DETENTION AND
CORRECTIONS
CASELAW CATALOG

26th Edition
2015-2016

Volume Five: Sec. 32-38
Rod C. Miller
Donald J. Walter
Research and Review:
Joseph Heltzel
Chris Dickey
Richard Drennon
Kyle McCarty

CRS, Inc.

A Non-Profit Organization
925 Johnson Drive
Gettysburg, PA 17325
(717) 338-9100
Fax (717) 718-6178
www.correction.org
rod@correction.org
Copyright 2017

Table of Contents
DETENTION AND CORRECTIONS CASELAW CATALOG
VOLUME 1
How to Use the Catalog
Index and Topic Finder
Table of Cases
1. Access to Courts
2. Administration

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Administrative Segregation
Assessment of Costs
Attorney Fees
Bail
Civil Rights

VOLUME 2
8. Classification and Separation
9. Conditions of Confinement
10. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
11. Discipline

12. Exercise and Recreation
13. Ex-Offenders
14. Failure to Protect

VOLUME 3
15. Facilities
16. False Imprisonment/Arrest
17. Female Prisoners
18. Food
19. Free Speech, Expression, Assoc.
20. Good Time

21. Grievance Procedures, Prisoner
22. Habeas Corpus
23. Hygiene-Prisoner Personal
24. Immunity
25. Intake and Admissions
26. Juveniles

VOLUME 4
27. Liability
28. Mail
29. Medical Care

30. Mental Problems (Prisoner)
31. Personnel

VOLUME 5
32. Pretrial Detention
33. Privacy
34. Programs-Prisoner
35. Property-Prisoner Personal

36. Release
37. Religion
38. Rules & Regulations-Prisoner

VOLUME 6
39. Safety and Security
40. Sanitation
41. Searches
42. Services-Prisoner
43. Sentence
44. Standards

45. Supervision
46. Training
47. Transfers
48. Use of Force
49. Visiting
50. Work- Prisoner

CRS, Inc.
925 Johnson Drive, Gettysburg, PA 17325 (717) 338-9100
www.correction.org Fax (717) 718-6178 rod@correction.org
All Rights Reserved

SECTION 32: PRETRIAL DETENTION
Detention and Corrections Caselaw Catalog All Rights Baerved
. C~, Inc. 925 Johnson Drive, Gettysburg PA 17325 (717) 338-9100 www.correction.org/
The following pages present summaries of court decisions which address this topic area. These summaries
provide readers with highlights of each case, but are not intended to be a substitute for the review of the full case.
The cases do not represe1;1t all court decisions which address this topic area, but rather offer a sampling of
relevant holdings,
The decisions summarized below were current as of the date indicated on the title page of this edition of the
Catalog. Prior to publication, the citation for each case was verified, and the case was researched in Shepard's
Citations to determine if it had been altered upon appeal (reversed or modified). The Catalog is updated
annually. An annual supplement provides replacement pages for cases in the prior edition which have changed,
and adds new cases. Readers are encouraged to consult the Topic Index to identify related topics of interest. The
text in the section entitled "How to Use The Catalog" at the beginning of the Catalog provides an overview which
may also be helpful to some readers.
The case summaries which follow are organized by year, with the earliest case presented first. Within each
year, cases are organized alphabetically by the name of the plaintiff. The left margin offers a quick refe~nce,
highlighting the type of court involved and identifying appropriate subtopics addressed by each case.
1964

U.S. District Court
SEPARATION
WORK

Tyler v. Harris, 226 F.Supp. 852 (W.D. Mo. 1964). Unconvicted persons can be kept
with convicted persons in federal medical centers, but they may not be subjected to
involuntary servitude. (Medical Center For Federal Prisoners, Springfield, Missouri)

1986
U.S. District Court
SEPARATION

Johnston v. Ciccone, 260 F.Supp. 553 (W.D. Mo. 1966). Pretrial commement with
convicted persons in the U.S. Medical Center for Federal Prisoners is not
unconstitutional for persons found to be mentally ill. (United States Medical Center for
Federal Prisoners)

1969
U.S. Supreme Court
VOTING

McDonald v. Board of Election Commissioners, 394 U.S. 802 (1969). Pretrial detainees
in the Cook County Jail alleged that lliinois absentee ballot provisions violate the
Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment for two reasons: First, since the
distinction between those medically incapacitated, and those "judicially incapacitated"
bear no reasonable relationship to any legitimate state objective, the classifications ~
arbitrary. Secondly, since pretrial detainees imprisoned in other states, or in counties
within. the state other than those of their own residence can vote absentee as citizens
absent for any reason, it is clearly arbitrary to deny absentee ballots to other unsentenced
inmates because they happen to be incarcerated within. their own resident counties. This
action was instituted after the defendant Board of Election Commissioners rejected a
timely application for absentee ballots by plaintiffs,
The U.S. District Court for Northern District of lliinois granted summary judgment for
the defendants, holding that extending absentee ballots to those physically incapacitat.ed
for medical reasons constituted a proper and reasonable classification not violative of
equal protection. Plaintiffs appealed directly to the U.S. Supreme Court. (Affirmed.)
HELD: lliinois' failure to provide absentee ballots for plaintiffs does not violate the
Equal Protection Clause. 894 U.S. at 806.
REASONING: a) Distinctions made by the absentee voting provisions are not drawn
on the basis of wealth or race, and while classif1cations which might invade or restrain
voting rights must be closely scrutinized, a more exacting judicial scrutiny is not necessary
here. b) State legislatures traditionally are allowed to take reform one step at a time, and
need not run the risk of losing an entire remedial scheme because it failed to cover every
potential group. c) It is reasonable for lliinois to treat differently the physically
handicapped as there is nothing to indicate that the judicially handicapped plaintiffs are
absolutely prohibited from voting. d) Constitutional safeguards are not offended by the
different treatment accorded unsen.tenced inmates incarcerated within and those
incarcerated out of their counties of residence.
~ : Footnote 9, p. 810 "Maine appears to be the only state to allow absentee ballot
for absence from the polls for any sufficient reason. ... " 21 M.R.S.A. Section 1251, 1306
(1964). (Cook County Jail, Illinois)

1970
U.S. District Court
STATE INTEREST

Davis v. Lindsay, 321 F.Supp. 1184 (S.D. N.Y. 1970). The only state interest in
incarcerating pretrial detamees is to guarantee appearance at trial. (City Jail, New
York)
32.1

1971

U.S. Appeals Court
CLCYfHING
CONDITIONS

Anderson v. Nosser. 438 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 848 (1971).
Male arrest.eee/petitioners forced t.o strip and kept in such condition for up t.o thirty-six
hours and female arrest.eelt'petitioners were forced t.o go without clothing other than
underwear leads t.o finding of constitutional violation. (Mississippi State Penitentiary,
Parchman)

U.S. District Court
PUNISHMENT

Conklin v. Hancock. 334 F.Supp. 1119 (D. N:H. 1971),;' Pretrial detainees are not
subject t.o "punishment. n (New Hampshire State Prison, Con.cbrd, Hew Hampshire)

U.S. District Court
STATE INTEREST
PUNISHMENT
CONDITIONS
"LEAST RESTRICTIVE
MEANSn

Hamilt.on v. Love, 328 F.Supp. 1182 (E.D. Ark. 1971). The only legitimate purpose
served by pretrial detention is assuring defendants' presence at trial. Minimally, a
detainee ought t.o have the reasonable expectation that he would survive his period of
detainment with his life; that he would not be assaulted, abused, or molested during
his detainment; and that his physical and mental health would be reasonably protected
during this period. Detainees may not be subjected t.o any punishment, "cruel and
unusualn or not. Conditions of incarceration for detainees must, cwnulati,vely, add up t.o
the least restrictive means of assuring appearance at trial. One female staff member must
be on duty twenty-four hours a day. There should be one staff member patrolling on each
cell floor in the immediate area of every detainee on a twenty-four hour basis. (Palaski
County Jail, Arkansas)
1972

U.S. Supreme Court

SPEEDY TRIAL

Barker v. Wingo. 407 U.S. 514 (6th Cir. 1972). A defendant's constitutional right t.o a
speedy trial cannot be established by an inflexible rule, but can be determined only on
an ad hoc balancing basis, in which the conduct of the prosecution and that of the
defendant are weighed. Among relevant factors t.o be considered are: the length and
reason for d&ay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice t.o the defendant.
(Christian County, Kentucky).

U.S. District Court
ATI'ORNEY VISITS
PARITYWITH
SENTENCED

Brenneman v. Madigan. 343 F.Supp. 128 (N.D. Ca. 1972). Pretrial detainees must
have opportunities t.o participate in educational, vocational and recreational programs
comparable t.o those of sentenced misdemeanants. Pretrial detainees have a first
amendment right t.o visit with attorneys. (Alameda County Jail Facility, California)

U;S. District Court
STATE INTEREST

Collins v. Schoonf'l.eld, 344 F.Supp. 257 (D. Md. 1972). A detainee can be deprived of
constitutional rights •only t.o the extent such denial is required t.o insure that he
appears at trial and t.o restrain him from endangering or disrupting the security of the
institution in which he is detained, or t.o deter him, if his conduct has already caused such
danger or disruption, from repeating such conduct. Pretrial detainees may not be forced
t.o change the length or manner in which they wear their hair, except where jail officials
can demonstrate a health or identifu:ation :need for so doing. (Baltimore City Jail,
Maryland)
.

HAIR

U.S. District Court
PROGRAMS

Hamilt.on v. Landrieu, 351 F.Supp. 549 (E.D. La. 1972). All inmates, in.eluding pretrial
detainees, shall be eligible t.o participate in rehabilitative programs. Rehabilitative
programs shall be immf'ltiately established and maintained. (Orleans Parish Prison,
Louisiana)

Smith v. Sampson, 849 F.Supp. 268 (D. N.H. 1972). Difference in state interest
U.S. District Court
mandates that detainees be treated better than convicts. Least restrictive alternative
STATE INTEREST
"LEAST RESTRICTIVE principles applies t.o detainees. (New Hampshire State Prison)

MEANS"
1973

U.S. District Court
PUNISHMENT
CONDITIONS

DUE PROCESS

U.S. Appeals Court

DUE PROCESS

Inmates of Suffolk. Co. Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F.Supp. 676 (D. Mass. 1973), afrd, 494
F.2d 1196 (1st Cir. 1974). Where precious penal liberties of detainees are affected. the
state bears the burden of justification. Detainees may not be punished- Detainees'
conditions must be superior t.o those of convicts. If detainees are subjected t.o
gratuitous and wholesale deprivation of rights which are unrelated t.o assuring their
presence at trial, due process is violated. (Suffolk. County Jail, Massachusetts)

Johnson v. Glick. 481 F.2d 1028 (2nd Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033. While it
is doubtful that the cruel and unusual punishment clause applies 1:o pretrial detainees,
they are prot.ected by the due process clause again.st acts of. brutality by correction officers.
However, protection is less ext.ensive than that provided by common law t.orts.
(Manhattan House of. Det.ention, New York)

32.2

1974

U.S. District Court
WORK

Main Road v. Atych. 385 F.Supp. 105 (E.D. Penn. 1974). Unsent.enced prisoners cannot
be required t.o perform uncompensat.ed labor. (Philadelphia Prison System,
Pennsylvania)
·

U.S. District Court
PARITYWITH
SENTENCED
RIGHTS RETAINED
"LEAST RESTRICTIVE
MEANS"

Rhem v. Malcolm, 371 F.Supp. 594 (S.D. N.Y. 1974). Detainee may not. be confined
under conditions more rigorous than a convicted prisoner. Detainees retain all rights
except where necessary t.o assure their appearance at trial, and conditions must be
least restrictive means t.o achieve that end. (Manhattan House of Detention, New
York)

U.S. District Court
STATE INTEREST
"LEAST RESTRICTIVE
MEANS"

Wilson v. Beame, 380 F.Supp. 1232 (E.D. N.Y. 1974). Stat.e's int.erest in interfering
with the personal liberty of pretrial detainees is limit.ed t.o the least restrictive "form of
incarceration" consonant with the accused being available for trial. (House of Det.ention
For Men, Brooklyn, New York)

1975
U.S. District Court
SEPARATION

Alberti v. Sheriff of Harris Co., 406 F.Supp. 649 (S.D. Tex. 1975). No pretrial detainee
shall be housed in the same cell or cellblock with any person who has been convicted
and sent.enced. Alcoholic and drug-dependent inmat.es shall be housed in an incarcerative
environment specifically designed and equipped for the treatment of withdrawal problems.
(Harris County Jail, Texas)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
PUNISHMENT

Dillard v. Pitchess, 399 F.Supp. 1225 (C.D. Calif. 1975). The conditions under which
unconvict.ed prisoners are detained may be so onerous as t.o constitut.e summary
punishment without due process of law. (Los Angeles County Jail, California)

U.S. District Court
STATE INTEREST

Giampetruzzi v. Malcolm, 406 F.Supp. 836 (S.D. N.Y. 1975). First Amendment rights
of detainees may be limit.ed only t.o the ext.ent necessary t.o ensure their appearance at
trial and t.o assure the security of the institution. (New York City House of Det.ention for
Men)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
PARITYWITH
SENTENCED
EQUAL PROTECTION

Miller v. Carson. 401 F.Supp. 835 (M.D. Fla. 1975). aff"d, 563 F.2d 741
(5th Cir. 1977). Conditions of pretrial det.ention which are worse than those
experienced by sent.enced prisoners deny equal protection. (Duval County Jail, Florida)

U.S. District Court
PROGRAMS
STATE INTEREST
PUNISHMENT
CONDITIONS

Padgett v. Stein, 406 F.Supp. 287 (M.D. Penn. 1975). Pretrial detainees should not be
forced t.o participat.e in rehabilitative programs. The only legitimat.e purpose of pretrial
detention is the det.ention itself. Although pretrial detainees may not be punished,
conditions that may be viewed as punitive are constitutional if they further the purpose
of maintaining cust.ody, security, or int.ernal order and discipline. (York County Prison.
Pennsylvania)
1976

U.S. District Court
SEPARATION
WORK

Barnes v. Government of the Virgin Islands, 415 F.Supp. 1218 (D, V.I. 1976).
Detainees are t.o be separat.ed from convicted inmates in separat.e buildings if physically
possible. Detainees are not required t.o work except t.o keep cell areas clean. (Golden
Grove Adult Correctional Facility, Virgin Islands)

U.S. District Court
STATE INTEREST

Bell v. Manso~ 427 F.Supp. 450 (D. Conn. 1976). Detainees "may be treat.ed as
prisoners only t.o the ut.ent the security, internal order, health and discipline of the
prison demand...considerations of rehabilitation, det.errence, and punishment are not
relevant fact.ors when an unconvicted inmat.e challenges on constitutional grounds a
regulation or procedure governing prison life." (Community Correctional Cent.er,
Bridgeport. Connecticut)
·

U.S. Appeals Court
STATE INTEREST
DUE PROCESS

Duran v. Elrod, 542 F.2d 998 (7th Cir. 1976). As a matter of due process, pretrial
detainees may suffer no more restrictions than are reasonably necessary t.o ensure their
presence at trial. (Cook County House of Corrections, Illinois)

U.S. Supreme Court
CLOTHING- COURT
APPEARANCES

Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976), cert. denied. 426 U.S. 9~ (1974). Williams,
unable t.o post bond, was held while awaiting trial on a charge of assault. When.
Williams learned he was t.o go on trial, he requested his civilian clothes. The request
was denied, but no objection was made at trial. Williams was convicted of assault with
int.ent t.o commit murder with malice. a decision upheld by the Texas Court of Appeals.
32.3

Williams then petitioned the U.S. district court for a writ of habeas corpus on the
ground that requiring him to stand trial in prison garb was unfair. While the district
court agreed such practice was unfair, it denied relief on the ground that the error was
harmless. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed solely on the issue of harmless
error. Defendant Estelle, Texas Corrections Director, sought certiorari from the U.S.
Supreme Court. The decision was reversed.
HELD: "[A]lthough the state cannot, consistently with the fourteenth amendment,
compel an accused to stand trial before a jury while ·dressed in identifiable prison clothes,
the failure to make an objection to the court as to being tried in such clothes, for whatever
reasons, is sufficient to negate the presence of compulsion necessary to establish a
constitutional violation." 425 U.S. at 512. (Harris County Jail, Texas)
U.S. Appeals Court
DUE PROCESS
EQUAL PROTECTION

Hampton v. Holmesburg Prison Officials, 546 F.2d 1077 (3rd Cir. 1976).
Protection of detainees is founded in due process and equal protection clauses, not the
eighth amendment or the presumption of innocence. (Holmesburg Federal Penitentiary,
Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
SEPARATION

Mitchell v. Untreiner, 421 F.Supp. 886 (N.D. Fla. 1976). No pretrial detainee may be
housed in the same cell with a convicted person. (Escambia County Jail, Pensacola,
Florida)

U.S. District Court
SEPARATION
STATE INTEREST

Moore v. Janing 427 F.Supp. 567 (D. Neb. 1976). Housing of convicts and detainees
together contributes to finding of unconstitutionality. Detainees may not be subjected
to restrictions unrelated to securing appearance at trial and maintaining internal order
and security. (Douglas County Jail, Nebraska)

U.S. District Court
VISITS
DUE PROCESS

Wolfish v. Levi, 406 F.Supp. 1243 (S.D. N.Y. 1976). Restrictions on visitation of
pretrial inmates must be justified by compelling necessity. Prison officials have the
ultimate burden of proof on this issue. Due process requires that the least restraint
necessary to assure institutional security and administrative manageability be employed.
{Metropolitan Correctional Facility, New York)

1977
U.S. District Court
INTAKE SCREENING
SEPARATION

Ahrens v. Thomas, 434 F.Supp. 873 (W.D. Mo. 1977), aff'd, 570 F.2d 288. Screening
officer shall inquire as to detainee's need for psychological or counseling care and shall
report to the correctional staff. So far as practicable, pretrial detainees shall not be
housed in the same cell with convicted persons. Juveniles may not be housed in the jail for
longer than it takes to arrange to transfer them. {Platt.e County Jail, Missouri)

U.S. District Court
CLOTHING
STATE INTEREST

. Forts v. Malcolm, 426 F.Supp. 464 (S.D. N.Y. 1977). A prohibition on the wearing of
pants by detainees is unconstitutional where its only justification is the administrative
inconvenience of having one rule for detainees and another for sentenced prisoners.
This justification is not rationally connected with assuring appearance at trial or jail
security, which is the only legitimate purpose of detention. {New York City Correctional
Institute for Women)

U.S. Appeals Court
STATE INTEREST
PUNISHMENT

Pugh v. Rainwater, 557 F.2d 1189 (5th Cir. 1977). The guiding principle of pretrial
detention conditions cases is that prior to trial a defendant is presumed innocent. His
incarceration during that period is permissible only to assure his appearance at trial,
not to inflict punishment. (Dade County, Florida)

U.S. District Court
VISITS

Vest v. Lubbock County, 444 F.Supp. 824 (N.D. Tex. 1977). Pretrial detainees are
ordered to be permitted daily visits, others at least twice_ a week. (Lubbock County Jail,
Texas)

U.S. District Court
STATE INTEREST

Vienneau v. Shanks, 425 F.Supp. 676 (W.D. Wisc. 1977). Pretrial detainees may be
subjected only to those deprivations reasonably necessary to ensure presence at trial.
(Sauk County Jail, Wisconsin)

1978
U.S. Appeals Court
WORK

Biieol v. Nelson, 579 F.2d 423 (7th Cir. 1978). Pretrial detainees may be required to
perform general housekeeping tasks. (Metro Correctional Center, Chicago)

1979
U.S. Supreme Court
PUBLICATIONS
PACKAGES
SEARCHES
DUE PROCESS

Bell v. Wolilsh, 441 U.S. 520 (1979). Pretrial detainees cxmfined in the Metropolitan
Correction Center (MCC) in New York City challenged virtually every facet of the
institution's conditions and practices in a writ of habeas corpus, alleging such
conditions and practices violate their constitutional rights. MCC is a federally
operated, short-term detention facility constructed in 1975. Eighty-five percent of all

32.4:

inmates are released within sixty days of admission. MCC was int.ended to include the
most advanced and innovative features of modern design in detention facilities. The
key design element of the facility is the "modular" or ''unit" concept, whereby each floor
housing inmates has one or two self-contained residential units, as opposed to the
traditional cellblock jail construction. Within four months of the opening of the twelvest.ory, 450 inmate capacity facility, this action was initiated.
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of N.Y. enjoined no less than twenty
practices at the MCC on constitutional and statutory grounds, many of which were not
appealed. See, United Stat.es Ex Rel Wolfish-v. Levi. 439 F.Supp. 114 (S.D.N.Y.). The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court decision, See. Wolfish v. Levi.
573 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1978), and reasserted the "compelling-necessity" test as the standard
for determining limitations on a detainee's freedom.
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari "to consider the important constitutional
questions raised by [recent prison decisions] and to resolve an apparent conflict among the
circuits." 441 U.S. at 524: Do the publisher-only rule, the prohibition on receiving
packages from outside sources, the search of living quarters, and the visual inspection of
body cavities aft.er contact visits constitute punishment in violation of the rights of pretrial
detainees under the due process clause of the fifth amendment?
HELD: "Nor do we think that the four MCC security restrictions and
practices...constitute 'punishment' in violation of the rights of pretrial detainees under the
due process clause of the fifth amendment.• 441 U.S. at 560, 561.
REASONING:
a. [T]he determination whether these restrictions and practices constitute punishment
in the constitutional sense depends on whether they are rationally related to a legitimate
nonpunitive governmental purpose and whether they appear excessive in relation to that
purpose. 441 U.S. at 561.
b. Ensuring security and order at the institution is a permissible nonpunitive
objective, whether the facility houses pretrial detainees, convicted inmates, or both... [W]e
think that these particular restrictions and practices were reasonable responses by MCC
officials to legitimate security concerns. [Detainees] simply have not met their heavy
burden of showing that these officials have exaggerated their response to the genuine
security considerations that activated these restrictions and practices. 441 U.S. at 561,
662.
CLOSING COMMENTS OF MAJORITY OPINION: "[T]he inquiry of federal courts
into prison management must be limited to the issue of whether a particular system
violates any prohibition of the constitution, or in the case of a federal prison, a statute.
The wide range of 'judgment calls' that meet constitutional and statutory requirements are
confided to officials outside of the judicial branch of government." 441 U.S. at 562.
GENERAL NOI'ES: The Court saw this case, a challenge to virtually every aspect of
the operation of a state of the art detention facility, as an opportunity to clarify the
judiciary's role in the operation of prisons. The five-four decision indicates there was no
general consensus as to what that role is, gr how it should be applied. No less than three
possible standards of review are contained in the majority and dissenting opinions: 1) A
"rational basis", subjective test; 2) A balancing of interests test; 3) An objective standard of
review.
Despite J. Rehnquist's statement that "our analysis does not turn on the particulars of
the MCC concept or design," the majority's reasoning frequently looks to that concept or
design for justification of its positions. 441 U.S. at 525. Clearly, the "double-bunking"
holding should be interpreted as applicable only to facilities where:
a) Inmates are locked in their cells a maximum of eight hrs. a day and have access to
a wide range of activities and programs; and
b) No inmate is detained longer than sixty days.
Situations other than these likely will not fall within the strict holding on this issue.
(Metropolitan Correction Cent.er (MCC), New York)
State Appeals Court
DUE PROCESS
CONTACT VISITS

Cooper v. Morin, 424 N.Y.2d 168 (1979), cert. denied, 100 S.Ct 2965 (1979).
The New York State Court of Appeals has ruled that state due process laws do allow
for contact visitation rights for pretrial detainees when the government's only argument
against such visitation centers on additional adrnini~ative costs. The court ruled that,
although federal constitutional requirements would not dictate such a finding in light of
the Bell v. Wolfish decision, state due process requirements called for an opposite finding.
The court examined carefully the rationale that was the basis for the Supreme Court
decision in the Bell case and made it clear that, at least in part, they felt the Supreme
Court had erred:
While we are in agreement with the Supreme Court's holding in Bell v. Wolfish
that due process forbids the punishment of pretrial detainees because punishment
can only be imposed aft.er conviction, we cannot agree that the validity of the
regimen imposed upon such persons during detention turns no more than whether
a regulation has a legitimate purpose other than punishment and is not excessive
in relation to that purpose. So one-sided a concept of due process we regard as
unacceptable. In our view what is required is a balancing of the harm to the
individual resulting from the condition imposed against the benefit sought by the
government through its enforcement.
32.5

In a dissenting opinion, two judges 1:ook the position that to find that state due process ·
requirements were different from federal requirements was impossible, since the wording
in the respective clauses is identical. Therefore, they claimed, the Bell case and its
holding must dictate the state court's decision. (Monroe County Jail, New York)
U.S. Appeals Court
SEPARATION
DISCRIMJNATION
VISITS
MAIL
LAW LIBRARY

Jones v. Diamond, 594 F.2d 997 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 102 S.Ct. 27
(1980). In this opinion, the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed Mississippi
District Court Judge William Cox's ruling on what the Fifth Circuit termed a
"challenge to nearly every conceivable facet of the Jackson County Jail at Pascagoula,
Mississippi." The court first noted that the conditions at the Jackson County Jail were
not "uncivilized" or "barbaric and inhumane", as the court had found rulings on the
conditions of other jails. A peculiar aspect of this case was that convicted felons were
being held in the jail while the state penitentiary was being brought up to constitutional
standards. Consequently, there were convicted felons, convicted misdemeanants and
pretrial detainees in the jail. Accordingly, the court, in reviewing the conditions at the
jail, applied different standards depending on.whether the inmate was pretrial detainee or
a convicted felon or misdemeanant. The court then reviewed the history of corrections in
the State of Mississippi and specifically in Jackson County. It noted that Jackson County
officials had spent a considerable amount of money and instituted several new programs
in the last ten years. In addition, at the time of this opinion, the county was in the
process of erecting a new jail. After noting these facts, the court made rulings in the
following areas.
DISCRIMINATION. The appellate court upheld the lower court's ruling that the cells
at the Jackson County Jail were not segregated. Two bull pens at the jail, however, were
ruled to be unconstitutionally segregated. In response to the plaintiff's interrogatories, the
jail officials had produced documents showing that the large bull pen was ''white" and the
small bull pen was "colored." The jail officials argued that they were not responsible for
the segregation because each new inmate was given the freedom to choose which bullpen
he wished to occupy. The court held that this was not enough, stating: "In the inherently
coercive setting of a jail, it is evident to us that the withdrawal of decision making by the
public officials for only part of the jail (here, the bull pens} amounts to impermissible
racial segregation of prisoners.
VISITATION. The court noted that convicted criminals do not have a constitutional
right to visitation except for legal counsel, whereas pretrial detainees rights are limited in
that they must yield, where necessary, to the needs of institutional security. In the Fifth
Circuit, the courts have held that a pretrial detainee also does not have constitutional
right to contact visitation. At the jail, visitation was officially limited to a brief period on
Sundays, although jail officials often allowed visitation at other than regular hours.
However, there had been a serious smuggling problem at the jail. When the officials
ordered that visit.ors be searched before being allowed visitation to prevent smuggling, the
inmates rioted, causing $30,000 damage. The appellate court upheld the lower court's
ruling that the existing visitation regulations were constitutionally adequate. The court
specifically pointed out that depriving inmates of contact visitation was unconstitutional.
MAIL. The court clearly spelled out the rights of inmates with regard to mail:
[P]rison officials may constitutionally censor incoming and outgoing general
correspondence. No numerical limitations may be placed upon prison correspondence, but
jail officials may employ a 'negative mail list' to eliminate any prisoner correspondence
with those on the outside who affirmatively indicate that they do not wish to receive
correspondence from a particular prisoner. Officials may not require prior approval of the
names of individuals with whom prisoners may correspond. Finally, letters which concern
plans for violations of prison rules or which contain a graphic presentation of sexual
behavior in violation of the law may be withheld. Outgoing mail to licensed att.orneys,
courts, and court officials must be sent unopened, and incoming mail from such sources
may be opened only in the presence of the inmate recipient, if considered necessary to
determine authenticity or to inspect for contraband. Prisoners may be required to submit
the names of att.orneys reasonably in advance of proposed mailings so that officials can
ascertain whether the named att.orney is licensed. Prisoners have the same general rights
as to media mail.
CLASSIFICATION. The court noted that the Constitution does not require that a
classification plan be put into effect, although a court may order such a plan to protect
inmates from homosexual attacks, violence and contagious diseases. The court ruled that
the policies in existence under the Mississippi Code were adequate to protect the inmate.
SECURITY. While noting that an inmate is to be protected from assaults from other
inmates, the court also stated that relief could be provided only where there was a
showing of deliberate indifference to the inmates' security and protection. Here, there was
no such showing, and the court refused to issue injunctive relief.
SANITATION. At the Jackson County Jail, the prisoners were responsible for
cleaning their own. cells, and a trusty was to assume responsi'bility for cleaning the cells
when the inmat.e was unable or unwilling to clean after himself. There was no evidence of
rodents in the jail. The jail was sprayed for insect.s once a month to

32.6

· minimize the cockroach problem. Sheets and other bedding as well as clothes were
cleaned regularly. Under these circumstances, the Court found no constitutional
violations regarding the sanitation of the Jack.son County Jail.
'LAW LIBRARY. Prisoners were able to acquire books by asking a public defender or
private attorney to obtain the book for them from the County Law Library. The Court
ruled that this was inadequate for convicted inmates who had exhausted their rights of
direct appeal. However, the Court ruled, the State of Mississippi, and not the County of
Jack.son, was the proper party to remedy the situation, and since the State had not been
named as a defendant, the Court refused to grant relief. The Court stated, however, that
its order would not preclude the inmates from taking an appropriate action against the
State of Mississippi in the future. The availability of public defenders and the ability of
prisoners to "page" books from the County Law Library provided adequate access to the
Courts for pretrial detainees. Where convicted
prisoners were provided neither public defender assistance nor access to the law library,
they were denied access to the Courts and their claims for relief could be heard. (Jackson
County Jail, Pascagoula, Mississippi)
State Appeals Court
CONDITIONS
DUE PROCESS
PUNISHMENT

Pruitt v. Joiner. 395 N.E.2d 276 (1979). The Indiana Court of Appeals for the Third
District has ruled that even where conditions of pretrial detention include "beatings,
deprivation of food, detention in solitary cells without bedding, punishment without due
process, and denial of medical care, visitation, and mailing privileges," the use of writ
of habeas corpus is not a satisfactory method of obtaining relief. The court specifically
refuted the broad use of habeas corpus in the federal system, which was argued by the
appellants. "Indiana.. has not chosen to expand the interpretation, this state has taken
the strict common law. By statute and judicial interpretation, this state has taken the
strict common law position that habeas corpus may be used only to inquire into the
legality of the cause of the restraint." Since the appellants did not challenge the legality of
their restraint but rather the manner used to accomplish it, the court reversed the lower
court decision. In a dissenting opinion one of the three panel judges argued that such a
separation of habeas corpus relief from due process considerations should not occur.
Not only has punishment been administered without a trial as required by due
process of law, but the punishment administered here could be characterized as
cruel and unusual even after trial and conviction...The petitioners are entitled to
immediate relief from the Indiana courts. This is not a question of civil rights. It
is a question of due process of law. Under what conditions does a lawful executive
commitment become unlawful as a violation of due process of law?
(Laite County Jail, Indiana)

1980
U.S. District Court
SEPARATION

Campbell v. Bergeron, 486 F.Supp. 1246 (M.D. La. 1980), aff'd, 654 F.2d 719
(5th Cir., 1981). Jail inmates have a right of personal safety when incarcerated.
However, there is nothing inherent in a failure to sep!ll'ate sentenced and pretrial inmates
which violates this right. (West Baton Rouge Parish Jail, Louisiana)

U.S. District Court
'LAW LIBRARY

Delgado v. Sheriff of Milwaukee Co. Jail, 487 F.Supp. 649 (E.D. Wisc. 1980).
Allegations that a pretrial detainee is denied the use of an adequate law library states
a claim in which relief could be granted. (Milwaukee County Jail, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
COMMISSARY
PROTECTIVE
CUSTODY

Epps v. Levine, 484 F.Supp. 474 (D. Md. 1980). Pretrial detainees transferred to the
state penitentiary and classified to protective custody shall have regular commissary
privileges. (State Penitentiary, Maryland)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
DUE PROCESS

Hutchings v. Corum, 501 F.Supp. 1276 (W.D. Mo. 1980). Class action is brought
challenging the constitutionality of numerous conditions and practices at the county
jail. The district court held that: (1) prison authorities' failure to immediately evacuate
inmates from any sewage contaminated cell, pending thorough cleaning of cell, violated
constitutional rights of inmates subject to that condition; (2) deficiencies in jail, including
lack of fire escape, absence of windows, lack of necessary fire doors, and limited number of
fire extinguishers amounted to constitutionally intolerable conditions. Prison conditions
for an unconvicted person are to be judged against due process standards of the fifth and
fourteenth amendments and conditions within the penal institution which are
unconstitutional for the convicted person under eighth amendment review are likewise an
abridgment of due process guarantees afforded unconvicted persons. The claim that
financial restrictions have prevented improvements in jail conditions is not a defense to
constitutional violations.
Although lights were left on all night in the county jail, and there was a high noise
level at night, such were not per se unconstitutional conditions, since inmates could sleep
during the day, and there was no indication that inmates had developed psychological or
physiological problems.

32.7

An entirely inadequate ventilation gystem at the county jail constituted a
constitutionally intolerable living condition. Deficiencies in the county jail, including lack
of fire escapes, absence of windows, lack of necessary fire doors, and limited number of fire
extinguishers amounted to constitutionally intolerable conditions. Failure of county jail
authorities to provide each inmate one hour per day of exercise outside cells was a
constitutionally intolerable condition. (Clay County Jail, Missouri)
U.S. District Court
PSYCHOLOGICAL
SERVICES

Santori v. Fong, 484 F.Supp. 1029 (E.D. Penn. 1980). A statutorily established policy
of provisions of pgychiatric and pgychological services to pretrial detainees does not
create an enforceable entitlement to such services. (Chester County Farm Prison,
Penngylvania)

State Appeals Court
TRANSFER

State v. Grey, 602 S.W.2d 259 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980). A pretrial detainee, about
whom rumors of escape were abundant, could not be transferred :to the state
penitentiary under the Tennessee safekeeping statute: Barry Grey was incarcerated in
the Davidson, Tennessee County Jail, unable to post bond after an arrest. Shortly after
his arrest, based upon alleged rumors of an imminent escape attempt, the state sought to
transfer him. The statute involved, (T.C.A. 41-1125) provides:
In all cases where the jail in which a prisoner is confined becomes insufficient
from any cause, any circuit or criminal judge, upon the application of the sheriff
and proof of the fact, may order the prisoner, by mittimus or warrant, to be
removed to the nearest sufficient jail.
Based upon the above statute the trial judge before whom the motion was presented
allowed the transfer, and an immediate appeal was taken. On appeal, the Court of
Criminal Appeals of Tennessee held that the state penitentiary was not a "jail" as defined
by the statute. The court noted that the stigma attached to confinement in the state
penitentiary should not be imposed upon a pretrial detainee without specific statutory
authorization. The court then ruled that this statute did not provide such authorization.
(Davidson County Jail, Tennessee)

1981
U.S. Appeals Court
TRANSFER
DUE PROCESS

Cobb v. Aty-ch, 643 F.2d 946 (3rd Cir. 1981). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, sitting ~ bane, held that the sixth amendment right to counsel prohibits the
transference of pretrial detainees to distant state prisons without first affording them
notice and an opportunity to be heard in court. Such transfers, the court found, severely
interfere with the inmates' access to counsel. A majority of the court also relied heavily on
the speedy trial clause in its argument. Eighty percent of the pretrial detainees involved
in the suit were represented by the public defenders, who were financially unable to make
long trips to the state institutions. Due to the prolonging of the pretrial period due to
continuances and other factors associated with the distance to the detention facility, some
transferred inmates spent more time incarcerated pretrial than the eventual length of
their sentences. Three of the judges also concluded that the right to counsel, speedy trial
provisions and the bail clause of the eight amendment create a federally protected interest
in reducing pretrial incarceration and minimizing interference with a pretrial detainee's
liberty. "The eighth amendment's prohibition against excessive bail bears plainly and
directly upon the ability of charged persons to prepare for trial and upon the presumption
of a right to be free from restraint which those persons enjoy. It should also be read as
preventing not merely the fact of detention, but also those forms of detention that
unnecessarily interfere with those liberty interests." The case also involved the transfer of
sentenced prisoners and those who have been convicted but are still awaiting sentencing.
The court found that no federally protected interests were involved for the sentenced
population, but unsentenced prisoners have speedy-trial and counsel rights similar to
those of pretrial detainees. (Philadelphia Prison System, Pennsylvania)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONDITIONS
RIGHTS RETAINED
DUE PROCESS

Jones v. Diamond, 636 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1981). Prisoners being held in county jail
brought an action challenging conditions of their confinement and seeking damages for
violation of their civil rights. The United States District Court for the Southern
District of Mississippi entered judgment generally favorable to county officials, and
prisoners appealed. On rehearing, 594 F.2d 997, the court of appeals held that due
process clause accords pretrial detainees rights not enjoyed by convicte_d inmates: while a
sentenced inmate may be punished in any fashion not cruel and unusual, the due process
clause forbids punishment of a person held in custody awaiting trial but not yet adjudged
guilty of any crime. (Jackson County Jail, Pascagoula, Mississippi)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONDITIONS

Lareau v. Manson, 651 F.2d 96 (2nd Cir. 1981). Adopting most of the findings of the
district court, the United States of Appeals for the Second Circuit has ordered major
reforms in the Hartford Community Correctional Center (HCCC), dealing generally with
overcrowding. The constitutional standard for the legality of conditions of confinement
is different for pretrial detainees and for convicted inmates. For pretrial detainees, the
test is whether the conditions amount to punishment without due process in violation

PUNISHMENT
CROWDING
STATE INTEREST

32.8

of the fourteenth amendment. With respect t.o convicted inmates, the criterion is whether
the punishment is cruel and unusual as defined under the eighth amendment.
Reviewing the numerous findings of the district court, the appellate court looked to
the supreme court case of Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520. Viewing overcrowding at the
HCCC as related t.o pretrial detainees, the. court cited the following standard of whether
such conditions amount t.o punishment: ''It must be shown that the overcrowding subjects
a detainee over an extended period t.o genuine privation and· hardship not reasonably
related t.o a legitimate governmental objective."
Based upon this standard the court found that double-bunking in cells originally
designed for one person, compounded by overcrowded dayrooms, imposed unconstitutional
punishment on pretrial detainees in all cases except where such hardship was related t.o a
legitimate governmental purpose. The court here found that these hardships promoted
neither security nor the effective management of the institution.
Other conditions were even less acceptable. The use of a glass enclosed dayroom
(dubbed the "fish tank") as a dormit.ory room housing numerous inmates on a full time•
basis was held t.o amount t.o punishment and was thus unconstitutional with regard to
pretrial detainees. In addition, the placing of mattresses on the floors of cells t.o ·
accommodate more inmates and the assignment of healthy inmates t.o medical cells
(sometimes with mentally or physically ill cellmates) t.o alleviate overcrowding were held
t.o constitute impermissible punishment.
The court further stated that the length of incarceration of pretrial detainees becomes
relevant in such determination: "Conditions unacceptable for weeks or months might be
t.olerable for a few days." As such, the court indicated that while double-bunking and
overloaded dayrooms might be t.olerable, and thus constitutionally permissible for a few
days, after 15 or so days, they would become unacceptable punishment. The use of the
"fish tank" and floor mattresses, however, were held to constitute punishment regardless
of the number of days imposed.
Viewing the conditions as they related t.o convicted persons, the court pointed out that
it was t.o be guided by a wholly different standard. Here, in order t.o constitute a
constitutional violation, the conditions had t.o be such as t.o amount t.o cruel and unusual
punishment. Nevertheless, the court found the overcrowded conditions int.olerable.
Noting that the thirty t.o thirty-five square feet of living space per inmate fell far short of
the standards promulgated by groups such as the Connecticut Department of Corrections,
the American Correctional Association, the United Nations and the National Sheriffs'
Association, and further noting that the dayroom at the HCCC offered the "relief of a
noisy subway platform" the court held that double-bunking, with respect t.o convicted
inmates, was unconstitutional except where inmates are confined no more than about
thirty days.
As with the pretrial detainees, the court found that the constitutional rights of the
convicted inmates were immediately violated by confinement in the "fish tank" and by
policies requiring them t.o sleep on mattresses on the floors and t.o be assigned to medical
holding cells for no reason other than t.o alleviate overcrowding.
Finally, the court ordered that all newly admitted inmates, with minor exceptions, be
given a medical examination within forty-eight hours of admission. (Hartford Community
Correctional Center, Connecticut)
U.S. Appeals Court
DUE PROCESS
PUNISHMENT
USE OF FORCE
CELLS
CONDITIONS
PARITYWITH
SENTENCED

Lock v. Jenkins, 641 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1981). The test for determining the

constitutionality of treatment of pretrial detainees alleged t.o deprive them of liberty
without due process of law is whether those conditions amount t.o punishment of the
detainee. It is appropriate t.o consider t.ogether all the conditions of confinement in
order t.o determine whether they amount t.o punishment. The use of tear gas t.o
retrieve a metal food tray from a pretrial detainee or t.o stop others from shouting and
utt.ering threats was found constitutionally impermissible. (Indiana State Prison,
Michigan 9ity, Indiana) Lock v. Jenkins, 641 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1981). The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ruled that having pretrial detainees confined t.o twentyseven square foot cells for twenty-two hours a day at the Indiana State Prison constitutes
illegal "punishment" under Bell v. Wolfish.
In Wolfish, the Supreme Court found no due process violations in holding two pretrial
detainees in a cell measuring seventy-five square feet. The Court pointed out that
inmates were required t.o be in their cells only seven t.o eight hours a day and that of the
pretrial detainees at the Metropolitan Correctional Center, the facility sued in Wolfish,
more than half were released within ten days, three-quarters within a month, and more
than eighty-five percent within sixty days. Therefore, the Seventh Circuit cited Wolfish
because of the amount of time. spent by pretrial detainees at the Indiana institution, an
average of about sixty days. The Circuit Court stated:
It seems t.o us that a minimum requirement as t.o cell area should be imposed and
this minimum should be determined flexibly in relation t.o the amount of time
individuals are t.o be kept in the cell...Except where individual circumstances show
the need for more restrictive confinement, (detainees) should be allowed t.o spend
significant periods· of each day out of their cells and some activities or programs
should be regularly available t.o them in their time out of cells.•.
32.9

We do not read anything in Wolfish as requiring this court to grant automatic
deference to ritual incantations by prison officials that their actions foster the goals of
order and discipline. Under the facts before us, we find that the (detainees) in this action
have been denied equal protection of the laws by being held under significantly more
burdensome conditions than convicted prisoners in the absence of any justification of such
treatment of each individual. (Indiana State Prison, Michigan City, Indiana)
U.S. Appeals Court

STATE INTEREST
CLOTHING

U.S. Appeals Court
CONDITIONS
PUNISHMENT
DUE PROCESS

STATE INTEREST

Olgin v. Darnell, 664 F.2d 107 (1981). The restrictions and conditions placed on a
pretrial detainee, particularly the removal of all his clothes but his underwear for one
day, were not arbitrary and purposeless. Those steps were unreasonably related to the
legitimate governmental objective of calming participants in the stabbing of a fellow
prisoner, restoring order and protecting inmates from a fire hazard created by the pretrial
detainee. (Midland County Jail, Texas)
Villanueva v. George, 659 F.2d 851 (1981). A majority of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit, sitting ~ bane, ruled that the allegations of a pretrial detainee
raised a legitimate factual issue as to the constitutionality of the conditions to which
he was subjected during his pretrial confinement. The court found, therefore, that the
trial judge should have presented the case to the jury rather than directed the verdict
against the plaintiff. The circuit court found that the jury might have concluded that the
conditions of confinement were punitive in nature. Since the due process clause prohibits
the punishment of persons prior to a judgment of conviction, plaintiff Robert Villanueva
would have to persuade the jury that punitive conditions existed during his pretrial
detention. According to the decision:
The question of whether there is sufficient evidence of the defendants' punitive
intent is one for the jury. Moreover, the jury may 'infer that the purpose was
punishment from the fact that the condition either bore no reasonable relation to a
legitimate goal or exceeded what was necessary for attaining such a goal... '
Putnam v. Gerloff, 639 F.2d 415 at 420 (8th Cir. 1981). See also Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. at 539. There is evidence in this record from which the jury could have
reasonably concluded that Villanueva's conditions of confinement were
unnecessarily excessive and bore no reasonable relation to a legitimate
governmental interest...We emphasize that our decision is not based solely on the
fact that Villanueva was confined in a cell measuring six feet by six feet, ~
Rhodes v. Chapman, 29 CrL 3061 (1981). It is rather based upon the totality of
the circumstances, including cell size, time spent in the cell, lack of opportunity for
exercise or recreation, general sanitary conditions, and the fact that the
appellant's past behavior demonstrated an ability to be confined under less
restrictive conditions without incident.
In dicta the court suggests that the classification procedure which resulted in the
plaintiffs being placed in segregation while awaiting trial was valid. The procedure took
into account the nature of the crime charged and particularly whether the crime was
violent or aggressive, the prisoner's desire to remain in a particular classification, the
psychological state of the individual and other similar factors. (St. Louis County Adult
Correctional Facility, Missouri)

1982
U.S. District Court
SEPARATION
VISITS

Boudin v. Thomas, 543 F.Supp. 686 (S.D. N.Y. 1982). Administrative detention is
terminated and contact visits are restored by Court. A pretrial detainee sought a writ
of habeas corpus challenging her confinement in administrative segregation. The
United States District Court held that administrative detention was to be immediately
suspended and contact visits between the petitioner and approved visitors were to be
initiated, where the detainee had not committed any act or engaged in any conduct
threatening herself, staff or institutional security and was not shown to be an escape risk.
The defendants presented only vague assertions in attempts to demonstrate the risks
posed by contact visits with her infant son. (Metropolitan Correctional Center, New York)

U.S. District Court
CELL CAPACITY

Campbell v. McGruder, 554 F.Supp. 562 (D.C. D.C. 1982). Double celling of pretrial
detainees is allowed but additional guards are ordered to be placed in each cellblock in
which double-celling occurs. No pretrial detainee is to be confined in the company of
another inmate in his cell for more than twelve hours per day. No pretrial detainee is to
be double-celled for more than thirty days. (D.C. Jail)

STAFFING

U.S. District Court
JUVENILES
CONDITIONS
PUNISHMENT

D.B., et al. v. Graham Tewksbury, et al., 545 F.Supp. 896 (D. Ore. 1982). A federal
district court judge in Oregon rules in a class action suit brought by Oregon Legal
Services on behalf of children confined in the Columbia County Correctional Facility
(CCCF). Judge Helen J. Frye held that it is unconstitutional to hold children in adult
jails, whether they are accused status offenders or are alleged to have committed crimes.
Jud_ge Frye first ruled that the conditions at CCCF constituted punishment, citing a
failure by the jail to provide any form of work, exercise, education, recreation, recreational
materials, adequate hygiene, minimal privacy, adequate diet or medical
32.10

care, emergency health service, "treatment of emotionally disturbed children who panic in
a jail setting," or visits with families. The twenty-three page opinion cited numerous other
deprivations.
Judge Frye indicated that the decision as to whether these conditions are punishment
was "simple,• since the director of the Columbia County Juvenile Department, Graham
Tewksbury, "has stated expressly that he intends to punish children" held in the jail. The
court cited Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979), stating that the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment requires that a pretrial detainee not be punished.
However, Judge Frye went further and ruled that the confinement of children,
whether status offenders or accused of conµnitting crimes, in !!m: adult jail is
unconstitutional:
... [TJo put such a child [status offender] in a jail--aey jail--with its criminal
stigma--constitutes punishment and is a violation of that child's due process rights
under the fourteenth amendment. ..
Would it be constitutionally permissible to lodge children accused of
committing crimes [in modern, 'enlightened' kinds of jails]?...Due process• or
fundamental fairness - does not guarantee to children all the rights in the
adjudication process which are constitutionally assured to adults accused of
committing crimes. For example, children are not entitled to a jury trial, to
indictment by grand jury, or to bail. In lieu of these constitutional rights, children
are not t.o be treated or considered as criminals...
Juvenile proceedings, in the state of Oregon as elsewhere, are in the nature
of a guardianship imposed by the state as parens patriae to provide the care and
guidance that under normal circumstances would be furnished by the natural
parents. It is, then, fundamentally fair constitutional - to deny children charged
with crimes, rights available to adults charged with crimes if that denial is offset
by a special solicitude designed for children. But when the denial of constitutional
rights for children is not offset by a 'special solicitude' but by lodging them in
adult jails, it is fundamentally unfair. When children who are found ~ of
committing criminal acts cannot be placed in adult jails, it is fundamentally unfair
to lodge children accused of committing criminal acts in adult jails...
The supervisors at jails are guards - not guardians. Jails hold convicted
criminals and adults charged with crimes...A jail is not a place where a truly
concerned natural parent would lodge his or her child for care and guidance. A
jail is not a place where the state can constitutionally lodge its children under the
guise of parens patriae.
To lodge a child in an adult jail pending adjudication of criminal charges against that
child is a violation of that child's due process rights under the fourteenth amendment to
the United States Constitution.
Since this decision, all children have been removed from CCCF. However, Oregon
state law permits placement of juveniles in adult facilities under certain circumstances.
(Columbia County Correctional Facility, Oregon)
U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Hunt v. Polk County, 551 F.Supp. 339 (S.D. Iowa 1982). Strip searches of
pre-arraignment detainees charged with minor offenses are declared impermissible. A
federal district court judge in Iowa found that no strip searches of pre-arraignment
detainees charged with minor offenses would be permitted unless the offense is associated
with weapons or contraband, or unless there is a basis for reasonable suspicion that the
particular detainee is concealing a weapon or contraband.
Because these detainees are being held solely due to their inability to post cash bail,
and because most are traffic violat.ors, the court found that there was little reason to
believe that a particular detainee would be concealing contraband or a weapon. (Polk
County Jail, Iowa)

U.S. District Court
TEMPORARY
RELEASE

Samuals v. Department of Corrections, N.Y.C., 548 F.Supp. 253 (E.D. N.Y. 1982).
Detainee does not have right to attend funeral. A federal district court has ruled
that allowing a prisoner t.o be temporarily released to visit sick relatives or to attend a
funeral is entirely within the discretion of the off'J.cials responsible for confinement. City
officials denied a pretrial detainee permission t.o attend the wake of his twin children, and
he filed suit. The court noted that pretrial detainees have no greater right to free
movement than 4o convicted criminals. (Queens House of Detention, New York)
1983

U.S. Appeals Court
PROBABLE CAUSE

Bernard v. County of Santa Clara, 699 F.2d 1023 (9th Cir., 1983). A probable cause
hearing shall be ordered within twenty-four hours of arrest without warrant. In a
decision that could affect police, sheriffs, and pretrial release policies throughout
California, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that Santa
Clara County must hold a probable cause hearing within twenty-four hours after an arrest
without a warrant. The plaintiff had alleged a violation of his right to a prompt

32.11

determination of probable cause, citing Gerstein v. Pugh. 420 U.S. 103 (1975), which held
that the fourth amendment required "as a condition for any s1gnil'icant pretrial restraint
on liberty" a fair and reliable determination of probable cause made by a judicial officer
"either before or promptly after arrest."
U.S. District Court

TRANSFER

CROWDING

U.S. Appeals Court
PARITY WITH

SENTENCED
SEPARATION
STATE INTEREST

U.S. Appeals Court

METHADONE
TREATMENT

U.S. District Court
MAil,

Black v. Delbello. 575 F.Supp. 28 (S.D. N.Y. 1983). Pretrial detainee's transfer left
within the discretion of jail officials. A pretrial detainee was transferred to another jail
by administrators who cited overcrowding as the reason for the transfer. The detainee
sued, alleging that since there were many empty beds in the facility, there was no need for
the transfer. The federal district court found that the transfer was authorized by New
York statu.t.es and an order by the New York State Commission of Corrections. Relying on
Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 96 S.Ct. 2532 (1976). the court refused to interfere,
finding that this matter was properly left within the discretion of jail officials.
(Westchester County and Orange County, New York).

court

Drayton v. Robinson, 719 F.2d 1214 (3rd Cir. 1983). Appeals
orders the same
protections for pretrial detainees as provided to sentenced offenders. Pennsylvania
prison officials housed pretrial detainees, at the request of local officials, in state
facilities with convicted offenders. At times, detainees were placed in administrative
segregation without applying the same policies and procedures used for convicted
offenders prior to placement.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with this practice, stating that •...to
accept appellants' interpretation of the regulations would create an anomalous situation
where inmates who were charged, tried, convicted and sentenced would have greater
constitutional protection from segregat.ed conimement than inmates who are merely being
held awaiting trial, or convicted but unsentenced. •
The court ruled that detainees had as much of a protectable interest in remaining out
of administrative segregation as all other inmates at the facility and were entitled to the
same protections. (Pennsylvania Bureau of Corrections)
Fredericks v. Huggins, 711 F.2d 31 (4th Cir. 1983). Pretrial detainees are not entitled
to methadone treatment in jail. A federal circuit court has upheld the practices of the
sheriff of Fairfax County with regard to the treatment of pretrial detainees who were
participating in methadone detoxification programs prior to detention.
The sheriff had developed a procedure for handling inmates with drug withdrawal
problems, and the procedure had been approved by the American Medical Association.
The procedure required consistent monitoring of detainees during withdrawal.
The court found that the sheriff's security concerns about introducing drugs into the
facility, even those administered on a controlled basis. were legitimate, and that
subsequent refusal to detoxify detainees did not amount to. unconstitutional punishment.
(Fairfax County Jail, Virginia)
Odom v. Tripp. 575 F.Supp. 1491 (E.D. Mo. 1983). Pretrial detainee in city jail is not
entitled to receive mail on Saturday. A detainee at the St. Louis City Jail sued the
city, alleging that the practice of not delivering mail to prisoners on Saturday amounted to
punishment. Based on the reason present.ed by administrators (lack of personnel) and the
lack of intent to punish, the federal district court found the practice "reasonably related"
to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental objective, and therefore, found no violation of
the plaintiff's constitutional rights. (St. Louis City Jail, Missouri)

U.S. District Court
SEPARATION
PROTECTION

Reynolds v. Sheriff, City of Richmond, 574 F.Supp. 90 (E.D. Va. 1983). Sheriff may be
liable for pretrial detainee's beating while housed with convicted felons. The United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia has refused the motion of the
defendant sheriff to dismiss him from a suit brought by a pretrial detainee.
The detainee alleges that he was beaten by convicted felons while he was detained at
the sheriff's facility. He accuses the sheriff of directing the act or acquiescing to it after it
happened. The court did not dismiss the sheriff from the suit because the plaintiff alleged
that he established and maintained a policy of not segregating convicted felons from
pretrial detainees. Because of a lack of separation, the plaintiff was attacked. Also, the
court ruled that the case could be pursued under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 because it alleged
a violation of the plaintiff's right to be free from bodily injury, and that cruel and unusual
punishment need not be alleged. (Richmond City Jail, Virginia)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONTACT VISITS
WINDOWS

Rutherford v. Pit.chess, 710 F.2d 572 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 104 S.Ct. 3227
(1984). Pretrial detainees class action suit brings changes. A class action suit was
f'tled against the Los Angeles County central jail by pretrial detainees. The federal
district court ordered twelve changes after a trial. Three of the changes were appealed by
county officials. The Ninth Circait Court of Appeals decided that: low risk detainees were
to be allowed one contact visit per week; detainees would be allowed to be present during
searches of their cells; and the replacement of transparent windows by concrete enclosures
was justif'ied. Subsequently the United States Supreme Court reversed on the f':irst two
issues. (Los Angeles County Central Jail)

CELL SEARCHES

32.12

U.S. Appeals Court
CROWDING
PUNISHMENT
STATE INTEREST

Union County Jail Inmat.es v. Di Buono, 713 F.2d 984 (1983), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct.
1600 (1983). Overcrowded conditions are found unconstitutional. Litigation challenging
severe overcrowding at the Union County Jail in New Jersey result.ed in a finding by a
federal district court and its special master that the overcrowded conditions at the·
jail were unconstitutional. The most serious concern of the court was placement of
inmat.es on mattresses on the floor of one man cells. Rejecting the stat.e corrections
commissioner's request to resolve the problem by double bunking, the district judge
ordered the convicted inmates removed from the jail and into the stat.e prison system to
which they had been sent.enced (537 F.Supp. 1009).
In reversing the district court's prohibition against double bunking, the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals ruled that under the "totality of the circwnstances," the double bunking
proposal would satisfy the constitutional prohibitions against the punishment of pretrial
detainees and against cruel and unusual punishment of sent.enced prisoners.
In reaching its decision, the Third Circuit relied on Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520
(1979), in which the Supreme Court held that while detainees may not be punished, there
is no punishment where conf'mement conditions serve legitimat.e nonpunitive purposes and
are not excessive in relation to those purposes. In addition, the court must inquire as to
whether the conditions cause inmat.es to endure "genuine privations and hardship over an
ext.ended period of time."
Both courts concluded that overcrowding served two legitimat.e purposes:
effective management of a det.ention facility during a stat.ewide prison overcrowding
emergency and the int.erests of stat.e and local government in not releasing inmat.es into
the streets. However, the circuit disagreed with the lower court's finding that conditions
would still violat.e the due process rights of detainees because of sheer lack of space and
because the totality of conditions would in any event be unconstitutional.
According to the appeals court, double bunking would resolve the "totality" issue by
providing adequat.e space for sleeping and would allow for reclaiming large recreation
areas, permitting each inmat.e one hour of exercise each day in the larger space. The
circuit claimed that this recreation period would offset the "cramped and overcrowded
conditions" of the remaining fifteen waking hours, during which square footage per inmat.e
varies from thirty-one to thirty-three and one half square feet. The Circuit Court was
further persuaded that such conditions were not unconstitutional because they were
convinced that the majority of detainees are conf'med for no more than sixty days, an
assertion disput.ed by some local parties. (Union County Jail, New Jersey)
1984

U.S. Supreme Court
CONTACT VISITS
CEIL SEARCHES

Block v. Rutherford, 104 S.Ct. 3227 (1984). U.S. Supreme Court reverses lower court
rulings; pretrial detainees in Los Angeles Central Jail will not have contact visits and
will not be allowed to be present when cells are searched.
Pretrial detainees at the Los Angeles County Central Jail brought a class action in
Federal District Court in 1975 against the County Sheriff and other officials, challenging
the jail's policy of denying' pretrial detainees contact visits with their spouses, relatives,
children and friends, and the jail's practice of conducting random, irregular "shakedown"
searches of cells while the detainees were away at meals, recreation, or other activities.
The district court concluded that the danger of permitting lower security risk inmat.es to
have contact visits was not great enough to warrant deprivation of such contact and, with
regard to cell searches, that allowing inmat.es to watch from a distance while their cells
are searched would allay inmat.e concerns that their personal property would be
unnecessarily conf'JSCat.ed or destroyed.
In a six to three decision, the Supreme Court relied upon its previous ruling in Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, to uphold practices at the Los Angeles County Central Jail.
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Burger stat.ed that " ...The principles artic:wat.ed in
Wolfish govern resolution of this case....We affirm that, 'proper deference to the informed
discretion of prison authorities demands that they, and not the courts, make the difficult
judgments which reconcile conflicting claims affecting the security of the institution, the
welfare of the prison staff, and the property rights of the detainees.' 441 U.S. at 557.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed."
Contact Visits. The Supreme Court based its decision on a narrow question: is the
prohibition of contact visits reasonably relat.ed to legitimate governmental objectives?
Finding, as in Wolfish. that there is no basis to conclude that pretrial detainees pose any
less security risk than convict.ed inmat.es, the court not.ed that detainees may in fact
present a greater risk to jail security. The district court had ordered: "Commencing not
more than ninety days following the dat.e of this order, the defendants will make available
a contact visit once each week to each pretrial detainee that has been held in the jail for
one month or more, and concerning whom there is no indication of drug or escape
propensities; provided, however, that no more than iift.een hundred such visits need be
allowed in any one week. App. to Pet. for Cert. 88.
The majority of the court held that the burden of identifying candidates for contact
visits is made even more difficult by the brevity of det.ention. The majority criticized the
district court for not ending its inquiry after the County had established reasons for
denying them; the "balancing" that the district court attempt.ed in its decision,
32.13

"result.ed in an impermissible substitution of its view on the proper administration of
Central Jail for that of the experienced administrators of the facility," according to the
majority opinion. The opinion concluded, on this issue, by stating: "In rejecting the
district court's order, we do not in any sense denigrat.e the importance of visits from f-amily
or friends to the detainee. Nor do we int.end to suggest that contact visits might not be a
factor contributing to the ultimat.e reint.egration of the detainee into society. We hold only
that the Constitution does not require that detainees be allowed contact visits when
responsible, experienced administrators have det.ermined, in their sound discretion, that
such visits will jeopardize the security of the facility." In a separat.e concurrmg opinion,
Justice Blackm.un' challenged the reasonmg of the majority, stating that when a detainee
attempts to demonstrat.e the punitive int.ent of a policy he is necessarily calling into
question the good faith of the prison adrninisb-ators: "Under those circumstances, it seems
to me to be somewhat perverse to insist" that a court assessing the rationality of a
particular administrative practice must accord prison administrators 'wide-ranging
deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices' ... such a requirement
boils down to a command that when a court is confront.ed with a charge of administrative
bad faith, it must evaluat.e the charge by assuming administrative good faith." The appeal
present.ed to the Supreme Court the issue of whether detainees are entitled to obse"~ jail
staff when their cells are being searched according to jail policies which require irregular
or random "(shakedown)" searches. The majority found the method of conducting searches
virtually identical to that present.ed in Wolfish, and found no reason to reconsider the
prior support of that method in light of a fourth amendment challenge and a due process
challenge. (Los Angeles County Central Jail)
U.S. District Court
PROTECTION
MEDICAL CARE

Gibson v. Babcock, 601 F.Supp. 1156 (N.D. Ill. 1984). Supervisors liable for
Detainee beating. A federal district court has held supervisors responsible for failing
to prot.ect a detainee from an assault by another prisoner. The court found that
knowledge of a history of violence within a jail, rather than a specific risk of harm t.o a
particular prisoner, was enough to hold the supervisors liable. The court found that the
eighth amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment does not apply to
pretrial detainees, and that a detainee need not demonstrat.e deliberat.e indifference t.o
stat.e a claim for denial of medical care under the due process clause of the eighth
amendment. (Lake County Jail, Waukegan, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Kathriner v. City of Overland, Missouri, 602 F.Supp. 124 (E.D. Mo. 1984).
The U.S. District Court held that strip searching a pretrial detainee without reason to
believe she possessed contraband or weapons violat.ed her constitutional rights. The
plaintiff challenged the blanket policy of strip searching all prisoners, regardless of their
length of det.ention. Corrections officials who conduct.ed the search were grant.ed good
faith immunity because they adopt.ed the strip search policy when Bell v. Wolfish was
decided and had not been put on notice that their actions were unconstitutional. The
court held the city liable for their violations. (Overland City Lockup, Missouri)

U.S. Appeals Court

Maey Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1984). Female detainees are
awarded damages for strip searches. Four women who were strip searched at a lockup
while awaiting arrival of bail funds brought action against the city. The women were all
arrest.ed for misdemeanor charges. The court found the strip search policy which result.ed
in the searching of prisoners who were not inherently dangerous and were only detained
briefly while awaiting bond was unreasonable under the fourth amendment. Equal
prot.ection was violat.ed as similarly situat.ed males were subject.ed to only hand searches.
Each plaintiff was awarded between $25,000 and $35,000 in damages. Attorney's fees
were also awarded. (Chicago City Lockups)

SEARCHES

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE
PROTECTION

Matzker v. Herr, 748 F.2d 1142 (7th Cir. 1984). Appeals court reverses lower
court ruling; finds that pretrial detainee's due process rights may have been
violat.ed by alleged denial of compet.ent medical care, and section 1983 action
possible for failure to protect. The plaintiff sought damages for injuries received while a
pretrial detainee at the St. Clair County Jail in Belleville, Illinois. A federal magistrat.e
had dismissed the action. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision.
The plaintiff was admitted to the jail as a detainee. A Caucasian, he "had some trouble"
with black inmat.es shortly after admission and was transferred to another cell block. In
his new cell block he was involved in another int.erracial fight and was transferred to
segregation. His att.orney brought his assignment to segregation to the attention of the
court, and he was subsequently transferred to cell block A. The plaintiff request.ed
transfer from cell block A, fearing additional problems with black imnat.es. Four days
lat.er he was beat.en by two black inmat.es and suffered the loss of three teeth, a fractured
nose and an eye injury. The plaintiff alleged that he was beat.en for over fifteen minut.es
before the c:orrections officer came to investigat.e. Although taken to a hospital the next
day, injuries to his teeth and eye were not treat.ed for three months, and he allegedly
suffered permanent injury. The appeals court reversed the dismiSSAl, ordering the case to
proceed to trial. (St. Clair County Jail, lliinois)

32.14

U.S. Supreme Court
PREVENTIVE

DETENTION
JUVENILES

U.S. District Court
CROWDING

Schall. Commissioner of New York Department of Juvenile Justice v. Martin et al., 104
S.Ct. 2403 (1984). Preventive detention of juveniles is upheld. A divided United
States Supreme Court (6 justices concurring, 3 justices dissenting) upheld section
320.4(3)(b) of the New York Family Court Act, which authorized pretrial detention of
an accused juvenile delinquent based on a finding that there is a "serious risk" that the
child "may before the return date commit an act which if committed by an adult would
constitute a crime." Attorneys brought action on behalf of a class of all juveniles detained
under the provisions of Section 320.4(3)(b), arguing that it permitted detention without
due process of law. The federal district court found for the plaintiffs and ordered the
immediate release of all members of the class. 513 F.Supp. 691 (1981).
Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the finding of the
lower court, finding the provision "unconstitutional as to all juveniles" because the statute
is administered in such a way that "the detention period serves as punishment imposed
without proof of guilt established according to the requisite constitutional standard." 689
F.2d 365, at 373-374 (1982). The majority of the Supreme Court found that:
•... preventive detention under the Family Court.Act serves a legitimate state
objective, and that the procedural protections afforded pretrial detainees by the
New York statute satisfy the requirements of the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution. 11
The district court rejected the equal protection challenge offered by the plaintiffs
attorneys, but agreed that the detention authorized under the Family Court Act violates
due process. On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the district court finding, stating
that ''the vast majority of juveniles detained under Section 320.5(3)(b) either have their
petitions dismissed before an adjudication of delinquency or are released after
adjudication. 11 689 F.2d at 369. The appeals court concluded that section 320.5(3)(b) is
used principally not for preventive purposes but to impose punishment, as the early
release of so many of those detained contradicts the asserted need for pretrial confinement
to protect the community. The appeals court concluded that section 320(5)(b) was
unconstitutional for all juveniles, reasoning that individual litigation would be a practical
impossibility because the periods of detention are so short.
The majority opinion of the Supreme Court, delivered by Justice Rehnquist, concluded
that the preventive detention system chosen by the state of New York and applied by the
New York Family Court comports with constitutional standards because the purpose for
detention under the act is regulatory, and proper procedural protections precede its
imposition.
In the majority opinion, Rehnquist stated "There is no doubt that the due process
clause is applicable in juvenile proceedings." Citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1967),
he stressed that the issue is to "ascertain the precise impact of the due process
requirement upon such proceedings.• Justice Rehnquist further stated: "We have held
that certain basic constitutional protections enjoyed by adults accused of crimes also apply
to juveniles. See In re Gault, supra, at 31-57 (notice of charges, right to counsel, privilege
against self-incrimination, right to confrontation and cross-examination); In re Winship,
397 U.S. 358 (1970) (proof beyond a reasonable doubt); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519
(1975) (double jeopardy). But the Constitution does not mandate elimination of all
differences in the treatment of juveniles...The state has a 'parens patriae interest in
preserving and promoting the welfare of the child', Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766
(1982), which makes a juvenile pl'ON!eding fundamentally different from an adult criminal
trial. We have tried, therefore, to strike a balance- to respect the 'informality' and
'flexibility' that characterize juvenile proceedings, In re Winship. supra, at 366, and yet to
ensure that such proceedings comport with the 'fundamental fairness' demanded by the
due process clause."
The majority opinion defined two questions to answer in determining the
constitutionality of the act: "...does preventive detention under the New York statute serve
a legitimate state objective? .... are the procedural safeguards contained in the Family
Court Act adequate to authorize the pretrial detention of at least some juveniles charged
with crimes?."
In finding positively for the first question, the majority cited the widespread use and
judicial acceptance of preventive detention in the United States. The limitations imposed
by the act on the length of detention, and the entitlement of a detainee to a probable
cause hearing and an expedited fact-finding hearing were also discussed in the majority
opinion. In overturning the lower court decision, the majority opinion stated:
We are unpersuaded by the court of appeals' rather cavalier equation of detentions
that do not lead to continued confinement after an adjudication of guilt and
'wrongful' or 'punitive' pretrial detentions... A delinqueru::y petition may be
dismissed for any number of reasons collateral to its merits... (Department of
Juvenile Justice, New York)
Tyler v. United States, 602 F.Supp. 476 (E.D. Mo. 1984). Court praises city
officials for reducing pretrial population. A U.S. District Court noted that although
the City of St. Louis initially violated its order to limit the number of prisoners housed in
the city jail, subsequent actions purged the city of its contempt of court responsibility.

32.15

An earlier order set limits on the city jail capacity. When excess prisoners were
housed at other facilities, the court stated that those facilities must also meet the
constitutional conditions ordered for the city jail. The court not.ed that staff levels at the
city jail were maintained at a time when other city agencies were reducing their force, and
efforts to expedit.e processing of cases showed the willingness of the city to comply with
the court order. As a result, the pretrial population was steadily decreased, as was
reliance on other facilities to house overflow populations. (St. Louis City Jail. Missouri)
1985

Stat.e Supreme Court
CROWDING
FACILITY PLANS

Attorney General v. Sheriff of Suffolk County, Mass., 477 N.E.2d 361 (Mass,
1985). The attorney general filed a complaint seeking an order to compel the sheriff to
accept into his cust.ody all pretrial detainees committ.ed to him by courts of the
Commonwealth. The sheriff then brought action seeking injunctive and declaratory relief
against the mayor, city council and commissioner of corrections. The actions were
consolidated, and the detainees and inmat.es were permitt.ed to int.ervene. A single justice
ordered the construction of a sevent.een story jail and re:eort.ed the, propriety of those
orders. The Supreme Judicial Court, Suffolk County hela that: (1) mandamus was
available to require the city council to construct the jail; (2) the order requiring fulfillment
of the city's statutory obligation to provide a suitable jail did not violat.e the principle of
separation of powers; and (3) the orders did not violat.e the supremacy clause. (Suffolk
County Jail, Massachusetts)

Stat.e Supreme Court
TRANSFER

Cleveland v. Goin, 703 P.2d 204 (Ore. Sup. Ct., 1985). Prisoner ordered back to
jail in county of trial. The plaintiff was transferred to a jail in another county
because, according to the sheriff. his jail was overcrowded. Aft.er examining records and
logs, the court det.ermined that jail occupancy had not exceeded the limit set by federal
court. As a result, the prisoner was ordered housed in the jail in which his upcoming trial
would be held. (Clatsop County Jail, Oregon)

U.S. Appeals Court
INTAKE SCREENING
MEDICAL CARE

Garcia v. Salt Lake County, 768 F.2d 303 (10th Cir. 1985). Appeals court aff'll'Dls
$147,000 judgment against county for admitting unconscious detainee who died after
admission. Although the county had a policy of taking all unconscious arrestees to a
hospital, evidence showed that they were routinely admitted to the jail if they were
suspected of being intoxicated. In this case, the arrestee was taken to the hospital
following a traffic accident. While there he ingested some barbiturat.es which had been
prescribed earlier and escaped while unattended. He was found unconscious in front of
the hospital, was examined by a doct.or. and then admitt.ed to the jail. He was checked
every thirty minutes by an officer. but was not examined by a medic until four hours after
admission. He eventually died after being placed on life support systems.
The appeals court agreed that jail practices differed from policies, and practices
therefore became "policy" for the purpose of det.ermining liability. In this case. the county
was held liable for implementing the "policy" and was ordered to pay $147.000 plus costs.
The court noted that eighth amendment prot.ections do not apply until after an
adjudication of guilt, but that pretrial detainees are entitled to the same degree of
prot.ection and care as convict.ed offenders under the due process standard (fourt.eenth
amendment). (Salt Lake County Jail. Utah)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONDITIONS

Goodson v. City of Atlanta, 763 F.2d 1381 (11th Cir. 1985). Detainee awarded
$50,000 damages for conditions of det.ention. The plaintiff was held as a rape
suspect in the Atlanta jail. A jury concluded that he was subjected to unconstitutional
conditions of confinement (sanitation, toilet facilities. medical care, lack of bedding. lack of
heating, roach infested food). The jury believed that the City of Atlanta and the jail
adrnini~ator knew of these conditions and had even made public stat.ements to the media
that the jail was "unfit for human habitation". Concluding that the administrator had
failed to properly train and supervise staff. they held him liable for $5,000 damages, and
held the city liable for $45,000 compensatory damages. (Atlanta City Jail, Georgia)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONDITIONS

Hamm v. DeKalb County, 774 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1096.
Eleventh circuit imds Wolfish stat.em.ent inadequat.e for determining pretrial detainee
conditions. The court assert.ed that the standard established in Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520 (1979), does not produce a clear result when applied to a jail's provision of basic
needs such as food, living space and medical care. The Wolfish t.est, developed for pretrial
detainees in a federal det.ention center, asks if conditions are reasonable and related to a
legitimat.e governmental objective, and whether conditions amount to "punishment." The
court concluded that pretrial conditions be evaluat.ed under the same standard that has
been developed for eighth amendment analysis of conditions for convict.ed offenders.
As many county and city jails hold both detainees and convict.ed prisoners, applying
the two separate standards necessarily requires courts to become "...enmeshed in the
minutia of prison operations," which the Supreme Court has warned agamst.

STATE INTEREST

32.16

Therefore, in addition to requiring pretrial conditions and practices to serve a legitimate
governmental purpose, the court also held that jails must furnish the detainees with a
reasonably adequate diet and living space, and with reference to medical needs that they
must not be deliberately indifferent to detainee's serious medical needs. (DeKalb County
Jail, Georgia)
U.S. Appeals Court

LAW LIBRARY
ACCESS TO COURTS

Love v. Summit County. 776 F.2d 908 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 814.
Detainee not denied access to courts because no access to law library. The Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals found that although the plaintiff's seven months detention
triggered the right to petition the courts, his continuing access to counsel provided
sufficient access. In addition, the court noted that his attorney, while declining. to
represent him in his civil claim, provided referral to others and appropriate forms to
pursue the claim. The court also noted that there was no evidence that the defendants did
anything to impede the detainee from contacting the courts or attorneys. (Summit Co.
Jail, Utah)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS .

Miles v. Bell, 621 F.Supp. 51 (D.C.Conn. 1985). The focus of this complaint was
overcrowding, particularly in the housing unit, which once consisted of open
dormitories. Pretrial detainees brought a class action suit primarily alleging that the
overcrowded dorms increased the spread of disease among them and were psychologically
harmful because of the stress, lack of control over their areas and lack of privacy. Most of
the plaintiffs' proof on the issue was based on comparisons between illness rates in
dormitories and other housing methods such as cubicles or single or double cells.
Testimony did show higher levels of complaints and a higher level of illness among
inmates housed in the open dorms. A doctor testified that the installation of cubicles
could correct many of these problems. In fact, the defendants had corrected the situation
by installing cubicles, rendering much of the pretrial detainees' complaint moot. The
cubicles mitigate the spread of disease, as well as afford privacy, testified the doctor. He
said that the decrease in stress would likely improve both the physical and mental states
of the inmates. Although there was no testimony as to what effect the cubicles had on
ventilation, the court found no violation on the matter. The barriers were likely to
decrease the effects of smoking and body odor of other inmates. The inmates complained
of drafts if windows were left open and of stifling heat if left closed. The living units
made up of cubicles were not challenged by the inmates. The court also found no
constitutional violation in that the number of toilets and showers did not conform to the
standards set by the American Correctional Association (ACA) and by the American Public
Health Association (APHA). The ACA advised one toilet and shower facility for every
eight inmates, and the APHA advised one toilet for every eight inmates and one shower
for every fifteen inmates. The defendants provided one toilet for every ten to frl'teen
inmates, and one shower for every fourteen to twenty-four inmates, depending on the
housing unit. These figures were nearly twice that advised. Still, the court found no
violation absent a showing that waiting in line led to either physical or mental problems.
Sanitary conditions were not challenged.
Although there were certain violations of the health code in the food service in that
maggots and weevils were occasionally found, the court found no constitutional violation.
With regards to recreational opportunities, the inmates had enough forms of exercise and
equipment available regularly. For security reasons and for the safety of a correctional
officer, he is not permitted to carry a key to the· exterior doors in the housing units if he is
working alone. The inmates claim this and staff shortages would prevent them from
evacuating in case of a fire. The court found no violation, since the correctional officer
does carry keys to exit doors that empty into adjoining units. (Federal Correctional
Institution at Danbury, Connecticut)

State Appeals Court
SEARCH

People v. Nagel, 38 CrL 2101 (Ill App. Ct. 4th Dist., October 1, 1985). Appeals court
rules that police should not have conducted inventory search of detainee's locked
briefcase. A police prisoner had more than enough cash to meet the 50 dollar bond set for
the offense on which he had been arrested, but his locked briefcase was searched by police
aeyway. Although the Supreme Court has permitted inventory searches of prisoners'
property as a valid exception to the fourth amendment's warrant requirements, the
majority of the Illinois Appellate Court found that the search is permissible only if it is
incident to the further incarceration of the prisoner. The state had argued that
"incarceration" should be interpreted to mean any period of detention, no matter how
short, including the booking process. The majority disagreed.
Incarceration must mean something more intrusive than simple detention for the
purely admini~ative purpose of booking an individual who would otherwise be
subject to immediate release on a non-substantial criminal charge. Simply put,
the significant inquiry is whether there is a reasonable belief that the defendant
will be subject to :furt}ler incarceration. If he is, then the inventory search is
legitimate... The focus must necessarily begin and end with an examinat\on of the
reasonableness of the police officer's necessarily ad hoc determination based on the
facts and information available to the officer at the station house following arrest.
32.17

U.S. Appeals Court
Roberts v. City of Troy, 773 F.2d 720 (6th Cir. 1985). Pretrial detainees not
PARITYWITH
protec:t.ed by eighth amendment. but rights are analogized to those of detainees under
fourt.eenth amendment to avoid extending great.er constitutional protection to sentenced
SENTENCED
EQUAL PROTECTION offenders. Shortly after admission to the City of Troy jail, a prisoner committed
SUICIDE
suicide. His mother sued the city under U.S.C. 42 Section 1983 and under state law,
claiming that officials should have identified him as suicidal during admission and should
have supervised him more closely. A federal jury found for the defendants. On appeal,
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the jury verdict concerning section 1983 claims
but reversed the prior summary judgment which released Chief of Police Fisher from
liability for state claims. In reaching its conclusions, the appeals court noted that
although pretrial detainees are not protected by the eighth amendment, those protections
must be analogized under the fourteenth amendment. (Troy City Jail, Michigan)
U.S. Appeals Court
USE OF FORCE
MEDICAL CARE
INTAKE SCREENING

Roclt v. McCoy, 763 F.2d 394 (10th Cir. 1985). City to pay $100,000 damages to
prisoner for excessive force and failing to provide treatment while detained. The
plaintiff was arrested by city police following a complaint by his mother-in-law who
had called them because he was drunk. After following Jiiis ,car hC?me1 ~o officers
grabbed his feet ash~ left his car, pulled him out and kicked him several times in the
ribs, legs and face, and repeatedly slammed the car door against his shins. Upon
admission to the city jail he received no medical treatment beyond wiping the blood from
his nose. He was released the next day. A district court jury found for the plaintiff,
awarding $100,000 actual damages against the city, $2,100 actual damages against each
police officer, and $1,000 in punitive damages against each officer. On appeal, the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld both the verdict and the awards. (Chelotah, Oklahoma
Police)

State Appeals Court
JUVENILES
DIVERSION

State v. Washingt;on, 37 CrL 2226 (Wash CtApp, &'&'85). Policy which excludes
juveniles charged with prostitution from diversion program struck down. King
County (Seattle) juvenile court officials had a policy against accepting any teenage
prostitution defendant for diversion. The policy was based on the defendants' mobility,
their repeated failure to appear for court, and officials' perception that the courts could
provide better supervision than the diversion program. The Washington Court of Appeals
struck down the policy, finding that the legislature clearly viewed prostitution as suitable
for diversion. The Court ordered the officials to consider juvenile prostitution defendants
for diversion and to reject them from the program only on a case-by-case basis. (King
County, Washington)

U.S. Appeals Court
BAll, REFORM ACT

U.S. v. Alatishe, 37 CrL 1070 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Motion for pretrial detention may
follow a temporary detention in spite of provision of bail reform act. In this
complicated case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia added another
interpretation to the provisions of the Bail Reform Act of 1984 (USC 3141-56). After
learning that the defendant who had been arrested on a serious drug charge was already
on probation, the government requested the magistrate to detain the defendant for t.en
days under the provisions of the act at the time of presentment. The request was granted,
allowing time for the court supervising his probation to ·revoke it.
Toward the end of the temporary detention period the magistrate allowed the
government to move for pretrial detention, over the objections of the defendant. The
appeals court found that while Section 3142(f), read literally, precludes a pretrial
detention hearing if one is not held "immediately upon the person's first appearance," the
court found that the provision for temporary detention and the legislative history dictate a
different interpretation, ruling that under the confusing circumstances of this case, the
detention hearing was timely.

U.S. Appeals Court
BAll, REFORM ACT

U.S. v. Al-AzzaWY, 768 F.2d 1141 (9th Cir. 1985). Ninth circuit requires strict
adherence to time requirements of bail reform act. Aligning itself with the
Second and Fifth Circuits, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held that if
the procedures under Section 3142(f) of the Bail Reform Act of 1984 are violated in any
material way, unconditional pretrial detention may not be ordered. In this case, the
hearing for indefinite pretrial detention did not occur, as required in the act, "immediately
upon the defendant's first appearance before a judicial officer." This hearing followed the
defendant's f'lrst appearance by nearly a month, during which time he was detamed.

U.S. Appeals Court
BA.Il, REFORM ACT

U.S. v. Contreras, 776 F.2d 51 (2nd Cir. 1985). Indictment by grand jury
establishes probable cause for purposes of bail reform act. The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit has ruled that if an indictment alleging the offense has
been returned, a district court facing bail decisions should rely on the indictment rather
than making «n. independent assessment of probable cause in the context of the Bail
Reform Act of 1984 (18 USC Section 3142-e). (East.em District, New York)

32.18

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS

U.S. v. LoFranco. 620 F.Supp. 1324 (N.D. N.Y. 1985). Defendant ordered released
from detention as federal court fmds violation of due process clause. The continued
detention of a defendant since May 1985, whose "complex case" will not come to trial until
February, 1986, did not consider the defendant's due process rights ~ therefore was
ordered discontinued by a federal district court. "In the absence of statutory limitations
on pretrial det.ention in a complex case like this, there is no indication that the legislative
and executive branches have considered the defendant's due process rights and therefore
no basis for confidence that the det.ention is constitutional," observed the court. In
weighing the defendant's liberty int.erest against society's interest in his continued
detention, the court concluded that the defendant must be released, even though he "will
create potential dangers to the public and to the integrity of his trial." (Northern District,
New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
BAIL REFORM ACT

U.S. v. Maull. 768 F.2d 211 (8th Cir. 1985). Eighth circuit creates split in
circuits over interpretation of "first appearance" requirement of bail reform
act. Disagreeing with other circuits, the U.S. Court of Appeal for the Eighth Circuit has
held that the requirement of subsection (f) of section 3142 of the Bail Reform Act of 1984
(detention hearing shall be held immediately upon the person's first appearance before the
judicial officer) should not be interpreted literally. Rather, the majority says that reading
the sentence in isolation is an error; when read in context and in the spirit of the act, the
majority submits that the sentence indicates that the hearing is to be held promptly when
one is ordered. (Eastern District, Massachusetts)

1986
U.S. Appeals Court
EQUAL PROTECTION

Anela v. City of Wildwood, 790 F.2d 1063 (3rd Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 949.
Female detainees confined overnight were denied fourteenth amendment rights; city
could be held liable for conditions. Nine females and one male, ages seventeen to twenty,
were arrested at 11:l,5 p.m. by city police for loud radio playing. The male arrestee was
able to post bail and was released. The females were held until 11:00 the following
morning. The females filed suit, alleging that their conf'mement in cells without drinking
water, food or mattresses violated their constitutional rights. The federal district court
dismissed several counts prior to trial and directed a verdict against the plaintiffs
following a trial. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that: (1) the city is
responsible for the use of a bail schedule in violation of a rule of the New Jersey Supreme
Court; (2) the conditions of confinement to which the non-disruptive, non-violent, nonalcoholic women were subjected constituted privation and punishment in violation of the
fourteenth amendment. (City of Wildwood, New Jersey)
·

U.S. Appeals Court
JUVENILES

H.C. by Hewett v. Jarrard, 786 F.2d 1080 (11th Cir. 1986). A juvenile, who had been
commed at a juvenile detention center pending a trial on delinquency charges, brought
action for imposition of isolation without notice or hearing, excessive length and conditions
of isolation, unjustified and excessive force applied to him by superintendent of the center,
and denial of medical care. The United States District Court awarded nominal damages
on claims that isolation without notice and hearing and conditions of isolation violated due
process and determined that the juvenile had not been deliberately deprived of medical
attention, and that battery of the juvenile by the superint.endent did not rise to a
constitutional violation. The juvenile appealed. The Court of Appeals held that: (1) the
superintendent's battery of the juvenile violated the juvenile's liberty interests protected
by the fourteenth amendment; (2) the superintendent was liable both personally and in
his capacity as the center's superintendent for denying the juvenile medical care; (3)
compensatory damages should have been awarded to the juvenile for imposition of
isolation without procedural due process, for being a period beyond the maximum period
set out in relevant regulations, and for his humiliation and dejection sustained as a result
of such isolation; and (4) the superintendent's conduct warranted the award of punitive
damages. The due process clause forbids punishment of pretrial juvenile detainees; the
conditions of a pretrial juvenile detainee incarceration affect interests protected by the
fourteenth amendment rather than the eighth amendment. (Volusia Reg. Juv. Detention,
Florida)

U.S. Appeals Court
USE OF FORCE

Justice v. Dennis, 793 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1986). The source of constitutional protection
against the use of excessive force on a pretrial detainee is the detainee's liberty
interest in bodily security, grounded in the fifth and fourteenth amendments rather than
the fourth amendment. The lower court's jury instruction, setting out a spectrum in which
int.entional conduct was contrasted with simple negligence and failing to suggest that
conduct short of intentional wrongdoing, such as wantonness, recklessness, or gross
negligence, was sufficient for imposition of liability, constituted reversible error in the
pretrial detainee's action against a state highway patrol trooper for alleged
unconstitutionally excessive force used while the detainee was held in the county
courthouse jail. The f11ndamental inquiry in all excessive force cases, regardless of
protected int.erest's fourth, fifth, or eighth amendment origins, is whether the degree of
force used against the arrestee was necessary to protect legitimate state int.erest and, hus,
was permissible under all the circumstances. (Onslow County, North Carolina)

32.19

U.S. District Court

CONDITIONS

SEPARATION

U.S. District Court

CONDITIONS

SEPARATION

U.S. District Court

MEDICAL CARE
TELEPHONE

U.S. District Court
SEARCH

Morales Feliciano v. Romero Bercelo, 672 F.Supp. 591 (D. P.R. 1986). According t.o a
federal court, prison overcrowding, inmate idleness, and the threat of violence among
inmates, combined with the continuous frustrations of reasonable expectation produced
by administrative incompetence, resulted in an ascertainable psychological deterioration in
the Puert.o Rican prison population. The psychological deterioration inflicted on inmates
in the prison system was an unnecessary and want.on infliction of pain in violation of
prisoners' Eighth Amendment protections against cruel and unusual punishment.
Inmates of Puert.o Rican jails were denied due process as a result of inefficient,
inexperienced, and often incompetent social-penal counseling system, which had a severe
negative impact on inmates' opportunities t.o establish eligibility for parole and t.o actually
be heard in a timely manner by a parole board. Commingling of pretrial detainees with
convicted prisoners, in conjunction with finding that qonditions which prevailed in all
institutions at which pretrial detainees were housed violated the Eighth Amendment
rights of convicted inmates, was a sufficient basis for holding that pretrial detainees were
being punished prior t.o conviction and that, therefore, they were deprived of liberty
without due process of law. (Commonwealth of Puert.o Rico)
Reece v. Gragg, 650 F.Supp. 1297 (10th Cir. 1986). A pretrial detainee representing a
class of all present and future pretrial detainees and sentenced inmates held in the
county jail brought action seeking injunctive relief t.o require that operation of the jail
under present conditions cease. The district court held that: (1) the current operation and
condition of the county jail violated the due process clause of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments and the eight amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment, and (2) due t.o unconstitutional conditions at the jail, an injunction was
warranted, but would be stayed under conditions outlined by court.
To the extent that the county jail is unable to segregate pretrial detainee~ and
sentenced inmates, the higher standard applicable under the due process clause, rather
than the eighth amendment, must be met by the entire facility. Jail overcrowding for the
purpose of allowing the county t.o house more inmates without creating more jail space is
an impermissible justification for resulting violations of due process and prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment. Severe overcrowding combined with lack of area
for exercise, lack of separate dining area, inadequate ventilation, inadequate temperature
control, and antiquated and unsanitary plumbing at the county jail violated due process
clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments and ran afoul of the eighth amendment's
proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. (Sedgwick County Jail, Kansas)
Robinson v. Moses, 644 F.Supp. 975 (N.D.Ind. 1986). The medical care given a pretrial
detainee while he was incarcerated in a county jail did not violate his right t.o due
process under the fourteenth amendment. The allegations of the complaint
demonstrated that the detainee was treated on numerous occasions, had an ear, nose, and
throat specialist appointed, and received medicine. The standard under the fourteenth
amendment was the same as that applied t.o prisoners bringing claims under the eighth
amendment.
A pretrial detainee did not establish that his being h1ald in a city-county lockup rather
than the county jail amounted t.o punishment without due process in violation of the
fourteenth amendment, where the only difference between the city-county lockup and the
county jail was the absence of television and a common area. The pretrial detainee's bare
allegation that he was denied the use of a telephone for three days while in the citycounty lockup was insufficient t.o create a genuine issue of material fact, precluding
summary judgment, in view of the affidavit of the jail commander indicating that
prisoners were permitted t.o use telephones while in the lockup and ha4 direct access t.o
phones while in holding cells. (Allen County Jail, Indiana)
Smith v. Montgomery County, Md., 643 F.Supp. 435 (D.Md. 1986). An arrestee who
was strip searched while temporarily detained at the county jail brought action against
the county and several of its officials for certification of a retrospective damages class.
The district court held that: (1) jail officials had probable cause t.o search temporary
detainees arrested for felonies or misdemeanors involving weapons or contraband or with
prior records of convictions or unresolved arrests for felonies or misdemeanors involving
weapons or contraband, and (2) members of class whose fourth amendment rights were
violated by jail's strip search policy were entitled t.o $200 nominal damages. Reasonable
suspicion would exist t.o strip search all felony arrestees and all temporary detainees
arrested for misdemeanor offenses that involved weapons or contraband, for purposes of
determining the plaintiff class in an action against the county for conducting
indiscriminate strip searches. Reasonable suspicion would also exist t.o strip search all
temporary detainees with prior records of convictions, umesolved arrests for felony
offenses, or for misdemeanors involving weapons or contraband. (Mon~mery County
Detention Center, Maryland)

32.20

U.S. District Court

BAIL

U,S. District Court

BAIL

U.S. Appeals Court

RELEASE

U.S. Appeals Court

BAIL REFORM ACT

U.S. Appeals Court

Talbert v. KellY. 799 F.2d 62 (3rd Cir. 1986). Rule 3:4-1 of the Rules Governing
Criminal Practice promulgated by the New Jersey Supreme Court allows supervising
police officers present at a stationhouse to issue a summons to those arrested for
misdemeanors and then release them or admit them to bail. However, the City of
Newark's policy was to hold the accused until he appeared before a magistrate, rather
than to allow bail at the stationhouse.
The trial judge called the city's procedure "absurd" and "ponderous" in that
transportation arrangements had to be made for court appearances, among other
"complexities." He held the city liable for "deviation from the procedure set forth in the
court rules."
The federal appellate court upheld the city's procedure in light of the availability of
magistrates on a twenty-four hour basis. Jail personnel were instructed to call them at
home on weekends or after court hours to obtain a "telephone" hearing within twenty-four
hours of an arrest. The fact that this procedure was not followed by an employee was not
grounds to hold the city liable for what ended up to be ·a four-day detention after a
magistrate left court early on a Friday. The statute of limitations had run before
interrogatories were served seeking the names of individuals at the station house. (City of
Newark, New Jersey)
United States v. Deitz. 629 F.Supp. 655 (N.D.N.Y. 1986). The standard for obtaining a
stay by the court of appeals of a district court order releasing defendants on bail is the
same as the standard for obtaining a preliminary injunction. It was unclear whether the
court of appeals applied that standard in staying a district court order because the court
did not write an opinion explaining the reason for its stay. Thus, defendants may have
been unconstitutionally detained between the time the order was stayed and the time they
pleaded guilty. However, even if the defendants were unconstitutionally detained, the
district court could not grant the request to compensate them by releasing them before
sentencing. The district court had to apply 18 U.S.C.A.
Section 3143 providing that a person who is found guilty and awaiting sentence must be
detained unless he shows by clear and convincing evidence that he is not likely to flee or
pose danger to the community if released. (New York)
United States v. Frisone. 795 F.2d 1 (2nd Cir. 1986). The detention of the defendant
for twelve months on federal charges was affected by the majority position in a second
circuit case that rendered unconstitutional the continued pretrial detention of a defendant
solely on the basis of dangerousness. Therefore, remand was necessary to determine
whether there were conditions of release which would reasonably assure the defendant's
appearance as required and, if so, to establish appropriate conditions of release. (New
York)
United States v. Himler, 797 F.2d 156 (3rd Cir. 1986). The Bail Reform Act does not
authorize the detention of a defendant based on danger to the community from the
likelihood that he will, if released, commit another offense involving false identification.
Any danger which he may present to the community may be considered only in setting
conditions of release. He may be detained only if the record supports a finding that he
presents a serious risk of flight. The magistrate properly ordered the temporary detention
of the defendant upon being informed that there was an outstanding Florida warrant for
the defendant's arrest as well as a detainer lodged against him by the Pennsylvania
Department of Probation and Parole, in order to give other officials time to take the
defendant into custody, where the defendant appeared on charges involving production of
a false identification document, being an international driving permit. The judicial officer
must impose least restrictive bail conditions necessary to assure appearance and safety if
judicial officer finds that release on personal recognizance or unsecured appearance bond
will not provide requisite assurances. (Pennsylvania)
United States v. Spilotro, 786 F.2d 808 (8th Cir. 1986). Imposing as a condition of

RELEASE-CONDITION pretrial release for a defendant in a prosecution for racketeering that he not associate
with any person who has been convicted of a felony except when necessary for business
purposes or the preparation of his defense was an abuse of discretion. The condition was
imposed as a general matter without any statement of reasons why the condition was
necessary to assure the defendant's appearance. (Missouri)
U.S. Appeals Court

SPEEDY TRIAL
DUE PROCESS

U.S. v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984 (2nd Cir. 1986). cert. denied 107 S.Ct. 562. A
federal appeals court ruled that defendants' due process rights were not violated by
their detention for more than 19 months prior to trial due to the risk of flight. There
was evidence that the defendants were leaders of a paramilitary terrorist group dedicated
to achieving independence for Puerto Rico and that they participated in a conspiracy
surrounding the 7.6 million dollar Wells Fargo robbery, as well as the robbery itself. Both
defendants had very limited ties to the community and had a record of prior flight.

32.21.

1987
U.S. Appeals Court

SEARCHES

U.S. Appeals Court
CONDITIONS

MEDICAL CARE

U.S. District Court

SEARCHES

State Appeals Court
PROTECTION

Abshire v. Walls, 830 F.2cl 1277 (4th Cir. 1987). $7,000 Award upheld in strip
search case. A jury award of $7,000 in damages against three police officers who
strip searched an arrestee without proper cause was upheld by a federal appeals court.
Following his arrest by police in Baltimore, Maryland, for disorderly conduct, Thomas
Abshire as taken to a police station and handcuffed to a railing. At trial, Abshire testified
that he made numerous requests to use the telephone, all of which were denied. After
Abshire became indignant, it was suggested by one of the officers that he be strip .
searched. Abshire was then unhandcuffed and escorted to a utility room, where he was
forced to disrobe and subject himself to a strip search. Baltimore County strip search
policy provides that arrestees should not be subjected to a strip search unless specific
factors are present. Considering this testimony, the court of appeals found that there was
a question as to the reasonableness of the search and the jury's resolution of that question
was not clearly erroneous. Therefore, the award of $2,000 in compensatory damages .and
$5,000 in punitive damages against the tbree officers was upheld. However, the award of
$4,000 in attorney's fees was found to be too small and the court of appeals ordered the
district court to recalculate this award. (Towson Precinct #6 of the Baltimore County
· Police Department, Maryland)
Cupit v. Jones, 835 F.2d 83 (5th Cir. 1987). A pretrial detainee, who allegedly had a
heart attack approximately three months prior to det.ention brought a 1983 civil rights
action against parish prison officials. The federal district court granted summary
judgment dismissing the action with prejudice. The pretrial detainee appealed. The
appeals court ruled that the detainee was not entitled to a stress-free atmosphere while
incarcerated. The court held that: (1) the pretrial detainee failed to establish that he had
been denied reasonable medical care; (2) the magistrate did not abuse discretion by
refusing to appoint counsel to assist the pretrial detainee; (3) the magistrate did not abuse
discretion by refusing to subpoena witnesses; and (4) the magistrate did not abuse
discretion by denying requests for production of jail documents. According to the court,
pretrial detainees are entitled to reasonable medical care unless failure to supply that care
is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective; furthermore, pretrial
detainees are entitled to protection from adverse conditions of confinement created by
prison officials for a punitive purpose or with punitive intent. (Richmond Pai:ish Jail)
Davis v. City of Camden, 657 F.Supp. 396 (D.N.J. 1987) A suit was filed against
county officials by a woman who came to the police station to file a complaint against
her neighbors was arrested and strip searched. Police officials found that the woman had
several outstanding arrest warrants when they ran an identification check. She was
arrested and sent to the Camden County Jail in New Jersey. At the jail a strip search
was conducted by a female officer. The policy at the jail was to conduct a strip search on
any person arrested who could not post bail. The court found that policy unconstitutional.
The suit was filed against the sheriff and the matron who performed the search claiming
the strip search was illegal. While the court did not hold the sheriff and matron liable, it
did find the county liable because "We believe that a municipality should be held liable
under Section 1983 when it officially adopts a policy that subsequently is declared
unconstitutional, notwithstanding the fact that the policy was mandated by state law."
The court reasoned that, for purposes of determining whether a particular strip search is
justified. reasonable suspicion that a particular arrestee is concealing weapons or
contraband can arise not only from specific circumstances relating to the arrestee or
arrests, but also from the nature of the charged offense. (Camden County Jail, New
Jersey)
DeBow v. City of East St. Louis, 510 N.E.2d 895 (Ill. App. 1987), cert. denied, 116 112d
552. A detainee was injured during his conf"mement in a city lockup. He was arrested
for illegal transportation of alcohol and he was placed in the same cell with a man
arrested for aggravated assault. The plaintiff was later found unconscious on the floor of
the cell with a severe head injury. Blood was found on one of the boots that were in the
possession of the other occupant of the cell. The injured detainee sued the city and its
police chief alleging that pre-trial detainees were inadequately supervised, that officers
failed to monitor their conduct and failed to segregate violent detainees from other
detainees. The inmate suffered permanent brain injury from the assault and a jury
initially awarded $3.4 million in damages. On appeal, the court upheld this award, noting
that "specific intent" to deprive the detainee of his rights was not required. The state
appeals court found that the plaintiff had established that the defendants had received
numerous notices of noncompliance with minimum jail safety standards, including a
warning that detainees were being inadequately supervised. Hourly visual checks of
detainees were not being conducted and no one understood it to be their offlcial duty to
conduct such routine checks. According to the court, it is sufficient that the defendants
acted recklessly by disregarding detainee safety. This disregard can be demonstrated
either by both deliberate acts or by the failure to act.
32.22

Since the repeat.ed notices of noncompliance with safety standards provided notice of
unsafe conditions, the appeals court agreed that the jury could conclude that the failure t.o
act t.o correct the situation ~s reckless. (City of East St. Louis, Illinois)
U.S. District Court

PROTECTION

Stat.e Appeals Court

PROTECTION

Gagne v. City of Galveston, 671 F.Supp. 1130 (S.D. Tex. 1987). Even though a
departmental policy called for him t.o do so, an officer's failure t.o remove a belt of a
prisoner who used it t.o hang himself, while a violation of policy, was not a constitutional
violation. A Section 1983 lawsuit was brought against the city and the police department
by the deceased prisoner's estat.e and surviving family members. There was nothing in
the prisoner's behavior t.o notify the officer that there was a possibility of suicidal
t.endencies. Further, because there was no showing that the incident occurred pursuant t.o
an official policy, even if there had been a constitutional violation in this case, there would
be no city or departmental liability. This appeared t.o be a single, isolated incident,
insufficient t.o demonstrat.e official policy. There was no showing of a wide-spread pattern
of similar incidents. The plaintiffs' argument that understaffing of the facility result.ed in
this case in a deprivation of rights was also rejected by the court. (Galveston City Jail,
Texas)
Gordon v. City of New York, 517 N.E.2d 1331 (N.Y. 1987). The New York Court of
Appeals stated that there is a duty t.o provide reasonable care when prison authorities
know or should know that a prisoner has suicidal t.endencies or that a prisoner might
physically harm himself--t.o assure that such harm does not occur. But the city was found
not liable for lack of knowledge or proper supervision when a detainee sustained injuries
caused by his plunging headfirst int.o a t.oilet bowl locat.ed in his cell. The court found
that the injury that occurred was not reasonably foreseeable and that the city took "every
possible precaution" against foreseeable harm. The 19-year-old detainee, who was charged
with attempted grand larceny and possession of burglary tools, exhibit.ed "boist.erous,
irrational and delusional behavior" at the time of his arrest, and was consequently placed
alone in a bare cell without a belt or shoelaces and with a correctional officer seated
directly outside his cell monit.oring him. The court rejected the argument that the
detainee should have been physically immobilized or restrained until he received medical
attention. The behavior that the detainee exhibit.ed, which included climbing the bars of
the cell, stating that he would like t.o fly, and yelling out "I am God," "Jesus Christ
Superstar" was "not uncommon in holding pens and would not in itself warrant medical
attention." The care taken in this case, according t.o the court, was reasonable and no
liability was imposed given the facts that the detainee had stated his int.ention t.o feign
insanity, although he appeared normal before the incident, and the officers had no
knowledge of a suicidal hist.ory. (New York City Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Kennedy v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 667 F.Supp. 697 (D.C. Cal. 1987). The policy of
the Los Angeles Police Department mandating a visual body cavity search for every
pretrial detainee arrested on any felony charge is unconstitutional according t.o a federal
district court. Some det.ermination of reasonable suspicion is required for persons initially
booked on felonies as well as those booked on misdemeanors. The classification by an
offense alone is not sufficiently probative of the question of whether a particular arrest.ee
is harboring contraband. The court ruled that body cavity searches of pretrial detainees
cannot take place if they are arbitrary and purposeless. (Los Angeles Police Department)

U.S. District Court
SEPARATION
CONDITIONS

Ryan v. Burlingt.on County, 674 F.Supp. 464 (D.N.J. 1987), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct.
1745. A pretrial detainee rendered quadriplegic by his cellmat.e, a Stat.e prisoner who
had been awaiting transfer to a Stat.e run facility as a parole violator for 58 days
alleged deprivation of a constitutional right in an action against various Stat.e and county
defendants. The federal district court ruled that pretrial detainees had a constitutional
right to be housed separately from known dangerous convicted imnat.es who posed a threat
t.o their personal security unless physical facilities did not permit their separation and
that the detainee could prove a constitutional violation if he could prove at trial that
classification was feasible at the county jail. The court noted that while detained at a
county jail, a pretrial detainee was entitled t.o rights grant.ed t.o convicted persons as well
as a right to be free of any practice or restriction placed on him as punishment. Whether
overcrowding of prisons or jails arises t.o such a level as t.o violat.e prisoners' or pretrial
detainees' constitutional rights, requires det.erminations as to whether conditions caused
mm.at.es t.o endure genuine deprivations and hardships over extended period of time and
whether adverse conditions become excessive in relation to purposes assigned for them.
Affirmed 860 F.2d 1199. (Burlingt.on County Jail, New Jersey)

U.S. District Court

U.S. v. Gonzalez, 675 F.Supp. 208 (D. N.J. 1987). Defendants, charged with narcotics
offenses, were subject to a rebuttable presumption that no condition or combination of
conditions would.reasonably assure their appearance and the safety of other persons in
the community. One defendant overcame the presumption and was conditionally

BAIL REFORM ACT

32.23

released from pretrial detention pursuant t.o the Bail Reform Act. He offered about
$800,000 in security, lived in a local community where he owned a house and an antique
business, and had previously been free on bail for a period of 18 months prior t.o another
conviction.
U.S. Supreme Court
BAIL REFORM ACT
DUE PROCESS

U.S. v. Salemo, 107 S.Ct. 2095 (1987). The section of the Bail Reform Act of 1984
authorizing pretrial detention on the ground of future dangerousness is not facially
invalid under the due process clause, ruled the United Stat.es Supreme Court. The
provision does not violat.e substantive due process on the ground that it constitut.es
impermissible punishment before trial. Congress formulated the det.ention provisions not
as punishment for dangerous individuals, but as a pot.ential solution t.o the pressing
problem of crimes committ.ed by persons on release. The government's regulat.ory int.erest
in community safety can, in appropriat.e circumstances, outweigh an individual's liberty
int.erest. Moreover, the Act's extensive procedural safeguards are specifically designed t.o
further the accuracy of the dangerousness determination, and are sufficient t.o withstand a
facial challenge. The court noted that, t.o qetermine whether a restriction on liberty
constitut.es impermissible punishment or permissible regulation, the Supreme Court first
looks t.o legislative int.ent. The due process clause does not cat.egorically prohibit pretrial
det.ention imposed as regulat.ory measure on ground of community danger, without regard
t.o duration of detention. Although primary function of bail is t.o safeguard courts' role in
adjudicating guilt or innocence of defendants, the Eighth Amendment does not
cat.egorically prohibit Government from pursuing other admittedly compelling int.erests
through regulation of pretrial release. Finally, t.o det.ermine whether Government's
proposed conditions of release or det.ention are excessive, for Eighth Amendment purposes,
the Supreme Court must compare Government's proposed conditions against int.erest
Government seek t.o protect. The high Court has allowed court t.o essentially set bail at an
inf'lnit.e amount for reasons not related t.o risk of flight. The Eighth Amendment did not
require release on bail when Congress had mandated det.ention on basis of compelling
int.erest other than prevention of flight, as Congress had done through Bail Reform Act.

1988
U.S. Appeals Court
PROTECTION

Anderson v. Gutschenritt.er, 836 F.2d 346 (7th Cir. 1988). A pretrial detainee was
stabbed by his cellmat.e. The detainee had informed the prison authorities that he had
heard rumors that "someone was out t.o get him." The due process clause prot.ects pretrial
detainees from both deliberat.e exposure t.o violence, and from a failure t.o protect when
prison authorities know of a strong likelihood that an inmat.e will be assaulted or injured.
According t.o the appeals court, evidence presented by the pretrial detainee would have
permitt.ed a reasonable jury t.o conclude that a sheriff and a warden failed t.o protect the
detainee. (Sangamon County Jail)

U.S. Pistrict Court
SUICIDE
INTAKE SCREENING

Boyd v. Harper, 702 F.Supp. 578 (E.D. Va. 1988). Action was brought under a civil
rights statut.e against custodial officials for the suicide of a pretrial detainee. On the
defendants' motions for summary judgment, the district court found that in order for
the suicide of a prisoner or pretrial detainee t.o form a basis for a civil rights cause of
action against the custodial official, it is necessary t.o prove that the official was
deliberat.ely indifferent t.o the suicidal stat.e of the prisoner or detainee. Deliberat.e
indifference may be manifested in one of three ways: by showing that the defendant knew
about the suicidal t.endencies and was deliberat.ely indifferent t.o the prisoner's or
detainee's condition in light of such knowledge; by showing that the defendant was
deliberat.ely indifferent t.o discovering any pot.ential suicidal t.endency; or by showing that
the defendant's conduct could be considered deliberat.ely indifferent t.o the possibility of
suicide even with no specific knowledge of the prisoner's or de~'s condition. No
deliberat.e indifference on the part of custodial officials was established with respect t.o the
suicide of the pretrial detainee, so as t.o provide a basis for civil rights cause of action.
Even if officials had previously been informed that the inmat.e was weeping in his cell or
of the fact that the official who had conduct.ed the classification int.erview had not received
proper training, such allegations showed at most merely negligent conduct on the part of
the sheriff and the staff of a correctional cent.er. The jail officials' providing the pretrial
detainee with a safety razor did not provide a basis for a civil rights claim on the theory of
deliberate indifference t.o the possibility of a suicide, where superficial injuries t.o the
detainee's wrists inflicted with the safety razor were not the cause of his death, which
resulted instead from asphyxia by hanging. (Pet.ersburg Correctional Cent.er, Virginia)

U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE

Cabrales v. County of Los Angeles, 864 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir. 1988). A civil rights suit
was brought against the county, the cnrnrnander of the county jail, and others for the
death of a pretrial detainee. Following a verdict against the county and jail
cnrnrnancJ'!r, motion for judgment was denied by the U.S. District Court and attorney
fees were awarded. The appeals court affirmed the lower court ruling, noting that the
sufficiency of evidence could not be reviewed except for plain error absent a motion for
directed verdict at the close of all the evidence.

MEDICAL CARE
PSYCHOLOGICAL
SERVICES

There were issues of the fact as to the liability of the county and the jail commander ·
on the ground of the policy of deliberate indifference to the detainee's medical needs.
Even though the detainee was not denied access to medical and psychiatric help, but was
in fact evaluated on several occasions by medical personnel, this did not preclude the
finding of deprivation of constitutional rights without due process based on a deliberate
indifference to medical needs, in light of the demonstration of inadequate staff such that
psychiatric staff could only spend minutes per month with disturbed inmates, so that any
psychological illness would go undiagnosed and untreated.
.
It was also found by the court that the plaintiff's unsuccessful claims against
individual county officers were related to successful claims against the county and the
commander of the county jail that inadequate psychiatric care led to the pretrial detainee's
suicide. There was no abuse of discretion in reducing the attorney fee award by 25% to
reflect limited success, where the plaintiff's overall relief was materially diminished for a
failure to make out claims against individual defendants who could have been found
individually liable for their own deliberate indifference to a detainee's medical and
psychiatric needs. (Los Angeles County Jail, California)
U.S. Appeals Court
PROTECTION

Colburn v. Upper Darby Township. 838 F. 2d 663 (3rd Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109
S.Ct. 1338. The estate of a detainee who committed suicide while incarcerated brought
action against township and police officials; the district court dismissed the case and the
plaintiffs appealed. The appeals court held that: (1) the allegation that custodial
personnel knew or should have known that the detainee was a suicide risk was sufficient
to state a Section 1983 claim against official; and (2) the allegation that the township had
a custom of inadequately monitoring jail for potential suicides was sufficient to state a
cause of action. Further, the court found that the fact that the deceased inmate was the
third person to commit suicide while in custody of the same jail was reason to state a
Section 1983 claim. Prior suicides could be viewed as providing a governing body with
knowledge of its alleged custom. The appeals court ruled, however, that the police
commissioner and mayor could not be held personally liable in a Section 1983 action
arising out of suicide of a detainee absent allegations that either was personally involved
in any activity related to detainee's death. (Upper Darby Police Department)

U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE

Estate of Cartwright v. City of Concord, Cal., 856 F.2d 1437 (9th Cir. 1988). A mother of a
pretrial detainee who committed suicide by hanging himself in a city jail brought a Section
1983 action against the city and city employees for alleged violation of constitutional
rights. The United States District Court entered judgment for the defendants following a
bench trial, and the mother appealed. The appeals court, affirming the decision, found
that the city jail employees did not violate the constitutional rights of the pretrial detainee
in failing to prevent him from committing suicide. Although the jailers overheard him
speaking of suicide, none of the detainee's other statements gave them reason to believe
that he needed preventive care. The jailers took reasonable steps to safeguard him by
taking away all his possessions except "soft clothing," and placed him in a cell with
another detainee. He W{ls also checked periodically. Finally, the city could not be held
separately liable on the basis of its policies, customs and practices. The city's training
program complied with relevant state laws and standards and there was no practice or
pattern showing ~ city investigated jail deaths inadequately or destroyed evidence in a
manner inconsistent with established policies. (Concord City Jail, Concord, California)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE

Francis v. Pike County, Ohio, 708 F.Supp. 170 (S.D. Ohio 1988). The administrator
and personal representative of a deceased arrestee brought a Section 1983 action
against the city, county, and their law enforcement officers for the failure to remove a belt
of the deceased arrestee who then committed suicide while in a cell. The defendants
moved for a summary judgment. The district court found that the police officers did not
use excessive force in arresting the arrestee. It was also found that neither the city nor its
police officers were liable for the arrestee's suicide while in the county jail following the
arrest assisted by the city officer. Since the arrestee was not in their custody or control at
the time of the suicide, the county deputies' failure to remove the drunk driving arrestee's
belt before placing him in a holding cell, without knowledge or reason to know that the
arrestee would commit suicide, did not impose a civil rights liability on them after the
arrestee committed suicide. The lack of allegations or evidence that the county was
grossly negligent in training its law enforcement officers precluded its liability. (Pike
County Jail, Ohio)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
DUE PROCESS
MEDICAL CARE

Grim v. Moore, 745 F.Supp. 1280 (S.D. Ohio 1988). A city jail detainee brought an action
against jail officials and others, alleging constitutional deprivations. On the motion of jail
officials and others for summary judgment, the district court found that the restrictions
placed upon the detainee during his detention in the city jail for 13 hours and 41 minutes
did not amount to constitutional deprivation, in view of evidence that the restrictions
amounted not to an express intent to punish, but rather were reasonably related to the

legitimate nonpunitive governmental objective of short term holding of prisoners. The
detainee, who claimed that jail personnel confiscated his personal property upon his
arrival at the jail, did not have a procedural due process claim redressable under Section
1983, given his ability to sue officials in tort, under state law; at best, the loss of his
property appeared to be a random and negligent act of jail personnel. (City of Urbana
Jail, Ohio)
U.S. Appeals Court
CONDITIONS
CELL CAPACITY

Lyons v. Powell, 838 F.2d 28 (1st Cir. 1988). A pretrial detainee brought action
alleging violation of his civil rights. The federal district court 'dismissed complaint for
failure to state cause of action, and appeal was taken. The appeals court held that the
pretrial detainee's allegations that he was confined to a cell for 22-23 hours per day for a
27-day period, and was forced to sleep on a floor mattress, were sufficient to state a
Section 1983 cause of action on ground of deprivation of liberty without due process. The
court was troubled by the inmate's contention that he was confined to a cell for 27 days
with another inmate, during which time he was forced to sleep on a mattress on the floor
of the cell, and his claims that the mattress nearly covered the floor of his cell, and placed
appellant in a position which was in close proximity to the open toilet in the cell,
According to the court, "Based on the foregoing considerations, we conclude that the
district court incorrectly dismissed appellant's complaint for failure to state a cause of
action." The court ruled, however, that the pretrial detainee was not denied access to
court. The detainee was given periodic access to a law library, and was not
constitutionally entitled to also receive assistance from "persons trained in the law." (New
Hampshire State Prison)

U.S. District Court
SEPARATION
SEARCHES

Moenius v. Stevens, 688 F.Supp. 1054 (D. Maryland, 1988). An arrestee filed suit in
state and federal court, alleging that the jailor's discretionary decision to place him in
a detention cell bearing a sign entitled "AIDS cell" intentionally and maliciously
inflicted emotional distress. The arrestee sought compensatory and punitive damages
from the mayor and city council as well as the jailor. According to the police sergeant, the
idea of putting the sign on the cell was conceived because some prisoners were under the
impression that they wouldn't be searched for drugs if they told turnkeys that they were
infested with AIDS. By putting a sign on the cell the jail personnel were hoping that the
arrested person would see it and admit that they really didn't have AIDS, and to go ahead
and search them. The court held that these facts showed "at most" a "half-baked idea of
unknown origin which terminated at the first inquiry by supervising officials in the police
department." The federal court granted summary judgment for the mayor, city council
and the jailor. State claims that arose out of the incident were allowed to proceed to trial.
(Baltimore City Police Department, Maryland)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

O'Brien v. Borough of Woodbury Heights, 679 F.Supp 429 (D. N.J. 1988). According to a
federal district court, a municipality was liable under Section 1983 for causing arrestees to
be subjected to unconstitutional strip/body cavity searches at the county jail, where it had
a policy of bringing arrestees to the county jail and was aware of the county jail's policy of
conducting stri:wbodY cavity searches on all arrestees. Two arrestees filed claims against
the Borough, County, and other law enforcement officials alleging that they were
unlawfully detained and stri:wbody cavity searches were performed on them even though
there was no suspicion that either arrestee was concealing contraband. The federal court
held that the county jail's rule of performing routine strip/body cavity searches on anyone
arrested, regardless of the offense, was unconstitutional. The court also denied a qualified
immunity claim by officers, stating that the law against such searches was clearly
established at the time of arrest. (Gloucester County Jail, New Jersey)

U.S. Appeals Court
SPEEDY TRIAL
DUE PROCESS

U.S. v. Gelfuso, 838 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1988). The due process limit on the length of
pretrial detention requires assessment on a case-by-case basis. The length of
confinement is considered in conjunction with the extent to which the prosecution bears
responsibility for the delay that has ensued. In deciding whether a defendant's pretrial
detention violat.es due process rights, a court should consider both length of confinement
and extent to which prosecution bears responsibility for any delay. In this case, the
defendants' ten-month eonfinement pending trial of racketeering and narcotics charges did
not violate due process rights, where the defendants were responsible for the delay
inasmuch as they had moved for continuance to enable them to prepare for trial.

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS

Wilkes v. Borough of Clayton, 696 F.Supp. 144 (D.N.J. 1988). An arrestee
brought an action against the Borough, chief of police, and two police officers,
for violation of her fourth amendment rights following an arrest. Both parties moved for
summary judgment. The district court found that the arrestee's fourth amendment rights
were affected by the officer's maintenance of visual observation over the arrestee while the
arrest.ee attended to the hygienic needs of changing a sanitary napkin, and the Borough's
policy of subjecting every arrestee t.o the humiliation of visual oversight while using the
bathroom facilities was unreasonable, and the application of that policy t.o the arrestee,
deprived her of rights secured by the fourth amendment. The fourth amendment does not
prohibit all government intrusions int.o citizens' privacy interest, but only those intrusions
found t.o be unreasonable. The fourth amendment forbids the police from visually
observing arrestees using bathroom facilities unless the police have a reasonable suspicion
that the arrest.ee will harm herself if allowed to defecate, urinate, or change a sanitary
napkin or tampon behind a closed stall or bathroom door; thus, only when an.arrestee's
behavior, emotional or physical condition, or past record of such harm are such as t.o
engender a reasoned and articulable basis for maintaining a direct visual oversight at all
times is viewing of an arrestee's bathroom use constitutionally justifiable. The application
of the policy t.o a driver arrested on a charge of driving under the influence, refusal to take
a breath test, and disorderly conduct deprived her of rights secured by the fourth
amendment. (Clayton Police Station, New Jersey)

U.S. Appeals Court
PROBABLE CAUSE
SPEEDY TRIAL

Williams v. Ward, 845 F.2d 374 (2nd Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 818. A
majority of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided that judicial
determination of probable cause within 24 hours is not constitutionally mandated,
contrary t.o an earlier ruling by a New York federal district court. The court found that
New York City's practice of delaying arraignment up t.o 72 hours and combining it with
the probable cause hearing affords arrestees certain benefits not available at an
immediate minimal hearing, such as the presence of counsel--improved opportunity t.o
obtain pretrial release, and a chance to negotiate a plea. These advantages suggest that
the "constitutional 'promptness' of a probable-cause hearing must be determined in light of
the t.otality of the process afforded the defendant," said the court. (New York City Police
Department)
1989

U.S. District Court
INTAKE SCREENING
MEDICAL CARE

Carapellucci v. Town of Winchest.er, 707 F.Supp. 611 (D. Mass. 1989). The
administratrix of a deceased pretrial arrestee's estate brought a civil rights action and
state law claim against police officers and the t.own for violation of the eighth
amendment right t.o medical treatment. On the motion for summary judgment, the federal
district court found that in light of the similarity between the sympt.oms of drug ingestion
and alcohol intoxication, the police officers and the t.own were not grossly negligent in
failing to arrange for the medical treatment of the arrestee. Both the expert and the lay
testimony were insufficient t.o raise a genuine issue of material fact. The court also found
that the booking procedures recommended by the American Correctional Association were
insufficient t.o determine what standard was applicable t.o the t.own jail. It was
determined that the officers had qualified immunity, and under Massachusetts law, the
police officers and the policy chief had immunity. The police officers' failure to supervise a
pretrial arrestee was not an adequate basis for a f'mding of gross negligence or worse after
the arrestee died in his cell from a prearrest drug ingestion, sufficient to impose liability
on them, where the officers were unaware of a serious medical need. The sympt.oms of the
arrestee were barely distinguishable from alcohol intoxication. The police officers' failure
to give a blood test or a medical examination to a drunk driving arrestee was not grossly
negligent or sufficient t.o impose liability following the arrestee's death. The evidence that
was found was inadequate t.o show that the town was grossly negligent for failing t.o have
a policy or facilities to allow for the treatment of the drunk driving arrestee who died in
cust.ody as a result of the previous ingestion of alcohol, glutethimide and large quantities
of codeine; the lack of evidence that any agency used the expert's recommended
procedures, or that any government unit had adopted the expert's suggested guidelines
rendered the opinion insufficient. The difference of seven minutes from the recommended
schedule for checking on an int.oxicated pretrial arrestee would not support the fmding of
negligence, nonetheless gross negligence, after the arrestee died in his cell as the result of
a prearrest drug ingestion. The jail's failure t.o have booking forms inquiring whether the
arrestee had consumed medication or drugs was not evidence of gross negligence of a
minimally accepted standard booking practice for holding jail facilities, notwithstanding
the recommendation for the use of such forms by the American Correctional Association.
(Winchester Police Department, Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
EQUAL PROTECTION
PUNISHMENT
WORK

Charron v. Medium Sec. Inst., 730 F.Supp. 987 (E.D. Mo. 1989). A former pretrial
detainee brought a civil rights action against the city and staff members of a city
workhouse, alleging various constitutional violations which occm-red in connection with
his refusal to work in the kit.chen of the workhouse, and the medical treatment that
was afforded him for a workhouse injury. The U.S. District Court found that as a
32.27

pretrial detainee, the plaintiff has no claim under the eighth amendment for cruel and
unusual punishment, arising from his being placed in segregation for refusing to work in
the workhouse kit:chen, however the placement in segregation did amount to punishment
in violation of his due process rights. According to the court, pretrial detainees do not
stand on the same footing as convicted inmates. If pretrial detainees are subjected to
restrictions and privations other than those inherent in their confinement itself or which
are justified by compelling necessities of jail administration, their rights are violated
under the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment. Placing
the detainee in segregation was not reasonably related to a legitimate goal or purpose
inasmuch as he did not pose a threat to security. The court found that he was entitled to
nominal damages, since he suffered no actual harm as a result of his segregation for six
days; thus, the plaintiff was awarded the sum of $600 in damages for the six days in
punitive segregation at $100 per day. It was also stated that nothing in the Constitution
requires that pretrial detainees be allowed contact visits when prison administrators had
determined that such visits will jeopardize the security of the facility. The court also
found that the members of the workhouse staff were not entitled to qualified immunity
from the civil rights claim; the law clearly established that the unnecessary imposition of
security confinement on a pretrial detainee violated the detainee's rights to due process.
(Medium Security Institution, Missouri)
U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE

Danese v. Asman, 875 F.2d 1239 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 1473. A
pretrial detainee's family and estate brought a civil rights action against police officers,
police supervisors, and the city after the detainee committed suicide. The U.S. District
Court found that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity. Interlocutory
appeal was taken. The appeals court reversed the lower court's decision and found that
the police officers and supervisors enjoyed qualified immunity from liability. The law
which existed at the time of the police officers' action did not clearly establish the right to
have the officers diagnose the pretrial detainee's condition as prone to suicide and to take
extraordinary measures to restrain the pretrial detainee; therefore, the police officers had
qualified immunity from liability. The police officers were not subject to a clearly
established constitutional duty to diagnose the pretrial detainee's condition as prone to
suicide; and given that, the supervisors could not be held liable. (Roseville City Jail,
Michigan)

U.S. Appeals Court
INTAKE SCREENING
SUICIDE

Dorman v. District of Columbia, 888 F.2d 159 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The representatives of
a detainee's estate brought a Section 1983 action against a municipality to recover for
the suicide of the detainee in a cell. The U.S. District Court denied the municipality's
motion for judgment notwithAtanding a verdict and the municipality appealed. The court
of appeals, reversing and remanding the lower court's decision, found that the
municipality was not liable. According to the court, the training of police officers on
suicide prevention did not rise to the level of a conscious choice by the municipality or the
policy of deliberate indifference to the eighth amendment rights of the detainee who
committed suicide in his cell and, therefore, did not permit the imposition of a Section
1983 liability upon the municipality, even though the police officers did not receive a
specific course on suicide prevention. The officers were trained to recognize abnormal
behavior, could not accept arrestees who showed signs of mental illness or abnormal
behavior, and utilized "WALES" computer system with information about previous arrests
and suicide attempts. The detainee's suicide was the first in the cell block in the
memories of the sergeant and the inspector who had been assigned there for eight years.
The alleged deficiencies in the training of police officers on suicide prevention did not
cause the suicide of the young male detainee in his cell. The mere fact that the detainee
was somewhat docile at the time of the arrest and closed his eyes at the police station
during lulls in the processing was insufficient to give the officers notice that he might be
suicidal. The court found that the case presented was insufficient to be submitted to a
jury and the verdict for the plaintiff was therefore reversed. (Fifth District, Metropolitan
Police Department, District of Columbia)

U.S. District Court
MAIL

Faulkner v. McLocldin, 727 F.Supp. 486 (N.D. Ind. 1989). A pretrial detainee brought
a civil rights action against the county sheriff, alleging the opening of his legal mail
outside of his presence. The district court found that the county jail, which had adopted
no policy or procedure concerning the marking of legal mail, violated the pretrial
detainee's civil rights by opening letters from the American Civil Liberties Union, legal
services program, and the U.S. Senate committee outside of the detainee's presence. The
letters were from attorneys or a senator and bore designations sufficient, absent specific
requirements articulated by the jail, to alert the jail personnel to their privileged nature.
Inmate mail from elected officials or government agencies is entitled to the same
protection from opening outside of the inmate's presence as mail from attorneys. Just as
attorney mail touches upon the su:th amendment right to counsel and the first
amendment right to access to courts, mail from elected officials and government agencies
touches upon

32.28

the inmate's first amendment. The court found that the pretrial detainee was entitled
only to nominal damages. Jail officials had honored the detainee's rights more
scrupulously than necessary with respect to the vast majority of the detainee's legal mail,
and there was no showing of actual damage. (Fulton County Jail, Indiana)
U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE
PSYCHOLOGICAL
SERVICES
PUNISHMENT

Green v. Baron, 879 F.2d 305 (8th Cir. 1989). A pretrial detainee brought a civil
rights action against the staff of a mental facility. The U.S. District Court granted the
inmate's a motion for judgment n.o.v. or, in the alternative, new trial, and, following a
separate trial and damages, the defendants appealed. The appeals court found that the
trial court properly granted judgment n.o.v. based on erroneous instructions. It was
also found by the court that a pretrial detainee could not be punished, and the issue of
whether he is punished depended upon whether deprivations he suffered were reasonably
related to a legitimate government purpose and not excessive and, the jury could find that
the treatment of a pretrial detainee in a mental health institute did not constitute
punishment, even though he was deprived of bedding and clothing and hot meals. In view
of the evidence that he was not placed in the treatment program until all other treatment
efforts had failed, the staff believed that the deprivation were vital to the success of his
behavioral modification program. The program was structured and supervised by medical
personnel, and deprivations were medically supervised, limited in degree, and restricted in
duration. (Security and Medical Facility, Oakdale, Iowa)

U.S. Appeals Court
RELEASE
BAIL

McConney v. City of Houston, 863 F.2d 1180 (5th Cir. 1989). An arrestee for
public intoxication brought a civil rights suit against the city and its chief of
police. The U.S. District Court entered a judgment on the jury verdict in
favor of the arrestee, and the city appealed. The appeals court, affirming in part and
reversing in part, found that the city chief of police was entitled to qualified immunity
from liability, but some evidence supported the finding that the city had an
unconstitutional policy for detaining the warrantless arrestee for public intoxication for
four hours even after determining that the arrestee was sober and had not been
intoxicated. A policy requiring the continued detention of a public intoxication arrestee
and denial of otherwise available bail aft.er the determination beyond a reasonable doubt
that the arrestee is in fact not intoxicated and that probable cause no longer exists raises
obvious constitutional concerns, but the arrestee is not constitutionally required to be
released immediately upon the ascertainment that he is clearly not intoxicated. It is
permissible for the detaining authority to take a reasonable amount of time for
administrative processing, the return of property, and making bail if appropriate.
(Houston City Jail, Texas)

U.S. District Court
USE OF FORCE

Mosier v. Robinson, 722 F.Supp. 555 (W.D. Ark. 1989). An arrestee who was
allegedly beaten by an intoxicated sheriff sued the sheriff, deputy sheriff, and
the county which employed them. In his complaint, the plaintiff alleged that he was
taken into custody and transported to the county jail. The plaintiff stated that upon his
arrival at the jail, the sheriff beat and choked him without provocation, that the plaintiff
offered no resistance, and that the arresting officer made no att.empt to stop the attack.
The plaintiff further contended that at the time of the attack, the sheriff was under the
influence of alcohol, and that he had acted in his official capacity as sheriff while under
the influence of alcohol on previous occasions. The county moved for summary judgment.
The district court found that the county was not subject to tort liability or liability for
punitive damages, and the county was potentially liable for the arrestee's Section 1983
claim. The county policy of condoning violations by the sheriff could be inferred from the
failure to take action on the sheriff's alleged violations of department policies occurring
over a period of time. (Ashley County Jail, Arkansas)

U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE
INTAKE
SCREENING

Williams v. Borough of West Chester, Pa., 891 F.2d 458 (3rd Cir. 1989). The
estate of an arrestee who committed suicide by hanging after jailing officers
failed to remove his belt sued officers and the city police department under
the federal civil rights statute. The U.S. District Court entered a judgment
for the officers and municipality and the estate appealed. The appeals court, affirming
the decision, found that the officers placing the arrestee in a cell lacked the knowledge of
his suicidal tendencies. The dispatcher was not responsible for the suicide, as he had no
prisoner care responsibilities; and the municipality was not liable, as none of the
individual officers were liable. A man and his twin brother were arrested in a store--one
of them for suspect.ed shoplifting and the other for allegedly threatening people in the
store and re-entering the store aft.er being told not to do so. Officers at the station placed
each man in a separate cell. They failed to remove the belt of the man with suicidal
tendencies. Of the three officers present, one then went off duty, one went out for dinner,
and a dispatcher stayed at his station answering the radio and the phone. While the
dispatcher heard noises coming from the cell area, he did not check the cell block. When
the other officer returned from dinner, he discovered that the detainee had hung himself
. with his belt. (West Chester Police Department, Pennsylvania)

32.29

1990

U.S. Appeals Court
INTAKE SCREENING
MEDICAL CARE
PROTECTION

Belcher v. Oliver, 898 F.2d 32 (4th Cir. 1990). A civil rights action was brought
against the city, mayor. chief of police, and police officers, by the daughter of a pretrial
detainee who committed suicide with a belt while detained at the city jail on charges of
public intoxication and hazardous driving. Reversing and remanding the lower
court decision, the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals found that the general right of pretrial
detainees to receive basic medical care does not place upon jail officials the responsibility
to screen every detainee for suicidal tendencies. The officers' failure to afford medical
screening or attention to the detainee did not violate constitutional standards. There was
an absence of evidence tliat indicated to the officers that the detainee posed a risk of
suicide. It was also established that the failure of the police officers to remove the
detainee's belt and shoelaces did not reach a level of "deliberate indifference," and
therefore the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. (Clendenin City Jail, West
Virginia)

U.S. Appeals Court
INTAKE SCREENING
PSYCHOLOGICAL
SERVICES
SUICIDE

Burns v. City of Galveston, Tex., 905 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1990). The mother of a
detainee who committed suicide while in jail sued the city under Section 1983. The
U.S. District Court entered a judgment for the city and the mother appealed. The
court of appeals found that the alleged noncompliance by police department officials
with a city policy requiring that detainees in jail be checked visually at hourly
intervals did not form a basis for a Section 1983 action following the suicide of a detainee
where the suicide occurred within one hour of confinement and would not have been
prevented by compliance with the requirement. It was also found by the court that the
city was not required to provide psychological screening which might have detected
suicidal tendencies of the detainee. The civil rights of the detainee were not violated by
the city's failure to train officers in psychological screening procedures and to utilize a
sample medical psychological screening questionnaire found in the detainee treatment
manual. The detainee did not have an absolute right to psychological screening.
(Galveston City Jail. Texas)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Davis v. Village of Calumet Park, 737 F.Supp. 1039 (N.D. Ill. 1990). reversed, 936 F.2d
971. A defendant brought a Section 1983 action alleging that village officials
unconstitutionally denied the defendant, while a pretrial detainee, access to adequate
medical care. After a trial by jury, the defendant was awarded $1 in compensatory
damages and $1,500 in punitive damages. The federal appeals court reversed the
decision, finding that an objectively reasonable officer would not have thought the injuries
were serious. (Village of Calumet Park, Illinois Jail)

U.S. District Court
OBSERVATION BY
STAFF

DiLoreto v. Borough of Oaklyn, 744 F.Supp. 610 (D. N.J. 1990). A detainee who was
subjected to a strip search brought a civil rights action against police officers. On cross
motions for summary judgment, the district court found that a female officer's observation
of the female detainee's urination, absent any particularized suspicion that the detainee
might harm herself or be in possession of contraband, violated the detainee's civil rights.
(Oaklyn Police Station, New Jersey)
·

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
SUICIDE

U.S. District Court
PROTECTION
SUICIDE
INTAKE SCREENING

Elliott v. Cheshire County. N.H., 750 F.Supp. 1146 (D. N.H. 1990). The father of a
pretrial detainee who committed suicide in his cell brought a civil rights action against the
county and jail officials. On defendants' motions for summary judgment, the district court
found that the jail officials did not act with deliberate indifference to the pretrial
. detainee's serious medical needs when they failed to diagnose his mental condition as
potentially suicidal or prevent his suicide, entitling them to qualified immunity; there was
no evidence that the officials were given actual notice of the detain.ee's need for special
care or for protection or that their failure to act placed the detainee in any serious danger.
The arresting officer who knew that the pretrial detainee had a history of mental illness
did not act with deliberate indifference to the detainee's medical needs when he failed to
recommend immediate treatment to prevent suicide, entitling him to qualified immunity;
the officer did not know that the detainee had suicidal tendencies, and had never
witnessed any violent behavior by him. It was also found that the county's alleged
inadequate training of jail officials in dealing with suicide risk inmates did not amount to
deh'berate indifference to the rights of the inmates, precluding the county from being held
liable. Although there had been other suicides and attempted suicides in the jail in the
previous ten years, the county had implemented suicide prevention procedures and there
was no evidence that better training in suicide prevention would have alerted the jail
officials that the detainee was a suicide risk. (Cheshire County House of Corrections, New
Hampshire)
Hamlin v. Kennebec County Sheriff's Dept.. 728 F.Supp. 804 (D.Me. 1990). A pretrial
detainee who had attempted suicide at the county jail brought a pro se civil rights suit
against the county sheriff and others. On defense motions to am.end and for summary
judgment, the district court found that the officers who were on duty at the county jail
on the night of the pretrial detainee's suicide attempt were necessary parties ·for

32.30

adjudication of the civil rights suit, and thus would be joined as defendants and added as
moving parties on the defense m9tion for summary judgment. The alleged conduct of the
county sheriff and the officers on duty at the county jail on the night of the pretrial
detainee's suicide attempt in allowing the detainee to keep the laces of his boots, which
the detainee used in an attempt to hang himself, was at most negligent and did not rise to
a level of constitutional violation, even though the jail policy required the removal of the
laces and the detainee was arrest.eel for driving while intoxicated. The guard at the jail
asked the detainee to remove the boot laces, the laces were difficult to remove and the
guard said they would have to be cut. The detainee objected on the grounds of cost, and
another guard said that they should admit the detainee with the boot laces because he
had been there before and would not "try anything." The plaintiff alleged that he suffered
severe physical and emotional distress as a result of his suicide attempt at the Kennebec
county jail.
The court stated, "It is plain that the defendants decided to deviate from their
standard procedure in processing jail admittees only after the plaintiff himself had
expressed concern for the cost to him of replacing the boo~ laces and another guard had
offered her opinion that based on her knowledge of the plaintiff he did not represent a
suicide threat. The plaintiff had not alleged that he manifest.eel any suicidal tendencies,
and clearly at the time of the incident the plaintiff was rational enough to express concern
over the price of the laces. If it represents any breach of the standard of care owed
pretrial detainees, the defendants' conduct, based on an informed opinion of the plaintiffs
state of mind by one of their colleagues, is negligence, and it does not rise to the level of a
constitutional violation". (Kennebec County Jail, Maine)
U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
MEDICAL CARE
RIGHTS RETAINED

Hodge v. Ruperto, 739 F.Supp. 873 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). A former pretrial
detainee brought a civil rights claim against police officers, commissioner and
mayor alleging constitutional violation as a result of treatment before he was
arraigned. The district court found that the claim that officers deprived the
detainee of food and water for two and one-half days while confining him to an
overcrowded unsanitary cell charged sufficiently flagrant conduct to allow reasonable
inference that the conduct was attributable to municipal policy. The alleged deprivation
allowed a reasonable inference of inadequate supervision which was deliberate
indifference to constitutional rights.
The constitutional rights of pretrial detainees were not violated by the failure of police
to allow him to contact family or att:orney during prearraignment detention. A pretrial
detainee does not have a constitutional right to a telephone call on completion of booking
formality. Prearraignment detainees are entitled to adequate food, clothing, shelter,
sanitation, medical care, and safety. The allegation by the pretrial detainee that he had
to sleep on a steel frame without a mattress, that sanitation facilities were so filthy he
was unable to use them and that he was denied access to necessary medical care stated a
claim for violation of fourteenth amendment rights. (43rd Precinct, New York)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS

Lyons v. Powell, 729 F.Supp. 1404 (D. N.H. 1990). A pretrial detainee, who had been at a
state prison and was transferred to a federal facility, filed a civil rights lawsuit
complaining that he was confined to a cell for 22-23 hours per day during a 27 day period
at the federal facility, during which time he was forced to sleep on a mattress on the floor.
The federal prison officials filed a motion, stating that they were entitled to qualified
immunity. The court denied the motion, noting that the defendants had a duty to check
on the institutions where federal pre-trial detainees were lodged and were also responsible
for any omissions they made in a supervisory capacity. (New Hampshire State Prison)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE

McDay v. City of Atlanta, 740 F.Supp. 852 (N.D. Ga. 1990). The daughter of
an arrestee who committed suicide brought a civil rights action against the
city and police officers. The district court found that there was no basis for imposition of
liability on the city or police chief and at the time of the arrest in 1986, the police officers
were not deliberately indifferent to the needs of the pretrial detainee even though they left
him in a position where he was able to obtain a gun and kill himself. He had never
previously attempted suicide or threatened suicide on the night of his arrest. In the
absence of any allegation that the arrestee had attempted suicide previously or that he
was threatening suicide on the night he was arrest.eel, police officers were not deliberately
indifferent in their treatment. Gross negligence is not a ground for imposing municipal
liability for failure to train. (Homicide Task Force Office, Somerset Terrace, Georgia)

U.S. Appeals Court
ADEQUACY OF CARE
FAILURE TO
PROVIDE CARE

Pedraza v. Meyer, 919 F.2d 317 (5th Cir. 1990). An inmate at a county jail appealed an
order of the U.S. District Court dismissing his pro se civil rights action. The court of
appeals found that the allegation in the inmate's action, that jail officials failed to give him
medical attention for his withdrawal symptoms while he was being held as a pretrial
detainee, was suff'JCient to state an Eighth Amendment inadequate medical attention
claim, where the allegation was not contradicted by a portion of the off'JCial prison medical
records. (Victoria County Jail, Teus)

32.31

U.S. Appeals Court
DUE PROCESS
PROTECTION
SEPARATION

Redman v. County of San Diego, 896 F.2d 362 (9th Cir. 1990). A pretrial
detainee who was raped during confinement brought a Section 1983 action
against the sheriff, the supervisor of the detention facility, the second in
command at the facility, the shift supervisor, the station deputy, and the
county. The U.S. District Court directed a verdict in favor of the defendants, and the
detainee appealed. The court of appeals affirmed the lower court decision and found that
the jail officials were not deliberately indifferent to the detainee's due process right to
personal security. Transferring the 18-year-old pretrial detainee from the "young and
tender" unit to a cell with a homosexual and investigating an alleged rape of the detainee
by questioning him in front of the cellmate and other inmates was not "deliberate
indifference" to the detainee's due process right to personal security, even though the jail
officials knew that the cellmate had a history of trying to coerce otheJ"s into sexual favors.
The knowledge about the cellmate and the detainee's profile merely gave jailors a
suspicion of a possible attack. (San Diego County's South Bay Detention Facility,
California)

U.S. District Court
ESCAPE
USE OF FORCE

Wright v. Whiddon, 747 F.Supp. 694 (M.D. Ga. 1990). A civil rights action was brought to
recover damages for the wrongful death of and deprivation of the constitutional rights of a
. pretrial detainee, who was fatally shot while attempting to escape, against a city police
officer, a city police chief, the city, and the county sheriff. On the defendants' motions for
summary judgment, the district court found that the Fourth Amendment, rather than the
Eighth Amendment, provided the standard for analyzing a claim that the pretrial detainee
who was fatally shot while attempting to escape was subjected to unconstitutional use of
excess force. The pretrial detainee had the status of a presumptively innocent individual,
so was more akin to suspect than a convicted prisoner, and the Fourth Amendment's
objective reasonableness standard accordingly applied. It was also found that genuine
issue of material fact existed as to whether a reasonable police officer could believe the
pretrial detainee who was attempting an escape posed a serious threat, thus rendering
lawful the officer's action in fatally shooting the detainee, so as to preclude summary
judgment on the issue of whether the officer was entitled to qualified immunity with
respect to constitutional claims asserted under the civil rights statute Section 1983. The
county sheriff who ordered the city police officer to shoot·the pretrial detainee who was
attempting the escape was not liable for violation of the fatally wounded detainee's
constitutional rights, although it was argued that the sheriff intentionally authorized the
commission of the unlawful act which resulted in the death and violation of constitutional
rights. The sheriff did not have authority to command the police officer, and the police
officer did not act pursuant to any command from the sheriff, but in reliance on his own
training and city policy, in deciding to draw his gun and fire at the detainee. (Turner
County, Georgia)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE

Zwalesky v. Manistee County. 749 F.Supp. 815 (W.D. Mich. 1990). A widow of an
intoxicated prisoner who committed suicide while a detainee, brought a Section 1983
action against jailers, the county, and the sheriffs department. The U.S. District Court
found that the jailers were entitled to qualified immuni-ty with respect to the "medical
needs" claims brought by the widow. A general constitutional right to medical care did
not establish a clear constitutional right to be appropriately screened by prison officials for
suicidal tendencies and psychological problems. In addition, the jailers did not deprive the
prisoner of a clearly established right by failing to prevent his suicide while detained in
an allegedly inadequate detoxification room, and, thus, the jailers' supervisors could not
held liable for improper training. (Manistee County Jail, Michigan)

1991
U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Allen v. Board of Com'rs of County of WY8Ildott.e, 773 F.Supp. 1442 (D.Kan. 1991). Ail.
arrestee, charged with a misdemeanor traffic offense, sued the county sheriff's
department, the county sheriff, a sergeant, and deputies alleging that the defendants
battered and falsely imprisoned her and subjected her to a strip search in violation of the
federal constitution. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The U.S. District
Court found that the strip search of the arrestee was unreasonable under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments absent any showing of necessity to confine the arrestee with
other prisoners, but the five hour detention was not unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. The deputy who conducted the strip search was not entitled to qualified
immunity because the strip search of traffic offenders without some level of suspicion that
they were harboring drugs, contraband or a weapon was pre se unreasonable at the time
of the plaintiff's arrest. The state law claims for battery, negligence per se, false and
negligent imprisonment, and negligent training and supervision and adoption of policies
fell within exceptions to the Kansas Tort Claims Act. (Wyandott.e County Sheriff's
Department, Kansas)

32.32

U.S. Appeals Court
ARREST AND
DETENTION
DUE PROCESS

Austin v. Hamilton. 945 F.2d 1155 (10th Cir. 1991). Arrest.ees brought an action alleging
that excessive force was used during arrest and subsequent detention, and that the
arrestees were detained following a warran~ess arrest t9r l!ID. unreasonably extended
duration without a probable cause determination by a judicial officer. The U.S. District
Court denied the agents' motion for summary judgment, and one agent appealed. The
court of appeals found that a reasonable officer, under either the Fourth Amendment or
substantive due process standard, could not have believed that the manner of the arrest
and detention was constitutionally permissible; therefore the district court properly denied
summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The Fourth Amendment protections
imposed restrictions on the treatment of arrest.ees detained without a warrant. The
substantive due process principles controlled the issue as to any excessive force employed
aft.er an arrest, where the Fourth Amendment law currently recognized as controlling up
until the arrested suspect's first judicial hearing was not. at the time of the arrest.
established with clarity. A genuine issue of material fact precluding judgment, existed as
to whether the warrantless detention was unreasonably prolonged in violation of the
Fourth Amendment principles. The court of appeals noted that. under the circumstances
of this case, in which the specific facts are unsettled and disputed regarding both the
length and the reasons for the delay, the district court's denial of summary judgment was
proper. (U.S. Customs, U.S. Immigration)
·

U.S. Appeals Court
PROTECTION

Bell v. Stigers, 937 F.2d 1340 (8th Cir. 1991). The guardian for a prisoner who attempted
to hang himself with a belt that the jailer had not detected during a pat search filed a
civil rights suit against an Iowa county and individual employees. alleging violations of
the prisoner's constitutional rights. The district court granted summary judgment in favor
of the county sheriff and communications operator on duty but denied summary judgment
for the jailer, who appealed. The appeals court found that the jailer did not violate the
civil rights of the prisoner, absent a showing that the jailer possessed a level of knowledge
required under the deliberate indifference standard that would alert him to a strong
likelihood that the prisoner would attempt suicide; the prisoner's offhand comment during
the booking procedure "well I think I'll shoot myself" could not reasonably constitute a
serious suicide threat when no gun was available. and there was no evidence that the
jailer was familiar with a "suicide profile" or that he was under any duty to be.
(Washington County Jail. Iowa)

U.S. Appeals Court
EQUAL PROTECTION

Chestnut v. Magnusson. 942 F.2d 820 (1st Cir. 1991). A state prisoner petitioned for
habeas corpus. The petition was dismissed by the U.S. District Court, and the prisoner
appealed. The court of appeals found that the failure to the State of Maine to provide a
syst.em of good-time credits to pretrial detainees. while allowing such credits to sentenced
prisoners, did not amount to denial of equal protection to the sentenced prisoner who.
unable to make bail because of indigency, was incarcerated prior to trial. Pretrial
detainees already had an incentive for good behavior in avoiding longer sentences. (Maine
Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE

Christian By and Through Jett v. Stanczak, 769 F.Supp. 317 (E.D. Mo. 1991). Survivors
of a prisoner who committed suicide in a holdover cell brought a Section 1983 action
against the arresting officer and a police dispat.cher. The defendants moved for summary
judgment. The U.S. District Court found that the officer's failure to designate the arrestee
as a suicide risk did not subject the officer to liability in the Section 1983 action, even
though the arrestee committed the suicide while he was incarcerated in a holdover cell.
The warnings concerning the arrestee"s reference to suicide. his state of intoxication, and
his abusive behavior were insufficient to apprise the officer of the arrestee"s suicidal
tendencies. It was also found that the police dispat.cher was not liable under Section 1983
for the suicide of the prisoner; while the dispatcher's failure to turn on the camera in the
holdover cell at the beginning of her shift may have constituted negligence on her part, it
did not rise to the level of deliberate indifference. (City of Florissant Police Department,
Missouri)

U.S. Appeals Court
PROTECTION

Colburn v. Upper Darby Tp., 946 F.2d 1017 (3rd Cir. 1991). The administratrix of the
estate of a pretrial detainee who committed suicide in jail brought a civil rights action
against the township and police officials. The U.S. District Court dismissed the complaint
and the court of appeals affirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part. On remand,
the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the plaintiff
appealed. The court of appeals found that the municipality was not liable for the suicide
of the pretrial detainee. Two components of the concept of serious. medical needs of
prisoners, as to which deliberate indifference by prison officials violates the Eighth
Amendment's proscription of cruel and unusual punishment, are that the detainee's
condition must be such that failure to treat can be expected to lead to substantial and
unnecessary suffering, injury or death, and that the condition be o~ that has been
diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or one that is so obvious that a lay
person would easily recognize the necessity for a doct.or's attention. (Upper Darby
Township·Police Department, Pennsylvania)
32.33

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Davis v. Jones, 936 F.2d 971 (7th Cir. 1991). A pretrial detainee who suffered a scraped
elbow and a one-inch cut in his temple during the course of an arrest brought. a civil
rights action against police. The U.S. District Court found that by not immediately taking
the detainee to a hospital or offering him the option of going to a hospital, the police
violated the detainee's due process rights, and appeal was taken. The court of appeals
found that police must offer medical care to a pretrial detainee if there is reason to
suspect that an injury to the detainee is serious, but because an objectively reasonable
officer would not have thought that the detainee's injuries were serious, failure to offer
medical care was not improper. (Calumet Park Police, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
LENGTH
PRIVACY

Doe v. City of Cleveland, 788 F.Supp. 979 (N.D. Ohio 1991). An arrestee brought a civil
rights action against a city. The district court found that the arrestee's fourth
amendment rights were not violated by 27-hour detention, as a jurisdiction providing
judicial determinations of probable cause within 48 hours of arrest, as a general matter,
did not violate a persons Fourth Amendment rights. The court also found that regulations
which permitted the disclosure of the fact that the prisoner was suspected of having AIDS
only to certain persons did not violate the prisoner's constitutionally-protected privacy
rights; and e'1dence did not show that the city had a policy of c}eliberately failing to train
itself with respect to confidentiality of booking records when the fact that the prisoner was
suspected of having AIDS was improperly disclosed. (Sixth Police District Headquarters,
Cleveland Police Department, Ohio)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Draper v. Walsh, 790 F.Supp. 1553 (W.D. Okl. 1991). A pretrial detainee who was
subjected to a visual strip search in a county jail filed suit against the county sheriff. On
the sheriff's motion for summary judgment, the district court found that the county's
policy of subjecting detainees arrested for traffic violations or other minor offenses to a
visual strip search at the discretion of a police officer was unconstitutional on its face,
making qualified immunity an unavailable defense. (Cleveland County Detention Center,
Oklahoma)

U.S. Appeals Court
PRISONER SUICIDE

Elliott v. Cheshire County, N.H., 940 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1991). The father of a detainee who
committed suicide while in a county jail brought a civil rights action against the county,
individual correctional officers, and the arresting officer. The U.S. District Court entered
summary judgment in favor of all defendants and the father appealed. The court of
appeals found that fact issues existed on the question of whether jail personnel knew or
reasonably should have known of the detainee's suicidal tendencies. The detainee made
suicide threats to fellow inmates, and whether inmates reported such threats to jail
personnel in such a manner as to be taken seriously, and whether jail personnel
responded reasonably or with deliberate indifference, precluded summary judgment for
them. The arresting officer was not deliberately indifferent to the detainee's medical
needs; although the officer was informed of the detainee's mental illness, he was not
informed that the detainee had previously threatened suicide, and there was no reason to
suspect from the detainee's demeanor or actions that such danger existed. The county
could not be held liable absent an indication of inadequately training its officers or
maintaining an unsafe jail. (Cheshire County House of Corrections, New Hampshire)

U.S. District Court
INTERROGATION
CONDITIONS OF
CONFINEMENT
SPEEDY TRIAL
CONDITIONS

Hickombottom v. McGuire, 765 F.Supp. 950 (N.D. Ill. 1991). An inmate sued police
officers who arrested him alleging that officers arrested him without probable cause, that
they failed to properly bring him before a magistrate, that they violated his right to due
process by denying him food and water, and that they coerced his confession. The officers
moved for summary judgment. The district court found that the arrestee had no civil
rights claim based on that fact that police officers questioned him for 11 hours after his
arrest without bringing him before a magistrate; 11 hours was not an unreasonable period
in which to delay an appearance before a magistrate. It was also found that the arrestee's
claims that police officers deprived him of his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process
by denying him food and water for an unreasonable length of time while he was in their
cust.ody and violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment right not to incriminate
himself when they coerced bis confession, which were indirect attacks on the arrestee's
confinement, were better pressed in a habeas corpus proceeding rather than a Section
1983 proceeding, and to the extent that the prisoner's claims would be proper in a Section
1983 proceeding, they were barred by the circuit court's determination that the prisoner's
confession was not coerced. (Danville Correctional Center, Danville, illinois)

U.S. District Court

Hinkfuss v. Shawano County. 772 F.Supp. 1104 (E.D. Wis. 1991). The personal
representatives and survivors of a pretrial detainee who committed suicide brought a
Section 1983 action against the county and jail officials who moved for summary judgment.
The U.S. District Court found that the county could not be held liable for the suicide based
on the claim of deliberate indifference to the right of detainees to medical attention.
There was no contention that the county's policy of giving jailers discretion in determining
medical conditions and needs of detainees was one of deliberate indifference. The jailers'
failure to provide the detainee with emergency medical attention did not show that the

TRAINING
FAILURE TO
PROVIDE CARE

32.34

jailers were inadequately trained pursuant to policies or customs of the county, and the
detainee's request for medical attention was not specific or urgent. The court also found
that the jail officials were entitled to qualified immunity from liability; there was nothing
which indicated that the conduct of the jailers was deliberately indifferent to the medical
needs of the detainee nor was there anything on the record to indicate a strong likelihood
that the detainee would commit suicide. (Shawano County Jail, Wisconsin)
U.S. District Court
ACCESS TO COURT
LAW LIBRARY

Kaiser v. County of Sacramento, 780 F.Supp. 1309 (E.D.Cal. 1991). Jail inmates brought
an action seeking access to legal materials. The district court found that.the pretrial
detainees and convicts who alleged denial of access to the law library but who did not
allege that they were denied access to alternative legal assistance had standing to
challenge the adequacy of the law library. It was also found that an incarcerated pretrial
detainee is entitled to limited access to law books and other legal materials, but the
county is not obligated to facilitate nonlawyer legal assistance for pretrial detainees who
are proceeding prose. The ''paging" or "slip" system for convicted inmates to obtain legal
materials, standing alone, is unconstitutional. Finally, the court would not grant
preliminary injunctive relief requiring the county to provide additional legal assistance to
convicts held in jail. It was unclear whether the combination of paging assistance and
legal assistance met constitutional requirements. The court did require the posting of a
copy of reference materials available. (Sacramento County Jail and Rio Cosumnes
Correctional Center, California)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE

Kocienski v. City of Bayonne, 757 F.Supp. 457 (D, N.J. 1991). An administratrix of a
pretrial detainee's estate brought a civil rights action against a city and city police officers
based on the detainee's suicide death. On the officer's motion for summary judgment, the
U.S. District Court found that even if the police officer was aware of the detainee's
suicidal tendencies, the officer's failure to communicate those tendencies to other officers
did not constitute deliberate indifference to the detainee's needs in violation of due
process; any failure by the officer to communicate suicidal tendencies to other officers
constituted negligence only. The police officers' failure to assure that the detainee's
pantyhose were removed after becoming aware that she was wearing pantyhose did not
constitute deliberate i.ndi!ference to the detainee's psychological needs because no evidence
indicated that the officers had knowledge of the detainee's suicidal tendencies. After it
was determined that police officers were not deliberately indifferent to the pretrial
detainee's needs when they failed to prevent her suicide, the city could not be held
separately liable for failing to train its police officers. (Bayonne Municipal Jail, New
Jersey)

U.S. Appeals Court
PSYCHOLOGICAL
CARE
SUICIDE

Leshore v. County of Worcester. 945 F.2d 471 (1st Cir. 1991). A civil rights action was
brought against a county and county officials in connection with a suicide of a pretrial
detainee. The U.S. District Court entered judgment on the verdict in favor of the
defendants, and the plaintiff appealed. The court of appeals found that the U.S. District
Court did not abuse its discretion in removing default against the county two weeks before
trial, on the grounds that failure to respond was due to an illness of the defendant
county's attorney, despite the plaintiff's contention that the short interval between the
removal of default and trial precluded discovery against the county. The plaintiff was not
prejudiced where she never moved to continue the case to conduct a discovery and had
already deposed several county officials in preparing her case against individual
defendants, who were themselves county officers. In addition, it was found that there was
no plain error in instructing the jury to consider whether the detainee was in need of
psychiatric care "particularly" at the time of the suicide, or in a comment concerning the
lack of evidence that a suicidal person remains forever suicidal, in light of evidence that
the detainee's condition did appear to have changed following an earlier suicide wat.ch,
and since the jury was not precluded from finding that earlier manifestations were so
severe that the defendants should have known that the detainee continued to need
treatment on the date of the suicide. (Worcester House of Correction, Worcester,
Massachusetts)

U.S. Appeals Court
DUE PROCESS
PLACEMENT

Martucci v. Johnson, 944 F.2d 291 (6th Cir. 1991). A former pretrial detainee filed a
Section 1983 action alleging various constitutional violations by sheriff's department
officials in concert with a State Bureau of Investigation agent. The U.S. District Court
entered summary judgment against th~ detainee, and he appealed. The court of appeals
found that conditions imposed on the pretrial detainee during his segregated confinement
were reasonably related to legitimate governmental objectives and aborting his escape and
ensuring his presence at trial and, thus, the segregation did not amount to
unconstitutional "punishment• and, consequently, his placement in segregated
confinement did not, in and of itself, violate due process. In addition, the pretrial detainee
was not denied procedural due process by the lack of a hearing at which he could contest
reasons for his con:f"mement, as he was not subjected to "discipline" for violation of a prison
rule a:nd, thus, could derive no liberty•interest from a regulat.oi:y provision requiring
jailers to provide for disciplinary hearings in cases of alleged violations of prisoner conduct
rules. (Anderson County Jail, Tennessee)
32.35

U.S. Appeals Court
PROTECTION FROM
HARM
PRISONER ON
PRISONER
ASSAULT

Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435 (9th Cir. 1991). A pretrial detainee sued a
county and county jail personnel under Section 1983 after he was placed in a holding cell
with a homosexual resulting in his rape. The U.S. District Court direct:ed a verdict in
favor of all defendants. and the detainee appealed. The court of appeals affirmed. Aft.er
granting rehearing en bane, the court of appeals found that the pretrial detainee
established a violation of his right to personal security under the due process clause of the
Fourt:eenth Amendment by demonstrating either that prison officials acted with deliberate
indifference or that their conduct was so reckless as to be tantamount .to desire to iDflict
harm. In addition, a jury question was presented as to whether jail officials were acting
pursuant to county policies or customs when placing the pretrial detainee in a cell with
the alleged "aggressive homosexual," who subsequently raped him. and whether that
policy or custom exacerbated the danger posed by the aggressi~e homosexual to the
general prison population to such an extent that it amounted to deliberate indifference to
the pretrial detainee's personal security in violation of Section 1983. A second jury
question was presented as to whether the county sheriff was deliberately indifferent to the
pretrial detainee's personal security rights by allowing overcrowding of the county jail and
whether the sheriff acquiesced in the deficient policy which was the moving force behind
the pretrial detainee's rape by his cellmate and which repudiated the detainee's
constitutional right to personal security. A final jury question was presented as to
whether the police captain in charge of the county jail facility developed and implemented
policies that were deliberately indifferent to the pretrial detainee's personal security and
were the moving force in violation of the detainee's constitutional rights and as to whether
the captain's assumption that heterosexual inmates were more able to protect themselves
from "aggressive" homosexuals than "passive" homosexuals exhibited deliberate
indifference to the potential security risk posed by placing an "aggressive" homosexual in
a cell with a heterosexual inmate. (San Diego County's So. Bay Detention Facil., Calif.)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Salazar v. City of Chicago, 940 F.2d 233 (7th Cir. 1991). An administrator of the estate of
a pretrial detainee who died following his arrest on DWI charges brought federal civil
rights and state law claims. The U.S. District Court directed verdict on the civil rights
claims against the arresting and lockup officers and against the city based on police
department policy and entered judgment on jury verdict in favor of the paramedics on the
federal civil rights claims. The district court then dismissed the remaining state law
claims for want of prosecution aft.er denying the administrator's motion to dismiss those
claims without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. and the administrator
appealed. The court of appeals found that the deliberate indifference standard applied to
determining whether the police officers and paramedics deprived the pretrial detainee of
his life without due process of law. However. it was found that the police officers did not
exhibit deliberate indifference to the pretrial detainee's medical needs such that they could
be held liable for depriving him of his life without due process of law when he died several
hours after being arrested for DWI following a traffic accident. There was no evidence
that the detainee displayed any obvious external signs of injury or complained about pain
or mjury, the officers knew that he had refused further treatment at the accident scene
and officers saw the detainee walk under his own power. Although the detainee staggered
and vomited at one point, the behavior was consistent with the fact that he was drunk. In
addition, the paramedics could not be held liable for violating the civil rights of the
pretrial detainee. where there was no evidence that they exhibited deliberate indifference
to his serious medical needs. Prior to refusing further treatment, the detainee allowed
paramedics to conduct a preliminary examination which revealed that his vital signs were
normal and that his skin color and skin moisture were normal and that his pupils were
responsive and equal, and the paramedics were not required to take the detainee to the
hospital to check for internal mjuries simply because he was intoxicated. It was also
found that the district court had discretion to retain jurisdiction over pendent state law
claims where both federal and state law claims had been tried, and the state law claims
remained for retrial after the jury in the first trial failed to return verdicts on the state
law issues. (19th District Police Station. Chicago, illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE
MEDICAL CARE

Simmons v. City of Philadelphia, 947 F.2d 1042 (3rd Cir. 1991). A mother and
administratrix of the estate of a detainee who hung himself in a Philadelphia station
house lockup after having been arrested for intoxication brought an action seeking
damages under Section 1983 and under state law. On the defendants' motions for post
trial relief, following a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff. the United States District
court denied relief and the city and turnkey appealed. The court of appeals found that
evidence made a question for the jury whether the city violated the detainee's rights by
means of custom or policy tainted by deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of
intoxicated detainees and as to whether the city violated the detainee's rights through
deliberately indifferent failure to train officers responsible for intoxicated detainees in
suicide detection and prevention, and was sufficient to support a conclusion that
indifference to the needs of detainees and failure to train was the cause of violation of the
detainee's Fourteenth Amendment rights. In addition, it was found that the Pennsylvania
political subdivision Tort Claims Act did not nullify a city owUnance waiving immunity
from liability arising from the negligence of city police officers. (Sixth Police District,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania}
32.36

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE

Trask v. County of Strafford, 772 F.Supp. 42 (D. N.H. 1991). The mother of a pretrial
detainee who committed suicide brought a Section 1983 action against correctional officers
and the officers moved for summary judgment. The U.S. District Court found that the
allegation that a classification specialist, who int.erviewed the pretrial detainee and
perceived no signs that he would injure himself. and contravened county policy when he
failed to contact a doctor or nurse after learning of the detainee's dependency on alcohol,
would only have supported a negligence claim and did not amount to the deliberate
indifference that would have required remedy under Section 1983. (Strafford County Jail,
New Hampshire)

U.S. Appeals Court
PRO SE LITIGATION
APPOINTED

Tucker v. Randall. 948 F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1991). A pretrial detainee filed a pro se civil
rights complaint against officers at a jail. The U.S. District Court disn;rlssed the
complaint. and the detainee appealed. The court of ,app~allj found thpt the appointment of
counsel would be appropriate in the action 'brought 'by i!he. indigent pretrial detainee
against officers ·of the jail, where the detainee had presented a colorable claim of
deliberat.e indifference to his serious medical needs. the detainee's incarceration in ·a
facility different from that in which the alleged conduct took place rendered him unable to
investigate crucial facts. it was clear that the detainee could not present his case properly.
and the detainee's complaint raised numerous complex constitutional issues. (Kendall
County Jail. Illinois)

ATI'ORNEY

U.S. District Court
PLACEMENT

U.S. v. Gotti. 755 F.Supp. 1159 (E.D. N.Y. 1991). Pretrial detainees obtained an order
directing the warden of a federal facility and the United States Attorney to show cause
why an order releasing them. or in the alternative. modifying the conditions of their
pretrial detention. should not be entered. The U.S. District Court found that the fact that
pretrial detainees who were charged with multiple murders. conspiracy and solicitation to
murder, and obstruction of justice, including witness tampering. did not justify their
placement in administrative detention, in absence of evidence that since the detainees had
been in custody they committed an act or omission which posed a serious threat to
inmates or to the security of the institution. (Metropolitan Correction Center. New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
ACCESS TO COURT

Wayland v. City of Springdale, Ark., 933 F.2d 668 (8th Cir. 1991). A civil rights action
was brought for fatal iiljuries sustained by an arrestee who hung himself in a cell. The
U.S. District Court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. and appeal
was taken. The court of appeals found that material question of fact, as to whether the
arrestee was detained in jail for an unreasonable period of time without being taken
before a judicial officer, precluded entry of summary judgment for the defendants on the
Section 1983 claim. The officials in the municipal police department could be liable under
Section 1983 for detaining the arrestee, even though they were not responsible for the
delay in the arraignment. The officers were under no obligation to continue to hold the
arrestee for an unreasonable period of time. (Springdale Police Department, Arkansas)

1992
U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE

Barber v. City of Salem, Ohio, 953 F.2d 232 (6th Cir. 1992). An administrator of a pretrial
detainee's estate brought a Section 1983 action against police officers and a city based on
the detainee's suicide. The United States District Court granted summary judgment in
favor of the police officers and the city, and the administrator appealed. The appeals
court, affirming the decision, found that there was no clearly established right to suicide
prevention screening or facilities in 1982 when the pretrial detainee hanged himself;
therefore, the law enforcement officers were entitled to qualified immunity from liability
in the action. The city could not be held liable for any failure to better train personnel to
detect and deter jail suicides. Although the pretrial detainee expressed concern over his
job, his engagement, and his ability to obtain custody of his young son due to his arrest,
such a reaction to arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol could not be considered
abnormal and would not have alerted jail authorities to a strong likelihood that the .
detainee would commit suicide in such a manner that failure of the city to take
precautions amounted to deliberate indifference to the detainee's serious medical needs.
(Salem City Jail, Salem, Ohio)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE

Bragado v. City of Zion/Police Dept., 788 F.Supp. 366 (N.D. ID. 1992). An estranged
husband of a detainee who committed suicide while in custody brought action on behalf of
himself and the detainee's estate against officials alleging violation of civil rights. The
defendants brought a motion for summary judgment. The district court found that
material issues of fact as to whether police had actual or constructive knowledge of the
detainee's suicidal condition and whether the response to that condition constituted
"deliberate indifference" precluded granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants.
There was substantial evidence that the detainee suffered from psychological problems of
which the police were aware, or should have been aware. Police reports of two incidents
involving the detainee include stat.ements by her former boyfriend and others that she
threat.ened to commit suicide and may have attempted to do so. When she was arrested,

MEDICAL CARE

32.37

she had cuts on her wrists and had just written a note stating her "life is over now." The
police were clearly aware of both the. cuts and the notle, atid the deWnee threatened·to
commit suicide repeat.edly while she was in her cell. The police cqnsultation with the
State's Attorney's office and the decision to hold the detainee overnight, apparently for her
own safety, also suggest that the police considered her suicidal. The detainee was not
constantly supervised, and it was clearly established at the time of the arrest that the
"deliberate indifference" standard applied to the handling of suicidal pretrial detainees,
and that failure to take special precautions toward such detainees could violate that
standard. (Zion, Illinois, Police Station)
U.S. Appeals Court
DUE PROCESS
MEDICAL CARE
ACCESS TO COURT

Brownlee v. Conine, 957 F.2d 353 (7th Cir. 1992). A prisoner brought a civil rights action
against jail personnel, accompanied by a request to be permitted to proceed in forma
pauperis, complaining about the treatment he received while confined in jail awaiting
trial. The U.S. District Court dismissed the claims as frivolous, and the prisoner
appealed. The court of appeals found that the claim that a jail official turned down
requests to return documents needed for a suit that had been confiscated by a guard, and
that the suit was dismissed because the documents were not returned, was not frivolous
on its face. The detainee's claims that another jail official deliberately loosed mentally ill
inmates on the detainee so that they would assault him, and that another official, in
retaliation for the detainee's having complained about him to the jail doctor, refused to
allow the prisoner to see a dentist though he was in severe pain, were, on their face,
perfectly good claims of violations of the right that the due process clause grants persons
held in jail awaiting trial to be spared punishment until they are convicted, and they
should not have been dismissed as frivolous under the in form.a pauperis statute.
(Wisconsin, Jail)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO
PROVIDE CARE
PRETRIAL
DETENTION

Hall v. Ryan. 957 F.2d 402 (7th Cir. 1992), The estate of a detainee who committed
suicide while being held in jail brought a Section 1983 action against police officers. The
U.S. District Court denied the officers' motion for summary judgment, and appeal was
taken. The court of appeals found that a jury question exist.ed as to whether the police
officers had treated the detainee, who had committed suicide in his cell, with wilful
neglect, so as to lose the benefit of qualified immunity, when they neglected to consult his
file after observing him cursing, flinging his shoes, urinating in his cell, and repeat.edly
flushing the toilet. (City of Decatur Police Department, Illinois)
·

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
CROWDING
MEDICAL CARE

Lile v. Tippecanoe County Jail, 844 F.Supp. 1301 (N.D. Ind. 1992). Pretrial detainees sued
a county jail and jail officials under Section 1983 alleging violations of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments. The district court found that allegations that pretrial detainees
were asked to wat.ch another inmate who had allegedly been brought to the jail because of
mental problems, that another inmate twice attempted to commit suicide, and that the
detainees were required to clean up after an initial suicide attempt, failed to state a
Section 1983 claim against any of the county jail officials under the prevailing standard of
deliberat.e indifference. The court found that there was no evidence that the actions of the
officials were intended to punish the detainees, or that their conduct toward the detainees
amounted to criminal recklessness. The court also found that the conditions of detention,
including overcrowding and lack of ventilation, either alone or in combination, were not a
result of deliberate indifference by jail officials or a policy or custom designed to punish
pretrial detainees. In addition, a pretrial detainee's allegation that the county sheriff
refused to have the county pay for removal of nose polyps could not be characterized as a
deliberat.e effort to punish the detainee in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment,
because it was entirely possible that the surgery could not have been scheduled within the
time the detainee had left at the county jail. Also, there was no indication that the
proposed surgery was a matter of urgency or that the detainee's condition was serious.
Finally, it was found that a county jail official's refusal to open windows after an inmat.e
started a f'ire in a cell block allegedly resulting in a detainee passing out was not int.ended
to punish the detainee in violation of the Eighth Amendment. There was no medical
evidence suggesting that the detainee suffered any injury resulting from the fire or the
presence of smoke in the unit. The officials responded to and extinguished the fire, and
there was no indication as to the length of time smoke was present or that any other
inmates complained about the presence of smoke or suffered any discomfort or injury.
(Tippecanoe County Jail, Indiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE

Manarit.e v. City of Springfield, 957 F.2d 953 (1st Cir. 1992). The estate and minor
daughter of a detainee who committed suicide while in prot.ective custody sued the police
chief and the city under Section 1983 for their alleged failure to prevent the suicide. The
U.S. District Court granted summary judgment for the defendants, and the plaintiff's
appealed. The court of appeals found that the police chief's failure to insist that officers
who implement.eel the suicide prevention policies remove shoelaces from persons in
prot.ective custody was not "deliberat.e indifference" that would permit holding the chief
liable for suicide of a person in protective detention. Although four detainees tried to
hang themselves with shoelaces in the preceding '1line months, the chief's conduct ~ht
have been negligent, but not deliberat.e)y indifferent. In addition, the city's failure to
32.38

provide training and education for police officers in suicide detection and prevention was
not "deliberat.e indifference" in violation of Section 1983, as the city's training and policies
regarding suicide prevention wei, in accord with requiren:ients of state law at the time of
the detainee's suicide, and there was no basis for fqiding that·his·suicide was closely
related to the city's failure to train officers itl suicide preTention. The'prison official's
failure to prevent the suicide of the detainee did not violated the detainee's minor
daught.er's right of familial associational privacy, and thus, afforded her no right of
recovery under Section 1983; the daught.er had no liberty interest prot.etj;ed by the due
process clause in her familial relationship with her father. (Springfield Police Station,
Springfield, Massachusetts)
U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE
SUICIDE ATl'EMPI'

Rich v .. City of Mayfield Heights, 955 F.2d 1092 (6th Cir. 1992). Action was brought
against police officers, paramedics, the city, and the police chief based on a pretrial
detainee's attempt to ·hang himself. The U.S. District Court denied the summary
judgment motion and the officers, city, and police chief appealed. The court of appeals
found that the police officers were entitled to qualified immunity from liability. According
to the court, the defendant police officers reacted immediat.ely by calling for the
paramedics, and the paramedics arrived within minutes. The police officers did not
intentionally deny or delay access to medical care, and there was no recognized
constitutional right that would have required the officers to cut down the detainee
themselves rather than call for medical assistance. (Mayfield Heights City Jail, Ohio)

U.S. Appeals Court
PROTECTION

Swofford v. Mandrell. 969 F.2d 547 (7th Cir. 1992). A pretrial detainee brought an action
against a sheriff to recover for a beating and sexual assault by other inmat.es. The U.S.
District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, and the detainee
appealed. The court of appeals, reversing and remanding; found that a due process claim
was stat.ed against the sheriff by the pretrial detainee's allegations that he was arrest.ed
on suspicion of aggravated sexual assault, placed in a holding cell with ten inmat.es, and
was jumped on, beat, kicked, urinated on, and sodomized with a broom handle. Neither
the sheriff nor the deputy came to the detainee's aid despite repeated screams, no one
inspected or guarded the cell for eight hours, and the sheriff "had to know" that the
actions put the detainee's life in great danger. The court also found that the pretrial
detainee was entitled to appointed counsel for the meritorious Section 1983 action as the
state of mind required for a due process violation was difficult and subtle, the detainee
had been unable to investigate crucial facts during his incarceration, the detainee's claim
was likely to turn on the credibility of witnesses, and the detainee was unable to present
the case adequat.ely without counsel. (Franklin County Jail, Benton, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
CONDfflONS
PUNISHMENT
RIGHTS RETAINED

Washingt.on v. Tinsley, 809 F.Supp. 504 (S.D. Tex. 1992). Pretrial detainees challenged a
city ordinance prohibiting smoking in public buildings, including the county jail. The
district court found that the city ordinance did not violat.e the Constitution and
impermissibly punish pretrial detainees without a trial; the city's ban affected all public
buildings, the ordinance did not disproportionately affect the inmat.es, and the ban
protected the health of smoking and nonsmoking workers and visitors, and eliminated a
fire hazard. (Harris County Jail, Texas)

U.S. District Court
CROWDING
EQUAL PROTECTION
PARITYWITH
SENTENCED

Young v. Keohane, 809 F.Supp. 1185 (M.D. Pa. 1992). A pretrial detainee brought a
Bivens civil rights action alleging that prison officials violated the detainee's constitutional
rights. Cross motions for summary judgment were made. The district court found that
the prison officials were not entitled to qualified immunity on claims that overcrowding
violated the detainee's due process rights. The detainee was confined to one room with up
to eleven other people between twenty-two and twenty-four hours per day without a wash
basin, toilet, table or chairs, or drinking fountain under mo.re .restrictive conditions than
those placed upon convicted prisoners. {United States Penitentiary, Lewisburg,
Pennsylvania)

1993
U.S. District Court
SUICIDE ATl'EMPI'

Camps v. City of Warner Robins, 822 F.Supp. 724 (M.D. Ga. 1993). The administrators of
an arrestee's estate brought a civil rights action against city, county, and various law
enforcement officers, alleging they were deliberately indifferent to the psychological needs
of the arrestee, who lapsed into a coma after a suicide att.empt and died approximately one
year later. On motions for summary judgment, the district court found that the decision
of a municipal holding facility supervisor to transport the arrestee to a county jail rather
than the hospital or a psychiatric facility was, at most, negligent, rather than deliberately
indifferent to the arrestee's serious psychological needs. Although the supervisor was
aware that the arrestee had att.empted suicide while at the det.ention facility, the
supervisor directed officers who transferred. the arrestee to inform jail officials that the
arrestee was acting suicidal, Triable issues msted regarding whether deputies and a
supervising officer at the county jail were aware that the arrestee was suicidal but were
deliberately indifferent to his psychological needs. However, absent any allegation that
32.39

the sheriff was personally involved in any way with the arrestee's suicide att.empt while in
cust.ody at the county jail, or that any failure to train by the sheriff caused this injury, the
sheriff was not subject to supervisory liability. The administrators of the arrestee's estate
failed to create a genuine issue of material fact that the county jail's suicide prevention
policy was inadequate, as would preclude summary judgment for the county of the civil
rights municipal liability claim, where the administrators made only general allegations
that policies regarding suicide prevention were grossly inadequate, and otherwise charged
violations of county policy. (Houston County Jail, Georgia)
U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCHES

Chapman v. Nichols, 989 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1993). Detainees brought a civil rights
action against a sheriff to recover damages after they were subjected to strip searches at a
jail following arrest. The U.S. District Court denied the sheriff's motion for summary
judgment on grounds of qualified immunity, and the sheriff appealed. The appeals court,
affirming and remanding, found that it was clearly established law in late 1991 and early
1992 when the arrests took place, that a blanket policy of strip searches for detainees was
unconstitutional, so that the sheriff was not entitled to qualified immunity. (Creek
County Jail, Sapulpa, Oklahoma)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Davis v. Hall, 992 F.2d 151 (8th Cir. 1993). A pretrial detainee brought a Section 1983
action against jail officials for their alleged deliberate indifference to his medical
condition. The U.S. District Court dismissed, and the detainee appealed. The appeals
court, affirming the decision, found that the pretrial detainee's allegations that he was
denied access to his crutches and to the jail's infirmary, despite a broken ankle, did not
state a deliberate indifference claim under the due process clause. (St. Louis County Jail,
Missouri)

U.S. District Court
EQUAL PROTECTION
PROGRAMS
RIGHTS RETAINED

Donnell C. v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 829 F.Supp. 1016 (N.D.Ill. 1993). School-aged
pretrial detainees in a county jail filed an action against the state Board of Education
concerning alleged inadequate education. The state filed a motion to dismiss. The district
court found that the allegation of inadequate education by the pretrial detainees
sufficiently stated a claim of violation of substantive due process to overcome a motion to
dismiss. The detainees alleged that only about 40% of the detainees in need of special
educational services were receiving the needed services, and that instruction was lacking
on the educational basics of reading and math, or even lacking altogether. The allegations
of inadequate education also sufficiently stated a claim of violation of equal protection to
overcome a motion to dismiss, absent a showing by the state of a rational relationship
between the lack of education and maintaining security. The state merely made
apocryphal claims that the county jail's actions were justified to avoid burdensome
litigation by the prisoners. The detainees had a constitutionally protect.ed due process
property interest in participation in educational programs during detention, and the
interest was not diminished by a probable cause hearing or indictment process undertaken
before confinement. Finally, the court found that the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (IDEA) applied to the school-aged pretrial detainees' claims of inadequate
education, in light of the application of the Act to state correctional facilities by the
Department of Education's Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services, and
absent any showing that the Department's regulations were arbitrary or capricious. (Cook
County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
ACCESS TO COURT
SPEEDY TRIAL

Hallstrom v. City of Garden City, 991 F.2d 1473 (9th Cir. 1993). An arrestee brought a
Section 1983 action against a county and its officials. The U.S. District Court dismissed
the action, and the arrestee appealed. The appeals court found that a four-day
incarceration period between arrest and presentation to a magistrate violated the
arrestee's right to prompt presentation, for the purposes of her Section 1983 action. The
county made no showing of justification for the delay other than as a measure to force her
to cooperate with booking procedures. The refusal to cooperate with booking procedures
did not excuse the ext.ended detention. The court noted that the county and its officials
were not entitled to qualified immunity from either official or personal liability under
Section 1983 for violating the arrestee's right to be taken before a magistrate promptly, as
no objectively reasonable officer could consider a four-day incarceration to be brief,
arraignment to be prompt, or the purpose of coercing compliance with booking procedures
to be sufficiently exigent to justify the delay. (Ada County Jail, Idaho)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE

Hare v. City of Corinth, Miss., 814 F.Supp. 1312 (N.D. Miss. 1993). The estate of a
detainee who committ.ed suicide while in jail sued city and cust.odial officials, under
Section 1983 and the Mississippi Wrongful Death Act. Cross motions for summary
judgment were made. The district court found that material issues of fact, precluding
summary judgment, aist:ed as to whether the detainee displayed a particular
vulnerability to suicide, triggering obligations of cust.odial officers to provide special care.
The officer in charge had made sure that the detainee did not have shoe laces or a belt,
had considered removing the blanket that the detainee later tore up to fashion a noose but
decided she lacked the strength to use the blanket as a suicide device, and had asked that
she be
32.40

wat.ched by a dispat.cher. However, the detainee was in jail for the first time, was under
the influence of a chemical drug, and exhibit.eel severe mood swings including distraught
and frantic activity. In addition, she sat in a fetal-type position during one int.erview,
attempt.ed to destroy a videotape of her int.erview and said she would kill herself if she
had to stay in jail another night. Although the detainee was chemically dependent,
undergoing withdrawal and depression, had made a suicide threat and exhibit.eel unstable
behavior, she was placed alone in a cell not allowing full-time observation. Mat.erial
issues of fact exist.eel on the question of whether the municipality had acquiesced in policy
or cust.om of inaction on the question of suicide prevention; there had been another suicide
in the same jail three months previously, and there was no attempt made to adopt policies
or procedures to prevent subsequent suicides.. However, the ~vidence did not support'a
claim of wrongful death involving the jail suicide; th~ officer's act of placing the detainee
in jail overnight could not have caused the d,evelopment of an irresistible impulse leading
the detainee to take her own life. (Corinth Jail. Mississippi)
U.S. Appeals Court
Hause v. Vaught. 993 F.2d 1079 (4th Cir. 1993). cert. denied. 114 S.Ct. 702. A former
EQUAL PROTECTION pretrial detainee brought a civil rights action challenging his conditions of confm.ement.
PUBIJCATIONS
The U.S. District Court grant.eel summary judgment in favor of the defendant jail officials.
WORK
and the detainee appealed. The appeals court found that restrictions on receiving outside
publications did not violat.e the detainee's First Amendment rights. Limitations placed on
the short-t.erm detainee's constitutional rights when the detainee was prevent.eel from
receiving outside publications while confined were reasonably relat.ed to penological
int.erests in the prevention of smuggling and of preventing fires. Requiring the detainee
to participat.e in the cleaning of a cell-block was not inherently punitive and was relat.ed to
a legitimat.e governmental int.erest in prison cleanliness, and thus was not a violation of
the detainee's right not to be punished before conviction for some crime. (Horry County
Det.ention Cent.er, Conway, South Carolina)
U.S. District Court
SUICIDE

