sanctions were warranted against
the prison officials for their alleged failure to preserve the digital video recording. The court found that a genuine issue
of material fact existed as to whether prison officials' use of force against the prisoner during an altercation was in good
faith and in order to maintain discipline, precluding summary judgment in favor of the officials on the issue of whether
the use of force exerted by the officials upon prisoner during the altercation violated the Eighth Amendment. (Northern
State Prison, New Jersey)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Lockett v. Suardini, 526 F.3d 866 (6th Cir. 2008). A state prisoner sued two prison officers and two prison nurses,
alleging violations of his free speech and Eighth Amendment rights. The district court entered summary judgment for
the officers and nurses. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the prisoner's act of
calling a hearing officer a “foul and corrupted bitch” was not protected conduct. The court found that the prison officers
did not use excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment in restraining the prisoner after he insulted a hearing
officer, where the prisoner did not dispute that he was angered, bit an officer’s hand, and verbally threatened the
officers. The prisoner stated that the officers merely attempted to shove him down stairs and “almost” broke his glasses,
and the prisoner by his own account suffered at most “minor lacerations and cuts.” According to the court, the
prisoner's injuries from the altercation with the officers, consisting of minor cuts and lacerations, did not create an
objectively serious medical need, and any denial of medical treatment thus did not violate his Eighth Amendment
rights. (Alger Maximum Correctional Facility, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

McCall v. Crosthwait, 590 F.Supp.2d 1337 (M.D.Ala. 2008). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action against a police
officer and others, alleging that an officer used excessive force against him when he was in a municipal jail, in violation
of the Fourth Amendment. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part
and denied in part. The court held that the police officer's use of force against the arrestee and the injuries sustained by
the arrestee, allegedly arising out of the officer pushing the arrestee in the jail with such force that he fell into a steel
door and plexiglass window, was de minimis under the Fourth Amendment. According to the court, even if the officer
pushed the arrestee into a jail house door unprovoked, a hospital found no injuries after the jail incident aside from a
minor contusion to the arrestee's right elbow and shoulder. (Montgomery Municipal Jail, Alabama)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Moore ex rel. Estate of Grady v. Tuelja, 546 F.3d 423 (7th Cir. 2008). Administrators of an arrestee's estate filed a §
1983 action alleging that police officers and jail personnel deprived the arrestee of his rights under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments by using excessive force and denying him medical care. The district court entered judgment
on a jury verdict in the defendants' favor and denied the administrators' motions for judgment as a matter of law and for
a new trial. The administrators appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that there was sufficient evidence
to support the jury's findings. A physician had testified that the nature of the arrestee's injuries indicated that he had
most likely been beaten with a baton by jail personnel. But all medical experts agreed that the arrestee suffered from
advanced heart disease and died of a heart attack, the arrestee had been in two automobile accidents on the date of his
death and had suffered a hand laceration immediately after the second accident, and there was evidence that the

48.74
XXII

arrestee's wrist injuries occurred in an accident or while he was being transported to jail, and that his head injuries
occurred when he fell to the floor after a heart attack. (Chicago Police Department, Illinois)
U.S. District Court
CELL EXTRACTION
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Muhammad v. McCarrell, 536 F.3d 934 (8th Cir. 2008). An inmate filed a § 1983 suit against a state prison and
officers, asserting claims for battery and an Eighth Amendment violation for officers' allegedly using excessive force in
extracting the inmate from his cell, resulting in a powder-round wound to his leg that required surgery. After a jury
trial, the district court entered judgment in favor of the defendants. The inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed.
The court held that the jury's credibility determinations about the officers' motives were not reviewable. (Varner
Supermax Unit, Arkansas Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE
STUN GUN

Orem v. Rephann, 523 F.3d 442 (4th Cir. 2008). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action against a sheriff's deputy, alleging
use of excessive force during transport to jail. The district court denied the deputy’s motion for summary judgment on
qualified immunity grounds. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the deputy's repeated use of a taser on the
unruly arrestee qualified as wanton and sadistic and was not objectively reasonable, precluding qualified immunity.
The court noted that the excessive force claim asserted by the arrestee, who had not been formally charged but was
being transported to a jail at the time of the events giving rise to the claim, was analyzed under the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause, not under the Fourth Amendment. According to the court, the deputy first tased the
arrestee after she forcefully stated “fuck you” to the deputy, the deputy did not follow the sheriff's department's taser
policy requiring initial use of open-hand measures, the arrestee likely was not endangering herself as the deputy had
claimed, since she was handcuffed and in a hobbling device while locked in the back-seat cage of the squad car, and the
deputy used the taser under the arrestee's breast and on her inner thigh. (Eastern Regional Jail, West Virginia)

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE
STUN GUN

Parker v. Bladen County, 583 F.Supp.2d 736 (E.D.N.C. 2008). The administratrix of a detainee's estate brought a §
1983 action in state court against county defendants, alleging that they used excessive force when they used tasers on
her. The defendants removed the action to federal court. The county and sheriff's department moved to dismiss. The
district court granted the motion. According to the court, under North Carolina law, the sheriff, not the county
encompassing his jurisdiction, has final policymaking authority over hiring, supervising, and discharging personnel in
the sheriff's office. The court found that the sheriff's deputies' alleged use of excessive force in attempting to control the
detainee by use of tasers, and the sheriff's department's alleged failure to train and supervise its employees as to the use
of tasers, could not be attributed to the county, so as to subject it to § 1983 liability for the detainee's death. The court
held that the county sheriff's department lacked the legal capacity, under North Carolina law, to be sued under § 1983
liability for the detainee's death. (Bladen County Sheriff’s Department, North Carolina)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Pavey v. Conley, 528 F.3d 494 (7th Cir. 2008). A prisoner filed a § 1983 suit for damages, governed by the Prison
Litigation Reform Act, claiming officers broke his arm when using excessive force to remove him from his cell. The
court denied the officers' motion to reconsider a grant of the prisoner's jury demand on factual issues related to an
affirmative defense. The officers filed an interlocutory appeal. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court
held that the prisoner was not entitled by the Seventh Amendment to a jury trial, rather than a bench trial, on factual
issues relating to his affirmative defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The prisoner alleged that he
could not prepare a grievance as he was left-handed and his left arm was broken, and that he was transferred to another
prison before prison officials conducted a promised investigation, which would form the basis of his grievance.
(Indiana)

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Powers-Bunce v. District of Columbia, 576 F.Supp.2d 67 (D.D.C. 2008). The mother of a detainee who committed
suicide while in police custody brought a suit in the District of Columbia Superior Court against police officers,
alleging violations of the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The case was removed to federal court and the
district court granted the officers' motion to dismiss in part and denied in part. The district court granted summary
judgment for the officers. An autopsy identified contusions that were consistent with being struck repeatedly with a
night stick or similar weapon. The detainee sustained injuries on his buttocks, back of legs, abdomen, back, shins, and
fingers. But the court noted that there was no evidence indicating whether the injuries were inflicted before the
detainee’s arrest or linking the injuries to the arresting officer. The district court concluded that there was an absence of
a factual dispute concerning the Fourth Amendment excessive force claim, and therefore summary judgment was
granted to the officers. (District of Columbia)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Richman v. Sheahan, 512 F.3d 876 (7th Cir. 2008). The administrator of the estate of contemnor filed a § 1983 suit
individually and in her official capacity against deputy sheriffs in their individual capacities for violating the Fourth
and Eighth Amendments. The administrator alleged that the deputies used excessive force, leading to her son's death,
while restrainig him for resisting arrest in a state courtroom after a judge held him in contempt. The district court
granted in part, and denied in part, the deputies' motion for summary judgment on the ground of official immunity and
the deputies appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held that summary judgment
was precluded by fact issues as to whether the deputy sheriffs applied excessive force with the intent to punish the
contemnor, not merely with the intent to arrest. The court found that the deputies were protected by official immunity
for seizing the mother. According to the court, the deputy sheriffs did not subject the mother to excessive force by
seizing her in the courtroom. Other deputies restrained her son for resisting arrest allegedly sat on his back. The court
noted that the deputies moved the mother by wheelchair to another courtroom in a modest use of force. The court found
that the use of force was well suited to the situation in which it was essential to remove her after she had tried to force
her way back to the courtroom, as her screaming would have likely distracted the deputies or incited the son to further
struggles. The court noted that she did not suffer the slightest injury from the short trip in the wheelchair. (Cook
County, Illinois)

48.75
XXII

U.S. Appeals Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Simpson v. Thomas, 528 F.3d 685 (9th Cir. 2008). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action against a corrections officer,
alleging use of excessive force after the inmate failed to comply with the officer's orders. A jury trial resulted in a
verdict in the officer's favor, and the district court denied the inmate's motion for a new trial. The inmate appealed. The
appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that the inmate was not precluded from testifying that the officer
started the physical altercation by punching him, and that his subsequent actions were done in self-defense, even if such
testimony was contrary to the result of a prison disciplinary proceeding in which the inmate was found guilty of battery
on the officer and assessed 150 days of behavioral credit forfeiture. (California Medical Facility, Vacaville)

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Stanley v. Muzio, 578 F.Supp.2d 443 (D.Conn. 2008). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action against two state judicial
marshals, the Connecticut State Police and individual troopers and officers of the Connecticut State Police, alleging
false imprisonment and use of excessive force. Following dismissal of claims against the State Police, troopers and
officers, the marshals moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court
noted that the arrestee’s claim for false imprisonment under Connecticut law, alleging that two state judicial marshals
kicked him in the head and back after he was forcibly restrained, were sufficient to allege reckless, wanton, or
malicious conduct that was outside the scope of the defendants' employment as state judicial marshals. The court found
that the arrestee's allegation that two state judicial marshals told him that he had to remain in the courtroom for five
minutes following a hearing on a restraining order obtained by his wife and forcibly stopped him when he tried to leave
after three minutes stated a § 1983 claim for false imprisonment. (Connecticut State Judicial Marshals, Connecticut
State Police)

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE
PEPPER SPRAY

Thomas v. Northern, 574 F.Supp.2d 1029 (E.D.Mo. 2008). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action against correctional
officers alleging that they violated his constitutional rights. The district court granted summary judgment for the
officers and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by fact issues as to whether the
correctional officers had an objective need to use pepper spray after the inmate placed his arm in his food port, whether
the amount of spray used was reasonable, and whether the officers properly attempted to temper the severity of their
use of force. (Southeast Correctional Center, Missouri)

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

U.S. v. Gould, 563 F.Supp.2d 1224 (D.N.M. 2008). A correctional officer was charged with violating the civil rights of
an inmate in a beating incident. Following a jury trial, the officer was convicted of various counts, including
deprivation of rights under the color of law and obstructing justice by writing false reports. The officer moved for a
new trial on those counts, alleging that the government had violated its obligations by not disclosing the inmate's
psychiatric evaluations. The court denied the motion, finding that the evaluations were not favorable to the defendant
and the evaluations were not material to the outcome of the trial. (Dona Ana County Detention Center, New Mexico)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE
RESTRAINTS

Vondrak v. City of Las Cruces, 535 F.3d 1198 (10th Cir. 2008). An arrestee filed a § 1983 action against a city and its
police officers alleging illegal arrest, excessive force, inadequate medical attention, and failure to train. The district
court granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The parties filed cross-appeals.
The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, dismissed in part, and remanded. The appeals court held that
summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the police officers ignored the
arrestee's complaints that his handcuffs were too tight, and whether the arrestee suffered permanent nerve injury
because of the handcuffing. The court noted that for purposes of determining the police officers' qualified immunity
from liability under § 1983 for use of excessive force, the arrestee's right to be free from unduly tight handcuffing, and
the contours of that right, were clearly established in 2003. The court also found that it was clearly established that all
law enforcement officials had an affirmative duty to intervene to protect the constitutional rights of citizens from
infringement by other law enforcement officers in their presence, and thus one of the officers was not entitled to
qualified immunity from liability, where the officer was in close proximity to the initial handcuffing, and was present
thereafter. The arrestee had been taken into custody and transported to the police station, where two blood alcohol tests
were administered. Both tests showed no alcohol. He was held for another 90 minutes, during which time he made
several requests for someone to loosen his handcuffs because his wrists were hurting. All requests were ignored.
Eventually, the officers charged the arrestee with Driving While Under the Influence to the Slightest Degree, and they
released him on his own recognizance. The charge was later dropped. Following his release, the arrestee went to an
emergency room. A toxicology screening report showed no drugs or alcohol. A doctor who treated the arrestee
observed “multiple superficial abrasions and ecchymosis” on both wrists. He diagnosed the arrestee with neurapraxia in
both wrists, and a soft tissue sprain of the right wrist. The pain and discomfort in the arrestee’s wrists did not subside,
and it interfered with his ability to practice as an orthodontist and to play golf. He was diagnosed with a permanent
radial nerve injury in his wrists that was caused by the handcuffing. (Las Cruces Police Department, New Mexico)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE
PEPPER SPRAY

Walker v. Bowersox, 526 F.3d 1186 (8th Cir. 2008). A state prisoner brought a pro se § 1983 action against correctional
officers. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the officers and the prisoner appealed. The appeals
court reversed in part and remanded. The appeals court held that summary judgment was precluded by fact issues as to
whether corrections officers used reasonable force when they restrained the prisoner on a bench for 24 hours after he
refused to accept a specific cell mate, and whether another corrections officer used reasonable force when he used
pepper spray after the prisoner admittedly ignored the officer's repeated orders to hand over his food tray. (South
Central Correctional Center, Missouri)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE
RESTRAINTS

Walker v. Sheahan, 526 F.3d 973 (7th Cir. 2008). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against county
correctional officers, a county sheriff, and a county, alleging that the officers used excessive force against him,
deprived him of access to medical care, and retaliated against him. The district court granted summary judgment in
favor of the defendants. The detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The
court held that the sheriff’s office was not liable under § 1983 because the detainee failed to demonstrate that the
sheriff's office had a pattern of widespread use of excessive force, inadequate investigation and training regarding use
of force, or a code of silence. The court noted that although 783 complaints of excessive force were made against the

48.76
XXII

sheriff's office over a five-year period, none resulted in an indictment, the the training the officers received imposed
limitations on the amount of force they could use, and that officers weredisciplined for the use of excessive force. The
court held that summary judgment for the officers was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
injuries sustained by the detainee were consistent with his account of the restraint incident involving county corrections
officers. (Cook County Jail, Illinois)
2009
U.S. District Court
RESTRAINING
CHAIR

Al-Adahi v. Obama, 596 F.Supp.2d 111 (D.D.C. 2009). Aliens who were alleged enemy combatants engaging in
voluntary hunger strikes while detained at the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, moved to enjoin measures
taken as part of a forced-feeding program. The district court denied the motion. The court found that the detainees
failed to show a likelihood that they would suffer irreparable harm in the absence of an order enjoining the government
from using a restraint-chair in order to facilitate force-feeding them. The court noted that pursuant to the Military
Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA), the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider the complaints of detained alleged
enemy combatants. According to the court, the government officials who imposed various restraints on the detained
alleged enemy combatants, including the use of a restraint chair, in order to facilitate force-feeding them in response to
their hunger strikes, were not thereby deliberately indifferent to their Eighth Amendment rights. The court found that
evidence that the detained alleged enemy combatants had assaulted medical staff and guards during attempts to forcefeed them after the detainees engaged in hunger strikes, demonstrated that the government might suffer a substantial
injury if the detainees' request for a preliminary injunction against the use of a restraint-chair to facilitate such feedings
were granted. (U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Askew v. Sheriff of Cook County, Ill., 568 F.3d 632 (7th Cir. 2009). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against a
prison guard and a sheriff, asserting excessive force and deliberate indifference claims against the guard and a
municipal liability claim against the sheriff. The district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss. The detainee
appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. The appeals court held that upon determining that a county was a
required party in the pretrial detainee's § 1983 suit against a prison guard and the sheriff, the district court was required
to order that the county be made a party, rather than dismissing the suit. The court noted that a county in Illinois is a
necessary party in any suit seeking damages from an independently elected county officer, and, because state law
requires the county to pay, federal law deems it an indispensable party to the litigation. But the court found that the
Illinois county was not a party that was required to be joined if feasible in § 1983 suit brought against a prison guard in
his individual capacity. (Cook County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
RESTRAINTS

Bowers v. Pollard, 602 F.Supp.2d 977 (E.D.Wis. 2009). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against correctional facility
officials, challenging the conditions of his confinement. The court held that the correctional facility's enforcement of a
behavior action plan that regularly denied the inmate a sleeping mattress, occasionally required him to wear only a
segregation smock or paper gown, and subjected him to frequent restraint did not deny the inmate the minimal civilized
measure of life's necessities and was targeted at his misconduct, and thus the plan did not violate the inmate's Eighth
Amendment rights. The court noted that the inmate's cell was heated to 73 degrees, he was generally provided some
form of dress, he was granted access to hygiene items, and he was only denied a mattress and other possessions after he
used them to perpetrate self-abusive behavior, covered his cell with excrement and blood, and injured facility staff.
The court held that the state Department of Corrections' regulations governing procedures for placing an inmate on
observational status to ensure his safety and the safety of others, and the procedures for utilizing restraints for inmate
safety were sufficient to protect the inmate's liberty interest in avoiding an erroneous determination that his behavior
required such measures. The procedures governing observational status required the inmate to be orally informed of the
reasons for placement on the status and prohibited placement for more than 15 days without an evidentiary hearing.
The procedures governing restraints prohibited restraining an inmate for more than a 12-hour period. (Green Bay
Correctional Institution, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Browne v. San Francisco Sheriff's Dept., 616 F.Supp.2d 975 (N.D.Cal. 2009). A former state pretrial detainee filed a §
1983 action against nearly 50 defendants, seeking redress for alleged injuries caused by deputies and medical staff of a
sheriff's department. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. The court held that a deputy's
alleged placing of a “white tip poisonous spider” in a safety cell before moving the pretrial detainee back into the cell,
grabbing the detainee and bending his arm while he threw him out of the cell, and putting his knee into the center of the
detainee's back did not rise to the level of malicious and sadistic use of force, as required for a Fourteenth Amendment
excessive force claim. The court noted that there was no evidence that the detainee was injured or that he sought
medical treatment for any injuries. (San Francisco County Sheriff's Department, San Francisco County Jail, California)

U.S. District Court
CELL EXTRACTION
EXCESSIVE FORCE
PEPPER SPRAY
STUN GUN

Cabral v. County of Glenn, 624 F.Supp.2d 1184 (E.D.Cal. 2009). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against a
city and a police officer alleging violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and claims under California law.
The city and officer filed a motion to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court
held that the detainee, a psychotic and suicidal individual who collided with the wall of a safety cell and broke his neck,
failed to plead that a police officer, who extracted the detainee from his holding cell and used a stun gun and pepper
spray on him following an incident in which the detainee rubbed water from his toilet on his body, was deliberately
indifferent to the detainee's need for medical attention, as required to state due process claim under § 1983. According
to the court, the detainee failed to allege that the officer knew he was suicidal and was not receiving medical care, or
that the officer attempted to interfere with the detainee's receipt of such medical attention. The court found that the
detainee's allegations that the officer used a stun gun, a stun-type shield and pepper spray in an attempted cell
extraction while the detainee was naked, unarmed and hiding behind his toilet were sufficient to state an excessive
force claim under § 1983. The court denied qualified immunity for the officer, even though the detainee had not
responded to the officers' commands to come out of his cell. The court noted that the law clearly established that police
officers could not use a stun gun on a detainee who did not pose a threat and who merely failed to comply with

48.77
XXII

commands. The court held that the detainee sufficiently pleaded that the city had a policy of using stun guns in such
situations, as required to state a § 1983 Fourth Amendment excessive force claim against the city. The detainee alleged
that nine months prior to his assault, a separate incident occurred that was similar. (City of Willows Police Department,
California)
U.S. District Court
DEADLY FORCE
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Creed v. Virginia, 596 F.Supp.2d 930 (E.D.Va. 2009). The father of a prisoner who died while in custody brought an
action in state court against the state of Virginia, a county sheriff, a prison supervisor, a prison director, and various
prison employees. The father alleged that the prisoner died when he was placed in a choke hold and stopped breathing
during a medical examination before his planned transfer to a hospital for involuntary commitment, asserting civil
rights and supervisory liability claims under § 1983, as well as state law claims for negligence, gross negligence, and
willful and wanton negligence. After the case was removed to federal court the prisoner's father and state moved to
remand. The district court granted the motion. (Prince William-Manassas Regional Adult Detention Center, Virginia)

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Cusamano v. Sobek, 604 F.Supp.2d 416 (N.D.N.Y. 2009). A former state prisoner brought a pro se action against
department of corrections employees, alleging violation of his First, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights as well
as the New York Constitution. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants in part, and denied in
part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether a
corrections officer was present during, and participated in, the alleged assault of the prisoner. The court noted that an
officer's failure to intervene during another officer's use of excessive force can itself constitute excessive force. The
court also held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether excessive
force was used against the prisoner. The court found that there was no meeting of the minds between corrections
officers to inflict an unconstitutional injury on the prisoner, as required for the prisoner's conspiracy claim against the
officers. According to the court, there was no evidence of an agreement to inflict an injury on the prisoner, or of an
overt act done in furtherance of that goal. The court found that there was no evidence that a misbehavior report that a
corrections officer filed against the prisoner was a false report intended to cover up the use of excessive force, as
required for the prisoner's false misbehavior report claim against the officer. The court also found no causal connection
between the state prisoner's grievance and the issuance of the misbehavior report, as required for the state prisoner's
retaliation claim against a corrections officer. The court found that the actions of the corrections officers toward the
prisoner, including the utterance of profanities and the deprivation of amenities, did not cause the prisoner physical
injury or psychological injury that was more than de minimis, as required for the prisoner's harassment claim against
the corrections officers under the Eighth Amendment. (Gouverneur Corr. Facility, Clinton Corr. Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
DISTURBANCE
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Fennell v. Gilstrap, 559 F.3d 1212 (11th Cir. 2009). A pretrial detainee brought a Fourteenth Amendment excessive
force claim against a sheriff's deputy under § 1983. The district court entered summary judgment for the deputy and the
detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that once the district court decided that the detainee had
shown excessive force, it could not then find that the deputy was qualifiedly immune because his use of excessive force
was not in violation of clearly established law. But the court found that the deputy's kick to the detainee's face, which
resulted in fractures, did not constitute excessive force. The court noted that the deputy saw the detainee struggling with
six other officers who were unable to restrain him, the detainee had not yet been secured when the deputy kicked him,
the deputy intended to kick the detainee in the arm rather than the face, the detainee had grabbed the arm of another
officer, and the officers made an immediate offer of medical care. (Georgia)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE
PEPPER SPRAY

Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318 (3rd Cir. 2009). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action against correctional officers and
others, alleging excessive force and deliberate indifference to his medical needs. The district court entered summary
judgment in favor of some officers, and entered judgment in favor of the remaining defendants. The inmate appealed.
The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded. The appeals court held that summary judgment was
precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the inmate had ceased resisting before correctional officers
kicked or “kneed” him in the side. According to the court, an administrative assault determination and a state court no
contest plea for the inmate's hitting of a correctional officer, before he was wrestled to the ground, did not provide a
blank check justification for the correctional officers' excessive use of force thereafter. The court held that the district
court's determination that correctional officers did not act with deliberate indifference to the inmate's serious needs
when they denied his request for pain medication and administered pepper spray to subdue the inmate after he became
agitated was not a clear error. The court noted that the inmate was in an infirmary, had suffered a broken rib and a
punctured lung, and was at risk of death as the result of a delay in diagnosis and transfer to a hospital. The officer
checked with the nurse on duty and found that no medication was prescribed, the inmate ignored repeated requests to
calm down and continued shouting and hitting and shaking a door late at night, and the officers administered a single
spray of pepper spray. (Sussex Correctional Institution, Delaware)

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE
FAILURE TO
PROTECT

Gregg v. Ohio Dept. of Youth Services, 661 F.Supp.2d 842 (S.D.Ohio 2009). The resident of a juvenile correctional
facility brought a § 1983 action against facility officials, seeking damages for injuries he allegedly received at the
hands of corrections officers. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a fact question as to whether
correctional officers used excessive force in subduing the resident when he stepped out of the line to receive his
medication. The court also found a fact question as to whether correctional officers who observed the alleged beating of
the resident by other officers violated the resident's constitutional rights by failing to intervene in the beating. (Ohio
River Valley Juvenile Correctional Facility, Ohio)

U.S. District Court
CHEMICAL AGENTS
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Hamilton v. Lajoie, 660 F.Supp.2d 261 (D.Conn. 2009). An inmate filed a pro se § 1983 action against the State of
Connecticut, a warden, and correctional officers, seeking compensatory and punitive damages for head trauma,
abrasions to his ear and shoulder, and post-traumatic stress due to an officers' alleged use of unconstitutionally
excessive force during a prison altercation. The inmate also alleged inadequate supervision, negligence, and willful
misconduct. The court held that the inmate's factual allegations against correctional officers, in their individual
capacities, were sufficient for a claim of excessive force in violation of the inmate's Eighth Amendment rights. The

48.78
XXII

officers allegedly pinned the inmate to the ground near his cell, following an inspection for contraband, and purportedly
sprayed the inmate in the face with a chemical agent despite his complaints that he had asthma. The court found that the
inmate's allegations against the warden in his individual capacity were sufficient for a claim of supervisory liability,
under § 1983, based on the warden's specific conduct before and after the altercation between the inmate and
correctional officers. The inmate alleged that the warden was responsible for policies that led to his injuries and for
procedures followed by medical staff following the incident, and the warden failed to properly train officers, to
adequately supervise medical staff, to review video evidence of the incident, and to order outside medical treatment of
the inmate's injuries even though a correctional officer received prompt medical care at an outside hospital for his head
injury sustained in the altercation. (Corrigan-Radgowski Correctional Center, Connecticut)
U.S. Appeals Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Harris v. City of Circleville, 583 F.3d 356 (6th Cir. 2009). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against a city and
police officers, alleging that he was subjected to excessive force and inadequate medical care, and discriminated against
on account of his race, while being booked at a jail. The district court denied the defendants' motion for summary
judgment and the defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that summary judgment was
precluded by fact issues on the excessive force claim, the deliberate indifference claim, and the equal protection claim.
The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether police officers'
use of force against the detainee, in yanking at the detainee's necklace and kicking his leg out from under him causing
the detainee to fall and hit his head, in using a takedown maneuver to get the detainee down on the floor in a booking
area, and in kicking the detainee in the ribs, was objectively reasonable or shocked the conscience. According to the
court, summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the detainee had a serious
need for medical care that was so obvious that even a layperson would easily recognize the need for a doctor's
attention, following the police officers' exercise of force against him. The court also held that summary judgment was
precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether police officers used excessive force and delayed medical
treatment of the detainee on account of his African-American race. (Circleville City Jail, Ohio)

U.S. District Court
CHEMICAL AGENTS
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Harris v. Curtin, 656 F.Supp.2d 732 (W.D.Mich. 2009). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action alleging that a
warden, nurse, and corrections officer violated his Eighth Amendment rights when he was sprayed with a chemical
agent. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court
affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. On remand, the defendants moved for summary judgment. The district
court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether the corrections officer used excessive force without regard to the health risks posed
to the prisoner, who had asthma and a history of a brain aneurysm. The officer sprayed a chemical agent into the
prisoner's cell while attempting to place the prisoner in restraints for having broken his cell window. The court held that
the prison nurse's authorization of the use of the chemical agent to restrain the prisoner did not constitute malicious or
sadistic behavior prohibited by the Eighth Amendment; even thought the prisoner, who had asthma and a history of
brain aneurysm, was classified in prison medical records as a high risk for unwanted side effects from chemical agents.
According to the court, such a classification did not preclude the use of chemical agents on him. (Michigan Department
of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
BRUTALITY
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Hendrickson v. Cooper, 589 F.3d 887 (7th Cir. 2009). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a prison officer
alleging excessive force. The district court entered judgment following a jury verdict in favor of the prisoner and
denied the officer's motion for judgment as matter of law or a new trial. The officer appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The court held that the issue of whether the officer attacked the prisoner for the malicious purpose of causing
harm was for the jury, as was the issue of whether the attack caused the prisoner to feel pain. According to the court,
the jury's award of compensatory damages of $75,000 for the prisoner's pain and suffering was not excessive, noting
that objective medical evidence was not required to support a compensatory damages award. The court also found that
the jury's punitive damages award of $125,000 against the officer was not excessive, in light of the prisoner’s
description of how much pain the officer inflicted by throwing him to the ground and kneeing him in the back. The
court noted that the officer acted with a malicious desire to cause the prisoner harm, the officer's use of force was
completely unjustified, the officer goaded the prisoner into leveling an assault which the officer then used as an excuse
to attack, the officer laid in wait for the prisoner to enter a housing unit, the prisoner was disabled, and when the
prisoner appeared the officer grabbed, shoved, floored, and kneed him. The appeals court opinion began with the
following statement: “Prison is rough. Violent prisoners can pose a serious threat, requiring prison officers to use force
to maintain order. Sometimes, though, the only real threat comes from a rogue officer who attacks a prisoner for no
good reason.” (Wabash Valley Correctional Facility, Indiana)

U.S. District Court
CELL EXTRACTION
EXCESSIVE FORCE
STINGER GRENADE

Jackson v. Gerl, 622 F.Supp.2d 738 (W.D.Wis. 2009). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a warden and other
prison officials, alleging that the use of a stinger grenade to extract him from his cell constituted excessive force in
violation of the Eighth Amendment, and that an abusive strip search following the deployment of the grenade also
violated the Eighth Amendment. The defendants moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the
motion in part and denied in part. The court held that a prison lieutenant's extraction of the prisoner from inside his cell
by means of a stinger grenade, which when detonated created a bright flash of light, emitted a loud blast accompanied
by smoke, and fired rubber balls, was not “de minimis,” as would bar a claim for excessive force under the Eighth
Amendment. The court found that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether
the extraction of the prisoner from his cell by means of a stinger grenade was malicious and sadistic, or whether the use
was in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline. The court held that the prison security director's
authorization of the prisoner's extraction by means of a stinger grenade was not malicious and sadistic, as required to
establish excessive force under the Eighth Amendment. According to the court, the director was aware that the prisoner
was refusing to cooperate, the prisoner had invited officials to “suit up” to “come in and play,” and had covered his
window and had put water on the floor. The director knew that tasers and incapacitating agents could not be used
against the prisoner, and relied on the lieutenant's statements that she had been trained and was certified in the use of
the grenade, having never used one himself.

48.79
XXII

The court held that members of the prison's emergency response unit did not act with deliberate or reckless
disregard of the prisoner's rights against excessive force under the Eighth Amendment when they failed to speak out
against higher ranking officers from extracting prisoner from cell by means of a stinger grenade.
According to the court, the prison's training captain and the commander of the emergency response unit did not
provide inadequate training on the use of a stinger grenade, with a deliberate or reckless disregard to the prisoners'
Eighth Amendment rights against excessive force, as required to subject the captain to § 1983 liability, even though the
captain advised trainees that stinger grenades could be used in a cell and did not tell them of the danger of using the
grenade in the presence of water. The captain lacked knowledge that using the grenade in a cell or in the presence of
water would likely be an excessive use of force even where immediate weapons would otherwise be justified.
The court found that the officials' alleged failure to give the prisoner an opportunity to strip down on his own so that
officials could perform a visual inspection of his person rather than be subject to a manual strip search was for a
legitimate penological purpose, and thus did not violate the Eighth Amendment as a wanton infliction of psychological
pain. The officials decided to manually strip search the prisoner after he had resisted following orders along every step
of the way. The court noted that the performance of the strip search in front of a cell, rather than inside a cell, was not
done to demean and humiliate the plaintiff, where the cell was not in an area widely visible to prisoners, but rather was
at the end of a hall with no cell across from it. (Wisconsin Secure Program Facility)
U.S. Appeals Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Krout v. Goemmer, 583 F.3d 557 (8th Cir. 2009). The administratrix of a pretrial detainee's estate brought a § 1983
action against police officers and correctional officers alleging excessive force and deprivation of medical care. The
district court denied the defendants' motions for summary judgment and the defendants appealed. The appeals court
dismissed in part, affirmed in part, and reversed in part. The appeals court held that summary judgment was precluded
by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether fellow police officers used excessive force in making a traffic stop and
arrest. According to the court, it was clearly established at the time of the arrest that a police officer had a duty to
intervene to prevent the excessive use of force by other officers. (Pope County Detention Center, Russellville Police
Department, Arkansas)

U.S. Appeals Court
RESTRAINTS

Lewis v. City of West Palm Beach, Fla., 561 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2009). The survivor of a detainee who had died in
police custody brought a § 1983 action against a city and against individual officers, alleging use of excessive force.
The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants and the survivor appealed. The appeals court affirmed.
The court held that the detainee's right not to be restrained via “hobbling” and being “hogtied” was not clearly
established. The detainee became unconscious and died during detention. According to the court, the officers' conduct
was not so egregious as to be plainly unlawful to any reasonable officer, given the detainee's agitated state when first
detained and given his continued uncooperative and agitated state, presenting a safety risk to himself and others, during
restraint. After handcuffing the detainee did not prevent his continued violent behavior, the officers attached an ankle
restraint to the handcuffs with a hobble cord (also known as “TARP,” the total appendage restraint position). The
hobble was tightened so that Lewis's hands and feet were close together behind his back in a “hogtied” position. The
court held that the city was not potentially liable for failure to train officers in the use of restraints, where the need for
training in the application of “hobble” restraints did not rise to the level of obviousness that would render the city
potentially liable under § 1983 for deliberate indifference based on the failure to administer such training. The court
noted that hobble restraints did not have the same potential flagrant risk of constitutional violations as the use of deadly
firearms. (West Palm Beach Police Department, Florida)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE
STUN GUN

Lewis v. Downey, 581 F.3d 467 (7th Cir. 2009). A federal prisoner in custody at a county jail filed a pro se § 1983
action, alleging jail guards' conduct in shooting him with a taser gun amounted to cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the
prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court held that a jail guard
who stood by while another guard shot a taser gun at the inmate in response to a superior officer's order, after the
inmate refused an order to get out of bed, could not be liable in the inmate's § 1983 excessive force claim, where the
bystander guard had no realistic opportunity to stop the other guard from discharging the taser gun. The court found
that the jail guard's use of a taser gun against the prisoner after the prisoner refused an order to get out of bed amounted
to more than a de minimis application of force, as required to prove the prisoner's pro se § 1983 excessive force claim.
The court noted that it was undisputed that the taser sent an electric shock through the prisoner's body strong enough to
cause him to fall from his bed and render him helpless while the guards secured him and removed him from his cell.
The court found that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the guard acted
in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm. The court held that
the guard was not entitled to qualified immunity from liability for his use of a taser gun against the prisoner, where, at
the time of the conduct, the prisoner was allegedly prone on his bed, weakened, and docile. According to the court, the
guard allegedly used the taser without warning the prisoner first, and the prisoner allegedly did not have enough time to
respond to the guard's order to get out of bed, so that no reasonable guard would think he was justified in using the
taser gun under the circumstances as alleged. (Jerome Combs Detention Center, Kankakee County, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
STUN GUN

Mann v. Taser Intern., Inc., 588 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2009). The administrators of an estate, the husband, and guardians
of the children of an arrestee who died following her arrest by sheriff's deputies and her admission to a county jail,
brought an action under § 1983 and state law against the deputies and the manufacturer and distributor of the stun gun
used by deputies during the arrest. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants and the plaintiffs
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the use of the stun gun constituted reasonable force
where the arrestee's behavior was violent, aggressive and prolonged, demonstrating that she was clearly a danger to
herself and others, and the deputy warned the arrestee to stop her behavior and discharged his stun gun only after she
refused to comply with the his orders. According to the court, the plaintiffs failed to establish that the arrestee's death
was caused by the use of a stun gun. The court noted that the plaintiffs' own medical expert testified that, while it
would have been naive of him to say that the use of the stun gun did not contribute in some degree to the arrestee's
death, he was unable to declare to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the arrestee would have survived but

48.80
XXII

for its use. The court held that the sheriff's deputies were not deliberately indifferent to the arrestee's serious medical
condition of “excited delirium” when they opted to take her to jail instead of to a hospital. Although one deputy had
knowledge of the arrestee's past methamphetamine use, and the arrestee's mother and another person told a different
deputy that the arrestee was sick and needed to go to the hospital, the deputies had no prior knowledge of the medical
condition called “excited delirium” or its accompanying risk of death. The court noted that the arrestee's physical
resistance and verbal communication suggested to the deputies that, although agitated, the arrestee was not in
immediate medical danger, which was an opinion shared by emergency medical personnel called to the scene by the
deputies. (Whitfield County Sheriff's Office, Georgia)
U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Moore v. Thomas, 653 F.Supp.2d 984 (N.D.Cal. 2009). A state prisoner filed a civil rights action in California state
court against prison defendants, alleging various claims stemming from his incarceration. After removal to federal
court, the defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part.
The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the alleged force
was applied by a correctional officer maliciously and sadistically to cause harm to the prisoner, or whether the officer
was using the force necessary to subdue the prisoner, who was engaged in a mutual combat with a fellow inmate and
refused to follow orders that he stop fighting. The court also found a fact issue as to whether the force used was
excessive. (Pelican Bay State Prison, California Medical Facility)

U.S. Appeals Court
RESTRAINTS

Nelson v. Correctional Medical Services, 583 F.3d 522 (8th Cir. 2009). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action against
the director of the Arkansas Department of Correction (ADC), and a corrections officer, alleging that while giving birth
to her child she was forced to go through the final stages of labor with both legs shackled to her hospital bed in
violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment. On
rehearing en banc, the Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded. The appeals court held that
summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the corrections officer’s conduct in
forcing the inmate to go through the final stages of labor with both legs shackled to her hospital bed constituted
“deliberate indifference” in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The appeals court held that the inmate, in the final
stages of labor, had a “clearly established” right not to be shackled absent clear and convincing evidence that she was a
security or flight risk, and thus a government official would not be protected from § 1983 liability for violating that
right based on qualified immunity. (Arkansas Department of Correction, McPherson Unit)

U.S. District Court
RESTRAINTS

Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F.Supp.2d 1005 (N.D.Cal.2009). reversed 678 F3d 748. A detainee, a United States citizen who
was designated an “enemy combatant” and detained in a military brig in South Carolina, brought an action against a
senior government official, alleging denial of access to counsel, denial of access to court, unconstitutional conditions of
confinement, unconstitutional interrogations, denial of freedom of religion, denial of right of information, denial of
right to association, unconstitutional military detention, denial of right to be free from unreasonable seizures, and denial
of due process. The defendant moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The
court held that the detainee, who was a United States citizen, had no other means of redress for alleged injuries he
sustained as a result of his detention, as required for Bivens claim against the senior government official, alleging the
official's actions violated constitutional rights. The court noted that the Military Commissions Act was only applicable
to alien, or non-citizen, unlawful enemy combatants, and the Detainee Treatment Act did not “affect the rights under
the United States Constitution of any person in the custody of the United States.” The court found that national security
was not a special factor counseling hesitation and precluding judicial review in the Bivens action brought by the
detainee. Documents drafted by the official were public record, and litigation may be necessary to ensure compliance
with the law. According to the court, the detainee's allegations that a senior government official bore responsibility for
his conditions of confinement due to his drafting opinions that purported to create legal legitimacy for such treatment,
were sufficient to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment, and thus stated a due process claim under the Fourteenth
Amendment. The detainee alleged that while detained, he suffered prolonged shackling in painful positions and
relentless periods of illumination and intentional interference with sleep by means of loud noises at all hours, that he
was subjected to extreme psychological stress and impermissibly denied medical care, that these restrictions and
conditions were not justified by a legitimate penological interest, but rather were intended to intensify the coerciveness
of interrogations. The court held that federal officials were cognizant of basic fundamental civil rights afforded to
detainees under the United States Constitution, and thus a senior government official was not entitled to qualified
immunity from claims brought by the detainee. The court also held that the official was not qualifiedly immune from
claims brought by the detainee under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). On appeal, 678 F3d 748, the
appeals court reversed the district court decision, finding that the official was entitled to qualified immunity because
there had not been a violation of well established law. (Military Brig, South Carolina)

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Parlin v. Cumberland County, 659 F.Supp.2d 201 (D.Me. 2009). A female former county jail inmate brought an action
against jail officers, a county, and a sheriff, under § 1983 and Maine law, alleging deliberate indifference to her serious
medical needs, negligence, and excessive force. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants in part
and denied in part. The court held that: (1) the officers were not deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need; (2)
an officer who fell on the inmate did not use excessive force; (3) the county was not liable for deprivation of medical
care; and (4) the county was not liable for failure to train. The court held that the officers were not entitled to absolute
immunity from excessive force claims where a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the officers used
excessive force in transferring the jail inmate between cells. According to the court, there was no evidence that jail
officers were subjectively aware of the jail inmate's serious medical condition, where the inmate made no mention of
her shoulder injury to the officers other than crying out “my shoulder” after she had fallen. (Cumberland County Jail,
Maine)

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Petrolino v. County of Spokane, 678 F.Supp.2d 1082 (E.D.Wash. 2009). A detainee, a German citizen, brought an
action against a county, county sheriff, and numerous defendants, seeking damages under § 1983 and state law for
force used during his arrest and detention. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the

48.81

motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether a corrections officers' knee strikes against the pretrial detainee were administered in response to a
threat, due to the detainee's alleged refusal to surrender a pen that he possessed, and thus whether the strikes were
reasonable uses of force. (Spokane County Jail, Washington)
U.S. Appeals Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Smith v. Ozmint, 578 F.3d 246 (4th Cir. 2009). A South Carolina prisoner brought an action alleging that a prison
grooming policy violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The South Carolina
Department of Corrections moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the motion. The prisoner
appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court held that the prison's policy
requiring maximum security inmates to wear closely cropped hair, and which allowed for implementation of that policy
through physical force, imposed a substantial burden on the inmate's religious practice within the meaning of the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), where the policy compelled an inmate to modify his
behavior in violation of his genuinely held religious beliefs. According to the court, an affidavit offered by the
Department of Corrections in support of summary judgment did not demonstrate that the prison policy of forcibly
shaving the heads of maximum security unit prisoners who wore long hair as a matter of religious belief furthered a
compelling governmental interest in space utilization, hygiene, or security by the least restrictive means under
RLUIPA. The court noted that the affidavit dealt solely with the grooming policy applied to special management unit
prisoners, and the Department failed to explain how the rationale offered for not accommodating special management
unit prisoners applied to maximum security unit prisoners. (South Carolina Department of Corrections, Maximum
Security Unit at Kirkland Correctional Institution)

U.S. Appeals Court
STUN GUN

Spears v. Ruth, 589 F.3d 249 (6th Cir. 2009). The estate of a deceased detainee brought a § 1983 action against a police
officer and a city, alleging deliberate indifference to the detainee's serious illness or injury while in the officer's care.
The district court denied summary judgment and the officer and city brought an appeal. The appeals court reversed and
remanded. The court held that the pretrial detainee's condition and need for medical attention was not so obvious to the
police officer as to establish the existence of a serious medical need, for the purposes of a claim of deliberate
indifference in violation of due process. The officer allegedly failed to inform emergency medical technicians (EMT)
on the scene and at the jail that the detainee, who later died from respiratory and cardiac failure resulting from cocaine
use, had admitted that he smoked crack cocaine. According to the court, the EMTs and jail nurse, who presumably had
a greater facility than the average layperson to recognize an individual's medical need, observed the detainee's behavior
and administered tests based on those observations, and both the EMTs and the jail officers concluded that the detainee
did not need to be transported to the hospital. After admission to the jail, the detainee continued to hallucinate and
officers placed him in a restraint chair “for his own safety,” tasing him to “relax his muscles.” The detainee remained
restrained for approximately three and a half hours, during which time he was calm but continued to hallucinate.
Shortly after the officers released him from the chair, the detainee began to shake and spit up blood and then became
unconscious. He was taken to a hospital where he was diagnosed with respiratory and cardiac failure and multi-organ
failure resulting from cocaine use. He lapsed into a coma and died eleven months later. (City of Cleveland, Bradley
County Justice Center, Tennessee)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Teague v. Mayo, 553 F.3d 1068 (7th Cir. 2009). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against corrections officers. The
district court granted summary judgment for the officers on the claim of deliberate indifference to the prisoner’s serious
medical needs, and, following a jury trial, entered judgment for the officers on an excessive force claim. The prisoner
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that while the prisoner was in segregation, two corrections
officers could not have been deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs relating to his degenerative joint
disease and other back problems, in violation of Eighth Amendment, where the officers were not assigned to the
segregation unit at the time. (Menard Correctional Institution, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Teas v. Ferguson, 608 F.Supp.2d 1070 (W.D.Ark. 2009). A former inmate brought a pro se civil rights action pursuant
to § 1983 against detention center staff alleging that while he was an inmate of the detention center, his constitutional
rights against excessive force and retaliation were violated. The district court denied the defendant’s motion for
summary judgment. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to
whether excessive force was used against the prisoner, while still a pretrial detainee. (Benton Co. Det. Center, Ark.)

U.S. Appeals Court
RESTRAINING
CHAIR

Vallario v. Vandehey, 554 F.3d 1259 (10th Cir. 2009). County jail inmates sued a county sheriff and a county's
administrator of jail operations in their official capacities, alleging disregard of risks to inmates from restraint chairs
and other devices, and the denial of access to psychiatric care for indigent inmates. The district court granted the
inmates' motion for class certification and the defendants petitioned for interlocutory appeal. The appeals court granted
the petition and remanded the case. The court held that the district court abused its discretion by misconstruing the
complaint as alleging that denial of adequate mental health treatment affected all inmates, and abused its discretion by
refraining from any consideration whatsoever of the action's merits. (Garfield County Jail, Colorado)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Wasserman v. Rodacker, 557 F.3d 635 (D.C. Cir. 2009). An arrestee brought an action against the government and a
police officer, alleging tort and constitutional claims based on his arrest for violating a leash law and assaulting a police
officer. The government substituted itself as a defendant and moved to dismiss. The district court dismissed the tort
claims and granted summary judgment on the constitutional claims. The arrestee appealed. The appeals court affirmed.
The court held that the government properly substituted itself as a party defendant and that the force used in the arrest
was reasonable. The court found that the arrestee's detention was not unreasonable, in violation of Fourth Amendment,
despite having been premised on an assault charge that was later dropped by the government, where the length of
detention was less than 48 hours, and the arrestee failed to allege that the delay of a probable cause hearing was a result
of ill will or some other malicious purpose. (District of Columbia, Metropolitan Police Department Central Cell Block)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Wright v. Goord, 554 F.3d 255 (2nd Cir. 2009). A prisoner brought two § 1983 actions against prison officers, alleging
excessive force and retaliation in violation of the First and Eighth Amendments. The district court summarily dismissed
both actions. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the prisoner did not sufficiently

48.82

allege excessive force by the prison officers in violation of the Eighth Amendment where the prisoner failed to
concretely allege a physical assault by an officer. According to the court, the assault alleged in his complaint involved
the prisoner's cellmate, and the prisoner proffered no evidence to support the suggestion that the officers returned a
cane to a cellmate after learning that the cellmate had allegedly hit the prisoner with a cane. The court found that a
prison officer's action in grabbing the prisoner did not constitute “excessive force” in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. The court noted that apart from several minutes where the prisoner alleged he experienced a shortness of
breath, the inmate did not allege any physical injuries resulting from the encounter. (Coxsackie Correctional Facility,
New York)
U.S. District Court
CELL EXTRACTION
CHEMICAL AGENTS
EXCESSIVE FORCE
FAILURE TO
PROTECT
RESTRAINING
CHAIR
RESTRAINTS
STUN GUN

Zimmerman v. Schaeffer, 654 F.Supp.2d 226 (M.D.Pa. 2009). Current and former inmates at a county jail brought a §
1983 action against the county, corrections officers, and prison officials, alleging that they were abused by officials
during their incarceration in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The
district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by
genuine issues of material fact as to: (1) whether corrections officers and prison officials knew or should have known
that an officer would apply excessive force to the inmate by shocking him when he was restrained and whether they
could have prevented the officer's excessive use of force; (2) whether the inmates exhausted administrative remedies by
filing grievances regarding use of a restraint chair, lack of mattresses, inability to shower, cell conditions, and issues
with mail; (3) whether the use of mechanical restraints against the inmates constituted wanton infliction of pain in
violation of the Eighth Amendment; (4) whether an inmate complied with officials when extracted from a cell,
rendering the use of oleoresin capsicum spray excessive and unjustified; (5) whether cell conditions posed a substantial
risk of harm to inmates and whether corrections officers and prison officials were deliberately indifferent to that risk;
and (6) whether the warden of the county jail was aware of and condoned the use of excessive force against inmates at
jail. (Mifflin County Correctional Facility, Lewistown, Pennsylvania)
2010

U.S. Appeals Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Aldini v. Johnson, 609 F.3d 858 (6th Cir. 2010). A detainee brought a § 1983 excessive force case against four
corrections officers, arising out of a beating which occurred while the detainee was being held in a booking room
pending completion of the booking process, but after he had been surrendered to jailers by his arresting officer. The
district court granted summary judgment to two of the officers based on qualified immunity. The detainee, and the
officers whose motions for summary judgment were denied, appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, and vacated
and remanded in part. The court held that the district court's error, in not applying the Fourth Amendment
reasonableness test to the officer whose actions the court found violated the higher Fourteenth Amendment due process
“shocks-the-conscience” standard, was harmless. (Montgomery County Jail, Ohio)

U.S. District Court
RESTRAINTS

Brawley v. Washington, 712 F.Supp.2d 1208 (W.D.Wash. 2010). A female former inmate brought a § 1983 action
against the Washington State Department of Corrections and various officials, seeking relief from violations of her
constitutional rights that she alleged occurred during the birth of her first child. The Department filed a motion for
summary judgment, which the district court granted in part and denied in part. The court held that the female inmate,
who was shackled to a hospital bed while giving birth, showed, from an objective standpoint, that she had a serious
medical need and was exposed to an unnecessary risk of harm for the purposes of her § 1983 Eighth Amendment claim.
The court held that summary judgment was precluded by material issues of fact as to whether officers were deliberately
indifferent to the risks of harm to the inmate and her serious medical needs when they shackled her to a hospital bed.
According to the court, the inmate showed that shackling inmates while they were in labor was clearly established as a
violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, thereby barring the Department
of Corrections' qualified immunity defense. (Washington State Corrections Center for Women)

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Brooks v. Austin, 720 F.Supp.2d 715 (E.D.Pa. 2010). A state pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against
correction officers, alleging violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The officers filed a motion to
dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the pretrial detainee's
allegations that a correctional officer slammed him into a wall, that another officer was “on his neck” while he was
handcuffed, and that these actions resulted in injuries to his knee and shoulder were sufficient to state a § 1983 claim
for excessive force in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Chester County Prison, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE
RESTRAINTS
CHEMICAL AGENTS
STUN GUN
RESTRAINING
CHAIR

Caldwell v. Luzerne County Corrections Facility Management Employees, 732 F.Supp.2d 458 (M.D.Pa. 2010). A
county prison inmate brought civil rights claims against prison officials. The officials moved to dismiss. The district
court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the inmate stated claims of excessive force
against prison officials with respect to various incidents in which he was allegedly tased, causing him to hit his
forehead on a cell wall, forced to remain on a hard mattress at an uncomfortable angle, causing severe neck pain, strip
searched, placed in 5-point restraints, causing swollen and bleeding wrists, pulled forcefully while handcuffed, causing
his hands to swell and bleed, punched and slapped in the back while handcuffed, maced, and slammed onto the floor,
kicked and punched. The court held that the inmate’s allegations that in four incidents occurring over a span of four
months he was placed on a mattress at an awkward angle for over 12 hours and subjected to severe pain, not permitted
to use the bathroom, eat, drink, or shower while placed in 5-point restraints for many hours, and was refused a blanket
while restrained in a cell with broken windows and an air vent blowing directly on him, were sufficient to state a
conditions of confinement claim under the Eighth Amendment. The court held that the inmate's allegations that he was
subjected by prison officials to excessive force and unconstitutional conditions of confinement, and that the officials'
conduct reflected retaliation for his filing of lawsuits against them, stated a claim for retaliation under § 1983. (Luzerne
County Corrections Facility, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Castro v. Melchor, 760 F.Supp.2d 970(D.Hawai‘i 2010). A female pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against
correctional facility officials and medical staff, alleging the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious
medical needs resulting in the delivery of a stillborn child. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district
court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine

48.83

issue of material fact as to whether the correctional facility's medical staff subjectively knew the pretrial detainee's
complaints of vaginal bleeding presented a serious medical need. The court held that the staff’s failure to ensure the
detainee received an ultrasound and consultation was no more than gross negligence, and the medical staff did not
deny, delay, or intentionally interfere with the pretrial detainee's medical treatment. According to the court, summary
judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the correctional facility officials' actions and
inactions in training the facility's medical staff resulted in the alleged deprivation of the pretrial detainee's right to
medical treatment and whether the officials consciously disregarded serious health risks by failing to apply the
women's lock-down policies. Following a verbal exchange with a guard, two officers physically forced the detainee to
the ground from a standing position. While she was lying on the ground on her stomach, the officers restrained her by
holding their body weights against her back and legs and placing her in handcuffs. The detainee was approximately
seven months pregnant at the time. (Oahu Community Correctional Center, Hawai’i)
U.S. District Court
BRUTALITY
EXCESSIVE FORCE
THREATENING

Cummings v. Harrison, 695 F.Supp.2d 1263 (N.D.Fla. 2010). A Black Muslim state prisoner brought a civil rights
action against a prison warden and correctional officers, alleging, among other things, that the defendants used
excessive force against him in violation of the Eighth Amendment and retaliated against him, in violation of First
Amendment, for submitting grievances. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court denied the
motion. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether
correctional officers' repeated verbal threats, including death threats, combined with physical assaults, against the Black
Muslim prisoner caused the prisoner extreme psychological harm, and as to whether the officers maliciously and
sadistically used force against the prisoner because he was black or because he practiced the Muslim faith. The court
also found that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the prison warden
had the ability to remove the Black Muslim prisoner from the supervision of the correctional officer who was allegedly
verbally and physically abusing him, but refused to do so, and denied the prisoner's request for protective custody.
(Taylor Correctional Institution, Florida)

U.S. District Court
CELL EXTRACTION
EXCESSIVE FORCE
PEPPER SPRAY

Enriquez v. Kearney, 694 F.Supp.2d 1282 (S.D.Fla. 2010). A civil detainee brought a pro se civil rights action against
correctional facility officers and physicians, asserting claims for excessive force. The officers and physicians moved for
summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that officers did not use excessive force
against the civil detainee in violation of his due process rights by spraying him with pepper spray, handcuffing him, and
escorting him from a detention unit in restraints, where the detainee did not sustain any serious injury, and the decision
to use pepper spray was only made after officers attempted for more than one hour to verbally convince the detainee to
cooperate and leave the unit where his interaction with officers was causing a disturbance. The court noted that there
was no indication that the force was imposed as punishment rather than in a good faith effort to further the need to
maintain order and security on a unit where numerous sexually violent predators (SVPs) were held. (Florida Civil
Commitment Center, Arcadia, Florida)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Fletcher v. Menard Correctional Center, 623 F.3d 1171 (7th Cir. 2010). A state prisoner subject to the Prison Litigation
Reform Act's (PLRA) three strikes provision brought a civil rights action against a prison, warden, and various prison
employees, alleging the defendants violated his federal constitutional rights by using excessive force to restrain him
and by recklessly disregarding his need for medical attention. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to
pre-pay the filing fee, and a motions panel authorized the prisoner's appeal. The appeals court affirmed. The court held
that that while the prisoner's allegation of excessive force satisfied the three strikes provision's imminent danger
requirement, the prisoner failed to exhaust administrative remedies under the PLRA. The court noted that the prisoner
had an administrative remedy under an Illinois regulation providing an emergency grievance procedure for state
prisoners claiming to be in urgent need of medical attention. (Menard Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
STUN GUN
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Forrest v. Prine, 620 F.3d 739 (7th Cir. 2010). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against a police officer
alleging the officer used excessive force against him when he used a stun gun in a holding cell. The district court
entered summary judgment for the officer. The detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the
officer did not violate the pretrial detainee's right to be free of illegal search and seizure when he used a stun gun on the
detainee while attempting to conduct a strip search in a holding cell following the detainee’s arrest. The court held that
the officer's decision to use the stun gun on the detainee did not violate the detainee’s due process guarantees, where
the officer was aware that the detainee had attacked another officer earlier in the night, and the detainee appeared to be
intoxicated. The court noted that the detainee was a relatively large man confined in an enclosed space of relatively
small area, and he was facing the officer, pacing in the cell, clenching his fists, and yelling obscenities in response to
orders to comply with the strip search policy. (Rock Island County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Griffin v. Hardrick, 604 F.3d 949 (6th Cir. 2010).A pretrial detainee brought an action against a county jail officer,
alleging use of excessive force under § 1983 and state-law battery. The district court granted summary judgment in
favor of the officer. The detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that a videotape of the incident
between the detainee and a county jail officer was properly considered by the district court, in determining the officer's
motion for summary judgment, where the detainee's version of events was blatantly contradicted by the videotape. The
court found that the county jail officer's use of a leg-sweep maneuver to bring the pretrial detainee to the floor, which
resulted in the detainee's leg being fractured, did not constitute wanton infliction of pain, and thus, the detainee could
not prevail in her § 1983 Fourteenth Amendment excessive force claim against the officer. The court noted that it was
undisputed that the detainee was acting in a manner, that she attempted to jerk away from the officer, and struggled
with the officer when he attempted to lead her away. It was undisputed that the leg-sweep maneuver was in compliance
with the jail's policies on the use of force. The leg fracture resulted from the accident of another officer collapsing on
the detainee as they both fell to floor. (Davidson County Criminal Justice Center, Tennessee)

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Hanson v. U.S., 712 F.Supp.2d 321 (D.N.J. 2010). An inmate brought a Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) action,
alleging that a Bureau of Prisons (BOP) officer slammed his head on the floor and choked him in an attempt to force
the inmate to spit out contraband that the inmate was attempting to swallow. The government filed a motion for
summary judgment and the district court denied the motion. The court held, for the purposes of the inmate's FTCA

48.84

claim, under New Jersey law the BOP officers employed unreasonable force while attempting to search the inmate for
contraband. According to the court, summary judgment was precluded by material issues of fact regarding whether the
BOP officers used reasonable force in holding and searching the inmate. (Fed. Corr'l Facility in Fort Dix, New Jersey)
U.S. Appeals Court
CELL EXTRACTION
EXCESSIVE FORCE
PEPPER SPRAY

Harvey v. Jordan, 605 F.3d 681 (9th Cir. 2010). An inmate brought a suit alleging that prison officials' use of pepper
spray to extract him from his cell during a building-wide search of all prisoners' cells constituted excessive force and
that his right to due process was denied in connection with a disciplinary charge stemming from his refusal to comply
with the search. The district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part,
reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that the inmate exhausted administrative process, as required by PLRA,
for the claim that he was denied due process in connection with a disciplinary charge when prison officials purported to
grant relief that resolved his grievance to his satisfaction, a hearing and access to a videotape. The court noted that the
inmate was not required to appeal that decision. (Salinas Valley State Prison, California)

U.S. District Court
BRUTALITY
EXCESSIVE FORCE
FAILURE TO
PROTECT

Johnson v. Deloach, 692 F.Supp.2d 1316 (M.D.Ala. 2010). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against prison
supervisory officials and correctional officers, challenging the constitutionality of actions taken against him during his
incarceration. The prisoner alleged that an officer, without justification, repeatedly slapped him about his face and head
causing the back of his head to strike the wall, and the prisoner “became dazed and disoriented....” The officer allegedly
stopped slapping the prisoner and then grabbed the prisoner around his throat and began choking him while shoving his
back and head against the wall. The officer then allegedly stopped choking the prisoner, lifted the prisoner off the floor
and slammed him to the floor causing his back, head and left leg to hit a pole protruding from the wall. According to
the prisoner, two other officers watched these actions and failed to intervene. The district court granted summary
judgment for the defendants in part and denied in part. The court held that state prison officials were absolutely
immune from the prisoner's § 1983 claims brought against them in their official capacities, since Alabama had not
waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity, and Congress had not abrogated Alabama's immunity. The court held that
summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact regarding the need for the use of force against the
state prisoner by a correctional officer and the amount of force used by the officer, as to whether the officer acted
“maliciously and sadistically” to cause harm, and as to whether two other officers witnessed the use of excessive force
and failed to intervene. The court noted that a correctional officer who is present at a scene and who fails to take
reasonable steps to protect the victim of another officer's use of excessive force can be held personally liable under §
1983 for his nonfeasance.(Draper Correctional Facility, Alabama)

U.S. District Court
STUN GUN

Johnson v. Roberts, 721 F.Supp.2d 1017 (D.Kan. 2010). A former county jail inmate brought an action against a
deputy, sheriff, and county board of commissioners, alleging use of excessive force when the deputy used a stun gun on
the inmate. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court held that the use of a
stun gun to subdue the county jail inmate was reasonable and did not violate the inmate's Eighth Amendment rights.
The court noted that the inmate had placed a towel in front of a security camera in violation of a jail rule, and when
deputies responded to the inmate's cell to confiscate the towel and the inmate's property box, the inmate refused to hand
over the box and either dropped or threw the box to the floor and refused an order to pick it up, placing the deputy in
the position of bending down to retrieve the box from directly in front of the noncompliant inmate. The court found that
the use of a stun gun was not a clearly established violation of the Eighth Amendment at the time of the incident and
thus the deputy, sheriff, and county board of commissioners were entitled to qualified immunity. The court noted that
the deputy used the stun gun to ensure the inmate's compliance with orders and not to punish the inmate. (Miami
County Jail, Kansas)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Johnston v. Maha, 606 F.3d 39 (2nd Cir. 2010). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against employees of a county jail,
alleging violations of his constitutional rights and of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) in connection with
detention and medical care while in jail. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The inmate
petitioned for the appointment of counsel in his appeal. The appeals court granted the petition. The court held that the
appointment of counsel was appropriate in connection with the inmate's appeal from dismissal of his claim that his
placement in solitary confinement, and subsequent excessive force he suffered, violated his constitutional rights, since
there was likely merit in the inmate's claims. The court found that it appeared from the inmate's complaint that he might
have been a pretrial detainee at the time he was placed in solitary confinement, and thus the claim that the inmate was
subjected to excessive force as a detainee would arise under the Fifth, not the Eighth Amendment, because as a
detainee he could not be punished at all. The court noted that there was no evidence that the inmate violated any rule or
was provided with a pre-deprivation hearing. According to the court, the legal issues were fairly complex, especially
with respect to whether the inmate's pretrial detention was substantial enough to give rise to a constitutional violation
of a procedural due process right. (Genesee County Jail, New York).

U.S. District Court
CELL EXTRACTION
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Kendrick v. Faust, 682 F.Supp.2d 932 (E.D. Ark. 2010). A female state prison inmate brought a § 1983 action against
employees of the Arkansas Department of Correction (ADC), alleging various violations of her constitutional rights.
The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The
court held that the inmate failed to allege that she sustained an actual injury or that an Arkansas Department of
Correction (ADC) official denied her the opportunity to review her mail prior to its being confiscated, as required to
support a claim that the official violated the inmate's constitutional right of access to the courts and her First
Amendment right to send and receive mail. The court found that an ADC employee's use of force against the inmate
was justified by the inmate's disruptive behavior during the search of her cell and thus did not give rise to the ADC
employee's liability on an excessive force claim. The inmate alleged that the ADC employee grabbed her by the arm,
dragged her from her cell, and threw her into the shower. The court note that there was no medical evidence that the
ADC employee's use of handcuffs caused any permanent injury to the inmate as required to support a claim that the
employee used excessive force against the inmate. The court found that summary judgment was precluded by genuine
issues of material fact as to whether there was a legitimate penological interest for the alleged destruction of the prison

48.85

inmate's bible, precluding summary judgment as to whether ADC employees violated the inmate's right to freedom of
religion by destroying her bible. (Arkansas Department of Corrections)
U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE
RESTRAINTS

Lewis v. Mollette, 752 F.Supp.2d 233 (N.D.N.Y. 2010). A former juvenile inmate at the Office of Child and Family
Services (OCFS) brought a § 1983 action against OCFS employees, alleging use of excessive force and failure to
intervene. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court denied the motion. The court held that
summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to: (1) the events leading up to the use of a
physical restraint technique (PRT) on the juvenile inmate by OCFS employees; (2) the need for a second employee to
assist the first employee with the PRT; and (3) the cause of the arm fracture the inmate sustained during the incident.
(Highland Office of Child and Family Services, New York)

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Molina v. New York, 697 F.Supp.2d 276 (N.D.N.Y. 2010). A juvenile detainee brought an action against a state, its
Office of Children and Family Services (OCFS) that operated a youth correctional facility, state and facility officials,
and detention aides, asserting § 1983 claims and claims of negligence and assault and battery. The defendants moved
for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the juvenile
detainee's allegations that detention aides at the youth correctional facility broke his arm while restraining him were
sufficient to support a plausible Eighth Amendment claim that the aides used excessive force. The court held that the
detainee's allegations that he had to wait approximately 15 hours before being diagnosed and scheduled for surgery
despite the obviousness of his injuries and his own pleading for assistance, were sufficient to state an Eighth
Amendment claim of deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. (Louis Gossett Jr. Resid. Center, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE
STUN GUN

Porro v. Barnes, 624 F.3d 1322 (10th Cir. 2010). An immigration detainee brought a § 1983 excessive force claim
against a jail employee, sheriff, and the sheriff's successor, related to an incident in which a stun gun was used on the
detainee. The district court granted the sheriff's motion for summary judgment and the successor's motion for summary
judgment. The detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the sheriff who was not present
during the incident in which a stun gun was used on the detainee while he was restrained was not liable under § 1983,
where the sheriff did not employ any force on the detainee, was not present when the force was applied, and did not
give any advance approval to the use of the stun gun on the detainee. The court found that the county jail's policy of
training jailers to use stun guns only if and when an inmate should become violent, combative, and pose a direct threat
to the security of staff did not exhibit deliberate indifference to the immigration detainee's due process rights against
the use of excessive force, as required for § 1983 liability. (Jefferson County Jail, Oklahoma)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE
CHEMICAL AGENTS
PEPPER SPRAY

Santiago v. Walls, 599 F.3d 749 (7th Cir. 2010). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against certain officers and
employees of the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC), alleging that they violated his constitutional rights by
failing to protect him from other inmates, failing to provide him with medical care, and retaliating against him for
speaking out against the IDOC. Following a jury trial, the district court entered judgment in favor of the defendants.
The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part. The court held that the
prisoner failed to state a claim against two correctional officers for failure to protect him from attack by an inmate. The
court also found no claim was stated by the prisoner's allegations that one prison official sprayed him with pepper spray
and that, while escorting him to the infirmary, another official “brutally yank[ed] and rip[ped]” backwards on his
handcuffs. But the court held that a claim was stated against the prison warden for failure to protect him from an assault
by his cellmate. The prisoner alleged that the warden knew or should have known that his cellmate had a history of
assaulting his cellmates and that the warden disregarded this risk. Four days prior to his assault, the plaintiff had filed
an emergency grievance with the warden, requesting that his cellmate be placed on his enemy list and that a “cell
change be conducted to prevent a physical confrontation.” According to the appeals court, the district court abused its
discretion in denying the pro se state prisoner's request for counsel under the federal in forma pauperis statute during
the discovery phase of his § 1983 action. The appeals court found that the district court failed to consider the relatively
difficult allegations the prisoner had to prove, the difficulty posed by the prisoner's confinement in another facility
during trial preparation, the prisoner's inability to identify parties and witnesses, and a decidedly uncooperative prison
administration who had the assurances of the magistrate judge that it would not have to worry about a lawyer being
around during the discovery period. The appeals court ruled that the prisoner was prejudiced by district court's denial of
his request for counsel, requiring reversal. (Menard Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Tafari v. McCarthy, 714 F.Supp.2d 317 (N.D.N.Y. 2010). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against employees
of the New York State Department of Correctional Services (DOCS), alleging, among other things, that the employees
violated his constitutional rights by subjecting him to excessive force, destroying his personal property, denying him
medical care, and subjecting him to inhumane conditions of confinement. The employees moved for summary
judgment, and the prisoner moved to file a second amended complaint and to appoint counsel. The court held that a
state prison correctional officer's alleged throwing of urine and feces on the prisoner to wake him up, while certainly
repulsive, was de minimis use of force, and was not sufficiently severe to be considered repugnant to the conscience of
mankind, and thus the officer's conduct did not violate the Eighth Amendment. The court found that officers who were
present in the prisoner's cell when another officer allegedly threw urine and feces on the prisoner lacked a reasonable
opportunity to stop the alleged violation, given the brief and unexpected nature of the incident, and thus the officers
present in the cell could not be held liable for failing to intervene. The court found that even if a correctional officers'
captain failed to thoroughly investigate the alleged incident in which one officer threw urine and feces on the prisoner
to wake him up, such failure to investigate did not violate the prisoner's due process rights, since the prisoner did not
have due process right to a thorough investigation of his grievances.
According to the court, one incident in which state correctional officers allegedly interfered with the prisoner's
outgoing legal mail did not create a cognizable claim under § 1983 for violation of the prisoner's First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights, absent a showing that the prisoner suffered any actual injury, that his access to courts was chilled,
or that his ability to legally represent himself was impaired. The court held that there was no evidence that the state

48.86

prisoner suffered any physical injury as result of an alleged incident in which a correctional officer spit chewing
tobacco in his face, as required to maintain an Eighth Amendment claim based on denial of medical care. The court
found that, even if a state prisoner's right to file prison grievances was protected by the First Amendment, a restriction
limiting the prisoner's filing of grievances to two per week did not violate the prisoner's constitutional rights, since the
prisoner was abusing the grievance program. The court noted that the prisoner filed an exorbitant amount of grievances,
including 115 in a two-month period, most of which were deemed frivolous.
The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether state
correctional officers used excessive force against the prisoner in the course of his transport to a different facility. The
court held that state correctional officers were not entitled to qualified immunity from the prisoner's § 1983 excessive
force claim arising from his alleged beating by officers during his transfer to a different facility, where a reasonable
juror could have concluded that the officers knew or should have known that their conduct violated the prisoner's
Eighth Amendment rights, and it was clearly established that prison official's use of force against an inmate for reasons
that did not serve penological purpose violated the inmate's constitutional rights. The inmate allegedly suffered injuries,
including bruises and superficial lacerations on his body, which the court found did not constitute a serious medical
condition. The court held that state prison officials' alleged retaliatory act of leaving the lights on in the prisoner's cell
in a special housing unit (SHU) 24 hours per day did not amount to cruel and unusual treatment, in violation of the
Eighth Amendment. According to the court, the prisoner failed to demonstrate a causal connection between his conduct
and the adverse action of leaving the lights on 24 hours per day, since the illumination policy applied to all inmates in
SHU, not just the prisoner, and constant illumination was related to a legitimate penological interest in protecting both
guards and inmates in SHU. (N.Y. State Department of Correctional Services, Eastern New York Correctional Facility)
U.S. Appeals Court
CHEMICAL AGENTS
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Thomas v. Bryant, 614 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2010). Inmates incarcerated at the Florida State Prison (FSP) brought a §
1983 action against various officers and employees of the Florida Department of Corrections (DOC), alleging that the
use of chemical agents on inmates with mental illness and other vulnerabilities violated the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. The claims against individual correctional officers responsible for
administering the agents were settled. After a five-day bench trial on the remaining claims against the DOC Secretary
and the FSP warden for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, the district court entered findings of fact and
conclusions of law. The court ended final judgment and a final permanent injunction in the inmates' favor. The
Secretary and warden appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that, notwithstanding his untimely death,
the inmate who obtained declaratory and injunctive relief could still be the “prevailing party” entitled to attorney fees
for the cost of district court litigation under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act (42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1983, 1988.)
The court found that in reaching its conclusion the district court did not clearly err in finding that an inmate was
sprayed with chemical agents at times when he had no capacity to comply with officers' orders because of his mental
illness, or in finding that those sprayings caused the inmate lasting psychological injuries. According to the court, the
repeated non-spontaneous use of chemical agents on an inmate with a serious mental illness constituted an extreme
deprivation sufficient to satisfy the objective prong of the test for an Eighth Amendment violation. The court noted that
the inmate's well-documented history of mental illness and psychotic episodes rendered him unable to comply at the
times he was sprayed, such that the policy was unnecessary and without penological justification in his specific case.
The court found that the DOC’s policy and practice of spraying inmates with chemical agents, as applied to an
inmate who was fully secured in his seven-by-nine-foot steel cell, was not presenting a threat of immediate harm to
himself or others, and was unable to understand and comply with officers' orders due to his mental illness, were
extreme deprivations violating the broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity and decency
embodied in the Eighth Amendment. The court held that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the record
demonstrated that DOC officials acted with deliberate indifference to the severe risk of harm an inmate faced when
officers repeatedly sprayed him with chemical agents for behaviors caused by his mental illness.
The appeals court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that injunctive relief was
warranted and necessary, despite contentions that an inmate was currently incarcerated at a facility where he was not
subject to DOC's chemical agents policy. The court noted that the permanent injunction against violations of the
mentally ill inmate's Eighth Amendment rights from sprayings with chemical agents did not extend further than
necessary to correct a constitutional violation and was not overly intrusive. According to the court, in addition to being
closely tethered to the identified harm, the district court's permanent injunctive relief was narrowly drawn and plainly
adhered to the requirements of Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). (Florida State Prison)

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Vanderburg v. Harrison County, Miss. ex rel. Bd. of Supervisors, 716 F.Supp.2d 482 (S.D.Miss. 2010). A pretrial
detainee brought an action against a county, officials and officers, alleging civil rights violations under § 1983 and
related statutes. A correctional officer moved for summary judgment and for dismissal. The district court granted the
motions in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material
fact, regarding whether the correctional officer acted with malice in allegedly injuring the pretrial detainee and whether
the force used by the correctional officer was objectively reasonable. (Harrison County Adult Detention Center,
Mississippi)
2011

U.S. Appeals Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Alspaugh v. McConnell, 643 F.3d 162 (6th Cir. 2011). A state prisoner filed a civil rights action alleging excessive force
and deliberate indifference against numerous state and private defendants. The district court granted summary
judgment against the prisoner. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The
appeals court held that the prisoner's request for a videotape of a fight was of the nature that it would have changed
legal and factual deficiencies of his civil rights action alleging excessive force, and thus the prisoner was entitled to
production of it, since the videotape would have shown how much force had been used in subduing the prisoner. But
the court held that the prisoner who was alleging excessive force and deliberate indifference was not entitled to the
production of his medical records before considering the state's motion for summary judgment, where the state and
private defendants produced enough evidence to demonstrate that medical personnel were not deliberately indifferent to
his medical needs. (Ionia Maximum Security Correctional Facility, Michigan)

48.87

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE
STUN GUN

Bailey v. Hughes, 815 F.Supp.2d 1246 (M.D.Ala. 2011). A state prisoner brought an action against a county sheriff's
department, a sheriff, corrections officers, and others, alleging unconstitutional deprivations of his rights while in
custody in a county jail. The defendants moved to dismiss and for an award of attorney fees. The district court granted
the motions. The district court held that: (1) neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Fourth Amendment's excessive
force prohibition applied to the sentenced offender; (2) the sheriff and supervisory officials were entitled to qualified
immunity; (3) allegations did not state an Eighth Amendment claim based on jail overcrowding; (4) the officers' alleged
conduct in tasering the prisoner did not violate the Eighth Amendment; (5) allegations did not state a § 1983 claim for
an unconstitutional strip search; (6) placement of the prisoner alone in closet-sized cell for eight hours after the alleged
incident did not amount to unconstitutional confinement; and (7) the officers' alleged conduct in searching the
prisoner's cell did not amount to retaliation for prisoner's prior lawsuit. The court noted that the prisoner admitted that
he repeatedly refused the officers' verbal commands and fled his cell, he was repeatedly warned that he would be
shocked if he did not comply with the officers' commands, and he was shocked by a taser only once before he fled his
cell and then two to three times after he did so. (Houston County Jail, Alabama)

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Barrington v. New York, 806 F.Supp.2d 730 (S.D.N.Y. 2011.) A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against correctional
officers and a state, alleging violation of his constitutional rights as the result of an assault from officers in retaliation
for filing grievances about disciplinary actions taken against him. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The
district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the state was entitled to sovereign
immunity. The court found that the prisoner's § 1983 excessive force suit against correctional officers in their
individual capacities did not implicate a rule against double recovery, under New York law, despite the officers'
contention that the prisoner had already won an excessive force suit in state court against the officers in their official
capacities and now wanted "a second bite at the apple." The court noted that there was no court in which the prisoner
could have brought both an excessive force claim under state law against the state and the officers in their official
capacities and a § 1983 claim against the officers in individual capacities for which punitive damages were available.
The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the prisoner's
filing of a grievance was the motivating factor for the alleged assault by the correctional officers. (Green Haven
Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Bridgewater v. Taylor, 832 F.Supp.2d 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). A New York state prisoner brought a § 1983 action
against prison officials and correctional officers, alleging excessive force, failure to protect, and failure to supervise and
properly train in violation of the Eighth Amendment. After the prisoner's motion for summary judgment against an
officer was preliminarily denied, the prisoner moved for reconsideration and the former prison superintendent and
another officer moved to dismiss. The district court denied the motion for reconsideration and granted the motion to
dismiss. The court held that the prisoner did not properly serve the complaint on the officer or superintendent and that
the prisoner failed to state a failure to protect claim against the officer. The court held that summary judgment was
precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the correctional officer acted with malice or wantonness
toward the prisoner necessary to constitute an Eighth Amendment violation, or whether he was applying force in a
good–faith effort to maintain discipline. The court also found that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues
of material fact as to whether the correctional officer's use of physical force against the prisoner was more than de
minimus. (Sing Sing Correctional Facility New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Hicks v. Norwood, 640 F.3d 839 (8th Cir. 2011). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action against a detention center captain
alleging use of excessive force, and against a lieutenant and sergeant for failing to prevent the use of excessive force.
The district court dismissed the action and the arrestee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the
detention center captain's decision to use force, and the amount of force used in subduing the arrestee during the
booking process were objectively reasonable under the circumstances, and he thus did not violate the arrestee's Fourth
Amendment rights. The court noted that the arrestee refused to comply with directions, loudly abused correctional
officers, and aggressively leapt toward the captain. (Ouachita County Jail, Arkansas)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Hunter v. County of Sacramento, 652 F.3d 1225 (9th Cir. 2011). Former jail inmates brought a § 1983 action against a
county, alleging that they were subjected to excessive force while in custody at the county jail. After a jury verdict in
favor of the county, the district court denied the inmates' motion for a new trial and the inmates appealed. The appeals
court reversed and remanded, ordering a new trial due to the district court’s refusal to submit the inmates’ proposed
instructions to the jury. The court noted that the inmates’ proposed instructions explicitly stating that the county's use of
an unconstitutional practice or custom could be proven through evidence that incidents of excessive force were not
investigated and their perpetrators were not disciplined. (Sacramento County Main Jail, California)

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Jordan v. Fischer, 773 F.Supp.2d 255 (N.D.N.Y. 2011). A state inmate brought a pro se § 1983 action alleging that
corrections officials violated his Eighth Amendment rights through the use of excessive force, failure to intervene, and
deliberate indifference to his medical needs. The parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The district court granted
the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of
material fact as to whether the inmate was subjected to excessive force by correction officers, given the existence of
some medical evidence supporting the inmate's claims of an assault, as well as another inmate's statement that he saw
the plaintiff inmate being pulled out of line, which was inconsistent with the correction officer's statements. The court
found that the alleged “sexual slurs” made to the inmate by a prison nurse did not rise to the level of an Eighth
Amendment violation even if the inmate felt insulted or harassed, where the inmate alleged that the nurse, while
inspecting the inmate's injuries, asked him how much the inmate could bench press and told him he had nice muscles.
(Great Meadow Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE
RESTRAINTS

Maraj v. Massachusetts, 836 F.Supp.2d 17 (D.Mass. 2011). The mother of a deceased inmate brought an action, as
administratrix of the inmate's estate, against the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, a county sheriff's department, a
county sheriff, and corrections officers, alleging that the defendants violated the inmate's Fourth and Fourteenth

48.88

Amendment rights. She also brought common law claims of wrongful death, negligence, and assault and battery. The
defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state claim. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part.
The court held that the Commonwealth, in enacting legislation effectuating the assumption of county sheriff's
department by the Commonwealth, did not waive sovereign immunity as to § 1983 claims filed against the
Commonwealth, the department, and corrections officers in their official capacities after the transfer took effect. The
court found that the correction officers who were no longer participating in the transfer of the inmate at the time inmate
first resisted and the officers who took the first responsive measure by “double locking” the inmate's handcuffs were
not subject to liability in their individual capacities as to the § 1983 substantive due process claim brought by inmate's
mother arising from the inmate's death following the transfer. According to the court, corrections officers who applied
physical force to the resisting inmate during the transfer of the inmate, or were present when the inmate was
unresponsive and requiring medical attention, were subject to liability, in their individual capacities, as to the § 1983
substantive due process claim brought by the inmate's mother. The court held that the county sheriff and corrections
officers who participated in the transfer of the inmate, who died following the transfer, were immune from negligence
and wrongful death claims brought by the inmate's mother under the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act (MTCA) provision
which categorically protected public employees acting within the scope of their employment from liability for
“personal injury or death” caused by their individual negligence. But the court found that the mother properly alleged
that county corrections officers' contact with the inmate amounted to excessive force, and that a supervisor instructed
the use of excessive force, as required to state a claim for assault and battery, under Massachusetts law, against the
officers. (South Bay House of Correction, Suffolk County, Massachusetts)
U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Plair v. City of New York, 789 F.Supp.2d 459 (S.D.N.Y. 2011.) A pre-trial detainee at an adolescent jail brought an
action against a city, city officials, and corrections officers, asserting claims under § 1983 and state law arising from an
incident in which an officer allegedly punched him in the face. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court
granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the detainee failed to state excessive force claims
against supervisory officials and a § 1983 claim against the city. The court found that correctional officers and
supervisors did not have immunity under New York law from state law claims and the city did not have immunity
under New York law from state law claims brought on the respondeat superior basis. The court held that the
determination of whether the pretrial detainee's claim against the city for its negligent hiring, training, and retention of
officers and supervisors allegedly involved in the detainee's beating could not be resolved at the motion to dismiss
phase because of factual issues as to whether the actions of these officers and supervisors were undertaken in the scope
of their employment. (Robert N. Davoren Center, Rikers Island, New York City)

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE
CHEMICAL AGENT

Thorpe v. Little, 804 F.Supp.2d 174 (D.Del. 2011.) A pretrial detainee, proceeding in forma pauperis, brought a § 1983
action against a prison, prison officials, and prison medical personnel, alleging violations of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), Civil Rights Act, Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), and supplemental
state law claims. The detainee moved to show cause and for transfer to a different institution. The district court denied
the motions and dismissed the claims in part. The court held that the prison did not violate the pretrial detainee's First
Amendment right of access to courts by only allowing the detainee to receive legal services from the prison law library
through written requests, where the detainee was provided access to courts if he merely submitted a written request, and
the detainee was represented by a public defender. The court held that the detainee’s complaint, alleging that a
corrections officer sprayed him in the face with pepper spray when he did not comply with the officer's order, stated a
claim for excessive force, as would violate the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. The detainee was maced
when he would not allow correctional officers to leave his food tray on the cell window flap. The macing caused vision
loss and facial irritation. Following the incident, the detainee was taken to isolation where he remained for the next
fifteen days. He received a disciplinary write-up for this incident and was found guilty. (James T. Vaughn Correctional
Center, Smyrna, Delaware)
2012