Hood v. Itawamba County, Miss.• 819 F.Supp. 556 (N.D. Miss. 1993). In an action arising
out of a suicide by a detainee. the county moved for summary judgment on Section 1983
claims. The district court found that. assuming that the detainee had shown suicidal
t.endencies, the county was not liable under Section 1983 for the detainee's suicide on the
theory of inadequat.e training, where the sheriffs office did have a policy regarding
cust.odial confinement of detainees who exhibit.eel a possible inclination to self-injury. The
negligence of a county law officer in not adhering to a county policy for custodial care of
the detainee did not support county liability under Section 1983. It was the deviation
from policy and standard practice that contribut.ed to the detainee's suicide, not the policy
or practice itself. (Itawamba County Jail, Mississippi)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
MEDICAL CARE
PUNISHMENT
SUICIDE ATrEMPr
USE OF FORCE

Jones v. Thompson, 818 F.Supp. 1263 (S.D. Ind. 1993). A pretrial detainee filed a Section
1983 civil rights action arising from the use of three-way restraints on the detainee
following his suicide attempt. The district court found that the ext.ended use of three-way
restraints on the detainee, coupled with the absence of medical review or treatment and
the denial of even basic amenities such as personal hygiene and toilet usage constitut.ed
deprivation of his due process rights. Various officers at the jail were found liable for
$5,000 compensatory damages in their individual capacities. In addition, an officer
responsible for management of the jail was liable for $2,000 punitive damages in her
individual capacity and the county was liable for $5,000 compensatory d!UJl&&'e&. (Madison
County Jail. Indiana)
'

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Kidd v. Gowen. 829 F.Supp. 16 (D.N.H. 1993). An action was brought against a county
concerning the strip search of an intoxic:at.ed prot.ective custody detainee. The district
court found that the facility's policy of strip-searching intoxicat.ed prot.ective custody
detainees violat.ed the Fourth Amendment because it permitted such searches without·any
individualized suspicion that a particular detainee might be secreting weapons or other
contraband. The county offered no evidence showing that such detainees were more likely
to secret.e weapons or other contraband or that the threat of self-harm by such detainees
was great.er. (Strafford County House of Correction. New Hampshire)

U.S. District Court
CELLS
SEARCHES
TELEPHONE

Newkirk v. Sheers, 834 F.Supp. 772 (E.D. Pa. 1993). Pretrial detainees brought a suit
against a local government and prison officials in their official and individual capacities
alleging violation of th~ detainees' constitutional rights. On cross motions for summary
judgment, the district court found that the double celling of the detainees in other than
exigent circumstances violat.ed their due process rights. In addition. blanket strip and
body cavity searches of the pretrial detainees violated their Fourth Amendment rights.
and the restricted use of t.elephones during the prison's required initial 48-hour lockdown
period did not violat.e constitutional rights. (Schuylkill County Prison. Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
SPEEDY TRIAL

Rodriguez v. U.S., 847 F.Supp. 281 (D.Puerto Rico 1993). An arrest.ee sued the
government pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act for false arrest after she was held
overnight before being brought to a magistrat.e. The arrest.ee was released the following

32.41

day when additional identification material convinced authorities that she was not the

subject of an arrest warrant from New York. The district court found that the defendant
officers' failure to wait for the arrival of photographs or fingerprint evidence before
conducting the arrest did not make the arrest illegal. In addition, the failure to bring the
arrestee before a magistrate until the morning following her arrest was not proof of failure
to bring the arrestee before a magistrate without undue delay. The arrestee did not show
any statute, regulation or rule in effect at the relevant time that would have required a
magistrate to see her imediately after the arrest. (Hogar Crea, Quisqueya Detention
Facility, Puert.o Rico)
U.S. District Court
SUICIDE

Russell v. Knox County, 826 F.Supp. 20 (D.Me. 1993). A Section 1983 action was brought
against a county, the sheriff and county corrections department officials' for an inmate's
death by suicide. On the defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law at the close
of the plaintiff's case, the district court found that the county was not liable for the
inmate's death, based on an alleged county policy of allowing all involuntary detainees to
retain their shoelaces. In addition, the actions of a line corrections officer at the county
jail, in allegedly delaying his inspection of the inmate's cell as part of a suicide watch for
four minutes while he went to the bathroom, did not manifest any "deliberate indifference"
to the inmate's constitutional rights, such as might support a Section 1983 action against
the officer when the inmate hanged himself in his cell. The officer had never been told
anything by the inmate suggesting that he intended to commit suicide, and the officer was
surprised that the inmate committed suicide. (Knox County Jail, Maine)

U.S. District Court
ACCESS TO COURT
CONDITIONS
MEDICAL CARE

Tucker v. Randall, 840 F.Supp. 1237 (N.D.Ill. 1993). A former pretrial detainee brought a
Section 1983 action against officers of a sheriff's department, alleging inadequate medical
care, inadequate access to the telephone and illegal taping of phone conversation, and
inadequate jail conditions. The district court dismissed, and the detainee appealed. The
appeals court found that the officers did not act with "deliberate indifference" to the
pretrial detainees' medical needs, even if they failed to treat him with ice and aspirin as
instructed by a doctor or delayed over two months in having the injuries viewed again. A
reasonable person would not have viewed the detainee's injuries as being life threatening
or serious. The detainee was transported to a hospital prior to booking and the hospital
doctor did not treat the injuries as serious or life threatening. In addition, the inmate did
not complain of injuries to the booking officer upon arrival. The court found that officers
did not violate clearly established law in 1986, when they allegedly denied the detainee
access to a telephone for the first 67 hours of his incarceration. The alleged secret taping
of the pretrial detainee's telephone calls did not substantially affect his right to confer
with counsel and, therefore, was not a "clearly established" constitutional violation in
1986. The detainee's counsel met with the detainee in person rather than by using the
phone, and the counsel could not recall any complaints by the detainee that the meetings
were less convenient than using the phone. The alleged intensely cold and hot
temperatures in the detainee's cell, and alleged lack of food in the jail, did not meet
"d'1iberate indifference" or "malicious motives" standards so as to defeat the qualmed
immunity defense asserted by the sheriffs department officials. Attempts to remedy
prison conditions, including the use of a space heater, giving the defendant an extra
blanket and clothes to wear, installing fans and opening windows, and giving the detainee
extra snacks, showed something less than a criminally reckless or malicious state of mind.
(Kendall County Jail, Illinois)

TELEPHONE

U.S. Appeals Court
USE OF FORCE

Valencia v. Wiggins, 981 F.2d 1440 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 2998. A pretrial
detainee brought a civil rights action against a jail official, alleging that the official used
excessive force against him during a jail disturbance. The U.S. District Court entered
judgment in favor of the detainee, and the official appealed. The appeals court, affirming
the decision, found that the substantive due process standard, rather than the Fourth
Amendment excessive force standard, applied to the pretrial detainee's excessive force
case, where the alleged use of excessive force occurred three weeks after the initial arrest.
The court also found that the jail official's use of a choke hold and other force to subdue
the nonresisting pretrial detainee during the jail disturbance was a malicious and sadistic
use of force to cause harm, rather than a good-faith effort to maintain or restore security,
violating due process. The use of force rendered the detainee temporarily unconscious.
The officer then struck the detainee while the detainee was handcuffed, kneeling, and
nonresisting. The court found that the jail official's use of force was not objectively ·
reasonable, so that the official was not entitled to qualified immunity in the detainee's
civil rights action, where the detainee suffered severe injuries as a result. The detainee
was awarded damages in the amount of $2,500 from the jail official, and was also granted
approximately $27,600 in attorneys' fees and costs. (Brewster County Jail, Texas)

U.S. Appeals Court
USE OF FORCE

Vineyard v. County of Murray, Ga., 990 F.2d 1207 (11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct.
636. An arrestee brought a Section 1983 action against deputies and a sheriff, alleging
that the defendants violated the arrestee's constitu.tional rights by beating mm. The U.S.
District Court entered judgment on a jury verdict for the arrestee, and the defendants
32.42

appealed. The court of appeals found that the evidence supported a finding that the county's
deliberate indifference to the rights of arrestees to be free frQJD use of excessive force by the
county's deputies was a moving force of the violation of the arrestee's constitutional rights
resulting from the beating by deputies. An expert wi1ness testified that, assuming the
arrestee's version of the beating was true, the beating would not have occurred if county policies
were such that officers knew they must report any confrontations, that others would call the
sheriffs department to report complaints to the department, and that the department would
investigate complaints. (Murray County Sheriffs Department)
1994

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
PUNISHMENT

Collazo-Leon v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons. 855 F.Supp. 530 (D. Puerto Rico 1994). A pretrial
detainee who was placed in solitary confinement as a disciplinary sanction applied for a
writ of habeas corpus. The district court granted the application, fmding that the
disciplinary segregation imposed on the pretrial de~ee as a sanction for an escape attempt
constituted punishment and served no legitimate regulatory purpose, in violation of substantive
due process. (M.D.C. Guaynabo, Puerto Rico) ·

U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE

Hare v. City of Corinth. MS, 22 F.3d 612 (5th Cir. 1994). The estate of a pretrial detainee
who committed suicide brought a civil rights action against jail officials. The U.S. District
Court denied the officials' motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, and
the officials appealed. The appeals court noted that, at the time the pretrial detainee
committed suicide in 1989, jail officials were under a clearly established constitutional duty to
respond to the detainee's serious medical needs, including suicidal tendencies and attempts to
commit suicide, with at least more than deliberate indifference. The pretrial detainee
committed suicide in her cell by hanging herself with a blanket she had tom into strips. The
court found genuine issues of material fact as to whether jail officials knew or should have
known of the detainee's vulnerability to suicide. She was placed in an isolated cell which was
not visually monitored and which could not be reached by a trustee or the dispat.cher on duty.
The court precluded summary judgment in favor of the officials on qualified immunity grounds.
(Corinth City Jail, Mississippi)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE
SUICIDE

Hare v. City of Corinth. MS, 36 F.3d 412 (5th Cir. 1994). The estate of a pretrial detainee
who committed suicide brought a Section 1983 action against jail officials. The U.S.
District Court denied the officials' motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity
grounds and the officials appealed. The appeals court found that when the pretrial detainee
committed suicide in 1989, jail officials were under a clearly established constitutional duty to
provide reasonable care for serious medical needs, unless the deficiency reasonably served a
legitimate governmental objective. The court ruled that whether the officials denied reasonable
medical care for the pretrial detainee and whether a legitimate governmental objective justified
the denial were questions of fact precluding summary judgment on the issue of qualified
immunity. (Corinth City Jail, Mississippi)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
DUE PROCESS

Hines v. Sheahan. 845 F.Supp. 1265 (N.D.Ill. 1994). A pretrial detainee brought a Section
1983 action for alleged constitutional deprivations suffered while incarcerated. On the
defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the district court found that the
pretrial detainee's complaint alleging that he was required to sleep on a mattress on the floor
with rats and roaches failed to state a due process claim based on unconstitutional conditions of
confinement. The complaint did not set forth facts that would support a claim of deliberate
indifference, and failed to allege facts indicating what harm the detainee suffered. (Cook
County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
METHADONE
TREATMENT

Messina v. Mazzeo. 854 F.Supp. 116 (E.D.N.Y. 1994). An arrestee brought a federal civil
rights action against a correctional facility physician. The district court found that the ·
pretrial detainee stated a claim for deliberate indifference to his medical needs by alleging
that the intake physician at the correctional facility denied him methadone which was
allegedly warranted upon the detainee's arrival. If, based on the detainee's condition, it was
medically necessary that he receive the methadone immediately, the physician's action was
more than negligent. (Rikers Island, New York)

U.S. District Court
USE OF FORCE

Newsome v. Webster, 843 F.Supp. 1460 (S.D. Ga. 1994). Jail detainees brought a Section
1983 action against various officers, alleging excessive use of force. Motions were made to
dismiss and for summary judgment. The district court found that the jail detainees failed to
establish the liability of the sheriff, either individually or officially. The detainees did not
allege that the sheriff had personally participated in any force inflict.ed upon them, and their
conclusory statements as to the inadequacy of training and policies towards the use of force did
not show that force was excessive. The detainees had not stated a cause of action for excessive
force against personnel who had arrested them or personnel responsible for their jail
confinement. (Richmond County Jail, Georgia)

32.43

U.S. District Court
RELIGION
VISITS

Pippins v. Adams County Jail. 851 F.Supp. 1228 (C.D. Ill. 1994). A pretrial detainee
brought a civil rights action against a jail and a jail administrator for violating his
constitutional rights. The district court found that the jail's denial of a hard-cover Koran.
because of legitimate security interests of preventing weapons and smuggling. and its failure t.o
provide a substitute main course when serving pork did not support the detainee's claim of
religious discrimination. The pretrial detainee's right to exercise religious freedom was not
violated by the jail's refusal to permit a visit from his Imam minister. who was on parole.
Obvious concerns dictate against allowing paroled felons to meet with incarcerat.ed people. and
jail officials never barred any other Imam from visiting the jail. (Adams County Jail. Illinois)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE

Plasko v. City of Pottsville, 852 F.Supp. 1258 (E.D.-Pa. 1994). Th.e estate of a pretrial
detainee brought claims against a city and city officials under Sections 1983. 1985. and
1986, under the Eighth and Fourt.eenth Amendments, and under Pennsylvania law, to recover
damages resulting from the pretrial detainee's suicide. On motions to dismiss, the district court
found that the estate of the pretrial detainee did not state a claim under Section 1983 against
jail officials for failure to prevent the detainee's suicide, absent an allegation of facts concerning
the mental hist.ory of the detainee or other facts showing that jail officials knew or should have
known the detainee posed a particular risk of suicide and that they disregarded those risks.
Without any reason to believe that the detainee was potentially suicidal, the fact that officials
did not take a belt from the detainee while he was in a holding cell amounted to nothing more
than negligence. The state law claims were also dismissed without prejudice to the plaintiffs
right to reassert them as supplemental claims in an amended complaint in district court or in
state court if no amended complaint was flied. (Pottsville Police Department, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
VISITS

Young v. Larkin. 871 F.Supp. 772 (M.D. Pa. 1994). affirmed, 47 F.3d 1163. A pretrial
detainee filed a civil rights action against prison officials complaining about treatment
during pretrial detention. On the defendants motion for summary judgment the district court
found that the prisoner, who was confmed in a restrictive housing unit, was not denied
constitutional rights by the fact that he was allowed fewer visits with family than other
prisoners in the general population and that he had to visit family with handcuffs on, unlike
prisoners in the general prison population. The restrictions were justified by valid security
concerns. (State Correctional Institution, Dallas. Pennsylvania)
1995

U.S. Appeals Court
CEU.S
CONDITIONS
SUICIDE ATTEMPI'

Anderson v. County of Kem, 45 F.3d 1310 (9th Cir. 1995). Pretrial detainees and
convicted prisoners brought an action against prison officials under Section 1983. The
U.S. District Court refused to enjoin pri.son officials from placing mentally disturbed or
suicidal prisoners in safety cells. The detainees and prisoners appealed. The appeals
court found that the district court did not err in refusing to enjoin the county from ever making
use of safety cells for mentally disturbed or suicidal prisoners. There was ample testimony that
some prisoners became so violent and such a danger to themselves that temporary placement in
a safety cell was needed to deprive the prisoners of all means of harming themselves. The fact
that some prisoners who were violent might be mentally disturbed or suicidal did not detract
from the need. The deprivation of sinks, stand up toilets, and beds for short periods ·of time
during violent episodes was constitutionally justifiable because the inmates were confined to the
safety cells only for short periods of time. (Kem County Jail. California)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
SANITATION

Burton v. Cameron County, Tex.• 884 F.Supp. 234 (S.D. Tex. 1995). A detainee who
suffered from AIDS brought Section 1983 and Texas tort claims actions against a sheriff. a
physician for the jail, and the county for insufficient medical care. On motions for
summary judgment by the county and the physician, the district court found that the physician
under contract to provide medical services to the county jail was not liable to the detainee for
alleged insufficient medical treatment. The detainee was given reasonable medical care and
suffered no adverse effects from the time spent in jail. In addition. the physician was not liable
to the detainee for alleged medical negligence because the detainee was not harmed by any
alleged shortcomings of treatment, and any failure by the infirmary staff to properly provide
the detainee with AZT treatment was not conduct which could be imputed on the physician.
The physician was not liable to the detainee for intentional infliction of emotional distress
regarding allegedly insufficient medical treatment. The administration of a placebo did not
constitute extreme or outrageous conduct and significant care was provided by the infirmary
staff in coordination with the care provided by the detainees private physician. The detainee's
private physician testified that the confinement had not affected the detainee's medical
conditions or his mental health. (Cameron County Jail, Texas)

32M

U.S. Appeals Court
DISCIPLINE
PUNISHMENT
SEPARATION
TELEPHONE
VISITS

Collazo-Leon v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 51 F.3d 315 (1st Cir. 1995). A pretrial detainee
subjected to disciplinary sanctions petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. The U.S.
District Court granted the writ and the government appealed. The appeals court, vacating
and remanding, found that even if a restriction or condition of confmement may be viewed
as having a punitive effect on a pretrial detainee, it is constitutional if it also furthers
some legitimate governmental objective and is not excessive. The court found that 90-day
disciplinary segregation and a six-month revocation of telephone and visitation privileges were
reasonable sanctions for the pretrial detainee's attempted bribe and attempted escape.
(Metropolitan Detention Center, Guaynabo, Puerto Rico)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES
PRIVACY

Ellis y. Meade, 887 F.Supp. 324 (D.Me. 1995). A pretrial detainee filed a § 1983 action against
a jail officer and jail administrator seeking compensation for alleged mistreatment while
confined at the jail. The district court entered judgment for the defendants, fmding that the
male officer's comments to the detainee, "How are you doing little boy," and "How's the little
guy doing," did not constitute sexual harassment. The court also held that the officer's patting
of the detainee on the buttocks did not constitute a "search" for Fourth Amendment purposes
and did not violate the detainee's right to privacy, nor did it constitute "punishment" in
violation of the detainee's due process rights. The court found that the officer's actions of
patting the detainee were immune from liability on an· assault and battery claim and that the
officer's observation of the detainee while naked did not violate the detainee's Fourth
Amendment privacy rights. The court noted that the officer's purpose in patting the inmate
was not to punish, but to placate the detainee, which was rationally connected to the officer's
stated purpose and was not excessive. The court commented that while the officer's actions
were possibly mistaken and ill-advised, they were not so egregious that they exceeded as a
matter of law the scope of any discretion the officer could have possessed. (Penobscot County
Jail, Maine)

U.S. District Court
PROTECTION
USE OF FORCE

Fickes v. Jefferson County, 900 F.Supp. 84 (E.D.Tex. 1995). A pretrial detainee brought a§
1983 action against a county, sheriff, and corrections officials. The district court granted
summary judgment for the defendants in part and denied it in part. The court found that a
corrections officer was at most negligent in leaving mops and brooms in a cell; the detainee
alleged that other inmates beat him with the mops and brooms. The court noted that bringing
an end to the flood that had disrupted several cells was a legitimate government purpose that
justified bringing the mops, brooms and squeegees into the cell. The court held that genuine
issues of fact remained as to whether an officer knew of the ongoing attack when he made his
rounds and chose to do nothing or whether the altercation erupted after the officer made his
rounds, precluding summary judgment. The court held that genuine fact issues remained as to
whether officers used excessive force when removing the detainee to another cell by continuing
to exert force directly on the detainee's neck by means of a headlock. after the detainee
announced he had injured his neck, precluding summary judgment. (Jefferson County Jail,
Texas)

U.S. District Court
VISITS

Flournoy v. Fairman, 897 F.Supp. 350 (N.D.IU. 1995). A pretrial detainee brought§ 1983
actions against a direct.or of a county department of corrections and a social worker at a county
jail. The district court held that denial of visitation when the visiting room was overcrowded,
when visitors refused to produce identification, when visitors did not know on which tier the
detainee was housed, or when insufficient time remained during visiting hours, did not violate
the detainee's right to due process. The court found that such policies and practices were
perfectly sensible and were reasonably related to the need to maintain internal security at the
jail. The court also noted that an Illinois statute governing visitation at state correctional
facilities did not apply to county jails and therefore did not give rise to any protected liberty
interest. (Cook County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE A'ITEMPI'

Litz v. City of Allentown, 896 F.Supp. 1401 (E.D.Pa. 1995). The guardian of a pretrial detainee
who had attempted suicide brought a civil rights action against a city and its police officials.
The district court found that evidence did not show that the detainee had a particular
vulnerability to suicide necessary for liability under § 1983 and that even if individual officers
were liable, the municipality was not liable absent some showing that it somehow
communicated a message of tacit approval or acquiescence in attempted suicides. The court
also found that any improper action by the police chief was at most negligence, which would not
support a § 1983 claim. The court noted that the actions of the detainee, who was intoxicated
and was asking why he could not go home, did not indicate a possibility that he was going to
harm hlmself for the purpose of showing a strong likelihood--rather than a mere possibility-that self-inflicted harm would occur. The court also noted that the city had taken measures to
prevent suicides. The detainee had attempted to hang himself using his socks in a holding cell
at the police department. (Allentown Police Department, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
REIJGION

Muslim y., Frame, 891 F.Supp. 226 (E.D.Pa. 1995). A former pretrial detainee brought a § 1983
action alleging that a county prison rule prohibiting inmates from wearing head gear in
common areas unconstitutionally restricted the Muslim detainee from wearing his prayer cap in
an expression of his faith. The district-court granted summary judgment for the defendants in
part, and denied it in part. The court found that state law-did not give prisoners a h'berty
interest in the unrestricted wearing of religious ornamentation, and that the prison head gear
rule was not the result of religious discrimination. But the court denied summary judgment on
32.45

the issues of whether the ban on head gear substantially burdened the detainee's free exercise
of religion, in violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and whether the head gear
restrictions were the least restrictive means of achieving safe prj.llOllS, The court noted that
prison officials failed to establish that allowing h~ad gear would unduly increase their
administrative costs, that allowing head gear would permit a means of expressing gang
affiliation, and that allowing head gear would impede the need to visually identify prisoners
during movement. (Chester County Prison, Pennsylvania)
U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
FAIWRE TO PROVIDE
CARE

Neville v. True. 900 F.Supp. 972 (N.D.Ill. 1995). A pretrial detainee brought a pro se § 1983
action against officials alleging denial of adequate medical care. The district court granted
summary judgment for the officials, fmding that although the inmate's heart condition,
pacemaker and poor circulation provided evidence of a serious medical need, the officials were
not deliberately indifferent. The court noted thl!,t the inmate was given medical attention, had
several appointments with outside doctors at three different hospitals, the inmate repeatedly
refused the doctor's advice to undergo pacemaker surgery, and the inmate caused certain
injuries to himself and hindered treatment by re-opening healing wounds. (Metropolitan
Correctional Center, Chicago, Federal Bureau of Prisons)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES
USE OF FORCE

Nowosad v. English, 903 F.Supp. 377 (E.D.N.Y. 1995). A plaintiff brought a § 1983 action
against county officials and individuals involved with his arrest and prosecution. The district
court found that the plaintiff stated an excessive force claim, where he alleged that during the
course of his arrest he was pushed, his arm was painfully and roughly twisted, and he suffered
such difficulties as a disabling knee injury, arm, shoulder, back and leg injuries causing pain.
The court found that a strip search did not _violate the Fourth Amendment, where the fact that
the plaintiff was charged with menacing with a weapon provided an element of reasonable
suspicion that another weapon was concealed. (Suffolk County Police Department, New York)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE
USE OF FORCE
BAIL

~ !:·

Village of Orland Park, 906 F.Supp. 1196 (N.D.Ill. 1995). The estate of an arrestee who
committed suicide while in detention brought a civil rights action against a village and police
officers. An eighteen-year-old youth in police custody committed suicide by hanging himself
from the bars of his cell with his t-shirt. The court found that the defendants were entitled to
qualified immunity on claims against them in their official capacity, but the officer who put the
arrest.ee in a chokehold was not entitled to immunity on the claim of excessive force, nor was
immunity available for an officer who failed to intervene in the first officer's takedown of the
arrestee. The court also found that the officers were not entitled to immunity on the claim that
they struck the arrestee in violation of his right to be free from pretrial detention that
constituted punishment; a videotape showed no sign of aggression or violence by the arrestee
before the officer grabbed him and placed him in a chokehold. The court found that the officers
were entitled to immunity on the claim of failure to provide medical care and that the village
had no policy of deliberate indifference as to measures to prevent suicide. The municipality was
not liable for the suicide of the arrestee based on its alleged failure to train police officers
regarding suicide awareness absent any evidence that the municipality had a large suicide
problem which it was ignoring or that statutes or regulations required officers either to perform
CPR upon the arrestee after he was discovered hanging in his cell or to take suicide awareness
classes. The court ruled that the arrestee's sister lacked standing and could not recover under §
1983 for loss of society and companionship. The court left the proximate cause issue to be
determined by a jury. The court ruled that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity on
the claim that they failed to process the arrestee for bail or allow bail to be posted in a timely
fashion, because the right to bail was not a clearly established right at the time of the incident.
(Overland Park Police Department, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
LAW LIBRARIES
CONDITIONS
EXERCISE

Smith !:· Harvey County Jail, 889 F.Supp. 426 (D.Kan. 1995). A pretrial detainee filed a § 1983
suit against jail officials alleging violation of his rights by the provision of inadequate medical
care, improper diet, denial of access to a law library, and denial of outdoor exercise. The
district court dismissed the case. The court held that serving plain but nutritious food did not
violate the detainee's constitutional rights; the detainee had complained of portion size, the food
selected and food preparation. 'lhe court held that while regular exercise of some type is crucial
for the psychological and physical fitness of inmates, determining what is adequate exercise will
depend on the circumstances of each case, including the physical characteristics of the cell and
jail, and the average length of stay of inmates. 'lhe court found no violation from the denial of
outdoor exercise because the detainee had access to printed instructions for calisthenics, the jail
made some recreational materials available to detainees, the average stay of a detainee was
seven days (although the plaintiff in this case spent nearly six months in confinement), the jail
was not crowded during his stay at the jail, and the detainee exercised in his cell at least part
of the time he was confined. 'lhe court noted that where a prisoner has a reasonable
opporbmity for exercise and does not allege any significant physical deterioration, there is no
Eighth Amendment violation. The court held that the detainee's rights were not violated by the
refusal of the jail to allow him access to the county law library, which was located in the same
building but which was not secure. 'lh.e detainee was represented by counsel throughout his
pretrial det.en1ion, removing any need for the county jail to allow him access to materials in the
law library to prepare his defense. The county also granted the detainee's requests for copies of
legal materials. (Harvey County Jail, Kansas)

32.46

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
SANITATION
EXERCISE
CROWDING

Stone-El v. Sheahan, 914- F.Supp. 202 (N.D.Ill. 1995). A pretrial detainee brought a§ 1983 civil
rights action against a sheriff. executive director of the county department of corrections, and
the superintendent of the county jail. The detainee alleged that various conditions of his
confinement violated his right to due process. The district court granted the defendants' motion
to dismiss. The court found that the defendants had not personally caused the conditions at the
jail, nor could they limit the number of pretrial detainees assigned there or appropriate funds to
improve conditions. The court also found that the detainee failea to allege conditions of
confinement serious enough to violate the objective component of a due process claim. The
detainee had asserted that he had slept on the floor without a mattress, that the jail was noisy,
that the jail lacked showers. that he was not able to maintain his personal hygiene, that
ventilation was poor, and that inadequate security permitted gangs to intimidate him. The
detainee also alleged a lack of exercise opportunities, but the court found that even dramatic
restrictions on outdoor exercise do not violate due process as long as detainees have ample
opportunities to participate in indoor activity. The court noted that the detainee failed to allege
any harm caused by the poor ventilation or any adverse health effects from the alleged lack of
exercise. (Cook County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
ACCESS TO COURTS

Turiano v. Schnarrs. 904- F.Supp. 4-00 (M.D.Pa. 1995). A§ 1983 action was filed by an inmate
alleging he was denied meaningful access to courts while a pretrial detainee in a county jail.
The district court found that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment in
favor of the jail officials. The county jail law library did not contain volumes one through 700
of the Federal Supplement, volumes one through 800 of the Federal Reporter Second Series.
contained only two volumes of the Supreme Court Reporter, and contained no volumes of Title
4-2 of the United States Code or any federal indices; the court found this to be inadequate to
provide meaningful access to courts. The court also found the county's paging system
inadequate; the system allows inmates to obtain law books or copies of cases and other legal
reference materials upon request from the county courthouse library, but no list of books
available was ever provided to inmates and officials did not make inmates aware of the system.
(Huntingdon County Jail, Pennsylvania)

LAW LIBRARY

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
MEDICAL CARE
STAFFING

Wilson v. Cook County Bd. of Commissioners, 878 F.Supp. 1163 (N.D. Ill. 1995). A
pretrial detainee brought a Section 1983 action against detention facility officials and a
county board of commissioners alleging due process violations. On the defendants' motions
to dismiss, the district court found that the failure to allege remedial injury warranted the
dismissal of claims alleging overcrowding, inadequate staffing, inadequate opportunity for
exercise, and inadequate grievance procedures. However, the court found that the pretrial
detainee's allegations that the detention facility failed to provide clean sheets, clothing, and a
towel, had a limited number of toilets, showers, and sinks, and lacked sufficient toilet paper,
soap, and cleaning materials stated a claim for violation of due process, where these conditions
were probably not reasonably related to any legitimate government objective. The detainees
allegation that the facility lacked adequate ventilation was sufficient to state a claim for due
process violation. The detainee's allegation that the detention facility failed to treat the
detainee's back injury and that the facility's officials were aware that the detainee's sleeping
conditions could adversely affect the injury also stated a claim for violation of due process. The
pretrial detainee's allegation that the detention facility served inadequate food under
unsanitary conditions and that facility officials were aware.of such conditions and the fact that
the conditions created an excessive risk. to the detainee's health and safety stated a claim for
violation of due process. The detainee's allegation that the board of commissioners failed to
appropriate and provide funds sufficient to improve the conditions at the detention facility,
despite its knowledge of unconstitutional conditions at the facility, and that the board was
deliberately indifferent to the excessive risk. created by the conditions, adequately stated a due
process claim against the board. (Cook. County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
PROTECTION
SEPARATION

~ :!·

Rhodes, 64 F.3d 285 (7th Cir. 1995). A pretrial detainee filed a pro se § 1983 action
against guards, alleging violation of her due process rights. The district court dismissed in part
and entered summary judgment for the guards in part. The appeals court affirmed in part and
reversed in part, finding that allegations that a guard showed deliberate indifference for the
detainee's rights by placing her in a cell with a mentally ill inmate who presented an imminent
potential for assault were sufficient to state a § 1983 claim. But the appeals court found that
allegations that a guard failed to supervise subordinate guards and allowed them to provide
inadequate medical care failed to state a claim. The court also found that the detainee was not
entitled to a presegregation hearing; she had been segregated for her own protection and that of
other inmates after a verbal confrontation. (Sangamon County Jail, Illinois)

1996

U.S. District Court
ACCESS TO COURI'S

Casteel v. Pieschek., 94-4- F.Supp. 74-8 (E.D.Wis. 1996). Detainees brought a§ 1983 action
against a county jail and jail officials, alleging violation of their right to meaningful
access to courts and other claims. 'Ihe district court granted summary judgment for the
defendants, finding that providing the detainees with weekly access to law h"brary materials
and letter access to legal assistance organizations did not violate the detainees' right to
meaningful access to courts. 'Ihe court noted that physical access to a law h"brary was not
provided and that the detainees were not provided with assistance of counsel for various civil
claims. (Brown County Jail, Wisconsin)
·
32.47

U.S. District Court
DISCIPLINE
DUE PROCESS
PROTECTION

Cephas v. Truitt. 940 F.Supp. 674 (D.Del. 1996). A pretrial detainee who had been
placed in administrative segregation for 18 days pending a disciplinary hearing brought
a federal civil rights action against a jail official, alleging violation of his due process
rights. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding that the
imposition of administrative segregation prior t.o a disciplinary hearing did not violate a
protected liberty interest. The court held that the 15-day isolation sanction given to the
detainee following a disciplinary hearing did not violate a protected liberty interest and that the
punishment was reasonably related to legitimate objectives and was permissible; nothing
indicated that the sanction was arbitrary or disproportionate to the offense. The court also
found that the detainee, who was assaulted by other inmates while in administrative
segregation, failed to establish that the jail official had been deliberately indifferent to the risk
that the detainee would be assaulted. According to the court, nothing indicated that the official
was actually aware of any risk prior to the assault or that the risk was apparent, nor that the
delay of the disciplinary hearing, during which time the detainee was kept in segregation, was
unreasonable. (Sussex Correctional Institution, Delaware)

U.S. District Court
PROTECTION
INTAKE SCREENING

Clark v. McMillin. 932 F.Supp. 789 (S.D.Miss. 1996). A wrongful death suit alleging state law
and federal civil rights claims was brought against a sheriff, a county, and an wmamed
defendant seeking damages for the death of a pretrial detainee who was assaulted and killed by
his cellmate. The district court remanded the state law claims and dismissed the federal
claims. The court found that the sheriff's policy of checking cells containing pretrial detainees
on suicide watch every 15 minutes was not deliberate indifference, even though 15 minutes was
more than enough time for one inmate to kill another. The court found that although the
sheriff did have constructive knowledge of the perpetrator's violent propensities from county
records, the sheriff did not have actual knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm to the
victim. The plaintiffs had alleged that the county had no policy to safeguard inmates from
attacks from other inmates, that the sheriff failed to place the perpetrator in a unit for violent
felons, that the county failed to properly screen inmates for violent propensities, and that the
county failed or refused to provide adequate medical care to the victim after the assault. (Hinds
County Detention Center, Mississippi)

U.S. District Court

Dorsey v. St. Joseph Co. Jail Officials. 910 F.Supp. 1343 (N.D.Ind. 1996). A former pretrial
detainee brought a civil rights action under § 1983 against county jail officials, alleging they
failed to protect him, used excessive force, and failed to meet his medical needs. The court
found that the inmate failed to show that jail officials failed to provide adequate medical
treatment for his diabetes and his broken arm; medical records indicated that he was treated by
a physician but that he was belligerent and uncooperative and that he refused treatment on
several occasions. The court found that jail officials did not fail t.o protect the inmate from
other prisoners, as all inmates could not be accommodated in single cell housing to ensure their
safety.· When jail officials attempted to transfer the inmate to a single cell for his own
protection the inmate became recalcitrant and belligerent; the court found that jail officials did
not use excessive force when transferring him to the single cell. (St. Joseph County Jail,
Indiana)

MEDICAL CARE
USE OF FORCE
PROTECTION

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Dugas v. Jefferson County. 931 F.Supp. 1315 (E.D.Tex. 1996). A female arrestee brought a §
1983 action against a county and a sheriff's deputy claiming that a strip search ordered by the
deputy following her arrest for a misdemeanor violated her Fourth Amendment rights. The
district court denied the deputy's motion for summary judgment, finding that he was not
entitled t.o a qualified immunity defense because it was clear at the time of the deputy's order
that a strip search of a minor offense arrestee violated the Fourth Amendment. The court also
found that the deputy was not shielded from civil liability for illegal acts simply because he was
following orders. (Jefferson County Jail, Texas)

U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE

Estate of Cole by Pardue v. Fromm, 94 F.3d 254 (7th Cir. 1996). The estate and mother
of a pretrial detainee who committed suicide in a psychiatric ward brought a civil rights
action in state court against nurses and a psychiatrist who assisted in the detainee's treatment.
After removal by the defendants to federal court the district court granted them summary
judgment. The appeals court affirmed, finding that allegations of medical malpractice were not
sufficient to sustain a § 1983 action. The court also held that the plaintiffs failed to
demonstrate that the defendants were subjectively aware that the detainee would try t.o commit
suicide. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate deliberate indifference by the
psychiatrist's classification of the detainee as a potential suicide risk rather than a high suicide
risk. Although the defendants conceded that plastic bags such as the one the detainee used to
asphyxiate himself posed a substantial risk to a patient intent on suicide, the court found that
the fact that the detainee was placed on the lower of two levels of suicide precautions showed a
subjective conclusion that the detainee did not intend to kill himself. The court noted that
determining the point at which a detainee's right under the due process clause to be free from
bodily restraint during psychiatric hospitalization intersects with the right t.o be restrained so
he will not harm himself is a matter of medical judgment. (Marion County Jail and Wishard
Memorial Psychiatric Ward, Indiana)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE

Estate of Frank v. City of Beaver Dam, 921 F.Supp. 590 (E.D.W1S. 1996). The personal
representative of the estate of a detainee who committed suicide in jail brought a § 1983 action
against police officers who had contact with the detainee prior t.o his suicide. The district court

32.48

found that the officers enjoyed qualified immunity and dismissed the case. The court noted
that although one officer was told that the detainee had exhibited severe mood swings on his
way to jail, the detainee did not make any threats, cause any disturbances, stagger, slur his
speech or do anything bizarre which would have lead the officer to believe he was suicidal. The
court also noted that the only contact a jail officer had with the detainee was while escorting
him to his cell and the officer only observed that the detainee was quiet and did not respond to
a question she asked him. According to the court, the detainee's behavior did not suggest that
he was in imminent danger to himself since he answered questions directly and clearly, walked
to his cell without problems, ate breakfast and engaged in a telephone conversation. (Dodge
County Jail, Wisconsin)
U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
CLOTHING
VISITS

Gerakaris v. Champagne, 913 F.Supp. 646 (D.Mass. 1996). A plaintiff who was detained at a
local police station and transferred to a county jail sued officials and law enforcement officers
alleging he was threatened and intimidated in an attempt to prevent him from testifying
against a public official, his father-in-law, in a grand jury investigation of professional
misconduct. The district court held that the plaintiff stated a § 1983 claim based on alleged
denial of free speech, deprivation of medical care, delayed booking, and conspiracy. Following
an alleged concerted period of intimidation seeking to dissuade him from cooperating with the
investigation of his father-in-law, the plaintiff was arrested at his mother's home for allegedly
violating a restraining order. The plaintiff informed the arresting officers that he suffered from
several illnesses, for which he was taking prescriptions. The officers refused to permit the
plaintiff to retrieve his medications before transporting him to the police station. During his
booking at the police station, the plaintiff complained again about his medical and dietary
needs. Law enforcement officers deliberately delayed the plaintiffs booking until after the local
court had closed, denying him an immediate appearance before a judge. Unable to make bail,
the plaintiff was transported to the county jail later that evening, remaining there for two
nights. The plaintiff alleged that jail staff and officials abused him during his confmement by
refusing to allow him to wear warm clothing, placing him in solitary confinement, misleading
visitors about his location and thereby denying his visitation rights, denying him prescription
medication, and providing him with inadequate food during his 40-hour confinement. The court
noted that although the plaintiffs period of confmement was short, it must be measured against
the intolerability of the conditions endured and the egregriousness of the defendants' conduct.
(Peabody Police StatiOIV'Middleton House of Correction, Massachusetts)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONDITIONS
ACCESS TO COURTS
RECREATION

Hamilton.!· ~ 74 F.3d 99 (5th Cir. 1996). A parolee who was detained for an alleged new
offense brought a § 1983 action challenging conditions of confinement at a city jail. The district
court dismissed the case as frivolous and the parolee appealed. The appeals court affirmed,
ruling that the alleged conditions did not violate the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments. The
parolee had alleged that he was denied visitation, recreation, mail, legal materials, sheets, and
showers for a three-day period, but the court found that the conditions were not
unconstitutional and that the parolee presented no evidence that the defendants intended to
punish the parolee for his pending charges. (DeSoto City Jail, Texas)

MAIL
TELEPHONE

U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE

Hare v. City of Corinth, MS, 74 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 1996). The estate of a detainee who
committed suicide while in custody brought a § 1983 action against a city and its officials. The
district court denied the officials' motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds
and the officials appealed. The appeals court dismissed the appeal, but after rehearing the case
en bane the appeals court vacated and remanded, finding that an episodic act or omission of a
jail official does not violate a pretrial detainee's due process right to medical care or protection
from suicide unless the official acted or failed to act with subjective deliberate indifference.
(City Jail, Corinth, Mississippi)

U.S. District Court

Hare v. City of Corinth. Miss., 949 F. Supp. 456 (N.D. Miss. 1996). The estate of a
detainee who committed suicide brought a § 1983 action against the City of Corinth and police
officers. The district court denied the police officers' motion for summary judgment on qualified
immunity grounds and the appeals court dismissed the appeal. Hearing the case en bane, the
court of appeals vacated and remanded. On remand, the district court denied the officers'
motion for summary judgment, finding that genuine issues of material fact existed as to
whether the officers had actual knowledge of an objectively substantial risk of harm to the
detainee, and whether they responded to that risk with deliberate indifference. The court noted
that law was clearly established in 1989 that the officers had a minimum duty to the detainee
not to be subjectively aware of a substantial risk of harm to the detainee and then be
deliberately indifferent to her serious medical needs. (City of Corinth, Mississippi)

FAILURE TO

PROTECT

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Kaufman v. Carter, 952 F.Supp. 520 (W.D.Mich. 1996). A parole violator who was a
bilateral amputee had been confined in a county jail while awaiting trial on new
charges. The detainee brought a § 1983 action against county officials and staff alleging
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment,
violation of the Rehabilitation Act and violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).
The district court held that the sheriff and county were entitled to summary judgment on the
deliberate indifference claim, but that issues remained as to whether nurses failed to provide
the inmate with materials needed to maintain the stumps of bis amputated legs in a condition
that would accept prostheses. The detainee had requested rubbing alcohol BO that he could
clean his prosthetic limbs and "ace wraps" BO that he could maintain the size of his leg stumps
32.49

while not wearing his prosthesis. As a result of being denied these materials, the detainee was
not able to walk until he was able to obtain new prostheses to fit his enlarged stumps. The
court found that the Rehabilitation Act and ADA applied to state correctional facilities, and that
summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds was precluded with respect to
Rehabilitation Act and ADA claims. (Kalamazoo County Jail, Michigan)
U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCHES

Kelly v. Foti, 77 F.3d 819 (5th Cir. 1996). An arrestee filed a§ 1983 action against police and
jail officials asserting constitutional and tort claims. The district court denied the defendants'
motion for summary judgment and they appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part,
dismissed in part, and remanded the case. The appeals court held that the conduct of the
arrestee in making an illegal left tum and failing to present a driver's license did not create
reasonable suspicion that she was hiding weapons or contraband so as to justify a strip search
for the purposes of a police officer's claim of qualified immunity. The court found that the strip
search was not objectively reasonable under the law at the time of the search, absent
individualized suspicion. The court ruled that jail officials may strip search a person arrested
for a minor offense and detained pending posting of bond only if they possess reasonable
suspicion based on such factors as the nature of the offense, the arrestee's appearance and
conduct, or a prior arrest record. The court noted that although the arrestee lacked photograph
identification and failed to post bond within five hours, she readily identified herself, explained
that she had left her driver's license in her hotel room, cooperated with police, and presented a
purse full of other nonphoto identification. (City of New Orleans and Sheriff)

U.S. Appeals Court
TRANSFER
PUNISHMENT

Laza y. Reish. 84 F.3d 578 (2nd Cir. 1996). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a
warden alleging that he had been subjected to unlawful punishment as a pretrial detainee
when he was transferred from state prison and held in a federal prison to await trial on federal
charges. The district court dismissed the suit and the appeals court affirmed, ruling that since
the prisoner had not completed his state sentence at the time he was held, he had not been a
pretrial detainee with a due process right to freedom from punishment under Belly. Wolfish.
The prisoner assaulted a counselor who was attempting to conduct a routine search of his cell
and was transferred two days later from a federal metropolitan correctional facility to a federal
correctional institution where he was placed in administrative detention. (Metropolitan
Correctional Center, Federal Bureau of Prisons, New York)

U.S. District Court
USE OF FORCE

Mathie v. Fries. 935 F.Supp. 1284 (E.D.N.Y. 1996). A form.er inmate of a county
correctional facility brought an action against the facility's Director of Security alleging
that the director sexually abused him while he was confined as a pretrial detainee. The district
court entered judgment for the inmate, fmding that evidence was sufficient to support findings
that the director repeatedly sexually abused the inmate and that the director sodomized the
inmate while he was handcuffed to pipes in the security office. The court found that these acts
violated the inmate's due process rights and that the director was not qualifiedly immune from
§ 1983 claims, awarding compensatory damages of $250,000 and punitive damages of $500,000.
The court noted that evidence showed that the inmate sustained physical injury to his anal
area and suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of sexual abuse by the
director. The court called the director's action an outrageous abuse of power and authority.
(Suffolk County Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Richerson v. Lexingt.on Fayette Urban County Government. 958 F.Supp. 299 (E.D.Ky.
1996). A pretrial detainee brought a civil rights action challenging a strip search that
was conducted when he returned from a courtroom. The district court entered judgment for the
defendants, finding that it was reasonable to have a policy of strip searching detainees, even
those held for minor, nonviolent traffic offenses, upon their return from a courtroom to the
general population of the detention center. According to the court, when pretrial detainees,
including those charged with minor, nonviolent offenses, are kept in the detention center's
general population prior to arraignment and are then put in a position where exposure to the
general public presents a very real danger of contraband being passed, the policy of strip
searching is justified and reasonable. (Fayette County Detention Center, Kentucky)

U.S. District Court

Robey v. Chester County. 946 F.Supp. 333 (E.D.Pa. 1996). The mother and the minor
children of a pretrial detainee who committed suicide after being taken off of a suicide
wat.ch brought civil rights and state law claims against the county, its board of prison
inspectors, two wardens, a prison counselor and a psychologist who treated the detainee. The
district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment in part and denied in part.
The court ruled that the wardens' failure to institute disciplinary proceedings following the
detainee's suicide did not constitute knowing acquiescence so as to preclude qualified immunity.
'Ihe court also held that the prison counselor's failure to respond to requests to see the detainee
was not a violation of clearly established rights so as to preclude qualified immunity, if the
counselor had not known of the detainee's prior suicide attempt until after the detainee's death.
However, the court ruled that reasonable jurors could find that the psychologist acted with
deh"berate indifference to the detainee's psychological needs so as to be liable under a§ 1983
civil rights claim, precluding summary judgment. The psychologist knew when the detainee
entered the prison of his prior suicide attempt and that the detainee was diagnosed upon
ent.ering the prison as suffering from major depression as well as impaired insights and
judgment. 'Ihe psychologist apparently ordered the discontinuation of the suicide wat.ch and
failed to perform a promised follow-up check. The court found evidence supporting a punitive

FAILURE TO

PROTECT

32.50

damage claim only against the psychologist and that the county and board of prison directors
had sovereign immunity from state law claims. (Chester County Prison, Pennsylvania)
U.S. Appeals Court
CONDITIONS
SANITATION

Smithy. Copeland, 87 F.3d 265 (8th Cir. 1996). A pretrial detainee brought a federal civil
rights action against jail officials alleging the use of excessive force and challenging his
conditions of confinement. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants on
several issues and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed, fmding that the inmate's
allegations that he was exposed to raw sewage for four days due to an overflowing toilet failed
to state a constitutional claim based on conditions of confmement. The court found that having
to endure the stench of his own feces and urine for four days amounted to a de minimis
imposition on detainee's rights, and noted that the inmate did not dispute the assertion by jail
officials that he was offered the opportunity to clean up the mess himself. (Cape Girardeau
County Jail, Missouri)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Swain v. Spinney. 932 F.Supp. 25 (D.Mass. 1996) reversed in part 117 F.3d 1. A female
arrestee brought a § 1983 action against a city and several of its police officials alleging that
her rights were violated by a strip search conducted by a female officer. The court granted
summary judgment for the defendants, fmding that the search did not violate the arrestee's
constitutional rights and that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. The court
also found that the arrestee failed to show that the city was deliberately indifferent to the
constitutional rights of its citizens. Before her arrest, an officer witnessed the arrestee try to
discard concealed contraband (marijuana) and police legitimately discovered rolling papers in
her pocketbook after her arrest. The strip search was conducted out of public view in front of
only one person of the same sex, and the arrestee was never touched during the procedure.
(North Reading Police Station, Massachusetts)

U.S. Appeals Court
TELEPHONE
PRIVACY

U.S. v. Van Poyck, 77 F.3d 285 (9th Cir. 1996). After a defendant was convicted in federal
court of armed robbery and conspiracy to commit armed bank robbery he appealed, challenging
the audiotaping of his telephone calls while he was confmed as a pretrial detainee. The appeals
court found that audiotaping of the calls did not implicate the Fourth Amendment and did not
violate Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act. The court found that the
detainee did not have a subjective or reasonable expectation of privacy in his telephone calls at
a jail, that the detainee knew of the policy of audiotaping calls before he made his first phone
call, that the detainee signed a form warning him of monitoring and taping, and that the
detainee read signs about the phones warning of taping and read a prisoners' manual that
warned of the recordings. (Metl'opolitan Detention Center, Los Angeles, Federal Bureau of
Prisons)

U.S. District Court
PRIVACY

U.S. v. Walton. 935 F.Supp. 1161 (D.Kan. 1996). A defendant in a criminal case who
was a detainee in a correctional institution moved to suppress a letter which was seized
by a correctional officer. The district court ruled that the detainee did not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the contents of an envelope he gave to an officer to be delivered to a
visitor. The court found that the detainee's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated when
the officer opened the envelope and read the letter it contained, where the envelope was not
sealed, was not properly marked as legal mail, was addressed to the detainee rather than a
court or his lawyer, and where the detainee knowingly and voluntarily gave the envelope to the
officer. (Corrections Corporation of America's Leavenworth Detention Center, Kansas)

U.S. Appeals Court
USE OF FORCE

Wilson Y! Williams. 83 F.3d 807 (7th Cir. 1996). A pretl'ial detainee brought a civil rights
action against a correctional officer for use of allegedly excessive force. The district court
granted summary judgment for the officer and an appeals court reversed the decision. On
remand, the district court entered judgment on a jury verdict in favor of the officer and the
detainee appealed. The appeals court reversed the district court decision. The appeals court
found that a jury could properly consider objective factors in determining intent, particularly
where the court listed a variety of factors that could be used to infer an intent to punish. The
detainee alleged that the correctional officer attacked him without provocation, continued to
beat him while he was restrained by other correctional officers, and attacked him again when
he was restrained in a different area of the jail. The appeals court ruled that the jury
instruction constituted an error. The jury was instructed to determine, through objective
means, whether the prohibited punitive intent was present, but was then told even if this was
found, a reasonable good faith punitive intent would excuse it. (Cook County Jail, Illinois)

1997
U.S. District Court
DISCRIMINATION
FALSE ARREST

Astrada v. Howard, 979 F.Supp. 90 (D.Conn. 1997). After the plaintiff had burst into a police
station, banged frantically on a desk window and brandished a smoking pistol, four
individuals arrived at the station and claimed that the plaintiff fired his pistol at them.
The plaintiff was held in a room in the station while police attempted to sort out the events.
The plaintiff was eventually arrested and charged with reckless endangerment, but after a year
the charge was nolled. The plaintiff sued police officials under§ 1981 and§ 1983 claiming
intentional infliction of emotional distress, false arrest and racial discrimination. The district
court held that the plaintiff failed to show a causal link between race and the alleged
32.51

discriminat.ory actions. The court found that detaining the plaintiff in an allegedly "scummy"
room at the police station did not amount t.o arrest without a showing of probable cause because
the detention was no more intrusive than was necessary. (West Haven Police Department,
Connecticut)
U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE

Barrie v. Grand County, Utah, 119 F.3d 862 (10th Cir. 1997). A detainee's heirs brought
a civil rights action against a county and various individuals after the pretrial detainee
committed suicide in a county jail. The district court entered summary judgment for the
defendants and the appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the defendants' duty t.o
the detainee was based on the deliberate indifference standard, not objective reasonableness,
and that the defendants did not act with deliberate indifference. The detainee was placed in the
jail's "drunk tank" after being booked, and a deputy noted that he had been drinking alcohol.
The detainee was allowed t.o retain the clothes he was wearing at the time of his arrest, which
included a pair of sweat pants containing a cloth cord t.o cinch the waist of the sweat pants. The
detainee was checked about four hours after he was placed in the cell, and again about two
hours later. An hour later the cell was checked and the detainee was found hanging from the
38-inch draw cord. (Grand County Jail, Utah)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
ACCESS TO COURI'

Carty v. Farrelly, 957 F.Supp. 727 (D.Virgin Islands 1997). Detainees and inmates
housed in a criminal justice complex asked the court t.o find officials in civil contempt of
a consent decree. The district court found that the consent decree comported with the
principles of the Prison Litigation Reform A-ct (PLRA) because it was narrowly drawn,
ext.ended no further than necessary to correct the violation of federal rights, and was the least
intrusive means necessary t.o correct the violations. The court found the officials in contempt for
failing t.o comply with the terms of the consent decree, and continued noncompliance with a
court order requiring officials t.o pay detainees' and inmates' attorney fees. The officials
admitted they never fully complied with the order and failed to make meaningful progress
toward reducing the inmate population. The officials had paid only $50,000 of the $155,000
attorney fees that the court had ordered paid to the National Prison Project of the American
Civil Liberties Union. The court found inmates' were denied meaningful access t.o courts where
the law library at the facility lacked recent volumes of legal reference materials and was not
comprehensive, and because officials at times allowed library access on an ad hoc basis t.o
sentenced inmates only.
The court found that conditions in the criminal justice complex continued to violate the
Eighth Amendment, where the complex housed an average of 168-190 prisoners in a facility
designed 51 short-term detainees, five or six persons were often housed in a single cell, single
cells housed two or more prisoners, and prisoners slept on mattresses on the floor. Crowding
was so severe that prisoners sleeping on the floor often had t.o sleep with their heads against a
toilet, resulting in inmates urinating on one another during the night. The disrepair of
plumbing, heating, ventilation and showers effected the sanitation and health of inmates in
violation of the Eighth Amendment.
According t.o the court, medical care was inadequate in violation of the Eighth Amendment,
where an on-site nurse and physician and two part-time nurses serviced 168 t.o 190 prisoners,
sick call was administered by prison security staff instead of medical staff, prisoners were not
seen promptly as needed, the facility did not maintain adequate equipment for emergencies,
personal hygiene items were not routinely distributed, intake health evaluations were
inadequate, and the facility failed t.o offer out.door access to all inmates.
The courted cited "abominable" treatment of mentally ill inmates at the facility. Mentally ill
inmates were housed t.ogether in clusters with often four or five inmates per cell, the majority of
inmate assaults occurred in the clusters, and correctional staff taunted mentally ill inmates,
rewarding them with cigarettes after instructing them t.o pull down their pants and hold their
crotch, or crawl across the floor. According t.o the court, when overcrowding and commingling of
mentally ill inmates with the general population contributes to inmate-to-inmate violence, the
failure t.o remedy the situation constitutes deliberate indifference t.o the inmates' basic safety
and security in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The court held that a officials may not use
restraints on mentally ill inmates as matter of course, but may restrain them only under special
circumstances.
The court also cited the failure of officials t.o house inmates according t.o an objectively
based classification system and the failure t.o maintain separate housing for violent inmates.
(Criminal Justice Complex, St. Thomas, Virgin Islands)

MEDICAL CARE

U.S. District Court
USE OF FORCE
CONDITIONS

Casaburro v. Giuliani, 986 F.Supp. 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). A pretrial detainee alleged that he
was subjected t.o cruel and unusual punishment because he was handcuffed in a holding cell
for over 7 hours. According t.o the detainee, he was placed in a holding cage "that had no seats,
no water, poor ventilation." He had notified officers that he was under a chiropract.or's care for
back problems but was allegedly tightly handcuffed behind his back anyway. After he
complained he was re-handcuffed t.o a hook approximately 12 inches off of the floor. After
complaining about this he was allegedly cuffed t.o the front of the cell in a standing position.
The district court found that the detainee stated a § 1983 claim against
officers, the police department and the city. (City of New York)

32.52

U.S. District Court
SEX OFFENDERS
RIGHT OF PRIVACY

Cutshall v. Sundquist. 980 F.Supp. 928 (M.D.Tenn. 1997). A sex offender brought an
action which challenged the constitutionality of the Tennessee Sexual Offender
Registration and Monitoring Act. The district court found that the Act's requirement that
offenders register with the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (TBO did not trigger protections
of procedural due process. But the court also held that the Act's discretionary disclosure
provisions violated due process. According to the court. the additional injury to a convicted sex
offender's reputation which would result from the disclosure of registry information to the
public under the provisions of the Act, coupled with the loss of rights to privacy and
employment, satisfied the "stigma plus" test and thus the offender deserved the protection of
procedural due process before law enforcement could disclose information about him to those
not involved with law enforcement. The court found that the state's interest in public safety did
not outweigh the offender's interest in not having false information disseminated. The Act
allowed dissemination of information from the registry without the control of anyone other than
local law enforcement and without an opportunity for a hearing. The court found that when a
person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what a government is
doing to him, notice and the opportunity to be heard are essential. (Tennessee)

U.S. District Court
ACCESS TO COURT
TRANSFER

Dodson v. Reno. 958 F.Supp. 49 (D.Puerto Rico 1997). An inmate in a federal pretrial
detention facility brought a Bivens action against facility officials challenging his
proposed transfer to a segregated wing of a federal penitentiary which also housed
members of a gang that posed a threat to his life. The district court granted summary judgment
for the officials, finding that the proposed transfer did not violate the inmate's Eighth
Amendment rights and that the inmate was not entitled to an injunction preventing prison
officials from transferring him to any penitentiary in the United States. The court noted that
the proposed facility offered an unusually high level of security for inmates whose lives were
threatened by other inmates. making the transfer a reasonable measure designed to ensure the
inmate's safety. The court also held that denying the inmate physical access to a prison law
library did not deny him his right of access to courts. (Metropolitan Detention Ctr., Puerto Rico)

U.S. District Court
PRISONER ON
PRISONER ASSAULT
STAFFING
SUPERVISION

Earrey v. Chickasaw County. Miss., 965 F.Supp. 870 (N.D.Miss. 1997). An inmate
detained in a county jail as the result of an alleged parole violation sued the county
because he was beaten by other inmates while detained. The district court held that the
detained parolee could not avail himself of Fourteenth Amendment claims, but could
pursue a failure to protect claim under the Eighth Amendment. The court denied
summary judgment for the county, finding it was precluded by genuine issues of material fact
as to the existence of subjective knowledge of risk on the part of the jail and the sheriff. The
parolee and most other persons housed at the jail were allowed to leave the jail during the day
to work and returned in the evenings. According to jail policy, only one jailer was provided for
the facility, and he was required to be present at the jail twenty-four hours a day, seven days a
week. The jailer was only allowed to leave the jail when deputy sheriffs were present at the
facility. Policy required the jailer to check on prisoners every hour during the day, but
nighttime checks were not made. The jailer could monitor inmates electronically in two ways:
an intercom, and an emergency switch available to inmates. The parolee alleged he was
severely beaten by other inmates, who prevented him from reaching the emergency switch.
(Chickasaw County Jail, Okolona, Mississippi)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCHES

Foote v. Spiegel, 118 F.3d 1416 (10th Cir. 1997). A motorist sued state highway patrol
officers alleging she was illegally detained and subjected to a strip search. The district
court denied the officers' motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds and the
officers and plaintiff appealed. The appeals court held that one of the troopers was not entitled
to qualified immunity for the strip search because undisputed facts known to the trooper did
not justify the strip search under clearly established law. The motorist had been arrested for
driving under the influence and tested neg~tive for alcohol on a breathalyzer. She was not
placed in the general population of a detention facility, had no opportunity to hide anything
.beneath her clothing after her vehicle was stopped. and a thorough pat-down search of her
lightweight summer clothing at the jail revealed no drugs. The county jail's policy of conducting
strip searches of all persons arrested on drug charges had been held unconstitutional by a
federal appeals court in 1993, but a jail officer testified that all persons arrested on drug
charges were subjected to strip searches. (Davis County Jail, Utah)

U.S. District Court
TELEPHONE

Hahn v. City of Kenner. 984 F.Supp. 424 (E.D.La. 1997). An arrestee brought a § 1983
action against city officials in connection with his arrest and detention. The district court
held that a three hour and 12 minute delay before his telephone call, or a five hour and 32
minute delay between arrest and release in pre-dawn hours, were not unreasonable. (City of
Kenner, Louisiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Haslar v. Megerman. 104 F.3d 178 (8th Cir. 1997). A county detainee brought a§ 1983
action after a guard refused to loosen or remove shackles from his swollen leg while he
was being treated in an outside hospital. The district court dismissed the complaint and the
detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that keeping the detainee shackled
while receiving treatment at an outside facility did not display indifference to the medical needs
of the detainee, nor did it constitute punishment in violation of the detainee's Fourteenth

32.53

Amendment rights. According to the court, the shackling was necessary to prevent the detainee
from overpowering the single guard who was watching him, and there were safeguards against

applying the shackles so as to cause pain and other medical problems. (Jackson County
Detention Center, Missouri)
U.S. District Court
PROTECTION

Heisler v. Kralik. 981 F.Supp. 830 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). A pretrial detainee sued a county, the
county sheriffs department, the medical department of a correctional facility, and various
individual correctional officers, alleging deliberate indifference to his safety and medical needs.
The district court found that the detainee adequately stated a claim for municipal liability
under § 1983, and that the existence of a substantial risk of serious harm to the detainee did
not depend on the seriousness of the injuries actually received in an assault. The court noted
that the detainee's constitutional right to be protected from a risk of harm from inmates was
clearly established at the time he was assaulted. The detainee was charged with sexual assault
of a minor and feared that he would be hanned by other prisoners when he was transferred to
another jail. The detainee claimed that he witnessed a telephone call by a police detective to the
receiving county's sheriffs department advising them that the detainee desired protective
custody. The detainee said he was told that the sending sheriff contacted the receiving sheriff to
advise him of the need for extra security. Six days after his transfer the detainee was assaulted
by another inmate and suffered contusions and swelling. The detainee alleged that officers
witnessed the actual assault but did nothing to stop it and that he was not given adequate pain
medication following the assault. (Rockland County Correctional Center, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
CEIL CAPACITY
CONDITIONS

Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Rouse, 129 F.3d 649 (1st Cir. 1997). A sheriff moved to
terminate a 1979 consent decree pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (Pl.RA). The
decree arose from a class action challenging conditions of confinement. The district court
granted the sheriffs motion in part, but denied the Massachusetts Commission of Correction's
motion to vacate the decree. The appeals court held that PLRA did not violate the separation of
powers principle, the detainees· due process rights, or the detainees· equal protection rights. The
appeals court found that PLRA mandates the termination of extant consent decrees unless the
district court makes specific findings that are necessary to keep a particular decree alive. The
court also found that the district court was not required to conduct an inquiry into whether
violation of a federal right currently existed. or would come into existence, before it terminated
a consent decree governing confinement conditions for pretrial detainees. The district court
determined that double-bunking of the county jail's pretrial detainees did not violate the federal
rights of detainees, given that such conduct. in and of itself, was not a constitutional violation.
(Suffolk County Jail, Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
CELL CAPACITY
STAFFING
CONDITIONS
CROWDING
EXERCISE
PRIVACY
ACCESS TO COURT
SANITATION

Jones v. City and County of San Francisco. 976 F.Supp. 896 (N.D.Cal. 1997). Pretrial
detainees brought a class action against the City and County of San Francisco and various
city officials challenging the constitutionality of their conditions of confinement at a jail.
The district court granted various summary judgment motions filed by the plaintiffs and
the defendants, enjoining future overcrowding based on past unconstitutional overcrowding.
The court found due process violations based on the defendants' inadequate response to fire
safety risks at the jail. excessive risks of harm from earthquakes, physical defects in the
jail's water, plumbing and sewage systems, excessive noise levels, and poor lighting. The
court held that the plaintiffs failed to show deliberate indifference or another basis for liability
on the claims of current overcrowding, inadequate food preparation and storage,
provision of medical services, personal visitation, hours and accessibility of legal visitation, legal
materials and assistance, and outdoor recreation. The court noted that pretrial detainees enjoy
the greater protections afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause, rather
than the Eighth Amendment's protection against cruel and unusual punishment.
Conditions violated the pretrial detainees' due process rights where the jail operated at
about 124% of its capacity on average during a nine-month period, resulting in double-celling of
inmates in 41-square-foot cells designed for single occupancy, and causing excessive time in
cells and insufficient day room space when inmates were allowed to leave their cells.
The court found that officials were entitled to swnmary judgment precluding any finding of
deliberate indifference on crowding and space allocation claims because of their efforts to move
inmates from the jail to relieve overcrowding.
The court found that the detainees were not provided with reasonable safety from fire
because the defendants failed to install door assemblies or additional sprinklers and had not
responded reasonably to fire safety risks at the jail.
The detainees were exposed to excessive risks of harm from earthquakes in violation of
their due process rights, where the jail lay a quarter mile from the San Andreas fault and faced
a 50%, chance of experiencing a high magnitude earthquake over the next 50 years. The jail
appeared structurally unable to withstand substantial seismic activity and had a
malfunctioning bar locking system and inadequate staffing that further augmented risk by
potentially leaving inmates trapped in their cells during and after an earthquake. The court
rejected the government's contention that more than 30 public buildings in the area had the
same seismic rating as the jail. The court noted that the public's alleged tolerance of risk
associated with entering a poorly-constructed library or museum for an hour did not equate to
tolerance for spending 100 days continuously trapped in such a facility.

32.54

The court found deliberat.e indifference to the risk of earthquakes despit.e the defendants'
contention that it would cost more than $33 million to upgrade the jail and efforts to gain vot.er
approval for funding for a new facility had failed. The court not.ed that the city could have
attempted other funding methods and did have some funds allocated for seismic repairs but
diverted that money to other projects.
The court found due process violations resulting from physical defects in the jail's wat.er,
plumbing and sewage syst.em which creat.ed safety hazards. The jail's antiquat.ed wat.er supply
syst.em violated public health requirements and safe drinking wat.er codes. Det.eriorat.ed
sanitary fixtures such as unsealed floors, hot wat.er pipes with det.eriorat.ed asbestos insulation,
violated the detainees' rights as did sewage leaks from plumbing equipment. These conditions
violated detainees' rights even though there was no evidence of any disease resulting from the
deficiencies.
The court found that although conditions relating to food preparation and storage remained
inadequat.e, recent improvements including efforts to combat vermin infestation and allocating
$100,000 to replace a floor and make other repairs shielded the defendants from liability for
deliberat.e indifference.
The court found that questions of fact precluded summary judgment on the claims that the
jail's video conferencing syst.em did not permit confidential attorney-client discussions, and
whether a substantial number of inmat.es could easily utilize the syst.em. The court held that to
establish a constitutional violation for lack of privacy for attorney-client consultations, it was
enough that harm appeared imminent, to the extent that any inmat.e might be hesitant to
disclose names and information relevant to his or her attorney's investigation and necessary to
secure advice.
Despit.e some efforts to reduce noise in the jail, the detainees established a constitutional
violation in noise levels which ranged behyeen 73 and 96 decibels, exceeding acceptable levels,
and caused increased risk of psychological harm and safety concerns due to officers' inability to
hear calls for help. The extent to which noise continued to exceed maximum standards
suggested that previous noise reduction efforts were merely cosmetic and that far more could be
done.
The court found due process violations from poor lighting where correctional standards
mandated lighting of at least 20 foot-candles in living areas, and some health standards
required 30 foot-candles, but readings in the jail ranged from 0.28 to 5 foot-candles.
The court found that the detainees' rights were not violat.ed by the jail's outdoor recreation
conditions which were substantially improved by the defendants. Detainees were offered
approximat.ely six hours of outdoor exercise per year and the defendants had hired a recreation
coach to ensure safe and healthy exercise habits. Although clothing remained inadequat.e for
cold weather, the shortage of suitable garments typically did not prevent inmat.es from using
the yard.
The court concluded that development and implementation of a narrowly tailored remedial
plan was an appropriat.e remedy, and that the plan was to address each condition that was
found unconstitutional including fire safety, seismic safety, wat.er, plumbing, sewage, noise,
lighting and overcrowding. (San Francisco Jail No. 3, California)
U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Lancast.er v. Monroe County, Ala., 116 F.3d 1419 (11th Cir. 1997). The administrator of
the estat.e of a pretrial detainee who died due to an injury sustained while in custody at
a county jail brought an action against the county, county commission, sheriff and jailers
alleging constitutional violations. The district court grant.ed summary judgment for the
defendants and the plaintiff appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded. The appeals court held that the sheriff and jailers were not entitled to qualified
immunity on the claim of deliberat.e indifference, but that the jailers were stat.e officials and
were thus immune under the Eleventh Amendment from suit in their official capacities. The
appeals court held that the sheriff and jailers were immune under the doctrine of sovereign
immunity from stat.e law claims brought against them in their individual capacities.
The detainee was a chronic alcoholic who, according the court, died in custody because the
sheriff and jailers delayed treatment despit.e their knowledge of his urgent medical condition.
The court found that the sheriffs and jailers' conduct amounted to deliberat.e indifference under
clearly established law at that time. The detainee was t.ested upon his admission to the jail,
where he registered blood alcohol cont.ents of .324 and .323. He was placed in the holding cell,
or the "drunk tank" as it was called, which was the normal practice for DUI detainees.
Relatives of the detainee informed jail officers and the sheriff that the detainee was a chronic
alcoholic who had been in the hospital recently with grand mal seizures. The relatives
repeat.edly att.empt.ed to secure treatment for the detainee, or to have him released to them so
that they could secure treatment. The detainees cellmat.es reported that no jail officers or
officials made any cell checks for several hours during the night. The following morning the
detainee was shaking, and he fell when he attempted to sit up. He fell backwards out of his
upper bunk and landed on his back on the floor where his head struck the floor and he began
bleeding from the mouth. According to the cellmat.es, it took at least t.en minut.es for anyone to
arrive at the cell after they called for help. When an officer did arrive, she did not ent.er the cell
to provide assistance because of a jail policy that prevented a jailer from ent.ering a cell without
a deputy being present. More than 30 minut.es after he fell from his bunk, the detainee was
transport.ed to the hospital by ambulance, where he lat.er died from an intracranial hemorrhage.
(Monroe County Jail, Alabama)
32.55

U.S. District Court
PROTECTION

Martinez v. Mathis, 970 F.Supp. 1047 (S.D.Ga. 1997). An arrestee who alleged he was
physically assaulted because a jailer encouraged other inmates to beat him brought a § 1983
claim against the jailer. The district court held that the arrestee established a Fourteenth
Amendment claim, but that the jailer was entitled to qualified immunity because it was not
clearly established that prison officials violate the constitution when they make statements in
the presence of inmates that a particular inmate is "sick" and "should have his ass beat." The
arrestee was suspected of molesting a child and he was placed in a cell with other inmates. (Jeff
Davis County Jail, Georgia)

U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE

Mathis v. Fairman, 120 F.3d 88 (7th Cir. 1997). A detainee's mother brought a civil
rights action against jail personnel following the detainee's suicide while in custody. The
district court entered summary judgment for the personnel and the mother appealed. The
appeals court affirmed, finding that personnel did not exhibit deliberate indifference to the
threat of suicide. The court noted that jail staff were concerned enough about the detainee's
strange behavior to have a paramedic speak with him, to have him evaluated psychologically,
and in deference to his fear that someone was trying to kill him, to place him in a single cell.
After a mental health specialist concluded that the detainee did not pose a threat to himself, he
was returned to the general jail population. The mother had alleged that the jail failed to
adequately staff the facility, and to adequately train its employees. A newly-hired officer was
responsible for supervising the 25 inmates on the non-aggressive protective custody tier on
which the detainee was housed. The officer, on his first day on the job, initially noticed the
detainee's strange behavior and alleges that he reported it to his supervisor. The officer
was hired less than a week earlier, and had just completed a four or five-day orientation. The
appeals court noted that while cadets like the officer may not have been trained in suicide
prevention, the jail maintained a psychiatric unit for that purpose. (Cook County Department of
Corrections. Illinois)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO
PROTECT

Morris v. City of Alvin, Tex.• 950 F. Supp. 804 (S.D.Tex. 1997). The representative of the
estate of an arrestee who died in jail from a drug overdose brought a § 1983 action
against the city. The district court dismissed the case, finding that allegations were
insufficient to establish the existence of a municipal policy with regard to detainees who
exhibited possible signs of a drug overdose. The court found that as a matter of law, the city's
policies neither deprived the arrestee of adequate medical assistance nor violated the
Fourteenth Amendment's required level of care. The court noted that the arrestee had already
taken the overdose at the time of her arrest, and that the city was not constitutionally required
to train jailers to recognize the ambiguous signs of a drug overdose. According to the court, the
city had provided prompt medical care on two occasions during the arrestee's brief one-day stay
at the jail, and the arrestee was immediately transferred to a hospital when she exhibited
physical symptoms of a serious medical problem. (Alvin City Jail, Texas)

U.S. District Court
VISITS

N.E.W. v. Kennard, 952 F.Supp. 714 (D.Utah 1997). Pretrial detainees and their children
brought a § 1983 action challenging a county jail policy restricting visitation by persons
younger than eight years of age, alleging violation of due process and equal protection. The
district court held that the restrictions did not violate due process or equal protection. The court
also held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to attorney fees, despite the claim that their suit
was the catalyst for a change in visitation policy. The court noted that a policy in effect since
1992 was clarified by the county, allowing visits with children under eight years of age with the
permission of the jail command. (Salt Lake County Metro Jail, Utah)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Nelson v. Prison Health Services, Inc., 991 F.Supp. 1452 (M.D.Fla. 1997). The personal
representative of an inmate who died of an acute myocardial infarction while awaiting
trial in a county jail brought a § 1983 action against a county, county sheriff, the private
company that provided medical services to the jail, and individual nurses employed by the
company. The district court held that the sheriff was protected from individual liability under
the qualified immunity doctrine, but that the nurses were not entitled to raise a defense of
qualified immunity even though they were considered state actors under § 1983. The court held
that the evidence was sufficient to establish that the nurses were deliberately indifferent to the
inmate's medical needs and failed to provide treatment. According to the court, the nurses
delayed giving the inmate her prescription medication for her cardiac condition for 36 hours,
failed to verify her medications after she disclosed them to the screening nurse, failed to
examine the inmate when she complained of chest pains, and failed to call for an emergency
response team until the inmate had stopped breathing. The court held that reports of a court
appointed monitor regarding the pervasive failure of the private medical service company to
provide medical care to the inmates of the county jail, and the company's own internal
memoranda characterizing the attitude of the nurses at the jail as one of deliberate
indifference, were sufficient to establish a custom of violating inmates' constitutional rights to
medical treatment. (Pinellas County Jail, Florida)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE
ASSESSMENT OF
COSTS

Reynolds v. Wagner, 128 F.3d 166 (3rd Cir. 1997). Inmates brought a class action suit
against a county prison and warden challenging the constitutionality of a program under
which the prison charged inmates a small fee ($5) when they sought certain types of
medical care. The district court entered a judgment in favor of the defendants and the

32.56

appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the program was not per se
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment and did not violat.e the Eighth Amendment as
implement.ed. The court found that Spanish-speaking inmat.es did not receive deficient notice of
the program due to the absence of a written Spanish translation of the program description.
The program was explained in Spanish by officers and counselors to all Spanish-speaking
inmat.es during orientation, the prison always had a Spanish-speaking employee on duty, and
the medical department employed at least three nurses who were fluent in Spanish. The court
held that the program did not violat.e procedural due process as the result of providing for fee
deductions from an inmat.e's account even when the inmat.e did not sign an authorization form.
The inmates had alleged that the program charged higher fees than the stat.e Medicaid
program, but the court found that the fees charged under Medicaid did not represent the
maximum that could be constitutionally charged against a prisoner. According to the court, the
failure of the prison to define the t.erms "chronic" and "emergency" which described in the
inmat.e handbook conditions for which no fees would be assessed, did not make the program
unconstitutionally vague. The court found no violation of the inmat.es' right of access to courts
in response to the inmates' claim that the program reduced their funds available for legal mail
&l)d photocopying, where the inmates failed to establish actual or imminent interference with
their access to court. (Berks County Prison, Pennsylvania)
U.S. Appeals Court
USE OF FORCE

Riley v. Dorton, 115 F.3d 1159 (4th Cir. 1997). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983
action against a police officer, alleging the use of excessive force during an interrogation
after his arrest. The district court grant.ed summary judgment for the officer and the detainee
appealed. The appeals court affirmed, fmding that the Fourth Amendment did not extend
protection from excessive force to pretrial detainees, and that the alleged use of force did not
violate the Eighth Amendment. According to the court, the Fourth Amendment applies to the
initial decision to detain the accused, not to conditions of confmement after that decision has
been made. The court also held that the officer's alleged use of force did not violate due process
where any injury suffered by the detainee was de minimis. The court found that the detainee's
encounter with police officers did not amount to "interrogation" within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment because officers did not directly question the detainee and their other conduct
(exchanging insults with the detainee and requesting that the detainee sign a waiver form for
genetic testing) was not reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. The detainee
alleged that the officer used handcuffs, inserted the tip of a pen into the detainee's nose,
threatened the detainee and slapped the detainee across the face. (Henrico County Public
Safety Building, Virginia)

U.S. District Court
USE OF FORCE

Santiago v. Semenza, 965 F.Supp. 468 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). A pretrial detainee brought an
action claiming excessive force against a Unit.ed States marshal who struggled with the
detainee during a commotion in a holding cell area. The district court granted summary
judgement for the marshal, fmding that the marshal was not liable for the alleged use of
excessive force and had qualified immunity. The court found that the marshal's actions were
necessary to secure the detainee, safeguard other marshals, and restore security to the holding
cell area. According to the court, there was no indication that the marshal's actions, which may
have been the cause of the detainee's bruise or scratch, were disproportionat.e to the situation.
(Holding Cell Area, United States Courthouse, Southern District of New York)

U.S. District Court

Schreter v. Bednosky, 963 F.Supp. 216 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). A former pretrial detainee filed
a prose§ 1983 action against the warden of a county facility and the county, alleging
violation of his due process rights. The district court found that the pretrial detainee did not
experience a sufficient delay in medical treatment for a kidney stone to support his claim of
violation of due process based on a county policy requiring transportation to a hospital by
sheriff's deputies rather than by on-site corrections officers. The court noted that the detainee
was moved from his cell to the medical unit, examined, and transferred to a hospital, all within
35 to 45 minutes of informing county personnel about his condition. (Suffolk County
Correctional Facility, New York)

MEDICAL CARE

U.S. Appeals Court
PROTECTION
STAFFING

Scott v. Moore, 114 F.3d 51 (5th Cir. 1997). A pretrial detainee who alleged she was
sexually assault.ed by a correctional officer brought a § 1983 action against a city and its
police chief. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants, but the
appeals court remanded. the case on the claim of inadequate staffing. On remand, the district
court again entered summary judgment for the defendants and the detainee appealed. The
appeals court vacat.ed and remanded. On rehearing en bane, the court of appeals affirmed,
holding that the detainee met the burden or establishing a constitutional violation but that the
city's failure to adopt a policy of adding jail staff did not constitute deliberate indifference.
According to the majority of the appeals court, there was no showing that the city had actual
knowledge that its staffing policy creat.ed a substantial risk of harm to female detainees. As a
condition of employment, jailers underwent background investigations, medical examinations
and polygraph tests, none of which revealed any concerns about the jailer who allegedly
sexually assaulted the detainee. The majority not.ed that the jailer had been a commissioned
police officer for four years prior to his employment with the jail, without incident, and that he
had been trained in the official policies of jail management by experienced jailers. The detainee
had been arrested for public intoxication, assault and resisting arrest, and was taken to a city

32.57

jail, processed by a female jailer who was on duty at the time, and placed in a holding cell
pending arraignment. A male jailer subsequently replaced the female officer, entered the
detainee's cell, and sexually assaulted her repeatedly during the course of his eight-hour shift.
The jailer resigned and pleaded guilty to criminal charges. The majority of the appeals court
rejected the detainee's argument that constitutionally adequate staffing would have included, at
a minimum, a female jail officer, or at least two male officers, whenever a female pretrial
detainee is in custody. The majority noi:ed that the jail is located on the first floor of the police
department, in the patrol division area, and a patrol duty sergeant periodically checks on jail
personnel. However, four appeals judges disseni:ed, suggesting that the city's policy of
inadequate staffing enabled the harm to be committed and actually facilitated the sexual
assault. While the majority asseri:ed that the assault was episodic--by definition incidental or
occasional, rather than regular and systematic. The minority argued that the long established
custom of inadequate staffing was far from episodic, and that the city only offered financial
justifications for its staffing policy. In the dissenting opinion, the judges stated they were
unwilling to "classify the issues in this case as 'minutia.'" (City of Killeen Police Department,
Texas)
U.S. District Court
JUVENILES

Thompson v. City of Galveston, 979 F.Supp. 504 (S.D.Tex. 1997). A mother on her own
behalf and on behalf of her minor son, brought a civil rights action challenging her arrest
and the taking into custody of her son. The district court dismissed with prejudice her claims
for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution. According to the court, because
the mother pled nolo contendere to the charges surrounding her arrest, imprisonment and
prosecution, she was barred from bringing any claims relating to her conviction unless she
could prove that the conviction or seni:ence had been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by
direct order, or otherwise declared invalid. The court found that her false arrest claim in
connection with taking her minor son into custody had failed because his mother was arrested
for contributing to the delinquency of another child and where the child was not arrested and
the officers were authorized to take the child into custody. Police had arrested the mother on an
arrest warrant on the charge of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. When she was
arrested, her 10-year-old son was taken into custody at the same time and taken to a juvenile
detention center. (Galveston Police Department)

U.S. District Court
ACCESS TO COURT
LAW LIBRARIES

U.S. v. Beckwith, 987 F.Supp. 1345 (D.Utah 1997). An indigent defendant who was detained
prior to trial on bank robbery charges elected to proceed pro se. The district court held that
the defendant was entitled to access to a satellite law library in the federal courthouse, with
his hands free, for two hours per day for five consecutive days, and for two hours per day
three days a week thereafter. The court noted that no special security problems regarding the
inmate's hands had been shown, notwithstanding the contention that the inmate was a martial
arts expert. The court also held that the detainee must be afforded unlimited mail access to
court, standby counsel, and prosecution, unless he abused that privilege. (Salt Lake County
Jail, Utah)

MAIL

U.S. District Court
BAIL REFORM ACT

U.S. Jones, 980 F.Supp. 359 (D.Kan. 1997). The government sought a review of a
magistrai:e judge's order releasing a defendant on bond pending trial. The district court
held that the detention of the defendant pending trial was appropriate under the criteria set
forth in the Bail Reform Act because the defendant had a prior conviction for solicitation to
commit murder, had a history of violence and a history of narcotics related arrests, and the
weight of evidence against the defendant was substantial. (U.S. District Court, Kansas)

U.S. District Court
BAIL
BAIL REFORM ACT

U.S. v. Wray, 980 F.Supp. 534 (D.D.C. 1997). The government moved to detain a
defendant prior to trial and the district court grani:ed the motion. The court found that
there was clear and convincing evidence that supported detention, including the
defendant's criminal history and his committing crimes while on parole for violent offenses.
(U.S. District Court, District of Columbia)

U.S. Appeals Court
WORK

Villarreal v. Woodham, 113 F.3d 202 (11th Cir. 1997). A pretrial detainee who was
allegedly required by correction officials to perform translation services for other
inma1:es, medical personnel, and court personnel, filed suit in federal court. The detainee
alleged violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and violation of his civil rights
because he was not paid for his services. The district court dismissed the claim and the detainee
appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the detainee was not an "employee" within
the meaning of FLSA and that the detainee's forced performance of translation services was not
cruel and unusual punishment. The court held that the four-factor standard for determining
whether labor falls within the Fair Labor Standards Act does not apply in the prison context,
but that a broader approach is applied to inmate labor, focusing on the economic situation as a
whole. The court noted that although there was no question that the sheriffs intent in
requesting that the detainee perform translation services was punitive in nature, the cerebral
task of language translation posed no risk to the detainee's safety or welfare, and presumably
the performance of the services served to occupy the detainee's time, keep him out of trouble,
and allow him interaction with others. (Gadsden County Correctional Facility, Florida)

32.58

1998
U.S. District Court
USEOFFOROE
SEARCHES

FALSE IMPRISONMENT

U.S. District Court
USEOFFOROE

MEDICAL CARE

Adewale v. Whalen, 21 F .Supp.2d 1006 (D.Minn. 1998). An arrestee sued a police
officer and the city that employed him under federal civil rights laws and state tort
claims. The district court found that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity
from liability for his decision to jail the arrestee, but found that genuine issues of
material fact precluded summary judgment on the grounds of official immunity on
allegations of assault, battery and false imprisonment. The court held that the officer's
decision to detain the arrestee for a misdemeanor did not violate her federal rights and was
objectively reasonable, given the arrestee's admission that she .had been drinking and
intended to drive. The court held that the arrestee failed to show that the city improperly
trained its officers to arrest noncooperative persons for obstruction of legal process, based
only on the decision of a deputy director of police that it was proper to arrest someone for
refusing to open a security door for the police. The arrestee suffered a broken arm which she
alleged was the result of excessive force used by the officer during a pat-down search. (City
of Richfield Police Department, Minnesota)
Boyer v. City of Mansfield. 3 F.Supp.2d 843 (N.D.Ohio 1998). An arrestee brought§
1983 claims against a police oftlcer, corrections officer and city who allegedly used
excessive force and failed to provide medical care. The district court grant.ed summary
judgment in favor of the defendants, finding that the city was not liable for a custom or
policy of using excessive force or for not properly investigating, supervising, training or
disciplining its officials. The city's police officers had reviewed the policy on use of force
regularly, the night watch rnroroander placed a hold on the videotape of the incident and
issued a personal complaint against the police officer who allegedly used excessive force. The
city's &afety service director eventually fired the officer for his actions, and the city saw to it
that the officer was charged and convicted on a misdemeanor assault charge. The court held
that the corrections officer was entitled to qualified immunity, where he helped the police
officer restrain the arrest.ee by holding the arrestee's legs and carrying the arrestee to a
padded cell. The corrections officer said that he entered the booking room and found the
arrestee kicking away at the police officer who was the only officer in the room, and the
corrections officer denied that be saw the police officer mistreating the arrestee until be
subsequently viewed the video tape of the booking. (Mansfield Police Department and City
Jail, Ohio)

U.S. Appeals Court
RELIGION

Canell v" Ughtner, 143 F .3d 1210 (9th Cir. 1998). A pretrial detainee brought a§
1983 action against a correctional officer, sheriff and county detention center
alleging violation of his First Amendment rights arising from the officer's alleged
proselytizing activities. The district court grant.ed summary judgment for the defendants
and the appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the sheriff was not liable under
the theory of failure to train. According to the court, the officer's actions did not violate the
First Amendment's establishment clause absent evidence of endorsement by government.
The court concluded that the officer's activities did not impermissibly interfere with the
detainee's free exercise of religion. The detainee alleged that the officer had brought
Christian literature to work, engaged in mock-preaching, and belittled other religions. The
officer was a licensed minister of the Church of God. (Multnomah County Detention Center,
Oregon)

U.S. Appeals Court

Collignon v. Milwaukee County. 163 F .3d 982 (7th Cir. 1998). An arrestee's parents
and estate sued county and village officials after the arrestee, who had a mental
illness and some criminal history, committed suicide after he was released on bail.
The district court grantedjudgment on pleadings for the village and grant.ed summary
judgment for the county defendants. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the treatment
of the arrestee by a county psychiatrist while he was in pretrial detention did not violate
substantive due process. The court also found that neither the police officers' failure to
commence emergency detention proceedings, nor their return of the arrestee to his parents,
amounted to a substantive due process violation. The court held that due process was not
violated by the alleged refusal of a police officer to provide the arrestee with access to
medical personnel capable of assessing the arrestee's condition. The appeals court held that
the treatment of the arrestee by a county psychiatrist did not violate the arrest.ee's
substantive due process rights because the psychiatrist exercised professional judgment in
the face o!tbe known serious medical needs of the arrestee. The psychiatrist, who was
principally responsible for deciding the course of the arrestee's treatment at the jail,
prescribed a nontherapeutic dosage of an antipsychotic drug with the intention of forming a
"therapeutic alliance" with the arrestee, planning to slowly increase the dosage so that the
arrestee could gradually overcome his aversion to side effects. The arrestee was able to lead
a productive life while on bis prescribed medication to treat his schizophrenia, but he
stopped taking his medication and was arrest.ed for damaging property and placed in a
county jail for 17 days. He was released on bail to his parents, and shortly thereafter was
temporarily detained by village police officers, who also released him to his parents. The
next day be committed suicide. (Shorewood Police Department and Milwaukee County,
W"JSCOnsin)

SUICIDE

MEDICAL CARE
RELEASE

32.59

U.S. Appeals Court
CROWDING
CELL CAPACITY
EXERCISE
SANITATION
CONDITIONS OF
CONFINEMENT

Craig v. Eberly, 164 F .3d 490 (10th Cir. 1998). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983
action against a sheriff in his individual capacity, and a county, alleging he was
subjected to unconstitutional conditions of confinement while he was confined in the
jail. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants and the
detainee appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that summary
judgment for the sheriff was precluded by the nature, seriousness and duration of
the alleged deprivations. The detainee alleged that he was placed in a cell that measured
eleven by fifteen feet with five or six other men for 24-hours a day, that his bed linens were
never cleaned nor exchanged, that he was permitted only two showers a week in an
unsanitary shower stall, that the sink in his cell frequently clogged and prevented his basic
hygiene, that his cell had poor ventilation, and that he was allowed out of his cell for
recreation only two times during his confinement. The parties disagreed on the length of the
detainee's confinement, which the court found to be between two-and-one-half months and
six months. (Otero County Jail, Colorado)

U.S. Appeals Court
HOME DETENTION

Cucciniello v. Keller, 137 F.3d 721 (2nd Cir. 1998). A federal prisoner brought a habeas
corpus petition seeking credit against his sentence for time spent in home confinement. The
prisoner claimed he was not informed, when he accepted bail release, that his time spend in
home confinement as a condition of release would not be credited against his sentence. The
district court dismissed the petition and the appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held
that statutes did not entitle the prisoner to credit for time spent in home confinement and
that the absence of notice to the prisoner was not a due process violation. (Fed. Bur. Pris.)

u.s. Appeals Court

Davis Y: Brady, 143 F .3d 1021 (6th Cir. 1998). An arrestee brought a§ 1983 action
against police officers who allegedly left him in an inebriated condition on a dark,
unfamiliar highway where he was subsequently hit by an automobile. The district
court denied summary judgment for the officers and the appeals court affirmed and
remanded. The appeals court held that the officers had a duty to not place the arrestee in
danger once he had been in custody, and that the arrestee's right not to be abandoned by
police was clearly established at the time of this incident. According to the court, once the
police officers took the affU'IIlative act of restraining the arrestee's freedom to act on his own
behalf by taking him into custody, the officers imposed on themselves the duty to ensure
that they were not placing the arrestee in danger, and that duty existed even after the
arrestee was released from custody. The arrestee had been arrested for intoxication and
disorderly conduct and was taken to a police station and subsequently transferred to a
county jail, but the jail was full. The desk sergeant instructed the officers to release the
arrestee "at the county jail ifhe was not so drunk that he would be a hazard to himself." The
officers then drove the arrestee to a road just outside the city limits and released him in an
area with a 55-mile-per-hour speed limit with few street lights and no sidewalks. The
officers alleged that the arrestee requested this release site but the arrestee denied this.
About seven minutes after he was released by the officers, the arrestee was struck by a car,
sustaining serious permanent injuries, resulting in the amputation of one of his legs. (Flint
Police Department, Michigan)

U.S. Appeals Court
JUVENILE
PROTECTION
CLASSIFICATION
CONDITIONS

Doe By and Through Doe v~ Washington County, 150 F.3d 920 (8th Cir. 1998). A
juvenile brought a § 1983 action against a county and a sheriff alleging that he was
beaten, raped and tortured by other pretrial detainees when he was detained in the
county jail. The district court jury awarded $8,000 in compensatory damages to the
juvenile and the district court awarded $34,824 in attorney fees. The juvenile
alleged that rough-housing among the five juvenile prisoners in a 200-square-foot holding
cell turned dangerous and he asked to be moved to a different cell. He was moved for a few
hours, but he was taken back to the holding cell by another guard who told the other
occupants that the juvenile was a "snitch" and they should "handle it." Over the following
five days the juvenile was subjected to unrelenting abuse, torture and humiliation. The
county appealed and the appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that there was
sufficient evidence that county policies regarding the housing of juveniles, resulting in
overcrowding, caused violations of the juvenile's constitutional rights to support the
imposition of liability. The sheriff had acknowledged the dangers of housing five juveniles
together in a 200-square-foot holding cell for months at a time. The appeals court found that
a jury verdict that found that the sheriff was not liable in his official capacity did not
exonerate the county by implication. The court suggested that the jury might have had a
mistaken belief that the sheriff was a defendant in his individual capacity, and did not find
that the county should "reap any benefit" from this inconsistency. The appeals court decided
that the juvenile was not a "prisoner" at the time he filed suit and therefore the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) did not apply to his case so as to limit an award of attorneys'
fees. (Washington County Detention Center, Arkansas)

U.S. District Court
FALSE IMPRISONMENT
FALSE ARREST
SEARCH

Duffy v. County of Bucks, 7 F.Supp.2d 569 (E.D.Pa. 1998). An individual who had
been arrested and detained over a weekend brought a § 1983 action against the
probation officer who had sought the warrant under which he was arrested, and
various county officials. The district court held that the arrest and detention of the
probationer pursuant to a facially valid warrant did not violate his substantive due

PROTECTION
RELEASE

32.60

process rights, even though the individual had informed officials that the warrant was
actually for a different person who had the same name. The court found that the officials did
not have a duty to take every step to eliminate the possibility that they were holding an
innocent person, and that they had no authority to ignore a bench warrant. The court also
held that the individual's detention over a weekend did not violate his procedural due
process rights. The court found that although the probationer failed to allege that strip
searches to which he was subjected had been performed pursuant to a pattern or practice,
his allegations regarding strip searches were sufficient to state a due process claim against
officers of the facility. The individual was subjected to strip searches at least once daily for
no apparent reason, even though he had no access to contraband or visitors. The court held
that the probation otr1cer was not entitled to qualified immunity because a reasonable
probation officer could not have believed that his actions did not violate the individual's
substantive due process rights. (Bucks County, Pennsylvania)
U.S. District Court
SillCIDE

Ellis v. Washington County, Tenn., 80 F.Supp.2d 791 (E.D.Tenn. 1998). The mother and the minor
child of a pretrial detainee who committed suicide while confined brought a § 1983 wrongful death
action against a city, county and jail officers. The district court granted summary judgment in favor
of all but one of the defendants, finding that they were not liable for failing to take special
precautions and to screen the detainee for suicidal tendencies in violation of his constitutional
rights because the detainee did not exhibit a strong likelihood that he would attempt to take his
own life. But the court denied summary judgment for a jail officer who allegedly failed to make
other officers aware that he had seen the detainee initiate his hanging until ten minutes later.
(Washington County Jail, Tennessee)

U.S. District Court
USE OF FORCE

Farabee v. Rider, 995 F .Supp. 1398 (M.D.Fla. 1998). An arrestee sued a county sheriff
and deputies alleging negligence and malicious prosecution. The district court found that
the sheriff owed a duty to protect the arrestee from the risk of use of excessive force created
by his alleged failure to train and supervise deputies. The court held that the sheriff was not
entitled to qualified immunity. The arrestee was pushed to the ground and handcuffed while
a deputy put his knee in her back. She was transported to the county jail where she was
incarcerated for at least 12 hours and she was suffering from back and arm injuries inflicted
by the deputy while confmed. (Glades County Jail, Florida)

u .s. District Court

Faulcon v. City of Philadelphia, 18 F.Supp.2d 537 (E.D.Pa. 1998). A pretrial
detainee who had been stabbed by another inmate sued city officials and
correction officers alleging failure to protect, failure to supervise and failure to train under
the Eighth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants,
fmding that the facility's policy of keeping pretrial detainees in the same housing unit as
convicted inmates did not constitute deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of harm.
The court also held that the lack of guidelines or training procedures regarding segregation
of convicted inmates was insufficient to support claims for failure to supervise or failure to
train. According to the court, a state statutory provision that indicated that sentenced
prisoners should be housed separately from detainees was merely a recommended guideline
rather than a mandatory requirement. (Philadelphia Industrial Correctional Center,
Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Foote v. Spiegel, 995 F .Supp. 1347 (D.Utah 1998). A detainee sued state and county
officials alleging violation of her rights because she was strip searched. The district court
denied summary judgment for the arresting officers and the case was atru-med in part,
reversed in part, and dismissed in part on appeal. On remand, the district court held that
there was not reasonable suspicion to strip search the detainee after a pat down search did
not reveal contraband and the detainee was not being placed in the general jail population.
The court found that suspicion that the detainee was under the influence of drugs or alcohol
did not provide adequate justification for the search. The court found the county liable for
failing to promulgate an adequate strip search policy that included reasonable suspicion of
concealed contraband that would not be discovered through a rub search as a prerequisite to
the strip search ofa detainee who is not entering the generaljail population. The court
noted that flaws in the jail policy were known for a year prior to this incident and the
county's refusal to change the policy exhibited deliberate indifference to the likelihood of
future violations. (Davis County Jail, Utah)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONDITIONS
HANDICAP
CLASSIFICATION
MEDICAL CARE

Frost!:~ 152 F .Sd 1124 (9th Cir. 1998). A pretrial detainee brought a§ 1983
suit against a sheriff, corrections officers and others alleging that he was subjected
to unconstitutional conditions because of his disability. The district court entered
judgment for the officers and the detainee appealed. The appeals court atru-med in
part, reversed in part and remanded. The appeals court held that, as a matter of
first impression, denial of adequate handicapped-accessible shower facilities to the detainee
who wore a leg cast and relied on crutches could support a § 1983 claim. The appeals court
held that the detainee failed to establish a § 1983 claim that the method utilized to deliver
food posed a significant safety risk to him, alleging that he slipped several times as he
attempted to carry his food tray while balancing himself on crutches. The detainee never
informed the otr1cers that he was having trouble with his food tray because he relied on

FAILURETO
PROTECT

32.61

crutches, and the risk of having to carry his food tray while using crutches was not,
according to the court, obvious enough to infer a subjective awareness of a substantial risk
of harm. The appeals court held that the detainee failed to establish a§ 1983 claim that he
was improperly classified as a close custody inmate, absent any showing that the jail's
classification system was not reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.
The appeals court remanded the case to the district court to determine whether the
detainee was administered a psychotropic drug without proper procedural safeguards. The
detainee alleged that he was tricked into taking amitriptyline by a nurse who told him that it
was a pain medication. He asserted that he would not have taken the medication if he had
know that it had "antipsychotic" effects.
According to the appeals court, the detainee failed to establish a§ 1983 claim based on
his contention that he was denied the opportunity to participate in outdoor recreation
because evidence indicated that he was denied recreation only once because officials
misunderstood a note in his file. The court found that an accidental, one-time denial of
recreation could not support a constitutional claim.
The appeals court held that the detainee failed to establish a § 1983 due process claim
based on alleged delays in the administration of his pain medication, treating his broken
nose, and providing him with a replacement crutch. The court found that while the jail
officials may have acted negligently, the detainee did not establish that they acted with
deliberate indifference to his medical needs. (Madison Street Jail, Maricopa County,
Arizona)
U.S. Appeals Court
TELEPHONE
PROTECTIVE
CUSTODY

Halvorsen v. Baird, 146 F.3d 680 (9th Cir. 1998). A detainee who was questioned
by police and then involuntarily committed to a detoxification facility overnight
filed a § 1983 action alleging constitutional violations. The district court entered
judgment in favor of the defendants on a jury verdict and the appeals court affirmed in part,
reversed in part and remanded. The appeals court held that a private non-profit firm that
provided involuntary detoxification services did not enjoy qualified immunity from § 1983
liability. The court found that the private firm was not a private individual that was briefly
deputized to assist government actors, in light of its nature as a company that was organized
to assume a major lengthy administrative task. The appeals court also held that
confinement for six hours overnight was not too short, as a matter of law, to trigger a due
process right to communicate with someone outside the facility. But the court found that a
facility can control the manner and timing of a telephone call from a detainee, so that it
comports with reasonable institutional requirements. The court found that the detainee was
given sufficient notice or opportunity to demonstrate sobriety to satisfy due process, where
testimony indicated that he was told why he was at the facility and that he was observed for
indications of drunkenness or sobriety. (Central City Concern, and City of Portland, Oregon)

U.S. District Court
TELEPHONE
BAIL
PRIVACY
ADA-Americans with
Disabilities Act

Hanson v. Sangamon County Sheriff's Dept., 991 F.Supp. 1059 (C.D.Ill.1998). An
arrestee who was deaf alleged failure to provide him with an adequate means of
communication in his suit against a county, a sheriff and a sheriff's department. The
district court held that the arrestee stated a claim under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act, and that he stated a § 1983 claim
against the sheriff. The arrestee alleged that he was denied, due to his disability, the
opportunity to post bond and make a telephone call when the department failed to provide,
despite his repeated requests, alternatives to a conventional telephone such as an
interpreter or a text telephone device (TTD). The arrestee alleged that the sheriff
maintained an express policy of forbidding officers from allowing deaf arrestees to use a
TTD which was stored in an office. The court denied qualified immunity for the sheriff,
noting that while there may have been a lack of caselaw directly on the point, the ADA and
Rehabilitation Act had been enacted several years prior to the arrest, and at least two
Courts of Appeal had held that the Rehabilitation Act was applicable to prisons and
prisoners. The plaintiff was arrested and informed officers that he was deaf. The officers did
not attempt to communicate with him, but rather placed him in a police van with eight to
ten other arrestees and transported him to a local jail. Throughout the night the arrestee
attempted to notify the officers of his need for alternative assistance in contacting his
friends and/or relatives, to no avail. He was eventually assisted in making a telephone call by
an officer and made arrangements to be released on bail, several hours after all of the others
who were arrested at the same time had been released. (Sangamon County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Higgins v. Correctional Medical Services of Ill.• 8 F.Supp.2d 821 (N .D.Ill. 1998). A
pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against medical personnel and a correctional
medical provider for allegedly denying him his constitutional right to medical care. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court found that
medical personnel's failure to order x-rays of the inmate's shoulder based on the inmate's
claim that it was dislocated was an exercise of medical judgment and did not amount to
deliberate indifference. The court found that evidence was insufficient to establish that
medical personnel strongly suspected that the inmate's shoulder was dislocated. The court
also found that the inmate failed to establish that the correctional medical service provider
had conspired to deny medical treatment to inmates who were soon to be transferred. The
court noted that the provider was contractually obligated to provide inmates with medical

32.62

care mandated by the Eighth Amendment and therefore could be held liable for
constitutional violations under§ 1983. (Kane County Correctional Center, Illinois)
U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Jones v. St. Tammany Parish Jail, 4 F.Supp.2d 606 (E.D.La. 1998). A pretrial
detainee brought a § 1983 action against a sheriff, warden, captain and parish based on
alleged failure to provide adequate medical care. The district court found that the captain,
sheriff and warden could not be held individually liable for the alleged unconstitutional
conduct and that the parish could not be held liable for alleged constitutional deprivations
related to the management of the jail. But the court found that genuine issues of fact
precluded summary judgment for the sheriff in his oftlcial capacity, as to whether the sheriff
had a policy or practice of maintaining an inadequate number of wheelchairs at the jail and
whether any such practice was reasonably related to a legitimate governmental purpose. At
the time of his arrest, the 57-year-old detainee was disabled due to a prior injury to his back.
He was assigned to the top bunk in his dorm, which had no ladder. Fourteen days after his
arrest the detainee fell from the top bunk and sustained several serious injuries, including a
fractured leg in three places, a partially severed fmger, broken ribs and a concussion. He was
placed in a full leg cast up to his hip and an arm cast. A week after he returned to the jail
from the hospital, he suffered another fall when his crutches slipped out from under him.
The detainee claimed that offi~ials ignored his repeated requests to be assigned a lower
bunk, and his repeated requests for a wheelchair because he could not walk safely on
crutches due to his arm and rib injuries. (St. Tammany Parish Jail, Louisiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE

Liebe v. Norton. 157 F.3d 574 (8th Cir. 1998). Adetainee's wife and the administrator of his
estate sued a county, sheriffandjailer for damages under§ 1983, after the detainee
committed suicide while incarcerated in a county jail. The district court dismissed the case
and the appeals court affirmed, fmding that the jailer who classified the detainee as a suicide
risk, took preventive measures by placing the detainee in a temporary holding cell and
removing his shoes and belt, and periodically checked on the detainee, did not act with
deliberate indifference to the detainee's health or safety. The court found the jailer was
entitled to qualified immunity because the steps taken by the jailer were affirmative,
deliberate steps to prevent suicide. The court held that the county could not he held liable on
a§ 1983 claim of failure to supervise, based on the on-the-job training received by the jailer,
the county's failure to test the jailer on his knowledge of a manual outlining suicide
prevention policies, and the county's decision to leave the jailer in charge. The appeals court
found that this did not rise to the level of deliberate indifference. The court also found that
the county was not liable for failing to train jailers on the risks of inmate suicides, when the
county had in place policies intended to prevent suicides and no suicides had occurred at the
jail before the detainee's. The court found that failing to lead the jailer, step by step, through
policies in the manual did not amount to failure to train. The detainee had been arrested
and taken to the jail and was intoxicated at the time of his admission. The admitting jail
officer classified the detainee as a "suicide risk" because he admitted to previously
attempting suicide and was on both clonazepam and valiwn. The officer checked on the
detainee at intervals ranging from 7 minutes to 21 minutes, but did not turn on the audio
system in the holding cell. The detainee used his long-sleeved shirt to hang himself on a
metal-framed electrical conduit in the cell. The jailer was the only staff member on duty at
the time. Before being assigned to work by himself he was given on-the-job training for 2½
weeks. The jailer was scheduled to attend a jailer training course but it was not offered for
another month. At the time of the suicide the jailer had worked full-time for approximately
two months. (Fall River County Jail, South Dakota)

U.S. District Court
BAIL
RELEASE

Love v. Ficano, 19 F.Supp.2d 754 (E.D.Mich. 1998). A murder defendant who was
confmed in a county jail pending the prosecution's appeal of a grant for a new trial,
petitioned for habeas corpus relief, challenging the revocation of his bond by a state
court of appeals. The district court granted relief, fmding that the defendant was effectively
a pretrial detainee for the purposes of entitlement to release pending appeal, and that
defendant had a protected liberty interest in remaining at liberty on a bond granted by the
trial court. (Wayne County Jail, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Ludlam v. Coffee County, 993 F.Supp. 1421 (M.D.Ala. 1998). A pretrial detainee and her
minor child brought a civil rights action against a sheriff and a county alleging
constitutional violations arising from alleged failure to provide her with adequate medical
treatment during her incarceration. The detainee was pregnant during her detention. The
district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, fmding that the detainee failed
to establish the sheriff's supervisory liability for alleged indifference to her medical needs.
According to the court, the sheriff was not shown to have been personally involved in the
alleged deprivation of treatment for the detainee, the county jail's policy was to provide
access to appropriate treatment for all inmates, and the sheriff never received a request
from the detainee regarding medical attention and knew of no inmate who had ever been
denied medical treatment. The court held that the county was not liable because, under
Alabama law, the county had no role in operating, administering or overseeing the local jail,
nor had the county ever received any notice that the detainee was denied medical treatment.
The detainee alleged that the county failed to provide adequate treatment for her during her

32.63

confinement, including failure to take her to an obstetrician/gynecologist as recommended
by the jail physician. The detainee alleged that as the result of the county's inadequate
treatment, her daughter, who was born four months after her release, experienced
diminished weight, limited development, and excessive medical problems. (Coffee County
Jail, Alabama)
U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Magill v. Lee County, 990 F.Supp. 1382 (M.D.Ala. 1998). Pretrial detainees filed a civil
rights action challenging a county's policy of conducting limited strip searches before
detainees are placed in cells. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
county, finding that the policy was reasonable and did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
According to the court, no heightened suspicion was necessary before jail officials could
conduct limited strip searches because the dangers posed by the detainees to the jail were as
high for one inmate as for another, no matter what crimes those inmates were charged with.
The policy required removal of outer clothing only, and was found reasonable by the court
given that small objects, such as pills, needles, or other contraband, could pose difficult and
dangerous situations for jail administrators. The court noted that the searches were
conducted by officers of the same sex as the detainee, and that pat-down searches or use of a
metal detector would not find drugs or small objects. (Lee County Jail, Alabama)

U.S. Appeals Court
FALSE IMPRISONMENT

Martinez v. City of Los Angeles, 141 F.3d 1373 (9th Cir. 1998). A defendant who was
arrested in Mexico at the request of a U.S. police department sued a city and police
officials. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, but the
appeals court affl.rmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The appeals court held that
material fact issues precluded summary judgment on the plaintiffs false imprisonment and
negligence claims based on his prolonged detention. The court held that under California
law, a jailer and the public entity that employs a jailer may be liable for false imprisonment if
the jailer knows that imprisonment is unlawful or if there is some notice sufficient to put
him, as a reasonable man, under a duty to investigate the validity of incarceration. Los
Angeles police had asked Mexican authorities to arrest a murder suspect. The plaintiff was
arrested, but was innocent and was nevertheless held in a Mexican prison for 59 days. Ten
days after his arrest and detention, the plaintiffs lawyer sent a letter to a Los Angeles
detective telling him that the Mexican authorities had arrested the wrong man, providing
information that challenged the validity of the arrest, but the two witnesses to the Los
Angeles murder were never given the opportunity to identify the plaintiff at the prison or to
view a picture of him. The plaintiff was eventually released when the true suspect was
identified. (Los Angeles Police Department)

U.S. District Court
USEOFFORCE

McClanahan v. City of Moberly, 35 F.Supp.2d 744 (E.D.Mo. 1998). A pretrial
detainee alleged that she was the victim of excessive force used in connection with
her transfer from a police department to a county jail. The district court granted summary
judgment for the defendants, finding that the detainee's allegations of being slapped three
times, without any evidence of any resulting injury. was at most a de minimis injury that did
not implicate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Moberly Police
Department and Shelby County, Missouri)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

McNally v. Prison Health Services, Inc., 28 F.Supp.2d 671 (D.Me. 1998). A pretrial
detainee sued a county jail and its private health care provider alleging that his
constitutional rights and his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) were
violated by the denial of his human immuno-deficiency virus (HIV) medication. The district
court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss, holding that the plaintiff had sufficiently
plead a § 1983 claim that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical
needs. The court found that the detainee suffered significant harm from the jail's failure to
provide care, noting that he suffered from fevers. night sweats, and infections from cuts
received from his arresting officers. The detainee was arrested by a local police department
and was injured by the arresting officers, suffering blackened eyes and cuts on his nose. The
local police took him to a hospital for treatment before taking him to the county jail. Upon
admission to the jail, the detainee told employees of the private health care provider that he
had been diagnosed with HIV and was on a strict regime of medication. He identified the
medication and the dosage, and told medical personnel that he had missed a dosage due to
his arrest and needed one at that time. Although the detainee's private physician confirmed
his medication and dosage, he was denied his medication throughout his three-day stay at
the jail. He was hospitalized immediately after his release for several days as the result of
being deprived of his medication. (Cumberland County Jail, Maine, and Prison Health
Services, Inc.)

U.S. Appeals Court
FALSE ARREST
FALSE IMPRISONMENT

Mistretta v. Prokesch, 5 F.Supp.2d 128 (E.D.N .Y. 1998). An arrestee sued a county,
arresting officer and jail officials under § 1983 alleging false arrest and false
imprisonment. The district court granted judgment as a matter oflaw in favor of
the defendants at the close of the arrestee's case. The court found that the jail
officials' decision to condition the release of this arrestee on his agreement to stay away
from his residence for 24 hours was reasonable and did not give. rise to a false arrest claim.
The court also found that the county's "pro-arrest" policy relating to domestic disputes did
not violate the Fourth Amendment. (Suffolk County Police Department, New York)
32.64

U.S. District Court
PROTECTION
PRIVACY
USEOFFORCE

Moore v. Hosier. 43 F.Supp.2d 978 (N.DJnd. 1998). A former pretrial detainee sued a county
sheriff's department and individual law enforcement officers alleging civil rights violations
arising out of his treatment while he was being held in county confinement. The district court
held that the restraint of the detainee by officers for the purposes of decontaminating him
after a pepper spray cannister malfunctioned did not amount to assault and battery under
state law. The detainee alleged that officers strapped him to a chair with his arms tied
behind his back and beat him about his face and body, and placed his face and mouth in front
of a shower. The court held that even if these allegations were true, they did not amount to
an invasion of privacy under Indiana law. The court denied summary judgment for officers
who did not participate in the beating of the detainee but witnessed it and had the
opportunity to stop it. The court held that the sheriff's department did not negligently train
its employees in the use of force, where the department had developed and maintained
detailed procedures for training incoming officers in handling inmates, and the department
policy specifically stated that officers were expected to use force only in a lawful and
justifiable manner. The detainee admitted that he was intoxicated when officers arrived at
the scene and that he fled on foot when they arrived. The detainee was involved with
altercations with officers at a detention center, and was strapped into a restraining chair
and was sprayed with pepper spray. (Allen County Confinement Center, Indiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
USEOFFORCE

Moore v. Nov~ 146 F .Sd 531 (8th Cir. 1998). An arrestee brought a civil rights
action against correctional officers under § 1983, alleging the use of excessive force
and violations of equal protection and due process. The district court entered judgment for
the oftlcers and the appeals court aftlrmed. The appeals court held that the fmding that
excessive force was not used was not clearly erroneous, even if the fact that a videotape of
the incident was missing raised the inference that the videotape would have supported the
arrestee's version of the incident. The court noted that a supervisor's testimony sufficiently
rebutted this inference. The arrestee was intoxicated, agitated, and refused to comply with
commands, kicked the arresting officer, continued to struggle and attempt to get away, and
posed an immediate threat to his own safety and to the safety of the officers. (Lancaster
County Jail, Nebraska)

U.S. District Court
JUVENILES
SUICIDE

Mroz v. City of Tonawanda. 999 F.Supp. 436 (W.D.N .Y. 1998). The administrator of
the estate of a minor who committed suicide after release from custody brought a
state court action asserting state and § 1983 claims. The case was removed to federal court,
which granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court held that the minor,
who had been released by police and taken home, was not owed a duty of protection under
the due process clause because the minor was no longer in custody. The minor committed
suicide shortly after he was driven home by police. He had been held in a booking room at
the police headquarters after being arrested. The court found that the officers did not have
actual knowledge that the minor posed a risk of suicide; although the minor was crying and
distraught while in custody, the police did not overhear any suicide threats. The court found
that probable cause existed for the arrest of the minor and that any force used was
reasonable. (City of Tonawanda Police Department, New York)

U.S. District Court
FALSE ARREST
FALSE IMPRISONMENT

Neal v. City of Harvey, Ill., 1 F.Supp.2d 849 (N.D.Ill. 1998). An arrestee brought a
§ 1983 action against a city and police officials. The district court held that
probable cause of the arrestee's attempted murder arrest barred his claims for false
arrest, false imprisonment and malicious prosecution. (City of Harvey, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCHES

Nelson!: City oflrvine. 143 F .Sd 1196 (9th Cir. 1998). Two arrestees brought a§
1983 action on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated against city officials,
alleging that they were coerced into submitting to blood tests to determine their alcohol
levels following arrest for driving under the influence. The arrestees alleged that they were
deprived of the option to take breath or urine tests instead. The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of the defendants but the appeals court affirmed in part,
reversed in part. and remanded. The appeals court held that arrestees who were forced to
undergo blood tests after requesting or consenting to breath tests stated Fourth
Amendment claims. According to the court, requiring the arrestees to submit to warrantless
blood tests after they have consented to available breath or urine tests violates the Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement. The court found that arrestees who consented to breath
tests did not impliedly consent to blood tests. (City oflrvine, California)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE

Owens v. City of Philadelphia. 6 F.Supp.2d 373 (E.D.Pa. 1998). The administratrix
of a pretrial detainee's estate and his surviving children brought a § 1983 action against
prison guards and ofllcials and the City of Philadelphia to recover for the detainee's suicide.
The district court found that fact questions precluded summary judgment in favor of the
guards on questions of qualified immunity, deliberate indifference and the adequacy of the
City's training program. According to the court, the detainee's statement to a guard that he
felt "schizy" and that he was "going to hurt myself' raised questions of fact on issues of
knowledge and deliberate indifference. According to the court, it was not necessary to show
that a guard believed that harm would actually befall the detainee; rather. the detainee's
children only needed to show that the official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a
substantial risk of serious harm. The guard called a psychiatrist knowing she intended to

32.65

issue a pass for the detainee to go to the psychiatric unit but failed to note in the prison log
the detainee's statement about hurting himself in order to inform the incoming officers and
his superiors. There was nothing in the record that indicates that the pass was ever issued.
The court also found that the otTl.cials' alleged conduct as policy-makers with respect to
inadequate training to prevent suicide by pretrial detainees was actionable under § 1983 in a
suit against them as individuals. The court held that whether the jail guards acted with
objective reasonableness after they learned that the pretrial detainee was hanging in his cell
involved questions of fact, precluding summary judgment. (Philadelphia Detention Center,
Pennsylvania)
U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE

Payne for Hicks v. Churchich. 161 F .3d 1030 (7th Cir. 1998). The children and
estate of an arrestee who committed suicide in a city jail brought a state court action and a §
1983 action asserting wrongful death and survival claims. The district court dismissed the
case. The appeals court affirmed in part. reversed in part and remanded. The appeals court
held that allegations that the arrestee was subjected to maltreatment while in custody as a
pretrial detainee were properly treated as claims arising under the Due Process Clause. The
court found that a deputy sheriff who transported the arrestee to a city jail did not violate
the due process rights of the arrestee. According to the court, the arrestee's intoxication, his
tattoo questioning life. and his angry cursing did not indicate an obvious, substantial risk of
suicide. The court found that failing to monitor the arrestee or recognize the risk of suicide
was, at most, negligence. The arrestee was admitted to the holding cell of a city police
department at 1:00 a.m. and died of suffocation after hanging himself with a blanket
sometime between 1:00 a.m. and 4:04 a.m. (Madison County Sheriff's Department, City of
Madison Police Department, Illinois)

u.s. Appeals Court

Perkins v. Grimes, 161 F .3d 1127 (8th Cir. 1998). A pretrial detainee, who was
raped by another inmate, sued jail officials under § 1983 for failing to protect him.
The district court enteredjudgment for the officials and the detainee appealed. The appeals
court affirmed, finding that jailers were not deliberately indifferent to the detainee's safety
when they housed him with an inmate who raped him. The court noted that although jailers
were on notice that the inmate was easily provoked, they also knew that the detainee and
the inmate had previously been housed together without incident, and the jailers neither
knew. nor had reason to know, that the inmate was a violent sexual aggressor. The detainee
had been arrested for public intoxication and was booked at a county facility and placed in a
holding cell for approximately five and one-half hours. During the final hour of his time in
the holding cell, the detainee shared the cell with an inmate who was also booked for public
intoxication. The detainee was subsequently raped by the inmate, who was larger and
heavier. The detainee alleged that ajail officer was aware of the assault and did not
intervene. (Sebastian County Adult Detention Center, Arkansas)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Petrazzoulo v. U.S. Marshals Service, 999 F.Supp. 401 (W.D.N.Y. 1998). A pretrial
detainee alleged that the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS) and a county which housed the
detainee under contract to the USMS failed to provide him with dentures. in violation of his
Eighth Amendment rights. The district court held that the USMS was not deliberately
indifferent to the detainee's dental needs and that the detainee failed to state a § 1983 claim
against county officials. The inmate's teeth had been extracted to treat a brokenjaw, and a
dentist had "recommended" that the detainee obtain dentures. The USMS concluded that
the dentist's recommendation was not a prescription and that the dentures were an elective
treatment. The detainee received prompt treatment for his brokenjaw, pain medication and
a soft food diet. The court also held that the detainee could not bring an action under the
Federal Tort Claim Act. (Chautauqua County Jail, New York)

u .s. Appeals Court

Ringuette v. City of Fall River, 146 F .3d 1 (1st Cir. 1998). A person who was
injured while in protective custody as the result of apparent intoxication brought a
§ 1983 action against a city and police officers. The district court granted qualified
immunity for the defendants, and the appeals court affirmed. The appeals court
held that under the circumstances, including the plaintiff's refusal of offers to let
him leave. the officers had qualified immunity for detaining the plaintiff in protective
custody beyond the 12 hours permitted by statute. The court found that the while further
corumement of the plaintitrbeyond the 12-hour limit could be called an unreasonable
seizure, the unreasonableness was mitigated by the belief that the plaintitrremained
incapacitated and the implicit willingness to let the plaintiff go whenever he said he was
ready. (City of Fall River. Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE

Sanders v. Howze, 50 F.Supp.2d 1364 (M.D.Ga. 1998). The estate of a prisoner who
committed suicide while in a county jail brought a § 1983 action against jail officials. The
district court denied summary judgment for the officials fmding it was barred by fact issues
as to whether the officials were deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's known suicidal
propensity and whether the county had adequate policies for dealing with potential suicides.
The court also found a material issue offact as to whether county jail officials were properly
trained in dealing with potential suicides. After being confined in the jail for six weeks the
prisoner removed a razor blade from a disposable razor and cut his wrists. He was
transferred to a state hospital for a psychological evaluation but returned to the jail two

PROTECTION
SEPARATION

PROTECTIVE
CUSTODY
PROTECTION
FALSE IMPRISONMENT

32.66

months later. He was placed in an isolation cell near the jailer's office, where he hung himself a
week later from a light fixture with a bed sheet. A few days earlier a judge had ordered a
psychiatric evaluation which was in the process of being arranged by the sheriff. <Dougherty
County Jail, Georgia}
U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
MEDICAL CARE

Smith v. Montefiore Med. Center-Health Services, 22 F.Supp.2d 275 (S.D.N.Y.
1998). A pretrial detainee sued a city and city corrections officials to recover from
alleged injuries he suffered as the result of his alleged exposure to asbestos. The district court
held that a three-day delay in treating the detainee after his alleged exposure did not amount to
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, noting that a mere delay in rendering medical
treatment does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. The court also found that prison
officials' failure to warn the detainee of the dangers of exposure to asbestos in connection with
asbestos abatement work in the prison did not support a claim of deliberate indifference. Warning
signs were reportedly posted three days after the alleged incident, which the court found to be at
most negligent conduct. (George Motchan Detention Center, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
HANDICAP
CONDITIONS

Tesch v. County of Green Lake, 157 F.3d 465 (7th Cir. 1998). An arrestee who was
wheelchair-bound brought a§ 1983 action against officials, alleging violation of his
constitutional rights during his arrest and detention. The district court granted summary
judgment for the defendants and the appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the
disabled detainee's inability to put on his jail-issued pants, obtain drinking water from his cell
sink, and get into the bed in his cell, during 44 hours of detention, were insufficiently severe to
amount to punishment in violation of the detainee's substantive due process rights. According to
the court, the detainee was not deprived of any of his basic necessities, but rather did not receive
the level of comfort he had demanded. The court noted that correctional officials are not required
to provide comfortable jails, even for pretrial detainees. The detainee suffered from muscular
dystrophy and was confined to a wheelchair, but was physically unable to function fully in a jail
cell that was equipped for handicapped inmates. (Green Lake County Jail, Wisconsin)

U.S. Appeals Court
PROTECTION
SEPARATION

Turguitt v. Jefferson County. Ala., 137 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 1998). The estate of a pretrial
detainee who was killed during an altercation with another inmate at a county jail filed a
civil rights action against the county. The district court denied the county's motion to
dismiss and the county appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded, finding that an
Alabama county cannot be liable in a civil rights case for harms that befall jail inmates due to
improper operation of the jail or negligent supervision of its inmates because the county has no
responsibility in that area. According to the court, the sheriff, not the county, is responsible for jail
conditions under Alabama law; counties have no duties with respect to daily operation of county
jails and have no authority to dictate how jails are run. The deceased inmate was fatally injured
in a fight with another inmate, who was a convicted felon, in the dayroom of the jail. (Jefferson
County Jail, Alabama)

U.S. Appeals Court
DUE PROCESS
PSYCHOLOGICAL
SERVICES
MEDICAL CARE

U.S. v. Brandon, 158 F.3d 947 (6th Cir. 1998). A pretrial detainee sought a judicial
hearing on the issue of whether he could be forcibly medicated with antipsychotic
drugs to render him competent to stand trial. The district court held that an
administrative hearing would be sufficient to satisfy due process, and the detainee
appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that due process required a judicial
hearing and that the detainee should be allowed to present his own rebuttal testimony on the
issues involved. The court also found that the strict-scrutiny standard of substantive due process
review applied, and that the government must prove its case with clear and convincing evidence.
(Federal Medical Center, Rochester, Minnesota)

U.S. District Court
BAIL
BAIL REFORM ACT

U.S. v. DeBeir, 16 F.Supp.2d 592 (D.Md. 1998). The government moved for pretrial
detention under the Bail Reform Act for a defendant who was charged with
interstate travel for the purpose of engaging in a sexual act with a minor. The district court
denied the motion, finding that the defendant did not pose a serious risk of flight and that the
offense was not a crime of violence. (Maryland)

U.S. District Court
BAIL
BAIL REFORM ACT

U.S. v. Floyd, 11 F.Supp.2d 39 (D.D.C. 1998). A defendant moved to revoke a
magistrate's order of detention pending trial. The district court held that the charge
of possession of a firearm by a felon is a crime of violence and that evidence was sufficient to
warrant pretrial detention. (U.S. District Court, District of Columbia)

U.S. District Court
RELEASE-CONDITION

U.S. v. Herrera, 29 F.Supp.2d 756 (N.D.Tex. 1998). After a defendant who was on
pretrial release tested positive for the use of a controlled substance, a pretrial services officer
petitioned the court for revocation of release. A U.S. Magistrate dismissed the motion, and the
district court affirmed. The district court noted that only an attorney for the government, not a
pretrial services officer, may initiate a proceeding for revocation of release. (U.S. District Court,
Northern District, Texas)

U.S. District Court
ELECTRONIC
MONITORING

U.S. v. Malloy, 11 F.Supp.2d 583 (D.N.J. 1998). A defendant charged with violating
the Arms Export Control Act moved to modify his bail conditions. The district court
granted his motion, finding that the defendant was entitled to have his bail conditions modified
from 24·hour house arrest with electronic monitoring to the use of a satellite tracking system. The
32.67

court found that the satellite tracking system provided a sufficient level of control over the
defendant's whereabouts to assure that the defendant would appear at trial. (U.S. District Court,
New Jersey)
U.S. District Court
SUICIDE

Vinson v. Clarke County, Ala., 10 F.Supp.2d 1282 (S.D.Ala. 1998). A§ 1983 action
was brought by the administrator of the estate of an intoxicated arrestee who had committed
suicide while being held in a county jail. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
the defendants, finding that the sheriff and jailer acted within the scope of their discretionary
authority and did not violate clearly established law. The court held that the county was not
deliberately indifferent to the risks of suicide. According to the court, it was not clearly
established in October 1994 that a county sherifrs failure to train jail personnel in the care of
intoxicated inmates amounted to deliberate indifference. The court found that the risk of suicide
among a class of intoxicated detainees at the county jail was not so obvious that the county's
failure to remedy conditions of confinement which gave detainees the opportunity to commit
suicide could be seen as showing deliberate indifference. The detainee committed suicide within
30 minutes of his admission by hanging himself from the bars of his jail cell. An autopsy revealed
that the detainee's blood contained .205 percent alcohol, which was well over the maximum of .1
allowed under state DUI law. (Clarke County Jail, Alabama)

U.S. Appeals Court
PROTECTION

Webb y_. Lawrence County, 144 F.3d 1131 (8th Cir. 1998). A prisoner who was allegedly
sexually assaulted by a cellmate brought an action against a county, sheriff, and sheriff
department employees, asserting§ 1983 and state-law negligence claims. The district court
granted summary judgment for the defendants and the appeals court affirmed. The appeals court
held that the prisoner failed to establish that the defendants actually knew of a substantial risk of
harm to the prisoner from his cellmate. The appeals court also held that the defendants were
protected by state statutory immunity on the prisoner's negligence claim. The court noted that
while the defendants knew generally of the risk of inmate rape and assault for young, physically
slight inmates such as the plaintiff, there was no evidence or allegations that inmate rape was
common in this particular institution, nor was there evidence that the cellmate, who was a sexual
offender, had assaulted other inmates or caused any other problems while incarcerated. Further,
the prisoner had requested to be placed with the cellmate. (Lawrence County Jail, South Dakota)

U.S. Appeals Court
RECREATION
EXERCISE
CONDITIONS
LAW LIBRARIES

Wilson v. Blankenship, 163 F.3d 1284 (11th Cir. 1998). A federal pretrial detainee
brought an action under § 1983 and Bivens claiming a federal marshal, wardens of
a city jail and corrections officers subjected him to unconstitutional conditions of
confinement in a city jail. The district court granted summary judgment for the
defendants and the appeals court affrrmed. The appeals court held that the lack of a law library at
the city jail did not prevent the detainee from pursuing civil rights claims or his criminal appeal to
the extent that his right of access to courts was violated. The appeals court agreed that the
wardens were entitled to qualified immunity because they did not have the authority or ability to
provide the jail with a law library or exercise area; according to the court, their duty was to
administer the jail pursuant to an agreement with the Marshals Service, which was aware of the
lack of a law library and exercise space. The appeals court also affrrmed the grant of qualified
immunity to the marshal because he did not violate clearly established law by transporting the
detainee to the city jail under the terms of an intergovernmental agreement. The court noted that
the detainee's stay at the facility was relatively brief. <Montgomery City Jail, Alabama)

U.S. District Court
CELLSEARCH
ACCESS TO COURT
LAW LIBRARIES

Zimmerman v. Hoard, 5 F.Supp.2d 633 (N.D. Ind. 1998). A state prisoner brought a
§ 1983 action concerning events that occurred while he was a pretrial detainee at a
county jail. The district court held that state directives and recommendations did
not provide the basis for § 1983 claims. The inmate had alleged that the county officials failed to
implement the Indiana Jail Standards and Rules and comply with the recommendations of the
State Jail Inspector. The court held that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to cell searches.
According to the court, the inmate's allegations that the county jail failed to have an adequate
collection of legal materials and its prohibition against defendants receiving incoming legal
publications stated a claim that would survive dismissal at the pleading stage. The inmate alleged
that the county had a blanket policy of prohibiting inmates from receiving any type of publication
through the mail. The court also found that a pro se inmate could not claim violation of attorney·
client confidentiality. The inmate had complained that he was forced to conduct attorney-client
consultations in a room equipped with a two-way intercom speaker that allowed jail personnel to
breach confidentiality. (Carroll County Jail, Indiana)

U.S. District Court
ACCESS TO COURT
COMMISSARY
SEPARATION
PRNACY
MEDICAL CARE
USE OF FORCE

Zimmerman v. Tippecanoe Sherifrs Dept., 25 F.Supp.2d 915 (N.D.lnd. 1998). A
state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against county officials and employees
alleging constitutional violations during his pretrial detention period in a county
jail. The district court found in favor of the defendants for all but one of the
allegations. The court found that the sheriff's decision to order the prisoner to be
held in a disciplinary segregation unit of the jail without a disciplinary hearing did
not violate the prisoner's due process rights because the decision was administrative and was
made in response to the prisoner's previous escape attempt. The court held that a jail physician's
failure to refer the prisoner to a dentist for emergency treatment of an abscess and bone
fragmentation did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment because the prisoner did not state that
he was in pain or had any discomfort when the physician examined him. According to the court,

32.68

the fact that the prisoner failed to receive one of his commissary orders did not constitute a
disciplinary action without due process, even if the prisoner was unable to purchase stamps and
materials with which to correspond with his family and his attorney. The court noted that the
prisoner had received regular commissary orders, including a large order with correspondence
materials placed just before his missed order, and he received regular orders after the missed
order. The court held that even if a county jail employee hid the prisoner's outgoing mail rather
than delivering it, the action did not violate the Fourth Amendment because another employee
found the mail and ensured that it was mailed, so that the prisoner suffered no harm. The court
found no constitutional violation of access to court because a jail official required the prisoner to
hold conversations with his attorney in a room equipped with a two·way intercom system because
the official did not actually listen to the conversation but merely stood in a control room. But the
court found triable issues of fact regarding whether the prisoner suffered an injury when a jail
employee handcuffed him immediately after an escape attempt. (Tippecanoe County Jail, Indiana)
1999
U.S. Appeals Court
FALSE IMPRISON·
MENT
FALSE ARREST

Anaya v. Crossroads Managed Care Systems, Inc., 196 F.3d 684 (10th Cir. 1999). Detainees who
were seized by police, transported to an alcohol detoxification facility and then detained, brought
a § 1983 action against the operator of the facility and government officials alleging violation of
their Fourth Amendment rights. The detainees had been seized from their front porches, from
their bedrooms and from the back seats of their cars under a policy of the City of Trinidad. The
district court granted summary judgment for the defendants and the detainees appealed. The
appeals court reversed and remanded. The appeals court found that the seizures set the standard
for detention well below the requirements of the Fourth Amendment and that the government
officials were not entitled to qualified immunity because the right against unreasonable seizures
for potential drunkenness was clearly established at the time of the seizures. (City of Trinidad,
Colorado)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
CLOTHING
MEDICAL CARE

Anton v. Sheriff of DuPage County. Ill., 47 F.Supp.2d 993 (N.D.111. 1999). A pretrial
detainee brought a § 1983 action against a county and county officials alleging that he was
subjected to unconstitutional conditions of confinement at a county jail. The district court
refused to dismiss the case, finding that his alleged exposure to low temperature in a
detention cell while naked and with no alternative means of protecting himself from the cold
supported a claim of inadequate shelter against the county. The detainee allegedly repeatedly
complained to jail officers for hours and they responded with jeers and laughter, and he was not
provided with medical care until he threatened litigation. When a nurse finally attended to the
detainee, his body temperature was three degrees below normal. The detainee had just attempted
suicide and had been placed in a rubberized cell without clothing and was observed every 16
minutes. The court also found that deputies' alleged thwarting of medical treatment given to the
detainee supported a claim of violation of his right to medical attention. The officers allegedly
removed a blanket that was given to the detainee by the nurse, which the court held supported a
claim for deliberate indifference. The court denied qualified immunity for the officers, finding that
it was clearly established at the time of this incident that pretrial detainees had a constitutional
right to adequate heat and medical attention. (DuPage County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
USE OF FORCE

Baker v. Willett, 42 F.Supp.2d 192 (N.D.N.Y. 1999). A jail inmate brought an action against a
county and county officials alleging excessive use of force in violation of § 1983. The district
court denied, in part, the defendants' motion to dismiss, finding that a named sheriffs deputy was
not entitled to qualified immunity because it was clearly established at the time of the incident
that unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain constituted cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Eighth Amendment. The deputy allegedly pushed the inmate in the back, causing
him to fall off of a table and strike his head on metal bars approximately four or five feet from
where he had been sitting. The inmate sustained a laceration on his forehead which required
sutures. The county Undersheriffreviewed the incident and spoke to the inmate and the deputy,
but did not conduct a formal investigation nor discipline the deputy. The district court dismissed
the sheriffs department and county from the suit, finding that they could not be held liable on the
ground that the sheriffs department had a practice of not investigating use of force complaints or
disciplining officers. The court noted that three of five meritorious complaints in the past ten
years had been directed toward one officer who had been terminated after disciplinary
proceedings. (Warren County Jail, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONDITION

Benjamin v. Jacobsen, 172 F.3d 144 (2nd Cir. 1999). Officials who had entered into a consent
decree governing New York City jail conditions moved for immediate termination of the decree
under provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). Pretrial detainees opposed the
motion. The district court vacated the decree and the appeals court affirmed in part and reversed
in part. A rehearing en bane was granted and the appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part,
and remanded. The appeals court held that the detainees were entitled to present evidence of
current and ongoing violations of federal rights and of the need for continuation of the prospective
relief provided in the decrees. According to the court PLRA provides for decrees to be terminated,
but it does not require that decrees be vacated. The appeals court found that the PLRA
termination provision does not violate the Constitutional separation of powers principle nor does
it strip the courts of their Article III power and duty to remedy constitutional wrongs. (New York
City Department Correction)
32.69

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Davis v. Dorsey, 167 F.3d 411 (8th Cir. 1999). A former pretrial detainee who allegedly
was injured when he fell in a jail shower brought a § 1983 action against jail officials and a
hospital The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants and the appeals court
affirmed in part and reversed in part. The appeals court held that material fact issues precluded
summary judgment for correctional officers and jail medical staff. The detainee fell in the shower,
hitting the back of his head and his left arm. He was not seen by medical staff following the fall
but he was given three Tylenol. For several days he requested medical attention but correctional
officers refused to process his requests or complete an incident report that would enable him to
receive emergency medical treatment. After five days the detainee was seen by a nurse, who made
disparaging remarks and did not clean his wounds or give him any medication. The appeals court
reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the officers and jail medical staff,
fmding that they "utterly failed to address many of the allegations in [the detainee's] verified
complaint." (St. Louis City Jail, Missouri)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Dunigan ex rel. Nyman v. Winnebago County, 165 F.3d 587 (7th Cir. 1999). Survivors of an
detainee who died in a county jail brought a § 1983 action against county officials alleging
failure to provide proper medical care to the detainee. The district court granted summary
judgment for the officials and the appeals court affirmed. The appeals court found that the
officials were not deliberately indifferent to the detainee's serious medical needs, despite their
alleged failure to consult medical personnel or actively administer medication when the inmate's
condition deteriorated during the days preceding his death. The court noted the officials' threemonth record of treating the detainee's medical condition and their lack of knowledge about the
detainee's specific condition of myasthenia gravis (MG). Treatment of the detainee began
immediately after he was admitted to the jail, when he complained of blurry vision as the result of
a car accident several weeks earlier. The detainee received various services and tests in the
following three months and was tentatively diagnosed by a specialist with MG, which had
intermittent symptoms offatigability and muscle weakness. Jail medical staff were not familiar
with MG, nor were they aware of the specialist's diagnosis. Several weeks later jail staff found the
detainee lying on his cell floor with his head resting on his bunk, claiming he had fallen and hurt
his neck. Officers could find no signs of an injury and the detainee was able to move his limbs
easily, so arrangements were made for close observation of the detainee. The detainee was seen
several times by jail medical staff in the next few days, but his condition gradually worsened and
he was found dead in his cell. (Winnebago County Jail, Wisconsin)

U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE

Ellis v. Washington County and Johnson City. Tenn., 198 F.3d 225 (6th Cir. 1999). A mother and
a minor child of a deceased pretrial detainee brought a wrongful death action under § 1983
against a city, county, and jailers after the detainee committee suicide in a county jail. The district
court entered summary judgment for all defendants except for one jailer and the plaintiffs and
jailer appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the county's alleged failure to train
jailers on suicide prevention was not the proximate cause of the detainee's injury absent any
circumstances from which a reasonable jailer would have foreseen the suicide. The appeals court
also found that one of the jailers was entitled to qualified immunity even though he made a
mistake in assessing the detainee's suicidal tendencies because he was not deliberately indifferent
toward the detainee and exhibited a genuine concern for the detainee's welfare while confined.
But the appeals court refused to grant summary judgment for one jailer because of his alleged
delay in informing an emergency medical team of his alleged observation of the detainee tying a
noose in his cell. The detainee committed suicide by handing himself in a county jail three hours
after his transfer from a city jail. The cell in which the detainee hung himself had a monitor
camera at one end but was not designed as a suicide prevention cell. The detainee had been held
overnight at a city jail after he was arrested because he was believed to be drunk or under the
influence of drugs. After his arraignment the following morning he was taken to the county jail
where, during the three hours preceding his suicide, "nothing occurred that would put reasonable
jailors on notice of a possible suicide attempt" according to the appeals court. The detainee was
asked about possible suicidal tendencies when he was admitted to the jail and responded that he
"loved life." A few minutes later a jailer who had gone to high school with the detainee came on
duty and was concerned about his mental health. The jailer found the detainee talking on the
phone to his mother and seemingly crying. After the call the jailer asked the detainee if he was
feeling suicidal and the detainee responded "Hell no, I've got a baby on the way that I've got to
take care of." But most persuasive to the court was the statement of the mother in a letter two
months after the death of her son that her son was "not suicidal at 11:30 when I talked to him [on
the phone] ... knew he was getting out [of jail.1" The detainee's mother was an experienced,
practicing, licensed clinical psychologist who held a Ph.D., and the court considered her statement
to be an expert opinion. The appeals court held that it was "unreasonable to attribute fault to the
County or its jailors for failing to predict suicide." (Johnson City Jail and Washington County Jail,
Texas)

Estate of Brooks Ex Rel. Brooks v. U.S., 197 F.3d 1245 (9th Cir. 1999). A federal detainee who was
U.S. Appeals Court
held by a county in pretrial detention for 12 days without being arraigned or brought before a federal
SPEEDY TRIAL
FALSE IMPRISONMENT judicial officer brought a § 1983 action. The detainee reached a settlement with the United States and
the charges against other defendants were dismissed. The appeals court affirmed, holding that the
county's actions were not the legal cause of the detainee's injuries and the county was not liable for
false imprisonment under state law. The court noted that the county was not authorized to act for the
United States and bring the detainee before a federal magistrate, nor could it release the detainee

32.70

without violating a state law. (United States Marshals Service and Alameda County, California)
U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Ferris v. County of Kennebec, 44 F.Supp.2d 62 CD.Me. 1999). A pretrial detainee sued county
officials and staff in state court. The case was removed to federal court, where the court denied
qualified immunity for a nurse and found that the detainee had adequately alleged the nurse's
indifference to her serious medical needs. The detainee alleged that the nurse responded to her
statement that she believed she was having a miscarriage by taking her pulse, telling her that she
was menstruating, and ordering her to lie down. According to the detainee, the nurse did not
speak to her again except to inform her that she was being transferred to a different cell because
she would not lie down as ordered. The nurse made no attempt to confirm whether the detainee
was pregnant, even though the detainee had told jail staff during her intake interview that she
was pregnant. The nurse also refused to provide the detainee with sanitary supplies. (Kennebec
County Jail. Maine)

U.S. District Court

Ford v. Nassau County Executive, 41 F.Supp.2d 392 (E.D.N.Y. 1999). A pretrial detainee
brought an action against a county correctional facility and county executive alleging
violation of his constitutional rights because he was required to serve as a "food cart worker"
without payment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The
court held that making the detainee choose between distributing food to inmates and being
segregated in "lock in" could not be deemed punishment, and therefore did not deprive the
detainee of liberty without due process. The court also held that requiring the detainee to work
without payment as a food cart worker did not violate the Thirteenth Amendment; according to
the court, to sustain a claim under the Thirteenth Amendment the detainee would have to
demonstrate he was subjected to compulsory labor "akin to African slavery." The court found that
the detainee's own alleged assistance in the distribution of food, for which he received at least
some consideration, did not rise to the level of the indignity and degradation that accompanied
slavery. As a food cart worker the detainee was required to push a pre-loaded food cart
approximately 125 yards to an elevator, and occasionally to hand out certain foods such as milk,
bread or oranges. He was also sometimes required to perform other tasks, such as sweeping a
guard walk or emptying garbage. According to the detainee, he was required to work seven days
per week, for all three meals. The detainee was required to take medication to control his epilectic
seizures and was accordingly assigned to a ''workers and medical dorm," which involved him in
work activities. The court held that there was no evidence that the detainee's chores, despite his
medical status, were overly burdensome to him. (Nassau County Correctional Center, New York)

WORK
FORCED LABOR

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO
PROTECT

Giroux v. Somerset County, 178 F.3d 28 (1st Cir. 1999). A jail inmate who had been assaulted
by another inmate sued a jail employee, sheriff and county alleging violations of§ 1983. The
district court granted summary judgment for the defendants and the inmate appealed. The
appeals court vacated and remanded, finding that summary judgment was precluded by a factual
dispute about the scope of the jail shift supervisor's responsibility and whether he abdicated his
responsibility. The inmate was threatened by a cellmate when he left his cell to meet with a
detective. After the meeting the inmate was moved to a different cell, apparently in response to
the threat. The inmate was threatened again the next day when he was escorted past his former
cell, and was allegedly threatened by other inmates while dining. The inmate requested protective
custody. Although he was not moved, he was placed on "cell feed" status which eliminated his
contact with other inmates in the common dining area. Several days later the inmate was
involved with a visit which required him to use a common visiting area. While in the visiting area
he was assaulted by his former cellmate who was also involved with a visit. The inmate suffered a
broken nose, torn shoulder ligaments and a head laceration which required stitches. <somerset
County Jail, Maine)

U.S. Appeals Court
PROTECTION
USE OF FORCE
MEDICAL CARE

Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d 692 (4th Cir. 1999). The administrator for the estate of a deceased detainee
sued officers and county officials under § 1983 asserting constitutional violations, negligence, gross
negligence, negligent training and negligent supervision. The district court granted summary
judgement for the defendants on all§ 1983 claims and declined to assume supplemental jurisdiction
over state law claims. The appeals court affirmed. The detainee had been arrested and
transported to the county detention center and the following day was declared brain dead. During
his booking the detainee was acting irrationally, his speech was slurred, and he kept repeating in
an intoxicated manner "I can't believe this is all over a traffic ticket." He was then taken to a cell
and strip searched, but at the conclusion of the search attempted to crawl out of the cell and a
struggle ensued. Officers used pepper spray to subdue him. Early the next morning the detainee
began acting belligerent again. He resisted being moved to another cell and a five-man cell
extraction team pinned him face down. During the struggle he was sprayed with pepper spray
and he was punched several times. Once restrained, he was carried face down to another cell and
was placed in four-point restraints. A few minutes later he appeared to be unconscious and was
checked by medics and was found to be "okay." Another officer then noticed that the detainee was
not breathing, CPR was initiated and he was taken to a local hospital where he was found to be
brain dead. The appeals court held that officers at the county detention center were not
deliberately indifferent to the medical needs of the deceased detainee, either when the detainee
was booked or during his custody. A trained medic was on hand in the booking area and discerned
no sign of a medical problem. According to the court, the failure to clean pepper spray off of the
detainee in a timely manner was, in the first instance, due to the detainee's violent response to
the officer's offer to wash the spray off, and in the second instance was due to the need to rush the
32.71

detainee to a hospital for emergency care. The appeals court held that the officers did not use
excessive force against the detainee, but rather that they applied the force necessary in a good
faith effort to restore discipline. The court also found that there were no actionable deficiencies in
the sheriffs policies, customs or training. According to the court, "...the appellant's own expert
penologist conceded that [sheriff] Peed's policies met the standards of both the Virginia Board of
Corrections and the American Correctional Association." The court also concluded, "...claims that
[sheriff] Peed provided inadequate training for his employees must also fail. As of the time of this
incident, the ADC had been accredited for more than ten years by both the American Correctional
Association and the National Commission on Correctional Health Care, two organizations whose
training requirements often surpass minimal constitutional standards." (Fairfax County Adult
Detention Center, Virginia)
U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Hall v. Thomas, 190 F.3d 693 (5th Cir. 1999). An arrestee brought a§ 1983 action alleging that a jail
was deliberately indifferent to his kidney condition, his orthopedic pains, his diabetes and his
epilepsy. The district court dismissed the action and the appeals court affirmed. The appeals court
held that any discrimination that may have occurred against the arrestee was not "because ot" his
alleged disability, within the meaning of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and that jail
physicians were not deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. The court noted that
even if the defendants had failed to administer or provide the arrestee's medication on some
occasions, the arrestee refused to take his seizure medication several times and refused to appear
to receive his medication on some occasions. (Harris County Jail, Texas)

U.S. District Court
FALSE IMPRISON.

Hardy v. Town of Hayneville, 50 F.Supp.2d 1176 (M.D.Ala. 1999). An arrestee brought a§
1983 suit against an arresting officer, chief of police. mayor and town, alleging false
imprisonment and use of excessive force. The court found that the arrestee's allegations that the
police officer arrested him and detained him in a county jail without informing him of the nature
and cause of the accusations against him were sufficient to state a Sixth Amendment claim. The
court also found that allegations that the police chief and town failed to provide police officers
with adequate training on the lawful use of force, and that the unlawful use of force would be
condoned by their superiors, were sufficient to state a Fourth Amendment claim. The arrestee had
been preaching the gospel and greeting people as they came into a store, with the permission of
the owner. A police officer instructed the arrestee to leave the store and then allegedly followed
the arrestee to the back of the store when he attempted to protest to the owner. The officer
allegedly assaulted the arrestee and battered him about the head and back, threw him to the
ground and struck his wrists repeatedly with unopened handcuffs. (Town of Hayneville, Alabama)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
CROWDING
PRNACY

Harris v. Brewington-Carr, 49 F.Supp.2d 378 (D.Del 1999). A pretrial detainee challenged
his conditions of confinement and a district court judge refused to dismiss the case, finding
that the detainee had sufficiently alleged violation of his due process rights. The pretrial
detainee alleged that he was required to sleep on the floor for one week while being held in a
booking and receiving area, that he had to sleep on the floor for three weeks before receiving a
bed, that he was housed in a one man cell with two other men, that the open toilet in his cell was
unsanitary and deprived him of his right to privacy, that there was a lack of showers and
excessive noise, that he was housed with sentenced and unsentenced inmates, and that as a non·
smoker he had to breathe cigarette smoke from other inmates. (Multi-Purpose Criminal Justice
Facility, Delaware)

U.S. District Court
USE OF FORCE
MEDICAL CARE

Harris v. Morales, 69 F.Supp.2d 1319 (D.Colo. 1999). An inmate brought a § 1983 action alleging
excessive force and deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs while he was confined in a
county jail. The district court denied summary judgment for the defendants, finding that the
allegations that the inmate was unnecessarily subjected to pepper spray and was then denied
medical attention stated Eighth Amendment claims. (Summit County Jail. Colorado)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONDITIONS

Henderson v. Sheahan, 196 F.3d 839 (7th Cir. 1999). U.S. Cert. Den. at 120 S.Ct. 2691. A pretrial
detainee who was held in a county jail for four-and ·one·half years brought a § 1983 action against
the sheriff and corrections officials claiming injuries allegedly sustained as the result of his
exposure to second·hand smoke. The district court dismissed the action. The appeals court
affirmed, finding that the inmate's alleged present injuries were not sufficiently serious to support
a due process claim and that the detainee could not recover for future injuries absent a showing to
a reasonable medical certainty that he faced an increased risk of developing a future injury
attributable to the alleged exposure. The detainee alleged present injuries that included breathing
problems, chest pains, dizziness, sinus problems, headaches, and loss of energy. Although the jail
had a non-smoking policy the detainee claimed that inmates routinely violated it. (Cook County
Jail, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
USE OF FORCE
SUICIDE

Lambert v. City of Dumas, 187 F.3d 931 (8th Cir. 1999). The family of a detainee who died
in his jail cell brought a § 1983 action against a city and police officers, asserting claims for
unlawful arrest, excessive force and wrongful death. The district court denied the defendants'
motion for summary judgment and the appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded. The appeals court held that summary judgment was precluded by factual issues
regarding the amount and degree of force used during the detainee's arrest, but that the officers
were not liable for wrongful death, absent any evidence that the officers were subjectively aware
of any risk that the detainee would inflict harm on himself. The detainee did not threaten to

32.72

commit suicide during his incarceration or otherwise indicate that he might do so, he was never
classified as a suicide risk, and the officers were not shown to have knowledge of a prior incident
when the detainee swallowed a metal crack pipe. The court noted that a showing that a jailer was
negligent in failing to recognize a prisoner's suicidal tendencies is insufficient to satisfy the § 1983
deliberate indifference standard. (Dumas Police Department, Arkansas)
U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
MEDICAL CARE

Lopez v. LeMaster. 172 F.3d 756 (10th Cir. 1999). A pretrial detainee who was beaten by other
inmates while confined in a jail brought a § 1983 action against the county sheriff individually
and in his official capacity. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the sheriff
and the detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.
The detainee was arrested and placed in a general population cell in the county jail where he was
threatened by another inmate. A jail officer took the detainee to an office where he prepared a
written statement about the threat. But the officer returned the detainee to the general
population cell where he was attacked and beaten by several inmates. The officer returned later
and the detainee asked to be taken to the hospital. The officer took the detainee to an office, called
an unknown person to ask for instructions, and then told the detainee "you are still conscious, we
don't have to take you." The detainee was given aspirin, placed in a different cell and was released
the next day. He went to the hospital after his release and was diagnosed with a severe contusion
to the skull with post-concussion syndrome and a severe strain to the cervical, thoracic and
lumbosacral spine. The appeals court held that the detainee failed to establish a claim for failure
to provide adequate training and supervision of jail personnel because he failed to identify specific
deficiencies that were closely related to his injuries. The court noted that evidence which showed
that the jailers were generally poorly trained was insufficient to support the training and
supervision claims. But the appeals court found that material issues of fact precluded summary
judgment on the claim that the county maintained an unconstitutional policy of understaffing the
jail and failing to monitor inmates, with deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety. The
court noted that a suit against the sheriff in his official capacity is the equivalent of a suit against
the county. The appeals court found that fact issues precluded summary judgment for the sheriff
in his individual and official capacities on the detainee's failure to protect claims. The appeals
court also held that summary judgment was precluded on the detainee's claim alleging that the
sheriff was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. (Jackson County Jail. Oklahoma)

U.S. Appeals Court
PROBABLE CAUSE
FALSE IMPRISON·
MENT

Luck v. Rovenstine. 168 F.3d 323 (7th Cir. 1999). An arrestee who was jailed for a
week without a probable cause hearing following his warrantless arrest brought a §
1983 action against a sheriff in his personal and official capacities. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the sheriff. The appeals court affirmed in
part and reversed and remanded in part. The appeals court held that the sheriff could not be held
liable in his individual capacity. Fact issues as to whether the arrestee's detention without a
probable cause hearing resulted from the sheriffs deliberate decision not to monitor detainees
who were brought to the jail by outside agencies precluded summary judgment on the official
capacity claim. According to the court, the sheriff, as the custodian of persons incarcerated in the
county jail. had a duty to ensure that detainees arrested without warrants received probable
cause hearings or gained release. The court noted that according to the Supreme Court, "prompt"
in this context means, under most circumstances. within 48 hours. (Kosciusko County jail,
Indiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
EQUAL PROTECTION
WORK
SENTENCE
REDUCTION
GOOD TIME

MacFarlane v. Walter. 179 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 1999). After their state habeas petitions were
denied, state prisoners petitioned for federal habeas corpus relief, challenging two counties'
"good conduct" and "good performance" policies as they were applied to them. The district
court granted summary judgment for the respondent corrections officials, but the appeals
court reversed and remanded. The appeals court held that there was an equal protection
violation in the counties' allowance oflesser good time credits for defendants who were
detained pretrial in county jails because of their financial inability to post bail. than that allowed
for defendants who were able to wait to serve their sentences until after sentencing to a state
correctional facility. The counties· early release policies limited presentence detainees to a
maximum good-conduct credit of 15% of the sentence imposed; the court noted that persons who
had posted bail and served their entire sentence at a state correctional facility could end up
serving 23 days less on a five· to six·year sentence. The court upheld the policies under which
pretrial detainees were not eligible for participation in work and other programs through which
they could earn good-performance credit, finding the counties had established a strong rational
connection between the legislative means and purpose of protecting community safety. (Pierce and
Clark County Jails, Washington)

U.S. Appeals Court
PUBLICATIONS

Mauro v. Arpaio, 188 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 1999). An inmate in a county jail system brought a
§ 1983 action challenging the constitutionality of a sheriffs department policy prohibiting
inmates from possessing "sexually explicit" material. The district court granted summary
judgment for the county and the appeals court affirmed, finding that the policy which excluded all
material containing frontal nudity was reasonably related to legitimate penological interests of
maintaining jail security, rehabilitating inmates and reducing sexual harassment of female
detention officers. According to the court, the policy was neutral in that jail administrators drew a
distinction based solely on the basis of the materials' potential effect on the jail. and was not so
remote as to render the policy arbitrary or irrational. The court noted that the jail's goal of
rehabilitation was legitimate only as it applied to convicted inmates housed at the jail, and was
32.73

not a legitimate goal to the extent that it was attempting to impose rehabilitation on pretrial
detainees. <Maricopa County Jail System, Arizona)
U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Olabisiomotosho v. City of Hudson, 185 F.3d 521 (5th Cir. 1999). A pretrial detainee brought
a § 1983 action alleging she suffered damages because of negligence, cruel and unusual
punishment, and deliberate denial of medical treatment for her asthma. The district court granted
summary judgment for all defendants. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the detainee failed
to show that her medical needs were "serious" while she was in custody, and that officers were not
deliberately indifferent to her medical needs. (City of Houston, Texas)

U.S. District Court
USE OF FORCE

Peters v. City of Biloxi, Mississippi, 57 F.Supp.2d 366 (S.D.Miss. 1999). An arrestee brought
a § 1983 claim challenging the use of force during his arrest. The district court found that the
arresting officer's conduct in handcuffing, shackling and verbally harassing the arrestee was
objectively reasonable and was not clearly excessive. The court noted that there was no evidence
that the officer hit or otherwise physically injured the arrestee. (City of Biloxi, MS)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
FAILURE TO
PROTECT
SANITATION

Preval v. Reno, 57 F.Supp.2d 307 (E.D.Va. 1999). A detainee of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) filed a prose action under§ 1983 alleging violation of his
constitutional rights. The district court found that loud noise, constant light, bad odor and
low room temperature could not be characterized as ''punishment" unrelated to the
detainee's detention. The district court also found that the detainee failed to state a due process
claim based on INS staff failure to protect him from an assault by another inmate, where there
was no allegation that any official or staff member was aware of the potential for the specific
altercation before it took place. <Piedmont Regional Jail, Virginia, under contract to the
Immigration and Naturalization Service)

U.S. Appeals Court
INTAKE SCREENING
MEDICAL CARE
FALSE IMPRISON·
MENT/ARREST

Qian v. Kautz, 168 F.3d 949 (7th Cir. 1999). An arrestee brought a civil rights action alleging
arrest without probable cause, and wrongful denial of adequate medical treatment. The district
court entered summary judgment for the defendants and the arrestee appealed. The appeals court
atrrrmed in part, and reversed and remanded in part. According to the court, "when the events
leading to this lawsuit began to unfold, ambiguous behavior combined with a severe language
barrier led to the arrest" of the plaintiff. After his initial arrest, police determined that he could be
released, but "because he did not want to pay for a hotel room, they then re-arrested him,
consigned him to the drunk tank, and failed to recognize that he was suffering from a serious
medical condition." The sheriff's department translator spoke the wrong Chinese dialect, making
communication very difficult. The appeals court held that summary judgment on the wrongful
arrest claim was precluded by fact questions as to whether a second arrest, without probable
cause, occurred when the arrestee refused to book a room at a hotel and a police officer took him
back into custody and brought him to a local jail. The court held that while the initial arrest for
driving while intoxicated was supported by probable cause, whether the police officer actually took
the arrestee into "protective custody" for his own safety rather than arresting him was an issue of
fact precluding summary judgment. The court noted that state law permits an officer to take into
custody someone who appears to be mentally ill and who may present a danger to himself or
others, but such involuntary incarcerations must meet requirements that include a medical
assessment of the detainee's condition and approval by a judge. The appeals court atl"irmed
summary judgment for the defendants on the medical care claim, noting that absent evidence that
county sheriffs' officials actually knew of the arrestee's medical condition, they could not be held
liable. (LaPorte County Jail, Indiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
COMMISSARY
DISCIPLINE
PUNISHMENT
RELIGION
SEGREGATION

Rapier v. Harris, 172 F.3d 999 (7th Cir. 1999). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action
against a sheriff, county jail employees and a police detective claiming constitutional violations
during his detention. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants and the
appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that although it is permissible to punish a
pretrial detainee for misconduct while in pretrial custody, that punishment can be imposed only
after affording the detainee some sort of procedural protection. The defendants had kept the
detainee in segregation as punishment for his conduct while confined, but he did not receive a
written notice or a hearing, or any other process. His misconduct continued while he was in
solitary confinement, resulting in a variety of interdepartmental reports and memoranda, and he
remained there for 270 consecutive days. During this time his phone and commissary privileges
were suspended for periods of time, he was denied writing materials, he received no access to
recreational facilities, and he was denied showers and personal hygiene items. But the appeals
court held that the detainee was not deprived of "anything necessary for his sustenance." The
appeals court granted qualified immunity to the defendants, finding that the law was not
sufficiently clear at the time to apprise the sheriff and employees that procedural safeguards were
required. The court also held that the detainee's free exercise rights were not violated when he
was denied his request for a pork free meal on three occasions, noting that it appeared that the
denial was based on the unavailability of a non-pork meal and was at most a de minimis
infringement in light of the more than 810 meals that were served to the detainee during his
confinement. (Vigo County Jail, Indiana)

U.S. District Court
PUNISHMENT
DISCIPLINE

Resnick v. Adams, 37 F.Supp.2d 1154 (C.D.Cal. 1999). A presentence detainee filed a habeas
corpus petition alleging that 27 days of good time credit were unlawfully taken from him as a
sanction for violating a prison regulation. He petitioned to have the 27 days restored. The district
32.74

court dismissed the petition, finding that denial of good time credit as a sanction for violating a
prison regulation during a detainee's presentence incarceration was not prohibited, if the sanction
is not excessive in light of the seriousness of the violation. While detained in a federal detention
center a routine drug screening had detected morphine in the detainee's urine. (Federal Detention
Center at Dublin, California, and United States Penitentiary at Lompoc, California)
U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
MEDICAL CARE
CROWDING
EXERCISE

Robeson v. Squadrito, 57 F.Supp.2d 642 (N.D.Ind. 1999). Inmates brought an action against
a county and jail officials alleging violations of their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court
held that the conditions of confinement in the overly-crowded jail did not rise to the level of
deprivations of"the minimal civilized measures of life's necessities." The court found that
the officials' failure to give an inmate his high blood pressure medication for 36 hours was not
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs given there was no evidence he was denied the
medication out of anything approaching a total unconcern for his welfare, and the inmate did not
suffer any injury or harm. The court also found that the failure of jail officials to give the inmate
his hypoglycemic diet was not deliberate indifference where the inmate's blood sugar was tested
daily in accordance with his physician's order, and no special diet was ordered because his sugar
levels were normal. According to the court, the cumulative conditions of confinement in the
crowded county jail did not rise to the level of deprivations required to find an Eighth Amendment
violation, even though the inmate was required to sleep on a thin mattress on the floor, had one
shower, was assaulted by another inmate, was not taken to a gymnasium, was given small
servings of food, and was initially denied an "indigent pack" of hygiene items. The court noted that
the inmate had a blanket, clean sheets, functional toilets, sinks, drinking fountain and television,
he exercised in the cell, and he did not suffer any injury as a result of the assault. CAllen County
Jail, Indiana)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
ADA-Americans with
Disabilities Act
EXERCISE
SANITATION
MEDICAL CARE
SEGREGATION

Roop v. Squadrito, 70 F.Supp.2d 868 (N.D.Ind. 1999). An inmate who was HIV-positive and incarcerated in a county jail on an outstanding arrest warrant brought a§ 1983 claim and a claim under
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) against county officials. The district court denied summary
summary judgment for the defendants. The court held that evidence raised an issue of material fact
as to whether the inmate's medical condition required that he be treated differently from other
inmates in jail, in violation of ADA The inmate had informed jailers that he was HIV-positive upon
his arrival at the jail and he was given an initial medical assessment. According to the inmate, he was
told that because of"your medical condition, and you having AIDS, you're going to be locked down."
He was initially housed by himself in an old shower room, which had a working shower but no
flushable toilet. After five days he was moved to a solitary cell located close to the jail's command
module, where there was no toilet or shower in the cell The court found that the fact that the inmate
was required to sleep on a floor mattress for an extended period of time and was not provided with
a bunk while detained in the jail was not a constitutional deprivation under the Eighth Amendment.
The court also found no constitutional violation in the alleged lack of ability to exercise while in the
county jail, since he could have done sit·ups or push·ups in his cell and was only in jail for 30 days.
No violation was found regarding the inmate's complaint that he was not able to take showers more
often while confined because the court held that the deprivation of"a mere cultural amenity" is not
cruel and unusual punishment. The inmate's complaints about sanitation, including dirt on the floor
of his cell, were not found to be a constitutional violation. However, the court found that the alleged
deprivations and violations, when taken together, constituted a violation of his Eighth Amendment
rights, precluding summary judgment for the jail officials. (Allen County Jail, Indiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE
USE OF FORCE

Ruvalcaba v. City of Los Angeles, 167 F.3d 514 (9th Cir. 1999). An arrestee brought
a§ 1983 action against a city, police chief, police officer, and physician alleging
excessive force during his arrest and deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The
court entered judgment against the police officer upon jury verdict, granted a directed motion for
the physician, and dismissed the remaining claims. The district court found that the physician's
failure to take the arrestee's medical history while treating him at the jail, and his failure to
diagnose the arrestee's broken ribs, did not establish a claim of deliberate indifference under §
1983. The arrestee was brought to a jail dispensary for treatment after he was arrested. He was
moaning, almost incoherent, and complained of severe pain in his chest. The jail physician did not
take a medical history. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded. The
appeals court held that whether the officer's use of force was in furtherance of the city's allegedly
unconstitutional dog-bite policy was an issue for the jury for the purposes of the arrestee's claims
against the city and the chief. The court noted that although the arrestee could not recover further
compensatory damages from the city or the chief, nominal damages were available. (City of Los
Angeles, California)

U.S. District Court
USE OF FORCE
MEDICAL CARE

Samuel v. City of Chicago. 41 F.Supp.2d 801 (N.D.Ill. 1999). A detainee sued a city alleging
excessive use of force and denial of medical care. The district court denied the defendants'
motion to dismiss, in part, finding that the detainee stated a conspiracy claim against two police
who removed him from his vehicle and allegedly beat him and took him to the station house. The
court also held that the detainee stated a claim that the police showed deliberate indifference to
his medical needs, where the detainee alleged that he was denied insulin over an 11 hour period of
confinement at the police station house, even though he informed the police he was a diabetic. The
detainee allegedly suffered an aggravation of his pre-existing heart condition and diabetic
condition as a result of the City's actions. The detainee also allegedly suffered contusions,
32.75

lacerations and other injuries about his legs, abdomen and chest. He remained at a local hospitals
for six weeks. (Fourth District Police Station, City of Chicago, Illinois)
U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE
SUPERVISION

Sanders v. Howze, 177 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 1999). The administrix o.f a detainee's estate sued
jailers alleging violation of the detainee's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights arising
from the detainee's suicide in jail. The district court denied summary judgment for the jailers and
they appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded with directions. The appeals court held
that the jailers were entitled to qualified immunity, absent any preexisting Eleventh Circuit
caselaw clearly establishing that the suicide prevention measures taken by the jailers were so
inadequate as to constitute deliberate indifference. Several weeks after he was arrested and
placed in the jail, the detainee removed a razor blade from a disposable razor and cut his left
wrist. Following jail policies, staff transported the detainee to a local hospital's emergency room
for treatment and evaluation. He was then transferred to a state hospital where he remained for
several months. He returned to the jail and was placed in the general population where two days
later he used a pencil to reopen his wrist wound. He was treated at the local hospital and returned
to the jail the same day, where he was placed in an isolation cell near the jailers' office to prevent
his access to items that might be used to injure himself. The next day he reopened the wound, was
treated at the hospital, and returned to the isolation cell. He was transferred to a state hospital for
several weeks and was placed in an isolation upon his return. The state hospital gave no special
instructions concerning his care. The county petitioned the court for a psychiatric evaluation of the
detainee but before the evaluation could be conducted the detainee was found dead, hanging from
a light fixture in his cell by a bedsheet. Two jailers were on duty the night the detainee died but
they did not detect his death for four to six hours after it occurred, despite a jail policy requiring
lights in isolation cells to remain on at all times and for inmates in isolation are to be visually
monitored every 30 minutes. <Dougherty County Jail, Georgia)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Shain v. Ellison, 53 F.Supp.2d 564 (E.D.N.Y. 1999). A detainee sued a county challenging
its policy of strip searching all detainees regardless of the nature of the crime for which they
were detained. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the detainee, finding that
the Fourth Amendment prohibited strip searches in the absence of reasonable suspicion that a
detainee was concealing weapons or other contraband. The court held that the county's policy
violated the Fourth Amendment and that a qualified immunity defense was not available as the
unconstitutionality of the practice was known for years. (Nassau County Corr'l Center, New York)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
MEDICAL CARE

Snell v. DeMello, 44 F.Supp.2d 386 (D.Mass. 1999). A jail inmate brought a§ 1983 suit against
a sheriff and various prison officials alleging failure to protect him from an attack by another
inmate. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants finding that the inmate
failed to state a claim for supervisory liability and that the defendants provided adequate medical
care. The court noted that the inmate was immediately treated after the attack by the another
inmate, the next day he was again treated by a physician and three days later was taken to a
hospital for X-rays which showed no injury. The inmate had allegedly reported being threatened
by other inmates but the court held that the inmate failed to show that the sheriff, prison
superintendent or state commissioner for corrections either knew of a substantial risk to the
inmate or harbored a subjective belief that he faced potential injury from other inmates. The
inmate testified that he had conversations with the sheriff and jail administrator in which he
indicated that he had received threats of bodily harm from other inmates and that he sent a letter
through the internal mail system addressed to the sheriff and others asking to be moved to an
alternate housing unit "to prevent any further aggression or physical assault." (Barnstable County
Jail and House of Correction, Massachusetts)

U.S. Appeals Court
TRANSPORT
RESTRAINTS
PROTECTION

Spencer v. Knapheide Truck Equipment Co., 183 F.3d 902 (8th Cir. 1999). A pretrial
detainee who had suffered injuries that rendered him quadriplegic after he was placed with
his hands cuffed behind his back in a police transport vehicle, and was thrown forward into
the bulkhead of the passenger compartment, brought a § 1983 action against city officials.
The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants and the appeals court affirmed.
The appeals court held that neither the purchase of patrol wagons which lacked safety restraints,
nor the manner of transporting arrestees in those wagons, showed deliberate indifference to the
rights of the pretrial detainee. (Kansas City Police Department, Missouri)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Tapp v. Banks, 72 F.Supp.2d 739 (E.D.Ky. 1999). An arrestee brought a civil rights action against
state police officers and county jail officials, alleging that he was denied proper medical care for an
injury to his knee. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, ruling that
the fact that the arrestee remained in the county jail for 20 days with a broken patella did not
amount to deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The court noted that the arrestee
was taken to a hospital after his arrest, that the hospital did not diagnose any knee problems, and
that the arrestee subsequently did not ask to see a physician. (Perry County Jail, Kentucky)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE
MEDICAL CARE

Thornton v. City of Montgomery. 78 F.Supp.2d 1218 (M.D.Ala. 1999). The relatives of a jail inmate
who committed suicide while in custody filed a wrongful death action. The district court granted
summary judgment for the defendants, finding that the jail officials' failure to prevent the suicide
did not violate sections 1985 and 1986 and that the city could not be held liable under § 1983. The
court found that whether the jail officials handled the inmate under a mental health policy or
under their suicide risk policy, they were no less diligent and were adequately trained in both
32.76

policies. The court found that the city and the jail officials were not deliberately indifferent to the
detainee's medical needs. The court held that the officials were not liable for failing to train jail
officers and staff. The detainee died of asphyxiation and a spoon was found in his mouth. He had
been placed in a cell reserved for inmates with mental health problems after he repeatedly
claimed he was going to die during the admission process. (Montgomery City Jail, Alabama)
U.S. Appeals Court
WORK

Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236 (3rd Cir. 1999). A detainee brought a prose§ 1983
action against state prison officials alleging that his constitutional rights were violated by
being compelled to work in a prison cafeteria while he was a pretrial detainee. He also alleged he
was denied meaningful access to courts by being compelled to work in the cafeteria while
preparing an appeal from his conviction. The detainee asserted that he was entitled to
compensation pursuant to the minimum wage provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).
The district court dismissed the complaints. The appeals court held that the detainee failed to
state a claim for meaningful access to court, and that prisoners and pretrial detainees who
perform intra·prison work are not entitled to minimum wages under FLSA. (Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
GRIEVANCE
ACCESS TO COURT

Trobaugh v. Hall, 176 F.3d 1087 (8th Cir. 1999). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against
county officials alleging violation of his First Amendment right to petition for the redress of
grievances was violated when he was placed in administrative segregation for filing repeated
grievances. The district court entered summary judgment for the jail administrator and awarded
$1 nominal damages against the deputy. The inmate appealed and the appeals court affirmed in
part, reversed in part and remanded. The appeals court held that the district court abused its
discretion by awarding only $1 in compensatory damages, which was "patently insufficient" to
compensate for the injury suffered by the inmate by being placed in segregation. The appeals court
also held that the deputy who placed the inmate in segregation was potentially subject to punitive
damages for his conduct. The inmate had filed a grievance to contest his transportation to court
early and when it was denied he filed a second grievance which was also denied. The inmate filed
a third grievance challenging the apparent lack of an appeal process, which was also denied. The
day after his third grievance was denied he was awakened at 12:30 a.m. and was escorted to an
isolation cell (Linn County Correctional Center, Iowa)

U.S. District Court
BAIL REFORM ACT
BAIL

U.S. v. Battle, 59 F.Supp.2d 17 (D.D.C. 1999). In a criminal proceeding the district court
held that a defendant who had a history of committing crimes while on pretrial release
represented a serious risk of flight and was thus subject to pretrial detention. The court noted
that the defendant had been convicted of two violations of the Bail Reform Act for failing to
appear when required. (U.S. District Court, District of Columbia)

U.S. District Court
SPEEDY TRIAL
BAIL REFORM ACT

U.S. v. Enriguez, 35 F.Supp.2d CD.Puerto Rico 1999). A defendant challenged his
pretrial detention and sought dismissal of his indictment alleging failure to comply
with speedy trial requirements. The district court held that the defendant should be detained,
noting that his alleged offense was serious and was punishable by up to life imprisonment, the
weight of evidence against him was strong, and although he had family ties he also had a prior
record of seven felonies. The court also found that the defendant's Sixth Amendment speedy trial
rights were not violated, even though the earliest trial date was in July 1997, and the trial had not
commenced as of January 1999. (United States District Court, Puerto Rico)

U.S. District Court
PRIVACY

U.S. v. Heatley, 41 F.Supp.2d 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). A pretrial detainee moved to suppress
evidence seized from his nonlegal correspondence. The district court denied the motion, finding
that although the detainee had an expectation of privacy in his nonlegal mail, the evidence was
secured under a valid warrant. The court noted that even though the detainee had signed a form
acknowledging that prison staff could open and read his general correspondence, the detainee was
not "signing away any remnant of protection the law otherwise might have afforded him."
<Metropolitan Correctional Center, New York)

MAIL

U.S.Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

U.S. v. Morgan, 193 F.3d 252 (4th Cir. 1999). A pretrial detainee who was found incompetent to stand
trial sought a review of an administrative order that permitted medical personnel to forcibly treat the
detainee with antipsychotic medication. The district court upheld the order and the detainee
appealed. The appeals court vacated the order and remanded the case. The appeals court found that
the detainee was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing before the district court before being forcibly
medicated, but that remand was required to determine whether a correctional officer had sufficient
education and experience to act as the detainee's staff representative. According to the appeals court,
medical personnel had an affirmative obligation to ensure that the detainee was represented by a
qualified staff member. (United States Medical Center for Federal Prisoners, Springfield, Missouri)

U.S. District Court
PRIVACY
SEARCHES

U.S. v. Rollack, 90 F.Supp.2d 263 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). A defendant moved to suppress evidence seized
in prison mail and cell searches that occurred during his pretrial detention. The district court held
that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his prison mail when a search is
performed or initiated by law enforcement officials other than those in charge of a prison and is
unrelated to institutional security concerns. The court noted that a prisoner had a reasonable
expectation to privacy in his mail as to searches that did not target concealed weapons, drugs orother items clearly related to security inside the prison. The court held that seizure of letters from
his jail cell and mail was valid despite the overbreadth of warrants that authorized seizure. The
32.77

court found that seizure of non·mail writings and photographs from the defendant's cell was
invalid. (Charlotte-Mecklenburg County Central Jail, North Carolina)
U.S. District Court
HOME DETENTION

U.S. v. Rudisill, 43 F.Supp.2d 1 CD.D.C. 1999). A detainee who had been committed to the
custody of the U.S. Department of Justice was brutally attacked by eight other inmates while
detained at the Central Detention Facility of the District of Columbia Department of Corrections.
He remained comatose in a hospital for nearly a month and was eventually released to his
mother's care for outpatient treatment under a home detention program. The federal district court
determined that the detainee was no longer competent to stand trial and that he would not become
competent in the foreseeable future. The court noted that the detainee appeared to have benefitted
from his home confinement. (District of Columbia Central Detention Facility)

U.S. Appea1s Court
USE OF FORCE
PUNISHMENT

U.S. v. Walsh, 194 F.3d 37 (2nd Cir. 1999). A corrections officer who was convicted of violating an
inmate's constitutional rights appealed his conviction on three counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 42,
that makes it a criminal act to willfully deprive a person of rights protected by the Constitution or
laws of the United States while acting under the color of law. The appeals court affirmed, finding
that the officer's acts constituted punishment and rose to the level of a constitutional violation.
The corrections officer was found to have stepped on an inmate's penis and to have perpetrated
other assaults on inmates. The officer, who was six feet two inches tall and weighed over 300
pounds, instructed an inmate to kneel and put his penis on a horizontal bar of his cell, and then
stood with his full weight on the penis for a few seconds. The court concluded that the officer was
acting under the color of state law, noting that the officer was "on duty and in full uniform, was
acting within his authority to supervise and care for inmates under his watch when the assaults
occurred." (Orleans County Jail, New York)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Weaver v. Tipton County. Tenn., 41 F.Supp.2d 779 (W.D.Tenn. 1999). The administrix of the
estate of a detainee who had died of alcohol withdrawal while in a county jail brought a § 1983
action against county officials alleging deliberate indifference to the deceased detainee's medical
needs. The district court granted summary judgment, in part, in favor of the defendants. The
district court held that the protections of the Eighth Amendment do not attach to pretrial
detainees and that the Captain of the jail was not deliberately indifferent to the needs of the
detainee by failing to act when he was left in a single·occupancy cell with no medical care. The
court also held that jail supervisors were not liable for failure to supervise their subordinates. The
court noted that the jail Captain had no contact with the detainee during his incarceration and
knew nothing about the incarceration until after the detainee's death, and that the supervisors did
not implicitly authorize, approve or acquiesce in their subordinates' failure to provide medical
treatment to the detainee. According to the court, the jailers' failure to provide medical care to the
detainee over the course of six days was not a pattern of unconstitutional conduct. The court cited
hundreds of other instances in which other inmates received medical attention. But the court
denied summary judgment for the sheriff and the county, finding that it was precluded by issues of
fact as to whether their failure to ensure that adequate staffing, medical training, and supervision
policies were in place and were enforced. (Tipton County Jail, Tennessee)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
PROTECTION

Wilson v. City of Chanute, 43 F.Supp.2d 1202 CD.Kan. 1999). The parents of a detainee who
died of a drug overdose shortly after being released from police custody brought a § 1983
action alleging conspiracy and violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The
defendants moved for summary judgment, which was granted in part and denied in part by the
district court. The court held that the police officers were not entitled to qualified immunity
because there was sufficient evidence of deliberate indifference to the detainee's serious medical
needs. The court also held that there was sufficient evidence that the police chief failed to properly
direct or supervise officers. Summary judgment was also denied for the city because the court
found fact questions as to whether municipal policy or custom was the moving force behind the
officers' alleged violation of the detainee's due process rights. The court found sufficient evidence
to create an inference that two police officers and a detective had agreed to deprive the detainee of
his due process rights by releasing him rather than providing medical treatment, for the purposes
of a § 1983 conspiracy claim. (City of Chanute, Kansas)

2000
U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Adams v. Franklin, 111 F.Supp.2d 1255 (M.D.Ala. 2000). A county jail detainee brought a§ 1983
action against county officials alleging he was denied medical treatment for two hours after he
complained about symptoms manifesting an imminent heart attack. The district court found that
the officials were not entitled to qualified immunity because the detainee's right to medical care
was clearly established at the time of the violation. But the district court found that the Eleventh
Amendment provided absolute immunity to sheriff department personnel in this § 1983 action
because they were deemed to be executive officers of the state under state law. (Elmore County
Jail, Alabama)

U.S. District Court
GRIEVANCE

A.N.R. Ex Rel. Reed v. Caldwell, 111 F.Supp.2d 1294 (M.D.Ala. 2000). A 16·year-old detainee at a
county jail sued the sheriff alleging inadequate provision of educational programs. The district
court dismissed the case, finding that the detainee failed to comply with the exhaustion
requirement of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). (Tallapoosa County Jail, Alabama)
32.78

U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE

Anderson v. Simon, 217 F.3d 472 (T1' Cir. 2000). A widow of a county prisoner brought a§ 1983
action against a prosecutor alleging that he violated the prisoner's Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights by failing to approve charges against him and ordering police to keep him in
custody until a lineup could be arranged, leading to his death from suicide. The district court
dismissed the action and the appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the prosecutor
was absolutely immune from the claim predicated on a delay in charging. The prisoner had been
held in a police lockup pending charging. During the night the prisoner began to experience
heroin withdrawal symptoms and told officers on duty that he was becoming depressed and
wanted to kill himself. A lineup was held the next afternoon and the prisoner was found dead in
his cell. hanging from a noose, early that evening. (25th District Police Station, Chicago, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
PUNISHMENT

Benjamin v. Kerik. 102 F.Supp.2d 157 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). Corrections officials who had entered into
consent decrees governing the conditions of New York City jails moved for immediate termination
of the decrees under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The district court terminated
provisions of the decree that addressed several operational issues. The court held that city jail
officials did not inflict punishment upon pretrial detainees by subjecting them to restrictive
housing, because disciplinary due process was required within 72 hours of an infraction leading to
the housing assignment. The court found that jail practices with respect to inmate correspondence
did not constitute a current and ongoing violation of federal court relief under the provisions of
PLRA, where mail was transmitted in a timely manner, without intrusion on the property rights
of the inmates and occasional problems were only isolated incidents of negligence. (New York City
Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
COMMISSARY
GRIEVANCE

Bowman v. City of Middletown, 91 F.Supp.2d 644 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). An arrestee who was held for
19 days on suspicion of murder brought a § 1983 action alleging false arrest, malicious prosecution
and civil rights violations while confined. The district court held that denial of commissary
privileges for five days was not a due process violation, especially since the only deprivation
suffered was the inability to order cigarettes, which was the sole item the detainee desired from
the commissary. The court found that the jail superintendent was entitled to qualified immunity
from liability for his decision to have the pretrial detainee shackled when outside of his cell based
on the wording of the note that the detainee had sent to the superintendent complaining of his
loss of commissary privileges, because the right to complain to prison administrators was not
clearly established. The note asked "[who] do you think you are" and promised "I will see you or
whomever in court." (Orange County Jail, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
CELLS
CONDITIONS

Brown v. Bargery. 207 F.3d 863 (61h Cir. 2000). An inmate sought permission to proceed in forma
pauperis in his § 1983 action that alleged violation of his Eighth Amendment rights because his
sleeping bunk was installed upside down causing him to slide off and land on the concrete floor,
and that anchor bolts that fastened the bunk to the wall improperly protruded into the sleeping
area posing a potential for injury. The district court denied the inmate's motion finding the action
to be frivolous, and the inmate appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that
the inmate's claims could conceivably implicate an Eighth Amendment concern. (Hardeman
County Correctional Facility, Tennessee)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
INTAKE SCREENING