U.S. Appeals Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Beaulieu v. Ludeman, 690 F.3d 1017 (8th Cir. 2012). Patients who were civilly committed to the Minnesota Sex
Offender Program (MSOP) brought a § 1983 action against Minnesota Department of Human Services (DHS) officials
and Minnesota Department of Corrections (DOC) officials, alleging that various MSOP policies and practices relating
to the patients' conditions of confinement were unconstitutional. The district court granted summary judgment in favor
of the defendants and the patients appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that: (1) the MSOP
policy of performing unclothed body searches of patients was not unreasonable; (2) the policy of placing full restraints
on patients during transport was not unreasonable; (3) officials were not liable for using excessive force in handcuffing
patients; (4) the officials' seizure of televisions from the patients' rooms was not unreasonable; (5) the MSOP
telephone-use policy did not violate the First Amendment; and (6) there was no evidence that officials were
deliberately indifferent to the patients' health or safety. (Minnesota Sex Offender Program)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Bernini v. City of St. Paul, 665 F.3d 997 (8th Cir. 2012). Thirty-two arrestees filed a § 1983 action against a city and
police officers in their individual capacities for allegedly violating the First and Fourth Amendments by detentions and
arrests, on the first day of the Republican National Convention. The charges were ultimately dismissed. The district
court granted the city and the officers summary judgment and the arrestees appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The
court held that police officers' brief detention of seven members of a group at a park during the Republican National
Convention comported with Fourth Amendment reasonableness requirements for investigative detention, since the
group members were detained only while the officers sought to determine which members were involved in a prior
confrontation with officers at an intersection.
The court found that the officers had arguable probable cause for the mass arrest of 160 people in the park, based on
an objectively reasonable mistaken belief that all 160 people were part of a unit of 100 protestors that officers had
probable cause to believe had committed third-degree riot and unlawful assembly in violation of Minnesota law.
According to the court, the officers' deployment of non-lethal munitions, as authorized by the lead sergeant

48.89

commanding mobile field force operations during the confrontation with a crowd at the Republican National
Convention, was not excessive force, under the Fourth Amendment, since officers reasonably believed that the
noncompliant crowd intended to penetrate a police line blocking access to the downtown. (City of St. Paul, Minnesota)
U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE
PEPPER SPRAY

Covarrubias v. Wallace, 907 F.Supp.2d 808 (E.D.Tex. 2012). A state prisoner brought a pro se § 1983 action against
prison guards and officials complaining of alleged violations of his constitutional rights, in connection with an alleged
assault by guards and a subsequent disciplinary hearing. The district court held that: (1) picket officers could not be
held liable under a supervisory liability theory for failing to intervene when the prisoner was subjected to pepper spray,
where even if they had authority to intervene, they did not have a realistic opportunity to intervene; (2) the punishments
imposed on the prisoner for assaulting a guard did not violate any due process liberty interest; (3) denial of the
prisoner's grievance did not violate any due process liberty interest; and (4) the prisoner failed to state an Eighth
Amendment claim for disregarding an excessive risk to his health or safety. But the court found that the prisoner's
allegations, that corrections officers used excessive force against him in retaliation for requesting a supervisor and for
attempts to informally resolve a complaint, stated § 1983 claims against the officers. The prisoner alleged that as he
was being restrained, one officer fired a two- to three-second burst of pepper spray into his right eye, and the officers
subsequently tackled him, using their elbows, knees, arms, and hands on his back, legs, arms, and face as they piled on
him and pressed his face into the concrete. (Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division,
Beto Unit)

U.S. Appeals Court
DEADLY FORCE

Gomez v. Randle, 680 F.3d 859 (7th Cir. 2012). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging excessive force, deliberate
indifference to his serious medical condition, and retaliation for filing a grievance. After appointing counsel for the
inmate and allowing him to proceed in forma pauperis, the district court granted an attorney's motion to withdraw and
dismissed the case. The inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court
held that the statutory period for the inmate to file a § 1983 action alleging that an unidentified corrections officer who
fired two rounds from shotgun into the inmate population violated an Eighth Amendment's prohibition against
excessive force was tolled while the inmate completed the administrative grievance process. The court held that the
issue of when the inmate completed the prison's grievance process with regard to his claim involved fact issues that
could not be resolved on a motion to dismiss. According to the court, the inmate's allegation that an unidentified
corrections officer fired two rounds from a shotgun into inmates who were not involved in an ongoing altercation was
sufficient to state an excessive force claim under the Eighth Amendment.
The court found that the inmate's allegations that he suffered a shotgun wound that caused excessive bruising and
bleeding, that prison officials waited four days before treating his wound, and that he experienced prolonged,
unnecessary pain as result of a readily treatable condition, were sufficient to state a claim for deliberate indifference to
his serious medical condition, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The court found that the inmate's allegations that
he used the prison's grievance system to address his injury and lack of treatment he received following his injury, that
he was transferred to a correctional center where he had known enemies when he refused to drop his grievance, and
that there was no other explanation for his transfer, were sufficient to state a claim of retaliation in violation of his First
Amendment right to use a prison grievance system. (Illinois Department of Corrections, Stateville Correctional Center)

U.S. Appeals Court
RESTRAINTS

Gruenberg v. Gempeler, 697 F.3d 573 (7th Cir. 2012). A state prisoner, proceeding pro se, filed a § 1983 action against
various prison officials, guards, and medical staff, alleging violations of the Eighth Amendment. The district court
granted summary judgment for the defendants. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court
held that: (1) the prisoner did not have a clearly established right to not be continually restrained without clothing or
cover in a cell for five days following his ingestion of a handcuff key, the master key for belt restraints, and the key
used for opening cell doors, where restraint had been imposed to keep the prisoner from re-ingesting those keys; (2) the
continuous restraint of the prisoner without clothing or cover in a cell for five days did not violate his Fourteenth
Amendment due process rights; (3) the prisoner's Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment substantive due
process claims were barred; and (4) the district court did not abuse its discretion by ruling that the prisoner was
competent to advance his case and was not entitled to appointed counsel. (Waupun Correction Institution, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Jackson v. Gandy, 877 F.Supp.2d 159 (D.N.J. 2012). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a department of
corrections, corrections officers, and prison officials, alleging violations of his Eighth Amendment right against cruel
and unusual punishment. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part
and denied in part. The court held that there was no evidence that prison officials were personally involved in a
corrections officers' alleged assault on the state prisoner, as required to establish supervisory liability against the
officials under § 1983, despite defense counsel's bare assertions of deliberate indifference and notice of assaultive
history. The court ruled that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the
force used by corrections officers to subdue the prisoner was excessive and in violation of Eighth Amendment, and
whether a corrections officer participated in the alleged assault on the prisoner. The court held that the corrections
officers were not entitled to qualified immunity where the prisoner's complaint alleged a violation of the constitutional
right to be free from unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, and such right was clearly established at the time of the
officers' alleged misconduct. The court also held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether the prisoner exhausted his administrative remedies regarding the excessive force claim against
corrections officials in accordance with the requirements of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). (N.J.
Department of Corrections, Bayside State Prison)

U.S. District Court
BRUTALITY
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Morrison v. Hartman, 898 F.Supp.2d 577 (W.D.N.Y. 2012). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against several
state corrections officers, alleging use of excessive force and sexual and verbal abuse in violation of his Eighth
Amendment rights. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and
denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether,
and to what extent, the corrections officers' alleged beating of the prisoner caused injuries or exacerbated pre–existing
injuries, and whether the officers acted in a good–faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or rather with malicious

48.90

and sadistic intent to cause harm. The court found that the prisoner's allegations that a corrections officer pinched his
left nipple and forced him to touch his own buttocks and then his mouth were not severe enough to be considered
objectively and sufficiently serious to support the prisoner's § 1983 claim of sexual abuse in violation of his Eighth
Amendment rights. According to the court, the prisoner's allegations of verbal abuse by a corrections officer during an
incident in which officers allegedly beat the prisoner did not state an independent § 1983 claim for violation of his
Eighth Amendment rights, but those allegations were potentially admissible in support of the prisoner's excessive force
claim against the officer in relation to the beating. (Attica Correctional Facility, New York)
U.S. Appeals Court
CELL EXTRACTION
PEPPER SPRAY
RESTRAINING
CHAIR

Rice ex rel. Rice v. Correctional Medical Services, 675 F.3d 650 (7th Cir. 2012). Following a pretrial detainee's death
while incarcerated, his parents, representing his estate filed suit pursuant to § 1983, alleging among other things that
jail officials and medical personnel had deprived the pretrial detainee of due process by exhibiting deliberate
indifference to his declining mental and physical condition. The district court entered summary judgment against the
estate. The estate filed a second suit reasserting the state wrongful death claims that the judge in the first suit had
dismissed without prejudice after disposing of the federal claims. The district court dismissed that case on the basis of
collateral estoppel, and the estate appealed both judgments. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded. The appeals court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to
whether jail officials were deliberately indifferent to the pretrial detainee's conditions of confinement, and whether his
conditions of confinement were sufficiently serious to support his Fourteenth Amendment due process claim. The court
noted that whether the detainee himself created the unsanitary conditions was a fact relevant to the claim, but given
detainee's mental condition, it did not foreclose the claim. The court held that jail officials did not employ excessive
force, in violation of due process, to the pretrial detainee who had been fighting with his cellmate and failed to comply
with a directive that he step out of his cell which he refused to leave for 18 hours, by spraying his face with pepper
foam, and placing him in a restraint chair.
The court found that neither jail guards or supervisors were deliberately indifferent to the risk that the mentally ill
pretrial detainee might engage in a behavior such as compulsive water drinking that would cause him to die within a
matter of hours and did not consciously disregarded that risk, and therefore they were not liable for his death under §
1983. According to the court, while a factfinder might conclude that the guards exhibited a generalized recklessness
with respect to the safety of the inmates housed in the administrative segregation unit by failing to conduct hourly
checks of the unit, there was no evidence that the guards or supervisors were subjectively aware of the possibility that
the detainee might injure himself to the point of death before anyone could intervene. (Elkhart County Jail, Indiana)

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE
RESTRAINING
CHAIR

Stanfill v. Talton, 851 F.Supp.2d 1346 (M.D.Ga. 2012). The father of a pretrial detainee who died while in custody at a
county jail brought a § 1983 action individually, and as administrator of the detainee's estate, against a county sheriff
and others, alleging that the defendants violated the detainee's rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth amendments. The
county defendants moved for summary judgment, and the father cross-moved for partial summary judgment and for
sanctions. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court held that the father failed
to establish that the county defendants had a duty to preserve any video of the detainee in his cells, as would support
sanctions against the defendants in the father's civil rights action. The court noted that the defendants did not anticipate
litigation resulting from the detainee's death, the father did not file suit until almost two years after the detainee's death,
and there was no indication that the father requested that the defendants impose a litigation hold or provided the
defendants any form of notice that litigation was imminent or even contemplated until the lawsuit was actually filed.
The court found that county correctional officers' use of force in placing the detainee in a restraint chair was not
excessive, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, where less than one hour before the detainee was placed in the
chair he had tied tourniquet around his arm, somehow removed metal button from his prison jumpsuit, cut his wrist or
arm, and sprayed blood across his cell. The court noted that the officers were familiar with the inmate's history of selfmutilation, and the extent of injury inflicted by the officers' use of the chair was minimal, and the officers made some
effort to temper the severity of their use of force. After the detainee was placed back in the restraint chair, he was given
water, and a jail nurse, at one officer's request, took the inmate's blood pressure, pulse, and breathing rate, and
determined that the detainee appeared in normal health and needed no further medical care.
The court also held that the officers' continued restraint of the detainee in the restraint chair was not excessive, as
would violate the Fourteenth Amendment where the officers were aware of detainee's history of self-mutilation, the
detainee posed a serious risk of harm to himself, and the particular circumstances confronting the officers justified the
continued use of restraints until the officers were reasonably assured that the situation had abated. The court concluded
that there was no causal connection between the county correctional officers' alleged indifference to the detainee's
medical needs and detainee's death while in custody at the county jail, as would support a Fourteenth Amendment
deliberate indifference claim brought by the detainee's father. The court noted that the father's medical expert opined
that the detainee's death was not causally related to his restraint in the chair, and although the expert listed dehydration
as a contributing cause of the detainee's sudden cardiac dysrhythmia that led to the detainee's death, the expert did not
testify that the detainee would have survived had he not been dehydrated. (Houston County Detention Center, Georgia)

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE
FAILURE TO
PROTECT

Taylor v. Hale, 909 F.Supp.2d 1320 (N.D.Ala. 2012). A pretrial detainee brought § 1983 and Bivens actions against
county deputy sheriffs and deputy United States marshals alleging they used excessive force against him. The
defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion and denied in part. The court held that
summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether county deputy sheriffs used more
force than was necessary to subdue the detainee and place him in a holding cell. The court also found that summary
judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether one county deputy sheriff, and a United
States Marshal, failed to protect the detainee from an alleged use of excessive force by two other deputy sheriffs.
According to the court, a deputy sheriff’s and a United States Marshal’s alleged conduct of failing to intervene when
she witnessed two other deputy sheriffs use excessive force against the detainee violated the clearly established duty of
officers to protect inmates in their care from assault by fellow officers, and thus, they were not entitled to qualified
immunity on the detainee's § 1983 claim against her, alleging deliberate indifference to a substantial danger to the

48.91

detainee in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights. During the booking process, a deputy allegedly forced the
detainee to the floor on his stomach with a “combination of repetitious blows to the temple, jaw, neck, and ribs” and he
was then handcuffed dragged to the holding cell where the beating continued. (Jefferson County Jail, Birmingham,
Alabama)
2013
U.S. Appeals Court
RESTRAINING
CHAIR
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Blackmon v. Sutton, 734 F.3d 1237 (10th Cir. 2013). A former juvenile pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against
various members of a juvenile detention center's staff, alleging they violated the Fourteenth Amendment rights
guaranteed to him as a pretrial detainee. The district court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment based
on qualified immunity. The defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, and reversed in part. The court
held that the eleven-year-old pretrial detainee's right to be free from punishment altogether was clearly established at
the time the staff allegedly used a chair bearing wrist, waist, chest, and ankle restraints to punish detainee, for the
purposes of the juvenile detention center's staff's qualified immunity defense. According to the court, the senior
correctional officer approved a decision by one of his subordinates, a fully grown man, to sit on the chest of the elevenyear-old without any penological purpose. The court found that the detainee’s Fourteenth Amendment due process
rights were violated when employees allegedly failed to provide the eleven-year-old detainee with any meaningful
mental health care despite his obvious need for it. The court noted that prison officials who assumed a “gate keeping”
authority over the prisoner’s access to medical professionals were deliberately indifferent to the detainee's medical
needs when they denied or delayed access to medical care. But the court also held that the detainee's alleged right to be
placed in a particular facility of his choice while awaiting trial was not clearly established at the time the director failed
to transfer detainee to a nearby shelter, for purposes of the juvenile detention center director's qualified immunity
defense.. The court stated: “Weeks before eleven-year-old, 4'11," 96–pound Brandon Blackmon arrived at the juvenile
detention center in Sedgwick, Kansas, officials there made a new purchase: the Pro–Straint Restraining Chair, Violent
Prisoner Chair Model RC–1200LX. The chair bore wrist, waist, chest, and ankle restraints. In the months that followed,
the staff made liberal use of their new acquisition on the center's youngest and smallest charge. Sometimes in a
legitimate effort to thwart his attempts at suicide and self-harm. But sometimes, it seems, only to punish him. And that's
the nub of this lawsuit.” (Juvenile Residential Facility, Sedgwick County, Kansas)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE
FAILURE TO
PROTECT

Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462 (6th Cir. 2013). An arrestee brought an action under § 1983 against a county board of
commissioners, sheriff, deputies, and jail nurse, alleging violations of his constitutional rights during his arrest. The
defendants moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the motion. The arrestee appealed. The appeals
court affirmed in part, vacated in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The appeals court held that: (1) a genuine issue
of material fact existed as to whether the force used against the arrestee was reasonable; (2) a corrections officer and
the jail nurse were not liable for failure to prevent deputy sheriffs from using excessive force, absent a showing that the
nurse and officer had both the opportunity and the means to prevent the harm from occurring; (3) the nurse was not
liable for deliberate indifference to the arrestee's medical needs, where the arrestee's latent cranial injury was not so
obvious that a lay person would easily have recognized the necessity for a doctor's attention; (4) the county board of
commissioners was not liable under § 1983 for any alleged conduct of deputy sheriffs in violating the arrestee's federal
constitutional rights, absent a showing that any county policy or custom was the moving force behind the alleged
violations; (5) a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether a deputy sheriffs' use of force against the arrestee
was reckless under Ohio law; (6) a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether a deputy sheriff assaulted the
arrestee in response to an off-color jibe; and (7) genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the county board
of commissioners, sheriff, and deputies knew that litigation was probable and whether their destruction of videotape
evidence of deputies' use of force against the arrestee was willful. The court also found that the jail nurse did not act
with malice and in a wanton and willful manner in allowing the arrestee to sit in a county jail cell for 12 hours with
serious injuries, where the nurse attended to the arrestee, assessed what she perceived to be minor injuries, provided
him with ibuprofen for his pain, and advised him he could contact someone for further medical assistance if necessary.
(Greene County Jail, Ohio)

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE
PEPPER SPRAY

Chennault v. Mitchell, 923 F.Supp.2d 765 (E.D.Va. 2013). The guardian for an incapacitated former pretrial detainee
filed § 1983 action against a former sheriff and former officers of the sheriff's department for alleged violation of the
detainee's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process, by deliberate indifference to her medical needs that resulted in
her permanent brain damage from an attempted suicide. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted
the motion. The court held that sheriff's department officers were not deliberately indifferent to the serious medical
needs of the detainee, as required to support the detainee's § 1983 claim for violation of her Fourteenth Amendment
due process rights, where the officers had no knowledge or even any reason to suspect that the detainee presented a risk
of suicide, rather than merely a risk of violent behavior towards officers. According to the court, the sheriff's
department officers' pepper spraying of the detainee due to her violent behavior toward the officers, and then failing to
decontaminate her, did not establish that the officers knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of harm to the detainee,
where the officers did not know or have reason to believe that the detainee was suicidal at the time that she was
sprayed, the detainee did not allege that the use of spray was unnecessary or excessive in amount, and the detainee did
not exhibit any adverse reactions to the spray or to the lack of decontamination.
The court found that the sheriff's department officers' failure to support the detainee's body and/or neck when they
cut her shirt on which she hung herself on cell bars in an attempted suicide did not constitute deliberate indifference to
her serious medical needs in violation of her Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The court noted that, even
though the detainee's injuries were increased from sliding down cell bars and forcibly striking her head on the cell door,
the officers faced an emergency and needed to act quickly and decisively to save the detainee's life. According to the
court, their actions “…were not only reasonable in this situation, but laudable.” The court held that the detainee's §
1983 claim that the sheriff failed to train jail personnel, to ensure they could adequately respond to the medical needs of
combative and/or intoxicated detainees, was foreclosed by the lack of a Fourteenth Amendment violation by jail
personnel and a lack of a causal link between the sheriff's policies and the detainee's attempted suicide, where jail

48.92

personnel were not deliberately indifferent to the detainee's medical needs in violation of the detainee's due process
rights, and there was no pattern of unconstitutional violations resulting in suicides or attempted suicides. (Richmond
City Jail Annex, Virginia)
U.S. District Court
BRUTALITY
EXCESSIVE FORCE
PEPPER SPRAY

Christie ex rel. estate of Christie v. Scott, 923 F.Supp.2d 1308 (M.D.Fla. 2013). An estate brought a § 1983 action
against a private prison health services provider and corrections officers following the death of a detainee after he was
pepper-sprayed over 12 times in 36 hours. The provider moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the
motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material
fact as to: (1) whether failure of the nurses to inspect the detainee after each time he was pepper-sprayed constituted
deliberate indifference; (2) whether the sheriff knew that corrections officers were using pepper spray nearly
indiscriminately; (3) whether corrections officers were deliberately indifferent to the detainee's physical and medical
needs; and (4) whether corrections officers' repeated pepper-spraying of the detainee while he was restrained naked in a
chair was malicious and sadistic to the point of shocking the conscience. The court found that the health services
provider did not have a policy of understaffing that constituted deliberate indifference to the detainee’s health, as
required to support a § 1983 claim against the private provider. (Lee County Jail, Florida)

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Clay v. Woodbury County, Iowa, 982 F.Supp.2d 904 (N.D.Iowa 2013). A female arrestee brought a § 1983 action
against a city, an arresting officer, county, county sheriff, and jail officers, alleging, among other things, that jail
officers “strip searched” her without reasonable suspicion and in unconstitutional manner, and did so in retaliation for
her vociferous complaints about her detention and the search of her purse and cell phone. The defendants moved for
summary judgment, and the arrestee moved to exclude expert testimony. The district court held that the expert's
reference to an incorrect standard for the excessive force claim did not warrant excluding his opinions in their entirety,
although portions of the expert's report were inadmissible.
The court found that the incident in which male and female county jail officers forcibly removed the female
arrestee's under-wire bra and changed her into jail attire was not a “strip search” within the meaning of the Iowa law
which defined a “strip search” as “having a person remove or arrange some or all of the person's clothing so as to
permit an inspection of the genitalia, buttocks, female breasts or undergarments of that person or a physical probe by
any body cavity,” where there was no indication that the officers inspected the arrestee's private parts or physically
probed any of her body cavities. The court also found that the arrestee whose clothing was forcibly removed in the
presence of male and female county jail officers in a holding cell after the arrestee refused to answer questions during
the booking process and to remove her clothing herself, was not subjected to a “strip search” requiring reasonable
suspicion under the Fourth Amendment. According to the court, the officers did not violate the arrestee’s privacy rights
under the Fourth Amendment where the officers' reason for removing the arrestee's bra-- institutional safety-- was
substantially justified, and the scope of the intrusion was relatively small. The court also found that the officers were
entitled to qualified immunity from the female arrestee's § 1983 unlawful search claim, where the officers neither
knew, nor reasonably should have known, that their actions would violate the arrestee's privacy rights. The court held
that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the amount of force used by
female county jail officers during the booking process to forcibly remove the female arrestee's under-wire bra and
change her into jail attire after the arrestee refused to answer questions, became disruptive, and refused to remove her
clothing herself, was reasonable. The officers allegedly threw the arrestee onto the cell bunk, causing her to bang her
head against the bunk or cell wall. The court found that male county jail officers did not use excessive force, within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment, in restraining the female arrestee in a holding cell after the female officers had
allegedly thrown the arrestee onto a cell bunk, causing her to bang her head against bunk or cell wall, in an effort to
forcibly remove the arrestee's clothing and to change her into jail attire. (Woodbury County Jail, Iowa)

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Davis v. Pickell, 939 F.Supp.2d 771 (E.D.Mich. 2013). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against a sheriff,
undersheriff, and deputies, alleging various claims, including excessive force. The defendants moved for summary
judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The detainee had been booked into a holding
cell at the jail and then he was removed from the multi-prisoner cell and taken to a single-inmate “safety cell.” He
alleges that during the transfer, deputy sheriffs subjected him to excessive force in the course of removing his jacket
and shoes. The district court found that “[T]he videotape provides substance to those allegations.” The court held that
summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the deputies' use of force against the
detainee shocked the conscience, whether the deputies maliciously used force, and whether the use of force on the
detainee was outrageous conduct. (Genesee County Jail, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
DISTURBANCE
DOGS
EXCESSIVE FORCE
PRETRIAL
DETAINEE

Eason v. Frye, 972 F.Supp.2d 935 (S.D.Miss. 2013). A pretrial detainee brought a pro se § 1983 action against an
officer and a sheriff, alleging that the officer used excessive force by releasing his canine while responding to a fight
between the detainee and another inmate, and that he did not receive immediate medical attention after the incident.
The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The district court held that: (1) the
detainee failed to allege that the sheriff was personally involved in the dog bite incident, as required for § 1983
liability; (2) the officer did not use excessive force; (3) prison officials were not deliberately indifferent to the
detainee's serious medical needs where there was no evidence that the officials refused to treat the detainee, ignored his
complaints, or intentionally treated him incorrectly; (4) the detainee failed to state a § 1983 failure to train or supervise
claim; (5) the sheriff was entitled to qualified immunity from the failure to train claim, where the detainee made no
specific allegations about how the sheriff was unreasonable in his training and supervising methods; and (6) the
detainee could not maintain a claim for mental or emotional suffering. The court noted that the detainee refused to stop
fighting when the officer ordered him to stop, thus causing an obvious threat to security. In response, the officer applied
the amount of force necessary to restore order on the tier, and as soon as the detainee went to the ground and stopped
fighting, the officer ordered the dog to release its grip. The detainee suffered a minor injury when he was bitten by the
dog. According to the court, the detainee made no specific allegations regarding how the training and supervision
program at the detention facility was inadequate or defective, he contended that his numerous complaints and
grievances went unanswered but provided no evidence of inadequate training or supervision, and he made no allegation

48.93

of an official policy that caused the allegedly inadequate training and supervision. (Harrison County Adult Detention
Center, Mississippi)
U.S. Appeals Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE
PEPPER SPRAY

Furnace v. Sullivan, 705 F.3d 1021 (9th Cir. 2013). A state prison inmate brought a § 1983 action against correctional
officers, alleging they used excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment by spraying him with an excessive
quantity of pepper spray, and that they violated his rights to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment rights
when they denied him a vegetarian breakfast as required by his religion. The officers moved for summary judgment.
The district court granted the motions, and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part,
and remanded. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether
the inmate posed a threat to correctional officers, and as to whether the officers' discharge of pepper spray on the
inmate was required to gain his compliance. The court found that correctional officers who refused to provide the
inmate with a vegetarian meal required by his religion did not treat the inmate any differently than others who were
similarly situated, and thus the officers did not violate the inmate's Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection.
The court noted that although other prisoners were provided with vegetarian meals for religious reasons, they were not
similarly situated to the inmate because the officers did not know the inmate had also been approved for a vegetarian
meal. (Salinas Valley State Prison, California)

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Gwathney v. Warren, 930 F.Supp.2d 1313 (M.D.Ala. 2013). An inmate filed a Bivens suit against a prison officer and
others for use of excessive force during a pat-down search, alleging violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment, and other claims. All claims except the excessive use of force claim were
dismissed. The officer filed a renewed motion to dismiss on the grounds of qualified immunity, or in the alternative for
summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the officer. The court held that evidence
did not create a fact issue as to whether the prison official maliciously or sadistically inflicted pain on the inmate while
conducting a pat-down search, as required for the inmate to survive summary judgment on the defense of qualified
immunity. According to the court, when the officer entered the inmate's cubicle, he observed the inmate rise from his
bunk, turn, and place his hand down front of his pants, which typically signaled that an inmate was trying to conceal an
object. The inmate was facing away from the officer when the officer began the pat-down and thus, the inmate could
not observe any expression or movement suggesting that the officer had any malicious motive in touching the inmate's
shoulders. Even after the inmate fell to his knees from post-surgery shoulder pain, the officer's statement “[o]h, you still
can't raise your arm” did not indicate malice for the sole purpose of inflicting pain, but rather supported an inference
that the officer still did not believe the inmate's assertion about shoulder surgery and that he could not raise his arm.
(Federal Prison Camp, Montgomery, Alabama)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
RESTRAINTS

Maraj v. Massachusetts, 953 F.Supp.2d 325 (D.Mass. 2013). The estate of a deceased inmate brought a § 1983
excessive-force action against county corrections officers and others, alleging that they used excessive force and were
deliberately indifferent to the inmate’s medical needs, in violation of the Constitution. The district court partially
granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss and the defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted
the motion. The defendants allegedly caused the inmate's death by using an emergency restraint belt and delaying
medical treatment, but a prison medical examiner determined that the inmate had a pre-existing heart condition that
ultimately led to the inmate's cardiac arrest, and the manner of death could not be determined. (Suffolk County House
of Correction, Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Moses v. Westchester County Dept. of Corrections, 951 F.Supp.2d 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). The estate of a deceased
prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a county, its department of corrections (DOC), and a corrections officer,
alleging state and federal claims after the prisoner was beaten by the officer. The defendants moved to dismiss. The
district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court found that the family exercised reasonable
diligence in pursuing the action, as required to equitably toll the limitations period for the § 1983 action. The estate
alleged that the corrections officer “kicked and stomped” on the prisoner’s head, causing injuries that eventually led to
his death. The officer was indicted in county court for assault and the Federal Bureau of Investigations opened an
investigation into allegations that the officer had used excessive force against the prisoner. The officer was eventually
convicted of reckless assault. The prisoner’s death also prompted a federal investigation into conditions at the jail, and
investigators found a number of instances of the use of excessive force by jail staff, a failure to provide an adequate
review system, and a failure to provide adequate mental and medical health care. (Westchester Department of
Corrections, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Navejar v. Iyiola, 718 F.3d 692 (7th Cir. 2013). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against prison guards claiming that
the guards used excessive force to subdue him after he punched a prison guard. The district court granted summary
judgment for the guards. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The appeals court held that
the trial court abused its discretion in denying the prisoner's request for the appointment of counsel under the federal in
forma pauperis statute in the prisoner's § 1983 action, where the court focused on the prisoner's competency to try his
case instead of whether the prisoner appeared competent to litigate his own claims. The appeals court found that the
trial court failed to address the prisoner's personal abilities and allegations that he had limited education, mental illness,
language difficulties, and lacked access to other resources, and the court applied the appellate review standard of
whether the recruitment of counsel would affect the outcome of the case. (Stateville Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
BRUTALITY
FAILURE TO
PROTECT
THREATENING

Randle v. Alexander, 960 F.Supp.2d 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). An African-American state inmate with a history of serious
mental illness brought an action against officials of the New York State Department of Corrections and Community
Supervision (DOCCS), correctional officers, and mental health personnel, alleging under § 1983 that the defendants
were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs and that he was retaliated against, in violation of his First
Amendment rights, among other claims. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part
and denied in part. The court held that the correctional officers' alleged actions in forcing the inmate to fight a fellow
inmate, and threatening to beat the inmate with a baton and engage in a joint cover-up if the two inmates did not

48.94

“finish” their fight within a specified area of the prison, which ultimately resulted in the fellow inmate sustaining fatal
injuries in the fight, had no legitimate penological purpose, and was far afield of the species of force employed to
restore or maintain discipline. The court held that the alleged actions reflected indifference to inmate safety, if not
malice toward the inmate, as supported the inmate's § 1983 Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim. According to
the court, the alleged forced fight between the inmate and a fellow inmate, orchestrated, condoned, and covered up by
correctional officers was an objectively serious violation of the inmate's Eighth Amendment right to reasonably safe
conditions of confinement, and the intent evinced by such activity was, at the very least, one of indifference to inmate
safety, supporting the inmate's § 1983 Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim against the officers.
The court held that the African-American state inmate's allegations in his complaint that a correctional officer
arranged inmates in his company so that white inmates were close to officers' posts, whereas black inmates were placed
further away, that white inmates were given superior jobs, that the officer's efforts in forcing a fight between the inmate
and a fellow inmate were done purposefully for his amusement because both inmates were black, and that the officer's
treatment of the inmate and other black inmates was motivated by his intent to discriminate on the basis of race and
malicious intent to injure inmates, stated a § 1983 equal protection claim against the officer. The court ruled that the
correctional officers were not entitled to qualified immunity from the inmate's § 1983 Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendment claims because inmates had a clearly established right to remain incarcerated in reasonably safe
conditions, and it was objectively unreasonable to threaten inmates until they agreed to fight each other in front of
prison officials.
The court found that the inmate stated an Eighth Amendment inadequate medical care claim against mental health
personnel. The inmate alleged that he had a history of serious mental illness, that his symptoms increased following a
forced fight with a fellow inmate, that the inmate attempted suicide on three occasions, two of which required his
hospitalization, that prison mental health personnel evidenced deliberate indifference to his medical needs, as they
recklessly disregarded the risk the inmate faced as result of special housing unit (SHU) confinement, and that the
inmate was confined to SHU despite a recommendation that he be placed in a less-restrictive location. (Green Haven
Correctional Facility, Protective Custody Unit, New York State Department of Corrections)
U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE
CHEMICAL AGENTS

Reid v. Cumberland County, 34 F.Supp.3d 396 (D.N.J. 2013). An inmate filed a § 1983 action against a county, its
department of corrections, warden, and correctional officers alleging that officers used excessive force against him. The
inmate moved to compel discovery. The district court granted the motion. The court held that: (1) information
regarding past instances of excessive force by correctional officers was relevant to the inmate's supervisory liability
claims; (2) officers' personnel files and internal affairs files were relevant; (3) officers' personnel files and internal
affairs files were not protected by the official information privilege; (4) officers' personnel files and internal affairs files
were not protected by the deliberative process privilege; (5) internal affairs files concerning the incident in question
were subject to discovery; (6) the county failed to adequately demonstrate that the inmate's request for prior instances
of excessive force and accompanying documentation was sufficiently burdensome to preclude discovery; and (7)
complaints about officers' excessive force, statistics of excessive force, the county's use of force reports, and related
internal affairs files were not protected by the official information privilege or the deliberative process privilege. The
inmate alleged that officers entered his cell and, without legal justification, willfully, maliciously, and intentionally
punched and kicked him until he was curled up on the ground, and that mace was sprayed in his face. The inmate
claimed that one officer “not only approved of the beating but also took the affirmative step of opening the cell door…”
so two other officers could attack him. The inmate asserted that, as a result of the beating, he was treated for injuries
that included broken ribs, a fracture of his left orbital bone, and loss of sensation and nerve damage in his lips and
cheek area. (Cumberland County Department of Corrections, New Jersey)

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE
FAILURE TO
PROTECT

Robinson v. Phelps, 946 F.Supp.2d 354 (D.Del. 2013). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against prison officials
alleging excessive force and failure to protect. The district court held that the prisoner stated cognizable and nonfrivolous claims for excessive force, failure to protect, and denial of medical care. The prisoner alleged that on one
occasion a sergeant assaulted him and that a lieutenant arrived during the assault and that he sustained injuries but was
denied medical care by these officers and other prison personnel, that another sergeant shoved and pushed him when he
was taken to a medical grievance hearing, making his injuries worse, that this sergeant shoved him to the ground while
escorting him to the shower, and then dragged him when he could not get up, requiring that he be taken away by
stretcher, and that other officers later choked him until he lost consciousness. According to the court, the prisoner's
allegations were sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim that the physicians denied his requests for medically
necessary accommodations. The prisoner alleged that medical officials did not authorize his housing on a lower bunk
and, as a result, he slept on the floor, that an officer later moved him to an upstairs cell even though he knew that the
prisoner required lower housing due to his neck and back injuries, and that the prisoner showed the officer a memo
from a superior officer indicating the prisoner needed the housing, (James T. Vaughn Correctional Center, Delaware)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE
THREATENING

Santiago v. Blair, 707 F.3d 984 (8th Cir. 2013). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against correctional officers,
alleging excessive force and deliberate indifference to his medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment and
retaliation in violation of the First Amendment. The district court granted the officers' motion for summary judgment
with respect to official capacity claims, but denied summary judgment with respect to individual capacity claims. The
officers appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The appeals court held that the
district court improperly applied the Fourth Amendment excessive force legal standard to the prisoner's § 1983 claim
for excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment, warranting remand to the district court to inquire whether
the force was applied to the prisoner in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and
sadistically to cause harm. The appeals court held that summary judgment in prisoner's First Amendment retaliation
action was precluded by a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether a correctional officer's threats of death would
chill a prisoner of ordinary firmness from engaging in the prison grievance process. The court also found a genuine
dispute of material fact as to whether the correctional officer issued death threats to the prisoner because the prisoner
had filed and pursued an excessive force grievance. According to the court, summary judgment in the First Amendment
retaliation action was precluded by a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the correctional officer's placement

48.95

of the prisoner in a cell without his personal property, proper facilities, bedding, or clothing, and the officer's threat that
things would get worse, issued after hearing the prisoner complain that he was being retaliated against, were adverse
actions sufficient to chill a prisoner of ordinary firmness from engaging in the prison grievance process. (Potosi
Correctional Center, Missouri)
U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Stone v. Caswell, 963 F.Supp.2d 32 (D.Mass. 2013). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a correctional
officer, a sergeant, a captain, and the Massachusetts Department of Correction (DOC) officials, alleging that the
defendants violated his state and federal civil rights while he was in their custody. The officials moved to dismiss. The
district court granted the motion in part and denied the motion in part. The court held that the prisoner stated a claim
against DOC officials, a sergeant, and a captain for supervisor liability under § 1983. According to the court, even
though they did not participate in the underlying constitutional violation—a correctional officer's alleged use of
excessive force against the prisoner-- the prisoner alleged that they caused his constitutional rights to be violated by
inadequately training and supervising the correctional officer. The prisoner was being held in a cell at a local court
when a DOC transportation officer asked about a pair of sneakers located in the prisoner’s cell. The prisoner responded
that the sneakers did not belong to him. The officer then entered the prisoner’s cell, pointed his finger in prisoner’s
face, grabbed him, forced him into a sitting position and, later, forced him to the ground of the lock-up corridor.
(Massachusetts Department of Correction)

U.S. Appeals Court
BRUTALITY
EXCESSIVE FORCE

U.S. v. McQueen, 727 F.3d 1144 (11th Cir. 2013). After a state prison sergeant was convicted of conspiring to deprive
several inmates of their right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, and for obstruction of justice, and a state
prison corrections officer was convicted of obstruction of justice, the district court denied the sergeant's motion for a
new trial, and denied the corrections officer's motion for judgment of acquittal or in the alternative, for a new trial, and
they appealed. The court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court held that evidence was sufficient to
establish an illegal agreement among the sergeant and others to violate the civil rights of numerous inmates, and that
any error by the government in improperly bolstering the credibility of a witness did not warrant reversal. The court
held that the prison officers' sentences were substantively unreasonable because the district court varied downward
from the bottom of the Sentencing Guideline range by more than 90%. The court noted that the sergeant had brutalized
more than five young prisoners and then lied about it, and the corrections officer intentionally sought to conceal those
serious crimes. Evidence showed that a law enforcement officer, in the sergeant's presence, beat one inmate around the
hands with a broomstick when the inmate refused to offer the name of another prisoner who had engaged in a fight, and
despite the sergeant's obligation to intervene the sergeant did nothing. The evidence also revealed that the sergeant, in
the presence of other officers, assaulted another inmate who had been involved in a prison fight, beating him with a
broken broomstick and throwing him to the ground, when the prisoner refused to disclose the name of the inmate with
whom he had been fighting. (South Florida Reception Center)

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE
FAILURE TO
PROTECT
RESTRAINTS

Valade v. City of New York, 949 F.Supp.2d 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). Arrestees brought § 1983 and state law actions
against police officers and a city. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion
in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment excessive force claim was
precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether a police officer used excessive force against the arrestee by
handcuffing her too tightly and shoving her into a police car. The court also found a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the arrestee was sexually assaulted while she was in police custody following her arrest. (New York City
Police Department, Central Booking)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Verser v. Barfield, 741 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 2013). An inmate brought a pro se § 1983 action against prison security
officers who allegedly held him down and punched him in the stomach during a cell change, alleging that the officers
violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from excessive use of force. Following a jury trial in the district court, a
verdict was returned in favor of the officers. The inmate appealed denial of his motion for a new trial. The appeals
court reversed and remanded. The appeals court held that the total exclusion of the inmate from the courtroom at the
time the verdict was read prevented the inmate from exercising his right to poll the jury. According to the court, the
error arising from the district court's total exclusion of the inmate from the courtroom was not harmless, and thus a new
trial was warranted. The court noted that a jury poll definitely or even likely would have revealed that the verdict in
favor of the officers was not unanimous. (Western Illinois Correctional Center)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Wilkins v. Gaddy, 734 F.3d 344 (4th Cir. 2013). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action alleging an officer maliciously
and sadistically assaulted him with excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The prisoner alleged that the
officer “lifted and then slammed him to the concrete floor where, once pinned, punched, kicked, kneed, and choked”
him until the officer was removed by another member of the corrections staff. After a jury returned a verdict for the
prisoner, the district court granted the prisoner's motion for attorneys' fees, but only in the amount of $1. The prisoner
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA),
capping attorneys' fee award at 150% of the value of the prisoner’s monetary judgment, satisfied a rational basis
review. The court held that the PLRA provision did not violate the Fifth Amendment's equal protection component by
treating the prisoner and non-prisoner litigants differently, where the provision rationally forestalled collateral fee
litigation while ensuring that the incentive provided by an attorneys' fee award still attached to the most injurious civil
rights violations. (Lanesboro Correctional Institute, North Carolina Department of Public Safety)
2014

U.S. Appeals Court
PEPPER SPRAY

Burns v. Eaton, 752 F.3d 1136 (8th Cir. 2014). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against two prison officers,
claiming his Eighth Amendment rights were violated when the first officer pepper-sprayed him, and the second officer
turned off the water and prevented him from rinsing off the pepper-spray. The district court granted summary judgment
in favor of the prison officers. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that one prison
officer did not act maliciously in an effort to cause harm, so as to support the prisoner's Eighth Amendment excessive

48.96

force claim under § 1983, when the officer deployed pepper spray after the prisoner refused orders to leave a locked
shower cell. The court noted that the prison officer warned the prisoner that he would be pepper-sprayed if he did not
comply with the officer's order, the prisoner then threw an object or spit at the officer three times, and, after each
aggressive act of defiance, the officer deployed a small amount of pepper spray. (Maximum Security Unit, Arkansas
Department of Corrections)
U.S. District Court
PEPPER SPRAY
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Coleman v. Brown, 28 F.Supp.3d 1068 (E.D.Cal. 2014). Nearly 20 years after mentally ill inmates prevailed on class
action challenges to conditions of their confinement and a special master was appointed to implement a remedial plan,
the inmates moved to enforce court orders and for affirmative relief related to the use of force, disciplinary measures,
and housing and treatment in administrative segregation units (ASUs) and segregated housing units (SHUs). The
district court granted the motions in part. The court held that prison officials' excessive use of force on seriously
mentally ill inmates by means of pepper spray and expandable batons, pursuant to prison policies and without regard to
the impact on inmates' psychiatric condition, was not yet remedied, as required by the prior judgment in favor of
inmates. The court found that prison officials' changes in policies and practices of housing mentally ill inmates in
administrative segregation units (ASUs) and segregated housing units (SHUs) were inadequate to remedy the systemic
Eighth Amendment violations identified in the prior judgment in favor of inmates. (California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation)

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE
RETALIATION

Coley v. Harris, 30 F.Supp.3d 428 (D.Md. 2014). An inmate brought a pro se action under § 1983 against correctional
facility officers in their individual capacities for common law battery and violations of his Fourth and Eighth
Amendment rights after he was allegedly beaten following a disagreement with one of the officers. The officers moved
for summary judgment. The district court denied the motion. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by
a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a strip search of the inmate was reasonable or motivated by punitive
intent. (Eastern Correctional Institution, Maryland)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE
RESTRAINTS

Cordell v. McKinney, 759 F.3d 573 (6th Cir. 2014). A jail inmate brought a § 1983 excessive force claim against a jail's
deputy sheriff, alleging that while the inmate was awaiting transfer to a state prison following his conviction for
involuntary manslaughter, the deputy sheriff slammed the inmate, who was handcuffed and restrained, headfirst into a
concrete wall. The district court granted summary judgment and qualified immunity to the deputy sheriff. The inmate
appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by fact
issues as to the subjective and objective components of the excessive force claim, and that the deputy sheriff's alleged
conduct violated clearly established law. (Greene County Jail, Ohio)

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Crayton v. Graffeo, 10 F.Supp.3d 888 (N.D. Ill. 2014). A pretrial detainee in a county department of corrections jail
brought an action against three correctional officers, alleging that they beat him in two separate incidents, and asserting
an excessive-force claim under § 1983. The officers filed a motion for summary judgment. The district court granted
the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the detainee failed to exhaust his administrative remedies
before filing his § 1983 action, where the detainee neither appealed the notice that his grievance was being forwarded
to the jail's Office of Professional Review (OPR), nor did he await the results of OPR's investigation. (Cook County
Department of Corrections, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE
STINGER GRENADE

Edwards v. Byrd, 750 F.3d 728 (8th Cir. 2014). Pretrial detainees in a county jail brought a § 1983 action against the
county, county sheriff, and jail guards, alleging use of excessive force, failure to protect, and other constitutional
violations. The district court denied, in part, the sheriff's and guards' motion for summary judgment based on qualified
immunity. The sheriff and a guard appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court found
that the guards were not entitled to qualified immunity for their alleged conduct in employing a flash-bang grenade in
pretrial detainees' cell, kicking the detainees, and shooting them with bean-bag guns. According to the court,
immediately before the guards entered the cell, the detainees were allegedly submissive, lying face-down, which the
guards could allegedly see through the cell door, and the detainees allegedly did not resist or otherwise act
aggressively, and, at the time of the incident, it was clearly established that such conduct would violate due process.
The court held that the sheriff could not be liable where it was undisputed that the sheriff was not present during the
alleged incident. (Falkner County Detention Center, Arkansas)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE
STUN GUN

Estate of Booker v. Gomez, 745 F.3d 405 (10th Cir. 2014). The estate of deceased pretrial detainee who died while in
custody after officers restrained him in his response to his alleged insubordination, brought a § 1983 action in state
court against the deputies and a sergeant, alleging excessive force, deprivation of life without due process, and failure
to provide immediate medical care. Following removal to federal court, the district court denied the defendants' motion
for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The
appeals court held that the detainee's right to be free from excessive force, including use of a neck restraint, stun gun,
and pressure on his back while he was on his stomach and not resisting, was clearly established, for purposes of
determining whether the deputies and sergeant were entitled to qualified immunity. According to the court, a
reasonable officer would know that failing to check a pretrial detainee's vital signs or provide immediate medical
attention after he was rendered unconscious by the use of force, which allegedly included at least a two-minute neck
hold, 140 pounds of pressure on his back, and the use of stun gun for eight seconds, was deliberate indifference.
(Downtown Detention Center, Denver, Colorado)

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Hill v. Hoisington, 28 F.Supp.3d 725 (E.D.Mich. 2014). A detainee filed an action alleging that a deputy sheriff used
excessive force and committed battery against him while he was in custody, after he was acquitted of criminal charges
against him. After a jury verdict in the detainee's favor, the detainee moved for entry of judgment on the jury verdict,
for costs, and for judgment as matter of law. The district court denied the motion as moot, where the award of

48.97

exemplary damages was justifiable and the detention of the detainee after he was acquitted was unlawful, where the
jury found that the deputy's conduct was malicious, or so willful and wanton as to demonstrate reckless disregard of the
detainee's rights. The court noted that the proper post-acquittal procedure requires immediate release of a detainee
following acquittal, allowing for any possible out-processing to occur without continued or required detention.
(Oakland County Jail, Michigan)
U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Holton v. Conrad, 24 F.Supp.3d 624(E.D.Ky. 2014). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action against a constable, a county
jail, and a county jailer, asserting claims arising out of his arrest and treatment at the jail. The jail and jailer moved for
judgment on the pleadings on the arrestee's state law claim. The district court denied the motion. According to the
court, the arrestee's claim requesting records under Kentucky law did not form part of same case or controversy as his
federal claim in § 1983, where the arrestee's federal claim was based on the constable's actions in allegedly beating him
at time of arrest and at the county jail. (Estill County Detention Center, Kentucky)

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE
PEPPER SPRAY

Imhoff v. Temas, 67 F.Supp.3d 700 (W.D.Pa. 2014). A pretrial detainee brought an action against employees of a
county correctional facility, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical need, violation of his rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment with regard to conditions of his confinement, and excessive force in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. The employees moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The
court held that the detainee stated a claim against the employees for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need
under the Fourteenth Amendment, where the detainee alleged that he informed facility personnel of his extensive drug
use, that he had repeatedly requested medical assistance when he began experiencing seizures and hallucinations in
conjunction with his drug withdrawal in the presence of facility personnel, and that he was provided no medical
treatment for at least eight days despite his requests for medical attention. The court held that the employees were not
entitled to qualified immunity from liability because a county correctional facility’s constitutional obligation to provide
care to inmates suffering unnecessary pain from a serious medical need was clearly established at the time the pretrial
detainee allegedly began experiencing seizures in conjunction with drug withdrawal and was not provided medical
treatment. The detainee had initially been refused admission to the jail because he displayed signs of a drug overdose
and he was admitted to a local hospital. After hospital personnel determined he was stable he was admitted to the jail.
At one point in his confinement, the detainee acted out and banged his cell door with a plastic stool. This resulted in the
retrieval of the stool by jail officers and, while he was held down by one officer, he was kicked in the face by another
officer. When he yelled for help, an officer responded by choking the detainee and then spraying him with pepper
spray, and he was not permitted to shower to remove the pepper spray for thirty minutes.
The court found that the detainee’s allegations against the employees in their individual capacities regarding the
intentional denial of medical treatment, excessive use of force, and violation of his rights under Fourteenth Amendment
with regard to conditions of his confinement were sufficient to set forth a plausible claim for punitive damages. The
detainee alleged that he was denied basic human needs such as drinking water, access to a toilet and toilet paper, and
toiletries such as soap and a toothbrush. (Washington County Correctional Facility, Pennsylvania)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Jackson v. Buckman, 756 F.3d 1060 (8th Cir. 2014). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against corrections
facility employees and corrections officials alleging he received constitutionally deficient medical care and that medical
officials used excessive force against him while responding to his medical emergency. The district court granted
summary judgment to the defendants, and the detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that: (1) a
physician was not deliberately indifferent to the detainee's surgical wound on his abdomen; (2) a nurse was not
deliberately indifferent to the detainee's medical needs; (3) absent an underlying constitutional violation, the detainee
could not maintain official-capacity and failure-to-supervise claims against a sheriff and a chief of detention; (4) a
nurse's act of hitting the pretrial detainee's nose while administering an ammonia inhalant was not excessive force; and
(5) the force used by nurses to move the pretrial detainee to his bed after he lost consciousness was not excessive.
(Pulaski County Regional Detention Facility, Arkansas)

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE
STUN GUN

Johnson v. Milliner, 65 F.Supp.3d 1295 (S.D.Ala. 2014). A county jail detainee brought an action against a jail officer
alleging use of excessive force and state law claims for assault and battery. The officer moved for summary judgment.
The district court denied the motion. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of
material fact as to whether the force applied against the detainee by the jail officer, which involved the use of a stun
gun, was applied in a good faith effort to preserve discipline and security or was applied maliciously and sadistically to
cause harm. (Mobile Metro Jail, Alabama)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE
CELL EXTRACTION
FAILURE TO
PROTECT

Kitchen v. Dallas County, Tex., 759 F.3d 468 (5th Cir. 2014). The widow of a pretrial detainee who died of
asphyxiation while he was being extracted from his jail cell brought a § 1983 action against the county, detention
officers, and others, alleging that the defendants used excessive force and acted with deliberate indifference to the
detainee's medical needs. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in its
entirety, and the plaintiff appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded in part, and affirmed in part. The court
held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to both the timing and the degree of
force used in extracting the detainee from his jail cell. The court noted that the law was “clearly established” at the
relevant time that use of force against an inmate was reserved for good-faith efforts to maintain or restore discipline,
rather than for the purpose of causing harm, such that the defendants had reasonable warning that kicking, stomping,
and choking a subdued inmate would violate the inmate's constitutional rights under certain circumstances. The court
held that the widow failed to demonstrate that detention officers acted with deliberate indifference to the detainee's
medical needs, even though they failed to contact medical staff prior to attempting to extract the detainee from his cell,
where the need for participation of specialized staff to perform the extraction of a mentally ill inmate from a jail cell
was not so apparent that even laymen would recognize this alleged medical need. (Dallas County Jail, Texas)

48.98

U.S. Appeals Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE
STUN GUN

Maus v. Baker, 747 F.3d 926 (7th Cir. 2014). A pretrial detainee filed a § 1983 action against personnel at a county jail,
alleging that they had used excessive force against him. The detainee alleged that the defendants used excessive force
in response to him covering the lens of the video camera in his jail cell. In the first incident, the detained alleged that
his arms were twisted, he was pinned against the wall, and he was choked. In the second incident, the detainee alleged
that a taser was used to gain his compliance in transferring him to a separate cell. Following a jury trial, the district
court entered judgment for the defendants and denied the detainee's motions for new trial. The detainee appealed. The
appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that the court’s errors in failing to conceal the detainee's shackles from
jury, and in requiring the detainee to wear prison clothing while the defendants were allowed to wear uniforms were not
harmless. According to the court there was no indication that concealment of the restraints would have been infeasible,
and visible shackling of the detainee had a prejudicial effect on the jury. The court noted that there would have been no
reason for the jury to know that the plaintiff was a prisoner, and being told that the plaintiff was a prisoner and the
defendants were guards made a different impression than seeing the plaintiff in a prison uniform and the defendants in
guard uniforms. (Langlade County Jail, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Pettit v. Smith, 45 F.Supp.3d 1099 (D.Ariz. 2014). A state prisoner filed a motion for spoliation sanctions against the
Arizona Department of Corrections, relating to the loss or destruction of a video recording of a use of force incident,
the personnel report for the incident, investigative reports and attachments, and a post-incident photograph of the
prisoner's hand. The prisoner asserted an excessive claim arising from an incident when the prisoner was escorted from
a shower to a prison cell. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the
department had a common-law duty to preserve evidence and reasonably should have anticipated the prisoner's lawsuit.
The court found that appropriate spoliation sanctions included an “adverse-inference” instruction. (Arizona State Prison
Complex—Eyman, Arizona Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Rahman v. Schriro, 22 F.Supp.3d 305 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against a state
prison commissioner, warden, deputy warden, deputy of security, and officers, alleging they violated the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause by forcing him to go through a radiation-emitting X-ray security screening machine
in order to get to and from his daily work assignment. The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The
district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the detainee sufficiently alleged a
serious present injury or future risk of serious injury, as required to state a deliberate indifference claim against prison
officials under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, by alleging that he was subjected to at least two fullbody X-ray scans each day, that each scan exposed him to a level of radiation that was 10 to 50 times higher than that
emitted by airport scanners, that radiation damages cells of the body and that even low doses of radiation increase an
individual's risk of cancer, and that federal regulations prohibited prison officials from using even non-repetitive X-ray
examinations for security purposes unless the device was operated by licensed practitioner and there was reasonable
suspicion that the inmate had recently secreted contraband. According to the court, the detainee's allegations that a
prison officer intentionally subjected him to a higher dose of radiation through a full-body X-ray screening machine
while calling him a “fake Muslim, homosexual, faggot” were sufficient to allege that the force was not applied to
maintain or restore discipline, as required to state an excessive force claim under Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause. The court held that the alleged force exerted by a prison officer on the detainee by setting the full-body X-ray
screening machine to a higher radiation dose on one occasion was not excessive in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause. The court noted that the alleged force was de minimis, and the use of a higher
setting of radiation, which was designed to produce a better image, in a situation where detainee expressed resistance to
the scanning process and could have been conceivably hiding contraband was not the type of force repugnant to the
conscience of mankind. (Anna M. Kross Center, Rikers Island, New York City Department of Correction)

U.S. Appeals Court
CHEMICAL AGENTS

Roberson v. Torres, 770 F.3d 398 (6th Cir. 2014). A state prisoner brought an action against a state corrections officer,
alleging that the officer sprayed him with a chemical agent while he was sleeping, in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. The district court denied the officer's motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.
The officer appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the corrections officer was not entitled to
qualified immunity for his alleged conduct in spraying a sleeping state prisoner with a chemical agent, without prior
warning, when the prisoner was covered from head to toe by his blanket. According to the court, the officer's alleged
conduct was unreasonable under the alleged circumstances, and the law was clearly established that the use of a
chemical agent in an initial attempt to wake a sleeping prisoner, when an officer had no reason to believe that a prisoner
was awake and disobeying orders, violated the Eighth Amendment. (Michigan Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Rodriguez v. County of Los Angeles, 96 F.Supp.3d 1012 (C.D. Cal. 2014). State detainees brought an action against
numerous defendants, including a county, a sheriff’s department, and individual jail guards and supervisors, alleging
excessive force under § 1983. Following a jury verdict in their favor, the detainees moved for attorney fees. The district
court granted the motion, holding that: (1) the detainees were entitled to recover fully compensatory attorney fees,
notwithstanding the fact that some individual defendants were dismissed or prevailed at trial and that the detainees did
not succeed on all motions, where the detainees succeeded on all of their claims; (2) the detainees were entitled to a
lodestar multiplier of 2.0; and, (3) the district court would apply only a 1% contribution of the detainees’ $950,000
damages award to their attorney fee award, where the defendants’ conduct involved malicious violence leaving some
detainees permanently injured. The court awarded over $5.3 million for attorney fees. (Men’s Central Jail, Los Angeles
County, California)

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE
STUN GUN
CELL EXTRACTION

Rodriguez v. County of Los Angeles, 96 F.Supp.3d 990 (C.D. Cal. 2014). Former and current inmates brought an action
against a county, a county sheriff’s department, and individual deputies, claiming that the deputies used excessive force
to remove the inmates from their cells, in violation of the right to be free from excessive force under the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments. After a jury verdict in favor of the inmates, the defendants moved for judgment as a matter of
law, to vacate the judgment, and for a new trial. The district court denied the motion. The court held that evidence that
supervising law enforcement officials in the county sheriff’s department saw or heard inmates being beaten and

48.99

knowingly and intentionally permitted the use of unconstitutional force, and that deputies engaged in malicious conduct
with the intent to harm in removing the inmates from their cells, was sufficient to demonstrate that the officials and
deputies used threats, intimidation, or coercion to violate the inmates’ constitutional rights, as required to hold the
officials and deputies liable. According to the court, the conduct of enforcement officials in supervising the extraction
of inmates from their cells was not discretionary, and thus the supervising officials were not immune from liability
resulting from the exercise of discretion, where the supervising officials saw or heard inmates being beaten and saw the
injuries caused by these beatings. The court found that evidence that the deputies engaged in malicious conduct with
intent to harm, by using stun guns on sensitive body parts and on unconscious inmates, was sufficient to demonstrate
that the deputies acted without a legitimate purpose in using the force, as required to hold the deputies liable.
According to the court, evidence that officials directed the deployment of riot-control rounds and grenades, and the
use of stun guns, to forcibly extract inmates from their cells, and that the force surpassed what was necessary to gain
control of the situation, was sufficient to show that the officials directed the use of excessive force and encouraged their
subordinates’ use of force with the intent to harm, warranting denial of qualified immunity to the officials. The court
noted that the force was used on inmates who were not resisting and after the inmates had been incapacitated,
The court found that the jury’s award of $210,000 in punitive damages to current and former inmates was not so
grossly excessively as would violate the Due Process Clause, despite the contention that the award of punitive damages
exceeded the officials’ ability to pay, where the jury found that the officials acted maliciously, causing serious physical
harm to the inmates. The court noted that there was no major disparity between the award of punitive damages and the
$740,000 awarded as compensatory damages. (Los Angeles County Men’s Central Jail, California)
U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Rowlery v. Genesee County, 54 F.Supp.3d 763 (E.D.Mich. 2014). A detainee brought an action against a county and
officers and deputies in the county sheriff’s department, alleging that he was assaulted by deputies on two occasions
when he was lodged at the county jail. The defendants moved for partial summary judgment. The district court granted
the motion in part and denied in part. The district court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues
of material fact as to: (1) whether the county adequately trained officers and deputies regarding the use of force; (2)
whether certain officers and deputies came into physical contact with the detainee; (3) whether certain officers and
deputies failed to act reasonably when they did not act to prevent or limit other deputies’ use of force on the detainee;
and (4) whether the alleged failure of certain officers and deputies to put a stop to other deputies’ use of force on the
detainee was the proximate cause of the detainee’s injuries. (Genesee County Jail, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE
FAILURE TO
DIRECT

Shepherd v. Powers, 55 F.Supp.3d 508 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). An inmate at a county jail brought a § 1983 action against a
first correction officer, a second correction officer, and a county, asserting excessive force in violation of the Eighth
Amendment, malicious prosecution, and denying or interfering with the inmate’s religious rights. The defendants
moved for summary judgment. The district court denied the motion. The court held that summary judgment was
precluded by a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the force a correction officer at the county jail used in
grabbing and squeezing the inmate’s testicles was applied maliciously or sadistically to cause harm, in violation of the
Eighth Amendment. The court also found fact issues as to whether the correction officer’s conduct, including throwing
the inmate to the floor, was objectively malicious and sadistic. According to the court, fact issues existed as to whether
the county had a custom and practice of using excessive force or failed to adequately train or supervise correction
officers in the use of force, precluding summary judgment on the inmate’s § 1983 claim against the county.
(Westchester County Jail, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE
STUN GUN

Shreve v. Franklin County, Ohio, 743 F.3d 126 (6th Cir. 2014). A detainee brought an action against a county, its
sheriff, and sheriff's deputies, alleging that the deputies used excessive force against him when they subdued him with a
stun gun while he was in custody. The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The
detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the sheriff's deputies did not act with
deliberate indifference towards the detainee's federally protected rights when they subdued the detainee with a stun gun
while he was in custody, and therefore the deputies did not use excessive force against the detainee under the
Fourteenth Amendment. According to the court: (1) the deputies tried to handcuff the detainee several times before
using the stun gun, showing that they sought to minimize the stun gun's use; (2) the deputies also warned the detainee
that the stun gun would hurt and that he did not want to have the gun used on him, which showed that they were trying
to avoid unnecessary harm; and (3) the deputies faced an ongoing danger with the detainee thrashing about on the cell
floor with a loose handcuff, as the deputies had been trained never to lose control of an inmate with a loose handcuff
because it could be used as a weapon. The court held that the incident, in which the detainee lunged towards a sheriff's
deputy with his hands raised after a hospital examination, was a rapidly evolving, fluid, and dangerous predicament
which precluded the luxury of a calm and reflective pre-response deliberation, and therefore the detainee was required
to show that the deputy's actions involved force employed maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing
harm, rather than in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, in order to establish the use of excessive force
under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court noted that the detainee lunged toward the deputy after asking the deputy
“Do you want a piece of me?” and the deputy explained that he had “no way of retreating” because of the cramped
quarters and the detainee's position over him while standing on the hospital bed. (Franklin Co. Corr. Center II, Ohio)

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Sloane v. Borawski, 64 F.Supp.3d 473 (W.D.N.Y. 2014). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action alleging that
correction officers used excessive force against him, denied him due process in connection with a disciplinary hearing,
and denied him adequate medical treatment after the alleged excessive use of force incident. The defendants moved for
summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that: (1) exclusion
of proposed witnesses at a prison disciplinary hearing did not violate the inmate’s procedural due process rights where
the testimony of three witnesses, who were prison employees, would have been irrelevant to the issues presented in the
hearing, and another potential witness, a fellow inmate, refused to testify on the grounds that he did not know anything;
(2) the hearing officer was not so partial as to violate the inmate’s procedural due process rights; (3) the inmate failed
to establish that retaliation was the motivating factor behind filing of an allegedly false misbehavior report; (4)

48.100

summary judgment was precluded by a fact issue on the Eighth Amendment excessive force claim as to whether
correction officers’ use of force against the inmate was unrelated to any effort to maintain order or discipline; but, (5)
the inmate’s injuries, including a two-and-a-half-inch laceration to the top of his head, a laceration to his left eyebrow,
and a chin abrasion, did not rise to the level of a serious medical condition warranting Eighth Amendment protection.
(Attica Correctional Facility, New York)
U.S. Appeals Court
STUN GUN
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Smith v. Conway County, Ark., 759 F.3d 853 (8th Cir. 2014). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against two
jailers, a county jail administrator, the county, and the sheriff, alleging claims for excessive force and failure to
supervise under the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court denied qualified immunity to the administrator and
jailers and denied summary judgment to the county and individual defendants. The defendants appealed. The appeals
court affirmed in part and dismissed in part. The court held that a nonviolent pretrial detainee's right to be free from
being shot with a stun gun for non-compliance was clearly established at the time a jailer used a stun gun on the
detainee for the purpose of achieving compliance, and thus, the jailer was not entitled to qualified immunity from the
detainee's § 1983 claim of excessive force in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court found that at the time a
jailer failed to intervene when another jailer warned the pretrial detainee and then shot him with a stun gun, that a jail
official violated a pretrial detainee's due process rights if the official knew that another official was using excessive
force against the detainee but failed to intervene, and thus the jailer was not entitled to qualified immunity from the
detainee's § 1983 claim of excessive force in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Conway County Jail, Arkansas)

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE
RESTRAINTS

Taylor v. Swift, 21 F.Supp.3d 237 (E.D.N.Y. 2014). A pro se prisoner brought a § 1983 action against city jail officials,
alleging that officials failed to protect him from an assault from other inmates, and that officials used excessive force in
uncuffing the prisoner after escorting him from showers to his cell. The officials moved to dismiss based on failure to
exhaust administrative remedies, and the motion was converted to a motion for summary judgment. The district court
denied the motion. The court held that it was objectively reasonable for the prisoner, to conclude that no administrative
mechanism existed through which to obtain remedies for the alleged attack, and thus the prisoner was not required
under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) to exhaust administrative remedies before bringing his claim. The
court noted that the jail's grievance policy stated that “allegation of assault…by either staff or inmates” was nongrievable, the policy stated that an inmate complaint “is grievable unless it constitutes assault, harassment or criminal
misconduct,” the prisoner alleged that officials committed criminal misconduct in acting with deliberate indifference
toward him, and although the prisoner did not complain of the assault by officials, the prisoner would not have been
required to name a defendant in filing a grievance. According to the court, even if city jail officials would have
accepted the prisoner's failure-to-protect grievance, the prisoner's mistake in failing to exhaust administrative
procedures was subjectively reasonable. The prisoner claimed indifferent supervision of jail officers, when members of
the Crips gang served him and other non-gang members “tiny food portions while serving gang members large food
portions.” The prisoner complained to officials and this resulted in the Crips gang members being admonished and
chided. The day after this chiding, the prisoner alleged that he and two other non-Crips-affiliated inmates “were victims
of gang assault where [plaintiff] & [another inmate] got cut & stabbed.” According to the inmate, while the attack was
occurring, a corrections officer allowed the Crips to act with impunity and waited 20 to 30 minutes to press an alarm,
and another officer failed to open a door that would lead the prisoner to safety, and failed to use mace to break up the
alleged gang assault. (New York City Department of Correction, Riker’s Island)

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Turner v. Rataczak, 28 F.Supp.3d 818 (W.D.Wis. 2014). An inmate at a correctional facility brought a pro se action
under § 1983 against a corrections officer alleging excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition
of cruel and unusual punishment, for injuries sustained when the officer allegedly assaulted the inmate without
provocation. The corrections officer moved for summary judgment. The district court denied the motion, finding a fact
issue existed as to whether the corrections officer maliciously and sadistically “decentralized” the inmate and punched
him in the face in order to cause him harm, rather than to restore discipline. (Wisconsin Department of Corrections,
Columbia Correctional Institution)

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE
RESTRAINTS
RESTRAINING
CHAIR

Williams v. Champagne, 13 F.Supp.3d 624 (E.D.La. 2014). A former inmate who was a practicing Rastafarian brought
an action against a sheriff and prison officials under § 1983, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA), and state law arising out of a grooming policy which he contended substantially burdened his Rastafarian
religious practices, and an alleged incident of excessive force. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The
district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The district court held that summary judgment was
precluded by: (1) issues of fact as to whether the grooming policy prohibiting dreadlocks and requiring men's hair to be
no more than two inches long was the least restrictive means of serving compelling government interests on the
RLUIPA claim; (2) issues of fact as to the incident in which the inmate had complied with orders to leave his cell,
whether there was any basis for prison officers to use any force at all to maintain discipline after the prisoner had
complied with orders to leave his cell, let alone with force sufficient to rip a dreadlock from his scalp; (3) issues of fact
as to whether it was objectively unreasonable for prison officers to pull on the chain connecting the prisoner's
handcuffs while he was fully restrained in the “suicide chair,” and for one officer to strike the prisoner forcefully in the
head after the prisoner spit on him, and, (4) issues of fact on the inmate's assault and battery claims.
The court found that prison officers did not violate the prisoner's Eighth Amendment right to be free of cruel and
unusual punishment in the form of excessive force when, in the course of a struggle in a hallway as they were bringing
the prisoner to the “suicide chair” cell, his head hit a wall, and the officers picked him up and carried him, since video
of the incident unambiguously showed the prisoner resisting multiple officers as he was escorted down the hallway.
(Nelson Coleman Correctional Center, Louisiana)

48.101

2015
U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE
RESTRAINTS

Barnes v. County of Monroe, 85 F.Supp.3d 696 (W.D.N.Y. 2015). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action against a
county, county officials, and correctional officers, alleging that the officers used excessive force against him and that he
was subjected to unconstitutional conditions of confinement during his pretrial detention. The defendants moved for
judgment on the pleadings. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the
former pretrial detainee’s allegation that a county correctional officer used excessive force when he responded to a
fight between the detainee and fellow inmates, and jumped on the detainee’s back, striking him in face and knocking
out a tooth, and that the officer was not merely using force to maintain or restore discipline but that the entire incident
was “premeditated,” stated a § 1983 excessive force claim against officer under the Due Process Clause. According to
the court, the former detainee’s allegations that county correctional officers used excessive force when they pushed him
face-first into a glass window, pushed him to the floor, kicked, stomped on and punched him, and used handcuffs to
inflict pain, that as a result of the altercation, the inmate urinated and defecated on himself and experienced dizziness
and a concussion, and that the force used on him was in response to his reaching for legal papers and attempting to
steady himself, stated a § 1983 excessive force claim against the officers under the Due Process Clause.
The court found that the former detainee’s allegations that a county correctional officer who responded to a fight
between the detainee and other inmates “collaborated” with fellow officers to delay an emergency call, allowing the
detainee to be attacked by inmates, stated a conspiracy claim in violation of his constitutional rights under § 1983.
The court held that the former detainee’s allegations that, before being placed in a special housing unit (SHU), he
was subjected to a strip search by a county correctional officer, that during the course of the strip search the detainee
felt that he was degraded and humiliated, and he subsequently filed grievance against the officer, that later the same
day the officer approached the detainee’s cell and made sexual comments and gestures, and that other officers filed a
false misbehavior report against him in retaliation for the detainee’s grievance, stated a § 1983 First Amendment
retaliation claim against the officers. The court found that the former detainee’s allegations that, after he was released
from a special housing unit (SHU), county correctional officers placed him in a poorly ventilated cell where he was
exposed to human excrement and bodily fluids over the course of multiple days, and that he was subjected to extreme
conditions in the SHU by way of 24-hour lighting by the officers, stated a § 1983 conditions-of-confinement claim
against the officers under the Due Process Clause. (Upstate Correctional Facility and Monroe County Jail, New York)

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Barnes v. Wilson, 110 F.Supp.3d 624 (D. Md. 2015). An inmate brought an action against certain county jail officials,
alleging that a deputy used excessive force when she slammed a door slot on the inmate’s hand. The deputy and a
supervisor moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court
held that summary judgment was precluded by an issue of material fact as to whether the deputy closed the door on the
inmate’s hand maliciously or in response to a breach of security by the inmate. (Washington Co. Det. Center, Md.)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCH

Chavarriaga v. New Jersey Dept. of Corrections, 806 F.3d 210 (3d Cir. 2015). A former prisoner brought a § 1983
action in state court against the New Jersey Department of Corrections (NJDOC), the former New Jersey Attorney
General, the New Jersey Commissioner of Corrections, a correctional sergeant, and various other correctional officers.
The prisoner alleged that the defendants violated her constitutional rights when they transferred her from one place of
confinement to another where they denied her potable water, clothing, sanitary napkins, and subjected her to an
unlawful body cavity search. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Attorney General,
Commissioner of Corrections, and correctional sergeant, and dismissed the remaining claims. The prisoner appealed.
The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded. The appeals court held that allegations that
correctional officers forced her to walk down a staircase and hallway naked in plain view of male prison personnel and
inmates to reach a shower were sufficiently serious so as to reach the level of Eighth Amendment violation. The court
held that the prisoner plausibly alleged that a correctional officer maliciously searched her body cavities, as required to
state a claim against the officer for using excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment, where the prisoner
alleged facts demonstrating that a cavity search was not routine, that the cavity search was conducted in a manner that
violated New Jersey regulations, and alleged that the cavity search was so painful that during the search prisoner
cracked a molar while clenching her teeth. (Garrett House Residential Community Release Facility, Edna Mahan
Correctional Facility, New Jersey)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE
RESTRAINTS

Coley v. Lucas County, Ohio, 799 F.3d 530 (6th Cir. 2015). The administrator of a pretrial detainee’s estate brought a
state court action against a county, county sheriff, police officer and police sergeant, alleging § 1983 violations of the
detainee’s constitutional rights and various state law claims. The district court denied the defendants’ motions to
dismiss and denied individual defendants’ requests for qualified immunity. The defendants appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The court held that a police officer’s act of shoving a fully restrained pretrial detainee in a jail booking area,
causing the detainee to strike his head on the wall as he fell to the cement floor without any way to break his fall,
constituted “gratuitous force” in violation of the detainee’s Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from excessive
force. The court noted that the detainee’s state of being handcuffed, in a belly chain and leg irons, led to a reasonable
inference that the officer’s actions were a result of his frustration with the detainee’s prior restraint behavior, since the
detainee was not in any condition to cause a disruption that would have provoked the officer to use such force. The
court held that the police officer was on notice that his actions were unconstitutional, and therefore he was not entitled
to qualified immunity from liability under § 1983. According to the court, the officer’s attempts to cover up the assault
by filing false reports and lying to federal investigators following the death of the detainee led to a reasonable
conclusion that the officer understood that his actions violated the detainees’ clearly established right not to be
gratuitously assaulted while fully restrained and subdued. The court held that a police sergeant’s continued use of a
chokehold on the unresisting, fully-shackled pre-trial detainee, after hearing the detainee choke and gurgle, and when a
fellow officer was urging him release his chokehold, was objectively unreasonable, in violation of the detainee’s
Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from excessive force. The court noted that the sergeant’s subsequent acts of
telling other officers to leave the medical cell after the detainee was rendered unconscious, failing to seek medical help,
and refusing to mention the use of a chokehold in incident reports, led to the inference the that sergeant was aware he

48.102

violated the law and sought to avoid liability. According to the court, the police sergeant was on notice that his actions
were unconstitutional, and therefore, he was not entitled to qualified immunity under § 1983.
The court found that the county sheriff could be held personally liable under § 1983, based on his failure to train
and supervise employees in the use of excessive force, the use of a chokehold and injuries derived therefrom, and to
ensure that the medical needs of persons in the sheriff’s custody were met. According to the court, evidence that the
sheriff helped his employees cover up their unconstitutional actions by making false statements to federal officials
about his knowledge of his employees’ assault, chokehold, and deliberate failure to provide medical attention to the
detainee demonstrated that the sheriff at least implicitly authorized, approved or knowingly acquiesced in the
unconstitutional conduct of the offending employees. The court noted that under Ohio law, allegations by the estate of
the pretrial detainee that the county sheriff had full knowledge of the assault but intentionally and deliberately made
false statements to federal officials were sufficient to state a claim that the sheriff ratified the conduct of his officers
and, thus, was potentially personally liable for his officers’ actions. The court concluded that the officers’ use of
excessive force, failure to provide medical care, assault and battery, and wrongful death could be imputed to the sheriff
in his official capacity since the sheriff’s false statements to federal investigators were a position that was inconsistent
to non-affirmance of the officers’ actions. (Lucas County Jail, Ohio)
U.S. Appeals Court
RESTRAINTS

Davis v. Wessel, 792 F.3d 793 (7th Cir. 2015). A civil detainee brought a pro se action under § 1983 against security
guards employed at civil detention facility for sexually violent persons, operated by the Illinois Department of Human
Services. The detainee alleged violation of his rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
district court entered judgment on a jury verdict in favor of the detainee and the security guards appealed. The appeals
court vacated and remanded. The court held that the issue of whether security guards employed at the civil detention
facility refused to remove the detainee’s handcuffs with the intent of humiliating him, by preventing him from using the
restroom and forcing him to urinate on himself, was for a jury to decide. The court found that the security guards were
not entitled to qualified immunity from the claim by the detainee under § 1983 alleging excessive use of restraints in
violation of the Due Process Clause after the guards refused to remove the detainee’s handcuffs because it was clearly
established at the time the detainee requested to use the restroom, which had no windows, that keeping the handcuffs
on was not rationally related to a legitimate non-punitive purpose absent an indication that the detainee was a security
risk. (Illinois Department of Human Services, Rushville Treatment and Detention Facility)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Dimanche v. Brown, 783 F.3d 1204 (11th Cir. 2015). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against prison officials,
alleging he was subjected to harsh treatment in retaliation for filing grievances about prison conditions and asserting
claims for cruel and unusual punishment, due process violations, and First Amendment retaliation. The district court
dismissed the case for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and failure to state a claim pursuant to the in forma
pauperis statute. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that the grievance
sent by the state prisoner directly to the Secretary of the Florida Department of Corrections (FDOC) met the conditions
for bypassing the informal and formal grievance steps at the institutional level under Florida law, and thus the prisoner
satisfied the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s (PLRA) exhaustion requirement with respect to his § 1983 claims alleging
cruel and unusual punishment, due process violations, and First Amendment retaliation. The court noted that the
prisoner clearly stated at the beginning of the grievance form that he was filing a grievance of reprisal, indicating he
feared for his life and that he was “gassed in confinement for grievances [he] wrote,” and clearly stated the reason for
bypassing the informal and formal grievance steps, namely, his fear that he would be killed if he filed additional
grievances at the institutional level, and alleged participation by high-ranking prison officials. The court found that the
prisoner stated claims against prison officials for First Amendment retaliation and cruel and unusual punishment by
alleging that prison guards and officials sprayed him with tear gas without provocation, denied him prompt medical
care, filed false disciplinary reports, and threatened further retaliation, all in retaliation for filing grievances. (Liberty
Correctional Institution, Florida)

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Ewing v. Cumberland County, 152 F.Supp.3d 269 (D. N.J. 2015). A former arrestee brought a § 1983 action, bringing
claims against county correctional officers, police officers, and a number of municipal entities for use of excessive
force and other constitutional violations. The defendants filed nine motions for summary judgment. The district court
held that (1) issues of fact existed as to whether the force used on detainee was imposed maliciously and sadistically to
cause harm; (2) issues of fact existed as to whether two officers who were not in the room when excessive force was
allegedly used on the pre-trial detainee knew of and failed to intervene in the assault; (3) issues of fact existed as to
whether five correctional officers conspired to cover up their actions; (4) issues of fact existed as to whether the police
officer who had taken the detainee back to the jail after a trip to the hospital had reason to believe that the detainee's
safety was in jeopardy when the officer left the jail, and (5) genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the
county trained its correctional officers on the use of force, whether the other trainings that took place were inadequate
and untimely, whether that failure to train amounted to deliberate indifference, and whether there was a causal link
between that lack of training and the injuries the detainee sustained at the hands of correction officers, precluding
summary judgment for the defendants in the failure to train claim. According to the court, the detainee, while unarmed,
suffered life-threatening injuries while in an isolated room with five officers, and that none of the officers were injured,
indicated that the officers used force beyond what was necessary to take down the detainee, in a manner intended to
inflict pain. The court noted that it was clearly established, at the time of the incident, that prisoners were protected
from excessive force and wanton beatings that exceed good-faith efforts to maintain discipline and order, and a
reasonable officer would have known that the force used was excessive. (Cumberland County Correctional Facility and
Vineland Police Department, New Jersey)

U.S. District Court
PEPPER SPRAY

Hughes v. Judd, 108 F.Supp.3d 1167 (M.D. Fla. 2015). Several juveniles, as representatives of other juveniles similarly
situated, brought a § 1983 action asserting that the sheriff of a Florida county and the health care provider retained by
the sheriff violated the juveniles’ rights under the Fourteenth Amendment during the juveniles’ detention at the county
jail. The district court held that the plaintiffs failed to prove that either the sheriff or the health care provider was
deliberately indifferent to any substantial risk of serious harm during the juveniles’ detention, or that their policies or

48.103

customs effected any other constitutional violation. According to the court, at most, the juveniles showed only that two
persons, each of whom was qualified to testify as an expert, disfavored some of the sheriff’s past or present managerial
policies and practices and advocated the adoption of others they felt were superior for one reason or another. The court
found that the use of pepper spray against the juvenile detainees at the county jail did not violate the Eighth
Amendment, where pepper spray was effective for quickly stopping a fight without inflicting injury, nearly every use
of pepper spray at that jail was to stop a fight, and there was no evidence that the pepper spray had lasting, negative
effect. (Polk County Central County Jail, Florida, and Corizon Health, Inc.)
U.S. Supreme Court
USE OF FORCE

Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S.Ct. 2466 (2015). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against county jail
officers, alleging, among other things, that they used excessive force against him in violation of his Fourteenth
Amendment rights. The district court entered an order denying the officers' motion for summary judgment on the
detainee's excessive force claim, and subsequently entered judgment on a jury verdict in the officers' favor. The
detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated and remanded, finding that the
detainee was required to show only that the force used was objectively unreasonable, and that jury instructions
improperly added a subjective standard for determining excessiveness. (Monroe County Jail, Wisconsin)

U.S. Appeals Court
STUN GUN
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 801 F.3d 828 (7th Cir. 2015). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against county jail
officers, alleging that they used excessive force against him in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights. The
district court entered an order denying the officers’ motion for summary judgment on the detainee’s excessive force
claim, and subsequently entered judgment on a jury verdict in the officers’ favor. The detainee appealed. The appeals
court affirmed. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated and remanded. On remand, the appeals court reversed and remanded
for a new trial. The appeals court held that the district court’s error of instructing the jury that the detainee was required
to establish the subjective intent of the officers was not a harmless error, and thus a new trial was warranted, since
jurors might have decided that, although the officers had acted in an objectively unreasonable manner, they did not
have the subjective intent required by the erroneous instruction. According to the court, a reasonable officer would
have been on notice that the detainee was not resisting officers in a manner that justified slamming his head into a wall
and using a stun gun while he was manacled, and thus the alleged use of a stun gun on the non-resisting detainee, lying
prone and handcuffed behind his back, violated the detainee’s clearly established right to be free from excessive force
in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Monroe County Jail, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE
PEPPER SPRAY