Butler v. Coitsville Tp. Police Dept., 93 F.Supp.2d 862 (N.D.Ohio 2000). The administrator of a
deceased detainee's estate brought a § 1983 action alleging that the detainee's rights were
violated by his arrest and detention. The district court granted summary judgment for the
defendants and dismissed state law claims without prejudice. The district court found that the
detainee's slurred speech and unsteadiness during his arrest did not make the potential for an
alcohol seizure so obvious as to permit the inference that the arresting officer or other law
.enforcement officers acted with deliberate indifference to the detainee's medical needs. The court
noted that although the detainee may have appeared intoxicated, he never complained of physical
distress, he signed a medical form stating that he suffered no medical ailment other than "bad
knees" and he explicitly stated that he typically suffered no ill effects when he ceased drinking
alcohol. The detainee had refused to submit to any sobriety tests and was processed at a township
police station. He was then transported to a jail and was placed in a detention cell after
completing intake and booking procedures. Seventeen hours after his admission the detainee
suffered an alcohol withdrawal seizure in his cell, falling and sustaining a serious head injury. He
was immediately taken to a hospital where he died three days later. <Mahoning County Jail, Ohio)

U.S. District Court
SEPARATION
PROTECTION

Burciaga v. County of Lenawee, 123 F.Supp.2d 1076 (E.D.Mich. 2000). A pretrial detainee brought
a civil rights action against county officials, alleging harm as the result of housing him with an
assaultive prisoner. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The court
held that the county did not violate the detainee's due process rights by housing him with another
detainee or by improperly classifying both inmates as medium·security inmates. Both inmates
had been previously incarcerated for assault. (Lenawee County Jail, Michigan)

U.S. Appeals Court
MENTAL HEALTH

Charles W. v. Maul, 214 F.3d 350 (2 nd Cir. 2000). A prisoner who had been confined for up to 72
hours after he was found incompetent to stand trial on a misdemeanor charge to allow for a
determination of the need for a civil commitment brought a § 1983 action. The district court
dismissed the action and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The
appeals court held that the confinement did not violate the prisoner's due process rights but that
the prisoner had an equal protection right not to receive treatment that was more onerous than
32.79

that given to candidates for civil commitment. (New York State Office of Mental Health}
U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Chavez v. Cady, 207 F.3d 901 (7th Cir. 2000). A former pretrial detainee brought a§ 1983 action
against a sheriff, jail administrator, correctional officers and nurse practitioner who supervised
the jail clinic, alleging deliberate indifference to his medical needs. The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the detainee appealed. The appeals court
affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part. The appeals court held that issues of fact
precluded summary judgment for the nurse practitioner and the correctional officers. According to
the court, the actions of the nurse practitioner in the treatment of the detainee who had a
ruptured appendix may have represented a substantial departure from accepted professional
judgment. The appeals court also found that the correctional officers may have been deliberately
indifferent by failing to follow the directives of the nurse practitioner. The court noted that the
county jail did not have its own written manual of policies for operation of the jail but rather
relied on the Illinois County Jail Standards which are issued by the Illinois Department of
Corrections. (Henry County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Cornelia v. Laib, 117 F.Supp.2d 754 (N.D.Ill. 2000). A detainee alleged that medical personnel
were deliberately indifferent to his diabetic condition. The district court granted partial summary
judgment to the defendants, finding that a nurse did not display deliberate indifference by
declining to send the detainee to a hospital, and a physician was not deliberately indifferent by
not authorizing the administration of insulin. The court noted that the nurse took the detainee's
vital signs and monitored his blood sugar level while she attempted to confirm the details of his
insulin regimen. The physician had refused to authorize the administration of insulin until the
detainee's insulin regimen could be confirmed. (Correctional Medical Services, Will County Adult
Detention Facility, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
PROTECTION
SUPERVISION

Daskalea v. District of Columbia, 227 F.3d 433 (D.C.Cir. 2000). A former District of Columbia jail
inmate who had been forced to perform a striptease in front of other prisons and male and female
guards, sued the District and corrections officials for§ 1983 violations. The district court entered a
jury verdict awarding $350,000 in compensatory and $5 million in punitive damages, and denied
the defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law. The appeals court atl'"irmed in part and
reversed in part. The appeals court held that the $350,000 award for mental and emotional
distress resulting from the§ 1983 violation was reasonable, but that the former inmate was not
entitled to punitive damages from the District for negligent supervision, because District law bars
the imposition of such awards against the District. The mental and emotional distress award was
supported, according to the court, by the fact that the inmate was denied library assistance
because she refused to have sex with the librarian, she was attacked with the assistance of
correctional officers, she was confined in isolation without underwear or a mattress, she felt
constant stress, anxiety and dread of imminent sexual attack, she had to sleep during the day for
fear of what guards might do to her at night, she suffered from insomnia and eating disorders, and
spent months emotionally and psychologically debilitated, withdrawn and depressed. The appeals
court agreed with the jury finding that the District's failure to train or supervise jail employees
amounted to deliberate indifference toward the female inmate's constitutional rights, so that the
District was liable under § 1983. The court noted that seven months prior to this incident the
district court had found the District liable under § 1983 for being deliberately indifferent to
repeated sexual abuse and harassment of female prisoners by correctional officers and for failing
to train staff to prevent such misconduct. According to the court, the fact that the District jail
officers sought to conceal the incident did not insulate the District from § 1983 liability based on
its deliberate indifference. (District of Columbia Jail)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

DeGenova v. Sheriff of DuPage County. 209 F.3d 973 (-ri, Cir. 2000). An arrestee brought a§ 1983
action against a sheriff in his official capacity alleging Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment
violations. The district court denied the sheriffs motion to dismiss and the appeals court affirmed.
The appeals court held that the sheriff was a county officer when he managed the jail, and was
thus not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. According to the court, under Illinois law the
sheriff had final policymaking authority over jail operations, was designated as a county officer by
the state constitution, and the sheriff was required as warden of the jail to notify the county board
if he decided that the jail was insufficient to secure prisoners. The arrestee told arresting officers
that he suffered from a serious cardiac condition that required medication but they did not
provide him with medical treatment even though they saw him holding his chest. The arrestee did
not receive his medication until his release the next day. (DuPage County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Douglas v. Stanwick, 93 F.Supp.2d 320 (W.D.N.Y. 2000). A pretrial detainee brought a§ 1983
action against a jail physician and nurse alleging that he received inadequate medical care when
he was denied narcotic pain medication. The district court granted summary judgment for the
defendants, finding that the prisoner did not show sufficient culpability on either the physician or
nurse's part to support his Fourteenth Amendment claim. The court noted that a mere
disagreement over proper medical treatment does not create a constitutional claim. The jail
physician had instructed the nurse to hold the detainee's narcotic prescription from an outside
doctor until nurses could determine if non·narcotic pain control medications would adequately
address the detainee's hand pain. (Monroe County Jail, New York)

32.80

U.S. Appeals Court
FALSE
IMPRISONMENT

Dry v. U.S., 235 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 2000). Members of an Indian tribe brought a§ 1983 and
Federal Tort Claims Act against tribal law enforcement officers who allegedly committed torts
when arresting them. The district court dismissed the claims and the appeals court affirmed. The
appeals court held that city jailers did not violate the constitutional rights of tribal members by
detaining them, in accordance with cross·deputization agreements with the tribe, based on the
representations of tribal law enforcement officers that offenses had been committed. The court
noted that the jailers had no constitutional duty to question the tribal officers as to their probable
cause for arrest, to verify the validity of the grounds for detention under tribal law, or to conduct
an independent constitutional or historical analysis to determine whether the tribe's assertion of
jurisdiction over the detainees was legitimate. (City of Talihina and City of Clayton, Oklahoma)

U.S. Appeals Court
DISCIPLINE

Edwards v. Johnson, 209 F.3d 772 (5th Cir. 2000). A detainee alleged he was deprived of his due
process and First Amendment rights when he was given fifteen days of disciplinary segregation
after being found to have had unauthorized contact with a member of the general public by
handing a flier to a visitor without permission. The district court dismissed the detainee's actions
and the appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the detainee's 11·day pre-hearing
detention and 15-day disciplinary detention did not violate the detainee's due process rights. The
detainee had handed a member of a group who was touring the prison a note that stated
"Welcome to Louisiana, home of the INS Terrorist-Styled Concentration Camp where all
constitutional rights are dispensed solely on the basis of national origin." (Federal Detention
Center, Oakdale, Louisiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE

Estate of Novack Ex Rel. Turbin v. County of Wood, 226 F.3d 525 (7th Cir. 2000). The estate and
mother of an inmate who committed suicide filed a § 1983 action against a county. The district
court granted summary judgment to the county and the appeals court affirmed. The appeals court
held that mere knowledge that an inmate is behaving violently or "acting in a 'freaky' manner" is
not sufficient to impute an awareness of a substantial risk of suicide for Eighth Amendment
purposes. The court found that jail personnel were not subjectively aware that the inmate posed a
high risk of suicide and there was not a pattern of suicides that led to the inference that the
county was aware that policies for treating mentally ill inmates were inadequate and chose to do
nothing. (Wood County Jail, Wisconsin)

U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE

Frake v. City of Chicago, 210 F.3d 779 (71h Cir. 2000). The administrator for the estate of a pretrial
detainee who committed suicide in a police lockup sued the city in state court and under § 1983.
After removing the action the city moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted.
The appeals court affll'med, finding that the city was not deliberately indifferent to the welfare of
pretrial detainees. According to the court, even though the city continued to place detainees in
cells containing horizontal metal bars despite past suicides by detainees using the bars, there was
no evidence that anyone had knowledge that this detainee was suicidal. The court noted that the
facility used a thorough screening process and took precautions to protect detainees from the risk
of suicide, facility personnel received suicide awareness training, cells were checked every fifteen
minutes··which "far exceeds" the hourly checks required in state municipal jail standards,
dangerous items were removed the detainees' possession, and cell construction was authorized by
state standards. (District 12 Chicago Police Department lockup)

U.S. Appeals Court
RESTRAINTS
PRE-SENTENCE
DETENTION

Fuentes v. Wagner, 206 F.3d 335 (3rd Cir. 2000). An inmate who had been detained in a county
prison while awaiting sentencing sued corrections officers and prison officials under § 1983 for the
alleged use of excessive force. A district court jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants
and the inmate appealed. The appeals court aff1rmed, finding that whether the inmate was placed
in a restraint chair to stop his disruptive behavior and maintain prison order or for purposes of
punishment was a jury question and that placement of the inmate in a restraint chair for eight
hours did not violate substantive due process under the Eighth Amendment. The court noted that
the inmate was not kept in the chair any longer than was authorized, his physical condition was
checked every fifteen minutes and he was released every two hours for ten minutes to allow
stretching, exercise, and use of the toilet. He was examined by a nurse at the end of the eight-hour
period. According to the court, an inmate awaiting sentencing had the same status under the
Constitution as a pretrial detainee and the Due Process Clause protected him from the use of
excessive force amounting to punishment. (Berks County Prison, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE ATTEMPT
USE OF FORCE

Garcia v. City of Boston, 115 F.Supp.2d 74 (D.Mass. 2000). A pretrial detainee brought an action
against a city, a hospital and the hospital's emergency psychiatric services program, alleging
excessive force and denial of medical and psychological care. The district court granted summary
judgment for the defendants. The detainee had been arrested by the city police following a
domestic disturbance and was taken to a police station where he was booked and placed in a cell.
That evening the detainee made an apparent attempt to commit suicide by cutting his left wrist
with the aluminum top of a juice container that had been given to him with his dinner. An
ambulance was summoned but the detainee refused treatment. He was placed on the suicide list
at the station and handcuffed to a bar on the wall iq the booking area, where he could be closely
monitored. The following evening the detainee again attempted to commit suicide when he
obtained a book of matches and set fll'e to his own c)pthing while still handcuffed to the bar. He
sustained burns and was taken to a hospital. Hospiqtl personnel explored various mental health
alternatives for the detainee but he was eventually returned to the police station and handcuffed
to the bar, where he lit his shirt on fll'e fifteen minutes after returning from the hospital. The
32.81

detainee's clothes were taken away and he remained in the booking area. Later that day the
detainee pulled an officer's gun out of its holster, shot the officer and another prisoner, and was
then shot by another officer. The district court held that the officials and hospital staff were not
negligent in their failure to place the detainee in a state mental facility since the detainee was not
eligible for placement while charges were pending. The court also held that firing of a gun at the
detainee was not an excessive use of force because there was a clear need for the use of force, only
one round was fired, and the detainee sustained only a limited injury. (Boston Police Department,
Area B, District 2 Police Station, Massachusetts)
U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE

Jacobs v. West Feliciana Sheriffs Dept., 228 F.3d 388 (5th Cir. 2000). Survivors of an arrestee
who had committed suicide brought a § 1983 action against a sheriff's department and against the
sheriff and deputies. The district court denied individual defendants' motions to dismiss on the
ground of qualified immunity and they appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in
part, and remanded the case. The appeals court held that the sheriff and senior deputy, who knew
of a prior suicide under similar circumstances, could have been found to have acted with
deliberate indifference to the arrestee's known suicidal tendencies, but that a newly-hired deputy
who only followed orders which were not facially outrageous, was entitled to qualified immunity.
The arrestee had been placed in a cell that had a significant blind spot and tie off points, and was
provided with a blanket and towel even though a prior detainee had hanged himself in the same
cell under similar circumstances. The female arrestee had been brought to the local jail by state
troopers who informed jail employees that she had tried to kill herself when she was
apprehended. She was placed in a "detox" cell which is used to house inmates who are intoxicated,
who need to be isolated for security reasons, or who are designated for placement on a suicide
watch. The arrestee was placed on a suicide watch, but the cell could be completely observed only
if an officer viewed it from an adjacent hallway. The following evening the arrestee was discovered
hanging from a light fixture in the cell, having not been observed by jail staff for as many as 45
minutes prior to being discovered. (West Feliciana Parish Prison, Louisiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEPARATION

Janes v. Hernandez, 215 F.3d 541 (5th Cir. 2000). A traffic offender sued a county to recover for
alleged violation of his civil rights based upon a sheriff's policy of confining all manner of
arrestees, including those with prior felony records, in one large cell. The district court entered
judgment in favor of the offender and awarded attorney fees. The appeals court affirmed, finding
that the sheriff, as the county policymaker, did not have to know that specific felons and other
inmates with whom the traffic offender was confined posed a risk of harm to him, in order to be
liable for violation of the offender's civil rights. The appeals court found that the section of the
Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) that limited attorney fees that may be awarded in suits by
inmates did not reply to the offender, who was not a prisoner when his complaint was filed.
<Bastrop County Jail, Texas)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Kelleher v. New York State Trooper Fearon, 90 F.Supp.2d 354 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). An arrestee
brought a § 1983 action against a police officer, alleging that he was subjected to an unlawful strip
search. The district court held that the issue of whether the officer had an objectively reasonable
suspicion to strip search the arrestee was for the jury, but that the jury award of damages in the
amount of $125,000 as compensation for emotional distress were excessive to the extent that they
exceeded $25,000. According to the court, although the unlawful strip search in which the arrestee
was touched by the officer was an "egregious intrusion" on the arrestee's person, there was no
corroborating medical evidence concerning the arrestee's emotional distress. The officer had
transported the arrestee to a state police barracks and conducted the strip search in a bathroom.
(~tate Police Barracks in Brewster, New York)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Mason v. Village of Babylon, New York, 124 F.Supp.2d 807 (E.D.N.Y. 2000). An arrestee who was
taken into custody based on a traffic warrant that was later determined to have been recalled,
filed an action under § 1983 alleging false arrest and illegal search. The district court found that a
no-contact partial strip search, incident to arrest violated the Fourth Amendment because neither
the nature of the offense nor the circumstances of arrest raised any suspicion that would justify
such an intrusion. The court noted that the unconstitutionality of a blanket strip-search policy
had been well-established. The female arrestee was asked by a female arresting officer to lift her
shirt, lower her pants, and rearrange her undergarments to dislodge any contraband that might
be concealed. (Village of Babylon, Second Precinct, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE
RESTRAINTS
ACCESS TO COURT
EQUAL PROTECTION

May v. Sheahan, 226 F.3d 876 (7th Cir. 2000). A pretrial detainee who suffered from Acquired
Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) and was hospitalized brought an action against a county
and county officials. The district court denied summary judgment for the sheriff on qualified
immunity grounds and the sheriff appealed. The appeals court atimned, finding that the detainee
stated an equal protection claim by alleging that the sheriff, for no legitimate reason, treated
hospitalized detainees differently from jail detainees by shackling them to their beds and not
taking them to court on their assigned court dates. The appeals court found that the allegation
that the sheriffs restrictive policies caused the detainee to miss scheduled court appearances and
impeded access to his attorney stated a claim for violation of his right of access to court. The
appeals court found that the allegation that the sheriff implemented a policy that required him to
be shackled to his bed around the clock, despite his weakened state and despite being watched by
armed guards, was sufficient to state a substantive due process claim. (Cook County Jail, Illinois)

32.82

U.S. Appeals Court
STRIP SEARCH

Miller v. Kennebec County, 219 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2000). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action against
an arresting officer, town, counties and county sheriffs alleging Fourth Amendment violations and
state law claims arising out of her arrest and detention. The district court granted summary
judgment for the defendants and the arrestee appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and
vacated and remanded in part. The appeals court held that the arresting officer was not entitled
to qualified immunity because the warrant under which he brought the arrestee to jail explicitly
directed that it was to be executed by bringing the defendant immediately before a sitting judge.
The court also found that a fact question precluded summary judgment on the unreasonable strip
search claim against the county where the arrestee was jailed. (Kennebec Co. and Knox Co.,
Maine)

U.S. District Court
CROWDING
CONDITIONS
MEDICAL CARE

Oladipupo v. Austin, 104 F.Supp.2d 626 (W.D.La. 2000). A detainee of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) who was awaiting removal from the United States brought a § 1983
action against parish jail officials challenging the constitutionality of his conditions of
confinement. The district court held that the failure of jail officials to segregate pretrial detainees
who were HIV positive did not violate the due process rights of non-infected detainees. The court
denied summary judgment for the officials on the issue of whether the detainee was transferred
before his request to see a dentist could be processed, finding issues of material fact and noting
that even a convicted inmate has a right of ready access to dental care. The court denied
summary judgment for the officials on the issue of whether the jail's dormitory violated state fire
and sanitation codes. The detainee alleged that the dormitory was overcrowded and had only
eight sinks, commodes and showers for 72 pretrial detainees that were housed in the dormitory.
According to the court, the detainee's allegation that he was denied a meal at the jail dining hall
on one occasion because he was not wearing shoes, as required by jail policy, was insufficient to
state a due process violation. The court denied summary judgment to the officials on the issue of
whether denial of a mattress during the initial part of his detention, which the court characterized
as a "basic human need," violated the due process rights of the detainee. The court denied
summary judgment to the officials on the allegation that preventing inmates from accessing
sexually explicit material was an exaggerated response to the officials' concerns about reducing
violence and sexual assault. (Avoyelles Parish Jail, Louisiana)

U.S. District Court
SAFETY
CONDITIONS
SANITATION

Oladipupo v. Austin, 104 F.Supp.2d 643 (W.D.La. 2000). A detainee of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) who was awaiting removal from the United States brought a § 1983
action against parish jail officials challenging the constitutionality of his conditions of
confmement. The district court found that the fact that INS detainees held at the parish jail had
fewer privileges than INS detainees held at a federal detention center did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause. The court also found that housing INS detainees with convicted prisoners did
not violate the Due Process Clause. The court denied summary judgment for the officials on the
allegation that the housing unit at the jail had serious sewage problems that created unsanitary
conditions. The court also denied summary judgment to the officials on the allegation that the jail
had an inadequate number of emergency exits. <Avoyelles Parish Jail, Louisiana)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
CROWDING

Oladipupo v. Austin, 104 F.Supp.2d 654 (W.D.La. 2000). A detainee of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) who was awaiting removal from the United States brought a § 1983
action against parish jail officials challenging the constitutionality of his conditions of
confinement. The district court held that the allegation that the detainee was deprived of a
mattress and bed presented a cognizable constitutional claim. According to the court, the
detainee's allegation that he was forced to sleep on a cold, wet floor for seven hours presented a
due process claim. Jail officers had removed mattresses from a cell in which the detainee and
others were housed after they had placed barriers in front of the ventilation system in an attempt
to control the temperature in the cell. The court held that an issue of fact existed as to whether
jail officials were personally involved in creating and perpetuating the conditions. (Avoyelles
Parish Jail, Louisiana)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Ralk v. Lincoln County, GA., 81 F.Supp.2d 1372 (S.D.Ga. 2000). A pretrial detainee brought an
action alleging deliberate indifference to his medical needs. The district court granted summary
judgment for the defendants, finding that the county jail physician had not been deliberately
indifferent to the detainee's serious medical needs. The detainee had alleged that the physician
failed to see him to treat his back pain but the court noted that even if the physician had been told
about the detainee's condition, he had previously prescribed medication for the pain. (Lincoln
County Jail, Georgia)

U.S. Appeals Court
PRE-SENTENCE
DETENTION

Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443 (9th Cir. 2000). A federal prisoner brought a§ 1983 action claiming
that a warden and correctional officers violated his constitutional rights when they confined him
in the prison's special housing unit. The district court dismissed the action and the prisoner
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. finding that the prisoner who had been convicted but not
yet sentenced had no liberty interest in not being confmed in a special housing unit pending a
disciplinary hearing. The court noted that the prisoner should be treated as a sentenced inmate
rather than as a pretrial detainee. (Federal Detention Center, Dublin, California)

U.S. District Court
FAILURETO
PROTECT

Richards v. Southeast Alabama Youth Ser. Diversion, 105 F.Supp.2d 1268 (M.D.Ala. 2000). The
mother of a detainee who had committed suicide while in custody brought a civil rights action
against city and county officials. The district court denied Eleventh Amendment immunity to the
32.83

city defendants and denied summary judgment for the defendants on a deliberate indifference
claim. The district court held that summary judgment was precluded by issues of material fact as
to whether the actions of the police officer who transported the detainee to a privately·owned
facility rose above the level of mere negligence and constituted deliberate indifference, and
whether his actions were the proximate cause of the detainee's death. Despite his knowledge of
the detainee's suicidal tendencies, the officer failed to search the detainee for weapons, failed to
handcuff the detainee, and failed to inform the subsequent custodians of the detainee's suicidal
proclivities. The court also found fact issues as to whether the actions or inactions of juvenile
probation officers rose above the level of mere negligence and constituted deliberate indifference,
and whether the detainee was in the custody of the officers at the time he escaped from the
detention facility and committed suicide with a gun he had surreptitiously brought into the
facility. The detainee had been taken to a privately-operated "diversion center" and was left alone
in an intake room where he produced a gun, fled the center, walked into a wooded area and fatally
shot himself. (Southeast Alabama Youth Services Diversion Center)
U.S. District Court
USE OF FORCE

Santiago v. C.O. Campisi Shield #4592., 91 F.Supp.2d 665 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). A pretrial detainee
brought a § 1983 action against a city corrections department alleging that an officer assaulted
him in his cell The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, finding that a
corrections officer's alleged open·handed slap of the detainee after an altercation was de minimis
where the detainee suffered no physical injury. The court found that the slap was not sufficiently
repugnant to the conscience of mankind to constitute a due process violation. (Bronx County
Courthouse, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
RELEASE
FALSE
IMPRISONMENT

Scull v. New Mexico, 236 F.3d 588 (10th Cir. 2000). A detainee sued state and local officials
alleging he was unlawfully detained for 30 days without initiation of extradition proceedings. The
appeals court found that the detainee, who had previously signed a waiver of extradition as a
condition of parole in another state, had no constitutional or statutory right to specific extradition
procedures. The appeals court held that county detention center officials were not required by the
federal constitution or statute to independently investigate the detainee's claim that he was
entitled to be released pursuant to an order issued by a judge in another county. According to the
court, the officials believed they had lawful authority to imprison the detainee based on a "hit" on
the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) database indicating the existence of an
outstanding warrant for the detainee's arrest in another state. The court held that officials were
not liable for false imprisonment under state law. (Bernalillo Co. Detention Center, New Mexico)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCHES

Skurstenis v. Jones, 236 F.3d 678 (11th Cir. 2000). A female detainee brought an action against a
county sheriff and sheriffs department staff, alleging that a strip search of her pelvic region
violated her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court granted the defendants'
motion for summary judgment in part and denied it in part. The appeals court afi""irmed in part,
reversed in part, and remanded in part. The appeals court held that the jail policy that required
each inmate to be strip-searched by a same-sex jail staff member, before being placed in a cell or
detention room, violated the Fourth Amendment. But the court found that the detainee's
possession of a handgun at the time of her arrest provided the "reasonable suspicion" needed to
permit her strip search. The detainee was taken to a bathroom and observed by a female officer,
who instructed the detainee to disrobe but did not conduct a body cavity search. A second
medically-related search took place in the infirmary, with no one other than the detainee and a
male nurses assistant present. The search was conducted pursuant to a contract between the
county and a hospital, and involved an examination of the detainee's cranial and pubic hair for
lice. The court held that the search was reasonable in manner and scope and did not violate the
Fourth Amendment. (Shelby County Jail, Alabama)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE A'ITEMPT

Stewart v. Robinson, 115 F.Supp.2d 188 (D.N.H. 2000). The guardian of a pretrial detainee
brought a civil rights action against police and county officials to recover for injuries sustained by
the detainee as the result of a suicide attempt that left the detainee in a vegetative state. The
district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, finding that neither the police
department nor the county could be held liable for the suicide attempt. The suicide attempt
occurred four days after the detainee was transferred from the police department's custody to the
jail Although police officers were possibly negligent by failing to complete an available intake
form, the court found that the department could not be held liable. The court held that the record
did not suggest that jail officials or the county were aware that the detainee posed a suicide risk
or that they should have known that jail cells posed an unreasonable danger to potentially
suicidal inmates. The court noted that police officials apparently failed to inform county jail
officials of the detainee's previous suicidal statements when he was transferred to the jail. The
detainee attempted to hang himself with a sheet tied around one of the supports of the upper
bunk in his cell, but was discovered approximately five minutes later and survived. (Carroll
County House of Corrections and Conway Police Department, New Hampshire)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Taylorv. Adams, 221 F.3d 1254 (11 th Cir. 2000). In an action arising from the death of a pretrial
detainee, the district court denied summary judgment to three firemedics and a jail nurse and
they appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The appeals court held that the
firemedics were not deliberately indifferent because they acted on whatever knowledge they had
of the detainee's condition and tried to check him out and administer aid, questioned him
repeatedly regarding his desire for treatment but the detainee declined treatment. (Mobile County
32.84

Jail, Alabama)
U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Taylor v. Plousis, 101 F.Supp.2d 255 (D.N.J. 2000). A former county jail detainee brought a § 1983
action against a county, county officials and a private health services provider alleging inadequate
medical treatment. The district court found that the detainee's deteriorating prosthesis which
caused pain and mobility problems was a serious medical need and that fact issues needed to be
resolved concerning a doctor's efforts to seek a replacement and a nurse's alleged delayed delivery
of the replacement. (Cape May County Jail, New Jersey, and Correctional Health Services, Inc.)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE
MEDICAL CARE

Thornhill v. Breazeale, 88 F.Supp.2d 647 (S.D.Miss. 2000). Survivors of a pretrial detainee who
committed suicide while in custody brought a § 1983 and wrongful death action. The district court
held that a sheriff and deputy did not act with deliberate indifference by placing the detainee in a
cell with a non-breakaway shower rod and neglecting to remove his shoes. But the court denied
summary judgment on the issue of whether the jail's lack of a written policy for suicide prevention
was reasonably related to a legitimate governmental interest. The plaintiffs challenged the lack of
a policy relating to the administration of cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) to detainees who
attempt suicide, and the lack of a written policy for detection and prevention of suicide. The
detainee was jailed awaiting trial for allegedly raping his estranged wife. The sheriff and his staff
were aware of the detainee's troubled mental history and that he had threatened suicide on two
prior occasions. He was initially placed in the jail's mental holding cell where he was isolated from
other inmates. He was placed on suicide watch which, according to an unwritten policy, required
him to be checked approximately every fifteen minutes. Items with which he could injure himself,
including his shoes, were taken from him. After three days without incident the detainee was
moved to a juvenile cell in the same section of the jail that was equipped with a toilet and shower
and had a non-breakaway shower rod. He remained on suicide watch. He was given his shoes and
allowed to leave his cell to exercise and watch television one morning but a deputy forgot to
remove his shoes when placing the detainee back in the cell. The detainee hung himself with his
shoelaces from the shower rod. He had been observed alive approximately ten minutes before he
was found hanging. After he was found hanging it took a period of time for the officers to open the
cell and he was eventually cut down and checked for vital signs. Finding no vital signs no
attempts were made to revive him. (Lamar County Jail, Mississippi)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
INTAKE SCREENING

Thornton v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 93 F.Supp.2d 1057 (D.Minn. 2000). An inmate who was a
federal prisoner incarcerated at a county jail sought damages arising from injuries he sustained
while at the jail. The district court held that a nurse did not treat the inmate with deliberate
indifference by failing to refer him to an emergency room for treatment of frostbite the night he
was admitted. The court found that a deputy subjectively acted with deliberate indifference when
she failed to notify a medical professional immediately about the prisoner's condition. The
prisoner informed the deputy that he could not feel most of his toes even though he had been
indoors in the custody of the U.S. Marshals for several hours, and that he had walked around
outside in frigid January temperatures for many hours before turning himself in. The court also
held that the inmate's complaint, which alleged a series of failures to attend to his medical needs
by several different county officials over a period of several weeks, adequately pleaded that
county officials had a widespread custom of failing to provide care for the prisoner's serious
medical needs. (Anoka County Jail, Minnesota, and United States Marshals Service)

U.S. Appeals Court
DUE PROCESS
CONDITIONS
SEGREGATION

U.S. v. El-Hage, 213 F.3d 74 (2nd Cir. 2000). A defendant who was an alleged member of an
international terrorist organization moved to be released on bail and for modification of his
conditions of pretrial detention. The detainee was separated from the general population and
limited to only three telephone calls per month to his family. The district court denied the motions
and the detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the detainee's conditions were
reasonably related to the government's asserted security concerns given ample evidence of the
detainee's extensive terrorist connections. (U.S. District Court, Southern Dist. of New York)

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
MENTAL HEALTH

U.S. v. Keeven, 115 F.Supp.2d 1132 (E.D.Mo. 2000). A detainee sought judicial review of a
determination that psychotropic medication could be administered involuntarily because she was
a danger to herself and others, and to render her competent to stand trial. The district court held
that the detainee was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing prior to the forcible administration of
medication and that her due process rights were adequately protected. The court also found that a
psychiatrist who conducted an administrative hearing qualified as a neutral hearing officer
because he was not currently involved with the diagnosis or treatment of the detainee at the time
of the hearing. (Federal Medical Center, Carswell, Texas)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

U.S. v. Weston, 206 F.3d 9 (D.C.Cir. 2000). A district court upheld the decision of the federal
Bureau of Prisons to involuntarily administer psychotropic medication to a pretrial detainee. The
detainee appealed and the appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that the record did not
support the district court's conclusion that the medication was essential for safety. (Federal
Correctional Institution in Butner, North Carolina)

U.S. Appeals Court
USE OF FORCE
MEDICAL CARE

Wagner v. Bay City, Tex., 227 F.3d 316 (5th Cir. 2000). Survivors of an arrestee who died in police
custody brought a § 1983 action against police officers, alleging the use of excessive force and
deliberate indifference to the need for medical attention. The district court denied summary
judgment for the officers. The appeals court reversed, entered judgment for the officers, and

32.85

remanded. The appeals court held that the officers did not act with deliberate indifference to a
risk of harm. The arrestee had resisted arrest and struck an officer with his fists. The arrestee
stopped breathing and died after officers sprayed him with pepper spray, placed him face down on
the pavement to handcuff him, placed a shin across his back to hold him down, and placed him on
his stomach in the back of a patrol car to transport him to the jail. The officers said that they
heard the arrestee groaning on the way to the police station and therefore believed he was still
breathing. Although the officers did not take the arrestee to the hospital, the court noted that
pepper spray decontamination could effectively be done in jail and the officers believed the
arrestee was still breathing. (Bay City, Texas)
U.S. Appeals Court
PROTECTION
SEPARATION

Weiss v. Cooley. 230 F.3d 1027 (7th Cir. 2000). A suspect in a highly publicized rape case, who had
been assaulted by fellow inmates while detained in a county jail, brought a § 1983 action against
the sheriff, jail commander and a jail officer. The district court dismissed the claims against the
sheriff and jail commander and granted summary judgment for the officer. The appeals court
affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The appeals court held that summary judgment
for the officer was precluded by a fact issue as to whether the officer had actual knowledge that
the suspect faced an objective risk of danger. Affirming the dismissal of the sheriff and jail
commander from the action, the appeals court noted that allegations that circumstances were
such that assaults on prisoners like the suspect were inevitable, and that the system used to
classify inmates for housing safety purposes were inadequate, were insufficient to provide
adequate notice to the sheriff and commander in order to sustain an Eighth Amendment claim
against them. Upon admission to the jail, the suspect had been asked if he had any enemies in the
jail, ifhe needed any special care, or ifhe had ever assaulted anyone or was contemplating
assaulting anyone, and the suspect answered "no" to each of these questions. (Morgan County
Jail, Indiana}

U.S. District Court
PRNACY
CONDITIONS

Wilson v. City of Kalamazoo, 127 F.Supp.2d 855 (W.D.Mich. 2000). Arrestees who were allegedly
detained in a city jail without any clothing or covering at all for varying periods of time, brought
eight separate actions against the city and others. After the actions were consolidated, the federal
district court ruled that the arrestees stated claims for violation of their Fourth Amendment right
to privacy and their Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. The arrestees had been
detained without clothing or covering for periods ranging from six to eighteen hours with at least
limited exposure to viewing by members of the opposite sex. The court noted that the city's
legitimate interest in suicide prevention could have been just as well served by less humiliating
and degrading means. (Kalamazoo City Jail, Michigan}

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Wilson v. Shelby County, Ala., 95 F.Supp.2d 1258 (N.D.Ala. 2000). A female arrestee who was
strip searched before being placed in jail following her arrest on charges of driving under the
influence sued county officials for damages. The district court denied the defendants' motion to
dismiss, finding that the policy of strip searching all jail admittees, regardless of personal
circumstances, violated the bodily privacy rights of the arrestee. The court held that the sheriff
was not entitled to qualified immunity from suit. The arrestee was kept in an isolated cell with no
opportunity to interact with the general population. The court noted that a strip search of an
arrestee charged with a minor offense may be conducted only when there is a reasonable suspicion
that the arrestee may be secreting drugs, weapons or other contraband on or in his or her body.
The arrestee was an 18·year·old high school student who had been stopped at a drivers' license
checkpoint and registered 0.08 percent blood alcohol. According to the arrestee, she was taken
into a restroom by a female deputy and was ordered to strip, and then according to the arrestee
"she checked my breasts and behind my ears and in my mouth and nose ...and then she told me to
squat and spread my butt apart and cough three times." (Shelby County Jail, Alabama)

U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE

Yellow Horse v. Pennington County. 225 F.3d 923 (81h Cir. 2000). The administrator for the estate
of an inmate who hanged himself in a county jail brought a§ 1983 action against a county,
correctional officer and deputy sheriff. The district court granted summary judgment for the
defendants and the appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the corrections officer who
removed the inmate from a suicide watch was entitled to qualified immunity because she followed
the routine practice for removing an inmate from a suicide watch, which included reviewing the
contact journal for information on the inmate's eating, sleeping and social habits, and
interviewing and evaluating the inmate. The appeals court found that the officer on duty at the
time of the suicide was not deliberately indifferent to the risk of suicide when she failed to make
more timely cell checks, despite learning from other prisoners that the inmate was upset and
talking about heaven and hell. According to the court, the county's suicide prevention policy did
not show deliberate indifference to the rights of others because it included inmate screening,
officer training, and annual policy review and was reasonable and comprised an effort to prevent
suicide. (Pennington County Jail, South Dakota)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Zentmyer v. Kendall County, Ill.• 220 F.3d 805 (7th Cir. 2000). A pretrial detainee brought a civil
rights action to recover for his jailers' alleged indifference to his serious medical needs. The
district court granted summary judgment for the defendants and the appeals court affirmed. The
appeals court held that guards' failure to dispense the detainee's medication for a middle ear
infection consistently on schedule did not manifest any conscious disregard for the detainee's
health of the kind needed to support a Fourteenth Amendment claim, where guards administered
medication of various forms to the detainee 162 times over a 20-day period and were not shown to
32.86

have any knowledge that serious medical consequences might result from occasionally missing the
prescribed dosage. (Kendall County Jail, Illinois)
2001
U.S. Appeals Court
A'ITORNEY VISITS
RESTRAINTS
PRNACY

Benjamin v. Fraser, 264 F.3d 175 (2nd Cir. 2001). A city corrections department moved for
immediate termination of consent decrees requiring judicial supervision over restrictive housing,
inmate correspondence, and law libraries at city jails, pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform
Act (PLRA). The district court vacated the decrees and pretrial detainees appealed. The appeals
court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. On remand the district court granted the
motion in part and denied it in part and the city appealed. The appeals affirmed. The appea1s
court held that the detainees were not required to show actual injury when they challenged
regulations which allegedly adversely affected their Sixth Amendment right to counsel by
impeding attorney visitation. The appeals court concluded that there was a continuing need for
prospective relief with respect to the detainees' right to counsel, and the relief granted by the
district court satisfied the requirements of PLRA. The court found that detainees were
experiencing unjustified delays during attorney visitation. The district court required procedures
to be established to ensure that attorney visits commenced within a specified time period
following arrival at the jail, and the city was instructed to ensure the availability of an adequate
number of visiting rooms that provide the requisite degree of privacy. The appeals court held that
the restraints used when moving certain detainees within, or outside, the jail, had a "severe and
deleterious effect" on the detainees given that such restraints were often painful and could result
in injury. The appeals court agreed with the district court that detainees were entitled to
reasonable afterthe·fact procedural protections to ensure that such restrictions were terminated
reasonably soon if they were not justified. These procedures include a hearing, written decision,
timely review of appeal from placement in special restraint status, and the opportunity to seek
further review based on good cause. (New York City Department of Correction)

U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE
INTAKE SCREENING

Boncher ex rel. Boncher v. Brown County. 272 F.3d 484 (7th Cir. 2001). The estate of a prisoner
who had committed suicide brought a § 1983 action against jail officials alleging deliberate
indifference to the risk of the prisoner's suicide. The district court granted summary judgment for
the jail officials and the appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that evidence was
insufficient that jail officials were deliberately indifferent, even though intake officers had little
training and relied on a checklist that was deficient in several areas. The court noted that the
officers were making a judgment that was not likely to be assisted by special training and that the
jail was in compliance with the state's minimum standards for suicide prevention. The prisoner
had been arrested after a domestic altercation, and had a long history of alcoholism and had
attempted suicide at least three times, but this history was not known to the arresting officers or
the personnel of the jail. The prisoner was joking with officers during his admission to the jail and
the officers thought him to be a "happy drunk." He was placed in a regular cell instead of the jail's
suicide-watch cell, and he died within 45 minutes by hanging himself with a bedsheet. The
appeals court also held that the evidence offered by an expert witness was "useless" and should
have been excluded. The criminologist had testified that the rate of suicide in the jail (five suicides
in the preceding five years) was unusually high. (Brown County Jail, Wisconsin)

U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE

Brown v. Harris, 240 F.3d 383 (4th Cir. 2001). The father of a detainee who committed suicide in a
jail brought state tort claims and § 1983 claims against county officials. The district court granted
judgment as a matter of law to the defendants and the father appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The appeals court held that the adult detainee committed common law suicide under
Virginia law, precluding the estate of the detainee from recovering on wrongful death and gross
negligence claims. The court found that even if the jail supervisor was informed that the detainee
was suicidal, he did not act with deliberate indifference to the detainee's medical needs because he
placed the detainee on "medical watch" which established constant video surveillance of the
detainee's cell The court noted that although the supervisor failed to place the detainee in a paper
gown or have him examined by medical staff, his failure amounted to, at most, negligence, not
deliberate indifference. (Virginia Beach General Jail, Virginia)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONDITIONS
CROWDING

Castillo v. Cameron County, Tex., 238 F.3d 339 (5th Cir. 2001). Pretrial detainees and convicted
inmates held at a jail brought a class action under § 1983 against a county, state and various
individuals, alleging that overcrowding at the jail resulted in cruel and unusual punishment. The
state moved to terminate previously-entered injunctions and the district court dismissed the state
from the action and ordered continuation of injunctive relief designed to reduce the jail
population. The appeals court vacated the decision and remanded the case. The appeals court
found that the order continuing injunctive relief was a "prisoner release order" within the
meaning of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) and that the state had standing to appeal the
continuation of injunctive relief. The appeals court held that on remand, the district court must
determine if a continuing and ongoing constitutional violation exists, and if so, whether the
remaining requirements of PLRA are met. (Cameron County Jail, Texas)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS

Chilcote v. Mitchell, 166 F.Supp.2d 1313 (D.Or. 2001). A former prisoner and detainees at a
federal detention center sued officials alleging they were subjected to unconstitutional conditions
of confinement. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the officials, finding no
32.87

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment violations from the size of the cell. The court noted that all
three occupants of the cell could not be off of their bunks at the same time because the cell was so
small, and the occupants were confined in the cell for 20 to 21 hours daily. The court found that
the crowding was necessitated by the volume of incoming detainees and the lockdown was needed
because of the danger posed by detainees had not yet been evaluated. The cells had been designed
to house two inmates and ranged in size from 80. 7 to 96 square feet. In a triple-bunk cell, 40 to 45
square feet of floor space is covered by the bunks, sink and toilet. The remaining floor space, 35 to
40 square feet "effectively does not permit all three occupants to be off their bunks at the same
time." There are no lockers, chairs or tables in the cells. (Fed'l Detention Ctr., Sheridan, Oregon)
U.S. Appeals Court
HANDICAP
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act

Chisolm v. McManimon. 275 F.3d 315 (3rd Cir. 2001). A hearing-impaired detainee brought a suit
against the warden of a pretrial detainment facility and county court system. alleging violations of
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Rehabilitation Act, § 1983 and a state discrimination
law. for failing to provide an interpreter and other services. The district court granted summary
judgment for the defendants and the detainee appealed. The appeals court reversed and
remanded, finding that the county court system was not entitled to Eleventh Amendment
immunity during an ongoing merger with the state court system. The appeals court held that
summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to: (1) the effectiveness of
alternate aids or services provided to the detainee when the jail failed to provide a sign language
interpreter during the intake process, activate closed captioning capabilities on a prison
television, (2) provide a text device for transcribing telephone calls; and whether pencil and paper
were effective auxiliary aids in place of a sign language interpreter; and (3) whether exceptions to
institutional rules on telephone calls were an effective alternative to providing special telephones.
The court held that extradition was a "program" within the meaning of ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act such that the court was required to ensure the ability of the detainee to
participate in the hearing. When the detainee arrived at the detention facility on a Saturday, he
was locked down in his cell to keep him apart from the general population until Monday when
facility classification staff arrived. This practice was applied to all detainees admitted when
classification staff members were not working at the facility. Such unclassified detainees
consumed meals in their cells and did not have television or telephone privileges. When the
detainee was not provided with an interpreter at intake he became upset and was eventually
interviewed by a nurse, who concluded that he was a suicide risk. He was kept in solitary lockup
from Saturday until Tuesday. On Monday he was taken to meet with a classification staff
member. where he was interviewed and was given a medium security classification. But the staff
member had described the detainee as a "vagrant" in spite of the fact that he had worked for the
U.S. Postal Service for 13 years and had lived at the same address for three years. This error
added two points to his classification score, moving him from "minimum" security to "medium."
(Mercer County Detention Center, New Jersey)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS OF
CONFINEMENT

Covillion v. Alsop. 145 F.Supp.2d 75 (D.Me. 2001). An arrestee brought a§ 1983 action alleging
excessive use of force while he was confined. The district court found that the arrestee failed to
show excessive use of force based on the allegedly freezing temperature of his holding cell. The
arrestee had alleged that he had been placed in the cell "where they turned the freezer on.. " and
implied that the jail administrator was responsible for cooling the cell. The court noted that the
thermostat that controls the cell temperature also controls the temperature of the jail control
room, booking room. and visitors' room. (Somerset County Jail, Maine)

U.S. District Court
USE OF FORCE

Craw v. Gray. 159 F.Supp.2d 679 (N.D.Ohio 2001). An arrestee sued law enforcement officers
under § 1983 asserting claims for use of excessive force. The district court granted partial
summary judgment in favor of the officers, finding that the allegations did not support a claim for
inadequate training of an officer and that past ''use of force" incident reports did not support the
claim for inadequate supervision of the officer. According to the court, the assertion that a
particular officer may be unsatisfactorily trained does not alone "suffice to fasten § 1983 liability"
on a municipality for failure to train. The court noted that none of the reports showed that the
deputy acted improperly. The officer had brought the arrestee to a county jail and during the
booking process an altercation between the arrestee and the officer resulted in a right hip fracture
and dislocation for the arrestee. <Mercer County Jail, Ohio)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
SANITATION

Curry v. Kerik. 163 F.Supp.2d 232 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action
against corrections officials alleging violation of the due process clause arising out of dangerous
conditions. The court held that the detainee stated a due process violation by alleging that he was
exposed to an unsanitary and hazardous showering area for over nine months. The court found
that the detainee's allegation that officials negligently appointed, trained and supervised
employees and failed to enforce rules requiring facility inspections and addressing repair
complaints were sufficient to show the personal involvement of the officials. The detainee alleged
that he had alerted the officials to dangerous conditions on several occasions, and the conditions
led to his injury when he fell in a shower. which stated a claim of deliberate indifference according
to the court. The inmate alleged that the shower facility in his unit leaked, tiles were falling off
the wall, and there were no shower curtains or floor mats. (North Infirmary Command,
Correctional Facility. New York City Department of Correctional Services)

U.S. District Court
USE OF FORCE

Davis v. Hill, 173 F.Supp.2d 1136 (D.Kan. 2001). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action against a
county. sheriff, and employees alleging that he was the victim of excessive force while detained.
32.88

The defendants moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the motion in part,
and denied it in part. The court held that fact issues as to whether sheriffs deputies beat the
arrestee senseless in his cell precluded summary judgment on the detainee's Fourth Amendment
excessive force claim. The court also found that the arrestee could maintain a suit against
deputies who were near the cell at the time, despite his inability to identify the two who allegedly
administered the beating. The arrestee was allegedly handcuffed in his cell during a staff shift
change. The arrestee was yelling and kicking his cell door and alleged that an officer entered the
cell and hit him behind his ear, knocking him into the steel bed and against a steel wall, and then
ground his thumb behind the arrestee's ear. According to the arrestee, another officer entered and
the two "proceeded attacking and torturing me on every joint in my body..." (Sedgwick County
Adult Detention Facility, Kansas)
U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Doan v. Watson, 168 F.Supp.2d 932 (S.D.Ind. 2001). Former inmates filed a§ 1983 suit against a
former and current sheriff, individually and in their official capacities, alleging unconstitutional
strip search policies. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the former inmates,
finding that the jail policy of stripping inmates and requiring them to undergo a delousing
procedure was an unreasonable search. According to the court, the policy authorized a blanket
strip search without justification. The court noted that the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA)
did not require the former inmates to produce evidence of physical injury to pursue their claims.
The inmates had been arrested for misdemeanor offenses and were subjected to intake searches
before entering the general jail population. (Floyd County Jail. Indiana)

U.S. District Court
SillCIDE

Ellis ex rel. Lanthorn v. Jamerson, 174 F.Supp.2d 747 (E.D.Tenn. 2001). The mother and the
minor child of a pretrial detainee who committed suicide in jail brought a § 1983 action against
county jail officials. The district court dismissed the case, finding that the county jailor who was
on duty at the time of the detainee's suicide was entitled to qualified immunity. The plaintiffs
attempted to introduce evidence that the jailor was watching video surveillance monitors and saw
the detainee fashion a noose and place it around his neck but did not summon help immediately.
The court refused to allow a statement made by the county sheriff to the media to be used as
evidence, even though it might support the assertion that jail staff did not act expediently to
prevent the detainee's death. (Washington County Jail, Tennessee)

U.S. District Court
PROTECTION

Gailor v. Armstrong, 187 F.Supp.2d 729 (W.D.Ky. 2001). The estate of a deceased pretrial
detainee brought a § 1983 action against a county and correctional officers for the beating death of
the detainee by officers. The district granted summary judgment in favor of the county, finding
that there was insufficient evidence to hold the county liable, but denied summary judgment for
the officers. The court held that fact issues remained as to whether the officers' use of force was
excessive. The court ruled that the officers and their supervisor were not entitled to qualified
immunity. The court held that the county was not liable under § 1983 because evidence that the
officers failed to follow the county's use of force policy, officials allegedly falsified reports, and
evidence that some officers received only limited use of force training, did not demonstrate custom

or usage necessary to support a § 1983 claim. The court denied summary judgment for a
supervisor who allegedly failed to intervene when she saw excessive force being used against the
detainee. (Jefferson County Department of Corrections, Kentucky)
U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Gonzalez v. City of Schenectady. 141 F.Supp.2d 304 (N.D.N.Y. 2001). Male and female detainees
sued a city claiming they were strip searched under an unconstitutional city policy. The district
court held that the city policy of strip searching all detainees who were awaiting court action
violated the Fourth Amendment. The court found that the police did not have reasonable
suspicion to strip search a male detainee and a female detainee, who were charged with minor
offenses. The court noted that the Fourth Amendment precludes strip or body cavity searches of
arrestees charged with misdemeanors or other minor offenses unless officials have reasonable
suspicion that the arrestee is concealing weapons or other contraband based on the crime charged,
particular circumstances of the arrestee, or the circumstances of the arrest. (City of Schenectady,
New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
RESTRAINTS
USE OF FORCE

Hawkins v. Comparet·Cassani, 251 F.3d 1230 (9th Cir. 2001). A convicted prisoner who had a
"stun belt" placed on him, and activated, when he appeared in court for sentencing, brought a §
1983 action. The district court certified a class action and granted a preliminary injunction. The
appeals court reversed in part and remanded. The appeals court held that the class of all persons
in the custody of the county sheriff was improperly certified since the convicted prisoner could not
serve as a representative for those prisoners who had not yet been convicted. The appeals court
also found the district court injunction against the use of the belt was overbroad because it did not
allow for use of the belt to protect courtroom security, such as restricting violence or preventing
escape. But the court noted that even at sentencing, where a defendant's guilt is no longer in
dispute, shackling is inherently prejudicial and detracts from the dignity and decorum of the
proceeding, and impedes the defendant's ability to communicate with his counsel. (Los Angeles
County, California)

U.S. District Court
PROTECTION

Hedrick v. Roberts, 183 F.Supp.2d 814 (E.D.Va. 2001). Pretrial detainees who were assaulted and
injured by other inmates brought separate actions in state court against a sheriff. The cases were
consolidated. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the sheriff. The court held
that the detainees were exposed to a substantial risk of harm in violation of the Eighth and
32.89

Fourteenth Amendments, but that the sheriff was not deliberately indifferent and was entitled to
qualified immunity. The court noted that the sheriff took immediate and reasonable measures to
alleviate problems associat.ed with the overcrowded jail and provided medical treatment to
detainees who were injured. (Hampton Jail, Virginia)
U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
SUICIDE

Holland v. City of Atmore, 168 F.Supp.2d 1303 <s.D.Ala. 2001). Survivors of an inmate who
committed suicide during his period of pretrial confinement filed a § 1983 action. The district
court grant.ed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court held that jail staff did not
have a duty to take any precautions to prevent his suicide, where the inmat.e had not shown a
strong likelihood of taking his life. The inmate had been admitted to the city jail aft.er being
arrested for driving under the influence and other offenses. He was booked into the facility and
locked down. Within thirty minutes he was found dead or dying in his cell, having used his
shoelaces to hang himself. The plaintiffs had argued that the inmate had previously attempted to
take his own life and that city police knew about these attempts. (Atmore City Jail, Alabama)

U.S. District Court
RELEASE

Johnson v. Herman, 132 F.Supp.2d 1130 (N.D.lnd. 2001). A detainee who was incarcerated
beyond his release date brought a § 1983 action against jail authorities, alleging violation of his
substantive due process rights. The district court denied summary judgment for the defendants,
finding that a jailer's record notations that a judge had ordered the detainee to remain in jail and
later had ordered the detainee released, were admissible as non-hearsay evidence that the jailer
did not act with deliberate indifference in retaining custody. The court held that summary
judgment was precluded by an issue of material fact as to whether the jail's "Inmate Request
Form" policy, which was used to correct defects in its "will call" policy for holding detainees
following their appearances in court, was being implemented in a manner suggesting deliberate
indifference to the right of detainees to be timely released. The court noted that the jailers were
not entitled to qualified immunity because the right of a detainee not to be held without a court
order was clearly established at the time of the incident. (Allen County Jail, Indiana)

U.S. District Court
USE OF FORCE

Jordan v. Cobb County, Georgia, 227 F.Supp.2d 1322 (N.D.Ga. 2001). A pretrial detainee brought
a§ 1983 action against a jail officer and a county, alleging excessive force, wrongful seizure, and
assault and batt.ery. The district court held that the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity
and that a fact issue as to whether the officer violated the detainee's substantive due process
rights, precluded summary judgment. The court found that the county could not be held liable for
the officer's alleged conduct. The detainee had been arrested for suspicion of driving under the
influence of alcohol and was detained in a holding cell at a police precinct. While in the holding
cell, the detainee allegedly resisted being handcuffed by the officer. After a struggle or altercation,
the detainee was shot twice in the abdomen by the officer. There were no witnesses to the
shooting. The court not.ed that "virtually all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the
altercation and shooting are in dispute." (Cobb County Police Department, Precinct One. Georgia)

U.S. Appeals Court
RESTRAINTS

Kostrzewa v. City of Troy. 247 F.3d 633 (6th Cir. 2001). An arrestee sued a city and police officers
asserting claims for use of excessive force. The district court dismissed the case but the appeals
court reversed and remanded. The appeals court held that the allegations supported a claim for
use of excessive force and that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity. The appeals
court found that the city's handcuff policy, that required all detainees to wear handcuffs,
supported a§ 1983 claim of the arrestee who allegedly suffered pain and injury from being
restrained with handcuffs that were too small for his wrists, despite being arrested for a non·
violent misdemeanant offense. (City of Troy, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Lee v. Perez, 175 F.Supp.2d 673 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). An arrestee brought an action against a
correctional officer, alleging he had been unconstitutionally strip searched. The district court
entered a jury verdict in favor of the officer and the arrestee moved for reconsideration. The
district court granted the motion, finding that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's
conclusion that the officer relied on permissible factors in making his decision to perform a body
cavity search on the arrestee. According to the court, the officer t.estified that he had not
considered the nature of the two misdemeanors with which the arrestee had been charged and
could not identify any charact.eristic of the arrest.ee that led to his conclusion that the arrestee
might have been carrying contraband. The arrestee had spent the night in a police holding cell
and was arraigned in court the next morning. Bail was set at $250 but the arrestee was not
allowed to post bail at the police station using money that had been in his possession at the time
of his arrest. He was transported to the local jail where he was processed in. The intake process
included a "personal hygiene check/visual body search" which consisted of having the arrestee
remove his clothes, followed by a visual inspection of his body. The officer contended that this
hygiene check was not the same as a strip search because it did not require the inmate to open his
mouth or bend over and spread his buttocks. (Orange County Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
USE OF FORCE

Lewis v. Board of Sedgwick County Com'rs., 140 F.Supp.2d 1125 (D.Kan. 2001). A detainee
brought a federal civil rights suit against a county alleging that jail officers used excessive force
against him. A jury returned a verdict of $500,000 in favor of the inmate and the county asked for
a new trial or for judgment as a matter of law. The district court granted judgment as a matt.er of
law, finding that evidence was insufficient to show that the county had been deliberately
indifferent to the use of excessive force against detainees at the county detention facility.
According to the court, the size of the damage award suggested that the jury was excessively or
32.90

improperly motivated by its desire to punish the county. The court held that the county was not
deliberately indifferent to the rights of the detainee because it provided training designed to
prevent the use of excessive force at both a training academy and on·the·job, and had established
a use-of-force policy of which its detention officers were aware. The court found that it was not a
"glaring omission" to fail to instruct detention officers during training that they were prohibited
from standing on a detainee's back in an effort to restrain a person. The court held that it was not
deliberate indifference by the county to state in county training manuals that it was permissible
to use pressure point tactics when inmates were being placed in a restraint chair, where the
manuals cautioned that the tactics were to be used with the minimal amount of force necessary to
gain compliance. The court noted that the county had encountered only 22 complaints of excessive
force in its jail from approximately 90,000 detainees who went through the facility. (Sedgwick
County Adult Detention Facility, Kansas)
U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
INTAKE SCREENING

Lutz v. Smith, 180 F.Supp.2d 941 (N.D.Ohio 2001). A man who was arrested for domestic violence
brought a § 1983 action against a sheriff and others alleging deliberate indifference to his medical
needs while he was in custody. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendants. The court found no violation in the actions of the sheriff's staff when they declined to
accompany the arrestee in an ambulance that transported him from the jail to a hospital to treat
him for an overdose of medication he ingested before he was arrested. The arrestee was returned
to the jail after receiving treatment. The court held that the county acted properly by ensuring
that the arrestee received treatment when he became ill in custody and the county was not
required to do so in a manner that made it responsible for the expense of the treatment. (Hardin
Co. Jail, Ohio)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
CLASSIFICATION

Mayoral v. Sheahan, 245 F.3d 934 (7th Cir. 2001). A pretrial detainee who was severely injured in
a gang-instigated jailhouse riot brought a civil rights suit against a county sheriff and jail officers,
alleging they were deliberately indifferent to his safety. The district court granted summary
judgment for the defendants and the detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part,
reversed in part and remanded. The appeals court held that the failure of the jail to segregate
inmates by gang affiliation was not a constitutional violation, given the high number of gang
members housed in the jail and the burden that would be placed on administrators by such a
policy. The court found that summary judgment was precluded by fact issues as to whether the
detainee had asked an officer for protective custody and was ignored, and whether an officer
delayed in summoning help when fighting broke out. (Cook County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

McGregor v. City of Olathe, KS, 158 F.Supp.2d 1225 (D.Kan. 2001). An arrestee brought a pro se
action against a city and city police officers challenging the removal of her keys from her
pantyhose as an illegal search. The arrestee was arrested and transported to a police station
where she was taken into a room to be searched. A female officer told the arrestee that they were
looking for some keys and the arrestee responded that the keys were in her pantyhose because
she did not want to be searched. The officer removed the keys from the arrestee's pantyhose. The
district court held that the search was not illegal (Olathe Police Department, Kansas)

U.S. District Court
USE OF FORCE

Morris v. Crawford County. Ark., 173 F.Supp.2d 870 (W.D.Ark. 2001). A detainee in a county jail
brought a § 1983 action and state law battery claims against the county, sheriff and deputies. The
defendants moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the motion in part and
denied it in part. The court held that genuine issues of material fact existed as to the type of force
used by a deputy against the detainee, and whether the detainee sustained injuries, precluding
summary judgment. The court also found that the deputy was not entitled to qualified immunity
for his alleged use of force on the detainee, who was allegedly not resisting. There was evidence
that the deputy used a ''knee drop" on the detainee, thereby severing his intestine. (Crawford
County Detention Center, Arkansas)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Napier v. Madison County, KY., 238 F.3d 739 (6th Cir. 2001). An arrestee who suffered from
complete kidney failure and who was kept from scheduled dialysis treatment during his period of
detention, brought a § 1983 action against a county and jail officials. The district court granted
summary judgment to the defendants and the appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that
the detainee failed to show any detrimental effects from the delay in treatment. The court noted
that the detainee, prior to his confinement, had missed over 40 treatments during the same year,
and did not go directly to the hospital after his release from confinement. (Madison County
Detention Center, Kentucky)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE

Naumoffv. Old, 167 F.Supp.2d 1250 (D.Kan. 2001). A mother whose son had committed suicide
while confined in a jail brought a § 1983 action against a county sheriff. The sheriff moved for
summary judgment and the court granted the motion, finding that the mother failed to allege an
injury to her own constitutional rights. The court held that the mother lacked standing to bring
the § 1983 action because she brought the action in her individual capacity rather than as
representative of her son's estate. The mother did not make a claim for deprivation of familial
association or otherwise allege injury to her own constitutional rights. (Wabaunsee C. Jail,
Kansas)

U.S. District Court
USE OF FORCE

Pittman v. Kurtz, 165 F.Supp.2d 1243 (D.Kan. 2001). An inmate brought an action against jail
officials and a county jail alleging that he was physically assaulted by staff while he was
32.91

incarcerated at the jail, in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants,
finding that the force applied by jail officials to restrain the inmate did not violate his rights. The
inmate had refused to go to his cell after multiple orders to do so, and struck at one official with a
pencil, hitting him in the neck and shoulder area between six and ten times. The altercation
lasted only a few seconds and the inmate's injuries were minor. (Sedgwick County Jail, Kansas)
U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
RELEASE
PROTECTION FROM

HARM

Ramsey v. Schauble, 141 F.Supp.2d 584 (W.D.N.C. 2001). A former detainee whose finger tip was
severed after a sheriff's deputy allegedly shut a cell window on it, brought a pro se complaint
against the deputy and the sheriff. The district court held that the detainee stated a cognizable
civil rights complaint against the sheriff, and the detainee pled a cause of action under a state law
that provided that a keeper of a jail must pay treble damages if he/she does any wrong or injury to
a detainee, and is guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor. The court found that jail officials ignored the
detainee's cries for help after he was injured by the deputy and displayed deliberate indifference
to his need for quick medical attention to preserve the possibility of reattaching the fmger. The
detainee was released from custody several hours after he was returned from the hospital, but
officials refused to give the detainee pain medication prescribed by the hospital, requiring him to
return to the jail periodically over the next several days to receive each pill individually. (Watauga
County Law Enforcement Center, North Carolina)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCHES

Shain v. Ellison, 273 F.3d 56 (2nd Cir. 2001). A misdemeanor detainee in a local correctional
facility sued a county and various individuals, challenging the policy of requiring strip searches of
all detainees regardless of the nature of the crime for which they were detained. The district court
granted summary judgment for the detainee and awarded $1 in nominal damages. The appeals
court affirmed in part and remanded in part. The appeals court held that the county's strip search
policy violated the Fourth Amendment and its illegality was clearly established in 1995, but the
detainee was not entitled to a new trial on the question of damages. The court noted that the
searching officer did not have reasonable suspicion to conduct the search of the detainee, and that
even if other officers had information that may have justified the search, the information was not
relayed to the searching officer. (Nassau County Correctional Center, New York)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Spencer v. Sheahan, 158 F.Supp.2d 837 (N.D.Ill. 2001). A former pretrial detainee brought a§
1983 action alleging deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. The district court denied
summary judgment for the defendants. The detainee was a known diabetic who suffered from a
cut between two toes on his right foot and subsequently developed an infection that resulted in
two amputations and stump revision surgery. The court noted that there was a seven-day delay
between the time that a physician observed "positive skin changes" on the detainee's foot and the
time of diagnosis and treatment. (Cook County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
RELEASE
FALSE
IMPRISONMENT

Streit v. County of Los Angeles, 236 F.3d 552 (9th Cir. 2001). Detainees brought a§ 1983 action
against a county and sheriff's department seeking damages for overdetention. The district court
denied the defendants' motion to dismiss and the appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held
that the county would be subject to liability under § 1983 and that the sheriff's department was
not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity because the department was not acting as an arm
of the state when it administered county jails. Before an inmate is released from custody the
sheriff's department conducts a check of a computerized database to confirm that the inmate is
not wanted by any other law enforcement agency. But the department's policy requires this check
to be run only after all wants and holds that arrive on a given day are entered into the database.
Entering wants and holds can take up to two days, resulting in extended incarceration for inmates
beyond their release date. (Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE
ALCOHOIJDRUGS

Thompson v. Upshur County, TX, 245 F.3d 447 (5th Cir. 2001). Parents whose son had died of
medical conditions associated with his delirium tremens while he was a pretrial detainee in a
county jail, sued under § 1983. The district court denied the defendants' motion for summary
judgment on qualified immunity grounds and the defendants appealed. The appeals court
affirmed in part and reversed in part. The appeals court held that the sheriff of the jail to which
the detainee was first admitted was entitled to qualified immunity in connection with the death of
the detainee, which occurred following his transfer to another county jail that had the
detoxification facilities that his jail lacked. The sheriff of the jail in the receiving county did not
violate any clearly established right in failing to instruct his staff on the potentially life·
threatening nature of medical conditions associated with delirium tremens and was entitled to
qualified immunity, according to the appeals court. But the appeals court found that a sergeant at
the jail in which the detainee died was not entitled to qualified immunity because of fact questions
as to whether she had instructed her subordinates not to disturb her at home unless a detainee
was on the verge of death, or whether she had otherwise interfered with the detainee's receipt of
medical care. (Upshur County Jail and Marion County Jail, Texas)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
TRANSFER

U.S. v. Wallen, 177 F.Supp.2d 455 (D.Md. 2001). A defendant who was charged with importation
of cocaine moved to be held at an alternative detention facility because he was allegedly being
provided with poor medical care. The district court granted the motion, noting that the
defendant's ·medications were dispenses irregularly and incompletely, leading to his collapse in his
cell. The court ordered the defendant to be detained in an infirmary or hospital and that he be
32.92

provided with medical care that complied with the relevant standard of care that applied to that
facility. (Maryland Correctional Adjustment Center)
U.S. District Court
MENTAL HEALTH

U.S. v. Weston, 134 F.Supp.2d 115 (D.D.C. 2001). An appeals court affirmed the decision of the
federal Bureau of Prisons to administer antipsychotic medication to a detainee who allegedly
killed Capitol police officers. On remand to the district court, the court held that the government
would be permitted to treat the defendant involuntarily with such medication because it was
appropriate and essential in order to render the defendant non-dangerous based on medical/safety
concerns, and to restore the defendant's competency to stand trial. (Federal Corr'l Institute,
Butner, N.C.)

U.S. District Court
USE OF FORCE

Watford v. Bruce. 126 F.Supp.2d 425 (E.D.Va. 2001). The district court held that a pretrial
detainee stated a claim for cruel and unusual punishment under § 1983 against a deputy sheriff
who allegedly assaulted him with such force that he sustained bruising, scarring and swelling,
despite the claim that the injuries were de minimis. (Virginia Beach Corr'l Center. Virginia)

U.S. Appeals Court
PROTECTION
MEDICAL CARE

Watkins v. City of Battle Creek. 273 F.3d 682 (6th Cir. 2001). The personal representative of the
estate of a prisoner who died in jail custody. after denying that he had ingested cocaine and
refusing medical treatment, brought a federal civil rights suit against a city, county and various
officials and employees. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants and the
appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the arresting officers and jail personnel were
not deliberately indifferent to the detainee's rights in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. and
that the detainee was not punished in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The court found that the
city and county could not be held liable for failure to train, in the absence of a constitutional
violation by individual defendants. According to the court, jail personnel were not deliberately
indifferent to the medical needs of the detainee even though he exhibited some behavioral
symptoms at the time of intake, where the personnel asked the detainee whether he had
swallowed drugs, stated that they would get him medical help if he had and that he would not face
additional charges. and generally kept him under observation even though one officer failed to do
so. The court noted that detainee repeatedly denied ingesting drugs, refused medical treatment,
and offered an alternative explanation for his symptoms. (Battle Creek Police Dept., and Calhoun
County Jail, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE

Wells v. Jefferson County Sheriff Dept., 159 F.Supp.2d 1002 (S.D.Ohio 2001). A former inmate
filed a § 1983 action against a county sheriff's department, sheriff and two deputy officers
employed at a county jail. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The
court found that jail officers were not liable for failing to protect the inmate from another prisoner
who had previously attacked him. The officers moved the former inmate to a different cell block
upon learning of the history between the inmates, and the former inmate did not allege that he
experienced any physical injury as the result of being attacked a second time. The court held that
the former inmate's allegations that the single blanket he was allowed in a holding cell was not
adequate to keep him warm, and that cockroaches climbed on him while he slept, did not state
Eighth Amendment claims where he did not complain to any officers or officials that the cell was
uncomfortable or unsanitary. (Jefferson County Jail, Ohio)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCHES
SEPARATION

Wilson v. Jones, 251 F.3d 1340 (11th Cir. 2001). A female arrestee brought a civil rights action
against a county sheriff challenging her strip search following her arrest for driving under the
influence. The district court denied the sheriff's motion to dismiss. The appeals court reversed.
The appeals court held that the strip search violated the arrestee's Fourth Amendment privacy
rights, but that the sheriff was entitled to qualified immunity because the unconstitutionality of
the county's blanket strip search policy was not clearly established at the time of the search. The
arrestee had been strip searched by a female corrections officer before being placed in a cell with
the general female population because the county did not have separate facilities to temporarily
hold female detainees. (Shelby County Jail, Alabama)

U.S. Appeals Court
PROTECTION FROM
HARM
USE OF FORCE

Young v. City of Mount Ranier, 238 F.3d 567 (4th Cir. 2001). The parents of a boy who died in
custody brought state law negligence and wrongful death claims. and constitutional claims under
§ 1983, arising from the death of their son. Following removal from state court, the federal district
court dismissed the complaint and the parents appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and
dismissed in part. The appeals court held that the conduct of officers who took the boy into
custody for emergency psychiatric evaluation fell within the "middle range of culpability," between
gross negligence and intentional misconduct, noting that the boy was owed the same duties owed
to a more typical pretrial detainee. The appeals court held that the conduct of the officers fell
short of deliberate indifference, as needed to establish§ 1983 liability. The boy had resisted when
officers tried to take him into custody. The officers used pepper spray to subdue him and then
handcuffed him and placed him face down in the back seat of their police car. He was transported
to a local hospital where he was found to have no pulse and where efforts to resuscitate him failed.
An autopsy revealed that he had PCP in his system. His parents alleged that he died from
"positional asphyxiation." (Mount Ranier Police Dept., Maryland)

32.93

2002
U.S. Appeals Court
RELEASE
INITIAL APPEARANCE

Alkire v. Irving. 305 F.3d 456 (6th Cir. 2002). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action against a
sheriff, county, and county judge, alleging violation of his Fourth, Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights. The district court denied the arrestee's motion for class certification and
granted summary judgment for the defendants on the remaining issues. The appeals court
affirmed in part, and reversed and remanded in part. The appeals court held that the Sherill's
policy of detaining persons in the county jail until their initial appearance was the type of "policy
or custom" under which the county could be held liable under § 1983. As the result of the policy,
persons arrested without warrants from late Friday afternoon through Sunday morning would not
likely appear in court before Tuesday morning, in violation of a requirement that a probable cause
hearing be held within 48 hours of a warrantless arrest. The appeals court held that the county,
sheriff and county clerk's office had quasi-judicial immunity and qualified immunity from § 1983
liability for failing to allow credit toward fines and costs for time served. (Holmes County Jail,
Ohio)

U.S. District Court
ASSESSMENT OF
COSTS
DUE PROCESS

Allen v. Leis, 213 F.Supp.2d 819 (S.D.Ohio 2002). A former pretrial detainee brought a class
action under § 1983 challenging the constitutionality of a county jail's pay-for-stay program. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. The court held that the jail's
policy of appropriating cash immediately upon a pretrial detainee's arrival at jail to cover the
"booking fee" was not statutorily authorized, and that the jail's policy violated due process. The
court noted that a detainee could obtain a refund of funds paid if the charges were subsequently
dismissed or if the detainee was acquitted, but the court found this post-deprivation remedy to be
inadequate. The county had adopted a $30 book-in fee in order to defray a portion of the booking
cost. Incoming prisoners were asked to sign a Release of Funds Waiver, but they were also advised
that their refusal to sign the waiver had no effect because the book-in fee was taken from the
prisoner with or without his signature on a waiver. In 1999, the county collected over $468,000
under the program, from 50,134 inmates. <Hamilton County Justice Center, Ohio)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS

Bobbitt v. Detroit Edison Co., 216 F.Supp.2d 669 (E.D.Mich. 2002). An arrestee filed a§ 1983
action in state court alleging that city police officers violated her constitutional rights in
connection with her arrest for disorderly conduct. The district court granted summary judgment
in favor of the defendants. The court held that the arrestee failed to establish liability with her
allegations that a city jail was not clean, did not provide sufficient seating, and did not provide
ready access to a telephone. According to the court, the arrestee's assertions that the city
maintained inadequate policies for training and hiring its police officers, and that an arresting
officer had been involved in one other incident of alleged misconduct, were insufficient to subject
the city to liability under § 1983 for failing to provide adequate training. The arrestee alleged she
was forced to stand for approximately five hours in a police holding cell, that the cell contained
only a 4-inch concrete slab on which to sit, and that the slab was too low. (Eighth Precinct, Detroit
Police Department, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
USE OF FORCE
MEDICAL CARE

Bozeman v. Orum, 199 F.Supp.2d 1216 <M.D.Ala. 2002). The representative of the estate of a
pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against a sheriff and officials at a county detention
facility, alleging that the detainee's death was the result constitutional violations. The district
court held that detention officers' use of force to restrain the detainee did not violate his
Fourteenth Amendment right against the use of excessive force, even though the officers
threatened to "kick" the detainee's "ass." The officers apparently punched or slapped the detainee,
and the detainee died as the result of the officers' actions, but the court found that some level of
force was necessary to restore order where the detainee was apparently undergoing a mental
breakdown in his cell. The court held that nurses at the detention facility were not deliberately
indifferent to the serious medical needs of the detainee when they failed to obtain treatment and
medication upon learning that the detainee had been evaluated for mental health problems and
prescribed medication in the past. The court noted that the nurses had no knowledge during
intake beyond a "slight flag" of past evaluations for mental illness and that the detainee had
medication to help him "rest.• The court also found that the failure of the detention facility to
implement a policy requiring staff to follow up on inmates who had acknowledged past mental
health problems or evaluations for mental health problems, did not violate the detainee's
Fourteenth Amendment right to adequate medical care. The court held that municipal jails are
not required to provide on-site psychiatric care for their inmates, and that the detention facility
was not required to train its officers in diagnosing or treating mental illness. According to the
court, the facility provided adequate training in the proper use of deadly force, including warnings
on the dangers of positional asphyxia, and was therefore not liable under § 1983 for failing to
supervise staff. The court found that summary judgment in favor of the county was precluded by a
genuine issue of material fact on the allegation that officers were deliberately indifferent to the
medical needs of the detainee by failing to resuscitate him after they realized that he was not
breathing. (Montgomery Co. Det. Fae., Alabama)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEPARATION
PROTECTION
CELL CAPACITY

Burrell v. Hampshire County, 307 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2002). A pretrial detainee who was severely
beaten by a fellow detainee brought a § 1983 action against a county and county officials, alleging
deliberate indifference to his health and safety in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
detainee also alleged an Eighth Amendment violation resulting from failure to segregate violent
and nonviolent detainees. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the

32.94

defendants and the appeals court affirmed. The detainee had told one jail official that he was
threatened by a fellow detainee who had a history of assaults, but the officials failed to separate
them. The court noted that the plaintiff told one official he had a black belt in martial arts and
was a decorated war hero and never requested protective custody. The court found that the
county's policy of not screening or segregating potentially violent inmates from non-violent ones
did not constitute deliberate indifference to the health and safety of detainees, because inmates
were housed in single cells and were able to lock their cells from the inside at any time.
(Hampshire County Jail/House of Corrections, Massachusetts)
U.S. Appeals Court
PROTECTION

Butera v. Cottey, 285 F.3d 601 (7th Cir. 2002). A pretrial detainee brought a§ 1983 action against
a county sheriff after the detainee was sexually assaulted by other detainees. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the sheriff and the appeals court affirmed. The appeals
court held that the detainee was required to show a deliberate action attributable to the sheriff,
not just any jail employee. According to the court, the detainee's statements to jail officers that he
was having unspecified problems and needed to be moved from his cellblock, and the detainee's
mother's telephone call to an unknown jail employee advising that the detainee had been
threatened with sexual assault, were not sufficient to give the sheriff actual notice of a specific
risk of serious harm. The appeals court also found that violence at the jail was not so prevalent as
to put the sheriff on notice of a substantial risk of harm to the detainee. The court noted that the
sheriff implemented policies to prevent violence by requiring jail officers to undergo annual
training, requiring officers to patrol cellblocks regularly, by allowing detainees to post anonymous
complaints, and by separating the most violent detainees from the rest of the population. (Marion
County Jail, Indiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE

Calderon-Ortiz v. Laboy-Alvarado, 300 F.3d 60 (1st Cir. 2002). A former pretrial detainee brought
a§ 1983 action against officials, alleging failure to protect him from other inmates. The district
court dismissed the action. The appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that the detainee's
complaint sufficiently stated a claim. The detainee alleged he had been forcibly sodomized by
other inmates, that officials were aware that inmates were being housed without adequate regard
to their custody and security needs, and that staff did not provide adequate supervision.
(Bayamon Regional Metropolitan Detention Center, Puerto Rico)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCHES

Cuesta v. School Bd. of Miami-Dade County. Fla., 285 F.3d 962 (11th Cir. 2002). A high school
student sued a school board and a county under § 1983 alleging she was subjected to an
unconstitutional strip search. The district court entered summary judgment for the school board
and county and the student appealed. The appeals court affumed, finding that there was
reasonable suspicion to strip search the student. The student had distributed, with eight other
students, an anonymous pamphlet on school grounds that included an essay in which the author
"wondered what would happen" ifhe shot the principal, teachers or other students. The students
were arrested for hate crime violations and transported to juvenile and adult detention facilities,
depending on their ages. The plaintiff student, who was over 18 years old, was booked and strip
searched at an adult detention facility pursuant to a policy that required the search of all newly·
arrested felons. (Turner Guildford Knight Correctional Facility, Metro-Dade County, Florida)

U.S. District Court
ACCESS TO COURT
DISCIPLINE
PARITYWITH
SENTENCED
EQUAL
PROTECTION
PUNISHMENT
RESTRAINTS

Davis v. Milwaukee County. 225 F.Supp.2d 967 (E.D.Wis. 2002). A state prisoner filed a prose§
1983 action claiming that his constitutional right of access to the courts was violated when he was
a pretrial detainee at a county jail. The defendants moved for summary judgment and the district
court granted the motion in part, and denied it in part. The district court held that the detainee's
access to courts was impeded because the county sheriff and others interfered with the detainee's
ability to exhaust administrative remedies, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(PLRA). According to the court, the detainee was unable to learn about the newly-enacted PLRA
due to the absence of any legal materials at the jail, and only learned of the Act's exhaustion
requirements after he had been transferred from the jail, when it was too late. The court noted
that even if the detainee had known about PLRA, the absence of materials at the jail about the
grievance procedure itself would have prevented him from knowing how to fully exhaust. When
the defendants' rejected the detainee's grievance they advised him that it was "not a grievable
situation." The court found that the detainee's allegations that he was subjected to corporal
punishment and that he was provided with no medical attention during the ordeal. were not
frivolous. The detainee alleged that he had been placed in painful physical restraints in a hot cell
in retaliation for a complaint he had recently filed against a jail officer. The court held that the
detainee's claim that he had to pay too much for postage on his letters because the jail had no
meter mail service to weigh them, was frivolous. Because the detainee had access to a court·
appointed lawyer at all times during his case, the court held that alleged lack of legal materials at
the jail did not hinder his defense. The court held that the detainee's claim that the defendants
rejected his mail without notifying him was non-frivolous, as required to establish a claim that he
had been denied access to courts. The court found that the detainee's allegations that pretrial
detainees such as himself were treated worse than convicted prisoners in a number of ways,
including being given less time out of their cells, was a non-frivolous claim of violation of equal
protection. <Milwaukee County Jail, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
FOOD
SANITATION

Drake v. Velasco, 207 F.Supp.2d 809 (N.D.111. 2002). An inmate sued county corrections officials
and a food service company under § 1983, alleging failure to provide him with sanitary meals. The
district court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss. The court held that the inmate's

32.95

allegations supported Fourteenth Amendment claims and a claim of deliberate indifference under
§ 1983. The court found that the inmate sufficiently alleged sufficient injury. The inmate alleged
that the food service company's preparation was so unsanitary as to pose both an immediate risk
to the inmate's health, and that the food served hindered his recovery from his ulcer, cirrhosis of
the liver, and Hepatitis B and C. The inmate alleged that unsanitary conditions included serving
meals on trays that contained spoiled food from previous meals, and inadequate supervision of
employees that resulted in improper handling, preparation and sterilization of equipment. (Cook
Co. Jail, Illinois, Aramark Food Services)
U.S. District Court
CROWDING
MEDICAL CARE
SUPERVISION
RELEASE

Foster v. Fulton County. Georgia. 223 F.Supp.2d 1292 (N.D.Ga. 2002). Inmates at a county jail,
who had tested positive for human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), brought an action complaining
of their conditions of confinement and inadequate medical care. The parties entered into a
settlement agreement. Two years later the district court responded to a report that described ten
areas in which the county had failed to comply with the terms of the settlement. The court held
that continued overcrowding at the jail deprived the HIV-positive inmates of their constitutional
right to minimal civilized measures of life's necessities. The court ordered the county to institute
additional measures to reduce crowding, including: providing counsel within 72 hours of arrest to
all persons accused of minor offenses who could not make bail; expanding the authority of Pretrial
Services to include supervision of persons arrested for misdemeanor offenses; eliminating any
unreasonable factors used to exclude persons charged with felonies from pretrial release; ensuring
persons charged with misdemeanors were offered a reasonable bond; and imposing additional
restrictions on the length of time a person could remain in jail without accusation or indictment,
or accused or indicted but untried. The court found the county had violated the settlement
agreement by failing to refer HIV-positive inmates to outside specialists in a timely manner when
the jail's own staff lacked the resources to provide timely care. The court noted that even though
the county had eliminated its financial review procedures, other bureaucratic problems remained
and resulted in delays of three weeks to six months. The court held that the county failed to
employ sufficient numbers of trained correctional staff to meet the health needs of HIV·positive
inmates. The court ordered the county to immediately develop and implement a plan to increase
security staffing at the jail to the level necessary to provide timely access to medical care for the
current population of inmates. The court also ordered the county to avoid unreasonable disruption
in the continuity of new inmates' medication, noting that only half of the inmates with a credible
history of HIV medications were receiving their first doses of medication within 24 hours after
admission. (Fulton County Jail, Georgia)

U.S. District Court
RELEASE
ACCESS TO COURT

Foster v. Fulton County. 223 F.Supp.2d 1301 (N.D.Ga. 2002). Inmates at a county jail, who had
tested positive for human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), brought an action complaining of their
conditions of confinement and inadequate medical care. The parties entered into a settlement
agreement. Two years later the district court responded to a report that described ten areas in
which the county had failed to comply with the terms of the settlement by ordering remedies. The
county moved to stay the corrective actions that were ordered and the district court denied the
motion. The court aff1rmed its requirement that the county develop a unified system for providing
counsel within 72 hours of arrest to persons arrested on state law misdemeanor charges. The
court also ordered the county to develop a meaningful discharge planning process for physically
and mentally ill inmate. (Fulton County Jail, Georgia)

BAIL

U.S. Appeals Court
CONDITIONS
SANITATION

Frye v. Pettis County Sheriff Dept., 41 Fed.Appx. 906 (8th Cir. 2002). A pretrial detainee brought
a § 1983 action against county officials, alleging unsafe and hazardous living conditions at a
county jail. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants and the appeals
court aff1rmed. The appeals court held that the detainee failed to show that jail officials were
deliberately indifferent to his health and safety because the toilet in his cell leaked both sewage
and water. Jail staff frequently provided blankets or towels to absorb the water and a plumber
had attempted to fix the toilet after the detainee slipped and fell. <Pettis County Jail, Missouri)

U.S. District Court

Gatlin Ex Rel. Gatlin v. Green, 227 F.Supp.2d 1064 (D.Minn. 2002). The estate of a cooperating
witness in a murder investigation brought civil rights, civil rights conspiracy, and state law claims
against a police officer and city. The witness had been murdered after police released a prisoner's
letter that identified the witness. The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary
judgment. The court found that there was no clearly established right at the time of the murder,
that required police or jail officers to embargo or detain threatening prison mail or to protect
cooperating confidential informants from retaliatory violence. The court noted that the officer who
released the prisoner's letter repeatedly warned the informant and took steps to help the
informant leave the state and to protect him. The court found that the city's failure to provide
more training to police officers in prisoner-rights law or the regulation of jail correspondence, was
inadequate to support civil rights liability for the city under a failure·to·train theory. (Carver
County Jail, Minnesota)

BAIL

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE
MEDICATION

Gibson v. County of Washoe. Nev., 290 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2002). The widow of a manic depressive
detainee who suffered a heart attack and died while in a county jail, sued the county, sheriff and
various officials under § 1983. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants
and the widow appealed. The appeals court afi1rmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The
appeals court held that several fact issues precluded summary judgment: whether the county's
policy of delaying medical screening of combative inmates posed a substantial risk of serious harm
32.96

to the detainee; whether the county was aware of that risk; whether the nurse who received the
detainee's medication at the jail was deliberately indifferent; and whether the county was liable
based upon its policy regarding handling of prescription medication. The appeals court found that
deputies who had contact with the detainee after he was admitted to the jail, and who took part in
the forcible restraint that preceded his death, were not deliberately indifferent to his medical
needs because they knew nothing of his mental condition beyond what they could observe.
(Washoe County Jail, Nevada)
U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
PROTECTION

Gonzalez v. Cecil County, Maryland, 221 F.Supp.2d 611 (D.Md. 2002). The widow of a pretrial
detainee who died while in custody filed a § 1983 action against a county, sheriff, and detention
center medical personnel. The district court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss, in part,
finding that fact issues remained as to whether the care provided to the detainee amounted to
deliberate indifference. The detainee was admitted to a county detention center at approximately
5:00 p.m. Shortly after his admission he identified himself as a heroin user during a standard
intake medical screening. He told three nurses employed by the detention center, upon his arrival,
that he was likely to undergo acute heroin withdrawal symptoms. The only treatment provided to
him at this time was to be placed on twice-daily doses of Clonidine, a blood pressure medication.
The detainee allegedly became violently ill and progressed to acute pulmonary distress, disease
and pneumonia during the night and during the next day. He complained to the nurses but was
only given an over-the-counter stomach remedy, Kaopectate. Two days later he was found in his
cell, unresponsive, and was pronounced dead twenty minutes later. His body was taken to a
nearby hospital where an autopsy revealed he died from "pneumonia, complicating narcotics
abuse." The district court held that the fact that the nurses were acting in conformity with the
county's established protocol in treating the inmate did not entitle them to qualified immunity
from liability under§ 1983. (Cecil County Detention Center, Maryland)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Gonzalez-Mercado v. Municipality of Guaynabo, 206 F.Supp.2d 257 (D.Puerto Rico 2002). A
plaintiff brought a § 1983 action following her arrest and indictment, alleging violations of her
right to medical assistance and malicious prosecution. The district court dismissed the action, in
part. The court held that the plaintiffs allegations were insufficient to establish a violation of her
Eighth Amendment right to medical assistance, even though her initial request for assistance was
denied. The court noted that the plaintiff was eventually examined by two paramedics while she
was detained in a police lockup. She was detained for seven hours and the indictment against her
was later dismissed. (Guaynabo Mun. Police Station, Puerto Rico)

U.S. District Court
PROTECTION FROM
HARM
MEDICAL CARE

Gulett v. Haines, 229 F.Supp.2d 806 (S.D.Ohio 2002). A pretrial detainee brought an action
against a sheriff, corrections officer, and a jail inmate asserting claims under §1981 and §1983.
The detainee had been assaulted by other prisoners and alleged that he was not protected from
harm and was denied adequate emergency medical care. The district court held that the jail's
emergency medical care policy was not unconstitutional on its face because the policy accounted
for any emergency and left medical decisions, subject to an obvious security concern, to a health
care staff member. The court denied summary judgment to one corrections officer, finding it was
prevented by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the officer knew that other prisoners
were likely to assault the detainee and whether he was responsible for preventing an assault.
<Montgomery County Jail, Ohio)

U.S. District Court
PROTECTION
SAFETY

Hammond v. Gordon County. 316 F.Supp.2d 1262 (N.D.Ga. 2002). Female former county jail
inmates sued county officials and officers, claiming they were subjected to cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment,
in part, for the defendants. The court held that a claim was stated by allegations that a male
officer required female inmates to strip and engage in lewd behavior in return for female hygiene
items and toiletries, and that the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity. The court denied
summary judgment to higher jail officials in connection with a claim that they violated the Eighth
Amendment by showing deliberate indifference to officer-inflicted harm of inmates. The court also
denied summary judgment and qualified immunity for a deputy jailer who was claimed to have
intentionally inflicted emotional harm and assault and battery on female inmates. The court
granted qualified immunity to an officer on a claim that he violated the rights of a female inmate
by opening the door of her cell and allowing a male inmate to enter, finding that there were no
precedents establishing that the conduct was illegal and the opening of the door was not so
obviously unlawful that immunity should not apply. According to the court, an inmate stated an
Eighth Amendment claim against an officer when she alleged that the officer had sex with her,
and the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity. But the court did not find deliberate
indifference on the part of an officer who allegedly offered a female inmate cigarettes if she would
expose her breasts, noting that the officer could not, under the circumstances, be placed on notice
that his conduct was unacceptable. The court granted qualified immunity to a jail administrator
and sheriff from a claim that they were deliberately indifferent by not intervening when male
officers required female inmates to strip in order to receive toiletries and instigated and
participated in sexual activities with inmates, because the jail administrator and sheriff did not
violate any clearly established law when they did not intervene. (Gordon County Jail, Georgia)

U.S. Appeals Court
TELEPHONE

Hanuman v. Groves, 41 Fed.Appx. 7 (8th Cir. 2002). An inmate brought a civil rights action
alleging that, while he was a pretrial detainee, prison officials violated his First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights by placing him in segregation, where his telephone privileges were limited.
32.97

The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the prison officials and the appeals court
affirmed. The appeals court held that the limitations placed on phone privileges did not give rise
to First and Fourteenth Amendment violations, where the inmate did not demonstrate any actual
injury from having to use the telephone while it was noisy or in the evening. (Pulaski Co. Det.
Facil., Arkansas)
U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Helton v. U.S., 191 F.Supp.2d 179 (D.D.C. 2002). Female arrestees brought an action under the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) alleging that United States Marshals conducted unlawful
searches and invasions of their privacy. The district court held that the alleged strip search of
arrestees satisfied the elements of a tort intrusion upon seclusion. The court noted that the
Fourth Amendment precludes police or prison officials from conducting a strip search of an
individual arrested for misdemeanors or other minor offenses, unless there is reasonable suspicion
that the individual is concealing contraband or weapons. The five women plaintiffs had been
arrested for unlawful entry in connection with an "anti-fur" demonstration at a department store.
According to their complaint, they were compelled "to remove clothing and submit to a strip and
squat search" while six men arrested with them were not subjected to such searches. (U.S.
Marshals Service)

U.S. Appeals Court
DISCIPLINE
PUNISHMENT
SEGREGATION

Higgs v. Carver, 286 F.3d 437 (7"' Cir. 2002). A pretrial detainee brought a civil right action
alleging due process violations and retaliation. The district court dismissed the complaint and the
detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The
district court held that issues of fact existed as to the reason for the detainee's segregation, and
that the detainee's retaliation allegations sufficiently stated a claim. The appeals court was
unable to determine from the record whether the detainee was placed in lockdown segregation for
preventive purposes or for punishment. (Indiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
PRIVACY
RESTRAINTS

Hill v. McKinley. 311 F.3d 899 (8th Cir. 2002). A prisoner brought § 1983 action alleging jail
officers and a sheriff violated her Fourth Amendment right to privacy, and her privacy rights
under state law. The prisoner had been marched down a hallway naked, escorted by staff
members of the opposite sex, and was then strapped face down to a restrainer board in a spread·
eagle position. The district court denied the defendants' request for judgment as a matter of law,
refused to reduce damages, and granted attorney fees to the prisoner. The appeals court affirmed
in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions. The appeals court held that the use of
male officers in an otherwise justified transfer of an unruly and naked female prisoner did not
violate the Fourth Amendment. The court held that the prisoner's Fourth Amendment rights were
violated when she was allowed to remain completely exposed to male officers on a restrainer
board for a substantial period of time after the threat to security and safety had passed. But the
court found that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity because their actions did not
violate clearly established law, noting that prisoners were entitled to very narrow zones of
privacy. The court found that evidence supported the verdict for the prisoner on her state law
privacy claim and the $2,500 compensatory damage award for invasion of privacy. (Story County
Jail, Iowa)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE
TRANSPORT

Jackson v. Illinois Medi-Car. Inc., 300 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2002). A pretrial detainee who was
transported to a police station by a private transportation service at the request of a police
department, brought a § 1983 action against the service and one of its drivers, alleging denial of
adequate medical care. The district court granted summary judgment against the detainee and
the appeals court affirmed. The appeals held that the decision of the driver to transport the
detainee to a police station, rather than taking him to a hospital, did not amount to deliberate
indifference to the detainee's objectively serious medical needs. The detainee collapsed from an
overdose of medication shortly after reaching the police station. The court noted that primary
authority for the detainee rested with the police officers, who had last determined that he should
be taken to the police station, and the driver lacked medical training or any realistic control over
the detainee. According to the court, "deliberate indifference" is simply a synonym for intentional
or reckless conduct, and "reckless" describes conduct so dangerous that the deliberate nature of
the defendant's actions can be inferred. (City of Chicago, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Loeber v. County Of Albany. 216 F.Supp.2d 20 (N.D.N.Y. 2002). An arrestee who was strip
searched several times after being arrested brought an action under § 1983, alleging numerous
constitutional violations and state law claims. The arrestee had been arrested pursuant to a
contempt order that was later expunged. The district court held that the county jail's strip search
policy was constitutional. The policy only called for strip searches upon admission to the jail
where there was a reasonable suspicion that the arrestee possessed contraband, including the
cigarettes and candy that the arrestee had in his possession. The court noted that the Fourth
Amendment prohibits a blanket policy under which all misdemeanor or minor offense arrestees
are strip-searched when admitted to a jail. The court found that a strip search could also be
conducted based on the crime charged, the particular characteristics of an arrestee, and/or the
circumstances of the arrest. The arrestee had been strip searched when he was admitted to a
courthouse holding cell, again when he was admitted to the county jail, and once again when he
was taken to a Special Housing Unit for possessing cigarettes and candy, which were considered
to be contraband. (Albany County Penitentiary, New York)

32.98

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO
PROTECT
USE OF FORCE

Morris v. Crawford County, 299 F.3d 919 (8th Cir. 2002). A county detention center detainee
brought§ 1983 and state law battery claims against a sheriff, county, and deputies. The district
court granted summary judgment for the defendants, in part, and the remaining claims were
voluntarily dismissed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that there was not a strong causal
connection between a deputy sheriff's background and the specific constitutional violation alleged
by the detainee. The detainee had been arrested and charged with driving while intoxicated and
disorderly conduct. After arriving at a county detention center, he refused to take a breathalyzer
test and began to yell and bang on his cell door. Four deputies responded, and according to the
detainee, they repeatedly assaulted him as they dragged him to another cell. One deputy allegedly
used excessive force on the detainee by utilizing a "knee drop" on him, which severed the
detainee's intestine. The court noted that the only violent act in the deputy's record was an
incident in which he slapped an inmate, although ex parte protective orders were obtained against
the deputy by both his ex·wife and girlfriend. The appeals court held that the sheriff and the
county were not liable under§ 1983 on the theory of deliberate indifference in hiring the deputy.
(Crawford County Detention Center, Arkansas)

U.S. District Court
CIVIL COMMITMENT

Munoz v. Kolender, 208 F.Supp.2d 1125 (S.D.Cal. 2002). A civil detainee who was confined in a
county jail under the provisions of California's Sexually Violent Predator Act brought a § 1983
action against a county sheriff, challenging his confinement and the conditions of his confinement.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the sheriff. The court held that the Act
had a dual purpose, to remove dangerous sexually violent predators from society and to provide
them with treatment, and that confinement pursuant to the Act was civil in nature, rather than
criminal and punitive. The court found that the prisoner's allegations that he was handcuffed
while speaking with his lawyer, subjected to strip searches, provided with poor food and with
clothes in poor condition, were insufficient to support a § 1983 Eighth Amendment violation. (San
Diego County Jail, California)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Murcia v. County of Orange, 185 F.Supp.2d 290 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). An arrestee who was, according
to the court, "the unfortunate victim of mistaken identity" was arrested by city police officers who
believed he was the same person named in a federal arrest warrant. The arrestee brought a §
1983 claim because he was subjected to one strip search at the city police department and three
subsequent strip searches at a county correctional facility. The district court granted the
arrestee's motion to amend his complaint, dropping false arrest claims but allowing the strip
search claims to continue. The court noted that if the county sheriffs alleged policy of strip·
searching every arriving prisoner existed, it was clearly unconstitutional and there could be no
qualified immunity defense. (Orange County Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Murcia v. County of Orange, 226 F.Supp.2d 489 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). A detainee filed a§ 1983 action
alleging that a county violated his constitutional rights by strip searching him, under a policy of
strip searching all detainees upon arrival at the correctional facility. The district court granted
qualified immunity for the county sheriff, finding that the detainee's right to be free from strip
searches without reasonable suspicion was not clearly established at the time. The court noted
that the county's policy of subjecting all new felony detainees to visual body cavity searches
required further scrutiny, although such searches for misdemeanor detainees had been clearly
established as unconstitutional in 1994. (Orange County Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONDITIONS
LENGTH
FAILURE TO PROTECT
CROWDING

Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623 (9th Cir. 2002). A pretrial detainee brought a§ 1983 action against a
county sheriff and two jail employees, alleging confinement in unconstitutional conditions. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the detainee appealed.
The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The appeals court held that
the detainee did not suffer more than a de minimis physical injury from his jail confinement and
therefore could not make the required showing for the purpose of the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(PLRA). But the appeals court held that the detainee was entitled to seek nominal and punitive
damages under the Fourteenth Amendment. The detainee had admitted during a deposition that
the back and leg pain he allegedly suffered from sitting and sleeping on benches and the floor of a
temporary cell was not serious. The detainee had been temporarily confined on three separate
occasions. In one instance he was confined in a temporary holding cell equipped with benches,
toilets and sinks. Inmates eat three meals per day in the cell, and are not provided with cots,
blankets or pillows. At one time the detainee was housed for 51 hours with approximately 50
other men in a cell measuring 404 square feet. He was transferred to another cell where he spent
another 74 hours confined with an average of 18 prisoners in a cell that measured 174 square feet.
The detainee described conditions in the cells as "a human carpet." (Clark Co. Detention Ctr.,
Nevada)

U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE
INTAKE SCREENING

Pardue Ex Rel Christian v. Ashe, 36 Fed.Appx. 199 (6th Cir. 2002). The next friend and next of kin
to an arrestee who committed suicide while being held in a county jail on a domestic assault
charge, brought a § 1983 action alleging that the county failed to recognize the arrestee's suicidal
tendencies. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the
appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the arrestee did not have a constitutional
right to be screened correctly for suicidal tendencies, and that he did not show a strong likelihood
that he was going to attempt suicide such that the failure to take precautions amounted to
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The appeals court also held that the.re was no
evidence that the county had a policy or custom of deliberate indifference to pretrial detainees
32.99

who were in similar situations to the arrestee. The arrestee had been admitted to a county jail
and was placed in a temporary holding cell near the intake desk. Sometime during the night the
arrestee hanged himself and his body was discovered the following morning. The appeals court
held that "this single incident is not sufficient to impose liability on Wilson County because it does
not establish a pattern of unconstitutional conduct." (Wilson County Criminal Justice Complex,
Tennessee)
U.S. Appeals Court
BAIL

Payton v. County of Kane, 308 F.3d 673 (7th Cir. 2002). Arrestees brought an action against two
county jails that charged a bond fee, above and beyond the set bail amount, as a condition of their
release. The district court dismissed the action and the arrestees appealed. The appeals court
reversed and remanded. The appeals court held that the arrestees sufficiently satisfied their
standing requirement by alleging violation of their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
The court noted that the arrestees suffered monetary injury when they were required to make the
extra payments, and that these injuries could be traced to the policy of each jail. A 1999 Illinois
law allowed a bond fee to be added to the required bond and set the fee at $1. The law empowered
county boards to increase the statutory fee by ordinance if the increase is justified by an
acceptable cost study that demonstrates that the $1 fee is not sufficient to cover the costs of
providing the service. Nineteen of Illinois's 102 counties charged a bail fee at the time of the
appeal. The plaintiff arrestees were charged $11 on one jail and $15 in another. (Kane County Jail
and DuPage County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
FALSE
IMPRISONMENT

Peacock v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 199 F.Supp.2d 306 (D.Md. 2002). A detainee sued
local and county officials alleging false arrest and false imprisonment. The district court granted
summary judgment for the defendants. The court held that members of the sheriff's office could
not be held liable for detaining the inmate for 10 days without investigating his claim that he had
already completed his sentence for violation of probation. It was eventually confirmed that the
detainee had served his sentence, and he was released (Baltimore Co. Detention Center,
Maryland)

U.S. District Court
FALSE
IMPRISONMENT

Potts v. City of Philadelphia, 224 F.Supp.2d 919 (E.D.Pa. 2002). An arrestee sued a city and city
officials asserting § 1983 claims. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendants on federal claims and dismissed state claims. The court held that the 30·hour
detention of the arrestee did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment protection against
deprivation of liberty without due process of law. The court noted that the U.S. Supreme Court
suggested in Baker v. McCollan (443 U.S. 137 1979) that prolonged detention in the face of a
person's protestation of innocence may violate the Fourteenth Amendment but that detention for
three days "does not and could not amount to such a deprivation." Because the arrestee in this
case was detained for 30 hours, the court found no constitutional violation. (Southwest Detective
Division, City of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania)

U.S. Appeals Court
PROTECTION
TRANSPORT

Proffitt v. Ridgway. 279 F.3d 503 (7 th Cir. 2002). The estate of an arrestee brought a § 1983 action
alleging excessive force on the part of a police officer and a private citizen. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the appeals court affirmed. The
appeals court held that the death of the arrestee from a choke hold administered by a bystander,
where the arresting officer made no effort to use deadly force against the arrestee, was not
deliberate indif·ference. The appeals court noted that the officer could not have foreseen that the
small unarmed man would kill the "hefty" arrestee, even though it was later learned that the man
was a martial-arts expert. The officer took reasonable efforts, according to the court, to protect the
arrestee from excessive force by telling the bystander to ease up on the choke hold. (City of Pana,
Illinois)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
SUICIDE

Rapier v. Kankakee County, Ill., 203 F.Supp.2d 978 (C.D.Ill. 2002). The wife of a detainee who
committed suicide while in jail filed a§ 1983 suit individually, and as the special administrator of
the detainee's estate. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, finding
that the county was not liable for alleged deliberate indifference toward the prevention of suicide
by detainees. The court found that the county's policy of placing potentially suicidal detainees in a
special needs cell, along with its policy to require checks of these inmates every 15 minutes, was
an effective way to prevent suicides. The court also found that the county's failure to adequately
deal with the problem of understaffing at the jail was not the cause of the detainee's suicide,
because an officer saw or spoke to the detainee 15 to 20 minutes prior to the time he was found
hanging in his cell. The sheriff has stated that seven staff members were working at the jail at the
time of the suicide, the jail's census was lower than usual at the time, and that he did not think
that having additional staff would have made a tremendous difference. (Kankakee Co. Detention
Ctr., Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCHES
DRUG TEST

Saulsberry v. Arpaio, 41 Fed.Appx. 953 (9th Cir. 2002). A detainee brought an action against a
county sheriff alleging violation of his Fourth and Eighth Amendment rights. The district court
entered judgment for the sheriff and the appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that a
physician working for the sheriff's office ordered catheterization and drug screening for the
detainee solely for medical purposes, not for any administrative or investigative reasons, and
therefore the tests did not violate the Fourth Amendment. (Maricopa Co. Sheriff's Office, Arizona)

32.100

U.S. District Court
TELEPHONE

MAIL
DISCIPLINE

U.S. District Court
ACCESS TO COURT
TELEPHONE

MAIL
DISCIPLINE

Simpson v. Gallant, 223 F.Supp.2d 286 (D.Me. 2002). A pretrial detainee filed a §1983 action
alleging his constitutional rights were violated when county jail officials denied him access to
telephone and mail services. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendants. The court held that the refusal to permit the pretrial detainee access to a telephone to
arrange bail, after he was placed in disciplinary segregation for violations of jail rules, did not
violate the detainee's Fourteenth Amendment rights, where the detainee retained the ability to
use the mail and to meet with his attorney. (Penobscot County Jail, Maine)
Simpson v. Gallant, 231 F.Supp.2d 341 (D.Me. 2002). A pretrial detainee brought an action
against county officials, alleging violations of his right of access to telephone and mail services as
the result of disciplinary actions taken against him. The district court held that the detainee's
claim was properly characterized as a claim that jail disciplinary sanctions violated his
constitutional right to make bail and to prepare his defense while he was a pretrial detainee. The
court declined to determine, at the motion to dismiss phase of the case, if sanctions restricting
access to mail and telephone were imposed to enforce reasonable disciplinary requirements. The
court held that the detainee's allegations supported a claim that the officials interfered with his
right to counsel, bail, and access to courts. The detainee alleged that the officials' restrictions
forced his trial to be postponed, and that soon after his release from detention he was cleared of
the charges. The detainee also alleged that he was able to make bail soon after he was able to
contact his associate. <Penobscot County Jail, Maine)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
MEDICAL CARE

Smith v. Lejeune, 203 F.Supp.2d 1260 (D.Wyo. 2002). Following the death of her husband who
had been detained at a county detention facility, a wife brought an action against a physician,
nurses and others, alleging deliberate indifference in violation of§ 1983. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding that the physician had trained
nurses regarding alcohol withdrawal, and the nurses did not have the requisite state of mind,
knowledge and disregard of possible risks to sustain a deliberate indifference claim. According to
the court, the physician did not fail to train the nurses, where he provided the nurses with
protocols and policies to deal with alcohol and alcohol withdrawal, and conducted monthly
meetings during which the policies were discussed. The nurses had not identified any signs that
the detainee was suffering for alcohol withdrawal, and the detainee had denied any history of
suffering from alcohol withdrawal. The detainee had been arrested for driving under the influence
of alcohol, and a breath alcohol test identified a level of .317. (Laramie County Detention Facility,
Wyoming)

U.S. District Court
PUNISHMENT
MENTAL HEALTH
PSYCHOLOGICAL
SERVICES
SPEEDY TRIAL

Terry Ex Rel. Terry v. Hill, 232 F.Supp.2d 934 (E.D.Ark. 2002). Pretrial detainees brought a class
action against the Arkansas Department of Human Services, claiming that inordinate delays in
providing evaluation and treatment of detainees who were referred by the court to determine
their fitness to stand trial, violated their Constitutional rights. The district court entered
judgment for the detainees. The court held that the inordinate delays amounted to prohibited
punishment that violated the detainee's due process rights. The court also found that the officials
displayed deliberate indifference to the detainees' circumstances, violating their Eighth
Amendment rights. According to the court, the Arkansas Constitution speaks of the State's duty
toward the mentally ill, and the Arkansas State Hospital, a division of the Department of Human
Services, has responsibility for treating citizens committed by civil courts or by criminal courts for
evaluation. <Arkansas State Hospital, Arkansas Department of Human Services)

U.S. Appeals Court
CIVIL COMMITMENT

Troville v. Yenz, 303 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir. 2002). A civilly committed detainee filed a§ 1983 action
challenging his conditions of confinement. The district court dismissed the case for failure to state
a claim and the detainee appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that the
civil detainee is not a "prisoner" for purposes of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) and
therefore the PLRA provision requiring full payment of the filing fee on appeal did not apply. The
appeals court held that the district court should have permitted the detainee to amend his
complaint. According to the court, the definition of "prisoner" in the in forma pauperis statute
applies only to persons incarcerated as punishment for a criminal conviction, and a civil detainee
is not a "prisoner." (South Bay Detainee Unit, South Bay Correctional Facility, Florida)

U.S. District Court
SEARCH
MEDICAL CARE
USE OF FORCE

Turner v. Kight, 192 F.Supp.2d 391 CD.Md. 2002). A female detainee who was arrested on an
outstanding warrant associated with a civil matter and detained at a jail brought an action
against county and state officials. The district court granted summary judgment for the
defendants. The court held that arresting and booking officers were deliberately indifferent to the
detainee's serious medical needs when they allegedly removed a neck brace and seized
medication, ignoring her complaints of pain and muscle spasm. The detainee sometimes limped
and walked with a cane, but the court found that the detainee's alleged pain did not rise to the
level of a serious medical need. The court granted qualified immunity to the officers, finding that
there was no indication that the officers actually knew of, and ignored, a serious need for medical
care. The court also found that the officers were not deliberately indifferent by failing to dispense
medication in response to the detainee's complaints of pain, where the officers were not permitted
to dispense medication and they notified the detention facility's medical staff of a nonemergency
situation, who did not respond during the six hours the detainee was confined. The court held that
the detainee's allegation that she was brutally handcuffed did not present a constitutional
violation, particularly in the absence of any explanation of how the handcuffing led to any injury.
The court held that if a strip search was conducted by an officer of the same sex during the
32.101

processing of the detainee, it did not rise to the level of a Fourth Amendment violation, where the
search was conducted in private and there was no physical contact between the detention officer
and the detainee. <Montgomery County Detention Center, Maryland)
U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Turner v. Kight, 217 F.Supp.2d 680 (D.Md. 2002). A detainee who was arrested on an outstanding
warrant brought a civil rights and state tort suit arising out of her arrest and the conditions of her
detention. The district court held that the detainee was entitled to reconsideration of the court's
determination that she was a "pretrial detainee" at the time of an allegedly unconstitutional strip
search. The detainee claimed that she was a "temporary detainee" at the time of the search, which
exempted her from a strip search according to county jail policy. <Montgomery County Detention
Center, Maryland)

U.S. District Court
SEGREGATION
MAIL
TELEPHONE
VISITS

U.S. v. Flores, 214 F.Supp.2d 1193 (D.Utah 2002). A prisoner who was indicted for alleged
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) violations, filed a writ of habeas
corpus challenging restrictions placed on his conditions of confinement. The district court denied
the petition. The court held that the secure confinement of the prisoner was justified and that
restrictions placed upon his confinement were warranted because the prisoner was a flight risk,
and a danger to others. The court upheld restrictions on the prisoner's mail that required mail to
be read for threats, conspiracy, or obstruction of justice efforts, because members of the prisoner's
gang outside the prison could act on his instructions. The court also upheld that the limitation of
one visitor per day and telephone restrictions. The court clarified that the prisoner's right of
access to counsel included investigators or other special assistants working for the prisoner's
attorney. (Utah State Prison)

U.S. District Court
BAIL
BAIL REFORM ACT
RELEASE·
CONDITIONS

U.S. v. Hammond, 204 F.Supp.2d 1157 (E.D.Wis. 2002). A defendant moved to modify his bail and
conditions of release. The U.S Magistrate reduced bail and set conditions of release and the
government moved for revocation of the order. The district court denied the motion, finding that
the government failed to show that the defendant was dangerous and that no conditions of release
would reasonably assure the safety of the community, and that the conditions of release were
insufficient. The defendant's bail was reduced to $135,500 (from $150,000) and he was required to
submit to electronic monitoring, travel restrictions, random urine tests, and reporting to pre·trial
services. He was also ordered not to associate with the Outlaws Motorcycle Club. (East. Dist.,
Wisc.)

U.S. Appeals Court
SPEEDY TRIAL
LENGTH

U.S. v. Hernandez, 281 F.3d 746 (8th Cir. 2002). An inmate who had been convicted in federal
court sought to appeal his conviction. The appeals court affirmed, finding that an overnight delay
between the defendant's arrest on a drug charge and his appearance before a magistrate was
neither excessive nor unnecessary, and that the defendant's statements while detained would not
be suppressed. The court noted that the defendant was arrested in the evening and was
questioned by police for two hours, and appeared before a magistrate the next morning, following
a total delay of 15 hours. (Iowa)

U.S. District Court
ACCESS TO COURT
TRANSFER

U.S. v. Johnson, 225 F.Supp.2d 982 <N.D.Iowa 2002). A pretrial detainee charged with murder
while engaged in a conspiracy moved to be transferred to a different facility. The district court
denied the motion, finding that denial of the transfer motion was not clearly erroneous, absent a
showing that detention at the current facility had interfered with the detainee's right to counsel.
The court noted that one of the detainee's lead attorneys had an office in the same city as the
current detention facility. The court also found that transfer was not warranted absent a showing
that conditions at the current facility amounted to unconstitutional "punishment." (Linn County
Jail, Iowa)

U.S. District Court
ACCESS TO COURT

U.S. v. McKinley. 228 F.Supp.2d 1158 (D.Or. 2002). A defendant charged with murder was
arrested and detained at 10:40 a.m. on Friday and was not arraigned until the following Monday.
The district court held that the delay in bringing the defendant before a magistrate was not
excessive. The court noted that it was 100 miles to the nearest magistrate and that authorities
spent all day Friday conducting an investigation needed to support the charge. (Warm Springs
Correctional Facility, Warm Springs Indian Reservation, Oregon)

U.S. Appeals Court
TELEPHONE

Valdez v. Rosenbaum, 302 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir. 2002). A pretrial detainee brought a civil rights
action against a federal prosecutor and jail officials alleging that his constitutional rights were
violated during his detention in a state-operated jail, as the result of restrictions placed upon his
telephone access. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the
detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that a state law that allowed prisoners
reasonable access to the telephone did not give the pretrial detainee a liberty interest in telephone
usage. The appeals court held that telephone restrictions did not violate the detainee's due process
rights nor the First Amendment, and that the detainee could not maintain a Sixth Amendment
claim based on the telephone restrictions. The court noted that the restrictions, which limited the
detainee's telephone access to calls to his attorney only, were reasonably related to the legitimate
government interest of ensuring the safety of police officers when they were executing arrests,
and preventing the detainee from helping his co-conspirators elude arrest. The court noted that
the detainee was allowed to receive visitors and could send and receive mail, but allowing the
detainee phone access would have required jail staff to monitor his calls, and there was no
obvious, easy alternative to the restriction. (Alaska Cook Inlet Pretrial Facility)
32.102

U.S. Appeals Court
PROTECTION
CROWDING

Washington v. LaPorte County Sheriffs Dept., 306 F.3d 515 (7th Cir. 2002). A pretrial detainee
brought a § 1983 due process claim against a jail and its officers, alleging that injuries he suffered
when he was attacked by another inmate were caused by the jail's cell assignment policy. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the detainee appealed.
The appeals court affirmed, finding that the jail's cell assignment policy did not demonstrate
deliberate indifference on the part of officials to a substantial risk of serious harm to the detainee.
The policy allowed inmates to choose their own cell assignments. The detainee was charged with
driving with a suspended license and he was detained at the jail pending trial, as he was unable to
post bond. He was assigned to a cell block originally designed to hold ten inmates, but which
actually housed seventeen. The detainee was allowed to choose his own cell assignment within the
housing unit. The court noted that the detainee shared a cell with the inmate who eventually
assaulted him for two weeks without incident prior to the attack, and did not inform jail officers
he had fought with the inmate or that he feared harm. (LaPointe County Jail, Indiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT

White v. Crane, 45 Fed.Appx. 552 (8th Cir. 2002). A county jail inmate brought a civil rights
action against a sheriff, jail administrators, and jail officers, seeking compensation for injuries
incurred when he was placed in a cell with another inmate who assaulted him. The appeals court
granted summary judgment in favor of the jail officers, but the appeals court reversed and
remanded, finding that the officers could not reasonably believe they were not violating the
inmate's right to be free from attack. Upon admission to the jail, the plaintiff inmate had notified
an officer that the other inmate should be put on his enemy-alert list because of a problem he had
just had with his wife. When officers placed plaintiff inmate in the same housing unit with the
other inmate, the plaintiff had asked them to at least handcuff the other inmate before opening
the door and the officers refused. When the door was opened the attack immediately occurred.
(Hempstead County Detention Facility, Arkansas)

U.S. Appeals Court
USE OF FORCE
RESTRAINTS

Williams v. City of Las Vegas, 34 Fed.Appx. 297 (9th Cir. 2002). An arrestee brought a suit against
a city and correctional officer alleging the use of excessive force. The district court granted
summary judgment to the defendants and the appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that
the officer's use of force and restraints when the arrestee refused to cooperate during the booking
process was not excessive under either the Eighth Amendment standard for prisoners, nor the
Fourteenth Amendment standard for pretrial detainees. The court noted that all of the officer's
conduct associated with this claim had been videotaped from three different positions by
surveillance cameras. According to the court, the use of waist and leg restraints on the inmate in
his jail cell did not violate the Eighth Amendment, where the inmate had refused to stand still
during a frisk search and displayed erratic and seemingly uncooperative behavior. <Las Vegas
Department of Detention, Nevada)
2003

U.S. Appeals Court
RELEASE

Brass v. County of Los Angeles, 328 F.3d 1192 (9th Cir. 2003). An arrestee brought an action
against a deputy and county, alleging that the county violated his constitutional rights by failing
to timely release him from jail. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants
and the arrestee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that a 39-hour
delay in releasing the detainee was not unreasonable and did not violate his constitutional rights.
The court found that the arrestee did not have a constitutional right to have his release papers
processed in any particular order, or ahead of other prisoners whose papers the sheriffs
department received the same day as his. According to the court, the order in which the
department handled prisoner releases was an administrative matter primarily within the
department's discretion. The court held that the county's policy of not starting to process the day's
releases until it received all information relating to prisoners scheduled for release, , including
wants and holds, was justified and reasonable in light of its responsibilities. (Los Angeles County
Sheriff's Department, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE
SUPERVISION

Cagle v. Sutherland, 334 F.3d 980 (11th Cir. 2003). The personal representative of the estate of a
pretrial detainee who hung himself in his cell brought a § 1983 action, alleging that officials failed
to prevent his suicide. The district court denied summary judgment in favor of the defendants and
they appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. The appeals court held that the county's
violation of a consent decree that arose out of a voluntary settlement of a prior jail conditions
lawsuit, did not establish a violation of the pretrial detainee's constitutional rights actionable
under § 1983. The consent decree required the county to provide a second nighttime jailer to staff
the jail during the hours that the detainee committed suicide, but the court noted that the prior
lawsuit was not concerned with the risk of prisoner suicides. According to the court, the county's
failure to fund the second jailer did not rise to the level of deliberate indifference to the strong
likelihood that a suicide would result. The court also found no deliberate indifference on the part
of the jailer who waited for one hour and forty·six minutes after his last cell check, even though
the detainee had expressly threatened suicide. The court noted that the jailer was aware that the
detainee's belt, shoelaces and the contents of his pockets had been confiscated, the cell had been
stripped of implements that might assist suicide, and the jailer regularly observed the detainee
through a closed circuit monitor that viewed the majority of the cell. The detainee was able to
commit suicide by tearing the elastic band from his underwear, tying it around his neck, and
hanging himself from the top bunk. (Winston County Jail, Alabama)
32.103

U.S. Appeals Court
PROTECTION
SEPARATION

Cardenas v. Lewis, 66 Fed.Appx. 86 (9th Cir. 2003). [unpublished] A pretrial detainee brought a
prose§ 1983 action against a county, alleging deliberate indifference to a substantial risk to his
safety. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the detainee
appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part. The appeals
court held that officers who placed the detainee in a holding tank with an inmate, from whom the
detainee was supposed to be kept separated, were not acting with deliberate indifference, even if
the officers were negligent in failing to check the detainee's "keep separate" wristband. The court
found that the detainee was deprived of due process in disciplinary proceedings in which he was
allegedly not allowed to call witnesses, to have his exculpatory statement read, or to tape the
hearings, and was placed in segregation without a hearing. (Yakima County Department of
Corrections, Washington)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
SUICIDE ATTEMPT

Cavalieri v. Shepard, 321 F.3d 616 (7th Cir. 2003). The mother of a pretrial detainee who
attempted suicide brought a§ 1983 action against a police officer, alleging deliberate indifference
to the detainee's risk of attempting suicide. The district court denied summary judgment for the
officer and the officer appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that summary
judgment was precluded by an issue of fact as to whether the officer was aware that the detainee
was on the verge of trying to commit suicide and whether the officer was deliberately indifferent
to the detainee's safety. The court noted that the detainee's right to be free from deliberate
indifference to the risk that he would attempt suicide was clearly established. The detainee was
transferred to a county facility after a brief period of detention in a city jail. When he was
admitted to the county facility he was not placed on suicide watch, but he did ask to speak to a
mental health advisor. He was assigned to a holding cell that contained a telephone with a strong
metal cord. When the police officer called the county facility to complain about calls from the
inmate, county employees found the detainee unconscious, hanging from the wire telephone cord.
The detainee remained in a vegetative state after his unsuccessful suicide attempt. (Champaign
County Correctional Facility, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
BAIL

Clynch v. Chapman, 285 F.Supp.2d 213 (D.Conn. 2003). An arrestee filed a § 1983 action arising
from his arrest for driving under the influence. The district court granted summary judgment for
the defendants, in part. The court held that city police officers' roles in setting the arrestee's bail
were functionally comparable to that of a judge, and that the officers were entitled to absolute
immunity from liability, even if they did not consider individualized circumstances. Under state
law, officers were required to attempt to conduct an interview with the arrestee to obtain
information relevant to the terms and conditions of his release from custody, before setting bail.
The arrestee was a 69-year-old man who had lived his entire life in the same house, who was
charged with Driving Under the Influence. He was taken to a police station where he was
detained in a holding cell. The police officer ordered him held on a $500 surety bond and set a
court date. (City of Derby, Connecticut)

U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE

Coleman Ex Rel. Coleman v. Parkman, 349 F.3d 534 (8th Cir. 2003). The administratix of a
pretrial detainee's estate brought an action, alleging that prison officials had been deliberately
indifferent to the risk that the detainee would commit suicide. The district court granted
summary judgment for the defendants in part, and the parties appealed. The appeals court
affirmed in part and dismissed in part. The appeals court held that summary judgment was
precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the arresting officer knew that the
detainee presented a substantial suicide risk, and whether a jailer recklessly failed to take
reasonable measures. The arresting officer had been told by someone who was with the detainee
before his arrest, that the detainee had been carrying a rifle and threatening suicide. After
interviewing the detainee, the officer concluded he was not a suicide risk. Jail records stated that
the detainee had threatened suicide and needed to be placed in isolation and monitored. The
detainee was placed in the jail's drunk tank, instead of the holding cell that was usually used for
suicidal inmates. The drunk tank had eighteen exposed bars, while the holding cell had none. The
drunk tank was difficult to observe because it was upstairs in the jail, unlike the holding tank.
Because the detainee was assigned to the drunk tank, and in spite of his being on a suicide watch,
an officer issued the detainee the usual items, including a bed sheet. The officer checked on the
detainee at 1:30 a.m.; the detainee was found hanging from the exposed bars by a bed sheet at
1:42 a.m. (St. Francis County Jail, Arkansas)

U.S. Appeals Court
PROTECTION

Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352 (11th Cir. 2003). The personal representative of the estate ofa
pretrial detainee who was killed by a mentally-ill co-inmate, brought a § 1983 action. The district
court denied qualified immunity for the defendants and they appealed. The appeals court affirmed
in part and reversed in part. The appeals court held that officers were not entitled to qualified
immunity because they failed to monitor a known violent inmate that was housed in a unit for
mentally ill inmates. The court held that supervisory officials were entitled to qualified immunity
from § 1983 liability for their failure to train and supervise officers on duty at the time of the
murder, absent an allegation of a constitutional violation on their part. (North Broward Detention
Center, Florida)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE

Crocker v. County of Macomb, 285 F.Supp.2d 971 (E.D.Mich. 2003). The personal representative
of the estate of deceased arrestee brought a § 1983 action against a county and officials, alleging
they were deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of the inmate, who committee
suicide in a holding cell. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding

32.104

that the arrestee did not demonstrate a strong likelihood of taking his own life, as required to
trigger a due process right to reasonable protection. The arrestee was brought to the county jail on
an outstanding warrant. The admitting officer noted that the arrestee smelled like alcohol but
saw that he was able to walk and talk without difficulty, remember telephone numbers, and use
the telephone. The arrestee was placed in a holding cell with a telephone where he made more
than twenty calls during the two hours he was held. He was discovered hanging from the
telephone cord approximately two hours after he was admitted. The court noted that the
arrestee's behavior while confined indicated an awareness of the present and a concern for the
future, indicative of a person wanting to live, not die. <Macomb County Jail, Michigan)
U.S. District Court
MENTAL HEALTH
ADA· Americans with
Disabilities Act

Disability Advocates, Inc. v. McMahon, 279 F.Supp.2d 158 (N.D.N.Y. 2003). An advocacy group for
disabled persons, and an individual subjected to a mental hygiene pickup, brought an action
under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act, alleging that the
state criminalized mental hygiene pickups by treating or labeling them as arrests, thereby
discriminating against persons with mental disabilities. The district court granted summary
judgment for the defendants. The court held that the custodial detention of a mentally ill person
constituted an "arrest" but that the detention did not violate due process. The court found that an
individual taken into custody in connection with a mental hygiene pickup was not stigmatized by
reason of her disability in violation of ADA or the Rehabilitation Act, where police acted because
the individual appeared to be mentally ill and was acting in a manner that was likely to result in
serious harm to herself or to others. (New York State Police)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Dodge v. County of Orange, 282~.Supp.2d 41 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). A suit sought a permanent
injunction against a county jail's policy of strip searching newly arrived pretrial detainees upon
their initial admission. The dist ct court held that the policy, in its initial form and in two
subsequent revisions, violated t Fourth Amendment to the extent that it allowed a strip search
without individualized reasonab suspicion that a detainee was carrying contraband. The court
granted a permanent injunction gainst the unconstitutional aspects of the policy. The banned
policy allowed strip searches for factors such as being a known gang member or having prior
escape charges. (Orange County Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
USE OF FORCE

Eberle v. City of Newton, 289 F.Supp.2d 1269 (D.Kan. 2003). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action
against a city and city officials and staff, alleging that she was subjected to excessive force while
in police custody. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, in
spite of finding violations, because the arrestee had signed a waiver of all civil rights claims. The
court found that an officer's use of violence against the arrestee during questioning at a police
station violated the arrestee's clearly established right to be free from excessive force, and that
the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity. The arrestee had attempted to leave an
interrogation room and the officer grabbed her by the arm, throwing her in the direction of a chair
and causing her to fall, and then the officer kicked the arrestee even though she posed no threat
to him. (City of Newton Police Department, Kansas)

U.S. District Court
LENGTH

Edwards v. Oberndorf, 309 F.Supp.2d 780 (E.D.Va. 2003). A driver arrested for driving under the
influence challenged his detention. The district court dismissed the action, finding that housing
the driver in a holding cell for a minimal period of time following the first court's order for the
inmate's release, while the sheriff's department checked on whether a detainer was still lodged by
a second court, did not violate due process. The court noted that the detainee was held for less
than 20 hours and there was no evidence of negligence or malice. (Virginia Beach City Jail, VA)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Engelleiter v. Brevard County Sheriffs Dept., 290 F.Supp.2d 1300 (M.D.Fla. 2003). A pretrial
detainee who as an insulin-dependent diabetic brought a civil rights action against a county
sheriff's department, claiming deliberate indifference to his serious medical condition. The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of the department. The court held that even if jail
officials were deliberately indifferent to the detainee's serious medical condition by giving him
only one shot of insulin during a period of approximately 48 hours, the detainee did not establish
the existence of a "policy or custom" based on treatment decisions by the department or the jail
nurses. (Brevard County Detention Center, Florida)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Estate of Allen v. City of Rockford, 349 F.3d 1015 (7th Cir. 2003). A pretrial detainee sued a city
and several police officers under § 1983, alleging due process violations stemming from unwanted
medical treatment received at a hospital following her arrest for driving under the influence of
drugs. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The appeals court
affirmed. The appeals court held that the officers owed the detainee a duty of care and safety
during the time that the detainee was at the hospital, and that the officers' failure to intervene
with the forcible medical treatment of the detainee did not violate her due process rights. The
officers had taken the detainee to a hospital for the purpose of obtaining a urine sample. An
emergency room physician stated that the detainee was not competent to make medical decisions
regarding her health and might suffer a potentially life-threatening drug overdose if a drug screen
was not conducted. The officers did not prevent the forcible extraction of blood and urine samples.
(City of Rockford, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Gaines v. Choctaw County Com'n., 242 F.Supp.2d 1153 (S.D.Ala. 2003). Administrators of a
deceased inmate's estate asserted state and federal law claims against a sheriff and county,
32.105

alleging that the inmate's death resulted from the denial of medical treatment while the
inmate was a pretrial detainee in a county jail. The district court held that the county could not be
held liable for any alleged lack of training or supervision of the sheriff, or sheriffs employees. The
court found that allegations failed to support a claim against the county based on its statutory
duty to maintain a jail, but that the allegations supported a claim against the county for an
alleged breach of duty to fund medical care, where the alleged failure to provide adequate funding
to meet the medical needs of inmates supported a claim for deliberate indifference under § 1983.
The court noted that although the county did not have a duty to appoint a physician, but merely
had the authority to do so, the county had the authority to act and its failure to do so could be
construed as a county policy. The court held that the allegations stated a § 1983 claim under the
Fourteenth Amendment against the sheriff in his individual capacity, based on his direct
participation. The sheriff allegedly removed the inmate from the hospital against medical advice,
failed to provide adequate treatment during his subsequent incarceration, and refused to readmit
the inmate to the hospital. At the time of his arrest, the inmate was a patient at an infirmary
where he was being treated for acute renal failure and pneumonia. The sheriff personally removed
the inmate from the hospital, over the strenuous objections of the inmate's physician. He was
placed in jail, where his condition deteriorated to the point that he was unable to walk or to feed
himself. His family found him in worsening condition during their visits and eventually paid other
inmates to help bathe and feed the inmate. Jail staff allegedly refused to administer prescription
medication because, according to the family, the Sheriffs policies did not require them to do so.
The she.riff finally took the inmate to a nearby medical clinic where the treating physician
recommended that the inmate be hospitalized, but the sheriff refused. The family contacted the
state human resources agency, which intervened and caused the inmate to be admitted to the
hospital. Upon admission, he was found to be dehydrated and malnourished and his illness had
become irreversible; he died a few days later. The court held that the alleged conduct of the county
in failing to equip the jail with audiovisual equipment to monitor inmates failed to support a claim
against the county, absent an allegation that the failure caused, or in any way contributed to, the
inmate's death. (Choctaw County Jail, Alabama)
U.S. District Court
SUICIDE

Gray v. Tunica County, Mississippi, 279 F.Supp.2d 789 (N.D.Miss. 2003). The estate of a jail
inmate and his relatives brought a suit against a county and a jailer, alleging federal civil rights
claims and state law claims. The inmate had committed suicide in a jail holding cell. The district
court granted summary judgment, in part, for the defendants. The court held that the county had
no civil rights liability for jail conditions or policies related to the suicide of the pretrial detainee
who was placed in a new "lunacy" cell under a suicide watch. The detainee apparently managed to
strangle himself with a ripped·off piece of his jail jumpsuit. The court found that the holding cell
was new and safe and that the method of suicide was unforeseeable. The court noted that it was
doubtful that the detainee could have been helped, even if a jailer had entered the cell
immediately upon noticing that the detainee had removed his jumpsuit and was lying nude in a
peculiar position. According to the court, the jail policies involving intermittent checks were
reasonably related to the legitimate purpose of protecting inmates from harm. The jailer had
decided to finish feeding other inmates before he returned to check on the welfare of the detainee
in the holding cell. The detainee had been checked about an hour after being placed in the new
holding cell, and the jailer returned 30 minutes later to discover the detainee unconscious in the
cell. (Tunica County Jail, Mississippi)

U.S. District Court
INITIAL APPEARANCE

Hayes v. Faulkner County, Ark., 285 F.Supp.2d 1132 (E.D.A.rk. 2003). An arrestee brought a§
1983 action against a county, sheriff and jail administrator, complaining of his long detention
prior to an initial court appearance. The district court entered judgment in favor of the arrestee,
finding that the county's detention policy was deliberately indifferent to the arrestee's
constitutional rights. The court held that the sheriff did not possess the requisite level of personal
knowledge to be individually liable, but that the jail administrator was not entitled to qualified
immunity. The sheriff and jail administrator were responsible for the policy under which the
she.riffs office submitted the names of those confined in jail to the court, and then waited for the
court to schedule a hearing. The policy resulted in a 38-day delay for the arrestee, in violation of
his Fourth Amendment right to a judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to
extended restraint of liberty following arrest. The court held that it would enter an order
awarding compensatory damages and attorney fees and costs, if the parties were unable to settle
the amounts between them. The court found that the arrestee was entitled to compensatory
damages because his reputation in the community was compromised as the result of his
confinement, he suffered mental anguish, emotional distress and physical pain while incarcerated,
and he was financially injured when his home and property were left unattended for the 38 days
he was confined. The arrestee had been brought to the jail when two outstanding warrants were
discovered during a traffic stop. (Faulkner County Detention Center, Arkansas)

U.S. District Court
JUVENILES

Hedgepeth v. Washington Metro. Area Transit. 284 F.Supp.2d 145 (D.D.C. 2003). The mother of a
12-year-old girl who was arrested for eating a french fry in a rail transit station. brought a § 1983
action alleging equal protection and other violations. The district court entered judgment for the
defendants. The court held that the city's "no citation" policy for juvenile offenses did not violate
the daughter's equal protection rights. Adult violators were able to be released with a citation,
while the law required juveniles to be arrested and detained. The 12-year-old ate one french fry in
a transit station and she was arrested. The transit police officer searched the girl and her
possessions and handcuffed her behind her back. The handcuffs remained on until she was
32.106

released from the juvenile processing station several hours later. (Juvenile Processing Center,
D.C.)
U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS

Jimenez v. New Jersey. 245 F.Supp.2d 584 (D.N.J. 2003). An arrestee whose charges were
subsequently dropped, brought a state court action alleging violation of his constitutional rights
and various state court claims. The case was removed to the federal district court, where it was
dismissed. The district court held that the arrestee had no due process right to pre·trial DNA
testing, and therefore officers could not be held liable under § 1983. The arrestee had been held
for 22 months, during which time he asked for DNA testing, asserting it would prove him innocent
of the charges. (Atlantic County, New Jersey)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Joseph Ex Rel. Estate of Harbin v. City of Detroit, 289 F.Supp.2d 863 (E.D.Mich. 2003). The
personal representative of the estate of an arrestee brought a § 1983 action in state court, alleging
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The representative alleged that jailers
delayed attending to the arrestee when he repeatedly complained of chest pain. The arrestee was
eventually taken to a hospital where he died 12 hours later. The district court granted summary
judgment for the defendants, finding that the police department's alleged five·hour delay in
taking the arrestee to the hospital did not rise to the level of an objective, serious harm. The court
noted that there was no evidence that any officer actually perceived, or knew of, a substantial risk
of serious harm, nor that his death could have been avoided if he had received more prompt
medical treatment. (Sixth Precinct Station House, Detroit Police Department, Michigan)

U.S. Appeals Court
USEOFFORCE
MEDICAL CARE

Lolli v. County of Orange, 351 F.3d 410 (9th Cir. 2003). A pretrial detainee filed a§ 1983 action
alleging the use of excessive force, and deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The
district court entered judgment in favor of the defendants. The appeals court affirmed in part, and
reversed in part and remanded. The appeals court held that there were genuine issues of material
fact, precluding summary judgment, as to whether sheriff's department officers were aware that
the detainee was diabetic and was showing signs of a ketoacidic condition, but failed to provide
him with food. The court also held that summary judgment was precluded on the issue of whether
sheriff's department officers employed excessive force against the detainee. The detainee claimed
that a deputy grabbed him and pulled him to the ground and that several deputies then kicked
him, punched him, hit him with batons or similar objects, twisted his arms and legs, poked his
face, knuckled his ear, and pepper sprayed him. The detainee had been arrested for an
outstanding warrant on an unpaid parking ticket. The detainee told the arresting officer that he
was diabetic and needed to eat as soon as possible. Upon admission to the jail the detainee's blood
was tested and a nurse told him that he would receive food promptly. The nurse's records
indicated that the detainee was not combative, verbally abusive, or agitated at intake. (Orange
County Men's Jail, California)

U.S. Appeals Court

Lumley v. City of Dade City, Fla., 327 F.3d 1186 (11th Cir. 2003). An arrestee who was wounded
in a shoot·out brought a suit against police officials. The district court granted summary judgment
in favor of the defendants on the arrestee's Sixth Amendment claim. but rejected their qualified
immunity defense, and both sides appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed in
part. The court held that a law enforcement officer's decision while he was present in the hospital
watching the arrestee as he awaited surgery for a bullet wound, that the arrestee should be
strapped to the hospital bed in order to minimize the risk of flight. did not rise to the level of a
substantive due process violation. The court found that the officers who took no part in a doctor's
decision to remove a bullet from the arrestee's jaw but not to treat a fracture of his right cheek
bone, could not be held vicariously liable for the doctor's conduct. (Dade City Police Dept., Florida)

MEDICAL CARE

RESTRAINTS

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Lynn v. O'Leary. 264 F.Supp.2d 306 (D.Md. 2003). An arrestee sued state prison officials, alleging
that he was subjected to an unlawful arrest, excessive force, and an illegal cavity search. The
district court granted summary judgment for the defendants in part, and denied it in part. The
court held that officials were not entitled to governmental official immunity. under state law, in
light of allegations that the officials acted with malice or were grossly negligent when they
allegedly searched the arrestee's cavities while he was attempting to visit his son, after the
officials informed the arrestee that a drug dog had falsely alerted on him. The arrestee had
arrived at a state prison with his wife. intending to visit his son who was an inmate. While he was
waiting to be admitted to the visiting area, a search dog was brought into the area and canvassed
the room on a long leash. The dog gave a positive alert for drugs and the arrestee was subjected to
a pat down search and his visitor locker was searched. No drugs were found on his person or in his
locker and he was told that the dog had made a false alert. But he was not allowed to visit. and
waited in lobby while his wife visited their son. After the visit prison officials ordered the arrestee
into a side room where his wife heard him scream in pain. He informed the officials that he
suffered from a medical condition. He was informed that he was under arrest and that he would
be subjected to a strip and body cavity search, and the arrestee demanded that a warrant be
produced. His clothes were forcibly removed and no contraband was found. $2,000 was taken from
his wallet and divided among the prison officials. His person was then searched, including a body
cavity examination. While he was dressing after the search one officer jerked up the arrestee's left
leg. causing him to fall off a chair and hit his head against a wall, and he was knocked
unconscious. He was taken to a hospital where he was found to be suffering from a contusion to
his brain. and injury to his back, shoulder and arm. He was permanently banned from visiting his
son. (Maryland House of Corrections Annex, Jessup, Maryland)
32.107

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Mace v. City of Palestine, 333 F.3d 621 (5th Cir. 2003). The estate of a suspect who was fatally
injured during a standoff with police officers brought a§ 1983 action. The district court granted
summary judgment for the defendants and the estate appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The
court held that a police chiefs decision to require an officer to drive an ambulance, so that both
medical personnel could attend to the wounded suspect during the drive to the hospital, did not
violate the suspect's due process right to medical care. The court noted that the suspect
subsequently died at the hospital and the driving arrangement had caused a delay at the arrest
scene, but found that there was no evidence that the chief was deliberately indifferent to the
suspect's medical needs. (City of Palestine, Texas)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
SANITATION

Mitchell v. Newryder, 245 F.Supp.2d 200 CD.Me. 2003). A detainee brought a § 1983 action against
a county jail officer, alleging permanent traumatization as a result of being made to sit in his feces
for five hours after his repeated requests to use a toilet were denied by the officer. The district
court denied the officer's motion to dismiss. The court found that the detainee sufficiently alleged
that he was denied a minimum civilized measure of life's necessity and that the officer had a
culpable state of mind. The court held that the detainee could not seek compensatory damages
absent an actual physical injury. The court agreed to consider the detainee's request for injunctive
relief, barring further interference with his rights by the officer. The detainee alleged that the
officer refused to allow him to use a toilet and then refused to let him clean himself up for five
hours after he defecated in his pants. According to the detainee, the officer displayed hostility
towards him during his denial, using insulting and offensive language and expressions. The
detainee had been placed in a cell without a toilet, mattress or blanket, upon his admission to the
jail. He was not being punished for anything but he was purposefully being separated from other
inmates. The detainee alleged that he was not intoxicated, nor did he act disrespectfully.
<Aroostook County Jail, Maine)

U.S. District Court
USE OF FORCE
MEDICAL CARE

Mladek v. Day, 293 F.Supp.2d 1297 (M.D.Ga. 2003). An arrestee brought a suit against county
officials alleging they violated his Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights when they
used excessive force during and after his arrest, and when they denied him medical attention as a
pretrial detainee. The district court dismissed the suit in part, and denied dismissal in part. The
court held that allegations that a deputy violently handcuffed the arrestee with no justification,
and that the handcuffing caused physical injury to the arrestee, were sufficient to state an
excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment. The court held that the alleged denial of
medical attention for the detainee's injuries during the one day he was detained was insufficient
to assert a constitutional violation. (Walton County, Georgia)

U.S. District Court
PROTECTION
SEPARATION

Mooring v. San Francisco Sheriffs Dept., 289 F.Supp.2d 1110 (N.D.Cal. 2003). A county jail
inmate brought a pro se § 1983 action alleging deliberate indifference to his safety when he was
housed unwillingly with gang rivals who assaulted him. The court granted summary judgment for
the defendants. The court held that a deputy sheriff did not violate the inmate's due process right
to protection from violence, absent any evidence that the deputy knew the inmate's particular
gang atrtliation or that the deputy could have learned the inmate's gang affiliation from
information on the inmate's housing records. (San Francisco County Jail, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Natale v. Camden County Correctional Facility. 318 F.3d 575 (3rd Cir. 2003). A detainee who was
an insulin-dependent diabetic, brought claims under§ 1981 and § 1983 in state court, alleging
that he suffered a stroke due to a delay in the administration of insulin during his first twenty·
one hours of incarceration. The case was removed to federal court, where summary judgment was
granted to the defendants. The detainee appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded,
finding that fact questions precluded summary judgment on the detainee's claim that his right to
adequate medical care was violated, and to whether the actions of private prison health service
employees could be attributed to their employer. The court noted that the employees failed to call
the detainee's treating physician to determine how often he needed insulin, and that they did not
even ask the detainee. (Camden County Correctional Facility, Prison Health Services, Inc., New
Jersey)

U.S. District Court
RELIGION
SEARCH

Omar v. Casterline, 288 F.Supp.2d 775 (W .D.La. 2003). A detainee brought a Bivens suit alleging
that federal prison officials subjected him to an unconstitutional search and failed to
accommodate his religious needs. The district court held that a body cavity search conducted upon
the detainee's arrival at a federal institution did not violate the Fourth Amendment, even though
a female officer was present and officers allegedly ridiculed the detainee during the search. The
district court denied summary judgment for the defendants on the detainee's religious claims. The
detainee alleged that he informed the facility chaplain about his dietary restrictions, was served
pork, could not see a clock from his cell, and was misinformed about the starting date of Ramadan.
(United States Penitentiary, Pollock, Louisiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
PROTECTION

Palmer v. Marion County. 327 F.3d 588 (7th Cir. 2003). A pretrial detainee who was severely
beaten by other inmates at a county jail, brought a § 1983 claim alleging deliberate indifference to
his safety and failure to properly train and supervise jail officials. The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the appeals court affirmed. The appeals court
held that the detainee's affidavit that stated he personally observed the county jail's practices of
segregating inmates by race, placing gang members with non-gang members, not segregating
inmates who feel threatened, and not intervening to stop inmate·on·inmate violence in cell blocks
32.108

occupied predominantly by non-white inmates, was insufficient to show that the county had either
a widespread practice of allowing jail inmates to fight or segregating them by race. <Marion
County Jail, Indiana)
U.S. District Court
STRIP SEARCH
MEDICAL CARE
USE OF FORCE

Perkins v. Brown, 285 F.Supp.2d 279 (E.D.N.Y. 2003). An inmate brought a prose§ 1983 action
alleging use of excessive force by colll."ections officers and failure to provide medical care. The
district court held that the inmate would be treated as a pretrial detainee. The court granted
summary judgment in favor of the officers. The court held that the officers did not use excessive
force against the detainee when they forcibly undressed and searched him in a courthouse holding
cell. The court found that the detainee's injuries were minor and noted that he was taken to the
courthouse infirmary immediately after he was injured. (New York City Department of
Correction, Brooklyn Criminal Courthouse)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Richardson v. Nassau County, 277 F.Supp.2d 196 (E.D.N.Y. 2003). A jail inmate sued a county
and sheriff, alleging deliberate indifference to his glaucoma condition. The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of a jail nurse, sheriff, and county. The court denied summary
judgment for medical officials, finding that it was precluded by fact issues as to whether the
worsening of the glaucoma condition could be the result of the withdrawal of medication. The
inmate alleged that there was a 51-day delay in the provision of an eye exam and the resumption
of his medication. (Nassau County Correctional Center, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
ACCESS TO COURT
TRANSPORT

Simmons v. Sacramento County Superior Court, 318 F.3d 1156 (9th Cir. 2003). A state prisoner
brought a§ 1983 action after a default judgment was issued against him in a civil personal injury
action because he failed to appear due to his detention in jail on an unrelated criminal action. The
district court dismissed the case and the appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that a
sherifrs refusal to transport the pretrial detainee from a jail to a courthouse for his civil personal
injury trial did not violate the prisoner's due process right of access to courts. The court noted that
the detainee did not claim that the sheriff's failure to transport him was intended to punish him,
and the court found that punitive intent could not be inferred. The court held that the sherift's
refusal was rationally related to a legitimate penological interest in keeping detainees in jail
unless absolutely necessary. (Sacramento County Jail, California)

U.S. District Court
STRIP SEARCH

Thomas v. City of Clanton, 285 F.Supp.2d 1275 (M.D.Ala. 2003). A detainee brought a§ 1983
action alleging that he was subjected to an unconstitutional strip search, and that he had been
subjected to sexual harassment while confined. The district court granted summary judgment in
favor of the defendants. The court held that the strip search violated the detainee's Fourth
Amendment rights, but that officials were not liable for the unwarranted strip search conducted
by an officer. The court also held that a single complaint of sexual misconduct against an officer
did not put the police department on notice of the need for increased supervision of the officer. The
detainee was a passenger in a car in which marijuana was found, but the driver's wife had told
the arresting officer that the marijuana belonged to the driver. There was no reasonable suspicion
that the detainee was concealing a weapon, but he was subjected to a strip search anyway. The
detainee had been taken to the police station where he was never booked, but was subjected to a
strip search that was conducted in a bathroom. The detainee was then taken to the officer's home
where the officer discussed oral sex. The detainee fled from the officer's home. The court noted
that the officer's violation of the detainee's rights was deliberate, and that no amount of training
would have prevented the violation. The court also noted that the police chief had attempted to
investigate an earlier complaint of sexual misconduct lodged against the officer. (City of Clanton,
Alabama)

U.S. District Court
DISCIPLINE
PUNISHMENT
PRE-SENTENCE
DETENTION

Tilmon v. Prator, 292 F.Supp.2d 898 (W.D.La. 2003). A state inmate who was held in a county jail
awaiting sentencing filed a § 1983 action, alleging civil rights violations when he was punished for
possessing contraband in his cell. The district court dismissed the complaint and the inmate
appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. On remand, the district court dismissed the
action, finding that the inmate who had been convicted, but not yet sentenced, was not entitled to
a hearing before being punished. The court held that the inmate had no liberty interest in not
being placed in disciplinary segregation, and was therefore not entitled under the Due Process
Clause to a hearing before such placement. The inmate was punished for possessing contraband in
his cell. His punishment included eight hours confinement in a punitive cell, loss of telephone
privileges, loss of visitation privileges, and loss of recreation privileges. (Caddo Correctional
Center, Shreveport, Louisiana)

U.S. District Court
CLASSIFICATION
GOOD TIME

Torres v. Stewart, 263 F.Supp.2d 463 (D.Conn. 2003). A state inmate sued prison officials, alleging
that as a pretrial detainee he was designated as a security risk without a hearing, and confined in
segregation in violation of his due process rights. The inmate sought damages and the restoration
of forfeited good time credits. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the
defendants. The court held that the inmate's request for restoration of good time credits was not
cognizable under§ 1983, and that as a pretrial detainee, he had not protected liberty interest in
his classification. The court noted that the classification was not punishment proscribed by due
process principles. The detainee had received a notice of his hearing two days prior to its
scheduled date, declined to present witnesses, declined the assistance of an advocate, admitted to
being a soldier for a gang, was identified as a regional commander in the gang, and had been
arrested for the murder of a rival gang member. (Northern Correctional Institution, Connecticut)
32.109

U.S. Appeals Court
PRIVACY
TELEPHONE

U.S. v. Gangi, 57 Fed.Appx. 809 (10th Cir. 2003) [unpublished]. A defendant who was convicted
for bank fraud challenged the taping of his jail telephone calls. The appeals court held that it was
not objectively reasonable for the detainee to have any expectation of privacy in his outgoing calls
from jail, and that the detainee impliedly consented to the taping of his calls from jail. The court
noted that the detainee was cognizant of detention settings, which permitted a strong inference
that he fully understood the fact that jail telephones were monitored. According to the court, the
detainee was a "keen observer of detail" and was presumed to have seen signs above other
telephones that provided notice of telephone monitoring. The court held that the Fourth
Amendment is not triggered by the routine taping of outgoing jail calls. (Uinta Co. Det. Ctr.,
Wyoming)

U.S. District Court
TELEPHONE
PRIVACY

U.S. v. Roy, 349 F.Supp.2d 60 (D.Mass. 2003). A detainee charged with drug, firearms and witness
tampering offenses moved to suppress the contents of his telephone conversations that were
recorded when he was in custody. The district court denied the motion, finding that the detainee
impliedly consented to the recording of his telephone conversations because he was informed that
his calls were subject to monitoring and recording, he chose to proceed with the conversations,
and those to whom the defendant made the calls expressly consented to participate in possiblyrecorded telephone conversations. (Worcester County House of Corrections, Massachusetts)

U.S. Appeals Court
USE OF FORCE

Walters v. County of Charleston, 63 Fed.Appx. 116 (4th Cir. 2003) [unpublished]. The personal
representative of a detainee who died in custody brought a § 1983 action, alleging that the
detainee's death was the result of officers' use of excessive force. The district court entered
summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the plaintiff appealed. The appeals court
affirmed, finding that the officers' use of force in restraining the detainee was not excessive, even
though the detainee died as the result of a compression injury to his neck sustained while officers
attempted to subdue him. The court noted that the detainee was an exceptionally large man who
became violent while in his cell and after he was let out of his cell, and that there was no evidence
that the officers intentionally choked the detainee. The detainee had been housed in a temporary
detention facility pursuant to a civil contempt order of a family court, for refusing to pay back
child support. (Charleston County Detention Center, South Carolina)

U.S. Appeals Court
STRIP SEARCH
UNLAWFUL
DETENTION

Williams v. Kaufman County. 352 F.3d 994 (5th Cir. 2003). Detainees brought a § 1983 action
against a sheriff and county, alleging violation of their civil rights during the execution of a search
warrant at a night club. The district court entered judgment against the defendants and they
appealed. The appeals court held that the strip searches of the detainees were unlawful, absent
individualized suspicion or probable cause, and that the law on this matter was clearly
established at the time of the searches. The court found that the prolonged detention of the
detainees was unlawful, but that the law was not clearly established at the time of the detention
and the district court had properly granted qualified immunity to the defendants on the unlawful
detention claims. The court held that the detainees established the county's municipal liability for
their strip search and detention, and that the district court did not err in imposing nominal
damages of $100 per plaintiff. The searches and detention were conducted according to a sheriff
department's unwritten policy for executing "hazardous" warrants, according to the court. The
appeals court found that the record supported the district court's conclusion that the sheriff acted
with reckless indifference toward the plaintiffs' constitutional rights, justifying an award of
punitive damages, and held that punitive damage awards of $15,000 per plaintiff were not
excessive. The plaintiffs had been held for three hours and were subjected to highly intrusive strip
searches, and the sheriff kept the plaintiffs handcuffed after they had been searched and no
weapons or contraband had been found. (Kaufman County, Texas)

U.S. District Court
SEARCH

Wood v. Hancock County, 245 F.Supp.2d 231 (D.Me. 2003). A misdemeanor arrestee brought a
civil rights action against a county and county officials, alleging he was subjected to
unconstitutional strip searches while in jail. The district court denied the defendants' motions for
judgment on the pleadings or for summary judgment. The court held that the arrestee stated a
claim, precluding judgment on the pleadings. The court found that summary judgment was
precluded by genuine issues of fact as to whether the jail policy of strip searching misdemeanor
arrestees after contact visits was reasonable, and whether the jail had a custom of conducting
strip searches upon admission. The court noted that further proceedings were needed to
determine if it was a "custom" to strip search misdemeanor arrestees without reasonable
suspicion that an arrestee harbored contraband or weapons, and that evidence suggested that
officers did not comply with recording requirements for strip searches. (Hancock Co. Jail, Maine)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCH

Wood v. Hancock County Sheriff's Dept., 354 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 2003). A jail inmate sought
damages under § 1983, alleging he was unconstitutionally strip searched on three separate
occasions by correctional officers. The district court entered judgment in favor of the defendants
and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for a
partial new trial. The appeals court held that a jury instruction that incorrectly defined a strip
search, improperly limited the jury's deliberations on the nature of the searches of the
misdemeanor detainee. The court found the district court's use of the term "deliberate," when
describing a strip search, unduly directed the jurors to the officers' subjective intent, and that
other elements of the definition (scrutiny of the mouth and armpits) were not prerequisites for
finding that a strip search took place. The court noted that an individual detained on a
misdemeanor charge may only be strip searched as part of the booking process if officers have
32.110

reasonable suspicion that he is either armed or carrying contraband. According to the court, a
blanket policy of strip-searching inmates after contact visits is constitutional, except in atypical
circumstances. (Hancock County Jail, Maine)

2004
U.S. District Court
SPEEDY TRIAL
CONDITIONS
DUE PROCESS

Atwood v. Vilsack, 338 F.Supp.2d 985 (S.D.Iowa 2004). Pretrial detainees who were awaiting
hearings on their sexually violent predator (SVP) petitions, brought a class action against a state
corrections department alleging denial of speedy justice. The district court granted summary
judgment for the defendants in part and denied it in part. The court held that the failure of the
co1Tections department to initiate proceedings for civil commitment of sexually violent predators
until immediately prior to discharge of their criminal sentences did not violate their speedy trial
rights, because the department was under no duty to minimize time in custody by ensuring that
commitment proceedings overlapped substantially with criminal incarceration. The court found
that a seven·month average time for trying an SVP case after appointment of defense counsel was
not presumptively prejudicial. According to the court, a civil commitment candidate does not have
a speedy trial right, until such time as he is identified by the statutory process to be a candidate
for commitment. The court held that even though the SVP Act stated that the purpose of pretrial
detention was for evaluation, and the detainees were held for periods exceeding the time needed
for evaluation, the Act also provided for a safekeeping component. The court concluded that denial
of bail for the detainees did not violate their due process rights, where the detention was premised
upon a judge's probable cause finding and a determination of mental abnormality and
dangerousness was made at the outset of confinement. The court held that the conditions of the
detainees' confinement violated their due process rights because the conditions were not
reasonably related to the government's objective of preventing them from harming themselves or
others. The detainees were kept in lockdown the majority of the day, denied reasonable access to
visitors, telephones, educational programming,.mental health treatment, recreation, exercise,
religious services, medical care, and hygiene. The court noted that when the detainees' conditions
are harsher than the conditions of criminal inmates, due process cannot be satisfied unless the
conditions are reasonably related to the purpose of confinement. The court found that the
implementation of the act, which resulted in an additional period of "dead time" incarceration,
violated the double jeopardy rights of detainees who had previously served criminal sentences.
(Iowa Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
RELEASE
BAIL

Barham v. Ramsey, 338 F.Supp.2d 48 (D.D.C. 2004). Persons who were arrested during a
demonstration at the World Bank in Washington, D.C., brought a § 1983 action alleging that their
arrests and detentions violated their constitutional rights. The district court dismissed the action,
in part. The court held that failure to provide the arrestees with citation release, or a post and
trial release option, did not constitute a deprivation of due process or equal protection, even
though the arrestees were detained for a lengthy period. According to the court, the unavailability
of citation release was due to unintended technological failures, and there was no evidence that
the arrestees were treated differently than other groups of arrestees regarding the availability of
a post and trial release option. The court noted that there were incompatibility problems with the
cameras used to photograph arrestees and computer software. (Metropolitan Police Department,
Washington, D.C.)

U.S. Appeals Court
RELEASE

Bern: v. Baca, 379 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2004). In three separate actions, arrestees who had been
detained in a county jail for periods ranging from 26 to 29 hours after courts had authorized their
release following resolution of their charges, brought § 1983 claims against a county sheriff in his
official capacity. The district court consolidated the cases and dismissed them. The appeals court
reversed and remanded, finding that summary judgment was precluded by fact issues as to
whether the application of county policies which resulted in the detentions was unreasonable
under the circumstances and thus amounted to a policy of deliberate indifference to the arrestees'
constitutional rights. The court found that as a matter a law, a county's system of administrative
processing of jail inmates could not be immune from allegations that, in practice, it amounts to
deliberate indifference. (Los Angeles County SherifPs Department)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Blackmore v. Kalamazoo County, 390 F.3d 890 (6th Cir. 2004). A former detainee brought an
action under § 1983 asserting claims under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments for failure to
provide prompt medical treatment during his detention. The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the defendants, and the detainee appealed. The appeals court reversed and
remanded. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether the officials' delay in treatment posed a substantial risk of serious harm, where
the seriousness of the detainee's appendicitis could be discerned without competent medical proof,
and the detainee's manifestations of pain and injury during his detention were so obvious that
even a layperson could have easily recognized the necessity for a doctor's attention. The court also
found unresolved fact issues as to the officials' culpable state of mind, where the detainee had
complained of stomach pain within an hour of his arrest, and officials were aware that the
detainee was subsequently experiencing sharp abdominal pain and vomiting. The detainee
received no medical attention until more than 50 hours after his arrest. <Kalamazoo County Jail,
Michigan)

32.111

U.S. District Court
MENTAL HEALTH
ADA-Americans with
Disabilities Act

Bolden v. Stroger, 306 F.Supp.2d 792 (N.D.Ill. 2004). Pretrial detainees brought an action
challenging a county's policy of barring individuals with mental illness from various pre-release
programs, and its policy of discharging mentally ill individuals without providing them with
medication and referrals necessary to manage their illnesses. The district court dismissed the
action, finding that a court monitoring consent decree that had created pre-release programs at
the jail was the proper forum for claims regarding eligibility for the programs, and for challenging
the treatment of mentally ill detainees, even though the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
was not in existence at the time the decree was originally entered. (Cook County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
ACCESS TO COURT

Bourdon v. Loughren, 386 F.3d 88 (2 nd Cir. 2004). A pretrial detainee in a county jail who sought
replacement of his court-appointed attorney, brought a§ 1983 due process and equal protection
action against county officials. The detainee alleged denial of access to courts because he was
denied access to law library materials. The district court granted summary judgment for the
defendants, and the detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the detainee was
not denied access to the courts when he was allegedly denied materials from the jail law library,
because the detainee had unrestricted access to an attorney. The court noted that there was no
evidence of denial or restriction of the detainee's access to his attorney, and that he never
requested the same law library reference materials from his attorney. (Chenango County Jail,
New York)

U.S. District Court
ACCESS TO COURT

Brewster v. Nassau County, 349 F.Supp.2d 540 (E.D.N.Y. 2004). A detainee brought a§ 1983
action. The district court dismissed the complaint, finding that the detainee failed to state a §
1983 conspiracy claim against a legal aid society, which had sent three successive attorneys work
with the detainee. The court considered these to be state law malpractice claims and declined to
exercise jurisdiction. The court found that even if the detainee suffered all of the psychological
and emotional injuries that he alleged, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) precluded
recovery against corrections officials under§ 1983 because the detainee did not allege any
physical injury. (Nassau County Correctional Facility, and Nassau County Legal Aid Society, New
York)

U.S. District Court
BAIL
INITIAL APPEARANCE
SPEEDY TRIAL

Bunyan v. Burke County, 306 F.Supp.2d 1240 (S.D.Ga. 2004). A detainee brought a§ 1983 action
stemming from his arrest and the alleged refusal of jail authorities to release him on bail. The
court denied summary judgment for the defendants on the issue of whether the sheriffs
department failed to bring the detainee before a judicial officer within 72 hours after his arrest.
The court held that the sheriffs department contravened state statutes and violated the
detainee's procedural due process rights by refusing to release the detainee, despite his proffer of
sufficient funds to post the amount of bail that had been set. (Burke County Jail, Georgia)

U.S. District Court
RELIGION

Byar v. Lee, 336 F.Supp.2d 896 (W.D.Ark. 2004). A former county jail detainee filed an action
against a former county sheriff, alleging violations of her constitutional rights arising out of the
sheriffs promulgation of a set of detainee rules for the county jail. The district court held that the
rules, which were modeled on the Ten Commandments, were excessively and impermissibly
entangled with religion and constituted an endorsement or advancement of religion. The court
found that a sufficient nexus existed between the requirement that the detainee read, sign, and
agree to follow the rules and the imposition suffered by the detainee by having religious tenets
forced upon her in the guise of secular rules of behavior. The detainee alleged that she considered
it offensive to have the government direct her to obey particular religious tenets and she was
fearful that she might be perceived as violating the rules and therefore be disciplined. The court
denied the sheriff qualified immunity from liability, finding that he knew, or reasonably should
have known, that his actions violated the Establishment Clause. The court noted that the sheriff
had previously been sued about the rules and was given notice that posting the Ten
Commandments in any form would violate the Establishment Clause. The court found that the
use of the Ten Commandments as a model for detainee rules served no secular purpose and that
the primary effect of the rules was to advance religion. (Benton County Jail, Arkansas)

U.S. District Court
PROTECTION
SEPARATION

Carmichael v. Richards, 307 F.Supp.2d 1014 (S.D.Ind. 2004). A county jail prisoner who was
injured by his cellmate brought a§ 1983 action against a sheriff in his individual and official
capacities, claiming that the sheriff failed to take reasonable measures to ensure his physical
safety, and did not provide necessary medical care. The district court granted summary judgment
in favor of the defendants. The court held that the sheriff could not be held individually liable for
failing to ensure the physical safety of a medium security inmate who was injured by a maximum
security inmate, absent evidence that the sheriff knew of a substantial risk that the inmate would
be harmed, or evidence of a causal link between the policy of mixing of medium and maximum
security prisoners and the increased risk of violence. The court also found that the sheriff was not
liable in his official capacity. The jail had three types of cell classifications: maximum, medium
and minimum security. Inmates are classified by the shift leader who is on duty at the time an
inmate arrives at the jail. (Johnson County Jail, Indiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
LENGTH

Chortek v. City of Milwaukee, 356 F.3d 740 (7th Cir. 2004). Arrestees brought a§ 1983 action
alleging that their arrests for violating a ticket-scalping ordinance was a violation of their Fourth
Amendment rights. The district court entered judgment in favor of the defendants and the
appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the arrests were reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment and that the length of detention, from three to fourteen hours, was reasonable. The
32.112

court noted that the arrests were humiliating, that the arrestees were held in a police vehicle
until one·halfhour after the start time for the event, that they were subjected to body cavity
searches, prevented from making phone calls, and forced to share holding cells with other
prisoners. The court concluded that the arrestees were not subjected to more harmful treatment
than would be involved in a normal custodial arrest. Police officials explained that the detention
center to which the arrestees were taken was busy at the time of the arrests, supervisors were
required to monitor the booking process, and the arresting officers processed the paperwork as
quickly as possible. {Milwaukee Police Department, Wisconsin)
U.S. Appeals Court
TELEPHONE
CROWDING
CONDITIONS

Collins v. Ainsworth, 382 F.3d 529 (5th Cir. 2004). Persons who were detained at police license
check.points after a concert brought a civil rights action. The district court denied summary
judgment for the defendants and they appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in
part, and remanded. The appeals court held that even if the arrestees were detained without
phone calls or mattresses for a period of less than 24 hours in a crowded jail, such conditions
would be in the nature of a de minimis imposition that did not rise to a violation of the detainee's
due process rights. (Copiah County Jail, Mississippi)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Cooper v. Office of Sheriff of Will County, 333 F.Supp.2d 728 (N.D.Ill. 2004). A pretrial detainee's
surviving father brought an action against a county, sheriff, and deputies after his son died as the
result of an asthma attack while he was incarcerated. The district court held that state law did
not preclude the possibility of respondeat superior liability on the sheriff for a deputy's intentional
or willful conduct. According to the court, the father's allegations were sufficient to state a § 1983
claim against the deputies based on deliberate indifference to the detainee's serious medical
condition. The court noted that the central allegation in the complaint was that the deputies failed
to provide timely medical care and treatment to the detainee. The detainee had been placed in the
general population of the jail, and had previously had an asthma attack that required inhaler
medication. When -the detainee had a subsequent attack, he and other inmates informed deputies
on duty that immediate medical care was necessary, but the deputies failed to act in a timely
manner and the detainee died. (Will County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
SAFETY

Davis v. Reilly. 324 F.Supp.2d 361 (E.D.N.Y. 2004). A prisoner who was injured when he slipped
and fell on a wet floor outside of a shower area brought a pro se § 1983 action, alleging failure to
remedy the wet shower area and inadequate medical care. The district court dismissed the action.
The court held that the inmate failed to exhaust administrative remedies, and that the injuries
the inmate sustained did not constitute a serious medial condition. The inmate had sprained his
back and neck, and experienced pain in his left testicle. The court found that failure to provide
mats for the wet shower area did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. <Nassau
County Correctional Center, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
PRIVACY
PUNISHMENT

Demery v. Arpaio, 378 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004). Pretrial detainees brought an action seeking a
preliminary injunction to prevent a county sheriff from continuing to use world·wide web
cameras, or "webcams," to broadcast live images of the pretrial detainees on the Internet. The
district court granted the request for an injunction and the sheriff appealed. The appeals court
affirmed, finding that the use of webcams constituted punishment prior to adjudication of guilt, in
violation of the due process clause. According to the court, the detainees were harmed by having
every moment of their daily activities exposed to general and world·wide scrutiny,
notwithstanding the sheriff's claim that the webcams served purposes of deterrence and public
scrutiny. The appeals court held that the grant of the injunction did not violate the sheriff's First
Amendment free speech rights, where the webcam transmissions were not the sheriff's personal
communications, but rather constituted governmental speech since the sheriff could not have
obtained or transmitted the images absent his official position. The court noted that improving jail
security was not a legitimate alternative purpose for the webcams. <Maricopa County Madison
Street Jail, Arizona)

U.S. District Court

Galen v. County of Los Angeles, 322 F.Supp.2d 1045 (C.D.Cal. 2004). A detainee arrested for
domestic violence brought a § 1983 Eighth Amendment action alleging that bail of $1 million was
excessive. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court held
that bail of $1 million, enhanced from the $50,000 bail listed in the county's felony bail schedule,
was not excessive. The court noted that the alleged victim had both older and more recent
injuries, including a seven·inch laceration, and allegedly feared for her safety. The detainee was a
local attorney who had obtained bail within hours by paying $50,000 to post bond, and the option
of denying bail was unavailable under state law. (Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department,
California)

BAIL

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

George v. City of Wichita, 348 F.Supp.2d 1232 (D.Kan. 2004). An arrestee brought a§ 1983 action
against a city and a city detective alleging violations of his constitutional rights. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court held that the strip search to
which the arrestee was subjected after being arrested for a violent felony and booked into jail, did
not violate his Fourth Amendment or due process rights. There was no evidence that the arrestee
was subjected to anything beyond a visual examination or that he was intrusively touched by jail
officials as part of the search. The court noted that the search was apparently conducted in an
appropriate room and in an appropriate manner, and that the facility had a legitimate interest in
32.113

preventing detainees charged with violent felonies from bringing weapons or contraband into the
facility. (Sedgwick County Detention Facility, Kansas)
U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Ginest v. Board of County Com'rs. of Carbon County, 333 F.Supp.2d 1190 CD.Wyo. 2004). County
jail inmates brought a class action against a county and sheriff, alleging deliberate indifference to
the inmates' medical needs, and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Following the entry of a
consent decree governing medical care, the inmates sought a contempt order, alleging specific
violations of the decree's terms. The defendants moved to terminate the consent decree. The
district court held that the county was potentially liable, and the sheriff was potentially liable for
failure to train. The court found that the constitutional rights of the inmates were violated by
inadequate medical care and inadequate medical records at the jail, including lack of training in
suicide prevention. According to the court, jail medical records that are inadequate, inaccurate
and unprofessionally maintained are actionable under the Eighth Amendment. The court found
that many physician progress notes and other medical records were missing, there was no written
definition of a medical emergency requiring immediate care, there were numerous delays in
responding to inmate requests for medical care, there was no suicide prevention training nor
written policies, and potentially suicidal inmates were often isolated physically and provided with
little or no counseling. (Carbon County Jail, Wyoming)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE
FAILURE TO PROTECT

Graham ex rel. Estate v. County of Washtenaw, 358 F.3d 377 (6th Cir. 2004). The estate of an
arrestee, who died after secretly ingesting cocaine upon his arrest, brought a § 1983 action
alleging that a county policy regarding provision of medical care to prisoners in the county jail
contributed to the arrestee's death. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
county and the estate appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the county policy of
giving responsibility for the provision of medical care to its contractual medical provider, was not
the cause of the alleged unconstitutional denial of adequate medical care to the arrestee. The
court noted that even if the policy required jail personnel to defer all medical decisions to the
medical provider's employees, and even if the medical care received by the arrestee constituted
deliberate indifference, there was no showing that the county policy was the moving force behind
the violation. (Washtenaw County Jail, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
RELEASE

Green v. Baca, 306 F.Supp.2d 903 (C.D.Cal. 2004). An arrestee sued a county sheriff, seeking
damages for his alleged over-detention. The district court denied summary judgment for the
sheriff, in part. The court held that fact issues as to the reasonableness of a twelve and one·half
hour delay, between receipt of an order authorizing release of the arrestee and the execution of
the order, precluded summary judgment. The court found that Fourteenth Amendment due
process standards, rather than the Fourth Amendment search and seizure principles, governed
the question of whether the constitutional rights of the arrestee were violated when, following a
legal arrest for a parole violation, he was detained for several days after a hearing that ended
with a determination that he had not violated parole. (Los Angeles County Jail, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
USE OF FORCE
RESTRAINTS

Guerra v. Drake, 371 F.3d 404 (81h Cir. 2004). A pretrial detainee brought civil rights claims
seeking damages from correctional officers, alleging they used excessive force and left him in a
"restraint" chair for prolonged periods. The district court entered judgment against a Captain for
$1,500 on the restraint chair claim and against another officer for $500 on the excessive force
claim. The district court refused to award punitive damages and the detainee appealed. The
appeals court affirmed, finding that the district court's refusal to award punitive damages was not
an abuse of discretion. The inmate had alleged that during his first six days of detention he was
subjected to unprovoked beatings and was placed in a "torture chair" for long periods. (Benton
County Detention Center, Arkansas)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Hartsfield v. Colburn, 371 F.3d 454 (8th Cir. 2004). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action
asserting that jail personnel were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the detainee appealed. The appeals
court affirmed in part and reversed in part, finding that fact issues precluded summary judgment
on the deliberate indifference claim and whether a jail custom or policy contributed to the alleged
deliberate indifference. The jail personnel allegedly failed to arrange for dental treatment until
about six weeks after the detainee's written request for it, causing him to suffer further pain and
infection. (Scott County Jail, Iowa)

U.S. Appeals Court
ACCESS TO COURTS
SPEEDY TRIAL

Hayes v. Faulkner County, Ark., 388 F.3d 669 (8th Cir. 2004). An arrestee brought a§ 1983 action
against a county, sheriff and jail administrator, stemming from his 38·day detention prior to an
initial court appearance. The district court entered judgment in favor of the arrestee and the
defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the county's detention policy
was deliberately indifferent to the substantive due process rights of the arrestee and that the 38·
day detention of the arrestee shocks the conscience. The county's detention policy involved the
sheriffs office submitting names of those confined in jail to the court, and then waiting for the
court to schedule a hearing. The court found that the policy improperly delegated the
responsibility of bringing arrestees promptly to court for first appearance, and ignored the lack of
authority for long-term confinement. The court held that the jail administrator was deliberately
indifferent because he did nothing about the lengthy detention, even after he received four
separate grievances from the arrestee. The administrator testified that he would have continued
to wait for the court to schedule an appearance, even if the arrestee were held for 99 days.
32.114

According to the court, a reasonable official would know that detentions of less than 38 days
violated a state criminal procedural rule and the constitutional rights of the arrestee. The
arrestee had been ticketed for not having automobile tags and insurance and had failed to appear
in municipal court, resulting in the issuance of a bench warrant. When he was stopped for a traffic
violation he was arrest on the warrant and did not post the $593 cash·only bond at the jail.
(Faulkner County Jail, Arkansas)
U.S. Appeals Court
JUVENILES

Hedgepeth v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth. 1 386 F.3d 1148 (D.C.Cir. 2004). The mother
of a 12·year·old who was arrested and detained for eating a french fry in a rail transit station
brought a § 1983 action. The district court ruled in favor of the defendants and the mother
appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the city's "no-citation" policy for juveniles was
rationally related to the legitimate goal of promoting parental awareness and involvement with
children who commit delinquent acts. The court held that the policy did not violate equal
protection, even though adults who were seen eating food in transit authority facilities would
merely have been given a citation. According to the court, classifications based on youth, like
those based on age in general, do not trigger heightened scrutiny for equal protection purposes.
The appeals court expressed dissatisfaction about the case in the opening paragraph of its opinion:
"no one is very happy about the events that led to this litigation. A twelve·year·old girl was
arrested, searched, and handcuffed. Her shoelaces were removed, and she was transported in a
windowless rear compartment of a police vehicle to a juvenile processing center, where she was
booked, fingerprinted, and detained until released to her mother some three hours later-all for
eating a single french fry in a Metrorail station." (Juvenile Processing Center, District of
Columbia)

U.S. District Court
FALSE IMPRIS·
ONMENT
FALSE ARREST

Johnson v. Board of Police Com'rs, 351 F.Supp.2d 929 (E.D.Mo. 2004). Homeless persons sued a
city board of police commissioners and a police captain, claiming harassment with the intent to
remove them from a downtown area in violation of their constitutional rights. The district court
entered a preliminary injunction on behalf of the plaintiffs. The court barred the continuation of
the challenged police practices, which included a pattern of arrests without probable cause,
throwing firecrackers into homeless groups, and inflicting community service work without the
adjudication of any crime. Several homeless persons were given a choice of performing manual
labor or remaining in jail, without being charged with any offense nor found to have committed
any offense. (City of St. Louis, Missouri)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONDITIONS
PUNISHMENT
CIVIL COMMITMENT

Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918 (9 th Cir. 2004). A jail detainee brought a civil rights against a sheriff
and county for violations of his constitutional rights during the period he was civilly confined
awaiting adjudication and eventual commitment under the California Sexually Violent Predator
Act (SVPA). The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the
detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with
instructions. The court held that fact issues as to whether the restrictive conditions of
confinement were justified by legitimate, non-punitive interests and were not excessive,
precluding summary judgment on the detainee's conditions of confinement claim. The court held
that the yearlong confinement of the civil detainee who was held in the general criminal
population of a county jail pending commitment proceedings, created a rebuttable assumption
that the confinement was punitive in violation of the detainee's substantive due process rights.
(Sacramento County Jail, California)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE

Kelley v. County of Wayne, 325 F.Supp.2d 788 (E.D.Mich. 2004). A pretrial detainee's survivor
brought a civil rights action against two deputy marshals, alleging they were deliberately
indifferent to a detainee's serious medical needs stemming from his heroin withdrawal, and that
they proximately caused his suicide. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
deputy marshals. The court held that the failure of the deputy marshals to notify county
authorities who had the resources to care for the inmate, that the detainee was suffering from
heroin withdrawal, did not create a known risk of suicide or other serious harm. The court noted
that the suicide occurred more than four days after the detainee's arrest, and the deputy marshals
did not know of any correlation between heroin withdrawal and suicide. According to the court,
the deputy marshals' failure to comply with a judge's instructions to transport the detainee to a
particular detention center so that the detainee could be treated for his heroin withdrawal did not
manifest deliberate indifference to the detainee's serious medical needs, because had the marshals
taken the detainee to the requested center, the detainee either would not have been accepted or, if
accepted, would not have been treated due to a lack of treatment resources at that institution.
(Wayne County Jail, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Kramer v. Gwinnett County, Georgia, 306 F.Supp.2d 1219 (N.D.Ga. 2004). A pretrial detainee
filed a·§ 1983 action alleging that jail officials were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical
needs. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court held
that the officials did not act with deliberate indifference to the detainee's psoriasis and related
conditions, even if the detainee's condition greatly deteriorated from the time of his arrival at the
facility until his release. The court noted that the detainee missed some of his appointments, and
that he was seen by jail physicians seven times, and by jail nurses at least fifteen times.
(Gwinnett County Detention Center, Georgia)

32.115

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
MEDICAL CARE

Layman Ex Rel. Layman v. Alexander, 343 F.Supp.2d 483 CW.D.N.C. 2004). A detainee who had
suffered a serious head or brain injury following a blow from another prisoner, brought § 1983
claims against a sheriff and sheriff's department officers. The district court denied summary
judgment in favor of the sheriff with respect to the detainee's failure to train claim, finding
genuine issues of material fact as to whether the department's training of new detention officers
properly and thoroughly trained them to respond to and appreciate the dangers associated with
injuries and other medical conditions of inmates. The court held that summary judgment for a
detention officer was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the officer acted
with deliberate indifference when she did not ensure that the detainee was taken to an emergency
room following a display of abnormal behavior after he suffered a serious head or brain injury
following a blow. (Haywood County Detention Center, North Carolina)

U.S. Appeals Court
ACCESS TO COURT
TELEPHONE

Lynch v. Leis, 382 F.3d 642 (6 th Cir. 2004). A detainee joined a class action that challenged a
county policy that allowed prisoners to make only collect telephone calls, which in combination
with the public defender's policy of refusing collect calls operated to deny pretrial detainees their
right to counsel. The district court found a Sixth Amendment violation of the pretrial detainees'
rights and ordered an injunction. The county complied with the injunction. The district court
awarded attorney fees to the detainee and the defendants appealed. The appeals court reversed,
finding that the detainee lacked the standing to join the class action suit and thus was not
entitled to attorney fees. (Hamilton County Justice Center, Ohio)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONDITIONS
SEGREGATION
DUE PROCESS

Magluta v. Samples, 375 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2004). A former pretrial detainee brought an action
against federal officials asserting constitutional claims relating to the conditions of his
confinement. The district court dismissed several defendants for lack of jurisdiction and dismissed
the case against the remaining defendants for failure to state a claim. The detainee appealed. The
appeals court vacated and remanded. On remand, the district court dismissed the detainee's first
amended complaint and the detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in
part, and remanded. The appeals court held that the detainee stated a claim that he suffered
unconstitutional conditions of confinement and that the defendants were not entitled to qualified
immunity. The detainee alleged that he was confined under extremely harsh conditions, that he
was placed in solitary confinement and locked in an extremely small closet-sized space, with
minimal contact with other human beings for a prolonged time that exceeded 500 days. The
detainee alleged that the harsh conditions were imposed solely for the sake of punishment. The
court noted that ample federal caselaw existed at the time of the challenged conduct to give fair
warning to officials that it was unconstitutional to hold a detainee in solitary confinement 500
days, for punishment, with virtually no procedural protection in the form of periodic reviews.
(United States Penitentiary, Atlanta, Georgia)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE
STAFFING

McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283 (11 th Cir. 2004). A former inmate of a county jail brought a§
1983 Eighth Amendment action against a county, alleging improper failure to treat his emergency
medical condition. The inmate also asserted negligence claims against the jail's health services
subcontractor and against a nurse employed by the subcontractor. The district court dismissed the
claims against the subcontractor and nurse and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed.
The court held that the county jail's staffing problems, allegedly resulting from the county board's
custom of inadequate budgeting for the sheriffs office and jail, did not satisfy the "custom or
policy" requirement of the inmate's § 1983 action. The inmate alleged that the county failed to
transport him to a hospital during a medical emergency. The court noted that the jail had a policy
to call an ambulance to transport inmates with emergency medical needs if jail personnel were
unable to do so. The inmate's transport to the hospital emergency room was delayed by nearly
twelve hours as jail staff accomplished other transports. By the time the inmate arrived at the
hospital he was experiencing paralysis in his legs. (Dekalb County Jail, Georgia, and Wexford
Health Sources, Inc.)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCHES
PRIVACY

Mills v. City of Barbourville, 389 F.3d 568 (6 th Cir. 2004). An arrestee brought a§ 1983 action
claiming that her constitutional rights were violated when a male jailer saw her bare chest during
a search at the jail after her arrest. The district court dismissed some of the defendants and
granted summary judgment in favor of the remaining defendants, and the arrestee appealed. The
appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The appeals court held that the
fact that a male jail employee may have seen the arrestee's bare breasts accidentally as he was
walking by while the arrestee was being searched, was not a Fourth Amendment violation in the
absence of any evidence that either the normal search policy was unconstitutional or that the
search was carried out in an unconstitutional manner. The court noted that the search was
conducted by female jailers. (Knox County Jail, Kentucky)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
RESTRAINTS
USE OF FORCE

Munera v. Metro West Detention Center, 351 F.Supp.2d 1353 (S.D.Fla. 2004). A former pretrial
detainee brought a§ 1983 action against a county correctional officer who escorted him on a visit
to an optometrist, alleging that the officer used excessive force, threatened him, and deprived him
of access to medical care. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendant.
The court held that the alleged profanity and ethnic slurs that the officer directed at the detainee
did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. The court found that the officer's decision to
remove the detainee from an eye clinic because of security concerns did not deprive the detainee of
needed medical care and did not amount to deliberate indifference to a serious medical need in
violation of the Due Process Clause. According to the court, the force applied by the officer was the
32.116

minimum necessary under the circumstances, where the force included wrist cuffs secured to a
waist chain with the detainee seated in a wheelchair. The court noted that the officer checked
that the cuffs were properly applied when the detainee complained of discomfort, and told the
detainee not to struggle. The officer used additional force and restraints to keep the detainee
seated in the wheelchair, when the detainee was repeatedly moving between the wheelchair and
another seat in the waiting room. (Ward D, Jackson Memorial Hospital, Miami·Dade County,
Florida)
U.S. Appeals Court
JUVENILES
SEARCHES

NG. v. Connecticut, 382 F.3d 225 (2 nd Cir. 2004). Parents of two female juveniles brought a suit
under § 1983 for damages and injunctive relief, alleging that strip searches of the juveniles in
juvenile detention facilities violated their Fourth Amendment rights. After a bench trial, the
district court dismissed the complaint. The juveniles appealed. The appeals court vacated and
remanded. The appeals court held that strip searches conducted on female juveniles after their
transfer from one detention facility to another were unlawful because they were undertaken
after the juveniles had been initially searched and had remained in custody. The court found
that a strip search of a juvenile to determine whether the juvenile had taken a missing pencil
required reasonable suspicion that the juvenile possessed the pencil. The court held that strip
searches performed upon juveniles' initial admission to state detention facilities did not violate
the Fourth Amendment because the state had an enhanced responsibility to take reasonable
action to protect them from hazards resulting from the presence of contraband, even though they
had not been convicted of any crime and were not confined awaiting trial on criminal charges.
(Girls Detention Center, Connecticut)