Kitchen v. Ickes, 116 F.Supp.3d 613 (D. Md. 2015). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against a corrections officer
and a prison health care provider, alleging excessive force in the officer’s use of pepper spray and deliberate
indifference to a serious medical need. The officer and the provider moved to dismiss, or, in the alternative, for
summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the inmate exhausted his available
administrative remedies as to his claim that the corrections officer used excessive force in spraying him with pepper
spray, as required to file suit against the officer, under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The court noted that
the inmate filed a request for an administrative remedy on the issue of alleged use of excessive force, appealed the
decision rendered concerning his claim of excessive force, and subsequently filed a grievance with the inmate
grievance office regarding the officer’s use of pepper spray. But the court held that the officer’s use of pepper spray on
the inmate was not excessive so as to violate the Eighth Amendment, where officer responded to a fight between the
inmate and his cellmate, the officer ordered the inmate to release the cellmate from his grip, after the inmate refused,
the officer sprayed the inmate and the cellmate in the head with pepper spray, he subsequently sprayed the inmate in
the upper torso after the inmate and the cellmate disobeyed repeated orders to stop fighting, the use of pepper spray
ceased immediately after the fighting ceased, and the inmate was immediately removed from the cell and was provided
a change of clothes and a shower to mitigate the effect of the chemical agents. (North Branch Corr. Inst., Maryland)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

McBride v. Lopez, 791 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 2015). After a prison’s appeals coordinator dismissed a prisoner’s
administrative grievance as untimely, the prisoner brought an action against prison guards under § 1983 claiming
violation of the Eighth Amendment by use of excessive force against him, under the provisions of the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (“PLRA”). The district court granted the guards’ motion to dismiss and the prisoner appealed. The appeals
court affirmed. The appeals court noted that a two-part test for determining whether a threat to a prisoner rendered the
prison grievance system unavailable had been developed by the 11th Circuit, requiring the prisoner to provide a basis
for the court to find that he actually believed prison officials would retaliate against him if he filed a grievance, and if
he makes such a showing, he must then demonstrate that his belief was objectively reasonable. The court found that the
prisoner subjectively believed that the guards’ statements were a threat, where the prisoner had recently been beaten by
the guards that made the statement, and the prisoner could have believed the guards bore him considerable hostility and
therefore the statement could have been interpreted as threatening. But the court found that the statement could not
have reasonably been objectively viewed as a threat of retaliation if the prisoner filed a grievance against the guards,
where there was no allegation or evidence that the guards believed the prisoner was contemplating filing a grievance,
and the prisoner had not asked for the materials necessary to file a grievance or had given any indication he intended to
file a grievance. (Pleasant Valley State Prison, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

McBride v. Lopez, 807 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2015). After a prison’s appeals coordinator dismissed a prisoner’s
administrative grievance as untimely, the prisoner brought an action against prison guards under § 1983 claiming
violation of the Eighth Amendment by use of excessive force against him. The district court granted the guards’ motion
to dismiss. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that: (1) the threat of retaliation for
reporting an incident can render the prison grievance process effectively unavailable and thereby excuse a prisoner’s
failure to exhaust administrative remedies before filing a court action; (2) the prisoner subjectively perceived prison
guards’ statement to be a threat not to use the prison grievance system; and (3) prison guards’ statement could not have
reasonable been objectively viewed as a threat of retaliation if the prisoner filed a grievance against the guards. The
guards had stated that he was “lucky,” in that the injuries he sustained during an altercation between the prisoner and
guards “could have been much worse” than they were, to be a threat not to use the prison grievance system. The court

48.104

noted that the prisoner had recently been beaten by the guards that made the statement, and the prisoner could have
believed the guards bore him considerable hostility and therefore the statement could have been interpreted as
threatening. (Pleasant Valley State Prison, California)
U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Nagy v. Corrections Corporation of America, 79 F.Supp.3d 114 (D.D.C. 2015). A female detainee brought an action in
the District of Columbia Superior Court against the operator of a correctional facility, alleging negligence, negligent
supervision, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The operator
moved the action to federal court and moved for summary judgment. The district court denied the motion, finding that
summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to: (1) whether the operator caused the
detainee’s injuries stemming from a second alleged assault by failing to follow up on the first alleged assault by guards
at the correctional facility; (2) whether the detainee was injured by outrageous behavior of the guards; (3) whether the
guards negligently handled the detainee, and (4) whether this negligence physically injured the detainee. The detainee
alleged that she was abused almost immediately upon arrival at the facility, when two correctional officers grabbed her
by the arms, took her to a locked cell, and threw her against the commode. She alleged that she landed sideways on her
back, and that the officers kicked her on her right side, broke her ribs, and bruised her body. She reported the incident
to corrections officials. Six days later, she was once again allegedly assaulted “by staff and officers.” She showed her
injuries to a doctor who observed bruises on her buttocks and hips “of varying stages, none that appeared newer than 2–
3 days old with some yellowing and fading.” (Corr. Treatment Facility, Corr. Corp. of America, District of Columbia)

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Pena v. Greffet, 108 F.Supp.3d 1030 (D.N.M. 2015). A former inmate at a privately operated correctional facility
brought a civil rights action against a correctional officer, among others, asserting a claim under § 1983 for violation of
her Eighth Amendment rights and asserting a claim for battery under state law. The officer moved to dismiss. The
district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the inmate failed to state a claim for
excessive force under the Eighth Amendment, but sufficiently stated a claim for battery under New Mexico law.
According to the court, the inmate’s allegations that a privately employed correctional officer pursued the inmate down
a hallway after she refused to answer a question, grabbed her from behind, and slammed her against a wall, were
insufficient to allege that the officer acted maliciously and sadistically to cause harm, as required to state a claim for
excessive force under the Eighth Amendment, since the allegations were just as much in line with the officer’s
legitimate pursuit of penological goals as they were with his desire to harm or humiliate the inmate. (New Mexico
Women’s Correctional Facility, operated by Corrections Corporation of America)

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Perry v. Dickhaut, 125 F.Supp.3d 285 (D. Mass. 2015). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against prison
officials and a prison nurse, asserting Eighth Amendment claims for excessive force in attempting to double-bunk the
prisoner. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that prison officials did not act
with deliberate indifference to the risk of serious harm from prisoner violence, as would violate the Eighth
Amendment, by repeatedly double-bunking the prisoner in a cell with another prisoner. According to the court, there
was no evidence that the officials knew or should have known that the prisoner and his cellmates were enemies, and
making an exception to the double-bunk system for one inmate simply because he was purposefully disruptive would
pose substantial risks for the overall management of prison. (Souza-Baranowski Correctional Center, Massachusetts)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Peters v. Risdal, 786 F.3d 1095 (8th Cir. 2015). A pretrial detainee filed a § 1983 action against a county, county
sheriff, and jail officers alleging that she was subjected to an unreasonable search, that her right to freedom of speech
was violated, and that the officers used excessive force. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment on the unreasonable search claim, and after a jury verdict, in the officers’ favor on the remaining claims, and
denied the detainee’s motion for a new trial. The detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the
officers did not violate the detainee’s Fourth Amendment rights when they forcibly removed her clothing in a holding
cell. According to the court, it was objectively reasonable for county jail officers to believe that the pretrial detainee
presented a risk of harm to herself if she was permitted to retain strings on her clothing, and thus the officers did not
violate her Fourth Amendment rights when they forcibly removed her clothing in a holding cell. The court noted that
the detainee refused to respond to medical screening questions, refused to comply with a female officer’s instruction to
change into an orange jumpsuit while male officers were outside the holding cell, and acted aggressively toward the
male officers when they entered. The officers restrained the detainee face down on her stomach and covered her with a
paper suit while the female officer removed her clothing. (Woodbury County Jail, Iowa)

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE
STUN GUN

Senalan v. Curran, 78 F.Supp.3d 905 (N.D. Ill. 2015). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against corrections
officers at a county jail, the sheriff, and the sheriff’s office, alleging unlawful detention and excessive force, as well as
conspiracy. The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court granted the motion in part
and denied in part. The court held that the detainee’s allegations were sufficient to plead excessive force and were
sufficient to state a conspiracy claim. The court found that the detainee’s allegations that he was pushed, pepper
sprayed, stunned, beaten, and subdued in his cell by correctional officers, that he was naked and prone on the floor of a
booking cell when four officers jumped on him and violently restrained him, and that he was not threatening or
resisting, were sufficient to plead excessive force, as required for the detainee’s § 1983 claim against the officers.
According to the court, the detainee’s allegations that correctional officers used excessive force against him, and that
the officers communicated with each other prior to engaging in their use of force, were sufficient to state a § 1983
claim against the officers for conspiracy to deprive him of his constitutional rights. (Lake County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
SEARCH

Shorter v. Baca, 101 F.Supp.3d 876 (C.D. Cal. 2015). A pretrial detainee brought an action against a county, sheriff,
and deputies, alleging under § 1983 that the defendants denied her medical care, subjected her to unsanitary living
conditions, deprived her of food, clean clothes, and access to exercise, and conducted overly invasive searches. The
detainee had been classified as mentally ill and housed in a mental health unit at the detention facility. The defendants
moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that
summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to what policies governed classification of

48.105

pretrial detainees who were mentally ill. The court also found fact issues as to whether the county sheriff’s deputies’
manner of conducting a visual body cavity search of the female pretrial detainee on three occasions exhibited
exaggerated and excessive force, and was vindictive or harassing, precluding summary judgment on the detainee’s §
1983 Fourth Amendment unlawful search claim against the deputies. (Century Regional Detention Facility, Los
Angeles County, California)
U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE
RESTRAINTS

Shuford v. Conway, 86 F.Supp.3d 1344 (N.D.Ga. 2015). Pretrial detainees brought a § 1983 action against a sheriff and
other county jail officials and employees, alleging excessive force in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion, finding that the jail employees did not
apply force maliciously and sadistically against any detainee. According to the court, in shooting the pretrial detainee
with a non-lethal chemical agent projectile, taking him to the floor, and placing him in restraint chair, the employees
did not apply force maliciously and sadistically. The court noted that the detainee had hit a wall and metal partition,
creating a risk of self-harm, the restraints reduced or eliminated the detainee’s ability to inflict harm against himself,
and the detainee did not suffer serious or permanent injuries. (Gwinnett County Jail, Georgia)

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE
CHEMICAL AGENTS
CELL EXTRACTION
BRUTALITY

Smith v. Eovaldi, 112 F.Supp.3d 779 (S.D. Ill. 2015). A state inmate, proceeding in forma pauperis, brought a § 1983
action against several prison officers, alleging use of excessive force and exposure to inhumane conditions in his cell.
The prisoner alleged that after he had a “negative outburst” and was “maced” by a lieutenant and removed from his cell
by a corrections officer, he was taken to an infirmary bullpen, where he was forced to lie on the floor. While he was on
the floor, the prisoner alleged that officers kicked and punched him for ten minutes, causing him to defecate upon
himself. He alleged that after the incident, he was stripped of his prison clothes and “inadequately seen” by “medical”
personnel. At the screening stage of the case, the district court dismissed the complaint in part against some defendants,
but declined to dismiss with regard to the others. The court held that the inmate sufficiently alleged § 1983 claims
against several prison officers for use of excessive force by alleging that the officers engaged in prolonged attacks
against him and that one officer subsequently attacked him again. The court allowed the prisoner’s claims against
several prison officers regarding conditions of his confinement to proceed. The prisoner alleged that two officers did
not feed him for several days after the alleged attack against him, that two other officers did not allow the inmate to
shower or otherwise clean off fecal matter for several months, and that two other officers denied him hygiene products
and warm clothing during winter months. (Menard Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Taylor v. United States, 103 F.Supp.3d 87 (D.D.C. 2015). A detainee brought an action under the Federal Tort Claims
Act (FTCA), alleging she suffered intentional infliction of emotional distress, assault, and battery while in the custody
of the United States Marshals Service. After a bench trial, the district court held that evidence did not support the
detainee’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, and that the officer’s use of force against the detainee was
protected by law enforcement privilege. The detainee alleged that a detention enforcement officer’s use of a leg sweep
on her, which caused her to fall and sustain facial injuries, caused intentional infliction of emotional distress. According
to the court, the officer’s conduct was not extreme and outrageous since the leg sweep maneuver is a standard nonlethal technique that was appropriate in the situation, and the detainee provided no documentation relating to any
psychiatric evaluation or counseling for the alleged emotional distress. The court found that the officer’s use of the leg
sweep maneuver was privileged, and thus could not support her claim of battery against the officer, where the detainee
could have posed a legitimate threat to the officer, and the officer responded to the detainee’s refusal to obey
commands by using a standard non-lethal technique. (D.C. Superior Court Holding Cell, District of Columbia)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE
RESTRAINTS

Thomas v. Reese, 787 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2015). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that county correctional
officers unlawfully used excessive force in the course of handcuffing him after he disobeyed an order. The district court
entered summary judgment in the officers’ favor and inmate the appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded,
finding that the inmate was not barred by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) from bringing the action. The court
noted that the inmate did not have an available administrative remedy, where the inmate did not have access to an
inmate handbook that set forth the proper grievance procedure, the officer informed the inmate that he could not file a
grievance, the handbook only permitted inmates to dispute alleged violations, and the inmate was not contesting his
discipline, but rather was challenging the officers’ conduct that occurred after his offenses. (Dane County Jail, Wisc.)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Tidwell v. Hicks, 791 F.3d 704 (7th Cir. 2015). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action against prison officers, alleging
they violated his Eighth Amendment rights when they failed to protect him from an attack by a fellow inmate and then
subjected him to excessive force by restraining him during the attack. The district court granted judgment as a matter of
law for two of the officers and, following a jury verdict, entered judgment in the third officer’s favor. The inmate
appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the inmate failed to show that the officers knew that the inmate was
at risk of serious harm. . (Pinckneyville Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE
CELL EXTRACTION

Ussery v. Mansfield, 786 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2015). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action against correctional officers,
alleging excessive force in forcibly extracting him from his cell. The inmate alleged that members of the cell extraction
team beat him repeatedly in the head and face with batons, punches, and kicks, and that a sergeant “kicked and
stomped” on him. The district court denied the officers’ motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity
and the officers appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine
issue of material fact existed as to whether the state inmate suffered more than a de minimis injury. (Bertie Correctional
Institution, North Carolina)

U.S. District Court
RESTRAINTS

Vincent v. Sitnewski, 117 F.Supp.3d 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). A New York inmate brought a § 1983 action against prison
officers, alleging claims for First Amendment retaliation and failure to protect under the Eighth Amendment. The
officers moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held
that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the alleged sexual groping by a
prison officer would have deterred a person of “ordinary firmness” from exercising his constitutional rights, and as to

48.106

whether the officer who allegedly groped the inmate was motivated by retaliatory purpose. The court found that the
inmate’s allegations that prison officers handcuffed him to a bedpost for 18 hours, purportedly as payback for filing
grievances, even if improbable, were neither fanciful, fantastic, nor delusional, precluding summary judgment on the
ground of factual frivolousness on the inmate’s § 1983 claim for First Amendment retaliation arising from such
conduct. The court noted that the inmate did not contradict himself and his allegations were quite serious, as they
showed officers using their power to threaten and dehumanize an inmate they were supposed to protect. (Green Haven
Correctional Facility, New York)
U.S. Appeals Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE

Whatley v. Warden, Ware State Prison, 802 F.3d 1205 (11th Cir. 2015). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action,
alleging that he had been beaten by prison staff and denied medical care after the beating. The district court dismissed
the action based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed. The
court held that the district court failed to accept as true the prisoner’s view of the facts regarding exhaustion of
administrative remedies and failed to make specific findings to resolve disputed issue of fact regarding the exhaustion
of administrative remedies. (Telfair State Prison, Ware State Prison, Georgia Diagnostic and Classification Prison)

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE
CELL EXTRACTION

Wilson v. Hauck, 141 F.Supp.3d 226 (W.D.N.Y. 2015). A former inmate brought a § 1983 action against corrections
officers alleging they violated his rights by use of excessive force and/or by failing to protect him from that excessive
force. The inmate moved for sanctions for alleged spoliation of evidence. The district court granted the motion. The
court held that: (1) officers at one point possessed and had the ability to preserve original photographs of the inmate's
injuries and the original videotape of his cell extraction; (2) officers were at least negligent with respect to the
destruction or loss of both the original photographs and the videotape; and (3) differences between the originals and the
copies were sufficient to permit a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that the originals would support inmate's claims.
(Attica Correctional Facility, New York)

48.107

48.108

U.S. District Court
SEGREGATION

Wrinkles v. Davis, 311 F.Supp.2d 735 (N.D.Ind. 2004). Death row inmates at a state prison brought a § 1983 action in
state court, alleging that a 79-day lockdown of the death row area violated their constitutional rights. The lockdown
had been implemented after a death row inmate was killed during recreation, apparently by other death row inmates.
The court held that ceasing, for security reasons, allowing religious volunteers into the death row unit for group
religious services and for spiritual discussions during the lockdown did not violate the inmates' First Amendment right
to practice their religion. The court also found no violation for the alleged denial of inmates' access to telephones for
55 days, to hygiene services for 65 days, to hot meals for 30 days, and to exercise equipment. According to the court,
suspending all personal visits to death row inmates for the first 54 days of the lockdown did not violate the inmates'
First Amendment rights, where visitation privileges were a matter subject to the discretion of prison officials. (Indiana
State Prison)
2005

U.S. Appeals Court
RESTRICTIONS

Bazzetta v. McGinnis, 423 F.3d 557 (6th Cir. 2005). A class of state prisoners challenged restrictions on visitation.
The district court entered judgment for the plaintiffs and the appeals court affirmed. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed
and remanded. On remand, the district court declined to dissolve its injunctive order of compliance and the state
corrections department appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that the department regulation
that restricted visitation did not, on its face, violate procedural due process. The court noted that prisoners do not have
a protected liberty interest in visitation. The regulation indefinitely precluded visitation from persons other than
attorneys or clergy for prisoner with two or more substance abuse violations. The appeals court opened its decision by
stating “This case marks another chapter in a ten-year controversy between incarcerated felons, their visitors, and the
Michigan Department of Corrections.” (Michigan Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

DeToledo v. County of Suffolk, 379 F.Supp.2d 138 (D.Mass. 2005). A jail visitor who was arrested and briefly
detained on an arrest warrant that was intended for another person, and a visitor who was arrested and strip searched
on a warrant for her arrest that had been recalled, brought an action against correctional officers, a jail supervisor and
the county. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants in part, and denied it in part. The
court held that the supervisor’s negligent conduct in mistakenly ordering the arrest of the wrong person did not rise to
the level of a due process violation that would support a claim under § 1983, where the supervisor made a reasonable
assumption as to the warrant target’s location in the visiting area and immediately rescinded the arrest when he was
alerted to his mistake by another officer. The court found that a fact issue precluded summary judgment in favor of the
supervisor for arresting the second visitor, noting that the supervisor had in his hands documents which, if read, would
have revealed that the arrest warrant had been recalled. The court granted summary judgment to low-ranking
correctional officers who conducted a strip search on the second visitor under then-existing policies that called for
strip searches of prisoners. According to the court, reasonable officers in their positions would not have known that
their actions would violate the Fourth Amendment. (South Bay House of Corrections, Suffolk County, Massachusetts)

U.S. Appeals Court
VISITING
SEARCHES

Neumeyer v. Beard, 421 F.3d 210 (3rd Cir. 2005). Prison visitors filed a § 1983 action seeking a declaration that the
prison’s practice of subjecting visitors’ vehicles to random searches violated their constitutional rights. The district
court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the visitors appealed. The appeals court affirmed,
holding that the prison’s practice of engaging in suspicionless searches of prison visitors’ vehicles was valid under the
special needs doctrine. According to the court, the relatively minor inconvenience of the searches, balanced against
the prison officials’ special need to maintain the security and safety of the prison, rose beyond their general need to
enforce the law. The court noted that some inmates have outside work details and may have access to the vehicles.
The prison had posted large signs at all entranceways to the prison and immediately in front of the visitors’ parking lot
that stated “…all persons, vehicles and personal property entering or brought on these grounds are subject to
search…” Visitors are asked to sign a Consent to Search Vehicle form before a search is conducted and if they refuse
they are denied entry into the prison and are asked to leave the premises. (State Correctional Institution at
Huntingdon, Pennsylvania)
2006

U.S. District Court
PRIVACY
ATTORNEY
VIDEO

Lonegan v. Hasty, 436 F.Supp.2d 419 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). Defense attorneys brought a Bivens action against officials of
a federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) facility, claiming that the statutory and constitutional rights of themselves and their
inmate clients were violated through the practice of videotaping meetings. The district court denied the defendants’
motion to dismiss in part, and granted it in part. The court held that: (1) the statute of limitations had not run on the
claim that the Wiretap Act was violated; (2) a claim was stated that conversations were actually recorded, as required
under the Wiretap Act; (3) a claim was stated that the interception was intentional; (4) a claim was stated that “oral
communications” were made with the expectation that they not be recorded; (5) there was no qualified immunity from
the Wiretap Act claims; (6) a claim was stated under the Fourth Amendment; (7) there was no qualified immunity
from the Fourth Amendment claim; (8) a claim of personal involvement by a warden was stated; and (9) the
availability of Fourth Amendment relief precluded a claim under Fifth Amendment. The plaintiffs, attorneys
employed by the Legal Aid Society of New York, claimed that, by secretly recording their conversations with certain
detainees at the federal Bureau of Prisons' Metropolitan Detention Center (“MDC”), located in Brooklyn, New York,
the defendants violated Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended (the
“Wiretap Act” or “Title III”), and the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. BOP personnel told the
attorneys that video cameras were not on during their meeting with their clients, but a subsequent BOP investigation
concluded that visual and sound recordings existed for many of the attorney/client meetings. (Metropolitan Detention
Center, Federal Bureau of Prisons, New York)

49.29
XXII

U.S. District Court
PRETRIAL
DETAINEES
RESTRICTIONS

Murray v. Edwards County Sheriff's Dept., 453 F.Supp.2d 1280 (D.Kan. 2006). A former pretrial detainee at a county
jail brought a § 1983 action against a county sheriff's department, sheriff, undersheriff, and county attorney, alleging
various constitutional violations. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. According
to the court, the county jail's policy prohibiting friends from visiting the pretrial detainee did not violate due process,
where the detainee had free access to visits by family clergy and counsel to the extent that they wished to visit him,
the detainee had the free use of a telephone in his cell to speak with his friends, and the detainee sent and received
over 200 letters while at jail. (Edwards County Jail, Kansas)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Zboralski v. Monahan, 446 F.Supp.2d 879 (N.D.Ill. 2006). A visitor to a state treatment and detention facility brought
a § 1983 action against facility officers, alleging that she was illegally searched prior to visits. The visitor moved to
proceed in forma pauperis, and the district court granted the motion. The court held that the visitor stated Fourth
Amendment claims based on unreasonable patdowns and “Rapiscan” scans, an invasion of privacy claim, and an
assault and battery claim. The visitor alleged that she was illegally searched prior to visits, claiming invasion of
privacy under Illinois law based on intrusion upon seclusion, alleging that her virtual naked image was captured
through the Rapiscan machine, kept, and viewed hours later by officers. The court noted that the visitor was neither a
patient nor under any criminal investigation. The visitor also alleged that an officer caused her to reasonably believe
that she would place her fingers in the visitor's vaginal area, and physically touched her in such a manner at least four
times. (Illinois Department of Human Services Treatment and Detention Facility, Joliet, Illinois)
2007

U.S. District Court
CONJUGAL VISIT

Gordon v. Woodbourne Correctional Facility, 481 F.Supp.2d 263 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). An inmate and his wife brought a
§ 1983 action against a correctional facility, facility superintendent, and supervisor of the facility's conjugal visit
program, alleging due process and equal protection violations. The superintendent and supervisor moved for summary
judgment and the district court granted the motion. The court held that the plaintiffs did not have a due process liberty
interest in participation in the conjugal visit program, nor did they have a fundamental right to participate in the
conjugal visit program, for equal protection purposes. The court held that the officials' requirement that the inmate
and his wife show, through proper documentation, the validity of their marriage as a prerequisite to participation in
the facility's conjugal visit program, rationally furthered a legitimate government interest, and thus, the officials were
not liable to inmate and his wife under § 1983. (Woodbourne Correctional Facility, New York)
2008

U.S. District Court
RESTRICTIONS
VISITOR SEARCHES

Adeyola v. Gibon, 537 F.Supp.2d 479 (W.D.N.Y. 2008). An inmate brought a pro se action against a sheriff and
correctional facility officials, alleging that they violated his constitutional rights by refusing to allow females to visit
him unless they removed their head scarves for a search or presented proof that they were practicing Muslims. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the sheriff and officials. The court held that the inmate failed to
allege any injury in fact and thus lacked standing. The court held that the allegations, even if proven, did not violate
any First Amendment right of the inmate to have visitors, in that it was reasonable for officials to require visitors to
remove scarves to determine that they were not attempting to bring in contraband, and he was not denied visitors,
given that visitors were simply required to agree to certain conditions before being allowed to see an inmate. (Erie
County Holding Center, New York State Department of Correctional Services)

U.S. District Court
DENIAL OF VISITS
VISITOR SEARCHES

Carter v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 579 F.Supp.2d 798 (W.D.Tex. 2008). A prison visitor filed an action against the
federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) and the United States Department of Justice under the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA) claiming wrongful denial of inmate visitation. The district court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. The court held that the United States had to be named as a defendant in an action under the Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA) and that the plaintiff visitor had to provide grounds for relief under Texas law in order to recover.
The plaintiff had traveled from Illinois to the Greater El Paso area “for the purpose of visiting her husband,” who at
the time was a prisoner at the BOP’s Federal Satellite Low La Tuna facility. She alleged that upon arriving at La
Tuna, a BOP agent selected her for contraband testing pursuant to a mandate from the Director and testing was
accomplished using a device called the Ion Spectrometer. The test was positive and the plaintiff was denied visitation
with her husband. (Low La Tuna Facility, Federal Bureau of Prisons, Texas)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Davis v. Peters, 566 F.Supp.2d 790 (N.D.Ill. 2008). A detainee who was civilly committed pursuant to the Sexually
Violent Persons Commitment Act sued the current and former facility directors of the Illinois Department of Human
Services' (DHS) Treatment and Detention Facility (TDF), where the detainee was housed, as well as two former DHS
Secretaries, and the current DHS Secretary. The detainee claimed that the conditions of his confinement violated his
constitutional rights to equal protection and substantive due process. After a bench trial, the district court held that the
practice of searching the detainee prior to his visits with guests and attorneys violated his substantive due process
rights. The court noted that strip searches of a detainee prior to his court appearances and upon his return to the
institution did not violate substantive due process, where detainees were far more likely to engage in successful
escapes if they could carry concealed items during their travel to court, and searches upon their return were closely
connected with the goal of keeping contraband out of the facility. The court held that the practice of conducting strip
searches of the detainee prior to his visits with guests and attorneys was not within the bounds of professional
judgment, and thus, violated the detainee's substantive due process rights, where the only motivation for such searches
appeared to be a concern that a detainee would bring a weapon into the meeting, and most weapons should have been
detectable through a pat-down search. (Treatment and Detention Facility, Illinois)

49.30
XXII

U.S. District Court
LIBERTY INTEREST
TERMINATION OF
VISITS

King v. Caruso, 542 F.Supp.2d 703 (E.D. Mich. 2008). The wife of a state prison inmate brought suit against prison
officials alleging violation of her First Amendment rights, her Equal Protection rights, and her Fourteenth
Amendment due process rights when her visitation rights were withdrawn for attempting to smuggle a cell phone into
an institution. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The court held that termination of the
spouse's visitation rights did not violate her First Amendment right to freedom of association nor did it infringe upon
any liberty interest for purposes of procedural or substantive due process. The court noted that a hearing on the cutoff
of visitor's rights could be conducted by a division of the Department of Corrections and that hearing procedures did
not deny the spouse procedural due process with respect to any liberty interest she might possess. The court found that
the termination was reasonably related to penological interests and did not violate equal protection. (Chippewa
Correctional Facility, Michigan)
2009

XXIII

U.S. District Court
ATTORNEY
DENIAL OF VISITS
RESTRICTIONS

Delaney v. District of Columbia, 659 F.Supp.2d 185 (D.D.C. 2009). A former inmate and his wife brought a § 1983
action, on behalf of themselves and their child, against the District of Columbia and several D.C. officials and
employees, alleging various constitutional violations related to the inmate's incarceration for criminal contempt due to
his admitted failure to pay child support. They also alleged the wife encountered difficulties when she and her child
attempted to visit the husband at the D.C. jail. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion
in part and denied in part. The court held that the inmate's wife did not allege that any District of Columbia custom or
policy caused the alleged violation of her Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizure, precluding her §
1983 claim against a D.C. corrections official, even if the corrections officer's request that the inmate's wife wait to
speak to a corrections official prior to exiting the visiting area constituted a seizure. The court held that an attorney,
who was an African-American woman, stated a § 1983 claim against the District of Columbia and D.C. jail official
for violations of her Fifth Amendment due process rights by alleging that an official refused to allow her to visit her
clients at the jail based on her gender and race. (Lorton and Rivers Correctional Centers, and Dist. of Columbia Jail)

U.S. District Court
VISITOR SEARCHES

Federal CURE v. Lappin, 602 F.Supp.2d 197 (D.D.C. 2009). A nonprofit organization that advocated for the federal
inmate population and their families and provided information to the public about the Federal Bureau of Prisons
(BOP) challenged the BOP's denial of a fee waiver for information requested under the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA), regarding the ion spectrometer method of scanning prison visitors. The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the organization. The court held that the requested information was likely to contribute to
increased public understanding of government activities, would reach a reasonably broad group of interested persons,
and would contribute significantly to public understanding of government activities. The court noted that the
organization would analyze and synthesize technical information to relay to prisoners and their families via a website,
online newsletter, and Internet chat room that would disseminate information to a sufficiently broad audience.
According to the court, the requested information was not yet in the public domain, so that any dissemination by the
organization would enhance public understanding of the technology in centralized and easily accessible forums.
(Federal Bureau of Prisons, Washington, D.C.)

U.S. District Court
CONJUGAL VISIT

Hill v. Washington State Dept. of Corrections, 628 F.Supp.2d 1250 (W.D.Wash. 2009). An inmate and his wife
brought a § 1983 action against a state department of corrections and various prison officials, alleging a prison
regulation regarding extended family visits (EFV) violated their equal protection rights. The district court dismissed
the action as moot. On subsequent determination, the district court held that: (1) the inmate did not have a
constitutionally protected right to conjugal visits with his wife; (2) the inmate and his wife were not absolutely
entitled to equal treatment under EFV policy; (3) EFV regulations were rationally related to a legitimate penological
interest; (4) prison officials were entitled to summary judgment; and (5) prison officials had Eleventh Amendment
immunity from the § 1983 action. The court noted that denial of prison access to a particular visitor is well within the
terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a prison sentence, and access to a particular visitor is not
independently protected by the Due Process Clause. The challenged EFV policy only allowed those spouses who were
legally married to inmates prior to incarceration to participate in extended family visitation. (Washington State
Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
DENIAL OF VISITS

Johnson v. Boyd, 676 F.Supp.2d 800 (E.D. Ark. 2009). A state prisoner filed a civil rights action against a detention
center and its personnel alleging several violations. The defendants moved for summary judgment and the district
court granted the motion in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether detention center personnel failed to protect the prisoner from an attack by another prisoner. The
court held that the prisoner stated a free exercise of religion claim under the First Amendment by alleging that
detention center personnel prevented him from practicing the central tenet of his faith of regularly reading his Bible
for 19 days while he was in protective custody. According to the court, the prisoner's First Amendment freedom of
association and speech rights had not been violated by denial of his visitation, phone, and mailing privileges for two
days as the direct result of the prisoner committing a disciplinary infraction while he was in protective custody.
(Crittenden County Detention Center, Arkansas)

U.S. Appeals Court
RULES

Mosher v. Nelson, 589 F.3d 488 (1st Cir. 2009). The administrator of the estate of a pretrial detainee who was killed at
a state mental health hospital by another patient brought an action against the superintendent of the hospital, the
commissioner of the state department of corrections (DOC), and other state officials, alleging civil rights violations
and state-law claims. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The administrator
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the superintendent of the state mental health hospital and the
commissioner of the state department of corrections were entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 liability on the
deliberate indifference claim. According to the court, although the patient was able to strangle the detainee while the
detainee was visiting the patient in his room, the hospital had a long-standing policy that allowed patients to visit in

49.31

each others' rooms during the short period during the end of the morning patient count and lunch. The court noted that
there was no history of violence or individualized threats made by any patient, and reasonable officials could have
believed that allowing the visiting policy to continue and maintaining the current staffing levels at the hospital would
not cause a substantial risk of harm. (Bridgewater State Hospital, Massachusetts)
U.S. Appeals Court
RESTRICTIONS

Samford v. Dretke, 562 F.3d 674 (5th Cir. 2009). A state prison inmate brought an in forma pauperis § 1983 action
against a corrections official, alleging that a prohibition against any communication between the inmate and his sons
constituted a violation of his First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and association. The district court
dismissed the petition and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the enforcement of a
“negative mail list” that included the inmate's sons did not unduly infringe upon the inmate's First Amendment rights,
and the officials' removal of the inmate's sons from the approved visitors list was reasonable. The court found that the
restriction was rationally related to the prison's legitimate interest in protecting crime victims and their families from
unwanted communications, given the inmate's wife's request that the sons be placed on the list and the fact that the
inmate had been imprisoned after violating a probation condition of no contact with the sons. The court noted that an
alternate means of communication remained open via the inmate's mother. (Texas Department of Criminal Justice)

U.S. District Court
FAMILY

Shariff v. Coombe, 655 F.Supp.2d 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). Disabled prisoners who depended on wheelchairs for
mobility filed an action against a state and its employees asserting claims pursuant to Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), Title V of Rehabilitation Act, New York State Correction Law, and First, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part
and denied in part. The court held that the existence of potholes and broken concrete in state prison yards did not
constitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment as to disabled prisoners
who depended on wheelchairs for mobility, even if those prisoners had fallen and suffered injuries as a result.
According to the court, the inaccessibility of telephones throughout a state prison, inaccessibility of a family reunion
site, inaccessibility of a law library, and malfunctioning of a school elevator, that did not cause any physical harm or
pain to disabled prisoners who depended on wheelchairs for mobility, were not the kind of deprivations that denied a
basic human need, and thus did not constitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment. (New York State Department of Correctional Services, Green Haven Correctional Facility)

U.S. District Court
RULES

Sparks v. Seltzer, 607 F.Supp.2d 437 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). A psychiatric patient, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, brought a § 1983 action against a director and a treatment team leader at a psychiatric center in a
New York state psychiatric hospital. The patient was housed in an inpatient, long-term locked ward which normally
houses a mixture of voluntary patients, patients who have been involuntarily committed under the civil law, and
patients committed as a result of a verdict of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect or a finding of
incompetence to stand trial. The patient alleged violations of his First Amendment rights and his “zone of privacy”
concerning a supervised visitation policy. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The court
held that the psychiatric patients' speech during supervised visits at a state psychiatric hospital was not wholly
unprotected by the First Amendment, although the speech was casual and among family members or friends.
According to the court, the reluctance of psychiatric patients in the state psychiatric hospital to discuss various matters
within the earshot of a supervising guard during supervised visitation did not give rise to a cognizable injury to their
free speech rights. The court noted that no patient had lost privileges, had the term of involuntary hospitalization
extended, or had otherwise been punished or threatened with being punished for anything he or a visitor had said in a
supervised visit. Patients were not required to speak loudly enough to be heard, guards did not generally report the
contents of conversations to hospital authorities, and no sound recordings of the visits were made. The court held that
the state psychiatric hospital's supervised visitation policy imposed upon patients did not invade their “zone of
privacy” in violation of the Fourth Amendment, since patients had no reasonable expectation of privacy in a hospital
visiting room which could be entered by anyone during a visit and which was used by more than one patient at a time
for visits. The court found that the supervised visitation policy did not, on its face or applied to patients, infringe upon
their privacy rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. (Creedmoor Psychiatric Center, New York)
2010

XXIII

U.S. Appeals Court
CHILDREN
DENIAL OF VISITS
RESTRICTIONS

Dunn v. Castro, 621 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 2010). A state prisoner, proceeding pro se, brought a § 1983 action against
prison officials, alleging violations of the First, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court denied the
officials' motion to dismiss. The officials appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that the
right of the prisoner to receive visits from his children was not clearly established and the officials were entitled to
qualified immunity. The court noted that the restriction was temporary and the prisoner had violated prison rules by
participating in a sexually-oriented telephone call involving a minor. (Corcoran State Prison, California)

U.S. District Court
ADA-Americans with
Disabilities Act
CONTACT VISITS
RESTRICTIONS

Durrenberger v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, 757 F.Supp.2d 640 (S.D.Tex. 2010). A hearing impaired prison
visitor brought an action against the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ), alleging failure to accommodate
his disability during visits in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Rehabilitation Act. The
district court denied summary judgment for the defendants and granted summary judgment, in part, for the visitor.
The court held that acceptance by the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) of federal financial assistance
waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity from the prison visitor's action alleging disability discrimination in
violation of the Rehabilitation Act, where the Act expressly stated that acceptance of federal funds waived immunity.
According to the court, the hearing impaired prison visitor was substantially limited in his ability to communicate
with others, and therefore, was disabled for the purposes of his action alleging the prison failed to accommodate his
disability in violation of the Rehabilitation Act. The court noted that it was difficult for the visitor to hear when a
speaker was not in close proximity to him or when background noise was present, he could not use telephones without
amplification devices, and he could not use the telephones in prison visitation rooms.
The court held that the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) failed to provide accommodations to the

49.32

visitor that would allow the visitor to participate in the visitation program, even though TDCJ allowed the visitor to
use the end booth furthest away from the noise of other visitors and made pen and paper available. The court noted
that the end booth was not always available, the visitor was still unable to hear while in the end booth, and passing
notes was qualitatively different from in-person visitation. The court held that the prison visitor's request for contact
visits with the inmate was not a reasonable accommodation for his disability, for the purposes of his Rehabilitation
Act failure to accommodate claim, where the inmate was in prison for violently assaulting the visitor, and contact
visits required additional staffing and security. According to the court, the provision of a telephone amplification
device to the visitor would have been a reasonable accommodation for his disability, where the devices were readily
available for approximately $15 to $100. The court also found that allowing the visitor to use an attorney client booth
during visitation would have been a reasonable accommodation for his disability, where use of the booth would not
fundamentally alter the visitation program, and the booth could be searched before and after visits for contraband.
The court held that summary judgment as to compensatory damages was precluded by a genuine issue of material
fact as to the amount of damages suffered by the visitor by the prison's failure to accommodate his disability.
The court found that a permanent injunction enjoining future violations of the Rehabilitation Act by the Texas
Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) was warranted in the hearing impaired prison visitor's action alleging failure
to accommodate, where TDCJ had not accommodated the visitor in the past, continued to not provide
accommodations and gave no indication that it intended to provide any in the future. (Hughes Unit, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division)
U.S. District Court
CONTACT VISITS
SEARCHES

Mashburn v. Yamhill County, 698 F.Supp.2d 1233 (D.Or. 2010). A class action was brought on behalf of juvenile
detainees against a county and officials, challenging strip-search procedures at a juvenile detention facility. The
parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The court held that the scope of an admission strip-search policy applied
to juvenile detainees was excessive in relation to the government's legitimate interests, in contravention of the Fourth
Amendment. According to the court, notwithstanding the county's general obligation to care for and protect juveniles,
the searches were highly intrusive, the county made no effort to mitigate the scope and intensity of the searches, and
less intrusive alternatives existed. The court found that county officials failed to establish a reasonable relationship
between their legitimate interests and post-contact visit strip-searches performed on juvenile detainees, as required
under the Fourth Amendment. The court noted that the searches occurred irrespective of whether there was an
individualized suspicion that a juvenile had acquired contraband, and most contact visits occurred between juveniles
and counsel or therapists. (Yamhill County Juvenile Detention Center, Oregon)

U.S. District Court
DENIAL OF VISITS
RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION

Shuler v. District of Columbia, 744 F.Supp.2d 320 (D.D.C. 2010). An inmate's wife, who was an African-American
attorney, brought a § 1983 action against the District of Columbia and a jail captain, alleging an equal protection
violation due to the captain's alleged refusal to allow her to visit the inmate. The defendants moved for summary
judgment and the district court granted the motion. The court held that there was no evidence that the captain
terminated the wife's visits with the inmate based on a discriminatory purpose or intent, or that the District had a
custom or policy of treating women or African-Americans differently than others. (District of Columbia Jail)
2011

U.S. District Court
LIBERTY INTEREST
RESTRICTIONS

Aref v. Holder, 774 F.Supp.2d 147 (D.D.C. 2011). A group of prisoners who were, or who had been, incarcerated in
communication management units (CMU) at federal correctional institutions (FCI) designed to monitor high-risk
prisoners filed suit against the United States Attorney General, the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), and BOP
officials, alleging that CMU incarceration violated the First, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments. Four additional prisoners
moved to intervene and the defendants moved to dismiss. The district court denied the motion to intervene, and
granted the motion to dismiss in part and denied in part. The court held that even though a federal prisoner who had
been convicted of solicitation of bank robbery was no longer housed in the federal prison's communication
management unit (CMU), he had standing under Article III to pursue constitutional claims against the Bureau of
Prisons (BOP) for alleged violations since there was a realistic threat that he might be redesignated to a CMU. The
court noted that the prisoner had originally been placed in CMU because of the nature of his underlying conviction
and because of his alleged efforts to radicalize other inmates, and these reasons for placing him in CMU remained.
The court found that the restrictions a federal prison put on prisoners housed within a communication management
unit (CMU), which included that all communications be conducted in English, that visits were monitored and subject
to recording, that each prisoner received only eight visitation hours per month, and that prisoners' telephone calls were
limited and subjected to monitoring, did not violate the prisoners' alleged First Amendment right to family integrity,
since the restrictions were rationally related to a legitimate penological interest. The court noted that prisoners
assigned to the unit typically had offenses related to international or domestic terrorism or had misused approved
communication methods while incarcerated.
The court found that prisoners confined to a communication management unit (CMU), stated a procedural due
process claim against the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) by alleging that the requirements imposed on CMU prisoners were
significantly different than those imposed on prisoners in the general population, and that there was a significant risk
that procedures used by the BOP to review whether prisoners should initially be placed within CMU or should
continue to be incarcerated there had resulted in erroneous deprivation of their liberty interests. The court noted that
CMU prisoners were allowed only eight hours of non-contact visitation per month and two 15 minute telephone calls
per week, while the general population at a prison was not subjected to a cap on visitation and had 300 minutes of
telephone time per month. The court also noted that the administrative review of CMU status, conducted by officials
in Washington, D.C., rather than at a unit itself, was allegedly so vague and generic as to render it illusory. The court
found that a federal prisoner stated a First Amendment retaliation claim against the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) by
alleging: (1) that he was “an outspoken and litigious prisoner;” (2) that he had written books about improper prison
conditions and filed grievances and complaints on his own behalf; (3) that his prison record contained “no serious
disciplinary infractions” and “one minor communications-related infraction” from 1997; (4) that prison staff told him
he would be “sent east” if he continued filing complaints; and (5) that he filed a complaint about that alleged threat