U.S. Distriec Court
ACCESS TO
COURT

Purkey v. CCA Detention Center, 339 F.Supp.2d 1145 (D.Kan. 2004). A federal prisoner brought
a Bivens action against private prison employees. The district court denied the defendants'
motion to dismiss. The district court held that employees at a private company under contract to
house federal pretrial detainees were "federal actors" for the purposes of potential Bivens
liability, since the detainees were in the custody of the United States Marshal and held under
the authority of the United States pending disposition of federal charges against them.
According to the court, the prisoner sufficiently stated that he was prejudiced by the employee's
destruction of his legal papers, for the purpose of his claim under Bivens that he was denied
access to court. The court also found that the prisoner stated a claim for violation of his free
speech and association rights. The court noted that prisoners incarcerated at prisons under
contract to the federal government enjoyed the same constitutional protections as those inmates
incarcerated at prisons that are actually run by the federal government. The court held that the
prisoner was prejudiced by the employee's destruction of his legal papers because the papers
contained written recollections of police interrogations shortly after they were conducted and
also recounted representations that were made to him to elicit his cooperation in return for a
lighter sentence. The court found that the prisoner stated a Bivens claim by alleging that
employees disciplined him because he assisted other inmates in the preparation of grievances
against the prisoner. According to the prisoner, the prison did not provide a law library and an
attorney employed by the prison to answer legal research requests refused requests for
assistance in preparing legal actions against the prison and its personnel. The prisoner alleged
that employees harassed and threatened him, placed him in segregation, entered his cell and
scattered his papers and belongings, denied him visits with his wife, and confiscated his legal
materials because he filed grievances. (Corrections Corporation of America, Leavenworth,
Kansas)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Quint v. Cox, 348 F.Supp.2d 1243 (D.Kan. 2004). A former jail detainee brought a§ 1983 suit
against a county sheriff, alleging that the sheriff showed deliberate indifference to the detainee's
lithium poisoning. The district court entered judgment in favor of the sheriff. The court held that
although the detainee may have been visibly suffering from lithium toxicity during his first few
days of incarceration, there was no evidence that the sheriff was aware that the detainee was
facing a substantial risk of serious harm, or that he personally saw the detainee at any time. The
court noted that under the sheriffs leadership, there was a policy of dispensing all inmate
medicines at set times, and of prompt response to inmate medical problems. The court found
that the sheriffs failure to provide a medical nurse or specially trained person to dispense
medications to the detainee did not amount to deliberate indifference, where the jail was
required to regularly provide medication, and there was a procedure in place for responding to
medical emergencies that was followed in the detainee's case. (Meade County Jail, Kansas)

U.S. District Court
FALSE IMPRIS·
ONMENT

Ramos Bonilla v. Vivoni Del Valle, 336 F.Supp.2d 159 (D.Puerto Rico 2004). A protester filed a §

XIX

1983 action alleging violation of his constitutional rights at a demonstration. The district court
dismissed the action. The court held that the protester's half·hour detention during a protest
was not so egregious as to violate his substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment, noting that the protestor was able to return to the demonstration after his release.
(Puerta de Tierra Police Station, Puerto Rico)

32.117

U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCH

Shain v. Ellison, 356 F.3d 211 (2nd Cir. 2004). A misdemeanor detainee in a county correctional
facility challenged a blanket policy that required strip searches of all detainees, regardless of the
nature of the crime for which they were detained. The detainee sought a declaration that the
policy was unconstitutional, monetary damages, and injunctive relief. The district court entered
judgment in favor of the detainee and awarded $1 in nominal damages. The parties appealed
and the appeals court affirmed in.part, and remanded on the issue of injunctive relief. On
remand, the district court granted injunctive relief to the detainee and the defendants again
appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded, finding that the detainee lacked standing to
seek prospective injunctive relief because he failed to show that he was likely to be rearrested or
that he would be remanded to the county correctional facility overnight if he was rearrested. The
court noted that the county had implemented a new policy that required reasonable suspicion
that a detainee is concealing contraband to justify a search. (Nassau Co. Corr'l Center, New
York)

U.S. District Court
JUVENILES

Smith v. Barber, 316 F.Supp.2d 992 (D.Kan. 2004). Five high school students who were arrested
for plotting an armed attack on a school sued city and county officials under § 1983, alleging
violations of the Fourth Amendment relating to searches and their arrest, malicious prosecution,
and violations of the Eighth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor
of the defendants. The court held conditions of pretrial detention in a county jail did not violate
the Eighth Amendment where state law required the juveniles to be held separate from adults,
the students were only held from 11 to 21 days, and they were allowed outside. The court found
that the requirement that they clean their own cells did not implicate the Eighth Amendment.
The court also held that a detention hearing broke the chain of causation required to support a
claim for malicious prosecution. (Labette County Jail, Kansas)b

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE

Stewart ex rel. Estate of Stewart v. Waldo County, 350 F.Supp.2d 215 (D.Me. 2004). The estate
of a deceased inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that a county violated the inmate's
constitutional right to medical care and supervision, and asserting a wrongful death claim. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court held that the
officials' knowledge that the inmate was intoxicated did not demonstrate deliberate indifference
to suicide risk. State and county policies and procedures required constant monitoring of
intoxicated individuals, but the court found that the officials had no subjective knowledge that
the inmate was suicidal or at risk for any reason. The court noted "despite the inmate's high
blood alcohol content, he was functioning and coherent enough to understand directions and
walk unassisted." The inmate hanged himself shortly after admission to the jail. Jail staff
checked on the inmate at least every fifteen minutes before his death. (Waldo County Jail,
Maine)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE
FAILURE TO
PROTECT

Stiltner v. Crouse, 327 F.Supp.2d 667 (W.D.Va. 2004). The father of a pretrial detainee who
committed suicide in jail brought a § 1983 action against jailers. The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of the jailers. The court held that the jailers were not deliberately
indifferent to the substantial risk of harm to the detainee, and that they were not negligent in
their handling of the detainee. The 39-year-old detainee had been arrested for suspicion of
operating a vehicle under the influence of drugs and was waiting for her bond to be posted at a
county jail. She was placed in a holding cell. Several hours later jailers discovered that she was
unconscious. After attempts to resuscitate her were unsuccessful she was transported to a local
hospital where she was pronounced dead. An autopsy showed that her death was caused by
either self-hanging or strangulation by another person. According to the court, the detainee did
not request medical aid from the jail nurse who saw her initially, and there was no indication to
jailers that she might be a danger to herself. (Buchanan County Jail, Virginia)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE

Strickler v. McCord, 306 F.Supp.2d 818 (N.D.Ind. 2004). A pretrial detainee sued jail officials
under§ 1983, alleging they were deliberately indifference to his serious medical needs. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court held that
although the jail officials allegedly placed the inmate on a suicide watch, noted that the detainee
hid razor blades and medication in his cell, observed that the detainee had tried to cut himself,
and saw the detainee draw pictures expressing sadness, the detainee could not demonstrate that
the officials were aware of a substantial risk that he would attempt suicide. The detainee had
been arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol and his car contained whiskey, a shotgun
and a suicide note. The detainee subsequently attempted suicide by cutting his arm, but jail staff
detected his condition and provided the detainee with medical treatment. (Miami County Jail,
Indiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
INTAKE
SCREENING

Sullivan v. Bornemann, 384 F.3d 372 (7 th Cir. 2004). An arrestee brought an action against
police officers and hospital staff. He had been arrested for disorderly conduct but jail staff
refused to admit him to confinement without medical clearance because of his high breathalyzer
test result. The arresting officers took him to the emergency room of a local hospital where he
failed to voluntarily produce a urine sample. The emergency room doctor ordered a
catheterization, and the officers restrained the arrestee during the brief procedure. The district
32.118

XIX

court entered judgment for the defendants and the arrestee appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The appeals court held that the officers' acquiescence in the hospital nurse's request to
help her restrain the arrestee during the catheterization process did not violate the arrestee's
Fourth Amendment rights. The court found that the State's substantial interest in assuring the
medical stability of the pretrial detainee outweighed the arrestee's due process right to refuse
unwanted medical treatment. (Shawano County Jail, Wisconsin)
U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO
PROTECT
SUPERVISION
STAFFING

Thompson v. Spears, 336 F.Supp.2d 1224 (S.D.Fla. 2004). A prisoner brought an action against a
county and a jail official, alleging deliberate indifference to his safety, negligent supervision, and
negligent infliction of emotional distress. The district court granted summary judgment in favor
of the defendants. The court held that a lack of monitoring devices in jail cells did not pose an
objectively substantial risk of harm to the inmate, particularly in light of the fact the state
Model Jail Standards did not require cameras. The court found that the inmate presented no
evidence that the officer posts were located so far that officers could not hear calls for help. The
court held that the county was not liable under § 1983, even if jail officers did not actually follow
the county policy of making hourly walk·throughs to monitor cells, where there was no evidence
that the county had officially sanctioned or ordered the officers to disregard the county policy.
The prisoner had been temporarily transferred from a state prison to the county jail in order to
be involved in a family court matter. '.I'he inmate, who was from Jacksonville, Florida, alleged
that he was severely beaten by other inmates for over two hours, after the Miami Dolphins beat
the Jacksonville Jaguars in a football game. (Pretrial Detention Center, Miami-Dade County,
Florida)

U.S. Appeals Court
DISCIPLINE
PRE-SENTENCE
DETENTION

Tilmon v. Prator, 368 F.3d 521 (5th Cir. 2004). A prisoner brought a civil rights action alleging
due process violations in connection with prison disciplinary proceedings. The district court
dismissed the action for failure to state a claim and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court
affirmed, finding that a prisoner who has been convicted but who has not yet been sentenced has
the same status as a sentenced prisoner for the purposes of analyzing whether the prisoner has a
liberty interest in having certain procedural protections before being punished in connection
with a prison disciplinary proceeding. The court found that the prisoner had no due process
protected liberty interest implicated by his confinement in a punitive cell for eight hours without
an administrative hearing. (Caddo Correctional Center, Louisiana)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
PROTECTION
FALSE IMPRIS·
ONMENT

Tinius v. Carroll County Sheriff Dept., 321 F.Supp.2d 1064 (N.D.Iowa 2004). A detainee filed a §
1983 action alleging that deputy sheriffs unlawfully detained him, and that medical procedures
were performed on him without his consent. The district court granted summary judgment in
favor of the defendants in part, and denied it in part. The court held that the deputy sheriffs
were justified in detaining the apparently intoxicated detainee under their community
caretaking function, where a deputy came across the detainee walking along a rural roadway in
winter without proper attire. According to the court, the law was not clearly established at the
time of the incident that the Fourth Amendment barred law enforcement officials from seizing
apparently intoxicated persons, or from restraining a detainee during medical procedures that
were being conducted for non-investigatory purposes. The court found that the detention did not
constitute false imprisonment. The court held that the hospital was not immune from liability
for failing to obtain informed consent before performing an involuntary catheterization on the
detainee, where the detainee never requested treatment at the hospital, and the officers who
brought him to the hospital had no authority to act on his behalf. (Carroll County Sheriff
Department, Iowa)

U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE
INTAKE
SCREENING

Turney v. Waterbury, 375 F.3d 756 (8th Cir. 2004). A mother brought a civil rights action to
recover damages related to the in-custody suicide of her son. The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the defendants and the mother appealed. The appeals court affirmed in
part, and reversed in part and remanded. The appeals court held that the sheriff was not
entitled to qualified immunity, where the sheriff knew of, but did not investigate, the arrestee's
earlier suicide attempt at a jail from which he was transferred, did not permit a jailer to
complete the arrestee's intake form, placed the arrestee in a cell alone with a bed sheet and
exposed ceiling bars, and ordered the jailer not to enter the arrestee's cell without backup and
yet left the jailer as the only staff member on duty at the jail. Before the arrestee was
transferred to the jail in which he committed suicide, he had told jail staff that "he was going to
hang it up" and shortly thereafter he was found in his cell with a bed sheet tied around his neck.
During his processing into the next jail he told staff he did not want to return to prison, and that
he would die and take someone with him ifhe received more than a 15 year sentence. The court
found that training provided to county officials was not inadequate, where the county provided
manuals that informed police officers how to recognize and respond to suicide risks. (Bennett
County Jail, South Dakota)

U.S. District Court
SEGREGATION
CLASSIFICATION

US. v. Catalan-Roman, 329 F.Supp.2d 240 (D.Puerto Rico 2004). Two pretrial detainees filed a
motion contesting their placement in administrative segregation after they were certified as
being death-penalty eligible. The district court granted their motion, finding that death

XIX

32.119

certification did not justify their automatic placement in administrative detention. The court
noted that the detainees had resided in the general prison population without incident for over
one year before being death-certified, there was no evidence that death-certified detainees were
more likely to be disruptive or to take hostages, and their placement in administrative
segregation eliminated their ability to establish mitigating evidence relative to their character
and adjustment to life in prison. (M_etropolitan Detention Center-Guaynabo, Puerto Rico)
U.S. Appeals Court
ACCESS TO
COURT
LAW LIBRARIES

U.S. v. Cooper, 375 F.3d 1041 (10th Cir. 2004). A defendant who was convicted of bank robbery
appealed his conviction and alleged that he was deprived of due process by refusal of his request
of access to a law library. The appeals court affirmed the conviction. The appeals court held that
a prisoner who voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waives his right to counsel in a criminal
proceeding is not entitled to a law library or other legal materials. (Utah)

U.S. District Court
PRIVACY
TELEPHONE

U.S. v. Faulkner, 323 F.Supp.2d 1111 (D.Kan. 2004). Three detainees who were indicted on
charges of attempting to kill a government witness moved to suppress recordings of their jail
telephone conversations. The court held that the detainees had impliedly consented to the
recording of telephone conversations because notices that conversations might be recorded were
posted throughout the facility, and a recorded warning was given before the commencement of
long distance calls. The district court noted that the recordings made by employees of a private
corrections company, were not covered by the wiretapping exemption that was applicable when
the interception was done by law enforcement officers. (Corrections Corporation of America,
Leavenworth, Kansas)

U.S. District Court
CLASSIFICATION
SEGREGATION
DISCIPLINE

U.S. v. Lopez, 327 F.Supp.2d 138 (D.Puerto Rico 2004). A pretrial detainee who was placed in a
special housing unit because he faced the death penalty, filed a motion for an evidentiary
hearing on the conditions of his pretrial confinement. The district court held that the detainee's
placement in a special housing unit solely because he faced the death penalty amounted to
unconstitutional punishment. (Special Housing Unit, MDC-Guaynabo, Puerto Rico)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
USE OF FORCE

Webster v. City of New York, 333 F.Supp.2d 184 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). Arrestees brought an action
against a city, police commissioner and police officers alleging unreasonable use of force and
punishment without due process. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendants, in part. The court held that failure to provide food and water to the pretrial
detainees for a few hours when they were held at a police station did not rise to the level of a due
process violation, because of the relatively brief duration and the absence of allegations of injury
or punitive intent. The court also held that the use of handcuffs on the pretrial detainees, and
subjecting them to abusive language, did not rise to the level of a due process violation. (City of
New York Police Department)

U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE

Wever v. Lincoln County, Nebraska, 388 F.3d 601 (8 th Cir. 2004). A personal representative
brought a civil rights action against a county and county sheriff alleging that an arrestee's
Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated. The district court denied the sheriffs motion for
summary judgment and the sheriff appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the
arrestee had a clearly established Fourteenth Amendment right to be protected from the known
risks of suicide, and two prior suicides in the county jail should have put the sheriff on notice
that his suicide prevention training needed revision. The court held that the representative
stated a supervisory liability claim under the due process clause, noting that a supervisor may
be held liable under§ 1983 if a failure to properly supervise and train an employee causes a
deprivation of constitutional rights. (Lincoln County Jail, Nebraska)

U.S. District Court
CIVIL
COMMITMENT
PUNISHMENT
CONDITIONS

Wilson v. Watters, 348 F.Supp.2d 1031 (W.D.Wis. 2004). A patient confined as a sex offender
brought an action alleging he was deprived of his due process rights. The district court denied
the patient's motion. The court found that the use of a polygraph examination as part of a sex
offender treatment program did not violate the patient's due process rights, even if the patient
was subject to more restrictive conditions solely because of his refusal to participate in the
polygraph examination. The court held that even if the treatment learning plan offered to the
sex offender was inappropriate, the sex offender's due process rights were not violated. According
to the court, confining the sex offender at a state detention facility did not violate his due process
rights, absent allegations that his conditions of confinement were different from those imposed
on any other civil detainee at the detention facility. (Wisconsin Resource Center)

U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE
MEDICAL CARE

Woodward v. Correctional Medical Services, 368 F.3d 917 (7th Cir. 2004). The administratrix of
the estate of a pretrial detainee who had committed suicide in a county jail brought a§ 1983
action against a private contractor hired by the county to provide medical and mental health
services at the jail, and against the contractor's agents. The district court entered judgment on a
jury verdict against the contractor and the contractor's social worker, awarding $250,000 in
compensatory damages and $1.5 million in punitive damages, and denied motions for summary
judgment as a matter of law. The contractor appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that
the contractor's employee's lack of training and carelessness were relevant toward establishing
32.120

XIX

deliberate indifference, even though the employee herself was not found liable. The court held
that the fact that no previous suicides had occurred in the jail did not preclude the contractor's
liability. According to the appeals court, the district court did not abuse its discretion by letting
the punitive damages award stand. The estate proffered evidence that the contractor failed to
adequately train its employees and condoned employees' failure to complete mental health
intake forms and the social worker's practice of challenging suicide watch referrals. According to
the court, employees knew that the detainee was suicidal but failed several time to place him on
suicide watch, in violation of its own written procedures. The court found that evidence of an
alcohol-impaired nurse, intake backlogs, and claims of delayed or denied medical care to other
inmates was relevant to the contractor's state of mind and was therefore admissible. (Lake
County Jail, Illinois)
2005
U.S. Appeals Court
USE OF FORCE
R i~STRAINTS

Agster v. Maricopa County, 406 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2005). The parents and the representative of
the estate of an inmate who died in jail brought an action against the county in state court. The
case was removed to federal court, where the county was ordered to produce a mortality review
report that was conducted by a private health provider. The county appealed the district court
decision. The appeals court upheld the district court order. The appeals court held that no
protected privilege of peer review protected the mortality review. The inmate had been arrested
and taken to a county jail where he was placed in a restraint chair. His respiration decreased
and he developed an irregular heartbeat. Attempts were made to resuscitate him and he was
transported to a hospital where he was placed on life support. He was pronounced dead three
days later. (Maricopa County Sheriffs Office, Arizona)

U.S. District Court
RELEASE

Arline v. City ofJacksonville, 359 F.Supp.2d 1300 (M.D.Fla. 2005). A suspect who was acquitted
of murder brought a § 1983 action challenging a delay in his release after he was acquitted. The
court held that the city was not liable under § 1983 for an allegedly improper custodial
interrogation. The court found that summary judgment for the defendants was precluded by a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the suspect's nearly three·hour post-acquittal
detention by a sheriffs office was reasonable. The suspect alleged that the city's policies and
procedures relating to transporting and releasing detainees following acquittal at trial violated
his Fourth Amendment rights. (City of Jacksonville, Florida)

U.S. District Court
RESTRAINTS
USE OF FORCE

Beltran v. O'Mara, 405 F.Supp.2d 140 (D.N.H. 2005). A pretrial detainee brought a§ 1983 action
against correctional officers, alleging civil rights violations. The court granted summary
judgment in favor of the officers in part, and denied in part. The court held that the failure to
exhaust some claims did not mandate dismissal of the entire complaint. The court found that
fact issues precluded summary judgment regarding whether officers used excessive force in
repeatedly placing the detainee in a restraint chair. The court held that the purported
withholding of toilet paper from the detainee did not deny him a minimal measure of necessities
required for civilized living, as required to establish a Fourteenth Amendment violation. The
only evidence that supported the allegation consisted of a complaint that the detainee was
regularly made to wait over one hour for toilet paper, and there was no evidence regarding the
frequency of such events. (Hillsborough County Department of Corrections, New Hampshire)

U.S. District Court
PRIVACY
RESTRAINTS
USE OF FORCE

Birdine v. Gray, 375 F.Supp.2d 874 (D.Neb. 2005). A pretrial detainee brought a§ 1983 action
against jail employees claiming violation of his right to be free of punishment and his right to
privacy. The district court dismissed the complaint. The court held that the detainee did not
have a privacy right that would allow him to cover the window of his cell with towels, noting that
the cell contained a privacy wall which allowed for partial privacy while using the toilet. The
court found that the inmate's privacy rights were not violated when he was moved from one cell
to another, naked. The inmate had removed all of his clothes and refused to put them back, and
jail staff moved him unclothed to a cell closer to their station where he could be constantly
watched. The court found no violation when the inmate was placed in a restraint chair because
he was confined as a last resort when all other restraint options proved ineffective. According to
the court, the detainee was monitored, the chair was not used to punish, and the detainee was
offered the opportunity to be released in return for acting appropriately. The court found no due
process violation when a stun gun was applied to the detainee two times, after he engaged in
violent actions as jail officers attempt to settle him into a cell to which he was being transferred.
The court found that the detainee's conduct was an immediate threat to institutional safety,
security and efficiency. (Lancaster County Jail, Nebraska)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONDITIONS
MEDICAL CARE
MEDICATION

Board v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469 (7 th Cir. 2005). Arrestees who were detained in a county jail
following their arrest on murder charges brought a civil rights action against a county sheriff
and jail staff following their acquittal and release from jail. The district court denied summary
judgment for the defendants and they appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court
held that the sheriff was not entitled to qualified immunity on the claim that he violated a
detainee's right to receive adequate attention for a serious medical condition, when he allegedly

XIX

32.121

deprived one detainee of toothpaste for over three weeks and another detainee for over 113 days.
One detainee suffered dental pain throughout his incarceration and had to have several teeth
extracted because of tooth decay. The court denied qualified immunity for jail staff who allegedly
deprived a detainee of his asthma inhaler on multiple occasions. The court also denied qualified
immunity on the claim that they failed to provide humane health conditions as the result of the
allegedly unhealthy condition of the jail's ventilation system. The detainees alleged that the flow
of black fiberglass from the ventilation system caused nosebleeds and respiratory problems, and
allegedly exacerbated the serious asthma condition of one detainee. (Edgar County Jail, Illinois)
U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE
USE OF FORCE

Bozeman v. Orum, 422 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 2005). The representative of the estate of a pretrial
detainee who had died during a struggle with county correctional officers brought a § 1983 suit
alleging use of excessive force and deliberate indifference to medical needs. The district court
granted summary judgment for several defendants but denied summary judgment for
corrections officers. The officers appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the
officers' alleged conduct in subduing the detainee was actionable as excessive force and that the
officers were not entitled to qualified immunity. The court also held that the officers' alleged
conduct following the struggle·· waiting 14 minutes before summoning medical assistance even
though the detainee appeared lifeless·· was actionable as deliberate indifference and the officers
were not entitled to qualified immunity. The court noted that the law defining excessive force
was clearly established at the time of the incident, and the officers should have known that
continuing to apply force to the unruly detainee after he had given up his struggle was not
acceptable. (Montgomery County Detention Facility, Alabama)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
MEDICAL CARE

Brookins v. Williams, 402 F.Supp.2d 508 (D.Del. 2005). A former pretrial detainee brought a §
1983 action against a prison warden, alleging violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the warden. The court held that forcing the
detainee to sleep on the floor, without a mattress, next to a toilet was not punishment and
therefore did not violate his due process rights, where the conditions served a legitimate
governmental purpose of housing inmates in an overcrowded facility and only lasted for a period
of five days. The court found that the warden was not deliberately indifferent to the serious
medical needs of the detainee, where the inmate was given all of his medication within a day of
being booked, except for medication that the inmate was unable to name for prison medical staff.
The detainee was given tests to determine what he would need to treat his detected conditions.
(Howard R. Young Correctional Institution, Delaware)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS

Brown v. Williams, 399 F.Supp.2d 558 (D.Del. 2005). A detainee brought an in forma pauperis
action against prison officials alleging unconstitutional conditions of confinement. The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of the officials. The court held that the detainee was
not exposed to unreasonably high levels of contaminated water, although water from his cell
sink was allegedly discolored, and the detainee fainted shortly after he drank the water. A
sample of the water was taken to a laboratory for independent testing and it met or exceeded
requisite standards. (Howard R. Young Correctional Institution, Delaware)

U.S. Appeals Court
RELEASE
LENGTH

Bryant v. City ofNew York, 404 F.3d 128 (2 nd Cir. 2005). Detainees who had been arrested for
disorderly conduct brought a§ 1983 action alleging a substantive due process violation as the
result of overlong detention. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants
and the detainees appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the police officers'
decision to detain the arrestees overnight rather than issuing desk appearance tickets (DATs)
which were authorized under state law, was not objectively unreasonable. The court noted that
DATs were discretionary rather than required, and the length of detention was well within the
range of flexibility allowed to states. According to the court, the detainees were members of a
difficult·to·control crowd that demanded substantial police manpower, and the additional
paperwork required for DATs would have drawn officers off of the streets. The detainees had
been part of a demonstration protesting antigay violence. (New York City Police Department)

U.S. District Court
USE OF FORCE
CONDITIONS
CELL CAPACITY

Calhoun v. Thomas, 360 F.Supp.2d 1264 (M.D.Ala. 2005). A detainee brought a § 1983 action
against a sheriff and deputy sheriff in their individual capacities, raising excessive force,
deliberate indifference and conditions of confinement claims. The defendants moved for
summary judgment, which the district court granted in part and denied in part. The court held
the detainee's allegation that he was deprived of shower shoes, clean clothes and a toothbrush
upon his arrival at the jail did not rise to the level of a constitutional level. The court also found
no violation in the allegation that he was made to sleep on the floor as the third person in a two·
person cell. The court found a potential violation in the alleged conduct of officers during his
interrogation. The officers allegedly choked and beat the detainee, who was restrained and posed
no threat to anyone's safety, punched him in his gunshot wound, and slammed him into a door
several times telling him they wanted to make him suffer as the victim in a robbery and shooting
had suffered. The court held that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity on the
excessive force claim. (Pike County Jail, Alabama)
32.122

XIX

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Calvin v. Sheriffof Will County, 405 F.Supp.2d 933 (N.D.Ill. 2005). County inmates sued a
sheriff under § 1983 alleging that a strip search policy violated the Fourth Amendment. The
court granted summary judgment in favor of the inmates. The court held that the blanket policy
of strip-searching persons arrested on failure-to-appear (FTA) warrants in misdemeanor traffic
cases violated the Fourth Amendment. The court also found a Fourth Amendment violation in
the blanket policy of strip-searching persons who were returned to jail for processing after being
ordered released on traffic or misdemeanor charges, absent individualized suspicion or probable
cause that a person was concealing contraband or weapons. The court noted that the searches
were unconstitutional, even though arrestees had been given an opportunity to post bond before
the searches, and notwithstanding that persons arrested on FTA warrants were intermingled
with the general population. (Will County Adult Detention Facility, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO
PROTECT

Collins v. County ofKern, 390 F.Supp.2d 964 (E.D.Cal. 2005). An inmate brought a§ 1983 action
against a county and a sheriffs department, stemming from an attack by other inmates while he
was incarcerated. A fight had erupted in a jail housing unit between Black and Hispanic inmates
and the inmate was injured. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendants. The court held that inmate failed to establish that department officials knew of and
disregarded a risk of attack when they moved the inmate to another jail unit. At the time of the
move, the inmate did not inform anyone of safety concerns or segregation issues due to a
purported gang affiliation. The court found that officials took prompt action to stop the fight,
secure the area, and ensure prompt medical treatment for the inmate. The court noted that a
"prison official need not believe tcr [a] moral certainty that one inmate intends to attack another
at [a] given place at time certain before he is obligated to prevent such an assault." According to
the court, before being required to take action, an official must have more than a mere suspicion
that an attack will occur. (Lerdo Pre-Trial Facility, Kern County, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE

Cook Ex Rel. Tessier v. Sheriff ofMonroe County, 402 F.3d 1092 (11 th Cir. 2005). The personal
representative of the estate of a pretrial detainee who committed suicide while incarcerated
brought an action against a sheriff, in his official capacity, asserting claims for deliberate
indifference to the detainee's medical needs in violation of§ 1983, negligent training and
supervision of jail employees, and vicarious liability for the employees' negligence. The district
court excluded the representative's expert witness testimony, precluded reference to other
suicides at the facility, and granted judgment as a matter of law for the sheriff. The
representative appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
The appeals court held that the district court acted within its discretion in excluding evidence of
other suicides at the jail. The court found that the plaintiff failed to establish that the detainee' s
suicide was foreseeable to the sheriff and therefore any deficiencies in the sheriffs training or
supervision did not rise to the level of deliberate indifference. But the court held that evidence
was sufficient to support a jury verdict on the plaintiffs claim that the sheriff was vicariously
liable under state law for employees' alleged negligence. The court noted that the detainee made
two written requests to see a psychiatrist, one on each of the two days immediately preceding his
suicide, and that the detainee stated in one request that he was "mentally sick" and asked to see
the psychiatrist "as soon as possible." Three deputies observed the detainee as nervous and
anxious, and one specifically observed the detainee apparently having an anxiety attack and
complaining of chest pains. (Monroe County Detention Center, Florida)

U.S. Appeals Court
PROTECTION

Copeland v. County ofMacon, Ill., 403 F.3d 929 (7 th Cir. 2005). A former pretrial detainee who
had been beaten by another inmate sued a county seeking indemnification under the "scope of
employment" provision of the state's local government tort immunity statute. The detainee
alleged that a county correctional officer recruited and encouraged other inmates to commit the
beating. The district court jury awarded the detainee $400,000 and the county appealed. The
appeals court reversed, finding that the corrections officer was not acting within the scope of his
employment within the meaning of the tort immunity statute, and that the county jail, not the
citizens of the county, was the officer's employer. (Macon County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
PROTECTION
CROWDING
STAFFING

Crow v. Montgomery, 403 F.3d 598 (8th Cir. 2005). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 and a §
1988 action against officials at a county detention center, alleging violations of the Fifth, Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court denied the officials' motion for summary
judgment based on qualified immunity, and the officials appealed. The appeals court reversed
and remanded. The court held that the detainee failed to establish that officials disregarded any
known risks to the detainee's health or safety while he was incarcerated. According to the court,
the detainee's allegations regarding inadequate records, overcrowding, poor supervision, and
understaffing showed at most that the officials were negligent, and did not rise to the level of
deliberate indifference. (Faulkner County Detention Center, Arkansas)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE

Cruise v. Marino, 404 F.Supp.2d 656 (M.D.Pa. 2005). The mother of a pretrial detainee who had
committed suicide in a holding cell brought an action against a city and officers, alleging
deliberate indifference to the detainee's serious medical needs. The district court granted
summary judgment for the defendants. The court held the officers were not deliberately

XIX

32.123

indifferent, where the detainee did not have a particular vulnerability to suicide and had not
threatened or attempted suicide. The court noted that the detainee's intoxication was not, by
itself, an indication of a suicidal tendency. The court found the city was not deliberately
indifferent, where it had no history of numerous suicides by detainees, the city had policies for
removing harmful items from detainees, and the city placed a video monitor in a cell following a
previous suicide. (Scranton Police Department, Pennsylvania)
U.S. Appeals Court
CONDITIONS
JUVENILES
SEPARATION
PROGRAMS

Daniels v. Woodside, 396 F.3d 730 (6 th Cir. 2005). A juvenile who had been detained at a county
jail on a murder charge brought a § 1983 action alleging violation of a state law governing
pretrial detention of juveniles, and violation of due process when he was expelled from an
alternative education program. The district court granted summary judgment for a sheriff and
school district, but denied it for a school superintendent. The juvenile and the superintendent
appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part. The court
found no violation of state law, where the law provided an exception for housing dangerous
juveniles in jails, and the statutory requirements of sight and sound separation were followed.
The court held that conditions of confinement deriving from the juvenile's classification as a
suicide risk did not constitute punishment prohibited by the Due Process Clause, or cruel and
unusual punishment. The juvenile was subjected to 24-hour lock-down, deprived of exercise,
dressed in a suicide gown that did not close in the back, denied access to a shower and personal
hygiene products, and denied visitors. The court found that the juvenile, who dropped out of high
school when he attained the age of 16, did not have a protected property interest in attending an
alternative high school program offered by the school district, and therefore the due process
claim against the superintendent was precluded. (Macomb County Jail, Michigan)

U.S. Appeals Court
BAIL

Dobrek v. Phelan, 419 F.3d 259 (3 rd Cir. 2005). A commercial bail bondsman brought an action
against the clerk of a state superior court, contending that the clerk wrongfully removed his
name from the bail bondsman registry following the discharge of his bail bond debts in a chapter
7 bankruptcy proceeding. The district court dismissed the action and the bail bondsman
appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the judgments against the commercial bail
bondsman which arose from bond debts were "forfeitures," excepted from discharge in a chapter
7 proceeding. The court noted that the judgments against the bondsman arose from the failure of
criminal defendants to appear in court and the bondsman's nonperformance of his duty to
produce those defendants. (New Jersey)

U.S. District Court
STAFFING
SUICIDE
ATTEMPT
SUPERVISION

Drake ex rel. Cotton v. Koss, 393 F.Supp.2d 756 (D.Minn. 2005). The legal guardian for an
incapacitated person, who attempted to commit suicide while he was a pretrial detainee in a
county jail, and the state human services department sued a county and various officials under §
1983 alleging Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment violations and a state law claim for
negligence. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court
held that the officials did not act with deliberate indifference in failing to recognize and respond
to the risk that the detainee was suicidal, even assuming there was a 72-minute gap between the
last time the detainee was checked and when he was found. According to the court, the officials
did not know that the detainee presented a substantial risk of suicide, based on a physician's
reports describing the detainee's depression as only "mild" or "situational." There was nothing in
the reports to suggest that anti-anxiety medication would have helped prevent the detainee's
depression and attempted suicide. The court held that the county was not shown to have any
official policy or custom of overcrowding or understaffing that played a role in the detainee's
attempted suicide. The court held that the officials acted with discretion with respect to their
placement and treatment of the detainee, and in accordance with a physician's orders, and they
promptly took the detainee to the hospital when they discovered he had harmed himself, and
were therefore entitled to official immunity as to the negligence claims. (McLeod County Jail,
Minnesota)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
RESTRAINTS
USE OF FORCE

Esmont v. City of New York, 371 F.Supp.2d 202 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). An arrestee filed a§ 1983
action alleging that city health inspectors and police officers violated her constitutional rights
during her arrest and detention for violations of a city nuisance law. The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court held that the officials were not
deliberately indifferent to the arrestee's serious medical needs when they did not comply with
the arrestee's request for hot tea during an asthma attack, but called emergency medical
services instead. The female detainee was handcuffed to a cross bar outside of a holding cell for
over 7 hours, with no place to rest her elbow. She was required to use a bathroom that was
monitored by a security camera and an officer insisted on watching her while she used the
bathroom. She sought medical attention two days after her release for damage caused to her
wrist by the handcuffing. The court held that the detainee was not exposed to excessive force,
where the jail had only one cell and officials had a policy of not placing prisoners of opposite
sexes in the cell together. The court noted that there was no evidence that the handcuffs were
too tight, and the arrestee did not request that her handcuffs be loosened. (City of New York
Police Department)
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XIX

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE

Estate ofAdbollahi v. County ofSacramento, 405 F.Supp.2d 1194 (E.D.Cal. 2005).
Representatives of the estates of two county jail detainees, and one inmate, who committed
suicide while in their cells brought a § 1983 action. The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the defendants in part, and denied in part. The court held that the county
was not liable for failing to train jail personnel in suicide prevention where the county had a
policy of periodic observation of cell occupants. The court noted that an officer, lacking
knowledge that a detainee was suicidal, made no observations, and falsely entered on duty logs
that he had done so. The court found that summary judgment was precluded by material issues
of fact as to whether a jail commander ratified or encouraged the practice of "pencil-whipping,"
which involved making false entries on records showing observations of cell occupants that were
not actually made. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by material issues of
fact as to whether the county knowingly established a policy of providing an inadequate number
of cell inspections and of falsifying logs showing completion of cell inspections, creating a
substantial risk of harm to suicide-prone cell occupants. The court ruled that the sheriff and jail
commander had immunity under state law from liability claims that there were holes in the
bunks that could be used for death by hanging, where use of the bunk holes for suicide was not
foreseeable. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by material issues of fact as
to whether a county jail nurse ratified, condoned, and encouraged the deliberately indifferent
behavior of a social worker who conducted an allegedly perfunctory interview of an inmate who
later committed suicide. The court found that summary judgment was precluded by material
issues of fact as to whether a psychiatric services clinician satisfied applicable standards of care,
under state law. (Sacramento County Jail, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO
PROTECT
MEDICAL CARE
SUICIDE

Estate of Bradich v. City of Chicago, 413 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 2005). The estate of an arrestee who
hung himself while in a county jail brought an action alleging failure to protect the arrestee from
the risk of suicide, and failing to react properly when the arrestee was discovered hanging. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the plaintiff appealed.
The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court held that jail staff
did not display deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of suicide by putting the intoxicated
arrestee in a regular cell and allowing him to keep his civilian clothes, rather than placing him
on a suicide watch or sending him to a hospital until he sobered up. The arrestee had been
arrested numerous times had never attempted to injure himself, and he did not have a mental
health history that implied any disposition toward suicide. The court found that the city could
not be liable for jail staffs' failure to comply with a rule requiring close monitoring of intoxicated
prisoners, where the city's policy requiring staff to check intoxicated prisoners every 15 minutes
was adequate and there was no allegation that the city systematically failed to enforce its
policies. The court noted that the record did not imply that the suicide rate in the city's jail was
abnormally high. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether three members of the jail staff acted with deliberate indifference by
failing to seek outside assistance for ten minutes after finding the arrestee hanging in his jail
cell. The court asked ''Why did it take all three officers to provide unhelpful assistance? Two
might have done what they could, while the third phoned for help (which would take only a
minute) and then rejoined the others. Why did the two officers who lacked CPR training think
that they should shout at a hanging prisoner rather than call for help? Why did the officer with
CPR training not use his skills?" The arrestee had been booked and put in a cell at the city police
stationhouse. (City of Chicago, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Estate of Carter v. City ofDetroit, 408 F.3d 305 (6 th Cir. 2005). The estate of a detainee who died
while in custody brought a state court § 1983 action that was removed to federal court. The
district court denied a police officer's motion for summary judgment and the officer appealed.
The appeals court affirmed, finding that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of
material fact as to whether the officer was deliberately indifferent to the detainee's serious
medical needs. The detainee suffered a heart attack while in custody and was pronounced dead
on arrival at the hospital. Shortly after the detainee was booked she told the officer that she was
having chest pains and needed to go to the hospital, and that she had not taken her heart
medicine for three days. Other detainees testified that the detainee cried loudly for help and
continued to complain that her chest hurt for several hours before another officer called for a car
to take her to the hospital. (Detroit Police Department, Michigan)

U.S. Appeals Court
USE OF FORCE

Estate ofMoreland v. Dieter, 395 F.3d 74 7 (7 th Cir. 2005). Family members of a county jail
detainee who died in custody, brought a § 1983 action alleging the use of unnecessary and
excessive force. The district court entered judgment, upon jury verdict, in favor of the family
members and against county deputies, and awarded $29 million in compensatory damages, and
$27.5 million in punitive damages. The parties appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding
that the punitive damages award was not excessive, where evidence showed that the deputies
threw the detainee's head against a concrete wall, discharged a can of pepper spray into his face
when he was fully restrained, and repeatedly assaulted him, without attending to the detainee's
medical needs. The detainee died of a fatal hematoma caused by one of the head traumas
inflicted by the deputies. The deputies lied to a jail nurse about the detainee's injuries and filed

XIX

32.125

false reports to conceal their wrongdoing. The court held that neither multiple prior incidents
involving the use of pepper spray, nor alleged jail overcrowding, established that a sheriff was
deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of harm to the detainee. The detainee had been
admitted to jail after he was arrested for driving under the influence. Shortly after his admission
to the jail, the detainee provoked a confrontation with another detainee by directing racial slurs
at him. Jail staff responded to the altercation with excessive force. (St. Joseph County Jail,
Indiana)
U.S. Appeals Court
SUPERVISION
STAFFING
FAILURE TO
PROTECT

Fisher v. Lovejoy, 414 F.3d 659 (7 th Cir. 2005). A pretrial detainee brought a prose§ 1983
Fourteenth Amendment action against a corrections officer, alleging that the officer failed to
protect the detainee from assault by other inmates of the facility. The district court entered
summary judgment for the officer and the detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The
court held that the fact that the officer witnessed the stabbing of the detainee by another inmate
did not render the officer deliberately indifferent to a second assault on the detainee that was
perpetrated minutes later by several inmates. The court noted that the officer entered the room
where the stabbing had occurred and attempted to restore order, found and confiscated a knife
near the spot where he had observed the stabbing, which permitted the inference that the first
assailant was unarmed. The officer did not identify the inmates who mounted the second attack
as participants in the first attack. The court held that the officer reasonably responded when he
witnessed the stabbing of the detainee, precluding liability. At the time of the assaults, the
officer had been assigned to "cross-watch" two separate housing units, one of which housed 48
inmates. He was required to walk back and forth between the two units' dayrooms. When the
first assault began the victim ran toward the locked dayroom door and saw the officer outside.
He pushed an intercom button near the door and summoned help. The officer immediately called
for assistance but was not able to enter the dayroom until it was unlocked by a central control
post. By the time the door opened, approximately twenty officers were waiting to enter. (Cook
County Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
FALSE IMPRIS·
ONMENT

Garcia Rodriguez v. Andreu Garcia, 403 F.Supp.2d 17 4 (D.Puerto Rico 2005). An arrestee
brought a civil rights claim alleging that he was illegally detained following his arrest on a
warrant for failure to pay alimony. The district court held that the arrestee stated a claim for
false imprisonment in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The arrestee alleged that the
officers who arrested him had no authority under the arrest warrant to immediately incarcerate
him, but should have caused his appearance before a judge. The arrestee was held in prison for
five days until bail was paid by his relatives. (Bayamon Penitentiary, Puerto Rico)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Garretson v. City ofMadison Heights, 407 F.3d 789 (6th Cir. 2005). A pretrial detainee brought
an action against a city, police department and individual police officers alleging constitutional
violations and asserting state law claims. The district court granted summary judgment for the
defendants and the detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded in part. The court held that the diabetic detainee who had allegedly been deprived of
insulin while in custody suffered a serious deprivation of necessary medical treatment, for the
purpose of a Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference claim. The detainee was later
admitted to a hospital for emergency treatment and stayed in the hospital for several days. The
court denied summary judgment for the booking officer and the officer who escorted the detainee
to her cell, both of whom were allegedly informed by the detainee of her diabetic condition and
need for insulin. (Madison Heights Police Department Lock· Up, Michigan)

U.S. Appeals Court
RELEASE
BAIL

Golberg v. Hennepin County, 417 F.3d 808 (8th Cir. 2005). A detainee brought a civil rights
action against a sheriff and county, alleging that she was subjected to an excessive delay in
releasing her from custody. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendants and the detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The detainee had appeared
in court in response to a felony fraud charge. The court continued the proceeding but ordered the
detainee to be booked at the detention center before her release. When detention center officials
discovered that the detainee had two outstanding warrants they required her to post bail before
she could be released. As a result, she remained in custody for 32 hours, including ten hours
after her father posted the required bail. The court noted that the detainee conceded that the
officials had probable cause to detain her after the outstanding warrants were discovered. The
appeals court held that the Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process analysis applied to
the constitutionality of the delayed release, and that the failure to process the detainee more
rapidly did not rise to the level of deliberate indifference. The court found that a sign advising
detainees that completing their paperwork might take "more than eight hours" did not show
reckless disregard. The court held that the county could not be liable under§ 1983 for adopting
administrative procedures that allegedly slowed the bail posting and release process, absent a
showing that the procedures violated federal law on their face or were intended to deprive
detainees of their constitutional rights. (Hennepin County Adult Detention Center, Minnesota)

U.S. Appeals Court
PROTECTION

Gonzales v. Martinez, 403 F.3d 1179 (10 th Cir. 2005). A female inmate who was sexually
assaulted at a county jail brought a civil rights action against the county, county sheriff and jail
32.126

XIX

officials. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the sheriff and the inmate
appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that summary judgment was
precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the sheriff had the requisite
knowledge of a substantial risk of harm to inmates because of conditions at the jail. The female
inmate was sexually assaulted on more than one occasion by the jail administrator and a jail
officer. The administrator and officer were suspended and were later charged with, and
convicted of, the assaults. (Huerfano County Jail, Colorado)

U.S. Apprals Court
SUICIDE
MEDICAL CARE
SUPERVISION

Gray v. City ofDetroit, 399 F.3d 612 (6th Cir. 2005). The personal representative of the estate of
a pretrial detainee who had committed suicide while in a police cell at a hospital brought a §
1983 action alleging inadequate medical treatment and failure to adequately monitor the
detainee. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants and the personal
representative appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the city could not be
held liable for deliberate indifference given the absence of an obvious and clear suicide risk. The
court concluded that an officer enjoyed qualified immunity because the detainee's pre-suicide
behavior did not give rise to a duty to monitor for suicide. The detainee had registered only
physical complaints and had engaged in no self-injurious behavior at the hospital. The officer
was not aware of, and could not be charged with knowledge of the detainee's behavior prior to
reaching the hospital, according to the court. The court found that the city could not be held
liable for failure to adequately train its officers regarding suicides, where officers complied with
city policies regarding medical care, including screening by an intake nurse at the hospital, and
no previous inmate suicides had occurred in the hospital cells. Although the detainee had been
destructive before he was transferred to the hospital-·ripping a phone from his cell wall and
breaking a sink and toilet-- the court noted that none of his destructive acts had been selfdirected. (Detroit Receiving Hospital, Michigan)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCHES
PUNISHMENT
FAfLURE TO
PROTECT

Hart v. Sheahan, 396 F.3d 887 (7th Cir. 2005). Female pretrial detainees brought an action
against a county and jail superintendent alleging deprivation of liberty without due process. The
district court dismissed the case and the detainees appealed. The appeals court reversed and
remanded, finding that the detainees stated a claim upon which relief could be granted. The
detainees alleged that during monthly lockdown searches of the jail, they were confined for 48 to
50 hours at a time to their cells, where they were not under observation or within hailing
distance of correctional officers. The detainees alleged that serious injuries resulted from their
inability to get the officers' attention during a crisis. The court noted that an alternative
procedure was available to the jail that would allow inmates in each locked tier to be released
from their cells after that tier was searched, resulting in shorter lockdown periods. (Cook County
Jail, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE

Harvey v. County of Ward, 352 F.Supp.2d 1003 (D.N.D. 2005). The surviving spouse of a jail
inmate who died after a suicide attempt brought an action under§ 1983 and state law, alleging
deliberate indifference to the inmate's known risk of suicide. The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the defendants. The district court held that the plaintiff failed to establish
that the sheriff and jail administrator knew of the inmate's potential risk of suicide. According to
the court, evidence of conversations between the spouse and jail employees about the inmate's
suicide risk, an officer's note that the inmate's wife thought that they should keep an eye on the
inmate, and another officer's report that the inmate may have been trying to save up some of his
medications to take at another time, was insufficient to establish that the sheriff and jail
administrator knew of the inmate's potential risk of suicide. The court found that the county was
not deliberately indifferent to the training of its employees on inmate suicide prevention. The
court held that the jail's suicide prevention policy appeared reasonable and comprised an effort
to prevent suicides, even if the policy had not been updated in recent years, and the jail was not
accredited by the American Correctional Association (ACA). The court noted that the policy set
forth a detailed list of factors to identify potentially suicidal inmates, set forth a procedure for
identification and screening of inmates, and required ongoing training in the implementation of
suicide prevention and intervention for all staff. (Ward County Jail, North Dakota)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCHES

Hicks v. Moore, 422 F.3d 1246 (11th Cir. 2005). A former pretrial detainee brought an action
challenging strip search practices at a county jail. The district court denied immunity for the
defendants and they appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded. The court held that the mere fact that a detainee was to be placed in the jail's general
population did not justify a strip search, but that reasonable suspicion existed for the plaintiffs
strip search because he had been charged with a family violence battery offense. The court noted
that battery is a crime of violence that would permit the inference that the detainee might be
concealing weapons or contraband. (Habersham County Jail, Georgia)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Hollenbaugh v. Maurer, 397 F.Supp.2d 894 (N.D.Ohio 2005). The estate of a pretrial detainee
sued a city, county, and jail officials under§ 1983 alleging the defendants violated the detainee's
constitutional rights by failing to provide necessary medical care during his arrest and
detention. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants in part, and denied

XIX

32.127

it in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by material issues of genuine
fact as to whether jail officials who dealt directly with the detainee and who had the opportunity
to closely observe him, knew that the detainee was seriously ill. The court noted that although
the detainee was allegedly intoxicated when he was arrested and brought to the county jail, he
was adamant about his need for medical attention and his belief that he was suffering from a
serious medical condition. The detainee died from a heart attack within a few hours of his arrest.
(Wayne County Jail, Ohio)

t: .S. Appeals Court
DUE PROCESS
SEGREGATION

Holly v. Woolfolk, 415 F.3d 678 (7th Cir. 2005). A pretrial detainee placed in segregation for two
days without a prior hearing brought a § 1983 action for damages against correctional officers.
The district court dismissed the case and the detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The
appeals court held that the placement of the detainee did not violate his due process rights,
where the officers had reason to believe that the detainee was disrupting a jail headcount, which
would interfere with jail security and discipline. The court noted that the detainee was given a
hearing upon his release from segregation and that he was returned to the general population.
The court expressed confusion about "what damages he could prove for being confined to a cell
for two days rather than being free to roam the dangerous general-population area of the jail-and dangerous it is." (Cook County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
CROWDING
CONDITIONS
CELL CAPACITY

Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150 (3 rd Cir. 2005). Pretrial detainees filed a suit under § 1983,
challenging the conditions of their confinement on Fourteenth Amendment due process grounds.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the detainees
appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. The court held that the district must employ
the "due process" analysis to determine whether the conditions of confinement amounted to
"punishment" that was improperly imposed prior to the adjudication of guilt, not the Eighth
Amendment standards regarding cruel and unusual punishment. The detainees challenged the
practice of triple-celling three detainees to a cell that had been designed to be occupied by a
single person, which required one of the occupants to sleep on the floor in proximity to a toilet.
(Multi-Purpose Criminal Justice Facility, Gander Hill, Delaware)

U.S. District Court
USE OF FORCE
PRE-SENTENCE
DETENTION

Jeanty v. County of Orange, 379 F.Supp.2d 533 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). A county jail inmate whose arm
was broken in an altercation with corrections officers sued the officers and the county, alleging
excessive use of force. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants in
part, and denied it in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by fact issues
as to whether excessive force was applied when the officers allegedly beat the prisoner in his cell
to the point of breaking his arm, and wantonly ignored his cries of pain and pleas that they
desist. The court also found that summary judgment was precluded by issues of fact as to
whether the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. According to the court, the conviction of
the inmate for assaulting an officer, arising out of the same incident, did not preclude the
inmate's claim. The court held that the Eighth Amendment, not the Fourteenth Amendment,
applied to this action because the inmate had been convicted of arson and was awaiting
sentencing. (Orange County Jail, New York)

U.S. District Court
WORK
FALSE IMPRISONMENT

Johnson v. Board ofPolice Com'rs, 370 F.Supp.2d 892 (E.D.Mo. 2005). Homeless persons brought
a§ 1983 action against a city police captain and a city, claiming that their Fourth, Thirteenth
and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when they were periodically removed from a
downtown area. After the district court entered a preliminary injunction barring the
continuation of the alleged harassment, the defendants moved to dismiss. The district court
denied the motions. The court held that the Fourth Amendment rights of the homeless persons
who were allegedly wrongfully detained were further violated when jailers ordered them to
perform manual labor or risk continued confinement, before they were charged with or found
guilty of the commission of a crime. (City of St. Louis, St. Louis Board of Police Commissioners)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Johnson v. Karnes, 398 F.3d 868 (6 th Cir. 2005). A detainee who had severely cut his hand
immediately prior to his arrest brought a civil rights action alleging violation of his right to
adequate medical care during his incarceration. The district court entered summary judgment in
favor of all defendants, and the detainee appealed. A divided appeals court affirmed in part,
reversed in part and remanded. The court held that summary judgment was precluded due to
genuine issues of fact as to whether a jail doctor had knowledge of the detainee's fully severed
tendons, whether the doctor disregarded the risks inherent in delayed tendon surgery, and
whether the doctor acted under the color of state law as an employee of a private contractor. In
his deposition, the detainee testified that he remembered an emergency room doctor telling him
that his tendons had been completely severed and that he was to return for surgery within three
to seven days. (Franklin County Jail, Ohio)

U.S. District Court
USE OF FORCE

Johnson v. Wright, 423 F.Supp.2d 1242 (M.D.Ala. 2005). An arrestee sued an arresting officer, a
volunteer riding with the officer, and county jail officers, claiming violation of his Fourth
Amendment protections against false arrest and excessive force. The officer, volunteer and jail
officers moved for summary judgment. The district court held that the jail officers were not
32.128

XIX

entitled to qualified immunity due to material issues of fact, as to whether the jail officers beat
the arrestee without provocation while he was in his cell. According to the arrestee, officers
dragged him out of his cell and put him in some type of harness chair, and he was in handcuffs
during the entire time he was being beaten at the jail and he was still in handcuffs when he was
strapped into the harness chair. The arrestee alleged that officers continued to beat him after he
was strapped into the harness chair. (Chilton County Jail, Alabama)
U.S. District Court
DUE PROrESS
ACCESS TO
COURT
INITIAL
APPEARANCE

Lingenfelter v. Bd. Of County Com'rs ofReno Cty., 359 F.Supp.2d 1163 (D.Kan. 2005). A
detainee filed a civil rights complaint alleging that he was arrested without a warrant and
detained unlawfully for eight days without a judicial determination of probable cause. The
district court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss. The court held that the detainee stated a
claim for violation of his right to a prompt judicial determination of probable cause. The court
found that the detainee state a claim against a sheriff in his official and personal capacities, and
denied qualified immunity from liability for the sheriff. The court found that the facts could
conceivably be produced that the sheriffs alleged policy or custom of not effectuating probable
cause determinations for detainees who were arrested without a warrant was a substantial
factor in bringing about the alleged violation. (Reno County Jail, Kansas)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO
PROTECT

Little v. Shelby County, Tenn., 384 F.Supp-.2d 1169 (W.D.Tenn. 2005). An inmate brought a§
1983 action against a county and sheriff, alleging that he had been raped in jail in violation of
his Eighth Amendment rights. The county stipulated to liability and an order of injunctive relief
was issued. Later, the district court found the county in contempt, and the county sought to
purge itself of the contempt finding. The court entered a purgation order. The court held that the
county and sheriff complied with·the Eighth Amendment and purged themselves of contempt
through the adoption of a structured reform to correct conditions that included violence, rape
and gang control among inmates. In reaching its conclusion, the court considered whether
officials took all reasonable steps within their power to comply with the order, which included
whether they marshaled their own resources, asserted their highest authority, and demanded
the results needed from subordinate persons and agencies in order to effectuate the course of
action required by the order. The court praised the county, noting that it had adopted a focused,
systemic and information-driven structural reform based on critical exert assessment of
essential institutional functions. The county adopted a 14-point remedial scheme that included
implementing direct supervision management of inmate cellblocks, improving population
management, collecting and utilizing data, and installing an objective inmate classification
system. (Shelby County Jail, Tennessee)

U.S. Appeals Court
LENGTH
INTAKE
SCREENING

Luckes v. County of Hennepin, 415 F.3d 936 (8 th Cir. 2005). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action
against a county and a sheriff related to his 24-hour detention after his arrest. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the arrestee appealed. The appeals
court affirmed, finding that the arrestee's due process rights were not violated by his twenty-four
hour detention following his arrest for an outstanding bench warrant, since the length of the
detention did not shock the conscience and the arrestee did not complain of any mistreatment by
jail staff. The arrestee had failed to pay fines for two traffic citations and bench warrants had
been issued. His license had also been suspended. He was stopped and cited for driving without a
license and then he was arrested pursuant to the bench warrants. He was placed in a holding
cell, where an officer told him that he had "picked the worst day to be here" because the jail had
just activated a new computerized jail management system and problems were encountered. A
sign posted in the jail asked inmates to ''be patient" and that it "may take more than eight
hours" to process their paperwork. During his 24-hour detention the arrestee was repeatedly
placed in overcrowded cells with persons arrested for crimes that were significantly more violent
in nature than failure to pay traffic fines. He endured threats and intimidation from other
inmates, as well as mockery prompted by his speech impediment. (Hennepin County Adult
Detention Center, Minnesota)

U.S. District Court
USE OF FORCE

Manier v. Cook, 394 F.Supp.2d 1282 (E.D.Wash. 2005). A county jail inmate brought a§ 1983
action against jail officers, alleging cruel and unusual punishment based on the use of excessive
force. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court held
that the use of force was within the scope of the jail's policy for maintaining and restoring order.
According to the court, the inmate had refused to return to his cell as ordered and he had
verbally abused jail officers. An officer fired two Taser gun shots rather than one continuous
trigger shot, and the officer decided not to fire a third short. The court noted that the inmate
suffered only a minor injury and that he had a history of self harm. (Spokane County Jail,
Washington)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE

Mann ex rel. Terrazas v. Lopez, 404 F.Supp.2d 932 (W.D.Tex. 2005). Representatives of the
estates of two detainees who had committed suicide while confined brought an action against a
sheriff and jail officers, alleging failure to supervise and failure to train. The district court found
that the sheriff was entitled to qualified immunity for failing to prevent the detainees' suicides,
where there was no evidence that the sheriff was personally aware of any suicidal thoughts the

XIX

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detainees might have had and did not personally direct any actions involving the detainees
during their incarceration. The court ordered further proceedings to determine if the sheriffs
failure to modify his policies regarding potentially suicidal detainees was an intentional choice,
or merely unintentionally negligent oversight. One inmate was known to have mental health
problems and was housed in a mental health unit that provided a 1 to 18 officer to inmate ratio,
compared to the 1 to 48 ratio required by state standards. The inmate hanged himself using a
torn-up bed sheet. The other inmate was being held in a new detox cell and was founding
hanging four minute after she had been visually observed by an officer. She also used a bed
sheet to hang herself. (Bexar County Adult Detention Center, Texas)
U.S. District Court
SUICIDE

Martin v. Somerset County, 387 F.Supp.2d 65 (D.Me. 2005). The representative of the estate of a
county jail inmate who hanged himself in his cell, sued the county, sheriff and jail officials
alleging violation of the inmate's federal and state rights. The district court granted summary
judgment in part for the defendants, and denied it in part. The court held that summary
judgment was precluded by fact issues as to whether jail officials displayed deliberate
indifference to the inmate in violation of the Eighth Amendment, prior to the hanging. The court
noted that it was necessary to determine if a jail shift supervisor and a control room officer
subjectively knew that the inmate was suicidal and whether they unreasonably disregarded the
risk. The court found that an officer who merely assisted in cutting down the inmate was not
liable for deliberate indifference, where he brought a seat belt cutter to the cell on orders of the
shift supervisor, and when it failed to release the sheet the inmate had used to hang himself, he
brought scissors. The court found officials did not show deliberate indifference after the hanging
when they did not apply cardio·pulmonary resuscitation, noting that the inmate was warm and
appeared to be breathing, and it was only a few minutes before an emergency medical team
arrived. The court held that the county did not show deliberate indifference to the suicide-prone
inmate when it established a suicide prevention protocol, noting that the thrust of this claim was
that the officials failed to follow the protocol in supervising the inmate. (Somerset Co. Jail,
Maine)

U.S. District Court
BAIL

McLaurin v. New Rochelle Police Officers, 368 F.Supp.2d 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). An arrestee
brought a § 1983 action against a county, alleging constitutional and state law violations after
being released on bail. The district court dismissed the case. The court held that the arrestee
who alleged adverse conditions ofrelease on bail, failed to establish a policy or custom of the
county that deprived him of his civil rights. The court noted that the court system, rather than
county government, was responsible for setting bail. The arrestee alleged that he was forced, as
a condition of bail, to attend a domestic violence program, and that he and another black man
were the only persons who were at the program as a condition of bail. (Westchester County, New
York)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

McRoy v. Sheahan, 383 F.Supp.2d 1010 (N.D.111. 2005). A pretrial detainee brought a civil rights
suit against jail authorities and a municipality, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious
medical needs. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The
court held that jail authorities were not deliberately indifferent to the presence of tuberculosis
bacteria in the jail in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment rights of the detainee who
contracted a latent form of tuberculosis. The court noted that the jail followed the screening,
isolation and treatment policies of the Center for Disease Control and the American Thoracic
Society. The court also found no deliberate indifference in the treatment of the detainee because
the detainee suffered no detrimental effects as the result of an alleged delay in treatment, or the
missing of four doses of medication during the treatment process. (Cook County Department of
Corrections, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
JUVENILE
CLASSIFICATION
PROTECTION

Merrriweather v. Marion County Sheriff, 368 F.Supp.2d 875 (S.D.lnd. 2005). A county jail
detainee who was beaten and raped by fellow detainees sued a sheriff, claiming deprivation of
his due process rights and negligence. The district court denied the sheriffs motion to dismiss
the action. The court found fact issues as to whether the sheriff had shown deliberate
indifference to the risk posed to the detainee by housing him with detainees who had a record of
prior violence, and whether the sheriff had immunity from the negligence claim under state law.
The court also found material issues of fact as to whether the level of violence in the juvenile
detention portion of the jail was significant and obvious, and whether the sheriffs policies and
procedures were systematically inadequate. The court noted that alleged material improvements
in procedures for protecting jail detainees from assault, implemented after the detainee was
beaten and raped by fellow detainees, were irrelevant in determining whether the due process
rights of the detainee were violated. (Marion County Jail, Indiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE
TRAINING

Miller v. Calhoun County, 408 F.3d 803 (6th Cir. 2005). The sister of a detainee, who died of a
brain tumor while in pretrial custody in a county facility, brought a wrongful death action under
§ 1983 alleging deliberate indifference to the detainee's medical needs and gross negligence. The
district court granted summary judgment for the defendants and the sister appealed. The
appeals court affirmed. The court held that county did not have a custom or policy of deliberate
32.130

XIX

indifference so as to support a § 1983 claim, given that there was no evidence of a clear and
consistent pattern of mistreatment of detainees, and that the shift commander followed the
county's policy and contacted the on·call doctor. The court found that the shift commander did
not act with deliberate indifference, noting that he questioned the detainee about his fall in the
cell, promptly consulted the on-call physician, and placed the detainee under observation. The
court noted that the sheriff had appointed a training coordinator for the facility, sought
accreditation for the facility, requested bids for medical services, changed medical providers,
formulated a policy for medical care at the facility, and initiated an investigation into the
detainee's death. The 44-yearold detainee had told facility staff at the time of admission that he
had sustained a head injury a month earlier. (Calhoun County Correctional Facility, Michigan)
U.S. Appeals Court
JUVENILES
FALSE IMPRISONMENT

Myers v. Potter, 422 F.3d 347 (6 th Cir. 2005). A juvenile detainee brought a suit against a police
officer and a police chief, alleging unlawful detention for interrogation in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants and the detainee
appealed. The appeals court reversed. The court held that the police officer was not entitled to
qualified immunity for detaining the juvenile without probable cause to arrest, or a valid consent
from his mother or the detainee, and for failing to allow the detainee to leave upon request. The
court noted that the district court should have given the detainee given more time to conduct
discovery before ruling on the claim against the police chief. The detainee alleged, among other
things, that the officer conducted a polygraph examination, threatened him with life
imprisonment, repeatedly called him profane names, and showed him photographs of charred
bodies discovered during the fire that was under investigation. (City of McMinnville, Tennessee)

U.S Di:;trict Court
USE OF FORCE

Niemyjski v. City ofAlbuquerque, 379 F.Supp.2d 1221 (D.N.M. 2005). An arrestee brought a
state court action against a city, alleging that police officers committed a civil rights violation in
connection with his arrest and detention. The action was removed to federal court, where the
district court granted summary judgment for the city and remanded state law claims. The court
held that the arrestee failed to show that a municipal custom or policy contributed to the alleged
violations. The court noted that the city's policy manual stated that staff were required to
received training in the legitimate use of force and restraints, and that no correctional officer
was permitted to work with inmates until and unless such training was successfully completed.
The arrestee had been placed in a holding cell. When he was denied the opportunity to make a
telephone call he protested by refusing to have his photograph taken. Because of his resistance,
jail officers used force to position him to take his photograph. The arrestee and the officers later
traded racial insults. He was taken up stairs rather than an elevator, and he fell down and
alleged that officers punched and kicked him resulting in an injury to his ribs. He was released
less than 24 hours after his arrest on a warrant. (Bernalillo Co. Detention Center, New Mexico)

ffS. District Court
SEARCHES

Nilsen v. York County, 382 F.Supp.2d 206 (D.Me. 2005). County jail inmates brought a class
action suit against a county, claiming that the practice of forced disrobing of all incoming
inmates, in the presence of an officer, was an unauthorized strip search. The parties submitted a
proposed settlement for court approval. The district court approved the settlement, in part. The
court found that the practice of having inmates remove their clothing in the presence of an
officer was the equivalent of a strip search conducted without cause. The county agreed to create
a $3.3 million settlement fund, from which members of the class would be compensated. The
court approved higher "incentive" payments of $6,500 to the first class representative, and
$5,500 and $5,000 to the other two class representatives, noting that they put considerable time
into the case and were required to give embarrassing deposition testimony. They also received
unfavorable publicity regarding their arrest and humiliation, due to the small size of the county
and the ease of their recognition. The court noted that a privacy factor was strong in this case,
and that requiring individual class members to prove damages would stifle individuals who are
too embarrassed to discuss their searches. The court rejected the proposal that would have
awarded twice as much to females. The proposal had been based on the assertion that females
had two areas of the body subject to privacy protection. The county contended, even when the
settlement was offered, that its policy was constitutional because the officers were looking for
contraband in the clothing and were not intentionally viewing arrestees' naked bodies. (York
County Jail, Maine)

U.S. Appeals Court
USE OF FORCE
MEDICAL CARE

Owensby v. City of Cincinnati, 414 F.3d 596 (6 th Cir. 2005). The estate of a detainee who died in
the course of a police encounter sued officers and others, asserting § 1983 and state law claims.
The district court resolved certain claims on summary judgment and denied the officers qualified
immunity. On appeal, the court held that the officers were not entitled to immunity on the claim
that the officers denied the detainee adequate medical care. The court found that the officers had
time to fully consider the potential consequences of their conduct during the six minutes that the
detainee was denied medical care after being taken into custody, given that the officers had time
to do such things as greet each other, prepare for their superiors' arrival, pick up dropped items,
and comment on the apparent severity of the detainee's injuries. The court applied the
traditional deliberate standard of culpability rather than the heightened standard requiring
malice and intent to harm. According to the court, each officer viewed the detainee in significant

XIX

32.131

physical distress, but made no attempt to summon or provide medical care until several minutes
later when a sergeant checked on the detainee and discovered that he was not breathing. The
detainee's death had been ruled a homicide resulting from the police officers' restraint attempts.
The estate alleged that one officer pulled the arrestee's head up when he was on the ground and
drove his knees into the arrestee's back. The estate also alleged that an officer twice sprayed
mace directly into the arrestee's eyes and nose from a distance of six inches, although police
policy directed a distance of five to ten feet. (City of Cincinnati, Village of Golf Manor, Ohio)
U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO
PROTECT
MEDICAL CARE

Patrick v. Lewis, 397 F.Supp.2d 1134 (D.Minn. 2005). The heirs and next of kin of an arrestee
who died while in detention brought an action alleging that officers violated the arrestee's
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by failing to seek medical attention for the arrestee
after he was involved in a motorcycle accident. The district court granted summary judgment on
the basis of qualified immunity for the officers in part, and denied it in part. The court held that
officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment in failing to summon medical aid during the
booking process, noting that the arrestee refused medical attention after being treated by
paramedics at the scene of the accident. The court found that an overnight jailer who made cell
checks periodically throughout the night was not deliberately indifferent to the arrestee's serious
medical needs, even though the arrestee died in his cell sometime in the early morning from
complications of a blunt force chest injury. The court noted that there was no indication that the
jailer heard the arrestee's alleged call for help during her overnight shift, or knew that the
arrestee had serious injuries. The court denied summary judgment on the claim that the jailer
was deliberately indifferent, finding it was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the jailer delayed in summoning aid for the arrestee after she discovered that he
appeared not to be breathing. (Brooklyn Park Police Department, Minnesota)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEGREGATION
ACCESS TO
COURT
TELEPHONE

Peoples v. CCA Detention Centers, 422 F.3d 1090 (10 th Cir. 2005). A pretrial detainee who was
housed at a detention center operated by a private contractor under a contract with the United
States Marshals Service brought actions against the contractor and its employees, alleging Fifth
and Eighth Amendment violations. The district court dismissed the action and the inmate
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the employees did not punish
the pretrial detainee in violation of his due process rights when they placed him in segregation
upon his arrival at the center and kept him in segregation for approximately 13 months without
a hearing. The detainee was first placed in segregation because the center lacked bed space in
the general population, and he remained in segregation due to his plot to escape from his
previous pretrial detention facility. According to the court, the detention center has a legitimate
interest in segregating individual inmates from the general population for nonpunitive reasons,
including threats to the safety and security of the institution. The court found that the detainee
did not suffer an actual injury as the result of the violation of his right of access to the courts.
The inmate was not provided with access to a law library and the lawyer who assisted him would
only retrieve case law when a specific citation was provided. The detainee did not allege that he
had missed court dates, been unable to make timely legal filings, been denied legal assistance to
which he was entitled, or lost a case which could have been won. The court precluded the
detainee's Bivens claim for damages under eavesdropping and breach of privacy statutes because
state law provided the detainee with a cause of action. The detainee challenged the failure of the
facility to provide him with unmonitored calls to his attorney. (Corrections Corporation of
America, Leavenworth, Kansas)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE
MENTAL
HEALTH
SUPERVISION

Perez v. Oakland County, 380 F.Supp.2d 830 (E.D.Mich. 2005). The father and personal
representative of the estate of an inmate brought a suit under § 1983, alleging that the
defendants violated the inmate's Eighth Amendment rights by failing to provide appropriate
mental health treatment or monitoring when the inmate was being held in the county jail,
leading to the inmate's suicide. The district court held that the county did not act with deliberate
indifference in allowing the inmate caseworker, who allegedly lacked sufficient medical
background or expertise, to make decisions affecting the health care needs of the inmate. The
court noted that the challenged practice was widespread, with the "vast majority" of county jails
allowing employees who were not psychiatrists, but who had been trained in suicide detection
and prevention, to make determinations whether inmates were suicidal or potentially suicidal.
The court found that the father failed the establish that deputies actually perceived that the
inmate faced a substantial risk of serious harm if they conducted their rounds 16 minutes
further apart than mandated under jail policy. The court held that the father failed to establish
that a deputy actually perceived a risk of placing the inmate in a single cell. The inmate had
been placed in a single cell and no special watch status had been ordered by the inmate
caseworker, who was responsible for cell assignments. The court held that the caseworker was
entitled to qualified immunity because it was not established at the time of the inmate's suicide
that the caseworker's actions of making determinations concerning the inmate's cell
assignments, without first consulting the inmate's physician or psychiatrist, would violate the
inmate's Eighth Amendment rights. According to the court, the jail psychiatrist did not
disregard a known and serious medical need, where evidence demonstrated that even though the
psychiatrist knew that the inmate was not taking his medication, he determined through his
32.132

XIX

own direct evaluation that the inmate was suicidal. The court found that allegations that the
sheriff failed to ensure that the county's deputies enforced and followed the law could not sustain
a § 1983 claim absent evidence that the sheriff himself engaged in active unconstitutional
behavior by directly participating, encouraging, authorizing, or acquiescing in the allegedly
offending conduct of the sheriff's deputy. (Oakland County Jail, Michigan)
U.S. District Court
FALSE
IM!'R.I.SONMENT
hELEASE

Perez-Garcia v. Village ofMundelein, 396 F.Supp.2d 907 (N.D.Ill. 2005). A county jail detainee
brought an action against a county and sheriff under§ 1983 alleging violation of his due process
rights, and asserting claims for false imprisonment. The district court granted the defendants'
motion to dismiss in part, and denied it in part. The court held that the detainee's complaint
against the sheriff sufficiently stated a claim for deprivation of due process rights, where the
detainee alleged he was jailed for nearly one month over his vigorous and repeated protests that
he was the wrong person, that he provided jail personnel with his identification card and
repeatedly told them he was not the named suspect, that his physical appearance did not match
the suspect's description, and that his detention continued for a day after a court ordered his
release. According to the court, the detainee sufficiently alleged that a policy, practice or custom
of the sheriffs department caused the alleged deprivation, and that the sheriff was responsible
for setting and supervising jail policies and procedures that did not require confirmation of the
detainee's identity. (Lake County Jail, Illinois)

US. District Court
SE.\RCHES
RELEASE

Powell v. Barrett, 376 F.Supp.2d 1340 (N.D.Ga. 2005). Former detainees at a county jail
initiated a class action complaining about "blanket strip searches" conducted on inmates when
they initially entered or returned to the jail. The detainees also alleged that they were detained
beyond their scheduled release dates. The district court dismissed the action in part, and denied
dismissal in part. The court denied qualified immunity to the two sheriffs who were defendants,
on claims that they continued detention beyond scheduled release dates, noting that the
detainees claimed they were over-detained for durations ranging from one to ten days, with an
average over-detention period of 3.9 days. According to the court, the detainees stated a claim
against the county under § 1983 with their allegations that the county defendants had actual
knowledge that the challenged practices at the county jail were unconstitutional. The court
granted qualified to immunity to the sheriffs with respect to the Fourth Amendment claims
challenging the jails search policy, which required detainees to submit to a visual "front and
back" inspection upon leaving a shower, without regard to reasonable suspicion. An arrested
individual would be assigned to a room with thirty or forty other arrestees, asked to remove his
clothing, and instructed to place the clothing in a box. As a group, the arrestees were required to
shower and then, standing in a line with others, were visually inspected front and back by
deputies. The court found that the policy did not violate clearly established rights of detainees at
the time the searches were allegedly performed in 2003 and 2004. The court noted that some of
these searches involved persons who were returning from court proceedings and who were
entitled to be released from the facility. (Fulton County Jail, Georgia)

U.S. Appeals Court
PROTECTION
SEPARATION
COMMISSARY
CLASSIFICATION

Purcell ex rel. Estate ofMorgan v. Toombs County, 400 F.3d 1313 (11 th Cir. 2005). The mother of
a county jail inmate who died after he was beaten and injured by three other inmates brought a
§ 1983 action against a sheriff and jail administrator. The district court denied qualified
immunity for the defendants, and Eleventh Amendment immunity for the sheriff, and they
appealed. The appeals court reversed. The court held that the conditions at the county jail did
not pose a "substantial risk of serious harm" as required to show an Eighth Amendment
violation. The inmate was beaten by three other inmates in his cell over an alleged money
dispute. Inmates were allowed to keep money in their cells, play cards and gamble, the jail had a
history of inmate-on-inmate assaults, and the jail's layout presented some difficulty in the
continuous observation of inmates. But the court noted that inmates were segregated based on
particularized factors, including the kind of crime committed and personal conflicts, the jail was
not understaffed at the time of the attack, serious inmate-on-inmate violence was not the norm,
fights that did occur were not linked to any recurring specific cause, and jailers had a history of
punishing inmate violence. At the time of the incident the jail held 118 inmates and was staffed
at normal levels, having five officers on duty. The sheriff had directed that a new commissary
system be instituted to manage inmate funds so that inmates would not have to keep money on
their persons, but the system had not been put in place by the day of the incident. (Toombs
County Jail, Georgia)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
SENTENCE
REDUCTION

Rickenbacker v. US., 365 F.Supp.2d 347 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). After pleading guilty to credit card
fraud and being sentenced to 24 months of imprisonment, a defendant moved to vacate, set
aside, or correct the sentence. The district court denied the motion. The court held that defense
counsel was not deficient in failing to move for a downward departure of the defendant's
sentence based on perceived hardships the defendant endured while being detained prior to
sentencing. According to the court, the alleged substandard conditions, consisting of being served
food that the defendant believed had been accessed by rodents, and not being provided with a
fully stocked library, were not conditions that rose to the level that would warrant a downward
departure. The defendant had been served bread that rodents had apparently partially eaten,

XIX

32.133

and in one instance a mouse had created a tunnel inside of the bread. (Nassau County
Correctional Center, New York)
U.S. District Court
SEGREGATION
CLOTHING
CONDITIONS

Rose v. Saginaw County, 353 F.Supp.2d 900 (E.D.Mich. 2005). Twenty-two pretrial detainees
sued a county, sheriffs department, sheriff and individual police officers, challenging the
county's policy of housing uncooperative and disruptive detainees naked in administrative
segregation. The district court held that the policy violated the detainees' due process rights and
their rights to be free of unreasonable seizure. According to the court, the policy was an
exaggerated response to the county's concerns about suicide, officer safety, and administrative
costs. The court declined to issue a preliminary injunction, and granted qualified immunity to
several of the defendants because the detainees' right not to have their clothes removed was not
clearly established at the time of the incidents. The court held that the forced removal of clothing
by an officer of the opposite sex was not justified by safety and security concerns. (Saginaw
County Jail, Michigan)

U.S. Appeals Court
RELEASE
RELEASE·
CONDITIONS
FALSE IMPRIS·
ONMENT

Russell v. Hennepin County, 420 F.3d 841 (8th Cir. 2005). A detainee sued a sheriff, deputies,
inspectors and a county, alleging that his six·day prolonged detention at a county detention
center violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and constituted false
imprisonment under state law. The district court granted the county's motion for summary
judgment and the detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the
detention center's policy regarding the monitoring of inmates who were subject to conditional
release was not deliberately indifferent to inmates' constitutional rights because of the lack of
policies to expedite the process of conditional release. The court found that the detainee failed to
establish that the detention center's policy regarding the monitoring of inmates who were
subject to conditional release caused his prolonged detention, where at worst, his detention for
six additional days resulted not from the executing of the policy, but from the failure to
assiduously follow the policy. The court held that the detainee did not demonstrate municipal
liability where he failed to show a widespread pattern of failing to follow the "check daily" policy
with respect to detainees subject to conditional release. (Hennepin County Adult Detention
Center, Minnesota)

U.S. District Court
BAIL
RELEASE

Sizer v. County ofHennepin, 393 F.Supp.2d 796 (D.Minn. 2005). An arrestee sued a county and
county officials asserting a state claim for false imprisonment and violations of state and federal
constitutional rights. The arrestee complained that his 10½ hour detention pending release on
bail was unreasonable. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The
court held that the 10½ hour detention was objectively reasonable and not unconstitutional. The
court found that the arrestee failed to prove a continuing, widespread, persistent custom or
practice of unconstitutional over-detentions, despite an alleged sign posted in a waiting area that
alerted inmates that they could expect delays of up to eight hours in processing their releases.
The county responded that the arrestee's processing was delayed by problems with its security
count, which halted out-processing of detainees for two hours. (Hennepin County Adult
Detention Center, Minnesota)

U.S. Appeals Court
ASSESSMENT OF
COSTS
DUE PROCESS

Slade v. Hampton Roads Regional Jail, 407 F.3d 243 (4 th Cir. 2005). A pretrial detainee sued a
jail, challenging the constitutionality of a one·dollar per day charge that was intended to
partially defray the costs of incarceration. The district court dismissed the complaint and the
detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the charge was not punishment, and
therefore did not violate due process. According to the court, the state statute that authorized
the charge expressed no intent to punish on its face, was an effort to offset the cost of housing,
had a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest, and was not excessive in
relation to that purpose. The court also held that due process was not violated by the lack of a
hearing before the charge was deducted from the detainee's account. (Hampton Roads Regional
Jail, Virginia)

U.S. District Court
JUVENILE
SEARCHES

Smoak v. Minnehaha County, S.D., 353 F.Supp.2d 1059 (D.S.D. 2005). Former detainees at a
county juvenile detention center brought a § 1983 action challenging the center's policy of strip·
searching all juveniles admitted to the facility, regardless of the seriousness of their charged
offense or the existence of suspicion. The district court granted partial summary judgment in
favor of the detainees and the defendants appealed. The appeals court held that the center's
policy of strip searching minors arrest for minor or non-felony offenses, without any
individualized determination of reasonable suspicion that the individual was or was likely to be
carrying or concealing weapons, drugs or other contraband, violated the Fourth Amendment.
The court denied qualified immunity for former and current directors of the detention center.
The court noted that there was no demonstration that the incidence of smuggling weapons or
contraband into the center was more than minimal, nor that any weapons or contraband could
not have been discovered with less invasive searches. (Minnehaha County Juvenile Detention
Center, South Dakota)

32.134

XIX

U.S Appeals Court
SUICIDE

Snow ex rel. Snow v. City of Citronelle, AL., 420 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 2005). The administrator of
the estate of a pretrial detainee who had committed suicide while in jail brought an action
against a city, its mayor and several police department employees, alleging violations of the
detainee's rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment and asserting a state wrongful
death claim. The detainee had been arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs.
The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants on the federal claims and
dismissed the state law claims. The administrator appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part,
reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court held that police department
employees who lacked a subjective knowledge of the detainee's potential for suicide were not
liable, in their individual capacities, for any constitutional violations. The court noted that the
employees had no knowledge of either the detainee's emergency room records showing that the
detainee told emergency room staff she had attempted suicide four times before, or of doctor's
notes showing that the detainee had suicidal ideation. The court denied summary judgment for
one police officer, finding fact issues as to whether he believed that there was a strong risk that
the detainee would attempt suicide and did not take any action to prevent her suicide. According
to the court, the city's alleged lack of a suicide policy did not cause any constitutional violation.
(City of Citronelle Jail, Alabama)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONDITIONS
DISCIPLINE
DUE PROCESS
SEARCHES
SEGREGATION

Surprenant v. Rivas, 424 F.3d 5 (1st Cir. 2005). A pretrial detainee brought a§ 1983 action
against a county jail and jail personnel, alleging that he was falsely accused of an infraction,
deprived of due process in disciplinary proceedings, and subjected to unconstitutional conditions
of confinement. A jury found the defendants liable on three counts and the district court denied
judgment as a matter of law for the defendants. The defendants appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The court held that a hearing officer deprived the detainee of due process because she
was not an impartial decision-maker. The officer testified that she declined to interview an alibi
witness based on her preconceived belief that the witness would lie, and the officer rushed to
impose sanctions on the detainee despite having been asked by officials to withhold judgment
pending the completion of a parallel investigation into the incident. The court held conditions of
confinement were shown to be constitutionally deficient, where the detainee was placed in
around-the-clock segregation with the exception of a five-minute shower break every third day,
all hygiene items were withheld from him, he could only access water-including water to flush
his toilet··at the discretion of individual officers, and was subjected daily to multiple strip
searches that required him to place his unwashed hands into his mouth. (Hillsborough County
Jail, New Hampshire)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Tardiffv. Knox County, 397 F.Supp.2d 115 (D.Me. 2005). A class action suit was brought against
a county, its sheriff, and jail officers claiming that the Fourth Amendment rights of some
detainees were violated when they were subjected to strip searches without reasonable suspicion
that they were harboring contraband on or within their bodies. The district court held that the
county violated the Fourth Amendment by adopting a policy that allowed for strip searches of all
detainees alleged to have committed felony offenses, although the sheriff was granted qualified
immunity because the law on this matter was not clearly established at the time the policy was
implemented. The policy provided for the strip-searching of all detainees alleged to have
committed non-violent, non-weapon, non-drug felonies. The court found that the county and the
sheriff were liable for a policy that called for the strip searches of detainees alleged to have
committed misdemeanors, without reasonable suspicion. According to the court, the sheriff was
responsible, in his individual capacity, for Fourth Amendment violations arising from strip
searches of all detainees alleged to have committed misdemeanors without a showing of
reasonable suspicion that they were harboring contraband on or within their bodies. The court
found that the sheriff was aware of the custom of these universal strip searches and did not take
effective action to halt the practice. The court noted that specific standards that described which
strip searches may be undertaken in jails and prisons had been issued by the state attorney
general. The state corrections department had conducted a review of the jail's policy and
procedure manual and informed the sheriff that the policy pertaining to body searches needed to
be revised to comply with the attorney general's rules for searches. (Knox County Jail, Maine)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Tatum v. Simpson, 399 F.Supp.2d 1159 (D.Colo. 2005). A detainee who was confined in a county
jail after being found in contempt of court for failing to comply with a state water court case
brought a § 1983 action and moved for summary judgment. The district court dismissed the
action. The court held that a sheriff was not liable under§ 1983 to the detainee for allegedly
denying him medications and medical treatment while he was detained, absent evidence that the
sheriff knew about the detainee's need for prescribed medication or medical treatment during his
detention. (Pueblo County Jail, Colorado)

U.S. District Court
CIVIL
COMMITMENT
CONDITIONS

Thiel v. Wisconsin, 399 F.Supp.2d 929 (W.D.Wisc. 2005). A detainee held under the Wisconsin
Sexually Violent Persons Law (WSVPL) brought a § 1983 action alleging due process violations
in connection with his commitment. The district court denied the detainee's motion to proceed in
forma pauperis and dismissed the action. The court held that no due process liberty interests
were implicated by the manner in which the detainee was treated, either in regard to his

XIX

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commitment, or in regard to trips outside the facility to a county jail for court proceedings. The
court found that the maximum security classification imposed on the detainee was an ordinary
incident of such confinement and did not pose atypical or significant hardships. The court found
no violations with the manner in which the detainee was strip-searched, dressed in prison
clothes and placed in restraints before being transported to a county jail for court proceedings.
(Sand Ridge Secure Treatment Center, Wisconsin)
U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO
PROTECT
MEDICAL CARE

Thomas ex rel. Smith v. Cook County Sheriff, 401 F.Supp.2d 867 (N.D.111. 2005). The
administrator of a detainee's estate brought an action arising from the death of the detainee at
the jail, allegedly due to inadequate medical attention. The district court granted the defendants'
motions to dismiss in part, and denied in part. The court held that the administrator had
standing to sue on behalf of the surviving spouse and next of kin, and that the allegations were
sufficient to state most of the § 1983 claims. The court found that allegations of conspiracy were
insufficient to state a claim. The court held that the allegations were sufficient to remove the
shield of immunity under a state tort immunity act by pleading ''willing and wanton conduct."
According to the court, allegations that an institutional policy, whether an express policy or a
widespread practice, led to the death of the detainee due to deliberate indifference to the
detainee's medical needs, were sufficient to state a § 1983 claim. The detainee was suffering flulike conditions at the time of arrest and he complained of these symptoms to medical personnel
during his initial screening at the jail. Three days later his condition worsened and he requested
medical attention from several officers, who refused and told him he was just "dopesick." The
next three days the detainee, and fellow detainees on his behalf, requested medical attention and
their requests were denied by officers and medical technicians, and even made written requests.
The detainee was found unconscious on the floor of his cell on the seventh day after his
admission and he died of meningitis later that day. (Cook County Dept. of Corrections, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES
MAIL
ACCESS TO
COURT
MEDICAL CARE

Thomsen v. Ross, 368 F.Supp.2d 961 (D.Minn. 2005). A detainee brought a§ 1983 civil rights
action against a county and county employees, alleging he was wrongfully strip searched and
suffered a broken hand after he arrested on driving under the influence (DUI) charges. The
district court granted summary judgment for the defendants in part, and denied it in part.
The district court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact
regarding the reasonableness of the strip search, and the existence and implementation of a
county policy authorizing strip searches for all gross misdemeanant arrestees. The court found
that even if a police officer grabbed the detainee and threw him to the floor, his actions did not
amount to the use of excessive force in violation of due process, absent evidence that the officer's
actions caused the detainee's lost tooth and broken hand. The court held that opening three of
the detainee's attorney letters outside of his presence did not violate his Fourteenth Amendment
right to court access, where the letters were not confiscated and did not prevent the detainee
from communicating with his attorney, and did not address matters of defense strategy.
According to the court, the detainee failed to identify any conceivable way in which the
information contained in the letters, even if read by jail officials, interfered with his defense or
hindered his access to the courts. The court noted that respect for the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments obliges a jail to open legal mail in the inmate's presence and to ensure it is not
read. The court found that the detainee's broken hand was not a serious medical need, such that
a 48-hour delay by county employees in taking the detainee to a hospital could amount to
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, absent evidence that a red and swollen hand
was a critical or escalating situation requiring immediate attention, or that the delay
jeopardized the detainee's prognosis. The court noted that employees took the detainee to the
hospital on the on the evening he made the written request for treatment. (Crow Wing County
Jail, Minnesota)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
TELEPHONE
VISITS

U.S. v. Ali, 396 F.Supp.2d 703 (E.D.Va. 2005). A pretrial detainee who was charged with
terrorism-related offenses filed a motion for relief from conditions of confinement. The district
court denied the motion, finding that the measures imposed did not violate due process. The
court also found that judicial relief was not available because the detainee did not exhaust
available administrative remedies, even though the detainee completed an inmate request form
seeking permission to receive regular phone calls to his family and lawyers, and visits from his
family. According to the court, the detainee did not pursue succeeding options available to him
when his request was denied. The court held that the "Special Administrative Measures" (SAM)
imposed on the detainee at the request of the Attorney General did not violate the detainee's due
process rights, where the SAMs were imposed to further the legitimate and compelling purpose
of preventing future terrorist acts. The measures prevented the detainee from receiving regular
phone calls from his family and lawyers, and from receiving visits from his family. According to
the court, there was no alternative means to prevent the detainee from communicating with his
confederates, and the special accommodations sought by the detainee would have imposed
unreasonable burdens on prison and law enforcement personnel. The court noted that the
measures did not restrict the detainee's ability to help prepare his own defense. (Alexandria
Detention Center, Virginia)
32.136

XIX

U.S. District Court
SEGREGATION
SEPARATION

U.S. v. Basciano, 369 F.Supp.2d 344 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). A purported crime boss who was being
held as a pretrial detainee petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, challenging his detention in a
restrictive special housing unit. The district court granted the petition, finding that indefinite
solitary confinement of the detainee was not reasonably related to the government's legitimate
objective of preventing the detainee from allegedly planning or approving violent criminal
conduct while behind bars. The court held that to justify such "harsh" detention, more
substantial proof was required that the detainee committed or directed the crime of murder in
aid of racketeering while in detention, or had conspired with another inmate to murder a federal
prosecutor. According to the court, the security restrictions placed obstacles on the detainee's
communications with his attorneys, which was especially important because the detainee was
charged with a crime for which he could receive the death penalty. (Federal Bureau of Prisons,
Metropolitan Correctional Center, Manhattan, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
MENTAL
HEALTH

U.S. v. Evans, 404 F.3d 227 (4th Cir. 2005). A detainee appealed the decision of a district court
to medicate a detainee against his will to render him competent to stand trial. The appeals court
vacated and remanded with instructions, finding that the government failed to demonstrate that
involuntary medication would "significantly further'' its prosecutorial interest and that it was
"medically appropriate." According to the court, the government did not disclose the particular
medication and dose range that it proposed to give the detainee, or indicate that it considered
the detainee's particular mental or physical condition in reaching its conclusions. (Federal
Correctional Institution, Butner, North Carolina)

U.S. District Court
INITIAL
APPEARANCE

U.S. v. Johnson, 352 F.Supp.2d 596 (D.Md. 2005). A detainee challenged his two-and-a-half day
delay in being presented to a judicial officer after his arrest. The court found that the delay was
reasonable, and was necessitated by the detainee's urgent need to receive medical care. (Western
District Police Station and Central Booking, Baltimore, Maryland)

U.S. District Court
RELEASE

U.S. v. Marcello, 370 F.Supp.2d 745 (N.D.Ill. 2005). In a pretrial detention hearing, the
government asked the court for permission to have the son of the murder victim offer an oral
statement opposing the release of the defendants. The district court denied the request, finding
that the statute that allows crime victims to be "reasonably heard at any public proceeding in
the district court involving release, plea, sentencing or any parole hearing" did not mandate oral
presentation of a victim statement. The court noted that a written statement could be
considered, but that the statement was not material to the "decision at hand." (U.S. District
Court, Northern District of Illinois)

U.S. District Court
INVOLUNTARY
MEDICATION

U.S. v. Rivera-Morales, 365 F.Supp.2d 1139 (S.D.Cal. 2005). After a defendant was determined
to be incompetent to stand trial and was committed to the Attorney General for treatment, the
government moved for an order directing the facility director to evaluate the defendant for
future dangerousness. The district court held that the use of involuntary medication to restore
the defendant to competency was inappropriate and ordered the defendant to be detained for an
additional 30 days to determine if he was subject to state commitment. (Federal Medical Center,
Butner, North Carolina)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO
PROTECT
SUPERVISION

Velez v. Johnson, 395 F.3d 732 (7 th Cir. 2005). A county jail detainee brought a§ 1983 action
against a county correctional officer, alleging that the officer failed to protect him from an
assault by another inmate by failing to adequately respond and investigate the situation when
the detainee pushed the emergency call button in his cell. The detainee had unsuccessfully
attempted to alert the officer who checked the cell during his rounds, but his cellmate was
holding a razor to his neck at the time. After the officer left the area, the detainee pushed the
emergency call button in his cell, hoping for help. The detainee had to choose his words carefully
and said he was "not getting along'' with his cellmate. The officer did not investigate the
situation nor ask the other officers to do so. The detainee was raped by his cellmate, bitten on his
back several times, and cut on his neck. The district court denied the officer's motion for
summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity and the officer appealed. The appeals
court affirmed, finding that the detainee need not show that the officer had a specific awareness
that an assault would occur, but that it was sufficient to show that the officer failed to act
despite his know ledge of a substantial risk of harm. The court held that the detainee had a
clearly established Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from the officer's deliberate
indifference to an assault by another inmate. (Milwaukee County Jail, Wisconsin)

U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE
MEDICAL CARE

Woloszyn v. County ofLawrence, 396 F.3d 314 (3 rd Cir. 2005). The administratrix of a pretrial
detainee who committed suicide in jail brought a § 1983 action and wrongful death claims
against and county and corrections officers. The district court granted summary judgment in
favor of the defendants and the administratrix appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding
that the administratrix failed to establish that the corrections officers were aware of the
detainee's vulnerability to suicide. The court noted that even though a captain said he would put
the detainee on five-minute checks, he also said that he would follow a nurse's advice. The nurse
found the detainee to be polite, cooperative and alert, and cleared the detainee for one-hour
32.137

XIX

checks for signs of alcohol withdrawal. The detainee told a booking officer he was not suicidal
and appeared to be in good spirits. The court also held that the fact that a breathing mask was
not in its designated location did not constitute deliberate indifference. Upon finding the
detainee hanging by a sheet, officers immediately initiated CPR without waiting for the
protective mask to arrive, they continued CPR until a protective breathing mask arrived, and
the administratrix did not claim that immediate use of the protective mask would have
prevented the detainee's death. The court found that the administratrix's expert failed to
identify what specific type of training would have alerted officers to the fact that the detainee
was suicidal. (Lawrence County Correctional Facility, Pennsylvania)
2006
U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Acosta v. U.S. Marshals Service, 445 F.3d 509 (1st Cir. 2006). A detainee brought an action
against the United States Marshals Service, various county jails where he was detained, doctors
in a federal prison, a private medical center, a private doctor, and others, alleging claims under §
1983 and the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), and alleging negligence under state law. The
district court dismissed the action and the detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The
court held that filing of an administrative claim with the United States Marshals Service was
insufficient to satisfy the administrative exhaustion requirement of the Prison Litigation Reform
Act (PLRA), for the purpose of§ 1983 claims against county jails and a federal prison doctor. The
court noted that administrative claims against the county jails had to be directed to those
facilities, and claims alleging wrongdoing by a doctor at a federal prison had to be filed with the
federal Bureau of Prisons. The court ruled that FTCA claims against county facilities were
barred by the independent contractor exemption of the FTCA. According to the court, allegations
did not state deliberate indifference claims against a private medical center or a private doctor
with allegations that someone at a private medical center overmedicated him, and that a private
doctor failed to properly diagnose the severity of his foot injury. The detainee had been arrested
on federal drug and firearm charges and he was held without bail. During his pretrial detention,
the United States Marshals Service lodged him in several county jail facilities with which it
contracts, and he also spent time in two federal facilities. (Hillsborough County Department of
Corrections, NH; Cumberland County Jail, Maine; Merrimack County House of Corrections, NH;
FMC Rochester, MN; Strafford County House of Corrections, NH; FCI Raybrook, NY)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Beasley v. City ofSugar Land, 410 F.Supp.2d 524 (S.D.Tex. 2006). An arrestee sued a city under
§ 1983, claiming she was subjected to a strip search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The
city moved for summary judgment and the district court entered summary judgment for the city.
The court held that the municipality's policy of authorizing strip searches only when an official
had reasonable suspicion that an arrestee was a threat to facility security, did not violate the
Fourth Amendment. The arrestee was cited for driving her mother's car with no driver's license,
no current motor vehicle inspection or registration, no insurance, and no license plate light, a
few days after her eighteenth birthday. She was summoned to appear in court but mistakenly
appeared five days late. She was arrested at her house on a warrant for failure to appear and
she was allowed to put on shoes and socks, but was taken to jail in the clothes she was wearing··
pajama pants and a cotton shirt with no bra. On the way to the city jail the arresting officer
radioed for a female officer to meet him at the jail to perform a search. At the jail a female police
officer told the arrestee to stand with her hands against a wall. She instructed the arrestee to lift
her shirt and the officer lifted Beasley's breasts to feel beneath them. The officer then instructed
the arrestee to drop her pants while continuing to hold up her shirt. The officer pulled the
arrestee's panties taut and did a quick two-finger swipe across Beasley's vagina. The male
arresting officer allegedly witnessed this search. The arrestee initially alleged that she was
subjected to a "strip search and body cavity search," but the court found that her description of
the events did not indicate that a body cavity search occurred. (City of Sugar Land, Texas)

U.S. District Court
SEPARATION
ADA- Americans
with Disabilities
Act
RA· Rehabilitation
Act

Bircoll v. Miami-Dade County, 410 F.Supp.2d 1280 (S.D.Fla. 2006). A deaf motorist brought an
action against a county, alleging that his arrest for driving under the influence (DUI) and
subsequent detention violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation
Act (RA). The motorist alleged that throughout the arrest process, the county failed to establish
effective communication because it did not provide him with any auxiliary aids as required by
the ADA and RA. The county moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the
motion. The court held that the motorist's arrest for driving under the influence (DUI) and his
subsequent stationhouse detention was not covered by the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act (RA).
According to the court, the motorist's arrest was due to his erratic and suspicious driving, not his
disability, and following his arrest the police merely communicated the breath test consent form
to the motorist, who foreclosed further questioning by requesting an attorney through his
driver's rights card. The court held that the detention of the motorist following his arrest for
driving under the influence (DUI) did not violate the Rehabilitation Act (RA), where the motorist
was not detained because of his disability, but instead was detained because Florida law
required a DUI arrestee to be detained for at least eight hours. The court found that a county
police officer did not intentionally discriminate, act in bad faith, or act with deliberate
32.138

XIX

indifference during the initial stop and arrest of the motorist, as required to support the award
of compensatory damages under the Rehabilitation Act (RA). As the officer became aware of the
motorist's disability, the officer allowed the motorist to get out of his car so they could speak face
to face, and attempted to communicate through sign language. The officer believed in good faith
that effective communication was established because the motorist responded to him, and the
motorist read the implied consent form. The court found that the detention of the deaf motorist
in solitary confinement following his arrest did not rise to the level of intentional discrimination
or deliberate indifference to the motorist's disability, as required to support the award of
compensatory damages under the Rehabilitation Act (RA). Corrections facility officers believed
that their communication with the motorist was effective and they detained the motorist in
solitary confinement as a good faith protective measure, not as a discriminatory act. (MiamiDade County, Florida)
U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Burkett v. Wicker, 435 F.Supp.2d 875 (N.D.Ind. 2006). A prisoner, proceeding pro se, brought a
civil rights action under § 1983 against a jail nurse and others, alleging that he was denied
medical treatment while he was a pretrial detainee. The inmate alleged that a jail nurse made a
false entry into the prisoner's medical record, denied him doses of his prescribed medication,
prevented him from seeing a doctor, and delayed filling his prescription, that the nurse knew
that his hand was injured and that it would get worse without treatment, and that because of
her deliberate indifference to his serious medical need, he developed an infection, his hand did
not heal properly, he had permanent disfigurement, and he was in prolonged, unnecessary pain.
The district court held that the allegations supported a claim for violation of Eighth
Amendment's prescription against cruel and unusual punishment. But the court found that no
liability existed against the nurse in her official capacity, for allegedly denying the prisoner
medical treatment while he was a pretrial detainee, in violation of the Eighth Amendment,
absent any allegation that the nurse was acting pursuant to a policy or custom. (Cass County
Jail, Indiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Butler v. Fletcher, 465 F.3d 340 (8th Cir. 2006). A prisoner who was transferred from a county

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES
RELEASE

Bynum v. District of Columbia, 412 F.Supp.2d 73 (D.D.C. 2006). Persons who had been, were, or
would be incarcerated by the District of Columbia Department of Corrections brought a § 1983
class action challenging the Department's policy of conducting suspicionless strip searches of
inmates who were declared releasable after their court appearances, and challenging alleged
over-detentions. The district court preliminarily approved a proposed settlement. Following a
final approval hearing, the district court held that final approval was warranted and that the
allocation of a sum for distribution to all class members who submitted claims was a fair method
of distribution. The court held that the distribution fund of $12 million was very favorable,
especially in view of the low number of opt-outs and objectors. The court found that there was no
collusion between the parties or their counsel and that the settlement comported with the rule
governing class actions and with due process requirements. The court found that the attorney fee
award of 33% of the settlement fund, or $4 million, was reasonable, noting that counsel had
engaged in protracted efforts over four years to obtain the outstanding settlement in both
monetary and injunctive terms, the case was complex and involved novel issues, the case carried
a serious risk of lack of success, and the settlement met with a high level of class satisfaction.
The court defined the “Over-Detention Injunctive Relief Class” as: (a) Each person who has been,
is or will be incarcerated in any District of Columbia Department of Corrections facility
beginning in the three years preceding the filing of the action on or about May 16, 2002 up to
and until the date this case is terminated; and (b) who was not released, or, in the future will
not be released by midnight on the date on which the person is entitled to be released by court
order or the date on which the basis for his or her detention has otherwise expired. (District of
Columbia Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
RESTRAINTS
USE OF FORCE

Calvi v. Knox County, 470 F.3d 422 (1st Cir. 2006). A female arrestee brought a § 1983 action

jail to a prison after his conviction, where he tested positive for tuberculosis (TB), filed a § 1983
action against a county sheriff, alleging the sheriff violated his substantive due process rights by
failing to adopt and implement adequate safeguards protecting county jail inmates from TB
infection. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the sheriff and the prisoner
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the sheriff did not act with deliberate
indifference to a serious health risk that TB posed to detainees in the county jail. The prisoner
alleged that he spent most of his time at the jail in two-person cells and in larger holding cells,
where as many as twenty-six short-term detainees were held under deplorable sanitary
conditions. He asserted that the sheriff’s policy of placing short-term detainees in multi-person
cells without an initial TB screening inadequately protects detainees from the serious health
risk of TB. (Ramsey County Adult Detention Center, Minnesota)

against a city, city officers, a county, and county officers alleging excessive force. The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the plaintiff appealed. The
appeals court affirmed. The court held that an officer who handcuffed the arrestee in the
customary manner by cuffing her hands behind her back did not use excessive force, even if the

32.139
XX

officer knew that the arrestee had a hand deformity. The court noted that the officer's decision to
not deviate from the standard practice of placing handcuffs behind the back was a judgment call.
The arrestee had told the officer to be gentle because she was frail and had recently undergone
elbow surgery. The officer double-locked the handcuffs behind her back so that they would not
tighten. He then marched her outside, deposited her in his cruiser, and belted her in for
transport to the jail. Upon arriving at the lockup, the arrestee was transferred to the custody of
a jail officer, who unlocked the handcuffs, patted her down, and placed her in a holding cell.
After other required aspects of the booking process had been completed, another jail officer
fingerprinted the arrestee, who claimed that the officer who fingerprinted her repeatedly pushed
her fingers down hard, in spite of being told that she had a hand deformity. She also claimed
that the fingerprinting caused injuries to her wrist and her surgically repaired middle finger.
(Knox County Jail, Maine)
U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO
PROTECT
RESTRAINTS

Carroll v. City of Quincy, 441 F.Supp.2d 215 (D.Mass. 2006). A pretrial detainee who was injured
when he fell in a cell after being left with his hands handcuffed behind his back, sued a city and
city police officers, alleging negligence and violations of his federal and state civil rights. The
detainee fell as he attempted to exit the cell when he was still handcuffed. It was later
determined at the hospital that the detainee had a blood alcohol content of 0.37. The detainee
allegedly sustained serious injuries, including a subdural hematoma, traumatic brain injury,
depressive illness and seizure disorder. The district court held that genuine issues of material
fact existed as to whether city police officers had subjective knowledge the detainee's highly
intoxicated state, and whether they acted with deliberate indifference when they left him with
his hands handcuffed behind his back. The court found that the officers' conduct in leaving the
highly intoxicated pretrial detainee in a cell was not undertaken pursuant to any city policy or
custom, as required for the imposition of municipal liability, where the city had rather detailed
written policies restricting the use of handcuffs. The court noted that an officer testified that if
an arrestee was too intoxicated to be booked, it was the usual practice to put the arrestee in a
cell until he/she sobered up and, during that period, the handcuffs would be removed unless the
detainee was acting violently. According to the court, the officers' conduct in leaving the
detainee alone with his hands handcuffed behind his back was not caused by deliberately
indifferent policies of the city, where the city's policies clearly delineated the proper procedures
for the use of restraints on intoxicated detainees and the handling of such detainees. (City of
Quincy Police Station, Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO
PROTECT

Cirilla v. Kankakee County Jail, 438 F.Supp.2d 937 (C.D.Ill. 2006). A pretrial detainee brought a

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Dare v. Knox County, 465 F.Supp.2d 17 (D.Me. 2006). In a class action, persons strip-searched
by jail officials agreed to a consent decree. The district court approved the agreement, issuing an
injunction ensuring compliance with the Fourth Amendment law governing strip searches of
certain arrestees. The court enjoined the county from strip searching any persons charged with a
crime that does not involve weapons, violence or controlled or scheduled substances during the
jail admission process, while they are being held awaiting bail or a first court appearance, or
after being arrested on a default or other warrant, unless the officer or person conducting the
strip search has reasonable suspicion to believe the person does possess a weapon, controlled or
scheduled substances, or other contraband. The court ordered the sheriff and his successors to
keep a written log that records every instance in which a newly-admitted individual is subject to
a strip search procedure, with the following information: (1) the date and time of the search
procedure; (2) the name of each officer participating in the search procedure; (3) a brief
statement of facts found to constitute “reasonable suspicion” for a strip search, to include the
crime with which the individual was charged; and (4) the name of the officer who made the
determination that “reasonable suspicion” warranted a strip search and who approved the
search. The agreement also provided for monetary compensation of persons who had been
improperly strip-searched. (Knox County Jail, Maine)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Davis v. Carter, 452 F.3d 686 (7th Cir. 2006). A plaintiff filed an action on behalf of an inmate’s
estate, alleging that county jail officials failed to provide adequate medical assistance to the
inmate. The inmate’s death in the county jail was due to sudden withdrawal from his prescribed
methadone medication. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the officials
and the plaintiff appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

§ 1983 action against a county jail and jail personnel, alleging violations of his due process
rights. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court held
that the county jail and jail personnel were not aware of, and deliberately indifferent to, a
specific, impending, and substantial threat to the pretrial detainee's safety, as required for
liability under § 1983 for failure to protect detainee from other inmates in violation of detainee's
right to due process. According to the court, even if the detainee was involved in several
altercations with other inmates, he never filed grievances or complaints about those incidents,
he claimed only some bruising and a bloody nose as result of the altercations, and although the
detainee requested medical attention for a sore finger after the altercations, he did not complain
at that time about injuries from fights. (Kankakee County Jail, Illinois)

32.140
XX

The court held that fact issues remained as to whether the county had a widespread practice or
custom of inordinate delay in providing methadone treatment to inmates. The court found that a
county jail officer was not deliberately indifferent to the inmate’s methadone withdrawal
symptoms, and thus was not subject to liability under § 1983 for an Eighth Amendment
violation following the inmate’s death, even though the officer received a call from the inmate’s
wife informing her that the inmate had not yet received methadone treatment and was in
excruciating pain. The officer responded that the county “don’t work that fast,” but appropriately
transferred the call to a person responsible for the inmate’s medical care. There was no evidence
that the officer’s job duties included anything more than answering the telephones. (Cook
County Jail, Illinois)
U.S. District Court
USE OF FORCE
MEDICAL CARE

Davis v. Township of Paulsboro, 421 F.Supp.2d 835 (D.N.J. 2006). The parents of an arrestee

U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE
ATTEMPT
SUPERVISION

Drake ex rel. Cotton v. Koss, 445 F.3d 1038 (8th Cir. 2006). The legal guardian for an
incapacitated person who attempted to commit suicide while he was a pretrial detainee in a
county jail, and a state department of human services sued a county and various officials in their
individual and official capacities under § 1983, alleging violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments, and asserted a state law claim for negligence. The district court granted the
defendants' motion for summary judgment and the guardian appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. On rehearing, the appeals court held that county jailers' actions did not constitute
deliberate indifference, and the jailers' decision not to assign a special need classification to the
pretrial detainee was a discretionary decision protected by official immunity. According to the
court, the jailers' actions of conducting well-being checks of the pretrial detainee only every 30
minutes, failing to remove bedding and clothing, and failing to fill the detainee's anti-anxiety
prescription in a timely manner did not constitute deliberate indifference. The court found that
the jailers' view of the risk was shaped by the diagnosis and recommendations of a psychiatrist,
who indicated that the detainee was not suicidal but simply manipulative. The court noted that
the jailers' decision not to assign a special need classification to the pretrial detainee, that would
have required more frequent observation, was a discretionary decision rather than a ministerial
duty, protected by official immunity. The detainee was discovered hanging by a bed sheet from a
ceiling vent in his cell. He was not breathing and the jailers immediately set to work
resuscitating him and then transported him to a nearby hospital. He survived, but suffered
serious brain injuries as a result of the suicide attempt. (McLeod County Jail, Minnesota)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Dukes v. Georgia, 428 F.Supp.2d 1298 (N.D.Ga. 2006). A pretrial detainee brought an action
against state and county defendants as well as jail personnel, alleging deliberate indifference to
a serious medical need, violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the
Rehabilitation Act, and medical malpractice. The defendants filed motions for summary
judgment. The court held that jail personnel did not violate the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) or the Rehabilitation Act when an officer and others allegedly told other inmates of the
detainee's status as an HIV infected person, where the detainee did not show that such
disclosure denied him the benefits of any program or service or that it discriminated against
him. The court also found no ADA or Rehabilitation Act violation when an officer did not place a
mask on the detainee when he was being transported to the hospital, where the failure to place a
mask on the detainee did not deny him the benefits of any program or service or discriminate
against him. The court noted that transportation can be construed as a “program or service

brought a federal civil rights claim against a county, a township, and various law enforcement
officers, arising from arrestee's death which occurred after he had been struck in the head by a
bottle during a fight and then taken into police custody. The defendants moved for summary
judgment and the district court granted the motion. The court held that the officers did not use
excessive force in spraying the suspect with pepper spray, where he was visibly agitated, was
acting aggressively, was yelling profanities, banged walls in his house, and shoved an officer
three times, and no lasting injury occurred. According to the court, the officers did not use
excessive force in waiting to wash the pepper spray from the suspect's eyes until after he had
been transported from the site of the spraying to a police station because the suspect continued
to physically resist officers and persisted in yelling and cursing after being sprayed. The court
found that an officer did not use excessive force in removing the arrestee from his cell, where the
officer nudged the arrestee several times on his lower leg in an attempt to rouse him, stepped
into the cell and grabbed the arrestee by the arm, smoothly pulled the suspect by the arm off the
bench and onto his hands and knees, pulled him a few feet across the floor, and placed handcuffs
on him. The court held that Township officers were not deliberately indifferent to the serious
medical needs of the arrestee who had been hit on the head with a bottle in a fight prior to
arrest, and thus due process principles were not violated, where an ambulance arrived to
transport the arrestee to a hospital within minutes of the arrestee's arrival at police
headquarters, a doctor examined the arrestee and determined he was fit for incarceration, and
the arrestee was periodically checked once back at the police station. According to the court, the
fact that the arrestee vomited and was still bleeding upon his return to the police station did not
establish deliberate indifference. (Gloucester County Sheriff's Department, Township of
Paulsboro, New Jersey)

32.141
XX

provided by the public entity” for the purposes of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA). According to the court, even if a physician's failure to diagnose the pretrial detainee's
cryptococcus was negligent or even severely negligent, her actions and treatment of the detainee
did not constitute deliberate indifference to the detainee's serious medical needs in violation of
due process where the detainee was receiving treatment for his symptoms and his underlying
illness, HIV, and while in hindsight it appeared that a lesion shown by the x-rays was in fact
cryptococcus, there was no showing that indicated that the physician was ever aware of that
severe risk. The court held that a jail nurse was not deliberately indifferent to the detainee's
serious medical needs in violation of the due process clause, where she responded to all requests
for medical service and conveyed the requests and relevant information to a physician, and did
not have substantial knowledge of a serious medical risk when she observed that the detainee
was not moving about, was urinating on his mat, and was cursing at the staff. (Coweta County
Jail, Georgia)
U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Gilanian v. City of Boston, 431 F.Supp.2d 172 (D.Mass. 2006). A detainee brought a civil rights
action against a municipality, county, sheriff, and corrections officers alleging that strip searches
violated her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The
district court denied the detainee’s motion, finding that fact issues as to whether the strip search
of the detainee was justified and whether the search was conducted in a reasonable manner,
precluded summary judgment. The case challenged two strip-searches of the detainee conducted
while she was held in pretrial detention, and asserted claims against the City of Boston, Suffolk
County, Suffolk County Sheriff Richard Rouse, and two unidentified Suffolk County corrections
officers. The court suggested that the trial should focus primarily on the question of whether
there was a less restrictive alternative. The court posed questions, including: could the policy
change, from strip-searching to segregation, have been implemented at the time of the detainee’s
second strip-search; what changes, if any, in staffing, space allocation, and budget were
necessary for the jail to switch to segregation after the Roberts decision; what less restrictive
alternatives, other than segregation, might have been available to the Jail in March 2000; if the
switch to segregation was possible in 2001, how far back in time is it proper to assume that the
same switch could have been made? (Nashua Street Jail, Suffolk County, Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Glass v. Rodriguez, 417 F.Supp.2d 943 (N.D.Ill. 2006). A state inmate brought an action against
a doctor at a county jail, alleging deliberate indifference to his back problems while he was a
pretrial detainee. The doctor moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the
motion. The court held that the doctor was not deliberately indifferent to the serious medical
condition of the detainee with back pain, as would violate the Due Process Clause, even though
the detainee never underwent an MRI and he was not able to see a physician every week as he
would have wished. The court found that doctors, orthopedic specialists, and physical therapists
used x-rays and CAT scans to diagnose the detainee's condition and to develop a treatment plan,
and the detainee was provided with pain medication, physical therapy, and visits to an outside
clinic. The court noted that neither simple medical malpractice nor mere dissatisfaction with a
doctor's prescribed course of treatment is actionable as Eighth Amendment deliberate
indifference under § 1983. (Cook County Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
ACCESS TO
COURTS
MENTAL
HEALTH
RESTRAINTS

Glisson v. Sangamon County Sheriff’s Department, 408 F.Supp.2d 609 (C.D.Ill. 2006). A detainee
brought a civil rights action against county defendants and a police officer, alleging various
violations of his constitutional rights in connection with his arrest and detention. The
defendants moved to dismiss. The district court dismissed in part and declined to dismiss in
part. The court held that the detainee sufficiently stated claims under the Eighth Amendment
and Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment against a jail and a correctional officer
with respect to both his first and second detentions. The court found that the detainee, who was
awaiting a probation revocation hearing, sufficiently stated a claim under the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments by alleging that the county jail maintained policies and customs that
tolerated cruel and unusual punishment of convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees, and that
the correctional officer strapped him to a wheelchair for several hours, forcing him to urinate on
himself and to sit in his urine for several hours, while he was in a manic state. The inmate
alleged that the jail and correctional officer knew of his mental condition because it was
documented and that the officer's and jail's acts were intentional with malice and reckless
disregard for his federally protected rights. The court held that the detainee sufficiently stated
denial of access to courts claims against a county jail and correctional officers by alleging that
the jail maintained a policy and practice of arbitrarily denying inmates’ confidential
consultations with their attorneys and that the officers directly participated in the arbitrary and
capricious denial of his access to counsel. The court found that the detainee stated an equal
protection claim against a county jail and officer by alleging that the jail maintained a policy and
practice that discriminated against him because of his mental illness, and that an officer
discriminated against him in terms of the type of confinement on the basis of his mental illness.
(Sangamon County Jail, Village of Grandview Police, Illinois)

32.142
XX

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO
PROTECT
SUICIDE

Grayson v. Ross, 454 F.3d 802 (8th Cir. 2006). The personal representative of the estate of a

U.S. District Court
RELIGION

Ha'min v. Lewis, 440 F.Supp.2d 715 (M.D.Tenn. 2006). A Muslim county jail inmate sued a
county, claiming that the county violated his First Amendment rights by failing to accommodate
his religious needs. The district court dismissed the complaint in part and the county moved for
summary judgment. The court held that the Establishment Clause was not violated when the
county provided Bibles to inmates, but did not provide the Quran to the Muslim inmate, where
the county, which did not pay for any religious materials, distributed donated Bibles to inmates
and would have distributed donated Qurans, if any had been received. The inmate's request the
county removed his copy of the Quran from his stored personal property and gave it to him. The
court found that the county did not violate the free exercise of religion rights of the inmate by
failing to hold Muslim services, where two Imams recruited by the county quit, the county was
searching the Muslim community for a replacement, the complaining inmate was barred from
conducting services himself by a policy against any inmate-led religious ceremonies, and the
county accommodated the inmate in private worship by providing a Quran, prayer rug, and a
compass. (Montgomery County Jail, Tennessee)

U.S. Appeals Court
RESTRAINTS
CLASSIFICATION

Hanks v. Prachar, 457 F.3d 774 (8th Cir. 2006). A former county jail detainee brought a § 1983
action against county jail officials, alleging violation of his due process rights in connection with
the use of restraints and confinement, requesting damages and injunctive relief. The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of the officials and the former detainee appealed. The
appeals court affirmed the grant of summary judgment on the claims for injunctive relief,
reversed the grant of summary judgment on the claims for damages, and remanded for further
proceedings. The court held that the detainee's claim for injunctive relief was rendered moot by
detainee's release from jail. The court found that summary judgment was precluded by genuine
issues of material fact as to whether the detainee was restrained in shackles and chains or
confined in a padded unit for the purpose punishment, or for valid reasons related to legitimate
goals. The detainee alleged he was placed in four-point restraints, chained to a wall in a “rubber
room,” forced to shower in waist chains and shackles, and denied hearings before being
punished. The detainee was 17 years old when he was admitted to the jail. (St. Louis County
Jail, Minnesota)

U.S. Appeals Court
FALSE IMPRISONMENT

Hernandez v. Sheahan, 455 F.3d 772 (7th Cir. 2006). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action
against a city and county sheriff’s department, alleging that police and sheriff’s deputies violated
his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by refusing to entertain his claim that he was
being held in custody due to mistaken identity. The district court granted summary judgment in
favor of city, and entered judgment upon a jury verdict against the sheriff’s department. The
arrestee and sheriff’s department appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed in
part. The court held that the sheriff’s department was not entitled to quasi-judicial immunity in
the arrestee’s § 1983 action, where units of government were not entitled to immunity in § 1983
actions, and the judge who arraigned the arrestee did not forbid the sheriff’s department from
conducting further inquires into the arrestee’s identity. The court found that the sheriff’s
department policy of ignoring an arrestee’s claims of mistaken identity after an arrestee has
appeared in court and a judge had ordered him held in custody did not violate the arrestee’s
right to due process, as required for the department to be liable under § 1983 to the arrestee.
The detainee was held by the department for 13 days after his arraignment on a warrant that
had been issued for someone else. The court noted that the judge did not abdicate responsibility
to determine the arrestee’s identity or delegate that responsibility to the department, and there
was no doubt that the arrestee was the person that the judge ordered held at arraignment.
(Cook County, Illinois)

pretrial detainee who died following self-mutilation while incarcerated in a jail, brought a civil
rights action against the county sheriff, the arresting police officer, and jailers in their
individual and official capacities alleging violation of the pretrial detainee’s right to medical
treatment and to due process. The district court granted judgment for the defendants and the
estate appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part. The court held that: (1) the detainee did not
have an objectively serious medical need on intake from the perspective of the arresting police
officer, as a layperson; (2) the arresting police officer did not subjectively know that the detainee
required medical attention; (3) a reasonable police officer would not have known on intake that
the pretrial detainee had an objectively serious medical need; (4) the detainee did not have an
objectively serious medical need on intake from the perspective of the jailer, as a layperson; (5)
the jailer did not subjectively know that the detainee required medical attention; (6) a
reasonable jailer would not have known on intake that the pretrial detainee had an objectively
serious medical need; (7) the county did not have an official practice of booking inmates who
were hallucinating without providing medical care; and (8) the district court did not abuse its
discretion by excluding the Arkansas State Jail Standards from evidence in the trial, as the jail
standards did not represent minimum constitutional standards. (Crawford County Detention
Center, Arkansas)

32.143
XX

U.S. Appeals Court
MENTAL
HEALTH

Hills v. Kentucky, 457 F.3d 583 (6th Cir. 2006). An arrestee brought a civil rights action against
a treating psychiatrist at a state correctional psychiatric center where the arrestee was held,
alleging constitutional violations arising out of his being forcibly medicated. The district court
denied the psychiatrist’s motion for summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity and
the psychiatrist appealed. The court of appeals reversed and remanded, finding that the
psychiatrist was entitled to qualified immunity. According to the court, a reasonable
governmental employee in the position of the treating psychiatrist who prescribed medication to
be forcibly administered to the arrestee would not have clearly known his conduct was unlawful,
and thus, the psychiatrist was entitled to qualified immunity in the arrestee’s civil rights action
against him. The court order that authorized the arrestee’s transfer to the center for treatment
and examination after the court had found that the arrestee was not competent to stand trial on
a burglary charge, stated that the treatment ordered included forced medication if necessary,
and after seven weeks of treatment, the center’s mental health professionals concluded that the
arrestee could benefit from antipsychotic medication. (Kentucky Cor’l. Psychiatric Center)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
CONDITIONS
CROWDING

Hubbard v. Taylor, 452 F.Supp.2d 533 (D.Del. 2006). Pretrial detainees filed suit under § 1983,

U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCHES

In re Nassau County Strip Search Cases, 461 F.3d 219 (2d Cir. 2006). Arrestees brought an
action against a county and others, challenging the county correctional center's blanket strip
search policy for newly-admitted, misdemeanor detainees. The district court denied the
plaintiffs' class certification motions, and the plaintiffs appealed. The appeals court reversed in
part and remanded in part. The court held that common issues predominated over individual
issues as to liability in this case, and the class action device was a superior litigation mechanism
as to the issue of liability. (Nassau County Correctional Center, New York)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES
RELIGION

Jean-Laurent v. Wilkerson, 438 F.Supp.2d 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). A detainee in a state facility

U.S. District Court
USE OF FORCE
RESTRAINTS

Jenkins v. Wilson, 432 F.Supp.2d 808 (W.D.Wis. 2006). A pretrial detainee brought a civil rights

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Johnson v. District of Columbia, 461 F.Supp.2d 48 (D.D.C. 2006). Pre-presentment arrestees

challenging conditions of their confinement on Fourteenth Amendment due process grounds, and
a prisoner imprisoned at the same facility asserted a claim under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA). The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment
and plaintiffs appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. On remand, the district court
granted summary judgment for the defendants. The court held that requiring the pretrial
detainees to sleep on a mattress on the floor of their cells for a period of three to seven months
did not violate the detainees' Fourteenth Amendment due process rights, because providing
sleeping accommodations on the floor was in response to overcrowding at the facility and was not
intended to punish. The court noted that even if the pretrial detainees' constitutional rights were
violated by requiring them to sleep on mattresses on the floor, the law was not sufficiently clear
so that a reasonable official would understand that what he was doing violated a constitutional
right, entitling the officials to qualified immunity. The court held that a former inmate's
allegations that he was released from prison due to his end stage renal disease, rather than be
provided with medical care, failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), where the inmate was not denied adequate medical
services because of his end stage renal disease and he received regular dialysis treatment while
he was incarcerated. (Multi-Purpose Criminal Justice Facility, Delaware)

sued officers and supervisors under § 1983, claiming that he was searched in violation of his due
process rights. The district court held that the detainee stated a claim of unconstitutional strip
search, under the Fourth Amendment, when he alleged that officers, having conducted a
legitimate search in connection with prison-wide strip searches, took him out of his cell and
subjected him to a second search, even though he had been in their custody ever since the first
search, precluding any hiding of contraband on his person. The court also found that the
detainee stated claim that the second of two strip searches violated his First Amendment rights
as a Muslim, to avoid being seen naked. The court noted that while first search was in
furtherance of a compelling government need to maintain order, allowing the search despite
religious objection, there was no compelling government need for the second search. The court
held that the detainee stated a claim that officers imposed a substantial burden on the religious
exercise of the Muslim inmate, in violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA), by forcing him to submit to the second strip search. (George Motchan
Detention Center, New York City)

claim alleging that jail officers used excessive force. The district court held that a genuine issue
of fact, as to whether deputies were justified in hitting the pretrial detainee about the head in
attempting to handcuff him and transport him to segregation, precluded summary judgment.
(Dane County Jail, Wisconsin)

brought a § 1983 action against the District of Columbia, U.S. Marshal’s Service, and former
U.S. Marshal, alleging that arrestees were subject to blanket strip searches and visual cavity
searches without a reasonable individualized suspicion that the arrestees were concealing
weapons or contraband. The government defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a

32.144
XX

claim. The court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The district court held that: (1)
arrestees’ allegations that the District of Columbia knew, or should have known, that marshals
were unconstitutionally strip searching arrestees supported a § 1983 claim as to the District of
Columbia; (2) the alleged policy under a former U.S. Marshal, if true, violated the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments; (3) the right to be free from a blanket strip-search policy was clearly
established; and (4) allegations that a former marshal and District of Columbia acted in concert
in developing a policy stated a claim that the marshal was “state actor.” The arrestees alleged
that there were blanket strip searches and visual cavity searches at Superior Court without a
reasonable individualized suspicion, that subjected all female arrestees, but not male arrestees,
to blanket strip searches. (District of Columbia and U.S. Marshal for the D.C. Superior Court)
U.S. Appeals Court
ACCESS TO
COURT
CONDITIONS
INITIAL
APPEARANCE
RESTRAINTS

Lopez v. City of Chicago, 464 F.3d 711 (7th Cir. 2006). An arrestee brought an action against a
city and city police officers, alleging the duration and conditions of his detention violated his
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and asserting a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress. The district court entered judgment as matter of law in favor of the
defendants. The arrestee appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court found
that the arrestee’s conditions of confinement civil rights claim for the five-day period between
his arrest and his preliminary probable cause hearing was required to be analyzed under the
Fourth Amendment, using the “objectively unreasonable” standard, rather than under the
Eighth Amendment's “deliberate indifference” standard. The court held that the question was
for the jury. The arrestee presented evidence that he was shackled to the wall of an
interrogation room for four days, that he was deprived of food, drink, and sleep, and that he was
forced to yell for a long period of time before being let out to use the bathroom, and that the
defendant officers denied such treatment. The court found that the police officers violated the
arrestee's Fourth Amendment right to a prompt judicial probable cause determination by
holding him for a period of five days after his arrest without a probable cause hearing, for the
purpose of arrestee's § 1983 Fourth Amendment claim, absent any justification for the delay.
The arrestee had been arrested for a murder he did not commit. Following his arrest, the
defendants-- all police detectives-- kept him shackled to the wall of a windowless, nine-by-sevenfoot interrogation room for four days and nights while they investigated the case. The arrestee
had nowhere to sleep but a four-foot-by-ten-inch metal bench or the dirty brick floor. The
interrogation room had no toilet or sink; he had to “scream” for the detectives to let him out to
use a bathroom. He was given only one bologna sandwich and one serving of juice as food and
drink during the entire four days and nights that he was kept in the interrogation room. The
detectives questioned him from time to time and made him stand in two lineups. After two-anda-half days in these conditions, the arrestee started to become disoriented and began hearing
voices telling him to confess. He ultimately gave a statement containing a false confession that
did not match the details of the crime. On the fifth day of his detention, the arrestee was moved
to a city lockup, charged, and finally taken to court. The following day, the police investigation
led detectives to another individual who confessed to the murder. The arrestee was released the
next day. (Chicago Police Department's Area 5, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Marriott v. County of Montgomery, 426 F.Supp.2d 1 (N.D.N.Y. 2006.) Arrestees brought suit,

individually and on behalf of a class of others similarly situated, against a county sheriff's
department, county sheriff, county undersheriff, former county undersheriff, a jail administrator
and a lieutenant, challenging the constitutionality of the search policy of the county jail. The
district court held that the policy, pursuant to which arrestees being admitted to a county jail
were effectively subjected to strip searches, violated the Fourth Amendment and that the
arrestees were entitled to permanent injunctive relief. The court found that the arrestees were
the “prevailing parties” entitled to an award of attorney fees. According to the court, the Fourth
Amendment precludes officials from performing strip searches and/or body cavity searches of
arrestees charged with misdemeanors or other minor offenses unless the officials have a
reasonable suspicion that the arrestee is concealing weapons or other contraband based on the
crime charged, the particular characteristics of the arrestee, and/or the circumstances of the
arrest. The court held that the indiscriminate strip-searching of misdemeanor arrestees is
unconstitutional. The policy required arrestees to remove their clothing in front of a corrections
officer (CO) and take a shower, regardless of the nature of their crime and without any
determination that there was a reasonable suspicion that they possessed contraband. The court
found that the policy violated the Fourth Amendment, despite the claim that the written policy
did not involve either a command for the arrestee to undress completely or a command for the
CO to inspect the naked arrestee. The court noted that the procedure that was followed in fact by
the COs required all admittees to remove their clothes, submit to a visual examination by the
CO, and shower. The court held that the arrestees were entitled to a permanent injunction
prohibiting county jail officials from conducting a strip search, as set forth in the jail's “change
out” procedure. (Montgomery County Jail, New York)

32.145
XX

U.S. District Court
USE OF FORCE
PROTECTION
MEDICAL CARE

Moore v. Morales, 445 F.Supp.2d 1000 (N.D.Ill. 2006). The administrator of the estate of a
detainee who died in police custody brought a § 1983 action against arresting officers, and other
officers and employees of a police department who had processed the detainee at a police
station, alleging that the defendants either had used excessive force on the detainee, ultimately
leading to his death, or had been deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. The defendants
moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the motion in part and denied in
part. The court held that the summary judgment was precluded by fact issues as to the degree
of force used on the detainee, and whether some police officers failed to stop the infliction of
injuries on the detainee by fellow officers. The court found that the police had not shown
deliberate indifference to the condition of the detainee and that there was no cover-up of the
use of excessive force. (Chicago Police Department, 12th District Police Station, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
EXERCISE
ACCESS TO
COURT
SANITATION
CONDITIONS
VISITING

Murray v. Edwards County Sheriff's Dept., 453 F.Supp.2d 1280 (D.Kan. 2006). A former

U.S. District Court
PROTECTION
FEMALE

Newsome v. Lee County, Ala., 431 F.Supp.2d 1189 (M.D.Ala. 2006). A female county jail
detainee who had been raped by three inmates, sued a county and employees, alleging violation
of her federal and state rights. The district court dismissed the case in part, and denied
dismissal in part. The court held that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity on the
claim that they retaliated against the detainee for her efforts to report the rape. The court
found that the detainee stated a Fourteenth Amendment due process violation against the
officer who placed the detainee in a cell with male inmates, but against no other jail personnel.
The court also found valid claims of conspiracy, and conspiracy to block the opportunity to
report the rape, under § 1983 on the part of officer who placed the detainee in the cell with the
male inmates. After the incident, officers allegedly cut off the detainee’s access to phones and
visitors and threatened that there would be negative consequences if she persevered with her
charges. (Lee County Jail, Alabama)

U.S. District Court
RELIGION

Omar v. Casterline, 414 F.Supp.2d 582 (W.D.La. 2006). A detainee brought an action pursuant
to Bivens and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), alleging that federal prison
officials subjected him to an unconstitutional search and failed to accommodate his religious
needs. The defendants moved for summary judgment and the court granted the motion. The
district court held that: the warden of the federal penitentiary at which the detainee was held
was not liable for alleged violations of the detainee's right to free exercise of religion; the
detainee failed to show that officials served him pork in violation of his right to free exercise of
religion; qualified immunity shielded the officials from liability to the extent that their alleged

pretrial detainee at a county jail brought a § 1983 action against a county sheriff's department,
sheriff, undersheriff, and county attorney, alleging various constitutional violations. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court held that the
inmate's alleged weight loss while he was a pretrial detainee at the county jail did not satisfy
the section of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requiring a showing of physical injury in
addition to mental or emotional injury in order to obtain compensatory damages. The court
noted that the inmate’s alleged weight loss was contrary to the uncontroverted facts, where the
inmate did not allege that he was not fed while at jail but that he was not allowed to exercise
out of his cell, and it was not clear how a lack of exercise would have caused weight loss.
The court found that the lack of outdoor exercise for the pretrial detainee at a small county
jail did not violate due process, where the cells were large, the detainee did a wide variety of
inside exercises during his stay at jail, and no physical deterioration occurred due to failure to
obtain outdoor exercise.
The court held that alleged inadequate temperature-control and ventilation, the presence of
insects, and a lack of cleaning at the county jail did not violate the due process rights of pretrial
detainee, where jail cells were heated and cooled by air conditioning that was on the same
ventilation system as the rest of the courthouse in which the jail was located, detainees had the
ability to open cell windows and had fans to use in the Summer, detainees were allowed
additional blankets in Winter, the jail and courthouse were treated for insects on a monthly
basis, and cleaning materials were provided to detainees to use in their cells.
According to the court, the county jail's policy prohibiting friends from visiting the pretrial
detainee did not violate due process, where the detainee had free access to visits by family
clergy and counsel to the extent that they wished to visit him, the detainee had the free use of a
telephone in his cell to speak with his friends, and the detainee sent and received over 200
letters while at jail.
The court held that the detainee was not deprived of access to the courts and competent
counsel, even if he was not permitted direct, physical access to a law library, was not separately
assigned a paralegal to assist him, and was unable to call counsel on a few instances, where the
detainee was given frequent and heavy access to law library materials, the county had limited
resources for providing physical access to a law library, the detainee was an able and
experienced prison litigator, the detainee decided not to file civil actions while at the jail, the
detainee spoke with counsel on many occasions, and the detainee was satisfied with counsel's
representation. (Edwards County Jail, Kansas)

32.146
XX

failure to inform the detainee that he was being served pork substitutes violated his right to
free exercise of religion; prison officials did not violate the detainee's free exercise rights by not
informing him of the time so that he could pray at appropriate times of day; officials' refusal to
hold three of the detainee's meals during Ramadan did not violate his free exercise rights;
allegations that prison officials mocked the detainee's religion at most asserted a de minimis
violation of the detainee's free exercise rights; and, the detainee did not establish a violation of
his rights under RFRA. According to the court, allegations that the Muslim detainee asked his
case manager at the federal penitentiary for a clock so that the he would know when to say his
prayers, and that the case manager said “You think this is going to work?” after the detainee
was praying, sufficiently alleged the case manager's personal participation in alleged violations
of the detainee's right to free exercise of religion. (U.S. Penitentiary, Pollock, Louisiana)
U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE
FAILURE TO
PROTECT

Pietrafeso v. Lawrence County, S. D., 452 F.3d 978 (8th Cir. 2006). A widow, as personal

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
CROWDING
MEDICAL CARE

Poole v. Taylor, 466 F.Supp.2d 578 (D.Del. 2006). A former pretrial detainee filed a § 1983
action alleging unconstitutional conditions of confinement, and that he was denied adequate
medical care. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The
court held that the detainee’s due process rights were not violated when he was required to
sleep on a mattress on the floor for over six months in an overcrowded facility that experienced
sporadic hot and cold temperatures and insect and rodent infestations. The court noted that the
officials had issued numerous work orders for temperature repairs and pest control, the
detainee was not denied access to toilet facilities, the officials determined that triple-celling
pretrial detainees was a method to deal with their overcrowded facilities, and there was no
evidence of intention on the officials’ part to punish the detainee. The court found that officials
were not deliberately indifferent to the detainee’s serious medical needs, in violation of the Due
Process Clause, even though he was not hospitalized or sent to a plastic surgeon after he
sustained a large cut over his right eye. The court noted that the detainee’s treatment included
sutures, bandaging of his wound, and administration of medication, as well as a follow-up visit.
The detainee was given instructions to contact the medical department for any perceived
problems with the wound, and the detainee did not seek additional treatment. (Multi-Purpose
Criminal Justice Facility, Delaware)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE

Posey v. Southwestern Bell Telephone L.P., 430 F.Supp.2d 616 (N.D.Tex. 2006). The family of
deceased county jail detainee sued a county and the company that provided telephone services
to a jail, after the detainee hanged himself using the cord from a defective telephone in his cell.
The county moved for summary judgment. The district court dismissed the federal claims
against all defendants. The court held that jail employees did not violate the due process rights
of the detainee by displaying deliberate indifference to his condition while he was being booked
and placed in a cell, when they left him alone in the cell, with a broken telephone that had an
exposed cord. The court noted that where there was no showing that the employees knew the
detainee was a suicide risk, and any shortcomings in following the county's suicide screening
procedures were at most gross negligence, which was below the deliberate indifference standard
needed to impose § 1983 liability. The court held that there was no policy or custom by which

representative of a pretrial detainee who died of an acute asthma attack while detained in a
county jail, brought a civil rights action against the county and jailers alleging deliberate
indifference to the detainee’s serious medical needs. The detainee had arrived at the jail at 7:10
p.m. with an envelope marked with the detainee’s name, inmate number, and the following
notation in bold red letters: “URGENT Colo. Inter-Correctional Medical Summary Transfer
Report DELIVER TO MEDICAL DEPARTMENT AT ONCE.” In an intake interview, the
detainee told the jailer that he suffered from a severe asthma condition. The detainee said he
was taking a “bunch” of medications, though he brought with him to the jail only an Albuterol
inhaler. After a jury trial, the district court entered judgment in favor of the defendants as a
matter of law. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the head jailer was not
deliberately indifferent to the detainee’s medical needs in failing to take the detainee to a
physician shortly after the detainee’s arrival, absent any evidence that the jailer actually knew
of and recklessly disregarded the risk of serious harm to the detainee posed by the lack of
access to his prescribed medications over the weekend. According to the court, the head jailer’s
failure to take the detainee and his medical records to the physician was at most negligence.
The court held that the jail administrator and the chief deputy were not deliberately
indifferent, notwithstanding the chief deputy’s instructions to another jailer to attempt to get
the inmate’s prescriptions filled without taking the detainee to an emergency room. Although
the jail administrator failed to ensure that the detainee visited a physician to secure a refill of
his prescriptions, the day before the detainee died the administrator had been advised by a
physicians assistant that an emergency room visit was not necessary unless the detainee made
frequent use of the inhaler. The administrator was following that advice. The court noted that a
jailer repeatedly asked others to obtain the detainee’s medications and, on his day off, took
medical notes transferred with the detainee to the physicians assistant and then visited the
detainee in the jail to tell him of the physicians assistant’s advice. (Lawrence County Jail,
South Dakota)

32.147
XX

county could be held liable under a § 1983 action for the suicide death of the detainee.
According to the court, the two previous incidents of detainee suicide, over almost two decades,
one of which may have involved telephone cords, did not establish that the existing suicide
policy was defective for failure to instruct staff on this contingency, and that failure of staff to
follow some suicide prevention policies did not rise to level of deliberate indifference required
for county liability. (Dallas County Jail, Texas)
U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Pryor v. Dearborn Police Dept., 452 F.Supp.2d 714 (E.D.Mich. 2006). The estate of an arrestee
brought a § 1983 action against police officers and a police department, alleging failure to
provide the arrestee with adequate medical care. The district court held that summary
judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the arrestee's
condition-- a crack cocaine overdose-- constituted a serious medical need, and whether the
police officers acted with deliberate indifference to the arrestee's serious medical need. The
detainee was arrested, and while he was in custody in a police vehicle he consumed an
unknown quantity of cocaine. He again ingested cocaine when he was detained at the police
station and subsequently collapsed on the floor of his cell and began convulsing. Paramedics
were eventually called, and they transported the arrestee to a hospital, where he died three
days later. (Dearborn Police Station, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Rand v. Simonds, 422 F.Supp.2d 318 (D.N.H. 2006). A pretrial detainee brought a pro se action
against a superintendent, assistant superintendent, and physician's assistant for a county
correctional facility, alleging that they were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical
needs. The defendants moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the motion.
The court held that the detainee administratively exhausted his claim that the superintendent
and assistant superintendent were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs, even
though he did not file a formal grievance, given that “rules” on grievance procedures in the
inmate handbook did not require that the grievance take a particular form. The court noted
that the detainee submitted a request form asking for referral to a specialist, as specified in the
medical procedures section of handbook, and that inquiries made by an investigator for the
detainee's criminal defense attorney into the facility's refusal to refer the detainee to an outside
medical care provider for his shoulder pain gave the superintendent and assistant
superintendent the requisite opportunity to address the detainee's complaints, which they took
advantage of by explaining the decision made. The court held that the detainee failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA),
on his claim that a physician's assistant at the county correctional facility was deliberately
indifferent to his serious medical needs by failing to refer him to specialist outside the facility
for his shoulder injury. According to the court, the complaints made on the detainee's behalf by
an investigator for the detainee's criminal defense attorney did not allege any misfeasance on
the part of the physician's assistant or even mention him, and therefore did not give the
facility's officials sufficient notice of the detainee's concerns about treatment received from the
physician's assistant to allow those concerns to be dealt with administratively. The court found
that material issues of fact existed as to whether the superintendent and assistant
superintendent denied outside care to the detainee on prohibited bases, such as the detainee's
ability or willingness to pay for such medical services, precluding summary judgment for the
officials on the detainee's claims alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.
But the court concluded that a delay in having the detainee examined by an orthopedic surgeon
did not cause him any additional pain or permanent injury, given that the specialists who
eventually saw the detainee did not believe that surgery was an appropriate treatment for his
shoulder pain and the measures recommended did not appreciably reduce the detainee's pain
and discomfort, such that implementing them earlier would not have measurably improved his
condition. The court found that the detainee's injury did not amount to a “serious medical need”
for alleged deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. (Merrimack County House of
Corrections, New Hampshire)

U.S. District Court
RELIGION

Rasul v. Rumsfeld, 433 F.Supp.2d 58 (D.D.C. 2006). Detainees at the United States naval
facility in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, sued the government, claiming that their treatment violated
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). The district court denied the government’s
motion to dismiss holding that: (1) RFRA applied outside of the continental United States; (2)
RFRA applied to Guantanamo Bay; (3) a claim of liability under RFRA was stated; and (4)
there was no qualified immunity from suit under RFRA. The Muslim inmates claimed
harassment when practicing their religion, forced shaving of religious beards, and placement of
the Koran in a toilet. (United States Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO
PROTECT

Rentz v. Spokane County, 438 F.Supp.2d 1252 (E.D.Wash. 2006). The personal representatives
of the estate of a pretrial detainee, who was murdered by two fellow pretrial detainees in a
county jail, sought recovery of damages from county defendants under Washington's wrongful
death and survival statutes. Parents and siblings, as beneficiaries of the estate, also sought
recovery of damages. The court granted partial summary judgment for the defendants. The
court held that neither the parents nor the siblings could recover under Washington's wrongful
32.148

XX

death and survival statutes, but that the parents could seek recovery from the county
defendants under § 1988 for violations of the detainee's constitutional rights. The court also
held that the parents were entitled to assert Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process
causes of action against the county defendants to vindicate their constitutional rights for loss of
companionship with their adult son, but the siblings were not. The court allowed the plaintiffs
to amend their complaint to include the jail officers and a jail nurse because they were allegedly
involved with the placement of the detainee in the same jail dormitory as the individuals who
murdered him. (Spokane County Jail, Washington)
U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Self v. Crum, 439 F.3d 1227 (10th Cir. 2006). A detainee brought an action against a jail's
physician alleging deliberate indifference to his medical needs in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the physician and the
detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the physician who provided
medication for a respiratory infection and to reduce fever and coughing did not consciously
disregard the substantial risk of serious harm arising from the detainee's symptoms. According
to the court, the detainee's allegation that the physician diagnosed his heart problem but
ignored it, was based on speculation and conjecture. The court noted that, at most, the
physician's actions amounted to a misdiagnosis or failure to conduct further testing. (Denver
County Jail, Colorado)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO
PROTECT
SUICIDE

Short v. Smoot, 436 F.3d 422 (4th Cir. 2006). The wife and administrator of the estate of a
detainee who committed suicide in jail brought a § 1983 action against a county and sheriff's
deputies alleging deliberate indifference to a substantial risk that the detainee would commit
suicide. The district court denied summary judgment for the defendants and they appealed. The
appeals court held that jailers who placed the detainee in a cell under video surveillance were
entitled to qualified immunity, but the jailer who observed the detainee in the cell by video
surveillance was not entitled to qualified immunity. According to the court, the jailers who
placed the detainee in a cell under video surveillance were entitled to qualified immunity even
though they did not remove the detainee's clothing and shoelaces, because the detainee did not
have the right to have his jailers take precautions against his suicide beyond placing him in a
cell under video surveillance. The court found that the jailer who observed the detainee in his
cell by video surveillance was not entitled to qualified immunity because the jailer observed the
detainee remove his shoelaces, tie them to a bar, place a noose around his neck, and test the
weight of his rope. The jail policy and procedures manual in effect at the time addressed the
proper treatment of potentially suicidal inmates and required custodial officers to remove all
potential tools such as sheets, blankets, and shoelaces, to conduct inmate checks at random
intervals at least twice per hour, and to make reports of any unusual occurrences. The jail used
surveillance cameras to monitor inmate activity. The court reviewed the videotape taken from
the surveillance camera that recorded the detainee’s activity and it showed the detainee
removing the laces from his shoes, tying them together, and climbing from his bed to the bars of
his cell. (Warren County Jail, Virginia)

U.S. District Court
ASSESSMENT OF
COSTS

Sickles v. Campbell County, Kentucky, 439 F.Supp.2d 751 (E.D.Ky. 2006). Inmates, former

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE

Smith v. Brevard County, 461 F.Supp.2d 1243 (M.D.Fla. 2006). The personal representative of

inmates, and relatives and friends of inmates brought a § 1983 action against counties, alleging
that the methods used by the counties to collect fees imposed on prisoners for the cost of
booking and incarceration violated the Due Process Clause. The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the defendants. The court held that the Kentucky statute authorizing
county jailers to adopt prisoner fee and expense reimbursement policies did not require that
prisoners be sentenced before fees could be imposed, and that due process did not require a predeprivation hearing before prison fees were assessed. According to the court, the First
Amendment rights of non-prisoners who contributed funds to prisoners' accounts were not
violated. The court noted that the statute authorized jails to begin to impose fees, and to deduct
them from prisoners' canteen accounts, as soon as prisoners' were booked into the jail.
(Campbell County and Kenton County, Kentucky)
the estate of pretrial detainee who hung himself in his cell, brought a § 1983 action on behalf of
the survivors of the estate, against a county sheriff, officers, and a non-profit corporation which
was under contract to provide mental health services to the prisoners at detention center. The
sheriff, officers and corporation moved to dismiss and the district court granted the motion in
part, and denied in part. The court held that allegations by the estate that, prior to the
detainee’s hanging himself in his cell, his family members and friends called and went to the
detention center in person to inform the non-profit corporation that the detainee was suicidal,
were sufficient to satisfy the deliberate indifference test in the suit. After receiving knowledge
of the detainee’s suicidal tendency, the corporation failed to provide adequate mental health
care to the detainee. According to the court, knowledge that the detainee was actually
threatening to commit suicide was certainly enough to show knowledge of a substantial risk of
suicide, rather than just a mere possibility. The court held that the estate stated a cause of
action under § 1983 against the county sheriff, in his official capacity, for violating the

32.149
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detainee’s Fourteenth Amendment rights. According to the court, violation of the detainee’s
constitutional rights was the result of the sheriff’s failure to provide adequate staffing and safe
housing for suicidal inmates, and in light of the sheriff’s knowledge that inmate suicide was a
problem, his failure to address any policies that were causing suicides constituted deliberate
indifference to the constitutional rights of inmates. (Brevard County Detention Center, Florida)
U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCH
JUVENILES

Smook v. Minnehaha County, 457 F.3d 806 (8th Cir. 2006). Former detainees at a county

juvenile detention center brought a § 1983 class action against a county and individual county
officials, challenging the center's policy of strip-searching all juveniles admitted to the facility
regardless of the seriousness of the charged offense or the existence of suspicion. The district
court entered partial summary judgment for the former detainees, finding that the searches
violated the minors' constitutional rights, and that the officials were not qualifiedly immune
from the minors' claims. The county and officials appealed the denial of qualified immunity.
The appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that requiring a juvenile to strip to her
undergarments upon admission to the facility was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. A
juvenile female had been brought to the center for a curfew violation. A female staff person took
her to a private restroom, directed her to remove her shorts, t-shirt, and sandals, but allowed
her to remain attired in her undergarments. The staff person touched her to look under her
arms, between her toes, and through her hair and scalp. The court held that the search was
reasonable under Fourth Amendment in light of the state's responsibility to act in loco parentis
with respect to juveniles in lawful state custody, and that the special needs for such a search
outweighed the invasion of personal privacy. The court held that the officials were entitled to
qualified immunity where there was no appellate decision from the Supreme Court or any
federal circuit ruling on such an issue, and, although many courts had concluded that the strip
search of adult offenders without individualized suspicion was unreasonable, those cases did
not consider interests involved when state had responsibility to act in loco parentis.
(Minnehaha County Juvenile Detention Center, South Dakota)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONDITIONS

Spencer v. Bouchard, 449 F.3d 721 (6th Cir. 2006). A former pretrial detainee brought a pro se

U.S. District Court
PROTECTION

Stephens v. Correctional Services Corp., 428 F.Supp.2d 580 (E.D.Tex. 2006). A pretrial detainee

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Tardiff v. Knox County, 425 F.Supp.2d 190 (D.Me. 2006). A class action suit was brought
against a county, its sheriff, and unidentified jail correctional personnel under § 1983, claiming
that the Fourth Amendment rights of detainees alleged to have committed non-violent, nonweapons, and non-drug felonies, and detainees alleged to have committed misdemeanors, were
violated when they were subjected to strip searches without reasonable suspicion that they
were harboring contraband on or within their bodies. Summary judgment was granted in part
and denied in part to the plaintiffs, and the defendants filed a motion for reconsideration. The
district court held that: (1) evidence, including booking logs at the county jail, demonstrated
that corrections officers routinely strip searched misdemeanor detainees without reasonable
suspicion; (2) a jail administrator's letter was highly probative of what municipal policymakers
knew about ongoing strip search practices at the jail; (3) intake and release log evidence
provided proof that, for at least some corrections officers, strip searching was customary; and
(4) the actions taken by the county in response to the unconstitutional practice of strip
searching misdemeanor detainees amounted to acquiescence in it. According to the court, a
county jail inspection report provided information about the circumstances surrounding search

§ 1983 action against a county sheriff and officials of the sheriff's office, alleging overcrowding
and inadequate shelter at the jail in violation of Due Process Clause. The district court granted
summary judgment for the defendants, and detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed in
part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court held that the detainee's
evidence that county officials had failed to address serious and obvious problems with
conditions, namely a continuously cold and wet cell area, for a period of months, especially
given additional evidence including officials' alleged wearing of winter coats inside jail, raised a
fact issue as to whether officials had been deliberately indifferent to a serious deprivation,
precluding summary judgment for the officials. (Oakland County Jail, Michigan)
brought an action against a private jail corporation, alleging civil rights violations and common
law negligence stemming from an attack while he was incarcerated. The corporation moved for
dismissal. The district court held that the corporation was not entitled to state sovereign
immunity and that the corporation was potentially liable under § 1983. The court found that
the detainee properly stated a negligence claim, and also a viable claim for failure to train
and/or supervise. The court noted that although the establishment and maintenance of jails
were “governmental functions” under state law, jail services provided by a private entity were
not. The detainee alleged that the corporation had a duty to protect his well-being and to
ensure his reasonable safety while incarcerated, and that the corporation breached such duty
by not properly segregating him from violent inmates who threatened his life. He alleged that
he informed officials of the death threats and they took no action, and that he was severely
beaten by three prisoners and suffered life-threatening injuries. (Jefferson County Corrections
Facility, Texas)

32.150
XX

practices at the jail, as well as the knowledge of the county policymakers before the
commencement of the class period, and, thus, was relevant in the class action suit. (Knox
County Jail, Maine)
U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS

Tate v. Gusman, 459 F.Supp.2d 519 (E.D.La. 2006). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action
against a sheriff, arising from conditions of confinement following a hurricane. The district
court held that the detainee failed to state a nonfrivolous claim upon which relief could be
granted and dismissed the action. The detainee alleged that the manner and timing of his
evacuation from a flooded prison system medical unit following a hurricane constituted cruel
and unusual punishment, but the court found that the detainee did not allege that the sheriff
personally acted with deliberate indifference to the detainee’s safety. The court noted that the
detainee did not allege that he suffered any physical injury as a result of any of the conditions
or lack of medical attention. (Orleans Parish Prison, Louisiana)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE

Taylor v. Wausau Underwriters Ins. Co., 423 F.Supp.2d 882 (E.D.Wis. 2006). The estate of a
pretrial detainee who had committed suicide in jail brought § 1983 claims against a county
corrections officer, alleging deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, a claim against the
county alleging that the county maintained an unconstitutional informal policy of allowing
inmates on suicide watch to turn out their lights, and a state law wrongful death claim against
the officer and county. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the officer and
county. The court held that the county was not liable for a due process violation under § 1983
for deliberate indifference to the detainee’s serious medical needs absent evidence that the
officer's delay in turning on the detainee's light after the detainee had turned it off, during
which time the detainee hanged himself, was a standard practice or an aberration. According to
the court, even if the jail's unofficial policy of allowing inmates on suicide watch access to light
switches was the cause of the detainee's suicide, in that it compromised corrections officers'
ability to supervise the detainee, the county was not deliberately indifferent to the detainee's
serious medical needs in violation of his due process rights. The court found that the jail's
classification of the detainee as a suicide risk did not indicate he was actually a suicide risk, the
fact that the detainee was a former corrections officer charged with heinous crimes did not
indicate a substantial suicide risk, and, even if suicide risk was indicated by facts that the
detainee stole a razor, that there were scratches on his wrists, and that he removed elastic from
his underwear, the county placed him on suicide watch and thus was not indifferent. The court
noted that the absence of mental illness in an inmate who commits suicide is not fatal to a
claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. The detainee was a former
correctional officer charged with attempted murder, kidnapping, and sexual assault of a minor.
He was admitted to jail where he was placed on a suicide watch in a cell with constant camera
surveillance. (Fond du Lac County Jail, Wisconsin)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Thomas v. Ashcroft, 470 F.3d 491 (2nd Cir. 2006). A detainee brought a Bivens action against
named and unnamed federal Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents and prison
officials, alleging that his blindness was caused by the defendants' deliberate indifference to his
serious medical needs while in federal custody. The district court dismissed the case and the
detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The
court held that allegations by the detainee, that federal prison officials were on notice of his
glaucoma and resulting medical needs, that they were aware of the improper administration of
his medications and that they still failed to address the situation, that he was transferred to
one correctional facility where he received no medication despite the requests of his family, his
lawyer, and outside physicians, and that the officials were personally ordered by a magistrate
judge to see to the detainee's medical needs, stated a Bivens claim against prison officials, for
deliberate indifference to the detainee's serious medical needs. (New York Metropolitan
Correctional Center, Federal Bureau of Prisons)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES
INTAKE
SCREENING
MEDICAL CARE

Thompson v. County of Cook, 428 F.Supp.2d 807 (N.D.Ill. 2006). A detainee held for civil

contempt brought an action against a county and a sheriff, alleging civil rights violations due to
invasive search procedures. Following a jury verdict for the defendants, the detainee moved for
a new trial. The district court held that a jury's verdict as to an unreasonable body cavity
search was against the manifest weight of evidence. The court noted that, notwithstanding the
detainee's purported intermingling with others who were incarcerated, he was not charged with
any crime, and there was no evidence that deputies noticed anything suspicious about detainee
which would have otherwise justified a search. The detainee was subjected to an invasive
urethral swabbing procedure without his consent. The detainee had been held in civil contempt
and ordered held in custody after he refused to sign certain documents related to his pending
divorce proceedings. Upon arrival at the jail, the detainee was processed along with
approximately 250 other new inmates. After spending some time in a holding pen, the detainee
and others were photographed and given identification cards. An employee from Cermak
Health Services, the agency responsible for administering medical treatment to detainees at the
jail, then asked Thompson a number of medical screening questions. During the interview, the
detainee responded to the questions on a standard form concerning his medical history and

32.151
XX

signed the following “consent for treatment” portion of the form: I consent to a medical and

mental health history and physical including screening for tuberculosis and sexually
transmitted diseases as part of the intake process of the Cook County Jail. I also consent to
ongoing medical treatment by Cermak Health Services staff for problems identified during this
process. I understand I may be asked to sign forms allowing other medical treatments. I
understand that every effort will be made by CHS staff to keep my medical problems
confidential. I understand the policy of CHS regarding access to health care at Cook County
Jail. The defendants presented evidence at trial that during the interview, an employee
informed the detainee of his right to refuse the medical screening, but the detainee denied that
anyone informed him of his right to refuse to consent. Following the medical screening
interview, his personal property was inventoried and then he and other inmates then
underwent a urethral swabbing procedure. He claimed that he felt pain both during and after
the procedure. (Cook County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
FALSE
IMPRISONMENT
USE OF FORCE

Tibbs v. City of Chicago, 469 F.3d 661 (7th Cir. 2006). An arrestee brought § 1983 action
against an arresting officer and city, alleging Fourth Amendment violations. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, and the arrestee appealed. The appeals
court affirmed. The court held that a police officer acted reasonably, and thus, did not violate
the arrestee's Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizure, when he made an arrest
on an outstanding traffic warrant. According to the court, although the arrestee had a different
middle initial and different birth date than the person listed on the warrant, the arrestee had
the same first and last name, and when the officer questioned the arrestee about the warrant,
he replied, apparently confusing it with a traffic violation that he had actually committed, that
he thought it had been taken care of already. The court found that there was no indication that
officer knew that the arrestee was not the person for whom the warrant had been issued. The
court noted that when the police have probable cause to arrest one party, and when they
reasonably mistake a second party for the first party, the arrest of the second party is a valid
arrest. The court also noted that when a person is lawfully arrested pursuant to a valid
warrant, police officers and jailers have no constitutional duty to investigate whether the
arrestee is actually the person named in the warrant. The court held that the police officer did
not use an unreasonable amount of force, in violation of the Fourth Amendment, by putting
tight handcuffs on the arrestee and leaving them on for approximately 30 minutes until the
arrestee was taken to a lockup at a police station. The arrestee complained only once to the
officer that the handcuffs were too tight, he offered the officer no indication of the degree of
pain caused by the handcuffs, he suffered minimal, if any, injury, other than redness on his
wrists for less than two days, and he sought no medical care for any wrist injury. The arrestee
was held in custody for two days. About twenty to twenty-five minutes after arriving at the
station, the arrestee was taken to a lockup where his handcuffs were removed. (City of Chicago,
Illinois)

U.S. District Court
ADA- Americans
With Disabilities
Act
TELEPHONE

Tucker v. Hardin County, 448 F.Supp.2d 901 (W.D.Tenn. 2006). Deaf detainees and their deaf
mother sued a county and a city, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court held
that a county court did not violate the ADA's Title II, which prohibits discrimination in public
services, by asking the deaf mother to serve as interpreter for her deaf sons at their plea
hearing, despite her contention that the request deprived her of her right to participate as a
spectator. The court noted that the mother expressed no reservations to the court about serving
as an interpreter, that she could have refused the request, and, even if the court were somehow
responsible for her service as an interpreter, its request was based on her skill in lip-reading
and sign language, not on her disability. According to the court, assuming that overnight
incarceration was covered by the ADA's Title II which prohibits discrimination in public
services, and assuming that placing a phone call was an “aid, benefit, or service” within the
meaning of an ADA regulation prohibiting public entities from providing a disabled person aid,
benefit, or service that was not as effective as that provided to others, the county did not violate
ADA in using relay operators and notes to allow the deaf detainees to communicate with their
mother, rather than providing them with a teletypewriter (TTY) telephone. The court noted
that information was transmitted and received, which was the same benefit non-disabled
person would have received. While in custody, the two brothers communicated with officers
through written notes. The jail was not equipped with a teletypewriter (TTY) telephone.
Instead, the officers acted as relay operators, using paper and pencil, as they spoke with an
operator acting on their behalf to complete the call, which lasted 45 minutes. (Hardin County
Jail, and the City of Savannah Police Department, Tennessee)

U.S. Appeals Court
USE OF FORCE
MEDICAL CARE

U.S. v. Gonzales, 436 F.3d 560 (5th Cir. 2006). Following a jury trial, deportation officers were

convicted of deprivation of civil rights and one defendant appealed. The appeals court held that
evidence was sufficient to support a finding that the defendant willfully sprayed a detainee,
who had a broken neck, with pepper spray and that the use of pepper spray resulted in bodily
injury. The court noted that a detention officer testified that while the defendant was carrying
the detainee to the bus, he said “Let's Mace the fucker and see if he budges” and two other

32.152
XX

detention officers remembered a similar statement, and when the defendant exited the bus, he
was coughing, smirking sarcastically, and claiming that there had been an “accidental
discharge.” After the pepper spray was used, the detainee's mouth was foaming, he complained
of stinging pain, and his eyes were swollen shut for at least three hours. The court found that
the force that caused this pain and that the pepper spray was applied when the detainee was
paralyzed, handcuffed, and lying on the floor of the bus. The detainee made his injury known to
the defendant, screaming “they broke me...” and in response to his pleas the officers taunted
him and invited people to wipe their feet on him. Two of the defendants dragged his limp body
from a house to the van, dragged him off the van onto a bus, and witnessed his reaction to being
pepper sprayed. According to the court, by moving the detainee without stabilizing him, the
officers exposed him to a risk of harm. The detainee was left alone on the bus floor, handcuffed,
eyes swollen shut, and foaming at the mouth, despite the officers’ training that, due to the risk
of potentially fatal asphyxiation, those who had been pepper sprayed should be continually
monitored and placed upright, never in a prone position. (San Antonio Division of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service [INS] and Brazos County Jail, Texas)
U.S. Appeals Court
TELEPHONE
PRIVACY

U.S. v. Morin, 437 F.3d 777 (8th Cir. 2006). A defendant was convicted in district court and he

U.S. District Court
PRE-SENTENCE
DETENTION

U.S. v. Nedd, 415 F.Supp.2d 1 (D.Me. 2006). A defendant convicted of two federal firearms
charges sought pre-sentence release. The district court denied release, based on the defendant’s
failure to comply with the terms of his pretrial release, and his belligerence toward a pretrial
services officer who indicated that he posed a danger to the community. (U.S. District Court,
Maine)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO
PROTECT
MENTAL
HEALTH
MEDICAL CARE
CRIPA- Civil
Rights of
Institutionalized
Persons Act

U.S. v. Terrell County, Ga., 457 F.Supp.2d 1359 (M.D.Ga. 2006). The federal government

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO
PROTECT
MEDICAL CARE

Vaughn v. Greene County, Arkansas, 438 F.3d 845 (8th Cir. 2006). The sister of a pretrial
detainee brought a civil rights action against a sheriff and others to recover damages related to
the in-custody death of her brother. The district court denied the sheriff's motion for summary
judgment and the sheriff appealed. The court of appeals dismissed in part, reversed and
remanded in part. The court held that the county sheriff had no knowledge of the pretrial
detainee's serious medical needs, and thus was entitled to qualified immunity. The court noted
that the sheriff had no personal interaction with the pretrial detainee during his incarceration,
and there was no indication that the sheriff knew the pretrial detainee had been vomiting for
several hours, was not provided with his anti-depressant medication for two to three days
preceding his death, or had heart problems that put him at risk for a heart attack. According to
the court, the sheriff's practice of delegating to others such duties as reading mail and
responding to communications regarding jail inmates did not amount to deliberate indifference
to the pretrial detainee's serious medical needs, as required to be held individually liable for the
detainee's death in a § 1983 action. The 46-year-old detainee had completed a medical intake
form indicating he had a history of mental illness, headaches, epilepsy/seizures, ulcers, and
kidney/bladder problems, but indicating that he did not have a history of heart problems or
high or low blood pressure. Although he had no medications with him upon his arrival at the
jail, his mother later brought his medications, including an anti-depressant. The jail ran out of
his anti-depressant medication for two days and the detainee began to act odd. He was moved
to an isolation cell to be monitored. He was later found dead in the cell. An autopsy led to the
determination that the detainee died of natural causes--arteriosclerotic cardiovascular disease-causing a heart attack that resulted in his death. Detectable amounts of his anti-depressant
medication were found in the detainee’s system during the autopsy. (Greene County Jail,
Arkansas)

appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that recordings of the defendant's jailhouse
telephone calls were admissible for sentencing purposes. The court found that the defendant
impliedly consented to the warrantless tape-recording of his jailhouse telephone calls, and thus,
the recordings were admissible for sentencing purposes. The defendant had been given a
prisoners' handbook that informed him that his jailhouse calls would be monitored, and there
were signs above the phones in the prison informing him of that fact. (North Dakota)

brought a Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA) action against a county, county
sheriff, and various other county officials, seeking a determination that county jail conditions
were grossly deficient in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court granted the
government’s motion for summary judgment. The court held that the sheriff and other officials
were deliberately indifferent to the jail's gross deficiencies in the areas of medical and mental
health care for inmates, protection of inmates from harm, environmental health and safety of
inmates, and fire safety, in violation of the due process clause. The court noted that the lack of
funds is not a defense to, nor legal justification for, unconstitutional conditions of a jail, for the
purpose of analyzing a deliberate indifference claim under the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Even if a defendant argues that it is planning or working towards
construction of a new jail to remedy the unconstitutional conditions at the current facility, the
failure to implement interim measures to alleviate those conditions demonstrates deliberate
indifference, according to the court. (Terrell County, Georgia)

32.153
XX

U.S. Appeals Court
FALSE
IMPRISONMENT

Walker v. City of Orem, 451 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2006). Two separate actions were brought
against a county and individual officers arising out of a police shooting and the subsequent
detention of witnesses to the shooting. The district court granted the officers’ motion for
summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The appeals court held that the 90-minute
detention of witnesses to a police shooting was not reasonable for investigative purposes under
the Fourth Amendment, but that the constitutional rights of the witnesses to a police shooting
to not be detained for 90 minutes following the shooting was not clearly established at the time.
According to the court, the witnesses to the shooting failed to establish the county’s policy or
custom to train its officers concerning the constitutional limitations on detention of witnesses
in connection with the police shooting investigations. (Utah County Sheriff’s Office, Utah)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCHES

Way v. County of Ventura, 445 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2006). A female arrestee who had undergone

U.S. District Court
BAIL
CONDITIONS
SUICIDE
ATTEMPT

White v. Crow Ghost, 456 F.Supp.2d 1096 (D.N.D. 2006). An arrestee brought a Bivens action
against personnel of a jail operated by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), alleging failure to
provide adequate medical care, unsanitary conditions, and delayed or prevented bond hearings.
The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The court held that jail
officials were not deliberately indifferent to the arrestee's medical needs, in violation of his
Eighth Amendment rights, where officials provided the arrestee with medical care promptly
after learning of his suicide gestures or attempts, and again upon learning he might have an
infection. The court noted that when the arrestee's need for medication was established,
officials ensured that the medications were administered. The court found that the officials
were not deliberately indifferent to any risk of harm to arrestee from his placement in two
different, allegedly cold and unsanitary jail cells for a total of four days, and thus such
placement did not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. The court noted that the
arrestee was placed in those cells after his suicide gestures or attempts so that he could be
monitored, his clothing and bedding was removed for his protection after he tried to hang
himself, and cleaning supplies were withheld to protect him. The court held that, absent any
evidence that any of the named jail officials were responsible for the delay in the arrestee's
bond hearing and subsequent failures to respond to his numerous requests for a bond reduction,
the arrestee's bare allegations of such delay and failures were insufficient to demonstrate the
deliberate indifference necessary to establish the violation of any constitutional right against
excessive bail. (Standing Rock Agency, Fort Yates Detention Center, North Dakota)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE
INTAKE
SCREENING

Williams v. Bradshaw, 459 F.3d 846 (8th Cir. 2006). The mother of a detainee who died while
in jail brought a § 1983 action, claiming that police officers violated the detainee’s rights under
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court granted judgment on the pleadings
in favor of the officers. The mother appealed. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the
mother lacked standing. The detainee, the daughter of the plaintiff, had been brought to a jail
and was being interrogated when she began talking unintelligibly and experiencing seizures.
An officer said that she was “faking a seizure” to avoid jail time. She lost consciousness but
officers did not request an ambulance for nearly an hour. She had ingested cocaine at the time
of her arrest and died from cocaine intoxication. (Howard County Jail and City of Nashville,
Arkansas)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO
PROTECT

Wilson v. Maricopa County, 463 F.Supp.2d 987 (D.Ariz. 2006). In a civil rights suit arising from

a strip search with body cavity inspection upon booking on a misdemeanor charge of being
under the influence of a controlled substance, brought § 1983 Fourth Amendment action
against a county sheriff and against the deputy who had performed the search. The district
court granted summary judgment for the arrestee, and defendants appealed. The appeals court
affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held that a suspicionless strip search
conducted solely on basis of the county's blanket policy for controlled-substance arrestees
offended the Fourth Amendment, where the intrusiveness of the search was extreme, the
county did not show any link between the policy and legitimate security concerns for persons
spontaneously arrested and detained temporarily on under-the-influence charges, and the
arrestee was detained only until bail was posted and never entered the jail's general
population. The court held that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because the
appellate court in the county's federal circuit had never previously addressed the
constitutionality of a body cavity search policy premised on the nature of drug offenses, and had
held that the nature of offense alone may sometimes provide reasonable suspicion. (Ventura
County Sheriff's Department, California)

a fatal assault on a county jail inmate by other inmates, the county defendants filed motions for
summary judgment on all claims. The plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration of the court’s
order that had dismissed the county sheriff’s office. The summary judgment motions were
granted in part and denied in part; the motion for reconsideration was denied. The court held
that summary judgment on Eighth Amendment liability for the fatal assault on the inmate was
precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to: (1) whether the county, through its final
policy maker the sheriff, implemented policies, customs, and practices with the requisite
subjective intent of deliberate indifference; (2) whether the county, through the sheriff, failed to

32.154
XX

act in the face of obvious omissions and likely constitutional violations; and (3) whether that failure to act
caused a constitutional violation. The court held that the estate sufficiently alleged a § 1983 claim against the
sheriff in his individual capacity by alleging that the sheriff was directly liable under § 1983 for being
deliberately indifferent in failing to supervise and train jail officers in appropriate, lawful, and constitutional
policies and procedures for providing a safe environment for inmates. The court also found that the estate
sufficiently alleged a claim that the sheriff was deliberately indifferent in fostering, encouraging, and
knowingly accepting formal and informal jail policies condoning brutality among the inmates and indifference
to proper supervision. According to the court, a jail supervisor could be found to have been deliberately
indifferent to the safety of the inmate if he knew that not having an officer on the ground in the jail yard posed
a risk of violence among the inmates and nonetheless allowed an officer to cover both the yard and another
post, which required the officer to leave the yard unattended for a significant period of time. (Maricopa County
Facility, known as “Tent City”, Phoenix, Arizona)
U.S. District Court
MENTAL
HEALTH
CIVIL
COMMITMENT

Winters ex rel. Estate of Winters v. Arkansas Department of Health and Human Services, 437 F.Supp.2d 851
(E.D.Ark. 2006). The administrator of the estate of mentally ill pre-trial detainee/civil committee who had died
of peritonitis while in custody of a sheriff sued the sheriff and the Arkansas Department of Human Services
(DHS) under § 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Rehabilitation Act. Following bench
trial, the district court held that neither DHS nor the sheriff caused or contributed to the death of the
detainee/committee, and they were not liable under the Due Process Clause, Eighth Amendment, Rehabilitation
Act, or ADA. The court found that the sheriff had no policy or custom to apprehend and incarcerate acutely
mentally ill persons, as indicated by the fact that the detainee may have been only person under civil
commitment ever housed in the sheriff's detention facility. (Benton County Jail, Arkansas)
2007

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Adams v. Cook County Dept. of Corrections, 485 F.Supp.2d 940 (N.D.Ill. 2007). An inmate brought a § 1983
claim against physicians, alleging they acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The
district court dismissed the claim in part, and denied the defendants’ motion for dismissal in part. The court
held that the prisoner alleged sufficiently serious medical needs to support his claim that jail officials acted with
deliberate indifference to such needs, in violation of due process, by alleging that he had “shortness of breath,”
“severe pain in [his] right side” and a high fever. The court found that the inmate stated a § 1983 claim for
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs under the Fourteenth Amendment by alleging that he had a
serious medical need and that he was insufficiently treated by two defendant physicians. (Cook County Jail,
Illinois)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
MENTAL HEALTH

Anderson ex rel. Cain v. Perkins, 532 F.Supp.2d 837 (S.D.Miss. 2007). A daughter, as next friend of a jail
detainee who suffered second-degree burns on her ankles, thighs, and buttocks while awaiting mental health
commitment, brought a civil rights suit against a sheriff and a county. The sheriff moved for summary
judgment on claims brought against him in his individual capacity. The district court granted the motion. The
court held that the sheriff did not violate the detainee's right to be protected from harm, absent evidence
showing that restraints were likely used to subdue her. The court found that the sheriff was not deliberately
indifferent to the detainee's medical needs in failing to administer her anti-psychotic medications, where the
detainee's refusal to take her medications prior to being taken into custody, coupled with her violent and
psychotic behavior as the result of the refusal, was the basis for her commitment. The court found that the
sheriff was not deliberately indifferent in failing to discover second-degree burns of an unknown origin on the
detainee's ankles, thighs, and buttocks because jailers regularly observed the detainee through a viewing
window in her cell door, but did not actually enter the cell to visually inspect the detainee for signs of injury.
(Amite County Jail, Mississippi)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
RELEASE
MEDICAL CARE
ACCESS TO COURT

Banks v. York, 515 F.Supp.2d 89 (D.D.C. 2007). A detainee in a jail operated by the District of Columbia
Department of Corrections (DOC), and in a correctional treatment facility operated by the District's private
contractor, brought a § 1983 action against District employees and contractor's employees alleging negligent
supervision under District of Columbia law, over-detention, deliberate indifference to serious medical needs,
harsh living conditions in jail, and extradition to Virginia without a hearing. The district court granted the
defendants’ motion to dismiss in part and denied in part.
The court held that the detainee’s allegations that his teeth became chipped and his gums became infected,
leading to damage to his gums, disfigurement of his face, infection, pain, anxiety, and extraction of four teeth,
were sufficient allegations of a serious medical need. Officials had confiscated his dental crown. The court
found that the detainee stated a claim under § 1983 for cruel and unusual punishment through deliberate
indifference to a serious medical need. The court held that the detainee stated a claim with his allegation that
the prison's dental unit should have replaced his dental crown or permitted him to have his private dentist do so.
The prison's dental unit had treated him with antibiotics and offered to extract the seven affected teeth. The
court held that this involved a mere disagreement over proper treatment and did not support a § 1983 claim of
violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment through deliberate
indifference to prisoner's serious medical needs.
According to the court, the private corporation which operated a prison as contractor for the District of
Columbia, was performing functions normally performed by a municipality, and thus, the corporation could be
liable to the prisoner under § 1983 if the prisoner alleged and ultimately proved that his injuries were the result
of an unconstitutional custom or policy of corporation.
The court held that the detainee sufficiently alleged that the Director of District of Columbia Department of
Corrections (DOC) was directly involved in violations of the detainee's constitutional rights, as required to state

32.155
XXI

a claim under § 1983 against a government official in his individual capacity. The detainee alleged that the
Director refused to transfer the detainee from the jail to a correctional treatment facility and failed to train DOC
employees under his supervision in such a way as to prevent the detainee's over-detention (detention beyond
proper release date). The court found that the Director of District of Columbia Department of Corrections
(DOC) could not be liable in his individual capacity, under the theory of respondeat superior, to the
jail detainee for allegedly unconstitutional actions or omissions of his subordinates.
The appeals court found that the detainee's allegation that policies or practices of the District of Columbia
Department of Corrections (DOC) pertaining to training, supervision and discipline of employees responsible
for the detainees' release from DOC custody resulted in his untimely release from jail, in violation of his
constitutional rights, stated a claim for municipal liability under § 1983.
The court held that dismissal of the detainee’s § 1983 claims of cruel and unusual punishment at the District
of Columbia jail based on lack of reading material, lack of recreational equipment, failure of the commissary to
stock items such as lotions, skin oils, hair oils, and peanut butter, the detainee's exposure to the stench created
by regular sewage backups, as well as the jail's use of bunk beds without ladders was required under the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) because the detainee did not allege that he suffered any physical injury.
Instead, the detainee alleged mental and emotional injuries.
The court held that the provision of Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requiring exhaustion of
administrative remedies before bringing a civil action against prison officials regarding prison conditions
applied to the detainee who brought a § 1983 action before he was released from jail, even though the detainee
had been released from jail by the time that the defendants brought their motion to dismiss.
The court found that the detainee's allegations that the District of Columbia jail provided only one desk and
chair in each two-person cell, failed to provide him with nail clippers, skin lotions, and a microwave oven and
failed to provide rehabilitative courses, did not allege deprivations sufficiently serious to rise to the level of
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of Eighth Amendment.
According to the court, the alleged conditions from overcrowding at a District of Columbia jail-- showers
infested with bacteria, standing water, various diseases and hundreds of unsanitary and defective mattresses,
some of which contained roaches and other insects, did not constitute the deprivation of basic human needs, as
required for jail overcrowding to constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
The court found that merely alleging that the lack of appropriate security at the District of Columbia jail
created a risk of personal injury to detainees, without any allegation that the detainee reasonably feared an
attack on his personal safety, failed to set forth sufficient facts to state a claim under § 1983 for cruel and
unusual punishment.
The court found that the detainee's allegations that he has special dietary needs as a diabetic, that officials at
the District of Columbia jail were deliberately indifferent to his needs and that such indifference occurred
pursuant to a custom, policy and systemic practices of the District, were sufficient to state a claim under § 1983
for cruel and unusual punishment through deliberate indifference to serious medical need.
The court found that the detainee's allegations that due to lack of heating and ventilation at the jail he
suffered from temperatures ranging from 30 to 40 degrees during the winter, that he was not provided with
sufficient blankets for cold jail cells, and that such actions were taken with deliberate indifference to his needs
and pursuant to policy of Department of Corrections (DOC) were sufficient to state a claim under § 1983 for
cruel and unusual punishment through deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. The court noted that
warmth is a basic human need, the deprivation of which can amount to a violation of Eighth Amendment
protection against cruel and unusual punishment.
The court held that the detainee did not state a claim under § 1983 that inadequacies in the jail's law library
violated his First Amendment right of access to the courts, even if he alleged that such inadequacies caused the
filing of his appeals to be untimely, in the absence of an allegation that such untimeliness had an actual adverse
impact on the appeals.
The court held that the detainee's allegations that his legal mail was opened by officials at the jail outside of
his presence on numerous occasions during a four-month period, and that such actions were intentional and
pursuant to a policy or systemic practice, stated a claim under § 1983 for violation of First Amendment free
speech rights. The court held that the alleged refusal of officials of Department of Corrections (DOC) to
transfer the detainee to a correctional treatment facility at which conditions were far less restrictive did not
implicate a due process liberty interest. The court noted that an inmate has no due process liberty interest in a
particular place of confinement or a particular level of security.
The court found that the detainee's allegations that a DOC captain placed him in solitary confinement in
retaliation for his oral complaint to the captain that his newly-assigned cellmate was HIV positive, stated a
claim under § 1983 for retaliation for exercising First Amendment free speech rights. The court found that
whether the detainee had a protected right under the First Amendment, to complain to the captain was not
clearly established at the time, and thus, the captain had qualified immunity from the detainee's§ 1983 claim.
The court found that the detainee's allegations that the Director of the Department of Corrections (DOC),
despite his actual and constructive knowledge that DOC employees were engaged in conduct that posed a
pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury through over-detention, failed to train, monitor, and
discipline DOC employees with regard to timely release of inmates from DOC custody, that the Director's
deliberate failure to do so caused detainee's over-detention, were sufficient when construed liberally to state a
claim under § 1983 for violation of due process and violation of protection against cruel and unusual
punishment. The court noted that the detainee had a clearly established constitutional protection against overdetention and thus, the Director was not entitled to qualified immunity. The court held that the detainee at the
correctional treatment facility operated by the District's private contractor was not excused from the
requirement, under Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), of exhausting his administrative remedies before
bringing a § 1983 action against the contractor's employee relating to denial of detainee's requests for dental
care, even if the detainee believed it would be futile to pursue the facility's grievance procedures. (Central
Detention Facility. D.C. and Correctional Treatment Facility operated by Corrections Corporation of America)

32.156
XXI

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE
MEDICAL CARE

Branton v. City of Moss Point, 503 F.Supp.2d 809 (S.D.Miss. 2007). The son of a pre-trial detainee who
had committed suicide while in custody, filed suit against the city and jail officers asserting claims pursuant
to the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments for failure to train, failure to adopt a policy for safe custodial
care of suicidal detainees, and failure to adopt a policy of furnishing medical care to suicidal detainees. The
detainee was detained on suspicion of drunk driving and was resistant during the booking process. During
the booking process the detainee answered a series of questions. When he was asked, “Have you ever
attempted suicide or are you thinking about it now?” he responded, “No.” He was taken to a cell that was
designated for intoxicated or combative prisoners, given a sheet and a blanket, and was locked in the cell at
3:30 a.m. While conducting a jail check at approximately 5:30 a.m., an officer discovered the detainee
kneeling in a corner of the cell with the sheet around his neck. He was unable to be revived. The defendants
moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court
held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether jail officers
had actual knowledge of a substantial risk of suicide by the detainee, and that fact issues precluded
summary judgment in the claim against the city and officers in their official capacities. On appeal (261
Fed.Appx. 659), the appeals court reversed and remanded. (City of Moss Point, Mississippi)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
USE OF FORCE

Clarke v. Blais, 473 F.Supp.2d 124 (D.Me. 2007). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against jail
officers, alleging they subjected him to excessive force, and against a physician’s assistant for allegedly
failing to give him proper treatment for his physical and mental health issues. The defendants moved for
summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that
questions as to whether jail officers used excessive force in restraining the detainee and whether qualified
immunity was available as a defense precluded summary judgment in the detainee’s § 1983 action. The
court found that the physician’s assistant was not deliberately indifferent to the detainee’s serious medical
needs, by not embarking upon anti-viral therapy for the detainee’s hepatitis C because, as a pretrial
detainee, he was subject to further movement among facilities, and in not prescribing Seroquel, an antipsychotic drug, as recommended by a counselor/social worker at an outside clinic. The court noted that the
physician’s assistant consulted an outside gastroenterologist, the detainee’s liver function was monitored,
and the counselor did not renew the Seroquel recommendation at a subsequent clinic evaluation. (Knox
County Jail, Maine)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Cox v. Hartshorn, 503 F.Supp.2d 1078 (C.D.Ill. 2007). A former pretrial detainee in a county jail brought a
§ 1983 action against a county sheriff and county jail nurse, alleging that he was denied proper medical
care within the county jail in violation of his constitutional rights. The district court granted the defendants’
motion for summary judgment. According to the court, the detainee's medical complaint of a foot rash did
not rise to the level of an objectively serious medical need, so as to afford the detainee due process
protections against the county sheriff and county jail nurse's alleged deliberate indifference to his request
for medical attention. The court noted that the detainee's fungal foot rash was not so serious that it was life
threatening or posed a risk of needless pain or lingering disability, and after being treated by a nurse, the
detainee did not submit any further medical requests for treatment of the rash, nor did he receive any
treatment of the rash after leaving the county jail. (Vermilion County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
USE OF FORCE
MEDICAL CARE

Danley v. Allyn, 485 F.Supp.2d 1260 (N.D.Ala. 2007). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against
jail officers, alleging that he was subjected to excessive force and then denied medical treatment when they
sprayed him with pepper spray. The district court denied the defendants' motions to dismiss and they
appealed. The court of appeals vacated and remanded. On the remand, the district court again denied the
defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court held that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity from
the detainee's claim that the officers subjected him to excessive force, in violation of Fourteenth
Amendment, by pepper spraying him in response to a dispute over toilet paper. The court noted that the
officers had fair warning that to employ pepper spray as punishment, or for the sadistic pleasure of the
sprayers, as distinguished from what was reasonably necessary to maintain prisoner control, was
constitutionally prohibited. The court found that the detainee' allegations that a jail administrator and sheriff
created an atmosphere or practice under which the defendant officers operated in allegedly subjecting the
detainee to excessive force and then denying him medical treatment when they sprayed him with pepper
spray, were sufficient, if proven, to create supervisory liability under § 1983. The court held that the
detainee's claim of deliberate indifference on behalf of defendant officers, wherein they failed to provide
medical attention to the detainee after using pepper spray against him, was no more than a continuation of
the detainee's excessive force claim, and thus was not a separate cause of action under § 1983. (Lauderdale
Detention Center, Alabama)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
CROWDING
MEDICAL CARE
PRIVACY

Desroche v. Strain, 507 F.Supp.2d 571 (E.D.La. 2007). A pre-trial detainee brought a pro se, in forma
pauperis action against prison officials, alleging improper conditions of confinement, negligent medical
treatment, invasion of privacy, and excessive force. The district court dismissed the action. The court held
that the alleged conditions of the detainee's confinement, including being required to sleep on the floor of
an overcrowded holding tank, being deprived of a mattress, and being provided with water only in a dirty
sink, if proven, did not violate his Eighth Amendment or due process rights, given that he experienced such
conditions for only ten days, and that use of sink did not cause him to suffer disease or other serious harm .
The court found that the detainee's attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) was not a serious
condition, and therefore any denial of medical care for the condition did not violate his Eighth Amendment
rights. The court noted that even if ADHD was a serious condition, prison officials were not deliberately
indifferent in treating it, and any denial of medical care did not violate the detainee's Eighth Amendment
rights, in that the detainee merely disagreed with the treatment offered by two doctors at the jail.