49.33

and he was then transferred to a high-risk inmate monitoring communication management unit (CMU) at a federal
correctional institution. (Communication Management Units at Federal Correctional Institutions in Terre Haute,
Indiana and Marion, Illinois)
U.S. District Court
MEDIA
PRIVACY
VISITING

Battle v. A & E Television Networks, LLC, 837 F.Supp.2d 767 (M.D.Tenn. 2011). A wife who had unwittingly been
filmed by a television crew at a maximum security prison while visiting her husband who was an inmate there filed
suit against a television producer and a television network alleging defamation/false light and intentional infliction of
emotional distress (IIED) when the program was aired on the national television network. The defendants moved to
dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that, under Tennessee law, the
television program which aired on a national network depicting the wife visiting her inmate husband in a maximum
security prison, and which contained a voice-over explaining how drugs and contraband were passed to prisoners from
outsiders, was capable of a defamatory meaning, and thus the wife stated a claim for defamation/false light against the
television producer and the network. According to the court, the stream of audio and visual components interacting
with each other suggested that the wife was a drug smuggler, and even though the program indicated that a search of
the wife revealed no drugs, the overall impression was that the wife just happened not to get caught on that particular
day. But the court found that the actions of television producer and network were not so outrageous as to be beyond
all bounds of decency or utterly intolerable in a civilized community, as required to support claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress, since the program could also be understood to suggest that the plaintiff had not
brought drugs into the facility. The program, “The Squad: Prison Police,” was aired by A & E Television Networks,
LLC. (Riverbend Maximum Security Institution, Nashville, Tennessee)

U.S. Appeals Court
DENIAL OF VISITS

McCollum v. California Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 647 F.3d 870 (9th Cir. 2011). Inmates and a
volunteer prison chaplain brought an action against the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
(CDCR) and others, challenging CDCR's paid chaplaincy program, and alleging retaliation for bringing such a suit.
The defendants moved to dismiss and for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion to dismiss the
inmates' claims in part, dismissed the chaplain's Establishment Clause claim for lack of standing, and granted
summary judgment on the chaplain's remaining claims. The plaintiffs appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The
appeals court held that the inmates' grievances failed to alert CDCR that inmates sought redress for wrongs allegedly
perpetuated by CDCR's chaplaincy-hiring program, as required to exhaust under the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(PLRA). According to the court, while the inmates' grievances gave notice that the inmates alleged the prison policies
failed to provide for certain general Wiccan religious needs and free exercise, they did not provide notice that the
source of the perceived problem was the absence of a paid Wiccan chaplaincy. But the court found that an inmate’s
grievance alleging he requested that the prison's administration contact and allow visitation by clergy of his own
Wiccan faith, which was denied because his chaplain was not a regular paid chaplain, was sufficient to put CDCR on
notice that the paid-chaplaincy hiring policy was the root cause of the inmate's complaint and thus preserved his
ability to challenge that policy under PLRA. According to the court, there was no direct evidence of a retaliatory
motive by the prison employee who restricted the Wiccan prison chaplain's access to a prison, as required to support
the chaplain's First Amendment retaliation claim. The court noted that the incident resulting in restricted access
occurred nearly three years after the chaplain filed a lawsuit against CDCR, and an employee's knowledge of the suit,
alone, was insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to a retaliatory motive. (California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation)

U.S. District Court
DENIAL OF VISITS
RESTRICTIONS
SCHEDULING

Roseboro v. Gillespie, 791 F.Supp.2d 353 (S.D.N.Y. 2011.) A federal prisoner brought a pro se Bivens action against
two prison correction officers and a prison counselor, alleging violations of his due process rights, cruel and unusual
punishment, and retaliation for filing prison grievances. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district
court granted the motion. The court held that the prisoner could not prove that a prison counselor failed to process his
visitor requests and filed a false incident report against him in retaliation for filing a grievance against a corrections
officer, as required to establish a retaliation claim under the First Amendment, even if the alleged retaliation occurred
close in time to the filing of the grievance. The court noted that the prisoner presented no evidence that the counselor's
conduct was motivated by in an intent to retaliate, that she even knew about the grievance, or that the one month time
for processing a visitor request was unusually long, and at least one visitor request was denied for the non-retaliatory
reason that the visitor had a criminal record. (Metropolitan Correctional Center, New York City)
2012

U.S. Appeals Court
CONJUGAL VISITS
RULES

Pouncil v. Tilton, 704 F.3d 568 (9th Cir. 2012). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action alleging that denials by prison
officials of his request for a conjugal visit with his wife violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act (RLUIPA) and the First Amendment by interfering with his practice of a tenet of his Islamic faith requiring him
to marry, consummate his marriage, and father children. The district court denied a prison official's motion to dismiss
the prisoner's claims as untimely, and the official appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that
notwithstanding a prior denial pursuant to the same regulation, denial of the prisoner's second request for a conjugal
visit was a separate, discrete act, triggering running of the statute of limitations on the prisoner's Section 1983 claim
against prison officials for violation of his First Amendment and RLUIPA rights. (Mule Creek State Prison,
California)

U.S. District Court
DENIAL OF VISITS
FAMILY

Sledge v. U.S., 883 F.Supp.2d 71 (D.D.C. 2012). A federal inmate's relatives brought an action under the Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA) against the United States, alleging claims for personal injury and wrongful death based on the
failure of Bureau of Prisons (BOP) employees to prevent or stop an attack on the inmate. The attack resulted in the
inmate’s hospitalization and death. The relatives also sought to recover for emotional distress that the inmate and his
mother allegedly suffered when BOP employees denied bedside visitation between the mother and the inmate.
Following dismissal of some of the claims, the United States moved to dismiss the remaining claims based on FTCA's
discretionary function exception. The district court granted the motion. The court found that a correction officer's

49.34

decision to position himself outside the housing unit, rather than in the sally port, to smoke a cigarette during a controlled move was discretionary, and thus the United States was immune from liability under the Federal Tort Claims
Act's (FTCA) discretionary function exception. The court noted that the prison lacked mandatory guidelines that required correctional staff to follow a particular course of action regarding supervision of inmates during controlled
moves, and the officer's decision implicated policy concerns, in that it required consideration of the risks posed by
inmates moving throughout prison, and required safety and security calculations. The court held that the mother of the
deceased federal inmate failed to state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, under Missouri law, arising from the Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) denial of bedside visitation between the mother and inmate, absent allegations
that the BOP should have realized that its failure to complete a visitation memorandum involved an unreasonable risk
of causing distress, or facts necessary to demonstrate that the mother's emotional distress was “medically diagnosable”
and was of sufficient severity as to be “medically significant.” The court found that the Bureau of Prisons' (BOP)
alleged decision not to allow the mother of federal inmate, who was in coma after being severely beaten by a fellow
inmate, to visit her son after the BOP allegedly failed to complete a visitation memorandum, was not so outrageous in
character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious,
and utterly intolerable in civilized community, thus precluding the mother's intentional infliction of emotional distress
claim under Missouri law. (Federal Correctional Institution, Allenwood, Pennsylvania)
2013
U.S. Appeals Court
CONTACT VISITS

Chappell v. Mandeville, 706 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2013). A state prison inmate brought a § 1983 action against prison
officials, alleging violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The defendants moved for summary
judgment on the ground of qualified immunity and the district court granted summary judgment as to some, but not
all, of the claims. The defendants appealed. The appeals court reversed. The appeals court held that: (1) it was not
clearly established that subjecting the prison inmate to a contraband watch violated the Eighth Amendment
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, and thus prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity on the
Eighth Amendment claim; (2) the contraband watch was not such an extreme change in conditions of confinement as
to trigger due-process protection; and (3) it was not clearly established whether a state-created liberty interest existed
with regard to the contraband watch, and thus officials were entitled to qualified immunity on the claim that the
inmate's right to due process was violated because he was not provided with an opportunity to be heard by the official
who ordered contraband watch. The inmate’s fiancée had visited him, and when she entered the prison she was
wearing a ponytail hairpiece. The next day the hairpiece was discovered in a trash can near the visiting room. Prison
officials then searched the entire visiting area and found spandex undergarments in the women's bathroom. Both the
hairpiece and the undergarments tested positive for cocaine residue. Prison staff conducted a search of the inmate’s
cell, during which they notified him that they believed that someone had introduced drugs through a hairpiece. The
officials discovered three unlabelled bottles of what appeared to be eye drops in the inmate’s cell. The liquid in the
bottles tested positive for methamphetamine. The inmate was then placed on a contraband watch. The contraband
watch conditions included 24-hour lighting, mattress deprivation, taping the inmate into two pairs of underwear and
jumpsuits, placing him in a hot cell with no ventilation, chaining him to an iron bed, shackling him at the ankles and
waist, and forcing him to eat “like a dog.” (California State Prison, Sacramento)

U.S. District Court
FAMILY
FORMER EMPLOYEES
FORMER PRISONERS
SPOUSES

Corso v. Fischer, 983 F.Supp.2d 320 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). A correctional officer brought an action against the
Commissioner of the New York Department of Corrections and Community Supervision's (DOCCS), alleging
DOCCS's work rule prohibiting personal association of DOCCS employees with current and former inmates and their
associates was overbroad, in violation of the First Amendment. The parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The
district court granted the officer’s motion. The court held that the work rule was facially overbroad in violation of the
First Amendment, where DOCCS had enforced the rule against the officer and denied her the right to associate with
her former husband and the father of her grandchild.
The court found that the rule was not narrowly tailored to further the State's compelling interest in maintaining safe
and orderly administration of its prisons, as applied to constitutionally protected close familial relationships, and thus,
did not withstand strict scrutiny on the First Amendment overbreadth claim. The court noted that the rule provided no
temporal or geographical limitation with respect to the former inmate's incarceration, nor did its prohibition account
for variations in the seriousness of that person's offense or his or her prison disciplinary history. The court found that
the rule was substantially overbroad, in violation of the First Amendment, as applied to close familial relationships,
where the rule would prevent a DOCCS employee from visiting, or even corresponding with an incarcerated spouse if
the couple had no children or if their children did not maintain a relationship with the incarcerated parent, and the rule
prohibited employees from ever reestablishing contact with a spouse, child, sibling, or parent when that person was
released and became a “former inmate.” (New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision)

U.S. District Court
CONTACT VISITS
PRIVACY RESTRICTIONS
SEARCHES
SEGREGATION
VIDEO

Royer v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 933 F.Supp.2d 170 (D.D.C. 2013). A federal prisoner brought an action against
Bureau of Prisoners (BOP), alleging classification as a “terrorist inmate” resulted in violations of the Privacy Act and
the First and Fifth Amendments. The BOP moved for summary judgment and to dismiss. The district court granted
the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that BOP rules prohibiting contact visits and limiting noncontact
visits and telephone time for federal inmates labeled as “terrorist inmates”, more than other inmates, had a rational
connection to a legitimate government interest, for the purpose of the inmate's action alleging the rules violated his
First Amendment rights of speech and association. According to the court, the prison had an interest in monitoring the
inmate's communications and the prison isolated inmates who could pose a threat to others or to the orderly operation
of the institution. The court noted that the rules did not preclude the inmate from using alternative means to
communicate with his family, where the inmate could send letters, the telephone was available to him, and he could
send messages through others allowed to visit. The court found that the inmate's assertions that the prison already
had multiple cameras and hypersensitive microphones, and that officers strip searched inmates before and after
contact visits, did not establish ready alternatives to a prohibition on contact visits for the inmate and limits on phone

49.35

usage and noncontact visits due to being labeled as a “terrorist inmate.” The court noted that increasing the number of
inmates subject to strip searches increased the cost of visitation, and microphones and cameras did not obviate all
security concerns that arose from contact visits, such as covert notes or hand signals. The court held that the inmate's
allegations that he was segregated from the prison's general population for over six years, that he was subject to
restrictions on recreational, religious, and educational opportunities available to other inmates, that contact with his
family was limited to one 15 minute phone call per week during business hours when his children were in school, and
that he was limited to two 2-hour noncontact visits per month, were sufficient to plead harsh and atypical conditions,
as required for his Fifth Amendment procedural due process claim. (Special Housing Units at FCI Allenwood and
USP Lewisburg, CMU at FCI Terre Haute, SHU at FCI Greenville, Supermax facility at Florence, Colorado, and
CMU at USP Marion)
U.S. Appeals Court
DENIAL OF VISITS
LIBERTY INTEREST

Williams v. Ozmint, 716 F.3d 801 (4th Cir. 2013). An inmate, proceeding pro se, brought a § 1983 action in state court
against a warden, alleging that suspension of his visitation privileges for two years violated the First, Fifth, Eight, and
Fourteenth Amendments. Following removal to federal court, the district court granted the warden's motion for
summary judgment. The inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and dismissed in part. The appeals court
held that: (1) the inmate did not have clearly established right to visitation; (2) the inmate’s claim for injunctive relief
was rendered moot when the inmate received restoration of his visitation privileges; (3) there was no evidence that the
inmate would be deprived of his visitation privileges in the absence of any culpable conduct on his part; and (4) the
inmate's request for “any other relief that seems just and proper” was insufficient to state a claim for declaratory relief.
(Evans Correctional Institution, South Carolina)
2014

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES
VISITOR SEARCHES

Hernandez v. Montanez, 36 F.Supp.3d 202 (D.Mass. 2014). A prison visitor brought a civil rights action against
corrections officers, alleging that a strip-search violated § 1983, the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act (MCRA), and the
Massachusetts Privacy Act (MPA). The corrections officers moved for summary judgment. The district court granted
the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to strip-search
the female prison visitor based on an anonymous tip by an inmate on the prison hotline that another inmate would be
receiving drugs from an unidentified visitor. The court noted that the officers had no knowledge of the source of the
single anonymous tip or how the source had received his information, and there was no evidence that the anonymous
tipster or hotline had provided reliable information in the past. The court found that an objectively reasonable prison
official would not have believed that he had reasonable suspicion to strip-search the visitor, and thus the prison
official and the corrections officers were not entitled to qualified immunity from visitor's Fourth Amendment claim
arising from the strip-search. The court noted that the officers knew that the inmate had enemies in the prison and that
inmates often used the hotline to harass other prisoners, and there was no evidence that the visitor was involved in
drug activity. (Souza–Baranowski Correctional Center, Massachusetts)
2015

U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCHES

Crawford v. Cuomo, 796 F.3d 252 (2nd Cir. 2015). A current state prisoner and a former state prisoner brought an
action against a corrections officer, the officer’s supervisor, and state officials, alleging that the corrections officer
sexually abused them in violation of their Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment, and
seeking damages and injunctive relief. The district court dismissed the action for failure to state a claim. The current
and former prisoners appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that one prisoner’s
allegation that the corrections officer, in frisking the prisoner during the prisoner’s visit with his wife, fondled and
squeezed the prisoner’s penis in order to make sure that prisoner did not have an erection, stated a claim for sexual
abuse in violation of his Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment. The court found that a
prisoner’s allegation that the corrections officer, in searching the prisoner after the prisoner left a mess hall, squeezed
and fondled the prisoner’s penis and roamed his hands down the prisoner’s thigh, while making demeaning comments
such as “[t]hat doesn’t feel like a penis to me” and “I’ll run my hands up the crack of your ass if I want to,” stated a
claim for sexual abuse in violation of the Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment.
(Eastern Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAMILY
DENIAL OF VISITS

Jackson v. Humphrey, 776 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2015). A wife brought an action under § 1983 against corrections
officials, claiming that revocation of her visitation privileges with her incarcerated husband who was on a hunger
strike violated the First Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment, based on qualified immunity, in
favor of the officials, for their decision to terminate the wife’s visitation privileges during the time of hunger strike.
The court denied summary judgment to the officials for the period following the end of the hunger strike, ruling that
the question of whether the officials continued to enjoy qualified immunity after the hunger strike ended was one for a
jury. The officials appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that the officials were entitled to
qualified immunity. According to the court, the officials’ decision had been motivated by lawful considerations even
though it had consequences in the future, where the husband had a considerable amount of influence over other
prisoners and considered himself, and was viewed by others, to be the leader of the hunger strike. The court noted that
evidence suggested that the wife had urged her husband to prolong that strike after the strike had ended, and the
officials were legitimately concerned that the strike might spread, about the disruption caused by the strike, and about
the security and safety of staff and inmates. (Georgia Department of Corrections, Georgia Diagnostic and
Classification Prison Special Management Unit)

U.S. District Court
VISITOR SEARCH

Knight v. Washington State Department of Corrections, 147 F.Supp.3d 1165 (W.D. Wash. 2015). A prison visitor
who suffered from a seizure disorder, and was subjected to a strip search and pat-down searches, brought an action
against the state Department of Corrections (DOC) and DOC officials, alleging that the searches violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the mo-

49.36

tion, finding that: (1)the strip search and pat-down searches did not violate ADA; (2) guards did not act with deliberate indifference in conducting a strip search; (3) the prison was not a place of public accommodation, under the
Washington Law Against Discrimination, as to visitors participating in an extended family visitation program; (4) the
guards' conduct was not sufficiently extreme to support an outrage claim; and (5) the guards' conduct did not support a
claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. According to the court, there was no showing that the guards proceeded in conscious disregard of a high probability of emotional distress when ordering the strip search, as the visitor
suggested the strip search as an alternative to a pat search and the guards followed this suggestion, and all visitors
were subjected to pat-down searches, which were justified on safety grounds. (Monroe Corr. Complex, Washington)
U.S. Appeals Court
SEGREGATION

Prieto v. Clarke, 780 F.3d 245 (4th Cir. 2015). A state prisoner convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death
brought a pro se § 1983 action, alleging that his confinement on death row, pursuant to a state policy which required
him to be in a single cell with minimal visitation and recreation opportunities, violated his procedural due process and
Eighth Amendment rights. The district court dismissed the Eighth Amendment claim, and subsequently granted
summary judgment in favor of the prisoner on the due process claim. Prison officials appealed. The appeals court
reversed, finding that the prisoner had no due process liberty interest in avoiding confinement on death row. (Sussex I
State Prison, Virginia)

U.S. Appeals Court
DENIAL OF VISITS
FORMER EMPLOYEE

Riker v. Lemmon, 798 F.3d 546 (7th Cir. 2015). A female former prison worker brought an action against prison
officials, alleging that the officials denied her request to marry an inmate in violation of her fundamental rights. The
district court granted the officials’ motion for summary judgment and the worker appealed. The appeals court reversed
and remanded, finding that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
prison’s decision to deny the worker’s request to marry an inmate was reasonably related to its legitimate penological
interests. The worker had been an employee of Aramark Correctional Services, Inc. that operated and managed food
services in the prison. She became involved with an inmate worker who was under her supervision. She quit her job
after being discovered in a romantic relationship with the inmate. She was denied visiting privileges after she left her
job. The former worker alleged that prohibiting her marriage to the inmate was an exaggerated response to the
prison’s security objectives and that the prohibition was unnecessary for the maintenance of a safe and orderly
institution. She emphasized that she only sought “a single visit to the institution, of a short duration, for the limited
purpose of marrying her fiancé.” (Wabash Valley Correctional Facility, Indiana)

U.S. District Court
SEGREGATION

U.S. v. Mohamed, 103 F.Supp.3d 281 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). A defendant who was indicted for murder of an
internationally protected person and attempted murder of an internationally protected person, filed a motion to vacate
or modify special administrative measures governing conditions of his pretrial detention. The district court denied the
motion, finding that the measures were rationally connected to the legitimate government objective of preventing the
detainee from coordinating violent attacks. The detainee had been placed in a special housing unit and limitations on
communications between him and people inside or outside the prison were limited. The court noted that the detainee
had admitted allegiance to terrorist organizations, had previously broken out of prison two times, one escape was
allegedly coordinated between the defendant and a terrorist organization, and three prison guards had been killed
during one escape. (Metropolitan Correctional Center, Manhattan, New York)

U.S. District Court
DENIAL OF VISITS
RESTRICTIONS

United States v. Rivera, 83 F.Supp.3d 1130 (D.Colo. 2015). A federal prisoner moved for an order directing the
Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to allow him to have a face-to-face meeting with another inmate, his co-defendant in a
federal prosecution. The district court denied the motion. The court held that the prisoner’s Fifth Amendment right to
a fair trial and his Sixth Amendment right to present witnesses in his own defense were trial rights that did not entitle
him to such a “tête-à-tête” witness interview. The court found that the opportunity afforded by the BOP for defense
counsel to interview the co-defendant was sufficient, even in the absence of a face-to-face meeting between the
defendant and the co-defendant, to satisfy the defendant’s constitutional rights. The court noted that the decision by
the BOP to keep the inmates separate was supported by a legitimate penological interest in the security of the facility
and the safety of its staff and inmates. (Administrative Maximum Facility Florence, Colorado)

49.37

49.38

XIX

XIX

who are enrolled in a program to fully participate in the program. Any inmate who refuses to
participate in the program in which he is enrolled is written up for “Refusal to Participate in
Classified Treatment Program.” Once written up, the inmate is referred to a disciplinary hearing
officer and is no longer eligible for an institutional work assignment. The assignment required the
inmate to think and write about alternative choices that he could have made prior to being
incarcerated, and the impact these choices may have had on his life. The inmate claimed that
completing the assignment would be a violation of his religious beliefs, alleging that answering it
“knowing the sinful nature in the sight of Allah, is willful and blatant disobedience to Allah.”
(Sussex Correctional Institution, Delaware)
U.S. District Court
RIGHT TO WORK

Torres Garcia v. Puerto Rico, 402 F.Supp.2d 373 (D.Puerto Rico 2005). A prisoner filed a civil
rights suit claiming violations of his constitutional rights. The district court granted the
defendants’ motions to dismiss in part, and denied in part. The court held that the prisoner stated
a due process claim against prison officials based on his transfer from a minimum security unit to
a maximum security unit in violation of a prison rule that required a timely post-transfer hearing,
but noted that the prisoner could only seek prospective injunctive relief. The court found that the
prisoner’s expectations of prison employment did not amount to a property or liberty interest
entitled to due process protection, noting that earning wages while incarcerated was a privilege,
not a right. The court held that the inmate failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim that prison
officials failed to afford him adequate protection from an attack by other inmates, absent an
allegation that he had sustained any injury at their hands. (Puerto Rico Department of
Corrections, Bayamon Institutions Nos. 292 and 501)

U.S. District Court
RELIGION
DISCIPLINE

Williams v. Bitner, 359 F.Supp.2d 370 (M.D.Pa. 2005). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against
employees and officials of a state corrections department, alleging violations of his right of free
exercise of religion, protected by the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA), and the First Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendants, in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of
material fact as to whether the issuance of a misconduct report against the Muslim inmate who
refused to assist in the preparation of pork while working in the prison kitchen, and his placement
on cell restriction for 30 days, constituted a substantial burden on his exercise of sincere religious
belief and whether the sanctions were the least restrictive means of furthering compelling
government interests. The court noted that the right of Muslim inmates to avoid handling pork
was clearly established at the time of the incidents. (Pennsylvania Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
COMPENSATION
DEDUCTIONS FROM
PAY

Young v. Wall, 359 F.Supp.2d 84 (D.R.I. 2005). A state prison inmate sued the director of a state
corrections department, claiming that the practice of not crediting accrued interest to his inmate
accounts funded through deduction from his wages violated his constitutional rights. The district
court dismissed the case in part, and denied the director’s motion to dismiss in part. The court held
that a state statute that provided for wage deductions and the release of funds to the inmate upon
his release did not create a property interest protected by the Takings Clause. The court found
that the inmate was not entitled to interest under the rule that interest generally follows
principal. But the court held that the inmate stated a procedural due process claim with regard to
denial of interest in the face of an Inmate Account Policy that seemingly requires the equitable
distribution of interest. The court noted that due to the rehabilitative nature of work assignments
imposed on prisoners, payment for their labor is purely discretionary for the state, although it is
possible for a state to create a right to be paid for labor which could create a limited protected
interest in wages it chooses to pay prisoners. According to the court, the statute that provides
deduction of 25% of the wages earned by the prison inmate, to be turned over to the inmate upon
his release, did not confer upon the inmate full rights of possession, control and disposition of
funds sufficient to support a § 1983 action. (Adult Correctional Institution, Rhode Island)
2006

U.S. District Court
COMPENSATION

Blanco v. U.S., 433 F.Supp.2d 190 (D.Puerto Rico 2006). Current and former prison employees

U.S. District Court
EQUAL PROTECTION
REMOVAL FROM JOB

Bussey v. Phillips, 419 F.Supp.2d 569 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). An inmate brought a civil rights action
against prison officials following his removal from his prison job. The officials moved for summary
judgment. The court held that the inmate did not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest
in his prison job assignment at a prison shop, and thus his removal from that assignment did not
violate due process. According to the court, the inmate's removal from the shop was well within the
terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by his prison sentence. The court found that the
inmate's allegations that prison officials allowed white and non-Muslim inmates, but not nonwhite, Muslim inmates, to return to the prison industry program after rule violations, were

brought an action against the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) and officials, alleging that they
were not fully compensated for time when they were restricted to a prison during a hurricane. The
district court held that the BOP regulation authorizing payroll deductions for sleep time was based
on a permissible construction of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). (Federal Bureau of Prisons
Metropolitan Detention Center, Guaynabo, Puerto Rico)

50.47
XX

sufficient to state an equal protection claim against the officials. (Green Haven Correctional
Facility, New York)
U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
PROPERTY INTEREST
PAYMENT

Daniels v. Crosby, 444 F.Supp.2d 1220 (N.D.Fla. 2006). An inmate brought a § 1983 suit against
corrections officials, alleging that they violated his due process rights by unconstitutionally
depriving him of wages, occupational training, and other benefits. The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court held that the inmate had no liberty or
property interest in wages for his work in prison, possession of particular items of personal
property, or involvement in rehabilitative programs. The court noted that the Kentucky inmate,
incarcerated in Florida for a Kentucky offense pursuant to an interstate corrections compact, had
no liberty or property interest, and that while Kentucky officials may have owed a legal duty to the
inmate to provide such benefits, Florida corrections officials did not. The inmate had argued that
Kentucky pays prisoners for work they do in prison at the rate of $1 per day and that Florida owed
him these back wages. He claimed entitlement to pay, to possess the same kind of personal
property (typewriter, television, stereo receiver, ice chest, hot pot, bed linen) he was allowed to
possess in Kentucky, and to enroll in a vocational trade as he was allowed to do in Kentucky.
(Florida Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
WORK CONDITIONS

Flanyak v. Hopta, 410 F.Supp.2d 394 (M.D.Penn. 2006). A state prison inmate filed a § 1983

U.S. Appeals Court
INJURY

Gobert v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d 339 (5th Cir. 2006). A former inmate whose leg was injured while he
was on work release brought a § 1983 action against a state prison physician, alleging
constitutionally inadequate medical care. The physician moved for summary judgment. The
district court denied qualified immunity, and the physician appealed. The appeals court reversed,
finding that the physician was aware of a substantial risk of serious harm to the inmate from the
nature of the wound itself, but the inmate failed to demonstrate that the physician disregarded the
substantial health risk about which he knew, as required to establish deliberate indifference to a
serious medical need. The inmate's leg was crushed while he was on work release when the
garbage collection truck on which he worked as a “hopper” collided with another vehicle. The
inmate's injury consisted of an open wound. According to medical records, the inmate was given
extensive medical treatment for the injury throughout his imprisonment term, and the court held
that, at most, there might have been negligence in the one-week lapse in antibiotic treatment.
(Elayn Hunt Correctional Center, Gabriel, Louisiana).

U.S. District Court
FREE SPEECH
DISCIPLINE

King v. Ditter, 432 F.Supp.2d 813 (W.D.Wis. 2006). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action against

U.S. Appeals Court
COMPENSATION
FLSA- Fair Labor
Standards Act
FORCED LABOR

Loving v. Johnson, 455 F.3d 562 (5th Cir. 2006). A prisoner brought an action against a warden
asserting he was entitled to the legal minimum wage under the provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA) for work he performed as a drying machine operator in a prison laundry.
The district court dismissed the action as frivolous and for failure to state a claim. The prisoner
appealed and the appeals court affirmed. The court held that a prisoner doing prison work in or for
the prison is not an employee under FLSA and is thus not entitled to the federal minimum wage.

Eighth Amendment action against the supervisor of the unit overseeing prison jobs and against
the prison's health care administrator, alleging that he had been subjected to unsafe conditions
while working as a welder. The inmate also alleged that the administrator had been deliberately
indifferent to his medical needs arising from those conditions. The defendants moved for summary
judgment and the district court granted the motion. The court held that the inmate's failure to
exhaust the prison's three-step grievance procedure precluded his § 1983 action, regardless of the
reasons given, including futility. The court noted that there is no futility exception to the Prison
Litigation Reform Act's (PLRA) administrative exhaustion requirement. According to the court,
the supervisor of the state prison unit overseeing prison jobs was not shown to have known of and
disregarded a risk to the inmate who had chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, from dust and
smoke accompanying his work as a welder, precluding recovery in the inmate's § 1983 Eighth
Amendment action against the supervisor alleging unsafe working conditions. The inmate did not
complain directly to the supervisor about his working conditions or file a grievance relating to
those conditions and declined to wear a dust mask he was given. The court noted that the prison's
accreditation required compliance with safe-working-area standards. The court held that the
prison's health care administrator could not be liable in the inmate's § 1983 Eighth Amendment
action alleging deliberate indifference to serious medical needs because the administrator was
neither a prison doctor nor on the medical staff. The inmate was diagnosed and treated by others
without ever seeing the administrator, and the inmate never filed any grievances that would have
alerted the administrator to any alleged mistreatment. (State Corr’l Inst. at Mahanoy, Penn.)

a prison job supervisor, alleging that the supervisor lowered his pay and ultimately fired him for
criticizing the supervisor's managerial practices. The supervisor moved for dismissal and the
district court dismissed in part, and denied dismissal in part. The court held that the inmate
stated a First Amendment retaliation claim, when the complaint alleged that the inmate engaged
in the protected activities of writing letter to warden and complaining to others about supervisor's
racism and changes in work schedule, and that the inmate experienced adverse actions in
response. (Columbia Correctional Institution, Wisconsin)

50.48
XX

According to the court, compelling an inmate to work without pay does not violate the Constitution and the failure of
a state to specifically sentence an inmate to hard labor does not change this rule. The court reviewed the history of its
rulings: “…In a similar situation, we held that a jail was not the FLSA employer of an inmate working in a workrelease program for a private employer outside the jail…we have also held that inmates who work inside a prison for
a private enterprise are not FLSA employees for the private company…however, until today we have not expressly
stated whether there is any FLSA employment relationship between the prison and its inmates working in and for the
prison.” The court noted that other circuits uniformly hold that prisoners doing prison work are not the prison’s
employees under FLSA. (Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division)
U.S. Appeals Court
TRANSFER
REMOVAL FROM JOB

Morris v. Powell, 449 F.3d 682 (5th Cir. 2006). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against prison officials, alleging
that they retaliated against him for exercising his First Amendment right to use the prison grievance system.
Following denial of the defendants' first motion for summary judgment, the appeals court remanded for
consideration of whether an inmate's retaliation claim must allege more than a de minimis adverse act. On remand,
the district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The inmate appealed. The appeals court
affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court held that: (1) when addressing an issue of apparent first
impression for the court, prisoners bringing § 1983 retaliation claims against prison officials must allege more than
an inconsequential or de minimis retaliatory act to establish a constitutional violation; (2) the officials' alleged
actions in moving the inmate to a less desirable job within the prison did not rise to the level of an actionable
retaliation; (3) the inmate's claim that he was transferred to an inferior and more dangerous prison satisfied the de
minimis threshold; and (4) the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on the inmate's job transfer claim. The
court noted that although the inmate's official job classification was switched from the commissary to the kitchen for
about six weeks, he was actually made to work in the kitchen for only a week at most, and he spent just one day in
the “pot room,” which was evidently an unpleasant work station, after which he was moved to the butcher shop,
about which he raised no complaints. (Telford Unit, Texas Department of Criminal Justice)

U.S. District Court
PROPERTY INTEREST
TRANSFER

Tanner v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 433 F.Supp.2d 117 (D.D.C. 2006). An inmate brought an action against the
federal Bureau of Prisons, alleging that his pending transfer to another facility would deprive him of participation in
vocational training programs. The inmate moved for a preliminary injunction. The district court denied the motion.
The court held that the inmate failed to demonstrate the likelihood of success on his due process claim, as required to
obtain a preliminary injunction preventing his transfer, where removal from programs did not constitute an atypical
or significant deprivation of the inmate's rights, nor did it affect the duration of his sentence, as may have impaired
his protected liberty interests. But the court found that the inmate demonstrated that he would suffer an irreparable
injury if injunctive relief were not granted, as required to obtain a preliminary injunction, because the transfer was
certain to result in the loss of access to an aquaculture program in which he was employed, loss of pay grade and loss
of eligibility for a cable technician program. (Federal Correctional Institution Fairton, New Jersey, United States
Penitentiary Leavenworth, Kansas)

U.S. Appeals Court
RELIGION

Williams v. Bitner, 455 F.3d 186 (3rd Cir. 2006). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against prison officials. The
district court denied the officials’ motion for summary judgment on the inmate’s First Amendment claim, and the
officials appealed. The court of appeals affirmed. The court held that the First Amendment right of Muslin inmate to
avoid handling pork was clearly established for purposes of qualified immunity. According to the court, the First
Amendment right that was violated when prison officials punished the inmate for refusing to handle or assist in
preparing pork while working in a prison kitchen was a clearly established right, and thus, officials were not entitled
to qualified immunity on the inmate’s § 1983 claim that officials violated his right to free exercise of religion. The
court noted that although neither the Supreme Court nor court of appeals had directly addressed whether requiring
Muslim inmates to handle pork violated their right to free exercise of religion, other courts that had considered this
precise question had uniformly held that prison officials had to respect and accommodate, when practicable, Muslim
inmates’ religious beliefs regarding prohibitions on handling pork. (State Corr. Inst. at Rockview, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
DISCRIMINATION
EQUAL PROTECTION
LIBERTY INTEREST

Wilson v. Taylor, 466 F.Supp.2d 567 (D.Del. 2006). Thirty-one Black inmates filed a § 1983 action alleging that
state prison officials routinely denied their right to procedural due process during disciplinary hearings and security
classification determinations. The officials moved to dismiss the complaint and the inmates asked for summary
judgment. The motions were granted in part and denied in part. The court held that Delaware has created no
constitutionally protected liberty interest in an inmate’s security classification, even when the change in
classification is for disciplinary reasons. The court found that the black inmates did not have a liberty interest in
prison jobs, a particular security classification, or assignments to particular buildings, and thus the state prison
officials’ decision in those matters did not violate the inmates’ due process rights. The court noted that state prison
policies and procedures did not give a reasonable expectation of employment, a particular security classification, or a
particular building assignment. The court denied summary judgment for the defendants on the issue of whether state
prison officials consistently treated black inmates differently from similarly situated white inmates in job
assignments, disciplinary actions, and security classification, and racially segregated the inmates within the facility.
According to the court, the issue involved fact questions that could not be resolved on a motion to dismiss the claim
against officials for violating their equal protection rights. (Delaware Department of Correction)
2007

U.S. District Court
DISCIPLINE
FREE SPEECH

Allah v. Poole, 506 F.Supp.2d 174 (W.D.N.Y. 2007). A state inmate sued correctional officers under § 1983,
alleging various violations of his constitutional rights. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district
court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that a commissary supervisor's directive to the
inmate and other prisoners working at the commissary, that they speak to each other only in English, did not violate
any constitutional right the inmate may have had to converse with fellow prisoners in Spanish. According to the

50.49
XXI

court, the stated rationale for the directive, to ensure the supervisor's own safety, was indisputably legitimate and the
restriction on the inmate's use of Spanish applied only while he was working in the commissary. (Five Points
Correctional Facility, New York)
U.S. Appeals Court
SAFETY
INJURY

Ambrose v. Young, 474 F.3d 1070 (8th Cir. 2007). The personal representative for the estate of a state prisoner who
was electrocuted while on a prison work detail brought a § 1983 action against state corrections officials. The district
court denied the officials’ motion for summary judgment and they appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and
reversed in part. The court held that: (1) the deliberate indifference standard applied; (2) the corrections officer in
charge of the prisoner’s work crew was deliberately indifferent to the serious risk of the prisoner’s electrocution; (3)
the corrections officer was not entitled to qualified immunity; (4) the supervisory official for the DOC was not
deliberately indifferent; and (5) the warden was not deliberately indifferent to the lack of training of the corrections
officer in charge of the work crew. The court noted that the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment applies
to the conditions of confinement, and that prison work assignments fall under the ambit of conditions of
confinement. According to the court, the Eighth Amendment forbids knowingly compelling an inmate to perform
labor that is beyond an inmate’s strength, dangerous to his or her life or health, or unduly painful, and requires
supervisors to supervise and train subordinates to prevent the deprivation of the inmate’s constitutional rights. The
prisoner was on an Emergency Response Team (ERT) when he was killed. ERTs are comprised of minimumsecurity inmates from South Dakota’s four state penitentiaries. The ERTs are dispatched to natural disaster clean-up
sites, where they assist in removing downed trees and other debris. The inmates are required to comply with
correctional officers’ orders and conduct themselves appropriately. The only training the inmate received was
watching a chainsaw safety training video. The court found that the corrections officer had the opportunity to
deliberate and think before the electrocution incident occurred. The prisoner was electrocuted by a downed power
line and the officer knew that the dangling, live power line created a substantial risk of harm, and despite the risk, the
officer told the prisoner and other inmates to stomp out a non-threatening fire within arms reach of the line. The
court held that the corrections officer was not entitled to qualified immunity for his deliberately indifferent conduct,
in ordering the prisoner and other inmates to stomp out a fire near a dangling live power line, where the law was
clearly established at the time of the electrocution incident that knowingly compelling a prisoner to perform labor
that was dangerous to his life or health violated the Eighth Amendment. (South Dakota Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
DISCRIMINATION
WORK RELEASE

Goldhaber v. Higgins, 576 F.Supp.2d 694 (W.D.Pa. 2007). An attorney brought an action against state officials,
county officials and a prison board, alleging civil rights violations in connection with his incarceration. The district
court granted the defendants’ motion for dismissal in part and denied in part. The court held that the attorney
adequately alleged that officials retaliated against him for filing a motion for house arrest or work release, as
required to state a claim under the Petition Clause. According to the court, the attorney's application to the court
made it clear that a prior judicial order had afforded him work release subject to the rules and regulations of the
facility where he was housed, and that he was requesting release to house arrest to facilitate work release. The court
found that the attorney asserted that he had been subjected to arbitrary and irrational terms of confinement, as
required to state an equal protection claim. The court noted that the attorney’s complaint alleged conduct on the part
of the defendants indicating the presence of discrimination against the attorney for the specific purpose of preventing
him from participating in a work release program. (Bedford County Prison Board, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
RELIGION

Henderson v. Ayers, 476 F.Supp.2d 1168 (C.D.Cal. 2007). An inmate brought a pro se and in forma pauperis suit
under § 1983 against an acting warden, in his individual and official capacities, claiming that the warden had denied
the inmate his right to attend Friday Islamic prayer services and seeking injunctive relief. The warden moved to
dismiss. The district court denied the motion. The court held that the inmate satisfied the exhaustion requirement of
the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), even though he did not specifically name the warden in his grievance.
The court noted that exhaustion under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) is not necessarily inadequate simply
because an individual later sued was not named in the grievances, but rather, compliance with prison grievance procedures is all that is required by the PLRA to properly exhaust. The court held that the inmate stated a claim for
violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA) and stated a claim for
violation of his First Amendment rights. The inmate alleged that he had been denied excused time-off work to attend
Friday Islamic prayer services, as his religion required, and that he had been subjected to progressive discipline,
including loss of privileges, for attempting to attend these prayer services. (Calif. State Prison, Los Angeles County)

U.S. District Court
COMPENSATION
EQUAL PROTECTION
GOOD-TIME

Jackson v. Russo, 495 F.Supp.2d 225 (D.Mass. 2007). A prisoner brought a suit against prison officials claiming that
compensation and good time credits awarded to him for participation in a barber program violated his due process
and equal protection rights. The prisoner moved for summary judgment, and the defendants moved to dismiss for
failure to state a claim. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part as moot. The court held that
the prisoner had no constitutionally created right to conduct business while incarcerated or to receive payment by the
prison for services he provided to other inmates as part of a barber vocational program. According to the court,
Massachusetts statutes that authorize the corrections commissioner to provide for education, training and
employment programs and to establish a system of inmate compensation did not create a protected property interest
for inmates in any job or in compensation for a job, for the purposes of a due process claim. The court noted that
authorization was dependent on several contingencies, including appropriation of funds, and conferred complete
discretion upon the commissioner over programs. The court held that the corrections commissioner's refusal to
award additional good time credits to the inmate who enrolled in the barber school, beyond awards granted in 2.5
day increments for participation in various programs, did not create an atypical prison hardship, so as to give rise to
an interest protected by due process. The court noted that the prisoner was not unfairly denied the opportunity to
participate in other prison activities that might have earned him more credits. According to the court, the prisoner
had no constitutional, statutory, or regulatory right to good time credits. The court found that a rational basis existed
for differences in levels of compensation received by state prison barbers and kitchen workers in prison vocational
programs, based on difficulties in recruiting prisoners, hours, and the demanding nature of the culinary arts program,