32.157
XXII

According to the court, a deputy's alleged recording of the detainee in a jail dormitory with a cell phone
video camera, if proven, was not a violation of any constitutional right to privacy, inasmuch as the detainee
had no expectation of privacy while in a public area of the jail, and any possible harm to the detainee's
reputation was so speculative as to be non-existent. (River Parish Correction Center, Louisiana)
U.S. District Court
INTAKE
SCREENING
SEARCHES

Doe v. Balaam, 524 F.Supp.2d 1238 (D.Nev. 2007). A transsexual arrestee, who was strip searched at a
county jail, brought an action against the county and county sheriff seeking damages, attorney fees, and a
permanent injunction prohibiting the defendants from conducting certain strip searches. The defendants
moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that deputies at the
county jail had a reasonable suspicion, based on specific articulated facts coming directly from the
transsexual arrestee concealing a sock in his crotch area, that the arrestee was carrying or concealing
contraband, so as to justify a strip search of the arrestee prior to being housed in the general jail population.
The court noted that the arrestee had turned himself in for a misdemeanor destruction of property charge,
and even though he had told deputies that he was a transsexual and that he had a rolled-up sock concealed
in his crotch area, the deputies had no way of knowing whether the arrestee was truthful about what he was,
in fact, concealing. According to the court, even if there had been a violation of the arrestee's Fourth
Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures, the transsexual arrestee failed to allege that
the county sheriff knew of and failed to act or prevent any alleged violation, or that any individual
employees acted pursuant to an official county policy or custom, as required to state a cognizable § 1983
claim against the sheriff and county for alleged constitutional violations. (Washoe County, Nevada)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Doe No. 1 v. Balaam, 494 F.Supp.2d 1173 (D.Nev. 2007). Arrestees who were subjected to strip searches
when they self-surrendered at a county jail and were then released on their own recognizance, pursuant to
the sheriff department's contraband control policy, brought an action against the county and county sheriff.
The arrestees sought damages, attorney fees, and a permanent injunction prohibiting the defendants from
conducting certain strip searches, prohibiting the defendants from engaging in similar unconstitutional
conduct in the future, and requiring and ordering the defendants to institute proper training and policy
changes. The inmates moved for partial summary judgment and the district court granted the motion. The
court held that the county's policy of strip searching all arrestees who self-surrendered to the county jail,
absent reasonable suspicion that any arrestee was smuggling contraband, was unreasonable, and thus
amounted to deliberate indifference to the arrestees' Fourth Amendment rights, especially given that all of
the arrestees were booked and then released on their own recognizance without ever being housed with the
general jail population. (Washoe County Detention Facility, Nevada)

U.S. District Court
CLASSIFICATION
FALURE TO
PROTECT

Eichelman v. Lancaster County, 510 F.Supp.2d 377 (E.D.Pa. 2007). A detainee brought a § 1983 action
against a county, the warden of the county prison, and a corrections officer, seeking monetary relief relating
to his treatment while detained in the county prison for a short period of time. The district court granted the
defendants’ motions for summary judgment in part and denied in part. The court held that summary
judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the corrections officer acted with
deliberate indifference to the detainee's safety when he informed inmates of the arrival of the detainee
charged with shooting incident involving a two-year old boy. The officer knew that the detainee was not in
protective custody but rather was in the general population among violent offenders with whom he would
have contact and was housed in a cell furthest from the guard post. The inmate subsequently suffered
injuries at the hands of other inmates. The court also found genuine issues of material fact as to whether the
officer acted recklessly and callously by intentionally inciting inmate animosity toward the detainee and as
to whether he acted with an awareness of the risk that his actions would result in serious harm to the
detainee when other inmates inevitably would have access to him. (Lancaster County Prison, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
INTAKE
SCREENING
SUICIDE

Estate of Puza v. Carbon County, 586 F.Supp.2d 271 (M.D.Pa. 2007). The estate of a pretrial detainee who
committed suicide brought an action alleging civil rights violations against a county and its corrections
officers, and negligence claims against the architect of a county prison. The defendants moved for summary
judgment and the district court granted the motion. The court held that correctional and intake officers were
not deliberately indifferent to the pretrial detainee's vulnerability to suicide, as was required for the officers'
liability under the due process clause for the detainee's suicide. The court noted that the suicide was a
“complete surprise” to the police chief who spent one and a half hours with the detainee, the detainee told
an officer “he had much to look forward to, and [did] not believe in suicide,” the detainee was placed in a
cell next to an inmate who was on suicide watch and could be regularly observed, and the officer
intervened when he noticed the detainee was still kneeling during a second observation of the detainee. The
court found that county employees, through the jail's suicide policy, were not deliberately indifferent as to
whether the pretrial detainee successfully committed suicide, as required to support a due process claim.
According to the court, the policy was annually reviewed by the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections
and was never found deficient, the detainee's screening form did not trigger a suicide watch, and the
employees acted without deliberate indifference in allowing the detainee to retain his shoelaces while in his
jail cell. (Crabtree, Rohrbaugh & Associates, Carbon County Prison, Pennsylvania)

U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE
MENTAL HEALTH
INTAKE
SCREENING
CLOTHING

Forgan v. Howard County, Tex., 494 F.3d 518 (5th Cir. 2007). The family of a county jail inmate who
committed suicide brought an action against the county, county sheriff's department, and various jail
officers, alleging deliberate indifference under § 1983 and claims under the Texas Tort Claims Act
(TTCA). The inmate was arrested for driving while intoxicated and possession of marijuana. During the
booking process, the inmate indicated that he was medicated for a number of mental ailments, including
depression, but that he was not thinking about killing himself at the time. Based on this and other
information, a jail officer classified the inmate as a “risk” for suicide, meaning that he would be checked

32.158
XXII

every fifteen minutes. The inmate was issued a pair of trousers and a shirt to wear, and he was placed in a
holding cell. After approximately one hour, the inmate was found hanging from his jail-issued trousers. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants and the family appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The appeals court held that providing a county jail inmate with non-defective trousers, which the
inmate later used to commit suicide, did not equate to “use of property” by the county, within the meaning
of the TTCA, and that the county was not liable under § 1983. According to the court, the county was not
liable in the § 1983 deliberate indifference claim absent a showing that the county lacked an adequate
suicide prevention policy for jail inmates, or that the county failed to adequately train its jail officials in
suicide prevention. The court noted that proof of a single incident generally will not support a finding of
inadequate training as a matter of custom or policy, for the purpose of establishing § 1983 municipal
liability. (Howard County Jail, Texas)
U.S. Appeals Court
BAIL

Galen v. County of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652 (9th Cir. 2007). A domestic violence arrestee brought a §
1983 Eighth Amendment action against a county, county sheriff, and individual sheriff's deputies, alleging
that bail of $1 million was excessive. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendants and awarded attorney fees in favor of the defendants. The arrestee appealed. The appeals court
affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that bail was not excessive, and that the
deputy who requested a bail enhancement and the deputy's superior who authorized the enhancement
request were entitled to qualified immunity. The court held that individual sheriff's deputies were not
entitled to the award of attorney fees under § 1988, but that the arrestee's post-discovery litigation of a
Monell claim was frivolous, supporting the award of attorney fees to the county. (Los Angeles County
Sheriff's Department, California)

U.S. District Court
RELEASE

Gary v. Floyd, 582 F.Supp.2d 741 (D.S.C. 2007). An arrestee brought a civil rights action against an
arresting officer and a police department, alleging he was arrested pursuant to improperly obtained
warrants. The arrestee sought compensatory and punitive damages for allegedly being held for
approximately one month after the charges against him were dropped. The district court held that the
arresting officer had probable cause to make the arrest and that the department could not be held liable
under the theory of respondeat superior. But the court found that the arrestee was entitled to amend his
complaint to include as defendants a sergeant and directors of the detention center. According to the court,
an amendment to the arrestee's complaint, alleging that he was not released from confinement within a
reasonable time after charges of forgery were dismissed, would not be futile, even though the sergeant's
affidavit indicated that the arrestee was released within 48 hours after the detention center received
notification that he was to be released. The arrestee alleged that the detention center was immediately
notified when the charges were dismissed, but that he was not released for nearly one month. (Greenville
City Police Department, Greenville County Detention Center, South Carolina)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE
PLRA- Prison
Litigation
Reform Act

Goebert v. Lee County, 510 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2007). A pretrial detainee in a county jail, who had been
pregnant during her detention and whose child had been stillborn, brought a § 1983 action against county
and jail officials, a physician, and the jail's medical services provider, alleging deliberate indifference to her
serious medical needs. The district court granted summary judgment for all defendants based on failure to
satisfy the administrative exhaustion requirement of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The
detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part. The court held
that the jail's administrative appeal procedure for inmates was not “available” within the meaning of PLRA,
where the detainee had no way of knowing about it. According to the court, the detainee adequately
exhausted her available remedies under PLRA by filing a document titled “request form.” The court noted
that the handbook given to inmates did not mention a grievance form, but only spoke of a “written request,”
and the inmate checked the “complaint” box on the request form rather than the “request” box and cogently
described her grievance. The court found that the detainee's amniotic fluid leak constituted a serious
medical need and the facility commander exceeded gross negligence in answering the detainee's complaint
about lack of treatment, supporting a deliberate indifference claim. The commander apparently held a
general disbelief of inmates' medical complaints, and responded only with a statement that the detainee
could visit an outside physician if she could pay for it. (Lee County Jail, Florida)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
CLASSIFICATION

Guzman v. Sheahan, 495 F.3d 852 (7th Cir. 2007). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against
county jail officials and a sheriff alleging violations of his right to due process as guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment. The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and the
detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that a corrections officer was not deliberately
indifferent to the detainee's safety and welfare, as required for the detainee's § 1983 due process claim,
arising out of a fight with another inmate and resulting in serious injury to the detainee. The court noted
that the detainee had never before interacted with the inmate involved in the altercation nor had he ever
communicated to the corrections officer or to anyone else that the inmate might be a specific danger to him.
Immediately after the fight broke out, the officer called for back-up. The court held that there was no
evidence that the sheriff had knowledge that the classification and reclassification of inmates were being
poorly implemented by corrections officers, as required for the detainee's § 1983 official capacity claim
against the sheriff. (Cook County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
INTAKE
SCREENING

Hall v. County of Nemaha, Neb., 509 F.Supp.2d 821 (D.Nev. 2007). A pretrial detainee's survivors sued a
city, county, and various city and county officers and officials, asserting various claims under § 1983 in
connection with the death of the detainee from an overdose after swallowing his methamphetamine during
a roadside stop of a vehicle in which he was riding. The district court granted summary judgment for the
defendants in part and denied in part. The district court held that summary judgment was precluded by

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genuine issues of material fact as to whether a deputy sheriff and a jailer knew that the detainee had
swallowed the methamphetamine during a roadside stop and whether they ignored the detainee's panting
and gasping, his claims that he could not see or breathe, and his crying and screaming that he needed to go
to the hospital. The court found that law enforcement officers and other jail officers, who were unaware
that the detainee had swallowed his methamphetamine during a roadside stop, were not deliberately
indifferent to the detainee's serious medical needs, so as to violate his Eighth Amendment rights, even
though he was complaining, uncooperative and acted like an intoxicated person. The court noted that from
their perspective, the detainee was behaving like many other “besotted” pretrial detainees who were
“plucked from the highway in the wee hours of the night and who suffered nothing more than a druginduced stupor while cooling their heels in a cell awaiting their turn to see the local magistrate.” (Nemaha
County, Nebraska)
U.S. District Court
ACCESS TO COURT
CONDITIONS

Harrison v. Moketa/Motycka, 485 F.Supp.2d 652 (D.S.C. 2007). A pretrial detainee sued various prison
officials and medical care providers under § 1983, claiming violations of a variety of his constitutional
rights. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The court held that the detainee did
not suffer a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights when he was allegedly served cold food and two
nutritionally deficient breakfasts. According to the court, merely serving food cold did not present a serious
risk of harm or an immediate danger to the health of the detainee, and while he had significant pre-existing
health problems, there was no indication that those conditions were caused or exacerbated by the diet
provided. The court held that the detainee's right of access to the courts was not violated by any restriction
on his access to a law library, despite his claim that his “wrongful” conviction was proof of his actual
injury. He did not identify a specific defense or legal claim that he was unable to pursue due to his alleged
lack of access to legal materials, and any finding that he had been injured by a “wrongful” conviction
would have impermissibly implied the invalidity of his conviction. The court noted that lack of free
photocopying of law library materials did not deny the indigent detainee access to the courts. (Alvin S.
Glenn Detention Center, South Carolina)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Hartsfield v. Colburn, 491 F.3d 394 (8th Cir. 2007). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against a
nurse, physician, and captain, alleging that they were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs.
The inmate alleged that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs when they
delayed referring him to an oral surgeon to have three teeth extracted. On remand the district court entered
judgment for the defendants and the detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held
that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the nurse and physician acted reasonably in requiring
a second sick call request from the detainee before referring him to a dentist, and that most of the delay in
the detainee seeing the dentist resulted when the detainee unreasonably failed or refused to submit a second
request. The court found that the captain in charge of transporting inmates to medical appointments did not
deny or delay the detainee's dental treatment by interfering with or overriding any medical staff decisions to
schedule an earlier appointment. (Scott County Jail, Iowa)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
SUICIDE
MEDICAL CARE

Herman v. County of York, 482 F.Supp.2d 554 (M.D.Pa. 2007). The estate of a prisoner who had
committed suicide in a county prison sued the county, a warden, the prison health service, and nurses,
asserting Eighth Amendment claims under § 1983, claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA), and state medical malpractice claims. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district
court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court found that, notwithstanding a Pennsylvania
statute stating that the safekeeping, discipline, and employment of prisoners was exclusively vested in a
prison board, the county could be held liable to the prisoner under § 1983 for the actions of the warden if he
was acting as an agent of the county. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine
issues of material fact as to whether the warden was acting as an agent for the county in allegedly failing to
prevent the prisoner's suicide, and as to the warden's role in ratifying county prison policies. The court
found that the county, warden, nurses, and prison health service were not deliberately indifferent to the
medical needs of prisoner who committed suicide, where alleged failures to check on the prisoner in his cell
was by officers other than the defendants, nurses could not have been deliberately indifferent if they were
unqualified as the prisoner's estate said, and the nurses' failure to place the prisoner on a suicide watch did
not fall outside their professional judgment, given the prisoner's denials of suicidal ideation and his family's
testimony. The court found that the prisoner was not denied access to county prison's programs or services
because of disability, and any failure by the county and warden to prevent his suicide thus was not
discrimination in services, programs, or activities of a public entity in violation of ADA. The prisoner
denied thoughts of suicide, he told a nurse that he did not wish to take anti-depressant medications that had
been prescribed for him, and a nurse told him to return to mental health services if necessary. (York County
Prison, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
CLASSIFICATION
FAILURE TO PROTECT

Jenkins v. DeKalb County, Ga., 528 F.Supp.2d 1329 (N.D.Ga. 2007). Survivors of a county jail detainee
who had died as the result of an apparent beating by a fellow inmate brought a § 1983, Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendment action against a county sheriff in his individual capacity, and against corrections
officers. The defendants moved for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The district court
granted the motion. The 71 year old pretrial detainee suffered from multiple mental illnesses including
schizophrenia and dementia, which reportedly manifested themselves in theform of delusions, paranoia,
bizarre thoughts and behavior, physical violence, and verbal outbursts that included racial epithets. The
court held that county corrections officers' putting the inmate into a cell different from the one to which he
had been assigned, allegedly leading to the beating death of a pretrial detainee who shared the same cell,
did not violate the detainee's right against cruel and unusual punishment. The court noted that even though
the action violated a jail policy, the policy was created primarily to keep track of inmates' placement, not to
maintain inmate safety, and there was no evidence of widespread inmate-on-inmate violence due to the

32.160
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misplacement of inmates. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to show that the sheriff's alleged poor
training and supervision of corrections officers led to the officers' allegedly inadequate reaction to the
incident between the jail inmates, which ended with the beating death of one inmate. The court also found
that the sheriff's failure to comply with a court order to transfer the pretrial detainee to a mental health
facility did not show supervisory liability because the purpose of the transfer order was likely to get the
detainee treatment for mental illness, not to protect him. The court held that the county corrections officers
were acting within the scope of their duties when they mistakenly placed a fellow inmate in the same cell
with a pretrial detainee, and thus the officers were eligible for qualified immunity in the detainee’s
survivors' § 1983 Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment action. The court noted that the fact that the mistake
violated jail policies or procedures did not mean that the officers were not exercising discretionary
authority. (DeKalb County Jail, Georgia)
U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
MENTAL HEALTH
SUICIDE

Justus v. County of Buchanan, 517 F.Supp.2d 810 (W.D.Va. 2007). The administrator of a pretrial
detainee's estate filed a § 1983 action against a sheriff and county jail employees arising out of the
detainee's jail suicide. The detainee had a history of schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, anxiety, paranoia, and
delusions and had been hospitalized for these conditions several times in the three years prior to his suicide.
His treatment records show that he was hospitalized because family members reported suicidal ideation and
bizarre, violent, and sexually inappropriate behavior. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The
district court granted the motion. The court held that the sheriff's deputies' failure to provide the pretrial
detainee with prompt medical care after they discovered him hanging in his cell did not amount to
deliberate indifference to the detainee's serious bodily injuries, in violation of the detainee's due process
rights. The court noted that, even though the detainee was still alive when they took him down
approximately 13 minutes after discovering him, there was no showing of an affirmative causal link
between their inaction and the detainee's death from hypoxic brain injury.
The court found that the sheriff was not deliberately indifferent to the pretrial detainee's suicidal nature,
and thus was not subject to liability under § 1983 for failing to take steps to prevent his suicide, even
though a notation on an incident report two months before the detainee's suicide indicated that another
prisoner reported that the detainee “was threatening suicide”. The court found no proof that the report did
not simply inadvertently escape the sheriff's knowledge.
The court held that a reasonable sheriff would not have understood from existing law that the absence of
an operating video surveillance system in the county jail would violate a suicidal pretrial detainee's
constitutional rights, and thus the sheriff was entitled to qualified immunity from liability under § 1983,
even though the jail policy and procedure manual required immediate repair of any defective security
equipment, and the sheriff was aware that the equipment had not been operating for some time.
According to the court, under Virginia law, the deputies' failure to provide the pretrial detainee with
prompt medical care after they discovered him hanging in his cell did not amount to gross negligence as
required to overcome their immunity from tort liability. (Buchanan County, Virginia)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
SEXUAL ASSAULT

Kahle v. Leonard, 477 F.3d 544 (8th Cir. 2007). A female pretrial detainee sued a deputy sheriff under §
1983, alleging that the deputy was deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk that she would be sexually
assaulted by a correctional officer. The district court denied the deputy’s motion for summary judgment
seeking qualified immunity. The deputy appealed and the appeals court affirmed. The court held that
genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether a county jail official was aware of a substantial risk of
serious harm from a male correctional officer’s alleged action of going to a female inmate’s cell three times
after lockdown, and as to whether the official exhibited deliberate indifference to that risk, precluded
summary judgment as to whether the official was liable under § 1983 for due process violations. The court
found that, for purposes of qualified immunity, the law was clearly established at the time of the detainee’s
assault (December 2002) that it would violate a county jail inmate’s due process rights for a jail official to
exhibit deliberate indifference to a substantial risk that a correctional officer would sexually assault the
inmate, and that a supervisor who was deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of such assault could be
held liable under § 1983. (Pennington County Jail, South Dakota)

U.S. Appeals Court
USE OF FORCE

Marvin v. City of Taylor, 509 F.3d 234 (6th Cir. 2007). An arrestee brought an action against police
officers under § 1983 and state law alleging excessive force. The district court denied the defendants'
motion for summary judgment and they appealed. The appeals court reversed. The court held that even if
an officer pushed the arrestee, who was drunk, to the ground as he exited the police vehicle upon arrival at
the police station, the officer did not use excessive force. The court noted that the arrestee was on the
ground outside of the vehicle for less than fifteen seconds, and as soon as the arrestee ended up on the
ground the officer closed the vehicle's door, joined another officer in helping arrestee to his feet, and
walked the arrestee inside to the booking room. The court found that the officers did not use excessive
force in the booking room when they moved the arrestee's arms behind him and over his head for less than
twenty seconds after the arrestee refused to keep his hands on a bench and struck out at an officer with
closed-fist swing. According to the court, the officers did not use excessive force outside of the cell in
which they attempted to place the arrestee when they restrained the arrestee on the floor for approximately
thirty seconds after the arrestee fell. (City of Taylor Police Department, Michigan)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Meuir v. Greene County Jail Employees, 487 F.3D 1115 (8th Cir. 2007). A prisoner who suffered from
chronic dental problems brought a § 1983 action against a county and county jail medical staff, alleging
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The prisoner suffered from chronic dental problems.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the prisoner appealed. The
appeals court affirmed. The court held that the prisoner failed to establish that jail medical staff acted with
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, where jail nurses provided the prisoner with over-thecounter pain medication and encouraged him to brush and gargle with salt water in response to his

32.161
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complaints of bleeding gums and toothaches. The court noted that staff referred him to a county dentist, but
the prisoner refused to go. According to the court, in the face of medical records indicating that medical
treatment was provided and physician affidavits indicating that the care provided was adequate, an inmate
cannot create a question of fact, to avoid summary judgment, in a claim for deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs by merely stating that he did not feel he received adequate treatment. The court held
that the prisoner failed to show that the county jail physician was motivated by an impermissible motive in
refusing to provide the prisoner with free over-the-counter pain medication, although the prisoner claimed
that he refused to see the dentist because the dentist was allegedly a “pull-teeth only” provider. The court
found that the physician refused to provide prisoner with medication based on his refusal to see the dentist,
and there was no showing that the physician knew why the prisoner refused to go to the dentist or that the
physician's motive was otherwise retaliatory. The court noted that the medication was available to the
prisoner for purchase in the commissary. According to the court, the prisoner lacked standing to seek
injunctive relief to end the county jail's unwritten “pull-teeth-only” policy for treatment of chronic dental
problems, where the prisoner filed suit against the county four months after he was transferred to another
correctional facility, his dental ailments were treated without complaint at the transferee facility, and there
was no reason to believe that detainee would be returned to the county jail. (Greene County Jail, Missouri)
U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
SUICIDE

Mombourquette ex rel. Mombourquette v. Amundson, 469 F.Supp.2d 624 (W.D.Wis. 2007). A pretrial
detainee in a county jail who was left seriously brain damaged after she attempted suicide by hanging in her
cell, brought a civil rights suit against a county sheriff, correctional officers, and jail nurses, alleging that
they violated her constitutional rights by failing to protect her from harming herself. The defendants filed
motions for summary judgment. The district court denied the motions. The court held that evidence that
the pretrial detainee reported to county jail personnel that a jail lieutenant was taking another female inmate
out of her cell at night to engage in sexual activity was admissible, because such evidence showed that the
lieutenant had a strong motive to withhold protection from the detainee, and thus was relevant to show he
intentionally disregarded a risk to the detainee’s safety. The court also found that evidence that county
sheriff refused to investigate allegations that the county jail lieutenant was engaging in sexual misconduct
with another inmate was relevant and admissible, where the sheriff’s dismissive attitude of the complaint
exhibited deliberate indifference, both toward the detainee’s health and safety in particular and generally
toward the health and safety of all inmates. The court denied summary judgment because it found a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether a nurse and correctional officers at the county jail were deliberately
indifferent to pretrial detainee’s health and safety. The court also found a genuine issue of material fact as
to whether there was an affirmative link between the county sheriff’s failure to properly train and supervise
county jail personnel and the failure to prevent the detainee’s suicide. (Monroe County Jail, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
RESTRAINTS
CONDITIONS
SANITATION

Murphy v. Franklin, 510 F.Supp.2d 558 (M.D.Ala. 2007). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action
against a sheriff and jail administrator, alleging that he was subjected to punitive, degrading and inhumane
treatment when, without explanation, he was shackled hands-to-feet to the toilet in an isolation cell, and, on
another occasion, shackled to his cot. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss in part
and denied in part. The court held that although the detainee's complaint against the sheriff and jail
administrator did not allege that he was subjected to mistreatment pursuant to any specific official policy,
the detainee's allegations that the sheriff promulgated all policies and procedures in the county jail, that the
detainee was placed in an isolation cell and shackled hands-to-feet to the toilet, which was nothing more
than a hole in the ground covered by a grate, and that the sheriff ordered the detainee removed from this
cell for an interview and then reshackled to the toilet grate, were sufficiently specific to state a § 1983 claim
against the sheriff under the theory of supervisory liability. The detainee alleged that without explanation,
he was moved into a ‘lockdown’ cell for one day, in which his right hand was cuffed to the frame of his cot
and his right leg was shackled to the other end of the cot's frame. Again without explanation, he was
allegedly then moved to an isolation cell, where he was shackled hands-to-feet to the toilet, which is
actually nothing more than a hole in the ground. He alleged that he was held in this configuration for almost
12 days and was not released to allow urination or defecation, which caused him to soil himself, and that he
was also not given any personal necessities such as clean, dry clothing, personal hygiene items, or bedding.
(Elmore County Jail, Alabama)

U.S. Appeals Court
USE OF FORCE
RESTRAINTS
PROTECTION

Norris v. Engles, 494 F.3d 634 (8th Cir. 2007). A county jail detainee, who had been diagnosed with manic
bipolar depression, sued a jail official under § 1983, alleging due process violations arising from his
physical restraint. The district court denied the official's motion for summary judgment based upon
qualified immunity. The official appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that the
official's alleged conduct of cuffing the detainee to a floor-grate toilet in an uncomfortable manner for
approximately three hours, if proven, did not violate the detainee's substantive due process rights.
According to the court, the official’s alleged actions did not shock the conscience and thus did not violate
the detainee's substantive due process rights, inasmuch as official took such action after the detainee, who
had been diagnosed with manic bipolar depression, had threatened to pull out her own peripherally inserted
central catheter (PICC) so that she would bleed to death, and after the detainee had shown that being
handcuffed behind her back was alone not an adequate form of restraint. (Independence Co. Jail, Ark.)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT

Orange v. Fielding, 517 F.Supp.2d 776 (D.S.C. 2007). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against
two detention center administrators to recover for a beating by officers. The court granted summary
judgment in favor of one administrator, and denied the other administrator's motion. The court held that the
detainee's conclusory statements in an affidavit, that the administrator was aware of an officer's
aggressiveness toward inmates and failed to protect the detainee, were insufficient to preclude summary
judgment. The court found that the detainee's affidavit stating that he spoke with the administrator several
times about danger from officers, but that the administrator failed to take action, raised genuine issues of

32.162
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material fact, precluding summary judgment in favor of the other administrator. (Georgetown County
Detention Center, South Carolina)
U.S. District Court
LENGTH
RELEASE

Portis v. City of Chicago, 510 F.Supp.2d 461 (N.D.Ill. 2007). Arrestees brought a class action challenging
the unconstitutional practice of delaying the release of persons arrested for ordinance violations that were
punishable by only a fine. After their class was certified, the arrestees moved for summary judgment. The
district court denied the motion. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue
of material fact as to when the steps necessary to process persons arrested for fine-only ordinance violations
were completed. (City of Chicago, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
CROWDING
STAFFING

Roberts v. County of Mahoning, Ohio, 495 F.Supp.2d 784 (N.D.Ohio 2007). Pretrial detainees and
convicted prisoners being held in the custody of an Ohio sheriff at two correctional facilities that were
allegedly understaffed and overcrowded brought a § 1983 class action against the county, sheriff, and
county commissioners, alleging that conditions of confinement at those facilities were unconstitutional. The
district court appointed a special master for the remedial phase of the litigation. A three-judge panel of the
district court approved the proposed stipulated order. The district court held that the appointment of a
special master had accomplished the court's original objective and the appointment would be terminated.
The court noted that the special master's reports and other actions had fulfilled the requirement that he
“assist the parties, specifically the Defendants, in attempting to find a solution to the problems which
created the unconstitutional conditions in the Jail,” and his fourth report had established a mechanism for
the litigation's actual resolution. The first two reports addressed a narrowly avoided crisis that would have
resulted from massive layoffs of security staff as a result of a budget shortfall in the county. The third
report, filed after passage of a successful ballot issue increasing revenues available for the funding of the
MCJC, described the parties' continued cooperation in attempting to resolve the problems facing the jail, in
particular, the need for accelerated collection of the proceeds from the successful bond issue. The court
concluded “These reports, to which no party filed any objection, were instrumental in establishing an
informational foundation for discussions of possible remedies to the phenomenon of chronic and serious
crowding in the jail.” (Mahoning County Justice Center, Ohio)

U.S. District Court
CROWDING
STAFFING

Roberts v. Mahoning County, 495 F.Supp.2d 719 (N.D.Ohio 2007). Pretrial detainees and convicted
prisoners being held in the custody of an Ohio sheriff at one of two correctional facilities that were
allegedly understaffed and overcrowded brought a § 1983 class action against the county, sheriff, and
county commissioners alleging that conditions of confinement at those facilities were unconstitutional. The
district court held that there was clear and convincing evidence that crowding was the primary cause of the
violation of a federal right, and that no other relief besides a prisoner release order would remedy that
violation. The release order provided for incarceration of all violent felons and for reopening of all jail
facilities under the control of the county to maximum occupancy, while at the same time protecting the
constitutional rights of inmates in the county jail facilities. (Mahoning County Justice Center, Ohio)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Ruiz-Rosa v. Rullán, 485 F.3d 150 (1st Cir. 2007). The mother of a pretrial detainee brought suit against
officials of the Puerto Rico prison system and prison medical personnel after her 18-year-old son died of
septicemia while incarcerated. The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and
the mother appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the district court's dismissal
with prejudice of the mother's complaint for failure to comply with a court order requiring her to file a
clearly stated amended complaint was an abuse of discretion, but that there was no evidence of deliberate
indifference on the part of prison personnel to the serious medical needs of pretrial detainee, as required for
the mother's claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court noted that the detainee received medical
care in the form of draining of his abscess, blood cultures, and two different antibiotics. (Bayamón
Correctional Complex, Puerto Rico)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT

Saunders v. U.S., 502 F.Supp.2d 493 (E.D.Va. 2007). A pretrial detainee brought an action under the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) seeking to hold the United States liable for injuries that he suffered during
a fight at a state jail while in federal custody. The district court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss.
The court held that the detainee's claim that the United States Marshals Service acted negligently in placing
him in an unsafe state jail, and in failing to respond to his verbal concerns about his safety, involved
discretionary decision making, and thus fell within the scope of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)
discretionary function exception. The court noted that there was no allegation that the Marshals Service had
any knowledge of unsafe conditions at the jail other than an apprehension expressed by the detainee
himself. (Western Tidewater Regional Jail, Virginia)

U.S. Appeals Court
ASSESSMENT OF
COSTS

Sickles v. Campbell County, Kentucky, 501 F.3d 726 (6th Cir. 2007). Inmates, former inmates, and relatives
and friends of inmates brought a § 1983 action against two counties, challenging methods used by the
counties to collect fees imposed on prisoners for the cost of booking and incarceration. The district court
entered summary judgment for the counties and the plaintiffs appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The
court held that the county was not required under the Due Process Clause to grant a predeprivation hearing
to inmates prior to withholding a portion of money from their canteen accounts to pay the costs of booking,
room, and board. The court found that the relatives lacked a property interest in the money they sent to
inmates and that the counties did not violate the free speech rights of relatives of inmates in withholding
money. According to the court, the county inmates had a property interest protected by the Due Process
Clause in money withheld from their canteen accounts to pay the costs of booking, room, and board, but the
county was not required under the Due Process Clause to grant a predeprivation hearing to inmates prior to
withholding money from their canteen accounts where the amounts withheld were small, the risk of
erroneous deprivation was minor in that withholding involved elementary accounting and was non-

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discretionary, the potential benefits of a hearing were small, and the government's interests of sharing costs
and furthering offender accountability were substantial. The court also found that the county did not violate
the free speech rights of relatives of inmates in withholding a portion of money that relatives had sent to the
inmates for their canteen accounts, notwithstanding that if the money had not been withheld the inmates
might have spent it making telephone calls. (Campbell County and Kenton County, Kentucky)
U.S. Appeals Court
SEGREGATION
CONDITIONS
DUE PROCESS

Stevenson v. Carroll, 495 F.3d 62 (3rd Cir. 2007). Three pretrial detainees filed a pro se § 1983 action
against a warden, alleging that their placement in restrictive confinement violated their substantive and
procedural due process rights. The district court dismissed the action and the detainees appealed. The
appeals court vacated and remanded. The court held that the detainees’ allegations stated a claim for
violation of substantive due process rights and a claim for violation of procedural due process rights. The
court remanded the case for consideration of the qualified immunity claim. The detainees alleged that they
were punished prior to being sentenced by being placed in restrictive confinement, that they were subjected
to lengthy stays in isolation with prisoners who had disciplinary problems or who were in protective
custody, and that they were subjected to additional hardships that were not shared by the general prison
population. The court found that the detainees’ allegations were sufficiently factual to raise the detainees'
right to relief above a speculative level. The detainees also alleged that they were placed in restrictive
confinement indefinitely and removed from the general prison population while awaiting resentencing after
their sentences were vacated, and that they were not given any explanation or opportunity to contest the
restrictive placement. (Security Housing Unit [SHU], Delaware)

U.S. District Court
USE OF FORCE
TRANSPORT

Stewart v. Beaufort County, 481 F.Supp.2d 483 (D.S.C. 2007). A pretrial detainee brought an action in state
court against a county, county sheriff's department, and deputy, alleging claims for assault and battery
against the deputy, gross negligence against the sheriff's department, and, pursuant to § 1983, violation of
his constitutional rights. Following removal to federal court, the defendants moved for summary judgment.
The district court denied the motion. The court held that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to
whether the deputy's use of force in transporting the pretrial detainee to a detention center was excessive,
precluding summary judgment for deputy on the basis of qualified immunity. The court noted that, at the
time of the alleged violation, a pretrial detainee's right to be free from excessive force was clearly
established. (Beaufort County Detention Center, South Carolina)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCHES

Tabbaa v. Chertoff, 509 F.3d 89 (2nd Cir. 2007). United States citizens brought an action alleging that the
Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officials violated their constitutional and statutory rights
by detaining and searching them at a border when they returned from an Islamic conference in Canada. The
district court entered summary judgment in the government's favor, and the plaintiffs appealed. The appeals
court affirmed, finding that the suspicionless searches of the plaintiffs did not violate the Fourth
Amendment. The court found that the burden placed on the plaintiffs' associational rights as the result of
the CBP searches and detention was sufficiently significant to implicate First Amendment protections, but
the searches and detention constituted the least restrictive means to protect the nation from terrorism. (U.S.
Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, Buffalo, New York)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS

Thomas v. Baca, 514 F.Supp.2d 1201 (C.D. California 2007). Pre-trial detainees and post-conviction
prisoners who alleged they were required to sleep on the floor of county jail facilities brought a civil rights
class action suit against a sheriff in his individual and official capacities. The prisoners moved for summary
adjudication of certain issues and the sheriff moved for summary judgment, or in the alternative, for
summary adjudication. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that
undisputed evidence established the custom of forcing inmates to sleep on the floor and that this custom
violated the Eighth Amendment, even if the majority of inmates had bunks and floor-sleeping inmates were
provided with mattresses. The plaintiffs had presented undisputed evidence that over 24,000 instances of
floor sleeping occurred in the jail system in a four month period. The court found that the sheriff was
entitled to qualified immunity from liability for the jail's custom of forcing some inmates to sleep on the
floor, where it was not clearly established during the 2002 to 2005 period covered by the suit, that
providing inmate with a mattress would not avoid a violation or that floor sleeping violated the Eighth
Amendment rights of convicted inmates as well as due process rights of pretrial detainees. (Los Angeles
Sheriff Department, California)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
STAFFING
SUPERVISION

Thomas v. Sheahan, 499 F.Supp.2d 1062 (N.D.Ill. 2007). A special administrator filed a § 1983 suit against
a county, sheriff, county board, correctional officers, supervisors, and a correctional medical technician, on
behalf of a pretrial detainee who died at a county jail from meningitis and pneumonia. The administrator
alleged violations of the detainee’s constitutional rights and state law claims for wrongful death, survival
action, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The defendants moved for summary judgment and to
strike documents. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court did not strike
all of the plaintiff's summary judgment submissions, for allegedly failing to disclose witnesses or
individuals with relevant information who submitted affidavits, given that the plaintiff had disclosed
witnesses prior to discovery deadline.
The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
the detainee's illness was an objectively serious medical need, and whether correctional officials and a
correctional medical technician were aware of the detainee's serious medical symptoms. The court found
that the supervisors of the correctional officers were not deliberately indifferent to the detainee's serious
medical condition, where the officers did not contact their supervisors about the detainee until the morning
that he died, the supervisors obtained medical care for the detainee, and the supervisors were not
responsible for security checks or rounds of jail. The court also found that summary judgment was
precluded on the issue of causation due to a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the county was

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deliberately indifferent to its widespread practice of failing to train its employees on how to handle inmate
medical requests at the county jail. Summary judgment was also precluded by genuine issues of material
fact as to whether the county was deliberately indifferent to: (1) its widespread practice of understaffing
correctional officers at the county jail; (2) its widespread practice of failing to repair broken video
monitoring systems for inmate surveillance at the jail; and, (3) its widespread policy or practice of
falsifying daily logs to cover up missed security checks on inmates. (Cook County Jail, Illinois).
U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Thomas v. Sheahan, 514 F.Supp.2d 1083 (N.D.Ill. 2007). A special administrator filed a § 1983 suit against
a county, sheriff, county board, correctional officers, supervisors and correctional medical technician on
behalf of a pretrial detainee who died at a county jail from meningitis and pneumonia, alleging violations of
constitutional rights and state law claims for wrongful death, survival action, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. The court held that the administrator's failure to produce documentary evidence of lost
wages or child support payments did not preclude her from introducing evidence at trial. The court found
that the physician was not qualified to testify as to the manifestations of meningitis absent evidence that the
physician was an expert on meningitis or infectious diseases. According to the court, a jail operations
expert's proposed testimony that the county did not meet minimum standards of the conduct for training of
correctional staff was inadmissible. The court also found that evidence of jail conditions was relevant and
thus admissible, where the administrator of the detainee's estate argued that county officials should have
known the detainee was sick because he was throwing up in his cell and in a day room. (Cook County,
Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCHES

U.S. v. Barnes, 506 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 2008). The government appealed an order of the United States District
Court for the District of Rhode Island suppressing cocaine seized from a defendant pursuant to a visual
body cavity search. The appeals court vacated and remanded. The court held that the strip search for
contraband and weapons was justified given the defendant's arrest for a drug trafficking crime, but that the
arresting officer did not have individualized suspicion that the arrestee was “cheeking” drugs, as required to
justify a visual body cavity search. According to the court, the evidence before the officer was that the
arrestee was a suspected drug dealer in possession of narcotics and that some drug dealers concealed drugs
between their buttocks. (Woonsocket Police Department, Rhode Island)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

U.S. v. Miller, 477 F.3d 644 (8th Cir. 2007). A supervisor at a county detention center was convicted in the
district court of depriving two prisoners of their Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment. The supervisor appealed and the appeals court affirmed. The court held that there was
sufficient evidence that the supervisor acted maliciously and sadistically toward the prisoner, in violation of
the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, even though the supervisor could
have inflicted even greater injuries upon the prisoner. Evidence indicated that the supervisor punched the
prisoner when there was no legitimate reason to do so, kicked the prisoner, and stomped on the prisoner
while he was lying on the ground. The court noted that the assailing officer's ability to inflict greater
injuries upon a prisoner does not make an attack any less malicious or sadistic, for the purposes of the
Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The court held that the prisoner's
medical records, which did not identify the supervisor as the individual responsible for the prisoner's
injuries, were admissible under the medical treatment or diagnosis exception to the hearsay records.
(Craighead County Detention Facility, Arkansas)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONDITIONS

U.S. v. Ramirez-Gutierrez, 503 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2007). A defendant pled guilty in the district court to
reentering the United States illegally after being deported. On appeal, the court held that the conditions of
the defendant's pretrial confinement were not so substandard or onerous as to warrant special consideration
at sentencing, and the sentencing judge considered the defendant's claim that he committed crimes because
of substance abuse problem. The defendant complained that he was unable to obtain care for his broken
tooth, lived in poorly ventilated quarters, and was given inadequate opportunity to exercise during his two
and a half month detention. (Kankakee County Detention Center, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
INTAKE SCREENING

Wakat v. Montgomery County, 471 F.Supp.2d 759 (S.D.Tex 2007). The estate of inmate who died in a
county jail brought a § 1983 action against the county, jail physician, and other county personnel. The
defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court held that the county was not liable based on a
county policy, the county was not liable for failure to train or supervise county jail personnel, and a
physician did not act with deliberate indifference to the inmate's serious medical needs. The court held that
the county sheriff was not liable in his individual capacity under § 1983 to the estate of the inmate absent a
showing that he participated in any of the alleged activities in any individual capacity. According to the
court, the county was not liable to the estate under § 1983 for deliberate indifference to the inmate's serious
medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment, since the county policy did not directly cause county
personnel to fail to seek physician approval to reinitiate the inmate's prescription medication. The court
noted that although the jail had a written policy of abruptly discontinuing any narcotic medications when
inmates were initially processed for booking, regardless of whether the inmate had a valid prescription for
the narcotic, the jail also had a policy allowing the narcotic medications to be reinstated with the permission
of a doctor. The court found that the county did not act with deliberate indifference in its training and
supervision of county jail personnel in dealing with inmates' medical needs, absent a showing of a pattern
or a recurring situation of tortuous conduct by inadequately trained employees. The court held that the
county jail physician did not act with deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of the inmate,
where the physician did not refuse to treat the inmate nor ignore his complaints, prescribed medication
when he was first called about the inmate's disorientation and hallucinations, and saw the inmate and
diagnosed him with undifferentiated schizophrenia. According to the court, although the physician failed to

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see signs of withdrawals from benzodiazepine, there was no indication that he intentionally treated the
inmate for schizophrenia while knowing that, in fact, he was suffering dangerous withdrawals from a
prescription drug to which he was addicted. (Montgomery County Jail, Texas)
U.S. District Court
CIVIL COMMITMENT

Webb v. Budz, 480 F.Supp.2d 1050 (N.D. Ill. 2007). African-American civil detainees in a state treatment
and detention facility for sexually violent persons brought a § 1983 action against facility officials, alleging
discrimination on the basis of race. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants.
The court held that the African-American civil detainees who were placed on temporary special/secure
management status (SMS) for committing acts of violence toward staff members were not similarly situated
to five Caucasian detainees who were placed on SMS for committing acts of violence toward staff
members, as required to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory effect in violation of equal
protection. According to the court, after being placed on SMS, each of the Caucasian detainees progressed
out of SMS as a result of good behavior and acceptance of responsibility, while the African-American
detainees engaged in numerous acts of insubordination while on SMS, including threats on security staff,
concealing weapons and contraband, and throwing urine at staff members. (Illinois Department of Human
Services Treatment and Detention Facility for Sexually Violent Persons, Sheridan, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Williams v. Rodriguez, 509 F.3d 392 (7th Cir. 2008). An arrestee sued a city and others under § 1983,
asserting claims for false arrest and deliberate indifference to his medical needs. The district court entered
summary judgment for the defendants and the arrestee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held
that the arrestee's asthma was not objectively serious during the time he was being processed, and therefore
an officer was not deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. According to the court, the arrestee's
statements to the officer that he had asthma, needed his medication, and could not breathe, made in the
context of a request that the arrestee take a breathalyzer test, were insufficient by themselves to show that
he was suffering from a serious attack. (City of Chicago Police Department, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
MENTAL HEALTH
MEDICAL CARE

Winters v. Arkansas Dept. of Health and Human Services, 491 F.3d 933 (8th Cir. 2007). The administrator
of the estate of a mentally ill pretrial detainee/civil committee who had died of peritonitis in a county jail
sued a sheriff and the Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) under § 1983, the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Rehabilitation Act. The district court entered judgment for the defendants.
The administrator appealed and the appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the pretrial detainee
was not discriminated against on the basis of his mental illness, as required to a establish violation of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) or the Rehabilitation Act. The court noted that the detainee was
arrested for criminal trespass, and although he was not treated for his peritonitis due to his inability to
communicate because of his mental illness, the sheriff and other jail officials sought immediate treatment
for the detainee's mental illness, and attempted to transport him to a state hospital, but he was denied
admittance due to lack of available space. The court found that neither the Arkansas Department of Human
Services (DHS) nor the county sheriff were deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of the
detainee, nor was there a policy or custom to deprive mentally ill detainees of treatment. According to the
court, the detainee died from a condition that neither defendant knew of or suspected, the sheriff and other
jail officers attempted to get the detainee into a mental health treatment facility, but no facility would
accept custody of him. (Benton County Jail, Arkansas)
2008

U.S. District Court
INVOLUNTARY
MEDICATION

Anglin v. City of Aspen, Colo., 552 F.Supp.2d 1205 (D.Colo. 2008). A pretrial detainee brought a civil
rights action, alleging that a county sheriff, county jailers, and others violated her rights to due process and
free speech, as well as her right to be free from unreasonable seizure, by forcibly injecting her with
antipsychotic medication while in custody at a county jail. The district court granted summary judgment for
the defendants in part. The court held that a county sheriff's deputy personally participated in the decision
to sedate the detainee and therefore the deputy could be liable in his individual capacity under § 1983. The
deputy had called paramedics and admittedly lobbied the medics to sedate the detainee, he allegedly falsely
reported to the paramedics that the detainee had been banging her head and throwing herself against her
steel cell door, and he participated in physically restraining the detainee during the injection, at the request
of the paramedics. The court found that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether the deputy falsely reported to the paramedics. The court found that the deputy was not
entitled to qualified immunity from liability. The court found that the training of county jail personnel by
the county sheriff and other officials with respect to forcible sedation of pretrial detainees in the county jail,
was not deliberately indifferent to the due process rights of the detainees, and therefore the sheriff and
county officials were not liable under § 1983 for failure to properly train. The training required personnel to
call the paramedics and let the paramedics, with the advice of a physician, make the decision as to whether
or not to sedate. (Pitkin County Jail, Colorado)

U.S. District Court
INVOLUNTARY
MEDICATION

Anglin v. City of Aspen, Colo., 552 F.Supp.2d 1229 (D.Colo. 2008). A jail inmate brought a civil rights
action, alleging that an emergency room physician violated her constitutional rights by forcibly injecting
her with antipsychotic medication while she was in custody. The physician filed a motion for summary
judgment, which was granted by the district court. The court held that the physician “acted under color of
state law” within the meaning of § 1983 when he ordered the inmate to be involuntarily sedated, and that
the physician exercised reasonable medical judgment in deciding to forcibly sedate the inmate. The court
noted that although the private physician did not contract directly with the state to treat the inmate, the
physician however undertook a public function because the provision of medical services to inmates was
traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state. The inmate appeared highly intoxicated and out of

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control, was pounding and throwing her body against her cell door, was violently pulling against her
restraints and thrashing about, and was unable to gain control in the presence of the paramedics or to allow
her vital signs to be taken. (Pitkin County Jail, Colorado)
U.S. Appeals Court
FALSE ARREST
INTAKE SCREENING
SEARCHES

Archuleta v. Wagner, 523 F.3d 1278 (10th Cir. 2008). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action against a jailer
and others alleging her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when she was strip
searched. The district court denied the jailer's request for qualified immunity and the jailer appealed. The
appeals court affirmed the district court decision. The court held that the jailer was not justified in
conducting the strip search during booking, following the arrest pursuant to an arrest warrant for
harassment, where the arrestee never intermingled with the general jail population but rather was confined
in a cell by herself for several hours while awaiting bail. The court noted that three pat down searches had
been performed on the arrestee prior to booking, the arrestee was wearing shorts and a sleeveless blouse at
the time of booking, the jailer saw that the arrestee did not have any tattoos or moles indicating that she was
the culprit, and the crime of harassment was not a crime of violence. The court found that the arrestee had a
right not to be strip searched during booking when she was not going to intermingle with the general prison
population. She had already been through a pat-down search, and there was no reasonable suspicion that
she had a weapon. According to the court, the jailer who conducted the strip search was not entitled to
qualified immunity because at the time of this incident it was clearly established that a strip search could be
justified if there was a reasonable suspicion that the detainee possessed weapons and the detainee
intermingled with the general jail population. The 46-year-old mother of nine had been riding in a family
van with some of her children when she was stopped by an officer because there was an extra child in the
back seat. The officer arrested her with the belief that she was the person for whom a warrant had been
issued. After being booked at the jail it became apparent that she was not the person named in the warrant
because she did not have the tattoos and moles that were described in the file. Knowing that the plaintiff
was not the person named in the warrant, a jail officer nonetheless continued to process and strip search
her. As she was standing naked, she began to lactate. She tried to cover herself but was told by the officer
to put her arms down. She was mocked continually by the officer and a male officer during this incident.
(Jefferson County Detention Facility, Colorado)

U.S. District Court
RESTRAINTS

Antoine v. County of Sacramento, 566 F.Supp.2d 1045 (E.D.Cal. 2008). A pretrial detainee brought a civil
rights action against corrections officers based upon the officers' use of a “grating” restraint practice. After
a jury verdict in favor of the detainees, the officers moved for a new trial. The district court granted the
motion in part and denied in part. The court held that it was proper to permit an expert witness to express
his opinions regarding the propriety of the “grating” practice in the context of whether the officers' decision
to employ that practice rather than the “prostraint” restraining chair was appropriate. The court found that
the detainee's attorneys' argument that the detainee was “hogtied” by the defendant corrections officers did
not constitute misconduct warranting a new trial, where testimony indicated that the detainee's feet were
shackled together and his hands were shackled together behind his back, but that his feet were not shackled
to his hands. The court found that the compensatory damages instruction given in the detainee's civil rights
action was in error since it permitted the jury to believe that it could award an unlimited amount of noncompensatory damages to compensate the plaintiff for the abstract “value” of his constitutional rights.
According to the court, the use of the term “constitutional injuries”--combined with the instruction allowing
the jury to award nominal damages, and the omission of the $1.00 limit--invited the jury to award an
unlimited amount of damages based on the importance of the plaintiff's constitutional rights in lieu of
awarding compensatory damages. The jury awarded the detainee $20,000 in compensatory damages as well
as $25,000 in punitive damages against each of four defendants, and $50,000 against one defendant.
(Sacramento County, California)

U.S. District Court
CLASSIFICATION
DUE PROCESS
SEGREGATION

Basciano v. Lindsay, 530 F.Supp.2d 435 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). A pretrial detainee petitioned for a writ of
habeas corpus seeking an order lifting special administrative measures governing his confinement and
releasing him from a special housing unit back into the general prison population. The district court denied
the petition. The court held that the restrictive conditions of pretrial confinement which removed the
detainee from the general prison population, did not amount to punishment without due process. The court
noted that there was substantial evidence of the detainee's dangerousness, a rational connection between the
conditions and a legitimate purpose of protecting potential victims, and the existence of an alternative
means for the detainee to exercise his right to communicate with others and with counsel. (Metropolitan
Detention Center, Brooklyn, New York)

U.S. District Court
PRIVACY

Bellamy v. Wells, 548 F.Supp.2d 234 (W.D.Va. 2008). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against
police officers and a chief of police for initiating and surreptitiously recording conversations with him
while he was in custody on an indictment for rape. The district court entered judgment for the defendants in
part. The court held that the detainee's allegations that police officers initiated and surreptitiously recorded
conversations with him while he was in custody, and that incriminating statements he made during these
conversations were subsequently used against him at trial, stated a cognizable claim under § 1983 for
violation of his Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination. While in a hospital, the
detainee spoke with an officer who was guarding him. When police learned of these conversations, they
had the officer wear a recording device and they recorded subsequent conversations. The detainee was
never given his Miranda warning during the course of these conversations. (City of Waynesboro, Virginia)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Brazier v. Oxford County, 575 F.Supp.2d 265 (D.Me. 2008). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action against a
county and corrections officers, alleging that strip searches performed upon her during two post-arrest
confinements at a county jail, both relating to her driving privileges, were unconstitutional. The district

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court held that the strip searches violated the county's written policy, and thus the county was subject to
liability under § 1983. The court noted that the county's written policy prohibited strip searches of inmates
charged with misdemeanor crimes unless there was reasonable suspicion to believe that an inmate was
hoarding evidence to a crime, weapons, drugs, or contraband. (Oxford County Jail, Maine)
U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
SUICIDE

Brumfield v. Hollins, 551 F.3d 322 (5th Cir. 2008). The daughter of a detainee who hung himself while
confined in a “drunk tank” of a county jail brought a § 1983 action against the county, and a sheriff and
deputies in their individual and official capacities. The district court awarded summary judgment to each
defendant sued in his individual capacity on the basis of qualified immunity, but denied summary judgment
to individual defendants in their official capacities and to the county. After a trial, the district court directed
a verdict in favor of all officers and the county. The daughter appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The
court held that the sheriff was protected by qualified immunity and that the district court did not abuse its
discretion by excluding expert testimony indicating that the detainee was alive when paramedics arrived at
the jail. The court found that the county was not liable under § 1983. According to the court, the sheriff was
entitled to qualified immunity from the claim that he failed to adopt any written policy pertaining to inmate
supervision or medical care, where verbal policies existed concerning inmate supervision and medical care.
The court found that the sheriff's efforts in training and supervising deputies were not deliberately
indifferent, as required for the sheriff to be liable under § 1983 for the suicide of a drunk driving detainee.
The court noted that the deputies did receive training, and that there was no evidence of a pattern of similar
violations or evidence that it should have been apparent that a constitutional violation was the highly
predictable consequence of an alleged failure to train. The court found that while the deputies' conclusion
that the detainee who had hung himself was already dead, and their resulting failure to make any attempt to
save his life, were arguably negligent, this conduct alone did not amount to deliberate indifference, nor was
any county custom or policy the moving force behind the deputies' conduct, as required for the county to be
liable under § 1983 for denial of reasonable medical care. (Marion County Jail, Mississippi)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
INTAKE SCREENING
MEDICAL CARE

Burnette v. Taylor, 533 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 2008). The father of a detainee who died while in custody in a
county jail brought a § 1983 claim against county sheriff's deputies and jailers, alleging deliberate
indifference to the detainee's serious medical needs. The district court denied the defendants' motion for
summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The defendants appealed. The appeals court reversed
and remanded. The court held that the arresting officers were not deliberately indifferent to the serious
medical needs of the detainee who died after ingesting a lethal combination of drugs while in custody in the
county jail. Although the officers had been warned by the detainee's stepfather that the detainee was strung
out on drugs, and one officer observed that the detainee had glassy eyes and appeared to be under the
influence of something, the officers saw only that the detainee possessed a bottle of prescription pills. The
court noted that neither the detainee nor any family member requested that the detainee be given medical
treatment, and the symptoms exhibited by the detainee were not necessarily indicative that medical
attention was required. The court found that a jailer was not deliberately indifferent to the serious medical
needs of the detainee. The jailer was in charge of dressing out the detainee before he was placed in his cell,
and although the jailer found a bottle of prescription pills and observed that the detainee was wasted, the
detainee advised that he had just woken up, and no one told the jailer that the detainee needed medical help
or needed to be looked after. The court also held that a jailer was not deliberately indifferent to the serious
medical needs of the detainee even though the jailer was aware that the detainee was in possession of a
bottle of pills when he was arrested, that his speech was slurred, that he needed assistance when he was
moved from one cell to another and that his eyes were rolling back in his head at that time, and that the
detainee was making a snoring sound at the time of one bed check. According to the court, the jailer was
never aware that the detainee could have ingested a lethal amount of drugs, no one ever recommended to
the jailer that the detainee be placed in a holding cell or otherwise be observed, and the jailer observed the
detainee laughing and talking with his cellmates at one point. (Bacon County Jail, Georgia)

U.S. Appeals Court
HABEAS CORPUS

Carrascosa v. McGuire, 520 F.3d 249 (3rd Cir. 2008). A detainee sought a writ of habeas corpus seeking to
end her detention in jail for violating a state court civil contempt order that directed her to return her child
to the father's custody in the United States pursuant to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction. The district court denied her motion for reconsideration and the detainee
appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the detainee’s incarceration was not in violation of laws
or treaties of the United States, as required for a grant of habeas petition. The court noted that a Spanish
court awarded custody of the child to the detainee, who had removed the child from her habitual place of
residence in New Jersey without the American father's permission, in direct contravention of both the letter
and spirit of the Hague Convention. The court noted that this also violated the principles of international
comity by applying Spanish law, rather than New Jersey law, and therefore warranted refusal to afford
comity to the decisions of Spanish courts. (Bergen County Jail, New Jersey)

U.S. District Court
INTAKE SCREENING

Castro v. City of Hanford , 546 F.Supp.2d 822 (E.D.Cal. 2008). An arrestee brought an action against a
county, city, and various law enforcement officers, alleging violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, and
asserting various state law claims, including false arrest, and false imprisonment. The district court granted
summary judgment for the county. The court held that the county was not liable under § 1983 for the
county jail officer's alleged unconstitutional conduct in failing to perform live scan fingerprinting on the
arrestee while he was in custody, absent a showing that the county had a policy or practice not to perform
such fingerprinting. The court found that county jailers had a reasonable belief that the detainee was the
person named in an arrest warrant, and did not have reason to know that the detainee was not the subject of
the warrant, and thus, the detainee could not prevail in false imprisonment and negligence claims. The court
noted that the jailers relied upon the information provided to them by the arresting officers, and there was

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no court order or other independent evidence that would have called the lawfulness of the detention into
question. (Hanford Police Department, Kings County Jail, California)
U.S. Appeals Court
LENGTH
UNLAWFUL
DETENTION

Center for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Sheriff Dept., 533 F.3d 780 (9th Cir. 2008).
Detainees, who were anti-abortion activists who had displayed photographs of aborted fetuses on the streets
outside a middle school's campus, brought a § 1983 action against a county sheriff's department, individual
deputies in their individual and official capacities, and a middle school official in his individual and official
capacity, alleging free speech and Fourth Amendment violations arising from their detention and the search
of their vehicle. The district court dismissed or granted summary judgment for the defendants on all claims.
The detainees appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded in part. The
court held that the Fourth Amendment was violated by the officers' 75-minute detention of the anti-abortion
activists, which followed a valid Terry stop to investigate possible vehicular violations after the activists
drove a “security vehicle” and truck featuring graphic photographs of aborted fetuses on public streets
around the middle school. According to the court, the detention should have lasted only long enough to
allow the officers to examine the security vehicle and determine whether there were outstanding warrants
involving the vehicle or its occupants. (Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, California)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Craft v. County of San Bernardino, 624 F.Supp.2d 1113 (C.D.Cal. 2008). County jail inmates brought a
class action alleging that a county's practice of routinely strip-searching inmates without probable cause or
reasonable suspicion that the inmates were in possession of weapons or drugs violated the Fourth
Amendment. After the court granted the inmates’ motion for partial summary judgment, the parties entered
into private mediation and reached a settlement agreement providing for, among other things, a class fund
award of $25,648,204. The inmates moved for the award of attorney's fees and costs. The district court held
that class counsel were entitled to an attorney's fees award in the amount of 25% of the settlement fund plus
costs. The court noted that counsel obtained excellent pecuniary and nonpecuniary results in a complex and
risky case involving 150,000 class members, 20,000 claims, and five certified classes, each of which
presented unsettled legal issues. According to the court, tens or hundreds of thousands of future inmates
benefited from policy changes brought about by the suit, and the attorneys were highly experienced and
highly regarded civil rights lawyers with extensive class action experience. (San Bernardino County Jail,
California)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE
USE OF FORCE

Danley v. Allen, 540 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2008). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against jailers,
alleging that he was subjected to excessive force and then denied medical treatment when they sprayed him
with pepper spray. The district court entered orders denying the defendants' motions to dismiss on qualified
immunity grounds, and the defendants appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. On remand, the
district court again denied the motion to dismiss, and defendants again appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The court held that the use of pepper spray to subdue the unruly detainee who had twice ignored a
jailer's instructions for him to return to his cell did not represent the application of excessive force in
violation of the detainee's Fourteenth Amendment rights. But the court found that allegations in the
detainee's complaint, regarding his subsequent confinement without being allowed to properly clean
himself and remove pepper spray from his clothing, in a small, poorly-ventilated cell, were sufficient to
state an excessive force claim.
According to the court, the entire incident, consisting of both the initial pepper-spraying and the
detainee’s subsequent confinement in a small, poorly-ventilated cell, could be treated as a single alleged
incident of use of excessive force. The court noted that the detainee’s eyes nearly swelled shut, he had
difficulty breathing, and he nearly passed out, while jail officials allegedly failed to take any, and then only
inadequate, steps to alleviate his suffering but instead mocked and ridiculed him. The court found that the
alleged mocking of the detainee while he suffered, by jailers who parodied his choking, was circumstantial
evidence of their malicious intent.
The court found that the allegations were sufficient to state a claim for officials' deliberate indifference
to the detainee’s serious medical needs. The court determined that the jailers were not entitled to qualified
immunity on the detainee's deliberate indifference claim and that the detainee stated a claim against the
sheriff and the jail administrator to hold them personally liable under § 1983 for alleged excessive force
and deliberate indifference by the jailers.
The detainee was allegedly diagnosed with chemical conjunctivitis and bronchospasms as the result of
the delay in treatment. The court noted that this, along with the fact that another prisoner allegedly
recognized the detainee's distress and was ultimately successful in obtaining a brief shower for him, was
sufficient to show the seriousness of his medical need. (Lauderdale County Detention Center, Alabama)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Dean v. City of Fresno, 546 F.Supp.2d 798 (E.D.Cal. 2008). The widow and children of a detainee who
died from complications of cocaine ingestion while incarcerated in a county jail, brought an action in state
court against a city and two police officers. After removal to federal court, the defendants moved for
summary judgment on all claims. The district court granted the motion in part and remanded. The court
found that the officers violated the detainee's Fourteenth Amendment right to medical care when they did
not obtain medical aid for the detainee after he vomited in the patrol car and rock cocaine was found in the
vomit. According to the court, a rational jury could conclude that the officers knew that the detainee had
swallowed rock cocaine and had a serious medical condition, and that the officers did not render care
themselves, did not call for paramedics, did not take the detainee to the hospital, and did not report the
discovery of the rock cocaine in the vomit to the jail nurse. The court found that the officers were entitled
to qualified immunity where the detainee, who did not exhibit signs of being high as his detention
progressed and who was previously communicative of his symptoms, gave an inaccurate reason to explain
his condition and never requested medical treatment. The court held that the plaintiffs failed to show that

32.169
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the city failed to adequately train the officers. According to the court, the undisputed evidence showed that
Fresno police officers receive police academy training, field training programs, on the job training,
advanced officer courses, and various classes and seminars. The court noted that Fresno police officers are
particularly trained: (1) to conduct evaluations to determine if a person is under the influence of a
controlled substance, including rock cocaine (for those officers involved in narcotics investigations); (2) to
request aid for persons in need of medical care; (3) to recognize an arrestee's need for medical care and
provide such care; (4) to be aware of efforts that suspects may make to hide controlled substances,
including putting such substances in their mouths; (5) to render medical aid, contact emergency medical
services or transport the suspect to the hospital if they have a reasonable belief that a suspect has swallowed
a controlled substance, such as rock cocaine; (6) to know that ingestion of cocaine can cause death; (7) to
know that arrested persons may have evidence in their mouth; (8) to know that persons arrested on drug
charges may attempt to conceal the illegal drugs on their person; and (9) to be suspicious of those arrested
and what the arrestees say. (City of Fresno and Fresno County Jail, California)
U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
USE OF FORCE

Estate of Harvey ex rel. Dent v. Roanoke City Sheriff's Office, 585 F.Supp.2d 844 (W.D.Va. 2008). The
administrator of a pretrial detainee's estate brought a civil rights action under §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986 and
Virginia law, against a city sheriff's department, sheriff, deputies, and prison health providers, alleging
excessive use of force, failure to train, assault, battery, conspiracy, breach of a non-delegable fiduciary
duty, intentional infliction of emotional distress and wrongful death. The defendants moved for summary
judgment. The district court granted the motions. The court held that the estate of the pretrial detainee who
died following cardiac arrest after transfer from a jail to a hospital could not sustain a deliberate
indifference claim under the Fourteenth Amendment against the employees of a prison health provider,
absent evidence that they actually knew of and disregarded a serious risk of harm to the detainee, or that
they actually knew of and ignored a serious need for medical care. The court noted that the city sheriff and
sheriff's deputies did not knowingly disregard a substantial risk of harm to the pretrial detainee in violation
of Fourteenth Amendment when they relied on medical personnel's decisions as to the appropriate course of
treatment for the detainee's medical needs. The court found that the city sheriff's deputies did not act with
deliberate indifference when, in an attempt to transfer the detainee to a hospital for treatment, they forcibly
removed the detainee from his cell, placed him face down on a stretcher, and covered him with a blanket to
stop him from spitting and throwing feces at the deputies. According to the court, there was no evidence
that the deputies knew that the detainee suffered from an excited delirium or serious heart condition. The
court noted that the detainee was naked, slick with feces and urine, spitting, yelling, being combative,
threatening to throw more bodily fluids, trying to bite, and was HIV and Hepatitis C positive. (Roanoke
City Jail, Virginia)

U.S. District Court
FALSE ARREST
FALSE
IMPRISONMENT

Farag v. U.S., 587 F.Supp.2d 436 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). Airline passengers detained after a flight landed
brought a Bivens action against Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents, a city police detective, and
counterterrorism agents, alleging that their seizure, detention, and interrogation after the flight landed
violated their Fourth Amendment rights, and false arrest and false imprisonment claims against United
States under Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district
court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the agents did not have probable
cause to detain the airline passengers and that, as an issue of first impression, the agents could not rely on
Arab ethnicity alone as probable cause to arrest airline passengers. The court held that the detention of the
airline passengers at the terminal after their plane landed was a de facto arrest, rather than a Terry stop, for
the purposes of the passengers' Fourth Amendment claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The
court noted that upon entering the terminal the passengers were met by police dogs and at least ten
uniformed police officers in SWAT gear carrying shotguns. They were taken to separate locations about
thirty-five to forty-feet apart, each accompanied by two police officers, ordered to raise their hands, and
frisked. They were held in separate cells at a police station. The passengers were removed from the airline
concourse and taken to a jail cell between five and fifteen minutes away by car. The court found that the
four hour detention of passengers in a city jail was not a justified Terry stop for the purposes of the
passengers' Fourth Amendment claims and common-law false imprisonment and false arrest claims. (Port
Authority Police Station, Kennedy Airport, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
ALIEN
FAILURE TO PROTECT
MEDICAL CARE

Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763 (7th Cir. 2008). A federal pretrial detainee who was a Canadian
citizen and who was held in a county jail brought actions against a city and against a sheriff, jail
commander, sergeant, jail officers, and the United States marshal. The detainee sued the defendants in their
official and individual capacities, asserting state-law negligence and constitutional claims, § 1983 claims,
and claims under the Alien Tort Claims Act. The district court granted summary judgment for the
defendants and the detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
The court held that there was no evidence that the county jail's grievance process and the allegedly sham
manner in which it functioned caused the injuries suffered by the pretrial detainee, who was beaten on
repeated occasions by other prisoners, as required for the detainee to establish the causation element of his
§ 1983 claim against the county sheriff in his official capacity.
The court found that the detainee did not show that the alleged practice at the county jail of dispensing an
inmate or detainee's entire drug prescription at one time was a widespread practice, reflective of a policy
choice made by the county sheriff, as required to establish a § 1983 claim against the sheriff in his official
capacity. According to the court, the detainee did not establish the frequency of the claimed practice or
indicate how many such disbursements to others he witnessed.
The court held that there was no evidence that jail officers knew that the detainee was perceived to be a
snitch by his fellow inmates and thus that the officers knew that the detainee's placement in a barracks-style
cell with 45 others posed a substantial risk of serious harm to the detainee, as required to establish the jail

32.170
XXII

officers' deliberate indifference to the detainee's safety in violation of his due process rights. The court
found that the repeated assaults suffered by the detainee at the hands of other jail inmates did not establish
that the jail officers were subjectively aware of a specific risk to the detainee's safety, as required for the
detainee to establish deliberate indifference to his safety in violation of his due process rights. The court
noted that the detainee did not inform jail officers of a specific threat to his life, such as the perception that
he was “snitch,” but instead indicated only that he was afraid and wanted to be moved. According to the
court, the officers could not have been on notice of specific threats to the detainee's safety, when the
detainee was assaulted by one inmate for taking too long to use a toilet, by another for snoring, and by
another out of anger over losing a card game. The court found that the inmate was a “victim of the inherent,
as it were the baseline, dangerousness of prison life.” The court held that summary judgment was
precluded by material issues of fact as to whether the detainee was assaulted by other inmates in the
presence of a jail officer and whether the jail officer watched the assault but did not intervene to protect the
detainee. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by verifiying medical evidence of a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether a delay in securing medical care for the detainee’s broken nose
was deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. According to the court, evidence that the detainee
suffered a nasal fracture, could experience further bleeding, and possibly would need to see a specialist, and
that the detainee later underwent painful nose surgery, would help a jury determine whether the one and
one-half day delay by jail officers in getting the detainee medical attention unnecessarily prolonged and
exacerbated the detainee's pain. (Marion County Jail, Indiana)
U.S. District Court
BAIL
LENGTH

Hernandez v. Carbone, 567 F.Supp.2d 320 (D.Conn. 2008). An indigent arrestee brought an action against
the director of Connecticut court support services, alleging violations of § 1983, the Eighth Amendment,
and the Fourteenth Amendment arising from the arrestee's nearly year-long pre-trial detention, during
which time the arrestee was unable to post bail, before charges were dropped. The director moved to
dismiss. The district court granted the motion. The arrestee alleged that the director caused his bail to be set
at $100,000. The court held that the director's alleged misconduct in adopting unconstitutional policies and
practices did not cause the arrestee's bail to be set so high or cause detention. The court held that it was
required to abstain from deciding the arrestee's facial constitutional challenges to Connecticut's bail system.
The court noted that the sentencing judge not only ignored a bail commissioner's recommendation for a
much lower bail, in an amount that was also requested by the arrestee's counsel, but he also ignored the bail
commissioner's statement that the arrestee could not post any bail, and at a subsequent bail reduction
hearing the judge declined to reduce the arrestee's bail. (Connecticut's Court Support Services Division,
City of Hartford)

U.S. Appeals Court
CELL CAPACITY
CROWDING
DUE PROCESS

Hubbard v. Taylor, 538 F.3d 229 (3rd Cir. 2008). Pretrial detainees filed suit under § 1983, challenging
conditions of their confinement on Fourteenth Amendment due process grounds. The district court granted
the defendants' motion for summary judgment and the detainees appealed. The appeals court vacated and
remanded. On remand the district court granted the defendants’ renewed motions for summary judgment
and the detainees again appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that triple-celling of the
pretrial detainees was rationally related to prison officials' legitimate governmental interest in trying to
manage overcrowding conditions at the prison, for the purposes of the detainees' claim that triple-celling
violated their Fourteenth Amendment due process right. The court found that requiring the detainees to
sleep on a mattress on the floor of their cells for a period of three to seven months did not violate the
detainees' Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The court noted that although many pretrial detainees
did spend a substantial amount of time on floor mattresses, they also had access to 3,900 square foot
dayrooms, there was no evidence that the use of the floor mattresses resulted in disease or the splashing of
human waste upon the detainees, and over $2.8 million dollars had been spent on capital improvements
during the past five years to maintain or elevate the living conditions for prisoners. The court noted that
even if the detainees' due process constitutional rights were violated by requiring them to sleep on
mattresses on the floor, the law was not sufficiently clear so that a reasonable official would understand that
what he was doing violated a constitutional right, entitling the prison officials to qualified immunity in the
detainees' suit under § 1983 challenging conditions of their confinement. (Multi-Purpose Criminal Justice
Facility, Delaware)

U.S. District Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
MEDICAL CARE
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Johnston v. Maha, 584 F.Supp.2d 612 (W.D.N.Y. 2008). A pretrial detainee brought an action against
employees of a county jail, alleging violations of his constitutional rights under § 1983 and violations of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The defendants moved for summary judgment and the district
court granted the motion. The court held that the inmate failed to exhaust administrative remedies for the
purposes of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) as to some of his § 1983 and Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) claims against employees of the county jail, where the inmate either did not pursue
appeals at all, or did not pursue appeals to the final step. The court found that the inmate's placement in
isolation at the county jail only lasted three or four days, and thus did not constitute an atypical and
significant hardship compared to the burdens of ordinary jail confinement in violation of the inmate's due
process rights for the purposes of § 1983 action, although it appeared that the inmate lost some privileges
during his time of isolation. According to the court, evidence was insufficient to show that the inmate was
injured, or that whatever force was used by correctional officers, who removed the inmate from his cell
during his transfer to segregation, was more than necessary, as would have supported the inmate's § 1983
claim for alleged violation of his rights under the Eighth Amendment. The court held that evidence was
insufficient to show that medical staff at the county jail acted with deliberate indifferent to the inmate's
medical needs as to requested dental care, as required to support his § 1983 claim for violation of the
Eighth Amendment. The court noted that although the inmate had to wait two months to see a dentist, the
dentist filled the inmate's cavities and took x-rays related to that treatment. (Genesee Co. Jail, New York)

32.171
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U.S. District Court
LAW LIBRARIES

Jones v. Lexington County Detention Center, 586 F.Supp.2d 444 (D.S.C. 2008). A pretrial detainee brought
a pro se civil rights action against a county detention center and sheriff, alleging his inability to have access
to legal research materials violated his constitutional rights. The district court dismissed the case. The court
held that the detainee did not have a constitutional right of access to a law library while being temporarily
held in a county detention facility awaiting trial on criminal charges, where the detainee did not allege that
he had been incarcerated for too long and was not pursuing any speedy trial claims. The court noted that a
state is only required to provide criminal defendants legal counsel, not legal research materials. According
to the court, the detainee's lack of access to a law library while being temporarily held in a county detention
facility was not an “actual injury,” as required to confer standing for the detainee to allege a deprivation of
a constitutional right of access to the courts. (Lexington County Detention Center, South Carolina)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT

Klebanowski v. Sheahan, 540 F.3d 633 (7th Cir. 2008). A detainee who was being held for trial brought a §
1983 action against a sheriff, a jail and its officers, alleging deliberate indifference to risks of housing gang
members with non-gang members, which caused attacks on the detainee by gang members. The detainee
had suffered two attacks at the hands of his fellow prisoners. The defendants moved for summary
judgment. The district court granted the motion and the detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The
court held that the allegation by the detainee that his attack by gang members was brought on by the jail's
policy of housing gang members with non-gang members, allowing them weapons, and periodically
leaving them unattended, did not sufficiently establish an unconstitutional policy, for purposes of
establishing deliberate indifference in violation of due process in his § 1983 action. According to the court,
the detainee submitted no evidence showing an express endorsement of the claimed policies, that any
policymaker caused the circumstances of which he complained, or any evidence to establish the existence
of a widespread practice by the jail. The court found that jail officers were not deliberately indifferent to the
detainee in violation of due process by not taking steps to protect the detainee from attack by gang
members. The court held that the detainee's statements to officers prior to the attack, that he was afraid for
his life, were not sufficient to alert the officers to a specific threat as he did not provide specific identities of
those who had threatened him, did not tell officers he had actually been threatened with future violence, nor
that the attack had been inflicted due to his non-gang status. (Cook County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT

Leary v. Livingston County, 528 F.3d 438 (6th Cir. 2008). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action
against a county and officers, alleging deliberate indifference and excessive force. The district court granted
summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds to one officer, but denied summary judgment to the
other officer. The officers appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held
that the harm facing the detainee resulting from an officer telling other inmates that the detainee was in for
raping a nine-year-old girl was objectively serious, as required to establish deliberate indifference and
preclude qualified immunity. The court noted that another officer had verified the risk of serious harm that
the detainee would face if the inmates learned of his charges, and the defendant officer himself informed
the detainee that “once other inmates found out what he did[,] there would be no protection from anyone
here at the jail”. Once other inmates learned of the detainee’s charges, the officer knew there was reason to
believe that the detainee would need protection at the jail, and yet the officer persisted in telling other
inmates about the detainee's charges despite that knowledge. (Livingston County Jail, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
USE OF FORCE

McCall v. Crosthwait, 590 F.Supp.2d 1337 (M.D.Ala. 2008). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action against a
police officer and others, alleging that an officer used excessive force against him when he was in a
municipal jail, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The
district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the police officer's use of
force against the arrestee and the injuries sustained by the arrestee, allegedly arising out of the officer
pushing the arrestee in the jail with such force that he fell into a steel door and plexiglass window, was de
minimis under the Fourth Amendment. According to the court, even if the officer pushed the arrestee into a
jail house door unprovoked, a hospital found no injuries after the jail incident aside from a minor contusion
to the arrestee's right elbow and shoulder. (Montgomery Municipal Jail, Alabama)

U.S. Appeals Court
USE OF FORCE

Moore ex rel. Estate of Grady v. Tuelja, 546 F.3d 423 (7th Cir. 2008). Administrators of an arrestee's estate
filed a § 1983 action alleging that police officers and jail personnel deprived the arrestee of his rights under
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments by using excessive force and denying him medical care. The
district court entered judgment on a jury verdict in the defendants' favor and denied the administrators'
motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial. The administrators appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's findings. A physician had
testified that the nature of the arrestee's injuries indicated that he had most likely been beaten with a baton
by jail personnel. But all medical experts agreed that the arrestee suffered from advanced heart disease and
died of a heart attack, the arrestee had been in two automobile accidents on the date of his death and had
suffered a hand laceration immediately after the second accident, and there was evidence that the arrestee's
wrist injuries occurred in an accident or while he was being transported to jail, and that his head injuries
occurred when he fell to the floor after a heart attack. (Chicago Police Department, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Munyiri v. Haduch, 585 F.Supp.2d 670 (D.Md. 2008). A motorist who was arrested for driving around a
police roadblock and subsequently failing to stop when signaled by a pursuing squad car brought a civil
rights action against an arresting officer, police commissioner and warden at central booking facility to
which she was transported. She alleged she was subjected to unlawful strip and visual body cavity searches.
The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court
held that allegations in the motorist's complaint were sufficient to state a supervisory liability claim against
the Secretary of the Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services (DPSCS) and the

32.172
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warden at a central booking facility, for intrusive searches to which she was subjected. The court found that
the allegations in the offender's complaint-- that she was improperly subjected to a strip search and to a
visual body cavity search as the result of a policy implemented by the Secretary of the Maryland
Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services (DPSCS) and by a warden at the central booking
facility-- adequately pleaded the minimum facts necessary to state a supervisory liability claim against the
Secretary and the warden under § 1983. The policy allegedly authorized strip searches and visual body
cavity searches of all persons admitted to the facility, regardless of the charges filed against them or
circumstances surrounding their arrest. (Baltimore Central Booking and Intake Facility, Maryland)
U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Myrie v. Calvo/Calvoba, 591 F.Supp.2d 620 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). A pretrial detainee brought a pro se § 1983
action alleging jail medical personnel violated his Eighth Amendment right to adequate medical care. The
medical personnel filed a pre-answer motion to dismiss the complaint. The district court granted the
motion. The court held that the detainee's claim that deprivation of his eyeglasses caused significant eye
deterioration constituted a serious deprivation of medical needs, but the allegation that a jail physician
neglected to take care of his vision problem in a sufficiently prompt manner did not sufficiently allege the
physician was deliberately indifferent to the detainee's serious medical needs. According to the court,
allegations that jail medical personnel's delay in locating his medical file, and the resulting cancellation of
his appointment with a physician, delayed or denied his access to medical treatment in violation of Due
Process failed to state a claim. (Otis Bantum Correctional Center, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
USE OF FORCE

Orem v. Rephann, 523 F.3d 442 (4th Cir. 2008). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action against a sheriff's
deputy, alleging use of excessive force during transport to jail. The district court denied the deputy’s
motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The appeals court affirmed. The court held
that the deputy's repeated use of a taser on the unruly arrestee qualified as wanton and sadistic and was not
objectively reasonable, precluding qualified immunity. The court noted that the excessive force claim
asserted by the arrestee, who had not been formally charged but was being transported to a jail at the time
of the events giving rise to the claim, was analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause, not under the Fourth Amendment. According to the court, the deputy first tased the arrestee after
she forcefully stated “fuck you” to the deputy, the deputy did not follow the sheriff's department's taser
policy requiring initial use of open-hand measures, the arrestee likely was not endangering herself as the
deputy had claimed, since she was handcuffed and in a hobbling device while locked in the back-seat cage
of the squad car, and the deputy used the taser under the arrestee's breast and on her inner thigh. (Eastern
Regional Jail, West Virginia)

U.S. District Court
ACCESS TO COURT
FALSE
IMPRISONMENT
INITIAL APPEARANCE

Petaway v. City of New Haven Police Dept., 541 F.Supp.2d 504 (D.Conn. 2008). An arrestee brought a §
1983 action against a city, its police department, and individual officers, alleging that his constitutional
rights were violated when he was not arraigned within the time prescribed under state law. The court held
that the municipal police department was not subject to suit pursuant to § 1983 and that the arrestee was not
falsely imprisoned during the 29-day period between his arrest and arraignment. According to the court, the
Connecticut arraignment statute did not give rise to a due process liberty interest. The court noted that the
arrestee was lawfully in the custody of the Department of Corrections pursuant to a remand to custody
order for a separate parole violation during the 29 days prior to his arraignment. (New Haven Police
Department, New Haven Correctional Center, Connecticut)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Phillips v. Roane County, Tenn., 534 F.3d 531 (6th Cir. 2008). A representative of the estate of a pretrial
detainee who died in a county jail of untreated diabetes brought an action against correctional officers, a jail
doctor, and paramedics, alleging deliberate indifference to the detainee's serious medical condition under §
1983 and asserting state law medical malpractice claims. The district court denied the defendants' motion
for summary judgment and the defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part,
and remanded. The court found that the detainee had a sufficiently serious medical condition, as required to
prevail in a § 1983 deliberate indifference claim against jail officers and others, under the Due Process
Clause. The court noted that at one point the detainee was found unconscious in her cell without a pulse,
and for approximately two weeks after that incident, the detainee complained to officers and a doctor about
chest pains, numbness, dizziness, vomiting, nausea, constipation, and a possible kidney infection.
The court held that the alleged conduct of the correctional officers in observing and being aware of the
detainee's serious medical condition, which included signs of nausea, vomiting blood, swelling, lethargy,
and chest pains, and in allegedly disregarding jail protocols, which required the officers to transport the
detainee to a hospital emergency room for evaluation upon complaints of chest pain, amounted to deliberate
indifference to the detainee's serious medical condition, in violation of the detainee’s due process rights.
The court found that the paramedic's conduct in allegedly disregarding a jail protocol which required the
paramedic to transport detainees to a hospital emergency room when they complained of chest pains, by
failing to transport the detainee upon responding to an incident in which the detainee allegedly lost
consciousness, had no pulse, and complained of chest pain and nausea after she regained consciousness,
amounted to deliberate indifference to the detainee's serious medical condition, in violation of her due
process rights.
The court found that county officials were not liable under § 1983 for their alleged failure to properly
train jail officers as to the proper protocols for obtaining medical treatment for the detainee, absent a
showing that any individual official encouraged, authorized, or knowingly acquiesced to the officers'
alleged deliberate indifference. The court found that the alleged conduct of a county jail doctor in being
aware of the detainee's serious medical condition, which included signs of nausea, vomiting blood,
swelling, lethargy, and chest pains, but failing to conduct more than a cursory examination, and in allegedly
disregarding jail protocols, amounted to deliberate indifference to the detainee's serious medical condition,

32.173
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in violation of the detainee's due process rights. Because the detainee had a clearly established right under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to receive medical treatment to address serious
medical needs, the court found that jail officials were not entitled to qualified immunity for their alleged
conduct in failing to provide the diabetic detainee with medical treatment. (Roane County Jail, Tennessee)
U.S. Appeals Court
CONDITIONS
DUE PROCESS
EXERCISE
RELIGION
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act

Pierce v. County of Orange, 519 F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 2008). Pretrial detainees in a county's jail facilities
brought a § 1983 class action suit against the county and its sheriff seeking relief for violations of their
constitutional and statutory rights. After consolidating the case with a prior case challenging jail conditions,
the district court rejected the detainees' claims and the detainees appealed. The appeals court affirmed in
part, reversed in part and remanded. The court held that the injunctive orders relating to the jail's reading
materials, mattresses and beds, law books, population caps, sleep, blankets, dayroom access (not less than
two hours each day), telephone access and communication with jailhouse lawyers were not necessary to
correct current ongoing violations of the pretrial detainees' constitutional rights. Inmates had alleged that
they were denied the opportunity for eight hours of uninterrupted sleep on the night before and the night
after each court appearance. The court found that an injunction relating to restrictions of the detainees'
religious rights based on security concerns was narrowly drawn and extended no further than necessary to
correct the violation of the federal right of pretrial detainees in administrative segregation. According to the
court, providing pretrial detainees housed in administrative segregation only ninety minutes of exercise per
week, less than thirteen minutes per day, constituted punishment in violation of due process standards. The
court also found that the county failed to reasonably accommodate mobility-impaired and dexterityimpaired pretrial detainees in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The court affirmed
termination of 12 of the injunctive orders, but found that the district court erred in its finding that two
orders were unnecessary. (Orange County, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
CONDITIONS
EXERCISE
PROGRAMS
RELIGION

Pierce v. County of Orange, 526 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 2008). Pretrial detainees in a county's jail facilities
brought a § 1983 class action suit against the county and its sheriff, seeking relief for violations of their
constitutional and statutory rights. After consolidating the case with a prior case challenging jail conditions,
the district court rejected the detainees' claims, and the detainees appealed. The appeals court affirmed in
part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that injunctive orders relating to the county jail’s
reading materials, mattresses and beds, law books, population caps, sleep, blankets, telephone access, and
communication with jailhouse lawyers were not necessary to current the current and ongoing violations of
pretrial detainees' constitutional rights.
The court found that an injunction relating to restrictions of detainees' religious rights based on security
concerns was narrowly drawn and extended no further than necessary to correct the violation of the federal
right of pretrial detainees in administrative segregation. The injunctive order, with its provision for the
curtailment or elimination of pretrial detainees' religious rights based on security concerns, provided for no
more than a minimum level of ongoing participation in religious activities.
The court held that providing pretrial detainees housed in administrative segregation only 90 minutes of
exercise per week, less than 13 minutes per day, constituted punishment in violation of due process
standards. The court found that an order requiring that inmates in administrative segregation be permitted
exercise at least twice each week for a total of not less than 2 hours per week was necessary to correct the
current and ongoing violation. The court found that the county failed to reasonably accommodate mobilityimpaired and dexterity-impaired pretrial detainees in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA). The county did not offer any legitimate rationale for maintaining inaccessible bathrooms, sinks,
showers, and other fixtures in the housing areas and common spaces assigned to mobility and dexterity
impaired detainees, and the county offered no explanation or justification for the significant differences
between the vocational and recreational activities available to non-disabled and disabled detainees.
Termination of injunctive orders requiring that inmates be provided with seating while detained in
holding cells, or elsewhere, awaiting transport to or from court and requiring that inmates be given at least
fifteen minutes within which to complete each meal did not constitute an abuse of discretion since the
treatment of detainees in the county's holding cells and the time allowed for meals did not violate the
detainees' constitutional rights. The court held that restrictions placed on use of the day room, limiting
administrative segregation detainees' use of the room to one or two inmates at a time, were reasonably
related to institutional security concerns. (Orange County Jail System, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCHES

Powell v. Barrett, 541 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2008). Former detainees at a county jail initiated a class action
complaining about being subjected to “blanket strip searches” upon entering and/or returning to the jail, as
well as their continued detention past their scheduled release dates. The county and city defendants filed
motions to dismiss. The district court granted the county defendants' motion in part and denied it in part,
and denied the city defendants' motion. The defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and remanded. On rehearing en banc, the appeals court held that the practice of conducting full body visual strip
searches on all jail detainees being booked into the general population for the first time did not violate the
Fourth Amendment, regardless of whether there was any reasonable suspicion to believe that the inmates
were concealing contraband, and regardless of whether the inmates were arrested for minor offenses or
misdemeanors. The plaintiffs were 11 former detainees at the Fulton County Jail, all of whom were strip
searched upon entering or re-entering the general population. The court divided the plaintiffs into three
groups, which overlapped to some extent. The court addressed the detainees in the “the Arrestee Strip
Search Class” which consists of the eight plaintiffs who were strip searched as part of the point-of-entry
booking process before they were placed into the general jail population for the first time. (Fulton County
Jail, Georgia)

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U.S. District Court
SUICIDE
USE OF FORCE

Powers-Bunce v. District of Columbia, 576 F.Supp.2d 67 (D.D.C. 2008). The mother of a detainee who
committed suicide while in police custody brought a suit in the District of Columbia Superior Court against
police officers, alleging violations of the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The case was
removed to federal court and the district court granted the officers' motion to dismiss in part and denied in
part. The district court granted summary judgment for the officers. An autopsy identified contusions that
were consistent with being struck repeatedly with a night stick or similar weapon. The detainee sustained
injuries on his buttocks, back of legs, abdomen, back, shins, and fingers. But the court noted that there was
no evidence indicating whether the injuries were inflicted before the detainee’s arrest or linking the injuries
to the arresting officer. The district court concluded that there was an absence of a factual dispute
concerning the Fourth Amendment excessive force claim, and therefore summary judgment was granted to
the officers. (District of Columbia)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
INTAKE SCREENING
MEDICAL CARE

Presley v. City of Blackshear, 650 F.Supp.2d 1307 (S.D.Ga. 2008). A mother brought an action against a
city police officer and a county paramedic, arising out of her son's death while detained in a county jail
after his arrest. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court held
that the arresting officer was not deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of the detainee who
died of an apparent drug overdose after being arrested on drug charges and placed into custody at a county
jail, absent evidence that the arresting officer actually saw the detainee swallow any drugs that allegedly led
to his death. The court held that the county paramedic who responded to the jail was not deliberately
indifferent despite any alleged negligence in the paramedic's original diagnosis. The court noted that the
paramedic promptly responded to both calls from county jail concerning the detainee, and, each time,
examined the detainee to determine whether further medical treatment was needed. According to the court,
the paramedic's alleged bad judgment and negligence in caring for the pretrial detainee who died of an
apparent drug overdose, was insufficient to show a lack of good faith for the purposes of statutory
immunity from negligence or malpractice liability under Georgia law. (City of Blackshear and Pierce
County Jail, Georgia)

U.S. Appeals Court
PRIVACY
TELEPHONE
ACCESS TO COURT

Sherbrooke v. City of Pelican Rapids, 513 F.3d 809 (8th Cir. 2008). An arrestee sued a city and its police
officers alleging that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when officers recorded one side of his
conversation with his attorney. The district court entered summary judgment for the arrestee and the
defendants appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that the recording of the
conversation with the attorney did not constitute a search. The court found that the police officers'
recording of one side of the suspect's conversation with his attorney, pursuant to a standard operating
procedure of recording detainees who were awaiting a blood alcohol content breath test, did not constitute a
search inasmuch as the suspect could not reasonably expect that the conversation was private. The court
noted that officers were present when the call was made in an open room at the police station and the
suspect acknowledged that the recording was “fine” with him. (City of Pelican Rapids, Minnesota)

U.S. District Court
ACCESS TO COURT
MAIL
SEGREGATION

Shine v. Hofman, 548 F.Supp.2d 112 (D.Vt. 2008). A federal pretrial detainee in the custody of the
Vermont Department of Corrections brought a pro se action, alleging violation of his constitutional rights.
The detainee alleged that his mail was opened and returned to him, thereby impeding his ability to
communicate with his attorney, that his placement in close custody limited his ability to access legal
materials, and that his placement in segregation barred him from contacting his attorney and potential
witnesses. The district court dismissed in part. The court held that the inmate did not state a First
Amendment claim for deprivation of access to courts, absent an allegation of actual injury in connection
with his challenge to his conviction or sentence. The court found that allegations by the detainee that state
officials failed to provide adequate fire sprinklers or access to fire extinguishers stated a claim for violation
of the detainee's due process rights. The court held that the detainee’s allegations that he was subjected to
segregation, and that the conditions of segregation included a small cell with no windows and no
opportunity to interact with other human beings, did not state a claim for violation of the due process
clause. The court noted that prisons may impose restrictions on pretrial detainees so long as those
restrictions are related to a non-punitive governmental purpose. (Vermont Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
ACCESS TO COURT
ASSESSMENT OF
COSTS
DISCIPLINE

Stanko v. Patton, 568 F.Supp.2d 1061 (D.Neb. 2008). A pretrial detainee brought two actions against jail
personnel alleging a number of constitutional violations. The district court granted summary judgment for
the defendants. The court noted that the detainee “…is a white supremacist. He is also a prolific pro se
litigator who makes a habit of suing jail and prison officials when he is charged with a crime. Those facts
are central to understanding these related civil cases.” The court held that the detainee's alleged belief in the
Church of the Creator and “White Man's Bible” was not protected and the jail had valid reasons for denying
the detainee's alleged religious dietary requests. The court found that there was no evidence that jail
employees were aware of facts from which an inference could be drawn that the detainee faced a serious
risk of harm by being celled with killers, robbers, and psychopaths, or that they actually drew such an
inference, as required to establish deliberate indifference.
The court found that the detainee was not denied his right of access to the courts, notwithstanding his
placement in segregation, where the detainee had been offered, and either accepted or declined, counsel in
both underlying criminal prosecutions. The court noted that the detainee was provided with legal assistance
and law library access, and the detainee was not substantially impeded regarding his legal matters whether
he was in segregation or otherwise. According to the court, the detainee had no right to assistance from jail
officials regarding his general civil litigation activities. The court held that there was no evidence that
county jail officials charged the detainee more than the standard rate for telephone calls, as required to
establish that the rates charged violated the detainee's right to equal access to the courts. The court held that
a charge of $65 to the detainee's account by county jail officials, as discipline for ripping pages from or

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otherwise defacing several law books, did not violate due process, as the disciplinary procedures the
detainee underwent provided him with all the process he was due and because he had additional remedies
in state court if such procedures were insufficient. (Douglas Co. Correctional Center, Nebraska)
U.S. District Court
FALSE
IMPRISONMENT
USE OF FORCE

Stanley v. Muzio, 578 F.Supp.2d 443 (D.Conn. 2008). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action against two state
judicial marshals, the Connecticut State Police and individual troopers and officers of the Connecticut State
Police, alleging false imprisonment and use of excessive force. Following dismissal of claims against the
State Police, troopers and officers, the marshals moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in
part and denied in part. The court held that the marshals did not enjoy state statutory immunity from federal
claims and from the state law false imprisonment claim. The court found that the arrestee stated a § 1983
claim for false imprisonment. According to the court, the marshals were not entitled to quasi-judicial
immunity or qualified immunity. The court noted that the arrestee’s claim for false imprisonment under
Connecticut law, alleging that two state judicial marshals kicked him in the head and back after he was
forcibly restrained, were sufficient to allege reckless, wanton, or malicious conduct that was outside the
scope of the defendants' employment as state judicial marshals. The court found that the arrestee's
allegation that two state judicial marshals told him that he had to remain in the courtroom for five minutes
following a hearing on a restraining order obtained by his wife and forcibly stopped him when he tried to
leave after three minutes stated a § 1983 claim for false imprisonment. (Connecticut State Judicial
Marshals, Connecticut State Police)

U.S. District Court
PRIVACY
SEARCHES

Streeter v. Sheriff of Cook County, 576 F.Supp.2d 913 (N.D.Ill. 2008). Current or former pretrial detainees
filed a class action under § 1983 against a county sheriff and the county, challenging a strip search policy at
the county jail, alleging it violated their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court denied
summary judgment for the defendants. The court held that the detainees stated a claim for violation of their
Fourth Amendment rights in connection with group strip searches that were allegedly conducted in an
unreasonably intrusive manner and went on longer than penologically necessary. The court also found that
the detainees stated a claim for violation of their rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment in connection with group strip searches that were allegedly conducted in a manner intended to
humiliate and embarrass the detainees, and that went on longer than necessary. (Cook County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Tardiff v. Knox County, 567 F.Supp.2d 201 (D.Me. 2008). An arrestee who was subjected to a strip and
visual body cavity search brought a § 1983 action against a county for alleged violations of her Fourth
Amendment rights. She brought the action after opting out of a class action against the county in which her
claim had initially moved forward and in which she was named as class representative. The county asserted
counterclaims for breach of contract and equitable estoppel and the parties cross-moved for summary
judgment. The district court held that the settlement agreement in a prior class action did not contain an
implied term that the arrestee, as named class representative, would not opt out of the agreement. (Knox
County Jail, Maine)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Tardiff v. Knox County, 573 F.Supp.2d 301 (D.Me. 2008). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action against a
county alleging a strip and visual body cavity search violated the Fourth Amendment. The district court
granted summary judgment for the plaintiff, in part. The court held that jail personnel did not have
individualized reasonable suspicion that the arrestee was concealing contraband or weapons, as required to
perform a strip and visual body cavity search of the arrestee who had been arrested for felony witness
tampering. The court noted that the arrestee was not arrested for a violent felony, spending a night in jail
did not implicate sufficiently serious security concerns to warrant a search, the county failed to show the
underlying facts of the crime provided individualized reasonable suspicion, and the county failed to
establish that the arrestee's conduct required the search. According to the court, a felony categorization
alone does not obviate the requirement of individualized reasonable suspicion for a strip and visual body
cavity search of an arrestee. (Knox County Jail, Maine)

U.S. Appeals Court
ADA-Americans with
Disabilities Act
TELEPHONE

Tucker v. Tennessee, 539 F.3d 526 (6th Cir. 2008). Deaf and mute arrestees and their deaf mother sued a
city and county, alleging that denial of an interpreter or other reasonable accommodations during criminal
proceedings violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The district court granted the county's
motion for summary judgment and the plaintiffs appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that
the county's use of the deaf mother's services as an interpreter during her deaf sons' dispositional hearing on
criminal charges did not violate Title II of the ADA, which prohibits discrimination in public services. The
court noted that the mother voluntarily served as the interpreter and that her service was requested in light
of her sign language skills, not for any discriminatory purpose. The court found that the deaf and mute
arrestees were not denied a “service, program, or activity” when the city failed to provide an interpreter
during a domestic disturbance call which resulted in their arrest, and the city thus was not liable under
ADA's Title II. According to the court, the arrests were made not because the arrestees were disabled, but
because the arrestees assaulted police officers, individual citizens, or attempted to interfere with a lawful
arrest. The court concluded that the arresting officers were able to effectively communicate with the
arrestees. The court held that the county did not violate Title II of the ADA, which prohibits discrimination
in public services, by using relay operators to allow the deaf arrestees to communicate with their mother,
rather than providing them with a teletypewriter (TTY) telephone. Jailers assisted the arrestees in making
their requested phone call by utilizing relay operators, the phone call lasted nearly forty-five minutes, and
the Department of Justice (DOJ) provisions did not mandate the presence of a TTY telephone. (City of
Savannah Police Department , Hardin County Jail, Tennessee)

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U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
USE OF FORCE

U.S. v. Cote, 544 F.3d 88 (2nd Cir. 2008). After a correction officer was convicted by a jury of criminal
violation of a pretrial detainee's civil rights, the district court granted the officer's motion for judgment of
acquittal notwithstanding the verdict and conditionally granted the officer's motion for a new trial. The
government appealed, and the officer cross-appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded, finding
that there was sufficient evidence to support the officer's conviction. The court held that the officer was not
entitled to a new trial. According to the court, evidence was sufficient to support the correction officer's
conviction for the criminal violation of the pretrial detainee's right to be free from excessive force, despite
discrepancies in inmate witnesses' accounts as to the number of stomps and kicks the defendant gave the
detainee, and the possibility that the detainee suffered a head injury when he was taken down by another
officer. The court noted that four eyewitnesses testified that the defendant viciously assaulted the detainee
while he was lying on the ground, already in a position of weakness, and that thedefendant yelled words of
punishment at the detainee. A fellow officer testified that the defendant falsified his incident report and
attempted to persuade him to “[stick] to the story.” The government's medical expert testified that it was
unlikely the detainee's injuries were caused by a single blow. All witnesses agreed that the defendant
approached and began assaulting the detainee while he was being held down by another officer, and that the
defendant was shouting at the detainee to respect his authority. (Westchester County Jail, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
INVOLUNTARY
MEDICATION
STATE INTEREST

U.S. v. Green, 532 F.3d 538 (6th Cir. 2008). A pretrial detainee who had been determined to be mentally
incompetent to stand trial on narcotics trafficking indictments, appealed the order of the district court for
involuntary administration of psychotropic medications. The appeals court affirmed, finding that an
important governmental interest was at stake in the prosecution, as required to support an order for
involuntary medication. (Federal Medical Center, Rochester, New York)

U.S. District Court
INVOLUNTARY
MEDICATION
PSYCHOTROPIC
DRUGS

U.S. v. Moruzin, 583 F.Supp.2d 535 (D.N.J. 2008). A defendant was indicted on charges of bank robbery
and jury tampering. The government moved for the involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication
to the defendant to render him competent to stand trial. The district court denied the motion. The court held
that the administration of medication would not significantly further the state's interests, that alternatives
existed to involuntary administration of the drug Haldol, and that involuntary administration of Haldol was
not in the defendant's best medical interest. (Federal Medical Center, Butner, North Carolina)

U.S. Appeals Court
CLOTHING

U.S. v. Reed, 522 F.3d 354 (D.C. Cir. 2008). A defendant was convicted in district court of armed bank
robbery, armed carjacking and destruction of property and he appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The
court held that requiring the defendant to wear a jumpsuit without underwear did not rise to the level of a
coercive police activity that would render the defendant's confession not voluntary within the meaning of
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (District of Columbia)

U.S. Appeals Court
RESTRAINTS

Vondrak v. City of Las Cruces, 535 F.3d 1198 (10th Cir. 2008). An arrestee filed a § 1983 action against a
city and its police officers alleging illegal arrest, excessive force, inadequate medical attention, and failure
to train. The district court granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion for summary judgment.
The parties filed cross-appeals. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, dismissed in part, and
remanded. The appeals court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact
as to whether the police officers ignored the arrestee's complaints that his handcuffs were too tight, and
whether the arrestee suffered permanent nerve injury because of the handcuffing. The court noted that for
purposes of determining the police officers' qualified immunity from liability under § 1983 for use of
excessive force, the arrestee's right to be free from unduly tight handcuffing, and the contours of that right,
were clearly established in 2003. The court also found that it was clearly established that all law
enforcement officials had an affirmative duty to intervene to protect the constitutional rights of citizens
from infringement by other law enforcement officers in their presence, and thus one of the officers was not
entitled to qualified immunity from liability, where the officer was in close proximity to the initial
handcuffing, and was present thereafter. The arrestee had been taken into custody and transported to the
police station, where two blood alcohol tests were administered. Both tests showed no alcohol. He was held
for another 90 minutes, during which time he made several requests for someone to loosen his handcuffs
because his wrists were hurting. All requests were ignored. Eventually, the officers charged the arrestee
with Driving While Under the Influence to the Slightest Degree, and they released him on his own
recognizance. The charge was later dropped. Following his release, the arrestee went to an emergency
room. A toxicology screening report showed no drugs or alcohol. A doctor who treated the arrestee
observed “multiple superficial abrasions and ecchymosis” on both wrists. He diagnosed the arrestee with
neurapraxia in both wrists, and a soft tissue sprain of the right wrist. The pain and discomfort in the
arrestee’s wrists did not subside, and it interfered with his ability to practice as an orthodontist and to play
golf. He was diagnosed with a permanent radial nerve injury in his wrists that was caused by the
handcuffing. (Las Cruces Police Department, New Mexico)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Walker v. Sheahan, 526 F.3d 973 (7th Cir. 2008). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against county
correctional officers, a county sheriff, and a county, alleging that the officers used excessive force against
him, deprived him of access to medical care, and retaliated against him. The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the defendants. The detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in
part, and remanded. The court held that the sheriff’s office was not liable under § 1983 because the detainee
failed to demonstrate that the sheriff's office had a pattern of widespread use of excessive force, inadequate
investigation and training regarding use of force, or a code of silence. The court noted that although 783
complaints of excessive force were made against the sheriff's office over a five-year period, none resulted
in an indictment, the the training the officers received imposed limitations on the amount of force they
could use, and that officers weredisciplined for the use of excessive force. The court held that summary

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judgment for the officers was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the injuries
sustained by the detainee were consistent with his account of the restraint incident involving county
corrections officers. (Cook County Jail, Illinois)
U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE

Whitt v. Stephens County, 529 F.3d 278 (5th Cir. 2008). The father of a pretrial detainee who purportedly
hanged himself while incarcerated at a county jail brought a § 1983 action against a county, the county
sheriff, and unknown jail officials. The district court granted summary judgment in part in favor of jail
officials and the sheriff in their individual capacities. The father appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The
district court denied the father's motion for leave to amend the complaint to identify the unknown jail
officials, and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on remaining claims. The father again
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the amended complaint to substitute named
county jail officials for unknown jail officials did not relate back to the original complaint, for the purpose
of avoiding a statute of limitations bar. The court found that the county sheriff was not liable under § 1983
for the death of the pretrial detainee, where the sheriff was not present at the jail until after the detainee was
found dead, and there was no showing that the sheriff played any part in the detainee's death, or that the
sheriff was deliberately indifferent in failing to attempt to resuscitate the detainee or obtain additional
medical care for the detainee. The court held that the county was not liable under § 1983 for the detainee's
purported suicide, where the county had adequate policies and procedures for detainees who posed an
obvious risk of suicide, the detainee did not indicate that he was suicidal on an intake form or otherwise
exhibit obvious suicidal tendencies, and the county was not deliberately indifferent in failing to train or
supervise county jail officials. The court noted that in the specific context of jail suicide prevention,
municipalities must provide custodial officials with minimal training to detect the obvious medical needs of
pretrial detainees with known, demonstrable, and serious medical disorders, but a failure to train custodial
officials in screening procedures to detect latent suicidal tendencies does not rise to the level of a
constitutional violation. The court found that in the absence of manifest signs of suicidal tendencies, a city
may not be held liable for a pretrial detainee's jailhouse suicide in a § 1983 suit based on a failure to train.
(Stephens County Jail, Texas)

U.S. District Court
SPEEDY TRIAL

Williams v. Warden-Central Detention Facility, 538 F.Supp.2d 74 (D.D.C. 2008). A pretrial detainee filed
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, seeking to invoke his right to a speedy trial, or to be released from
custody and to have all charges against him dropped. The district court denied the petition. The court held
that the detainee was not entitled to federal habeas relief, despite the detainee's allegations of prosecutorial
misconduct and violations of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, Fifth Amendment presentment and due
process clauses, Sixth Amendment right to speedy trial, and Fourteenth Amendment due process clause.
According to the court, the record bore no suggestion that he had presented any of his claims to a state
court, any delays were the result of the detainee's conduct, and the claims could all be properly resolved by
a state court. (District of Columbia Central Detention Facility)
2009

U.S. District Court
PRIVACY
SEARCHES

Allison v. GEO Group, Inc., 611 F.Supp.2d 433 (E.D.Pa. 2009). Arrestees detained in state custodial
facilities managed by a private corporation brought a class action against the corporation, alleging the
facilities' blanket policy of mandatory strip searches without individualized suspicion violated the Fourth
Amendment. The corporation moved for judgment on the pleadings for failure to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted and the district court denied the motion. The court held that the arrestees stated a §
1983 claim for a Fourth Amendment violation. The court noted that strip searches in a custodial facility
differ qualitatively from other intake procedures which entail some incidental nudity but do not involve
visual inspection of the naked body. The court said that the exposure of the naked body to scrutiny by
government officers is what makes strip searches more invasive than other admission procedures at a
custodial facility. According to the court, the searches involved visual inspection of the arrestees’ naked
bodies, the searches of named arrestees were not based on reasonable suspicion, and the purported class
consisted of arrestees who were either charged with minor offenses or non-violent offenses that did not
involve drugs. (George W. Hill Correctional Facility, Pennsylvania)

U.S. Supreme Court
CONDITIONS
DISCRIMINATION

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. (2009). A Muslim Pakistani pretrial detainee brought an action against current
and former government officials, alleging that they took a series of unconstitutional actions against him in
connection with his confinement under harsh conditions after separation from the general prison
population. The detainee had been placed in a section of a federal detention facility known as the
Administrative Maximum Special Housing Unit, where detainees were kept in lockdown 23 hours a day,
spending the remaining hour outside their cells in handcuffs and leg irons accompanied by a four-officer
escort. The district court denied in part the defendants' motions to dismiss on the grounds of qualified
immunity and the defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The court
held that the appeals court had subject matter jurisdiction to affirm the district court's order denying the
officials' motion to dismiss on the grounds of qualified immunity, and the detainee's complaint failed to
plead sufficient facts to state a claim for purposeful and unlawful discrimination. The court noted that the
detainee challenged neither the constitutionality of his arrest nor his initial detention, but rather the policy
of holding post-September 11th detainees once they were categorized as of “high interest.” (Federal Bureau
of Prisons, Metropolitan Detention Center, Brooklyn, New York)

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U.S. Appeals Court
USE OF FORCE

Askew v. Sheriff of Cook County, Ill., 568 F.3d 632 (7th Cir. 2009). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983
action against a prison guard and a sheriff, asserting excessive force and deliberate indifference claims
against the guard and a municipal liability claim against the sheriff. The district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss. The detainee appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. The appeals court
held that upon determining that a county was a required party in the pretrial detainee's § 1983 suit against a
prison guard and the sheriff, the district court was required to order that the county be made a party, rather
than dismissing the suit. The court noted that a county in Illinois is a necessary party in any suit seeking
damages from an independently elected county officer, and, because state law requires the county to pay,
federal law deems it an indispensable party to the litigation. But the court found that the Illinois county was
not a party that was required to be joined if feasible in § 1983 suit brought against a prison guard in his
individual capacity. (Cook County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
ADA-Americans with
Disabilities Act
HANDICAP
INTAKE SCREENING
RA-Rehabilitation Act
TELEPHONE

Bahl v. County of Ramsey, 597 F.Supp.2d 981 (D.Minn. 2009). Two hearing-impaired arrestees, and their
respective girlfriend and husband, brought an action against a county, sheriff's department, and city, alleging that they were arrested by city police officers without being provided an American Sign Language
(ASL) interpreter and detained at an adult detention center (ADC) without access to an ASL interpreter or
auxiliary aids that would have permitted them to communicate with others outside of the ADC. The plaintiffs asserted claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act, and the
Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), and for negligence. The district court dismissed the case in part.
The court held that the girlfriend and husband had standing to sue the county, sheriff's department, and city
under state and federal anti-discrimination laws, where they alleged that they experienced fear, anxiety,
humiliation, and embarrassment because of the defendants' failure to permit the arrestees to contact them.
The court found that the girlfriend and husband stated a claim for discrimination under the ADA by alleging that the arrestees requested auxiliary aids to communicate with people outside of the ADC, and that the
county's failure to provide such aids precluded their communication with the arrestees. (Ramsey County
Adult Detention Center, Minnesota)

U.S. District Court
RELEASE

Blandford v. District of Columbia Jail, 593 F.Supp.2d 255 (D.D.C. 2009). An arrestee brought a civil rights
action against a District of Columbia jail, alleging that he was detained for seven days without a lawful
basis. The district court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The court held that the
arrestee failed to demonstrate that he was detained beyond his purported release date, as required to state a
§ 1983 claim against the jail for unlawful detention. The court noted that the arrestee appended to his complaint a document that showed he was freed two days after his purported release date and voluntarily appeared in court on that date, and jail records showed that the arrestee was released on the same day that
bond was posted on his behalf, and was not in jail at any time after the purported release date. (District of
Columbia Jail)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
FAILURE TO PROTECT

Brace v. Massachusetts, 673 F.Supp.2d 36 (D.Mass. 2009). The administrator of a female detainee’s estate
sued the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and a number of individuals having some role in providing medical services to inmates at a county correctional facility, including a clinician, asserting claims for negligence and medical malpractice, and alleging that the detainee was deprived of her constitutional rights by
deliberate indifference to her medical needs. A clinician moved to dismiss certain counts. The district court
allowed the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that dismissal of a medical malpractice claim
after a medical tribunal found that there was insufficient evidence to raise a legitimate question of liability
did not preclude the deceased detainee's estate from stating a § 1983 claim against a prison clinician for
deliberate indifference to the inmate's medical needs. The court held that the deceased detainee's estate
stated a § 1983 wrongful death claim against the jail clinician for deliberate indifference to the inmate's
medical needs, in violation of her Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The estate alleged that the
clinician observed the detainee while she was in obvious medical distress and took the minimal step of
making a phone call to a medical unit about the detainee's condition. (Hampden County House of Correction, Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
USE OF FORCE

Browne v. San Francisco Sheriff's Dept., 616 F.Supp.2d 975 (N.D.Cal. 2009). A former state pretrial detainee filed a § 1983 action against nearly 50 defendants, seeking redress for alleged injuries caused by
deputies and medical staff of a sheriff's department. The district court granted summary judgment to the
defendants. The court held that a deputy's alleged placing of a “white tip poisonous spider” in a safety cell
before moving the pretrial detainee back into the cell, grabbing the detainee and bending his arm while he
threw him out of the cell, and putting his knee into the center of the detainee's back did not rise to the level
of malicious and sadistic use of force, as required for a Fourteenth Amendment excessive force claim. The
court noted that there was no evidence that the detainee was injured or that he sought medical treatment for
any injuries. (San Francisco County Sheriff's Department, San Francisco County Jail, California)

U.S. District Court
USE OF FORCE

Cabral v. County of Glenn, 624 F.Supp.2d 1184 (E.D.Cal. 2009). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983
action against a city and a police officer alleging violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and
claims under California law. The city and officer filed a motion to dismiss. The district court granted the
motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the detainee, a psychotic and suicidal individual who
collided with the wall of a safety cell and broke his neck, failed to plead that a police officer, who extracted
the detainee from his holding cell and used a stun gun and pepper spray on him following an incident in
which the detainee rubbed water from his toilet on his body, was deliberately indifferent to the detainee's
need for medical attention, as required to state due process claim under § 1983. According to the court, the
detainee failed to allege that the officer knew he was suicidal and was not receiving medical care, or that

XXIII

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the officer attempted to interfere with the detainee's receipt of such medical attention. The court found that
the detainee's allegations that the officer used a stun gun, a stun-type shield and pepper spray in an attempted cell extraction while the detainee was naked, unarmed and hiding behind his toilet were sufficient to
state an excessive force claim under § 1983. The court denied qualified immunity for the officer, even
though the detainee had not responded to the officers' commands to come out of his cell. The court noted
that the law clearly established that police officers could not use a stun gun on a detainee who did not pose
a threat and who merely failed to comply with commands. The court held that the detainee sufficiently
pleaded that the city had a policy of using stun guns in such situations, as required to state a § 1983 Fourth
Amendment excessive force claim against the city. The detainee alleged that nine months prior to his assault, a separate incident occurred that was similar. (City of Willows Police Dept., California)
U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Caiozzo v. Koreman, 581 F.3d 63 (2nd Cir. 2009). The estate of a pretrial detainee who died in custody at a
county jail, brought a § 1983 action against county corrections officials and medical staff, alleging deliberate indifference to the detainee's serious medical condition in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The estate appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The appeals court held: (1) the subjective standard for analyzing a claim of deliberate indifference
to medical needs of a convicted prisoner held in state custody also applied to the pretrial detainee, overruling Liscio v. Warren and Benjamin v. Fraser; (2) the estate was required to prove that the defendants disregarded a risk of harm to the detainee of which the defendants were aware; and (3) a nurse was not deliberately indifferent to the detainee's serious medical condition of alcohol withdrawal. The court noted that the
nurse incorrectly believed that the detainee was intoxicated, and there was no evidence that the nurse actually believed that the detainee was in danger of imminent severe alcohol withdrawal. The detainee had
previously been incarcerated at the facility on at least 27 separate occasions, and had been treated for
chronic alcoholism by the facility's medical staff. (Albany Co. Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
ALIEN
STRIP SEARCH

Chehade Refai v. Lazaro, 614 F.Supp.2d 1103 (D.Nev. 2009). A German citizen, who was detained by
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) officials at a Nevada airport, and later transferred to a local jail,
after his name had been erroneously placed on a watch list, brought an action against the United States,
DHS officials, a police department, a city, and a police chief, alleging various constitutional violations. The
district court granted the DHS and United States motions to dismiss in part, and denied in part. The court
held that DHS officials could not bypass constitutional requirements for strip searches and body-cavity
searches of non-admitted aliens at a border by sending the German citizen to a detention facility where they
allegedly knew strip searches occurred in the absence of reasonable suspicion under circumstances in which
the DHS officials could not perform the strip search themselves. According to the court, regardless of any
reasonable suspicion that detention center officials had for a strip search, federal officials at the border
needed reasonable suspicion for a strip search.
The court found that the Fourth Amendment right of a non-admitted alien to be free from a noninvasive, non-abusive strip search absent suspicion to conduct such a search was clearly established in
2006, when the German citizen was detained at an airport, and thus, a DHS officer was not entitled to qualified immunity. The court held that the German citizen who was detained after arriving at a United States
airport and was asked to spy for the United States government in order to obtain an entry visa was not subjected to “involuntary servitude” in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment, where the German citizen
never actually spied for the United States.
The court found that the German citizen adequately alleged that the defendant's actions constituted extreme and outrageous conduct, as required to state claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress
under Nevada law, where he alleged that DHS officials told him that if he did not spy for the United States
government, he would never be able to return to the United States where his daughter and grandchild lived.
According to the court, the detained German citizen's negligence claim, alleging that the United States
owed him a duty of care not to cause him to be detained in a local jail when he had not been and was never
charged with any criminal offense, was not barred by the discretionary function exception to the Federal
Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The court noted that although the government claimed that immigration officials
had discretion in choosing where to house aliens, under an Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
memorandum, the alien should never have been booked into local jail. (North Las Vegas Detention Center,
Nevada)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
MEDICAL CARE

Christian v. Wagner, 611 F.Supp.2d 958 (S.D.Iowa 2009). A pretrial detainee brought an action against
county jail officials and employees, seeking to recover damages for injuries he allegedly sustained as a
result of his exposure to a cleaning solvent used to clean cells. Following a jury verdict in favor of the defendants, the detainee filed a combined motion for a new trial and for judgment as a matter of law. The
district court denied the motion. The court held that the detainee's claim was properly construed as a deliberate indifference to a serious medical need claim, not a general conditions of confinement claim. According to the court, whether the detainee had a serious medical need to be removed from the cleaning solvent
was an issue for the jury. (Johnson County Jail, Iowa)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE
SUPERVISION

Cuebas v. Davila, 618 F.Supp.2d 124 (D.Puerto Rico 2009). The mother of a man who committed suicide
in a jail cell filed a § 1983 action on behalf of herself, her minor daughter, and her deceased son, claiming
deprivation of constitutional rights by the arresting police officers and their supervisors, and seeking compensatory damages for pain and suffering due to the loss of her mentally ill son. The district court dismissed the case in part, and declined to dismiss in part. The court held that the mother, as sole heir of her
deceased son, under Puerto Rico law, had Article III standing to bring a § 1983 suit on behalf of her son
against the police officers and supervisors for alleged constitutional violations, since the mother inherited
her son's cause of action. The court found that the mother's allegations that arresting officers and their supe-

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riors were deliberately indifferent to her son’s risk of suicide in his jail cell following his arrest were sufficient to state a § 1983 claim that the son's due process rights were violated under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court held that the mother's allegations that the police officer in charge of detainees was deliberately indifferent to her son's risk of suicide were factually sufficient to state a § 1983 claim that the officer
violated her son's due process rights, including allegations that the officer was aware of the likelihood that
the arrestee might commit suicide, and that the officer did not take obvious steps to prevent the arrestee's
suicide. The mother had explained to the officers that her son was mentally ill and that he had recently
attempted suicide. The son was placed in a cell after his shoes and belt had been removed. At some point
during that night he committed suicide. The mother alleged that he was not properly monitored while being
held in custody, as he should have been, by the officers who were aware he was suicidal. She alleged that
his cell was not adequately monitored even though the police officers who arrested him and who monitored
him knew that he was mentally ill and had recently attempted suicide. (Puerto Rico Police Department,
Salinas Police Headquarters)
U.S. Appeals Court
FALSE ARREST
PROBABLE CAUSE
UNLAWFUL
DETENTION

Drogosch v. Metcalf, 557 F.3d 372 (6th Cir. 2009). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action against a parole
agent and others, alleging false arrest and unlawful detention in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all claims but the one against the
parole agent for unlawful detention. The district court denied the agent’s motion for reconsideration and the
agent appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the arrestee's 13-day confinement in jail
without a probable cause hearing violated the Fourth Amendment. The court found that the parole agent
was the person responsible for ensuring that the arrestee received a prompt probable cause hearing after his
warrantless arrest for allegedly violating probation. The court held that the parole agent was not entitled to
qualified immunity because he logged the arrestee into jail incorrectly as a parole violator, which ensured
that the arrestee would not receive a prompt probable cause hearing. (Michigan Department of Corrections
and Wayne County Jail, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Estate of Henson v. Wichita County, Tex., 652 F.Supp.2d 730 (N.D.Tex. 2009). Daughters of a pre-trial
detainee, who died from chronic obstructive pulmonary disease while being held in a county jail, brought a
§ 1983 action against the county and jail physician, among others, for violation of the detainee's Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of
material fact as to whether the jail physician was a supervisor, whether a policy of intimidation of jail nurses was a moving force behind the alleged violation of the rights of the detainee, whether the physician
failed to supervise nurses, and, if so, whether his failure to supervise amounted to deliberate indifference.
The court held that the jail physician was entitled to assert a defense of qualified immunity, even though he
was a contract physician. (Wichita County Jail, Texas)

U.S. District Court
MEDICATION
MENTAL HEALTH

Estate of Rice ex rel. Rice v. Correctional Medical Services, 596 F.Supp.2d 1208 (N.D.Ind. 2009). The
estate of a prisoner who died while detained at a county jail, where he suffered from schizophrenia and
various complications as the result of his refusal to take his medication and his self-imposed starvation,
brought an action against a private hospital and a physician at the hospital. The estate alleged that the physician deprived the prisoner of his constitutional rights in violation of § 1983, and that the hospital and
physician negligently failed, under state law, to provide adequate medical care and treatment to the prisoner. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants in part. The court held that an expert's
summary judgment report, in which he stated, among other things, that the treating physician was fully
aware that the deceased prisoner had been refusing food, drink, and medications, and that she had no reason
to believe that the same pattern would not subsequently continue back in jail, was admissible. The court
also found that the expert's summary judgment report that the physician who treated the schizophrenic
prisoner prior to his death showed indifference to the prisoner's serious medical condition “by turning a
blind eye to the likely outcome of a return to jail” was admissible. The court noted that the expert was not
offering a legal conclusion as to the treating physician's subjective knowledge. The court found that the
prisoner had a serious medical need, as an element of his alleged Eighth Amendment violation. The court
noted that the prisoner went to a hospital because he was not taking his medications, was not eating, had
lost 50 pounds in 13 months, and was uncommunicative. Medical records indicated that the prisoner had
severe mental problems, including schizophrenia, which posed a risk of serious damage to his future health.
The physician who treated the prisoner acknowledged the seriousness of his condition in her medical recommendation, and ten weeks after his hospital stay, the prisoner died from malnutrition. (Elkhart County
Jail, Indiana)

U.S. District Court
ALIEN
CONDITIONS

Families for Freedom v. Napolitano, 628 F.Supp.2d 535 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). Immigrant advocacy organizations and former immigration detainees brought an action under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
seeking an order to compel the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to act on their petition seeking
promulgation of regulations to govern conditions in immigration detention facilities operated by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). DHS moved to dismiss. The district court denied the motion, finding
that DHS's nearly two-and-one-half year delay in deciding the petition was unreasonable as a matter of law.
The court noted that the DHS Office of Inspector General had issued a report detailing significant problems
in ICE detention facilities, problems with detainee medical care had been chronicled by the news media,
and the petitioners alleged that detainees in DHS custody were dying as result of substandard conditions.
(U.S. Department of Homeland Security)

U.S. Appeals Court
USE OF FORCE

Fennell v. Gilstrap, 559 F.3d 1212 (11th Cir. 2009). A pretrial detainee brought a Fourteenth Amendment
excessive force claim against a sheriff's deputy under § 1983. The district court entered summary judgment
for the deputy and the detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that once the district

32.181

court decided that the detainee had shown excessive force, it could not then find that the deputy was qualifiedly immune because his use of excessive force was not in violation of clearly established law. But the
court found that the deputy's kick to the detainee's face, which resulted in fractures, did not constitute excessive force. The court noted that the deputy saw the detainee struggling with six other officers who were
unable to restrain him, the detainee had not yet been secured when the deputy kicked him, the deputy intended to kick the detainee in the arm rather than the face, the detainee had grabbed the arm of another
officer, and the officers made an immediate offer of medical care. (Georgia)
U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of County of Burlington, 595 F.Supp.2d 492 (D.N.J. 2009) Reversed and remanded 621 F.3d 296 (3rd Cir. 2010); aff’d 132 S.Ct. 1510). A non-indictable arrestee
brought a class action under § 1983 against counties, county jails, and jail wardens, among others, alleging
that the defendants violated the non-indictable arrestees' constitutional rights by their policy of strip searching them without reasonable suspicion. The arrestee sought a preliminary injunction. The district court
denied an injunction. The court held that county jail officers' “visual observation” of indictable and nonindictable offenders during intake procedures, which included complete disrobing, followed by examination of nude inmates for bruises, marks, wounds, or other distinguishing features, followed by supervised
shower with a delousing agent, constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment. According to the district
court, the blanket strip search policy, in the absence of a reasonable suspicion for drugs, weapons, or other
contraband, violated the arrestees' Fourth Amendment rights. According to the court, the jails' justification
for the policy-- general security concerns and health concerns-- did not trump Fourth Amendment protections. The court noted that the mere fact that there was ambiguity or inconsistency in a state regulation
pertaining to strip searches did not change the fact that the law on the issue was clearly established in a
jurisdiction pursuant to case law for nearly twenty-two years, for purposes of qualified immunity. On appeal the district court ruling was reversed and remanded. The appeals court found that the jails' policy of
conducting strip searches of all arrestees upon their admission into the general prison population was reasonable and that the jails were not required to provide evidence of attempted smuggling or discovered contraband as justification for the policy. According to the appeals court, the decision to conduct strip searches,
rather than use a body scanning chair, was reasonable; the U.S. Supreme Court agreed. (Burleigh County
Jail, Essex County Correctional Facility, New Jersey).

U.S. District Court
MENTAL HEALTH
PSYCHOLOGICAL
SERVICES
SUICIDE
SUPERVISION

Francis ex rel. Estate of Francis v. Northumberland County, 636 F.Supp.2d 368 (M.D.Pa. 2009). The administrator of the estate of a detainee who committed suicide while in a county prison brought an action
against the county and prison officials, asserting claims for Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment reckless indifference and Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment under § 1983. The administrator also alleged
wrongful death under state law. The county defendants brought third-party claims against a psychiatrist
who evaluated the detainee, and the psychiatrist counter-claimed. The county defendants and psychiatrist
moved separately for summary judgment. The court held that the County, which paid $360,000 in exchange
for a release of claims brought by the estate of the detainee, would be entitled to indemnity on third-party
claims against the psychiatrist who evaluated the detainee if a jury determined that the psychiatrist was at
fault in the detainee's suicide. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of
material fact as to: (1) whether the evaluating psychiatrist knew the pretrial detainee was a suicide risk and
failed to take necessary and available precautions to prevent the detainee's suicide as would show deliberate
indifference to the detainee's medical needs; (2) whether the evaluating psychiatrist was an employee of the
county prison entitled to immunity under the Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Tort Claim Act (PSTCA)
or was an independent contractor excluded from such immunity; (3) whether the evaluating psychiatrist's
failure to appropriately document the pretrial detainee's medical records led to the detainee's removal from
a suicide watch; (4) whether the recordation of the pretrial detainee's suicide watch level was customary,
precluding summary judgment as to whether the evaluating psychiatrist had a duty to record this information; (5) whether the evaluating psychiatrist's failure to communicate the appropriate suicide watch level
to county prison officials resulted in the pretrial detainee's suicide; and (6) whether the evaluating psychiatrist communicated the appropriate suicide watch level for the pretrial detainee to county prison officials
and whether the psychiatrist was required to record the watch level in the detainee's medical records. The
court found that the county prison had an effective suicide policy in place and thus the psychiatrist who
evaluated the pretrial detainee had no viable Fourteenth Amendment inadequate medical care and failure to
train counterclaims under § 1983 against the county. According to the court, while at least one individual at
the prison may have failed to carry out protocols for the diagnosis and care of suicidal detainees, the policy
would have been effective if properly followed as was customary at the prison. The court held that the
county prison warden adequately trained subordinates with regard to protocols for the care and supervision
of suicidal inmates and adequately supervised execution of these protocols, and thus the psychiatrist who
evaluated the pretrial detainee had no viable counterclaim under § 1983 against the warden for failure to
adequately train or supervise under the Fourteenth Amendment. (Northumberland Co. Prison, Penn.)

U.S. District Court
ACCESS TO COURT
CONDITIONS
CROWDING
DISCIPLINE
MEDICAL CARE
RECREATION
SUPERVISION

Graves v. Arpaio, 633 F.Supp.2d 834 (D.Ariz. 2009). Pretrial detainees in a county jail system brought a
class action against a county sheriff and a county board of supervisors, alleging violation of the detainees'
civil rights. The parties entered into a consent decree which was superseded by an amended judgment entered by stipulation of the parties. The defendants moved to terminate the amended judgment. The district
court entered a second amended judgment which ordered prospective relief for the pretrial detainees. The
amended judgment provided relief regarding the following: population/housing limitations, dayroom access, natural light and windows, artificial lighting, temperature, noise, access to reading materials, access to
religious services, mail, telephone privileges, clothes and towels, sanitation, safety, hygiene, toilet facilities,
access to law library, medical care, dental care, psychiatric care, intake areas, mechanical restraints, segregation, outdoor recreation, inmate classification, visitation, food, visual observation by detention officers,

32.182

training and screening of staff members, facilities for the handicapped, disciplinary policy and procedures,
inmate grievance policy and procedures, reports and record keeping, security override, and dispute resolution. The detainees moved for attorney's fees and nontaxable costs. The district court held that: (1) the class
of detainees was the prevailing party entitled to attorney's fees; (2) the initial lodestar figure of
$1,239,491.63 for attorney's fees was reasonable; (3) Kerr factors provided no basis for downward adjustment of the initial lodestar; (4) the attorney's fees award would not be reduced for limited success; (5) the
amount requested as reimbursement for attorney's fees was fully compensable under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (PLRA); (6) PLRA did not require appointment of class counsel for the award of attorney's
fees and non-taxable costs; and (7) the class was entitled to interest on the award of attorney' fees from the
date of the court's order ruling in favor of the detainees on the motion to terminate. The court noted that
defending and enforcing the judgment for more than five years and obtaining prospective relief required
substantial time and labor, the issues presented were not novel but many were difficult and complex, conducting discovery, marshaling evidence, and presenting that evidence during a 13-day evidentiary hearing
required considerable skill, commitment of attorneys' time and advancement of costs limited attorneys'
ability to take on new cases, and the attorneys would not receive any compensation for their work representing the detainees except as awarded by the court. (Maricopa County Sheriff and Maricopa County
Board of Supervisors, Arizona)
U.S. District Court
HAIRCUT

Greene v. Furman, 610 F.Supp.2d 234 (W.D.N.Y. 2009). A state inmate brought a pro se § 1983 action
against corrections officials, alleging various constitutional violations arising out of disciplinary proceedings instituted after he allegedly spit at another inmate. The district court dismissed the case. The court held
that an allegation that a corrections officer issued a false misbehavior report against the inmate failed to
state a claim for a due process violation. The court noted that the issuance of false misbehavior reports
against an inmate by corrections officers is insufficient on its own to establish a denial of due process. According to the court, the allegation that the inmate, who was being escorted to a mental health appointment
when he became involved in an altercation with another inmate and was not allowed to continue to his
appointment, failed to state a claim for an Eighth Amendment violation. The court found that any delay in
the inmate's mental health treatment did not cause him actual harm or put his health at risk, and there was
no evidence that the delay resulted from any sadistic or otherwise impermissible motive. The court held
that the allegation that the inmate was denied exercise, showers and haircuts after he became involved in an
altercation with another inmate failed to state a claim for an Eighth Amendment violation based on his
conditions of confinement, where the deprivations alleged were not atypical, did not result in any physical
injury, and did not amount to cruel and unusual punishment. Southport Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
FAILURE TO PROTECT
STAFFING

Hardy v. District of Columbia, 601 F.Supp.2d 182 (D.D.C. 2009). Pretrial detainees, allegedly assaulted by
fellow inmates, brought a suit against the former Director of the District of Columbia Department of Corrections and a former jail warden in both their official and individual capacities, and against the District of
Columbia. The detainees sought damages under § 1983 for alleged Fifth and Eighth Amendment violations.
The district court dismissed the case in part. The court held that the detainees' § 1983 official capacity
claims against the former Director and former jail warden were redundant to the claims against the District
of Columbia, warranting dismissal. The court noted that claims brought against government employees in
their official capacity are treated as claims against the employing government and serve no independent
purpose when the government is also sued. The detainees alleged that before the scalding attacks that injured them, one of the very assailants had committed a similar scalding attack using water heated in an
unguarded microwave, and that the locations where their assaults occurred were inadequately staffed with
corrections officers and resulted in the assaults taking place without any officers in the vicinity. The court
held that these allegations were sufficient to plead conditions of detention that posed a substantial risk of
serious harm, as required to state a failure-to-protect claim against the Director of the District of Columbia
Department of Corrections and the jail warden. The detainees alleged that on the day of one of their scalding assaults by a fellow inmate, officials were present at a council hearing at which testimony described
significant and multiple instances of violence in unguarded locations occurring in the jail, that the previous
scalding assaults had occurred by the same inmate in question, and that despite such knowledge, the officials refused to take measures to protect inmates. The court found that the detainees' allegation that the
Director and jail warden were deliberately indifferent to negligent supervision of correctional officers and
lack of staff training, was sufficient to state a § 1983 failure to train claim violative of their due process
rights. The detainees alleged that the warden and Director were at the top of the “chain of command” at the
jail, that they had been aware of violence issues for many years, and that they had been instructed to take
action against violence on numerous occasions. The district court denied qualified immunity for the Director and jail warden, noting that the detainees' due process rights against deliberate indifference were clearly
established at the time of violent scalding attacks by fellow inmates. (District of Columbia Jail)

U.S. Appeals Court
DISCRIMINATION
MEDICAL CARE
USE OF FORCE

Harris v. City of Circleville, 583 F.3d 356 (6th Cir. 2009). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action
against a city and police officers, alleging that he was subjected to excessive force and inadequate medical
care, and discriminated against on account of his race, while being booked at a jail. The district court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment and the defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that summary judgment was precluded by fact issues on the excessive force
claim, the deliberate indifference claim, and the equal protection claim. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether police officers' use of force against the
detainee, in yanking at the detainee's necklace and kicking his leg out from under him causing the detainee
to fall and hit his head, in using a takedown maneuver to get the detainee down on the floor in a booking
area, and in kicking the detainee in the ribs, was objectively reasonable or shocked the conscience. According to the court, summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the

32.183

detainee had a serious need for medical care that was so obvious that even a layperson would easily recognize the need for a doctor's attention, following the police officers' exercise of force against him. The court
also held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether police
officers used excessive force and delayed medical treatment of the detainee on account of his AfricanAmerican race. (Circleville City Jail, Ohio)
U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE
PRIVACY
SUICIDE

Hunter v. Amin, 583 F.3d 486 (7th Cir. 2009). The sister of a pretrial detainee who committed suicide in a
county jail brought an action on her own behalf, and as the personal representative of the estate of her deceased brother, against a jail psychiatrist, county sheriff, and the county, asserting claims under § 1983, as
well as claims of medical malpractice. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the sister appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The appeals court held that the county jail's policy that prevented the pretrial detainee from speaking to the jail
psychiatrist without a jail officer being present did not violate the detainee's constitutional rights, so as to
serve as the basis for holding the county liable for the detainee's death under § 1983. According to the
court, the pretrial detainee had a constitutional right to adequate mental health treatment, but there was no
evidence suggesting that the detainee could not have received adequate mental health treatment in the presence of a corrections officer. The appeals court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether the jail psychiatrist committed medical malpractice by discontinuing the
medication of the detainee who later committed suicide. (St. Clair County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Jenkins v. County of Hennepin, Minn., 557 F.3d 628 (8th Cir. 2009). An inmate brought a § 1983 action
against a county, the supervisor of a jail's nursing staff, and others alleging he received constitutionally
inadequate medical care while incarcerated. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendants and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court found that the supervisor of the
jail's nursing staff did not act with deliberate indifference to the inmate's serious medical condition when
she determined that the inmate should be sent for an x-ray in a day or two. The inmate was unable to open
his jaw completely, blow his nose, or chew. According to the court, the decision reflected a medical judgment that the inmate's injury, though possibly serious, was not urgent and nothing indicated that a one-day
delay was detrimental to the inmate's recovery. The court held that the inmate failed to establish that any of
the jail's official policies reflected deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, as required to support his § 1983 claim. (Hennepin County Adult Detention Center, Minnesota)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
SEXUAL ASSAULT

Kahle v. Leonard, 563 F.3d 736 (8th Cir. 2009). An individual who was raped by a trainee corrections officer while she was a pretrial detainee, brought a § 1983 action against the trainee corrections officer and
other public officials and entities. After a jury found the trainee corrections officer liable and awarded damages, the district court granted the plaintiff's motion for attorneys' fees. The trainee corrections officer appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and remanded in part. The court held that the district court did
not abuse its discretion by admitting the plaintiff's psychologist's report as a supplemental report, and the
district court's jury instructions did not constitute an abuse of discretion. The district court applied one
percent of the detainee’s $1.1 million judgment ($11,000) to attorneys' fees. With the detainee’s legal expenses totaling $186,208.88, the defendant was responsible for $175,208.88 in attorneys' fees, in addition
to the $1.1 million judgment. The appeals court did not affirm the award of only one percent and remanded
the case for further proceedings. (Pennington County Jail, South Dakota)

U.S. Appeals Court
DISCIPLINE

King v. Rivas, 555 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2009). A pretrial detainee brought an action against corrections officers
and others, alleging constitutional violations relating to a false accusation of threatening a guard. Prior to
trial, the defendants made a package settlement offer, which was rejected by the detainee. Following the
trial of one officer, a jury awarded the detainee damages in an amount less than the settlement offer. The
parties moved for attorney's fees and costs. The district court granted the detainee's motion and denied the
defendant's motion. The officer appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. The court held that the
package settlement offer is to be taken on its own terms and compared with the total recovery package in
determining whether a defendant is entitled to costs following the detainee’s success at trial. The court held
that the officer was entitled to costs, excluding attorney's fees, and that the detainee was entitled only to
attorney's fees and costs accrued prior to the rejected offer. (Hillsborough House of Corrections, New
Hampshire).

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE
USE OF FORCE

Krout v. Goemmer, 583 F.3d 557 (8th Cir. 2009). The administratrix of a pretrial detainee's estate brought a
§ 1983 action against police officers and correctional officers alleging excessive force and deprivation of
medical care. The district court denied the defendants' motions for summary judgment and the defendants
appealed. The appeals court dismissed in part, affirmed in part, and reversed in part. The appeals court held
that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether fellow police officers used excessive force in making a traffic stop and arrest. According to the court, it was clearly established at the time of the arrest that a police officer had a duty to intervene to prevent the excessive use of
force by other officers. The appeals court held that the correctional officers' response to the pretrial detainee's inability to walk or feel his legs and difficulty breathing was not deliberately indifferent to his medical
needs under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court noted that the detainee was
closely monitored and checked by an officer every 15 minutes, the detainee did not want medical attention,
the detainee stated he was doing fine, emergency medical services (EMS) technicians examined the detainee's neck and neuromuscular function and determined there was nothing unusual, the detainee declined to
go to a hospital at least three times, and officers repositioned the detainee's neck to ease his breathing.
(Pope County Detention Center, Russellville Police Department, Arkansas)

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U.S. Appeals Court
RESTRAINTS
USE OF FORCE

Lewis v. City of West Palm Beach, Fla., 561 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2009). The survivor of a detainee who had
died in police custody brought a § 1983 action against a city and against individual officers, alleging use of
excessive force. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants and the survivor appealed.
The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the detainee's right not to be restrained via “hobbling” and
being “hogtied” was not clearly established. The detainee became unconscious and died during detention.
According to the court, the officers' conduct was not so egregious as to be plainly unlawful to any reasonable officer, given the detainee's agitated state when first detained and given his continued uncooperative
and agitated state, presenting a safety risk to himself and others, during restraint. After handcuffing the
detainee did not prevent his continued violent behavior, the officers attached an ankle restraint to the handcuffs with a hobble cord (also known as “TARP,” the total appendage restraint position). The hobble was
tightened so that Lewis's hands and feet were close together behind his back in a “hogtied” position. The
court held that the city was not potentially liable for failure to train officers in the use of restraints, where
the need for training in the application of “hobble” restraints did not rise to the level of obviousness that
would render the city potentially liable under § 1983 for deliberate indifference based on the failure to
administer such training. The court noted that hobble restraints did not have the same potential flagrant risk
of constitutional violations as the use of deadly firearms. (West Palm Beach Police Department, Florida)

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
PRIVACY
SEARCHES

Lopez v. Youngblood, 609 F.Supp.2d 1125 (E.D.Cal. 2009). Plaintiffs brought a class action against a county, sheriff, and former sheriff, seeking injunctive relief and damages for alleged violations of his federal
and state constitutional rights resulting from strip and/or visual body cavity searches of detainees and inmates of the county jail. The district granted summary judgment in part and denied in part. The court held
that the policy of the county sheriff's office of subjecting to strip search all pretrial detainees who are ordered released as a result of court appearances, upon their return from the courthouse and prior to their
being returned to the county jail's general population for administrative reasons pending release, violated
the detainees' Fourth Amendment rights. The court found that there was no evidence that pretrial detainees
at the county jail were subjected to strip searches in small groups as a means of punishment, as required to
establish that the strip searches violated the detainees' due process rights. According to the court, prearraignment arrestees were not similarly situated to post-arraignment detainees, such that the practice of
providing privacy for pre-arraignment strip and/or visual body cavity searches, but not for such searches of
post-arraignment detainees, did not violate equal protection, notwithstanding the contention that the interest
in maintaining the privacy of one's body cavities was the same for both arrestees and detainees.
The court held that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because, at the time the county
sheriff's office maintained the policy allowing for group strip and visual body cavity searches of postarraignment detainees of the county jail, it was not clearly established that such searches violated the detainees' Fourth Amendment rights. (Kern County Sheriff's Department, Central Receiving Facility, Ridgecrest, Mojave, and Lerdo facilities, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE
USE OF FORCE

Mann v. Taser Intern., Inc., 588 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2009). The administrators of an estate, the husband,
and guardians of the children of an arrestee who died following her arrest by sheriff's deputies and her
admission to a county jail, brought an action under § 1983 and state law against the deputies and the manufacturer and distributor of the stun gun used by deputies during the arrest. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants and the plaintiffs appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court
held that the use of the stun gun constituted reasonable force where the arrestee's behavior was violent,
aggressive and prolonged, demonstrating that she was clearly a danger to herself and others, and the deputy
warned the arrestee to stop her behavior and discharged his stun gun only after she refused to comply with
the his orders. According to the court, the plaintiffs failed to establish that the arrestee's death was caused
by the use of a stun gun. The court noted that the plaintiffs' own medical expert testified that, while it
would have been naive of him to say that the use of the stun gun did not contribute in some degree to the
arrestee's death, he was unable to declare to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the arrestee would
have survived but for its use. The court held that the sheriff's deputies were not deliberately indifferent to
the arrestee's serious medical condition of “excited delirium” when they opted to take her to jail instead of
to a hospital. Although one deputy had knowledge of the arrestee's past methamphetamine use, and the
arrestee's mother and another person told a different deputy that the arrestee was sick and needed to go to
the hospital, the deputies had no prior knowledge of the medical condition called “excited delirium” or its
accompanying risk of death. The court noted that the arrestee's physical resistance and verbal communication suggested to the deputies that, although agitated, the arrestee was not in immediate medical danger,
which was an opinion shared by emergency medical personnel called to the scene by the deputies. (Whitfield County Sheriff's Office, Georgia)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
INTAKE SCREENING
MEDICAL CARE

Martinez v. Beggs, 563 F.3d 1082 (10th Cir. 2009). A pretrial detainee's estate brought a § 1983 action
against a sheriff, deputies, and board of county commissioners alleging violations of the Fourteenth
Amendment for deliberate indifference to the detainee's serious medical needs after the detainee died while
in police custody. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on qualified
immunity grounds. The plaintiff appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the arresting
officers and custodial officers had no reason to suspect that the detainee, who was intoxicated, posed a risk
of heart attack and death, as required to support a claim that the officers violated the Fourteenth Amendment by being deliberately indifferent to the detainee's serious medical needs. (Cleveland County Detention
Center, Oklahoma)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

McRaven v. Sanders, 577 F.3d 974 (8th Cir. 2009). The guardian of an incapacitated detainee brought a §
1983 action on behalf of the detainee against a supervising detention facility officer, a practical nurse, and
other detention facility officers, alleging deliberate indifference to the detainee's medical needs. The district

32.185

court denied qualified immunity to the defendants and they appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court
held that the supervising officer could not have reasonably relied on the practical nurse's opinion that the
detainee did not require hospitalization and, thus, was not entitled to qualified immunity. The court noted
that the officer was aware of the cocktail of potent drugs the detainee had consumed and that circumstances
strongly suggested he did not consume the drugs in prescribed dosages, the officer was aware the detainee
exhibited symptoms of extreme intoxication, and the officer knew or reasonably should have known that
the practical nurse based his assessment on the faulty assumption that the detainee was under the influence
of alcohol, not drugs. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material
fact as to the deputies' and sergeant's subjective knowledge of the detainee's medical need, and the care that
the nurse provided to the detainee. The court also found that a sergeant who was trained in cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) and who made no attempt to resuscitate the detainee was not entitled to qualified
immunity, since the sergeant was aware of the detainee's medical need and was capable of providing assistance, but failed to do so. (Garland County Adult Detention Center, Arkansas)
U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Miller v. Yamhill County, 620 F.Supp.2d 1241 (D.Or. 2009). Three inmates of a county correction facility
brought a class action against a county and sheriff alleging their policy of strip searching inmates at the
facility without reasonable suspicion that they were carrying contraband or weapons was a violation of the
Fourth Amendment. The defendants moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the motion. The court held that the sheriff supervising the deputies who conducted allegedly unconstitutional
searches was not liable under § 1983, where the sheriff was not personally involved in any of the searches
at issue, and there was no causal connection between any conduct of the sheriff and the alleged violations.
The court held that the strip search of an inmate at the facility, who was arrested for threatening someone with a knife and a cane, was reasonable upon the inmate's entry into the general jail population following his completion of a drug treatment program, in light of the underlying menacing charge. The court
noted that the inmate was returning to the jail at the time of his choosing and therefore had knowledge that
he would be entering the jail, and the inmate was returning from a drug treatment facility because of his
possession and use of contraband. According to the court, the strip search of another inmate at the facility,
who had been arrested on charges of driving while suspended and the felony of attempt to elude, was reasonable, in light of one of the charges being a felony, and the fact that the inmate had eluded arrest earlier
in the day, and therefore knew that the police were looking for him and that he would likely be entering the
jail population. The court found that the strip search of a third inmate at the facility, who had been arrested
on driving under the influence of intoxicants (DUII) charges, was reasonable, noting that after her arrest,
the inmate managed to remove and conceal her handcuffs in her underwear, and after an extended search of
the patrol car and booking area, and repeated denials that she had the handcuffs, the inmate removed the
handcuffs from her pants, and deputy concluded that a strip search was necessary on the basis that inmate
might be concealing other contraband. (Yamhill County Corrections Facility, Oregon)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT

Mosher v. Nelson, 589 F.3d 488 (1st Cir. 2009). The administrator of the estate of a pretrial detainee who
was killed at a state mental health hospital by another patient brought an action against the superintendent
of the hospital, the commissioner of the state department of corrections (DOC), and other state officials,
alleging civil rights violations and state-law claims. The district court granted summary judgment in favor
of the defendants. The administrator appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the superintendent of the state mental health hospital and the commissioner of the state department of corrections were
entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 liability on the deliberate indifference claim. According to the
court, although the patient was able to strangle the detainee while the detainee was visiting the patient in his
room, the hospital had a long-standing policy that allowed patients to visit in each others' rooms during the
short period during the end of the morning patient count and lunch. The court noted that there was no history of violence or individualized threats made by any patient, and reasonable officials could have believed
that allowing the visiting policy to continue and maintaining the current staffing levels at the hospital would
not cause a substantial risk of harm. (Bridgewater State Hospital, Massachusetts)

U.S. Appeals Court
CLASSIFICATION
FAILURE TO PROTECT

Moyle v. Anderson, 571 F.3d 814 (8th Cir. 2009). The son of an inmate murdered in a county jail, and the
son's trustee, brought a § 1983 action against a county, seeking damages for the murder of the son's father
based on the county's booking policy. The district court granted the county's motion for summary judgment
and the son appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the county's booking policy, classifying an incoming inmate as high or low risk after an intake interview, and then housing those incoming
inmates designated as high risk in a separate area of the jail, was not itself unconstitutional, so as to establish the county's municipal liability under § 1983 for the murder of an inmate killed by another inmate. The
inmate who murdered the plaintiff’s father had been transferred from a maximum security state prison and
had previously attacked a fellow inmate. The policy vested discretion in the booking officer to determine
whether additional information about an inmate's criminal or incarceration history was necessary and
whether the inmate posed a risk to others and needed to be placed in a separate unit. According to the court,
there was no evidence that the county had notice of an alleged inadequacy in its booking policy, or that the
policy's alleged inadequacy in failing to require officers to seek information about an incoming individual's
history for violence prior to classification was so patently obvious that the county should have known that a
constitutional violation was inevitable, as required to impose § 1983 liability on county, based on deliberate
indifference. The father was arrested for having no proof of auto insurance and was placed in a cell in the
Alpha Intake Unit (AIU) after it was determined that he would be unable to go before a county judge that
day. When the inmate who murdered the father arrived at the jail, he was booked by a county corrections
officer under the booking policy at the time that required the officer to ask an arriving inmate several questions, to observe the inmate's demeanor, to review any additional information provided about the inmate,
and then to classify the inmate as either high or low risk. Under the policy, if there was no information

32.186

provided about the inmate's previous history, the policy did not require the officer to seek such information.
Incoming inmates classified as low risk, including those transferred from other correctional facilities, were
placed in the AIU for a 72 hour observation period, after which their classification was reviewed. If classified as high risk, inmates were placed in a separate housing unit. The booking officer was unaware that the
prison inmate had been in segregation 23 hours a day at a high security prison, that he had a history of mental illness, and that the assault related to his court appearance had been an unprovoked, violent attack on a
fellow inmate. The officer classified him as low risk, based on the information she had and the inmate’s
calm, polite demeanor during the booking process. (Sherburne County Jail, Minnesota)
U.S. District Court
ALIEN
FALSE ARREST
FALSE
IMPRISONMENT

Ortega Melendres v. Arpaio, 598 F.Supp.2d 1025 (D.Ariz. 2009). Detainees of Hispanic descent brought
an action against a county sheriff for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that deputies from the sheriff's office profiled, targeted, and ultimately stopped and detained persons based on their race in violation of
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court ruled against the defendants’ motion to dismiss.
The court held that: (1) allegations were sufficient to state Fourth Amendment claims; (2) allegations were
sufficient to state equal protection claims; (3) the county was subject to municipal liability; and (4) the
court would not dismiss the county sheriff's office as a non-jural entity. The plaintiff was detained for four
hours in a police holding cell without being apprised of any charges against him, and was then handed over
to Immigration and Customs Enforcement officials. The court held that an allegation that deputies placed
the Hispanic passenger of a speeding vehicle in full custodial arrest for violating United States immigration
laws, even after the passenger provided them with sufficient immigration documents, including a United
States Visa containing a fingerprint and picture, a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) permit, and a
Mexican Federal Voter Registration Card with a picture and fingerprint, was sufficient to state a claim for a
Fourth Amendment violation for being placed into full custodial arrest without probable cause. The court
noted that an allegation that the deputies' request for an Hispanic driver's Social Security card was not
“standard procedure” for all routine traffic stops conducted by the county. According to the court, allegations that the county sheriff made a public statement that physical appearance alone was sufficient to question an individual about their immigration status, that the county's crime suppression sweeps had been allegedly targeted at areas having a high concentration of Hispanics, and that the county had used volunteers
with known animosity towards Hispanics and immigrants to assist in crime sweeps, were sufficient to allege a discriminatory purpose, as required to state a § 1983 equal protection claim. (Maricopa County Sheriff's Office, Cave Creek Holding Cell, Arizona)

U.S. Appeals Court
ACCESS TO COURT
LAW LIBRARIES
RELIGION

Ortiz v. Downey, 561 F.3d 664 (7th Cir. 2009). A federal pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against
the chief of corrections at a detention center, alleging his rights under the First Amendment's Free Exercise
Clause were violated. The district court dismissed the complaint and the detainee appealed. The appeals
court reversed and remanded. The court held that the detainee stated a § 1983 claim that his First Amendment free exercise rights were violated by alleging that he was denied a religious rosary and a prayer booklet solely because a jail official did not find those items vital to worship. The court also found the alleged
denial stated a claim under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The court
found that the detainee failed to allege that any deprivations in obtaining legal materials caused him an
actual injury, as required to state a claim that his right of access to courts was denied. The court noted that a
prisoner's complaint must spell out, in minimal detail, the connection between the alleged denial of access
to legal materials and an inability to pursue a legitimate challenge to a conviction, sentence, or prison conditions to state a claim that his right to access the courts was denied. The detainee had asked jail officials to
copy, at no charge, approximately fifty legal documents that pertained either to his pro se civil suit against
his jailers or to his criminal prosecution. The detainee was represented by counsel in the criminal case, but
was proceeding pro se in the civil matter. Jail officials told the detainee that he would be charged $1.00 per
page, but also noted that copies regarding his criminal case would be provided at no charge. The detainee
sought access to a law library and tried to subscribe to various legal periodicals, but his requests were denied. (Jerome Combs Detention Center, Kankakee, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
ACCESS TO COURT
CONDITIONS
RELIGION
RESTRAINTS

Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F.Supp.2d 1005 (N.D.Cal.2009) reversed 678 F3d 748. A detainee, a United States
citizen who was designated an “enemy combatant” and detained in a military brig in South Carolina,
brought an action against a senior government official, alleging denial of access to counsel, denial of access
to court, unconstitutional conditions of confinement, unconstitutional interrogations, denial of freedom of
religion, denial of right of information, denial of right to association, unconstitutional military detention,
denial of right to be free from unreasonable seizures, and denial of due process. The defendant moved to
dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the detainee,
who was a United States citizen, had no other means of redress for alleged injuries he sustained as a result
of his detention, as required for Bivens claim against the senior government official, alleging the official's
actions violated constitutional rights. The court noted that the Military Commissions Act was only applicable to alien, or non-citizen, unlawful enemy combatants, and the Detainee Treatment Act did not “affect the
rights under the United States Constitution of any person in the custody of the United States.” The court
found that national security was not a special factor counseling hesitation and precluding judicial review in
the Bivens action brought by the detainee. Documents drafted by the official were public record, and litigation may be necessary to ensure compliance with the law.
The court held that the detainee sufficiently alleged that the official's acts caused a constitutional deprivation, as required for the detainee's constitutional claims against the official. The detainee alleged that the
senior government official intended or was deliberately indifferent to the fact that the detainee would be
subjected to illegal policies that the official set in motion, and to a substantial risk that the detainee would
suffer harm as a result, that the official personally recommended the detainee's unlawful military detention
and then wrote opinions to justify the use of unlawful interrogation methods against persons suspected of

32.187

being enemy combatants. According to the court, it was foreseeable that illegal interrogation policies would
be applied to the detainee, who was under the effective control of a military authority and was one of only
two suspected enemy combatants held in South Carolina.
The court found that the detainee's allegations that he was detained incommunicado for nearly two years
with no access to counsel and thereafter with very restricted and closely-monitored access, and that he was
hindered from bringing his claims as a result of the conditions of his detention, were sufficient to state a
claim for violation of his right to access to courts against a senior government official.
According to the court, the detainee's allegations that a senior government official bore responsibility for
his conditions of confinement due to his drafting opinions that purported to create legal legitimacy for such
treatment, were sufficient to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment, and thus stated a due process claim
under the Fourteenth Amendment. The detainee alleged that while detained, he suffered prolonged shackling in painful positions and relentless periods of illumination and intentional interference with sleep by
means of loud noises at all hours, that he was subjected to extreme psychological stress and impermissibly
denied medical care, that these restrictions and conditions were not justified by a legitimate penological
interest, but rather were intended to intensify the coerciveness of interrogations. The court held that federal
officials were cognizant of basic fundamental civil rights afforded to detainees under the United States
Constitution, and thus a senior government official was not entitled to qualified immunity from claims
brought by the detainee. The court also held that the official was not qualifiedly immune from claims
brought by the detainee under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). On appeal, 678 F3d 748,
the appeals court reversed the district court decision, finding that the official was entitled to qualified immunity because there had not been a violation of well established law. (Military Brig, South Carolina)
U.S. District Court
USE OF FORCE
ALIEN

Petrolino v. County of Spokane, 678 F.Supp.2d 1082 (E.D.Wash. 2009). A detainee, a German citizen,
brought an action against a county, county sheriff, and numerous defendants, seeking damages under §
1983 and state law for force used during his arrest and detention. The defendants moved for summary
judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary
judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a corrections officers' knee strikes
against the pretrial detainee were administered in response to a threat, due to the detainee's alleged refusal
to surrender a pen that he possessed, and thus whether the strikes were reasonable uses of force. (Spokane
County Jail, Washington)

U.S. District Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
MEDICAL CARE
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act
RA- Rehabilitation Act

Phipps v. Sheriff of Cook County, 681 F.Supp.2d 899 (N.D.Ill. 2009). Paraplegic and partially-paralyzed
pretrial detainees currently and formerly housed at a county prison brought a class action against the county
and county sheriff, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation
Act. The parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The district court denied the motions for summary
judgment. The court held that the sheriff waived the affirmative defense that the plaintiffs failed to exhaust
their administrative remedies, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), where the sheriff
raised that defense for the first time in his motion for summary judgment. The court held that paraplegic
and partially-paralyzed pretrial detainees who were formerly housed at the county prison were not “prisoners confined in jail” for the purposes of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), and thus their civil rights
claims were not subject to, or barred by, PLRA.The court held that the pretrial detainees adequately alleged
discrimination based on the prison's failure to provide wheelchair-accessible bathroom facilities. According
to the court, the detainees met the PLRA physical injury required. In addition to alleging mental and emotional harm, the detainees complained of bed sores, infections, and injuries resulting from falling to the
ground from their wheelchairs and toilets, which were undeniably physical injuries. According to the court,
the county and county sheriff failed to establish that they were not recipients of federal funds, as would
render them beyond the reach of the Rehabilitation Act's requirements. The court held that county prison
facilities to which the paraplegic and partially-paralyzed pretrial detainees claimed to have been denied
access--showers, toilets, and sinks--were “services” and “programs” within the meaning of Title II of ADA,
which forbade discrimination against persons with disabilities in the area of public services, programs, and
activities. The court found that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to
whether the paraplegic and partially-paralyzed pretrial detainees were intentionally discriminated against,
and as to whether modifications to county prison facilities requested by the detainees were reasonable. The
court found no evidence that the detainees were excluded from electronic monitoring or drug rehabilitation
programs by the county department of corrections, as would support their Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) claim. (Cook County Department of Corrections, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
SUICIDE

Powers-Bunce v. District of Columbia, 594 F.Supp.2d 54 (D.D.C. 2009). The mother of a detainee who
hung himself in a holding cell at a police precinct headquarters brought an action against the District of
Columbia and individual police and Secret Service officers alleging constitutional violations and tort claims
for her son's suicide. The detainee hung himself shortly after he was arrested by the Secret Service for cocaine possession and driving with a suspended license. The detainee had been placed in a jail cell away
from other detainees around 2:00 a.m. No one checked on the detainee while he was alone in his cell between 2:30 a.m. and 4:16 a.m. He was found hanging from the bars of the jail cell by his tube socks tied in
a knot around 4:16 a.m. The district court dismissed claims against the police officers and the Secret Service officers in their entirety. The court held that the arresting Secret Service officers were not the custodians of the detainee and therefore had no “special relationship” with the detainee giving rise to an affirmative duty to resuscitate the detainee, as would support the due process claims of the detainee's mother
against the officers for deliberate indifference in their failure to resuscitate. According to the court, although the officers had taken temporary custody of the detainee and might have obtained a key to the cell,
the District, not the officers, was the custodian which owed an affirmative duty of protection to the detainee. (Metropolitan Police Department's Third District Precinct Headquarters, District Columbia)

32.188

U.S. District Court
INTAKE SCREENING
MEDICAL CARE
SUICIDE

Powers-Bunce v. District of Columbia, 659 F.Supp.2d 173 (D.D.C. 2009). A mother, for herself and as the
personal representative of an arrestee who hanged himself in a holding cell at a police precinct shortly after
he was arrested by the United States Secret Service, brought an action against the District of Columbia and
several police and Secret Service officers. The District of Columbia moved for judgment on the pleadings,
or in the alternative, for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that: (1)
the District of Columbia did not violate the Fifth Amendment right of the arrestee to be free from deliberate
indifference to his substantial risk of committing suicide; (2) the District of Columbia could not be held
liable for a police officers' failure to attempt to revive the arrestee; and (3) the District of Columbia could
not be held liable for officers' inadequate training and supervision.
The court noted that although a Secret Service officer suspected the arrestee was under the influence of
cocaine after he had observed his jittery behavior and discovered a half-used bag of cocaine on the arrestee
during a search at the precinct, there was no evidence that cocaine-users were a greater suicide risk or that
jittery behavior was a warning sign of impending suicide. According to the court, there was no evidence
that police officers who accepted custody of the arrestee had subjective knowledge of his suicidal tendencies or actually drew the inference that the arrestee was a suicide risk, and there was no evidence that a
Secret Service officer communicated either his suspicion of the arrestee's cocaine use or his observation of
jittery behavior to either police officer. The court held that inadequate training and supervision of District
of Columbia police officers, who failed to follow police department procedures when they did not attempt
to revive the arrestee who had hanged himself in his cell, failed to expeditiously obtain assistance from
Emergency Medical Services, and failed to maintain and operate the video surveillance system, did not
reflect a deliberate or conscious choice by the District of Columbia, as required to hold the District of Columbia liable under § 1983 for the detainee's death. (District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department,
Third District Precinct)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Reinhart v. City of Schenectady Police Dept., 599 F.Supp.2d 323 (N.D.N.Y. 2009). An arrestee brought a §
1983 action against a city, police department and officers, alleging Fourth Amendment violations following
her arrest for allegedly making harassing telephone calls. The district court granted summary judgment for
the defendants. The court held that probable cause existed to commence the criminal action and perform the
arrest, and that the suspicionless seizure of the arrestee's brassiere while incarcerated qualified as a “special
need” for Fourth Amendment purposes. The court noted that the police department had a policy of seizing
brassieres purely as a safety measure to preclude their use as a suicide tool, and the policy was implemented in a manner reasonably designed to reduce intrusion on the arrestee's privacy by allowing her to remove
the brassiere without disrobing. (Schenectady Police Department, New York)

U.S. District Court
CELLS
FAILURE TO PROTECT
SUPERVISION

Rodriguez-Borton v. Pereira-Castillo, 593 F.Supp.2d 399 (D.Puerto Rico 2009). Relatives of a deceased
pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against prison officials, requesting damages for constitutional
violations culminating in the detainee's death. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by fact issues as to the
lack of adequate inmate supervision and malfunctioning cell locks and cell lights. The court also found an
issue of material fact as to whether the Administrator of the Puerto Rico Administration of Corrections
(AOC) failed to act with regard to security risks, including malfunctioning door locks, in the annex within
which the pretrial detainee was found hanged. The court also found a genuine issue of material fact as to
the prison annex superintendent's failure to remedy supervision problems in housing units where he knew
inmates were able to and did move freely in and out of their cells due to malfunctioning door locks. The
court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to a correctional
officer's failure to patrol the living area of the annex within which the pretrial detainee was found hanged
while he knew inmates were able to freely move around. The court denied qualified immunity to the defendants because it was clearly established at the time of the alleged inaction, and a reasonable prison official working in the system would have known that a lack of supervision, combined with the knowledge that
cell locks did not function, would create an obvious and undeniable security risk. (Administration of Corrections of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and Annex 246)

U.S. Appeals Court
DUE PROCESS
JUVENILES
PRIVACY
SEARCHES

Schmidt v. City of Bella Villa, 557 F.3d 564 (8th Cir. 2009). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action against a
police chief and city, alleging the chief's photographing of her tattoo violated her rights. The defendants
moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the motion. The arrestee appealed. The appeals
court affirmed. The court held that the chief's photographing of the arrestee's tattoo was not an unreasonable search and did not violate due process, and the photographing of the arrestee's tattoo did not amount to
a strip search under Missouri strip search law. The court found that the action of photographing the tattoo
did not violate the Fourth Amendment, despite the fact that the arrestee was required to unzip her pants for
the photograph and that the photograph was taken by male officer. The court concluded that the photograph
served legitimate law enforcement purposes, the chief told the arrestee that photograph was needed for
identification purposes, and the photograph was taken in private. The court noted that the arrestee gave a
false date of birth and social security number. She was arrested for making a false declaration and for being
a minor in possession of alcohol. (City of Bella Villa, Missouri)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE
MEDICATION

Shepherd v. Dallas County, 591 F.3d 445 (5th Cir. 2009). A pretrial detainee sued a county under § 1983,
alleging that conditions of confinement, specifically the jail's failure to administer pills he needed to ameliorate chronic hypertension, violated his due process right to medical care while in custody. The district
court, entered judgment on jury verdict for the detainee. The county appealed. The appeals court affirmed,
finding that the action was an attack on conditions of confinement rather than on episodic acts or omissions
of particular jail officials. The court noted that the jail medical director testified that the jail's medical ser-

32.189

vices were inadequate, and a clinical pharmacist testified that the administration of medication at the jail
was so inadequate that half or more of the inmates did not receive their prescription medications. The court
held that a Department of Justice (DOJ) report concerning jail conditions was not excludable as being more
prejudicial than probative, inasmuch as the report was relevant in that it provided strong support for the
claim that medical care at the jail was constitutionally inadequate, and, although findings in the report were
prejudicial to the county's cause, they were probative as well. (Dallas County Jail, Texas)
U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE
USE OF FORCE

Spears v. Ruth, 589 F.3d 249 (6th Cir. 2009). The estate of a deceased detainee brought a § 1983 action
against a police officer and a city, alleging deliberate indifference to the detainee's serious illness or injury
while in the officer's care. The district court denied summary judgment and the officer and city brought an
appeal. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that the pretrial detainee's condition and
need for medical attention was not so obvious to the police officer as to establish the existence of a serious
medical need, for the purposes of a claim of deliberate indifference in violation of due process. The officer
allegedly failed to inform emergency medical technicians (EMT) on the scene and at the jail that the detainee, who later died from respiratory and cardiac failure resulting from cocaine use, had admitted that he
smoked crack cocaine. According to the court, the EMTs and jail nurse, who presumably had a greater
facility than the average layperson to recognize an individual's medical need, observed the detainee's behavior and administered tests based on those observations, and both the EMTs and the jail officers concluded that the detainee did not need to be transported to the hospital. After admission to the jail, the detainee
continued to hallucinate and officers placed him in a restraint chair “for his own safety,” tasing him to “relax his muscles.” The detainee remained restrained for approximately three and a half hours, during which
time he was calm but continued to hallucinate. Shortly after the officers released him from the chair, the
detainee began to shake and spit up blood and then became unconscious. He was taken to a hospital where
he was diagnosed with respiratory and cardiac failure and multi-organ failure resulting from cocaine use.
He lapsed into a coma and died eleven months later. (City of Cleveland, Bradley Co. Justice Ctr., Tenn.)

U.S. Appeals Court
INTAKE SCREENING
MEDICAL CARE

Tamez v. Manthey, 589 F.3d 764 (5th Cir. 2009). Survivors of a pretrial detainee, who died while in custody
from acute cocaine intoxication when the bag of cocaine that he swallowed before his arrest burst in his
intestines, brought a § 1983 action, alleging that police officers and prison officials were deliberately indifferent to the detainee's need for medical care. The district court granted the summary judgment in favor of
the defendants. The plaintiffs appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that police detectives
were not deliberately indifferent to the medical needs of the detainee. The court noted that the detectives'
knowledge that the detainee had pupils that were maximally dilated and that he needed medical clearance
did not show that the detectives were aware of an unjustifiably high risk to the detainee's health, or that the
risk to the detainee's health was so obvious that they should have inferred such a risk. According to the
court, jailers were not deliberately indifferent to the medical needs of the detainee. According to the court,
the fact that the jailers were told the detainee needed medical clearance and that he had dilated pupils did
not show that the jailers knew or should have known of a substantial risk to the detainee's health. (Harlingen City Jail, Cameron County Carrizales-Rucker Detention Center, Texas)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Tardiff v. Knox County, 598 F.Supp.2d 115 (D.Me. 2009). After granting a detainee's motion for summary
judgment on liability under § 1983 for a strip search she underwent at a county jail, the county moved to
exclude the detainee's evidence of lost income or profits allegedly caused by her mental distress growing
out of the strip search. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that
the detainee's tardy pretrial disclosure of economic loss information did not prejudice the county's ability to
investigate so as to warrant the exclusion of evidence of the detainee's evidence of lost income or profits.
The court found that damages for economic loss based upon a lost future contract were not recoverable in
the civil rights suit seeking damages allegedly caused by the detainee's mental distress, since the jury would
have to speculate in order to determine whether the detainee suffered an economic loss on a future contract
and, if so, how much. (Knox County Jail, Maine)

U.S. Appeals Court
INTAKE SCREENING
MEDICAL CARE

Vaughn v. Gray, 557 F.3d 904 (8th Cir. 2009). A detainee’s sister brought a § 1983 action against several
officers and county employees alleging they were deliberately indifferent to the detainee’s serious medical
needs which resulted in his death. The district court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment
based on qualified immunity and the defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that a
genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether jail officials deliberately disregarded the medical needs
and condition of the detainee. The detainee was charged with first-degree sexual assault. During the jail's
intake procedure, he completed a medical intake form, indicating that he had a history of mental illness,
headaches, epilepsy/seizures, ulcers, and kidney/bladder problems, but indicating that he did not have a
history of heart problems or high or low blood pressure. Although the detainee had no medications with
him upon his arrival at the jail, his mother later brought his medications, including an anti-depressant. He
received his medication for several days until the prescription ran out. He missed several doses before a
new prescription arrived. During the time he was without medication, his cellmate told jail employees that
the detainee had been ingesting shampoo and engaging in other odd behavior. The detainee was moved to
an isolation cell to be monitored on an hourly basis. He was observed vomiting and asked to see a nurse but
he was not provided access. He was later found dead in his cell. An autopsy determined that he died of
natural causes: arteriosclerotic cardiovascular disease, causing a heart attack that resulted in his death.
(Greene County Jail, Arkansas)

U.S. District Court
PROBABLE CAUSE
RELEASE
USE OF FORCE

Wasserman v. Rodacker, 557 F.3d 635 (D.C. Cir. 2009). An arrestee brought an action against the government and a police officer, alleging tort and constitutional claims based on his arrest for violating a leash law
and assaulting a police officer. The government substituted itself as a defendant and moved to dismiss. The
district court dismissed the tort claims and granted summary judgment on the constitutional claims. The

32.190

arrestee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the government properly substituted
itself as a party defendant and that the force used in the arrest was reasonable. The court found that the
arrestee's detention was not unreasonable, in violation of Fourth Amendment, despite having been premised
on an assault charge that was later dropped by the government, where the length of detention was less than
48 hours, and the arrestee failed to allege that the delay of a probable cause hearing was a result of ill will
or some other malicious purpose. (District of Columbia, Metropolitan Police Dept. Central Cell Block)
U.S. District Court
PRIVACY
SEARCHES

Young v. County of Cook, 616 F.Supp.2d 834 (N.D.Ill. 2009). Pretrial detainees brought an action against a
county, sheriff, and current and former directors of the county department of corrections, on behalf of
themselves and two certified classes, alleging that the county jail's strip search policy for new detainees
violated their rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court granted the parties’
motions for summary judgment in part and denied in part. The court held that: (1) the strip search of detainees charged with misdemeanor offenses not involving drugs or weapons violated the Fourth Amendment;
(2) the strip searches of members of a class of males who were subjected to a strip search as new detainees
before privacy screens were installed violated the Fourth Amendment; (3) issues of material fact precluded
summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment claims for the time period after privacy screens were installed; and (4) strip searches before privacy screens were installed violated due process. According to the
court, there was no evidence that blanket strip searches were necessary with respect to these class members,
and there was no evidence that the strip search of individual class members was required. The court noted
that although intermingling with general prisoners may be one factor in evaluating the reasonableness of a
prison's strip search policy with respect to new pretrial detainees, that fact standing alone is not enough to
justify strip searches of pretrial detainees in the absence of individualized reasonable suspicion. (Cook
County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
PRIVACY
SEARCHES

Young v. County of Cook, 616 F.Supp.2d 856 (N.D.Ill. 2009). Pretrial detainees charged with misdemeanors brought a civil rights class action under § 1983 against a county, a former county sheriff, and sheriff's
employees, alleging that the jail's blanket strip search policy violated their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the detainees on the issue of liability
and the defendants moved for reconsideration. The district court denied the defendants’ motion for reconsideration. The court held that the county could have forfeited its claim to raise the issue that the details of
2,000 contraband reports revealed 832 instances where persons purportedly charged with misdemeanors
were found to have contraband money during strip search process, where the county failed to properly
bring this evidence to the court's attention during the summary judgment briefing process. According to the
court, the deference accorded to the jail's expertise in matters of institutional security did not preclude the
court from determining whether the evidence supported the application of the jail's policy of subjecting
newly arriving misdemeanor detainees to a blanket policy of strip/body cavity searches. The court noted
that the defendants asserted that the district court had “ignored ... downplayed, and ... distorted” the evidence. In its decision, the court responded “Not so. With their submissions, defendants submitted volumes
of exhibits that, if stacked up, create a pile over fifteen inches high.” (Cook County Jail, Illinois)
2010

U.S. Appeals Court
RELEASE
FALSE IMPRISONMENT

Avalos v. Baca, 596 F.3d 583 (9th Cir. 2010). A detainee brought an action against officers of a county
sheriff's department in their official and individual capacities for alleged violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights based on his over-detention and the officers' alleged efforts to procure an involuntary waiver of his civil rights claim. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the officers.
The detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the officers were not liable under §
1983 in their official capacities on the over-detention claim, absent evidence that they had a policy, practice, or custom of over-detaining inmates. According to the court, the detainee had no freestanding constitutional right to be free of a coercive waiver, and even if the detainee had a right to be free from a coercive
waiver, the officers were entitled to qualified immunity on the involuntary waiver claim. The detainee had
been arrested on a warrant from another county for domestic abuse and was transported to the arresting
county jail. The arresting county had the responsibility to notify the other county, under state law, but failed
to do so. Over two months later the arresting county realized that the detainee had been over-detained and
released him. On the day of his release, a deputy in street clothing asked the detainee, who did not speak
English, to sign papers that were an offer to settle his claim for over-detention for $500. The detainee asserted that he did not know what was in the papers. (Los Angeles Sheriff's Department, California)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Beatty v. Davidson, 713 F.Supp.2d 167 (W.D.N.Y. 2010). A former pretrial detainee brought a § 1983
action against a county, jail officials, and a nurse, alleging that the defendants denied him adequate medical
care while he was a pretrial detainee, in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights. The defendants
moved for summary judgment. The district court denied the motion. The court held that the detainee's diabetic condition was a serious medical condition and that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to
whether the nurse was deliberately indifferent to the detainee's diabetic condition, precluding summary
judgment for the nurse. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether jail officials were grossly negligent in supervising subordinates who allegedly violated
the former pretrial detainee's constitutional rights. According to the court, a genuine issue of material fact
existed as to whether the county lacked a system at its jail for managing chronically ill inmates and failed to
train and properly supervise its staff, precluding summary judgment for the county on the former pretrial
detainee's municipal liability claim under § 1983. (Erie County Holding Center, Pennsylvania)

32.191

U.S. District Court
USE OF FORCE

Brooks v. Austin, 720 F.Supp.2d 715 (E.D.Pa. 2010). A state pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action
against correction officers, alleging violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The officers filed
a motion to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the
pretrial detainee's allegations that a correctional officer slammed him into a wall, that another officer was
“on his neck” while he was handcuffed, and that these actions resulted in injuries to his knee and shoulder
were sufficient to state a § 1983 claim for excessive force in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
(Chester County Prison, Pennsylvania)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Brown v. Callahan, 623 F.3d 249 (5th Cir. 2010). The estate of a pretrial detainee, who died of a gastrointestinal hemorrhage while in pretrial custody, brought a § 1983 action against a county sheriff in his individual and official capacity for failure to train and supervise the jail's medical employees and for maintaining an unconstitutional policy of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. The district court denied
the sheriff's motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The sheriff appealed. The appeals
court reversed. The court held that the county sheriff was not deliberately indifferent to a known or obvious
risk of inadequate medical care toward pretrial detainees arising from the supervising jail physician's unpleasant attitude or practice of intimidation toward jail nurses, which allegedly discouraged nurses from
calling the physician or sending patients to the emergency room. The court noted that the detainee’s gastrointestinal hemorrhage was neither referred for treatment by a hospital emergency room nor treated by the
jail's supervising physician. According to the court, despite the physician's bad temper, despite one nurse's
expressed fear of an “ass-chewing” from the physician had she sent the detainee to the emergency room,
and even though the nurses and physician had disagreed in two instances on whether inmates should be sent
to an emergency room, the two nurses had previously decided to send inmates to the emergency room over
the physician's objections. The sheriff had reportedly counseled the physician and ordered the nurses to act
appropriately notwithstanding the physician’s distemper, and there was no prior instance in which the sheriff's instruction to the nurses was not followed. (Wichita County Jail, Texas)

U.S. District Court
INTAKE SCREENING
SEARCHES

Cantley v. West Virginia Regional Jail and Correctional Facility Authority, 728 F.Supp.2d 803 (S.D.W.Va.
2010). A pretrial detainee who was strip searched and deloused brought a class action against a regional jail
authority, challenging its strip search and delousing policies. The jail authority moved to dismiss. The district court denied the motion. The court held that the detainee stated a claim in regard to the strip search
policy and in regard to the delousing policy. The court found that a jail authority official sued in his individual capacity was not entitled to qualified immunity. The detainee alleged that the jail had a blanket policy of conducting visual cavity strip searches of all pretrial detainees charged with misdemeanors or other
minor crimes, regardless of whether the detainees were intermingled with the general population of the jail,
and that there was no reasonable suspicion that he harbored weapons or contraband. The court ruled that
whether the jail's delousing policy, which allegedly applied to all pretrial detainees, was reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment could not be decided on a motion to dismiss. The court noted that the detainee who
brought the action against a regional jail authority for alleged civil rights violations was not required to
exhaust his administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), where he was no
longer an inmate at the time he filed suit. (West Virginia Regional Jail and Correctional Facility Authority,
Western Regional Jail)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
USE OF FORCE

Castro v. Melchor, 760 F.Supp.2d 970(D.Hawai‘i 2010). A female pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against correctional facility officials and medical staff, alleging the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs resulting in the delivery of a stillborn child. The defendants moved for
summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that
summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the correctional facility's medical staff subjectively knew the pretrial detainee's complaints of vaginal bleeding presented a serious medical need. The court held that the staff’s failure to ensure the detainee received an ultrasound and
consultation was no more than gross negligence, and the medical staff did not deny, delay, or intentionally
interfere with the pretrial detainee's medical treatment. According to the court, summary judgment was
precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the correctional facility officials' actions and
inactions in training the facility's medical staff resulted in the alleged deprivation of the pretrial detainee's
right to medical treatment and whether the officials consciously disregarded serious health risks by failing
to apply the women's lock-down policies. Following a verbal exchange with a guard, two officers physically forced the detainee to the ground from a standing position. While she was lying on the ground on her
stomach, the officers restrained her by holding their body weights against her back and legs and placing her
in handcuffs. The detainee was approximately seven months pregnant at the time. (Oahu Community Correctional Center, Hawai’i)

U.S. District Court
FEMALES
PRIVACY
SEARCHES

Chase v. District of Columbia, 723 F.Supp.2d 130 (D.D.C. 2010). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983
action for monetary damages against the District of Columbia and the operator of the District's Correctional
Treatment Facility (CTF), alleging violations of the Fourth, Fifth and Eighth Amendments, as well as invasion of privacy, while under arrest, during interrogation, and while in jail and CTF. The defendants moved
to dismiss. The district court granted the motions. The court held that the District did not have a custom or
policy that caused the detainee to be videotaped while naked and changing her clothes in an interrogation
room, thereby precluding the detainee's municipal liability claim alleging that the videotaping was an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The court found that the detainee had not been
adjudicated of any crime and was not subject to punishment, thereby precluding her Eighth Amendment
claim. (District of Columbia, Corrections Corporation of America, Correctional Treatment Facility)

32.192

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Christian v. Wagner, 623 F.3d 608 (8th Cir. 2010). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against jail
officials and employees, alleging a due process violation arising out of his exposure to a cleaning solvent.
After a jury found in favor of the defendants, the district court denied the detainee's motion for a new trial
or judgment as a matter of law. The detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held
that the jury could reasonably find that the detainee failed to show that a physician or other medical personnel had diagnosed him with a serious medical need while incarcerated, as would support a finding that such
need was objectively serious. The court noted that medical personnel who examined the detainee found no
objective evidence supporting a diagnosis, and the record did not contain a medical order to jail employees.
The court also held that evidence supported the finding that the detainee's need for medical attention was
not so obvious that a layperson must have recognized it, as would support a finding that such need was
objectively serious. According to the court, the detainee's testimony that he informed jail employees that he
coughed up blood and experienced difficulty breathing was corroborated only by his mother, whereas several jail employees testified they did not observe the detainee suffering adverse reactions to cleaning solutions and had no recollection of his complaining of a medical problem. (Johnson County Jail, Iowa)

U.S. Appeals Court
MENTAL HEALTH
SUICIDE

Clouthier v. County of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232 (9th Cir. 2010). The estate of a pretrial detainee
brought a § 1983 action against a county, mental health specialist, and two sheriff's deputies alleging they
violated the detainee’s due process rights by failing to prevent his suicide while he was confined. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the estate appealed. The appeals court
affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that the estate had to show that the detainee
was confined under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm and that correction officers were
deliberately indifferent to that risk. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether the mental health specialist at the jail, who was on notice of the pretrial
detainee's suicidal condition, was deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of harm to the detainee when
she removed the detainee from an observation log and told deputies that the detainee could be given regular
clothes and bedding. According to the court, it was clearly established at the time of detention that a reasonable mental health professional would not have removed key suicide prevention measures put in place
by a prior mental health staff member, and therefore the specialist was not entitled to qualified immunity.
The court found that the estate failed to establish that a sheriff's deputy at the jail knew that moving the
detainee to the general population in the jail posed a substantial risk of serious harm to the detainee, where
the deputy only knew that the detainee had missed meals and free time, and that the detainee had been taken off an observation log. The court noted that the deputy spoke to the detainee all weekend and noted he
had a positive outlook on wanting to get out of the room, and earlier that day the mental health specialist
found that the detainee was not actively suicidal at the time. The court held that the estate failed to establish
that another sheriff’s deputy knew that the detainee was suicidal and deliberately ignored that risk, where
the deputy knew only that the detainee was suicidal and needed to be on 15-minute checks and the mental
health specialist told the deputy to give the detainee his regular clothes and bedding. The court noted that
nothing indicated that the deputy saw the detainee's knotted sheet. According to the court, the county did
not have a longstanding custom or practice of moving pretrial detainees from an observation cell into the
general population without consultation with mental health staff, or a longstanding practice of miscommunication between mental health staff and custodial staff. The court found no pattern of repeated wrongful
conduct by county staff, and nothing that indicated another suicide resulted from the improper transfer of a
detainee. The court found that the affidavit of the estate's expert, who opined that custodial staff and mental
health staff did not work together as a team, was speculative and conclusory, and thus was insufficient to
avoid summary judgment. The court noted that the factual basis for the expert's declaration was limited to a
sequence of events and statements of participants surrounding the detainee's transfer to the general population in the jail, and the report did not address the key question of whether the alleged disconnect was so
obvious as to have been deliberate indifference. (Contra Costa Co. Martinez Detention Facility, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
DUE PROCESS

Davis v. Oregon County, Missouri, 607 F.3d 543 (8th Cir. 2010). A pretrial detainee brought an action under § 1983 and various state law authority against a county, county sheriff's department, and a sheriff, alleging the defendants violated his rights in failing to ensure his safety after a fire broke out at the county jail.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the county jail's smoking policy did not demonstrate that the sheriff acted with deliberate indifference in violation of the due process rights of the detainee caught in his cell
during a jail fire, even if a jailer supplied cigarettes to inmates, since the jail had an anti-smoking policy in
effect at all relevant times. The court noted that the jailer who allegedly supplied the cigarettes to the inmates had retired nine months before the fire occurred, and jail officials made sweeps for contraband as
recently as five days before the fire. According to the court, the county jail's inoperable sprinklers and lack
of extra fire safety equipment such as oxygen tanks did not amount to deliberate indifference in violation of
the due process rights of the detainee caught in his cell during a fire, where jail officials took action to deal
with fire hazards by prohibiting smoking and searching for contraband, and fire extinguishers and smoke
detectors were present at the time of the fire. The court held that any failure of the sheriff to engage his
officers in more exhaustive emergency training did not amount to deliberate indifference in violation of the
due process rights of the detainee caught in his cell during a fire, even if the officers' lack of training presented a substantial safety risk. The court noted that the officers' actions in removing inmates from their
cells after they discovered the fire demonstrated that they did not disregard the risk. (Oregon Co. Jail, Mo.)