50.50
XXI

such that the lesser compensation received by the prisoner enrolled in the barber training program and providing
services to other inmates did not violate equal protection. (Souza Baranowski Correctional Center, Massachusetts)
U.S. Appeals Court
EQUAL PROTECTION
DISCRIMINATION
DISCIPLINE

Lewis v. Jacks, 486 F.3d 1025 (8th Cir. 2007). A state prisoner brought an action under § 1983 alleging
discrimination and retaliation in his prison employment. The district court entered summary judgment for the
defendants and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that: (1) telling admittedly noisy
inmates to “shut up” on one occasion did not violate the equal protection clause, even if equally noisy inmates of
another race were not equally chastised; (2) the prisoner failed to present affirmative evidence that the garment
factory supervisor’s work assignments were motivated by race discrimination; (3) the supervisor’s work assignments
would not have chilled an inmate of ordinary firmness from filing grievances, as was required for a § 1983
retaliation claim; and (4) the prisoner’s protected activity of filing a grievance was not causally connected to the
alleged retaliation of an increased work load. The court held that the prisoner failed to present affirmative evidence
that the garment factory supervisor’s work assignments were motivated by race discrimination, in violation of his
Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection. The prisoner, who admitted that he was given no personal
production quota, did not refute evidence that each inmate was allowed to work at his own pace, that he was a
particularly fast worker, and that he complained to every supervisor that he worked too hard but could have chosen
to do less work. The factory manager, responding to the prisoner’s complaint that the supervisor was assigning too
much work, told the prisoner to “just do what you can.” An altercation that occurred when another inmate put more
work on the prisoner’s bench, which resulted in the prisoner receiving a disciplinary write-up and filing three more
grievances, occurred more than two years after the prisoner filed a grievance against the supervisor. The prisoner
alleged that the supervisor told him and two other black inmates to “shut up and stop laughing” about ten minutes
before break time. (Maximum Security Unit, Arkansas Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
DEDUCTIONS FROM
WAGES

U.S. v. Young, 533 F.Supp.2d 1086 (D.Nev. 2007). A federal prisoner who had been ordered to pay restitution in the
amount of $457,740 and a penalty assessment in the amount of $3,300 moved to set aside the schedule of payments.
The district court denied the motion. The court held that the defendant's participation in the federal Bureau of
Prison’s (BOP) Inmate Financial Responsibility Program (IFRP), which allowed the BOP to withhold $50 per month
from the defendant's account, was not under duress, and that withholding 21 percent of the defendant's monthly
income was not egregious or unreasonable. The court noted that the prisoner earns approximately $57 while
imprisoned and that he typically receives a bonus of approximately $28 per month, bringing his total monthly
earnings to approximately $85. The prisoner also receives approximately $150 per month from family members,
making his total monthly income $235. (Nevada)

U.S. District Court
DEDUCTION FROM
WAGES
PROPERTY INTEREST

Ward v. Stewart, 511 F.Supp.2d 981 (D.Ariz. 2007). A state inmate brought a pro se § 1983 action alleging
violations of his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights based on corrections officials' withholding of a portion of
his wages for “gate-money.” After dismissal of the inmate's claim was reversed by an appeals court, a partial
summary judgment for the corrections officials was granted. A supplemental briefing was ordered as to inmate's
request for injunctive relief. The district court denied the request for injunctive relief. The court found that the
inmate had a constitutionally protected property interest in his wages, based on an Arizona statute creating a
cognizable property interest in inmate wages for purposes of his action alleging that corrections officials violated his
rights under the Takings Clause. The court concluded that corrections officials did not violate the inmate's rights
under the Takings Clause by withholding a portion of his wages for “gate-money.” The court found that even though
the money was the inmate's private property, prison inmates forfeit all right to possess, control or dispose of private
property. The court also held that state correction officials did not act arbitrarily in withholding a portion of the
inmate's wages for “gate-money” even though he was serving a life sentence, and therefore he was not deprived of
due process. The court noted that the withholding was intended to promote public welfare and the common good,
and that it was not arbitrary since the inmate might be able to obtain release prior to the end of his life and if not, the
money would be used to pay costs associated with his cremation or other expenses. (Arizona Dept. of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
WORK ASSIGNMENT
EQUAL PROTECTION
DISCRIMINATION

Wilson v. Taylor, 515 F.Supp.2d 469 (D.Del. 2007). Black inmates brought a suit against prison officials asserting
an equal protection claim that they were consistently treated differently from similarly situated white inmates in job
assignments, disciplinary actions and security classifications. One inmate also asserted a retaliation claim against a
deputy warden. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants and denied summary judgment for
the plaintiffs. The court held that an inmate failed to establish an equal protection claim against a prison
commissioner and warden, absent evidence of the involvement of the commissioner or warden in the alleged
incidents of racial discrimination. The court found that an inmate did not establish an equal protection claim based
on the allegation that he was not permitted to return to a particular prison building following an investigation while a
similarly situated white inmate was permitted to return. According to the court, the exhaustion provision of the
Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) barred an inmate's claim that his transfer to another facility constituted
retaliation for filing grievances and civil rights lawsuits. The inmate had written a letter to the warden's office
contesting his transfer, but filed no grievances raising a retaliation claim or even his housing transfer generally.
(Sussex Correctional Institution, Delaware)
2008

U.S. District Court
INJURY
SAFETY
SUPERVISION

Buckley v. Barbour County, Ala., 624 F.Supp.2d 1335 (M.D.Ala. 2008). An inmate brought § 1983, Eighth
Amendment and due process claims, as well as state law claims, against a county and a work-crew supervisor,
alleging that his back was injured as the result of a failure to train him in equipment safety before he cleared trees as
part of a prison work crew. The county and supervisor filed separate motions to dismiss. The district court granted
the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that the inmate's allegations that the county failed to train him
and another inmate in equipment operations safety, that they were ordered while part of a community work squad to
use chainsaws to cut a large oak tree to clear it from a roadway, and that the tree rolled onto the inmate, breaking his

50.51
XXII

back, were sufficient to plead a causal connection between the county's practice or custom of failing to train and the
inmate's injury. The court noted that the inmate was not required to allege a specific practice or custom of failing to
train inmates to avoid falling trees. The court held that the inmate's allegations were also sufficient to show the
county's awareness of facts from which an inference of a substantial risk of harm could be drawn, as required to
plead a deliberate indifference § 1983 Eighth Amendment claim. According to the court, the inmate's allegations that
a prison work-crew supervisor was aware that the inmate was not trained in equipment safety and felt unqualified to
use a chainsaw, yet still ordered the inmate to use a chainsaw to cut a fallen tree hanging over a ditch, were sufficient
to plead a § 1983 Eighth Amendment claim against the supervisor. The court also denied qualified immunity from
the inmate’s allegations. According to the court, under Alabama law, the inmate's allegations that the work-crew
supervisor ordered him and another inmate to cut a tree hanging over a ditch with chainsaws, with the knowledge
they were not trained in equipment safety, and that the tree rolled onto the inmate breaking his back, were sufficient
to plead willful negligence by the supervisor. (Barbour County Community Work Squad, Alabama)
U.S. District Court
INJURY

Cason v. District of Columbia, 580 F.Supp.2d 76 (D.D.C. 2008). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a
correctional services company, alleging violations of the Eighth Amendment related to an injury to the prisoner's
eye, alleged misdiagnosis, and alleged inadequate treatment. The district court granted summary judgment for the
company. The court found that the company was not responsible for dishwashing at the prison or for the prisoner's
medical care, and thus the company was not liable under § 1983 for the prisoner's alleged eye injury while working
in the kitchen as a dishwasher, alleged misdiagnosis by prison medical staff, or alleged inadequate treatment.
(ARAMARK Correctional Service, District of Columbia Central Detention Facility, Operated by Corrections
Corporation of America)

U.S. District Court
FREE SPEECH
REMOVAL FROM JOB

Cossette v. Poulin, 573 F.Supp.2d 456 (D.N.H. 2008). An inmate at a correctional facility filed a First Amendment
retaliation suit against a prison librarian, a major and a former warden, alleging he was removed from his job as a
clerk in the prison law library in retribution for giving a written statement to another inmate in support of a planned
lawsuit challenging an action taken by the prison librarian. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment. The court held that the inmate did not engage in a constitutionally protected activity by
providing a fellow inmate with a written statement. The court noted that the inmate’s statement, that a fellow inmate
“followed all print procedures” when the librarian allegedly overcharged him for a copy/printout request, dealt with
a matter of purely individual economic importance, rather than a matter of “public concern.” (Northern Correctional
Facility, New Hampshire)

U.S. Appeals Court
WORK RELEASE

Domka v. Portage County, Wis., 523 F.3d 776 (7th Cir. 2008). A former county jail inmate brought a § 1983 action
against a county, alleging that revocation of his work-release and home-detention privileges, granted through a plea
bargain in his prosecution for his third offense of driving under the influence (DUI), had constituted deprivation of
due process. The district court granted summary judgment for the county, and the inmate appealed. The appeals
court affirmed. The court held that the plea agreement did not give rise to protected liberty interests in home
detention and work-release, and that the inmate had knowingly and intelligently waived any due process rights he
may have had in the home-detention program by signing an agreement as to the program's terms. The agreement
unambiguously stated that the inmate could, and would, be removed from the program without notice if, among
other reasons, he tested positive for alcohol use. According to the court, the waiver was knowing and intelligent,
regardless of the prisoner's reliance on an allegedly false oral promise that any positive test would be verified by a
personally administered retest, since the written agreement conditioned removal on a positive initial test only, not on
the prisoner's actually consuming alcohol. The court noted that the inmate received what he bargained for, the
opportunity to serve a portion of his time under home detention with work release. (Portage County's Home
Detention Program, Wisconsin)

U.S. Appeals Court
INJURY

Gabriel v. Hamlin, 514 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 2008). A state prisoner who was seriously burned while working in a
prison kitchen filed a § 1983 action against prison officials alleging that they were recklessly indifferent to his
serious medical needs. The district court dismissed the action for want of prosecution, and subsequently denied a
motion for reconsideration. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that dismissal
of the prisoner's claim was not warranted as a sanction. According to the court, the prisoner's failure to secure a trial
deposition of his expert as a contingency did not justify the harsh sanction of dismissal for want of prosecution. (Big
Muddy River Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL
RESTRICTIONS

Jacobs v. Wilkinson, 529 F.Supp.2d 804 (N.D.Ohio 2008). An inmate brought a § 1983 suit, claiming constitutional
violations arising from prison officials' forcing him to shave his beard in contravention of his religious beliefs. The
inmate also alleged denial of proper medical work restrictions. The district court dismissed the suit for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The inmate moved to
reopen, and to consolidate his complaint and the court's prior screening order. The court held that a Supreme Court
decision holding that courts should not dismiss prisoner complaints under the PLRA in their entirety when the
prisoner presents both exhausted and unexhausted claims did not apply retroactively to the inmate's case. (Mansfield
Correctional Institution, Ohio)

U.S. District Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
DISCRIMINATION
LIBERTY INTEREST
TERMINATION

Kogut v. Ashe, 592 F.Supp.2d 204 (D.Mass. 2008). A county jail inmate petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus,
alleging he was prevented from participating in various jail work programs as a result of discrimination based on his
disability. The district court granted petition. The court held that the allegation that the inmate was prevented from
participating in a good-time work program that would have affected the duration of his confinement as a result of
discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) was sufficient to form the basis of habeas
relief. The court noted that while an inmate may have no right under the Constitution to credit for good-time, he may
not under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) be barred, based on discrimination arising from his
disability, from work programs that may have the effect of reducing his sentence. He alleged that he suffers from

50.52
XXII

disabilities which affect his ability to perform certain types of work assigned in the jail. The inmate alleged that he
was “denied any and/or all access” to work assigned through the “County Correctional Facilities Work Programs”
and provided 16 inmate work request forms in support of this claim. (Worcester County Jail, Massachusetts)
U.S. District Court
WORK ASSIGNMENTS

Ringgold v. Lamby, 565 F.Supp.2d 549 (D.Del. 2008). An inmate filed a § 1983 action against a correctional officer,
alleging deliberate indifference amounting to cruel and unusual punishment based on the officer's alleged refusal to
let him leave his cell early to serve food and the officer's alleged discussion of his hygiene and HIV status with
another prisoner. The district court granted the officer‘s motion for summary judgment. The court held that the
officer's alleged discussion of the prisoner's hygiene and HIV status with another prisoner was only verbal
harassment and therefore could not be cruel and unusual punishment. The court noted that the inmate's right to
privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited the officer from making any statements to another prisoner
about the inmate's hygiene and HIV status, and the statements did not involve correctional goals or institutional
security. The court found that the officer's refusal to allow the inmate to leave his cell to serve a meal as a prison
food worker was a good faith error and not cruel and unusual punishment, where the officer thought that the inmate
worked on a different crew. (Howard R. Young Correctional Institution, Rhode Island)

U.S. Appeals Court
WORK RELEASE

Sandage v. Board of Com'rs of Vanderburgh County, 548 F.3d 595 (7th Cir. 2008). The family of murder victims
brought a civil rights action under § 1983 against county officials, alleging that a county sheriff's department's failure
to act on the victims' complaint deprived the victims of their lives without due process of law, in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The victims had complained that they were being harassed by a murderer who was a county
jail inmate and they asked county officials to revoke the inmate’s work-release privilege and re-imprison him. The
inmate ultimately murdered the victims while he was on work release. The inmate had been serving a four-year
sentence for robbery. The district court dismissed the complaint, and the plaintiffs appealed. The appeals court
affirmed, finding that the sheriff's department's failure to act on the victims' complaint did not deprive the victims of
due process. The court noted that the county officials had no duty to protect the victims against private violence, and
the officials' failure to revoke the inmate's work release did not create the danger that the inmate posed to the
victims. (Vanderburgh County Jail, Indiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
COMPENSATION
FLSA- Fair Labor
Standards Act

Sanders v. Hayden, 544 F.3d 812 (7th Cir 2008). A prisoner who was civilly committed to a secure treatment facility
as a sexually violent person, after serving a prison sentence, filed a § 1983 suit against state officials, claiming
violation of his federal rights by a reduction of pay from $2.50 to $2.00 per hour for work performed at the treatment
facility. The district court dismissed the complaint and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court
held that the complaint would be construed as asserting a claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA),
although the complaint did not refer to FLSA, since the prisoner sued without the aid of counsel. The court found
that the prisoner was not covered by FLSA, precluding his claims challenging reduction of his pay. The court noted
that the payment of sub-minimum wages to prisoners presents no threat of unfair competition to other employers,
who must pay the minimum wage to their employees, because the facility does not operate in the marketplace and
has no business competitors. (Wisconsin Resource Center)

U.S. District Court
FREE SPEECH
REMOVAL FROM JOB

St. Louis v. Morris, 573 F.Supp.2d 846 (D.Del. 2008). A state prison inmate brought a § 1983 action against various
prison staff and officials, alleging that he was removed from his prison kitchen job in retaliation for exercising his
First Amendment rights to report institutional violations. The district court granted summary judgment for the
defendants. The court held that the prisoner's unsubstantiated deposition testimony concerning informal, verbal
complaints he made to prison officials reporting alleged institutional violations was insufficient to defeat summary
judgment. The court noted that a prisoner does not have a constitutional right to employment while an inmate.
(James T. Vaughn Correctional Center, Delaware)

U.S. District Court
RETALIATION
TERMINATION

Taylor v. Walker, 537 F.Supp.2d 966 (C.D.Ill. 2008). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against the Illinois
Department of Corrections Director, a correctional center warden, and corrections officer. The district court held that
summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact, including the issue of whether the corrections
officer was the prisoner's work supervisor. The prisoner alleged that the officer retaliated against him for exercising
his First Amendment rights by firing him from his prison job. (Hill Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
COMPENSATION
INJURY

Thompson v. Federal Prisons Industries, Inc., 546 F.Supp.2d 456 (S.D.Tex. 2008). A federal prisoner who sustained
a wrist injury while working in a prison kitchen brought a pro se action in state court to enforce a settlement with
prison officials for compensation for his injuries. The action was removed to federal court. The district court
dismissed the action. The court held that the prisoner was not entitled to receive a lump sum payment of $857 for the
settlement until he was released from federal custody. The court noted that the purpose of the Inmate Accident
Compensation statutes is to provide accident compensation to former federal inmates or their dependents for
physical impairment or death resultant from injuries sustained while performing work assignments in prison.
(Federal Correctional Institution, Three Rivers, Texas)

U.S. District Court
COMPENSATION
INJURY

Thompson v. Joslin, 536 F.Supp.2d 799 (S.D.Tex. 2008). A federal prisoner brought a state court action against a
warden and kitchen supervisor, seeking compensation for wrist and back injuries. The inmate had been offered a
payment of $857.00 for his wrist injury, and $71.42 a month for a back injury. The inmate alleged that the BOP had
not yet paid him. The warden and supervisor removed the action to federal court and moved to dismiss. The district
court held that the prison operator was the proper defendant and dismissed the action with regard to the warden and
kitchen supervisor. The court held that the statute authorizing Federal Prison Industries, Inc. (FPI) to pay
compensation to inmates injured in a prison industry or work activity provides the exclusive remedy for inmates
injured while working in federal prisons. FPI was substituted as the proper defendant, and FPI was ordered to file an
answer or a dispositive motion addressing the claim that the plaintiff not yet been paid. (Federal Correctional
Institution El Reno, Oklahoma, FCI-Three Rivers, Texas)

50.53
XXII

U.S. Appeals Court
WORK RELEASE

U.S. v. Miller, 547 F.3d 1207 (9th Cir. 2008). A federal supervisee who had been transferred to a county workrelease program at the midpoint of his federal prison term, pursuant to a “prerelease custody” statute, moved to
dismiss the government's petition to revoke his supervised release. The supervisee contended that his period of
supervised release had expired prior to the revocation petition. The district court denied the supervisee's motion, and
he appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that transfer to the work-release program did not mark the
beginning of the supervised release period, given the continuing Bureau of Prisons (BOP) control. The court noted
that the period of work-release was “imprisonment” within the meaning of the statute, and thus the period of
supervised release commenced only upon the inmate's release from work-release. (Bannock County Jail Work
Release Program, Montana)

U.S. District Court
FORCED LABOR
WORK ASSIGNMENTS

U.S. v. Peterson, 544 F.Supp.2d 1363 (M.D.Ga. 2008). A sheriff filed a motion to suppress his grand jury testimony
and a motion to dismiss certain counts of an indictment charging him with extortion by a public official, obstruction
of justice, perjury, and forced labor. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held
that the sheriff, who charged inmates for room and board, could not be guilty of extortion by a public official in
violation of the Hobbs Act because he collected the funds and remitted them to the county commissioners. The court
noted that a public official who obtains property on behalf of the government does not commit the offense of
extortion, even if the government does not have a lawful or legal claim to the property. The court held that an
indictment charging the sheriff with obtaining an inmate's labor by means of the abuse or threatened abuse of the law
or the legal process was factually insufficient. The sheriff was charged with using an inmate’s labor at a private
business owned by his wife. (Clinch Co. Georgia)
2009

U.S. District Court
ADA-Americans with
Disabilities Act

Burke v. North Dakota Dept. of Correction and Rehabilitation, 620 F.Supp.2d 1035 (D.N.D. 2009). A state inmate
filed a § 1983 action against prison officials alleging statutory and constitutional violations, including interference
with his free exercise of religion, lack of adequate medical care, retaliation for exercising his constitutional rights,
failure to protect, refusal to accommodate his disability, and cruel and unusual punishment. The district court granted
summary judgment for the defendants. The court held that: (1) failure to provide Hindu worship services on
Thursdays did not violate the inmate's equal protection rights; (2) the decision to reduce Hindu worship services at
the facility did not violate the Free Exercise Clause; (3) restriction of the Hindu inmate's use of camphor, kumkum,
incense, and a butter lamp during worship services did not violate the Free Exercise Clause; and (4) failure to find a
qualified Hindu representative to assist the inmate in the study of his religion did not violate the Free Exercise
Clause. According to the court, the officials' requirement that the inmate work did not violate the Eighth
Amendment, even though the inmate suffered from mental illness and hepatitis C, and the Social Security
Administration had determined that he was disabled. The inmate had not requested accommodations in his working
conditions on account of his disabilities, and there was no evidence that the inmate was being forced to work beyond
his physical strength or that the jobs were endangering his life or health. The court noted that the prison policies and
procedures manual established that all inmates were expected to work, regardless of their disability status.
The court found that the inmate's purported schizoid/sociopathic personality did not substantially limit any major
life activity, and thus did not constitute a “disability” under ADA, where the inmate did not describe the nature and
severity, duration, the anticipated duration, or the long-term impact of his mental impairment. The court held that the
inmate failed to demonstrate that his mental impairment substantially limited his ability to care for himself.
Similarly, the inmate's hepatitis C did not substantially limit any major life activity, and thus did not constitute a
“disability” under ADA. (North Dakota State Penitentiary)

U.S. District Court
COMPENSATION
DISCIPLINE
DUE PROCESS
FLSA-Fair Labor
Standards Act
LIBERTY INTEREST
PROPERTY INTEREST
REMOVAL FROM JOB

Cox v. Ashcroft, 603 F.Supp.2d 1261 (E.D.Cal. 2009). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against the United States
Attorney General, several federal prosecutors, and the owner and employees of a privately-owned federal facility in
which the prisoner was incarcerated, alleging constitutional violations arising from his arrest, prosecution, and
incarceration. The district court dismissed the action. The court held that the prisoner did not have any Fourth
Amendment rights to privacy in his cell, and thus did not suffer any constitutional injury as a result of the search of
his cell and the confiscation of another inmate's legal materials. The court found that the prisoner did not have any
liberty or property interest in employment while in prison, and thus the prisoner did not suffer any violation of his
due process right related to his termination from his prison job as a result of discipline arising from the search of his
cell, precluding liability on the part of facility owner and its employees under § 1983. The court found that the
prisoner lacked standing to bring a claim against the warden of a privately-owned federal prison facility, alleging
that paying the prisoner at a rate below minimum wage violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The court
noted that prisoners were not “employees” within the meaning of FLSA. (Taft Correctional Institution, Wackenhut
Corrections Corporation, California)

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
EQUAL PROTECTION
WORK RELEASE

Holland v. Taylor, 604 F.Supp.2d 692 (D.Del. 2009). A state prisoner brought a pro se § 1983 action against a
Department of Correction (DOC) and DOC officials, alleging violations of his constitutional rights to equal
protection and due process, deliberate indifference, cruel and unusual punishment, and false imprisonment. The
prisoner moved to appoint counsel, and the defendants brought a renewed motion for summary judgment. The
district court granted the motion for summary judgment and denied the motion to appoint counsel. The court found
that neither Delaware law nor Delaware Department of Correction regulations create a liberty interest, the denial of
which would constitute a due process violation, in a prisoner's classification within an institution. The court found
that the state prisoner had no constitutionally protected right to work release, and thus, neither the alleged failure of a
multi-disciplinary team (MDT) member to inform the inmate of a disciplinary review meeting regarding his alleged
work release program violation, nor the prisoner's transfer following completion of the sentence imposed in
connection with the disciplinary meeting, to another facility to await return to the work-release facility, violated the
prisoner's due process rights, absent any atypical or significant hardship by being housed at the other facility as
compared to a work-release facility. (Delaware Correctional Center)

50.54
XXII

XXIII

U.S. Appeals Court
DUE PROCESS
PROPERTY INTEREST
TERMINATION

Johnson v. Rowley, 569 F.3d 40 (2nd Cir. 2009). A Muslim federal prisoner proceeding pro se filed suit against his
supervisor at a prison factory, claiming that his termination from a prison job assignment was due to the supervisor's
personal animus towards Muslims in violation of the Due Process Clause and the First Amendment. The district
court dismissed the claims and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part. The court held that the
federal prisoner had no protected property interest in his job assignment at a prison factory, precluding the prisoner's
due process claim against a former supervisor for terminating his job assignment. The court noted that property
interests protected by the Due Process Clause are not created by the Constitution, but rather are created and their
dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law,
rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits. The court
also noted that employees “at will” have no property interest protected by the Due Process Clause in their continued
employment. The court found that the prisoner failed to exhaust administrative remedies, as required by the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), where the prisoner failed to comply with the Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) procedural
rules creating a four-step administrative grievance system for prisoner complaints, by not raising his First
Amendment claim until the third step of grievance process. According to the court, the prisoner lacked good cause
for failing to exhaust administrative remedies. (Federal Correctional Institution, Otisville, New York)

U.S. District Court
ADA-Americans With
Disabilities Act
DISCIPLINE
SEGREGATION

Kogut v. Ashe, 602 F.Supp.2d 251 (D.Mass. 2009). A state prisoner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
alleging that he had been discriminatorily excluded from work programs in which he could have earned good-time
credits, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The district court dismissed the petition, finding
that the prisoner's alleged disabilities were not the reason for his exclusion from the work programs, as would violate
the ADA. The prisoner was excluded from the work programs because he had been the subject of over 30 incident
reports for harassment of staff, fights with other inmates, and other disciplinary infractions, and several of those
incidents required the prisoner's segregation from general prison population. The court noted that disciplinary issues
and concerns over prison security may be legitimate non-discriminatory grounds for limiting access to a jail
program. (Worcester County Jail, Massachusetts)

U.S. Appeals Court
WORK STOPPAGE

Pilgrim v. Luther, 571 F.3d 201 (2nd Cir. 2009). A prisoner, appearing pro se, brought an action against three prison
officials alleging they violated his constitutional rights to free speech and due process of law in the course of an
investigation and disciplinary hearing related to a pamphlet allegedly written by the prisoner, which encouraged
inmates to engage in work stoppages. The district court granted the prison officials' motion for summary judgment.
The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that entreaties to work stoppages, like petitions
protesting prison conditions, are not entitled to First Amendment protection where other less disruptive means of
airing grievances are available. According to the court, work stoppages are deliberate disruptions of the regular order
of the prison environment and are a species of organized union activity, which are plainly inconsistent with the
legitimate objectives of a prison organization. (Sing Sing Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
EQUAL PROTECTION
WORK ASSIGNMENTS

Roubideaux v. North Dakota Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 570 F.3d 966 (8th Cir. 2009). North Dakota
prison inmates, representing a certified class of female inmates, brought a sex discrimination suit under § 1983 and
Title IX, alleging that a state prison system provided them with unequal programs and facilities as compared to male
inmates. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the inmates appealed. The
appeals court affirmed. The court held that North Dakota's gender-explicit statutes, allowing the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation to place female inmates in county jails and allowing the Department to place female
inmates in “grade one correctional facilities” for more than one year, was substantially related to the important
governmental objective of providing adequate segregated housing for female inmates, and thus the statutes were
facially valid under heightened equal protection review. According to the court, even if the decision to house them at
the women’s center was based on economic concerns, where the female prison population as a whole was much
smaller than the male population, sufficient space to house the female prisoners was becoming an issue as the entire
prison population increased. Female inmates were in need of a separate facility to better meet their needs, and
statutes expressly required the Department to contract with county facilities that had adequate space and the ability
to provide appropriate level of services and programs for female inmates. The court held that the female inmates, by
expressing an assertion before the district court that they were not challenging the programming decisions made by
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation upon transfer to county jails for housing, abandoned an “as-applied”
challenge to the gender-explicit statutes facilitating such transfers.
The court held that North Dakota's “prison industries” program offered at a women's correction and rehabilitation
center, under contract between several counties and the state, was not an “educational program” subject to Title IX
protections, even though the program provided on-the-job training. The court noted that the program was primarily
an inmate work or employment program, providing female inmates with paying jobs and enabling them to make
purchases, pay restitution, or support their families, and the contract between the counties and state distinctly
separated inmate employment and educational programs.
According to the court, vocational training offered at the center was not discriminatorily inferior to those offered
to male inmates at state facilities, as required for a claim under Title IX. Although locational differences existed, like
male inmates, female inmates had access to a welding class and classes in basic parenting, social skills, speech, and
healthy lifestyles. (Southwest Multi-County Correctional Center, North Dakota)

U.S. District Court
DISCIPLINE
REMOVAL FROM JOB

Skinner v. Holman, 672 F.Supp.2d 657 (D.Del. 2009). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against prison employees,
alleging he was retaliated against for having filed a prison grievance. The defendants moved to dismiss the claims as
frivolous and the district court denied the motion. The court held that the inmate's allegations that he was denied
transfer to a minimum security prison, was prevented from working, and was kept in disciplinary confinement for
several months as a result of a grievance he had filed were sufficient to state a claim of retaliation for the exercise of
his First Amendment rights by prison employees. (James T. Correctional Center, Delaware)

50.55

U.S. Appeals Court
WORK CONDITIONS

Smith v. U.S., 561 F.3d 1090 (10th Cir. 2009). An inmate brought an action against prison employees, the U.S.
Attorney General, and the director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, alleging that he was exposed to asbestos while
assigned to work at a prison. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, and the inmate appealed.
The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that the Inmate Accident
Compensation Act was the exclusive remedy against the government for a prisoner with alleged work-related
injuries, and thus dismissal of the prisoner's claims under Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) was warranted. The court
held that the federal workers' compensation scheme for participants in a prison work program lacked the requisite
procedural safeguards of the inmate's constitutional rights to foreclose a Bivens action by the inmate. According to
the court, the inmate's allegations that prison employees had known that asbestos was present in a closet in which the
inmate was working when he was exposed to asbestos were sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment Bivens claim
against those employees. (United States Penitentiary at Leavenworth, Kansas)

U.S. District Court
INJURY
WORK RELEASE

Vuncannon v. U.S., 650 F.Supp.2d 577 (N.D.Miss. 2009). A parolee brought an action against a county and others,
alleging claims under § 1983 arising out of injuries he sustained in an accident while operating a forklift as part of a
work release project. The court held that summary judgment for the county on the hospital’s claim was precluded by
a genuine issues of material fact as to (1) whether the parolee was a county prisoner, indigent, and unable to pay; (2)
whether the parolee was in need of hospitalization for the entire length of time; and (3) whether the hospital's
charges were reasonable and customary. (Shelby County Health Care Corporation, Tennessee, and Tippah County,
Mississippi)

U.S. Appeals Court
COMPENSATION
PRISON INDUSTRIES

Walton v. U.S., 551 F.3d 1367 (Fed.Cir. 2009). A federal prisoner brought an action to recover from the United
States for copyright infringement involving the government's use of calendars he created as part of his assigned
duties in prison. The district court dismissed the complaint, and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed.
The court held that the prisoner was in the “service of the United States” when he created calendars as part of his
assigned duties in prison, and thus the Court of Federal Claims lacked jurisdiction over the prisoner's copyright
infringement action against the United States. The court noted that the prisoner worked on the calendar on
government-furnished computers while supervised by United States employees as part of his assigned duties at a
government facility, and received compensation for his efforts. The prisoner developed and produced desk-blotter
calendars for the years 2000 and 2001-2002. Federal Prison Industries made a substantial number of those calendars,
which it distributed to General Services Administration warehouses throughout the country, and it also sold the
calendars to private purchasers. Prisoners assigned to that work were given compensation ranging from $0.23 to
$1.15 per hour and various other benefits. (United States Prison, Leavenworth, Kansas)
2010

XXIII

U.S. District Court
ADA-Americans with
Disabilities Act
PRIVATE SECTOR
RIGHT TO WORK

Castle v. Eurofresh, Inc., 734 F.Supp.2d 938 (D.Ariz. 2010). A state prisoner brought a pro se action against a state,
department of corrections, its current and former directors, and a company to which his services were contracted
while in prison, asserting claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act, and the
Arizona Civil Rights Act (ACRA). The court held that the state, the department of corrections, and its current and
former directors had Eleventh Amendment immunity as to the prisoner's ADA disability discrimination claims
relating to the tomato picking he performed for a private business through a prison program. The court found that the
prisoner stated a claim under Title II of the ADA. Americans with Disabilities Act with allegations that: (1) the
prison program under which prisoners picked tomatoes for a private business offered six times the wages paid for
other prison jobs, as well as bonuses, and job skills not otherwise available; (2) that because of his disability, he was
denied access to the program and the ability to obtain the benefits; and (3) that prison and state officials intentionally
discriminated against him by denying and ignoring his requests for accommodations.
The court found that the private company that contracted with the state prison for prisoners to perform tomato
picking on behalf of the company was not a “public entity” and, thus, it was not subject to Title II of the ADA.
According to the court, the prisoner's allegations that state, prison, and state officials received direct federal financial
assistance and therefore his claim stated a Rehabilitation Act claim against the state and these officials.
The court found that the prisoner's allegation that the private company that contracted with the state prison for
prisoners to perform tomato picking on behalf of the company received an indirect financial benefit and competitive
advantage from paying lower wages, was too vague and conclusory, as well as implausible, to satisfy the short and
plain statement requirement for stating a claim that company violated the Rehabilitation Act. (Arizona Department
of Corrections, Arizona Correctional Industries, Eurofresh)

U.S. Appeals Court
SAFETY
EXPOSURE TO
CHEMICALS

Christian v. Wagner, 623 F.3d 608 (8th Cir. 2010). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against jail officials
and employees, alleging a due process violation arising out of his exposure to a cleaning solvent. After a jury found
in favor of the defendants, the district court denied the detainee's motion for a new trial or judgment as a matter of
law. The detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the jury could reasonably find
that the detainee failed to show that a physician or other medical personnel had diagnosed him with a serious
medical need while incarcerated, as would support a finding that such need was objectively serious. The court noted
that medical personnel who examined the detainee found no objective evidence supporting a diagnosis, and the
record did not contain a medical order to jail employees. The court also held that evidence supported the finding that
the detainee's need for medical attention was not so obvious that a layperson must have recognized it, as would
support a finding that such need was objectively serious. According to the court, the detainee's testimony that he
informed jail employees that he coughed up blood and experienced difficulty breathing was corroborated only by his
mother, whereas several jail employees testified they did not observe the detainee suffering adverse reactions to
cleaning solutions and had no recollection of his complaining of a medical problem. (Johnson County Jail, Iowa)

U.S. District Court
RELIGION

Jackson v. Raemisch, 726 F.Supp.2d 991 (W.D.Wis. 2010). A Muslim inmate brought an action against correctional
officials, alleging civil rights violations due to a prohibition against workplace prayer. The defendants moved for
summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the claim
brought under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) stemming from the defendants'

50.56

alleged refusal to allow the inmate to pray in a kitchen facility, was moot, since only injunctive or declaratory relief
was available under the statute, and the inmate no longer worked in the kitchen and was unlikely to return to work
there. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact, regarding whether a
correctional official issued a conduct report to the Muslim inmate because of a grievance he filed concerning the
prohibition against workplace prayer. The court also found that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues
of material fact, regarding whether a correctional official directed her staff to take retaliatory action against the
Muslim inmate because of a grievance he filed concerning the prohibition against workplace prayer. (Waupun
Correctional Institution, Wisconsin)
U.S. District Court
MEDICAL
RESTRICTIONS
WORK ASSIGNMENT

Jones v. Michigan, 698 F.Supp.2d 905 (E.D.Mich. 2010). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action against a state
correctional facility's classification director and a correction officer. The defendants moved for summary judgment.
The district court granted the motion. The court held that the inmate's grievance against the classification director
and correction officer gave fair notice of his claim that he was harassed and forced to perform work as a sports
equipment handler, despite fact that he was wearing a neck brace and walking with a cane due to injuries arising
from an automobile accident. But the court found that the correction officer was not deliberately indifferent to the
inmate's injuries, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, where the officer was never told by the inmate that he could
not perform work duties as a sports equipment handler. Similarly, the classification director was not deliberately
indifferent to the inmate's injuries, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, where the director was never advised of an
accommodation notice or of the physician's diagnoses that the inmate could not perform work duties. (Saginaw
Correctional Facility, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
ASSIGNMENT
DUE PROCESS
LIBERTY INTEREST
MEDICAL
RESTRICTIONS

Lymon v. Aramark Corp., 728 F.Supp.2d 1222 (D.N.M. 2010). A former state prisoner brought an action against the
New Mexico Department of Corrections (NMDOC), its secretary, prison officers, the private company that managed
a prison kitchen, and two of the company's employees, alleging various constitutional claims and negligence under
the New Mexico Tort Claims Act (NMTCA). The prisoner had sustained injuries from work he was required to
perform in a kitchen, and he made allegations about the injuries and his subsequent treatment. The state defendants
moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion. The court held that no New Mexico Department of
Corrections (NMDOC) policy or regulation made any provision for the state prisoner's liberty interest in a labor
assignment or otherwise provided the prisoner with protection from corrections officers ordering him to perform
work in a prison kitchen or protection from orders in contravention of a medical order. The court ruled that the
prisoner's § 1983 procedural due process claim arising from injuries he allegedly sustained while performing kitchen
work was precluded. According to the court, corrections officers' alleged misclassification and denial of a grievance
process did not rise to the degree of outrageousness, or the magnitude of potential or actual harm, that was truly
conscience-shocking, precluding the state prisoner's § 1983 substantive due process claims.
The court noted that the state prisoner made no allegation that he contracted any disease while working in the
prison kitchen, but only that he suffered a shoulder injury as the result of a heavy-lifting component of his work, thus
precluding his § 1983 unconstitutional conditions claim against the New Mexico Department of Corrections
(NMDOC) and its secretary. The court held that the prisoner did not personally suffer any injury as a result of a
corrections officer's classification of prisoners for work duty, purportedly assigning inmates with known
transmissible diseases to kitchen work, precluding the prisoner's claim for an alleged violation of federal public
health policy. (Aramark Corporation, Central New Mexico Correctional Facility)

U.S. Appeals Court
SECURITY SEARCHES

Nunez v. Duncan, 591 F.3d 1217 (9th Cir. 2010). A federal inmate brought a pro se Bivens action against prison
officials, alleging he was subjected to a random strip search in violation of his First, Fourth, and Eighth Amendment
rights. The district court entered summary judgment for the officials, and the inmate appealed. The appeals court
affirmed, finding that the strip search of the inmate pursuant to a policy authorizing strip searches of inmates
returning from outside work detail was reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest in controlling
contraband within the prison, and thus did not violate the inmate's Fourth Amendment rights. (Federal Prison Camp,
Sheridan, Oregon)

U.S. District Court
DISCRIMINATION
EQUAL PROTECTION
TERMINATION

Reynolds v. Barrett, 741 F.Supp.2d 416 (W.D.N.Y. 2010). Four African-American inmates brought an action under
§ 1983 and § 1985 against New York State Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) employees, alleging that
they were subjected to discrimination on account of their race in connection with their inmate jobs in a print shop.
The actions were consolidated for discovery purposes. The inmates moved to amend their complaints and to certify
the class, and the employees moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held
that: (1) the first inmate failed to establish that white workers were treated differently under similar circumstances;
(2) there was no evidence that the second inmate's race was a motivating factor in his removal from the shop; (3) fact
issues precluded summary judgment as to third and fourth inmates' discrimination and retaliation claims against a
supervisor. The court held that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether a prison print shop supervisor
acted out of retaliatory motives in recommending that an African-American inmate, who filed a grievance over an
inmate counseling notification issued by the supervisor, be removed from his job in shop, and as to whether the
supervisor acted toward the inmate based on discriminatory animus, precluding summary judgment as to inmate's §
1983 retaliation and racial discrimination claims against supervisor.
The court noted that a poster hanging in a prison print shop supervisor's office on which there was a photograph
of an ape staring directly into camera with the words “whoever regards work as pleasure can sure have a HELL of a
good time in this institution” was not probative of discriminatory animus on the supervisor's part. According to the
court, documents authored by a New York State Department of Correctional Services' (DOCS) diversity trainer
regarding the prison print shop supervisor's allegedly discriminatory statements at a training session did not create a
genuine issue of material fact sufficient to overcome summary judgment on the African-American inmate's racial
discrimination claim under § 1983 arising from his bonus deductions, demotion, and eventual removal from his job
in the shop. (Elmira Correctional Facility, New York)

50.57

U.S. Appeals Court
COMPENSATION
LIBERTY INTEREST
DUE PROCESS

Serra v. Lappin, 600 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2010). Current and former federal prisoners brought an action against
various prison officials, alleging that the low wages they were paid for work performed in prison violated their rights
under the Fifth Amendment and international law. The district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, and
the prisoners appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that current and former federal prisoners did not
have a legal entitlement to payment for work performed while incarcerated for federal crimes, and thus prison
officials did not violate the prisoners' Fifth Amendment due process rights by allegedly paying them inadequate
wages for work performed in prison, absent an allegation that wages paid were less than applicable regulations
required. The court found that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) conferred no
judicially enforceable rights, and thus did not provide current and former federal prisoners a legal claim or remedy
against prison officials in their action alleging that low wages inmates were paid for work performed in prison
violated their rights under international law. The court noted that ICCPR was ratified on the express understanding
that it was not self-executing. Similarly, the court held that the United Nations' document entitled Standard
Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners conferred no judicially enforceable rights, and thus did not provide
current and former federal prisoners a legal claim or remedy against prison officials in their action. The court noted
that the document was not binding on the United States, did not purport to serve as a source of private rights, and
even if it were a self-executing treaty, did not specify what wages would qualify as equitable remuneration of
prisoners' work. According to the court, the current and former federal prisoners failed to establish that any statute
conferred jurisdiction over their claim that customary international law entitled them to higher wages for work
performed in prison, and thus the district court did not have jurisdiction over prisoners' “law of nations” claim. The
court held that the current and former federal prisoners had no constitutional right to be paid for work performed
while in prison, as would be required to state a claim against prison officials in their individual capacities for money
damages based on alleged inadequacy of the prisoners' earnings. (Fed. Prison Industries, Federal Bureau of Prisons)

U.S. Appeals Court
DEDUCTIONS FROM
WAGES
PAYMENT

Ward v. Ryan, 623 F.3d 807 (9th Cir. 2010). A state inmate who was serving a 197-year sentence brought a § 1983
action against the director of the Arizona Department of Corrections, alleging the Department's withholding of a
portion of his prison wages for “gate money,” to be paid to him upon his release from incarceration, violated his
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights since it was unlikely he would be released from prison prior to his death.
The appeals court reversed the dismissal of the claim. The district court subsequently denied the inmate injunctive
relief and granted summary judgment in favor of the director. The inmate appealed. The appeals court held that the
inmate did not have a current possessory property interest in wages withheld in a dedicated discharge account, as
required to establish a violation of the Takings Clause. The court noted that Arizona statutes creating a protected
property interest in prison inmate wages did not give inmates full and unfettered right to their property. (Arizona
Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL
RESTRICTIONS

Wright v. Genovese, 694 F.Supp.2d 137 (N.D.N.Y. 2010). A state prisoner, who underwent open-heart surgery,
brought a § 1983 action against a private physician and three physicians who were employed by, or contractors for,
the Department of Correctional Services (DOCS). The prisoner alleged that the physicians denied him
constitutionally adequate medical care and equal protection of law. The district court granted the physicians’ motions
for summary judgment. The court held that, to the extent the physicians were being sued in their official capacities,
they were immune from suit. The court found that the private physician was not deliberately indifferent to the
prisoner's medical needs and that the primary treating physician and a consulting cardiologist did not act with
deliberate indifference in how they addressed the prisoner's work restrictions following his surgery. According to the
court, the primary treating physician was not deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's serious medical needs with
respect to prescribing post-operative cardiac and pain medication. (Shawagunk Correctional Facility, New York)
2011

U.S. District Court
DEDUCTION FROM
PAY
FLSA- Fair Labor
Standards Act

Martin v. Benson, 827 F.Supp.2d 1022 (D.Minn.2011). A civilly committed sex offender and resident of the
Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP) facility brought a pro se action against the chief executive officer (CEO)
of MSOP, alleging the CEO violated the minimum wage provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) by
withholding 50% of his earnings as a work-related expense to be applied toward the cost of care. The CEO moved to
dismiss. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the economic reality of the civilly committed sex
offender's work within the MSOP vocational work program was not the type of employment covered by FLSA. The
court noted that the program was specifically designed to provide “meaningful work skills training, educational
training, and development of proper work habits and extended treatment services for civilly committed sex
offenders,” and to the extent that the program engaged in commercial activity, it was incidental to the program's
primary purpose of providing meaningful work for sex offenders. According to the court, the program had few of the
indicia of traditional, free market employment, as the limits on the program prevented it from operating in a truly
competitive manner, and the offender's basic needs were met almost entirely by the State. The court noted that the
conclusion that the FLSA does not apply to a civilly committed sex offender should not be arrived at just because, as
a committed individual, he is confined like those in prison or because his confinement is related to criminal activity,
“…it is not simply an individual's status as a prisoner that determines the applicability of the FLSA, but the
economic reality itself that determines the availability of the law's protections.” (Minnesota Sex Offender Program)

U.S. District Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
PRIVATE SECTOR
WORK RELEASE

Maxwell v. South Bend Work Release Center, 787 F.Supp.2d 819 (N.D.Ind. 2011.) An inmate who worked for a
metal products production facility pursuant to a work release program brought an action against the employer
alleging discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act. The employer
moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the metal products
production facility which employed prisoners in a work-release center was not a public entity within the meaning of
Title II of the ADA, where the facility was a private for-profit corporation, and merely contracting with a public
entity for the provision of some service did not make the facility an instrumentality of the state. The court noted that
the production facility was not a program or activity receiving federal assistance, as required to support the prisoner's

50.58

claim under the Rehabilitation Act, where the facility was a private employer, and even if the facility participated in
a joint venture with the state's department of corrections, it did not actually receive federal financial assistance.
(Indiana Department of Corrections, South Bend Work Release Center, Indiana)
U.S. Appeals Court
TERMINATION
EQUAL PROTECTION

Milligan v. Archuleta, 659 F.3d 1294 (10th Cir. 2011). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that prison
officials took away his prison employment in retaliation for his grievance regarding his designation as a potential
escape risk, and in violation of his equal protection rights. The district court dismissed the complaint on its own
motion and the inmate appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The appeals court held that the district
court erred in dismissing the equal protection claim, even though the complaint was deficient because it did not
plead facts sufficient to show that the inmate's classification as an escape risk lacked a rational basis or a reasonable
relation to a legitimate penological interest. According to the court, amendment of the complaint would not
necessarily be futile, and the claim was not based on an indisputably meritless legal theory. The court noted that the
fact that the state inmate did not have a constitutional right to employment did not foreclose his retaliation claim
against the prison official arising from loss of his prison job after he filed a grievance. (Colorado Territorial
Correctional Facility)

U.S. District Court
GOOD-TIME
PAYMENT
PRISON INDUSTRIES

Morton v. Bolyard, 810 F.Supp.2d 112 (D.D.C. 2011.) A federal prisoner, who was employed by the Department of
Justice's Federal Prison Industries (UNICOR) program while in Federal Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) custody, brought a
Bivens action against various federal officials, alleging that the defendants denied him promotions and back pay for
his UNICOR job, and denied him good time credit for vocational training received through UNICOR and
educational training he took at his own expense through a correspondence course. The defendants moved to dismiss.
The district court granted the motion. The court held that sovereign immunity barred the prisoner's claims against the
officials in their official capacities and that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over the officials in their
individual capacities. The court found that the prisoner failed to exhaust administrative remedies under the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), even though the prisoner had filed an administrative remedy request at the
institutional level, where the prisoner had failed to file an administrative remedy request at the regional and central
office levels, and the regional and central office levels had the authority to provide relief or to take action in response
to the complaint. (United States Penitentiary Hazelton, West Virginia, Federal Prison Industries)

U.S. District Court
RELIGION
REMOVAL FROM JOB
WORK

Murphy v. Lockhart, 826 F.Supp.2d 1016 (E.D.Mich.2011). An inmate at a maximum correctional facility in
Michigan brought a § 1983 action against various Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) employees alleging
that his placement in long-term and/or indefinite segregation was unconstitutional, that he was prohibited from
communicating with his friends and family, and that his ability to practice his Christian religion was being hampered
in violation of his First Amendment rights. The inmate also alleged that the MDOC's mail policy was
unconstitutional. The defendants moved for summary judgment and for a protective order. The court held that the
prisoner's statements in a published magazine article discussing an escape attempt were protected speech, and that a
fact issue precluded summary judgment on the retaliation claims against the other facility's warden, resident unit
manager, and assistant resident unit supervisor stemming from the prisoner's participation in that article. The Esquire
Magazine article discussed security flaws at the correctional facility, detailing the prisoners' escape plan and
revealing which prison staff he manipulated and how he obtained and built necessary tools to dig a tunnel. The court
noted that the prisoner's statements were not directed to fellow inmates, and rather he spoke on issues relating to
prison security and was critical of the conduct of Michigan Department of Corrections personnel, which resulted in
his near-successful prison break.
The court found that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact, as to whether the
defendants' proffered legitimate grounds for removing the prisoner from his coveted administrative segregation work
assignment as a porter/painter/laundry worker--discovery that he possessed contraband--were a pretext to retaliate
for his protected speech in the published magazine article. The court found that the alleged violation of the prisoner's
right to free exercise of his religion from the rejection of a claimed religious publication, Codex Magica, was
justified by the prison's legitimate penological interest in limiting prisoners' access to books that included
instructions on how to write in code. According to the court, because the prison had a valid penological interest in
restricting access to the publication, which contained instructions on how to write in code, the prisoner mail
regulation used to censor that book could not be unconstitutional as applied on the ground that it prevented the
prisoner's access to that publication. (Ionia Maximum Correctional Facility, Kinross Correctional Facility, Standish
Correctional Facility, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
MEDICAL
RESTRICTIONS

O'Neil v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, 804 F.Supp.2d 532 (N.D.Tex. 2011.) The next friend to a deceased
prisoner's minor daughter who died of an asthma attack while confined brought a § 1983 action against the Texas
Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ), a prison doctor, the company that provided health care services at the
prison, and others, alleging violations of the Eighth Amendment, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and
the Rehabilitation Act (RA). The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motions in
part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as
to whether a picket officer, in failing to respond to the emergency call button of the prisoner who was suffering from
an asthma attack and in refusing to respond to the cellmate's verbal calls to help the prisoner during an asthma attack,
knew of a substantial risk of serious harm to the prisoner and failed to act with deliberate indifference to that harm.
The court found that the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity. The court held that summary judgment on
claims alleging violations of Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Rehabilitation Act (RA). Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Texas Department of Criminal
Justice (TDCJ), in failing to put the prisoner who suffered from asthma on job restriction from temperature or
humidity extremes, failing to allow the prisoner access to his medication on the day he died as the result of an
asthma attack, and failing to provide the prisoner with periodic physician follow-up appointments, failed to
accommodate the prisoner's disability. The court held that summary judgment on alleged violations of Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Rehabilitation Act (RA) was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to

50.59

whether the company that provided health care services at the prison, in failing to respond to emergency calls for
help for the prisoner who suffered from asthma and failing to provide the prisoner with prompt medical attention on
the day he died as the result of an asthma attack, failed to accommodate the prisoner's disability. (Jordan Unit, Texas
Department of Criminal Justice)
U.S. District Court
DISCIPLINE
RELIGION
TERMINATION

Roberts v. Klein, 770 F.Supp.2d 1102 (D.Nev. 2011). A Black state prisoner filed a civil rights action against prison
administrators and employees alleging violation of his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion, his
statutory rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), and the Equal Protection
Clause. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court
held that the prisoner stated a claim that prison officials and employees violated his religious rights under the First
Amendment, RLUIPA, and the Equal Protection Clause on allegations that they implemented and enforced a policy
that denied him kosher meals because his Jewish faith had not been verified by an outside entity, and the prison did
not show that there was valid rational connection between the prison regulation and a legitimate government interest.
The court found that the prisoner stated a claim that a prison employee retaliated against him for exercising his
First Amendment right to free exercise of religion, on allegations that he sincerely believed that he must attend
religious services and his work assignment was terminated soon after he attended Jewish services, after which the
employee stated that “You're no damn Jew,” “You're right I'm firing you,” and “Around here I'm your God.”
According to the court, the prisoner also stated a claim that a prison employee retaliated against him for exercising
his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion and deprived him of Equal Protection under Fourteenth
Amendment, on allegations that he was written up on disciplinary charges for attending Jewish services, as a
protected activity, while white inmates of the Jewish faith were not written up on disciplinary charges for attending
services, and that he was placed on disciplinary charges two days later because he attended the services. The court
held that the prison employees were not entitled to qualified immunity. (Southern Desert Corr'l Center, Nevada)

U.S. Appeals Court
SAFETY
WORK CONDITIONS

Smith v. Peters, 631 F.3d 418 (7th Cir, 2011). A state prisoner brought an action against prison employees, alleging
that the employees violated the Eighth Amendment by forcing him to work at hard labor in dangerous conditions,
and violated the First Amendment by penalizing him for questioning the propriety of the work assignment and
preparing to sue. The district court dismissed the complaint. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and
remanded. The court held that the prisoner stated a claim against prison employees for violating his Eighth
Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment by forcing him to work at hard labor in dangerous
conditions. The prisoner alleged that he was assigned to uproot tree stumps in cold weather, without being given any
protective gear, that he developed blisters from handling heavy tools in the cold without gloves, and that he was
subjected to the risk of getting hit by the blades of the tools because they slipped from their handles as prisoners
hacked away without proper training. The court found that the prisoner stated a claim against prison employees for
violating his First Amendment right to free speech, by alleging that the employees penalized him for questioning the
propriety of his work assignment and preparing to sue. (Branchville Correctional Facility, Indiana)
2012

U.S. District Court
SAFETY

Allen v. Ford, 880 F.Supp.2d 407 (W.D.N.Y. 2012). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action against correction
officers, alleging negligence in failing to provide adequate safety equipment while he was working in a cafeteria and
in failing to provide treatment when he burned himself, as well as asserting deliberate indifference in instruction and
supervision. The officers moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that:
(1) the negligence claims were precluded by sovereign immunity; (2) one officer did not know of and disregard the
severity of the prisoner's injuries; and (3) the officer advising the prisoner to sign up for sick call for the following
morning, rather than providing emergency sick call at that time, was not deliberately indifferent. The court noted that
the prisoner reported the incident to the officer, who asked if he was badly burned, the prisoner responded that he did
not know, the prisoner's skin did not blister until after he returned to his cell at the end of his shift, and the prisoner
visited the medical department the next morning and was transferred to a county medical center. (New York State
Department of Corrections, Wende Correctional Facility)

U.S. Appeals Court
EQUAL PROTECTION
REMOVED FROM JOB

Davis v. Prison Health Services, 679 F.3d 433 (6th Cir. 2012). A homosexual state inmate, proceeding pro se and in
forma pauperis, brought an action against prison health services, the health unit manager, the public works
supervisor, and a corrections officer, alleging that he was improperly removed from his employment in a prison
public-works program because of his sexual orientation. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state
a claim and the inmate appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that the inmate stated an
equal protection claim against prison personnel by alleging that: (1) public-works officers supervising his work crew
treated him differently than other inmates, ridiculed and belittled him, and “made a spectacle” of him when they
brought him back to the correctional facility after a public-works assignment because of his sexual orientation; (2)
the officers did not want to strip search him because he was homosexual and would make “under the breath” remarks
when selected to do so; and there were similarly situated, non-homosexual, insulin-dependent diabetic inmates who
participated in the public-works program and who were allowed to continue working in the program after an episode
in which the inmate believed he was experiencing low blood sugar, which turned out to be a false alarm, while the
inmate was removed from the program. (Florence Crane Correctional Facility, Michigan)

50.60

U.S. District Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
EQUAL PROTECTION
SEGREGATION
WORK ASSIGNMENT
WORK RELEASE

Henderson v. Thomas, 913 F.Supp.2d 1267 (M.D.Ala. 2012). Seven HIV-positive inmates brought an action on
behalf of themselves and class of all current and future HIV-positive inmates incarcerated in Alabama Department of
Corrections (ADOC) facilities, alleging that ADOC's HIV segregation policy discriminated against them on the basis
of their disability, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Rehabilitation Act. After a nonjury trial, the district court held that: (1) the class representatives had standing to sue; (2) the claims were not moot
even though one inmate had been transferred, where it was reasonable to believe that the challenged practices would
continue; (3) inmates housed in a special housing unit were “otherwise qualified,” or reasonable accommodation
would render them “otherwise qualified;” (4) the blanket policy of categorically segregating all HIV-positive
inmates in a special housing unit violated ADA and the Rehabilitation Act; (5) housing HIV-positive inmates at
other facilities would not impose an undue burden on the state; and (6) food-service policies that excluded HIVpositive inmates from kitchen jobs within prisons and prohibited HIV-positive inmates from holding food-service
jobs in the work-release program irrationally excluded HIV-positive inmates from programs for which they were
unquestionably qualified and therefore violated ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.
The court also found that female HIV-positive class representative had standing to challenge ADOC policies that
HIV-positive women were segregated within the prison from general-population prisoners and that women were
allowed work-release housing at one facility, but not at ADOC's other work-release facility for women. The court
held that modification of the ADOC medical classification system to afford HIV-positive inmates individualized
determinations, instead of treating HIV status as a dispositive criterion regardless of viral load, history of high-risk
behavior, physical and mental health, and any other individual aspects of inmates, was a reasonable accommodation
to ensure that HIV-positive inmates housed in the prison's special housing unit were “otherwise qualified,” under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act, for integration into the general prison
population. According to the court, requiring ADOC to dismantle its policy of segregating HIV-positive female
inmates in a particular dormitory at a prison would neither impose undue financial and administrative burdens nor
require fundamental alteration in the nature of ADOC's operations. The court suggested that it was almost certain
that ADOC was wasting valuable resources by maintaining its segregation policy, in that a large space at a prison
filled with empty beds was being used to house only a few women. (Alabama Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
PRETRIAL DETAINEES
FORCED LABOR
INVOLUNTARY
SERVITUDE

McGarry v. Pallito, 687 F.3d 505 (2nd Cir. 2012). A pretrial detainee filed an action against state prison officials
alleging that compelling him to work in a prison laundry under the threat of physical restraint and legal process
violated the Thirteenth Amendment. The district court dismissed the action and the detainee appealed. The appeals
court reversed and remanded. The appeals court held that the detainee stated a civil rights claim under the Thirteenth
Amendment, on allegations that his work in a prison laundry was compelled and maintained by the use and the
threatened use of physical and legal coercion, where state prison officials threatened to send him to “the hole” if he
refused to work and that he would thereby be subjected to 23 hour-per-day administrative confinement and shackles.
The detainee also alleged that he had been threatened with disciplinary reports, which are alleged to be taken into
consideration when making recommendations for a release date and, therefore, lengthen any period of incarceration.
The court found that the prohibition against prison officials from rehabilitating pretrial detainees had been clearly
established, and thus it was not objectively reasonable for the prison officials to compel and maintain the pretrial
detainee's work in the prison laundry by the use and threatened use of physical and legal coercion. The court held
that the officials were not entitled to qualified immunity at the pleading stage of the detainee's civil rights claim.
According to the court, officers of reasonable competence should have known that compelling a pretrial detainee, as
a person not “duly convicted,” to work in the laundry for up to 14 hours per day for three days per week, doing other
inmates' laundry, reasonably could not be construed as personally-related housekeeping chores. The court found that
the work constituted hard labor solely to assist in defraying of institutional costs in violation of the Thirteenth
Amendment. (Chittenden Regional Correction Facility, Vermont)

U.S. Appeals Court
COMPENSATION
DEDUCTION FROM
PAY
DISCRIMINATION
EQUAL PROTECTION
WORK ASSIGNMENTS

Reynolds v. Barrett, 685 F.3d 193 (2nd Cir. 2012). African–American inmates brought actions under § 1983 and §
1985 against New York State Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) employees, alleging that they were
subjected to discrimination on account of their race in connection with their inmate jobs in a print shop. The actions
were consolidated for discovery purposes. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants and the
plaintiffs appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the disparate-impact theory of liability
was not applicable to the African-American inmates' class claims against individual state officials under §§ 1981,
1983, 1985, and 1986, which relied on an equal protection racial discrimination violation as the underlying basis,
since equal protection always required intentional discrimination, and disparate impact did not. At the time the suits
here were filed, inmates employed in the prison print shop were paid an hourly wage, which ranged from sixteen
cents to sixty-five cents per hour depending on the inmate's experience and expertise. In addition, inmates were
eligible to receive an “incentive bonus” as a reward for good work. Civilian supervisors determined, in their
discretion, whether a particular inmate merited promotion and higher pay. Similarly, these supervisors could
recommend to the prison Program Committee—the entity tasked with assigning and removing inmates from various
prison programs—that inmates be terminated from employment in the print shop. As a general matter, an inmate
would be removed upon two requests. The plaintiffs alleged that print shop supervisors demoted minority inmates
more often than white inmates, confined minority inmates to low-paying positions, and unfairly docked the pay of
minority inmates. (Elmira Correctional Facility, New York)
2013

U.S. Appeals Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
RIGHT TO WORK
WORK CONDITIONS

Castle v. Eurofresh, Inc., 731 F.3d 901 (9th Cir. 2013). A former state prisoner brought an action against the state,
the state department of corrections (DOC), prison officials, and a private employer who contracted with the state to
provide off-site work to prisoners pursuant to a DOC program, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act. The district court dismissed claims against the private employer, and granted
summary judgment in favor of the state defendants. The prisoner appealed. The court affirmed in part, reversed in
part, and remanded. The court held that the state prisoner who performed work for a private employer that contracted

50.61

with the state department of corrections (DOC) to provide work opportunities to prisoners through DOC's off-site
work program was not “employed” by that private employer, within the meaning of the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA), where the prisoner had a legal obligation to work under state law. According to the court, the
Rehabilitation Act did not apply to the private employer, where the employer did not affirmatively choose to receive
any federal funding, either directly or indirectly. But the court found that the DOC could not “contract away” its
liability for the alleged violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitations Act by the
private employer, and the district court should not have granted judgment for the DOC. (Arizona Department of
Corrections, Work Incentive Pay Program, Arizona Correctional Industries)
U.S. District Court
DISCRIMINATION
EQUAL PROTECTION

Randle v. Alexander, 960 F.Supp.2d 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). An African-American state inmate with a history of
serious mental illness brought an action against officials of the New York State Department of Corrections and
Community Supervision (DOCCS), correctional officers, and mental health personnel, alleging under § 1983 that the
defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs and that he was retaliated against, in violation
of his First Amendment rights, among other claims. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the
motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the correctional officers' alleged actions in forcing the inmate
to fight a fellow inmate, and threatening to beat the inmate with a baton and engage in a joint cover-up if the two
inmates did not “finish” their fight within a specified area of the prison, which ultimately resulted in the fellow
inmate sustaining fatal injuries in the fight, had no legitimate penological purpose, and was far afield of the species
of force employed to restore or maintain discipline. The court held that the alleged actions reflected indifference to
inmate safety, if not malice toward the inmate, as supported the inmate's § 1983 Eighth Amendment failure to
protect claim. According to the court, the alleged forced fight between the inmate and a fellow inmate, orchestrated,
condoned, and covered up by correctional officers was an objectively serious violation of the inmate's Eighth
Amendment right to reasonably safe conditions of confinement, and the intent evinced by such activity was, at the
very least, one of indifference to inmate safety, supporting the inmate's § 1983 Eighth Amendment conditions of
confinement claim against the officers.
The court held that the African-American state inmate's allegations in his complaint that a correctional officer
arranged inmates in his company so that white inmates were close to officers' posts, whereas black inmates were
placed further away, that white inmates were given superior jobs, that the officer's efforts in forcing a fight between
the inmate and a fellow inmate were done purposefully for his amusement because both inmates were black, and that
the officer's treatment of the inmate and other black inmates was motivated by his intent to discriminate on the basis
of race and malicious intent to injure inmates, stated a § 1983 equal protection claim against the officer. The court
ruled that the correctional officers were not entitled to qualified immunity from the inmate's § 1983 Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendment claims because inmates had a clearly established right to remain incarcerated in reasonably
safe conditions, and it was objectively unreasonable to threaten inmates until they agreed to fight each other in front
of prison officials. The court found that the inmate stated an Eighth Amendment inadequate medical care claim
against mental health personnel. The inmate alleged that he had a history of serious mental illness, that his symptoms
increased following a forced fight with a fellow inmate, that the inmate attempted suicide on three occasions, two of
which required his hospitalization, that prison mental health personnel evidenced deliberate indifference to his
medical needs, as they recklessly disregarded the risk the inmate faced as result of special housing unit (SHU)
confinement, and that the inmate was confined to SHU despite a recommendation that he be placed in a lessrestrictive location. (Green Haven Correctional Facility, Protective Custody Unit, New York State Department of
Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
REMOVAL FROM JOB

Spencer v. Jackson County, Mo., 738 F.3d 907 (8th Cir. 2013). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against county
detention center employees, alleging violation of his First Amendment rights. The district court granted the
defendants' motion for summary judgment. The inmate appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The
court held that summary judgment was precluded by issues of material fast as to: (1) the inmate's First Amendment
retaliation claim against a supervisor; (2) First Amendment retaliation claims arising from the inmate's transfer to
another housing module; and (3) claims arising from the alleged obstruction of the inmate's access to a grievance
process. The court found a dispute of material fact as to whether a program supervisor was motivated by the lawsuit
the inmate had previously filed against her, when she removed the inmate from a trustee program almost
immediately after he reminded her about his having filed the suit, resulting in his loss of access to income, work
opportunities, and housing advantages as well as other privileges.
A fact issue was found as to whether the 53-year old inmate would have been transferred from a housing module
for older inmates to a module that housed younger and more violent offenders, but for his use of the grievance
process. The inmate had been approved for the detention center's Inmate Worker Program (IWP), also known as the
“trustee program.” Inmates in the trustee program received job assignments within the detention center and were
paid for each shift, with an opportunity to earn more for additional work. They also received a number of privileges
and incentives. They were housed in a trustee module and were eligible for late nights, weekend contact visitation
rewards, and access to popcorn, soda, and a movie player. One of inmate's work assignments was in the kitchen,
where inmates received extra food and may have one meal per work day in the break room area. (Jackson County
Detention Center, Missouri)

U.S. Appeals Court
COMPENSATION
BENEFITS
EMPLOYEE
SAFETY

Vuncannon v. U.S., 711 F.3d 536 (5th Cir. 2013). A county and the medical corporation that treated a county inmate
sought reimbursement of medical expenses from the provider of workers' compensation insurance under the
Mississippi Workers' Compensation Act (MWCA). The inmate was in a county work program under the sheriff's
supervision, for which services he earned $10 per day to be credited “toward any and all charges of F.T.A/cash
bonds owed to the county.” He was seriously injured in a forklift accident while helping law enforcement officials
conduct a “drug bust” pursuant to that program. The inmate’s treatment cost more than $640,000. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of provider. The county appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held
that the inmate did not qualify for reimbursement of medical expenses under MWCA. The appeals court noted that
the county inmate was not an employee working under contract of hire, and therefore, did not qualify for

50.62

reimbursement of medical expenses from the provider of workers' compensation insurance under the Mississippi
Workers' Compensation Act (MWCA) after he was injured in a county work program. According to the court, there
was no express, written contract between the inmate and the county, the inmate did not sign a document transmitted
by the sheriff to a county justice court stating that the inmate was placed on a work detail, the document was
transmitted after he began working for the county, and inmates were required to work under Mississippi law.
(Tippah County Jail, Mississippi)
U.S. District Court
EQUAL PROTECTION
RELIGION
WORK ASSIGNMENT

Washington v. Afify, 968 F.Supp.2d 532 (W.D.N.Y. 2013). A Muslim inmate, proceeding pro se, brought an action
against the department of correctional services (DOCS) employees, alleging violations of the First, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments. The employees moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied
in part. The district court held that: (1) ordering the inmate to clean up human waste did not violate the Eighth
Amendment; (2) housing the inmate with a cellmate who allegedly exposed the inmate to pornographic images and
prevented him from reciting his daily prayers with necessary humility and tranquility did not violate the inmate's
First Amendment free exercise right; (3) the inmate's allegations that he was denied two religious breakfast meals
and one evening meal during a Muslim holy month unless he signed up to work in the mess hall were insufficient to
state a claim; (4) the Muslim inmate's allegations that he was singled out in being ordered to clean up feces, being
transferred to a different cell, and transferred to new prison job were insufficient to state a claim for violations of
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection. The court held that the inmate's allegations that he was charged with
disobeying a direct order after he refused to clean feces, that he was found guilty by a biased hearing officer, and that
the hearing officer called the inmate a “little monkey” and warned that there was “more retaliation on the way” were
sufficient to state a § 1983 claim for violations of Fourteenth Amendment due process against the hearing officer.
The court also found that the inmate's allegations that he filed a grievance against a prison employee, that the
employee told the inmate he was “nuts” and that the inmate “was playing with the wrong one,” and that the
employee issued a false misbehavior report against the inmate the next day, were sufficient to state a § 1983
retaliation claim in violation of the First Amendment. (Southport Correctional Facility, New York)
2014

U.S. District Court
EQUAL PROTECTION
SUPERVISION
WORK RELEASE

Castillo v. Bobelu, 1 F.Supp.3d 1190 (W.D.Okla. 2014). Five female inmates brought a § 1983 action against state
officials and employees, alleging they were subjected to sexual abuse while working outside a community
corrections center in which they were housed, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The inmates were participating
in the Prisoner Public Works Program (“PPWP”) that allowed offenders to work off-site at different state offices.
They were working during the day doing grounds maintenance at the Oklahoma Governor's Mansion, where they
were supervised by a groundskeeper and his immediate supervisor. When inmates work at places such as the
Governor's Mansion, the DOC does not have a guard stay with the women at the work site. Instead, they are
supervised by state workers employed at the work site, who function like guards. These individuals go through an
eight hour training program. The inmate claimed that they were sexually harassed and sexually assaulted by the
groundskeeper and by a cook employed at the Governor's Mansion. The defendants moved for summary judgment.
The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was
precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to (1) whether prison guards were deliberately indifferent. The court
held that: (1) the prison district supervisor did not have knowledge of a substantial risk of harm to the inmates
because the supervisor did not know that the inmates were working only with males while off-site; (2) the supervisor
was not deliberately indifferent; (3) the prison supervising case manager was not deliberately indifferent; and (4)
there was no evidence that the employee had supervisory authority over the inmate. The court noted that the inmate
did not return to the work assignment where she was allegedly abused by state employees or have contact with the
alleged abusers, as required for the continuing violation doctrine to apply to her § 1983 action that alleged violations
of the Eighth Amendment.
According to the court, despite the supervisor being aware of misconduct by a groundskeeper under his
supervision, the supervisor was aware that the groundskeeper violated certain policies, but did not have knowledge
of the sexual assaults, and he investigated the groundskeeper's conduct and counseled the groundskeeper. The court
also found that the prison supervising case manager, who oversaw the off-site public works program, was not
deliberately indifferent to the excessive risk of sexual assaults of female inmates working at the governor's mansion
as part of the program, where the inmates did not complain to the manager and the manager was never informed of
misconduct. (Hillside Community Corrections Center, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma)

U.S. Appeals Court
INJURY

Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2014). An inmate, who was blind in one eye due to a cataract, brought
an action against Nevada Department of Corrections (NDOC) officials and supervisory medical personnel, alleging
under § 1983 that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in denying his requests
for cataract-removal surgery. The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and the inmate
appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that the inmate's monocular blindness was a serious
medical need and the NDOC director was the proper defendant. The court noted that although monocular blindness
is not life-threatening, it is the loss of the function of an organ, the inmate's eye had been blind for more than a
decade, the inmate's condition affected his perception and rendered him unable to see if he turned to the left. Several
doctors, including an ophthalmologist, found the cataract and resulting vision loss “important and worthy of
treatment,” and the inmate's monocular blindness caused him a physical injury when he ran his hand through a
sewing machine on two occasions while working in the prison mattress factory. According to the court, summary
judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the inmate, who was blind in his right eye
due to a cataract, was harmed by prison officials' denial of his requests for cataract-removal surgery, as to whether
the officials were deliberately indifferent to the inmate's monocular blindness, and as to whether a particular
physician was personally involved in the inmate's medical care. (Nevada Department of Corrections)

50.63

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES
SAFETY
PRETRIAL DETAINEE

Rahman v. Schriro, 22 F.Supp.3d 305 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against a state
prison commissioner, warden, deputy warden, deputy of security, and officers, alleging they violated the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause by forcing him to go through a radiation-emitting X-ray security screening
machine in order to get to and from his daily work assignment. The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a
claim. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the detainee sufficiently
alleged a serious present injury or future risk of serious injury, as required to state a deliberate indifference claim
against prison officials under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, by alleging that he was subjected to
at least two full-body X-ray scans each day, that each scan exposed him to a level of radiation that was 10 to 50
times higher than that emitted by airport scanners, that radiation damages cells of the body and that even low doses
of radiation increase an individual's risk of cancer, and that federal regulations prohibited prison officials from using
even non-repetitive X-ray examinations for security purposes unless the device was operated by licensed practitioner
and there was reasonable suspicion that the inmate had recently secreted contraband. According to the court, the
detainee's allegations that a prison officer intentionally subjected him to a higher dose of radiation through a fullbody X-ray screening machine while calling him a “fake Muslim, homosexual, faggot” were sufficient to allege that
the force was not applied to maintain or restore discipline, as required to state an excessive force claim under
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The court held that the alleged force exerted by a prison officer on the
detainee by setting the full-body X-ray screening machine to a higher radiation dose on one occasion was not
excessive in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The court noted that the alleged force
was de minimis, and the use of a higher setting of radiation, which was designed to produce a better image, in a
situation where detainee expressed resistance to the scanning process and could have been conceivably hiding
contraband was not the type of force repugnant to the conscience of mankind.
The court found that the prison commissioner was not entitled to qualified immunity where the right to be free
from deliberate indifference to serious medical needs was clearly established, and given the known dangers of
radiation, a reasonable person would have understood that exposing the detainee to a cumulative level of radiation
that posed a risk of damage to his future health could violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
(Anna M. Kross Center, Rikers Island, New York City Department of Correction)

U.S. District Court
DISCRIMINATION
EQUAL PROTECTION
RELIGION
WORK ASSIGNMENT

Richard v. Fischer, 38 F.Supp.3d 340 (W.D.N.Y. 2014). A multiracial Muslim inmate brought a civil rights action
alleging that prison officials and employees discriminated against him on the basis of race and religion and retaliated
against him for filing grievances. The officials moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court
granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that New York State Department of Correctional
Services (DOCS) employees were acting within scope of their employment, specifically, the duty of assigning work
positions to inmates, when they denied the multiracial Muslim inmate employment outside of his cellblock. The
court found that the inmate's allegations that no other inmate in the prison was “isolated by programming” or
restricted to an employment position in his or her cellblock, that the inmate was isolated to programs in his cellblock,
presumably because of his race and religion, and that prison employees tasked with assigning work refused to place
the inmate on a waiting list for his desired program, when waiting lists were open to “all others,” sufficiently stated
that the inmate was treated differently than similarly-situated individuals, supporting the inmate's § 1983 claim that
employees denied him equal protection by restricting him to employment opportunities in his cellblock. (Five Points
Correctional Facility, New York)
2015

U.S. Appeals Court
WORK ASSIGNMENT
SAFETY

Estate of Johnson v. Weber, 785 F.3d 267 (8th Cir. 2015). The estate of a state prison guard who was murdered by
inmates who attempted to escape brought a § 1983 action in state court against various prison officials and the state
department of corrections (DOC), alleging constitutional violations. The action was transferred to federal court. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the estate appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The court held that state prison officials did not shock the conscience or act with deliberate indifference by
housing two prisoners with violent criminal pasts, one with a history of multiple escapes and one with a history of
planning an escape, in a medium security environment, and giving them job assignments which allowed the
prisoners to move within the prison, and thus, the officials did not violate the substantive due process rights of the
prison guard who was murdered by prisoners during their attempted escape. The court noted that the prisoners had
no history of violence or threats while incarcerated before the murder, and one prisoner had worked in the prison for
many years without creating any known threat of harm to any guard. (South Dakota State Penitentiary)

U.S. Appeals Court
RELIGION
GOOD-TIME
TRANSFER
WORK ASSIGNMENTS

Jehovah v. Clarke, 798 F.3d 169 (4th Cir. 2015). A Christian inmate brought a § 1983 action against the
Commonwealth of Virginia and various employees and contractors of the Virginia Department of Corrections
(VDOC), alleging that the defendants violated his free exercise rights under the First Amendment and the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) by prohibiting him from consuming wine during communion,
requiring him to work on Sabbath days, and assigning him non-Christian cellmates. Following dismissal of some
claims, the district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The inmate appealed. The appeals
court reversed and remanded. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by fact issues regarding the
wine ban. The court also found that the inmate stated an RLUIPA claim based on cell assignment, a First
Amendment claim based on cell assignment, and an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim. The court
noted that the inmate alleged that he was required to share a cell with a particular inmate who subjected him to “antiChristian” rhetoric, and that he was “burdened, mocked, and harassed” on account of his religious views by being
housed in a cell with that inmate.
The inmate alleged that his religion required him to abstain from working during the “Old Jewish” and “New
Christic” Sabbaths, that his cleaning job would not accommodate his Sabbath observations, that his requests for job
transfers were denied, that prison officials had not approved him for any job for which he applied in over three years.
The inmate alleged that he would face sanctions and lose the opportunity to accrue good conduct allowances and
earned sentence credits if he failed to work for 30 to 40 hours per week. (Sussex I Prison, Waverly, Virginia)

50.64

U.S. Appeals Court
RELIGION

Jones v. Williams, 791 F.3d 1023 (9th Cir. 2015). A Muslim former inmate brought civil rights claims against prison
officials under § 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), seeking monetary
and injunctive relief. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the officials and the former inmate
appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated, and remanded in part. The court held that the inmate’s claims
for injunctive relief, arising from an alleged requirement that he handle pork while working in a kitchen, were moot
because he had been released from custody. The court found that unsworn statements of an inmate cook who told the
Muslim inmate that the food service coordinator had directed the inmate cook to mix pork in with meat used in a
tamale pie were hearsay, and thus could not properly be considered in opposition to the prison officials’ motion for
summary judgment as to the Muslim inmate’s claim that his free exercise rights were violated when he was served
and ate the pie without notice that it contained pork. But the court held that prison officials were not entitled to
qualified immunity from the Muslim inmate’s § 1983 claim that he was ordered in 2007 to cook pork loins as part of
his job duties in a kitchen, in violation of his religious beliefs. The court noted that the penitentiary implemented a
policy prior to the incident in question, providing that an inmate could opt out of handling pork on religious grounds,
the inmate alleged that he told the officers in charge that he had the right to not handle pork, and the fact that some
officers claimed they were not personally aware of the policy change was not sufficient to show that the inmate’s
right to avoid handling pork was not clearly established. (Oregon State Penitentiary)

U.S. District Court
COMPENSATION
FLSA- Fair Labor
Standards
Act
FORCED LABOR
TVPA- Trafficking
Victims Protection Act

Menocal v. GEO Group, Inc., 113 F.Supp.3d 1125 (D. Colo. 2015). Current and former detainees at a private, forprofit immigration detention facility brought an action against the facility’s owner-operator, alleging that a work
program violated the Colorado Minimum Wage Order (CMWO) because detainees were paid $1 per day instead of
the state minimum wage, that forcing detainees to clean living areas under the threat of solitary confinement violated
the Trafficking Victims Protection Act’s (TVPA) prohibition on forced labor, and that the owner-operator was
unjustly enriched through the work program. The detainees participate in a “Voluntary Work Program” at the facility
where they perform tasks such as maintaining the on-site medical facility that is owned and operated by the same
company, doing laundry, preparing meals, and cleaning various parts of the facility for compensation of $1 per day.
They also alleged that each day, six randomly selected detainees (whether they participate in the Voluntary Work
Program or not) are required to clean the facility’s “pods” without compensation under the threat of solitary
confinement. The owner-operator moved to dismiss. The court found that the detainees adequately alleged that the
owner-operator obtained the detainees’ labor by threats of physical restraint, as required to state a claim for violation
of TVPA.
The court held that the detainees were not the facility owner-operator’s “employees” who could bring claim
alleging that a work program violated CMWO. The court noted that the detainees apparently fell within CMWO’s
broad definition of employee, but so did prisoners to whom the state labor department found CMWO’s definition of
employee should not apply, and detainees, like prisoners, did not use the wages to provide for themselves, and thus
the purposes of CMWO were not served by including them in the definition of employee. (Aurora Detention
Facility, Owned and Operated by the GEO Group, Colorado)

U.S. Appeals Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
INJURY
DISCRIMINATION

Neisler v. Tuckwell, 807 F.3d 225 (7th Cir. 2015). An inmate brought an action against prison administrators under
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) after losing his prison job following an incident where a cart overturned
and damaged his prosthetic leg. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion.
The inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the provision of ADA prohibiting exclusion from
benefits or services does not cover a prisoner’s workplace discrimination claim regarding damage to his prosthetic
leg. (Waupun Correctional Institution, Wisconsin)

U.S. Appeals Court
REMOVAL FROM JOB

Pearson v. Secretary Dept. of Corrections, 775 F.3d 598 (3rd Cir. 2015). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging
that prison officials retaliated against him for filing grievances and a civil lawsuit. The district court dismissed the
case and denied the inmate's motion for reconsideration. The inmate appealed. The appeals court reversed and
remanded. The court held that the inmate's allegation that a unit manager told him he was being terminated from his
prison job because of grievances that he had filed nearly one year earlier was sufficient to state a plausible retaliation
claim in the inmate's § 1983 action against prison officials. (Pennsylvania Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
FLSA- Fair Labor
Standards Act
INVOLUNTARY
SERVITUDE

Smith v. Dart, 803 F.3d 304 (7th Cir. 2015). A pretrial detainee brought action under § 1983 against a county alleging
deliberate indifference to his health in violation of the right to the provision of adequate medical treatment under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as failure to pay adequate wages under the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA) for his job in the jail’s laundry room. The district court dismissed the case and the detainee
appealed. The appeals court held that the detainee sufficiently alleged that the food he received was “well below
nutritional value,” as required to state a claim under § 1983 for deliberate indifference to his health in violation of
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court ruled that pretrial detainees are not protected by
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) because they are not employees of their jail. The court noted that the detainee
had volunteered to participate in a veteran’s program within the county jail that included a job in the jail’s laundry
room, and that this was not “involuntary servitude” or punishment that would violate the Thirteenth Amendment.
According to the court, “[P]eople are not imprisoned for the purpose of enabling them to earn a living. The prison
pays for their keep. If it puts them to work, it is to offset some of the cost of keeping them, or to keep them out of
mischief, or to ease their transition to the world outside, or to equip them with skills and habits that will make them
less likely to return to crime outside. None of these goals is compatible with federal regulation of their wages and
hours. The reason the FLSA contains no express exception for prisoners is probably that the idea was too outlandish
to occur to anyone when the legislation was under consideration by Congress.” (Cook County Jail, Illinois)

50.65

50.66