U.S. Appeals Court
USE OF FORCE
MEDICAL CARE
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Dillon v. Rogers, 596 F.3d 260 (5th Cir. 2010). A pretrial detainee, who was transferred first to a temporary
jail and then to a state corrections facility after Hurricane Katrina damaged a parish correctional center,
brought a § 1983 action. The detainee alleged that he was beaten and mistreated while at the temporary jail,
resulting in hearing loss and other injuries. The district court dismissed the action for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. The detainee appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded for further dis-

32.193

covery. The court held that the record was not sufficiently developed to determine whether administrative
remedies were “available” for detainee to exhaust at the state facility, requiring remand. (Jefferson Parish,
Louisiana)
U.S. District Court
CIVIL COMMITMENT
USE OF FORCE

Enriquez v. Kearney, 694 F.Supp.2d 1282 (S.D.Fla. 2010). A civil detainee brought a pro se civil rights
action against correctional facility officers and physicians, asserting claims for excessive force. The officers
and physicians moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that
officers did not use excessive force against the civil detainee in violation of his due process rights by spraying him with pepper spray, handcuffing him, and escorting him from a detention unit in restraints, where
the detainee did not sustain any serious injury, and the decision to use pepper spray was only made after
officers attempted for more than one hour to verbally convince the detainee to cooperate and leave the unit
where his interaction with officers was causing a disturbance. The court noted that there was no indication
that the force was imposed as punishment rather than in a good faith effort to further the need to maintain
order and security on a unit where numerous sexually violent predators (SVPs) were held. (Florida Civil
Commitment Center, Arcadia, Florida)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCHES

Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of County of Burlington, 621 F.3d 296 (3rd Cir. 2010). Affirmed
132 S.Ct. 1510 (2012). A non-indictable arrestee brought a class action pursuant to § 1983 against two jails,
alleging a strip search violated the Fourth Amendment. After granting the motion for class certification, the
district court granted the arrestee's motion for summary judgment, denied his motion for a preliminary
injunction and denied the jails' motions for qualified and Eleventh Amendment immunity. The jails appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The appeals court held that as a matter of first impression in the circuit, the jails' policy of conducting strip searches of all arrestees upon their admission into the
general prison population was reasonable. The court found that jails were not required to provide evidence
of attempted smuggling or discovered contraband as justification for the strip search policy. According to
the court, the decision to conduct strip searches, rather than use a body scanning chair, was reasonable. The
court noted that the chair would not detect non-metallic contraband like drugs, and there was no evidence
regarding the efficacy of the chair in detecting metallic objects. The appeals court decision was affirmed by
the United States Supreme Court in 2012 (132 S.Ct. 1510). (Burlington County Jail, Essex County Correctional Facility, New Jersey)

U.S. District Court
CLASSIFICATION
DUE PROCESS
DISCIPLINE

Ford v. Clarke, 746 F.Supp.2d 273 (D.Mass. 2010). An inmate brought an action challenging his confinement in a Departmental Disciplinary Unit (DDU) at a prison while a pretrial detainee and, later, as a convicted felon serving his sentence. The Department of Corrections' employees filed a motion for summary
judgment, which the court allowed in part and denied in part. The court held that the detainee's incarceration in the DDU was intended as punishment, and thus, the Department of Corrections violated the detainee's substantive due process rights. According to the court, the Deputy Commissioner of the Prison Division of Department of Corrections stated, when he placed the pretrial detainee in DDU after his criminal
sentence had been completed, that it was meant as punishment and deterrence, as well as for the safety and
security of the institution and staff. The detainee's confinement in DDU was imposed as part of a 10–year
disciplinary sanction that he had received while serving his prior criminal sentence, and the Commissioner
never reassessed the detainee's threat to the institution or others, but, instead relied on conduct which had
occurred years earlier. According to the court, the detainee retained a liberty interest in freedom from disciplinary confinement without due process, even after he pled guilty and was sentenced, and thus, the Deputy
Commissioner of Correction's failure to provide the detainee with any procedural protections at the time he
was returned to DDU as a pretrial detainee, or at the time he was placed in the DDU as a convicted prisoner, violated his procedural due process rights. (Departmental Disc. Unit MCI–Cedar Junction, Mass.)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCHES
USE OF FORCE

Forrest v. Prine, 620 F.3d 739 (7th Cir. 2010). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against a police
officer alleging the officer used excessive force against him when he used a stun gun in a holding cell. The
district court entered summary judgment for the officer. The detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed.
The court held that the officer did not violate the pretrial detainee's right to be free of illegal search and
seizure when he used a stun gun on the detainee while attempting to conduct a strip search in a holding cell
following the detainee’s arrest. The court held that the officer's decision to use the stun gun on the detainee
did not violate the detainee’s due process guarantees, where the officer was aware that the detainee had
attacked another officer earlier in the night, and the detainee appeared to be intoxicated. The court noted
that the detainee was a relatively large man confined in an enclosed space of relatively small area, and he
was facing the officer, pacing in the cell, clenching his fists, and yelling obscenities in response to orders to
comply with the strip search policy. (Rock Island County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE
WRONGFUL DEATH

Gayton v. McCoy, 593 F.3d 610 (7th Cir. 2010). The administrator of a female detainee‘s estate brought a §
1983 action against correctional facility officials and nurses, alleging they violated her due process rights
by failing to provide adequate medical care. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants, and the administrator appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
The appeals court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding a physician unqualified
to offer expert testimony that the detainee's death from non-specific heart failure would have been prevented had she been given her congestive heart failure medication, where the physician lacked specific
knowledge in cardiology and pharmacology, and he provided no basis for his testimony except that the
detainee's medication treated heart disease. But the appeals court held that the district court abused its discretion in finding the physician unqualified to offer expert testimony that the detainee's vomiting combined
with her diuretic medication may have contributed to her tachycardia and subsequent death from nonspecific heart failure. The court held that a correctional facility nurse who examined the detainee during

32.194

intake was not deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs posed by her heart condition, as required to establish violation of the detainee's due process right to adequate medical care in the § 1983 action. The court noted that, even though the nurse failed to follow the facility's protocol requiring her to
contact a doctor when an inmate complained of chest pains, the nurse placed the detainee on a list to have
her vital signs checked each morning, and the nurse arranged for the detainee to get her congestive heart
failure medication. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether the nurse who examined the detainee following her complaints of nausea was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs posed by her heart condition and vomiting. In its decision, the
court noted that “On the other hand, Nurse Pam Hibbert was presented with ample evidence that Taylor
needed medical treatment.” (Peoria County Jail, Illinois)
U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE
CONDITIONS

Graves v. Arpaio, 623 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir, 2010). Pretrial detainees in a county jail system brought a class
action against a county sheriff and the county supervisors board, alleging violation of the detainees' civil
rights. The parties entered into a consent decree which was superseded by an amended judgment entered by
stipulation of the parties. The defendants moved to terminate the amended judgment. The district court
entered a second amended judgment which ordered prospective relief for the pretrial detainees. The district
court awarded attorney fees to the detainees. The sheriff appealed the second amended judgment. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by ordering prospective relief requiring the sheriff to house all detainees taking psychotropic medications in temperatures not
exceeding 85 degrees and requiring the sheriff to provide food to pretrial detainees that met or exceeded the
United States Department of Agriculture's Dietary Guidelines for Americans. The district court had held
that air temperatures above 85 degrees greatly increased the risk of heat-related illnesses for individuals
taking psychotropic medications, and thus that the Eighth Amendment prohibited housing such detainees in
areas where the temperature exceeded 85 degrees. (Maricopa County Sheriff, Jail, Maricopa County Supervisors, Arizona)

U.S. Appeals Court
FEMALES
USE OF FORCE

Griffin v. Hardrick, 604 F.3d 949 (6th Cir. 2010).A pretrial detainee brought an action against a county jail
officer, alleging use of excessive force under § 1983 and state-law battery. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the officer. The detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held
that a videotape of the incident between the detainee and a county jail officer was properly considered by
the district court, in determining the officer's motion for summary judgment, where the detainee's version of
events was blatantly contradicted by the videotape. The court found that the county jail officer's use of a
leg-sweep maneuver to bring the pretrial detainee to the floor, which resulted in the detainee's leg being
fractured, did not constitute wanton infliction of pain, and thus, the detainee could not prevail in her § 1983
Fourteenth Amendment excessive force claim against the officer. The court noted that it was undisputed
that the detainee was acting in a manner, that she attempted to jerk away from the officer, and struggled
with the officer when he attempted to lead her away. It was undisputed that the leg-sweep maneuver was in
compliance with the jail's policies on the use of force. The leg fracture resulted from the accident of another
officer collapsing on the detainee as they both fell to floor. (Davidson Co. Criminal Justice Center, Tenn.)

U.S. Appeals Court
INTAKE SCREENING
MEDICAL CARE
DUE PROCESS

Harper v. Lawrence County, Ala., 592 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2010). Following a pretrial detainee's death
from alcohol withdrawal while in a county jail, the detainee's estate brought an action against the county,
sheriff, police officers, and others under § 1983 and state law, alleging deliberate indifference to the detainee's serious medical needs. The district court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss and the defendants
appealed. The appeals court affirmed and reversed in part. The court held that allegations supported a claim
that jailers were deliberately indifferent to the detainee's serious medical needs, but that the sheriff and
others did not have actual knowledge of the detainee's erratic and strange behavior while in jail. The court
found that allegations supported a claim that the sheriff and jail administrators were deliberately indifferent.
The court held that allegations that jailers were told by other inmates and other jail staff that the pretrial
detainee was displaying erratic and strange behavior, and that jailers took no steps to secure immediate
medical attention for the detainee, supported a § 1983 claim that jailers were deliberately indifferent to the
detainee's serious medical needs under the due process clause. The court held that the detainee’s estate
failed to allege how the sheriff and jail administrators could possibly have had actual knowledge of the
detainee's erratic and strange behavior while in jail, as required to support a § 1983 claim alleging deliberate indifference to the detainee’s serious medical needs. According to the court, for the purposes of a jailer's
claim of qualified immunity from the § 1983 claim that he was deliberately indifferent to the pretrial detainee's serious medical needs under the due process clause, it was clearly established at the time of the
detainee’s confinement that a jail official who was aware of, but ignored, dangers of acute alcohol withdrawal and waited for an emergency before obtaining medical care was deliberately indifferent to the inmate's constitutional rights. The court found that the complaint's specific allegations that the sheriff and jail
administrators who were responsible for management and administration of the jail had customs or policies
of improperly screening inmates for alcohol withdrawal and improperly handling inmates addicted to alcohol or drugs, together with its factual detail concerning a prior similar incident, satisfied the pleading standards for stating a § 1983 claim of deliberate indifference to the pretrial detainee's serious medical needs
under the due process clause based on supervisor liability. (Lawrence County Jail, Alabama)

U.S. Appeals Court
FALSE IMPRISONMENT
RELEASECONDITIONS

Harrington v. City of Nashua, 610 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2010). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action against a
city and others alleging false imprisonment and malicious prosecution. The district court granted the city's
motion for summary judgment and the arrestee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that
the limitations period for a Fourth Amendment claim of false imprisonment begins to run when the false
imprisonment ends, when the plaintiff is either released or detained pursuant to a legal process. The arrestee
was released on personal recognizance after charges were brought against him. The court noted that the

32.195

commencement of a criminal case by the institution of a legal process marks the dividing line between
claims of false imprisonment and claims of malicious prosecution. The court found that pretrial release
conditions imposed on the arrestee did not constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure, as required to support a
§ 1983 malicious prosecution claim against the city, where the conditions required the arrestee to notify the
court of any change in address, to refrain from committing crimes, and to forebear from consuming either
controlled substances or excessive quantities of alcohol. (City of Nashua, New Hampshire)
U.S. District Court
USE OF FORCE
FAILURE TO PROTECT

Hunt ex rel. Chiovari v. Dart, 754 F.Supp.2d 962 (N.D.Ill. 2010). A pretrial detainee's estate brought a civil
rights action against a sheriff, whose actions allegedly led to the death of detainee while he was in custody
at a county jail. The district court granted the sheriff’s motion for summary judgment. According to the
court, the mere fact that the pretrial detainee died while he was in the custody of the sheriff at the county
jail was not sufficient to give rise to an excessive force claim under the due process clause, without identifying any responsible officer, or providing any admissible evidence regarding what happened to the detainee or what the detainee or any officers in the vicinity were doing at the time of the detainee's collapse. The
court found that the opinions of medical experts, that the detainee’s death resulted from trauma to the head
from an assault, “was hopelessly speculative” and therefore inadmissible. (Cook County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
FEMALES
MEDICAL CARE
SUICIDE ATTEMPT

Jessup v. Miami-Dade County, 697 F.Supp.2d 1312 (S.D.Fla. 2010). A pre-trial detainee who had been
placed on suicide precaution status at a county detention center for women, filed a state action against a
corrections officer and the county, asserting negligence and claims under § 1983 for the officer's deliberate
indifference to his serious medical needs, and against the county for failure to train or discipline staff. The
defendants removed the case to federal court and moved for summary judgment. The district court granted
the motion. The court held that the detainee's actions of drinking from a toilet, smearing menstrual blood on
a window, and stepping on and off a ledge in her cell, did not indicate a “strong likelihood” that she was
about to inflict self-harm, as required for jail officials to be liable for deliberately disregarding the detainee's serious medical needs in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, when they failed to place her in fourpoint restraints. The detainee subsequently injured her head. The court noted that the detainee's activities
were bizarre but not violent, aggressive or out of control as would require restraints. According to the court,
a jail official did not act in a fashion “beyond gross negligence,” as required to hold her liable for deliberate
disregard of the pre-trial detainee's serious medical needs, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, when
the official failed to act to stop the detainee from self-inflicting head and nose injuries by banging her head
against a cell wall during her confinement after being placed on a suicide watch. The officials immediately
ordered the detainee to stop head banging activity and tried to open her cell. (Miami-Dade Women's Detention Center, Florida)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE
SEGREGATION
USE OF FORCE
DUE PROCESS

Johnston v. Maha, 606 F.3d 39 (2nd Cir. 2010). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against employees of a
county jail, alleging violations of his constitutional rights and of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) in connection with detention and medical care while in jail. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The inmate petitioned for the appointment of counsel in his appeal. The appeals
court granted the petition. The court held that the appointment of counsel was appropriate in connection
with the inmate's appeal from dismissal of his claim that his placement in solitary confinement, and subsequent excessive force he suffered, violated his constitutional rights, since there was likely merit in the inmate's claims. The court found that it appeared from the inmate's complaint that he might have been a pretrial detainee at the time he was placed in solitary confinement, and thus the claim that the inmate was subjected to excessive force as a detainee would arise under the Fifth, not the Eighth Amendment, because as a
detainee he could not be punished at all. The court noted that there was no evidence that the inmate violated
any rule or was provided with a pre-deprivation hearing. According to the court, the legal issues were fairly
complex, especially with respect to whether the inmate's pretrial detention was substantial enough to give
rise to a constitutional violation of a procedural due process right. On appeal (460 Fed.Appx. 11) the court
found that remand was warranted to allow the District Court to evaluate inmate's claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, and that the inmate exhausted his administrative remedies and was excused from the
exhaustion requirement under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). (Genesee County Jail, New York).

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Jones v. Muskegon County, 625 F.3d 935 (6th Cir. 2010). A father, as the personal representative of the
estate of a deceased pretrial detainee, brought an action against a county and various corrections officers
and medical staff, alleging constitutional claims pursuant to § 1983, gross negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment. The
father appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded. The court held that
assignment charts listing corrections officers assigned to the pretrial detainee's area during the period in
which his health deteriorated, and affidavits from other detainees who witnessed his deterioration and the
officers' alleged failure to assist the detainee, were insufficient to create a fact issue as to whether the officers were deliberately indifferent towards the detainee's serious medical needs in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The court noted that the affidavits referred to “guards” in a general sense without specifying
wrongdoing attributable to any particular officer, and did not specify which officers observed the detainee's
deterioration or ignored his requests for medical care. The court found that a correctional officer's failure to
immediately call an ambulance upon observing the pretrial detainee's deteriorating health condition was not
deliberate indifference towards his serious medical needs as would violate the Fourteenth Amendment,
where the officer believed the decision to call an ambulance was not hers to make but was command's, and
the officer attended to the detainee's medical needs and made efforts to make him more comfortable. But
the court found that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
prison nurses were aware of the risk to the pretrial detainee's health and chose to disregard the risk, and
whether the prison nurses were grossly negligent under Michigan law as to the pretrial detainee's medical
care. (Muskegon County Jail, Michigan)

32.196

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
WRONGFUL DEATH
RELEASE
MEDICAL CARE

Lum v. County of San Joaquin, 756 F.Supp.2d 1243 (E.D.Cal. 2010). An arrestee's survivors brought an
action against a county, city, and several city and county employees, alleging § 1983 claims for various
civil rights violations and a state law claim for wrongful death arising from the arrestee's accidental drowning after his release from the county jail. The defendants moved to dismiss portions of the complaint and
the survivors moved for leave to amend. The district court granted the defendants' motion in part and denied in part, and granted the plaintiffs' motion. The survivors alleged that the city's police sergeants made a
decision to arrest the individual for being under the influence in public, despite lack of evidence of alcohol
use and knowledge that the individual was being medicated for bipolar disorder, and to book him on a
“kickout” charge so that he would be released from jail six hours later. The court found that the arresting
officers, by taking the arrestee into custody, created a special relationship with the arrestee, similar to the
special relationship between a jailer and a prisoner, so as to create a duty of care for the purposes of wrongful death claim under California law, arising from the arrestee's accidental drowning following his release
from the county jail. The court noted that it was foreseeable that the arrestee needed medical attention and
that there was a risk posed by releasing him without providing such attention. The court held that the county, city, and arresting officers were entitled to immunity, under a California Tort Claims Act section related
to liability of public entities and employees for the release of prisoners, for the wrongful death of the arrestee, only as to the basic decision to release the arrestee from the county jail, but not as to the defendants'
ministerial acts after the initial decision to release the arrestee. The court noted that the arrestee had a lacerated foot, was covered with vomit and had trouble walking, and had a seizure while he was in a holding
cell. The arrestee’s body was found floating in the San Joaquin River, approximately two miles west of the
county jail, shortly after he was released. (San Joaquin County Jail, California)

U.S. District Court
JUVENILES
SEARCHES

Mashburn v. Yamhill County, 698 F.Supp.2d 1233 (D.Or. 2010). A class action was brought on behalf of
juvenile detainees against a county and officials, challenging strip-search procedures at a juvenile detention
facility. The parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The court held that the scope of an admission
strip-search policy applied to juvenile detainees was excessive in relation to the government's legitimate
interests, in contravention of the Fourth Amendment. According to the court, notwithstanding the county's
general obligation to care for and protect juveniles, the searches were highly intrusive, the county made no
effort to mitigate the scope and intensity of the searches, and less intrusive alternatives existed. The court
found that county officials failed to establish a reasonable relationship between their legitimate interests
and post-contact visit strip-searches performed on juvenile detainees, as required under the Fourth Amendment. The court noted that the searches occurred irrespective of whether there was an individualized suspicion that a juvenile had acquired contraband, and most contact visits occurred between juveniles and counsel or therapists. (Yamhill County Juvenile Detention Center, Oregon)

U.S. District Court
JUVENILES
MEDICAL CARE
USE OF FORCE

Molina v. New York, 697 F.Supp.2d 276 (N.D.N.Y. 2010). A juvenile detainee brought an action against a
state, its Office of Children and Family Services (OCFS) that operated a youth correctional facility, state
and facility officials, and detention aides, asserting § 1983 claims and claims of negligence and assault and
battery. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and
denied in part. The court held that the juvenile detainee's allegations that detention aides at the youth correctional facility broke his arm while restraining him were sufficient to support a plausible Eighth Amendment claim that the aides used excessive force. The court held that the detainee's allegations that he had to
wait approximately 15 hours before being diagnosed and scheduled for surgery despite the obviousness of
his injuries and his own pleading for assistance, were sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim of
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. (Louis Gossett Jr. Residential Center, New York)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Mosby v. Cavey, 686 F.Supp.2d 868 (W.D.Wis. 2010). A pretrial detainee sued medical personnel at a
county jail, asserting a Fourteenth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference to his serious medical need.
The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court denied the motion. The court held that
summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to when the inmate's impacted
wisdom tooth presented an emergency condition requiring surgery, and whether dentists refused to refer
him to an outside oral surgeon because they were not permitted to make such referrals. The court also
found genuine issues of material fact as to whether a failure of prison nurses to schedule the inmate to see
the dentists or consult with the dentists was intentional mistreatment likely to seriously aggravate the inmate's serious dental condition. (Dane County Jail, Wisconsin)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
PSYCHOLOGICAL
SERVICES
TRANSFER

Nelson v. Shuffman, 603 F.3d 439 (8th Cir. 2010). A pretrial detainee resident of the Missouri Sexual Offender Treatment Center brought a § 1983 action against 13 treatment center officials, alleging violations of
his constitutional rights. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of six of the 13 defendants.
The remaining seven defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as follows: (1) as to whether the officials
recklessly disregarded an objectively serious risk of harm to the pretrial detainee resident by placing him
with a roommate who had a history of sexually assaulting vulnerable young males; (2) as to whether the
pretrial detainee had a serious medical need and whether a treatment center official deliberately disregarded
the need by failing to provide the psychological treatment she prescribed; (3) as to whether officials retaliated against the detainee resident for filing an abuse and neglect charge and several grievances complaining
about treatment center officials' failure to provide him necessary psychological treatment; and (4) as to
whether officials' transfer of the detainee resident to an unfinished ward that only housed one resident who
was confined to shackles twenty-four hours a day was punitive and violated due process by imposing a
punishment that had no legitimate institutional objective. (Missouri Sexual Offender Treatment Center)

32.197

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
FEMALES
MENTAL HEALTH
PSYCHOLOGICAL
SERVICES
RELEASE

Paine v. Johnson, 689 F.Supp.2d 1027 (N.D.Ill. 2010) affirmed 678 F.3d 500. The guardian of the estate of
a pretrial detainee, who allegedly suffered from bipolar disorder, brought a § 1983 action against a city and
city police officers, alleging civil rights violations in connection with the detainee's arrest and subsequent
release from custody without being provided access to mental health treatment. The defendants moved for
summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that
summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the detainee, who exhibited drastic and unnatural behavior throughout her 28-hour detention, had a serious mental health condition. The court also found a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the arresting city police officer, and
other police employees, who witnessed the arrestee singing rap lyrics, taking her clothes off and dancing
provocatively for different men, acting erratically, discussing the price of oil, and screaming bizarre and
vulgar statements, among other things, had notice that the arrestee had a serious mental health condition
that required medical attention. The court noted that a city police officer, who spoke on the telephone with
the detainee's mother, and was informed by her mother that the detainee was likely bipolar and might be
having an episode, had notice that the detainee had a serious mental health condition that required medical
attention, precluding summary judgment.
The court also found genuine issues of material fact as to whether a city police officer, who had actual
knowledge of the pretrial detainee's mental health condition based on observations of her behavior while in
custody, placed the detainee in a position of heightened risk when she released the detainee from the police
station and pointed her toward an area known for violent crime, without providing the detainee with food,
money, or medication, and as to whether the officer's conduct “shocked the conscience.” The court identified a fact issue as to whether the detainee would not have been raped and seriously injured absent a city
police officers' failure to provide the detainee with psychiatric care. The court held that city police officers
were not entitled to qualified immunity from the § 1983 claim brought by the mother of the detainee, for
unreasonably failing to provide the detainee with mental health care under the Fourth Amendment, as it
was clearly established that pretrial detainees were entitled to mental health treatment for serious mental
health conditions. On appeal (678 F.3d 500), the appeals court held that the arresting officer was entitled to
qualified immunity. The district court also denied qualified immunity for the city police officer who released the detainee, where the law was clearly established that the officer could not release the detainee
from custody in a manner that increased her risk of harm. (Chicago Police Department, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
FEMALES
SEXUAL ASSAULT

Parrish v. Ball, 594 F.3d 993 (8th Cir. 2010). A female detainee filed a § 1983 suit against a sheriff and a
deputy, individually and in their official capacities, alleging failure to train the deputy, who had sexually
assaulted the detainee. After bench trial the district court granted in part and denied in part the sheriff’s
motion for summary judgment. The sheriff and the detainee cross-appealed. The appeals court affirmed in
part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that the sheriff in his official capacity was not liable for
the deputy's inadequate training, and that the sheriff in his individual capacity was entitled to qualified
immunity from the failure to train claim. The court noted that although the deputy received minimal training at best for his law enforcement position, the inadequacy of his training was not so likely to result in
violation of the constitutional rights of the detainee, so that the county could reasonably be said to have
been deliberately indifferent to the need for training, especially when the county had no notice at all that a
sexual assault was likely. According to the court, there was no patently obvious need to train the deputy not
to sexually assault women, and the sexual assault was a consequence too remote to conclude that failure to
train the deputy caused him to sexually assault the detainee. (Hot Spring County Sheriff's Department and
Jail, Arkansas)

U.S. Appeals Court
ALIEN
USE OF FORCE

Porro v. Barnes, 624 F.3d 1322 (10th Cir. 2010). An immigration detainee brought a § 1983 excessive force
claim against a jail employee, sheriff, and the sheriff's successor, related to an incident in which a stun gun
was used on the detainee. The district court granted the sheriff's motion for summary judgment and the
successor's motion for summary judgment. The detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court
held that the sheriff who was not present during the incident in which a stun gun was used on the detainee
while he was restrained was not liable under § 1983, where the sheriff did not employ any force on the
detainee, was not present when the force was applied, and did not give any advance approval to the use of
the stun gun on the detainee. The court found that the county jail's policy of training jailers to use stun guns
only if and when an inmate should become violent, combative, and pose a direct threat to the security of
staff did not exhibit deliberate indifference to the immigration detainee's due process rights against the use
of excessive force, as required for § 1983 liability. (Jefferson County Jail, Oklahoma)

U.S. Appeals Court
RELEASE

Portis v. City of Chicago, Ill., 613 F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 2010). Arrestees brought a class action against a city,
alleging that the city had a practice of unconstitutionally delaying the release of persons arrested for nonjailable ordinance violations that were punishable by a fine only. The arrestees alleged that release was
delayed for more than two hours after all the administrative steps necessary to determine their eligibility for
release was completed. The district court granted the arrestees' motion for summary judgment and the city
appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The appeals court held that the district court, in finding the city's delay in releasing arrestees for non-jailable offenses unreasonable, erred in prescribing a twohour limit between the city's completion of all the administrative steps necessary to identify the arrestees
correctly and to determine their eligibility for release. Instead, according to the court, the arrestees bore the
burden of proof and persuasion on the contention that any particular detention was excessive, and the court
was required to examine not only the length of a given detention but also the reasons why the release was
deferred. (City of Chicago, Illinois)

32.198

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
USE OF FORCE
FEMALES
MEDICAL CARE

Pourmoghani-Esfahani v. Gee, 625 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2010). A female pretrial detainee brought a § 1983
action against a deputy sheriff, alleging excessive force and deliberate indifference to her serious medical
needs. The district court denied the deputy's motion for summary judgment and the deputy appealed. The
appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that the deputy sheriff was
not qualifiedly immune from the pretrial detainee's § 1983 excessive force claim, since the deputy's alleged
actions, including slamming the detainee's head to the floor seven to eight times while she was restrained, if
proven, were obviously beyond what the Constitution would allow under the circumstances.
The court held the deputy sheriff's alleged actions or inactions following her altercation with the pretrial
detainee, if proven, did not constitute deliberate indifference to the detainee's serious medical needs, where:
the detainee alleged that the deputy dispatched her to her cell directly after the altercation; the nurse saw
her within approximately two minutes of her arrival in the cell; the nurse informed the deputy that the detainee had a possible nose injury but that her nose was not broken; the nurse and an officer then attended to
the detainee within approximately five minutes of the detainee's cellmate's first signals for help; and, the
detainee then received continuous medical care until she was taken to hospital. The court noted that no
preexisting law clearly established that an approximately two-to-five-minute delay of medical care, either
while the detainee moved from a waiting room to her cell following an altercation or while her cellmate
waited for the guard to respond to her signaling, was a constitutional violation. The appeals court accepted
the depiction of events from recordings from closed-circuit video cameras placed throughout jail, rather
than crediting the detainee's account of the altercation, where the video obviously contradicted the detainee's version of the facts. But the court noted that video failed to convey spoken words or tone and sometimes failed to provide unobstructed views of the events, and the court credited the detainee's version where
no obviously contradictory video evidence was available. (Hillsborough County Jail, Florida)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
DISCIPLINE
DUE PROCESS
RECREATION
SAFETY
SANITATION

Robinson v. Danberg, 729 F.Supp.2d 666 (D.Del. 2010). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against 47
defendants, including various prison officials, alleging various claims arising from acts occurring while he
was a pretrial detainee and sentenced inmate. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted
the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that allegations that a sergeant and a corporal sergeant
“set up” the pretrial detainee in connection with a hearing on a razor incident, and that the detainee was told
during a disciplinary hearing that the sergeant and corporal sergeant were going to make the detainee's life
miserable, were sufficient for the detainee to state a due process claim. The court also held that a retaliation
claim was stated by allegations that the state prisoner received false charges, write-ups and accusations
from prison officials, was placed in “the hole” or in isolation on numerous occasions, received numerous
threats, was denied food and had foreign objects placed in his food. The inmate alleged that these actions
were all in retaliation for exercising his right to file grievances, his statements about suing people, and
making those on the outside aware of the prison conditions. The court held that these allegations, when
construed liberally, set forth a chronology of events from which retaliation could be inferred.
According to the court, allegations that the pretrial detainee was denied dinner on several occasions, the
toilet in his cell flooded and he was left in his cell for over seven hours, all of the detainee's uneaten food
was shaken on the cell floor while prison staff was collecting food trays, the detainee was placed in a cell
with blood everywhere and nothing to be protected from exposure, he was intentionally awoken from sleep,
was denied recreation, and was not given supplies to clean urine thrown under his cell door, were sufficient
for the detainee to state a claim that his conditions of confinement were in violation of the due process
clause of Fourteenth Amendment. (James T. Vaughn Correctional Center, Smyrna, Delaware)

U.S. District Court
BAIL
LENGTH
RELEASE

Schneyder v. Smith, 709 F.Supp.2d 368 (E.D.Pa. 2010). A detainee who was being held as a material witness whose testimony was vital to a homicide prosecution brought a civil rights action against the prosecutor who had secured the material witness warrant for her arrest, alleging the prosecutor failed to notify the
judge that the case had been continued for nearly four months. The detainee sought her release. The district
court granted the prosecutor’s motion to dismiss in part and the detainee appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. On remand, the district court denied the prosecutor’s motion for summary judgment.
The court held that the detainee had a clearly established constitutional right to be free from detention
without probable cause and that a triable issue existed regarding whether a reasonable prosecutor would
have been aware of her duty to inform the judge of the status of any detained material witness. The detainee
had sought bail, but at the bail hearing, the judge articulated his dislike for “setting bail on people who are
not accused of a crime.” In open court, he told the plaintiff, “[i]f the case breaks down, let me know early
and I'll let you out.” (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT

Schoelch v. Mitchell, 625 F.3d 1041 (8th Cir, 2010). A pretrial detainee who was assaulted two times by a
fellow inmate in a county jail brought a civil rights action against a jail guard, and against various supervisory jail officials and county officials. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the detainee did not establish a claim
against the guard for deprivation of his due process rights, arising from the first assault, and the guard was
not deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm to the detainee. The court noted that even
assuming that the county jail guard was deliberately indifferent to the pretrial detainee's risk of substantial
harm from being assaulted by a fellow inmate by opening the door to the detainee's cell and allowing the
other inmate to enter, there was no evidence that the detainee suffered an objectively serious injury as the
result of the assault by the fellow inmate, as required to establish a claim against the guard for deprivation
of the detainee's due process rights. According to the court, although the fellow inmate had a history of
fighting with the detainee and others, the fellow inmate's prior conduct did not put the guard on notice of a
substantial risk that he would violently attack the detainee, as it was a surprise attack and the guard was
unaware that the inmate had engaged in any prior violent attacks. (St. Louis County Justice Center, Missouri)

32.199

U.S. District Court
CLOTHING
DUE PROCESS
FAILURE TO PROTECT
MENTAL HEALTH
PROTECTIVE CUSTODY
SUICIDE
SUPERVISION

Silvera v. Connecticut Dept. of Corrections, 726 F.Supp.2d 183 (D.Conn. 2010). The representative of a
pretrial detainee's estate filed a § 1983 action alleging that state prison officials' decision to house the detainee with a convicted inmate and their failure to provide adequate mental health care caused the detainee's
suicide death. The officials moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in
part. The court held that allegations that prison medical staff ignored abundant evidence demonstrating that
the pretrial detainee was an acute suicide risk were sufficient to state a claim of deliberate indifference to
his serious medical needs, in violation of the Due Process Clause. The court noted that evidence included a
judge's instructions to keep him on suicide watch, the detainee's prior medical records, contemporaneous
complaints and behavior, and examinations by medical staff, all of whom concluded that the detainee suffered from severe mental health issues. Nonetheless, officials placed him in a cell by himself, rather than in
specialized housing, with access to materials with which he could hang himself, failed to check on him
regularly, and ignored signs that his mental condition had deteriorated. The court found that a state prison
supervisor was not liable under § 1983 for the pretrial detainee's suicide death, even if the supervisor had
some training with regards to caring for mentally ill detainees, and his subordinates failed to properly oversee the detainee's activities. The court noted that the detainee was placed in the general prison population
based on a mental health professional's recommendation, the supervisor was not aware that the detainee
posed an excessive risk of suicide, and subordinates were given proper orders to keep the detainee under
constant surveillance and interact with him at frequent, irregular intervals. The court described the change
in the detainee’s conditions of confinement prior to his suicide. “Inmates housed in the Charlie Unit—
apparently unlike those in the specialized housing unit where Mr. Lyle was held from May 11 until May
15—have the ability to turn the cell's lights on and off at will. Additionally, the Charlie Unit has bunk-style
beds, which are outfitted with standard-issue sheets and pillow case—both of which would play a role in
Mr. Lyle's suicide. Once transferred to the Charlie Unit, Mr. Lyle was given standard DOC clothing,
whereas previously he had been given only a ‘suicide gown.’ ” According to the court, the pretrial detainee's right to due process was not violated merely because he was forced to share a cell with a convicted
prisoner, absent an allegation that the detainee suffered an injury from being housed with a convicted inmate, or that placement with the convicted inmate was intended to punish the detainee. (Garner Correctional Institute, Connecticut)

U.S. Appeals Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
MENTAL HEALTH
SUICIDE

Simmons v. Navajo County, Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2010). Parents of a pretrial detainee who committed suicide while in custody brought a state-court action against various jail personnel, their supervisors,
and their county employer, asserting claims under state tort law, § 1983, and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the parents
appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court held that there was
no evidence that a prison nurse knew the pretrial detainee who subsequently committed suicide was in
substantial danger of killing himself, as required to demonstrate the prison nurse was deliberately indifferent to such risk in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. According to the court, although the nurse was
aware that the detainee had previously attempted to take his own life, suffered from depression, and was at
some risk of making another attempt, at the time detainee killed himself, over a month had elapsed since his
suicide attempt, during which time the detainee received counseling, took antidepressants, and by all accounts, was doing better. The court found that prison nurses were not deliberately indifferent, under the
Fourteenth Amendment, to the detainee who committed suicide, because they failed to ensure that the detainee had daily evaluations pursuant to the suicide prevention policy, absent evidence that they knew detainee was in a suicidal crisis. According to the court, the prison nurses' failure to retrieve the used gauze
the pretrial detainee used to hang himself did not constitute deliberate indifference in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, absent evidence that the prison nurses were aware the pretrial detainee had accumulated the gauze. The court found that the teenage pretrial detainee waved the prison nurse away on the morning of the day he committed suicide, when the nurse tried to speak with him, because he was absorbed in
watching television, did not show that the prison nurse was subjectively aware of the detainee's risk of
suicide, so as to support a deliberate indifference claim against the prison nurse under the Fourteenth
Amendment. (Navajo County Jail, Arizona)

U.S. Appeals Court
FEMALES
MEDICAL CARE
SUPERVISION

Smith v. County of Lenawee, 600 F.3d 686 (6th Cir. 2010). A female detainee's estate brought an action
against a county, sheriff, on-call physician, police officers, and parole agent, under § 1983 and state law,
arising out of the detainee's death while in the county's custody. The district court denied the parole agent's
motion for summary judgment on a gross negligence claim. The agent filed interlocutory appeal. The appeals court reversed. The court held that the parole agent's failure to intercede on behalf of the detainee in
county custody, upon arriving at the jail to serve the detainee a notice of parole violation charges and determining that the detainee was unable to be transported or served, was not the “proximate cause” of the
detainee's death, so as to entitle the agent to governmental immunity from gross negligence liability under
Michigan law. The court noted that the detainee was in the custody of county jail officials in the hours
leading up to her death, the parole agent worked for the state Department of Corrections, not the county, the
detainee had been experiencing delirium tremens (DT) symptoms for close to 48 hours prior to arrival at
the jail, a physician had been notified of the detainee's condition and told jail officials to monitor the detainee, the agent was present at the jail for a matter of minutes only, and county jail officials failed to check
the detainee until 40 minutes after the agent left the jail. (Lenawee County Sheriff’s Department, and Michigan Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
INTAKE SCREENING
SUICIDE
SUPERVISION

Teague v. St. Charles County, 708 F.Supp.2d 935 (E.D.Mo. 2010). The mother of a detainee who committed suicide in a cell in county detention center brought an action against the county and corrections officials, asserting claims for wrongful death under § 1983 and under the Missouri Wrongful Death Statute.
The county and the commanding officer moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court
granted in the motion, in part. The court held that the mother failed to allege that the detention center's

32.200

commanding officer personally participated. The court found that the mother's allegations that her son was
demonstrating that he was under the influence of narcotics at the time of his detention, that her son had
expressed suicidal tendencies, and that jail employees heard or were told of choking sounds coming from
her son's cell but took no action, were sufficient to state a Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference
claim under § 1983. The court held that the mother's allegation that the county unconstitutionally failed to
train and supervise its employees with respect to custody of persons with symptoms of narcotics withdrawal and suicidal tendencies was sufficient to state a failure to train claim against the county, under § 1983,
arising out of the death of her son who committed suicide while housed as a pretrial detainee. The detainee
had used a bed sheet to hang himself and the mother alleged that the county failed to check him every 20
minutes, as required by jail policy. (St. Charles County Detention Center, Missouri)
U.S. District Court
USE OF FORCE

Vanderburg v. Harrison County, Miss. ex rel. Bd. of Supervisors, 716 F.Supp.2d 482 (S.D.Miss. 2010). A
pretrial detainee brought an action against a county, officials and officers, alleging civil rights violations
under § 1983 and related statutes. A correctional officer moved for summary judgment and for dismissal.
The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment
was precluded by genuine issues of material fact, regarding whether the correctional officer acted with
malice in allegedly injuring the pretrial detainee and whether the force used by the correctional officer was
objectively reasonable. (Harrison County Adult Detention Center, Mississippi)

U.S. District Court
SPEEDY TRIAL
CONDITIONS

Varricchio v. County of Nassau, 702 F.Supp.2d 40 (E.D.N.Y. 2010). A detainee brought a § 1983 action
against a county and officials, alleging civil rights violations. The defendants moved for dismissal. The
district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the detainee adequately
alleged that he was denied his right to a speedy trial and that he was presumptively prejudiced by the delay,
as required to state a § 1983 claim for a Sixth Amendment violation. The detainee alleged he was held for
two years in prison prior to receiving trial for the charge of violating a protective order, and that he was
subsequently found not guilty. The court held that the detainee adequately alleged that his conditions of
confinement constituted cruel and unusual punishment, as required to state an Eighth Amendment claim.
The detainee alleged that he received tainted food that contained bodily waste, soap, metal pins, and staples, and that, when he went on a hunger strike to protest his legal situation, deputy sheriffs were taking
bets on when he would start eating again. (Nassau County Sheriff's Department, New York)

U.S. District Court
FALSE IMPRISONMENT
INITIAL APPEARANCE
LENGTH
RELEASE

Waker v. Brown, 754 F.Supp.2d 62 (D.D.C. 2010). An arrestee, proceeding pro se, brought a § 1983 action
against various defendants, including the District of Columbia mayor and police chief. The defendants filed
motions to dismiss and the arrestee filed a motion to compel the identities of police and Department of
Corrections (DOC) officers. The district court granted the defendants’ motions in part and denied in part,
and denied the plaintiff's motion. The court held that police officers did not violate the arrestee's due process rights in arresting him and detaining him for several days, where the arrest was based upon a fugitive
warrant from another county that was not invalidated or based upon mistaken identity, and the arrestee
appeared before a court and was released on his own recognizance. The arrestee had been held for six days
in jail prior to his release. (District of Columbia Jail)

U.S. District Court
ADA-Americans with
Disabilities Act
DUE PROCESS
JUVENILES
SUICIDE

Wells v. Bureau County, 723 F.Supp.2d 1061 (C.D.Ill. 2010). The estate of a 17-year-old pretrial detainee
who committed suicide while in custody at a county jail brought an action against the county, county sheriff, and corrections officers, alleging claims pursuant to § 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA), and the Rehabilitation Act. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the fact that the pretrial detainee, who committed suicide while in custody at a county jail, did not need a mental health professional when he was booked
at the jail after being arrested on charges of illegal consumption of alcohol by a minor and possession of
drug paraphernalia, was not dispositive of whether the detainee presented a serious need when he was
booked at the jail approximately two weeks later after being arrested on charges of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. The court held that information received by booking officers after pretrial detainee's
suicide, including information that the detainee had been kicked out of his father's house, that the detainee
was living in a tent, that the detainee and his girlfriend had a suicide pact, and that the detainee had commented to other inmates that if he was going to prison he would “shoot himself,” was irrelevant to establishing what was in the officers' minds at time they were alleged to have been deliberately indifferent to the
risk that the detainee would commit suicide. According to the court, the corrections officers lacked actual
knowledge of a significant likelihood that the detainee would imminently seek to take his own life, or even
of facts that would promote the inference of a subjective awareness of such a substantial risk, and thus the
officers did not act with deliberate indifference to that risk in violation of due process, despite any alleged
negligence in assessing and observing the detainee prior to his suicide.
The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
the county sheriff's policy that correctional officers not personally observe prisoners during the overnight
shift was constitutionally inadequate. From 10 PM to 6:30 AM, detainees are locked in their cells. During
the overnight period from 11 PM on June 8, 2007, to 5 AM on June 9, 2007, Officer Keefer did eleven cell
checks on Cellblock 2. While standing in the guard walkway, officers are able to look into two of the four
cells and observe detainees in those cells, but officers are unable to see the detainees in the other two cells
in the cellblock. During her checks, Officer Keefer personally observed the detainees in two of the cells in
Cellblock 2 because she could see them from the guard walkway, but did not observe Wells in his cell because she was unable to see into his cell from the guard walkway. At 6:45 AM, when another officer let the
detainees in Cellblock 2 out of their cells for breakfast, he discovered Wells hanging in his cell. (Bureau
County Jail, Illinois)

32.201

2011
U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
MEDICATION

Alexander v. City of Muscle Shoals, Ala., 766 F.Supp.2d 1214 (N.D.Ala. 2011). A pretrial detainee sued a
city, city police officers, jailers, a mayor, and city council members, asserting § 1983 claims alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs and his health and safety. The court found that qualified
immunity applied to bar the § 1983 liability of jailers for deliberate indifference to the serious medical
needs of the pretrial detainee, because the detainee failed to argue against the qualified immunity defense.
According to the court, once a defendant raises a defense of qualified immunity, the plaintiff bears the
burden of establishing both that the defendant committed the constitutional violation and that the law governing the circumstances was already clearly established at the time of the violation, and the detainee failed
to adequately respond to the qualified immunity defense. The court noted that the jailers did not contact
medical professionals at the detainee's request for four days at most, and that the detainee, who complained
that he was in pain, at that point had been without prescription pain medication to which he was addicted
for at least three days. The court also noted that the detainee had already faked a suicide attempt to garner
jailers' attention and had also been both combative and difficult. (City of Muscle Shoals Mun. Jail, Ala.)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Annoreno v. Sheriff of Kankakee County, 823 F.Supp.2d 860 (C.D.Ill. 2011). A federal pretrial detainee
brought a § 1983 action against a county sheriff, correctional officers, and others, alleging that the officers
assaulted him while in their custody. The defendants moved for summary judgment and the district court
granted the motion. The court held that the detainee failed to exhaust administrative remedies under the
Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) prior to filing suit. According to the court, the detainee's submission
of a “sick call slip,” rather than an “inmate grievance form,” regarding an alleged assault committed upon
him by corrections officers, was inadequate to exhaust administrative remedies under PLRA, and thus the
district court lacked jurisdiction over the detainee's § 1983 action. The court noted that sick call slips were
submitted directly to medical department and not forwarded to administrative staff who received inmate
grievance forms, the inmate handbook required that complaints be submitted in writing on an inmate grievance form, and the detainee knew that grievance forms were used in the facility and had filed multiple
grievance forms prior to the incident in question. (Jerome Combs Detention Center, Kankakee County,
Illinois)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES
INTAKE SCREENING

Augustin v. Jablonsky, 819 F.Supp.2d 153 (E.D.N.Y. 2011). Arrestees brought a class action against a
county challenging the county correctional center's blanket strip search policy for newly admitted, misdemeanor detainees. After the county admitted liability, the plaintiffs' class action involving more than 17,000
members was certified for the issue of general damages and the district court awarded general damages of
$500 per strip search. The county moved to decertify the class for purposes of determining the issue of
arrestees' special damages. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the resolution of special damages could not proceed on a class-wide basis, since questions of law or fact common to the class no
longer predominated over questions affecting individuals. (Nassau County Correctional Center, New York)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Bame v. Dillard, 637 F.3d 380 (D.C.Cir. 2011). Arrestees, who were arrested while protesting International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank policies in the District of Columbia, brought a Bivens action against
a former United States Marshal, alleging that they had been subjected to unconstitutional strip searches
upon being processed into holding cells at a courthouse. The arrestees moved for summary judgment as to
liability, and the Marshal moved for summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity. The district
court denied those motions. On appeal, the appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that there
was no clearly established constitutional prohibition of strip searching arrestees without individualized,
reasonable suspicion. According to the court, strip searching of all male arrestee demonstrators or protestors engaged in civil disobedience, in a locality that had a persistent problem with contraband being smuggled into a cellblock, prior to their commingled placement in holding cells, without individualized, reasonable suspicion had not been prohibited by the Fourth Amendment at the time of the incident, and therefore
the supervising United States Marshal was entitled to qualified immunity. (United States Marshal for the
Superior Court of the District of Columbia)

U.S. District Court
RELEASE

Barnes v. District of Columbia, 793 F.Supp.2d 260 (D.D.C. 2011). Inmates at local jails brought a putative
class action, under § 1983, against the District of Columbia, alleging that their over-detentions violated
their Fourth, Fifth and Eighth Amendments rights. Following certification of the over-detention class, the
parties moved and cross–moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motions in part and
denied in part. The court held that the District of Columbia's over-detention of jail inmates did not constitute a “seizure,” precluding § 1983 claims alleging Fourth Amendment violations related to over-detentions
stemming from the time it took to process inmates' court–ordered releases. The court noted that the inmates
were already in custody at the time they were ordered released or their sentences expired, such that their
freedom of movement had already been terminated, and there was no evidence that the plaintiffs' overdetentions involved fresh “seizures” warranting a Fourth Amendment analysis. The court found that the
District of Columbia's enforcement of a local ordinance with a “10 p.m. cut-off” rule, under which jail
inmates were kept overnight if their court–ordered releases were not processed prior to 10 p.m., violated the
inmates' substantive due process rights for purposes of a § 1983 action. According to the court, the enforcement of the rule resulted in over-detention of individuals who were entitled to release, such overdetentions were not the result of necessary administrative tasks or other reasonable delays, and the District
could have promoted a claimed interest in inmate welfare while simultaneously respecting the entitlement
of persons with court orders for release to prompt release.
The court held that the District of Columbia violated the inmates' substantive due process rights, for the
purposes of a § 1983 action, by over-detaining inmates and failing to release them by the end of the day on

32.202

which they were entitled to release. According to the court, although processing of releases generally
should have taken between two and two–and–a–half hours to complete, the average over-detention time for
inmates was approximately 36 hours, even though the District was on notice, via another litigation involving over-detention, that prevailing release practices were deeply inadequate and that a fundamental change
was required. The court found that a significant reduction in the number of over-detentions after the District
of Columbia implemented measures to improve the manner in which inmate releases were processed
demonstrated that the District was not deliberately indifferent to inmates' substantive due process rights,
precluding the inmates' § 1983 action against the District. (District of Columbia Department of Corrections)
U.S. District Court
CELL CAPACITY
LAW LIBRARIES
TELEPHONE
PRIVACY

Bradley v. Mason, 833 F.Supp.2d 763 (N.D.Ohio 2011). State inmates filed a § 1983 action asserting multiple causes of action pertaining to their convictions and conditions of confinement. The district court dismissed the case, finding that class certification was not warranted, where the inmates made no attempt to
define the class, many claims were specific to named plaintiffs, and the plaintiffs were proceeding pro se.
The court held that a pretrial detainee had no reasonable expectation of privacy in telephone calls made
from within jail to individuals other than his attorney, and thus jail officials did not violate the detainee's
Fourth Amendment rights by monitoring his calls to his former spouse.
The court found that overcrowded conditions at the county jail, which required two inmates to share a
cell designed for one and required inmates to eat meals in their cells, did not amount to cruel and unusual
punishment, in violation of the pretrial detainee's due process rights and an inmate's Eighth Amendment
rights, absent a showing that conditions of confinement deprived them of the minimal civilized measure of
life's necessities, or subjected them to a health risk. The inmates claimed that one inmate was required to
sleep on a mattress on the floor cell, which allegedly adds clutter to the floor and increases the risk of injury. The inmates alleged that the jail has more inmates than the day rooms can accommodate at meal time,
and inmates are therefore required to eat meals in their cells. The court held that the county inmates lacked
standing to raise a claim that the county jail's lack of a law library violated their due process rights, where
the inmates did not claim that they attempted to exercise the right of self-representation and did not otherwise have access to legal materials. According to the court, the county jail's removal of its law library was
rationally related to its interest in reducing expenses, and thus did not violate the inmates' equal protection
rights. The court noted “…because Plaintiff's claim for law library is not explicitly or implicitly guaranteed
by the Constitution, it is not a fundamental right. Therefore, the prison's policy need only bear a rational
relationship to a legitimate state interest.” (Cuyahoga County Jail, Ohio)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Burgos v. Philadelphia Prison System, 760 F.Supp.2d 502 (E.D.Pa. 2011). A pretrial detainee brought a §
1983 action against a city prison system, health service and officials, alleging wrongful delay in receiving
medical treatment for his broken arm. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of
material fact, regarding whether the prison health service's actions in failing to timely refer the detainee to
an orthopedic surgeon for treatment of a broken arm constituted an official “policy” of deliberate indifference to the detainee's serious medical needs, for the purposes of municipal liability under § 1983, and
whether the prison health administrator significantly delayed the detainee's medical treatment for nonmedical reasons. (Philadelphia Prisons Systems, Prison Health Services, Inc.)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCHES

Byrd v. Maricopa County Sheriff's Dept., 629 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 2011). A male pretrial detainee, proceeding pro se, brought a § 1983 action against a female cadet and a sheriff's department, alleging violations of
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court entered judgment in favor of the defendants. The
ruling was affirmed on appeal. After granting a rehearing en banc, the appeals court reversed and remanded. The appeals court held that the strip search of the male pretrial detainee by a female cadet was unreasonable in violation of the Fourth Amendment, where the cadet touched the detainee's inner and outer
thighs, buttocks and genital area with her latex gloved hand through very thin boxer shorts, the female
cadet moved the detainee’s penis and scrotum in the process of conducting the search, the cadet wore only
jeans and a white t-shirt without any identification other than a name printed on the back of the shirt, ten to
fifteen non-participating officers watched the search, and at least one person videotaped the search. (Maricopa County Sheriff, Arizona)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
CELLS

Byron v. Dart, 825 F.Supp.2d 958 (N.D.Ill. 2011). A pretrial detainee who was stabbed in the head by an
unknown inmate who opened the detainee's cell door from outside without a key brought a § 1983 action
against the county sheriff, jail administrators, and a corrections officer, alleging that the defendants failed to
protect him in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The officials moved to dismiss for failure to state a
claim. The district court denied the motion. The court held that the detainee's allegations in his complaint
stated a “sufficiently serious injury” as required for a Fourteenth Amendment failure to protect claim
against the prison administrators. The court also found that the detainee's allegations in his complaint were
sufficient to state a “deliberate indifference” element of the detainee's Fourteenth Amendment failure to
protect claim against prison administrators. The detainee alleged that the problem of malfunctioning cell
doors was “pervasive,” “well-documented,” and “expressly noted by prison officials in the past,” that work
orders to repair cell doors were never executed, and that he complained about his door, but it was never
repaired. According to the court, the detainee became aware, from his own observations and in speaking
with other detainees, that numerous cells were “in a state of disrepair and/or had malfunctioned,” and that
specifically, the doors of the cells could be “popped” open by detainees from the outside without a key.
(Cook County Jail, Illinois)

32.203

U.S. Appeals Court
SEXUAL ASSAULT
FAILURE TO PROTECT

Cash v. County of Erie, 654 F.3d 324 (2nd Cir. 2011). A pretrial detainee filed a § 1983 action against a
county, sheriff, and deputy sheriff alleging that the deputy sexually assaulted her. After entry of a jury verdict in the detainee's favor, the district court granted the defendants' motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict. The parties filed cross-appeals. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The appeals court
held that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that the sheriff was deliberately indifferent to the risk of sexual misconduct, and the jury's determination that the county was subject to municipal
liability was not irreconcilably inconsistent with its finding that the sheriff was not negligent. According to
the court, trial evidence revealed that the detainee was housed in a female housing unit at the facility, that
the deputy, acting alone, escorted some female detainees to the recreation center but ordered the plaintiff to
remain behind. When the deputy returned, he grabbed the plaintiff, put his hands over her nose and mouth,
forced her into the deputies' bathroom, and raped her. The plaintiff reported the assault the next morning,
prompting an investigation that led to the deputy’s arrest for first-degree rape. (Erie County Holding Center, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE
FAILURE TO PROTECT

Cobige v. City of Chicago, Ill., 651 F.3d 780 (7th Cir. 2011). The estate of a deceased female arrestee
brought a § 1983 action against a city and police officers, alleging failure to provide medical care in violation of the Fourth Amendment and the Illinois wrongful death law. After a jury verdict in favor of the estate, the city and officers filed motions for judgment as a matter of law and/or for a new trial. The district
court denied the motions. The city and officers appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part
and remanded. The appeals court held that evidence presented at trial in the estate's § 1983 action was sufficient to establish causation of the arrestee's death, where evidence from one of the arrestee's cellmates,
two deputy sheriffs and a civilian aide at the lockup, permitted a jury to find that she experienced severe
abdominal pain throughout her confinement. A professor and head of coronary care at university hospitals
testified that the pain led the arrestee to produce more epinephrine, which combined with a pre-existing
heart condition caused her death, and uterine tumors found during a post-mortem examination led to his
conclusion that the arrestee had suffered serious abdominal pain. The court held that the probative value of
evidence of the deceased arrestee's police record, time in prison, and drug addiction outweighed the danger
of unfair prejudice, where the evidence bore directly on the appropriate amount of damages and that a new
trial on the issue of damages was warranted. (Chicago Police Department lockup, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
RELEASE
FAILURE TO PROTECT
INTAKE SCREENING
MEDICAL CARE
SUICIDE

Coscia v. Town of Pembroke, Mass., 659 F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 2011). The estate of a detainee who committed
suicide after being released from custody brought a § 1983 action against police officers, their supervisors,
and a town, alleging that the officers and supervisors were deliberately indifferent to the arrestee's medical
needs and that the town failed to train the officers to prevent detainee suicides. The district court denied the
individual defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings and they appealed. The appeals court reversed.
The appeals court held that the estate failed to state a claim for deliberate indifference to a substantial risk
of serious harm to health under the Fourteenth Amendment. According to the court, the estate failed to
allege facts sufficient to demonstrate a causal relationship between the police officers' failure to furnish
medical care to the detainee during a seven-hour period of custody and the detainee's act of committing
suicide by walking in front of a train 14 hours after his release from custody. The court noted that the detainee had been thinking about suicide at the time he was arrested, the detainee was thinking about suicide
at the time he was released from custody, and when the police released the detainee from custody they
placed him in no worse position than that in which he would have been had they not acted at all. The court
found that in the absence of a risk of harm created or intensified by a state action, there is no due process
liability for harm suffered by a prior detainee after release from custody in circumstances that do not effectively extend any state impediment to exercising self-help or to receiving whatever aid by others may normally be available. The twenty-one-year-old detainee had been involved in a one-car accident, he was arrested about eleven o'clock in the morning and brought to the police station. On the way there he said he
intended to throw himself in front of a train, and he continued to utter suicide threats at the station house
accompanied by self-destructive behavior, to the point of licking an electrical outlet. As a consequence, the
police did not lock him in a cell, but placed him in leg restraints and followed an evaluation protocol that
showed a high suicide risk. He was not examined by a doctor, but was released on his own recognizance
about six o'clock that evening. (Town of Pembroke, Massachusetts)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Craig v. Floyd County, Ga., 643 F.3d 1306 (11th Cir. 2011). A pretrial detainee who was admitted to a
county jail after being cleared for admittance by a medical center to which he was transported following his
arrest, brought a civil rights action against the county based on its nine-day delay in eventually providing
him with surgical treatment for multiple fractures to his head. The district court granted the county's motion
for summary judgment. The detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the
pretrial detainee failed to show that a nine-day delay by medical personnel at the county jail in providing
him with appropriate surgical treatment for multiple fractures to his skull was the result of any unconstitutional custom or policy of allegedly not referring detainees to physicians, of relying on hospital clearance
forms instead of performing their own diagnostic tests on detainees transported to jail from a hospital, or of
using the least costly means to treat detainees. The court noted that the detainee's only proof of any such
policy or custom was that nine medical providers had evaluated him sixteen times at the county jail, before
he was finally transported to a medical center when a tomography scan of his head revealed these fractures.
According to the court, while nine different medical providers were involved in the detainee's treatment
before a tomography was eventually ordered, this was insufficient to show that the county had a policy or
custom of constitutional violations against detainees that was either persistent or so widespread as to have
the force of law, as required to subject the county to liability under § 1983. (Floyd County Jail, Georgia)

32.204

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE
USE OF FORCE

Estate of Amaro v. City of Oakland, 653 F.3d 808 (9th Cir. 2011). An arrestee's mother filed a § 1983 action
against a city and police officers, alleging that arresting officers used excessive force and that prison medical officials were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical condition. The district court denied the
city's motion for summary judgment and the city appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court
held that the city could not assert a limitations defense in the § 1983 excessive force action, where the suspect's mother diligently investigated his arrest and death within the limitations period and believed she had
a claim against the city, but five different lawyers told her that, in light of the suspect's uncorroborated
statements about a police beating and a police sergeant’s misstatements regarding his death, she did not
have sufficient evidence to file a § 1983 claim. The court noted that the city's continued stonewalling in
refusing her requests for police department reports prevented her from appreciating the full nature of her
claim and dissuaded her from filing a § 1983 claim. (Oakland County Jail, California)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
STAFFING

Estate of Gaither ex rel. Gaither v. District of Columbia, 833 F.Supp.2d 110 (D.D.C. 2011). The personal
representative of a detainee's estate brought a § 1983 action against the District of Columbia, department of
corrections officials, and corrections officers, seeking damages in connection with the detainee's fatal stabbing while he was incarcerated pending sentencing for felony distribution of cocaine. The corrections officers moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion, finding that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. According to the court, at the time of the detainee's death it was not clearly
established that corrections officers were acting with deliberate indifference by exposing inmates, including
the detainee, to a substantial threat of inmate-on-inmate attack by understaffing a unit, and thus corrections
officers were entitled to qualified immunity. (District of Columbia, Central Detention Facility)

U.S. District Court
ACCESS TO COURT
ALIEN
MENTAL HEALTH
RA- Rehabilitation Act

Franco-Gonzales v. Holder, 828 F.Supp.2d 1133 (C.D.Cal. 2011). Immigrant detainees brought a putative
class action on behalf of mentally disabled detainees being held in custody without counsel during removal
proceedings, asserting claims under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), Rehabilitation Act, and
Due Process Clause. A detainee who was a native and citizen of Belarus, and who had been deemed mentally incompetent to represent himself in removal proceedings, moved for a preliminary injunction. The
district court granted the motion in part. The court held that: (1) the detainee was entitled to a custody hearing at which the government had to justify his continued detention on the basis that he was a flight risk or
would be a danger to the community; (2) a qualified representative for a mentally incompetent immigrant
detainee may be an attorney, law student or law graduate directly supervised by a retained attorney, or an
accredited representative; (3) the detainee’s father could not serve as a qualified representative for detainee
at a custody hearing; (4) appointment of a qualified representative to represent the detainee at a custody
hearing was a reasonable accommodation under the Rehabilitation Act; (5) the likelihood of irreparable
harm and the balance of hardships favored the detainee; and (6) a mandatory injunction was warranted.
(Sacramento County Jail, California)

U.S. District Court
RELEASE
FALSE IMPRISON
MENT

Harbeck v. Smith, 814 F.Supp.2d 608 (E.D.Va. 2011). A former pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action
against a public defender, clerk of court, and deputy clerk of court, alleging that she was unlawfully imprisoned for 87 days after criminal charges against her were dismissed, in violation of her rights under Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments, and false imprisonment under Virginia law. The defendants moved to dismiss
for failure to state claim. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held
that the detainee failed to state § 1983 and false imprisonment claims against public defender and that the
public defender was entitled to governmental immunity against a legal malpractice claim. The court found
that the detainee's allegations were sufficient to state a § 1983 claim against the clerk and that the clerk was
not entitled to quasi–judicial immunity against the § 1983 claim and was not entitled to sovereign immunity
against the negligence claim. The court also found that the detainee alleged necessary conduct by the clerk
and deputy clerk to state a claim for punitive damages. According to the court, the allegations that the clerk
of court received at least two letters notifying her that the pretrial detainee should be released, and that she
still failed to take action to effectuate that release after criminal charges against the detainee were dismissed, were sufficient to allege the clerk's personal involvement in the detainee's continued detention. The
court noted that the clerk's alleged inaction in procuring the detainee's release after criminal charges were
dismissed was not a choice within the clerk's discretion and was not taken pursuant to the state court's direction. The court also held that the clerk of court failed in her execution of a ministerial duty, precluding
her entitlement to sovereign immunity against the pretrial detainee's negligence claim, where the clerk
received orders for detainee to be released, which the clerk's office was then required to notify the jail of
the detainee's change in status so as to effectuate her release. (Hampton Roads Regional Jail, and Circuit
Court of the City of Hampton, Virginia)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
SUICIDE
SUPERVISION

Hawkins v. County of Lincoln, 785 F.Supp.2d 781 (D.Neb. 2011). The personal representative of a hospital
patient brought a § 1983 action against the hospital, a county, a city, and related defendants for claims arising when the patient was brought to the hospital at the time of his arrest, was released by the hospital to a
county jail, and subsequently hanged himself at the jail. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The
district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was
precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether prison officials were objectively aware that the
prisoner posed a risk of harm to himself that included a risk of suicide. According to the court, although the
prisoner had serious medical needs in connection with his risk of suicide, no prison correctional officers,
jailers, and/or law enforcement officers were deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's needs, even though it
might have been negligent for individual defendants to take the prisoner off a suicide watch without having
him evaluated by a physician or other professional. According to the court, the defendants' conduct was not
more blameworthy than mere negligence. The court also held that summary judgment was precluded by a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the county acted with deliberate indifference by failing to have

32.205

a specific policy for determining when an inmate could be removed from a suicide watch and placed in a
situation that could increase the likelihood of a successful suicide attempt. (Lincoln County Jail, Nebraska)
U.S. Appeals Court
USE OF FORCE

Hicks v. Norwood, 640 F.3d 839 (8th Cir. 2011). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action against a detention
center captain alleging use of excessive force, and against a lieutenant and sergeant for failing to prevent
the use of excessive force. The district court dismissed the action and the arrestee appealed. The appeals
court affirmed. The court held that the detention center captain's decision to use force, and the amount of
force used in subduing the arrestee during the booking process were objectively reasonable under the circumstances, and he thus did not violate the arrestee's Fourth Amendment rights. The court noted that the
arrestee refused to comply with directions, loudly abused correctional officers, and aggressively leapt toward the captain. (Ouachita County Jail, Arkansas)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Hodge v. Murphy, 808 F.Supp.2d 405 (D.R.I. 2011). A pretrial detainee brought a pro se action against a
state prison warden and others, alleging the defendants failed to properly dispense his daily medication for
migraines and pain resulting from a fractured lower back. The district court dismissed the action. The court
held that the allegation that the pretrial detainee suffered undue pain as the result of prison officials' failure
to properly dispense daily medication was insufficient to establish a serious medical need involving a substantial risk of serious harm, as required to state a due process claim against the prison officials under the
Fourteenth Amendment. (Donald W. Wyatt Detention Facility, Central Falls, Rhode Island)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
MEDICAL CARE
SAFETY
DUE PROCESS

Holden v. Hirner, 663 F.3d 336 (8th Cir. 2011). A pretrial detainee filed a § 1983 action against officials of
a county jail for allegedly violating his Fourteenth Amendment rights under the Due Process Clause by
allegedly failing to protect him from an assault by three other inmates, and failing to provide adequate medical treatment for his tooth pain. The district court granted prison officials summary judgment and the detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that there was no evidence that the pretrial
detainee was incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm in the protective custody pod in which the detainee was imprisoned as a sex offender, even though one of the assaulting inmates
was involved in another fight four days before the altercation with the detainee. The court noted that the
pod was designed to provide greater supervision and security for vulnerable inmates who were more likely
to be assaulted, and nothing in the record established that the prior fight involved a sex offender. According
to the court, even if the pretrial detainee faced a substantial risk of serious harm from other inmates in the
protective custody pod, there was no evidence that officials at the county jail were deliberately indifferent
to his safety, where the detainee did not tell officials that he felt threatened by other inmates, and the officials had no knowledge of any specific danger to the detainee in the pod. The court held that the pretrial
detainee's tooth pain did not constitute a serious medical need, as required to support the detainee's Fourteenth Amendment claim of deprivation of his due process rights by officials of the county jail. The court
noted that a nurse employed by the jail evaluated the detainee's teeth and gums on multiple occasions and
never noted bleeding, swelling, infection, or other visible symptoms of tooth pain. The nurse never determined that the detainee's tooth pain required treatment, and the detainee was observed eating without difficulty and later refused to have his tooth extracted. The court found that the detainee's prognosis was not
negatively impacted by any delay in treatment. (Marion County Jail, Missouri)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Johnson v. Government of Dist. of Columbia, 780 F.Supp.2d 62 (D.D.C. 2011). Female arrestees, who were
arrested for non-drug and non-violent offenses, brought an action against the District of Columbia and a
former United States Marshal for the Superior Court, among others, alleging that the defendants' blanket
policy of subjecting them to “drop, squat, and cough” strip searches before presentment to a judicial official
violated their rights to be free from unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment, and their rights to
equal protection under the Fifth Amendment. The marshal moved for summary judgment. The court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the Marshal was entitled to qualified immunity
from the Fourth Amendment claim and that there was no evidence that the Marshal implemented a policy
that directed the blanket practice of strip searching female arrestees, as would support a Fifth Amendment
claim, nor that the Marshal knew of a blanket practice of strip searching female arrestees. The court noted
that the law at the time of the searches did not clearly establish that strip searching female arrestees prior to
presentment to a judicial official violated the Fourth Amendment. (United States Marshal for the Superior
Court of the District of Columbia)

U.S. Appeals Court
CLOTHING-COURT
APPEARANCES
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
RELIGION

Khatib v. County of Orange, 639 F.3d 898 (9th Cir. 2011). A former detainee sued a county for allegedly
violating the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) by requiring her to remove
her headscarf, in public, against her Muslim religious beliefs and practice, while she was held on two occasions in a county courthouse holding facility pending disposition of her probation violation. The district
court granted the county's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and the detainee appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that the holding facility was an “institution” under RLUIPA.
According to the court, the county courthouse holding facility was a “pretrial detention facility,” and thus
was an “institution” under RLUIPA, where the facility's main purpose was to temporarily hold individuals
who were awaiting court proceedings, including individuals awaiting trial. The court noted that although
the facility housed inmates for relatively short periods, it held up to 600 inmates a day, and was described
by the county as a secure detention facility for the confinement of persons making a court appearance. According to the court, the short-term detainee was not required to satisfy PLRA's exhaustion requirements
before suing for the county's alleged violation of RLUIPA in failing to accommodate her religious beliefs.
(Orange County Santa Ana Courthouse, California)

32.206

U.S. District Court
ALIEN
MEDICAL CARE

Newbrough v. Piedmont Regional Jail Authority, 822 F.Supp.2d 558 (E.D.Va. 2011). The administrator of
an immigration detainee's estate brought an action against the federal government, a regional jail authority
and various of its employees, and several agents of the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), alleging § 1983 claims in relation to medical treatment received by detainee while in jail, and a
claim for wrongful death. The defendants moved to dismiss and the plaintiff moved for a stay. The court
held that the stricter deliberate indifference standard, rather than the professional judgment standard, applied to the § 1983 denial–of–medical–care claims brought by the administrator, where immigration detention was more similar to pretrial detention rather than the involuntary commitment of psychiatric patients,
in that immigration detention served to secure the detainee's appearance at future proceedings and to protect
the community, and pre–removal detention was generally limited in duration.
The court held that the allegations of the administrator were sufficient to allege that a prison nurse deliberately denied, delayed, or interfered with the detainee's medical care with knowledge of his serious condition, as required to state a § 1983 denial–of–medical–care claim under Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The administrator alleged that the nurse visited the detainee while he was held in isolation in a
medical segregation unit with an apparent inability to walk or stand, and yet withheld medication because
the detainee was unwilling to stand up and walk to the door to receive that medication. The court noted that
the nurse acknowledged that not giving the detainee his medication could cause severe problems.
The court found that the nurse did not deny, delay, or intentionally interfere with the immigration detainee's medical treatment, where the nurse documented her observations regarding the detainee's acute
back pain, sleeplessness, and unresponsiveness, and then related those observations to superior prison officials, including a prison doctor. According to the court, allegations of the administrator were sufficient to
allege that a prison doctor deliberately denied, delayed, or interfered with the detainee's medical care with
knowledge of his serious condition, where the administrator alleged that the doctor received multiple reports from his subordinates regarding the detainee's back pain, his inability to stand, and elevated vital
signs and yet failed to act or personally assess the detainee's condition, to provide more than perfunctory
treatment, or to follow up on prescribed courses of treatment. The court found that the administrator sufficiently alleged that the regional jail authority and its superintendent failed to adequately train jail staff, as
required to state a § 1983 policy–or–custom claim in relation to the detainee's medical care under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The administrator alleged that prison officers regularly refused to
refer requests for medical attention unless a request was in writing, regardless of the urgency of a detainee's
need, that prison staff either failed to recognize symptoms of grave illness or ignored them, and that, even
in the face of the detainee's potentially fatal infection, staff provided no more than an over–the–counter
pain reliever. The court found that the administrator’s allegations were sufficient to allege that the jail's
superintendent, even if newly hired, was aware of the shortcomings in his facility's medical care, as required to state a § 1983 supervisory liability claim, where the administrator alleged that numerous public
investigations and media coverage reported the poor quality of the jail's health services and the superintendent failed to act to improve those services. (Piedmont Regional Jail Authority, Virginia, and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE
FAILURE TO PROTECT

Ortiz v. City of Chicago, 656 F.3d 523 (7th Cir. 2011). A female arrestee's estate brought a civil rights action against a city and a number of its police officers, alleging claims arising out of the arrestee's denial of
medical care and death during detention. The district court barred the proposed testimony of the estate's
medical expert, and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The estate appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The appeals court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether it was objectively unreasonable for police officers to
take no action to seek medical care for the arrestee, and as to whether the arrestee would not have died or
experienced pain and suffering prior to her death had the police officers taken her to a hospital. The court
held that remand was required for the district court to determine whether the medical expert's testimony
that, assuming the arrestee died of a heroin overdose, she would have suffered less if she had been taken to
the hospital, would help a jury understand whether the police officers' failure to take the arrestee to the
hospital exacerbated her injury. According to the court, the police officers were not entitled to qualified
immunity where it was clearly established at the time of arrestee's death that the Fourth Amendment protected a person's rights until she had had a probable cause hearing, and that providing no medical care in the
face of a serious health risk was deliberate indifference. (Chicago Police Dept. 23rd Dist. Lockup, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Palmer v. Board of Com'rs for Payne County Oklahoma, 765 F.Supp.2d 1289 (W.D.Okla. 2011). A former
pretrial detainee in a county detention center filed a § 1983 action against a sheriff, deputy sheriff, and
county jail administrator for alleged deliberate indifference to the detainee's serious medical needs in violation of the Due Process Clause. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted
the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that a deputy sheriff was not deliberately indifferent to
the pretrial detainee's serious medical needs, in violation of the Due Process Clause, due to a bacterial infection that required surgical excision of three gangrenous areas of the detainee's body, but rather, he took
active and reasonable steps to abate any harm to the detainee. According to the court, there was no evidence
of inadequate training of jailers as to the passing on of doctor's instructions for inmates, as required to establish the deliberate indifference of the county sheriff to the serious medical needs of the pretrial detainee
who contracted a bacterial infection, in violation of due process,. (Payne County Jail, Oklahoma)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
GRIEVANCE
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
SEXUAL ASSAULT

Pauls v. Green, 816 F.Supp.2d 961 (D.Idaho 2011). A female pretrial detainee brought an action against a
county, county officials, and a jail guard, alleging that she was coerced into having inappropriate sexual
contact with the guard. The defendants moved to dismiss and for summary judgment, and the plaintiff
moved to compel discovery and for sanctions. The district court granted the motions, in part. The court held
that the detainee was not required to file grievances after being transferred to a state prison before filing her
§ 1983 action, in order to satisfy the administrative exhaustion requirement under the Prison Litigation

32.207

Reform Act (PLRA). The court noted that the county jail grievance procedures were not available to detainees after they transferred, and the county did not offer any assistance to the detainee after learning of
the alleged assaults. The court found that neither the county nor the county sheriff was deliberately indifferent in failing to train or supervise county jail guards to not sexually assault jail detainees, and thus, the
female detainee could not demonstrate that the county or sheriff was liable under § 1983. According to the
court, the guards did not need specific training to know that they should refrain from sexually assaulting
detainees, and there was no showing that the general training program for guards was deficient or that there
was a pattern of prior abuses at county jail. The court held that the summary judgment affidavit of the pretrial detainee's expert, containing the opinion that county officials exhibited deliberate indifference to the
rights and safety of jail detainees in training or supervising jail staff, and that sexual improprieties on the
part of staff were easily accomplished and rarely punished, was insufficient to avoid summary judgment,
where the affidavit was conclusory, and without factual predicate. The court found that the detainee was
entitled to the sanction of an adverse jury instruction against the county for the destruction of recordings of
interviews conducted by police during the investigation of the county jail guard's contact with the detainee.
(Adams County Jail, Idaho)
U.S. District Court
HANDICAP
ADA-Americans with
Disabilities Act
CONDITIONS
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
PROGRAMS

Pierce v. County of Orange, 761 F.Supp.2d 915 (C.D.Cal. 2011). Pretrial detainees in a county's jail facilities brought a § 1983 class action suit against the county and its sheriff, seeking relief for violations of their
constitutional and statutory rights. After consolidating the case with a prior case challenging jail conditions,
the district court rejected the detainees' claims, and the detainees appealed. The appeals court affirmed in
part, reversed in part, and remanded. On remand, the court held that: (1) a sub-class was properly defined as
mobility-impaired and dexterity-impaired pretrial detainees; (2) the detainees were subject to physical barriers to accessibility of jail facilities, in violation of ADA; (3) certain categories of programs, services, and
activities were not similarly available to the detainees, in violation of ADA; (4) the county failed to establish that accommodations requested by the detainees would require fundamental alteration or produce an
undue burden, or that current conditions were reasonably related to the facilities' legitimate interests; (5) the
county's revised grievance procedure satisfied ADA; and (6) the least intrusive means to compel the county
to remedy physical barriers and disparate provision of programs, services, and activities to detainees was to
allow the county to draft a proposed plan. The court held that the widespread injunctive relief ordered by
the district court, which addressed the county's failure to accommodate detainees with respect to toilets and
showers, as well as programs, activities, and services, was narrowly drawn, extended no further than necessary to correct violations of the detainees' federal rights, and was the least intrusive means necessary to
correct violation of those federal rights, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). (Orange
County Jail System, California, including the Central Jail Complex, the Intake Release Center, the Men's
Central Jail, the Women's Central Jail and the James A. Facility Musick and the Theo Lacy Facility)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
USE OF FORCE
JUVENILES

Plair v. City of New York, 789 F.Supp.2d 459 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). A pre-trial detainee at an adolescent jail
brought an action against a city, city officials, and corrections officers, asserting claims under § 1983 and
state law arising from an incident in which an officer allegedly punched him in the face. The defendants
moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the
detainee failed to state excessive force claims against supervisory officials and a § 1983 claim against the
city. The court found that correctional officers and supervisors did not have immunity under New York law
from state law claims and the city did not have immunity under New York law from state law claims
brought on the respondeat superior basis. The court held that the determination of whether the pretrial detainee's claim against the city for its negligent hiring, training, and retention of officers and supervisors
allegedly involved in the detainee's beating could not be resolved at the motion to dismiss phase because of
factual issues as to whether the actions of these officers and supervisors were undertaken in the scope of
their employment. (Robert N. Davoren Center, Rikers Island, New York City)

U.S. District Court
FALSE
IMPRISONMENT

Reed v. Baca, 800 F.Supp.2d 1102 (C.D.Cal. 2011). A detainee brought a § 1983 action against a sheriff,
county, and the sheriff's department, alleging wrongful arrest and detention. The defendants moved for
summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the county and the sheriff's
department did not infringe on the pretrial detainee's Fourteenth Amendment rights by detaining him pursuant to a valid warrant but in the face of repeated protests of innocence, despite the detainee's argument
that the county and the department knew or should have known that he was entitled to release prior to dismissal of the case against him. According to the court, even assuming a violation, the detainee failed to
present evidence to show that his continued detention, beyond the point at which the county and the department allegedly knew or should have known he was entitled to release, was pursuant to a policy or custom evincing deliberate indifference to his constitutional rights, as would support liability. The court found
that the county sheriff was not liable in his individual capacity under § 1983 for the pretrial detainee's overdetention, absent evidence that the sheriff had any direct contact with the detainee or actual knowledge of
claimed constitutional violations, or condoned, ratified, or encouraged the alleged constitutional violations
in any way. (Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, California)

U.S. District Court
ALIEN
BAIL
RELEASE

Rivas v. Martin, 781 F.Supp.2d 775 (N.D.Ind. 2011). A female detainee brought a § 1983 action against a
sheriff and jail officials, alleging they violated her right to due process by detaining her beyond their authority to do so. The district court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court held that the detainee stated a § 1983 claim for violation of her right to due process by alleging that the sheriff and jail officials held her, after she had posted bond, without a probable cause determination for five days beyond the
48 hour limit in her immigration detainer. The court found that the defendants were not entitled to qualified
immunity because the defendants allegedly violated the detainee's clearly established constitutional rights.
(LaGrange County Jail, Indiana)

32.208

U.S. Appeals Court
RELEASE
CIVIL COMMITMENT

Schneyder v. Smith, 653 F.3d 313 (3rd Cir. 2011). A detainee who was being held as a material witness in a
homicide prosecution brought a civil rights action against the prosecutor who secured her arrest warrant,
alleging the prosecutor failed to have her released from custody knowing that her testimony was not required for several months. The district court entered an order granting the prosecutor's motion to dismiss
and the detainee appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. On remand, the district court entered
an order denying the prosecutor's motion for summary judgment, and the prosecutor appealed. The appeals
court affirmed. The appeals court held that the prosecutor's conduct was sufficient to establish prima facie
violation of the detainee's Fourth Amendment rights. According to the court, the detainee's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures was clearly established and the prosecutor was not entitled
to prosecutorial immunity. (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT

Shields v. Dart, 664 F.3d 178 (7th Cir. 2011). A pretrial detainee brought a pro se § 1983 action against
prison officials who allegedly were deliberately indifferent in failing to protect him from an attack by other
inmates at a county jail. The prison officials moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the
motion and the detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the officials were unaware of a substantial risk of serious injury to the pretrial detainee, and thus the officials were not deliberately indifferent in failing to protect the detainee from the attack. According to the court, a corrections officer
on duty during the two inmates' attack did not act with deliberate indifference by failing to enter a day room
where the attack was occurring. The officer verbally commanded the inmates to stop the attack. The officer
was alone, intervened by promptly calling for back-up and monitoring the fight from a secure area until
other officers arrived, and was not required to put herself in significant jeopardy by attempting to break up
fight herself. (Cook County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
SANITATION

Solomon v. Nassau County, 759 F.Supp.2d 251 (E.D.N.Y. 2011). A pretrial detainee brought an action
against a county, jail, sheriff, and undersheriff, alleging that his civil rights were violated when he was
bitten by a rodent in his jail cell. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted
the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that because the sheriff and undersheriff were not
“personally involved” in any alleged failure to maintain a safe prison environment, they were not subject to
§ 1983 liability for the injury to the pretrial detainee who was bitten by a rodent in his jail cell. The court
held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the pretrial
detainee was exposed to a substantial risk of contracting rabies or another dangerous disease from a rodent
bite, and whether the county was aware of the substantial risk of serious harm. According to the court,
although protection of inmates from harmful chemicals and the need to prevent inmates from using poisons,
glue traps, or door sweeps as weapons were legitimate penological interests that supported the reasonableness of the jail's pest control plan, a genuine issue of fact existed as to whether the county was adequately
complying with the plan, and whether the lack of compliance could have resulted in the alleged substantial
risk of harm. (Nassau County Correctional Center, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT

Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 2011). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action for damages resulting from
a violent attack he allegedly suffered while he was an inmate in a county jail. The district court dismissed
the prisoner's supervisory liability claim for deliberate indifference against the sheriff in his individual
capacity, and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that the inmate sufficiently alleged a supervisory liability claim of deliberate indifference against the sheriff in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments based on allegations that the sheriff failed to act to protect
inmates under his care despite his knowledge that they were in danger because of the culpable acts of his
subordinates and despite his ability to take actions that would have protected them. The court noted that the
complaint specifically alleged numerous incidents in which inmates in county jails had been killed or injured because of the culpable actions of the subordinates of the sheriff, that the sheriff was given notice of
all of those incidents, was given notice, in several reports, of systematic problems in the county jails under
his supervision that had resulted in deaths and injuries, and that the sheriff did not take action to protect
inmates under his care despite the dangers created by the actions of his subordinates of which he had been
made aware. (Los Angeles County Jails, California)

U.S. District Court
LAW LIBRARY
ACCESS TO COURT
CRIPA- Civil Rights of
Institutionalized Persons
Act
DUE PROCESS
USE OF FORCE

Thorpe v. Little, 804 F.Supp.2d 174 (D.Del. 2011). A pretrial detainee, proceeding in forma pauperis,
brought a § 1983 action against a prison, prison officials, and prison medical personnel, alleging violations
of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Civil Rights Act, Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons
Act (CRIPA), and supplemental state law claims. The detainee moved to show cause and for transfer to a
different institution. The district court denied the motions and dismissed the claims in part. The court held
that the prison did not violate the pretrial detainee's First Amendment right of access to courts by only allowing the detainee to receive legal services from the prison law library through written requests, where the
detainee was provided access to courts if he merely submitted a written request, and the detainee was represented by a public defender. The court held that the detainee’s complaint, alleging that a corrections officer
sprayed him in the face with pepper spray when he did not comply with the officer's order, stated a claim
for excessive force, as would violate the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. The detainee was
maced when he would not allow correctional officers to leave his food tray on the cell window flap. The
macing caused vision loss and facial irritation. Following the incident, the detainee was taken to isolation
where he remained for the next fifteen days. He received a disciplinary write-up for this incident and was
found guilty. (James T. Vaughn Correctional Center, Smyrna, Delaware)

U.S. Appeals Court
SPEEDY TRIAL

U.S. v. Ferreira, 665 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 2011). After denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment based on
violation of his Sixth Amendment speedy trial right, a defendant pled guilty in district court to conspiracy
to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine. The defendant appealed. The appeals court reversed

32.209

and remanded. The court held that a thirty-five month delay between an indictment charging conspiracy to
distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine and the defendant's guilty plea was sufficient to trigger
an analysis of the defendant's claim that his Sixth Amendment speedy trial rights were violated. The court
found that the thirty-five month delay was caused solely by the government's gross negligence, for the
purposes of determining whether such a delay violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to speedy
trial. The defendant was serving a term of imprisonment of 110 months following his guilty plea. (U.S.
Marshals Service, Bartow County, Cobb County, Georgia)
U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
MEDICAL CARE

Wereb v. Maui County, 830 F.Supp.2d 1026 (D.Hawai‘i 2011). The parents of a diabetic pretrial detainee
who died in custody brought an action against a county and county police department employees, alleging
under § 1983 that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to the detainee's medical needs, and asserting
a claim for wrongful death under state law. The district granted summary judgment, in part, in favor of the
defendants. The county moved for reconsideration. The district court granted the motion in part and denied
in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by fact issues on the claim that the county
failed to train jail employees to monitor detainees' serious medical needs. The court found that the county
and its police department were not liable for their alleged failure to train employees on the risks and symptoms of alcohol withdrawal. According to the court, assuming that the detainee died from alcohol withdrawal, no other prisoner in the county jail had suffered injury from alcohol withdrawal for more than 17
years before the detainee's death, so that such a failure to train did not constitute deliberate indifference.
(Lahaina, Maui, Police Station, Hawai’i)
2012

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT

Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352 (3rd Cir. 2012). A federal inmate brought a civil rights action against prison
officials and employees, alleging, among other things, that the defendants failed to protect him from inmate
violence, and that the defendants placed him in a special housing unit (SHU) in retaliation for exercising his
First Amendment rights. The inmate alleged that prison investigators used him to intercept notes being
passed among other inmates, and then failed to protect him after they fouled up the operation and the inmates discovered his involvement. When the target inmates threatened to retaliate, the inmate contended he
repeatedly begged the officials responsible for help, but no one took any preventive measures. Later, one of
the inmates against whom inmate had cooperated, along with two others, beat him while they were together
in a locked recreation pen. A few months later, an inmate wielding a razor-blade type weapon also attacked
the inmate in the recreation pen. The district court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss. The defendants
appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The appeals court held that:
(1) the officials' decision to keep the inmate, who had acted as an informant, in SHU after his cooperation
with the officials was not unreasonable; (2) the officials were deliberately indifferent to the inmate's safety
when they placed him in a recreation yard with prisoners who were aware of his complicity with officials
by informing on them; (3) the officials were not deliberately indifferent to a risk of harm when they placed
the inmate in the yard with a prisoner who had a history of violent assaults against other inmates; (4) the
inmate stated a failure-to-protect claim with respect to the officer's failure to intervene in the assault, where
he intervened in another prisoner's assault on the inmate in the special housing unit's (SHU) recreation yard
“only after several minutes of continued pummeling;” and (6) the inmate stated a substantive due process
claim. The court noted that the federal inmate, who was either not yet convicted, or convicted but not yet
sentenced, when he was attacked by other inmates in the prison's recreation yard, had a clearly established
due process right to have prison officials protect him from inmate violence. (Federal Detention Center,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
ACCESS TO COURT
MAIL

Blalock v. Eaker, 845 F.Supp.2d 678 (W.D.N.C. 2012). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against
prison officials, alleging they lost his legal mail. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment. The court held that when prison staff ignored the detainee's subpoenas it did not violate
his right of access to the courts. The court noted that the detainee was represented by counsel, the subpoenas were invalid as the detainee was a criminal defendant who had no right under North Carolina common
law to pretrial discovery, North Carolina statutes did not authorize the use of subpoenas “duces tecum” as a
criminal discovery tool, and North Carolina law did not allow criminal defendants to depose witnesses.
(Lincoln County Detention Center, North Carolina)

U.S. District Court
FEMALES
MEDICAL CARE
SEARCHES

Choquette v. City of New York, 839 F.Supp.2d 692 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). Female detainees filed § 1983 actions
against a city and city officials alleging that the policy, practice, and custom of the city department of correction (DOC) of subjecting female detainees to a forced gynecological examination upon admission to
DOC custody violated their constitutional rights. The detainees alleged that they were not informed of what
the exam entailed and were subjected to, or threatened with, punishment if they questioned or refused the
exam. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court denied the motion. The court held that the statute of limitations for the detainees' claims was tolled until the gynecological exam class claims were dismissed from the class action challenging the DOC's alleged practice of conducting strip searches, where the
potential gynecological exam class was pleaded in both the original complaint and the first amended
intervenor complaint, and the settlement agreement did not provide unequivocal notice that the gynecological exam class claims were not being pursued. (New York City Dept. of Correction, Rose M. Singer Center,
Rikers Island)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
WRONGFUL DEATH

Currie v. Cundiff, 870 F.Supp.2d 581 (S.D.Ill. 2012). The administrator of the estate of a deceased detainee
brought an action against a county, jail officials, and health care providers, alleging various claims, including claims pursuant to § 1983 and the Illinois Wrongful Death Act, as well as for punitive damages. The
court held that allegations by the administrator of the estate of the deceased arrestee, that jail officials and

32.210

health care providers acted with deliberate indifference in dealing with his diabetes while he was in custody, were sufficient to plead that they acted with reckless or callous disregard to federally protected rights, as
required to seek punitive damages in the § 1983 proceedings alleging violations of the Fourth Amendment.
The detainee died as a result of diabetic ketoacidosis while confined in the county jail. (Williamson County
Jail, Illinois)
U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
MEDICATION

Dilworth v. Goldberg, 914 F.Supp.2d 433 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). A released pretrial detainee and his wife
brought an action against a county, its health care corporation, and 47 related individuals, for federal and
state claims arising from his confinement at a county jail. The district court partially dismissed the claims
and the plaintiffs moved to amend. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The
court found that New York's three-year limitations period began to run on the date in which the pretrial
detainee was directed by an officer to sign fraudulent papers indicating he caused his own injuries and that
would waive his legal claims against the county and jail officials. According to the court, it was appropriate
for the now-released pretrial detainee to amend his complaint to assert his section 1983 unconstitutional
conditions of confinement claim, under the Eighth Amendment, against the officer, since there were sufficient allegations in the proposed pleading to support the claim. The court noted that loss of consortium
claims are not cognizable under § 1983 because they do not involve an injury based on a deprivation of the
plaintiff's rights, privileges, and immunities.
The detainee, an African-American, was detained in the jail when he slipped and fell on wet wax that
had been left on a corridor floor by a trustee inmate. He “suffered severe injuries to his head, back, and
right arm, and lost consciousness due to the fall.”He was taken the jail infirmary and given a "cursory"
examination, which allegedly resulted in the understatement of his actual medical condition. Rather than
allowing him to return to his cell to rest, he was ordered to go to a visit and he was threatened with a charge
of disobeying a direct order if he did not comply. He suffered several subsequent health problems but was
not taken to an outside source of medical care. He was given a wheelchair and assigned to a dormitory with
inmates who had medical problems. While confined in the dorm he was allegedly denied meals on several
occasions, was not able to take a shower, and was refused pain medication. He alleged further complaints
about his treatment and conditions. (Westchester County Department of Corrections, New York Medical
College, Westchester County Health Care Corporation, New York)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT

Ebrahime v. Dart, 899 F.Supp.2d 777 (N.D.Ill. 2012). A pretrial detainee at a county jail brought a § 1983
action against a county sheriff and jail officials arising from an attack by a fellow detainee. The district
court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court held that county jail officials were
not deliberately indifferent in preventing the attack on the detainee, who reported theft of commissary items
from his table, by the accused fellow inmate. The court noted that the detainee did not himself feel there
was threat, and the fellow inmate did not know that the detainee had reported him, but rather, he only knew
that the detainee's associates had reported their items stolen from detainee's table. The court found that the
county jail officials were not deliberately indifferent in failing to intervene in the attack on the pretrial detainee, even though the corrections officer who was with the detainee when the attack began did not respond on his own, he called for backup which arrived, in force, within a minute or two. (Cook County Jail,
Illinois)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
SUICIDE
SUICIDE ATTEMPT
WRONGFUL DEATH

Ferencz v. Medlock, 905 F.Supp.2d 656 (W.D.Pa. 2012). A mother, as administrator for her son’s estate,
brought deliberate indifference claims under a wrongful death statute against prison employees, and the
prison's medical services provider, following the death of her son when he was a pretrial detainee in a county prison. The employees and provider moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and
denied in part. The district court held that under Pennsylvania law, the mother lacked standing to bring
wrongful death and survival actions in her individual capacity against several prison employees for her
son's death while he was in prison, where the wrongful death and survival statutes only permitted recovery
by a personal representative, such as a mother in her action as administratrix of her son's estate, or as a
person entitled to recover damages as a trustee ad litem. The court found that the mother's claims that a
prison's medical services provider had a policy, practice, or custom that resulted in her son's death were
sufficient to overcome the provider's motion to dismiss the mother's § 1983 action for the death of her son
while he was in prison.
Upon admission to the facility, the detainee had been evaluated and scored a 12 on a scale, which was to
have triggered classification as suicidal (a score of 8 or more). The Classification Committee subsequently
did not classify the detainee as suicidal as they were required to do under the jail classification policy, and
no member of the Committee communicated to medical contractor staff or correctional officers responsible
for monitoring the detainee that he was suicidal and going through drug withdrawal. At the time, the jail
was equipped with an operational and working video surveillance system and there was a video camera in
the detainee’s cell. The video surveillance of the cell was broadcast on four different television monitors
throughout the jail, all of which were working and manned by officers. Additionally, the work station
thhhattt was located around the corner from the cell, approximately 20 feet away, was equipped with one of
the four television monitors. The monitor was situated on the wall above the desk at the work station, such
that it would be directly in front of the officer manning the station if he was sitting facing his desk.
The detainee attempted suicide by trying to hang himself with his bed sheet from the top of the cell bars,
which took several minutes and was unsuccessful. After the attempt, however, the detainee left the bed
sheet hanging from the top of his cell bars and started to pace in his cell in visible mental distress. This
suicide attempt, as well as the hanging bedsheet were viewable from the nearby work station video surveillance monitor as well as the other three monitors throughout the jail. A few minutes later the detainee attempted to commit suicide a second time by hanging himself with his bed sheet from the top of his cell
bars. This suicide attempt took several minutes, was unsuccessful, and was viewable from the work station

32.211

video surveillance monitor as well as the other three monitors throughout the jail. A few minutes later, the
detainee attempted to commit suicide a third time by hanging himself with his bed sheet. This time, he hung
himself from his bed sheet for over twenty minutes, without being noticed by any of the four officers who
were manning the four video surveillance monitors. In fact, one officer admitted he was asleep at his work
station at the time. By the time another officer noticed the hanging, nearly 30 minutes had passed. The
detainee was cut down and transported to a local hospital where he was subsequently pronounced dead due
to asphyxiation by hanging. (Fayette County Prison, Pennsylvania, and PrimeCare Medical, Inc.)
U.S. Appeals Court
BAIL
DUE PROCESS
RELEASE

Fields v. Henry County, Tenn., 701 F.3d 180 (6th Cir. 2012). An arrestee filed a civil rights action alleging
that a county had violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from excessive bail and his Fourteenth
Amendment right to procedural due process. The district court granted summary judgment for the county
and the arrestee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that setting the arrestee's bail
at the same amount as other defendants facing domestic-assault charges through the county's use of a bond
schedule without particularized examination of his situation did not violate the arrestee's Eighth Amendment right to be free from excessive bail. The court noted that the mere use of a bond schedule does not
itself pose a constitutional problem under the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of excessive bail, since a
schedule is aimed at assuring the presence of a defendant, and the bond schedule represents an assessment
of what bail amount would ensure the appearance of the average defendant facing such a charge.
The court found that a liberty interest protected by due process had not been implicated by the county's
policy of automatically detaining domestic-assault defendants for 12 hours without bail.
The court noted that a Tennessee statute providing that a person could not “be committed to prison”
until he had a hearing before a magistrate did not create a liberty interest, and release on personal recognizance under Tennessee law lacked explicitly mandatory language needed to create a liberty interest. (Henry
County Sherriff's Office and Henry County Jail, Tennessee)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Frank v. County of Ontario, 884 F.Supp.2d 11 (W.D.N.Y. 2012). A pretrial detainee brought a state action
against a county, a jail physician, and a nurse practitioner, alleging medical malpractice and deliberate
indifference to his serious medical need under §§ 1983 and 1985. The defendants removed the action to
federal court and moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that
there was no evidence that the pretrial detainee who had a history of colitis had a serious medical need, as
required to support a claim for deliberate indifference to his serious medical need in violation of Fourteenth
Amendment. The court noted that the detainee was repeatedly examined during his relatively brief stay at
the jail, and the defendants ordered tests on more than one occasion, which generally yielded normal results
that did not indicate a need for surgery or more aggressive treatment. The court also found no evidence that
the jail physician and or nurse practitioner unreasonably delayed treatment of the detainee's colitis. According to the court, the fact that the detainee did not undergo surgery for his condition until some weeks after
he was discharged from jail suggested that the detainee did not need emergency surgery as a result of
treatment that he had received at the jail. (Ontario County Jail, New York)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
FAILURE TO PROTECT

Gabriel v. County of Herkimer. 889 F.Supp.2d 374 (N.D.N.Y. 2012). The administrator of a pretrial detainee's estate brought a § 1983 action against a county, jail officials, and jail medical personnel, alleging deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, due process violations, and a state claim for wrongful death.
The county brought a third-party complaint against a hospital demanding indemnity. The defendants moved
for summary judgment and the hospital moved to dismiss the third-party complaint. The district court held
that severance of the third party complaint involving the hospital was warranted, where a separate trial
regarding indemnity, following a verdict on liability, would be both economical and convenient. The court
found that summary judgment was precluded by material fact issues as to: (1) whether a nurse practitioner
was aware of the detainee’s history of depression, anxiety, tachycardia, angina, mitral valve prolapsed,
degenerative back disease, and sciatic nerve, but consciously disregarded the risk of harm to him; (2)
whether the detainee had a serious medical condition; and (3) whether a policy or custom of the county led
to the denial of medical treatment for the detainee. According to the court, there was no evidence that a
corrections officer disregarded an excessive risk to the safety of the pretrial detainee, noting that when the
officer witnessed the detainee fall, he assisted him and promptly contacted the medical unit. According to
the court, a lieutenant was not a policymaker, as required to support a § 1983 claim by the estate, where the
lieutenant was responsible for jail security and had no involvement in the jail's medical policies and procedures. (Herkimer County Jail, New York)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE
MEDICAL CARE

Glover v. Gartman, 899 F.Supp.2d 1115 (D.N.M. 2012). The personal representative of the estate of a
pretrial detainee who committed suicide while in custody brought an action against a warden of a county
detention center and corrections officers, alleging under § 1983 that the defendants violated his substantive
due process rights when they provided him with razor blades and failed to respond in a timely manner to
his emergency calls for help. The officers moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court
granted the motion. The court held that a county corrections officer's act of providing the pretrial detainee
with two razor blades and then leaving the detainee alone for over an hour so that detainee could shave
before trial, during which time the detainee committed suicide, did not violate the detainee's substantive
due process rights under the United States Constitution or the New Mexico Constitution, where the officer
did not know that the detainee posed any suicide risk. The court also held that the officer was entitled to
qualified immunity from the § 1983 claim that the officer violated the pretrial detainee's substantive due
process rights, where there was no due process violation, as the officer did not know that the detainee posed
any suicide risk, and a detainee's substantive due process right not to be left alone with razor blades was not
clearly established at the time of the incident. The court also found that a corrections officer was entitled to
qualified immunity from the § 1983 claim that the officer violated the substantive due process rights of the

32.212

detainee by failing to respond to the detainee's calls for help. According to the court, the officer's conduct
did not rise to the level of a due process violation, and the substantive due process right of the detainee to
have an officer respond to a call was not clearly established absent evidence that the officer heard the call
or knew of a suicide risk. (Lea County Detention Center, New Mexico)
U.S. Appeals Court
INTAKE SCREENING
RELEASE

Handt v. Lynch, 681 F.3d 939 (8th Cir. 2012). A detainee, who suffered a month-long incarceration following sentencing for operating while intoxicated, even though a state court had not ordered his incarceration,
brought a § 1983 action against prison intake officers and a counselor. The district court denied the officers'
and counselor's motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, and they appealed. The
appeals court vacated and remanded. The appeals court held that the district court failed to engage in a full
qualified immunity analysis as to each of the detainee's § 1983.claims, setting aside the district court's order
denying summary judgment to the prison intake officers and counselor on qualified immunity grounds. The
court noted that, although the district court did an admirable job of explaining the facts of the case and
construing those facts in the light most favorable to the detainee, the court nevertheless repeatedly stated in
its analysis that there were material issues of fact in dispute, and its decision lacked consideration of the
individual defendants' actions with respect to each of the constitutional claims. (Iowa Medical Classification Center, Oakdale, Iowa)

U.S. Appeals Court
SPEEDY TRIAL

Heyerman v. County of Calhoun, 680 F.3d 642 (6th Cir. 2012). A pretrial detainee, who was imprisoned for
more than 17 years after a state appellate court reversed his criminal conviction and remanded the matter to
the trial court, brought a § 1983 action against a county and the county's prosecuting attorney. The district
court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The detainee appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The court held that there was no evidence that the county's prosecuting attorney was directly
responsible for any conduct that led to any violation of the speedy-trial rights of the pretrial detainee, as
required to hold the prosecuting attorney individually liable under § 1983. The court also found that the
detainee, failed to demonstrate a defective policy or practice to hold the county or the county's prosecuting
attorney in her official capacity liable for the alleged violation of his speedy-trial rights under § 1983. (Calhoun County, Michigan)

U.S. Appeals Court
ACCESS TO COURT
DUE PROCESS
SPEEDY TRIAL

Holloway v. Delaware County Sheriff, 700 F.3d 1063 (7th Cir. 2012). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action,
alleging that a sheriff, who was sued in his official capacity, violated his rights by detaining him without
charges for nine days, The district court granted summary judgment for the sheriff and the arrestee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the sheriff did not violate the substantive
due process rights of the arrestee, where the sheriff brought the arrestee before court for an initial hearing
within 72 hours of his arrest, followed the court's order in holding the arrestee without bond, and released
the arrestee promptly, within 72 hours of the initial hearing, excluding intervening weekend days, when the
prosecutor did not file charges within the time permitted by the court. (Delaware County Jail, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
DISCIPLINE
DUE PROCESS
FAILURE TO PROTECT
GRIEVANCE

Johnston v. Maha, 845 F.Supp.2d 535 (W.D.N.Y. 2012). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action
against a county sheriff, employees of a county jail, and others, alleging, among other things, violations of
his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment and his Fourteenth Amendment
right to due process. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and the detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings.
On remand, the district court held that: (1) a fact issue as to whether a correctional officer assaulted the
detainee precluded summary judgment on the detainee's Eighth Amendment claim; (2) summary judgment
was precluded by fact issue as to whether the detainee was twice placed in isolation as a form of punishment without being given advance notice or opportunity to be heard; and (3) summary judgment was precluded by a fact issue as to whether the detainee exhausted administrative remedies as to the claim that a
correctional officer placed him in an isolation cell without prior notice. (Genesee County Jail, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

King v. Kramer, 680 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir. 2012). The widow of a deceased pre-trial detainee brought a §
1983 action against a county, officers, and nurses, alleging violations of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The widow appealed. The appeals
court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held that the county jail officers were not deliberately
indifferent to the pre-trial detainee's serious medical needs, as would violate the Fourteenth Amendment,
even though severe seizures led to his death. The court noted that the officers were not responsible for administering medical care and they immediately notified nursing staff when the seizures began, and the officers monitored the detainee while waiting for a nurse to arrive. The court held that summary judgment
was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a prison nurse's actions regarding treatment
of the pre-trial detainee were so far afield from an appropriate medical response to the detainee's seizures
that they fell outside the bounds of her professional judgment. The court found that summary judgment was
precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the county had a policy or custom resulting in
violations of the pre-trial detainee's constitutional rights, precluding summary judgment in a § 1983 action
alleging violations of the 14th Amendment following the detainee's death. (La Crosse Co. Jail, Wisconsin)

U.S. Appeals Court
FALSE ARREST

Livers v. Schenck, 700 F.3d 340 (8th Cir. 2012). Two pretrial detainees, who were arrested for murder, but
who were subsequently released after their charges were dropped, brought a § 1983 action against a county
sheriff and investigating officers, alleging violations of their Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment
rights. The district court entered an order denying the defendants' motions for summary judgment, and they
appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, denied in part, and remanded. The court held that summary
judgment was precluded by fact issues as to whether a detainee's confession was coerced, and whether
officers fabricated evidence. The court held that the sheriff could not be liable under § 1983 for his alleged
failure to train investigating officers not to fabricate evidence, since any reasonable officer would know that
fabricating evidence was unacceptable. (Cass County Sheriff's Office, Nebraska)

32.213

U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE
MEDICAL CARE

Luckert v. Dodge County, 684 F.3d 808 (8th Cir. 2012). The personal representative of the estate of her
deceased son, who committed suicide while detained in a county jail, filed a § 1983 action against the county and jail officials for allegedly violating due process by deliberate indifference to the detainee's medical
needs. Following a jury trial, the district court entered judgment for the personal representative, awarding
actual and punitive damages as well as attorney fees and costs. The jury awarded $750,000 in compensatory damages and $100,000 in punitive damages. The district court denied the defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law and the defendants appealed. The appeals court reversed the denial of the defendants’ motion and vacated the awards. The appeals court held that while the detainee had a constitutional
right to protection from a known risk of suicide, the jail nurse and the jail director were protected by qualified immunity, and the county was not liable. According to the court, the county jail nurse's affirmative but
unsuccessful measures to prevent the pretrial detainee's suicide did not constitute deliberate indifference to
his risk of suicide, where the nurse assessed the detainee twice after learning from his mother that he had
recently attempted suicide, the nurse arranged for the detainee to have two appointments with the jail's
psychiatrist, including an appointment on the morning of the detainee's suicide, the nurse contacted the
detainee's own psychiatrist to gather information about the detainee's condition, she reviewed the detainee's
medical records, and she responded in writing to each of the detainee's requests for medical care. The court
held that the county jail director's actions and omissions in managing jail's suicide intervention practices did
not rise to the level of deliberate indifference to the pretrial detainee's risk of suicide, even though the director delegated to the jail nurse significant responsibility for suicide intervention before formally training her
on suicide policies and procedures, and the jail's actual suicide intervention practices did not comport with
the jail's written policy. The court noted that the jail had a practice under the director's management of
identifying detainees at risk of committing suicide, placing them on a suicide watch, and providing on-site
medical attention, and the detainee remained on suicide watch and received medical attention including on
the day of his suicide. The court held that the county lacked a custom, policy, or practice that violated the
pretrial detainee's due process rights and caused his suicide, precluding recovery in the § 1983 action. The
court found that, even though the county had flaws in its suicide intervention practices, the county did not
have a continuing, widespread, and persistent pattern of constitutional misconduct regarding prevention of
suicide in the county jail. (Dodge County Jail, Fremont, Nebraska)

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
MEDICATION
SEARCHES
UNLAWFUL
DETENTION

Manning v. Sweitzer, 891 F.Supp.2d 961 (N.D.Ill. 2012). An arrestee brought an action against various
village police officers and a village alleging unreasonable search and seizure of her vehicle, denial of the
right to counsel, cruel and unusual punishment, conspiracy under § 1985, failure to train, unlawful detention, and several state law claims. The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district
court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the detainee's allegation that she was
offered medication for her unnamed mental ailment while incarcerated, but that she declined to accept the
medication “for fear of overmedication or a harmful interaction,” failed to establish that she was subjected
to inhumane conditions or that the police were deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need, as required to support her claim that she was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause. According to the court, the arrestee's failure to allege any
other incidents of wrongdoing by the village, combined with her failure to show that the unconstitutional
consequences of the village's alleged failure to train its police officers were patently obvious, precluded her
claim against the village. (Village of Park Forest Police Department, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
WORK

McGarry v. Pallito, 687 F.3d 505 (2nd Cir. 2012). A pretrial detainee filed an action against state prison
officials alleging that compelling him to work in a prison laundry under the threat of physical restraint and
legal process violated the Thirteenth Amendment. The district court dismissed the action and the detainee
appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The appeals court held that the detainee stated a civil
rights claim under the Thirteenth Amendment, on allegations that his work in a prison laundry was compelled and maintained by the use and the threatened use of physical and legal coercion, where state prison
officials threatened to send him to “the hole” if he refused to work and that he would thereby be subjected
to 23 hour-per-day administrative confinement and shackles. The detainee also alleged that he had been
threatened with disciplinary reports, which are alleged to be taken into consideration when making recommendations for a release date and, therefore, lengthen any period of incarceration. The court found that the
prohibition against prison officials from rehabilitating pretrial detainees had been clearly established, and
thus it was not objectively reasonable for the prison officials to compel and maintain the pretrial detainee's
work in the prison laundry by the use and threatened use of physical and legal coercion. The court held that
the officials were not entitled to qualified immunity at the pleading stage of the detainee's civil rights claim.
According to the court, officers of reasonable competence should have known that compelling a pretrial
detainee, as a person not “duly convicted,” to work in the laundry for up to 14 hours per day for three days
per week, doing other inmates' laundry, reasonably could not be construed as personally-related housekeeping chores. The court found that the work constituted hard labor solely to assist in defraying of institutional
costs in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment. (Chittenden Regional Correction Facility, Vermont)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
WRONGFUL DEATH

Moulton v. DeSue, 966 F.Supp.2d 1298 (M.D.Fla. 2012). The personal representative of a jail inmate's
estate brought a § 1983 action against correctional officers, a nurse, and a sheriff, alleging deliberate indifference to the inmate's right to adequate medical care while in pretrial confinement, which resulted in her
death. The defendants filed motions for summary judgment. The district court denied the motions in part
and granted the motions in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue
of material fact as to whether the correctional officers' failure to call emergency rescue when the pregnant
jail inmate complained of stomach cramps constituted more than grossly negligent disregard of a substantial risk of a serious harm, precluding summary judgment for the officers on the deliberate indifference to
the inmate's serious medical need claim. According to the court, correctional officers were on notice that

32.214

their alleged actions or inactions violated the jail inmate's clearly established Fourteenth Amendment right
to adequate medical care, and, thus, the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity in § 1983 action.
The court also held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
the correctional officers acted with ill will or malice toward the jail inmate, or exhibited reckless indifference. (Bradford County Jail, Florida)
U.S. District Court
MEDICATION
MENTAL HEALTH
DUE PROCESS

Olaniyi v. District of Columbia, 876 F.Supp.2d 39 (D.D.C. 2012). A pretrial detainee brought an action
against the District of Columbia and the United States, asserting claims under § 1983 and the Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA), arising from his detention and a separate incident involving a traffic stop. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that past alleged
deficiencies in medical services at the District of Columbia jail that were unrelated to unconstitutional
forced medication of inmates could not have put the District on notice of the need for training to avoid an
alleged due process violation arising from the detainee's being forcibly injected with a psychoactive drug
while residing in the jail's mental health unit, and thus could not sustain a finding of deliberate indifference
necessary to hold the District liable under § 1983 for an alleged due process violation. The court also held
that the detainee failed to establish a pattern of similar due process violations by untrained or inadequately
trained jail employees that could have put the District on notice of a need for more training with respect to
forced medication of inmates, thus precluding the detainee's § 1983 due process claim against the District
based on a failure to train theory. (Mental Health Unit of the District of Columbia Jail)

U.S. Appeals Court
DUE PROCESS
FAILURE TO PROTECT
FEMALES
INTAKE SCREENING
MENTAL HEALTH
RELEASE

Paine v. Cason, 678 F.3d 500 (7th Cir. 2012). The guardian of the estate of an arrestee, who allegedly suffered from bipolar disorder, brought a § 1983 action against a municipality and police officers, alleging
civil rights violations in connection with the arrest and subsequent release from custody without being
provided access to mental health treatment. The arrestee was raped at knifepoint after her release and either
jumped or was pushed from a window, causing permanent brain damage. The district court denied summary judgment in part for the defendants. The defendants sought relief through interlocutory appeal. The
appeals court affirmed in part, denied in part, and remanded. The appeals held that: (1) the arrestee, as a
person in custody, had clearly a established right for police to provide care for her serious medical condition; (2) whether the police should have understood that the arrestee had a serious medical condition, and
thus should have provided care, was a factual issue that could not be decided on interlocutory appeal; (3)
causation was a factual issue not suited to resolution on interlocutory appeal of denial of qualified immunity; (4) the arrestee did not have a clearly established constitutional right for her release to be delayed pending mental-health treatment; (5) the arrestee had a clearly established due process right for the police to not
create danger, without justification, by arresting her in a safe place and releasing her in a hazardous one
while unable to protect herself; (6) the arresting officer was entitled to qualified immunity; (7) the watch
officer was not entitled to qualified immunity; and (8) a detention aide was not entitled to qualified immunity. According to the court, a police officer who was responsible for preparing the arrestee's individualrecognizance bond and collecting possessions that were to be returned on her release, and who received a
telephone call from the mother of the arrestee regarding the arrestee's bi-polar condition and did nothing in
response and who did not even note the call in a log, was not entitled to qualified immunity to the civil
rights claims that the police had created a danger, without justification. The court found that the detention
aide who was responsible for evaluating inmates, observed the arrestee behaving in a mentally unstable
way, such as smearing menstrual blood on her cell walls, and transferred another person out of the arrestee's cell because of her inappropriate behavior, and yet did nothing to alert other personnel at the stationhouse, was not entitled to qualified immunity to the civil rights claims that the police did not arrange
for medical treatment of serious conditions while the arrestee's custody continued. (Eighth District Station,
Second District Station, Chicago Police Department)

U.S. District Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
ASSESSMENT OF
COSTS
DUE PROCESS
EXERCISE
MEDICAL CARE
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Pierce v. County of Orange, 905 F.Supp.2d 1017 (C.D.Cal. 2012). Pretrial detainees in a county's jail facilities brought a § 1983 class action suit against the county and its sheriff, seeking relief for violations of
their constitutional and statutory rights. After consolidating the case with a prior case challenging jail conditions, the district court rejected the detainees' claims, and the detainees appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. On remand, following a bench trial, the district court entered
a final judgment and a permanent injunction, and the detainees renewed their motion for attorney fees. The
district court granted the motion. The court held that: (1) attorneys were entitled to compensation for time
spent taking calls from inmates and performing pre-trial preparation; (2) time spent unsuccessfully opposing a motion for sanctions was not compensable as part of fee award; (3) a 50%/50% split between preappeal constitutional claims and Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) claims was appropriate; (4) reduction in the fee award in the amount of 30% was warranted based on the detainees' limited success on their
constitutional claims; and (5) application of a multiplier to the lodestar calculations, under the provisions of
the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) was not warranted. The case began in 2001, a class of pre-trial
detainees in the Orange County, California, jails, filed a lawsuit against the County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
for violations of their Fourteenth Amendment due process rights for the County's operation of the County
jails in an unconstitutional manner. Allegations included depriving detainees of opportunities for exercise
and restricting their ability to practice religion. (Orange County, California)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE
MEDICAL CARE
MEDICATION
MENTAL HEALTH
SUPERVISION

Ponzini v. Monroe County, 897 F.Supp.2d 282 (M.D.Pa. 2012). Survivors of a pretrial detainee sued prison
officials, medical care providers and a corrections officer under § 1983 and state tort law, claiming that
they were deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of the detainee, who committed suicide. The
detainee allegedly did not receive his medication during his confinement. The survivors noted that one of
the medications, Paxil, has “a short half-life and leaves a user's system very quickly,” and that its withdrawal symptoms include “worsening of underlying anxiety or depression, headache, tremor or ‘shakes',

32.215

gastrointestinal distress and fatigue-, all of which were allegedly present in detainee during his incarceration.” The detainee had also been taking Trazadone. The survivors alleged that during the period in which
the detainee was incarcerated at the facility, officers were aware that the detainee should have been monitored closely and placed on a suicide watch. The survivors asserted that, although the detainee was not on a
suicide watch, the inmate housed in an adjacent cell was on such a watch. An officer was expected to pass
the neighboring cell, and by virtue of its location, the detainee’s cell, every fifteen minutes. The survivors
alleged that the officer falsified documents demonstrating that he properly made his rounds every fifteen
minutes, and that officer failure to properly maintain a suicide watch on the detainee’s neighbor facilitated
the detainee’s own suicide. The detainee killed himself by swallowing shreds of his own t-shirt. The court
held that the survivors stated a § 1983 claim under the Fourteenth Amendment against prison officials for
deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of the detainee, who committed suicide allegedly as a
result of a lack of daily medication necessary to treat depression and other psychological issues. According
to the court, the complaint raised the possibility that prison officials knew that the detainee suffered from a
severe medical condition and did not attempt to provide appropriate, necessary care in a timely manner.
The court held that the survivors also stated a § 1983 claim under the Fourteenth Amendment against the
corporate medical provider for deliberate indifference. (PrimeCare Medical, Inc., and Monroe County Correctional Facility, Pennsylvania)
U.S. District Court
PROBABLE CAUSE
SEARCHES

Rattray v. Woodbury County, Iowa, 908 F.Supp.2d 976 (N.D.Iowa 2012). Misdemeanor arrestees brought a
civil rights action against a county and law enforcement officials, alleging that their Fourth Amendment
rights were violated when they were searched pursuant to a “blanket” policy authorizing strip searches of
all arrestees facing serious misdemeanor or more serious charges. Following the grant of summary judgment, in part, in favor of the arrestees, the county moved for reconsideration. The court granted the motion,
in part. The court held that the recent Supreme Court decision in Florence, which held that reasonable suspicion was generally not required to strip search pretrial detainees, subject to possible exceptions, was an
intervening change in the law, justifying reconsideration. According to the court, the county's strip search
policy was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, regardless of whether arrestees would be put into the
general population. But the court found that summary judgment was precluded on the arrestee's claim that
the manner of a strip search was unreasonable. (Woodbury County Jail, Iowa)

U.S. Appeals Court
DUE PROCESS
FAILURE TO PROTECT
MEDICAL CARE
SUICIDE
USE OF FORCE

Rice ex rel. Rice v. Correctional Medical Services, 675 F.3d 650 (7th Cir. 2012). Following a pretrial detainee's death while incarcerated, his parents, representing his estate filed suit pursuant to § 1983, alleging
among other things that jail officials and medical personnel had deprived the pretrial detainee of due process by exhibiting deliberate indifference to his declining mental and physical condition. The district court
entered summary judgment against the estate. The estate filed a second suit reasserting the state wrongful
death claims that the judge in the first suit had dismissed without prejudice after disposing of the federal
claims. The district court dismissed that case on the basis of collateral estoppel, and the estate appealed
both judgments. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The appeals court held
that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether jail officials were
deliberately indifferent to the pretrial detainee's conditions of confinement, and whether his conditions of
confinement were sufficiently serious to support his Fourteenth Amendment due process claim. The court
noted that whether the detainee himself created the unsanitary conditions was a fact relevant to the claim,
but given detainee's mental condition, it did not foreclose the claim. The court found that the estate failed to
show that the detainee's assignment to an administrative segregation unit of the jail for approximately seven
months violated the detainee's due process rights, where the estate failed to identify feasible alternatives
and to tender evidence supporting the contention that the detainee likely would have fared better in one of
those alternative placements. The court held that jail officials did not employ excessive force, in violation
of due process, to the pretrial detainee who had been fighting with his cellmate and failed to comply with a
directive that he step out of his cell which he refused to leave for 18 hours, by spraying his face with pepper
foam, and placing him in a restraint chair. The court held that jail officials did not have notice of a substantial risk that the mentally ill pretrial detainee might be assaulted by other inmates, as required to support the
pretrial detainee's claim of deliberate indifference in violation of due process. The court noted that while
jail personnel were aware that the detainee had a hygiene problem, they had no notice that he was at risk of
assault because of that problem, particularly within the more secure confines of the administrative segregation unit. The court found that neither jail guards or supervisors were deliberately indifferent to the risk that
the mentally ill pretrial detainee might engage in a behavior such as compulsive water drinking that would
cause him to die within a matter of hours and did not consciously disregarded that risk, and therefore they
were not liable for his death under § 1983. According to the court, while a fact-finder might conclude that
the guards exhibited a generalized recklessness with respect to the safety of the inmates housed in the administrative segregation unit by failing to conduct hourly checks of the unit, there was no evidence that the
guards or supervisors were subjectively aware of the possibility that the detainee might injure himself to the
point of death before anyone could intervene. (Elkhart County Jail, Indiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE
FAILURE TO PROTECT
MENTAL HEALTH
SUICIDE
TRANSPORT

Rosario v. Brawn, 670 F.3d 816 (7th Cir. 2012). The father of a detainee who committed suicide while in
police custody brought a § 1983 action against police officers, alleging deliberate indifference to the detainee's risk of suicide in violation of the detainee's right to due process under Fourteenth Amendment. The
district court granted summary judgment to the police officers, and the father appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The court held that the police officers did not intentionally disregard a substantial risk that the
detainee would commit suicide, as required for liability on a due-process claim alleging deliberately indifferent treatment of the detainee. The detainee committed suicide while being transported to a mental health
facility after exhibiting self-destructive behavior. The officers failed to discover the detainee's razor blade,
which he used to commit suicide. According to the court, their overall actions toward the detainee showed

32.216

protection and compassion by searching the detainee, arranging for assessment of his mental condition,
ensuring his comfort during transportation, and personally administering first aid despite his resistance.
(Washington County Sheriff, Wisconsin)
U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
MEDICAL CARE
SAFETY

Schwartz v. Lassen County ex rel. Lassen County Jail (Detention Facility), 838 F.Supp.2d 1045 (E.D.Cal.
2012). The mother of a deceased pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action on behalf of herself and as successor in interest against a county, sheriff, city, police department, and several officers, alleging violations
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss. The district court granted the
motion in part and denied in part. The court held that allegations that: (1) the undersheriff knew the pretrial
detainee from various encounters with the county, including his diverticulitis and congenital heart condition
that required a restricted diet; (2) the undersheriff gave testimony to set bail for the detainee at $150,000 on
a misdemeanor offense; (3) the detainee's doctor sent a letter explaining the detainee should be put on
house arrest as opposed to detention because of his medical condition; (4) the detainee had to be admitted
to a hospital for emergency surgery during a previous confinement; (5) the detainee's mother requested he
be released for medical attention; (6) the detainee lost over 40 pounds during two weeks of detention; (7)
the detainee requested to see a doctor but was told to “quit complaining;” and (8) the undersheriff personally knew the detainee was critically ill, were sufficient to plead that the undersheriff knew of and failed to
respond to the detainee's serious medical condition, as would be deliberate indifference required to state a §
1983 claim alleging violations of Fourteenth Amendment due process after the detainee died.
According to the court, allegations that the pretrial detainee's health was visibly deteriorating, that he
had requested medical care on numerous occasions, and that the undersheriff knew of his health issues but
failed to ensure that the prison provided him medical care, were sufficient to plead a causal connection
between the undersheriff's conduct and denial of medical care for the detainee's serious medical need, as
required to state a § 1983 supervisory liability claim against the undersheriff alleging violations of Fourteenth Amendment due process after the detainee died. The court also found that allegations were sufficient
to plead that training was obviously deficient, as required to state a § 1983 claim for municipal liability
against the city, alleging violations of the Fourteenth Amendment due process after the detainee died.
The court found that allegations that the undersheriff owed the pretrial detainee an affirmative duty to
keep the jail and prisoners in it, and that he was answerable for their safekeeping, were sufficient to plead a
duty, as required to state a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) under California law
against the undersheriff after the detainee died. (Lassen County Adult Detention Facility, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Smentek v. Dart, 683 F.3d 373 (7th Cir. 2012). Pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners brought a § 1983
class action against a county and county jail officials, alleging that the failure to make more than a single
dentist available to 10,000 inmates violated their federal constitutional rights. The district court certified the
class, and the defendants petitioned for leave to appeal from the grant of class certification. The appeals
court affirmed. The appeals court held that the district court's earlier denial of class certification of the
inmates' § 1983 suit did not bar, pursuant to the rule of comity, the subsequent certification by a different
district judge of the same or a similar class in a § 1983 suit brought by an inmate who was a member of the
class in the previous suit. (Cook County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
MEDICAL CARE
SUPERVISION

Smith v. Knox County Jail, 666 F.3d 1037 (7th Cir. 2012). A pretrial detainee brought a pro se action against
a county jail under § 1983, alleging that jail officials violated the Eighth Amendment because they were
deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs after a fellow inmate attacked him. The district court
dismissed the case and the detainee appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. The court held that
the detainee stated a claim for deliberate indifference under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment with his allegations that while he was asleep in his cell a guard opened the door and allowed
another inmate to attack him, that he requested medical attention after the attack but received none for five
days, and that the guard knew of his “obvious blood,” dizziness, throwing up, blind spots, severe pain, and
loss of eye color. (Knox County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
CELLS
EQUAL PROTECTION
FAILURE TO PROTECT

Solivan v. Dart, 897 F.Supp.2d 694 (N.D.Ill. 2012). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against a
county, corrections officers, and a sheriff, alleging deliberate indifference to undue punishment. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held
that the detainee's § 1983 complaint stated a claim against a correctional officer for deliberate indifference
to a serious need in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, where the complaint alleged facts that indicated that the officer left inmates visually and audibly unsupervised for hours, knowing that a substantial risk
of harm was present. The complaint further alleged that there were no light bulbs in the detainee's cell, no
intercoms or emergency call buttons in cells, and no overhead cameras on his tier of the jail. According to
the court, the complaint stated that the harm the detainee suffered at the hands of other inmates was significant, including severe injuries to his right eye and bleeding from his ear, and the complaint alleged that the
detainee was the only person of Hispanic origin housed in the maximum security tier, while a significant
majority of other inmates were African American, and that these circumstances put the detainee in an identifiable group of prisoners who were singled out for attack. (Division One, Cook County Department of
Corrections, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
RESTRAINTS
SUICIDE ATTEMPT
USE OF FORCE

Stanfill v. Talton, 851 F.Supp.2d 1346 (M.D.Ga. 2012). The father of a pretrial detainee who died while in
custody at a county jail brought a § 1983 action individually, and as administrator of the detainee's estate,
against a county sheriff and others, alleging that the defendants violated the detainee's rights under the
Eighth and Fourteenth amendments. The county defendants moved for summary judgment, and the father
cross-moved for partial summary judgment and for sanctions. The district court granted the defendants’
motion for summary judgment. The court held that the father failed to establish that the county defendants
had a duty to preserve any video of the detainee in his cells, as would support sanctions against the defend-

32.217

ants in the father's civil rights action. The court noted that the defendants did not anticipate litigation resulting from the detainee's death, the father did not file suit until almost two years after the detainee's death,
and there was no indication that the father requested that the defendants impose a litigation hold or provided the defendants any form of notice that litigation was imminent or even contemplated until the lawsuit
was actually filed. The court found that county correctional officers' use of force in placing the detainee in a
restraint chair was not excessive, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, where less than one hour before the detainee was placed in the chair he had tied tourniquet around his arm, somehow removed metal
button from his prison jumpsuit, cut his wrist or arm, and sprayed blood across his cell. The court noted that
the officers were familiar with the inmate's history of self-mutilation, and the extent of injury inflicted by
the officers' use of the chair was minimal, and the officers made some effort to temper the severity of their
use of force. After the detainee was placed back in the restraint chair, he was given water, and a jail nurse,
at one officer's request, took the inmate's blood pressure, pulse, and breathing rate, and determined that the
detainee appeared in normal health and needed no further medical care.
The court also held that the officers' continued restraint of the detainee in the restraint chair was not
excessive, as would violate the Fourteenth Amendment where the officers were aware of detainee's history
of self-mutilation, the detainee posed a serious risk of harm to himself, and the particular circumstances
confronting the officers justified the continued use of restraints until the officers were reasonably assured
that the situation had abated. According to the court, even if the history of the detainee as a “cutter” constituted a serious medical need, there was no evidence that the county correctional officers were deliberately
indifferent to that need, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, where the only risk of harm the officers
were subjectively aware of was the detainee's potential to injure himself. Despite the detainee's refusal to
speak with medical staff upon arrival at jail, he was immediately classified as a suicide risk due to his selfdestructive history and was placed on a suicide watch, and for two days, the detainee remained on suicide
watch in jail custody, whereby he was observed at least every 15 minutes, without incident.
The court concluded that there was no causal connection between the county correctional officers' alleged indifference to the detainee's medical needs and detainee's death while in custody at the county jail, as
would support a Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference claim brought by the detainee's father. The
court noted that the father's medical expert opined that the detainee's death was not causally related to his
restraint in the chair, and although the expert listed dehydration as a contributing cause of the detainee's
sudden cardiac dysrhythmia that led to the detainee's death, the expert did not testify that the detainee
would have survived had he not been dehydrated. The court held that the father failed to show, by way of
medical evidence, that an alleged six-minute delay of a correctional officer in performing resuscitation
efforts once the detainee was found unresponsive, was the cause of the detainee's death, as would support
the father's Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against the county defendants. The court
ruled that “All parties can agree that Stanfill's death was unfortunate, and that in hindsight, perhaps more
could have been done. Hindsight, however, is not an appropriate lens through which to view the Defendants' actions. The Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of proving that the Defendants violated Stanfill's
constitutional rights. The Defendants are therefore entitled to qualified immunity.” (Houston County Detention Center, Georgia)
U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
USE OF FORCE

Taylor v. Hale, 909 F.Supp.2d 1320 (N.D.Ala. 2012). A pretrial detainee brought § 1983 and Bivens actions against county deputy sheriffs and deputy United States marshals alleging they used excessive force
against him. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether county deputy sheriffs used more force than was necessary to subdue the detainee and place him in
a holding cell. The court also found that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether one county deputy sheriff, and a United States Marshal, failed to protect the detainee
from an alleged use of excessive force by two other deputy sheriffs. According to the court, a deputy sheriff’s and a United States Marshal’s alleged conduct of failing to intervene when she witnessed two other
deputy sheriffs use excessive force against the detainee violated the clearly established duty of officers to
protect inmates in their care from assault by fellow officers, and thus, they were not entitled to qualified
immunity on the detainee's § 1983 claim against her, alleging deliberate indifference to a substantial danger
to the detainee in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights. During the booking process, a deputy
allegedly forced the detainee to the floor on his stomach with a “combination of repetitious blows to the
temple, jaw, neck, and ribs” and he was then handcuffed dragged to the holding cell where the beating
continued. (Jefferson County Jail, Birmingham, Alabama)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT

Todd v. Montoya, 877 F.Supp.2d 1048 (D.N.M. 2012). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against a
corrections officer and prison officials, alleging cruel and unusual punishment, and state claims for negligence, gross negligence, and recklessness. The corrections officer moved for summary judgment and the
detainee moved for additional discovery. The district court granted the officer’s motion and denied the
detainee’s motion. The court found that there was evidence that the detainee suffered an injury that was
more than de minimis, as required to meet the objective element of a § 1983 claim against corrections official for deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm, in violation of the Due Process Clause.
According to the court, there was evidence showing that the detainee received a beating from two other
prisoners, including having them hit him in the face and attacking him for two to three minutes. But the
court held that there was no evidence that a corrections officer acted with deliberate indifference when the
detainee was physically assaulted by the other prisoners. The court noted that the officer called other officers to come stop the fight almost immediately after the physical altercation involving the detainee began.
The court held that there was no evidence that the corrections officer permitted two prisoners to discover
the detainee's criminal history as a sex offender in such a way that caused the detainee's beating, as required
to support the detainee's negligence claim against the officer under New Mexico law. (Bernalillo County
Metropolitan Detention Center, Albuquerque, New Mexico)

32.218

U.S. District Court
MAIL
PRIVACY

U.S. v. Ligambi, 886 F.Supp.2d 492 (E.D.Pa. 2012). A detainee who was charged with various crimes,
including racketeering, moved to suppress an outgoing prison letter seized by prison officials. The district
court denied the motion. The court held that the defendant, who was in prison while charged with various
crimes, including racketeering, did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his outgoing nonprivileged mail. The court noted that prison regulations permitted officials to seize correspondence when it
might contain information concerning criminal activities, it was established practice to inspect nonprivileged mailings to promote discipline in the institution, and the defendant had a reputation for involvement with organized crime. (South Woods State Prison, Southern State Correctional Facility, New Jersey)

U.S. Appeals Court
INVOLUNTARY
MEDICATION

U.S. v. Loughner, 672 F.3d 731 (9th Cir. 2012). In a prosecution for attempted assassination of a Congresswoman, murder of federal judge, murder and attempted murder of other federal employees, injuring and
causing death to participants at a federally provided activity, and related weapons offenses, the district
court denied the defendant's emergency motion to enjoin an involuntary medication decision, and he appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that: (1) procedures used to determine whether
the defendant ought to be involuntarily medicated complied with due process; (2) the Bureau of Prisons
(BOP) medical facility did not act arbitrarily in finding that the defendant was a danger to himself and that
antipsychotic medication was in his best interest; and, (3) due process did not require the BOP to specify a
medication regimen before it could involuntarily medicate the defendant. (U.S. Medical Center for Federal
Prisoners in Springfield, Missouri)

U.S. District Court
PRIVACY
TELEPHONE

U.S. v. Salyer, 853 F.Supp.2d 1014 (E.D.Cal. 2012). A defendant in a criminal prosecution moved to suppress recordings of telephone calls he made while in pretrial detention, and the government moved for an
order permitting it to listen to and use the recordings. The district court granted the motions in part and
denied in part. The court held that most of the recorded conversations were not covered by attorney-client
privilege, and conversations in which legal advice was the predominate purpose were covered by the attorney-client privilege. The court noted that attorney-client communication was not the predominate purpose
of telephone conversations between defendant and attorney who was a friend and who did not represent
him in the criminal case. (Sacramento County Jail, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
PRE-SENTENCE
DETENTION

U.S. v. Tyerman, 701 F.3d 552 (8th Cir. 2012). A defendant was convicted in district court of being a felon
in possession of a firearm and he appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. After a trial, the
defendant was convicted in the district court of being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition,
and possession of a stolen firearm. His motion for acquittal or new trial was denied and the defendant appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the government's passive conduct in receiving
information regarding the location of the defendant's gun, from the defendant's counsel, did not violate the
defendant's Sixth Amendment right-to-counsel. The court found that the defendant's conduct in creating
handcuff keys and practicing the use of them constituted a substantial step, as an element of attempt, with
respect to escaping from pretrial incarceration, for purposes of using attempted escape as the basis for a
sentence enhancement for obstruction of justice. At sentencing, a U.S. Marshal testified that prison guards
discovered two homemade handcuff keys in the defendant’s cell. According to the Marshal, during the
investigation, other inmates revealed the defendant’s plans to escape from jail and his use of the law library
(which lacked surveillance) to practice removing handcuffs. Finding the Marshal credible, the district court
applied a two-level adjustment for obstruction of justice based on the attempted escape, sentencing the
defendant 72 months' imprisonment. (U. S. District Court, Iowa)

U.S. Appeals Court
ACCESS TO COURT
INITIAL APPEARANCE

Waganfeald v. Gusman, 674 F.3d 475 (5th Cir. 2012). Pre-trial detainees who had been arrested for public
intoxication and were incarcerated in New Orleans when Hurricane Katrina struck the city brought a § 1983
action against a sheriff, chief deputy, and others, alleging claims for violations of their Fourth, Sixth, and
Eighth Amendment rights, as well as claims for false imprisonment under Louisiana law. A jury trial was
held. After denying the defendants' motions for judgment as a matter of law, the district court entered
judgment on the jury verdict for the plaintiffs on some of the claims, and denied the defendants' postverdict motions for judgment as a matter of law or, alternatively, for a new trial. The defendants appealed.
The appeals court reversed, vacated, and remanded with instructions. The appeals court held that under
Louisiana law, the sheriff's actions fell within the emergency exception to the 48-hour rule, and so the
plaintiffs' detention was not “unlawful,” as required to establish their claim of false imprisonment, despite
the sheriff's failure to release them when they were not granted a probable cause determination within 48
hours after their arrest. The court found that, even if the plaintiffs had a Sixth Amendment right to counsel
during the period in question, the chief deputy did not act in an objectively unreasonable manner in light of
clearly established law when, after the prison's land-line telephones became inoperable, he refused to let the
plaintiffs use their cell phones to call an attorney. (Orleans Parish Criminal Sheriff, Louisiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCHES

Washington v. Hively, 695 F.3d 641 (7th Cir. 2012). A federal pretrial detainee filed a § 1983 action alleging that a county jail guard improperly touched him during a pat down and strip search. The detainee alleged that while patting him down, the guard spent five to seven seconds gratuitously fondling the plaintiff's testicles and penis through the plaintiff's clothing and then while strip searching him fondled his nude
testicles for two or three seconds, contrary to a jail policy which forbids touching the inmate in the course
of a strip search, and again without any justification. The district court entered summary judgment in the
guard's favor, and the detainee appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The appeals court held
that: (1) the detainee's allegation that the guard touched his private parts to humiliate him or to gratify the
guard's sexual desires was sufficient to state a claim, whether or not the force exerted by the guard was
significant; (2) fact issues remained as to the guard's subjective intent in conducting the pat down and strip
search; and (3) a statute barring federal civil actions by prisoners for mental or emotional injuries absent a

32.219

showing of physical injury did not bar the pretrial detainee from seeking both nominal and punitive damages in his § 1983 action, even though the detainee did not claim to have suffered any physical injury.
(Waukesha County Jail, Wisconsin)
U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
RELEASE
UNLAWFUL
DETENTION

Wells v. City of Chicago, 896 F.Supp.2d 725 (N.D.Ill. 2012). The representative of the estate of a detainee
who died on the night he was to be released from custody brought an action against a city and city police
officers, alleging under § 1983 that the defendants unlawfully detained the detainee and denied him medical
care. Following a trial, the jury returned a verdict for the representative and against four defendants on the
unlawful detention claim, and for the defendants on claims relating to denial of medical care. The defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, a new trial or remittitur on the issue of
damages. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The district court held that: (1)
the issue of whether the defendants held the detainee for more than 48 hours before being taken before a
judge or being released, or for less than 48 hours for an improper purpose, was for the the jury; (2) the
officers had probable cause to arrest the detainee for a crime with an intent element; (3) the issue of whether individual officers participated in the unlawful detention was for the jury; (4) the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity from the unlawful detention claim; (5) the award of $1 million in compensatory
damages was excessive; and (6) the award of $150,500 in punitive damages was not warranted where there
was little to indicate that the defendants acted with evil intent or callous indifference to the detainee's
rights.. The court noted that, although the detainee suffered significant physical pain during the time he was
detained, as well as intense humiliation and severe mental and emotional distress, he was in custody for, at
most, 53 hours, and only the final five hours of his detention were unlawful. The detainee had driven a
semi-trailer truck through a bus stop and into a Chicago Transit Authority “L” Station, killing two women
and injuring 20 people. After brief treatment in a hospital, the police transported him to a police station,
where he was interviewed and then placed in a holding cell. He ultimately only received a traffic citation,
though police kept investigating the collision until the time of his death. Officers were making arrangements to take the detainee to a hospital for evaluation after finding that he had difficulty walking once removed from his cell. He died in the hospital 6 weeks later. (City of Chicago Police Department, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
RELEASE

Wiley v. Buncombe County, 846 F.Supp.2d 480 (W.D.N.C. 2012). A pretrial detainee brought an action
under § 1983 and § 1985 against a county, sheriff, jail, and court official, alleging that the defendants unlawfully subjected him to multiple periods of involuntary commitment and failed to take proper action on a
state habeas corpus petition that he filed challenging the periods of commitment. The defendants moved to
dismiss. The district court granted the motion. The court held that: (1) the detainee could not maintain a §
1983 action challenging the terms of his confinement; (2) the clerk had quasi-judicial immunity from the
pretrial detainee's § 1983 claim; (3) the jail was not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983; (4) the county
could not be liable to the pretrial detainee under § 1983 for the actions of the sheriff; and (5) the county
could not be liable to the pretrial detainee under § 1983 for the actions of the county clerk. The court noted
that under North Carolina law, the county had no control over the sheriff's employees and/or control over
the jail, and therefore county could not be liable to the detainee under § 1983 for the actions of the sheriff
or those of his detention officers for events that occurred at a jail operated by the sheriff. (Buncombe County Detention Facility, North Carolina)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
SAFETY
SUPERVISION

Wilkins v. District of Columbia, 879 F.Supp.2d 35 (D.D.C. 2012). A pretrial detainee in a District of Columbia jail who was stabbed by another inmate brought an action against the District. The district court
entered judgment as a matter of law in favor of the District and the detainee moved for reconsideration. The
district court granted the motion and ordered a new trial. The court held that the issue of whether the failure
of District of Columbia jail personnel to follow national standards of care for inmate access to storage closets and monitoring of inmate movements was the proximate cause of the detainee's stabbing by a fellow
inmate was for the jury, in the detainee's negligence action, under District of Columbia law. Another inmate
who was being held at the D.C. Jail on charges of first-degree murder attacked the detainee. The inmate had
received a pass to go to the jail's law library, unaccompanied. Apparently he did not arrive at the library but
no one from the library called the inmate’s housing unit to report that he had not arrived. An expert retained
by the detainee asserted that failure to monitor inmate movements violated national standards for the operation of jails. En route to the jail mental health unit, the detainee saw the inmate enter a mop closet. The
inmate, along with another inmate, approached the detainee and stabbed him nine times with a knife. During court proceedings there was testimony that the inmates had hidden contraband in the mop closets. The
closets are supposed to be locked at all times, other than when the jail is being cleaned each afternoon. But
there was evidence from which the jury could infer that all inmates except those who did not have jobs
cleaning in the jail had access to them. According to the detainee’s expert witness, keeping mop closets
locked at times when the general inmate population is permitted to be in the vicinity of the closets is in
accordance with national standards of care for the operation of detention facilities. According to the district
court, “In sum, the circumstantial evidence of Mr. Foreman's [inmate who attacked the detainee] freedom
of movement is enough to have allowed a jury to conclude that the District's negligence was a proximate
cause of Mr. Wilkins's injury…”. (District of Columbia Central Detention Facility)

U.S. District Court
TRANSPORTATION
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
DUE PROCESS
EQUAL PROTECTION
HANDICAP
PRIVACY
SAFETY

Woods v. City of Utica, 902 F.Supp.2d 273 (N.D.N.Y. 2012). A wheelchair-using, paraplegic arrestee sued
a city, police officer, a county, a former sheriff, and county corrections officers, bringing federal causes of
action for violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act, and Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection and due process. The arrestee alleged that he was lifted out of his wheelchair
and placed on the floor of a sheriff's van, forcing him to maneuver himself onto a bench seat which caused
his pants and underwear to fall, exposing his genitals, that he was not secured to the bench with a seatbelt,
causing him to be thrown about the passenger compartment and suffer leg spasms during his ride to the jail,
that he was forced to urinate into an empty soda bottle and handle his sterile catheter with his hands that
were dirty from moving himself around the floor of the van, and that the county corrections officers stood

32.220

by as he struggled to maneuver himself out of the van and into his wheelchair while other inmates watched.
The city and county defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court held that: (1) the city did
not fail to accommodate the arrestee's disability, for purposes of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims;
(2) summary judgment was precluded by fact issues as to whether the arrestee was denied the benefit of
safe and appropriate transportation by the county on the day of his arrest when he was moved from a police
station to a county jail; (3) the county was entitled to summary judgment to the extent the arrestee's claims
involved his transportation from the jail to court proceedings on two other dates; (4) fact issues existed as to
whether the county defendants were deliberately indifferent to the paraplegic inmate's known medical need
for suppositories every other day, in violation of due process, but they were not deliberately indifferent to
his need for catheters and prescription pain medication; and (5) the county defendants were not entitled to
qualified immunity. The court noted that while the county defendants disputed the arrestee's version of the
facts, corrections officers all denied receiving any training regarding how to transport disabled inmates.
(Utica Police Department, Oneida County Correctional Facility, New York)
U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Wright v. County of Franklin, Ohio, 881 F.Supp.2d 887 (S.D.Ohio 2012). A pretrial detainee brought a §
1983 action against a county, sheriff, deputy, medical staff, and physician, alleging deliberate indifference
to his serious medical needs in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and state common law claims. The
defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part.
The court held that the pretrial detainee who had abdominal pain had a serious medical need, as required to
support a § 1983 claim against the county, sheriff, deputy, medical staff, and physician for deliberate indifference to his serious medical need in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. According to the court, as a
result of the delay in diagnosis and treatment, the detainee was later rushed to a hospital, diagnosed with a
small bowel obstruction and a mass in his colon, and subjected to emergency surgery. The court found that
summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issues of material fact as to: (1) whether a nurse failed to
exercise judgment and instead chose to ignore serious symptoms that ultimately led to the pretrial detainee
with abdominal pain having to undergo multiple major surgeries; (2) whether nurses did basically nothing
in the face of the pretrial detainee's alarming symptoms, including vomiting blood and severe abdominal
pain, which later proved to be precursor to a serious gastrointestinal issue. The court found that there was
no evidence that the county or sheriff had a policy or custom of recklessly training medical staff who were
contracted to work at the prison, as required to support the pretrial detainee's § 1983 claim for failure to
train. The court noted that the detainee's claim was based on little more than the argument that the Sheriff's
Office and the county did not do enough to ensure that nurses were familiar with policies applicable to
inmates who need medical care. (Franklin County Correctional Center, Correctional Care Plus, Ohio)
2013

U.S. District Court
PUNISHMNET
RESTRAINTS
SEGREGATION
DUE PROCESS

Allah v. Milling, 982 F.Supp.2d 172 (D.Conn. 2013). A pretrial detainee brought an action against prison
officials, asserting claims for violation of the Eighth Amendment and his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment based on his placement in an administrative segregation program. The officials moved
for summary judgment on the due process claims. The district court denied the motion, finding that summary judgment was precluded by several fact issues. The court held that a genuine issue of material fact
existed as to whether the decision by prison officials to place the pretrial detainee, who had previously been
in an administrative segregation program before being discharged from the correctional facility, in administrative segregation immediately upon his readmission for a subsequent offense, was for a punitive purpose
or was based on a legitimate non-punitive purpose. The court found that a fact issue existed as to whether
the restrictions imposed upon the detainee during his confinement in administrative segregation, including
handcuffs and leg shackles, constituted punishment. (Garner Correctional Institution, Connecticut)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
SAFETY

Baker v. RR Brink Locking Systems, Inc., 721 F.3d 716 (5th Cir. 2013). A pretrial detainee brought an action
against the manufacturer of allegedly faulty locks on cell doors that permitted another inmate to enter the
detainee's cell and assault and rape him. The manufacturer moved for summary judgment. The district court
denied the motion and then denied reconsideration. The manufacturer moved for permission to file an appeal before the case had been adjudicated. The motion was granted in part. The appeals court affirmed,
allowing the case to continue. (RR Brink, Harrison County Detention Center, Mississippi)

U.S. Appeals Court
ALIEN
DUE PROCESS
EQUAL PROTECTION
FEMALES
INTAKE SCREENING
MEDICAL CARE
MENTAL HEALTH
SUICIDE

Belbachir v. County of McHenry, 726 F.3d 975 (7th Cir. 2013). The administrator of the estate of a female
federal detainee who committed suicide in a county jail filed suit against the county, county jail officials,
and employees of the medical provider that had a contract with the county to provide medical services at
the jail, alleging violation of the detainee's due process rights and Illinois tort claims. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of all county defendants. The administrator appealed. The appeals
court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The appeals court found that the jail inmate who was
detained by federal immigration authorities pending her removal hearing was in the same position as a
lawfully arrested pretrial detainee. The court noted that a pretrial detainee was entitled, pursuant to the due
process clause, to at least as much protection during her detention as convicted criminals were entitled to
under the Eighth Amendment-- namely protection from harm caused by a defendant's deliberate indifference to the inmate's safety or health. The court asserted that persons who have been involuntarily committed are entitled, under the due process clause, to more considerate treatment during detention than criminals
whose conditions of confinement are designed to punish.
The court found that the alleged conduct of a clinical social worker at the county jail who interviewed
the detainee, in noting that the detainee suffered from a major depressive disorder, hallucinations, acute
anxiety, and feelings of hopelessness, but allegedly failing to report those findings to the jail guards or any
other jail staff or to recommend that the detainee be placed on a suicide watch or receive mental health
treatment, amounted to deliberate indifference to the detainee's risk of suicide, in violation of the detainee's

32.221

due process rights. The court held that a nurse manager employed by the medical provider was not deliberately indifferent to the detainee's risk of suicide, as would violate the detainee's due process rights, where
the nurse manager treated the detainee for panic attacks and anxiety, and recommended that she be given a
cellmate and transferred to a medical treatment area at the jail, both of which were done, and there was no
showing that the nurse manager knew that the detainee was suicidal.
According to the court, the county sheriff's and county jail director's failure to provide annual training to
jail staff on how to recognize the risk of suicide in detainees, and their failure to implement a suicide prevention policy, did not render the county liable under § 1983 for the detainee's suicide during her detention
at the jail, absent a showing that such failures caused the detainee's suicide. (McHenry County Jail, Illinois)
U.S. District Court
TRANSPORT
FAILURE TO PROTECT
TRANSFER

Benton v. Rousseau, 940 F.Supp.2d 1370 (M.D.Fla. 2013). A pretrial detainee, who alleged that he was
beaten by drivers while being transported to prison, brought a § 1983 action against drivers of a private
company which was in the business of transporting prisoners throughout the State of Florida. The district
court held that the inmate established a § 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim and a § 1983 Fourteenth
Amendment excessive force claim. According to the court: (1) the prisoner engaged in constitutionally
protected speech because he complained about conditions of his confinement in the transport vehicle; (2)
the driver of transport vehicle engaged in adverse or retaliatory conduct by pulling the inmate out of the van
and onto the ground and beating and kicking the inmate; and (3) there was a causal connection between the
driver's retaliatory action and inmate's protected speech, in that the incident would not have occurred but
for the inmate's complaints regarding conditions of his confinement. The court noted that the inmate's injuries included headaches and facial scars, and his injuries, although perhaps not serious, amounted to more
than de minimis injuries. The court ruled that the inmate was entitled to $45,012 in compensatory damages
because the inmate had scarring on his face and suffered from headaches and numbness in his side, he suffered the loss of a $12 shirt, and he suffered mental and emotional anguish as a result of actions of drivers
of transport van, who kicked and beat him. The court held that the inmate was entitled to punitive damages
in the amount of $15,000 based on the violation of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by the drivers. The court noted that although the drivers were no longer employed by their private employer, the employer did not investigate after the incident nor did it punish the drivers for their actions, and imposition of
punitive damages would deter the drivers from taking similar actions in the future. (United States Prisoner
Transport, Hernando County Jail, Florida)

U.S. Appeals Court
JUVENILES
MEDICAL CARE
MENTAL HEALTH
RESTRAINTS
USE OF FORCE
DUE PROCESS

Blackmon v. Sutton, 734 F.3d 1237 (10th Cir. 2013). A former juvenile pretrial detainee brought a § 1983
action against various members of a juvenile detention center's staff, alleging they violated the Fourteenth
Amendment rights guaranteed to him as a pretrial detainee. The district court denied the defendants' motion
for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed
in part, and reversed in part. The court held that the eleven-year-old pretrial detainee's right to be free from
punishment altogether was clearly established at the time the staff allegedly used a chair bearing wrist,
waist, chest, and ankle restraints to punish detainee, for the purposes of the juvenile detention center's
staff's qualified immunity defense. According to the court, the senior correctional officer approved a decision by one of his subordinates, a fully grown man, to sit on the chest of the eleven-year-old without any
penological purpose. The court found that the detainee’s Fourteenth Amendment due process rights were
violated when employees allegedly failed to provide the eleven-year-old detainee with any meaningful
mental health care despite his obvious need for it. The court noted that prison officials who assumed a “gate
keeping” authority over the prisoner’s access to medical professionals were deliberately indifferent to the
detainee's medical needs when they denied or delayed access to medical care. But the court also held that
the detainee's alleged right to be placed in a particular facility of his choice while awaiting trial was not
clearly established at the time the director failed to transfer detainee to a nearby shelter, for purposes of the
juvenile detention center director's qualified immunity defense.. The court stated: “Weeks before elevenyear-old, 4'11," 96–pound Brandon Blackmon arrived at the juvenile detention center in Sedgwick, Kansas,
officials there made a new purchase: the Pro–Straint Restraining Chair, Violent Prisoner Chair Model RC–
1200LX. The chair bore wrist, waist, chest, and ankle restraints. In the months that followed, the staff made
liberal use of their new acquisition on the center's youngest and smallest charge. Sometimes in a legitimate
effort to thwart his attempts at suicide and self-harm. But sometimes, it seems, only to punish him. And
that's the nub of this lawsuit.” (Juvenile Residential Facility, Sedgwick County, Kansas)

U.S. Appeals Court
CROWDING
CONDITIONS
EXERCISE
MEDICAL CARE
RECREATION
SANITATION

Budd v. Motley, 711 F.3d 840 (7th Cir. 2013). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that, as a pretrial
detainee, he was subjected to unconstitutional conditions of confinement at a county jail and that the sheriff
was deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. The district court dismissed the complaint, and the inmate
appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The appeals court held that the
detainee's allegations were sufficient to state a plausible claim under the Due Process Clause for subjecting
him to unconstitutional conditions of confinement. The prisoner alleged that: (1) on one occasion he was
confined with eight inmates in a portion of the county jail intended for three; (2) he had to sleep on the
floor alongside broken windows and cracked toilets; (3) on another occasion he and other inmates had to
sleep on the floor even though shower water leaked there; (4) cells had broken windows, exposed wiring,
extensive rust, sinks without running water, toilets covered in mold and spider webs, and a broken heating
and cooling system; (5) inmates were denied any recreation; and (6) the jail furnished inmates with no
supplies to clean for themselves. The appeals court found that county jail officials were not deliberately
indifferent to the pretrial detainee's serious medical needs, in violation of the Due Process Clause even if he
was dissatisfied with the treatment he received from a jail nurse. The court noted that the detainee was
taken to see a nurse as soon as he informed the officer on duty about his leg wound, he was taken to a hospital promptly after writing a letter to the sheriff asking to see a doctor, and the detainee received medical
attention, medication, testing, and ongoing observation at the hospital. (Edgar County Jail, Illinois)

32.222

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
MEDICAL CARE
USE OF FORCE

Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462 (6th Cir. 2013). An arrestee brought an action under § 1983 against a
county board of commissioners, sheriff, deputies, and jail nurse, alleging violations of his constitutional
rights during his arrest. The defendants moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the
motion. The arrestee appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part, reversed in part, and
remanded. The appeals court held that: (1) a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the force
used against the arrestee was reasonable; (2) a corrections officer and the jail nurse were not liable for failure to prevent deputy sheriffs from using excessive force, absent a showing that the nurse and officer had
both the opportunity and the means to prevent the harm from occurring; (3) the nurse was not liable for
deliberate indifference to the arrestee's medical needs, where the arrestee's latent cranial injury was not so
obvious that a lay person would easily have recognized the necessity for a doctor's attention; (4) the county
board of commissioners was not liable under § 1983 for any alleged conduct of deputy sheriffs in violating
the arrestee's federal constitutional rights, absent a showing that any county policy or custom was the moving force behind the alleged violations; (5) a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether a deputy
sheriffs' use of force against the arrestee was reckless under Ohio law; (6) a genuine issue of material fact
existed as to whether a deputy sheriff assaulted the arrestee in response to an off-color jibe; and (7) genuine
issues of material fact existed as to whether the county board of commissioners, sheriff, and deputies knew
that litigation was probable and whether their destruction of videotape evidence of deputies' use of force
against the arrestee was willful. The court also found that the jail nurse did not act with malice and in a
wanton and willful manner in allowing the arrestee to sit in a county jail cell for 12 hours with serious injuries, where the nurse attended to the arrestee, assessed what she perceived to be minor injuries, provided
him with ibuprofen for his pain, and advised him he could contact someone for further medical assistance if
necessary. (Greene County Jail, Ohio)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
MEDICAL CARE
MENTAL HEALTH
SUICIDE ATTEMPT

Chennault v. Mitchell, 923 F.Supp.2d 765 (E.D.Va. 2013). The guardian for an incapacitated former pretrial detainee filed § 1983 action against a former sheriff and former officers of the sheriff's department for
alleged violation of the detainee's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process, by deliberate indifference to
her medical needs that resulted in her permanent brain damage from an attempted suicide. The defendants
moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion. The court held that sheriff's department officers
were not deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of the detainee, as required to support the
detainee's § 1983 claim for violation of her Fourteenth Amendment due process rights, where the officers
had no knowledge or even any reason to suspect that the detainee presented a risk of suicide, rather than
merely a risk of violent behavior towards officers. According to the court, the sheriff's department officers'
pepper spraying of the detainee due to her violent behavior toward the officers, and then failing to decontaminate her, did not establish that the officers knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of harm to the
detainee, where the officers did not know or have reason to believe that the detainee was suicidal at the
time that she was sprayed, the detainee did not allege that the use of spray was unnecessary or excessive in
amount, and the detainee did not exhibit any adverse reactions to the spray or to the lack of decontamination. The court found that the sheriff's department officers' failure to support the detainee's body and/or
neck when they cut her shirt on which she hung herself on cell bars in an attempted suicide did not constitute deliberate indifference to her serious medical needs in violation of her Fourteenth Amendment due
process rights. The court noted that, even though the detainee's injuries were increased from sliding down
cell bars and forcibly striking her head on the cell door, the officers faced an emergency and needed to act
quickly and decisively to save the detainee's life. According to the court, their actions “…were not only
reasonable in this situation, but laudable.” The court held that the detainee's § 1983 claim that the sheriff
failed to train jail personnel, to ensure they could adequately respond to the medical needs of combative
and/or intoxicated detainees, was foreclosed by the lack of a Fourteenth Amendment violation by jail personnel and a lack of a causal link between the sheriff's policies and the detainee's attempted suicide, where
jail personnel were not deliberately indifferent to the detainee's medical needs in violation of the detainee's
due process rights, and there was no pattern of unconstitutional violations resulting in suicides or attempted
suicides. (Richmond City Jail Annex, Virginia)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
USE OF FORCE
DUE PROCESS
SUPERVISION

Christie ex rel. estate of Christie v. Scott, 923 F.Supp.2d 1308 (M.D.Fla. 2013). An estate brought a §
1983 action against a private prison health services provider and corrections officers following the death of
a detainee after he was pepper-sprayed over 12 times in 36 hours. The provider moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to: (1) whether failure of the nurses to inspect the
detainee after each time he was pepper-sprayed constituted deliberate indifference; (2) whether the sheriff
knew that corrections officers were using pepper spray nearly indiscriminately; (3) whether corrections
officers were deliberately indifferent to the detainee's physical and medical needs; and (4) whether corrections officers' repeated pepper-spraying of the detainee while he was restrained naked in a chair was malicious and sadistic to the point of shocking the conscience. The estate alleged that the nurses' failed to evaluate the detainee after each time he was pepper-sprayed, failed to follow their employer’s policy by not
monitoring the detainee every 15 minutes for the periods he was restrained, and failed to offer the detainee
fluids or a bedpan while he was restrained. The nurses allegedly checked the inmate only two times during
the five hours he was restrained. The court found that the health services provider did not have a policy of
understaffing that constituted deliberate indifference to the detainee’s health, as required to support a §
1983 claim against the private provider. (Lee County Jail, Florida)

U.S. District Court
CLOTHING
PRIVACY
SEARCHES
USE OF FORCE

Clay v. Woodbury County, Iowa, 982 F.Supp.2d 904 (N.D.Iowa 2013). A female arrestee brought a § 1983
action against a city, an arresting officer, county, county sheriff, and jail officers, alleging, among other
things, that jail officers “strip searched” her without reasonable suspicion and in unconstitutional manner,
and did so in retaliation for her vociferous complaints about her detention and the search of her purse and
cell phone. The defendants moved for summary judgment, and the arrestee moved to exclude expert testi-

32.223

mony. The district court held that the expert's reference to an incorrect standard for the excessive force
claim did not warrant excluding his opinions in their entirety, although portions of the expert's report were
inadmissible.
The court found that the incident in which male and female county jail officers forcibly removed the
female arrestee's under-wire bra and changed her into jail attire was not a “strip search” within the meaning
of the Iowa law which defined a “strip search” as “having a person remove or arrange some or all of the
person's clothing so as to permit an inspection of the genitalia, buttocks, female breasts or undergarments of
that person or a physical probe by any body cavity,” where there was no indication that the officers inspected the arrestee's private parts or physically probed any of her body cavities. The court also found that the
arrestee whose clothing was forcibly removed in the presence of male and female county jail officers in a
holding cell after the arrestee refused to answer questions during the booking process and to remove her
clothing herself, was not subjected to a “strip search” requiring reasonable suspicion under the Fourth
Amendment. According to the court, the officers did not violate the arrestee’s privacy rights under the
Fourth Amendment where the officers' reason for removing the arrestee's bra-- institutional safety-- was
substantially justified, and the scope of the intrusion was relatively small. The court also found that the
officers were entitled to qualified immunity from the female arrestee's § 1983 unlawful search claim, where
the officers neither knew, nor reasonably should have known, that their actions would violate the arrestee's
privacy rights.
The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether
the amount of force used by female county jail officers during the booking process to forcibly remove the
female arrestee's under-wire bra and change her into jail attire after the arrestee refused to answer questions, became disruptive, and refused to remove her clothing herself, was reasonable. The officers allegedly
threw the arrestee onto the cell bunk, causing her to bang her head against the bunk or cell wall. The court
found that male county jail officers did not use excessive force, within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, in restraining the female arrestee in a holding cell after the female officers had allegedly thrown the
arrestee onto a cell bunk, causing her to bang her head against bunk or cell wall, in an effort to forcibly
remove the arrestee's clothing and to change her into jail attire. (Woodbury County Jail, Iowa)
U.S. District Court
CIVIL COMMITMENT
HANDICAP
RELIGION

Cooke v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 926 F.Supp.2d 720 (E.D.N.C. 2013). Detainees who used wheelchairs
and who were civilly committed at a federal corrections facility as sexually dangerous persons filed suit,
seeking injunctive relief against the United States Bureau of Prisons for its alleged failure to accommodate
their disabilities in violation of the Architectural Barriers Act (ABA), the Rehabilitation Act, the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), and the First and Fifth Amendments. The government moved to dismiss
and for summary judgment, and the detainees moved for discovery and to deny the government's motions.
The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court found that although the detainees failed to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing suit under the ABA, the detainees were not
“prisoners” as defined by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) and thus did not have to exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit. The court found that the detainees, by alleging that, unlike detainees without disabilities, they could not access the prison's religious library or an outdoor pagan worship
area, stated claims under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA) in their action seeking injunctive relief against the Bureau of Prisons for failing to
accommodate their disabilities. The court held that the detainees failed to state a claim for a violation of the
constitutional right to privacy. According to the court, even assuming that the detainees had a limited constitutional right to privacy in medical treatment, the inmates alleged that the prison medical facility had no
private, wheelchair-accessible examination room, but did not allege harm from the use or disclosure of their
medical information. (Butner Federal Correctional Complex, North Carolina)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
MEDICATION
WRONGFUL DEATH

Currie v. Chhabra, 728 F.3d 626 (7th Cir. 2013). The administrator of the estate of a deceased arrestee
brought an action against a county, jail officials, and health care providers, alleging various claims, including claims pursuant to § 1983 and the Illinois Wrongful Death Act, and for punitive damages. The district
court denied the providers' motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity. The providers appealed prior to
disposition by the district court. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the health care
providers were not entitled to qualified immunity to the arrestee's estate's civil rights claim under the Fourth
Amendment alleging that the providers' failure to monitor the arrestee's blood sugar level, provide insulin
shots, and deliver other necessary medical care while the arrestee was detained in the county jail. According to the court, the officials’ conduct was objectively unreasonable and caused the detainee’s death, which
resulted from diabetic ketoacidosis, a life-threatening condition associated with untreated Type I diabetes.
The court noted that although prior Fourth Amendment medical care cases spoke only of “officers,” those
opinions did not hint at any special Fourth Amendment exemption for health care professionals. (Williamson County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
SEGREGATION
USE OF FORCE
CLASSIFICATION

Davis v. Pickell, 939 F.Supp.2d 771 (E.D.Mich. 2013). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against
a sheriff, undersheriff, and deputies, alleging various claims, including excessive force. The defendants
moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The detainee had been booked into a holding cell at the jail and then he was removed from the multi-prisoner cell and
taken to a single-inmate “safety cell.” He alleges that during the transfer, deputy sheriffs subjected him to
excessive force in the course of removing his jacket and shoes. The district court found that “[T]he videotape provides substance to those allegations.” The court held that summary judgment was precluded by
genuine issues of material fact as to whether the deputies' use of force against the detainee shocked the
conscience, whether the deputies maliciously used force, and whether the use of force on the detainee was
outrageous conduct. (Genesee County Jail, Michigan)

32.224

U.S. District Court
CELL CAPACITY
CROWDING
DUE PROCESS
FAILURE TO PROTECT
MAIL
MEDICAL CARE
SAFETY
SANITATION

Duran v. Merline, 923 F.Supp.2d 702 (D.N.J. 2013). A former pretrial detainee at a county detention facility brought a pro se § 1983 action against various facility officials and employees, the company which provided food and sanitation services to the facility, and the medical services provider, alleging various constitutional torts related to his pretrial detention. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district
court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The district court held that fact issues precluded summary judgment on: (1) the conditions of confinement claim against a former warden in his official capacity;
(2) an interference with legal mail claim against a correctional officer that alleged that the facility deliberately withheld the detainee's legal mail during a two-week period; (3) a First Amendment retaliation claim
based on interference with legal mail; and (4) a claim for inadequate medical care as to whether the detainee's Hepatitis C condition was a serious medical condition that required treatment and whether the provider
denied such treatment because it was too costly. The detainee asserted that overcrowding at the county
detention facility, which allegedly led to the detainee being forced to sleep and eat his meals next to open
toilet, and led to inmate-on-inmate violence, contributed to his assault by another inmate. According to the
court, the long-standing conditions of confinement whereby the county detention facility was overcrowded
for at least 24 years and facility officials “triple-celled” inmates, allegedly leading to unsanitary conditions,
amounted to a “custom” for the purposes of the former detainee's § 1983 Fourteenth Amendment conditions of confinement claim against a former warden in his official capacity.
The court held that the food service provider's serving the detainee cold meals for a 45-day period while
the kitchen in the county detention facility was being renovated, was not “punishment,” as would support
the inmate's § 1983 Fourteenth Amendment conditions of confinement claim against the provider, absent
evidence that the food served to the detainee was spoiled or contaminated, that a significant portion of the
detainee's diet consisted of such food, or that the food service caused more than a temporary discomfort.
The court also held that the alleged actions of the food service provider in serving the detainee one food
item when another ran out, failing to serve bread with the inmate's meal, serving the inmate leftovers from
days before, serving juice in a dirty container on one occasion, serving milk after its expiration date, and
serving meals on cracked trays that caused the detainee to contract food poisoning, did not amount to a
substantial deprivation of food sufficient to amount to unconstitutional conditions of confinement, as would
violate the inmate's due process rights. (Atlantic County Justice Facility, New Jersey)

U.S. District Court
ALIEN
DUE PROCESS
FAILURE TO PROTECT
JUVENILES
SAFETY

E.A.F.F. v. U.S., 955 F.Supp.2d 707 (W.D.Tex. 2013). Unaccompanied alien minors brought an action
against Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) officials, alleging they were physically and sexually abused
while they were in detention awaiting final adjudication of their immigration status. The officials moved for
partial summary judgment. The district court granted the motions. The court noted that a person detained
for deportation is equivalent to a pretrial detainee, and a pretrial detainee's constitutional claims are considered under the Due Process Clause. The court held that the officials could not be held liable for due process
violations that occurred when the unaccompanied alien minors were physically and sexually abused as a
result of alleged overcrowding at a detention facility, where they were being held while awaiting final adjudication of their immigration status, and where there was no evidence that the officials were responsible
for decisions regarding the facility's capacity.
According to the court, isolated incidents of physical and sexual abuse by staff members at the detention
facility were insufficient to put the officials on notice of a substantial risk of future abuse, as required to
hold the officials liable for deliberate indifference in failing to protect the minors' safety in violation of their
due process rights. The court noted that other incidents of alleged abuse were investigated by the Texas
Department of Family and Protective Services and did not result in any abuse findings.
The court found that officials' failure to systematically interview minors concerning their abuse allegations did not amount to deliberate indifference to their safety in violation of their due process rights, where
officials spoke to some of the minors during their monitoring visits, and clinicians were on-site and available to speak with the minors on a regular basis. The court held that the officials could not be held liable in
their supervisory capacities on a theory of failure to train or supervise, for due process violations arising
from alleged physical and sexual abuse by staff members at the detention facility, where staff members
received training in behavior management and de-escalation techniques, officials responded to reports of
abuse by recommending or providing further training, officials adopted safety policies designed to prevent
abuse, and officials recommended that staff members work in pairs and they were unaware that staff members were working individually. (Nixon facility Operated by Away From Home, Inc., Texas)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
USE OF FORCE

Eason v. Frye, 972 F.Supp.2d 935 (S.D.Miss. 2013). A pretrial detainee brought a pro se § 1983 action
against an officer and a sheriff, alleging that the officer used excessive force by releasing his canine while
responding to a fight between the detainee and another inmate, and that he did not receive immediate medical attention after the incident. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the
motion. The district court held that: (1) the detainee failed to allege that the sheriff was personally involved
in the dog bite incident, as required for § 1983 liability; (2) the officer did not use excessive force; (3) prison officials were not deliberately indifferent to the detainee's serious medical needs where there was no
evidence that the officials refused to treat the detainee, ignored his complaints, or intentionally treated him
incorrectly; (4) the detainee failed to state a § 1983 failure to train or supervise claim; (5) the sheriff was
entitled to qualified immunity from the failure to train claim, where the detainee made no specific allegations about how the sheriff was unreasonable in his training and supervising methods; and (6) the detainee
could not maintain a claim for mental or emotional suffering. The court noted that the detainee refused to
stop fighting when the officer ordered him to stop, thus causing an obvious threat to security. In response,
the officer applied the amount of force necessary to restore order on the tier, and as soon as the detainee
went to the ground and stopped fighting, the officer ordered the dog to release its grip. The detainee suffered a minor injury when he was bitten by the dog. According to the court, the detainee made no specific
allegations regarding how the training and supervision program at the detention facility was inadequate or

32.225

defective, he contended that his numerous complaints and grievances went unanswered but provided no
evidence of inadequate training or supervision, and he made no allegation of an official policy that caused
the allegedly inadequate training and supervision. (Harrison County Adult Detention Center, Mississippi)
U.S. District Court
EQUAL PROTECTION
MEDICAL CARE
TRANSPORT
WRONGFUL DEATH

Estate of Prasad ex rel. Prasad v. County of Sutter, 958 F.Supp.2d 1101 (E.D.Cal. 2013). The estate of a
deceased pretrial detainee brought an action against jail employees and officials, as well as medical staff,
alleging violations of the Fourteenth Amendment. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court
granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that: (1) although the detainee died at a hospital, liability for the jail employees and officials was not precluded, where the jail employees and officials
could have contributed to detainee's death despite the transfer to the hospital; (2) allegations were sufficient
plead deliberate indifference to serious medical needs by the deputies and medical staff; (3) allegations
were sufficient to state a claim for supervisory liability; (4) allegations were sufficient to state a claim for
supervisory liability against the corrections officers in charge; (5) allegations were sufficient to state a
claim against the county; (6) allegations were sufficient to state a claim for wrongful death under California
law; and (7) the health care provider was a state actor. The court found that a statement by health care providers, in an attachment to the complaint, that even if the detainee had been transferred to the hospital
sooner, it “probably” would not have changed his death, was possibly self serving, and did not contradict
the complaint's allegations that the detainee's death was unnecessary and unavoidable.
According to the court, allegations that the county maintained customs or practices whereby no medical
staff whatsoever were at the jail for one-sixth of every day, that the staff lacked authority to respond to
emergency and critical inmate needs, and that the jail records system withheld information from affiliated
health care providers, were sufficient to state a § 1983 claim against the county, alleging violations of the
Fourteenth Amendment after the pretrial detainee died.
The court held that allegations that deficiencies in medical care at the jail, including lack of 24-hour
emergency care, were longstanding, repeatedly documented, and expressly noted by officials in the past.,
and that the doctor who was employed by the health care provider that contracted with the prison was
aware of the deficiencies, and that the doctor discharged the pretrial detainee to the jail were sufficient to
plead deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, as required to state a § 1983 action against the doctor for violations of the Fourteenth Amendment after the detainee died. (Sutter County Jail, California)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
MEDICATION
WRONGFUL DEATH

Ford-Sholebo v. U.S., 980 F.Supp.2d 917 (N.D.Ill. 2013). The wife of a deceased pretrial detainee who
suffered from a seizure disorder, individually and as administrator of the detainee's estate, brought a wrongful death action against the United States pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The district
court held that: (1) evidence supported a finding that the detainee had a seizure disorder; (2) correctional
facility employees breached the standard of care for treating the detainee's seizure disorder; (3) the employees' failures and breaches of the standard of care proximately caused the detainee's death; and (4) an award
of damages to the wife in the amount of $40,000 for the loss of consortium was appropriate. The court
noted that the testimony of the administrator's expert physician and a pathologist who was subpoenaed to
testify at trial, that the detainee suffered from a seizure disorder, was overwhelmingly credible, while testimony of the government's two experts, that the detainee did not have seizure disorder, was incredible and
unreliable. According to the court, the standard of care for treating the detainee's seizure disorder required
correctional facility personnel, including physicians and physician assistants, to examine the detainee on a
monthly basis, review the detainee's medical records, draw the detainee's blood for the purpose of monitoring the level of anti-seizure medication in his blood and obtain corresponding lab reports, and inform the
detainee about the risks and benefits of taking or not taking medication, and to counsel him about his medication. The court found that the facility breached the appropriate standard of care, where required monthly
evaluations were not conducted, facility personnel failed to make any efforts to retrieve the detainee's medical records while they were treating the detainee, facility physicians were derelict in their duty to review
medical records they actually possessed and then to meet with the detainee in light of information they
derived from those records, and physicians failed to talk to the detainee about his medication, to ask him
why he was not taking his medication, and to counsel him about his noncompliance. (Metropolitan Correctional Center, Chicago, and Kankakee County Detention Center, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
SEXUAL ASSAULT

Franklin v. Curry, 738 F.3d 1246 (11th Cir. 2013). A female pretrial detainee brought an action under §
1983 against a corrections officer and various other officers at a jail after she had been sexually assaulted.
The district court denied the supervisory defendants' motion to dismiss and they appealed. The appeals
court reversed, finding that the detainee had to allege that the supervisory officers actually knew of a serious risk that the offending officer posed, and that her complaint was insufficient to state a plausible claim
that each supervisory officer should have known of a substantial risk that the offending officer would sexually assault her. (Shelby County Jail, Florida)

U.S. Appeals Court
ADA-Americans with
Disabilities Act
MEDICAL CARE

Gilmore v. Hodges, 738 F.3d 266 (11th Cir. 2013). A pretrial detainee, proceeding pro se, brought a § 1983
action against prison officers, alleging violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), in failing to provide batteries for his hearing aids. The district
court granted summary judgment for the officers. The detainee appealed. The appealed court affirmed. The
court found genuine issues of material fact as to whether the detainee's severe hearing loss that could be
corrected by hearing aids was an objectively serious medical need, and whether prison officials' response to
the detainee's need for batteries for his hearing aids was objectively insufficient. But the court held that the
detainee's right to a functioning hearing aid was not clearly established at the time, and therefore the officers were entitled to summary judgment. (Wakulla County Jail, Florida)

32.226

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
SAFETY

Glaze v. Byrd, 721 F.3d 528 (8th Cir. 2013). A pretrial detainee who had been beaten by three fellow inmates brought an action against a correctional officer, a lieutenant, and jail officials, alleging deliberate
indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district
court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The officer and
the lieutenant appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held that summary judgment for the correctional officer was precluded by a fact question as to whether the correctional
officer was aware of a substantial risk of harm to the detainee and was deliberately indifferent to his safety.
(Faulkner County Detention Center, Arkansas)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
SUPERVISION

Goodman v. Kimbrough, 718 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 2013). The wife of a pretrial detainee who suffered from
dementia and who was severely beaten by his cellmate filed a § 1983 action against jail officials in their
individual capacities for alleged violation of the Due Process Clause by deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of harm to the detainee. The wife also asserted a supervisory liability claim against the sheriff in his
official capacity and a state law claim for loss of support and consortium. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The wife appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that there
was no evidence that jail officials were subjectively aware of a risk of serious harm to which the pretrial
detainee was exposed from his severe beating by a cellmate, and that the officials deliberately disregarded
that risk, as required to support the detainee's § 1983 claim of deliberate indifference in violation of the Due
Process Clause. According to the court, the officers' failure to conduct cell checks and head counts and their
deactivation of emergency call buttons constituted negligence but did not justify constitutional liability
under § 1983. According to the court, jail officials' policy violations by failing to enter every cell in conducting head counts and in deactivating emergency call buttons did not constitute a custom so settled and
permanent as to have the force of law. (Clayton County Jail, Georgia)

U.S. District Court
ALIENS
DUE PROCESS
INITIAL APPEARANCE

Gordon v. Johnson, 991 F.Supp.2d 258 (D.Mass. 2013). An alien, a lawful permanent resident who was
subjected to mandatory detention pending removal five years after his arrest for narcotics possession, petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus on his own behalf and on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals, seeking an individualized bond hearing to challenge his ongoing detention. The government moved to
dismiss. The district court allowed the petition, finding that the phrase “when the alien is released” in the
statute authorizing mandatory detention of criminal aliens meant “at the time of release,” and that the petitioner was entitled to a bond hearing for consideration of the possibility of his release on conditions.
(Franklin County Jail and House of Correction, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, Sheriff
of Bristol County, Sheriff of Plymouth County, Sheriff of Suffolk County, Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
CIVIL COMMITMENT
DUE PROCESS
CONDITIONS

Grohs v. Yatauro, 984 F.Supp.2d 273 (D.N.J. 2013). A civilly-committed resident at a special treatment
unit (STU) operated by the New Jersey Department of Corrections (NJDOC) brought action an against
NJDOC officials, alleging violations of his substantive due process rights under § 1983. The district court
held that the resident's claims against the officials in their official capacities were barred by sovereign immunity. The court held that the resident's allegations adequately pled the officials’ personal involvement in
his complaint that: (1) there were visibly leaking steam pipes in a special treatment unit (STU) for which
trash cans were used to collect water; (2) NJDOC officials personally toured STU; (3) STU received numerous written complaints from residents about inadequate hot water; and (4) an STU assistant administrator told the resident that defective piping valves were too expensive to repair. The court found that the officials were subject to liability under § 1983 in their individual capacities. The court held that NJDOC officials were not entitled to qualified immunity from the civilly committed resident's § 1983 conditions of
civil commitment claim under the Due Process Clause, arising from inadequate hot water at a special
treatment unit (STU) in which he was housed. (Special Treatment Unit, Avenel, Middlesex County, New
Jersey)

U.S. District Court
CLASSIFICATION
SEARCHES

Haas v. Burlington County, 955 F.Supp.2d 334 (D.N.J. 2013). Arrestees filed a proposed class action under
§ 1983 alleging that their constitutional rights were violated when they were strip searched at a county jail.
The district court granted the arrestees' motion for leave to file an amended complaint, and the county appealed. The district court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held that the arrestees' proposed
amendment to their complaint, in which they alleged that they were arrested for minor offenses, that they
either were held, or could have been held, outside of the general jail population, and that they were subjected to strip searches pursuant to the county's blanket policy before their detentions had been reviewed by a
judicial officer, stated plausible claims for violation of their rights under Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Burlington County Jail, New Jersey)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Hahn v. Walsh, 915 F.Supp.2d 925 (C.D.Ill. 2013). The estate of a diabetic pretrial detainee brought an
action against a city, police officers, a county, the county sheriff, and a jail medical provider, alleging under
§ 1983 that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to the detainee's serious medical needs. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part.
The court held that a city police officer at the scene of the arrest who had no involvement with the diabetic
detainee could not be held liable under § 1983 for being deliberately indifferent to the serious medical
needs of detainee, who died from diabetic ketoacidosis after she was taken to a county jail. The court also
found that city police officers who transported the detainee to the county jail, rather than a hospital, were
not deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of the detainee, where the officers were entitled to
defer to the judgment of the paramedics on the scene.
According to the court, there was no evidence that the county sheriff knew of a serious risk to the health
of the diabetic pretrial detainee and consciously disregarded that risk, that any prior deaths at the jail involved medical care provided to an inmate, much less that medical care involved an inmate with diabetes,

32.227

or that the sheriff's decisions about certification of the jail's medical contractor had any adverse effect on
the detainee, as would subject the sheriff to liability under § 1983, in his individual capacity, for his alleged
deliberate indifference to the detainee's serious medical needs.
The court found that the county's actions in shutting off water to the mentally ill, diabetic pretrial detainee's cell when the inmate was stuffing clothing into the cell's toilet did not violate the detainee's Fourteenth
Amendment rights. According to the court, the estate's claim against the county that the detainee, who died
of diabetic ketoacidosis after allegedly refusing diabetic treatment and food while incarcerated, was not
properly treated for her mental illness and diabetes was not actionable under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) or the Rehabilitation Act. (Champaign County Jail, Illinois)
U.S. Appeals Court
FALSE
IMPRISONMENT
PROBABLE CAUSE

Hernandez-Cuevas v. Taylor, 723 F.3d 91 (1st Cir. 2013). A pretrial detainee brought a Bivens action
against FBI agents, alleging that the agents' unlawful conduct caused him to be held in custody for three
months without probable cause. The district court denied the agents' motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds. The agents appealed. The appeals court affirmed and remanded. The court held that: (1) allegations by the detainee that FBI agents witnessed a black male, short, stocky, and in his late fifties, transfer
$321,956 in drug proceeds to an undercover informant; (2) after a year passed without the FBI being able to
locate or identify that suspect, they were under pressure to make an arrest; (3) agents worked with the informant to arrange a tainted photo array, during which informant identified the detainee, who was a tall,
thin, 40-year-old, black male, and who had strikingly dissimilar appearance to the suspect; (4) that one
agent either knowingly or with reckless disregard for the truth made sworn statements in a warrant affidavit
identifying the detainee as the suspect who delivered the tainted cash; (5) that based on the affidavit, a
magistrate issued an arrest warrant; and (6) that the detainee was bound over and held in federal custody for
three months, stated a Bivens claim against agents for violation of detainee's Fourth Amendment rights.
(Puerto Rico)

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
INTAKE SCREENING
MEDICAL CARE
SUICIDE

Holscher v. Mille Lacs County, 924 F.Supp.2d 1044 (D.Minn. 2013). Trustees for the next-of-kin of a pretrial detainee who committed suicide while incarcerated at a county jail brought an action against the county, alleging under § 1983 that the county provided inadequate medical care to the detainee, in violation of
his due process rights. The trustees also asserted related claims for negligence and wrongful death under
state law. The county moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to
whether the county had actual knowledge of the pretrial detainee's risk of suicide, as to whether the county
was deliberately indifferent to that risk, and as to whether the detainee's death was the result of an unconstitutional custom. The court also held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material
fact as to whether the county's training of its jail employees on proper implementation of its suicide prevention policy was adequate, as to whether the county was deliberately indifferent in failing to revise its training, and as to whether any inadequate training on the part of the county caused the pretrial detainee's suicide. (Mille Lacs County Jail, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

In re Nassau County Strip Search Cases, 958 F.Supp.2d 339 (E.D.N.Y. 2013). Arrestees brought a class
action against county officials and others, challenging a county correctional center's blanket strip search
policy for newly admitted, misdemeanor detainees. The defendants moved for reconsideration and to vacate
a prior order granting summary judgment in favor of the arrestees on the liability issue. The district court
granted the motion in part and denied the motion in part. The court held that: (1) the defendants' concession
of liability did not, in and of itself, divest the court of discretion to reconsider its prior order granting summary judgment in favor of the arrestees on the issue of liability; (2) the Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders decision was an intervening change in the controlling federal law, justifying the district court's
reconsideration of a prior order granting summary judgment in favor of the arrestees on their federal claim;
and (3) the Florence decision did not justify reconsideration of a prior grant of summary judgment on the
New York state constitutional claim. (Nassau County Correctional Center, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCHES
EQUAL PROTECTION

Johnson v. Government of Dist. of Columbia, 734 F.3d 1194 (D.C. Cir. 2013). Female arrestees who were
forced to endure strip searches while awaiting presentment at hearings at the District of Columbia Superior
Court filed a class action against the District of Columbia and a former United States Marshal for the Superior Court, alleging that such searches violated the Fourth Amendment. They also alleged a violation of the
Fifth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee, where men were not similarly strip searched. The district
court granted summary judgment to the District and the Marshal. The arrestees appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The appeals court found that the former marshal who administered the Superior Court cellblock
was at all times a federal official acting under the color of federal law, and, thus, the District of Columbia
could not be held liable under § 1983 for the marshal's conduct. The court noted that the statutory scheme
gave the District of Columbia no power to exercise authority over, or to delegate authority to, the marshal,
and lacked the discretion to stop sending pre-presentment arrestees to the marshal. According to the court,
any Fourth Amendment right that the former United States Marshal may have violated by subjecting detainees arrested on minor charges to blanket strip searches was not clearly established at the time of any
violation, and therefore the marshal was entitled to qualified immunity on the detainees' claims alleging
violations of their Fourth Amendment rights. The court also found no evidence that the marshal purposefully directed that women should be treated differently than men with respect to the strip-search policy at the
Superior Court cellblock, in violation of the Fifth Amendment's equal protection guarantee. (District of
Columbia, United States Marshal for the Superior Court)

32.228

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
SAFETY

Junior v. Anderson, 724 F.3d 812 (7th Cir. 2013). A pretrial detainee brought a suit under § 1983 against a
guard who allegedly failed to protect him from an attack by other inmates. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the guard, and the detainee appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded.
The appeals court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to
whether the guard acted with a conscious disregard of a significant risk of violence to the detainee, when
she noted that two cells in the corridor where she was posted were not securely locked, but only noted that
this was a “security risk” in her log. The guard then let several of the inmates who were supposed to remain
locked up out of their cells, let them congregate in a darkened corridor, and then left her post, so that no
guard was present to observe more than 20 maximum-security prisoners milling about. The court found that
the detainee was entitled to appointed counsel in his § 1983 suit against a prison guard. According to the
court, although the case was not analytically complex, its sound resolution depended on evidence to which
detainee in his distant lockup had no access, and the detainee needed to, but could not, depose the guard in
order to explore the reason for her having left her post and other issues. (Cook County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
WRONGFUL DEATH

Keele v. Glynn County, Ga.. 938 F.Supp.2d 1270 (S.D.Ga. 2013). A pretrial detainee's estate brought an
action against a county, county sheriff, and officials at the county detention facility in their official and
individual capacities, alleging that, while detained, the detainee's access to necessary medical care was
delayed or deficient and that the delay or deficiency led to the detainee's death. The defendants moved for
summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the
detainee's bruised or fractured ribs and rash were objectively serious medical needs, as required for the
estate's deliberate indifference claim against officials at the county detention facility under Fourteenth
Amendment. According to the court, a lay person would be alerted to the necessity of medical attention
after the detainee lost control of her bowels, began to hallucinate, vomited repeatedly, became pale and
developed blisters inside her mouth, and thus the detainee had an objectively serious medical need when
the symptoms manifested, as required for the estate's deliberate indifference claim against the officials.
The court found that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact regarding
whether the nurse at the county detention facility was subjectively aware that the pretrial detainee faced a
substantial risk of serious harm, whether the nurse was more than grossly negligent in disregarding that risk
of harm, and whether the nurse's actions caused the detainee's injuries, including death. The court noted that
a reasonable nurse in the county detention facility nurse's position would have known that delaying provision of medical care to a pretrial detainee with the detainee's symptoms, which included hallucinating,
withdrawing from pain medication, pale, vomiting, hives, complaining of feeling bad, and not eating, drinking, or getting up to do any activity, violated her constitutional rights, and thus the nurse failed to establish
an entitlement to qualified immunity from deliberate indifference claims under the Fourteenth Amendment.
According to the court, it was clearly established that knowledge of the need for medical care and intentional refusal to provide that care constituted deliberate indifference, and the law was clearly established
that nearly half a day was too long to fail to properly respond to a medical need. (Glynn County Detention
Center, Georgia)

U.S. District Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
DUE PROCESS
PACKAGES
RELIGION

Kramer v. Conway, 962 F.Supp.2d 1333 (N.D.Ga. 2013). A pretrial detainee at a county jail brought an
action against the jail, the jail administrator, and a county sheriff, alleging that conditions of his confinement violated his right to practice his Orthodox Jewish faith, that the defendants violated his right to possess legal reference books, and that the defendants failed to accommodate his physical disabilities. The
detainee moved for a preliminary and a permanent injunction and moved for leave to file a second amendment to his verified complaint. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court denied the
motions in part and granted the motion in part. The court held that the pretrial detainee’s allegation that the
county jail denied him books needed to practice his Orthodox Jewish religious faith failed to establish a
violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), absent evidence that the
county jail received federal funds in connection with its policies limiting the number and type of books
allowed in cells. The court held that the county jail's policy of limiting the number of religious books that
the pretrial detainee, an Orthodox Jew, could keep in his cell, but providing him access to others that were
not in his cell, was based on legitimate penological interests, and thus, did not violate the detainee's rights
under the Free Exercise Clause. According to the court, a uniformly applied books-in-cell limitation was
reasonable in a facility that housed 2,200 inmates, the limitation was applied in a neutral way and the expressive content of books was not considered, books in sufficient quantities could be used as weapons and
presented fire and obstacle hazards, access to other books was made by exchanging out titles and by allowing the copying of parts or all of a text, and the detainee was not denied access to nine religious books he
claimed were required in practicing his faith, but rather, argued only that access was required to be more
convenient.
The court found that the jail's policy of prohibiting hard cover books in cells, including limiting religious texts to those that did not have hard covers, was based on legitimate penological interests, and thus,
did not violate rights of the pretrial detainee, an Orthodox Jew, under the Free Exercise Clause. The court
noted that evidence at hearing on the detainee's motion for injunctive relief showed that hardcover books
posed safety and security risks because hard covers could be used to conceal contraband and because of
their potential use as weapons, the policy was applied in a neutral way, and the expressive content of books
was not considered. The court found that the jail's policy of limiting package mail to four pounds was based
on legitimate penological interests, and thus, did not violate rights as applied to the pretrial detainee, an
Orthodox Jew, under the Free Exercise Clause when the jail rejected one of detainee's packages that contained more than four pounds of books. The court noted that the jail received a large volume of mail and
other items each day, all of which had to be searched for contraband and threats their contents could pose to
the safety and security of inmates and jail officials, the policy was applied in a neutral way, and the expressive content of books was not considered. The court held that the jail's policy that limited the number and

32.229

type of books allowed in a cell did not violate the pretrial detainee's Due Process rights, where there was no
evidence that the policy was intended to punish the detainee, the jail's policies prohibiting hard cover books
and limiting the number of books allowed in a cell were reasonably related to legitimate penological interests, and the jail gave the detainee substantial access to legal materials by increasing the time he was allowed in the library and liberally allowing him to copy legal materials to keep in his cell.
The court held that the jail, the jail administrator, and the county sheriff's denial of a typewriter in the
pretrial detainee's cell to accommodate his alleged handwriting disability did not violate the detainee's
rights under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The court noted that the detainee was
able to write by hand, although he stated he experienced pain when doing so. According to the court, if the
detainee chose to avoid writing by hand he had substantial access to a typewriter in the jail's law library,
there was no permanent harm from the handwriting he performed, there was no evidence the detainee was
not able to adequately communicate with lawyers and jail officials without a typewriter in his cell, and the
accommodation of an in-cell typewriter would impose an undue burden on jail personnel because metal and
moving parts of typewriter could be used as weapons. (Gwinnett County Jail, Georgia)
U.S. District Court
CIVIL COMMITMENT
FAILURE TO PROTECT
MEDICAL CARE
PROTECTIVE
CUSTODY

Lucia v. City of Peabody, 971 F.Supp.2d 153 (D.Mass. 2013). The administrator of the estate of an individual who died from acute and chronic substance abuse while in protective custody brought an action against
a city and its mayor, as well as the police department, its chief, and four other individual officers, alleging
claims under § 1983 for various constitutional violations and claims of negligence and false imprisonment
under state law. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The
district court held that: (1) the officers were entitled to qualified immunity on the claim that they violated
the individual's constitutional rights by failing to call a treatment center; (2) the officers were entitled to
qualified immunity on the claim that they violated the individual's constitutional rights by failing to monitor
him and provide proper care; (3) the administrator failed to establish municipal liability based on failure to
train; (4) the administrator failed to establish supervisory liability against the supervising officer; (5) police
were immune from negligence liability under statutory exception to Massachusetts Tort Claims Act; and (6)
the officers were not liable for false imprisonment. The court noted that at the time of the relevant events, a
reasonable officer would not have known that determining that a suitable treatment facility was not available was a Fourth Amendment prerequisite to his ability to constitutionally detain an intoxicated individual
who was not charged with any crime, as required for the right to be clearly established, and therefore the
individual officers who detained the individual were entitled to qualified immunity under § 1983. (Peabody
Police Department, Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
MEDICAL CARE
WRONGFUL DEATH

Morris v. Dallas County, 960 F.Supp.2d 665 (N.D.Tex. 2013) The parents of a detainee who died while in
custody at a county jail brought a § 1983 action in state court against the county, the county jail medical
staff, and officials, alleging violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and constitutional
violations. The action was removed to federal court. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The
district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment for the
defendants was precluded by fact issues with regard to: (1) the nurses who were defendants; (2) the claim
that the county failed to monitor the detainee’s health; and (3) failure to train officers on how to observe
and assess the jail detainees' medical needs and respond to those needs. The court noted that the way the
jail infirmary was structured, including the lack of direct access between the detainees and the nursing staff,
and the absence of procedures for communication between the nurses and the correctional officers concerning emergent medical symptoms, were a county custom. According to the court, whether that custom was
adopted or continued, even though it was obvious that its likely consequence would be a deprivation of
medical care for the detainees, precluded summary judgment in favor of the county in the § 1983 deliberate
indifference claim brought against the county. (Dallas County Jail, Texas)

U.S. District Court
ACCESS TO COURT
CONDITIONS
SANITATION
MEDICAL CARE
SEGREGATION
TELEPHONE

Nelson v. District of Columbia, 928 F.Supp.2d 210 (D.D.C. 2013). A detainee brought a § 1983 claim
against the District of Columbia arising from his stay in jail. The defendant moved to dismiss and the district court granted the motion. The court held that denial of one telephone call and access to stationery during the detainee's five-day stay in a “Safe Cell,” which was located in the jail's infirmary, did not implicate
his First Amendment right of free speech or right of access to courts. The court found that the detainee's
alleged exposure to “dried urine on the toilet seat and floor” and garbage during his five-day stay, along
with the denial of a shower, did not rise to the level of a Fifth Amendment due process violation. According
to the court, placement of detainee in a Safe Cell was not motivated by a desire to punish the detainee, but
rather by a nurse's desire to attend to the detainee's ailments after his “legs and back gave out” twice. The
court noted that denial of the detainee’s request to have the cell cleaned was for the non-punitive reason
that the detainee would not be in the cell that long. (D.C. Jail, District of Columbia)

U.S. District Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
CONDITIONS
SANITATION

Newell v. Kankakee County Sheriff's Department, 968 F.Supp.2d 973 (C.D.Ill. 2013). A disabled federal
detainee who was housed at a county jail for two months brought an action against the county sheriff's
department and county officials under § 1983 and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court denied the motion. The court held that the detainee's allegations
that the county officials developed, supervised, and enforced policies and practices of the jail, ensured that
grievances were received in the proper manner and were properly responded to, and were aware of his
serious medical needs and his grievances, yet turned a blind eye to the situation, were sufficient to state a
claim against the officials in their individual capacities in his civil rights action alleging he was denied
medical care and kept in unsafe and unhealthy conditions while he was housed at the county jail. The detainee allegedly had multiple disabilities that he sustained in an auto accident, including weakness and
numbness in his left side and he partially dragged his left leg. He also had incontinence with urine and
bowel movements and required the use of adult diapers. He was unable to stand still without assistance,
which made showering and using the toilet difficult. The detainee alleged that despite his obvious disabili-

32.230

ties and medical issues, he was assigned to a regular dorm on the top floor of the jail, and a to a top bunk.
He had to hop on one leg to go up or down the stairs and needed assistance from other inmates to get into
and out of his bunk. He was allegedly not given adult diapers until his third day at the jail, and even then,
he was not given an adequate supply of diapers and would sometimes sit in a soiled diaper for days, and in
clothes with urine and feces on them. He alleged that he was not given enough biohazard bags, and the
soiled diapers and bags piled up in his cell. One day, when there was no one to assist the detainee, he fell
while attempting to get out of his bunk and he sat for two hours until someone came to help him. As a result, his left leg worsened and his right leg was numb, he could not walk at all and was forced to crawl
down stairs on his buttocks, and scoot along the floor and walk on his hands.
The court found that the detainee's allegations that he was denied medical care and kept in unsafe and
unhealthy conditions while he was housed at the county jail, and that the jail was not an exceptionally large
facility, were sufficient to state claim against the corrections officer working at the jail in his individual
capacity. According to the court, the situation described by the inmate, if true, would have been obvious to
any correctional officer working in the area in which the inmate was housed.
The court held that the detainee's allegations that correctional staff at the county jail acted pursuant to an
official policy or custom not to perform a medical intake, investigate inmates' medical issues or complaints
about problems with walking if they were ambulatory, nor provide sufficient medically-necessary hygiene
items such as adult diapers to inmates, among other things, were sufficient to allege that an official policy
or custom was a “moving force” in the alleged violation of his rights, as required to state official capacity
claims under Monell. The court held that the detainee's allegation that he was barred from basic facilities on
the basis of his disabilities while he was housed at the county jail was sufficient to allege discriminatory
intent, as required to state an ADA claim against the county sheriff's department. (Jerome Combs Detention
Center, Kankakee, Illinois)
U.S. District Court
SEARCHES
UNLAWFUL
DETENTION

Page v. Mancuso, 999 F.Supp.2d 269 (D.D.C. 2013). A pretrial detainee brought an action in the Superior
Court for the District of Columbia, against the District of Columbia and a police officer, alleging unlawful
arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and deliberate indifference to the arrestee's over-detention and
strip search. The detainee also alleged that the District maintained a custom and practice of strip searches in
violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. The defendants removed the action to federal court and filed
a partial motion to dismiss. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the detainee's complaint failed to allege that the District of Columbia was deliberately indifferent to Fourth and Fifth
Amendment violations jail officials inflicted upon the detainee when they subjected him to “overdetention” and strip searches, as required to state a claim against District for Fourth and Fifth Amendment
violations under the theory of municipal liability. (D.C. Jail)

U.S. District Court
ACCESS TO COURT
RELIGION

Parkell v. Morgan, 917 F.Supp.2d 328 (D.Del. 2013). A pretrial detainee, proceeding pro se and in forma
pauperis, brought a § 1983 action against a medical provider and various officials, alleging violations of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court found that the detainee’s
allegations that he did not have adequate law library access were insufficient to state a § 1983 claim for
violation of the First Amendment right of access to the courts, where the detainee alleged he was provided
access to a law library, just not type he desired. The court held that the detainee's allegations that he adhered to a mystic branch of Wicca and that the prison offered limited selection of diets to satisfy his religious needs were sufficient to state a § 1983 claim for violation of his First Amendment religious rights.
(Howard R. Young Correctional Institution, Delaware)

U.S. District Court
ACCESS TO COURT
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
BAIL
DISCIPLINE
DISCRIMINATION
DUE PROCESS
EQUAL PROTECTION
FALSE
IMPRISONMENT
FEMALES
MENTAL HEALTH
PROBABLE CAUSE
RA- Rehabilitation Act
RELEASE

Poche v. Gautreaux, 973 F.Supp.2d 658 (M.D.La. 2013). A pretrial detainee brought an action against a
district attorney and prison officials, among others, alleging various constitutional violations pursuant to §
1983, statutory violations under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act
(RA), as well as state law claims, all related to her alleged unlawful detention for seven months. The district attorney and prison officials moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that the detainee sufficiently alleged an official policy or custom, as required to
establish local government liability for constitutional torts, by alleging that failures of the district attorney
and the prison officials to implement policies designed to prevent the constitutional deprivations alleged,
and to adequately train their employees in such tasks as processing paperwork related to detention, created
such obvious dangers of constitutional violations that the district attorney and the prison officials could all
be reasonably said to have acted with conscious indifference. The court found that the pretrial detainee
stated a procedural due process claim against the district attorney and the prison officials under § 1983
related to her alleged unlawful detention for seven months, by alleging that it was official policy and custom of the officials to skirt constitutional requirements related to procedures for: (1) establishing probable
cause to detain; (2) arraignment; (3) bail; and (4) appointment of counsel, and that the officials' policy and
custom resulted in a deprivation of her liberty without due process.
The court also found a procedural due process claim against the district attorney under § 1983 by the
detainee’s allegation that it was the district attorney's policy and custom to sign charging papers such as
bills of information without reading them, without checking their correctness, and without even knowing
what he was signing, and that the attorney's policy and custom resulted in a deprivation of her liberty without due process. The court found a substantive due process claim against the district attorney in the detainee’s allegation that after obtaining clear direct knowledge that the detainee was being wrongfully and illegally held, the district attorney still failed to correct the mistakes that caused the detention, and to cover up
his failures in connection with the case, the district attorney made a conscious decision to bring belated
charges against the detainee.
The court held that the detainee stated an equal protection claim against the prison officials under §
1983, by alleging that the officials acted with a discriminatory animus toward her because she was mentally

32.231

disabled, and that she was repeatedly and deliberately punished for, and discriminated against, on that basis. (East Baton Rouge Prison, Louisiana)
U.S. District Court
SEGREGATION
CLASSIFICATION
DUE PROCESS

Potts v. Moreci, 12 F.Supp.3d 1065 (N.D.Ill. 2013). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against a
county, employees of the county jail in their individual capacities, and a sheriff, in his individual and official capacities, alleging retaliation in violation of his First Amendment rights, deprivation of his procedural
due process and equal protection rights, denial of access to the courts, municipal liability, and statutory
indemnification. The sheriff moved to dismiss the claims asserted against him. The district court granted
the motion in part and denied in part. The court found that the detainee who allegedly was placed in a segregation unit at the county jail without adequate grounds and without an opportunity to contest such placement stated a claim for a procedural due process violation against the sheriff, in his individual capacity,
under § 1983. The court noted that the sheriff's personal responsibility for the detainee's placement in segregation could be assumed in determining whether the detainee adequately pleaded the claim, and the detainee also sufficiently alleged the sheriff's knowledge of the detainee's allegedly unconstitutional confinement in segregation by asserting that the sheriff attended periodic meetings at which the detainee's confinement was discussed, which permitted the inference that sheriff knew about the challenged conduct and
facilitated, approved, condoned, or turned a blind eye to it. The court held that the detainee sufficiently
pleaded the sheriff's personal involvement in the alleged misconduct of jail employees in singling out the
detainee for arbitrary treatment during his confinement in a segregation unit, subjecting him to living conditions that were inconsistent even with conditions of other detainees in a segregation unit, and thus stated a §
1983 claim for class-of-one equal protection violation against the sheriff. (Cook County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
MAIL
PUBLICATIONS

Prison Legal News v. Columbia County, 942 F.Supp.2d 1068 (D.Or. 2013). A publisher filed a § 1983
action alleging that a county and its officials violated the First Amendment by rejecting dozens of its publications and letters mailed to inmates incarcerated in its jail and violated the Fourteenth Amendment by
failing to provide it or the inmates with the notice of, and opportunity to, appeal the jail's rejection of its
publications and letters. A bench trial was held, resulting in a judgment for the publisher. The court held
that: (1) the policy prohibiting inmates from receiving mail that was not on a postcard violated the First
Amendment; (2) the county had a policy of prohibiting inmates from receiving magazines; (3) the county
failed to provide adequate notice of withholding of incoming mail by jail authorities; (4) entry of a permanent injunction prohibiting officials from enforcing the postcard-only policy was warranted; and (5) a permanent injunction prohibiting officials from enforcing the prohibition against magazines was not warranted. (Columbia County Jail, Oregon)

U.S. Appeals Court
ALIEN
BAIL
DUE PROCESS

Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2013). Aliens subject to detention pursuant to federal immigration statutes brought a class action against Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and others,
challenging prolonged detention without individualized bond hearings and determinations to justify their
continued detention. The district court entered a preliminary injunction requiring the holding of bond hearings before an immigration judge (IJ). The government appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court
held that: (1) the statute authorizing the Attorney General to take into custody any alien who is inadmissible
or deportable by reason of having committed certain offenses for as long as removal proceedings are “pending” cannot be read to authorize mandatory detention of criminal aliens with no limit on the duration of
imprisonment; (2) aliens subject to prolonged detention were entitled to bond hearings before IJs; (3) irreparable harm was likely to result from the government's reading of the immigration detention statutes as not
requiring a bond hearing for aliens subject to prolonged detention; and, (4) the public interest would benefit
from a preliminary injunction. The court ruled that the class was comprised of all non-citizens within the
Central District of California who: (1) are or were detained for longer than six months pursuant to one of
the general immigration detention statutes pending completion of removal proceedings, including judicial
review, (2) are not and have not been detained pursuant to a national security detention statute, and (3) have
not been afforded a hearing to determine whether their detention is justified. (Los Angeles Field Office of
ICE, California)

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
FEMALES
PRIVACY
SEARCHES

Shaw v. District of Columbia, 944 F.Supp.2d 43 (D.D.C. 2013). A former pretrial detainee, a transgender
woman, who underwent sex reassignment surgery and had her sex legally changed to female, brought an
action against the United States Marshals Service (USMS), USMS marshals, District of Columbia, a police
chief, and police officers, alleging under § 1983 that the defendants violated her Fourth Amendment rights
in connection with her arrests, and asserting claims under the District of Columbia Human Rights Act and
tort law. The police chief, officer, and USMS defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the
motion in part and denied in part. The district court held that the USMS marshals were not entitled to qualified immunity from the unlawful search claim, where a reasonable officer would have known that a crossgender search of a female detainee by male USMS employees that included intimate physical contact, exposure of private body parts, and verbal harassment, all in front of male detainees and male USMS employees, in the absence of an emergency, was unreasonable. The court also found that the USMS marshals and
the police officer were not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 Fifth Amendment conditions of
confinement claim brought by the pretrial detainee, arising from the defendants' actions in holding the detainee with male detainees and otherwise treating her as if she were male. According to the court, a reasonable officer would know that treating the female detainee as the detainee was treated exposed her to a substantial risk of serious harm, and, therefore, would know that those actions violated the detainee's due process rights. (District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department, Sixth District Police Station and MPD's
Central Cellblock, and United States Marshals Service)

32.232

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Sistrunk v. Khan, 931 F.Supp.2d 849 (N.D.Ill. 2013). A pretrial detainee with a leg injury brought a pro se
§ 1983 action against a county jail physician, alleging deliberate indifference to his medical needs in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court granted the physician’s motion for summary judgment. The court found that there was no evidence that the detainee's perceived need for a wheelchair, rather
than crutches, due to his injured and infected leg, was an objectively serious medical need, as required to
support the pro se § 1983 claim against the jail physician for deliberate indifference to a serious medical
need under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court noted that, although the detainee's physical therapist and hospital physicians recommended that he be placed in wheelchair “for now,”
such accommodation was not medically necessary in light of the fact that the detainee's left leg was uninjured and could support weight, and the wheelchair recommendation was preliminary to more active ambulation by detainee. According to the court, the physician's decision to issue the detainee crutches instead of
a wheelchair when detainee had one good leg was not so far afield as to demonstrate an absence of professional judgment. The court noted that there was no evidence that the jail physician was aware that the detainee had fallen, let alone that he had a serious medical need for treatment of his injuries, as required to
support a § 1983 claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical need under the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. (Cook County Department of Corrections, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
SEGREGATION
DUE PROCESS
ADA-Americans with
Disabilities Act
MEDICAL CARE
MENTAL HEALTH
PSYCHOLOGICAL
SERVICES

Slevin v. Board of Com'rs for County of Dona Ana, 934 F.Supp.2d 1270 (D.N.M. 2013). A detainee
brought an action against a county board of commissioners, detention center director, and medical director,
alleging violations of his rights with regard to his medical care. The detainee alleged that, because of his
mental illness, officials at the Detention Center kept him in administrative segregation for virtually the
entire 22 months of his incarceration, without humane conditions of confinement or adequate medical care,
and without periodic review of his confinement, causing his physical and mental deterioration, in violation
of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The jury awarded the detainee $3 million in punitive damages
against the Detention Center Director, and $3.5 million in punitive damages against the facility medical
director. The jury fixed the amount of compensatory damages at $15.5 million, which included $500,000
for each month that detainee was incarcerated, plus an additional $1 million for each year since the detainee’s release from custody. The defendants moved for a new trial or for reduction of the damages awards.
The district court denied the motion, finding that the compensatory damages award was supported by substantial evidence and it would not be set aside on the ground that it was the product of passion or prejudices. The court also declined to set aside the punitive damages awards as excessive. (Doña Ana County Detention Center, New Mexico)

U.S. District Court
ADA-Americans with
Disabilities Act
MEDICAL CARE
MENTAL HEALTH
SEGREGATION

Slevin v. Board of Com'rs for County of Dona Ana, 934 F.Supp.2d 1282 (D.N.M. 2013). A detainee
brought an action against a county board of commissioners, detention center director, and medical director,
alleging violations of his rights with regard to his medical care. After a verdict in favor of the detainee, the
defendants moved for a new trial based on nondisclosure of the existence of attorney-client relationship
between the detainee's counsel and a witness, who was a lead plaintiff in other proceedings. The district
court denied the motion, finding that failure to volunteer information about their representation of the witness was not fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct, and did not substantially interfere with the defense.
The detainee alleged that, because of his mental illness, officials at the Detention Center kept him in administrative segregation for virtually the entire 22 months of his incarceration, without humane conditions of
confinement or adequate medical care, and without periodic review of his confinement, causing his physical and mental deterioration, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The jury awarded the
detainee $3 million in punitive damages against the Detention Center Director, and $3.5 million in punitive
damages against the facility medical director. The jury fixed the amount of compensatory damages at $15.5
million, which included $500,000 for each month that detainee was incarcerated, plus an additional $1
million for each year since the detainee’s release from custody. (Doña Ana County Detention Center, New
Mexico)

U.S. Appeals Court
CLASSIFICATION
FAILURE TO PROTECT
INTAKE SCREENING
SAFETY

Smith v. Sangamon County Sheriff's Dept., 715 F.3d 188 (7th Cir. 2013). A pretrial detainee filed suit under
§ 1983 against a sheriff's department to recover for injuries sustained when he was severely beaten by another inmate housed in a maximum-security cellblock. The district court entered summary judgment for the
sheriff's department, and the detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the detainee
failed to establish that the security classification policy used by the sheriff's department to assign inmates to
cellblocks within the jail was deliberately indifferent to inmate safety in violation of his due-process rights.
The court noted that: (1) the detainee presented no evidence that the classification policy created a serious
risk of physical harm to inmates, much less that the sheriff's department knew of it and did nothing; (2) the
attack by the detainee's cellmate was not enough to establish that the policy itself systematically exposed
inmates like the detainee to a serious risk of harm; and (3) it was unclear that a policy strictly segregating
those accused of nonviolent crimes from those accused of violent crimes would do a better job of ensuring
inmate safety than the multiple-factor classification system used by the sheriff's department. The detainee
claimed that the Department's approach to classifying inmates for cellblock placement ignored serious risks
to inmate safety because the security classification policy fails to separate “violent” from “nonviolent”
inmates and thus fails to protect peaceful inmates from attacks by inmates with assaultive tendencies. The
appeals court described the classification practices: “A classification officer interviews each new detainee
and reviews a range of information, including the inmate's age, gender, gang affiliation, medical concerns,
current charge, criminal history, behavioral and disciplinary history within the jail, and any holds due to
parole violations. Pursuant to standards recommended by the American Correctional Association, the classification policy assigns point values within these categories, with higher point values corresponding to
lower security risks.” (Sangamon County Detention Facility, Illinois)

32.233

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
MEDICAL CARE
WRONGFUL DEATH

Sours v. Big Sandy Regional Jail Authority, 946 F.Supp.2d 678 (E.D.Ky. 2013). The administrator of a
detainee's estate filed a § 1983 action against jail officials alleging deliberate indifference to the detainee's
serious medical needs, negligence, and violation of state regulations. The officials moved for summary
judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that: (1) the nurse,
a deputy jailer, and the center's administrator were not deliberately indifferent to the detainee's serious
medical needs; (2) the nurse's determination that the detainee did not need insulin “right away” was a discretionary decision for which she was entitled to qualified official immunity; (3) the nurse was not entitled
to qualified official immunity for her alleged failure to leave adequate instructions to deputy jailers for the
care of the detainee; and (4) the jailers were entitled to qualified official immunity, The court noted that,
under Kentucky law, the detention center nurse's duty to ensure that the diabetic pretrial detainee could be
cared for in her absence was mandatory and ministerial, and thus the nurse was not entitled to qualified
official immunity in the wrongful death action brought by the administrator, for her alleged failure to leave
adequate instructions for deputy jailers for the care of the detainee. According to the court, the nurse was
aware that the jailers were unlikely to be able to identify the symptoms of diabetic ketoacidosis and that
there was no information in the detention center about diabetes. On appeal, the court affirmed in part and
reversed in part. The appeals court held that the nurse was not entitled to qualified immunity. (Big Sandy
Regional Detention Center, Kentucky)

U.S. Appeals Court
EQUAL PROTECTION

Stickley v. Byrd, 703 F.3d 421 (8th Cir. 2013). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against a county
sheriff and county detention center personnel. The district court granted the defendants qualified immunity
in part, but denied it as to the detainee's claim that the defendants' refusal to give him adequate toilet paper
violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The defendants appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded.
The appeals court held that detention center personnel did not violate the detainee's Fourteenth Amendment
rights by providing him with only one roll of toilet paper per week, even the detainee used his weekly allotment before the week's end each week. When this happened, the detainee had to shower to clean himself
following a bowel movement. The court noted that although the detainee exhausted his toilet paper supply
each week before receiving an additional roll the following week, he was not always without toilet paper,
and when he did run out of toilet paper, he was able to clean himself by taking a shower. (Faulkner County
Detention Center, Arkansas)

U.S. District Court
ADA-Americans with
Disabilities Act
FALSE
IMPRISONMENT
INTERROGATION
RA- Rehabilitation Act

Taylor v. City of Mason, 970 F.Supp.2d 776 (S.D.Ohio 2013). A deaf arrestee brought an action against a
police department and a city, alleging that denial of a qualified interpreter during questioning prior to arrest
at the jail violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act, and that he was
falsely imprisoned. The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court denied
the motion. The court held that the deaf arrestee's allegations, that police officers denied him the benefits of
effectively communicating with them prior to arrest by failing to provide an appropriate auxiliary aid, were
sufficient to state a claim under ADA and Rehabilitation Act. The arrestee alleged that he initiated a phone
call to police because he had been assaulted, and that, although officers requested an American Sign Language (ASL) interpreter, they did not wait for the interpreter to arrive before they began questioning him,
but instead used his alleged attacker as an interpreter, and she reported that the arrestee sexually assaulted
her. The court found that the allegations were also sufficient to state a claim under the Rehabilitation Act,
where the arrestee alleged that he expressed dissatisfaction with the interpreter provided at the jail, who
was not certified in ASL, that he did not fully understand his Miranda rights as explained by the interpreter,
and that the lack of a qualified interpreter was directed at him particularly. (City of Mason Police Department and Jail, Ohio)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
MEDICAL CARE
WRONGFUL DEATH

Thompson v. King, 730 F.3d 742 (8th Cir. 2013). The estate of a detainee, who died in police custody from
multiple drug intoxication, brought a § 1983 action against the arresting and detaining officers, alleging that
the officers had shown deliberate indifference to the detainee's serious medical needs. The district court
denied the officers’ motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. The officers appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The appeals court held that the
arresting officer's discovery of an empty bottle of a recently refilled anti-anxiety medication, and the detainee's statement that he had taken “a little” of the medication, did not amount to subjective knowledge
that the detainee required medical attention, and thus the officer was entitled to qualified immunity in the §
1983 action arising from the subsequent death of the detainee in police custody. The court noted that the
detainee presented no external injuries, and the detainee was conscious during the initial encounter, answering officers’ questions and following instructions. The court found that summary judgment for the police
officer in charge of the jail was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the police officer had subjective knowledge of the serious medical need of the detainee and whether the officer deliberately disregarded that need. According to the court, a reasonable officer in charge of a jail would have
known that a constitutional violation occurs by deliberately disregarding a detainee's serious medical needs,
and thus the right was clearly established, and in turn the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity
from the § 1983 claim arising from detainee's death while in police custody. (Saline County Detention
Center, Arkansas)

U.S. Appeals Court
INVOLUNTARY
MEDICATION
MENTAL HEALTH
SAFETY

U.S. v. Hardy, 724 F.3d 280 (2nd Cir. 2013). The district court granted the motion of the United States to
authorize the Bureau of Prisons to medicate a mentally ill detainee without his consent, and the detainee
appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that there was no basis for disturbing the district court's order
authorizing involuntary medication of the pretrial detainee to reduce the danger he posed to Bureau of Prisons staff. The court noted that involuntary medication of the detainee to reduce the danger he posed to staff
was warranted, where the detainee suffered from schizophrenia, the consensus of the testifying psychiatrists
and psychologists was that antipsychotic medication was the treatment of choice for someone with the

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detainee's condition. The court noted that the detainee's past conduct, which included threats of harm, attempts to bite or hit officers, repeated throwing of liquids in their faces, and attempted and actual stabbings,
indicated that he posed a danger to others. (United States Bureau of Prisons, Metropolitan Corrections Center, New York City, Metropolitan Detention Center, Brooklyn, New York)
U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
RESTRAINTS
SEXUAL ASSAULT
USE OF FORCE

Valade v. City of New York, 949 F.Supp.2d 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). Arrestees brought § 1983 and state law
actions against police officers and a city. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court
granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment on the Fourth
Amendment excessive force claim was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether a police
officer used excessive force against the arrestee by handcuffing her too tightly and shoving her into a police
car. The court also found a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the arrestee was sexually assaulted
while she was in police custody following her arrest. (New York City Police Department, Central Booking)

U.S. Appeals Court
ACCESS TO COURT
DUE PROCESS
PROBABLE CAUSE
INITIAL APPEARANCE

Wilson v. Montano, 715 F.3d 847 (10th Cir. 2013). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action against a county
sheriff, several deputies, and the warden of the county's detention center, alleging that he was unlawfully
detained, and that his right to a prompt probable cause determination was violated. The district court denied
the defendants' motion to dismiss. The defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in
part, and remanded in part. The detainee had been held for 11 days without a hearing and without charges
being filed. The appeals court held that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity from the
claim that they violated the arrestee's right to a prompt post-arrest probable cause determination, where the
Fourth Amendment right to a prompt probable cause determination was clearly established at the time. The
court held that the arrestee sufficiently alleged that the arresting sheriff's deputy was personally involved in
the deprivation of his Fourth Amendment right to a prompt probable cause hearing, as required to support
his § 1983 claim against the deputy. The arrestee alleged that he was arrested without a warrant, and that
the deputy wrote out a criminal complaint but failed to file it in any court with jurisdiction to hear a misdemeanor charge until after he was released from the county's detention facility, despite having a clear duty
under New Mexico law to ensure that the arrestee received a prompt probable cause determination.
According to the court, under New Mexico law, the warden of the county's detention facility and the
county sheriff were responsible for policies or customs that operated and were enforced by their subordinates, and for any failure to adequately train their subordinates. The court noted that statutes charged both
the warden and the sheriff with responsibility to supervise subordinates in diligently filing a criminal complaint or information and ensuring that arrestees received a prompt probable cause hearing.
The court found that the arrestee sufficiently alleged that the warden promulgated policies that caused
the arrestee's prolonged detention without a probable cause hearing, and that the warden acted with the
requisite mental state, as required to support his § 1983 claim against the warden, regardless of whether the
arrestee ever had direct contact with the warden. The arrestee alleged that the warden did not require filing
of written criminal complaints, resulting in the detainees' being held without receiving a probable cause
hearing, and that the warden acted with deliberate indifference to routine constitutional violations at the
facility. The court held that the arrestee sufficiently alleged that the county sheriff established a policy or
custom that led to the arrestee's prolonged detention without a probable cause hearing, and that the sheriff
acted with the requisite mental state, as required to support his § 1983 claim against the sheriff, by alleging
that: (1) the sheriff allowed deputies to arrest people and wait before filing charges, thus resulting in the
arrest and detention of citizens with charges never being filed; (2) the sheriff was deliberately indifferent to
ongoing constitutional violations occurring under his supervision and due to his failure to adequately train
his employees; (3) routine warrantless arrest and incarceration of citizens without charges being filed
amounted to a policy or custom; and (4) such policy was the significant moving force behind the arrestee's
illegal detention. (Valencia County Sheriff's Office, Valencia County Detention Center, New Mexico)
2014

U.S. Appeals Court
GRIEVANCE
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
FAILURE TO PROTECT

Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2014). A detainee in a county jail brought a § 1983 action against a
sheriff, alleging failure to protect him against other inmates, deliberate indifference to his serious medical
needs, failure to adequately train and supervise deputies, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
gross negligence. The district court granted summary judgment for the sheriff. The detainee appealed. The
appeals court affirmed and then the court granted a rehearing en banc. The appeals court then reversed and
remanded. The court held that administrative remedies at the jail were not available within meaning of the
Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), and therefore the detainee satisfied his exhaustion requirement.
(Los Angeles County Men's Central Jail, California)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
MEDICATION
GRIEVANCE

Awalt v. Marketti, 74 F.Supp.3d 909 (N.D.Ill. 2014). The estate and the widow of a pretrial detainee who
died in a county jail brought civil rights and wrongful death actions against jail personnel and medical care
providers who serviced the jail. The county defendants and the medical defendants moved for summary
judgment. The district court held that: (1) the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable juror to find that the
correctional officers and a jail superintendent were deliberately indifferent to the detainee’s medical needs;
(2) summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the officers knew
that the detainee was suffering seizures while in jail and failed to take appropriate action; (3) a reasonable
juror could have found that neither a physician nor a nurse made a reasoned medical judgment not to prescribe a particular anti-seizure drug for the detainee; and, (4) in the Seventh Circuit, private health care
workers providing medical services to inmates are not entitled to assert qualified immunity.
The court also found that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact: (1) concerning whether failure of the sheriff’s office and the jail’s medical services provider to provide adequate
medical training to correctional officers caused the detainee’s death; (2) as to whether the sheriff’s office
and the jail’s medical services provider had an implicit policy of deliberate indifference to medical care

32.235

provided to detainees; (3) regarding whether correctional officers knew that the detainee was suffering
seizures and ignored his suffering; (5) as to whether the decision of the sheriff’s office and the jail’s medical services provider not to implement a standardized grievance mechanism led to a widespread practice at
the jail of ignoring or delaying response to grievances and medical requests made by detainees, and as to
whether this failure was the moving force behind the pretrial detainee’s seizure-related death; and (6) as to
whether the sheriff’s office and the jail’s medical services provider had an express policy that prevented a
nurse from restocking a particular medication until there were only eight pills left in stock and whether that
policy was the moving force behind the pretrial detainee’s seizure-related death. The court denied qualified
immunity from liability to the correctional officers and the sheriff’s office. (Grundy County Jail, Illinois)
U.S. District Court
WRONGFUL DEATH
MEDICAL CARE

Awalt v. Marketti, 75 F.Supp.3d 777 (N.D.Ill. 2014). The estate and the widow of a pretrial detainee who
died in a county jail brought civil rights and wrongful death action against the county, jail personnel, the
medical services contractor, and the contractor’s employees. Individual defendants moved to separate their
cases from the claims against the county and the contractor. The district court granted the motion, finding
that the potential for unfair prejudice warranted the separation. (Correctional Health Companies, Inc.,
Health Professional, Ltd., Grundy County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
CIVIL COMMITMENT
RELIGION
PROGRAMS
SEARCHES

Ballard v. Johns, 17 F.Supp.3d 511 (E.D.N.C. 2014). A civil detainee being considered for certification as
a sexually dangerous person brought an action against federal employees, in their official capacities and in
their individual capacities under Bivens, challenging various conditions of his detention, including claims
concerning due process violations and inability to attend religious services. The employees moved to dismiss or for summary judgment and the detainee moved to overrule objections to requests for document
production. The district court granted the employees’ motion and denied the detainee’s motion. The court
held that: (1) the detainee did not show that federal employees, by following Federal Bureau of Prisons
(BOP) regulations and policies, violated his constitutional rights; (2) the detainee was properly subjected to
restrictions and disciplinary consequences of the BOP commitment and treatment program; (3) denial of the
detainee's request to attend or receive religious services while in disciplinary segregation did not unduly
burden his free exercise of religion; and (4) the employees did not violate detainee's right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures by searching his cell and seizing his property. (Federal Correctional
Institution at Butner, North Carolina)

U.S. District Court
DISCIPLINE
SEGREGATION
FAILURE TO PROTECT
TRANSPORT

Best v. New York City Dept. of Correction, 14 F.Supp.3d 341 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). A pretrial detainee filed a §
1983 action alleging that state prison officials denied him due process at an infraction hearing, improperly
placed him in segregated housing, and failed to protect him while being transported to court. The officials
moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the
issues of whether the detainee's placement in segregated housing following the infraction hearing was administrative or punitive in nature, and whether he was provided the opportunity to call a witnesses at a
hearing involved fact issues that could not be resolved on a motion to dismiss the detainee's claim that
prison officials' denied him procedural due process at the hearing. According to the court, the officials'
failure to provide the detainee with a seat belt while he was being transported to court with his hands handcuffed behind his back did not demonstrate deliberate indifference to the detainee's safety. Plaintiff alleges
that, some time after he was placed in segregated housing, “while being transported to court, handcuffs
[were] placed behind [Plaintiff's] back and [he was] “placed in a cage with no seatbelt or a way to protect
[himself] in case of a sudden stop or accident.” and that, “while riding[, he sat] on a slippery seat that
cause[d] [him] to continuously slide.” According to the detainee, “On [his] way to court, the bus kept stopping short and [Plaintiff] continued to bump [his] head on the gate in front of [him].” The detainee complained to the driver and after he returned to the detention facility he was taken to the medical center where
his injuries were assessed and an injury report was filed. The detainee claims that, as a result of the injuries
that he sustained during this trip, his neck and shoulders were injured, and that “he now has to take medication for migraine headaches. (Metropolitan Detention Center, Brooklyn, New York)

U.S. District Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act,
CLASSIFICATION

Blossom v. Dart, 64 F.Supp.3d 1158 (N.D.Ill. 2014). A disabled detainee in a county jail brought an action
against a county and a county sheriff, asserting a § 1983 claim for deprivation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights and alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation
Act. The sheriff filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court denied the motion.
The court held that the disabled detainee, who suffered injuries due to the lack of accommodation for his
disability, sufficiently alleged that the sheriff had personal knowledge of, or involvement in, the alleged
deprivation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights, so as to state a § 1983 claim against the sheriff in his
individual capacity. The detainee alleged that the sheriff acquired personal knowledge of the fact that disabled prisoners assigned to a certain jail division had sustained injuries because shower and toilet facilities
were not equipped with appropriate grab bars, toilet seats, and shower seats, and the detainee alleged that
despite revising the jail’s housing assignment policy for detainees who used wheelchairs, the sheriff refused
to revise the policy for other disabled detainees. The court also found that the detainee sufficiently alleged
that there was an official policy allowing disabled detainees to be housed in non-accessible housing units
that continued to exist despite the knowledge that the policy had caused serious injuries to disabled detainees. (Cook County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE
MEDICAL CARE

Cady v. Walsh, 753 F.3d 348 (1st Cir. 2014). Following her son’s death from self-inflicted injuries in a
county jail, the mother of a pretrial detainee brought an action under § 1983 against employees of a private
healthcare services provider, alleging deliberate indifference to the detainee’s health in violation of the
Due Process Clause. The provider's employees moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity.
The district court denied the motion and the employees appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that

32.236

the employees failed to raise a purely legal challenge, depriving the court of jurisdiction. (Cumberland
County Jail, Corizon Inc., Maine)
U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS

Cano v. City of New York, 44 F.Supp.3d 324 (E.D.N.Y. 2014). Pretrial detainees brought an action against
a city and police officers, alleging that inhumane conditions at a detention facility violated due process. The
city and the officers moved to dismiss. The district court denied the motion, finding that the detainees alleged objectively serious conditions that deprived them of basic human needs, that the officers and the city
were deliberately indifferent to conditions at the facility, and that there was punitive intent. The detainees
alleged that, over a 24-hour period, they were subjected to overcrowded cells, insects, rodents, extreme
temperatures, unsanitary conditions, sleep deprivation, lack of adequate food and water, lack of access to
bathroom facilities, and lack of protection from the conduct of other inmates. (Brooklyn Central Booking,
New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCHES

Cantley v. West Virginia Regional Jail and Correctional Facility Authority, 771 F.3d 201 (4th Cir. 2014).
Two arrestees brought a § 1983 action for damages and declaratory and injunctive relief against a regional
jail authority and three of its former or current executive directors, challenging the constitutionality of visual strip searches and delousing of the arrestees. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. An arrestee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that: (1) the post-arraignment visual
strip search of one arrestee did not violate the Fourth Amendment; (2) the pre-arraignment visual strip
search of the other arrestee did not violate a clearly established right where the arrestee was strip-searched
in a private room, and he was to be held until the next morning in a holding cell where he might interact
with up to 15 other arrestees; (3) delousing of the arrestees did not violate a clearly established right; and
(4) declaratory and injunctive relief would be premature. The court noted that the delousing was done in a
private room with only one officer, who was of the same sex as the arrestees, and it did not entail the officer himself touching either arrestee. (West Virginia Regional Jail and Correctional Facility Authority)

U.S. Appeals Court
MENTAL HEALTH

Carl v. Muskegon County, 763 F.3d 592 (6th Cir. 2014). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against
a psychiatrist, who served as an independent contractor to the provider of jail mental health services, claiming that the psychiatrist failed to provide necessary mental health services in violation of the detainee's
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court dismissed and the detainee appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that the psychiatrist was a state actor for the purposes of inmate's § 1983 claim. (Muskegon County Jail, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
FALSE ARREST
FALSE IMPRISONMENT
UNLAWFUL DETENTION

Chavez v. County of Bernalillo, 3 F.Supp.3d 936 (D.N.M. 2014). An arrestee brought § 1983 claims and
state-law claims against a county and its jail director, relating to the arrestee's detention pursuant to a bench
warrant that had been cancelled before the arrest. After removal to federal court, the defendants filed a
motion for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part, and remanded to the state court. The court held that the arrestee's § 1983 claims against a county and its jail director, relating to detention pursuant to a bench warrant that had been cancelled before the arrest, were properly characterized as Fourth Amendment claims for false arrest and false imprisonment, rather than for malicious prosecution. The court found that county jail employees did not violate the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unlawful seizure, when they booked him into the jail following a city police
officer's arrest of the plaintiff pursuant to a bench warrant that was facially valid, but that had been cancelled before the arrest. According to the court, county jail employees, upon learning from the arrestee's
attorney about the pre-arrest cancellation of the facially valid bench warrant pursuant to which city police
officers had conducted the arrest, did not act with deliberate or reckless intent to falsely imprison the arrestee by requiring a release order from a judge, and thus, the arrestee's continued detention for two days,
until the release order was issued, did not constitute false imprisonment in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The court noted that jail employees acted reasonably, since a judge could better determine why a
bench warrant remained available to city police at the time of arrest, and whether any other basis for detaining the arrestee existed. (Metropolitan Detention Center, Bernalillo County, New Mexico)

U.S. District Court
USE OF FORCE

Crayton v. Graffeo, 10 F.Supp.3d 888 (N.D. Ill. 2014). A pretrial detainee in a county department of corrections jail brought an action against three correctional officers, alleging that they beat him in two separate
incidents, and asserting an excessive-force claim under § 1983. The officers filed a motion for summary
judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the detainee
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing his § 1983 action, where the detainee neither
appealed the notice that his grievance was being forwarded to the jail's Office of Professional Review
(OPR), nor did he await the results of OPR's investigation. (Cook County Department of Corrections, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
USE OF FORCE

Edwards v. Byrd, 750 F.3d 728 (8th Cir. 2014). Pretrial detainees in a county jail brought a § 1983 action
against the county, county sheriff, and jail guards, alleging use of excessive force, failure to protect, and
other constitutional violations. The district court denied, in part, the sheriff's and guards' motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The sheriff and a guard appealed. The appeals court affirmed
in part and reversed in part. The court found that the guards were not entitled to qualified immunity for
their alleged conduct in employing a flash-bang grenade in pretrial detainees' cell, kicking the detainees,
and shooting them with bean-bag guns. According to the court, immediately before the guards entered the
cell, the detainees were allegedly submissive, lying face-down, which the guards could allegedly see
through the cell door, and the detainees allegedly did not resist or otherwise act aggressively, and, at the
time of the incident, it was clearly established that such conduct would violate due process. The court held
that the sheriff could not be liable where it was undisputed that the sheriff was not present during the alleged incident. (Falkner County Detention Center, Arkansas)

32.237

U.S. Appeals Court
WRONGFUL DEATH
FAILURE TO PROTECT
MEDICAL CARE
USE OF FORCE
DUE PROCESS

Estate of Booker v. Gomez, 745 F.3d 405 (10th Cir. 2014). The estate of deceased pretrial detainee who died
while in custody after officers restrained him in his response to his alleged insubordination, brought a §
1983 action in state court against the deputies and a sergeant, alleging excessive force, deprivation of life
without due process, and failure to provide immediate medical care. Following removal to federal court, the
district court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The
defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the detainee's right to be free
from excessive force, including use of a neck restraint, stun gun, and pressure on his back while he was on
his stomach and not resisting, was clearly established, for purposes of determining whether the deputies and
sergeant were entitled to qualified immunity. According to the court, a reasonable officer would know that
failing to check a pretrial detainee's vital signs or provide immediate medical attention after he was rendered unconscious by the use of force, which allegedly included at least a two-minute neck hold, 140
pounds of pressure on his back, and the use of stun gun for eight seconds, was deliberate indifference.
(Downtown Detention Center, Denver, Colorado)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE
FAILURE TO PROTECT

Estate of Schroeder v. Gillespie County, 23 F.Supp.3d 775 (W.D.Tex. 2014). The estate of a deceased pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against a county, its sheriff, the sheriff's department, and a jailer,
alleging violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that: (1) the sheriff's
department did not have the legal capacity to engage in litigation separate from the county; (2) the detainee's right not to be subjected to deliberate indifference by prison officials while they had a subjective
knowledge of a risk of serious harm to the detainee that was clearly established; (3) the jailer's conduct was
objectively reasonable; and (4) genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the county's policies
were the moving force behind the alleged constitutional violation. According to the court, the jailer's conduct in relation to the pretrial detainee, who the jailer was aware was suicidal, was objectively reasonable,
and therefore, the jailer was entitled to qualified immunity. The detainee committed suicide using his socks.
The jailer was aware that the detainee had torn a piece of a blanket and tied it to a fixture in his cell in what
was interpreted by on duty officers as a suicide attempt, which led to the detainee's being put on 15 minute
suicide watch. The jailer continued that watch when he came on duty, following existing policies. The jailer
was not aware that the detainee still had his socks, and the jailer immediately cut the detainee down upon
discovering detainee had hanged himself, called for help, and attempted to resuscitate the detainee. (Gillespie County Jail, Texas)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
SUICIDE

Estate of Stevens ex rel. Collins v. Board of Com’rs. of County of San Juan, 53 F.Supp.3d 1368 (D.N.M.
2014). The estate of a county jail detainee who committed suicide while in custody brought a § 1983 action
against county officials, county jail officers, and the healthcare provider that contracted with the county jail.
The healthcare provider filed a partial motion to dismiss. The district court converted it to a motion for
judgment on the pleadings, and granted the motion. According to the court, the estate failed to isolate the
allegedly unconstitutional acts of each defendant, and thus did not provide adequate notice as to the nature
of the claims against each, where the complaint generally used the collective term “defendants” and failed
to differentiate between unnamed jail officers and unnamed employees of the healthcare provider when
discussing the alleged wrongful action or inaction. (San Juan County Adult Detention Center, New Mexico)

U.S. Appeals Court
DISCIPLINE
CONDITIONS
SEGREGATION
PUNISHMENT

Ford v. Bender, 768 F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 2014). A pretrial detainee commenced an action alleging that prison
officials violated his due process rights by holding him in disciplinary segregated confinement throughout
the period of pretrial detention and into the subsequent criminal sentence as punishment for conduct that
had occurred while he was imprisoned during a prior criminal sentence. The district court held that the
detainee's punitive disciplinary confinement violated due process, and largely denied the officials' claims of
qualified immunity. The court awarded the detainee partial money damages and equitable relief after a
three-day bench trial, and awarded attorneys' fees and costs on the detainee's motion. The officials appealed. The appeals court reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court held that: (1) reasonable prison officials would not have known that the pretrial detainee's substantive due process rights and
procedural due process rights would have been violated by holding him in disciplinary segregated confinement throughout the period of pretrial detention as punishment for conduct that had occurred while he was
imprisoned during a prior criminal sentence; (2) the detainee's two prior convictions were not sufficient to
establish reasonable expectation after he had been released from custody that he would re-offend; (3) the
detainee was not the “prevailing party” for the purpose of attorneys' fees and costs with regard to a declaratory judgment entered on his behalf as it related to his rights as a detainee; (4) the detainee was the “prevailing party” for the purpose of attorneys' fees and costs with regard to an injunction to ensure his access
to traditional programs that were available to the general population; and (5) the detainee was not the “prevailing party” for the purpose of attorneys' fees and costs with regard to an injunction to deem his administrative sanction satisfied.
The court noted that conditions in the disciplinary unit are considerably more onerous than conditions of
confinement for the general population--an inmate is kept for twenty-three hours a day in a cell measuring
seven by twelve feet, each cell has a solid steel door with a small inset window, a narrow window to the
outdoors, a cement bed, desk, and stool, and a toilet visible through the inset window. An inmate typically
leaves his cell for only one hour a day to exercise (five days a week) and to shower (three days a week). He
is subject to strip searches whenever he enters or leaves his cell. When an inmate is out of his cell for any
reason, he is manacled and placed in leg chains. Inmates are socially isolated. Each inmate receives his
meals through a slot in the steel door and is given only twenty minutes to eat. The prison library is offlimits, although an inmate may receive law books from a “book cart,” which requires a formal request and
typically results in a wait of eight days. Communication with other inmates, guards, and the outside world
is severely restricted. (Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Cedar Junction)

32.238

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT

Fouch v. District of Columbia, 10 F.Supp.3d 45 (D.D.C. 2014). A detainee, who allegedly suffered severe
injuries from collision between two police vehicles, one of which he was riding in, handcuffed behind the
back and without a seat belt or harness, while being transported between police stations for processing of a
misdemeanor threat charge, brought an action against the District of Columbia and the two officers who
had been driving the vehicles. After the court dismissed claims against the officer who had been driving the
other vehicle, the District and the remaining officer filed a motion for partial dismissal. The district court
granted the motion for partial dismissal in part and denied in part without prejudice. The court held that the
District of Columbia could not be held liable for damages under § 1983. (District of Columbia Metropolitan
Police Department, Central Booking Division)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE
INTAKE SCREENING

Fourte v. Faulkner County, Ark., 746 F.3d 384 (8th Cir. 2014). A pretrial detainee sued a county and jail
officials for alleged deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, after he became legally blind allegedly due to his high blood pressure while incarcerated. The district court denied the defendants summary
judgment based on qualified immunity. The defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The appeals court held that the lack of medical screening at intake, failure to
prescribe medication, and a delay in administering medication were not deliberate indifference. The court
held that the officials' failure to conduct medical screening of the detainee at intake did not constitute deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, where the officials began logging the detainee's daily blood
pressure in response to his complaints of heart problems.
The court found that the officials' failure to prescribe medication for the detainee after several high
blood pressure readings did not constitute deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The court
noted that although the officials at most should have known they were committing malpractice by not prescribing medication, medical malpractice was not deliberate indifference. According to the court, the officials' delay in administering blood pressure medication to the detainee by failing to write a second prescription sooner, after the medication did not arrive following first prescription, did not constitute deliberate
indifference to his serious medical needs, where the officials at most were negligent, and deliberate indifference required even more than gross negligence. (Faulkner County Jail, Arkansas)

U.S. District Court
ALIEN
DUE PROCESS
INITIAL APPEARANCE

Gayle v. Johnson, 4 F.Supp.3d 692 (D.N.J. 2014). Aliens brought a class-action lawsuit against the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and numerous other federal and state government agencies, alleging
that the defendants' acts of subjecting individuals to mandatory immigration detention violated the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and the Due Process Clause. The government moved to dismiss. The
district court declined to dismiss the alien’s claims for injunctive relief, finding that the aliens had standing
to challenge the adequacy of the Joseph hearing and associated mandatory detention procedures, and that
allegations that the Joseph hearings failed to afford aliens adequate protection were sufficient to state
claims for due process violations. (Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, District of New Jersey)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
WRONGFUL DEATH

Graham v. Hodge, 69 F.Supp.3d 618 (S.D.Miss. 2014). The spouse of a pretrial detainee who died of cardiac arrhythmia brought a wrongful death action against a sheriff and a county alleging deliberate indifference to the detainee’s medical care under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as
failure to train under § 1983. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the
motion. The court held that a nurse was not deliberately indifferent to the detainee’s medical needs, notwithstanding that the nurse waited 13 days to fax a medical authorization to a care center, that she sent the
detainee to a medical clinic that had no cardiologist, that she was not aware for several months that the
detainee was not taking necessary heart medication, and that the detainee ultimately died of cardiac arrhythmia. According to the court, the nurse regularly treated the detainee, which included providing him
with his medication once she was made aware of its necessity, and the detainee’s death was not proximately
caused by the months-long lack of medicine. The court found that the detainee’s death was not a highly
predictable consequence of failing to train the jail nurse. (Jones County Adult Det. Facility, Mississippi)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
MENTAL HEALTH

Graves v. Arpaio, 48 F.Supp.3d 1318 (D.Ariz. 2014). Pretrial detainees in the Maricopa County, Arizona,
jail system brought a class action against the county and the county board of supervisors, seeking injunctive
relief for alleged violations of their civil rights. The parties entered into consent decree which was superseded by amended judgments entered by stipulation of the parties. The defendants sought to terminate the
remaining court-ordered injunctive relief regarding medical, dental, and mental health care for detainees.
The district court denied the motion. The court held that: (1) termination of injunctive relief requiring the
timely identification, assessment, and placement of detainees suffering from serious health conditions was
not warranted; (2) termination of injunctive relief requiring the timely identification, assessment, and
placement of detainees suffering from mental illness was not warranted; (3) termination of injunctive relief
requiring the timely identification, segregation, and treatment of detainees with communicable diseases was
not warranted; (4) termination of injunctive relief requiring that the detainees have ready access to care to
meet their serious medical and mental health needs was not warranted; and (5) the detainees were the prevailing party for the purpose of awarding attorney's fees. (Maricopa County Jail, Arizona)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE
WRONGFUL DEATH

Hahn v. Walsh, 762 F.3d 617 (7th Cir. 2014). A female pretrial detainee's estate brought an action against a
county, sheriff, and medical services contractor, alleging the defendants failed to provide adequate medical
treatment for the detainee's diabetes in violation of her rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act, and Illinois law. After several of the estate's
claims were dismissed, the district court entered summary judgment for the defendants on the estate's remaining claims. The estate appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
The court held that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing with prejudice the wrongful death

32.239

claim brought by the detainee's estate for failure to include an affidavit and written report confirming the
claim's merit, where the court made no specific finding that failure to include an affidavit and report was in
bad faith or an attempt to delay litigation, and its conclusion that the estate could not timely file an amended complaint because the statute of limitations had lapsed failed to take into account the possibility that an
amendment would relate back to the estate's initial, timely complaint.
The court found that the county sheriff's lack of a written policy or procedure for diabetic detainees
whose blood sugar was not being measured and who refused to eat did not amount to deliberate indifference to the pretrial detainee's serious medical needs in violation of her due process rights. According to the
court, the deaths of seven correctional facility inmates and a single incident of an inmate complaining about
his diabetes treatment were insufficient to put the sheriff on notice that his lack of a policy could cause the
death of a detainee as a result of diabetic ketoacidosis, as none of the deaths were caused by complications
from diabetes. (Champaign County Correctional Center, Illinois)
U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
MEDICAL CARE

Haley v. Tryon, 12 F.Supp.3d 573 (W.D.N.Y. 2014). A former detainee brought an action against federal
detention facility officials and four nonfederal officers, alleging failure to protect him and denial of proper
medical treatment, in violation of his rights pursuant to the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the detainee's complaint failed to allege that a field office director and an assistant field officer director were personally involved in any constitutional violation, as required to state a Bivens claim. (Buffalo Federal Detention Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES
FALSE IMPRISONMENT

Hebshi v. U.S., 32 F.Supp.3d 834 (E.D.Mich. 2014). After she was forcibly removed from an airliner, detained, and subjected to a strip-search, a passenger brought a civil rights action against federal agents and
airport law enforcement officers, alleging discrimination based on race, ethnicity, or national origin, and
violations of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The airline law enforcement officers moved
for partial judgment on the pleadings. The district court denied the motion. The court held that the passenger stated claims for unreasonable seizure and unreasonable search, and that the officers were not entitled
to qualified immunity. The court held that the passenger's allegations that she was forced off an airplane by
armed officers, handcuffed, briefly questioned on the tarmac, transported to a jail, locked in a guarded cell
under video surveillance, detained for four hours, and strip-searched, before being extensively questioned
about her involvement in other passengers' alleged suspicious activity, were sufficient to allege that the
seizure was a de facto arrest made without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment. According to the court, the passenger's allegations that she was arrested, detained for four hours, strip-searched by
airport law enforcement officers, based on her alleged involvement in suspicious activities by two other
passengers, that the officers made no effort to verify her identity or corroborate any connection between her
and the other passengers, and that the strip-search was not conducted promptly, were sufficient to state a
claim for unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. (Frontier Airlines, Federal Law Enforcement
Agents, Wayne County Airport Authority Law Enforcement Agents, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
STAFFING
CONDITIONS
MEDICAL CARE
HANDICAP
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
RA- Rehabilitation Act

Hernandez v. County of Monterey, 70 F.Supp.3d 963 (N.D.Cal. 2014). Current and recently released inmates from a county jail brought an action against the county, the sheriff’s office, and the private company
that administered all jail health care facilities and services, alleging, on behalf of a class of inmates, that
substandard conditions at the jail violated the federal and state constitutions, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act, and a California statute prohibiting discrimination in state-funded
programs. The inmates sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The defendants filed motions to dismiss.
The district court denied the motions. The court held that both current and recently released inmates had
standing to pursue their claims against the county and others for allegedly substandard conditions at the jail,
even though the recently released inmates were no longer subject to the conditions they challenged. The
court noted that the short average length of stay of inmates in the proposed class, which was largely made
up of pretrial detainees, was approximately 34 days, and that short period, coupled with the plodding speed
of legal action and the fact that other persons similarly situated would continue to be subject to the challenged conduct, qualified the plaintiffs for the “inherently transitory” exception to the mootness doctrine.
The court found that the inmates sufficiently alleged that the private company that administered all jail
health care facilities and services operated a place of public accommodation, as required to state a claim for
violation of ADA Title III. The court noted that: “The complaint alleges a litany of substandard conditions
at the jail, including: violence due to understaffing, overcrowding, inadequate training, policies, procedures,
facilities, and prisoner classification; inadequate medical and mental health care screening, attention, distribution, and resources; and lack of policies and practices for identifying, tracking, responding, communicating, and providing accessibility for accommodations for prisoners with disabilities.” (Monterey County
Jail, California)

U.S. District Court
USE OF FORCE
RELEASE

Hill v. Hoisington, 28 F.Supp.3d 725 (E.D.Mich. 2014). A detainee filed an action alleging that a deputy
sheriff used excessive force and committed battery against him while he was in custody, after he was acquitted of criminal charges against him. After a jury verdict in the detainee's favor, the detainee moved for
entry of judgment on the jury verdict, for costs, and for judgment as matter of law. The district court denied
the motion as moot, where the award of exemplary damages was justifiable and the detention of the detainee after he was acquitted was unlawful, where the jury found that the deputy's conduct was malicious, or so
willful and wanton as to demonstrate reckless disregard of the detainee's rights. The court noted that the
proper post-acquittal procedure requires immediate release of a detainee following acquittal, allowing for
any possible out-processing to occur without continued or required detention. (Oakland Co. Jail, Michigan)

32.240

U.S. District Court
USE OF FORCE

Holton v. Conrad, 24 F.Supp.3d 624 (E.D.Ky. 2014). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action against a constable, a county jail, and a county jailer, asserting claims arising out of his arrest and treatment at the jail. The
jail and jailer moved for judgment on the pleadings on the arrestee's state law claim. The district court denied the motion. According to the court, the arrestee's claim requesting records under Kentucky law did not
form part of same case or controversy as his federal claim in § 1983, where the arrestee's federal claim was
based on the constable's actions in allegedly beating him at time of arrest and at the county jail. (Estill
County Detention Center, Kentucky)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
CONDITIONS
USE OF FORCE
SANITATION

Imhoff v. Temas, 67 F.Supp.3d 700 (W.D.Pa. 2014). A pretrial detainee brought an action against employees of a county correctional facility, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical need, violation
of his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment with regard to conditions of his confinement, and excessive
force in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The employees moved to dismiss. The district court granted
the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the detainee stated a claim against the employees
for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need under the Fourteenth Amendment, where the detainee
alleged that he informed facility personnel of his extensive drug use, that he had repeatedly requested medical assistance when he began experiencing seizures and hallucinations in conjunction with his drug withdrawal in the presence of facility personnel, and that he was provided no medical treatment for at least eight
days despite his requests for medical attention. The court held that the employees were not entitled to qualified immunity from liability because a county correctional facility’s constitutional obligation to provide
care to inmates suffering unnecessary pain from a serious medical need was clearly established at the time
the pretrial detainee allegedly began experiencing seizures in conjunction with drug withdrawal and was
not provided medical treatment.
The detainee had initially been refused admission to the jail because he displayed signs of a drug overdose and he was admitted to a local hospital. After hospital personnel determined he was stable he was
admitted to the jail. At one point in his confinement, the detainee acted out and banged his cell door with a
plastic stool. This resulted in the retrieval of the stool by jail officers and, while he was held down by one
officer, he was kicked in the face by another officer. When he yelled for help, an officer responded by
choking the detainee and then spraying him with pepper spray, and he was not permitted to shower to remove the pepper spray for thirty minutes.
The court found that the detainee’s allegations against the employees in their individual capacities
regarding the intentional denial of medical treatment, excessive use of force, and violation of his rights
under Fourteenth Amendment with regard to conditions of his confinement were sufficient to set forth a
plausible claim for punitive damages. The detainee alleged that he was denied basic human needs such as
drinking water, access to a toilet and toilet paper, and toiletries such as soap and a toothbrush. (Washington
County Correctional Facility, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

In re Nassau County Strip Search Cases, 12 F.Supp.3d 485 (E.D.N.Y. 2014). Arrestees brought a class
action against county officials and others, challenging the county correctional center's blanket strip search
policy for newly admitted, misdemeanor detainees. Following a bench trial, the district court awarded general damages of $500 per strip search for the 17,000 persons who comprised the class. Subsequently, the
arrestees moved for attorney fees in the amount of $5,754,000 plus costs and expenses of $182,030. The
court held that it would apply the current, unadjusted hourly rates charged by the various attorneys in determining counsel fees using the lodestar method as a cross-check against the percentage method. The court
found that the lodestar rates were $300 for all associates, with two exceptions for requested rates below
$300, and $450 for all partners. The court awarded $3,836,000 in counsel fees, which was equivalent to 33
1/3 % of the total amount recovered on behalf of the class, and $182,030.25 in costs and expenses. (Nassau
County Correctional Center, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE
USE OF FORCE

Jackson v. Buckman, 756 F.3d 1060 (8th Cir. 2014). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against
corrections facility employees and corrections officials alleging he received constitutionally deficient medical care and that medical officials used excessive force against him while responding to his medical emergency. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, and the detainee appealed. The
appeals court affirmed. The court held that: (1) a physician was not deliberately indifferent to the detainee's
surgical wound on his abdomen; (2) a nurse was not deliberately indifferent to the detainee's medical needs;
(3) absent an underlying constitutional violation, the detainee could not maintain official-capacity and failure-to-supervise claims against a sheriff and a chief of detention; (4) a nurse's act of hitting the pretrial
detainee's nose while administering an ammonia inhalant was not excessive force; and (5) the force used by
nurses to move the pretrial detainee to his bed after he lost consciousness was not excessive. (Pulaski County Regional Detention Facility, Arkansas)

U.S. District Court
USE OF FORCE

Johnson v. Milliner, 65 F.Supp.3d 1295 (S.D.Ala. 2014). A county jail detainee brought an action against a
jail officer alleging use of excessive force and state law claims for assault and battery. The officer moved
for summary judgment. The district court denied the motion. The court held that summary judgment was
precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the force applied against the detainee by the jail
officer, which involved the use of a stun gun, was applied in a good faith effort to preserve discipline and
security or was applied maliciously and sadistically to cause harm. (Mobile Metro Jail, Alabama)

32.241

U.S. District Court
CIVIL COMMITMENT
CONDITIONS
CELL SEARCHES
DUE PROCESS
MAIL
PROGRAMS
TELEPHONE
SEARCHES

Karsjens v. Jesson, 6 F.Supp.3d 916 (D.Minn. 2014). Patients who were civilly committed to the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP) brought a § 1983 class action against officials, alleging various claims,
including failure to provide treatment, denial of the right to be free from inhumane treatment, and denial of
the right to religious freedom. The patients moved for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, and the
officials moved to dismiss. The district court granted the defendants’ motion in part and denied in part, and
denied the plaintiffs’ motions. The court held that the patients’ allegations that commitment to MSOP essentially amounted to lifelong confinement, equivalent to a lifetime of criminal incarceration in a facility
resembling, and run like, a medium to high security prison, sufficiently stated a § 1983 substantive due
process claim pertaining to the punitive nature of the patients' confinement. The court found that the patients’ allegations that, based on policies and procedures created and implemented by state officials, patients spent no more than six or seven hours per week in treatment, that their treatment plans were not detailed and individualized, that treatment staff was not qualified to treat sex offenders, and that staffing levels were often far too low, sufficiently stated a § 1983 substantive due process claim based on the officials'
failure to provide adequate treatment. According to the court, the patients stated a § 1983 First Amendment
free exercise claim against state officials with allegations that MSOP's policies, procedures, and practices
caused the patients to be monitored during religious services and during private meetings with clergy, did
not permit patients to wear religious apparel or to possess certain religious property, and did not allow patients to “communally celebrate their religious beliefs by having feasts,” and that such policies and practices were not related to legitimate institutional or therapeutic interests. The court also found that the patients’
allegations that state officials limited their phone use, limited their access to certain newspapers and magazines, and removed or censored articles from newspapers and magazines, stated a § 1983 First Amendment
claim that officials unreasonably restricted their right to free speech. The court found that the patients stated
a § 1983 unreasonable search and seizure claim under the Fourth Amendment with allegations that, taken
together with the patients' other allegations surrounding the punitive nature of their confinement, state officials violated their Fourth Amendment rights through their search policies, procedures, and practices, and
that they were subjected to cell searches, window checks, strip searches, and random pat downs. The court
ordered that its court-appointed experts would be granted complete and unrestricted access to the documents the experts requested, including publicly available reports and documents related to the patients'
lawsuit, as well as MSOP evaluation reports and administrative directives and rules. (Minnesota Sex Offender Program)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT

Keith v. DeKalb County, Georgia, 749 F.3d 1034 (11th Cir. 2014). The administrator of the estate of a pretrial detainee who was murdered by a fellow inmate in a jail's mental health unit brought an action against a
county, the county sheriff, and correctional officers, alleging under § 1983 that the defendants violated the
detainee's substantive due process rights. The district court denied the sheriff's motion for summary judgment based on the doctrine of qualified immunity. The sheriff appealed. The appeals court reversed. The
court held that while a correctional officer on duty at the time the detainee was murdered by a fellow inmate may have acted contrary to jail policy by using a cell phone within the jail, the administrator of the
detainee's estate failed to show that the use of personal cell phones within the jail was a widespread problem or that the county sheriff was aware that officers routinely violated the policy and failed to correct the
problem. The court found that the sheriff was entitled to qualified immunity on the § 1983 due process
claim that he was deliberately indifferent to the safety of the detainee, in failing to segregate mental health
inmates with violent histories from those with nonviolent histories and by failing to separate mental health
inmates charged with a violent crime from those charged with a nonviolent crime. According to the court,
even if the sheriff violated the detainee's due process rights, it was not clearly established that he had a
constitutional obligation to disregard the medical expertise of mental health contractors he hired to ensure
that inmates' mental health was tended to. The court also found that the administrator of the estate of the
detainee failed to show that the county sheriff was subjectively aware that the jail's policy of requiring
detention officers to alert mental health staff when relocating mental health inmates to different cells within
the same pod was disregarded on a widespread basis, as would have subjected the sheriff to supervisory
liability under § 1983. The court found that a prior isolated incident in which a pretrial detainee was killed
by another inmate when the two were placed in the same cell in the jail's mental health pod did not provide
requisite notice to the county sheriff that training provided to detention officers was constitutionally deficient, as would subject the sheriff to liability under § 1983 with respect to claims arising from the subsequent murder of a pretrial detainee by a fellow inmate in the same pod. (DeKalb County Jail, Georgia)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

King v. Kramer, 763 F.3d 635 (7th Cir. 2014). The estate of a pretrial detainee who died while awaiting trial
in a county jail brought a civil rights action against the county and the health care provider for the jail.
Following reversal in part of the grant of summary judgment in favor of the county and the provider, the
court entered judgment for the county and the provider on a jury verdict. The estate appealed. The appeals
court reversed and remanded, finding that: (1) the county was not liable for the death of the detainee who
was found dead in his jail cell after jail medical staff rapidly tapered off his psychotropic medication, absent evidence that the county had an official custom or policy in place to deprive inmates of their prescribed
medications; (2) the district court could not take judicial notice of a contract between the county and the
provider; and (3) the indemnification agreement between the county and the provider was inadmissible to
show liability. (La Crosse Jail, Wisconsin)

U.S. Appeals Court
WRONGFUL DEATH
USE OF FORCE
MEDICAL CARE

Kitchen v. Dallas County, Tex., 759 F.3d 468 (5th Cir. 2014). The widow of a pretrial detainee who died of
asphyxiation while he was being extracted from his jail cell brought a § 1983 action against the county,
detention officers, and others, alleging that the defendants used excessive force and acted with deliberate
indifference to the detainee's medical needs. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district
court granted the motion in its entirety, and the plaintiff appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded
in part, and affirmed in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of

32.242

material fact as to both the timing and the degree of force used in extracting the detainee from his jail cell.
The court noted that the law was “clearly established” at the relevant time that use of force against an inmate was reserved for good-faith efforts to maintain or restore discipline, rather than for the purpose of
causing harm, such that the defendants had reasonable warning that kicking, stomping, and choking a subdued inmate would violate the inmate's constitutional rights under certain circumstances.
The court held that the widow failed to demonstrate that detention officers acted with deliberate indifference to the detainee's medical needs, even though they failed to contact medical staff prior to attempting
to extract the detainee from his cell, where the need for participation of specialized staff to perform the
extraction of a mentally ill inmate from a jail cell was not so apparent that even laymen would recognize
this alleged medical need. According to the court, the widow failed to establish that the county failed to
provide proper training to personnel located in the facility's North tower, where the detainee was being held
when he died, where the widow pointed to no pattern of past constitutional violations bearing a sufficient
resemblance to the events surrounding the death of detainee. (Dallas County Jail, Texas)
U.S. District Court
HOME DETENTION

Liska v. Dart, 60 F.Supp.3d 889 (N.D. Ill. 2014). A pretrial detainee brought an action against a county and
a county sheriff, alleging under § 1983 that the defendants deprived him of liberty without procedural due
process, and asserting claims under state law for false imprisonment and intentional infliction of emotional
distress. The defendants moved to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim. The district court granted the
motion in part and denied in part. The court held that: (1) as a matter of first impression, the detainee had a
liberty interest protected by procedural due process in remaining on home confinement; (2) the defendants
violated the detainee’s procedural due process rights; (3) the detainee sufficiently stated the sheriff’s personal involvement in the alleged procedural due process violation; and (4) the sheriff was not entitled to
qualified immunity. The court noted that the pretrial detainee had a liberty interest protected by procedural
due process in remaining on home confinement, and thus the county and county sheriff were required to
afford the detainee procedural due process prior to transferring the detainee to jail due to his alleged violation of the terms of home confinement. The detainee alleged that the sheriff was responsible for implementing the cell-box system used in the detainee’s home during his home confinement, that the sheriff was
aware of issues with the type and brand of system assigned to the detainee and many other home detainees,
that the sheriff knew or should have known of the malfunctions of the system in the detainee’s home, and
that the sheriff allowed the detainee’s incarceration in the county jail for violation of the terms of his home
confinement despite knowledge of numerous false alarms registered by the system. (Cook County Sheriff’s
Department, Cook County Jail)

U.S. Appeals Court
ALIEN
BAIL

Lopez-Valenzuela v. Arpaio, 770 F.3d 772 (9th Cir. 2014). A felony arrestee brought an action against state
officials challenging the constitutionality of an Arizona constitutional provision prohibiting state courts
from setting bail for detainees who were in the United States illegally. The district court granted summary
judgment and partial dismissal in the officials' favor, and the arrestees appealed. The appeals court affirmed. On rehearing en banc, the appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that the Arizona
constitutional provision forbidding any form of bail or pretrial release to undocumented immigrants arrested for serious felony offenses, without regard to whether they were dangerous or a flight risk, was not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest in ensuring that persons accused of crimes be available
for trial, and thus violated substantive due process. The court noted that there was no evidence that the
provision was adopted to address a particularly acute problem regarding an unmanageable flight risk of
undocumented immigrants, the provision encompassed an exceedingly broad range of offenses, including
not only serious offenses but also relatively minor ones, and the provision employed an overbroad,
irrebuttable presumption, rather than an individualized hearing, to determine whether a particular arrestee
posed an unmanageable flight risk. (Maricopa County Sheriff, Maricopa County Attorney, and Presiding
Judge of the Maricopa County Superior Court)

U.S. Appeals Court
USE OF FORCE
ACCESS TO COURT

Maus v. Baker, 747 F.3d 926 (7th Cir. 2014). A pretrial detainee filed a § 1983 action against personnel at a
county jail, alleging that they had used excessive force against him. The detainee alleged that the defendants used excessive force in response to him covering the lens of the video camera in his jail cell. In the
first incident, the detained alleged that his arms were twisted, he was pinned against the wall, and he was
choked. In the second incident, the detainee alleged that a taser was used to gain his compliance in transferring him to a separate cell. Following a jury trial, the district court entered judgment for the defendants and
denied the detainee's motions for new trial. The detainee appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that the court’s errors in failing to conceal the detainee's shackles from jury, and in requiring the
detainee to wear prison clothing while the defendants were allowed to wear uniforms were not harmless.
According to the court there was no indication that concealment of the restraints would have been infeasible, and visible shackling of the detainee had a prejudicial effect on the jury. The court noted that there
would have been no reason for the jury to know that the plaintiff was a prisoner, and being told that the
plaintiff was a prisoner and the defendants were guards made a different impression than seeing the plaintiff in a prison uniform and the defendants in guard uniforms. (Langlade County Jail, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
MEDICAL CARE
WRONGFUL DEATH
CONTRACT SERVICES

M.H. v. County of Alameda, 62 F.Supp.3d 1049 (N.D.Cal. 2014). A pretrial detainee’s estate brought a
civil rights action against a county, its sheriff, sheriff’s deputies, and a correctional healthcare provider,
alleging violations of § 1983 as well as common law claims for negligence, assault, and battery after the
detainee died from alcohol withdrawal. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court
held that summary judgment was precluded by fact issues: (1) with regard to the nurse who performed the
detainee’s medical intake assessment to determine, if she was subjectively aware of his risk of alcohol
withdrawal but did nothing prior to his death; (2) as to whether the county adequately implemented its
training policies concerning recognition of inmates with alcohol and other drug problems; (3) with regard

32.243

to the healthcare provider for failure to supervise the nurse who performed the detainee’s medical intake
assessment and for failure to follow its own policies; and (4) as to whether a deputy was justified in using a
stun gun against the detainee while moving him to an isolation cell and in delivering closed-fist strikes to
the detainee’s back after a struggle ensued. The court also found a fact issue with regard to whether a social
worker was subjectively reckless when she chose to see other inmates despite knowing that the pretrial
detainee was at risk for severe alcohol withdrawal. The detainee had been arrested for jaywalking. (Alameda County, Glenn Dyer Detention Facility, California)
U.S. District Court
SUICIDE
SUPERVISION

Nagle v. Gusman, 61 F.Supp.3d 609 (E.D.La. 2014). Siblings of a mentally ill pretrial detainee who committed suicide brought an action against numerous employees of a parish sheriff’s office, alleging a due
process violation under § 1983, and asserting claims for wrongful death and negligence under state law.
The siblings moved for partial summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held
that: (1) a deputy had a duty to take reasonable measures to protect the detainee from self-inflicted harm;
(2) the deputy breached his duty by failing to observe the detainee for long periods of time; (3) the deputy’s
abandonment of his post was the cause of the detainee’s suicide; (4) the sheriff was vicariously liable; and
(5) the deputy’s repeated decision to abandon his post violated the detainee’s due process right to adequate
protection from his known suicidal impulses. According to the court, the detainee was suffering from psychosis and was suicidal while in custody, the detainee was placed on a suicide watch, suicide watch policies
and training materials of the sheriff’s office explicitly required officers to continuously monitor detainees
on a suicide watch and to document that they had done so, and it was during one of the deputy’s extended
absences that the detainee succeeded in killing himself. The officer left his post at least three times during
his suicide watch shift, to help another employee distribute meals to other inmates, to take a restroom
break, and to visit the nurses’ station. During these absences, the detainee went unobserved for an hour and
a half, fifteen minutes, and two hours respectively. No other staff took the officer’s place observing the
detainee during the times when the officer abandoned his post. During the officer’s final absence, an inmate
notified an on-duty officer that the detainee was lying on the floor of his cell, unresponsive. It was later
determined that the detainee had asphyxiated after his airway became blocked by a wad of toilet paper.
(Orleans Parish Sheriff’s Office, House of Detention at Orleans Parish Prison, Louisiana)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Nam Dang v. Sheriff of Seminole County, Fla., 38 F.Supp.3d 1333 (M.D.Fla. 2014). A pretrial detainee
brought a § 1983 action against a county sheriff, county jail medical staff, and others, alleging that he was
deprived of his constitutional right to receive adequate medical care for his meningitis, resulting in multiple
strokes and severe brain damage. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court denied the motions,
finding that the pretrial detainee had serious medical needs, his allegations stated a claim against jail nurses
for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, and the detainee stated a § 1983 claim against the
county sheriff. The detainee allegedly experienced severe and increasing neck and back pain, minimal neck
rotation, fever, and bouts of unconsciousness and was eventually diagnosed with meningitis, and ended up
suffering multiple strokes and brain damage. The inmate alleged that the nurses who regularly attended to
the detainee over a period of weeks were well aware of his increasing symptoms and declining health, that
the nurses allegedly put him on muscle relaxants and returned him repeatedly to the general population, that
the nurses allegedly made no meaningful effort to diagnose or treat his condition, until he passed out in a
wheelchair, could not sit up, and became unresponsive.
The court held that the detainee’s allegations that the lack of meaningful health care training of county
jail personnel was the result of the county sheriff's deliberate cost-cutting efforts, and that the lack of such
training was reckless and created an obvious risk that the detainee's constitutional right to adequate medical
care for his serious medical need of meningitis would be violated, stated a § 1983 claim against county
sheriff. (John E. Polk Correctional Facility, Seminole County, Florida)

U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE ATTEMPT

Penn v. Escorsio, 764 F.3d 102 (1st Cir. 2014). The guardian of a pretrial detainee brought an action
against county corrections officers, alleging deliberate indifference to the detainee's health in violation of
the detainee's Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights, following the detainee's attempted suicide while
in the county jail. The district court denied the officers' motion for summary judgment. The officers appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and dismissed the appeal in part. The court held that the officers
were not entitled to qualified immunity from a deliberate indifference claim at the summary judgment
phase, where the law was clearly established that county corrections officers were required to take some
reasonable measures to thwart a known, substantial risk that a pretrial detainee would attempt suicide at the
time that plaintiff detainee made such an attempt. The court noted that the facts supported conclusions that
the officers faced the knowledge of a substantial risk to the detainee, and effectively failed to take any action to forestall the risk that the detainee would attempt suicide at the moment he did.
The detainee was arrested and taken to the jail on a Saturday for allegedly being intoxicated and committing an assault in violation of the terms of his release. His arraignment was set for Monday. During the
booking process, an officer completed both a suicide risk assessment form and a medical screening form
for the detainee. The suicide risk assessment revealed that that the detainee had, among other things: (1)
lost two close friends to suicide; (2) attempted suicide himself two years prior; and, (3) when asked whether he then felt like killing himself responded “not sure, feels that ... life is over.” Under the jail’s suicide
risk assessment form, a suicide risk score of 15 or more points qualifies as the highest suicide risk level and
requires one-on-one observation of the inmate, and the completion of a mental health evaluation within one
hour. The detainee’s risk of suicide scored at least 20 points. The detainee was placed on a “welfare
watch,” which required staff to make separate log entries regarding his condition when they conducted their
fifteen-minute checks of his cell. Although the jail had an available suicide prevention cell which could be
constantly monitored from the intake desk, he was placed in another cell out of view of any staff post. The
cell was not stripped of objects a detainee could use to harm himself, and contained sheets and bedding

32.244

which a detainee could potentially fashion into a makeshift noose—as the detainee did, following his return
to jail after his court appearance on Monday. (Knox County Jail, Maine)
U.S. District Court
CIVIL COMMITMENT
MENTAL HEALTH

Pierce v. Pemiscot Memorial Health Systems, 25 F.Supp.3d 1198 (E.D.Mo. 2014). A mental health detainee brought a § 1983 action against a medical director and a program director employed by the company that
contracted to provide psychiatric services to a county hospital, alleging violations of her due process rights
and Missouri law. The parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The district court denied the motion,
granted the defendants’ motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment on the
issue of punitive damages was precluded by genuine issue of material fact as to whether the conduct of the
medical director and the program director in continuing to detain the mental health detainee was motivated
by an evil motive or involved reckless indifference to the detainee's rights. The detainee brought the action
to challenge her detention in an inpatient psychiatric unit following the expiration of a 96–hour detention
order. She alleged that her continued detention violated her due process rights under the United States and
Missouri Constitutions, governing involuntary commitment procedures. (Pemiscot Memorial Hospital,
Missouri)

U.S. Appeals Court
MENTAL HEALTH
SUICIDE ATTEMPT

Pittman ex rel. Hamilton v. County of Madison, Ill., 746 F.3d 766 (7th Cir. 2014). By and through his
guardian, a pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against a county and various jail officials, alleging the
defendants were deliberately indifferent to his risk of suicide in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and denied the detainee's motion
for a new trial. The detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
The appeals court held that a nurse and doctor were not deliberately indifferent, that there was no evidence
that the sheriff or a captain knew of a substantial risk of harm for the detainee, and that the jail's suicide
prevention policies and practices were not so inadequate that they violated the detainee's rights. But the
appeals court also held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether a deputy and a sergeant were aware of the detainee's risk of suicide, where the detainee requested
to see a crisis intervention person. According to the court, when an inmate presents an officer with a request
to see a crisis intervention person and the officer also is aware that the reason for the request well may be a
serious psychological condition that is beyond the officer's capacity to assess definitively, the officer has an
obligation under the Eighth Amendment to refer that individual to the person who, under existing prison
procedures, is charged with making that definitive assessment. (Madison County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES
MEDICAL CARE
FAILURE TO PROTECT

Rahman v. Schriro, 22 F.Supp.3d 305 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against
a state prison commissioner, warden, deputy warden, deputy of security, and officers, alleging they violated
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause by forcing him to go through a radiation-emitting X-ray
security screening machine in order to get to and from his daily work assignment. The defendants moved to
dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The
court held that the detainee sufficiently alleged a serious present injury or future risk of serious injury, as
required to state a deliberate indifference claim against prison officials under the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause, by alleging that he was subjected to at least two full-body X-ray scans each day, that
each scan exposed him to a level of radiation that was 10 to 50 times higher than that emitted by airport
scanners, that radiation damages cells of the body and that even low doses of radiation increase an individual's risk of cancer, and that federal regulations prohibited prison officials from using even non-repetitive
X-ray examinations for security purposes unless the device was operated by licensed practitioner and there
was reasonable suspicion that the inmate had recently secreted contraband. According to the court, the
detainee's allegations that a prison officer intentionally subjected him to a higher dose of radiation through
a full-body X-ray screening machine while calling him a “fake Muslim, homosexual, faggot” were sufficient to allege that the force was not applied to maintain or restore discipline, as required to state an excessive force claim under Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The court held that the alleged force
exerted by a prison officer on the detainee by setting the full-body X-ray screening machine to a higher
radiation dose on one occasion was not excessive in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause. The court noted that the alleged force was de minimis, and the use of a higher setting of radiation,
which was designed to produce a better image, in a situation where detainee expressed resistance to the
scanning process and could have been conceivably hiding contraband was not the type of force repugnant
to the conscience of mankind. The court found that the prison commissioner was not entitled to qualified
immunity where the right to be free from deliberate indifference to serious medical needs was clearly established, and given the known dangers of radiation, a reasonable person would have understood that exposing
the detainee to a cumulative level of radiation that posed a risk of damage to his future health could violate
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Anna M. Kross Center, Rikers Island, New York
City Department of Correction)

U.S. District Court
ALIEN
ACCESS TO COURTS
BAIL
RESTRAINTS

Reid v. Donelan, 2 F.Supp.3d 38 (D.Mass. 2014). Following the grant of a detainee's individual petition for
habeas corpus, and the grant of the detainee's motion for class certification, the detainee brought a class
action against, among others, officials of Immigration & Customs Enforcement (ICE), challenging the
detention of individuals who were held in immigration detention within the Commonwealth of Massachusetts for over six months and were not provided with an individualized bond hearing. The detainee also
moved, on his own behalf, for a permanent injunction prohibiting the defendants from shackling him during
immigration proceedings absent an individualized determination that such restraint was necessary. The
defendants cross-moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the defendants’ motion. The
court held that an individual assessment is required before a detainee may be shackled during immigration
proceedings, but that the individual assessment performed by ICE satisfied the detainee's procedural due
process rights, such that an assessment by an independent Immigration Judge was unnecessary in the de-

32.245

tainee's case. The court denied the motion for an injunction, finding that the detainee would not suffer irreparable harm absent a permanent injunction. The court noted that the detainee had an interest in preservation of his dignity, but ICE had safety concerns about his immigration proceedings, including the logistical
issues of escorting the detainee through multiple floors and public hallways, and an Immigration Judge
would be unlikely to overturn a decision by ICE to shackle the detainee, given the detainee's extensive
criminal history. (Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Massachusetts)
U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
SUPERVISION
DUE PROCESS

Revilla v. Glanz, 7 F.Supp.3d 1207 (N.D.Okla. 2014). Four pretrial detainees or representatives of their
estates brought an action against a county sheriff, asserting claims under § 1983 and the Oklahoma Constitution, relating to allegedly deficient medical care. The sheriff filed a motion to dismiss. The district court
denied the motion, finding that the plaintiffs stated a § 1983 claim against the sheriff for supervisory liability in his individual capacity, and a § 1983 claim against the sheriff for liability in his individual capacity.
The court noted that the Due Process Clause of the Oklahoma Constitution protects pretrial detainees
against the denial of medical attention. The plaintiffs alleged: (1) that the sheriff was responsible for ensuring that pretrial detainees received appropriate medical care; (2) that he was responsible for creating, adopting, approving, ratifying, nd enforcing the policies that his subordinates allegedly violated; (3) that he failed
to provide prompt and adequate care in the face of known and substantial risks to each detainee's health-;,
and (4) that he had long known of systemic deficiencies in the jail's medical care. The plaintiffs cited numerous incidents and reports, as well as inmate deaths, which they alleged provided clear notice to the
sheriff of seriously deficient medical and mental health care which placed inmates at a serious risk of injury
or death. One such notice included a report by the United States Department of Homeland Security's Office
of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties which “found a prevailing attitude among clinic staff [at the Jail] of
indifference.” (Tulsa County Jail, Oklahoma)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Revilla v. Glanz, 8 F.Supp.3d 1336 (N.D.Okla. 2014). Pretrial detainees or representatives of their estates
brought an action against healthcare providers, doctors, and nurse, asserting claims under § 1983 and the
Oklahoma Constitution, relating to allegedly deficient medical care. The defendants moved to dismiss. The
district court denied the motion, finding that: (1) allegations were sufficient to plead the provider, doctors,
and nurse were acting under the color of state law; (2) allegations were sufficient to state a § 1983 claim
against the provider under the theory of municipal liability; and (3) the provider was not entitled to immunity from punitive damages afforded to municipalities.
The court noted that the healthcare provider was endowed by the county with powers or functions that
were governmental in nature, that provider was responsible for providing medical services at the jail, including creating and implementing policies and practices governing provision of care, as well as training
and supervision, that doctors and nurse were employees of the provider, that they had responsibility for
overseeing and treating detainees, and that doctors served as the medical director.
The pretrial detainees and representatives of their estates also alleged that the provider refused to send
detainees to a hospital for financial reasons, understaffed the medical unit, failed to properly train and supervise employees, and the provider was on notice of these deficiencies from reports by the National
Commission on Correctional Health Care, the Oklahoma Department of Health, the United States Department of Homeland Security's Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL), and the Jail's own medical
auditor. (Correctional Healthcare Companies, Inc.)

U.S. District Court
FALSE IMPRISONMENT

Robinson v. Keita, 20 F.Supp.3d 1140 (D.Colo. 2014). An arrestee brought an action against a city, city
police officers, a county, and sheriff's deputies, alleging under § 1983 that he was unreasonably arrested
and incarcerated for a 12-day period. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court
granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that: (1) a front desk officer was entitled to
qualified immunity from unlawful arrest claim; (2) the deputies who transported the arrestee from a police
station across the street to a detention facility, and assisted in the arrestee's booking, were entitled to qualified immunity from a substantive due process claim; (3) there was no evidence that the city's alleged policy
of relying on the state court to schedule a hearing after promptly being advised of a warrant arrest was
substantially certain to result in a constitutional violation; but (4) summary judgment was precluded by fact
issues as to whether the city had actual or constructive notice that its failure to train as to how to process
conflicting information during the process of “packing” an arrest warrant for distribution was substantially
certain to result in a constitutional violation, and as to whether the city substantially chose to disregard the
risk of harm. (City and County of Denver, Colorado)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE
SUPERVISION

Rogge v. City of Richmond, Tex., 995 F.Supp.2d 657 (S.D.Tex. 2014). The parents of an arrestee who
committed suicide while in police custody brought a § 1983 and state law action in state court against the
city and two police officers. The defendants removed the action to federal court and moved for summary
judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the arresting police officer was unaware of the arrestee’s risk of self harm. The arrestee committed suicide in a police station holding cell, and
thus, by not checking on the arrestee for several hours, the officer did not act with deliberate indifference to
the arrestee's obvious need for protection from self harm, so as to violate his due process rights. The court
noted that the arrestee was calm and that he cooperated with the officer during their interaction, and although he said he was terminated from his job, admitted drinking, and said he was on medication for anxiety, he did not express an interest in hurting himself or appear distraught. The message that the officer received from the arrestee's father did not raise suspicion of a risk of suicide, and the officer believed that all
dangerous personal items had been taken from the arrestee and that the dispatch officer would monitor him
via a video feed. The court found that the police dispatch officer who was monitoring the video feed from
the police station holding cell was unaware of the arrestee’s risk of self harm, and thus, the officer did not
act with deliberate indifference to the arrestee's obvious need for protection from self harm, so as to violate

32.246

his due process rights. The arrestee slept on bench in the cell for most of the two and a half hours he was in
the cell before hanging himself, and the officer did not observe on the video monitor any behavior on the
arrestee's part that suggested he was a suicide risk. The officer observed that the arrestee did not have items
of personal property considered to be suicide implements, and although the arrestee's father came to the
station and told the officer that he and his wife were worried, he did not indicate the arrestee might be suicidal. (Richmond City Jail, Texas)
U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE
WRONGFUL DEATH

Rouster v. County of Saginaw, 749 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 2014). The representative of the estate of a detainee
who died while in custody at a county jail brought a § 1983 action against the county, the contractor that
provided medical services to the county jail, and the jail's nursing staff, who were employees of the contractor. The district court granted in part the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The representative
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the county jail's nursing staff did not have subjective knowledge of the detainee's perforated duodenal ulcers, which eventually resulted in sepsis and the
detainee's death, and staff did not consciously disregard the detainee's condition or otherwise refuse to
provide appropriate treatment, as required for staff to be liable in a § 1983 Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference claim. According to the court, although staff was aware that the detainee had complained of
stomach cramping, diarrhea, and vomiting, and that he had been observed engaging in bizarre behavior,
such as drinking from a toilet, they misdiagnosed him first with gas and diarrhea, and later with alcohol
withdrawal. The court noted that the detainee never told any staff member about his previous treatment for
his ulcer, staff did not ignore the detainee's symptoms, but attempted to treat him with over-the-counter
medication and moved him to an observation cell for monitoring. (Saginaw County Jail, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
USE OF FORCE

Rowlery v. Genesee County, 54 F.Supp.3d 763 (E.D.Mich. 2014). A detainee brought an action against a
county and officers and deputies in the county sheriff’s department, alleging that he was assaulted by deputies on two occasions when he was lodged at the county jail. The defendants moved for partial summary
judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The district court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to: (1) whether the county adequately
trained officers and deputies regarding the use of force; (2) whether certain officers and deputies came into
physical contact with the detainee; (3) whether certain officers and deputies failed to act reasonably when
they did not act to prevent or limit other deputies’ use of force on the detainee; and (4) whether the alleged
failure of certain officers and deputies to put a stop to other deputies’ use of force on the detainee was the
proximate cause of the detainee’s injuries. (Genesee County Jail, Michigan)

U.S. Appeals Court
JUVENILE
INTAKE SCREENING

S.L. ex rel. K.L. v. Pierce Tp. Bd. of Trustees, 771 F.3d 956 (6th Cir. 2014). A juvenile, by and through his
guardian, filed a § 1983 action against a township, its police chief, a police officer, the superintendent of a
juvenile detention center, and the center's intake officer, alleging false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious
prosecution, and loss of filial consortium. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court
denied the motion. The defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed, and on remand the district court
entered summary judgment in favor of the superintendent and the intake officer, and the plaintiffs appealed.
The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the intake officer at the juvenile detention center had no
duty to make an independent assessment of probable cause for the juvenile detainee's arrest and detention,
and thus did not violate the detainee's Fourth Amendment rights by signing a complaint prepared by the
arresting officer that charged the detainee as a delinquent child. (Clermont Co. Juv. Det. Center, Ohio)

U.S. Appeals Court
USE OF FORCE
RESTRAINTS

Shreve v. Franklin County, Ohio, 743 F.3d 126 (6th Cir. 2014). A detainee brought an action against a county, its sheriff, and sheriff's deputies, alleging that the deputies used excessive force against him when they
subdued him with a stun gun while he was in custody. The district court granted the defendants' motion for
summary judgment. The detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the
sheriff's deputies did not act with deliberate indifference towards the detainee's federally protected rights
when they subdued the detainee with a stun gun while he was in custody, and therefore the deputies did not
use excessive force against the detainee under the Fourteenth Amendment. According to the court: (1) the
deputies tried to handcuff the detainee several times before using the stun gun, showing that they sought to
minimize the stun gun's use; (2) the deputies also warned the detainee that the stun gun would hurt and that
he did not want to have the gun used on him, which showed that they were trying to avoid unnecessary
harm; and (3) the deputies faced an ongoing danger with the detainee thrashing about on the cell floor with
a loose handcuff, as the deputies had been trained never to lose control of an inmate with a loose handcuff
because it could be used as a weapon. The court held that the incident, in which the detainee lunged towards a sheriff's deputy with his hands raised after a hospital examination, was a rapidly evolving, fluid,
and dangerous predicament which precluded the luxury of a calm and reflective pre-response deliberation,
and therefore the detainee was required to show that the deputy's actions involved force employed maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm, rather than in a good faith effort to maintain
or restore discipline, in order to establish the use of excessive force under the Fourteenth Amendment. The
court noted that the detainee lunged toward the deputy after asking the deputy “Do you want a piece of
me?” and the deputy explained that he had “no way of retreating” because of the cramped quarters and the
detainee's position over him while standing on the hospital bed. (Franklin County Corrections Center II,
Ohio)

U.S. Appeals Court
USE OF FORCE

Smith v. Conway County, Ark., 759 F.3d 853 (8th Cir. 2014). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action
against two jailers, a county jail administrator, the county, and the sheriff, alleging claims for excessive
force and failure to supervise under the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court denied qualified immunity to the administrator and jailers and denied summary judgment to the county and individual defendants. The defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and dismissed in part. The court held that

32.247

a nonviolent pretrial detainee's right to be free from being shot with a stun gun for non-compliance was
clearly established at the time a jailer used a stun gun on the detainee for the purpose of achieving compliance, and thus, the jailer was not entitled to qualified immunity from the detainee's § 1983 claim of excessive force in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court found that at the time a jailer failed to intervene when another jailer warned the pretrial detainee and then shot him with a stun gun, that a jail official violated a pretrial detainee's due process rights if the official knew that another official was using excessive force against the detainee but failed to intervene, and thus the jailer was not entitled to qualified
immunity from the detainee's § 1983 claim of excessive force in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
(Conway County Jail, Arkansas)
U.S. District Court
PRIVACY

Taha v. Bucks County, 9 F.Supp.3d 490 (E.D.Pa. 2014). An arrestee brought an action against a county, a
county correctional facility, and companies that operated websites publishing mug shot and arrest information, alleging that the defendants published his expunged arrest record in violation of Pennsylvania's
Criminal History Record Information Act (CHRIA), and that the companies violated a Pennsylvania statute
prohibiting the unauthorized use of a name or likeness and committed an invasion-of-privacy tort of “false
light.” The company moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The
court held that the arrestee's allegations that the company selectively published his expunged arrest record
and mug shot on its website in order to falsely portray him as a criminal, and created a false impression
regarding his criminal history and character, were sufficient to state a “false light” claim against the company under Pennsylvania law. (Citizens Information Associates, LLC, Bucks Co. Corr. Facility, Penn.)

U.S. District Court
TRANSPORTATION
FAILURE TO PROTECT

Torres v. Amato, 22 F.Supp.3d 166 (N.D.N.Y. 2014). The administrator of a pretrial detainee's estate
brought a § 1983 action against corrections officers, a sheriff, government officials, and a county, alleging
deliberate indifference to the serious risk of harm in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and various
state claims. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court denied the motion. The court
held that: (1) disputes of material fact as to whether the door to a transport van was improperly latched or
the officer was operating the van in a reckless manner precluded summary judgment on the deliberate indifference claim against the officers; (2) a dispute of material fact as to the personal involvement of government officials in the alleged conduct precluded summary judgment on deliberate indifference claim against
the officials and the county; and (3) the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity from the § 1983
claim. The court noted that the detainee's right to be free from deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of
harm was clearly established at the time the detainee suffered fatal injuries after falling out of transport van
driven by corrections officers, and thus, officers and government officials were not entitled to qualified
immunity from the § 1983 claim of deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of harm in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. (Montgomery County Sheriff's Department, New York)

U.S. District Court
MENTAL HEALTH

Trueblood v. Washington State Dept. of Social and Health Services, 73 F.Supp.3d 1311 (W.D.Wash. 2014).
Pretrial detainees brought a class action against the Washington Department of Social and Health Services
and two state hospitals, alleging that in-jail waiting times for court-ordered competency evaluations and
restoration services violated their Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The detainees moved for
summary judgment. The district court granted the motion, finding that in-jail waiting times for courtordered competency evaluations and restoration services violated the Fourteenth Amendment substantive
due process rights of mentally incapacitated pretrial detainees. The court noted that detainees were incarcerated for many weeks, not because they were convicted, found to be dangerous, or posed a flight risk, but
because Department of Social and Health Services and state hospitals did not have sufficient bed space or
available staff to provide the services they were required to provide. Some detainees were held in solitary
confinement due to space issues, exacerbating any mental illness, and the rate of medication compliance
was lower in jail. (Washington State Department of Social and Health Services, Western State Hospital and
Eastern State Hospital)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCHES

West v. Murphy, 771 F.3d 209 (4th Cir. 2014). Arrestees brought a civil rights action under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments against a mayor, municipal council, police department, and current and former
wardens of a central booking and intake center for alleged mistreatment of persons arrested and taken to the
center for booking and processing. The district court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity. The arrestees appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court
held that the law on strip searches of arrestees in jail in a dedicated search room with compelling security
justifications was not clearly established at the time that the searches were conducted. (Baltimore Central
Booking and Intake Center, Maryland)

U.S. District Court
MENTAL HEALTH
MEDICATION

Williams v. Board of Regents of University of New Mexico, 20 F.Supp.3d 1177 (D.N.M. 2014). A mental
health detainee and his mother brought an action against a county, alleging medical negligence, negligence
per se, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and loss of consortium, based on conduct
while the detainee was being held at a county medical center and jail. The plaintiffs alleged that the detainee was not given his psychotropic medications while detained. The county moved to dismiss. The district
court granted the motion. According to the court, the New Mexico Tort Claims Act (NMTCA) did not
waive the county's immunity for any of the detainee's claims. (Bernalillo County Metropolitan Detention
Center, New Mexico)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
MEDICAL CARE

Woodson v. City of Richmond, Va., 2 F.Supp.3d 804 (E.D.Va. 2014). A detainee in a city jail filed a § 1983
action against the city, the sheriff, and deputies, claiming constitutional and state law violations arising
from the detainee's heat stroke allegedly caused by deliberate indifference to his need for medical care. The
detainee was housed on the top floor of the jail during a time when outside temperatures exceeded 100

32.248

degrees, and when interior temperatures were even higher. The inmate suffered a heat stroke and was found
unresponsive in his cell, and he had a body temperature of 106.1 degrees. The sheriff cross-claimed against
the city for indemnification or contribution. The city moved to dismiss the cross-claim. The court dismissed
the cross-claim, finding that the sheriff lacked the right to contribution and the right to indemnification for
§ 1983 claims or state law claims. (Richmond City Jail, Virginia)
U.S. District Court
INITIAL APPEARANCE
LENGTH
FALSE ARREST

Ysasi v. Brown, 3 F.Supp.3d 1088 (D.N.M. 2014). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action against county sheriff officers and a detention center, alleging false arrest, excessive force, and other claims under the Constitution. The officers and the detention center moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the
motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the arrestee presented no evidence that the four-day
incarceration prior to his arraignment prejudiced his defense, either in his criminal trial or in the current
civil case, by concealing evidence against the arresting county sheriff officers. The court noted that the
arrestee was arraigned within the time required by New Mexico rule. (Lea County Detention Center, New
Mexico)
2015

U.S. Appeals Court
MAIL
ACCESS TO COURT

American Civil Liberties Union Fund of Michigan v. Livingston County, 796 F.3d 636 (6th Cir. 2015). A
civil rights organization brought a § 1983 action against a county and county officials alleging that the jail’s
mail policy, pursuant to which all incoming and outgoing mail except “bona-fide legal mail” had to be on
standard four-by-six-inch postcards, violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Following the grant of
a temporary restraining order (TRO), the organization moved for a preliminary injunction. The district
court granted the motion and the county appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the organization had a likelihood of success on the merits of its claim that the policy violated the Fourteenth
Amendment’s due process protections. The court noted that the organization alleged that the jail blocked
delivery of letters sent by the organization’s attorney without providing the organization or the intended
inmate recipients notice and opportunity to contest the decision. (Livingston County Jail, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE FORCE
SEARCHES
GRIEVANCE
CONDITIONS

Barnes v. County of Monroe, 85 F.Supp.3d 696 (W.D.N.Y. 2015). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action
against a county, county officials, and correctional officers, alleging that the officers used excessive force
against him and that he was subjected to unconstitutional conditions of confinement during his pretrial
detention. The defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings. The district court granted the motion in
part and denied in part. The court held that the former pretrial detainee’s allegation that a county correctional officer used excessive force when he responded to a fight between the detainee and fellow inmates,
and jumped on the detainee’s back, striking him in face and knocking out a tooth, and that the officer was
not merely using force to maintain or restore discipline but that the entire incident was “premeditated,”
stated a § 1983 excessive force claim against officer under the Due Process Clause. According to the court,
the former detainee’s allegations that county correctional officers used excessive force when they pushed
him face-first into a glass window, pushed him to the floor, kicked, stomped on and punched him, and used
handcuffs to inflict pain, that as a result of the altercation, the inmate urinated and defecated on himself and
experienced dizziness and a concussion, and that the force used on him was in response to his reaching for
legal papers and attempting to steady himself, stated a § 1983 excessive force claim against the officers
under the Due Process Clause. The court found that the former detainee’s allegations that a county correctional officer who responded to a fight between the detainee and other inmates “collaborated” with fellow
officers to delay an emergency call, allowing the detainee to be attacked by inmates, stated a conspiracy
claim in violation of his constitutional rights under § 1983.
The court held that the former detainee’s allegations that, before being placed in a special housing unit
(SHU), he was subjected to a strip search by a county correctional officer, that during the course of the strip
search the detainee felt that he was degraded and humiliated, and he subsequently filed grievance against
the officer, that later the same day the officer approached the detainee’s cell and made sexual comments
and gestures, and that other officers filed a false misbehavior report against him in retaliation for the detainee’s grievance, stated a § 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim against the officers.
The court found that the former detainee’s allegations that, after he was released from a special housing
unit (SHU), county correctional officers placed him in a poorly ventilated cell where he was exposed to
human excrement and bodily fluids over the course of multiple days, and that he was subjected to extreme
conditions in the SHU by way of 24-hour lighting by the officers, stated a § 1983 conditions-ofconfinement claim against the officers under the Due Process Clause. (Upstate Correctional Facility and
Monroe County Jail, New York)

U.S. District Court
USE OF FORCE
CONDITIONS OF
CONFINEMENT
MEDICAL CARE

Bell v. Lindsay, 116 F.Supp.3d 511 (D. Md. 2015). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action alleging that
officers used excessive force when arresting him, in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and that prison
employees subjected him to overcrowded conditions of confinement and manifested deliberate indifference
to his medical needs, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to
state claim. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the detainee:
(1) failed to state a conditions of confinement claim based on overcrowding; and (2) failed to state a claim
under Title II of Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), absent allegations that the detainee was disabled,
that he was denied any benefit of prison’s services, programs, or activities, and that any such exclusion or
denial was by reason of his disability. According to the court, the detainee’s allegations that he was placed
into a holding room at the prison with 25 to 30 inmates without a toilet or sink and forced to sleep on the
floor failed to state a § 1983 Fourteenth Amendment conditions of confinement claim, absent allegations
that the detainee was in the holding room for any substantial period of time, or that employees were personally involved in the violation of detainee’s constitutional rights. (George W. Hill Corr. Facility, Md.)

32.249

U.S. District Court
SEARCH
FEMALE
PRIVACY

Blanco v. County of Kings, 142 F.Supp.3d 986 (E.D. Cal. 2015). An arrestee brought an action against a
county, city, and county and city law enforcement officers alleging violations of her First, Fourth, Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights under § 1983, stemming from an alleged cross gender strip search at a county jail. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part.
The court held that the female arrestee sufficiently alleged that a male law enforcement officer's entering a
room while she was still undressed following a strip search at the county jail, in order to interrogate her
further, and in absence of a compelling interest or emergency, violated her right to privacy, as required to
state claim under § 1983 for violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court
found that the officer’s conduct in entering the room was outrageous, willful, and intended to cause her
mental anguish that directly and proximately caused the arrestee severe and protracted emotional distress
likely to result in a “permanent disability,” as required to state a claim under the California law for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). (City of Lemoore Police Dept., Kings County Jail, California)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT

Bloom v. Toliver, 133 F.Supp.3d 1314 (N.D. Okla. 2015). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action
against a jail's administrator, shift supervisors, detention officer, and county sheriff, alleging violations of
his Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights in connection with an attack on him by another inmate while being transferred from a holding cell to a segregation cell. The defendants moved for summary
judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary
judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the jail shift supervisor who made
the decision to move the pretrial detainee from a holding cell to a segregation cell did so with a desire to
punish the detainee, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause. The supervisor admitted that there were cells other than the one where the detainee was moved, and testified that his intent in
moving the detainee “was to discipline [the detainee] Bloom,” and that placement in any of the other cells
“wouldn't have been disciplinary.” The court also found that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the jail's detention officer violated the pretrial detainee's Fourteenth
Amendment right to be protected from substantial risks of assault from other inmates by moving him from
the holding cell to a segregation cell in which another inmate was being held.(Creek County Criminal Justice Center Oklahoma)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Burton v. Downey, 805 F.3d 776 (7th Cir. 2015). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against a county, county jail, county sheriff, non-medical correctional officials, physician’s assistants, and nurses, asserting due process violations based on deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, relating to hip and
elbow pain, a rash, and rectal bleeding. The district court denied the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment based on qualified immunity and the defendants appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that an alleged two-day delay in providing non-narcotic pain medication to the
detainee was not deliberate indifference, failure to honor the detainee’s preference for narcotic pain medication was not deliberate indifference, the detainee did not offer objective evidence of a serious medical
need for narcotic pain medication, and failure to provide outside physical therapy was not deliberate indifference. The court noted that an orthopedic surgeon who had treated the detainee before his detention recommended to staff that the detainee receive in-cell therapy using a towel. The court held that failure of
county jail staff to provide the detainee, who suffered from hip pain, with a second mattress, did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment with respect to conditions of confinement, in the absence of evidence
that a second mattress was essential medical care. (Jerome Combs Detention Center, Kankakee County,
Illinois)

U.S. District Court
CROWDING
SANITATION
CLASSIFICATION
FAILURE TO PROTECT
CONDITIONS

Cano v. City of New York, 119 F.Supp.3d 65 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). Pretrial detainees temporarily housed in a
booking facility brought an action against a city and city officials under § 1983 alleging deliberate indifference to detainee health in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The defendants moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the motion. The court held that: (1) temporarily subjecting detainees to overcrowded jail cells was not deliberate indifference; (2) failure to provide
sleeping equipment, such as beds, cots, pillows, blankets, or bedding was not deliberate indifference; (3)
availability of only one toilet for 24 hours in each overcrowded holding cell was not deliberate indifference;
(4) alleged failure to provide food and water was not deliberate indifference; (5) police officers were not
subjectively aware of a risk to the detainees; (6) police officers did not act with punitive intent; (7) placement of pretrial detainees in jail cells with alleged rodent and insect infestations was not deliberate indifference; (8) placement of pretrial detainees in jail cells with alleged violent offenders that had limited police
supervision, allegedly leading to fights, thefts, and bullying, was not deliberate indifference to detainee
health; and (9) alleged exposure of pretrial detainees to extreme hot or cold temperature conditions in unventilated jail cells was not deliberate indifference to detainee health that would violate the right to provision of adequate medical treatment under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court
noted that the detainees were not kept in the cells for more than 24 hours, and were not harmed by the alleged overcrowding. (Brooklyn Central Booking, City of New York Police Department, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
FACILITY PLANS

Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 797 F.3d 654 (9th Cir. 2015). An arrestee brought an action against a
county, its sheriff’s department, and two officers under § 1983 for violation of his Fourth Amendment right
to be protected from harm by other inmates, arising out of an attack against the arrestee by another arrestee
with whom he was jailed. A jury returned a verdict for the arrestee, and the district court denied the defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law. The defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part
and reversed in part. The court held that: (1) the right of inmates to be protected from attacks by other inmates was established with sufficient clarity to guide a reasonable officer; (2) substantial evidence supported the jury’s determination that the officer was deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm
to the arrestee; (3) sufficient evidence supported the jury’s determination that the officer’s deliberate indif-

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ference was the actual and proximate cause of harm to the arrestee; (4) sufficient evidence supported the
jury’s determination that the supervising officer was aware of, but disregarded, the risk to the arrestee
posed by the other inmate; (5) the design of a jail by a municipality is the result of a series of deliberate
choices that render the design a formal municipal policy for the purposes of municipal liability under §
1983; (6) arrestee failed to establish that the county had actual knowledge of a risk of harm from the design
of the jail, as required to establish liability under § 1983; and (7) the award of future damages to the arrestee was supported by the record. The jury returned a verdict for the arrestee on all counts and awarded
him $2,605,632 in damages. The parties later stipulated to $840,000 in attorney fees, $18,000 in punitive
damages. The arrestee had been placed in a “sobering cell” after his arrest for public drunkenness and was
seriously injured by another drunken inmate in the sobering cell. When the other inmate was admitted, staff
determined that he posed a threat to officers, requiring supervision by two officers at all times. The other
arrestee was placed in the same cell as the plaintiff, even though the jail policy was to place combative
inmates in a separate cell, and separate cells were available but left unused on the night of the incident.
The court noted that the arrestee submitted billing records from his cognitive assistant and his treating
psychologist and a chart detailing the charges for medical expenses he already had incurred, and proffered
several medical experts who testified to his need for ongoing medical care.
The jail was purportedly in violation of a state regulation requiring monitoring equipment in sobering
cells, as required to establish that the county was deliberately indifferent to the Fourth Amendment right of
pretrial detainees to be protected from harm by other inmates and was liable under § 1983 for injuries sustained by the arrestee. According to the court ”One would assume that for any given construction project,
including jails, the municipality’s governing body—or a committee that it appoints to act in its stead—
reviews bids, considers designs, and ultimately approves a plan for the facility and allocates funds for its
construction. These choices are sufficient, in our opinion, to meet the definition of a formal municipal policy…” (Los Angeles Sheriff’s West Hollywood Station, California)
U.S. District Court
SUICIDE
INTAKE SCREENING

Cavanagh v. Taranto, 95 F.Supp.3d 220 (D. Mass. 2015). A pretrial detainee’s son brought an action under
§ 1983 against correctional officers who were on duty the day of the detainee’s suicide, alleging the officers
violated the detainee’s due process rights. The officers moved for summary judgment. The district court
granted the motion. The court held that the officers were not deliberately indifferent to the detainee’s mental health history and safety, to her safety through inadequate cell checks, or to her safety by failing to remove a looped shoelace from her cell. The court noted that the detainee was not identified as a suicide risk,
the officers did not have access to the detainee’s medical records, the officers were not trained to make
suicide assessments, and the detainee’s risk of suicide was not so obvious that someone other than a professional could have recognized the risk. (Suffolk County House of Correction, Massachusetts)

U.S. Appeals Court
USE OF FORCE
MEDICAL CARE
RESTRAINTS

Coley v. Lucas County, Ohio, 799 F.3d 530 (6th Cir. 2015). The administrator of a pretrial detainee’s estate
brought a state court action against a county, county sheriff, police officer and police sergeant, alleging §
1983 violations of the detainee’s constitutional rights and various state law claims. The district court denied
the defendants’ motions to dismiss and denied individual defendants’ requests for qualified immunity. The
defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that a police officer’s act of shoving a
fully restrained pretrial detainee in a jail booking area, causing the detainee to strike his head on the wall as
he fell to the cement floor without any way to break his fall, constituted “gratuitous force” in violation of
the detainee’s Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from excessive force. The court noted that the detainee’s state of being handcuffed, in a belly chain and leg irons, led to a reasonable inference that the officer’s actions were a result of his frustration with the detainee’s prior restraint behavior, since the detainee
was not in any condition to cause a disruption that would have provoked the officer to use such force. The
court held that the police officer was on notice that his actions were unconstitutional, and therefore he was
not entitled to qualified immunity from liability under § 1983. According to the court, the officer’s attempts
to cover up the assault by filing false reports and lying to federal investigators following the death of the
detainee led to a reasonable conclusion that the officer understood that his actions violated the detainees’
clearly established right not to be gratuitously assaulted while fully restrained and subdued. The court held
that a police sergeant’s continued use of a chokehold on the unresisting, fully-shackled pre-trial detainee,
after hearing the detainee choke and gurgle, and when a fellow officer was urging him release his chokehold, was objectively unreasonable, in violation of the detainee’s Fourteenth Amendment right to be free
from excessive force. The court noted that the sergeant’s subsequent acts of telling other officers to leave
the medical cell after the detainee was rendered unconscious, failing to seek medical help, and refusing to
mention the use of a chokehold in incident reports, led to the inference the that sergeant was aware he violated the law and sought to avoid liability. According to the court, the police sergeant was on notice that his
actions were unconstitutional, and therefore, he was not entitled to qualified immunity under § 1983.
The court found that the county sheriff could be held personally liable under § 1983, based on his failure to train and supervise employees in the use of excessive force, the use of a chokehold and injuries derived therefrom, and to ensure that the medical needs of persons in the sheriff’s custody were met. According to the court, evidence that the sheriff helped his employees cover up their unconstitutional actions by
making false statements to federal officials about his knowledge of his employees’ assault, chokehold, and
deliberate failure to provide medical attention to the detainee demonstrated that the sheriff at least implicitly authorized, approved or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending employees. The court noted that under Ohio law, allegations by the estate of the pretrial detainee that the county
sheriff had full knowledge of the assault but intentionally and deliberately made false statements to federal
officials were sufficient to state a claim that the sheriff ratified the conduct of his officers and, thus, was
potentially personally liable for his officers’ actions. The court concluded that the officers’ use of excessive
force, failure to provide medical care, assault and battery, and wrongful death could be imputed to the sheriff in his official capacity since the sheriff’s false statements to federal investigators were a position that
was inconsistent to non-affirmance of the officers’ actions. (Lucas County Jail, Ohio)

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U.S. District Court
PUBLICATIONS

Crime, Justice & America, Inc. v. Honea, 110 F.Supp.3d 1027 (E.D. Cal. 2015). The publisher of a magazine intended for newly arrested county jail detainees awaiting trial brought an action against a county
alleging violation of the right to free speech protected under the First Amendment after the county barred
general distribution of unsolicited paper products to detainees. After a bench trial, the district court held
that: (1) the county jail’s policy of limiting written publications was rationally related to legitimate a
penological interest in preventing inmates from using paper to conduct illicit activity; (2) electronic touchscreen kiosks that displayed the publisher’s magazine in the jail were sufficient alternative means; (3) the
impact of accommodating the asserted right weighed in favor of the county policy; and (4) the policy was
not an exaggerated response. The court found that a corrections officer’s testimony regarding the nefarious
uses of paper in county jails, including that he could not recall a time when the publisher’s law-oriented
magazine had been used by detainees for such purposes was not, without more, sufficient to refute the
county’s explanation that its policy limiting detainee’s access to paper was rationally related to a legitimate
penological interest. The court ruled that the publisher’s proposal to provide two copies of the publisher’s
law-oriented magazine in the county jail law library, standing alone, was not a sufficient alternative means
for the publisher to communicate the existence of the magazine to county jail detainees, where most inmates would likely have left the jail before they would receive it from the library. (Butte County Jail, Cal.)

U.S. Appeals Court
CIVIL COMMITMENT

Davis v. Wessel, 792 F.3d 793 (7th Cir. 2015). A civil detainee brought a pro se action under § 1983 against
security guards employed at civil detention facility for sexually violent persons, operated by the Illinois
Department of Human Services. The detainee alleged violation of his rights under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court entered judgment on a jury verdict in favor of the detainee
and the security guards appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. The court held that the issue of
whether security guards employed at the civil detention facility refused to remove the detainee’s handcuffs
with the intent of humiliating him, by preventing him from using the restroom and forcing him to urinate on
himself, was for a jury to decide. The court found that the security guards were not entitled to qualified
immunity from the claim by the detainee under § 1983 alleging excessive use of restraints in violation of
the Due Process Clause after the guards refused to remove the detainee’s handcuffs because it was clearly
established at the time the detainee requested to use the restroom, which had no windows, that keeping the
handcuffs on was not rationally related to a legitimate non-punitive purpose absent an indication that the
detainee was a security risk. (Illinois Dept. of Human Services, Rushville Treatment and Det.Facility)

U.S. Appeals Court
JUVENILES

Doe v. Cook County, Illinois, 798 F.3d 558 (7th Cir. 2015). Detainees at a county juvenile detention center
brought a class action against the center and the county, alleging that some employees at the center violated
their constitutional rights by abusing their charges. The facility administrator, who was appointed to run the
detention center as part of a settlement between the parties, proposed to terminate the employment of 225
direct-care employees and require them to apply to fill the new positions. The union for the employees
intervened to oppose the administrator’s plan, arguing that the proposal violated Illinois employment law
by overriding the collective bargaining and arbitration statutes. The district court authorized the administrator to implement the plan. The union appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The appeals
court held that the district court’s approval of the administrator’s plan was not a simple enforcement of the
order appointing the administrator, and thus the district court was required pursuant to the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (PLRA) to make findings that the relief requested by the administrator was narrowly drawn,
extended no further than necessary to correct the violation of a federal right, and was the least intrusive
means. (Cook County Juvenile Temporary Detention Center, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE
HOSPITAL
EMERGENCY CARE
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE

Estate of Henson v. Wichita County, Tex., 795 F.3d 456 (5th Cir. 2015). The estate of a pretrial detainee
who died from chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) while being held in a county jail brought a §
1983 action against the county, jail physician, and others, alleging violation of the detainee’s Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights, and asserted claims under state law for negligence and breach of contract.
The district court granted in part, and denied in part, the defendants’ motions for summary judgment based
on qualified immunity. The court of appeals reversed and remanded in part. The physician and county
moved for reconsideration. The appeals court granted the motion and the estate appealed. The court held
that there was no unstated policy of intimidation at the jail to prevent sending detainees to a hospital, and
thus, the doctor could not be liable for alleged enforcement of such a policy. According to the court, the
county’s multi-tiered health services plan, which provided that the county jail would employ six licensed
vocational nurses, rather than registered nurses, and one jail physician, to provide medical care for pretrial
detainees, and which did not require the nurses and physician to be present at jail facility at all times, but
required them to be available via telephone and regularly present for sick call clinics, and provided that
detainees facing emergency situations would be transported to a hospital, did not violate the due process
rights of the pretrial detainee who died of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) while held at the
jail. According to the court, the county’s plan was reasonably related to its legitimate interest in providing
medical attention to detainees with varying levels of need, and there was no showing that serious injury and
death were the inevitable results of the plan. (Wichita County Jail, Texas)

U.S. District Court
USE OF FORCE

Ewing v. Cumberland County, 152 F.Supp.3d 269 (D. N.J. 2015). A former arrestee brought a § 1983 action, bringing claims against county correctional officers, police officers, and a number of municipal entities for use of excessive force and other constitutional violations. The defendants filed nine motions for
summary judgment. The district court held that (1) issues of fact existed as to whether the force used on
detainee was imposed maliciously and sadistically to cause harm; (2) issues of fact existed as to whether
two officers who were not in the room when excessive force was allegedly used on the pre-trial detainee
knew of and failed to intervene in the assault; (3) issues of fact existed as to whether five correctional officers conspired to cover up their actions; (4) issues of fact existed as to whether the police officer who had

32.252

taken the detainee back to the jail after a trip to the hospital had reason to believe that the detainee's safety
was in jeopardy when the officer left the jail, and (5) genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether
the county trained its correctional officers on the use of force, whether the other trainings that took place
were inadequate and untimely, whether that failure to train amounted to deliberate indifference, and whether there was a causal link between that lack of training and the injuries the detainee sustained at the hands
of correction officers, precluding summary judgment for the defendants in the failure to train claim. According to the court, the detainee, while unarmed, suffered life-threatening injuries while in an isolated
room with five officers, and that none of the officers were injured, indicated that the officers used force
beyond what was necessary to take down the detainee, in a manner intended to inflict pain. The court noted
that it was clearly established, at the time of the incident, that prisoners were protected from excessive force
and wanton beatings that exceed good-faith efforts to maintain discipline and order, and a reasonable officer would have known that the force used was excessive. (Cumberland County Correctional Facility and
Vineland Police Department, New Jersey)
U.S. District Court
ACCESS TO COURT
DUE PROCESS
CONDITIONS
EQUAL PROTECTION
FALSE IMPRISON
MENT
INITIAL APPEARANCE
MEDICATION
SANITATION

Fant v. City of Ferguson, 107 F.Supp.3d 1016 (E.D. Mo. 2015). City residents brought a class action lawsuit against a city, asserting claims under § 1983 for violations of Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments based on allegations that they were repeatedly jailed by the city for being unable to pay fines owed
from traffic tickets and other minor offenses. The residents alleged that pre-appearance detentions lasting
days, weeks, and in one case, nearly two months, in allegedly poor conditions, based on alleged violations
of a municipal code that did not warrant incarceration in the first instance, and which were alleged to have
continued until an arbitrarily determined payment was made, violated their Due Process rights. The residents alleged that they were forced to sleep on the floor in dirty cells with blood, mucus, and feces, were
denied basic hygiene and feminine hygiene products, were denied access to a shower, laundry, and clean
undergarments for several days at a time, were denied medications, and were provided little or inadequate
food and water. The plaintiffs sought a declaration that the city’s policies and practices violated their constitutional rights, and sought a permanent injunction preventing the city from enforcing the policies and
practices. The city moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The
court held that: (1) allegations that residents were jailed for failure to pay fines without inquiry into their
ability to pay and without any consideration of alternative measures of punishment were sufficient to state a
claim that the city violated the residents’ Due Process and Equal Protection rights; (2) the residents plausibly stated a claim that the city’s failure to appoint counsel violated their Due Process rights; (3) allegations
of pre-appearance detentions plausibly stated a pattern and practice of Due Process violations; (4) allegations of conditions of confinement were sufficient to state a plausible claim for Due Process violations; and
(5) the residents could not state an Equal Protection claim for being treated differently, with respect to
fines, than civil judgment debtors. The court noted that the residents alleged they were not afforded counsel
at initial hearings on traffic and other offenses, nor were they afforded counsel prior to their incarceration
for failing to pay court-ordered fines for those offenses. (City of Ferguson, Missouri)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Fisher v. Miami-Dade County, 114 F.Supp.3d 1247 (S.D. Fla. 2015). A former pre-trial detainee brought a
§ 1983 action against a county, alleging that during his detention in a county jail, county employees were
deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. The county moved to dismiss for failure to state a
claim. The district court denied the motion. The court held that the detainee: (1) sufficiently alleged that the
county had policy that constituted deliberate indifference to jail detainees’ serious medical needs (2) sufficiently alleged that County policymakers had notice of a pattern or practice of deliberate indifference to
detainees’ serious medical needs; and (3) sufficiently alleged that county policymakers failed to take action
after being put on notice of the pattern of deliberate indifference to detainees’ serious medical needs. According to the court, detailed allegations of a pattern of deliberate indifference to county jail detainees’
medical needs, including 117 inmate deaths in the years preceding the plaintiff’s detention, and 20 specific
instances in which county employees withheld necessary medical care from detainees, or provided insufficient medical care, resulting in severe injury or death to those detainees, were sufficient to state a claim for
municipal liability under § 1983. The court noted that direct complaints by detainees had been made to
county officials, there were widespread news accounts in local newspapers and on local news television
programs regarding treatment of detainees, the Department of Justice (DOJ) had conducted a three-year
DOJ investigation into county employees’ violations of detainees’ constitutional rights, including the right
to medical care, and there were more than half a dozen judicial orders from federal, state and county courts
relating to detainees’ medical treatment. The court noted that the detainee sufficiently alleged that county
policymakers chose not to take action after being put on notice of county employees’ deliberate indifference to jail detainees’ serious medical needs, where the detainee alleged that systemic deficiencies occurred, including two deaths, following the mayor’s promise to correct such deficiencies. (Miami-Dade
Corr. and Rehabilitation Dept. Florida)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
SUPERVISION
WRONGFUL DEATH

Frary v. County of Marin, 81 F.Supp.3d 811 (N.D.Cal. 2015). A deceased detainee’s wife, mother, daughter, and estate brought an action against a county and certain county jail employees, alleging that the employees were deliberately indifferent to the detainee’s serious medical needs while he was in custody. The
defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part.
The district court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to: (1)
whether a deputy was aware of a substantial risk to the detainee’s serious medical needs and disregarded
that risk by failing to monitor the detainee more closely; (2) whether another deputy knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to the detainee’s health when she failed to ascertain the circumstances of the detainee’s prolonged unconsciousness, and when she falsely radioed another deputy falsely suggesting that
the detainee had consciously refused breakfast; (3) whether a nurse recognized a serious risk to the detainee’s health from ingesting street morphine pills and then failed to take reasonable precautionary steps to

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protect the detainee from that risk; (4) whether the sheriff’s duties with respect to the county jail were causally connected to the alleged violations of the detainee’s due process rights; (5) whether the county’s policy
and practice of indirect monitoring at the county jail was a moving force behind the alleged violation of the
detainee’s due process rights; and (6) whether the county’s failure to implement policies at the county jail
about how to monitor detainees with medical needs was the moving force behind the alleged violation of
the due process rights of the detainee. The plaintiffs alleged that the Jail’s regular practice and operating
procedure was only to observe inmates indirectly, using “tower checks” where deputies looked out the
tower window to observe the inmates from dozens of feet away, or listening to inmates through intercoms
in their cells. (Marin County Jail, California)
U.S. Appeals Court
DISCIPLINE
SEGREGATION
GRIEVANCE

Goguen v. Allen, 780 F.3d 437 (1st Cir. 2015). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against correctional officers, claiming that the defendants inflicted punishment on him without due process of law and
retaliated against him for filing grievances, in violation of his rights under the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments. The district court denied summary judgment to the defendants on qualified immunity
grounds. The defendants appealed. The appeals court dismissed the appeal. The court held that the district
court’s determination that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to the
motivations of the corrections officers in assigning a pretrial detainee to administrative segregation precluded granting the officers’ motion for a sovereign immunity-based summary judgment was not subject to
appellate review, where the officers on appeal did not raise any purely legal issues that called into question
the denial of their summary judgment motion based on qualified immunity, but rather raised challenges to
the plaintiff’s evidence and recitation of facts. (Somerset County Jail, Maine)

U.S. Appeals Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
USE OF FORCE

Hubbs v. Suffolk County Sheriff’s Dept., 788 F.3d 54 (2nd Cir. 2015). A county jail detainee brought a §
1983 action against a county sheriff’s department, and sheriff’s deputies, alleging that he was severely
beaten by the deputies while in a holding cell at a courthouse. The district court granted summary judgment
in favor of the defendants based on the detainee’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The detainee
appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded, finding that the affidavit of a county jail grievance
coordinator, along with a handbook detailing a grievance procedure, did not establish that the detainee had
an available administrative remedy, and neither the handbook nor the affidavit demonstrated that the county
or sheriff’s department, or any official, handled grievances arising from occurrences in the courthouse holding cells or whether remedies for such grievances were actually available. According to the court, the deputies forfeited any arguments that statutory remedies were available to the county jail detainee where the
deputies failed to identify in the district court or on appeal any statutes or regulations showing that administrative remedies were available for events that took place in the courthouse holding facility. (Suffolk County Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE
MENTAL HEALTH
MEDICAL CARE

Jackson v. West, 787 F.3d 1345 (11th Cir. 2015). The estate of a detainee who committed suicide while in
the custody of a county jail brought a § 1983 action against a county sheriff and against 10 corrections
officers, alleging violation of the detainee’s due process rights. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of three officers on qualified immunity grounds, but denied summary judgment on qualified
immunity grounds with respect to the remaining officers. The remaining officers filed an appeal. The appeals court reversed, finding that the officers lacked a subjective knowledge of a strong risk that the detainee would attempt suicide, so that the officers did not act with deliberate indifference in failing to prevent
the suicide. The court noted that the detainee had made explicit suicide threats and he was placed in the
suicide prevention unit, as was proper protocol, and the detainee was released from that unit when prison
medical staff later determined that he no longer presented such a risk. The court stated: “This case is troubling. The Marion County Jail tragically failed to keep Mr. James safe while he was incarcerated. Under
our precedent, however, an officer is liable under § 1983 for the suicide of an inmate only if he had subjective knowledge of a serious risk that the inmate would commit suicide and he disregarded that known risk.”
(Marion County Jail, Florida)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
MEDICATION

Johnson v. Clafton, 136 F.Supp.3d 838 (E.D. Mich. 2015). A pretrial detainee brought an action against a
jail's medical director, alleging that, during his pretrial detention, the medical director was deliberately
indifferent to his severe pain and infected ulcers. The director filed a motion for summary judgment. The
district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was
precluded on the detainee’s claim that the medical director knew that the detainee had an infection, but
chose to not treat it with antibiotics. According to the court, the medical director did not violate the due
process clause by prescribing non-narcotic pain relievers to the detainee since the director's decision was
objectively reasonable and the director was not deliberately indifferent to the detainee's pain. The court
noted that the detainee has received 11 prescriptions for pain in 16 months. (Wayne County Jail, Michigan)

U.S. Supreme Court
USE OF FORCE

Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S.Ct. 2466 (2015). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against county
jail officers, alleging, among other things, that they used excessive force against him in violation of his
Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court entered an order denying the officers' motion for summary
judgment on the detainee's excessive force claim, and subsequently entered judgment on a jury verdict in
the officers' favor. The detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated
and remanded, finding that the detainee was required to show only that the force used was objectively unreasonable, and that jury instructions improperly added a subjective standard for determining excessiveness. (Monroe County Jail, Wisconsin)

32.254

U.S. Appeals Court
USE OF FORCE

Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 801 F.3d 828 (7th Cir. 2015). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against
county jail officers, alleging that they used excessive force against him in violation of his Fourteenth
Amendment rights. The district court entered an order denying the officers’ motion for summary judgment
on the detainee’s excessive force claim, and subsequently entered judgment on a jury verdict in the officers’ favor. The detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated and remanded. On remand, the appeals court reversed and remanded for a new trial. The appeals court held that
the district court’s error of instructing the jury that the detainee was required to establish the subjective
intent of the officers was not a harmless error, and thus a new trial was warranted, since jurors might have
decided that, although the officers had acted in an objectively unreasonable manner, they did not have the
subjective intent required by the erroneous instruction. According to the court, a reasonable officer would
have been on notice that the detainee was not resisting officers in a manner that justified slamming his head
into a wall and using a stun gun while he was manacled, and thus the alleged use of a stun gun on the nonresisting detainee, lying prone and handcuffed behind his back, violated the detainee’s clearly established
right to be free from excessive force in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Monroe County Jail,
Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

McNeill v. Allen, 106 F.Supp.3d 711 (W.D. N.C. 2015). A pre-trial detainee in a county detention facility
brought an action against county sheriff’s office captain under § 1983, alleging deliberate indifference to
his medical needs in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court dismissed the case, finding
that the detainee failed to plead personal involvement as required to maintain claim against sheriff’s captain
in his individual capacity under § 1983. The detainee alleged that jail staff did not adequately treat him for
injuries he suffered after slipping on water in his jail cell. (Buncombe County Sheriff’s Office and Jail,
North Carolina)

U.S. District Court
TVPA- Trafficking
Victims Protection Act
WORK

Menocal v. GEO Group, Inc., 113 F.Supp.3d 1125 (D. Colo. 2015). Current and former detainees at a private, for-profit immigration detention facility brought an action against the facility’s owner-operator, alleging that a work program violated the Colorado Minimum Wage Order (CMWO) because detainees were
paid $1 per day instead of the state minimum wage, that forcing detainees to clean living areas under the
threat of solitary confinement violated the Trafficking Victims Protection Act’s (TVPA) prohibition on
forced labor, and that the owner-operator was unjustly enriched through the work program. The detainees
participate in a “Voluntary Work Program” at the facility where they perform tasks such as maintaining the
on-site medical facility that is owned and operated by the same company, doing laundry, preparing meals,
and cleaning various parts of the facility for compensation of $1 per day. They also alleged that each day,
six randomly selected detainees (whether they participate in the Voluntary Work Program or not) are required to clean the facility’s “pods” without compensation under the threat of solitary confinement. The
owner-operator moved to dismiss. The court found that the detainees adequately alleged that the owneroperator obtained the detainees’ labor by threats of physical restraint, as required to state a claim for violation of TVPA The court held that the detainees were not the facility owner-operator’s “employees” who
could bring claim alleging that a work program violated CMWO. The court noted that the detainees apparently fell within CMWO’s broad definition of employee, but so did prisoners to whom the state labor department found CMWO’s definition of employee should not apply, and detainees, like prisoners, did not
use the wages to provide for themselves, and thus the purposes of CMWO were not served by including
them in the definition of employee. (Aurora Det. Facility, Owned and Operated by the GEO Group, Colo.)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
SANITATION

Montoya v. Newman, 115 F.Supp.3d 1263 (D. Colo. 2015). A former county jail detainee brought a § 1983
action against a sheriff, jail detention officer, and jail medical staff member, and a physician, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the summary judgment was
precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a county jail detention officer was aware of the
detainee’s serious medical need and was deliberately indifferent to that need when he failed to arrange for
the detainee to see a doctor for at least two days, despite knowing that the detainee was coughing up bloody
phlegm, had trouble breathing, and was not eating. The officer was also allegedly told by two other detainees, as well as the detainee’s sister, and the detainee himself, the detainee needed to see a doctor.
The court found that evidence did not support the detainee’s § 1983 municipal liability claim based on
failure to abate unsanitary conditions and disease in the county jail, where there was no evidence that, prior
to the detainee’s incarceration in the county jail, the sheriff was aware of a mold or sanitation problem in
the jail that presented a serious risk to the health of detainee or other inmates, that the sheriff was deliberately indifferent to those conditions, or that those conditions were a cause of the detainee’s illness.
(Huerfano County Jail, Colorado)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCHES
USE OF FORCE
INTAKE SCREENING
PRIVACY

Peters v. Risdal, 786 F.3d 1095 (8th Cir. 2015). A pretrial detainee filed a § 1983 action against a county,
county sheriff, and jail officers alleging that she was subjected to an unreasonable search, that her right to
freedom of speech was violated, and that the officers used excessive force. The district court granted the
defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the unreasonable search claim, and after a jury verdict, in the
officers’ favor on the remaining claims, and denied the detainee’s motion for a new trial. The detainee
appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the officers did not violate the detainee’s Fourth
Amendment rights when they forcibly removed her clothing in a holding cell. According to the court, it was
objectively reasonable for county jail officers to believe that the pretrial detainee presented a risk of harm
to herself if she was permitted to retain strings on her clothing, and thus the officers did not violate her
Fourth Amendment rights when they forcibly removed her clothing in a holding cell. The court noted that
the detainee refused to respond to medical screening questions, refused to comply with a female officer’s
instruction to change into an orange jumpsuit while male officers were outside the holding cell, and acted

32.255

aggressively toward the male officers when they entered. The officers restrained the detainee face down on
her stomach and covered her with a paper suit while the female officer removed her clothing. (Woodbury
County Jail, Iowa)
U.S. District Court
RELEASE
FALSE IMPRISON
MENT

Purvis. v. City of Atlanta, 142 F.Supp.3d 1337 (N.D. Ga. 2015). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action
against a city, county, and the county sheriff, asserting claims for unlawful arrest and detention in violation
of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The arrestee alleged that, following his lawful arrest for drinking in public, he was unlawfully held by the city and county for an additional five to six days on an invalid
warrant. The city, county, and sheriff moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion and denied in
part. The court held that: (1) the allegation was insufficient to establish a pattern or practice on the part of
the county or city arising out of an official policy or custom; (2) the sheriff, in his official capacity, was
entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity; (3) the allegations were sufficient to support an inference that
the sheriff directed subordinates to act unlawfully; (4) the sheriff was not entitled to qualified immunity
from the claim for violation of the arrestee's due process right to timely release; and (5) the sheriff was
entitled to qualified immunity from the claim alleging violation of the arrestee's Fourth Amendment rights.
(Atlanta City Detention Center, Fulton County Jail, Georgia)

U.S. Appeals Court
BAIL
ALIEN

Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2015). A petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus, on behalf
of himself and a class of aliens detained during immigration proceedings for more than six months without
a bond hearing, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief providing individualized bond hearings with the
burden on the government, certification of the class, and appointment of class counsel. The district court
denied the petition. The petitioner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. On remand, the
district court entered a preliminary injunction and the government appealed. The appeals court affirmed.
The district court then granted summary judgment to the class and entered a permanent injunction, and the
parties appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held that the aliens were
entitled to automatic individualized bond hearings and determinations to justify their continued detention.
The court ruled that the government had to prove by clear and convincing evidence that an alien was a
flight risk or a danger to the community to justify denial of a bond at the hearing. (Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Los Angeles, California)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
MEDICAL CARE
MENTAL HEALTH

Sanders v. Glanz, 138 F.Supp.3d 1248 (N.D. Okla. 2015). A pretrial detainee's guardian filed a § 1983
action against a sheriff, the jail's private healthcare providers, and a booking nurse to recover for injuries
that the detainee suffered from a severe assault by fellow prisoners. The defendants filed for dismissal. The
district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that the detainee, who had been
assaulted by other county jail inmates, stated a plausible municipal liability claim under § 1983 against the
corporation that assisted in developing the sheriff's policies with respect to medical and mental health care
of inmates, where the detainee alleged that the corporation shared responsibility with the sheriff to adequately train and supervise its employees, and that the corporation's policies, practices, and customs posed
substantial risks to inmates' health and safety, but failed to take reasonable steps to alleviate those risks.
The court found that the detainee's allegations were sufficient to state a plausible claim against the sheriff in his individual capacity by alleging that the sheriff was responsible for creating and enforcing regulations, policies, practices, and customs at the county jail, and that pursuant to those practices, policies, and
customs, the jail maintained a longstanding, constitutionally deficient system of medical and mental health
care. According to the court, the sheriff knew of substantial risks created by that system but failed to take
reasonable steps to alleviate the risks, but instead took intentional and active steps to conceal the dangerous
conditions at the jail, and the sheriff disregarded known and obvious risks of severe harm from lack of
adequate mental health assessment and treatment, classification, supervision, or protection. (David L. Moss
Criminal Justice Center, Tulsa County Sheriff, Oklahoma, Correctional Healthcare Management, Inc. and,
Correctional Healthcare Management of Oklahoma, Inc.)

U.S. District Court
USE OF FORCE
BRUTALITY

Senalan v. Curran, 78 F.Supp.3d 905 (N.D. Ill. 2015). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against
corrections officers at a county jail, the sheriff, and the sheriff’s office, alleging unlawful detention and
excessive force, as well as conspiracy. The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The
district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the detainee’s allegations
were sufficient to plead excessive force and were sufficient to state a conspiracy claim. The court found
that the detainee’s allegations that he was pushed, pepper sprayed, stunned, beaten, and subdued in his cell
by correctional officers, that he was naked and prone on the floor of a booking cell when four officers
jumped on him and violently restrained him, and that he was not threatening or resisting, were sufficient to
plead excessive force, as required for the detainee’s § 1983 claim against the officers. According to the
court, the detainee’s allegations that correctional officers used excessive force against him, and that the
officers communicated with each other prior to engaging in their use of force, were sufficient to state a §
1983 claim against the officers for conspiracy to deprive him of his constitutional rights. (Lake County Jail,
Illinois)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
SUICIDE
SUPERVISION

Shaidnagle v. Adams County, Miss., 88 F.Supp.3d 705 (S.D.Miss. 2015). After a detainee committed suicide while being held in a county jail, his mother, individually, on behalf of the detainee’s wrongful death
beneficiaries, and as administratrix of the detainee’s estate, brought an action against the county, sheriff,
jail staff, and others, asserting claims for deprivation of civil rights, equitable relief, and declaratory judgment. The defendants brought a § 1988 cross-claim for attorney fees and costs against the plaintiff, and
subsequently moved for summary judgment. The court held that neither the sheriff nor another alleged
policymaker could be held liable on a theory of supervisory liability for failure to train or supervise, where
the mother did not show that the training jail staff received was inadequate, and the policy in place to de-

32.256

termine whether the detainee was a suicide risk was not the “moving force” behind a constitutional violation. The court held that the correct legal standard was not whether jail officers “knew or should have
known,” but whether they had gained actual knowledge of the substantial risk of suicide and responded
with deliberate indifference. The court held that neither party was entitled to attorney fees as the “prevailing party.” (Adams County Jail, Mississippi)
U.S. District Court
SUICIDE
FAILURE TO PROTECT
STAFFING

Shepard v. Hansford County, 110 F.Supp.3d 696 (N.D. Tex. 2015). A husband brought an action against a
county and a county jail employee under § 1983 alleging deliberate indifference to detainee health in violation of the right to provision of adequate medical treatment under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, following his wife’s suicide while in the county jail. The defendants moved for summary
judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that: (1) the jail
employee was entitled to qualified immunity; (2) summary judgment was precluded by a fact issue as to
whether the jail employee violated the detainee’s rights, (3) the county had an adequate suicide risk prevention training policy, where employees were required to attend training to learn about suicide risk detection and prevention methods, and were required to read the county’s policy on conducting face-to-face
suicide checks with detainees; (4) the county adequately trained employees on cell entry; but (5) a fact
issue existed as to whether the county had an unwritten policy of understaffing the jail, precluding summary judgment. The court noted that it was not clearly established at the time of the suicide that an employee was required to abandon other duties to ensure that suicide watch checks were completed, and it was
not clearly established that the employee was prohibited from providing a detainee with a towel in a cell
with “tie-off points,” since the employee was not aware of any other suicides in that cell.
According to the court, the jail cell entry policy prohibiting jail employees from entering a cell alone did
not amount to training employees to be deliberately indifferent to the needs of detainees, and was not causally related to the detainee’s death, and thus the county was not liable under § 1983 for deliberate indifference to detainee health. (Hansford County Jail, Texas)

U.S. District Court
CLASSIFICATION
CLOTHING
CONDITIONS
EXERCISE
FEMALES
MEDICAL CARE
MENTAL HEALTH
SANITATION
SEARCHES
RECREATION
USE OF FORCE

Shorter v. Baca, 101 F.Supp.3d 876 (C.D. Cal. 2015). A pretrial detainee brought an action against a county, sheriff, and deputies, alleging under § 1983 that the defendants denied her medical care, subjected her to
unsanitary living conditions, deprived her of food, clean clothes, and access to exercise, and conducted
overly invasive searches. The detainee had been classified as mentally ill and housed in a mental health unit
at the detention facility. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of
material fact as to what policies governed classification of pretrial detainees who were mentally ill.
The court found that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
jail conditions imposed on the detainee, including permitting the detainee, who was incarcerated for 32
days, to shower only three times, only permitting the detainee outside of her cell for recreation on one occasion, failing to clean her cell, failing to provide the detainee with clean clothing, and depriving the detainee
of food, amounted to punishment.
The court also found fact issues as to whether the county sheriff’s deputies’ manner of conducting a
visual body cavity search of the female pretrial detainee on three occasions exhibited exaggerated and excessive force, and was vindictive or harassing, precluding summary judgment on the detainee’s § 1983
Fourth Amendment unlawful search claim against the deputies.
The court found that there was no evidence that county jail employees’ alleged failure to adequately
treat the detainee’s blood condition caused her measurable harm, where there was no indication that the
alleged denial of treatment caused the detainee any physical pain, or that any mental anguish the detainee
suffered was related to denial of her medication.
The court denied summary judgment to the defendants on the detainee’s claim that she was denied dental treatment. (Century Regional Detention Facility, Los Angeles County, California)

U.S. District Court
USE OF FORCE
FAILURE TO PROTECT
RESTRAINTS

Shuford v. Conway, 86 F.Supp.3d 1344 (N.D.Ga. 2015). Pretrial detainees brought a § 1983 action against
a sheriff and other county jail officials and employees, alleging excessive force in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion,
finding that the jail employees did not apply force maliciously and sadistically against any detainee. According to the court, in shooting the pretrial detainee with a non-lethal chemical agent projectile, taking him
to the floor, and placing him in restraint chair, the employees did not apply force maliciously and sadistically. The court noted that the detainee had hit a wall and metal partition, creating a risk of self-harm, the
restraints reduced or eliminated the detainee’s ability to inflict harm against himself, and the detainee did
not suffer serious or permanent injuries. (Gwinnett County Jail, Georgia)

U.S. Appeals Court
FOOD
MEDICAL CARE
RECREATION
SANITATION
WORK

Smith v. Dart, 803 F.3d 304 (7th Cir. 2015). A pretrial detainee brought action under § 1983 against a county alleging deliberate indifference to his health in violation of the right to the provision of adequate medical
treatment under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as failure to pay adequate
wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) for his job in the jail’s laundry room. The district court
dismissed the case and the detainee appealed. The appeals court held that the detainee sufficiently alleged
that the food he received was “well below nutritional value,” as required to state a claim under § 1983 for
deliberate indifference to his health in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The court held that the detainee failed to allege harm stemming from the presence of spider nests, cockroaches, and mice, and thus failed to state a claim under § 1983 for deliberate indifference to his health in
violation of the right to provision of adequate medical treatment under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court noted that the detainee did not allege that pests were present in his cell, or
that pests had ever come into contact with his person or his property, or that he’d been bitten or stung or

32.257

otherwise suffered physical or psychological harm, or that his property had been damaged.
According to the court, the detainee’s mere assertion that he could not “go outside for recreation” was
insufficient to allege that he was deprived of the opportunity to exercise, and thus failed to state a claim
under § 1983 for deliberate indifference. The court noted that “…there is a significant difference between a
lack of outdoor recreation and an inability to exercise.”
The court found that the detainee’s claims that prison water contained cyanide, lead, and “alpha and beta
radiation,” if true, were sufficient to allege deprivation of drinkable water, as required to state a claim under
§ 1983 for deliberate indifference to his health in violation of the right to provision of adequate medical
treatment under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The court ruled that pretrial detainees are not protected by the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) because
they are not employees of their jail. The court noted that the detainee had volunteered to participate in a
veteran’s program within the county jail that included a job in the jail’s laundry room, and that this was not
“involuntary servitude” or punishment that would violate the Thirteenth Amendment. According to the
court, “[P]eople are not imprisoned for the purpose of enabling them to earn a living. The prison pays for
their keep. If it puts them to work, it is to offset some of the cost of keeping them, or to keep them out of
mischief, or to ease their transition to the world outside, or to equip them with skills and habits that will
make them less likely to return to crime outside. None of these goals is compatible with federal regulation
of their wages and hours. The reason the FLSA contains no express exception for prisoners is probably that
the idea was too outlandish to occur to anyone when the legislation was under consideration by Congress.”
(Cook County Jail, Illinois)
U.S. District Court
USE OF FORCE

Taylor v. United States, 103 F.Supp.3d 87 (D.D.C. 2015). A detainee brought an action under the Federal
Tort Claims Act (FTCA), alleging she suffered intentional infliction of emotional distress, assault, and
battery while in the custody of the United States Marshals Service. After a bench trial, the district court
held that evidence did not support the detainee’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, and that
the officer’s use of force against the detainee was protected by law enforcement privilege. The detainee
alleged that a detention enforcement officer’s use of a leg sweep on her, which caused her to fall and sustain facial injuries, caused intentional infliction of emotional distress. According to the court, the officer’s
conduct was not extreme and outrageous since the leg sweep maneuver is a standard non-lethal technique
that was appropriate in the situation, and the detainee provided no documentation relating to any psychiatric
evaluation or counseling for the alleged emotional distress. The court found that the officer’s use of the leg
sweep maneuver was privileged, and thus could not support her claim of battery against the officer, where
the detainee could have posed a legitimate threat to the officer, and the officer responded to the detainee’s
refusal to obey commands by using a standard non-lethal technique. (D.C. Superior Court Holding Cell,
District of Columbia)

U.S. District Court
MENTAL HEALTH
SEGREGATION
CONDITIONS

Trueblood v. Washington State Dept. of Social and Health, 101 F.Supp.3d 1010 (W.D. Wash. 2015). Members of a class of pretrial detainees suspected of being mentally incompetent, the next friends of such pretrial detainees, and a disability rights organization brought an action seeking a permanent injunction and a
declaratory judgment establishing a time frame within which due process required that the Department of
Social and Health Services provide a competency evaluation and restoration of services to such detainees.
After a bench trial, the district court held that: (1) the disability rights organization had standing to bring the
action; (2) the next friends of the pretrial detainees had standing to bring an action; and (3) due process
balancing favored the interests of the pretrial detainees, and thus seven days was the maximum justifiable
period of incarceration while awaiting a competency evaluation and restoration of services. A permanent
injunction was ordered. The court noted that jails could not provide an environment or type of care required
for such detainees, especially as they were often held in solitary confinement without access to medication,
and that confinement in jails actively damaged detainees’ mental condition and each additional day of incarceration caused further deterioration of the detainees’ mental health, increased the risk of suicide and
victimization by other inmates. (State of Washington, Department of Social and Health Services)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
SEGREGATION
MAIL
VISITS
TELEPHONE

U.S. v. Mohamed, 103 F.Supp.3d 281 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). A defendant who was indicted for murder of an
internationally protected person and attempted murder of an internationally protected person, filed a motion
to vacate or modify special administrative measures governing conditions of his pretrial detention. The
district court denied the motion, finding that the measures were rationally connected to the legitimate government objective of preventing the detainee from coordinating violent attacks. The detainee had been
placed in a special housing unit and limitations on communications between him and people inside or outside the prison were limited. The court noted that the detainee had admitted allegiance to terrorist organizations, had previously broken out of prison two times, one escape was allegedly coordinated between the
defendant and a terrorist organization, and three prison guards had been killed during one escape. (Metropolitan Correctional Center, Manhattan, New York)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE
MEDICAL CARE
FAILURE TO PROTECT

White v. Washington County, Tenn., 85 F.Supp.3d 955 (E.D.Tenn. 2015). The mother of a county jail detainee who committed suicide in custody brought an action against the county, county sheriff, and the private contractor that provided health care services to county jail inmates, alleging federal constitutional
claims and state-law negligence claims. The defendants moved to dismiss. The court held that claims
against the private health care provider were “health care liability claims,” under Tennessee law, for which
the mother was required to a file certificate of good faith and a pre-suit notice of a potential claim, where
the mother asserted that the provider failed to properly assess or provide adequate care for detainee’s mental health issues. (Washington County Jail, Tennessee)

32.258

U.S. District Court
RESTRAINTS
MEDICAL CARE

Young v. District of Columbia, 107 F.Supp.3d 69 (D.D.C. 2015). A pretrial detainee who was shot in the
back by a police officer brought an action against the municipal police department and the officer, alleging
under § 1983 that the defendants violated his Fourth Amendment rights by seizing him without probable
cause and using excessive force. The defendants moved for partial dismissal for failure to state claim. The
district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that the officer was entitled to
qualified immunity from the claim that handcuffing and shackling of the detainee during hospital treatment
violated his due process rights, where the law regarding use of handcuffs and shackles on a pretrial detainee
during hospital treatment was not clearly established at the time of the incident in question. The court held
that the detainee failed to state a § 1983 claim based on the municipality’s alleged failure to train the officer, absent allegations regarding any specific policy or custom, the enforcement of which caused the detainee’s injury, or any particular deficiency in training or supervision resulting in the officer’s allegedly
shooting an unarmed man with his hands raised. (District of Columbia and D.C. Metropolitan Police Department)
2016

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Bailey v. Feltmann, 810 F.3d 589 (8th Cir. 2016). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action against a law enforcement officer, alleging that the officer’s decision to transport him to the jail rather than a hospital denied him emergency medical care for lacerations to his hand. The district court entered summary judgment
in the officer’s favor and the arrestee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that: (1) the
Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable delay in medical care for an arrestee was not clearly established at the time of the incident; (2) it was clearly established, under the Due Process Clause, that pretrial
detainees or arrestees had the right to be free from deliberately indifferent denial of emergency medical
care; and (3) evidence did not support the finding that the arrestee had an objectively serious medical need
for treatment. (Jefferson County Sheriff’s Department, Missouri)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE
RESTRAINTS
GRIEVANCE
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Hernandez v. Dart, 814 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 2016). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a sheriff and
the county that employed him, alleging excessive force and deliberate indifference for shackling him to his
hospital bed and failing to provide assistance to move between his geriatric (jerry) chair and bed, with the
result that his bed sores did not improve. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment based on the prisoner’s alleged failure to exhaust his administrative remedies, and the prisoner
appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that a prison employees’ failure to
inform the prisoner of the grievance procedure available to him at the time when he was hospitalized and
complaining of being shackled to his hospital bed, meant that the grievance procedure was unavailable and
that the prisoner did not have to exhaust his administrative remedies. (Cook County Department of Corrections, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
GRIEVANCE

Hughes v. Scott, 816 F.3d 955 (7th Cir. 2016). A civil detainee filed a § 1983 action alleging that a facility’s
officials retaliated against him for filing grievances. The district court dismissed the complaint, and the
detainee appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that the detained sex offender’s allegations that officials at the detention facility disregarded his grievances regarding his dental care,
and told him that he was “ignorant” and “stupid” and “moron,” and that his life would go better if he
stopped complaining, were sufficient to state a plausible First Amendment retaliation claim against the
officials. (Rushville Treatment and Detention Facility, Illinois)

32.259

32.260

carrying or concealing a weapon or contraband and there was no indication of a prior delinquency
record. (Minnehaha County Juvenile Detention Center, South Dakota)
U.S. District Court
TELEPHONE CALLS

U.S. v. Faulkner, 323 F.Supp.2d 1111 (D.Kan. 2004). Three detainees who were indicted on
charges of attempting to kill a government witness moved to suppress recordings of their jail
telephone conversations. The court held that the detainees had impliedly consented to the
recording of telephone conversations because notices that conversations might be recorded were
posted throughout the facility, and a recorded warning was given before the commencement of
long distance calls. The district court noted that the recordings made by employees of a private
corrections company, were not covered by the wiretapping exemption that was applicable when
the interception was done by law enforcement officers. (Corrections Corporation of America,
Leavenworth, Kansas)
2005

U.S. District Court
NUDITY
RIGHT TO PRIVACY

Birdine v. Gray, 375 F.Supp.2d 874 (D.Neb. 2005). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action
against jail employees claiming violation of his right to be free of punishment and his right to
privacy. The district court dismissed the complaint. The court held that the detainee did not have
a privacy right that would allow him to cover the window of his cell with towels, noting that the
cell contained a privacy wall which allowed for partial privacy while using the toilet. The court
found that the inmate’s privacy rights were not violated when he was moved from one cell to
another, naked. The inmate had removed all of his clothes and refused to put them back, and jail
staff moved him unclothed to a cell closer to their station where he could be constantly watched.
(Lancaster County Jail, Nebraska)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCHES

Conyers v. Abitz, 416 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 2005). A state prison inmate brought a § 1983 action
against prison officials, challenging a search imposed on him when he left a prison chapel. The
inmate also claimed that prison officials hindered his observance of a religious fast, violating his
right to religious exercise. The district court granted summary judgment for the officials on the
ground that the inmate failed to his exhaust his claims. The inmate appealed. The appeals court
affirmed in part, and vacated and remanded in part. The court held that any Fourth Amendment
privacy interest that the inmate had in not being frisked upon leaving a prison chapel was
insufficient to overcome the judicial deference generally afforded to prison officials when they are
evaluating what is necessary to preserve institutional order and discipline. The court noted that
the officials produced evidence that they had a legitimate security interest in frisking inmates as
they left the prison chapel because the chapel was a hotbed of contraband exchanges. (Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEX OFFENDERS
DNA

Doe v. Moore, 410 F.3d 1337 (11th Cir. 2005). Florida sex offenders filed a class action challenging
the constitutionality of Florida’s sex offender registration and notification scheme and its DNA
collection statute. The district court dismissed the action and the offenders appealed. The appeals
court affirmed, finding that the registration and notification scheme did not violate the offenders’
substantive due process rights or the Equal Protection Clause. The court found that the Sex
Offender Act did not unreasonably burden the offenders’ right to travel. The court also held that
the DNA collection statute did not give rise to substantive due process rights. (State of Florida)

U.S. District Court
BLOOD TEST

Henderson v. Belfueil, 354 F.Supp.2d 889 (W.D.Wis. 2005). A prison inmate brought a civil rights
suit against a police detective who took a blood sample from the inmate as part of a criminal
investigation of a prison assault. The district court granted summary judgment for the detective
in part, and denied it in part. The court held that the detective did not violate the Eighth
Amendment in having the inmate’s blood drawn, where the sample was not taken to cause the
inmate pain, but rather to further legitimate penal and law enforcement interests. The court
found that fact issues as to whether the inmate consented to the blood draw precluded summary
judgment on the inmate’s Fourth Amendment claim. (Redgranite Correctional Institution,
Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
RECORDS

Hubbs v. Alamao, 360 F.Supp.2d 1073 (C.D.Cal. 2005). A person who had been civilly confined at
a state hospital as a sexually violent predator (SVP) brought a pro se § 1983 action alleging
violation of his constitutional rights. The district court held that the plaintiff’s right to privacy
was not violated when the defendants reviewed his medical records when assessing whether he
was a sexually violent predator. According to the court, the state had a compelling government
interest in identifying, confining and treating SVPs that outweighed the plaintiff’s right to
privacy in his medical records. The court found that the plaintiff’s civil conspiracy and equal
protection claims were barred because they implied the invalidity of his commitment. (Atascadero
State Hospital, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
DNA

Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652 (2nd Cir. 2005). Convicted felons brought a § 1983 action against

state officials and others, arguing that a state DNA-database statute violated their Fourth
Amendment rights. The district court dismissed the action and the felons appealed. The appeals
court affirmed. The court held that the extraction and analysis of convicted felons’ blood for DNA-

33.35
XX

indexing purposes constituted a search that implicated the Fourth Amendment, but that this
search was justified under the “special needs” exception. (New York State Department of
Correctional Services)
U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Nilsen v. York County, 382 F.Supp.2d 206 (D.Me. 2005). County jail inmates brought a class
action suit against a county, claiming that the practice of forced disrobing of all incoming
inmates, in the presence of an officer, was an unauthorized strip search. The parties submitted a
proposed settlement for court approval. The district court approved the settlement, in part. The
court found that the practice of having inmates remove their clothing in the presence of an officer
was the equivalent of a strip search conducted without cause. The county agreed to create a $3.3
million settlement fund, from which members of the class would be compensated. The court
approved higher “incentive” payments of $6,500 to the first class representative, and $5,500 and
$5,000 to the other two class representatives, noting that they put considerable time into the case
and were required to give embarrassing deposition testimony. They also received unfavorable
publicity regarding their arrest and humiliation, due to the small size of the county and the ease
of their recognition. The court noted that a privacy factor was strong in this case, and that
requiring individual class members to prove damages would stifle individuals who are too
embarrassed to discuss their searches. The court rejected the proposal that would have awarded
twice as much to females. The proposal had been based on the assertion that females had two
areas of the body subject to privacy protection. The county contended, even when the settlement
was offered, that its policy was constitutional because the officers were looking for contraband in
the clothing and were not intentionally viewing arrestees’ naked bodies. (York Co. Jail, Maine)

U.S. Appeals Court
DNA

Padgett v. Donald, 401 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2005). Incarcerated felons brought an action seeking

U.S. Appeals Court
ATTORNEY/CLIENT
COMMUNICATION
TELEPHONE CALLS

Peoples v. CCA Detention Centers, 422 F.3d 1090 (10th Cir. 2005). A pretrial detainee who was

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Rodriguez v. McClenning, 399 F.Supp.2d 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). A prisoner brought a civil rights
action alleging that a corrections officer sexually assaulted him during a routine pat-frisk search
and retaliated against him for filing a subsequent grievance. The district court denied summary
judgment for the officer. The court held that officer’s alleged sexual assault constituted cruel and
unusual punishment and that the officer as not entitled to qualified immunity. The court held
that the officer’s alleged retaliatory planting of evidence and retaliatory filing of a misbehavior
report was in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendment. According to the court, the
prisoner did not have any constitutional right to be free from cell searches of any kind, including
retaliatory cell searches. The court found that the prisoner suffered punishment as the result of
the officer’s alleged retaliatory issuance of a misbehavior report, when he was placed in less
desirable housing. (Green Haven Correctional Facility, New York)

injunctive relief, asking the court to find a state statute requiring DNA sampling of all convicted
felons unconstitutional. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants
and the felons appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held the statute did not
violate the prisoners’ rights to privacy under the state constitution nor under the Fourteenth
Amendment. The court found that the state’s legitimate interest in creating a permanent
identification record of convicted felons for law enforcement purposes outweighed the minor
intrusion involved in taking prisoners’ saliva samples and storing their DNA profiles, given the
prisoners’ reduced expectation of privacy in their identities. (Georgia Department of Corrections)

housed at a detention center operated by a private contractor under a contract with the United
States Marshals Service brought actions against the contractor and its employees, alleging Fifth
and Eighth Amendment violations. The district court dismissed the action and the inmate
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court precluded the detainee’s Bivens claim for
damages under eavesdropping and breach of privacy statutes because state law provided the
detainee with a cause of action. The detainee challenged the failure of the facility to provide him
with unmonitored calls to his attorney. (Corrections Corporation of America, Leavenworth,
Kansas)

2006
U.S. District Court
DRUG TESTING

Davies v. Valdes, 462 F.Supp.2d 1084 (C.D.Cal. 2006). A state prisoner brought a pro se action

against various corrections officials, alleging that they violated his due process rights in
connection with disciplinary proceedings. The district court granted summary judgment in favor
of the defendants. The court held that the issuance of a report that the prisoner possessed a
weapon, and approval of the report during the administrative review, did not violate the
prisoner’s due process rights because they were supported by some evidence. The court also held
that requiring the prisoner to submit to a drug/urine test did not violate his right to privacy,
where he was found in possession of a weapon, his bed was next to the bed of an inmate found
with marijuana, and the prison had a legitimate interest in attempting to curb drug use.
(California Rehabilitation Center)

33.36
XX

U.S. District Court
ATTORNEY-CLIENT
COMMUNICATIONS

Glisson v. Sangamon County Sheriff’s Department, 408 F.Supp.2d 609 (C.D.Ill. 2006). A detainee
brought a civil rights action against county defendants and a police officer, alleging various
violations of his constitutional rights in connection with his arrest and detention. The defendants
moved to dismiss. The district court dismissed in part and declined to dismiss in part. The court
held that the detainee sufficiently stated claims under the Eighth Amendment and Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment against a jail and a correctional officer with respect to both
his first and second detentions. The court found that the detainee, who was awaiting a probation
revocation hearing, sufficiently stated a claim under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by
alleging that the county jail maintained policies and customs that tolerated cruel and unusual
punishment of convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees, and that the correctional officer
strapped him to a wheelchair for several hours, forcing him to urinate on himself and to sit in his
urine for several hours, while he was in a manic state. The inmate alleged that the jail and
correctional officer knew of his mental condition because it was documented and that the officer's
and jail's acts were intentional with malice and reckless disregard for his federally protected
rights. The court held that the detainee sufficiently stated denial of access to courts claims
against a county jail and correctional officers by alleging that the jail maintained a policy and
practice of arbitrarily denying inmates’ confidential consultations with their attorneys and that
the officers directly participated in the arbitrary and capricious denial of his access to counsel.
The court found that the detainee stated an equal protection claim against a county jail and
officer by alleging that the jail maintained a policy and practice that discriminated against him
because of his mental illness, and that an officer discriminated against him in terms of the type of
confinement on the basis of mental illness. (Sangamon Co. Jail, Village of Grandview Police, Ill.)

U.S. District Court
ATTORNEY-CLIENT
COMMUNICATION

Lonegan v. Hasty, 436 F.Supp.2d 419 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). Defense attorneys brought a Bivens action

against officials of a federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) facility, claiming that the statutory and
constitutional rights of themselves and their inmate clients were violated through the practice of
videotaping meetings. The district court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss in part, and
granted it in part. The court held that: (1) the statute of limitations had not run on the claim that
the Wiretap Act was violated; (2) a claim was stated that conversations were actually recorded, as
required under the Wiretap Act; (3) a claim was stated that the interception was intentional; (4) a
claim was stated that “oral communications” were made with the expectation that they not be
recorded; (5) there was no qualified immunity from the Wiretap Act claims; (6) a claim was stated
under the Fourth Amendment; (7) there was no qualified immunity from the Fourth Amendment
claim; (8) a claim of personal involvement by a warden was stated; and (9) the availability of
Fourth Amendment relief precluded a claim under Fifth Amendment. The plaintiffs, attorneys
employed by the Legal Aid Society of New York, claimed that, by secretly recording their
conversations with certain detainees at the federal Bureau of Prisons' Metropolitan Detention
Center (“MDC”), located in Brooklyn, New York, the defendants violated Title III of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended (the “Wiretap Act” or “Title III”), and the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. BOP personnel told the attorneys that
video cameras were not on during their meeting with their clients, but a subsequent BOP
investigation concluded that visual and sound recordings existed for many of the attorney/client
meetings. (Metropolitan Detention Center, Federal Bureau of Prisons, New York)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL

Niemic v. Maloney, 448 F.Supp.2d 270 (D.Mass. 2006). An inmate in state correctional facility
brought action against corrections officials and health care providers alleging that the health care
providers improperly shared his medical records. The district court held that health care
providers who provided medical services at the correctional facility did not violate inmate's
Fourth Amendment rights when they exchanged medical information with corrections officers
without the inmate's informed consent. The court found that the corrections officers had a
reasonable need to know that the inmate's drug test showed use of heroin and cocaine. (MCICedar Junction, Massachusetts)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL ISSUES

Pabon v. Wright, 459 F.3d 241 (2nd Cir. 2006). A pro se state prisoner sued prison physicians and

private consulting physicians under § 1983, alleging that they violated Eighth Amendment by
providing inadequate treatment for his Hepatitis C. The district court entered summary
judgment in favor of the physicians and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The
court held that the prisoner's due process right to refuse medical treatment carries with it a
concomitant right to such information as a reasonable patient would deem necessary to make an
informed decision, and that the prison officials' action of requiring the prisoner to undergo a liver
biopsy before considering him eligible for Hepatitis C treatment was not a violation of his due
process rights. The court also found that the prisoner's right to receive medical information was
not clearly established when he had a liver biopsy. The court noted that prison officials may
administer treatment to a prisoner despite that prisoner's desire to refuse treatment, without
violating the prisoner's due process rights, if, in the exercise of their professional judgment, the
officials reasonably determine that providing such treatment furthers a legitimate penological
interest. (Green Haven Correctional Facility, New York)

33.37
XX

U.S. District Court
TELEPHONE CALLS

Swope v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 439 F.Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C. 2006). A federal inmate brought a pro se
action under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) seeking copies of recorded telephone
conversations between him and third parties in the possession of Bureau of Prisons (BOP). The
district court held that the third parties involved with the calls did not waive their privacy
interests, that the recordings were exempt from disclosure, and that the exempt and non-exempt
portions of the recordings were non-segregable. According to the court, the BOP recordings of
inmate telephone conversations are the functional equivalent of “law enforcement records” for the
purposes of a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) exemption from disclosure of law enforcement
records that would involve an invasion of a third party's privacy. (Medical Center for Federal
Prisoners, Springfield, Missouri)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL ISSUES

Sykes v. McPhillips, 412 F.Supp.2d 197 (N.D.N.Y. 2006). The personal representatives for a

U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCHES

Smook v. Minnehaha County, 457 F.3d 806 (8th Cir. 2006). Former detainees at a county juvenile

U.S. Appeals Court
TELEPHONE CALLS

U.S. v. Morin, 437 F.3d 777 (8th Cir. 2006). A defendant was convicted in district court and he

U.S. District Court
VISITOR
SEARCHES

Zboralski v. Monahan, 446 F.Supp.2d 879 (N.D.Ill. 2006). A visitor to a state treatment and
detention facility brought a § 1983 action against facility officers, alleging that she was illegally
searched prior to visits. The visitor moved to proceed in forma pauperis, and the district court
granted the motion. The court held that the visitor stated Fourth Amendment claims based on

mother and son's estates brought a civil rights action under § 1983 against various employees of a
substance abuse correctional facility where the son had been confined, a private hospital which
provided emergency medical services to the son, and a physician. The representatives alleged
constitutional violations arising from the delivery of emergency medical services during the son's
incarceration, as well as a state law malpractice/negligence claim. The hospital and physician
moved for summary judgment on the issue of their “state actor” status. The district court granted
the motion, holding that neither the hospital nor the physician were a “state actor” for the
purposes of § 1983. According to the court, hospitals and physicians that provide care outside of
the prison facility may be held to be state actors for purposes of § 1983 when they work pursuant
to a contract, but the private hospital did not voluntarily assume the function of the state by
accepting the correctional facility's delegation of its duty to provide emergency medical care to the
prisoner. The court noted that the hospital did not have an implied contract with the correctional
facility to provide emergency medical services when it treated the prisoner, given that it was
federally mandated to do so by the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act
(EMTALA). The prisoner suffered from diabetes while confined at the facility and the plaintiffs
alleged that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. The defendants
maintained that the prisoner received the same medical care as any other patient, regardless of
his prisoner status. The plaintiff disputed this by pointing out that corrections officers exercised
continual custody over the prisoner in a manner that interfered with the confidentiality normally
accorded the health information of free patients, the hospital accommodated the officers' constant
attendance upon the prisoner, and the state paid for his medical care. (Hale Creek Alcohol and
Substance Abuse Correctional Treatment Center, New York)

detention center brought a § 1983 class action against a county and individual county officials,
challenging the center's policy of strip-searching all juveniles admitted to the facility regardless of
the seriousness of the charged offense or the existence of suspicion. The district court entered
partial summary judgment for the former detainees, finding that the searches violated the
minors' constitutional rights, and that the officials were not qualifiedly immune from the minors'
claims. The county and officials appealed the denial of qualified immunity. The appeals court
reversed and remanded, finding that requiring a juvenile to strip to her undergarments upon
admission to the facility was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. A juvenile female had
been brought to the center for a curfew violation. A female staff person took her to a private
restroom, directed her to remove her shorts, t-shirt, and sandals, but allowed her to remain
attired in her undergarments. The staff person touched her to look under her arms, between her
toes, and through her hair and scalp. The court held that the search was reasonable under Fourth
Amendment in light of the state's responsibility to act in loco parentis with respect to juveniles in
lawful state custody, and that the special needs for such a search outweighed the invasion of
personal privacy. The court held that the officials were entitled to qualified immunity where there
was no appellate decision from the Supreme Court or any federal circuit ruling on such an issue,
and, although many courts had concluded that the strip search of adult offenders without
individualized suspicion was unreasonable, those cases did not consider interests involved when
state had responsibility to act in loco parentis. (Minnehaha County Juvenile Detention Center,
South Dakota)
appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that recordings of the defendant's jailhouse
telephone calls were admissible for sentencing purposes. The court found that the defendant
impliedly consented to the warrantless tape-recording of his jailhouse telephone calls, and thus,
the recordings were admissible for sentencing purposes. The defendant had been given a
prisoners' handbook that informed him that his jailhouse calls would be monitored, and there
were signs above the phones in the prison informing him of that fact. (North Dakota)

33.38
XX

unreasonable patdowns and “Rapiscan” scans, an invasion of privacy claim, and an assault and battery claim. The
visitor alleged that she was illegally searched prior to visits, claiming invasion of privacy under Illinois law based on
intrusion upon seclusion, alleging that her virtual naked image was captured through the Rapiscan machine, kept, and
viewed hours later by officers. The court noted that the visitor was neither a patient nor under any criminal
investigation. The visitor also alleged that an officer caused her to reasonably believe that she would place her fingers
in the visitor's vaginal area, and physically touched her in such a manner at least four times. (Illinois Department of
Human Services Treatment and Detention Facility, Joliet, Illinois)
2007
U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Bullock v. Sheahan, 519 F.Supp.2d 763 (N.D.Ill. 2007). Male jail inmates brought a class action against a county and
county sheriff alleging violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments based on an alleged policy and/or practice
under which male inmates were subjected to strip searches upon returning to a county department of corrections for
out-processing after having been ordered released. The sheriff and county moved to strike certain portions of the
inmates' motion for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held
that the sheriff and county had notice of the male jail inmates' claims challenging the policy and practice, despite
allegations that the claims regarding the inmates having to strip in a large non-private group setting came as a surprise
to the county and the sheriff because they were never addressed by inmates during fact or expert discovery. The court
found that factual allegations contained in the complaint satisfied the notice pleading standards with respect to all
claims, and that the county and sheriff did not provide specific evidence of any misrepresentations or sandbagging
other than an affidavit stating that discovery did not focus on the privacy issue. (Cook County Department of
Corrections, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCHES

Campbell v. Miller, 499 F.3d 711 (7th Cir. 2007). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action against a police officer and city,
alleging that a strip search violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The district court entered judgment, upon jury
verdict, in favor of the defendants and denied the arrestee's motion for judgment as a matter of law. The arrestee
appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded. The court held that evidence was
sufficient to support a jury verdict that police officers had reasonable suspicion to believe that the arrestee was
concealing contraband, as would justify a strip search and body cavity search of the arrestee, for the purpose of the
arrestee's § 1983 unreasonable search claim. The court noted that the plaintiff was arrested for narcotics possession,
when an officer first encountered the arrestee the officer reasonably believed that the plaintiff fit the description of a
man who had just engaged in a drug transaction. The officer testified that he saw the arrestee drop a bag of marijuana
and then disregarded repeated commands to stop moving away. But the court found that a strip and body cavity search
conducted on the arrestee in an open backyard was not reasonable, and thus, the search violated the arrestee's Fourth
Amendment rights. The search involved nudity and visual inspection of the anal area, the backyard was exposed to the
neighbors, the arrestee's friend was able to watch the search and others could have watched as well, and no exigency
justified such a public exposure. The court concluded that the city was not liable under § 1983 for the arresting officer's
unreasonable conduct. Although the city had a policy that any officer making an arrest had to conduct a body search of
the prisoner, there was no policy requiring the search to be conducted in public, the decision to conduct the search in
an open and exposed area was what rendered the search unconstitutional, and that decision was made by the officer.
(City of Indianapolis, Indiana)

U.S. District Court
PRIVACY ACT
RECORD

Conklin v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 514 F.Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C. 2007). A federal inmate brought a pro se action against
the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) under the Privacy Act alleging that the copy of his pre-sentence investigation report (PSI)
in the BOP's files contained incorrect statements about him, resulting in his classification as a “high custody” inmate.
The district court granted the BOP’s motion to dismiss. The court held that fact issues as to the date on which the
prisoner knew or had reason to know of allegedly incorrect statements in the copy of his PSI in BOP files precluded
dismissal as untimely. The court held that amendment of the copy of the inmate's PSI in BOP files was not an available
remedy and damages were not an available remedy. (Beckley Federal Correctional Institution in Beaver, West
Virginia)

U.S. District Court
RIGHT OF PRIVACY

Desroche v. Strain, 507 F.Supp.2d 571 (E.D.La. 2007). A pre-trial detainee brought a pro se, in forma pauperis action
against prison officials, alleging improper conditions of confinement, negligent medical treatment, invasion of privacy,
and excessive force. The district court dismissed the action. The court held that the alleged conditions of the detainee's
confinement, including being required to sleep on the floor of an overcrowded holding tank, being deprived of a
mattress, and being provided with water only in a dirty sink, if proven, did not violate his Eighth Amendment or due
process rights, given that he experienced such conditions for only ten days, and that use of sink did not cause him to
suffer disease or other serious harm. According to the court, a deputy's alleged recording of the detainee in a jail
dormitory with a cell phone video camera, if proven, was not a violation of any constitutional right to privacy,
inasmuch as the detainee had no expectation of privacy while in a public area of the jail, and any possible harm to the
detainee's reputation was so speculative as to be non-existent. (River Parish Correction Center, Louisiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
DNA

U.S. v. Kriesel, 508 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2007). The government petitioned to revoke supervised release of a felon who
refused to submit a DNA sample. In response, the convicted felon challenged the constitutionality of the Justice for All
Act, which expanded coverage of the DNA Act to require DNA samples from all convicted felons on supervised
release. The felon also challenged the regulation issued pursuant to the Justice for All Act. The district court upheld the
constitutionality of the Justice for All Act and the validity of the regulation. The felon appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The court held that requiring a convicted felon on supervised release to provide a DNA sample, even through
drawing of blood, did not constitute an illegal search. The court found that the government's significant interests in
identifying supervised releasees, preventing recidivism, and solving past crimes outweighed the diminished privacy
interests of the convicted felon. (United States District Court for the Western District of Washington)

33.39
XXII

U.S. District Court
DNA
RECORDS

Wilson v. Wilkinson, 608 F.Supp.2d 891 (S.D.Ohio 2007). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against state
officials, challenging the constitutionality of a state statute requiring the collection of DNA specimens from convicted
felons. The parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The district court held that the collection of a DNA specimen
was not an unreasonable search and seizure, and that a DNA sample did not implicate the prisoner's Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. The court noted that law enforcement's interest in obtaining DNA for a database to
solve past and future crimes outweighed the prisoner's diminished privacy rights. According to the court, the prisoner
did not have a fundamental privacy interest protected by substantive due process in the information contained in a
DNA sample and the profile obtained pursuant to the state statute. The court noted that the prisoner, as a convicted
felon, did not enjoy the same privacy rights as did ordinary citizens. (Ross Correctional Institution, Ohio Department
of Rehabilitation and Correction)
2008

U.S. District Court
RIGHT TO PRIVACY

Bellamy v. Wells, 548 F.Supp.2d 234 (W.D.Va. 2008). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against police
officers and a chief of police for initiating and surreptitiously recording conversations with him while he was in
custody on an indictment for rape. The district court entered judgment for the defendants in part. The court held that
the detainee's allegations that police officers initiated and surreptitiously recorded conversations with him while he was
in custody, and that incriminating statements he made during these conversations were subsequently used against him
at trial, stated a cognizable claim under § 1983 for violation of his Fifth Amendment right against compelled selfincrimination. While in a hospital, the detainee spoke with an officer who was guarding him. When police learned of
these conversations, they had the officer wear a recording device and they recorded subsequent conversations. The
detainee was never given his Miranda warning during the course of these conversations. (City of Waynesboro,
Virginia)

U.S. District Court
RIGHT TO PRIVACY
SEARCHES

Bullock v. Sheahan, 568 F.Supp.2d 965 (N.D.Ill. 2008). Two county inmates who were ordered released after being
found not guilty of the charges against them brought an action individually and on behalf of a class against a county
sheriff and county, challenging the constitutionality of a policy under which male inmates, in the custody of the Cook
County Department of Corrections (CCDC), were subjected to strip searches upon returning to CCDC after being
ordered released. The court found that potentially discharged male inmates, for whom there was no longer any basis
for detention, had a privacy interest with regard to strip searches which was arguably greater than that of pretrial
detainees. According to the court, the county's policy of strip searching all male discharged inmates in large group
settings in which inmates were placed at approximately an arm's length apart when searched violated the Fourth
Amendment. (Cook Co. Dept. of Corrections, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Collins v. Knox County, 569 F.Supp.2d 269 (D.Me. 2008). A female arrestee brought a § 1983 action against a county,
sheriff, and corrections officers, alleging an unconstitutional policy and/or custom and practice of conducting a strip
search and visual body cavity search of every person taken into custody at the jail. The district court granted summary
judgment for the defendants. The court held that the county did not have an unconstitutional strip search policy or
custom at the county jail, and that the sheriff did not acquiesce to a policy or practice of unconstitutional strip searches.
The court found that there was no evidence of an unconstitutional policy and/or custom and practice of conducting a
strip search and visual body cavity search of every person taken into custody at the county jail, as required for the
arrestee to establish a § 1983 claim against the county. The court noted that it’s prior determination in an unrelated
case, that the county maintained an unconstitutional policy of strip searching all misdemeanor detainees, concerned a
period several years prior to the time that the arrestee was detained. The court found that the strip search of the female
arrestee upon her admission to jail after self-surrendering on an outstanding felony arrest warrant was reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment. The search, in which the arrestee was required to run her fingers through her hair, extend her
arms out straight, open her mouth for visual inspection, spread her toes, lift each of her breasts, expose her vagina,
squat on her haunches with her back to the officer and, while squatting, cough violently several times, at which time
she expelled menstrual fluid, caused the arrestee humiliation and embarrassment. The court found that the search was
based on a drug charge in her inmate file, the fact that she made a planned admission to jail which provided the
opportunity to conceal contraband, and that she was going to be housed overnight at the jail, which had a problem with
contraband. The search was performed by a female officer in the changing area of the shower stall adjacent to the
booking area, which was mostly shielded from view by a plastic curtain. (Knox County Jail, Maine)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
NUDITY
STAFF OF
OPPOSITE SEX
SEARCHES

Graham v. Van Dycke, 564 F.Supp.2d 1305 (D.Kan. 2008). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against medical
providers working at a state correctional facility, alleging violations of her Eighth Amendment due process rights
arising from a strip search conducted by a male officer. She also challenged her mental health confinement. The
district court granted summary judgment for the medical providers. The court found that removal of the female inmate
from her cell into administrative segregation and removal of her clothing, after she became agitated and demanded
psychotropic drugs, did not violate her privacy or Eighth Amendment due process rights, even though officers who
performed such tasks were all male. According to the court, the inmate was on suicide watch, which required removal
of clothing to avoid self-injury, removal was done pursuant to established procedure and was videotaped, and a staffing
shortage rendered it impractical to include a female officer on the removal team. (Topeka Correctional Facility,
Kansas)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCHES

Hartline v. Gallo, 546 F.3d 95 (2nd Cir. 2008). An arrestee brought § 1983 and 1985 claims against a police department
and others alleging her Fourth Amendment rights were violated when she was subjected to a strip search. The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the arrestee appealed. The appeals court affirmed in
part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court held that there was no reasonable suspicion that the arrestee was hiding
drugs on her person as required to justify the strip search and the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity. The
court found that summary judgment was precluded by an issue of material fact regarding whether the jail's surveillance
system telecast the strip search. (Southampton Police Department, New York)

33.40
XXII

U.S. Appeals Court
OBSERVATION BY
STAFF

Henry v. Milwaukee County, 539 F.3d 573 (7th Cir. 2008). Female corrections officers brought a Title VII action
against a county, challenging a staffing policy that reduced the number of shifts available to them at a juvenile
detention center, and alleging other incidents of discrimination as well as retaliation. Following a bench trial, the
district court entered judgment for the county. The officers appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed and
remanded in part. The court held that a sex-based classification, requiring that each unit in the juvenile detention center
be staffed by at least one officer of the same sex as the detainees in the unit, was not reasonably necessary for the
rehabilitation, security, or privacy functions of the facility, with respect to the third shift when only one officer was
present on each unit. According to the court, the classification was therefore not a bona fide occupational qualification
(BFOQ), so as to be exempt from Title VII. The court noted that no staff-on-inmate sexual assaults had occurred, the
county had not investigated alternatives to same-sex staffing, juvenile privacy concerns were not limited to the third
shift, and the effectiveness of role-modeling programs did not require the presence of a same-sex staff member at all
times. (Milwaukee County Juvenile Detention Center, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
PRIVACY ACT
RECORDS

Jackson v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 538 F.Supp.2d 194 (D.D.C. 2008). A federal prisoner brought an action under
the Privacy Act against the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) and the United States Parole Commission, alleging that the
defendants failed to maintain accurate records regarding his sentence and criminal history, and refused to amend the
inaccurate files. The district court held that the BOP's inmate record systems were exempt from the Privacy Act's
access and amendment requirements and civil remedies provision. The court found that the Parole Commission's
decision-making files were also exempt from the Privacy Act's amendment provisions. The court held that the prisoner
failed to show that the Parole Commission willfully or intentionally failed to maintain accurate records. (Rivers
Correctional Institution, North Carolina)

U.S. Appeals Court
DNA- Deoxy
Ribonucleic Acid

Kaemmerling v. Lappin, 553 F.3d 669 (D.C.Cir. 2008). A federal prisoner sought to enjoin application of the DNA
Analysis Backlog Elimination Act (DNA Act), alleging the Act violated his rights under the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA) and the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments. The district court dismissed the action for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the
prisoner’s allegation that DNA collection burdened his free exercise of religion failed to state a claim under the First
Amendment and RFRA. The court found that the potential criminal penalty for failure to cooperate with the collection
of a DNA sample did not violate RFRA. According to the court, the collection of prisoner DNA furthers a compelling
government interest using the least restrictive means. The court also found that the DNA Act does not violate equal
protection despite the fact that it requires collection of DNA only from felons who are incarcerated or on supervised
release, rather than those who are no longer under the supervision of the Bureau of Prisons (BOP), where the BOP's
measure of control over supervised and incarcerated felons makes it significantly easier to collect their DNA samples.
The court noted that the extraction, analysis, and storage of the prisoner's DNA information did not call for the prisoner
to modify his religious behavior in any way, did not involve any action or forbearance on the prisoner's part, and did
not interfere with any religious act in which the prisoner was engaged. (Federal Corr. Institution, Seagoville, Texas)

U.S. District Court
AIDS-Acquired
Immune
Deficiency
Syndrome
HEALTH
RIGHT TO PRIVACY

Ringgold v. Lamby, 565 F.Supp.2d 549 (D.Del. 2008). An inmate filed a § 1983 action against a correctional officer,
alleging deliberate indifference amounting to cruel and unusual punishment based on the officer's alleged refusal to let
him leave his cell early to serve food and the officer's alleged discussion of his hygiene and HIV status with another
prisoner. The district court granted the officer‘s motion for summary judgment. The court held that the officer's alleged
discussion of the prisoner's hygiene and HIV status with another prisoner was only verbal harassment and therefore
could not be cruel and unusual punishment. The court noted that the inmate's right to privacy under the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibited the officer from making any statements to another prisoner about the inmate's hygiene and HIV
status, and the statements did not involve correctional goals or institutional security. The court found that the officer's
refusal to allow the inmate to leave his cell to serve a meal as a prison food worker was a good faith error and not cruel
and unusual punishment, where the officer thought that the inmate worked on a different crew. (Howard R. Young
Correctional Institution, Rhode Island)

U.S. Appeals Court
ATTORNEY-CLIENT
COMMUNICATIONS
TELEPHONE CALLS

Sherbrooke v. City of Pelican Rapids, 513 F.3d 809 (8th Cir. 2008). An arrestee sued a city and its police officers
alleging that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when officers recorded one side of his conversation with his
attorney. The district court entered summary judgment for the arrestee and the defendants appealed. The appeals court
reversed and remanded, finding that the recording of the conversation with the attorney did not constitute a search. The
court found that the police officers' recording of one side of the suspect's conversation with his attorney, pursuant to a
standard operating procedure of recording detainees who were awaiting a blood alcohol content breath test, did not
constitute a search inasmuch as the suspect could not reasonably expect that the conversation was private. The court
noted that officers were present when the call was made in an open room at the police station and the suspect
acknowledged that the recording was “fine” with him. (City of Pelican Rapids, Minnesota)

U.S. District Court
RECORDS
RIGHT TO PRIVACY

Smith v. Stanton, 545 F.Supp.2d 302 (W.D.N.Y. 2008). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action against a state, a
probation officer, a probation supervisor, and a county, alleging that his constitutional rights were violated in
connection with the inclusion in a state pre-sentence report (PSR) of certain confidential psychiatric records. The court
held that claims against the state were barred by the state's sovereign immunity. According to the court, the inclusion
of the records in the PSR did not violate New York statutes governing PSRs and did not violate the inmate's
constitutional right to privacy. (Chemung County, New York)

U.S. District Court
RIGHT TO PRIVACY
SEARCHES

Streeter v. Sheriff of Cook County, 576 F.Supp.2d 913 (N.D.Ill. 2008). Current or former pretrial detainees filed a class
action under § 1983 against a county sheriff and the county, challenging a strip search policy at the county jail,
alleging it violated their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court denied summary judgment for the
defendants. The court held that the detainees stated a claim for violation of their Fourth Amendment rights in
connection with group strip searches that were allegedly conducted in an unreasonably intrusive manner and went on
longer than penologically necessary. The court also found that the detainees stated a claim for violation of their rights

33.41
XXII

under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in connection with group strip searches that were
allegedly conducted in a manner intended to humiliate and embarrass the detainees, and that went on longer than
necessary. (Cook County Jail, Illinois)
U.S. District Court
CONFIDENTIAL
INFORMATION
SEX OFFENDERS

Swift v. Tweddell, 582 F.Supp.2d 437 (W.D.N.Y. 2008). An inmate brought a pro se § 1983 action against a sheriff,
deputies, and jail employees. The district court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court found
that jail officials did not act with deliberate indifference to the inmate's safety, in violation of the Eighth Amendment,
in connection with a corrections officer's alleged disclosure to other inmates that the inmate had been charged with
rape. The court noted that following the disclosure, the inmate spoke with a captain who agreed to, and did remove
another inmate who had allegedly taunted him about the rape charge from the inmate's housing unit. The inmate was
not harmed, or placed in imminent danger, as a result of the disclosure. According to the court, disclosure to other
inmates that the inmate had been charged with rape did not violate any of the inmate's privacy rights, since the
information was not privileged or otherwise protected, and the inmate was also a sentenced offender under the
authority of the New York State Department of Correctional Services. (Steuben County Jail, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
TELEPHONE CALLS

U.S. v. Conley, 531 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2008). After denial of his motion to suppress phone calls between him and an
inmate in a correctional facility, a defendant pled guilty in the district court to making a false statement to a
government agency. The defendant appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the inmate
consented to the monitoring of his phone calls with the defendant, and therefore no Wiretap Act violation occurred.
The court noted that the paperwork required to obtain a personal identification number (PIN) needed to place calls
required consent to monitor calls, the inmate had received his PIN, placards placed near telephones warned that calls
were subject to monitoring, recorded messages announced the monitoring of calls, and the inmate's conversations
indicated that he was aware his calls were being recorded. (Maine Correctional Center)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONFIDENTIAL
INFORMATION
TELEPHONE CALLS

U.S. v. Verdin-Garcia, 516 F.3d 884 (10th Cir. 2008). A defendant was convicted in district court of multiple crimes
related to drug trafficking conspiracy and he appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the defendant's
consent to the recording of his prison phone calls could be implied from his decision to use the prison telephone and
therefore the voice exemplars used from prison recordings were admissible in trial. The court noted that a prison
employee testified that prominent signs next to the telephones proclaimed “all calls may be recorded/monitored,” in
both English and Spanish. The defendant underwent orientation at the prison and received a handbook in his choice of
English or Spanish which stated that all calls may be monitored. When the defendant made phone calls, a recorded
message prompted him to select English or Spanish and then informed him in the language of his choice that all calls
were subject to being monitored and recorded. (Correctional Corp. of America (CCA), Leavenworth, Kansas)

U.S. Appeals Court
DNA- Deoxy
Ribonucleic Acid

Wilson v. Collins, 517 F.3d 421 (6th Cir. 2008). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against state officials
challenging the constitutionality of Ohio's DNA Act that required the collection of DNA specimens from convicted
felons. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The court held that collection of a DNA specimen pursuant to the statute was not an unreasonable search and
seizure and that the prisoner did not have a fundamental privacy interest in the information contained in a DNA
specimen. (Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES
VISITORS

Zboralski v. Monahan, 616 F.Supp.2d 792 (N.D.Ill. 2008). The wife of a civilly committed resident of a state treatment
and detention facility brought an action against facility employees, in their individual and official capacities, alleging
claims under § 1983 for violations of her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, as well as claims for invasion of
privacy and assault and battery, in connection with a series of searches the employees performed on her when she was
visiting a resident. The court denied the employees’ motion for summary judgment, in part. The court held that a
hearing was required in order to develop the record on the issue of the reasonableness of the searches. The court held
that summary judgment was precluded by fact issues as to whether the wife agreed to undergo a scan each and every
time she entered the facility, and as to whether one employee intentionally touched the wife's vaginal area during patdown searches. The court denied immunity to the employee and found that, as a matter of first impression, requiring
the wife to submit to a scan in order to visit her husband amounted to an unconstitutional condition. The facility
employed X-ray technology to conduct a body search of visitors. The court noted that questions to be addressed at a
hearing included how the machine actually worked and the quality of the images it produced, and how reasonable
persons would feel being subjected to such a scan. According to the court, to determine whether a body scan of a
prison visitor is akin to a pat-down or strip search, the key factor is the level of embarrassment and intrusion that the
visitor searched feels. (Illinois Department of Human Services' Treatment and Detention Facility, Joliet, Illinois)
2009

U.S. District Court
PRIVACY ACT
RECORDS

Brown v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 602 F.Supp.2d 173 (D.D.C. 2009). A federal prisoner filed an action under the
Privacy Act alleging that the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) deliberately and willfully did not maintain accurate
records and reports about gangs and gang members which caused him to be housed with inmates from whom he should
have been kept separate, jeopardizing his safety and resulting in serious physical injury from attacks. The BOP filed a
motion to dismiss, and the district court granted the motion. The court found that the Inmate Central Records System
maintained by the BOP was exempt from the amendment requirements and civil remedies provisions of the Privacy
Act; therefore, the federal prisoner could not sue the BOP for damages under the Privacy Act for information not
maintained or incorrectly maintained in the BOP's Inmate Central Records System. According to the court, the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) was not available to the federal prisoner to address alleged inadequate and
inaccurate record keeping by BOP, since BOP was not required to maintain accurate records. The court also noted that
suit under APA was not available to the prisoner even under a liberal construction of his complaint as a challenge to
the decision of the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) of where to house him, since the prisoner's place of imprisonment, and his
transfers to other federal facilities, were specifically exempted from challenge under APA. (Federal Bureau of Prisons,
District of Columbia)

33.42
XXII

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Bullock v. Dart, 599 F.Supp.2d 947 (N.D.Ill. 2009). Inmates filed a § 1983 action challenging the constitutionality a
county's policies of performing blanket strip searches on male, but not female, inmates returning to county jail from
court hearings at which charges against them were dismissed, and of providing privacy screens for female discharges
but not male discharges. After entry of summary judgment in the inmates' favor, the defendants moved for
reconsideration. The district court granted the motion in part. The court held that male inmates were similarly situated
to female potential discharges. The court found that fact issues remained as to whether the county's policies were
justified, and whether security considerations prevented the county from segregating inmates against whom charges
had been dismissed before they returned to their divisions. The defendants asserted that the much greater number of
male inmates in county custody and the differences in the nature and frequency of dangerous incidents in each
population justified the policy. The court held that the county's policy and practice of segregating female possible
discharges from the remainder of female court returns, such that female actual returns could elect to avoid strip
searches, but not segregating male possible discharges in a similar manner, was not gender-neutral on its face, for the
purposes of the Equal Protection Clause. (Cook County Department of Corrections, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
RIGHT OF PRIVACY
SEARCHES

Cox v. Ashcroft, 603 F.Supp.2d 1261 (E.D.Cal. 2009). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against the United States
Attorney General, several federal prosecutors, and the owner and employees of a privately-owned federal facility in
which the prisoner was incarcerated, alleging constitutional violations arising from his arrest, prosecution, and
incarceration. The district court dismissed the action. The court held that the prisoner did not have any Fourth
Amendment rights to privacy in his cell, and thus did not suffer any constitutional injury as a result of the search of his
cell and the confiscation of another inmate's legal materials. The court found that regulations at a privately-owned
federal prison facility prohibiting the prisoner from having the legal papers of another inmates in his cell did not chill
the prisoner's exercise of his First Amendment right to provide legal assistance to fellow inmates, thus precluding
liability on the part of the prison and its employees in the prisoner's § 1983 action alleging First Amendment
retaliation. The court noted that the regulations reflected a legitimate penological objective in regulating when and
where such assistance was provided. The court found that the prisoner lacked standing to bring a claim against the
warden of a privately-owned federal prison facility, alleging that paying the prisoner at a rate below minimum wage
violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The court noted that prisoners were not “employees” within the
meaning of FLSA. (Taft Correctional Institution, Wackenhut Corrections Corporation, California)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES
STAFF OF
OPPOSITE
SEX

Forde v. Zickefoose, 612 F.Supp.2d 171 (D.Conn. 2009). A federal prisoner petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus,
alleging that she was being denied freedom of religious expression, in violation of the First and Fourth Amendments
and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). The district court granted the government's motion for summary
judgment in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by issues of fact as to: (1)
whether the prisoner’s exercise of her religion was substantially burdened by the prison's non-emergency cross-gender
pat-down search policy; (2) whether the prisoner’s exercise of her religion was substantially burdened by the prison's
policy of requiring her to carry an identification photograph that showed her without a hijab to cover her head; and, (3)
whether the prisoner’s exercise of her religion was substantially burdened by the prison's failure to provide an imam
during Ramadan. The court held that the prison's non-emergency cross-gender pat-down search policy did not violate
the prisoner’s limited right, under the Fourth Amendment, to bodily privacy. According to the court, although the
prisoner made a sufficient showing of a subjective expectation of privacy, the expectation would not be considered
reasonable by society, since the prison had a legitimate penological interest in security and in providing equal
employment opportunities to both male and female staff, and no available further accommodation was reasonable
under the circumstances. (Federal Correctional Institution, Danbury, Connecticut)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Hunter v. Amin, 583 F.3d 486 (7th Cir. 2009). The sister of a pretrial detainee who committed suicide in a county jail
brought an action on her own behalf, and as the personal representative of the estate of her deceased brother, against a
jail psychiatrist, county sheriff, and the county, asserting claims under § 1983, as well as claims of medical
malpractice. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the sister appealed. The
appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The appeals court held that the county jail's policy that
prevented the pretrial detainee from speaking to the jail psychiatrist without a jail officer being present did not violate
the detainee's constitutional rights, so as to serve as the basis for holding the county liable for the detainee's death
under § 1983. According to the court, the pretrial detainee had a constitutional right to adequate mental health
treatment, but there was no evidence suggesting that the detainee could not have received adequate mental health
treatment in the presence of a corrections officer. The appeals court held that summary judgment was precluded by a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the jail psychiatrist committed medical malpractice by discontinuing the
medication of the detainee who later committed suicide. (St. Clair County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES
VIEW BY INMATES

Lopez v. Youngblood, 609 F.Supp.2d 1125 (E.D.Cal. 2009). Plaintiffs brought a class action against a county, sheriff,
and former sheriff, seeking injunctive relief and damages for alleged violations of his federal and state constitutional
rights resulting from strip and/or visual body cavity searches of detainees and inmates of the county jail. The district
granted summary judgment in part and denied in part. The court held that the policy of the county sheriff's office of
subjecting to strip search all pretrial detainees who are ordered released as a result of court appearances, upon their
return from the courthouse and prior to their being returned to the county jail's general population for administrative
reasons pending release, violated the detainees' Fourth Amendment rights. The court found that there was no evidence
that pretrial detainees at the county jail were subjected to strip searches in small groups as a means of punishment, as
required to establish that the strip searches violated the detainees' due process rights. According to the court, prearraignment arrestees were not similarly situated to post-arraignment detainees, such that the practice of providing
privacy for pre-arraignment strip and/or visual body cavity searches, but not for such searches of post-arraignment
detainees, did not violate equal protection, notwithstanding the contention that the interest in maintaining the privacy
of one's body cavities was the same for both arrestees and detainees. The court held that the defendants were entitled to
qualified immunity because, at the time the county sheriff's office maintained the policy allowing for group strip and
visual body cavity searches of post-arraignment detainees of the county jail, it was not clearly established that such

33.43

searches violated the detainees' Fourth Amendment rights. (Kern County Sheriff's Department, Central Receiving
Facility, Ridgecrest, Mojave, and Lerdo facilities, California)
U.S. District Court
PRIVACY ACT
RECORDS

Lynn v. Lappin, 593 F.Supp.2d 104 (D.D.C. 2009). A federal prisoner brought a pro se action against the Bureau of
Prisons director and a prison warden, alleging that the defendants used false and inaccurate records to willfully and
intentionally make adverse decisions concerning the prisoner. The district court dismissed the action. The court held
that the Privacy Act provided the prisoner's exclusive remedy, and that the prisoner could not maintain a claim under
the Act, where the Department of Justice (DOJ) had properly exempted the Bureau of Prisons' inmate central record
system entirely from the Act's access and amendment requirements. (Administrative Maximum Facility, Federal
Bureau of Prisons, Florence, Colorado)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Sanchez v. Pereira-Castillo, 590 F.3d 31 (1st Cir. 2009). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 claims against correctional
officials, a prison warden, a prison's correctional officer, and a physician, and medical battery and medical malpractice
claims against the physician, relating to strip searches, x-rays, rectal examinations, and exploratory surgery to detect
and recover suspected contraband. The district court dismissed the suit and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court
affirmed in part, vacated in part and remanded.
The appeals court held that the digital rectal examinations were not unreasonable where the procedures were the
direct culmination of a series of searches that began when a metal detector used to scan the prisoner's person gave a
positive reading, the prisoner had two normal bowel movements before the searches were conducted, a physician
examined him upon arrival at the hospital and found him to be asymptomatic, and several lab tests were found to be
“within normal limits.” The court noted that the searches were carried out by medical professionals in the relatively
private, sanitary environment of a hospital, upon suspicion that the prisoner had contraband, namely a cell phone, in
his rectum, and with no abusive or humiliating conduct on the part of the law enforcement officers or the doctors.
But the court found that the exploratory surgery of the abdomen of the prisoner was unreasonable where the surgery
required total anesthesia, surgical invasion of the abdominal cavity, and two days of recovery in the hospital. The court
noted that the surgery was conducted despite several indications of the absence of contraband, including the results of
two monitored bowel movements and two rectal examinations. According to the court, an x-ray, as a much less
invasive procedure, could have confirmed the results.
The court held that the prisoner's signed consent form for the exploratory surgery of his abdomen did not preclude
the prisoner's claim that he was deprived of his Fourth Amendment rights, where the prisoner was pressured and
intimidated into signing the consent, had been under constant surveillance for more than a day prior to the surgery, had
been forced to submit to searches, x-rays, and invasive rectal examinations prior to his signing the consent form, and
had twice been forced to excrete on a floor in the presence of prison personnel.
The court held that the prisoner's allegations against correctional officers were sufficient to allege that the officers
caused the hospital's forced exploratory surgery on the prisoner, as required to state a § 1983 claim against the officers.
The prisoner alleged that the officers were directly involved in all phases of the search for contraband and in the
ultimate decision to transport the prisoner to the hospital for a rectal examination or a medical procedure to remove the
foreign object purportedly lodged in the prisoner's rectum. According to the court, the prisoner's allegation that
correctional officers exerted pressure on hospital physicians that examined the prisoner was sufficient to allege the
state compulsion necessary to state a claim of § 1983 liability against a surgeon. The court found that correctional
officers' conduct, in forcing the prisoner to undergo an invasive abdominal surgery, was a violation of a clearly
established constitutional right, such that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 liability.
(Bayamón 501 Unit of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico Administration of Corrections, Río Piedras Medical Center)

U.S. Appeals Court
RIGHT TO PRIVACY
SEARCHES
STAFF OF
OPPOSITE SEX

Schmidt v. City of Bella Villa, 557 F.3d 564 (8th Cir. 2009). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action against a police chief
and city, alleging the chief's photographing of her tattoo violated her rights. The defendants moved for summary
judgment and the district court granted the motion. The arrestee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held
that the chief's photographing of the arrestee's tattoo was not an unreasonable search and did not violate due process,
and the photographing of the arrestee's tattoo did not amount to a strip search under Missouri strip search law. The
court found that the action of photographing the tattoo did not violate the Fourth Amendment, despite the fact that the
arrestee was required to unzip her pants for the photograph and that the photograph was taken by male officer. The
court concluded that the photograph served legitimate law enforcement purposes, the chief told the arrestee that
photograph was needed for identification purposes, and the photograph was taken in private. The court noted that the
arrestee gave a false date of birth and social security number. She was arrested for making a false declaration and for
being a minor in possession of alcohol. (City of Bella Villa, Missouri)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCHES

Serna v. Goodno, 567 F.3d 944 (8th Cir. 2009). A patient of a state mental hospital, involuntarily civilly committed as
a sexually dangerous person pursuant to a Minnesota sex offender program, brought a § 1983 action against a program
official and against the head of the state's Department of Human Services. The patient alleged that visual body-cavity
searches performed on all patients as part of a contraband investigation violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The
district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, and the patient appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The
court held that visual body-cavity searches performed on all patients of a state mental hospital, as part of a contraband
investigation following the discovery of a cell-phone case in a common area, did not infringe upon the Fourth
Amendment rights of the patient involuntarily civilly committed to the facility as a sexually dangerous person.
According to the court, even though facility-wide searches may have constituted a disproportionate reaction, cell
phones presented a security threat in the context of sexually violent persons, there was a history of patients' use of
phones to commit crimes, and the searches were conducted in a private bathroom with no extraneous personnel present
and in a professional manner with same-sex teams of two. (Minnesota Sex Offender Program, Moose Lake,
Minnesota)

33.44

U.S. District Court
RIGHT TO PRIVACY

Sital v. Burgio, 592 F.Supp.2d 355 (W.D.N.Y. 2009). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against corrections
officers, a hearing officer, and a deputy superintendent employed by New York State Department of Correctional Services (DOCS). The defendants moved for summary judgment on all claims, and the prisoner moved for summary
judgment on all but one of his claims. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The
court held that no evidence supported a finding that alleged false disciplinary reports were issued with a retaliatory
motive. The court held that the conditions of the prisoner's confinement in a drug-watch room, where he was held for
six days so that officers could examine his feces to see if they contained drugs, and during his nine-month stay in a
special housing unit (SHU) did not constitute violations of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishments giving rise to the § 1983 claim. According to the court, although the conditions were unpleasant,
evidence did not support a finding that the conditions were particularly severe, or that they jeopardized the prisoner's
health or safety. The court found that legitimate penological interests of maintaining prison security and discipline,
particularly concerning the suspected smuggling and possession of illegal drugs, outweighed any privacy right enjoyed
by a state prisoner, and thus the prisoner failed to state a § 1983 claim related to the prisoner being forced to defecate
in full view of other persons in the drug-watch room. (Attica Correctional Facility. New York)

U.S. District Court
OBSERVATION BY
STAFF
VISITORS

Sparks v. Seltzer, 607 F.Supp.2d 437 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). A psychiatric patient, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, brought a § 1983 action against a director and a treatment team leader at a psychiatric center in a New
York state psychiatric hospital. The patient was housed in an inpatient, long-term locked ward which normally houses
a mixture of voluntary patients, patients who have been involuntarily committed under the civil law, and patients
committed as a result of a verdict of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect or a finding of incompetence to
stand trial. The patient alleged violations of his First Amendment rights and his “zone of privacy” concerning a supervised visitation policy. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The court held that the psychiatric patients' speech during supervised visits at a state psychiatric hospital was not wholly unprotected by the First
Amendment, although the speech was casual and among family members or friends. According to the court, the reluctance of psychiatric patients in the state psychiatric hospital to discuss various matters within the earshot of a supervising guard during supervised visitation did not give rise to a cognizable injury to their free speech rights. The court
noted that no patient had lost privileges, had the term of involuntary hospitalization extended, or had otherwise been
punished or threatened with being punished for anything he or a visitor had said in a supervised visit. Patients were not
required to speak loudly enough to be heard, guards did not generally report the contents of conversations to hospital
authorities, and no sound recordings of the visits were made. The court held that the state psychiatric hospital's supervised visitation policy imposed upon patients did not invade their “zone of privacy” in violation of the Fourth Amendment, since patients had no reasonable expectation of privacy in a hospital visiting room which could be entered by
anyone during a visit and which was used by more than one patient at a time for visits. The court found that the supervised visitation policy did not, on its face or applied to patients, infringe upon their privacy rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment. (Creedmoor Psychiatric Center, New York)

U.S. District Court
OBSERVATION BY
STAFF
TELEPHONE CALLS

Walker v. Gomez, 609 F.Supp.2d 1149 (S.D.Cal. 2009). A prisoner brought an action against the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, alleging violations of their settlement agreement with the prisoner that resulted
from a prior complaint, discrimination based on race as a policy, and retaliation. The prisoner moved to enforce the
settlement agreement and for monetary sanctions. The court held that the prison officials' conduct of placing the prisoner under lockdown for a period of 10 days following incidents of riots and attempted murder was not a severe restriction on the prisoner's activities amounting to a breach of the terms of the prior settlement agreement. According to
the court, a prison counselor's conduct of staying in the same room as the prisoner while he completed confidential
calls did not amount to retaliation in violation of the settlement agreement. (Calipatria State Prison, California)
2010

U.S. District Court
MAIL

Akers v. Watts, 740 F.Supp.2d 83 (D.D.C. 2010). A federal inmate brought a civil rights action against various officials, employees, and agents of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), United
States Attorney's Office for the District of Kansas, and the United States Marshals Service (USMS) in their individual
capacities, alleging, among other things, that the defendants conspired to violate his constitutional rights by restricting
his communications with persons outside the prison. The district court granted the federal defendants motion to dismiss. The court held that it did not have personal jurisdiction in the federal inmate's civil rights action against the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) officials, employees, and agents, a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agent, a Kansas Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA), or the United States marshals, where the complaint made no allegations that
such defendants had any personal connection with District of Columbia other than their federal employment, and the
mere fact that the defendants were federal government employees, affiliated with agencies that were headquartered or
maintained offices in the District of Columbia, was insufficient to render them subject to suit in their individual capacities. The court held that restrictions imposed upon, and the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) interferences with, the correspondence of federal inmate, who had initiated fraudulent schemes from prison on more than one occasion and used
the mail in furtherance of his efforts, served a legitimate penological interest by limiting the inmate's ability to manipulate or swindle others, and thus did not violate the inmate's First Amendment rights. The court noted that the inmate
had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his non-legal mail, and therefore restrictions placed upon the inmate’s
correspondence following his repeated efforts to initiate new fraudulent schemes while incarcerated did not violate the
Fourth Amendment. (Administrative Maximum, Florence, Colorado, Federal Bureau of Prisons)

U.S. District Court
STAFF OF OPPOSITE SEX

Ambat v. City and County of San Francisco, 693 F.Supp.2d 1130 (N.D.Cal. 2010). Sheriff's deputies brought an action
against a city and county, alleging various claims including retaliation, and that a gender based staffing policy violated
Title VII and California's Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). Cross-motions for summary judgment were
filed. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants in part, and denied in part. The court held that
the sheriff's department policy that only female deputies would be assigned to female-only housing units was implemented to protect the interests that amount to the essence of the Sheriff's business, including safety and privacy, as

33.45

required to establish a bona fide occupational qualification as a defense to the deputies' claims of employment discrimination under Title VII and California's Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). The court noted that the policy was implemented to prevent sexual misconduct and inappropriate relationships between male deputies and female
inmates, to alleviate male deputies' fears of false accusations of misconduct resulting in a reluctance to supervise female inmates closely, which created opportunities for smuggling and use of contraband, and to prevent female inmates
from being required to dress and undress in front of male deputies.
The court found that the sheriff was entitled to deference in his policy judgment to implement the department policy
that only female deputies would be assigned to female-only housing units and in determining whether the policy was
reasonably necessary to achieve issues of safety and privacy and to ensure normal operation of the jails, as required to
establish a bona fide occupational qualification as a defense to the deputies' claims of employment discrimination
under Title VII and California's Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). The court noted that, despite not conducting formal studies or seeking consultation, the policy was based upon the sheriff's experience and observations
over thirty years as sheriff and conversations with senior officials and jail commanders over several months. The court
noted that suggested non-discriminatory alternatives to the sheriff's department policy, including cameras and additional training, were not feasible alternatives that furthered the objectives of safety, security and privacy. Installation of
cameras in the units was cost-prohibitive and did not address privacy concerns or the fact that misconduct took place
outside of the units, additional training would not eliminate sexual abuse since deputies already knew it was forbidden,
and there was no effective testing or screening method to identify deputies who might engage in sexual misconduct.
The court found that the fact that the deputy made statements to the National Academy of Arbitrators, alleging that
the sheriff was influenced by financial contributions and nepotism and that the sheriff's general counsel had engaged in
sex tourism was a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason to terminate the deputy under Title VII and the California Fair
Employment and Housing Act. (San Francisco Sheriff's Department, California)
U.S. District Court
NUDITY
SEARCHES
VIEW BY STAFF

Antonetti v. Skolnik, 748 F.Supp.2d 1201 (D.Nev. 2010). A prisoner, proceeding pro se, brought a § 1983 action
against various prison officials, alleging various constitutional claims, including violations of the First, Fifth, Sixth,
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court dismissed in part. The court held that the prisoner's allegations
were factually sufficient to state a colorable § 1983 claim that prison officials violated the Eighth Amendment by depriving him of needed medical care. The prisoner alleged that he was housed in segregation/isolation, leading to a
mental health breakdown, and: (1) that he was seen by mental health professionals eight times over a five year period
instead of every 90 days as required by administrative regulations; (2) that mental health professionals recommended
he pursue art and music for his mental health but that prison officials denied him the materials; (3) and that the officials' actions resulted in the need to take anti-psychotic and anti-depression medications due to suffering from bouts of
aggression, extreme depression, voices, paranoia, hallucinations, emotional breakdowns and distress, unreasonable
fear, and systematic dehumanization. The court held that the prisoner's allegations were sufficient to state a colorable §
1983 claim that he was deprived of personal hygienic items and sanitary conditions in violation of the Eighth Amendment, where the prisoner alleged he was regularly deprived of toilet paper and soap, that he was only allowed to
shower twice a week, that he was made to strip in dirty showers full of filth and insects, that the unit in which he resided was littered with food and urine and contained open sewers, and that he suffered illness as a result. The court
held that the prisoner's allegations were factually sufficient to state a colorable § 1983 claim for violations of his
Fourth Amendment right to be free of unlawful searches and Eighth Amendment right to be free of cruel and unusual
punishment. The prisoner alleged that whenever he was moved from his cell to any other location he was made to
stand in a brightly lit shower in full view of female employees, made to strip naked, place his bare feet on a filthy floor
covered in insects and scum, spread his buttocks, lift his penis, then put his fingers in his mouth without any opportunity to wash his hands, and that the process was unnecessary because inmates were in full restraints, escorted and
solitary at all times. (High Desert State Prison, Nevada)

U.S. District Court
NUDITY
SEARCHES

Chase v. District of Columbia, 723 F.Supp.2d 130 (D.D.C. 2010). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action for monetary damages against the District of Columbia and the operator of the District's Correctional Treatment Facility
(CTF), alleging violations of the Fourth, Fifth and Eighth Amendments, as well as invasion of privacy, while under
arrest, during interrogation, and while in jail and CTF. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the
motions. The court held that the District did not have a custom or policy that caused the detainee to be videotaped
while naked and changing her clothes in an interrogation room, thereby precluding the detainee's municipal liability
claim alleging that the videotaping was an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The court found
that the detainee had not been adjudicated of any crime and was not subject to punishment, thereby precluding her
Eighth Amendment claim. (Dist. of Columbia, Corrections Corporation of America, Correctional Treatment Facility)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES
VIEW BY STAFF

Jones v. Price, 696 F.Supp.2d 618 (N.D.W.Va. 2010). A male inmate brought a § 1983 action against a correctional
officer alleging that the officer violated his constitutional rights by requiring him to undergo a strip search in a nonprivate area in front of a female booking clerk. The district court denied the officer’s motion for summary judgment.
The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the correctional
officer conducted the strip search in a reasonably necessary manner. The court noted that the inmate’s right to keep his
genitals private from unreasonable exposure to members of the opposite sex was clearly established at the time of the
search. (Tygart Valley Regional Jail, West Virginia)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES
STAFF OF OPPOSITE SEX

McIllwain v. Weaver, 686 F.Supp.2d 894 (E.D.Ark. 2010). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action against a city, county,
and law enforcement officers challenging his strip search. The defendants moved for summary judgment, and the arrestee moved for partial summary judgment. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court
held that special circumstances justified the presence of a male sheriff's deputy during the strip search of the female
arrestee who was being booked into jail, and thus, the male deputy's presence during the strip search did not violate the
arrestee's Fourth Amendment rights. The court noted that the male deputy came to the cell in which the arrestee was
being searched only after the arrestee began physically resisting the efforts of a female officer to perform the strip
search, and the female officer called for help. The court found that summary judgment was precluded by genuine

33.46

issues of material fact as to what the county policy or custom was with respect to strip searches of arrestees, and as to
the adequacy of the county's training procedures for strip searches. (Sharp County Jail, Arkansas)
U.S. Appeals Court
SEX OFFENDERS

U.S. v. Sanders, 622 F.3d 779 (7th Cir. 2010). A defendant charged with violating the Sex Offender Registration and
Notification Act (SORNA) by traveling in interstate commerce without updating his sex offender registration, moved
to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that SORNA's registration requirement exceeded Congressional authority
under the Commerce Clause. The district court denied the motion. The appeals court affirmed, finding that SORNA
did not exceed Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause. (Mississippi and Wisconsin)
2011

U.S. District Court
VIEW BY INMATES

Banker v. County of Livingston, 782 F.Supp.2d 39 (W.D.N.Y. 2011.) A female patient brought an action against a
county and the company that provided court-ordered alcohol treatment and counseling services, alleging she was sexually abused by a counselor while undergoing treatment and counseling. The defendants moved to dismiss and the
district court granted the motions. The court held that the plaintiff's allegation that she was required to make unescorted
visits to a male area of the jail in order to receive alcohol abuse medication that was mandated as a condition of probation, did not state a claim of a constitutional magnitude as would give rise to the county's municipal liability under §
1983. According to the court, the county's alleged requirement that the plaintiff walk unescorted through portions of
the male population jail to receive her medication was not so outrageous as could give rise to the county's liability for
negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) under New York law, where nothing indicated that the plaintiff's
physical safety was threatened. (Livingston County Council on Alcohol and Substance Abuse, Livingston County Jail,
New York)

U.S. District Court
MEDIA
VISITORS

Battle v. A & E Television Networks, LLC, 837 F.Supp.2d 767 (M.D.Tenn. 2011). A wife who had unwittingly been
filmed by a television crew at a maximum security prison while visiting her husband who was an inmate there filed
suit against a television producer and a television network alleging defamation/false light and intentional infliction of
emotional distress (IIED) when the program was aired on the national television network. The defendants moved to
dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that, under Tennessee law, the
television program which aired on a national network depicting the wife visiting her inmate husband in a maximum
security prison, and which contained a voice-over explaining how drugs and contraband were passed to prisoners from
outsiders, was capable of a defamatory meaning, and thus the wife stated a claim for defamation/false light against the
television producer and the network. According to the court, the stream of audio and visual components interacting
with each other suggested that the wife was a drug smuggler, and even though the program indicated that a search of
the wife revealed no drugs, the overall impression was that the wife just happened not to get caught on that particular
day. But the court found that the actions of television producer and network were not so outrageous as to be beyond all
bounds of decency or utterly intolerable in a civilized community, as required to support claim for intentional infliction
of emotional distress, since the program could also be understood to suggest that the plaintiff had not brought drugs
into the facility. The program, “The Squad: Prison Police,” was aired by A & E Television Networks, LLC. (Riverbend
Maximum Security Institution, Nashville, Tennessee)

U.S. District Court
TELEPHONE CALLS

Bradley v. Mason, 833 F.Supp.2d 763 (N.D.Ohio 2011). State inmates filed a § 1983 action asserting multiple causes
of action pertaining to their convictions and conditions of confinement. The district court dismissed the case, finding
that class certification was not warranted, where the inmates made no attempt to define the class, many claims were
specific to named plaintiffs, and the plaintiffs were proceeding pro se. The court held that a pretrial detainee had no
reasonable expectation of privacy in telephone calls made from within jail to individuals other than his attorney, and
thus jail officials did not violate the detainee's Fourth Amendment rights by monitoring his calls to his former spouse.
The court held that the county inmates lacked standing to raise a claim that the county jail's lack of a law library
violated their due process rights, where the inmates did not claim that they attempted to exercise the right of selfrepresentation and did not otherwise have access to legal materials. According to the court, the county jail's removal of
its law library was rationally related to its interest in reducing expenses, and thus did not violate the inmates' equal
protection rights. The court noted “…because Plaintiff's claim for law library is not explicitly or implicitly guaranteed
by the Constitution, it is not a fundamental right. Therefore, the prison's policy need only bear a rational relationship to
a legitimate state interest.” (Cuyahoga County Jail, Ohio)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCHES
STAFF OF OPPOSITE SEX
VIEW BY STAFF

Byrd v. Maricopa County Sheriff's Dept., 629 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 2011). A male pretrial detainee, proceeding pro se,
brought a § 1983 action against a female cadet and a sheriff's department, alleging violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court entered judgment in favor of the defendants. The ruling was affirmed on appeal.
After granting a rehearing en banc, the appeals court reversed and remanded. The appeals court held that the strip
search of the male pretrial detainee by a female cadet was unreasonable in violation of the Fourth Amendment, where
the cadet touched the detainee's inner and outer thighs, buttocks and genital area with her latex gloved hand through
very thin boxer shorts, the female cadet moved the detainee’s penis and scrotum in the process of conducting the
search, the cadet wore only jeans and a white t-shirt without any identification other than a name printed on the back of
the shirt, ten to fifteen non-participating officers watched the search, and at least one person videotaped the search.
(Maricopa County Sheriff, Arizona)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL ISSUES
MEDICAL CARE

Davidson v. Desai, 817 F.Supp.2d 166 (W.D.N.Y. 2011). An inmate at a state prison filed a pro se § 1983 action
against prison officials and medical staff alleging that they had been deliberately indifferent to his serious medical
needs, and had interfered with his attempts to file grievances regarding his medical care, in violation of the First,
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The defendants moved alternatively for judgment on the pleadings and for
summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary
judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the state inmate's shoulder surgery, related to
his degenerative disc disease, was delayed because of the inmate's refusal to submit to a pre-operative chest x-ray, or

33.47

whether it was delayed due to the prison's deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. According to the court,
the inmate's allergies were not a “sufficiently serious condition” under the Eighth Amendment, and thus prison
officials' failure to provide the inmate with allergy treatment did not constitute deliberate indifference, where the
inmate had undergone allergy testing, allergy sensitivity injections were recommended, but when the inmate arrived
for allergy injections he objected to the fact that the injection serum had not been drawn into a syringe within his view
and refused the injections. The court also found that the inmate's breathing difficulties and possible asthma did not
constitute “sufficiently serious conditions” under the Eighth Amendment, and thus prison officials' failure to house the
inmate in a prison infirmary where levels of allergens were allegedly lower than levels in other parts of prison was not
deliberate indifference. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to
whether the inmate suffered serious health problems caused by exposure to environmental tobacco smoke (ETS), and
whether officials knew of, yet disregarded an excessive risk to the inmate's health.
According to the court, there was no evidence that prison officials' delays in providing the inmate with an updated
prescription to his corrective eyeglass lenses had resulted in symptoms which impaired his daily activities, as required
to support the inmate's claim against the prison for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The court noted
that the inmate was able to order glasses from an outside source, he made no claims that the lack of a proper
prescription had resulted in eye strain or headaches, and during the delay, the inmate was able to continue to research
and write in support of his legal actions. The court held that the state prison's sick call procedures, which required that,
prior to seeing a physician or nurse practitioner, the inmate discuss his medical issues with a nurse while in close
proximity to other inmates at sick call such that others were able to overhear medical concerns, did not violate the
inmate's right to privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court noted that the inmate's medical conditions were
not so unusual so as to provoke an intense desire to preserve confidentiality, nor would result in hostility and
intolerance from others if disclosed. (Elmira Correctional Facility, New York)
U.S. District Court
TELEPHONE CALLS

Hill v. Donoghue, 815 F.Supp.2d 583 (E.D.N.Y. 2011). An inmate, proceeding pro se, brought an action against an
Assistant United States Attorneys (AUSA) and the United States, asserting various claims under Bivens and the
Wiretap Act in relation to his jailhouse phone calls. The defendants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings,
which the district court granted. The court held that the AUSAs were entitled to absolute immunity from claims
relating to their use of the tapes. The but court found that an AUSA was not entitled to absolute immunity for ordering
the recordings, where the alleged order to make warrantless recordings of the inmate's jailhouse phone calls was
investigative, rather than prosecutorial, and therefore, the AUSA was not entitled to absolute immunity from the
inmate's Wiretap Act or Bivens Fourth Amendment claims. The court found that the inmate did not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his jailhouse phone calls, and therefore, the warrantless recording of his calls did not violate
his Fourth Amendment rights. The court noted that the jail telephones played a recorded warning that calls might be
recorded and monitored, and the inmate's use of a jailhouse phone after hearing the warning constituted implied
consent to the recording of his calls. (Eastern District of New York, Nassau County Correctional Center, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
PRIVACY ACT
RECORDS

Prison Legal News v. Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys, 628 F.3d 1243 (10th Cir. 2011). The publisher of a legal
journal brought a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) action against the Executive Office for United States Attorneys
(EOUSA), seeking disclosure of a videotape depicting the aftermath of a brutal prison murder and autopsy photographs
of the victim. The district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the EOUSA and the plaintiff appealed.
The appeals court affirmed in part and dismissed the appeal in part. The court held that: (1) the FOIA personal privacy
exemption for law enforcement records barred disclosure of the portion of the prison videotape depicting the victim's
body after the murder and the autopsy photographs; (2) the FOIA personal privacy exemption for law enforcement
records barred disclosure of a portion of the audio recording from the prison videotape; and (3) the public domain
doctrine did not override the exemption. (United States Penitentiary, Florence, Colorado)
2012

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDIA

Associated Press v. Otter, 682 F.3d 821 (9th Cir. 2012). A coalition of media corporations filed a § 1983 action
alleging that a state's denial of the right to witness all stages of executions violated the First Amendment. The district
court denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, and they appealed. The appeals court reversed and
remanded, finding that the plaintiffs were likely to prevail on the merits of their claim. The court held that the plaintiffs
were likely to prevail, gaining access to all steps in the execution process, beginning with the condemned prisoner's
entry into the execution chamber, through insertion of intravenous lines into his body, reading of the death warrant,
and pronouncement of death. The state's asserted interests in protecting the dignity of condemned prisoners and the
sensibilities of their family and fellow inmates, and in protecting the identity of medical team members who
participated in the execution. The court noted that the state already offended the dignity of condemned inmates and the
sensibilities of their families and fellow inmates by allowing strangers to watch as they were put to death, that medical
team members could wear surgical garb to mask their identities, and there was no evidence that the state was unable to
recruit and retain medical team members to participate in executions. (State of Idaho)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Gooding v. Ketcher, 838 F.Supp.2d 1231(N.D.Okla. 2012). A musician brought an action against a marshal of the
Cherokee Nation and a deputy county sheriff, sheriff, casino employees, county police officer, jail employees, and a
nurse, alleging false imprisonment, assault and battery, and violation of his First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment
rights, and seeking declaratory judgment that Oklahoma law governing flag burning and desecration was
unconstitutional. The musician had been arrested and detained at a local county jail. The defendants moved to dismiss.
The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the musician's allegations that his
use of an American flag during his performance at a casino was a constitutionally protected activity, that the county
sheriff failed to train his deputies as to the constitutional nature of the activity, and that the sheriff adopted an
unconstitutional policy and/or custom which led to the musician's arrest and imprisonment, stated a § 1983 claim
against the sheriff in his individual capacity as a supervisor for violations of the musician's First, Fourth, and
Fourteenth Amendment rights. The court found that the musician's allegations that the county sheriff was, at all times

33.48

relevant to the musician's claims related to his arrest and imprisonment, a commissioned law enforcement officer and
the duly-elected sheriff and chief policy maker for county sheriff's office, that the deputy sheriff was a commissioned
law enforcement officer acting as a marshal for Cherokee Nation and a deputy sheriff for the county's sheriff's office,
and that the deputy sheriff was acting as the sheriff's employee during events giving rise to the musician's claims, were
sufficient to demonstrate that the sheriff was responsible for the deputy's training and supervision, as required for the
musician's § 1983 inadequate training claim against county sheriff in his official capacity. According to the court, the
musician's allegations that the county had policy or custom that was the moving force behind the alleged violation of
the musician's First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and that the policy/custom encouraged the confinement
of the musician in response to his use of an American flag during a concert for allegedly expressive purposes, stated a
§ 1983 claim against the county sheriff in his official capacity. The court held that the musician's allegations that the
seizure and search of his person were unconstitutional because the underlying conduct for which he was seized was
legal and did not provide lawful grounds upon which to base his arrest and the subsequent searches of his person,
stated a § 1983 claim against the county sheriff in his official capacity. (Cherokee Casino, Rogers County Jail,
Oklahoma)
U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL ISSUES
NUDITY
RESTRAINTS

Gruenberg v. Gempeler, 697 F.3d 573 (7th Cir. 2012). A state prisoner, proceeding pro se, filed a § 1983 action against
various prison officials, guards, and medical staff, alleging violations of the Eighth Amendment. The district court
granted summary judgment for the defendants. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court
held that: (1) the prisoner did not have a clearly established right to not be continually restrained without clothing or
cover in a cell for five days following his ingestion of a handcuff key, the master key for belt restraints, and the key
used for opening cell doors, where restraint had been imposed to keep the prisoner from re-ingesting those keys; (2)
the continuous restraint of the prisoner without clothing or cover in a cell for five days did not violate his Fourteenth
Amendment due process rights; (3) the prisoner's Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment substantive due
process claims were barred; and (4) the district court did not abuse its discretion by ruling that the prisoner was
competent to advance his case and was not entitled to appointed counsel. (Waupun Correction Institution, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES
VIEW BY INMATES
VIEW BY STAFF

Knows His Gun v. Montana, 866 F.Supp.2d 1235 (D.Mont. 2012). Native American state prisoners brought an action
against a state, the state department of corrections (DOC), a private prison facility, and wardens, alleging violations of
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). Defendants filed motion to dismiss. The district
court held that: (1) the allegations were sufficient to plead the searches were a substantial burden on their religious
exercise; (2) the allegations were sufficient plead the confiscations and prohibitions were a substantial burden on their
religious exercise; (3) the allegations about relieving a prisoner from the pipe carrier position were sufficient to plead it
was a substantial burden on his religious exercise; (4) transferred prisoners did not have standing for claims for
injunctive and declaratory relief; (5) the private facility was a state actor; and (6) the private facility was an
instrumentality of the state. The Native American prisoners' alleged that the prison subjected them to en masse strip
searches before and after sweat lodge ceremonies, that the searches sometimes occurred in a hallway where other
inmates could see them and at least one occurred in a gym with video cameras monitored by a female guard, and that
some inmates declined to participate in the ceremony due to the degrading nature of the searches. According to the
court, the prisoners' allegations that sacred items were confiscated or prohibited by the prison for their sweat lodge
ceremonies, including smudge tobacco and antlers, and that the items were essential for the ceremony to be meaningful
and proper were sufficient to plead confiscations and prohibitions were a substantial burden on their religious exercise,
as required for their claims under RLUIPA. The prisoner also alleged that they were subject to pat down searches
before and after entering the ceremonial sweat lodge grounds, that they were provided insufficient water and toilet
facilities, that the size of the sweat lodge and the frequency of the ceremonies was inadequate, and that they were not
provided a Native American spiritual advisor. (Montana Department of Corrections; Corrections Corporation of
America; Crossroads Correctional Center)

U.S. District Court
MEDIA

Philadelphia Inquirer v. Wetzel, 906 F.Supp.2d 362 (M.D.Pa. 2012). A newspaper brought an action against the
secretary of a state department of corrections (DOC), alleging the First Amendment guaranteed the right to observe a
prisoner's execution without obstructions. The newspaper moved for a preliminary injunction. The district court
granted the motion. The court held that the historical practice in Pennsylvania indicated that the public and press
traditionally enjoyed a right of access to executions and that permitting the press to view an entire execution without
visual or auditory obstruction contributed to the proper functioning of the execution process. The court found that the
state's significant interest in protecting the identities of employees taking part in lethal injections did not outweigh the
newspaper's right of access to observe executions, and that the newspaper demonstrated that granting a preliminary
injunction would not result in harm to the state. The court noted that “… allowing the press to report on the entire
method of execution may promote a more informed discussion of the death penalty… and it may promote the public
perception of fairness and transparency concerning the death penalty, which can only be achieved by permitting full
public view of the execution…. Allowing the press to view the entire execution also provides significant community
therapeutic value, as well as exposes the execution process to public scrutiny.” (Penn. Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
DNA- Deoxy
Ribonucleic
Acid
RECORDS

U.S. v. Fricosu, 844 F.Supp.2d 1201 (D.Colo. 2012). A defendant moved for an order requiring that the DNA sample
taken when she presented herself to the United States Marshal for processing and any DNA profiles developed from it
be destroyed. The district court denied the motion. The court held that the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were
not violated when the sample was taken and was later furnished to the FBI for analysis and inclusion in a Combined
DNA Index System. The court noted that although a vast amount of sensitive information could be mined from the
defendant's DNA, the statute authorizing the taking of the sample specified for the limited purposes for which the DNA
profile could be used. (United States Marshal, Denver, Colorado)

33.49

U.S. District Court
MAIL

U.S. v. Ligambi, 886 F.Supp.2d 492 (E.D.Pa. 2012). A detainee who was charged with various crimes, including
racketeering, moved to suppress an outgoing prison letter seized by prison officials. The district court denied the
motion. The court held that the defendant, who was in prison while charged with various crimes, including
racketeering, did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his outgoing non-privileged mail. The court noted that
prison regulations permitted officials to seize correspondence when it might contain information concerning criminal
activities, it was established practice to inspect non-privileged mailings to promote discipline in the institution, and the
defendant had a reputation for involvement with organized crime. (South Woods State Prison, Southern State
Correctional Facility, New Jersey)

U.S. District Court
ATTORNEY-CLIENT
COMMUNICATIONS
TELEPHONE CALLS

U.S. v. Salyer, 853 F.Supp.2d 1014 (E.D.Cal. 2012). A defendant in a criminal prosecution moved to suppress
recordings of telephone calls he made while in pretrial detention, and the government moved for an order permitting it
to listen to and use the recordings. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that
most of the recorded conversations were not covered by attorney-client privilege, and conversations in which legal
advice was the predominate purpose were covered by the attorney-client privilege. The court noted that attorney-client
communication was not the predominate purpose of telephone conversations between defendant and attorney who was
a friend and who did not represent him in the criminal case. (Sacramento County Jail, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
NUDITY
VIEW BY STAFF

Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2012). A state inmate brought a pro se § 1983 action against prison officials,
alleging violations of his federal constitutional rights and Nevada laws. The district court dismissed the complaint with
prejudice pursuant to the in forma pauperis (IFP) statute, and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part,
reversed in part, and remanded with instructions. The court held that the humiliation that the state inmate suffered
during an alleged incident did not rise to the level of severe psychological pain as required to state an Eighth
Amendment claim. The inmate alleged that a correctional officer entered the inmate's cell while the inmate was on the
toilet and, while the inmate was still on the toilet, rubbed his thigh against inmate's thigh and smiled in sexual manner,
then left the cell laughing. The court found that the inmate sufficiently alleged a First Amendment retaliation claim
against a correctional officer and an associate warden by alleging that he engaged in protected conduct by filing
grievances against the officer and alleging: (1) that the officer and the associate warden took adverse actions against
him, including filing of a false disciplinary charge against him, placing him in administrative segregation, and telling
lies that resulted in denial of his parole, and (2) that such adverse actions were taken shortly after, and in retaliation for,
the filing of grievances, and that the adverse actions, which involved more than minimal harms, had no legitimate
penological reason. The court held that the inmate sufficiently alleged a First Amendment retaliation claim against a
correctional officer by asserting that he had filed grievances against the officer, who allegedly refused to give him his
breakfast, that the officer mentioned grievances during same interaction in which the officer refused to give the inmate
his breakfast, that the officer's conduct was retaliatory, and that the inmate also asked during the same interaction to
file an additional grievance about the denial of breakfast. (Nevada State Prison)

U.S. District Court
NUDITY

Woods v. City of Utica, 902 F.Supp.2d 273 (N.D.N.Y. 2012). A wheelchair-using, paraplegic arrestee sued a city,
police officer, a county, a former sheriff, and county corrections officers, bringing federal causes of action for violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act, and Fourteenth Amendment equal protection and due process. The arrestee alleged that he was lifted out of his wheelchair and placed on the floor of a sheriff's
van, forcing him to maneuver himself onto a bench seat which caused his pants and underwear to fall, exposing his
genitals, that he was not secured to the bench with a seatbelt, causing him to be thrown about the passenger compartment and suffer leg spasms during his ride to the jail, that he was forced to urinate into an empty soda bottle and handle his sterile catheter with his hands that were dirty from moving himself around the floor of the van, and that the
county corrections officers stood by as he struggled to maneuver himself out of the van and into his wheelchair while
other inmates watched. The city and county defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court held that: (1)
the city did not fail to accommodate the arrestee's disability, for purposes of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims;
(2) summary judgment was precluded by fact issues as to whether the arrestee was denied the benefit of safe and
appropriate transportation by the county on the day of his arrest when he was moved from a police station to a county
jail; (3) the county was entitled to summary judgment to the extent the arrestee's claims involved his transportation
from the jail to court proceedings on two other dates; (4) fact issues existed as to whether the county defendants were
deliberately indifferent to the paraplegic inmate's known medical need for suppositories every other day, in violation of
due process, but they were not deliberately indifferent to his need for catheters and prescription pain medication; and
(5) the county defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity. The court noted that while the county defendants
disputed the arrestee's version of the facts, corrections officers all denied receiving any training regarding how to
transport disabled inmates. (Utica Police Department, Oneida County Correctional Facility, New York)
2013

U.S. Appeals Court
RIGHT OF PRIVACY
OBSERVATION BY
STAFF

Arnzen v. Palmer, 713 F.3d 369 (8th Cir 2013). Patients at a state Civil Commitment Unit for Sex Offenders (CCUSO)
brought a § 1983 complaint against CCUSO administrators, challenging placement of video cameras in CCUSO
restrooms, and moved for a preliminary injunction to stop their use. The district court denied the motion as to cameras
in “dormitory style restrooms” but granted an injunction ordering that cameras in “traditional style bathrooms” be
pointed at a ceiling or covered with lens cap. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that CCUSO
conducted a “search” by capturing images of patients while occupying single-user bathrooms, and that CCUSO did not
conduct a reasonable search by capturing patients' images, thereby constituting a Fourth Amendment violation. The
appeals court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in issuing preliminary injunctive relief. The court
noted that the patients had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a single-person bathroom when there was no
immediate indication it was being used for purposes other than those ordinarily associated with bathroom facilities, and
that involuntarily civilly committed persons retain the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches
that is analogous to the right retained by pretrial detainees. According to the court, the facility did not conduct a
reasonable search of its involuntarily committed patients by capturing images of patients while they occupied single-

33.50

user bathrooms in a secure facility, thereby constituting a violation of Fourth Amendment, where the cameras did not
provide administrators with immediate alerts concerning patient safety or prevent assaults or dangerous acts, and less
intrusive methods were available for administrators to use to prevent illicit activities by patients. (Iowa Civil
Commitment Unit for Sex Offenders)
U.S. District Court
RECORDS

Brooks v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 959 F.Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013). A federal prisoner brought an action against the
Department of Justice (DOJ) alleging violations of the Privacy Act. DOJ moved to dismiss. The district court granted
the motion. The court held that a constitutional claim arising from alleged violations of the Privacy Act was not
cognizable. The court also found that the prisoner could not maintain an action under the Privacy Act seeking
reassessment of his custody classification by BOP and a designation to a lower security facility, based on alleged errors
in information in the presentence investigation report (PSI) that had been prepared in connection with his prior offense,
which BOP allegedly relied on in deeming him ineligible for designation to a lower security facility. The court noted
that BOP had exempted the Inmate Central Records System and the files maintained therein from the substantive
provision of the Act regarding its recordkeeping obligations. (U.S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Prisons)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES
STAFF OF
OPPOSITE SEX

Clay v. Woodbury County, Iowa, 982 F.Supp.2d 904 (N.D.Iowa 2013). A female arrestee brought a § 1983 action
against a city, an arresting officer, county, county sheriff, and jail officers, alleging, among other things, that jail
officers “strip searched” her without reasonable suspicion and in unconstitutional manner, and did so in retaliation for
her vociferous complaints about her detention and the search of her purse and cell phone. The defendants moved for
summary judgment, and the arrestee moved to exclude expert testimony. The district court held that the expert's
reference to an incorrect standard for the excessive force claim did not warrant excluding his opinions in their entirety,
although portions of the expert's report were inadmissible.
The court found that the incident in which male and female county jail officers forcibly removed the female
arrestee's under-wire bra and changed her into jail attire was not a “strip search” within the meaning of the Iowa law
which defined a “strip search” as “having a person remove or arrange some or all of the person's clothing so as to
permit an inspection of the genitalia, buttocks, female breasts or undergarments of that person or a physical probe by
any body cavity,” where there was no indication that the officers inspected the arrestee's private parts or physically
probed any of her body cavities. The court also found that the arrestee whose clothing was forcibly removed in the
presence of male and female county jail officers in a holding cell after the arrestee refused to answer questions during
the booking process and to remove her clothing herself, was not subjected to a “strip search” requiring reasonable
suspicion under the Fourth Amendment. According to the court, the officers did not violate the arrestee’s privacy rights
under the Fourth Amendment where the officers' reason for removing the arrestee's bra-- institutional safety-- was
substantially justified, and the scope of the intrusion was relatively small. The court also found that the officers were
entitled to qualified immunity from the female arrestee's § 1983 unlawful search claim, where the officers neither
knew, nor reasonably should have known, that their actions would violate the arrestee's privacy rights.
The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the amount
of force used by female county jail officers during the booking process to forcibly remove the female arrestee's underwire bra and change her into jail attire after the arrestee refused to answer questions, became disruptive, and refused to
remove her clothing herself, was reasonable. The officers allegedly threw the arrestee onto the cell bunk, causing her
to bang her head against the bunk or cell wall. The court found that male county jail officers did not use excessive
force, within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, in restraining the female arrestee in a holding cell after the female
officers had allegedly thrown the arrestee onto a cell bunk, causing her to bang her head against bunk or cell wall, in an
effort to forcibly remove the arrestee's clothing and to change her into jail attire. (Woodbury County Jail, Iowa)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
RIGHT TO PRIVACY

Cooke v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 926 F.Supp.2d 720 (E.D.N.C. 2013). Detainees who used wheelchairs and who were
civilly committed at a federal corrections facility as sexually dangerous persons filed suit, seeking injunctive relief
against the United States Bureau of Prisons for its alleged failure to accommodate their disabilities in violation of the
Architectural Barriers Act (ABA), the Rehabilitation Act, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), and the
First and Fifth Amendments. The government moved to dismiss and for summary judgment, and the detainees moved
for discovery and to deny the government's motions. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part.
The court found that although the detainees failed to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing suit under the
ABA, the detainees were not “prisoners” as defined by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) and thus did not have
to exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit. The court held that the detainees failed to state a claim for a
violation of the constitutional right to privacy. According to the court, even assuming that the detainees had a limited
constitutional right to privacy in medical treatment, the inmates alleged that the prison medical facility had no private,
wheelchair-accessible examination room, but did not allege harm from the use or disclosure of their medical
information. (Butner Federal Correctional Complex, North Carolina)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDIA
RIGHT OF PRIVACY

Doe v. Gangland Productions, Inc., 730 F.3d 946 (9th Cir. 2013). A former prison gang member brought claims of
appropriation of likeness, public disclosure of private fact, false promise, and negligent and intentional infliction of
emotional distress, against the producers of a documentary television series on gangs, alleging that the producers failed
to conceal the member's identity in the broadcast as promised. The district court denied the producers' motion to strike
the complaint under the California anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuits against Public Participation) statute. The producers
appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that the producers' actions
were in furtherance free speech rights, the producers' actions were connected with issues of public interest, the identity
of the former gang member was not a topic of legitimate public concern, the broadcast of the documentary series met
the public affairs exception to appropriation of likeness liability, and the producers had no legal duty not to reveal
private facts about the former gang member during the broadcast. (Gangland Productions, Inc. and A & E Television
Networks, California)

33.51

U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCHES
STAFF OF
OPPOSITE SEX
VIEW BY STAFF

McCreary v. Richardson, 738 F.3d 651 (5th Cir. 2013). A Muslim state inmate brought an action against a prison
captain in his individual capacity, alleging that the captain ordered an unconstitutional strip search and prevented him
from attending religious services in violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Person's Act (RLUIPA),
and the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court denied the inmate's motion for default judgment
and granted the captain's motion for summary judgment. The inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals
court held that: (1) the inmate was not entitled to monetary damages against a correctional officer under the provisions
of RLUIPA; (2) the strip search did not violate the inmate's Fourth Amendment rights; (3) a reasonable officer would
not know that a lengthy strip search in the presence of female officers violated clearly established law, and thus the
captain was entitled to qualified immunity; and (4) the captain did not act in an objectively unreasonable manner by
refusing to permit the inmate to attend a religious service after the search, where the inmate had created a disturbance
during the search. According to the court, the inmate’s potentially provocative questions in a public hallway
constituted a disturbance, where during the strip search, the inmate asked the captain why he was singling out
Muslims and subjecting them to harassment in a hallway with several other Muslim inmates who were waiting to
attend a religious service. (H.H. Coffield Unit, Texas Department of Criminal Justice)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES
TELEPHONE CALLS
VISITORS

Royer v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 933 F.Supp.2d 170 (D.D.C. 2013). A federal prisoner brought an action against
Bureau of Prisoners (BOP), alleging classification as a “terrorist inmate” resulted in violations of the Privacy Act and
the First and Fifth Amendments. The BOP moved for summary judgment and to dismiss. The district court granted the
motion in part and denied in part. The court held that BOP rules prohibiting contact visits and limiting noncontact
visits and telephone time for federal inmates labeled as “terrorist inmates”, more than other inmates, had a rational
connection to a legitimate government interest, for the purpose of the inmate's action alleging the rules violated his
First Amendment rights of speech and association. According to the court, the prison had an interest in monitoring the
inmate's communications and the prison isolated inmates who could pose a threat to others or to the orderly operation
of the institution. The court noted that the rules did not preclude the inmate from using alternative means to
communicate with his family, where the inmate could send letters, the telephone was available to him, and he could
send messages through others allowed to visit.
The court found that the inmate's assertions that the prison already had multiple cameras and hypersensitive
microphones, and that officers strip searched inmates before and after contact visits, did not establish ready alternatives
to a prohibition on contact visits for the inmate and limits on phone usage and noncontact visits due to being labeled as
a “terrorist inmate.” The court noted that increasing the number of inmates subject to strip searches increased the cost
of visitation, and microphones and cameras did not obviate all security concerns that arose from contact visits, such as
covert notes or hand signals.
The court held that the inmate's allegations that he was segregated from the prison's general population for over six
years, that he was subject to restrictions on recreational, religious, and educational opportunities available to other
inmates, that contact with his family was limited to one 15 minute phone call per week during business hours when his
children were in school, and that he was limited to two 2-hour noncontact visits per month, were sufficient to plead
harsh and atypical conditions, as required for his Fifth Amendment procedural due process claim.
According to the court, the inmate's allegations that he was taken from his cell without warning, that he was only
provided an administrative detention order that stated he was being moved due to his classification, that he was
eventually told he was classified as a “terrorist inmate,” that such classification imposed greater restrictions upon his
confinement, and that he was never provided with a hearing, notice of criteria for release from conditions, or notice of
a projected date for release from conditions were sufficient to plead denial of due process, as required for his claim
alleging violations of the Fifth Amendment procedural due process. (Special Housing Units at FCI Allenwood and
USP Lewisburg, CMU at FCI Terre Haute, SHU at FCI Greenville, Supermax facility at Florence, Colorado, and CMU
at USP Marion)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES
STAFF OF
OPPOSITE SEX
VIEW OF INMATES
VIEW OF STAFF

Shaw v. District of Columbia, 944 F.Supp.2d 43 (D.D.C. 2013). A former pretrial detainee, a transgender woman, who
underwent sex reassignment surgery and had her sex legally changed to female, brought an action against the United
States Marshals Service (USMS), USMS marshals, District of Columbia, a police chief, and police officers, alleging
under § 1983 that the defendants violated her Fourth Amendment rights in connection with her arrests, and asserting
claims under the District of Columbia Human Rights Act and tort law. The police chief, officer, and USMS defendants
moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The district court held that the
USMS marshals were not entitled to qualified immunity from the unlawful search claim, where a reasonable officer
would have known that a cross-gender search of a female detainee by male USMS employees that included intimate
physical contact, exposure of private body parts, and verbal harassment, all in front of male detainees and male USMS
employees, in the absence of an emergency, was unreasonable. The court also found that the USMS marshals and the
police officer were not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 Fifth Amendment conditions of confinement claim
brought by the pretrial detainee, arising from the defendants' actions in holding the detainee with male detainees and
otherwise treating her as if she were male. According to the court, a reasonable officer would know that treating the
female detainee as the detainee was treated exposed her to a substantial risk of serious harm, and, therefore, would
know that those actions violated the detainee's due process rights. (District of Columbia Metropolitan Police
Department, Sixth District Police Station and MPD's Central Cellblock, and United States Marshals Service)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCHES
VIEW OF INMATES
VIEW OF STAFF

Stoudemire v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections, 705 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2013). A female former prisoner brought an
action against the Michigan Department of Corrections (DOC), a warden, and other DOC-associated officers, doctors,
and nurses, asserting violations of § 1983, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), and state law. The
prisoner alleged that she underwent three separate amputations as a result of inadequate health care by the defendants
and was subjected to a strip search that served no legitimate penological purpose. The district court denied summary
judgment to the warden and a corrections officer on their qualified immunity defenses to the § 1983 claims against
them, and they appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The appeals court held that
the district court did not properly evaluate the warden's qualified immunity defense to the prisoner's Eighth
Amendment claim of deliberate indifference to her serious medical needs, when it denied summary judgment on

33.52

qualified immunity grounds to “defendants.,” The court held that remand was warranted for the court to conduct a
particularized analysis of whether the warden was deliberately indifferent to the conditions of the prisoner's
confinement while in quarantine. The court noted that the district court did not mention any facts in the record that
specifically pertained to the warden, nor did the court make any findings regarding the warden's knowledge or mental
state. According to the court, the prisoner established, for qualified immunity purposes, that the corrections officer
violated her Fourth Amendment rights by conducting a strip search of her in her cell in view of other inmates and
prison personnel. The court noted that the officer received a reprimand for violating Department of Corrections (DOC)
rules by conducting the strip search in view of those not assisting in the search, the officer allegedly refused to tell the
prisoner her reasons for initiating the search, and smirked during the search, which suggested personal animus and
implicated the prisoner's dignitary interest. The court found that the female prisoner's right not to be subjected to a
suspicionless strip search in full view of others absent a legitimate penological justification was clearly established, for
purposes of the female corrections officer's qualified immunity defense. (Huron Valley Women's Correctional Facility,
Michigan)
U.S. District Court
DRUG TESTING

Terbush v. Massachusetts ex rel. Hampden County Sheriff's Office, 987 F.Supp.2d 109 (D.Mass. 2013). An inmate
brought a state court action against the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, a medical doctor, a registered nurse, and a
physician assistant, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs and asserting claims under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act. The inmate alleged that his inability to provide a
urine sample while participating in a day reporting program, was due to an alleged “Shy Bladder Syndrome” condition
as well as subsequent medical issues following his return to a correctional facility. The day reporting program provided
home-based incarceration for selected inmates with the goal of transitioning them back to the community. Inmates
were still “incarcerated” but were allowed to live at home under strict reporting conditions, including drug testing.
When the inmate could not produce a urine sample upon his admission to the program, he was returned to jail. The
defendants removed the action to federal court, and moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the
motion. The court found that the inmate's alleged “Shy Bladder Syndrome” condition was not a “disability” under the
ADA, and even if the condition was a disability, the inmate did not meet the essential eligibility requirements for
participation in the program and, therefore, was not a “qualified individual with a disability” under the ADA. The court
noted that inmate had often refused to cooperate with medical advice, he received extensive medical care on practically
a daily basis, sometimes multiple times a day, the inmate failed to inform anyone at the facility of his urinary retention
until two or three days after returning to the facility, the inmate was sent to a hospital when he complained about his
urinary retention, and while the inmate did not see an outside urologist until approximately one month later, at that
point his medical issues were resolved. (Hampden County Sheriff's Department Day Reporting Program, Hampden
County Correctional Center, Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Vollette v. Watson, 937 F.Supp.2d 706 (E.D.Va. 2013). Former food service and medical care contractors who worked
at a city jail brought an action against a sheriff, who oversaw the jail, and sheriff's deputies, alleging under § 1983 that
their being required to undergo strip searches at the jail violated their Fourth Amendment rights, and that they were
retaliated against, in violation of the First Amendment. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district
court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine
issues of material fact as to what triggered the strip searches of contractors who worked at city jail, the nature of such
searches, and the factual predicate for revocation of the contractors' security clearances. According to the court, at the
time the contractors were strip searched, it was clearly established, for qualified immunity purposes in the contractors'
§ 1983 Fourth Amendment unlawful search action against the sheriff and sheriff's deputies, that prison employees did
not forfeit all privacy rights when they accepted employment, and thus, that prison authorities were required to have
reasonable and individualized suspicion that employees were hiding contraband on their person before performing a
“visual body cavity search.” The court also found that summary judgment as to the contractors’ claims for false
imprisonment and battery was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to what triggered the strip searches.
(Aramark and Correct Care Solutions, Contractors, Portsmouth City Jail, Virginia)

U.S. District Court
MEDIA

Von Kahl v. Bureau of Nat. Affairs, Inc., 934 F.Supp.2d 204 (D.D.C. 2013). A prisoner brought an action against a
legal publisher, alleging libel in summary of his mandamus petition published more than 20 years after his criminal
convictions. The court held that: (1) the publisher's statement that the prisoner “showed no hint of contrition” with
respect to the murders of deputy United States Marshals was actionable; (2) the prisoner was not “libel proof”; (3) the
prisoner was a limited purpose public figure, but the complaint alleged sufficient facts supporting a claim of actual
malice; (4) the summary did not falsely impute that the prisoner had been accused of a crime and thus was not libelous
per se; and (5) the prisoner pled sufficient facts showing special harm to support a claim for special damages. (Bureau
of National Affairs, Inc., Criminal Law Reporter, District of Columbia)

U.S. District Court
VIEW BY STAFF

Williams v. Community Solutions, Inc., 932 F.Supp.2d 323 (D.Conn. 2013). State prison inmates brought an action
against state department of corrections (DOC) officials and others, alleging that they were subjected to sexual abuse,
harassment, and threatening conduct at a residential reentry work-release program, and asserting both federal
constitutional claims and state law tort claims. The state officials moved to dismiss. The district court granted the
motion in part, and denied in part. The court held that the alleged sexual abuse, harassment, and threats perpetrated
against the state prison inmates by staff did not rise to the level of a deprivation of the inmates' Eighth Amendment
rights. According to the court, although staff allegedly stayed in the bathroom with inmates and watched them give
urine samples, touched inmates on their buttocks and genitals on a few occasions, and made inappropriate comments
toward inmates, such alleged conduct involved isolated incidents and was not sufficiently serious or severe to amount
to cruel and unusual punishment. The court found that the inmates failed to state a Fourth Amendment claim for
violation of their constitutional right to bodily privacy, absent an allegation of an invalid search or seizure.
(Connecticut Department of Corrections, Residential Re-entry Work-Release Program, Community Solutions, Inc.,
Bloomfield Connecticut)

33.53

2014
U.S. Appeals Court
VIEW BY STAFF
STAFF OF OPPOSITE SEX
OBSERVATION BY
STAFF

Ambat v. City and County of San Francisco, 757 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 2014). Current and former sheriff's deputies
brought an action against a city and county, alleging various claims including retaliation and that a policy prohibiting
male deputies from supervising female inmates in housing units of jails operated by the county violated Title VII and
California's Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). The district court granted the defendants' motion on gender
discrimination claims and denied the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration. The plaintiffs appealed. The appeals court
affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated in part, and dismissed the appeal in part. The court held that the county
was not entitled to summary judgment based on a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) defense, in light of fact
issues as to whether a reasoned decision-making process, based on available information and experience, led to the
sheriff's adoption of the policy such that the policy would be entitled to deference. The court also found fact issues as
to whether the policy of excluding male deputies because of their sex was a legitimate proxy for reasonably necessary
job qualifications. The court noted that the primary justification for the policy was to protect the safety of female
inmates by reducing the possibility of sexual harassment and abuse by male deputies, a secondary justification was that
employing male deputies in female housing pods posed a threat to jail security because of a threat of manipulation, a
tertiary justification was protecting the privacy interests of female inmates, and the final justification was promoting
female inmates' rehabilitation. (San Francisco Sheriff's Department, California)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES
STAFF OF OPPOSITE SEX
VIEW BY STAFF

Baggett v. Ashe, 41 F.Supp.3d 113 (D.Mass. 2014). A former female inmate and current female inmates brought a
class action against a sheriff and an assistant superintendent pursuant to § 1983, alleging that the policy of permitting
male officers to videotape female inmates being strip-searched violated the Fourth Amendment. The defendants moved
for summary judgment and the plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment. The district court granted the inmates’
motion and denied the defendants’ motion. The court held that strip searches of female inmates being transferred to a
segregation unit while male officers conducted videotaping in the vicinity were unreasonable in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, regardless of whether the officers actually viewed the inmates, where the inmate being searched was fully
aware that a male officer was videotaping her, the officer was within the inmate's view just a few feet away, the inmate
was required to strip and manipulate her body in the officer's presence, including lifting her breasts and spreading her
legs, and the videotaping by male officers was not limited to urgent situations. The court found that the policy did not
have a reasonable relationship with a legitimate penological interest, and therefore, the policy was unconstitutional in
violation of the Fourth Amendment as applied to the inmates, regardless of whether the officers actually viewed the
inmates. The court noted that the policy of using males to tape searches applied to all strip searches upon transfer, not
just emergencies, the prison did not have staffing problems, permitting males to tape the searches did not enhance
employment opportunities, and the policy did not provide for alternatives. According to the court, clearly established
law prohibited male officers from viewing female inmates during a strip search, and therefore, the sheriff and assistant
superintendent were not entitled to qualified immunity in female inmates' § 1983 class action. (Western Regional
Women's Correctional Center, Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
MEDIA

Brown v. Pepe, 42 F.Supp.3d 310 (D.Mass. 2014). An inmate, a convicted felon who was recaptured following escape
from custody, brought an action against a correctional facility officer and a state police trooper under § 1983 and §
1985 for violations of his Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights after the officer and trooper required him
to perform a “perp walk” in front the news media to be photographed following his recapture, and after the trooper
photographed himself with the inmate by taking a “selfie.” The trooper moved for judgment on the pleadings. The
district court granted the motion, finding that: (1) the “perp walk” did not violate the defendant's Fourth Amendment
rights; (2) the trooper's privately-taken “selfie” was a de minimis intrusion; (3) the walk was not cruel and unusual; and
(4) the walk did not affect a tangible protectable interest. (Dekalb County Jail, Georgia)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL ISSUES
MEDICAL CARE
RECORDS

Doe v. Beard, 63 F.Supp.3d 1159 (C.D.Cal. 2014). A state prisoner who was HIV-positive, brought an action against a
medical technician, the technician’s supervisor, corrections officers, and the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (CDCR), alleging violations of his right to privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause and the California constitution, based on the defendants’ failure to retrieve the prisoner’s medical file, which
had been delivered to another prisoner. The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court
denied the motion. The court held that the prisoner stated a § 1983 claim against corrections officers and a medical
technician for violation of his right to privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause by alleging that
they acted with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm when they failed to retrieve his medical file,
even after the prisoner explained that it had fallen into the hands of another prisoner and that he was receiving threats
based on his HIV-positive status. The court found that prison officials were not entitled to qualified immunity from the
prisoner’s § 1983 claim, where the prisoner’s right to medical privacy was clearly established and a reasonable prison
official would have been on notice that he or she could not violate the prisoner’s right to medical privacy without a
legitimate penological objective. (California Institute for Men)

U.S. District Court
VIEW BY STAFF
STAFF OF OPPOSITE SEX

Gethers v. Harrison, 27 F.Supp.3d 644 (E.D.N.C. 2014). A female employee of a county detention center brought
Title VII gender discrimination and retaliation claims against her employer after she was terminated for allegedly
being untruthful regarding a situation in which she was present while a male detainee on suicide watch used the
shower. The county moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion, finding that the employee
failed to demonstrate that she was meeting job expectations or that she was engaged in a protected activity. The
employee had been demoted for violating a detention center policy by being present while a male detainee on suicide
watch showered naked despite the presence of two male officers, and for extracting the detainee from his cell by
herself, creating a risk of danger. The court noted that the male detention officers who assisted male detainees on a
suicide watch to shower were not similarly situated to the female detention officer who was also present, under the
detention center's policy prohibiting officers of the opposite sex from being present while a detainee showered; the
court noted that the proper comparison would be a male officer remaining in a shower area while a female prisoner
showered, and there was no indication that such male officer would not also be punished. (Wake County Sheriff's
Office, Detention Center, North Carolina)

33.54

U.S. District Court
MAIL
FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS
INTERNET

Grenning v. Klemme, 34 F.Supp.3d 1144 (E.D.Wash. 2014). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action alleging that
prison officials and employees retaliated against him, in violation of the First Amendment, for the content of letters
and manuscript he authored, as well as his filing of grievances and a lawsuit. The district court granted the inmate’s
motion for a protective order. The officials moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part
and denied in part. The court held that the inmate's incoming mail from his creative writing instructor and his outgoing
mail to his mother were restricted by prison officials due to the legitimate penological interest of prohibiting inmates
from receiving or sending sexually explicit mail, and thus the restriction of the mail did not violate the inmate's First
Amendment rights. The court also found that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to
whether a correctional officer who screened the inmate's outgoing e-mail to his family and a correctional sergeant with
whom the screening officer shared the e-mail colluded to penalize the inmate for opinions expressed in the e-mail, and
as to whether the actions of the screening officer and the sergeant chilled the inmate's exercise of protected rights. The
court held that the correctional sergeant was not entitled to qualified immunity from the inmate's § 1983 claim that the
sergeant retaliated against him, in violation of the First Amendment, when he disciplined the inmate based on
disparaging remarks contained in the inmate's outgoing e-mail to his mother, where a reasonable official would have
understood that punishing the inmate for the unflattering content of personal correspondence directed to another was
unlawful. (Airway Heights Corrections Center, Washington)

U.S. District Court
DRUG TESTING

Meeks v. Schofield, 10 F.Supp.3d 774 (M.D.Tenn. 2014). A state prisoner, who allegedly suffered from paruresis, a
mental anxiety disorder that made it difficult to urinate without complete privacy, brought an action against the
Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Correction, its Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) officer, a
housing unit supervisor, a grievance board chairman, and a warden, asserting § 1983 claims for First Amendment
retaliation and violation of his right to privacy, and alleging violations of the ADA and Title VII. The defendants
moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the prisoner failed to establish
retaliation claims against the ADA officer, the housing unit supervisor, and the warden. The court found that the
prisoner, who was assisting other inmates with their legal work, was not engaged in “protected conduct,” as required to
establish a First Amendment retaliation claim against the housing unit supervisor, where the prisoner was not
authorized to help other inmates with legal work, and thus was in violation of department policy. According to the
court, the state prison's decision to remove exterior bathroom doors and refusal to put at least one door back to
accommodate the prisoner, who allegedly suffered from paruresis, a mental anxiety disorder that made it difficult to
urinate without complete privacy, was not intentionally discriminatory and did not violate the ADA. (Lois M. DeBerry
Special Needs Facility, Tennessee)

U.S. Appeals Court
AIDS- Acquired
Immune Deficiency
Syndrome
MEDICAL ISSUES

Nunes v. Massachusetts Dept. of Correction, 766 F.3d 136 (1st Cir. 2014). Prisoners with HIV brought an action
against the Massachusetts Department of Correction, a prison healthcare provider, and various corrections officials,
challenging the decision to dispense HIV medication only in single doses at the dispensing window, alleging violation
of the Eighth Amendment, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The district court
granted summary judgment to the defendants. The prisoners appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that:
(1) the prison's change in the method for dispensing HIV medication did not violate the Eighth Amendment; (2) the
requirement that prisoners obtain their HIV medication from the prison's dispensing window did not violate any right
to privacy; (3) the change to dispensing HIV medication only at the prison's dispensing window was not disparate
treatment; and (4) the prison offered a reasonable accommodation to a prisoner who claimed an inability to visit the
dispensing window by offering to move the prisoner to the prison's medical unit. The court noted that prison doctors
had raised concerns about a lack of privacy and whether prisoners would maintain their drug regimen, and the prison
delayed implementing the change to investigate those concerns, and found no evidence that the provision of HIV
medication from the dispensing window resulted in inadequate medical care. (Massachusetts Department of
Corrections)

U.S. District Court
INTERNET
EXPUNGEMENT
RECORDS

Taha v. Bucks County, 9 F.Supp.3d 490 (E.D.Pa. 2014). An arrestee brought an action against a county, a county
correctional facility, and companies that operated websites publishing mug shot and arrest information, alleging that
the defendants published his expunged arrest record in violation of Pennsylvania's Criminal History Record
Information Act (CHRIA), and that the companies violated a Pennsylvania statute prohibiting the unauthorized use of a
name or likeness and committed an invasion-of-privacy tort of “false light.” The company moved to dismiss. The
district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the arrestee's allegations that the
company selectively published his expunged arrest record and mug shot on its website in order to falsely portray him
as a criminal, and created a false impression regarding his criminal history and character, were sufficient to state a
“false light” claim against the company under Pennsylvania law. (Citizens Information Associates, LLC, Bucks
County Correctional Facility, Pennsylvania)
2015

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES
STAFF OF OPPOSITE SEX

Blanco v. County of Kings, 142 F.Supp.3d 986 (E.D. Cal. 2015). An arrestee brought an action against a county, city,
and county and city law enforcement officers alleging violations of her First, Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights under § 1983, stemming from an alleged cross gender strip search at a county jail. The defendants moved to
dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the female arrestee
sufficiently alleged that a male law enforcement officer's entering a room while she was still undressed following a
strip search at the county jail, in order to interrogate her further, and in absence of a compelling interest or emergency,
violated her right to privacy, as required to state claim under § 1983 for violation of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The court found that the officer’s conduct in entering the room was outrageous, willful, and
intended to cause her mental anguish that directly and proximately caused the arrestee severe and protracted emotional
distress likely to result in a “permanent disability,” as required to state a claim under the California law for intentional
infliction of emotional distress (IIED). (City of Lemoore Police Department, Kings County Jail, California)

33.55

U.S. Appeals Court
NUDITY
STAFF OF OPPOSITE SEX
VIEW BY INMATES

Chavarriaga v. New Jersey Dept. of Corrections, 806 F.3d 210 (3d Cir. 2015). A former prisoner brought a § 1983
action in state court against the New Jersey Department of Corrections (NJDOC), the former New Jersey Attorney
General, the New Jersey Commissioner of Corrections, a correctional sergeant, and various other correctional officers.
The prisoner alleged that the defendants violated her constitutional rights when they transferred her from one place of
confinement to another where they denied her potable water, clothing, sanitary napkins, and subjected her to an
unlawful body cavity search. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Attorney General,
Commissioner of Corrections, and correctional sergeant, and dismissed the remaining claims. The prisoner appealed.
The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded. The appeals court held that: (1) NJDOC’s
policies regarding custodial placements and the Due Process Clause did not give the prisoner a liberty interest in being
housed in a particular institution, as required to support a due process claim based on the prisoner’s transfers among
custodial facilities; (2) allegations that correctional officers deprived the prisoner of potable water were sufficiently
serious so as to reach level of an Eighth Amendment violation; (3) allegations that correctional officers forced her to
walk down a staircase and hallway naked in plain view of male prison personnel and inmates to reach a shower were
sufficiently serious so as to reach the level of Eighth Amendment violation; (4) allegations that she was denied her
sanitary napkins and medication for migraine headaches and menstrual cramps were sufficiently serious so as to reach
the level of an Eighth Amendment violation; and (5) the prisoner plausibly alleged that a correctional officer
maliciously searched her body cavities, as required to state a claim against the officer for using excessive force in
violation of the Eighth Amendment, where the prisoner alleged facts demonstrating that a cavity search was not
routine, that the cavity search was conducted in a manner that violated New Jersey regulations, and alleged that the
cavity search was so painful that during the search prisoner cracked a molar while clenching her teeth. The court noted
that a state has broad authority to confine an inmate in any of its institutions, and thus, courts recognize that a state’s
authority to place inmates anywhere within the prison system is among a wide spectrum of discretionary actions that
traditionally have been the business of prison administrators rather than of the federal courts. (Garrett House
Residential Community Release Facility, Edna Mahan Correctional Facility, New Jersey)

U.S. Appeals Court
DNA- Deoxy Ribonucleic Acid

Crabbs v. Scott, 786 F.3d 426 (6th Cir. 2015). An acquitted defendant brought an action against a sheriff in his official
capacity under § 1983 for violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, arising out of the sheriff’s requiring
him to submit to a cheek swab for a DNA sample before he could be released from jail, after he was acquitted of
felony charges by a jury. The district court denied the sheriff’s motion for summary judgment based on sovereign
immunity and the sheriff appealed. The appeal court affirmed, finding that the sheriff was generally considered a
county official and thus not afforded immunity as a state actor, and the sheriff was not required by state law to the
collect defendant’s DNA prior to releasing him from jail following his acquittal, and thus the sheriff was acting as a
county official and not entitled to immunity. (Franklin County, Ohio)

U.S. Appeals Court
VIEW BY STAFF
VIEW BY INMATES

King v. McCarty, 781 F.3d 889 (7th Cir. 2015). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a county sheriff and
two jail guards, alleging the jail’s use of a transparent jumpsuit during his transfer to a state prison, which exposed the
prisoner’s genitals, violated the prisoner’s rights under the Fourth and Eighth Amendments. The district court
dismissed the prisoner’s Eighth Amendment claim for failure to state a claim and granted the defendant’s motion for
summary judgment as to the Fourth Amendment claim. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and
remanded. The court held that: (1) the prisoner was required to direct his grievance to the jail, not the state prison, in
order to satisfy the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s (PLRA) exhaustion requirement; (2) the jail’s grievance procedure
was not “available,” within the meaning of PLRA; (3) allegations were sufficient to state a claim under the Eighth
Amendment; and (4) the jail’s requirement that the prisoner wear a transparent jumpsuit did not violate the Fourth
Amendment. (Illinois Department of Corrections, Livingston County Jail)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCHES
STAFF OF OPPOSITE SEX

Peters v. Risdal, 786 F.3d 1095 (8th Cir. 2015). A pretrial detainee filed a § 1983 action against a county, county
sheriff, and jail officers alleging that she was subjected to an unreasonable search, that her right to freedom of speech
was violated, and that the officers used excessive force. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment on the unreasonable search claim, and after a jury verdict, in the officers’ favor on the remaining claims, and
denied the detainee’s motion for a new trial. The detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the
officers did not violate the detainee’s Fourth Amendment rights when they forcibly removed her clothing in a holding
cell. According to the court, it was objectively reasonable for county jail officers to believe that the pretrial detainee
presented a risk of harm to herself if she was permitted to retain strings on her clothing, and thus the officers did not
violate her Fourth Amendment rights when they forcibly removed her clothing in a holding cell. The court noted that
the detainee refused to respond to medical screening questions, refused to comply with a female officer’s instruction to
change into an orange jumpsuit while male officers were outside the holding cell, and acted aggressively toward the
male officers when they entered. The officers restrained the detainee face down on her stomach and covered her with a
paper suit while the female officer removed her clothing. (Woodbury County Jail, Iowa)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCHES
VIEW BY STAFF
STAFF OF OPPOSITE SEX
VIEW BY INMATES

Story v. Foote, 782 F.3d 968 (8th Cir. 2015). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against four corrections officers for
violation of his Fourth Amendment rights arising from a visual body-cavity search that allegedly took place in view of
a female officer and other inmates, during which the officer allegedly called the inmate a derogatory name. The district
court dismissed the case and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the visual bodycavity inspection search after the inmate returned to the correctional facility from outside the institution did not violate
a clearly established right, as would preclude the qualified immunity defense, and the manner in which the search was
conducted did not violate a clearly established right. According to the court, such a search was not unreasonable
considering the serious security dangers inherent at a correctional institution and the institution’s strong interest in
preventing and deterring the smuggling of contraband into the prison.
The court noted that the manner in which the search was conducted did not violate the inmate’s rights. The inmate
alleged that a female officer observed the search on a video screen in a master control room, that the search was
conducted in the presence of other inmates, and that the officer called him a “monkey” during the search. According to
the court, there was a rational connection between the sex-neutral visual surveillance of inmates and the goal of prison

33.56

security. The court found that the staffing adjustments that would have been necessary to prevent the female officer
from viewing the search would have interfered with the female officer’s equal employment opportunities and burdened
the prison. The court noted that the inmate did not allege that a more private, equally secure, and cost-effective means
of conducting the search was available away from other inmates, and a single use of a term with potential racial
overtones was not unconstitutional race discrimination. (Williams Correctional Facility, Arkansas)
U.S. District Court
PRIVACY ACT
RECORDS

Vaden v. U.S. Department of Justice, 79 F.Supp.3d 207 (D.D.C. 2015), A federal prisoner filed suit under the Privacy
Act against the Department of Justice, seeking injunctive relief for the correction of alleged inaccuracies with respect
to the determination of his custody classification and security level. The prisoner sought damages. The Department
filed a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and the prisoner filed a motion for summary
judgment. The district court dismissed the action. The court held that the prisoner’s failure to exhaust administrative
remedies did not warrant dismissal under the provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), but the
prisoner’s custody classification and determination of security level were part of an inmate central records system that
was expressly exempt from agency obligations under the Privacy Act. (Federal Bureau of Prisons, United States
Penitentiary—II, Coleman, Florida)
2016

U.S. Appeals Court
SEX OFFENDERS

Belleau v. Wall, 811 F.3d 929 (7th Cir. 2016). A citizen, who had previously been convicted of second degree sexual
assault of a child but was no longer under any form of court-ordered supervision, brought an action against Wisconsin
state officials, alleging that a Wisconsin statute, requiring certain persons who had been convicted of serious child sex
offenses to wear global positioning system (GPS) tracking devices for the rest of their lives, violated his rights under
the Ex Post Facto Clause and the Fourth Amendment. The district court entered summary judgment in the citizen’s
favor. The appeals court reversed the decision. The court held that the statute did not violate the Fourth Amendment,
where the loss of privacy from the requirement to wear the device-- that the Department of Corrections used device to
map the wearer’s whereabouts so that police would be alerted to the need to conduct an investigation if the wearer was
present at a place where a sex crime was committed-- was very slight compared to the societal gain of deterring future
offenses by making persons who were likely to commit offenses aware that they were being monitored. According to
the court, the statute did not impose punishment, and thus did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. (Wisconsin
Department of Corrections)

33.57

33.58

XIX

XIX

XIX

XIX

XIX

XIX

various matters, delaying the inmate’s classification status upgrade and prohibiting him from participating in
further rehabilitation. (Rhode Island Department of Corrections)
U.S. District Court
LIBERTY INTEREST

Tanner v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 433 F.Supp.2d 117 (D.D.C. 2006). An inmate brought an action against the
federal Bureau of Prisons, alleging that his pending transfer to another facility would deprive him of participation
in vocational training programs. The inmate moved for a preliminary injunction. The district court denied the
motion. The court held that the inmate failed to demonstrate the likelihood of success on his due process claim, as
required to obtain a preliminary injunction preventing his transfer, where removal from programs did not
constitute an atypical or significant deprivation of the inmate's rights, nor did it affect the duration of his sentence,
as may have impaired his protected liberty interests. But the court found that the inmate demonstrated that he
would suffer an irreparable injury if injunctive relief were not granted, as required to obtain a preliminary
injunction, because the transfer was certain to result in the loss of access to an aquaculture program in which he
was employed, loss of pay grade and loss of eligibility for a cable technician program. (Federal Correctional
Institution Fairton, New Jersey, United States Penitentiary Leavenworth, Kansas)
2007

U.S. District Court
REHABILITATION

Banks v. York, 515 F.Supp.2d 89 (D.D.C. 2007). A detainee in a jail operated by the District of Columbia
Department of Corrections (DOC), and in a correctional treatment facility operated by the District's private
contractor, brought a § 1983 action against District employees and contractor's employees alleging negligent
supervision under District of Columbia law, over-detention, deliberate indifference to serious medical needs,
harsh living conditions in jail, and extradition to Virginia without a hearing. The district court granted the
defendants’ motion to dismiss in part and denied in part. (Central Detention Facility. D.C. and Correctional
Treatment Facility operated by the Corrections Corporation of America)

U.S. District Court
EQUAL PROTECTION
LIBERTY INTEREST
VOCATIONAL

Boulware v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 518 F.Supp.2d 186 (D.D.C. 2007). A federal prisoner brought a pro se
action against the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) and various BOP officials in their official and individual capacities,
seeking to compel them to provide the prisoner with some of the marketable vocational opportunities provided to
similarly situated offenders housed in other federal facilities. The defendants moved to dismiss and the court
granted the motion. The court held that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) claim. The court found that the prisoner failed to state a claim against individual BOP
officials. According to the court, the prisoner did not have a liberty interest to participate in vocational programs
of his choice as required to sustain a due process claim and the prisoner could not sustain an equal protection
claim. The court held that the BOP's failure to provide additional programs did not violate the prisoner's right to
participate in programs. According to the court, the unavailability of a program at a particular prison is not an
atypical deprivation of rights in violation of the due process clause, but rather merely leaves the prisoner with the
normal attributes of confinement. (United States Bureau of Prisons' Rivers Correctional Institution (“RCI”) in
Winton, North Carolina)

U.S. District Court
RELEASE
REMOVAL FROM
PROGRAM
DUE PROCESS

Gutierrez v. Joy, 502 F.Supp.2d 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). A pro se prisoner brought a § 1983 action against the state
and various state corrections officials in their official and individual capacities, alleging that the officials violated
his due process rights when he was removed from a temporary release program. The officials moved for summary
judgment. The district court granted the motion in part, and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment
was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether state corrections officials followed required
procedures governing state temporary release program hearings, specifically whether a prisoner participating in
the program received notice of the reasons for a Temporary Release Committee hearing and an opportunity to
reply to the charges against him before he was transferred to another location and removed from the temporary
release program. According to the court, the proceeding that was held in the prisoner's absence to determine his
status in the temporary release program, without an opportunity for him to speak on his own behalf, did not fulfill
the requirements of fairness and due process, and resulted in prejudice toward the inmate, notwithstanding the fact
that the prisoner was under investigation. The court noted that even if the facts of the case were undisputed and
made it clear that the prisoner violated the regulations of the program, the Temporary Release Committee retained
discretion to recommend that he not be removed from the program. According to the court, the short letter
provided by corrections officials to the prisoner could not cure any deprivation of due process resulting from his
absence from a hearing regarding his program status, as the letter did not afford the prisoner the ability to dispute
the claims against him pertaining to his alleged violation of program rules. (Fulton Corr’ Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act

Herman v. County of York, 482 F.Supp.2d 554 (M.D.Pa. 2007). The estate of a prisoner who had committed
suicide in a county prison sued the county, a warden, the prison health service, and nurses, asserting Eighth
Amendment claims under § 1983, claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and state medical
malpractice claims. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motions in part
and denied in part. The court found that the prisoner was not denied access to county prison's programs or services
because of disability, and any failure by the county and warden to prevent his suicide thus was not discrimination
in services, programs, or activities of a public entity in violation of ADA. The prisoner denied thoughts of suicide,
he told a nurse that he did not wish to take anti-depressant medications which had been prescribed for him, and a
nurse told him to return to mental health services if necessary. (York County Prison, Pennsylvania)

34.33
XXII

U.S. District Court
VOCATIONAL
TRAINING
INCENTIVES

Jackson v. Russo, 495 F.Supp.2d 225 (D.Mass. 2007). A prisoner brought a suit against prison officials claiming
that compensation and good time credits awarded to him for participation in a barber program violated his due
process and equal protection rights. The prisoner moved for summary judgment, and the defendants moved to
dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part as moot. The
court held that the prisoner had no constitutionally created right to conduct business while incarcerated or to
receive payment by the prison for services he provided to other inmates as part of a barber vocational program.
According to the court, Massachusetts statutes that authorize the corrections commissioner to provide for
education, training and employment programs and to establish a system of inmate compensation did not create a
protected property interest for inmates in any job or in compensation for a job, for the purposes of a due process
claim. The court noted that authorization was dependent on several contingencies, including appropriation of
funds, and conferred complete discretion upon the commissioner over programs. The court found that a rational
basis existed for differences in levels of compensation received by state prison barbers and kitchen workers in
prison vocational programs, based on difficulties in recruiting prisoners, hours, and the demanding nature of the
culinary arts program, such that the lesser compensation received by the prisoner enrolled in the barber training
program and providing services to other inmates did not violate equal protection. (Souza Baranowski Correctional
Center, Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
EQUAL PROTECTION
LIBERTY INTEREST
REQUIREMENTS
VOCATIONAL

Marshall v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 518 F.Supp.2d 190 (D.D.C. 2007). A District of Columbia prisoner
incarcerated in a federal facility brought a pro se civil rights action, seeking to compel the Federal Bureau of
Prisons (BOP) and its officials to provide him with the same marketable vocational opportunities it provided to
similarly situated District of Columbia prisoners housed in federal facilities. The prisoner was denied the
opportunity to participate in a heating and air conditioning technology program. The defendants moved to dismiss
and the district court granted the motion. The court held that the prisoner could not pursue a Bivens action against
individual BOP officials without seeking money damages. The court also found that failure to provide the prisoner
with the opportunity to participate in a vocational program did not violate due process because the prisoner did
not have a protected liberty interest in participating in the program. The court held that the prison program's age
requirements did not violate equal protection and that the failure of the BOP to allow the prisoner to participate in
a vocational program did not violate his statutory and regulatory rights. According to the court, the prison's
requirement that District of Columbia prisoners be between the ages of 18 and 25 in order to participate in the
program, was rationally related to a legitimate purpose of program, to prepare younger inmates for reentry into
society. (United States Bureau of Prisons' Rivers Correctional Institution, Winton, North Carolina)

U.S. District Court
RELIGION
REMOVAL FROM
PROGRAM

Monk v. Williams, 516 F.Supp.2d 343 (D.Del.2007). An inmate brought an action against a warden and a prison
administrator, alleging retaliation based upon his practice of religion. The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the defendants. The court held that the inmate's removal from a drug treatment program
would not have deterred a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his right to practice religion. The inmate
told responding officers that he had just finished praying and to let another inmate finish prayer, and thus his own
religious conduct was not disturbed. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), a prisoner must complete
an administrative review process in accordance with applicable procedural rules, including deadlines, as a
precondition to bringing suit in federal court. The court held that the inmate failed to exhaust all administrative
remedies before filing action because the inmate failed to appeal the prison administrator’s denial of his
grievance. (Howard R. Young Correctional Institution, Delaware)

U.S. District Court
EQUAL PROTECTION
PARITY-MALE/FEMALE
PARTICIPATION
VOCATIONAL

Roubideaux v. North Dakota Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 523 F.Supp.2d 952 (D.N.D. 2007). Former
and present female inmates of the North Dakota Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation filed suit alleging
that the department violated their equal protection rights and Title IX of the Federal Educational Amendments Act
by discrimination on the basis of sex. The female inmates alleged that the state provided female inmates, in
comparison with their male counterparts, with unequal and inferior housing, facilities, classification systems,
orientation programs, educational programs, vocational programs, work opportunities, and substance abuse
treatment opportunities. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court held that the
female inmates' placement at a women's correction and rehabilitation center, a contract facility to house female
inmates, was not based on a discriminatory statutory scheme. The court found that the prison industry programs
offered at the center were not “education programs or activities” as defined by Title IX. According to the court,
the vocational training offered at the center was not discriminatorily inferior to those offered to male inmates at
state facilities. The court noted that the availability and access to the restaurant management, heating and air
conditioning, auto technician, welding, carpentry, and food service programs is based on the location of inmates,
not on their gender. (Southwest Multi-County Correction Center, North Dakota)

U.S. District Court
REQUIREMENTS
SEX OFFENDER

Schnitzler v. Reisch, 518 F.Supp.2d 1098 (D.S.D. 2007). An inmate who was a practicing Jehovah’s Witness
brought a § 1983 action against a secretary of corrections, warden, and prison officials, alleging that a prison's sex
offender treatment program violated his religious beliefs by requiring his participation in explicit group
discussions of a sexual nature as well as viewing certain images. The defendants moved for summary judgment
and the district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the prisoner's First
Amendment rights were not violated by participation in the program, but the prisoner stated a claim for violation
of his statutory free exercise of religion under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA). The court held that the § 1983 claims against the secretary and warden were not based upon the theory
of respondeat superior. The court found that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact
as to the level of personal involvement of the warden and the Secretary of the South Dakota Department of
Corrections in the determination that no alternative form of sex offender treatment program should be provided to
the prisoner. (Mike Durfee State Penitentiary, Springfield, South Dakota)

34.34
XXII

2008
U.S. District Court
JUVENILES
TREATMENT
PROGRAMS

Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program v. Wood, 584 F.Supp.2d 1314 (M.D.Ala. 2008). A disabilities advocacy
program brought a suit against the director of the Alabama Department of Youth Services (DYS) seeking access
to residents, facilities, staff and records under federal law. The parties filed a joint motion seeking court approval
of a settlement. The court held that the limitations under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) on prospective
relief concerning conditions had no application because the suit was not concerned with conditions of
confinement or effects of actions by officials on confined juveniles. The court also found that the advocacy group
was not subject to the limitations on prisoner suits under PLRA. The court held that the settlement of the suit was
fair, adequate, reasonable and not illegal or against public policy, and thus warranted the requested court approval.
According to the court, the agreement contained a detailed plan for facilitating access, a process for dispute
resolution between the parties, and a provision for the court's retaining jurisdiction for one year for the limited
purpose of enforcing compliance. (Alabama Department of Youth Services)

U.S. Appeals Court
RELEASE
TREATMENT PROGRAM

Arrington v. Daniels, 516 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2008). Prisoners filed numerous petitions for a writ of habeas
corpus, asserting that a regulation implemented by the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) violated the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by categorically excluding prisoners convicted of offenses involving
possession, carrying, or use of firearms from early release for the successful completion of a residential substance
abuse program. The district court denied the petitions and the prisoners appealed. The appeals court reversed and
remanded. The court held that the regulation was invalid under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), since the
BOP failed to articulate a rationale for the regulation so as to provide a means for reviewing the reasonableness of
the agency's categorical exclusion of a class of nonviolent offenders from eligibility for early release. The court
noted that the BOP's general desire for uniformity in the application of the regulation did not explain why the
exclusion rule was promulgated, as the uniformity could have been accomplished in any number of ways.
(Sheridan Correctional Institution, Federal Bureau of Prisons, Oregon)

U.S. District Court
PARTICIPATION
REHABILITATION
RELIGION

Bader v. Wren, 532 F.Supp.2d 308, (D.N.H. 2008). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against the
commissioner of a Department of Corrections, alleging that a prison rehabilitation program violated the
Establishment Clause by improperly endorsing religion as part of the rehabilitative process. The parties crossmoved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The court held
that the rehabilitation program, Alternatives to Violence,” was not religious. According to the court, the state
prison's recommendation that the prisoner participate in a violence rehabilitation program did not constitute
coercive pressure advancing a religion, or excessive governmental entanglement in religion, as required to support
a finding that primary effect of recommendation was to advance religion in violation of the Establishment Clause.
The court noted that although the program was rooted in the non-violent philosophy of a certain religion, the
program was secular, not religious, given that nothing about the program promoted, advanced, or even subtly
endorsed that religion. The court found that program guides did not allude to, invoke, or call upon any religious
books, scriptures, passages or moral code, the program did not implement any cognizable religious practice or
methodology, and, notwithstanding the program's identification of a “Transforming Power,” the program was
explicitly individualistic, relying primarily on the participant's ability to change himself. (New Hampshire State
Prison)

U.S. District Court
RELIGION

Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Olson, 566 F.Supp.2d 980 (D.N.D. 2008). An organization that
opposed government endorsement of religion and its members brought an action against the state of North
Dakota, and officials from various state and county agencies, alleging that they improperly directed taxpayer
funds to the support of religion in violation of the Establishment Clause. The organization sought declaratory and
injunctive relief. The district court dismissed the case. The court held that the members of the organization lacked
standing to sue state officials and lacked municipal taxpayer standing to sue county officials. The court noted that
the action did not attack any legislative action or appropriation, but rather challenged the discretionary distribution
of funds made by executive branch officials carrying out their official duties. The suit challenged public funding
of the Dakota Boys and Girls Ranch that provides residential treatment and educational services to children
referred for treatment by North Dakota government agencies, including state correctional agencies. The ranch is a
publicly accredited Christian organization, and receives taxpayer appropriations pursuant to disbursement
programs authorized by the North Dakota Legislative Assembly. The organization alleged that allocation of public
funds to the ranch violates “the fundamental principle prohibiting government endorsement of religion by
disbursing taxpayer appropriations for the operation of a faith-based organization that includes the integration of
religion as an inherent component of services provided.” (North Dakota Department of Corrections and other state
and local agencies)

U.S. District Court
ADA-Americans with
Disabilities Act
DRUG
REMOVAL FROM
PROGRAM

Kula v. Malani, 539 F.Supp.2d 1263 (D.Hawai‘I 2008). A state prisoner brought a pro se civil rights complaint
pursuant to § 1983 against a substance abuse counselor, social worker, and prison officer, seeking monetary
damages and injunctive relief. The prisoner alleged that while incarcerated, the defendants violated his due
process rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The district court held that the prisoner's
termination from a prison drug rehabilitation program because he was found guilty of an administrative infraction,
rather than by reason of his drug addiction itself, did not constitute discrimination under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), notwithstanding the prisoner's contention that prison officials had fabricated misconduct
charges against him. The court noted that the prisoner had no due process right to participate in a drug
rehabilitation program under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). (Saguaro Correctional Center, Arizona)

34.35

U.S. Appeals Court
PARTICIPATION
RELEASE
REQUIREMENTS

Miller v. Whitehead, 527 F.3d 752 (8th Cir. 2008). Federal inmates brought separate § 2241 petitions for writs of
habeas corpus alleging that the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) unlawfully declared them ineligible for placement at a
halfway house. Following consolidation, the district court denied the petitions. The inmates appealed. The appeals
court affirmed in part and dismissed in part. The court held that the petitions brought by the two inmates were
rendered moot by their placement in halfway houses. The court found that the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) program
statement establishing a policy concerning when the BOP would place the inmate in a Residential Re-Entry
Center (RRC) did not conflict with a statute authorizing the BOP to designate the place of a prisoner's
confinement by categorically excluding a class of inmates from the opportunity to be transferred to a RRC more
that 11 to 13 months before release. According to the court, the plain language of the program statement allowed a
decision regarding RRC referral earlier than 11 to 13 months before release, at the time when most inmates would
have been serious candidates for such a transfer, and the program statement said only that the decision usually was
made no later than that time. (Federal Prison Camp, Yankton, South Dakota)

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
EQUAL PROTECTION
LIBERTY INTEREST
RIGHT TO TREATMENT
SEX OFFENDER

Patrick v. Raemisch, 550 F.Supp.2d 859 (W.D.Wis. 2008). A state prisoner brought a civil rights action under §
1983 against prison officials and employees, alleging the defendants violated his Eighth Amendment, equal
protection, and due process rights by impeding his access to discretionary and mandatory parole and to a sex
offender treatment program. The district court dismissed the case. The court held that the prisoner's claim
challenging the legality of his ongoing incarceration was not cognizable under § 1983. According to the court, the
prisoner did not have protected liberty interest in treatment programs or discretionary parole that would support
his due process claim. The court found that the prisoner's right to equal protection was not violated. (Racine
Correctional Institution, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
PARTICIPATION
SEX OFFENDER

Pentlarge v. Murphy, 541 F.Supp.2d, 421 (D.Mass. 2008). Detainees who had been civilly committed as sexually
dangerous persons (SDPs) under Massachusetts law brought a civil rights suit against officials seeking damages
and equitable relief against the enforcement of a policy requiring them to waive confidentiality as a condition to
receiving sexual offender treatment. The district court granted the officials’ motion to dismiss in part and denied
in part. The court held that the detainees stated a claim for declaratory and injunctive relief against the policy that
forced the detainees to choose between treatment and a waiver of the right against self-incrimination. The court
found that the officials were entitled to qualified immunity from liability for damages as they were not on notice
of the potential unconstitutionality of the waiver policy. (Nemansket Correctional Center, Massachusetts)

U.S. Appeals Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
VOCATIONAL

Pierce v. County of Orange, 526 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 2008). Pretrial detainees in a county's jail facilities brought a
§ 1983 class action suit against the county and its sheriff, seeking relief for violations of their constitutional and
statutory rights. After consolidating the case with a prior case challenging jail conditions, the district court rejected the detainees' claims, and the detainees appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded. The court held that injunctive orders relating to the county jail’s reading materials, mattresses and
beds, law books, population caps, sleep, blankets, telephone access, and communication with jailhouse lawyers
were not necessary to current the current and ongoing violations of pretrial detainees' constitutional rights. The
court found that an injunction relating to restrictions of detainees' religious rights based on security concerns was
narrowly drawn and extended no further than necessary to correct the violation of the federal right of pretrial detainees in administrative segregation. The injunctive order, with its provision for the curtailment or elimination of
pretrial detainees' religious rights based on security concerns, provided for no more than a minimum level of ongoing participation in religious activities. The court held that providing pretrial detainees housed in administrative
segregation only 90 minutes of exercise per week, less than 13 minutes per day, constituted punishment in violation of due process standards. The court found that an order requiring that inmates in administrative segregation
be permitted exercise at least twice each week for a total of not less than 2 hours per week was necessary to correct the current and ongoing violation. The court found that the county failed to reasonably accommodate mobility-impaired and dexterity-impaired pretrial detainees in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).
The county did not offer any legitimate rationale for maintaining inaccessible bathrooms, sinks, showers, and
other fixtures in the housing areas and common spaces assigned to mobility and dexterity impaired detainees, and
the county offered no explanation or justification for the significant differences between the vocational and recreational activities available to non-disabled and disabled detainees. Termination of injunctive orders requiring that
inmates be provided with seating while detained in holding cells, or elsewhere, awaiting transport to or from court
and requiring that inmates be given at least fifteen minutes within which to complete each meal did not constitute
an abuse of discretion since the treatment of detainees in the county's holding cells and the time allowed for meals
did not violate the detainees' constitutional rights. The court held that restrictions placed on use of the day room,
limiting administrative segregation detainees' use of the room to one or two inmates at a time, were reasonably
related to institutional security concerns. (Orange County Jail System, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEX OFFENDER
TREATMENT PROGRAM

Sain v. Wood, 512 F.3d 886 (7th Cir. 2008). A civilly-committed sex offender brought a § 1983 action alleging
that his conditions of confinement violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of some defendants and denied a motion for summary judgment based on
qualified immunity for the clinical director of a detention facility. The clinical director appealed. The appeals
court reversed and remanded. The court held that the district court did not commit plain error in assuming
implicitly that the clinical director was entitled to assert qualified immunity as a state actor. The court held that
the failure of the clinical director to transfer the offender to the newer, more comfortable and sanitary unit of the
facility did not amount to deliberate indifference, even assuming that the director knew of the allegedly poor
conditions of confinement that included cockroach infestations. The court noted that the director decided that a
transfer would contravene the offender's treatment objectives because the rooms in the new unit were double
occupancy. The court noted that the offender had refused to participate in sex offender treatment programs and he
had a history of sexual aggression with other inmates. (Joliet Treatment and Detention Facility, Illinois
Department of Human Services)

34.36

U.S. District Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
PARTICIPATION

Williams v. Hayman, 657 F.Supp.2d 488 (D.N.J. 2008). A state prisoner brought an action for violation of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), alleging denial of various social and educational programs and services
at a prison because he was deaf, and naming as a defendant the Commissioner of the New Jersey Department of
Corrections (NJDOC), the Executive Director of the New Jersey Parole Board, the prison's chief administrator,
the prison's assistant administrator, the prison's parole administrator, a corrections officer, two social workers at
prison, and the prison's psychiatrist. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants in part and
denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the prisoner's deafness inhibited his capacity to express his grievances comprehensibly in writing in accordance with prison grievance program's requirements. The court also found a genuine issue of material fact as to
the prison social worker's ability to interpret effectively, accurately, and impartially, both receptively and expressively, using any necessary specialized vocabulary. (South Woods State Prison, New Jersey)
2009

U.S. District Court
LIBERTY INTEREST
SEX OFFENDER

Gilmore v. Bostic, 636 F.Supp.2d 496 (S.D.W.Va. 2009). A state prison inmate brought an action against a probation officer, the state parole board, and state correctional facility employees, asserting that his constitutional
rights were violated by allegedly false information in his presentence report for a burglary conviction and in the
prison file which resulted in the inmate's classification in the state penal system at a higher level than was appropriate and in a sex offender designation. The district court held that: (1) the board was entitled to absolute immunity; (2) employees were not liable in their official capacities on claims for compensatory relief but the employees sued in their individual capacities were liable; (3) the inmate stated a violation of a protected liberty interest in parole release under the state constitution; (4) the inmate stated a claim under the state constitution for violation of a protected liberty interest in not being required to undergo sex offender treatment; and (5) the inmate
adequately alleged a physical injury required to recover for mental or emotional injury. (Kanawha County Adult
Probation Department, West Virginia Board of Probation and Parole, Huttonsville Corr. Center, West Virginia)

U.S. District Court
ADA-Americans with
Disabilities Act
PARTICIPATION

Kogut v. Ashe, 602 F.Supp.2d 251 (D.Mass. 2009). A state prisoner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
alleging that he had been discriminatorily excluded from work programs in which he could have earned good-time
credits, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The district court dismissed the petition, finding that the prisoner's alleged disabilities were not the reason for his exclusion from the work programs, as would
violate the ADA. The prisoner was excluded from the work programs because he had been the subject of over 30
incident reports for harassment of staff, fights with other inmates, and other disciplinary infractions, and several of
those incidents required the prisoner's segregation from general prison population. The court noted that disciplinary issues and concerns over prison security may be legitimate non-discriminatory grounds for limiting access to
a jail program. (Worcester County Jail, Massachusetts)

U.S. Appeals Court
ADA-Americans with
Disabilities Act
HANDICAPPED
PARTICIPATION

Mason v. Correctional Medical Services, Inc., 559 F.3d 880 (8th Cir. 2009). A state prisoner brought an action
against the manager of his prison housing unit and the director of prison medical services, alleging that they violated his Eighth Amendment rights by failing to facilitate or render adequate medical treatment. The prisoner also
brought an action against the Missouri Department of Corrections (MDOC), alleging violations of the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the director and the
MDOC. Following a jury verdict in favor of the manager, the district court denied the prisoner's post-trial motion
for judgment as a matter of law. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court found that recreational activities, medical services, and educational and vocational programs at state prisons are “benefits” within
the meaning of the ADA, and qualified individuals with a disability are entitled to meaningful access to such benefits. The court held that the blind prisoner was provided with meaningful access to prison benefits, including
library benefits, which required him to read and write, as required by the ADA. According to the court, given the
sufficiency of the accommodations provided, the prison was not required to provide alternative accommodations
such as Braille materials or computer software that would read written materials aloud. The prisoner was provided
with an inmate reader, who was available to read to the prisoner in person and to create audio tapes of written
material at the prisoner's request. The prisoner was also granted access to audio materials by mail and to a tape
recorder. The court held that the prison did not deny the blind prisoner meaningful access to prison facility benefits, in violation of the ADA, when it did not provide the prisoner with a trained outside assistant capable of assisting him in his day-to-day activities. The prisoner was provided with an inmate assistant, and the court found
that it would be unduly burdensome to require the prison to furnish the prisoner with a trained handler from outside the prison, given that such a person would not be trained in safety and security matters, and would require the
escort of a prison guard at all times. The court found that the prison did not deprive the blind prisoner of meaningful access to the prison's exercise and recreation facilities, in violation of the ADA, where the prison provided the
inmate an assistant who walked with the prisoner, and the prisoner chose not to engage in other activities, such as
weightlifting. According to the court, the prisoner was not denied meaningful access to his prison housing unit's
ADA compliance officer, in violation of the ADA. The prisoner knew the identity of the ADA compliance officer,
the officer had answered requests that the prisoner submitted and had not refused the prisoner's requests for assistance, and the prisoner was not entitled to a general disability assessment. (Northeast Correctional Center, Mo.)

U.S. District Court
ALCOHOL/DRUGS
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
EQUAL PROTECTION
PARTICIPATION

Phipps v. Sheriff of Cook County, 681 F.Supp.2d 899 (N.D.Ill. 2009). Paraplegic and partially-paralyzed pretrial
detainees currently and formerly housed at a county prison brought a class action against the county and county
sheriff, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act. The parties
cross-moved for summary judgment. The district court denied the motions for summary judgment. The court held
that the sheriff waived the affirmative defense that the plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies, as
required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), where the sheriff raised that defense for the first time in his
motion for summary judgment. The court held that paraplegic and partially-paralyzed pretrial detainees who were
formerly housed at the county prison were not “prisoners confined in jail” for the purposes of the Prison Litigation

34.37

Reform Act (PLRA), and thus their civil rights claims were not subject to, or barred by, PLRA.
The court held that the pretrial detainees adequately alleged discrimination based on the prison's failure to
provide wheelchair-accessible bathroom facilities. According to the court, the detainees met the PLRA physical
injury required. In addition to alleging mental and emotional harm, the detainees complained of bed sores, infections, and injuries resulting from falling to the ground from their wheelchairs and toilets, which were undeniably
physical injuries. According to the court, the county and county sheriff failed to establish that they were not recipients of federal funds, as would render them beyond the reach of the Rehabilitation Act's requirements.
The court held that county prison facilities to which the paraplegic and partially-paralyzed pretrial detainees
claimed to have been denied access--showers, toilets, and sinks--were “services” and “programs” within the
meaning of Title II of ADA, which forbade discrimination against persons with disabilities in the area of public
services, programs, and activities. The court found that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of
material fact as to whether the paraplegic and partially-paralyzed pretrial detainees were intentionally discriminated against, and as to whether modifications to county prison facilities requested by the detainees were reasonable. The court found no evidence that the detainees were excluded from electronic monitoring or drug
rehabilitation programs by the county department of corrections, as would support their Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) claim. (Cook County Department of Corrections, Illinois)
U.S. Appeals Court
EQUAL PROTECTION
VOCATIONAL
WORK/STUDY

Roubideaux v. North Dakota Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 570 F.3d 966 (8th Cir. 2009). North Dakota
prison inmates, representing a certified class of female inmates, brought a sex discrimination suit under § 1983
and Title IX, alleging that a state prison system provided them with unequal programs and facilities as compared
to male inmates. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the inmates
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that North Dakota's gender-explicit statutes, allowing the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to place female inmates in county jails and allowing the Department
to place female inmates in “grade one correctional facilities” for more than one year, was substantially related to
the important governmental objective of providing adequate segregated housing for female inmates, and thus the
statutes were facially valid under heightened equal protection review. According to the court, even if the decision
to house them at the women’s center was based on economic concerns, where the female prison population as a
whole was much smaller than the male population, sufficient space to house the female prisoners was becoming
an issue as the entire prison population increased. Female inmates were in need of a separate facility to better
meet their needs, and statutes expressly required the Department to contract with county facilities that had
adequate space and the ability to provide appropriate level of services and programs for female inmates. The court
held that the female inmates, by expressing an assertion before the district court that they were not challenging the
programming decisions made by Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation upon transfer to county jails for
housing, abandoned an “as-applied” challenge to the gender-explicit statutes facilitating such transfers.
The court held that North Dakota's “prison industries” program offered at a women's correction and
rehabilitation center, under contract between several counties and the state, was not an “educational program”
subject to Title IX protections, even though the program provided on-the-job training. The court noted that the
program was primarily an inmate work or employment program, providing female inmates with paying jobs and
enabling them to make purchases, pay restitution, or support their families, and the contract between the counties
and state distinctly separated inmate employment and educational programs. According to the court, vocational
training offered at the center was not discriminatorily inferior to those offered to male inmates at state facilities, as
required for a claim under Title IX. Although locational differences existed, like male inmates, female inmates
had access to a welding class and classes in basic parenting, social skills, speech, and healthy lifestyles.
(Southwest Multi-County Correctional Center, North Dakota)

U.S. District Court
CRISIS INTERVENTION

Vann v. Vandenbrook, 596 F.Supp.2d 1238 (.D.Wis. 2009). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a crisis
intervention worker, registered nurse, and several corrections officers, alleging deliberate indifference to a serious
medical need in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The prisoner moved to proceed in forma pauperis and for the
appointment of counsel. The district court granted the motion to proceed in part and denied in part, and denied the
motion for appointment of counsel. The court held that the prisoner stated a § 1983 claim against the intervention
worker and the unknown officer where they were aware of the prisoner's suicide risk when the worker refused to
place the prisoner in an observation program and the officer provided the prisoner with a razor and a nail clipper
and left the prisoner unattended. The court found that the registered nurse's failure to provide treatment to the
prisoner constituted deliberate indifference to the prisoner's serious medical needs, as required for the prisoner to
state a § 1983 claim for violation of the Eighth Amendment, where the prisoner had sustained 133 self-inflicted
wounds that were bleeding and the nurse merely inspected his wounds. According to the court, the corrections
officers who performed an emergency cell extraction of the prisoner following his suicide attempt, transported
him to a day room where the prison's registered nurse performed an inspection of the prisoner's wounds, thus
precluding the prisoner's § 1983 claim against the officer for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs
in violation of Eighth Amendment. (Columbia Correctional Institution, Wisconsin)
2010

U.S. District Court
ADA-Americans with
Disabilities Act
PARTICIPATION
WORK/STUDY

Castle v. Eurofresh, Inc., 734 F.Supp.2d 938 (D.Ariz. 2010). A state prisoner brought a pro se action against a
state, department of corrections, its current and former directors, and a company to which his services were
contracted while in prison, asserting claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation
Act, and the Arizona Civil Rights Act (ACRA). The court held that the state, the department of corrections, and its
current and former directors had Eleventh Amendment immunity as to the prisoner's ADA disability
discrimination claims relating to the tomato picking he performed for a private business through a prison program.
The court found that the prisoner stated a claim under Title II of the ADA. Americans with Disabilities Act with
allegations that: (1) the prison program under which prisoners picked tomatoes for a private business offered six
times the wages paid for other prison jobs, as well as bonuses, and job skills not otherwise available; (2) that

34.38

because of his disability, he was denied access to the program and the ability to obtain the benefits; and (3) that
prison and state officials intentionally discriminated against him by denying and ignoring his requests for
accommodations. The court found that the private company that contracted with the state prison for prisoners to
perform tomato picking on behalf of the company was not a “public entity” and, thus, it was not subject to Title II
of the ADA. According to the court, the prisoner's allegations that state, prison, and state officials received direct
federal financial assistance and therefore his claim stated a Rehabilitation Act claim against the state and these
officials. The court found that the prisoner's allegation that the private company that contracted with the state
prison for prisoners to perform tomato picking on behalf of the company received an indirect financial benefit and
competitive advantage from paying lower wages, was too vague and conclusory, as well as implausible, to satisfy
the short and plain statement requirement for stating a claim that the company violated the Rehabilitation Act.
(Arizona Department of Corrections, Arizona Correctional Industries, Eurofresh)
U.S. District Court
HANDICAPPED
EQUAL PROTECTION

Clark v. California, 739 F.Supp.2d 1168 (N.D.Cal. 2010). The state of California, Governor and various state
prison officials filed a motion pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) to terminate the prospective
relief in a 2001 settlement agreement and an order that required them to comply with a remedial plan designed to
ensure that California prisoners with developmental disabilities were protected from serious injury and
discrimination on the basis of their disability. Developmentally disabled prisoners moved for enforcement of, and
further relief under, the settlement agreement and order. The court held that for the purposes of a motion pursuant
to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), testimony from a few prison staff members at individual prisons did
not prove systemic compliance with the remedial plan. The court held that termination of the settlement
agreement and order entered pursuant to Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) was unwarranted since the state
defendants failed to carry their burden to show the absence of current and ongoing rights violations under ADA
and Rehabilitation Act, and the prospective relief contained in the settlement agreement and order remained
necessary, was sufficiently narrow, and was minimally intrusive. According to the court, the defendants failed to
fulfill their obligation to provide developmentally disabled California prisoners with the accommodations and
program modifications that would enable them to gain access to prison programs, services, and activities afforded
non-disabled prisoners. The court found that the state defendants were not deliberately indifferent, so as to violate
the Eighth Amendment, even though the state defendants had not adequately implemented the remedial plan,
where the correction department's policies provided for constitutionally acceptable treatment. The court ruled that
further relief was necessary under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) to secure the rights of class of
developmentally disabled prisoners, where the defendants demonstrated an ignorance of conditions for
developmentally disabled prisoners and an inability to recognize the gravity of and to remedy the problems that
had been identified by the court expert and others. According to the court, the defendants demonstrated an
inability to take remedial steps absent court intervention, evidence reflected that the defendants had failed to
comply with the remedial plan even nine years later, and the remedial plan in its current form did not go far
enough to ensure compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Rehabilitation Act. (California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation)

U.S. Appeals Court
LIBERTY INTEREST
REMOVAL FROM
PROGRAM
DUE PROCESS

Gonzalez-Fuentes v. Molina, 607 F.3d 864 (1st Cir. 2010). A class of prisoners convicted of murder, who had been
released pursuant to an electronic supervision program (ESP), filed a complaint under § 1983, seeking a
preliminary injunction against their re-incarceration pursuant to a regulation which became effective after their
releases. The district court granted a preliminary injunction and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico appealed.
Another class of prisoners who had been re-incarcerated filed a separate petition for a writ of habeas corpus and
the district court granted the petition. The district court consolidated the two cases, and denied the
Commonwealth's motion to dismiss. The commonwealth appealed. The appeals court reversed in part, vacated in
part, and remanded. The court held that re-incarceration of the prisoners convicted of murder under a new
regulation eliminating the ESP program for prisoners convicted of murder, did not violate the ex post facto clause,
where the prisoners had committed their crimes of conviction at times predating the creation of the ESP, so that
Puerto Rico's decision to disqualify prisoners from participating in the ESP had no effect on the punishment
assigned by law. The court also held the re-incarceration of the prisoners convicted of murder did not violate
substantive due process. The court found that although the impact of re-incarceration on the prisoners was
substantial, Puerto Rico had a justifiable interest in faithfully applying the new statute which barred prisoners
convicted of murder from the ESP program. According to the court, there was no showing that Puerto Rico acted
with deliberate indifference or that re-imprisonment was conscience-shocking. But the court found that the
prisoners convicted of murder, who had been released for several years pursuant to the ESP, had a protected due
process liberty interest in their continued participation in the ESP program, despite the fact that their releases were
premised on lower court determination, which was later overturned, that the statute eliminating such prisoners
from the program violated the ex post facto clause. The prisoners were serving out the remainder of their
sentences in their homes, where they lived either with close relatives, significant others, or spouses and children,
and although they were subject to monitoring with an electronic tracking anklet, and routine drug and alcohol
testing, they were authorized to work at a job or attend school.
The court also found that the re-incarceration of the prisoners deprived them of procedural due process, where
the prisoners were not given any pre-hearing notice as to the reason their ESP status was revoked, and the
prisoners had to wait two weeks after their arrest before receiving any opportunity to contest it.
The court concluded that the prisoners whose procedural due process rights were violated by their reincarceration or their imminent future re-incarceration after determination that they had been unlawfully admitted
into the ESP were not entitled to either habeas relief, for those already re-imprisoned, or preliminary injunctive
relief for those yet to be re-imprisoned, where the subsequent Puerto Rico statute provided a valid, independent,
constitutional basis for the prisoners' re-incarceration. (Puerto Rico Department of Justice, Puerto Rico
Administration of Corrections)

34.39

U.S. Appeals Court
PARTICIPATION
RELEASE

Izzo v. Wiley, 620 F.3d 1257 (10th Cir. 2010). A federal inmate petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, challenging
a decision of the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) denying his eligibility for the Elderly Offender Home Detention Pilot
Program. The district court denied the petition and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court
held that the provision of the Second Chance Act (SCA) making an offender eligible for the Elderly Offender
Home Detention Pilot Program if he is at least 65 years old and has served 75% of the term of imprisonment to
which he was sentenced refers to the term imposed by the sentencing court, without any consideration of good
time credit. (Federal Bureau of Prisons, Colorado)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEX OFFENDER
DUE PROCESS

Meza v. Livingston, 607 F.3d 392 (5th Cir. 2010). A parolee, who had never been convicted of a sex offense,
brought an action against the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) and officials, alleging that defendants
denied him due process when they imposed and enforced sex-offender conditions as part of mandatory
supervision following his term of incarceration. The district court found that the procedural protections given to
the parolee were constitutionally insufficient and ordered that the parolee be provided with an appropriate hearing.
Cross-appeals were taken. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The appeals court
held that: (1) the procedure provided by TDCJ to parolees who had never been convicted of a sex offense and
faced possible sex offender registration and therapy violated due process; (2) a parolee subject to imposition and
enforcement of sex-offender conditions as part of mandatory supervision was owed a hearing that meets due
process requirements; (3) the state was not required to provide counsel to a parolee facing registration as a sex
offender and sex therapy as part of mandatory supervision; and (4) TDCJ officials were not entitled to immunity
under the Eleventh Amendment from the parolee's claim for injunctive relief. (Texas Board of Pardons and
Paroles, Texas Department of Criminal Justice—Parole Division)

U.S. Appeals Court
DRUG
RIGHT TO TREATMENT

Mora-Meraz v. Thomas, 601 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 2010). A federal prisoner petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus
challenging a decision of the United States Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to deny him eligibility for admission to a
Residential Drug Abuse Program (RDAP). The district court denied the petition and the prisoner appealed. The
appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that BOP’s promulgation of a rule requiring the federal prisoner to
present documented proof of substance use within 12 months of imprisonment to be eligible for admission to
RDAP was a valid interpretive rule, and that implementation of the 12-month rule was neither arbitrary nor
capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act. The court noted that a reasonable basis existed for the BOP
decision to adhere to 12-month rule in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition,
(DSM-IV), and a reasonable basis existed for the Bureau to apply that rule to require documented use of drugs
within 12 months prior to incarceration. (United States Bureau of Prisons, Federal Correctional Institution at
Sheridan, Oregon)

U.S. District Court
PSYCHIATRIC
RIGHT TO TREATMENT

Paine v. Johnson, 689 F.Supp.2d 1027 (N.D.Ill. 2010) affirmed 678 F.3d 500. The guardian of the estate of a
pretrial detainee, who allegedly suffered from bipolar disorder, brought a § 1983 action against a city and city
police officers, alleging civil rights violations in connection with the detainee's arrest and subsequent release from
custody without being provided access to mental health treatment. The defendants moved for summary judgment.
The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was
precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the detainee, who exhibited drastic and unnatural
behavior throughout her 28-hour detention, had a serious mental health condition. The court also found a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether the arresting city police officer, and other police employees, who witnessed
the arrestee singing rap lyrics, taking her clothes off and dancing provocatively for different men, acting
erratically, discussing the price of oil, and screaming bizarre and vulgar statements, among other things, had
notice that the arrestee had a serious mental health condition that required medical attention. The court noted that
a city police officer, who spoke on the telephone with the detainee's mother, and was informed by her mother that
the detainee was likely bipolar and might be having an episode, had notice that the detainee had a serious mental
health condition that required medical attention, precluding summary judgment.
The court also found genuine issues of material fact as to whether a city police officer, who had actual
knowledge of the pretrial detainee's mental health condition based on observations of her behavior while in
custody, placed the detainee in a position of heightened risk when she released the detainee from the police station
and pointed her toward an area known for violent crime, without providing the detainee with food, money, or
medication, and as to whether the officer's conduct “shocked the conscience.” The court identified a fact issue as
to whether the detainee would not have been raped and seriously injured absent a city police officers' failure to
provide the detainee with psychiatric care. The court held that city police officers were not entitled to qualified
immunity from the § 1983 claim brought by the mother of the detainee, for unreasonably failing to provide the
detainee with mental health care under the Fourth Amendment, as it was clearly established that pretrial detainees
were entitled to mental health treatment for serious mental health conditions. On appeal (678 F.3d 500), the
appeals court held that the arresting officer was entitled to qualified immunity. The district court also denied
qualified immunity for the city police officer who released the detainee, where the law was clearly established that
the officer could not release the detainee from custody in a manner that increased her risk of harm. (Chicago
Police Department, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
HANDICAPPED
ADA-Americans with
Disabilities Act

Paulone v. City of Frederick, 718 F.Supp.2d 626 (D.Md. 2010). An arrestee, a deaf woman, brought an action
against a state, a county board, and a sheriff alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the
Rehabilitation Act, and related torts. The state and sheriff moved to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary
judgment. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that the arrestee failed
to allege that any program or activity she was required to complete following her arrest for driving under the
influence (DUI) and during her subsequent probation, received federal funds, as required to state Rehabilitation
Act claims against the state for discriminating against her and denying her benefits because of her deafness. The
court found that the arrestee stated an ADA claim with her allegations that, after her arrest and during her
detention, police officers denied her the use of a working machine that would have allowed her to make a

34.40

telephone call, help in reading and understanding forms, and access to a sign language interpreter. (Frederick
County Board of County Commissioners, Frederick County Adult Detention Center, Maryland)
U.S. Appeals Court
SEX OFFENDER
DUE PROCESS

Renchenski v. Williams, 622 F.3d 315 (3rd Cir. 2010). A state inmate, who was serving a life sentence without the
possibility of parole for first-degree murder, brought a pro se § 1983 action against prison officials and personnel,
alleging that his forced participation in sex offender treatment therapy violated his constitutional rights. The
district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed in
part and reversed in part. The court held that sex offender conditions may be imposed on an inmate who has not
been convicted of a sexual offense only after due process has been afforded. The court found that the inmate had
an independent liberty interest in not being labeled as a sex offender and forced into treatment, and thus was
entitled to adequate process before prison officials took such actions. (Pennsylvania's Sex Offender Treatment
Program, State Correctional Institution at Coal Township, Pennsylvania)
2011

U.S. District Court
PARTICIPATION
GOOD TIME

Bonadonna v. Grondolsky, 762 F.Supp.2d 311 (D.Mass. 2011). A federal inmate filed a habeas petition
challenging the Federal Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) determination that he was ineligible to participate in the Elderly
Offender Home Detention Pilot Program. The district court dismissed the action. The court held that good time
credit could not be considered in determining whether the inmate was eligible for home detention by satisfying the
requirement that he serve 75% of his “term of imprisonment.” The court also held that due process did not require
that the inmate receive a hearing prior to denial of his request. (Federal Medical Center, Devens, Massachusetts)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEX OFFENDER
EQUAL PROTECTION
PARTICIPATION

Brown v. Montoya, 662 F.3d 1152 (10th Cir. 2011). A probationer, who had been convicted of false imprisonment
under New Mexico law, brought § 1983 claims against a probation officer and the New Mexico Secretary of Corrections, alleging that he was wrongly directed to register as a sex offender and was wrongly placed in a sex offender probation unit, in violation of his rights to substantive due process, procedural due process, and equal
protection. The district court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss and the defendants appealed. The appeals
court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that the complaint was insufficient to overcome the Secretary's qualified immunity defense, but the probation officer's alleged actions, if proven, denied the
probationer of a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. According to the court, the probation officer's alleged actions of placing the probationer in a sex offender probation unit and directing him to register as a
sex offender, after the probationer had been convicted of false imprisonment under New Mexico law, if proven,
denied the probationer of a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. The court noted that false imprisonment was not a sex offense in New Mexico unless the victim was a minor. (New Mexico Dept.of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
REQUIREMENTS
SEX OFFENDER
TREATMENT
PROGRAMS
DUE PROCESS
LIBERTY INTEREST

Doe v. Heil, 781 F.Supp.2d 1134 (D.Colo. 2011.) A state prisoner convicted of a sex offense filed a § 1983 action,
alleging that Department of Corrections (DOC) regulations requiring him to provide a full sexual history and to
pass a polygraph examination in order to participate in a sex offender treatment program violated his
constitutional rights. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion. The court held that
the regulations did not violate the prisoner's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. According to
the court, the DOC had a legitimate penological interest in having convicted sex offenders complete a treatment
program before being released on parole. The court found that the prisoner lacked a due process liberty interest in
participating in a sex offender treatment program. (Colorado Department of Corrections Sex Offender Treatment
and Monitoring Program)

U.S. District Court
EDUCATIONAL
IDEA- Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act
PARTICIPATION

Keitt v. New York City, 882 F.Supp.2d 412 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). An inmate brought a pro se suit against a state, state
agencies, a city, city agencies, and state and city officials, and corrections officers, claiming that he was dyslexic
and that the defendants failed to accommodate his disability in the public school system and in education
programs offered in juvenile detention facilities and adult correctional facilities, as well as in prison disciplinary
proceedings. The court dismissed some claims and denied dismissal for other claims. The court held that the
inmate's Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) claims accrued for limitations purposes no later than
the year in which he reached the age of 21, where under New York law, a child was no longer entitled to the
protections and benefits of the IDEA after the age of 21 and did not have a right to demand a public education
beyond that age. The court found that the inmate adequately alleged the personal involvement of the
Commissioner of the New York Department of Correction in an alleged ongoing violation of the inmate's
constitutional rights, stating a § 1983 claim against the Commissioner. The inmate alleged that: (1) he repeatedly
gave the Commissioner complete details of the failures of a correctional facility to accommodate the his
disability; (2) the Commissioner had “full knowledge” of the refusal to accommodate from both grievances and
disciplinary appeals; (3) the Commissioner had upheld every decision denying accommodation; and (4) the
Commissioner failed to take action to remedy the ongoing violation. The court ruled that the inmate's allegations
suggested a discriminatory animus against him because of his alleged disability, dyslexia, and thus, Eleventh
Amendment immunity did not apply to shield the state, state agencies and state employees from the inmate's ADA
claims. (New York City Department of Correction- Rikers Island, State of New York Department of Correctional
Services Elmira Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
SEX OFFENDER
VOCATIONAL

Martin v. Benson, 827 F.Supp.2d 1022 (D.Minn.2011). A civilly committed sex offender and resident of the
Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP) facility brought a pro se action against the chief executive officer
(CEO) of MSOP, alleging the CEO violated the minimum wage provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA) by withholding 50% of his earnings as a work-related expense to be applied toward the cost of care. The
CEO moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the economic reality of the
civilly committed sex offender's work within the MSOP vocational work program was not the type of
employment covered by FLSA. The court noted that the program was specifically designed to provide

34.41

“meaningful work skills training, educational training, and development of proper work habits and extended
treatment services for civilly committed sex offenders,” and to the extent that the program engaged in commercial
activity, it was incidental to the program's primary purpose of providing meaningful work for sex offenders.
According to the court, the program had few of the indicia of traditional, free market employment, as the limits on
the program prevented it from operating in a truly competitive manner, and the offender's basic needs were met
almost entirely by the State. The court noted that the conclusion that the FLSA does not apply to a civilly
committed sex offender should not be arrived at just because, as a committed individual, he is confined like those
in prison or because his confinement is related to criminal activity, “…it is not simply an individual's status as a
prisoner that determines the applicability of the FLSA, but the economic reality itself that determines the
availability of the law's protections.” (Minnesota Sex Offender Program)
U.S. Appeals Court
RELIGION

McCollum v. California Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 647 F.3d 870 (9th Cir. 2011). Inmates and a
volunteer prison chaplain brought an action against the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
(CDCR) and others, challenging CDCR's paid chaplaincy program, and alleging retaliation for bringing such a
suit. The defendants moved to dismiss and for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion to
dismiss the inmates' claims in part, dismissed the chaplain's Establishment Clause claim for lack of standing, and
granted summary judgment on the chaplain's remaining claims. The plaintiffs appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The appeals court held that the inmates' grievances failed to alert CDCR that inmates sought redress for
wrongs allegedly perpetuated by CDCR's chaplaincy-hiring program, as required to exhaust under the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). According to the court, while the inmates' grievances gave notice that the inmates
alleged the prison policies failed to provide for certain general Wiccan religious needs and free exercise, they did
not provide notice that the source of the perceived problem was the absence of a paid Wiccan chaplaincy. But the
court found that an inmate’s grievance alleging he requested that the prison's administration contact and allow
visitation by clergy of his own Wiccan faith, which was denied because his chaplain was not a regular paid
chaplain, was sufficient to put CDCR on notice that the paid-chaplaincy hiring policy was the root cause of the
inmate's complaint and thus preserved his ability to challenge that policy under PLRA. The court held that a
volunteer Wiccan prison chaplain lacked taxpayer standing to challenge CDCR’s paid chaplaincy program, based
on violations of his First Amendment right to freedom of religion, where the chaplain did not challenge the
expenditure of government funds to provide paid chaplaincies nor even the existence of denomination-specific
paid chaplaincies, but rather challenged only the current allocation of chaplaincies among religious denominations
and the procedure for determining such allocations. According to the court, there was no direct evidence of a
retaliatory motive by the prison employee who restricted the Wiccan prison chaplain's access to a prison, as
required to support the chaplain's First Amendment retaliation claim. The court noted that the incident resulting in
restricted access occurred nearly three years after the chaplain filed a lawsuit against CDCR, and an employee's
knowledge of the suit, alone, was insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to a retaliatory motive.
(California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation)

U.S. District Court
TRAINING
WORK/STUDY

Morton v. Bolyard, 810 F.Supp.2d 112 (D.D.C. 2011.) A federal prisoner, who was employed by the Department
of Justice's Federal Prison Industries (UNICOR) program while in Federal Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) custody,
brought a Bivens action against various federal officials, alleging that the defendants denied him promotions and
back pay for his UNICOR job, and denied him good time credit for vocational training received through UNICOR
and educational training he took at his own expense through a correspondence course. The defendants moved to
dismiss. The district court granted the motion. The court held that sovereign immunity barred the prisoner's claims
against the officials in their official capacities and that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over the
officials in their individual capacities. The court found that the prisoner failed to exhaust administrative remedies
under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), even though the prisoner had filed an administrative remedy
request at the institutional level, where the prisoner had failed to file an administrative remedy request at the
regional and central office levels, and the regional and central office levels had the authority to provide relief or to
take action in response to the complaint. (United States Penitentiary Hazelton, West Virginia, Federal Prison
Industries)

U.S. District Court
REMOVAL FROM
PROGRAM

Ocasio v. Konesky, 821 F.Supp.2d 571 (W.D.N.Y. 2011). An inmate, proceeding pro se, brought a § 1983 claim
against a social worker employed by a Department of Correctional Services (DOCS), alleging he was wrongfully
removed from a mental health program. The social worker filed a motion for summary judgment, which the
district court granted. The court held that the social worker's removal of a designation permitting the inmate to
participate in an intensive mental health program administered by Department of Correctional Services (DOCS)
was not retaliation for the inmate's complaints, where the designation was based upon the worker's observations of
the inmate's symptoms, and the conclusions were seconded by the inmate's treating physicians and other DOCS
staff. (Wende Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
REMOVAL FROM
PROGRAM
DUE PROCESS
LIBERTY INTEREST

Persechini v. Callaway, 651 F.3d 802 (8th Cir. 2011). A state prisoner filed a § 1983 action against prison officials
for alleged deprivation of his due process rights by terminating him from long-term substance abuse treatment
program that resulted in the mandatory execution of his 15-year sentence and his ineligibility for probation. The
district court dismissed the claim for failure to a state claim. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed.
The court held that the prisoner lacked a liberty interest in: (1) the outcome of a disciplinary proceeding; (2) the
outcome of the action taken by a program review committee; and (3) the outcome of termination from a treatment
program. The court noted that the sanction imposed by the disciplinary committee for stealing a towel,
confinement to his room for ten days and referral to program review committee, was neither atypical nor
significant hardships in relation to ordinary incidents of prison life. (Ozark Correctional Center, Missouri)

34.42

U.S. District Court
ADA-Americans with
Disabilities Act
EQUAL PROTECTION
PARTICIPATION

Pierce v. County of Orange, 761 F.Supp.2d 915 (C.D.Cal. 2011). Pretrial detainees in a county's jail facilities
brought a § 1983 class action suit against the county and its sheriff, seeking relief for violations of their constitutional and statutory rights. After consolidating the case with a prior case challenging jail conditions, the district
court rejected the detainees' claims, and the detainees appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in
part, and remanded. On remand, the court held that: (1) a sub-class was properly defined as mobility-impaired and
dexterity-impaired pretrial detainees; (2) the detainees were subject to physical barriers to accessibility of jail
facilities, in violation of ADA; (3) certain categories of programs, services, and activities were not similarly available to the detainees, in violation of ADA; (4) the county failed to establish that accommodations requested by the
detainees would require fundamental alteration or produce an undue burden, or that current conditions were reasonably related to the facilities' legitimate interests; (5) the county's revised grievance procedure satisfied ADA;
and (6) the least intrusive means to compel the county to remedy physical barriers and disparate provision of
programs, services, and activities to detainees was to allow the county to draft a proposed plan. The court held
that the widespread injunctive relief ordered by the district court, which addressed the county's failure to accommodate detainees with respect to toilets and showers, as well as programs, activities, and services, was narrowly
drawn, extended no further than necessary to correct violations of the detainees' federal rights, and was the least
intrusive means necessary to correct violation of those federal rights, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform
Act (PLRA). (Orange County Jail System, California, including Central Jail Complex, the Intake Release Center,
the Men's Central Jail, the Women's Central Jail and the James A. Facility Musick and the Theo Lacy Facility)

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
PARTICIPATION

Reyes-Morales v. Wells, 766 F.Supp.2d 1349 (S.D.Ga. 2011). An alien federal prisoner petitioned for habeas
relief, challenging the Federal Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) decision to reduce good conduct time (GCT) applied to
his sentence after he withdrew from a literacy program required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The
district court denied the petition. The court held that the prisoner was not subject to a final order of removal,
deportation, or exclusion, as required to receive the 54-day per year Good Conduct Time award, despite
nonparticipation in a literacy program. According to the court, the BOP's regulations and program statements
concerning loss of GCT time due to nonparticipation in a literacy program were a reasonable interpretation of
PLRA. The court found that the reduction of GCT did not violate the prisoner's procedural due process rights.
(McRae Correctional Facility, Georgia)

U.S. District Court
PARTICIPATION

Santiago-Lebron v. Florida Parole Com'm, 767 F.Supp.2d 1340 (S.D.Fla. 2011). A federal inmate petitioned for
habeas relief, seeking immediate release based on the Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) cancellation of the Spanish
Residential Drug and Alcohol Program (RDAP). The district court dismissed the action. The court held that: (1)
BOP did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause in canceling the Spanish RDAP; (2) the prisoner was not “similarly
situated” to English-speaking inmates who took the English RDAP; (3) termination of the Spanish RDAP was
rationally related to a legitimate government purpose; (4) BOP was not required to comply with APA's “notice
and comment” requirement before canceling the Spanish RDAP; and (5) cancellation of the Spanish RDAP was a
permissible construction of the statute requiring BOP to provide substance abuse treatment to eligible inmates.
The court noted that the prisoner had not started the program, much less successfully completed it or been
provided with a determination of eligibility for early release, prior to the date the amended policy became
effective. According to the court, the prisoner did not have a settled expectation of participating in the Spanish
Residential Drug and Alcohol Program (RDAP) and potentially receiving a sentence reduction, and thus no ex
post facto violation occurred when the Spanish RDAP was cancelled, where the prisoner had not yet begun RDAP
when it was cancelled. (Federal Correctional Institution, Miami, Florida)

U.S. Supreme Court
DRUG

Tapia v. U.S., 131 S.Ct. 238 (2011). A defendant who was convicted of, among other things, smuggling
unauthorized aliens into the United States, was sentenced to a 51-month term of imprisonment in order to qualify
for and complete the Bureau of Prisons' Residential Drug Abuse Program (RDAP). The defendant appealed. The
appeals court affirmed. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding that the Sentencing Reform Act
precluded the district court from lengthening the defendant's prison term to promote rehabilitation. (California)
2012

U.S. District Court
ALCOHOL/DRUGS
PARTICIPATION
RELIGION

Brooks v. Roy, 881 F.Supp.2d 1034 (D.Minn. 2012). A Native American state prisoner filed a § 1983 action,
claiming that his required participation in a prison's substance abuse treatment program violated the Free Exercise
Clause, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), the American Indian Religious
Freedom Act (AIRFA), and the Minnesota Constitution. The prisoner sought an injunction assigning him at his
own expense to a privately-run, Native American inpatient treatment program 200 miles from the prison, or
readmitting him to the prison's program so that he would be eligible for prison benefits. The prisoner moved for a
temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction. The district court denied the motion. The court held that:
(1) the Free Exercise Clause and RLUIPA claims were not actionable; (2) the First Amendment retaliation claim
was not actionable; (3) the prisoner would not likely suffer irreparable harm absent a preliminary injunction; (4)
the balance of hardships did not favor a preliminary injunction; (5) the public interest did not support a
preliminary injunction; and (6) AIRFA lacked a private cause of action. The court noted that the prisoner failed to
delineate any sincerely-held religious belief that was in any way infringed on by his participation in the prison
substance abuse treatment program, as required to support his claim for infringement of his right to free exercise
of religion. The prisoner referenced the Native American belief that a person must confront the root causes of
substance abuse, but he did not allege that he held such a belief himself, and the program explicitly required the
prisoner to examine the cause of his substance abuse and encouraged him to speak and write freely and to develop
his own program for rehabilitation incorporating whatever Native American beliefs and practices he wanted, but
he refused to do so. (Minnesota Correctional Facility, Faribault)

34.43

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
PARTICIPATION
SEX OFFENDER

Catanzaro v. Harry, 848 F.Supp.2d 780 (W.D.Mich. 2012). A state prisoner, proceeding pro se, brought a § 1983
action against a state department of corrections, department officials, a warden, parole board members, and
numerous prison and department employees, alleging violation of his due process rights, violation of the Fourth
Amendment, denial of adequate medical care, his right to free exercise of religion, equal protection, access to
courts, and retaliation. The district court held that: (1) the prisoner had no protected interest in early release on
parole; (2) the requirement that the prisoner complete a sex-offender treatment program as condition for parole
did not violate the Due Process Clause as the condition for parole did not exceed the sentence imposed on the
prisoner; (3) the prisoner's conditions at sex-offender treatment facility did not implicate the prisoner's right to
procedural due process, notwithstanding the fact that the prisoner did not have access to recreational facilities or a
law library, the prisoner could not work, the prisoner had to arrange for his own health care, and the prisoner did
not have the opportunity to attend religious services; (4) the transfer of the prisoner to facility for sex-offender
treatment program did not violate his right to substantive due process; and (5) the prisoner stated a claim for
violation of Free Exercise Clause.According to the court, the prisoner's complaint, alleging that a parole agent
prevented him from bringing his own legal papers with him during his transfer from a sex-offender treatment
facility to a prison, and that as a result, the prisoner was unable to notify the court of his address change and a lost
opportunity to object to dismissal of two retaliation claims, failed to state a claim for violation of prisoner's right
of access to the courts. (Cooper Street Correctional Facility, Residential Sex Offender Program [RSOP]
Kalamazoo, and Probation Enhancement Program, Muskegon, Mich.)

U.S. District Court
EQUAL PROTECTION
PARTICIPATION
SEX OFFENDER

Doe v. Jindal, 851 F.Supp.2d 995 (E.D.La. 2012). Individuals convicted of violating Louisiana's Crime Against
Nature by Solicitation (CANS) statute brought a § 1983 action against Louisiana's Governor, Attorney General,
and other state and municipal officials, challenging the statute's requirement that they register as sex offenders
under Louisiana's sex offender registry law. The individuals moved for summary judgment and the district court
granted the motion. The court held that the individuals were treated differently than those convicted of engaging
in the same conduct under the solicitation provision of Louisiana's prostitution statute, which did not require
registration as sex offender, and thus the provision of the sex offender registry law requiring individuals convicted
of CANS to register as sex offenders deprived the individuals of equal protection of laws in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. (Crime Against Nature by Solicitation Statute, Louisiana)

U.S. District Court
SEX OFFENDER
DUE PROCESS
EQUAL PROTECTION

Edmond v. Clements, 896 F.Supp.2d 960 (D.Colo. 2012). A parolee brought a civil rights action alleging that his
constitutional rights were violated when he failed to receive a $100 cash payment upon his release from a state
prison to parole, and by state corrections officials' failure to perform a proper sex offender evaluation, which
resulted in the parolee being improperly ordered to participate in sex offense treatment that included a
requirement that he have no contact with his children. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted
the motion. The district court held that: (1) the private sex offender treatment program that contracted with the
state and its employees did not qualify as “state actors,” and thus, could not be liable in the parolee's § 1983 claim;
(2) the claim against the executive director of the state department of corrections in his official capacity for
recovery of a cash payment was barred by the Eleventh Amendment; (3) the executive director was not personally
liable for the cash payable to the parolee upon release; (4) the officials were not liable under § 1983 for their
alleged negligent supervision, failure to instruct or warn, or failure to implement proper training procedures for
parole officers; (5) the parolee's equal protection rights were not violated; and (6) the allegations stated a due
process claim against corrections officials. According to the court, allegations by the parolee that Colorado
department of corrections officials failed to perform a proper sex offender evaluation prior to releasing him on
parole, as required by Colorado law, which allegedly resulted in a parole condition that he have no contact with
his children, stated a due process claim against the corrections officials. (Bijou Treatment & Training Institute,
under contract to the Colorado Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
TREATMENT
PROGRAMS

Henderson v. Thomas, 891 F.Supp.2d 1296 (M.D.Ala. 2012). State prisoners, on behalf of themselves and a class
of all current and future HIV-positive (HIV+) prisoners, filed a class action against prison officials, seeking
declaratory judgment that the Alabama Department of Corrections' (ADOC) policy of segregating HIV+ prisoners
from the general prison population violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation
Act, and seeking an injunction against further enforcement of the policy. The district court denied the officials’
motion to dismiss. The court held that the prisoners' class action complaint plausibly alleged that HIV-positive
prisoners suffered from an impairment that substantially limited a major life activity, as required to state claims
that the ADOC HIV-segregation policy discriminated against prisoners on the basis of a disability in violation of
ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. According to the court, the complaint provided information on the contemporary
medical consensus regarding HIV treatment and alleged that each named plaintiff was diagnosed with HIV, that
HIV was an impairment of the immune system, that HIV substantially limited the named plaintiffs in one or more
major life activities, and that HIV qualified as a disability. The court found that the prisoners' class action
complaint plausibly alleged that they were otherwise qualified individuals with a disability due to their HIVpositive status on the grounds that reasonable accommodations could be made to eliminate the significant risk of
HIV+ prisoners transmitting HIV while integrated with other prisoners. The complaint alleged details of the
programs and accommodations for which HIV+ prisoners were ineligible, alleged that all but two state penal
systems had integrated HIV+ prisoners into the general prison population, and alleged that the National
Commission on Correctional Health Care counseled against segregation. (Alabama Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
EQUAL PROTECTION
SEGREGATION
WORK/STUDY

Henderson v. Thomas, 913 F.Supp.2d 1267 (M.D.Ala. 2012). Seven HIV-positive inmates brought an action on
behalf of themselves and class of all current and future HIV-positive inmates incarcerated in Alabama Department
of Corrections (ADOC) facilities, alleging that ADOC's HIV segregation policy discriminated against them on the
basis of their disability, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Rehabilitation Act. After a
non-jury trial, the district court held that: (1) the class representatives had standing to sue; (2) the claims were not
moot even though one inmate had been transferred, where it was reasonable to believe that the challenged

34.44

practices would continue; (3) inmates housed in a special housing unit were “otherwise qualified,” or reasonable
accommodation would render them “otherwise qualified;” (4) the blanket policy of categorically segregating all
HIV-positive inmates in a special housing unit violated ADA and the Rehabilitation Act; (5) housing HIVpositive inmates at other facilities would not impose an undue burden on the state; and (6) food-service policies
that excluded HIV-positive inmates from kitchen jobs within prisons and prohibited HIV-positive inmates from
holding food-service jobs in the work-release program irrationally excluded HIV-positive inmates from programs
for which they were unquestionably qualified and therefore violated ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.
The court also found that female HIV-positive class representative had standing to challenge ADOC policies
that HIV-positive women were segregated within the prison from general-population prisoners and that women
were allowed work-release housing at one facility, but not at ADOC's other work-release facility for women. The
court held that modification of the ADOC medical classification system to afford HIV-positive inmates
individualized determinations, instead of treating HIV status as a dispositive criterion regardless of viral load,
history of high-risk behavior, physical and mental health, and any other individual aspects of inmates, was a
reasonable accommodation to ensure that HIV-positive inmates housed in the prison's special housing unit were
“otherwise qualified,” under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act, for
integration into the general prison population. According to the court, requiring ADOC to dismantle its policy of
segregating HIV-positive female inmates in a particular dormitory at a prison would neither impose undue
financial and administrative burdens nor require fundamental alteration in the nature of ADOC's operations. The
court suggested that it was almost certain that ADOC was wasting valuable resources by maintaining its
segregation policy, in that a large space at a prison filled with empty beds was being used to house only a few
women. (Alabama Department of Corrections)
U.S. Appeals Court
SEX OFFENDER
TREATMENT
PROGRAMS

Lane v. Williams, 689 F.3d 879 (7th Cir. 2012). Convicted sex offenders who, after completing their sentences,
remained in state custody as civil detainees pursuant to the Illinois Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act,
brought a § 1983 action, alleging constitutional problems with the conditions of their confinement at a treatment
facility. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants and the detainees appealed. The appeals
court affirmed. The appeals court held that security restrictions on face-to-face interactions between the civil
detainees held in different units within the state's treatment facility for sexually violent persons (SVP) did not
constitute treatment decisions which, as a matter of due process, had to be made by health professionals, merely
because the security restrictions affected treatment options. The court found that requiring the civil detainees to
use United States Mail, rather than the facility's internal mail system, to send letters to detainees in the facility's
other units did not violate the detainees' First Amendment associational rights, even if the facility's internal mail
system was a superior means of sending letters. The court noted that commitment under the Illinois Sexually
Violent Persons Commitment Act is civil and may be for purposes such as incapacitation and treatment, but not
for punishment. As a general matter, persons who have been involuntarily civilly committed are entitled to more
considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are designed
to punish. (Rushville Treatment and Detention Center, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
EQUAL PROTECTION
RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION
REMOVAL FROM
PROGRAM

Reynolds v. Barrett, 685 F.3d 193 (2nd Cir. 2012). African–American inmates brought actions under § 1983 and §
1985 against New York State Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) employees, alleging that they were
subjected to discrimination on account of their race in connection with their inmate jobs in a print shop. The
actions were consolidated for discovery purposes. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants
and the plaintiffs appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the disparate-impact theory of
liability was not applicable to the African-American inmates' class claims against individual state officials under
§§ 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986, which relied on an equal protection racial discrimination violation as the
underlying basis, since equal protection always required intentional discrimination, and disparate impact did not.
At the time the suits here were filed, inmates employed in the prison print shop were paid an hourly wage, which
ranged from sixteen cents to sixty-five cents per hour depending on the inmate's experience and expertise. In
addition, inmates were eligible to receive an “incentive bonus” as a reward for good work. Civilian supervisors
determined, in their discretion, whether a particular inmate merited promotion and higher pay. Similarly, these
supervisors could recommend to the prison Program Committee—the entity tasked with assigning and removing
inmates from various prison programs—that inmates be terminated from employment in the print shop. As a
general matter, an inmate would be removed upon two requests. The plaintiffs alleged that print shop supervisors
demoted minority inmates more often than white inmates, confined minority inmates to low-paying positions, and
unfairly docked the pay of minority inmates. (Elmira Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
PARTICIPATION
SEX OFFENDER

Roman v. DiGuglielmo, 675 F.3d 204 (3rd Cir. 2012). A state prisoner petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, after
a state court denied habeas relief, alleging that state's decision to deny him parole, unless he admitted his guilt and
participated in sex offender treatment program, violated his Fifth Amendment right against self incrimination. The
district court denied the petition and the prisoner appealed. The court held that the parole condition did not violate
the prisoner's right against self incrimination. The court noted that the state had a legitimate interest in
rehabilitating prisoners, the prisoner did not have any right or entitlement to parole under state law, his sentence
was not lengthened, and the actual conditions of his imprisonment had not been altered. (Pennsylvania)

U.S. Appeals Court
DUE PROCESS
REQUIREMENTS
SEX OFFENDER

Strutton v. Meade, 668 F.3d 549 (8th Cir. 2012). A civilly-committed sex offender brought a civil rights action
challenging the adequacy of his treatment at the Missouri Sexual Offender Treatment Center. The district court
entered judgment in favor of the defendants, and the plaintiff appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court
found that the offender had standing to bring the due process challenge to the adequacy of Missouri's four-phase
treatment program for such offenders, where he demonstrated that his alleged injury of not advancing in treatment
was not due solely to his own recalcitrance and could have been due to the lack of adequate treatment resources.
But according to the court, the treatment received by offender did not shock the conscience, in violation of
substantive due process. The court noted that although budget shortfalls and staffing shortages resulted in

34.45

treatment modifications that were below standards set in place by the center's directors, temporary modifications
in the treatment regimen of eliminating psychoeducational classes and increasing the size of process groups was
neither arbitrary nor egregious, and the center sought to maintain essential treatment services in light of the
challenges it faced.
The court found that the treatment center's use of the “restriction table” and the later use of a restriction area in
treating the civilly-committed sex offender did not shock the conscience, and thus did not violate offender's
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. A resident assigned to the Restriction Table, which was located near a
nurses' station, was not permitted to speak to another person unless that person was also seated at the table, and
was only allowed to leave the table for meals, classes, process groups, and for an hour of exercise. Residents
would remain at the table from early morning until late evening. Despite its name, residents assigned to the
Restriction Table were not physically restrained and were allowed to stand, stretch, get a drink of water, or use the
restroom as needed. Use of the table was discontinued and it was replaced with a “Restriction Area.” According to
the court, residents assigned to a restriction table or restriction area retained a comparatively free range of
movement and activities, including the ability to get up and stretch, to leave to attend group sessions and
meetings, to converse with other residents, to work on homework or legal issues, and to play cards. (Missouri
Sexual Offender Treatment Center)
U.S. Appeals Court
DRUG RELEASE
TREATMENT
PROGRAMS

U.S. v. Taylor, 679 F.3d 1005 (8th Cir. 2012). Following release from prison, the district court sentenced a
defendant to 24 months in prison after he admitted to violating two conditions of supervised release. The
defendant appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded, finding that consideration of the defendant's
eligibility to participate in a rehabilitation program for sentencing purposes was plain error. The district court had
considered the defendant's eligibility to participate in a 500–hour drug program available from the Bureau of
Prisons when sentencing the defendant to 24 months for violation of supervised release. The appeals court held
that this affected the defendant’s rights in a manner that seriously affected fairness, integrity, or public reputation
of judicial proceedings, and thus amounted to plain error. The court noted that the advisory guideline range was 6
to 12 months, and the district court may have imposed a lesser sentence if it had not focused on a particular drug
treatment program within a federal institution. The defendant had failed to report to a residential facility where he
was to spend 120 days and admitted to consuming alcohol. (Nebraska)

U.S. District Court
REMOVAL FROM
PROGRAM

Way v. Johnson, 893 F.Supp.2d 15 (D.D.C. 2012). A District of Columbia inmate brought an action against
wardens, an investigator, federal agencies, and other officials, alleging failure to investigate, and that his removal
from a drug treatment program was discrimination based on his homosexuality and HIV-positive status. The
district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court held that the inmate failed to exhaust
administrative remedies in either of the two prisons in which he was housed as to removal from the drug treatment
program or a change of housing, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), where the inmate did
not file any grievance in the first prison, and only filed an informal grievance form at the second prison. The court
noted that the inmate did not appeal upon the response from the warden at the second prison. (United States
Parole Commission, Secure Residential Treatment Program, Court Services and Offender Supervision Agency for
the District of Columbia)
2013

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
LIBERTY INTEREST
REMOVAL FROM
PROGRAM
SEX OFFENDER

Allen v. Clements, 930 F.Supp.2d 1252 (D.Colo. 2013). Inmates in the Colorado Department of Corrections
(CDOC) who had been sentenced to indeterminate terms of imprisonment under the Colorado Sex Offender
Lifetime Supervision Act (SOLSA) brought a class action against CDOC officials, alleging under § 1983 that the
officials were arbitrarily denying them sex offender treatment and interfering with their access to counsel and
courts. The officials moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court granted the motion. The court
held that: (1) the inmates failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim; (2) terminating one inmate's treatment
because of polygraphs did not violate due process; (3) denial of re-enrollment requests did not implicate the
inmates' liberty interests; (4) termination procedures comported with procedural due process; and (5) the inmates
failed to state a substantive due process claim. The court found that terminating two inmates' treatment because
one had a rash and the other reported a telephone call in which his cousin mentioned seeing his children
implicated the inmates' liberty interests protected by due process because the reasons for termination were not
reasonably related to the goals of their treatment. But the court noted that there was no indication that the alleged
deprivation extended the inmates' sentences, and that procedures providing for a treatment waitlist and for state
judicial review of CDOC termination decisions existed, and the two inmates had already been able to re-enroll in
treatment multiple times. (Colorado Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
HANDICAPPED

Armstrong v. Brown, 939 F.Supp.2d 1012 (N.D.Cal. 2013). Prisoners brought a class action against the Governor
of California, the state Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and a number of related directors and
executive officers, seeking to enforce prior orders requiring the defendants to provide sign language interpreters
(SLI), and to hold the defendants in contempt for violations. The district court granted the motion to enforce the
prior orders. The court held that setting a policy which failed to provide SLIs for hearing-impaired inmates during
rounds by psychiatric technicians warranted enforcement of the order against the defendants, and the defendants'
failure to provide SLIs for hearing-impaired inmates at classes attended by deaf inmates also warranted an
enforcement order. But the court decided that civil contempt sanctions were not appropriate because officials were
making substantial efforts to reach compliance with the orders by voluntarily increasing both contract and civil
services positions for qualified SLIs. (Substance Abuse Treatment Facility, California Department of
Rehabilitation and Corrections)

34.46

U.S. Appeals Court
DRUG
PARTICIPATION
RELIGION

Hazle v. Crofoot, 727 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2013). A parolee, who was an atheist, brought an action against various
state officials and a state contractor, seeking damages and injunctive relief for the deprivation of his First
Amendment rights, after his parole was revoked following his refusal to participate in a residential drug treatment
program that required him to acknowledge a higher power, as a condition of his parole. The contractor, Westcare,
was a private regional substance abuse coordination agency, and made the arrangements for the parolee’s
placement in the program. After the parolee was granted partial summary judgment by the district court, a jury
awarded the parolee zero damages. The district court denied the parolee’s motion for a new trial, and the parolee
appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that the parolee was entitled to an award of
compensatory damages for each day that he spent in prison as a result of the violation of his First Amendment
rights by various state officials.
The appeals court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
the contractor's conduct was the proximate cause of the parolee's unconstitutional imprisonment, when it
contracted only with drug treatment facilities offering solely religious based programs or services, and counseled
and arranged for the parolee to attend a religion-based facility as part of his state-imposed parole program, despite
having been informed that the parolee was an atheist and that he objected to such religious programming. The
court held that the parolee's claim under California law for an injunction preventing both a state contractor and
various state officials from expending state funds in an unconstitutional manner that required parolees to
participate in religious treatment programs in order to be eligible for parole, failed to provide parolees with
secular or non-religious treatment alternatives, and revoked the parole of those who protested or resisted
participation in religion-based treatment programs, was not rendered moot after the state issued a directive stating
that parole agents could not require a parolee to attend any religious based program if the parolee refused to
participate for religious reasons, where the state directive had not been implemented in any meaningful fashion.
(California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitations, Board of Parole Hearings, Westcare, and Empire
Recovery Center, California)

U.S. District Court
TREATMENT
PROGRAMS

Hilton v. Wright, 928 F.Supp.2d 530 (N.D.N.Y. 2013). A state prison inmate infected with the Hepatitis C virus
(HCV) brought a class action against the New York State Department of Correctional Services and Community
Supervision (DOCCS) and its chief medical officer, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs
in violation of the Eighth Amendment, as well as violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the
Rehabilitation Act. Following class certification, the parties entered into a settlement agreement resolving
injunctive and equitable claims. The defendants moved for summary judgment on the remaining damages claims.
The inmate's attorneys moved for attorney's fees and out-of-pocket expenses incurred monitoring the settlement
agreement. The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, awarded fees to the inmate's
attorneys, but denied expenses. The inmate appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. On remand, the
district court held that: (1) the Eleventh Amendment barred an Eighth Amendment claim against an officer in his
official capacity; (2) the inmate waived the Eighth Amendment claim based on initial denial of treatment due to
his short prison term; (3) a fact issue precluded summary judgment on the Eighth Amendment claim based on
denial of treatment due to the inmate's failure to complete a substance abuse program;(4) a fact issue precluded
summary judgment on the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims; and (5) enlargement of the cap set forth in the
agreement was appropriate. (New York State Department of Correctional Services and Community Supervision)

U.S. Appeals Court
REMOVAL FROM
PROGRAM
WORK/STUDY

Spencer v. Jackson County, Mo., 738 F.3d 907 (8th Cir. 2013). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against county
detention center employees, alleging violation of his First Amendment rights. The district court granted the
defendants' motion for summary judgment. The inmate appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The
court held that summary judgment was precluded by issues of material fast as to: (1) the inmate's First
Amendment retaliation claim against a supervisor; (2) First Amendment retaliation claims arising from the
inmate's transfer to another housing module; and (3) claims arising from the alleged obstruction of the inmate's
access to a grievance process. The court found a dispute of material fact as to whether a program supervisor was
motivated by the lawsuit the inmate had previously filed against her, when she removed the inmate from a trustee
program almost immediately after he reminded her about his having filed the suit, resulting in his loss of access to
income, work opportunities, and housing advantages as well as other privileges.
A fact issue was found as to whether the 53-year old inmate would have been transferred from a housing
module for older inmates to a module that housed younger and more violent offenders, but for his use of the
grievance process. The inmate had been approved for the detention center's Inmate Worker Program (IWP), also
known as the “trustee program.” Inmates in the trustee program received job assignments within the detention
center and were paid for each shift, with an opportunity to earn more for additional work. They also received a
number of privileges and incentives. They were housed in a trustee module and were eligible for late nights,
weekend contact visitation rewards, and access to popcorn, soda, and a movie player. One of inmate's work
assignments was in the kitchen, where inmates received extra food and may have one meal per work day in the
break room area. (Jackson County Detention Center, Missouri)
2014

U.S. District Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act

Ballard v. Johns, 17 F.Supp.3d 511 (E.D.N.C. 2014). A civil detainee being considered for certification as a
sexually dangerous person brought an action against federal employees, in their official capacities and in their
individual capacities under Bivens, challenging various conditions of his detention, including claims concerning
due process violations and inability to attend religious services. The employees moved to dismiss or for summary
judgment and the detainee moved to overrule objections to requests for document production. The district court
granted the employees’ motion and denied the detainee’s motion. The court held that: (1) the detainee did not
show that federal employees, by following Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) regulations and policies, violated his
constitutional rights; (2) the detainee was properly subjected to restrictions and disciplinary consequences of the
BOP commitment and treatment program; (3) denial of the detainee's request to attend or receive religious

34.47

services while in disciplinary segregation did not unduly burden his free exercise of religion; and (4) the
employees did not violate detainee's right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures by searching his cell
and seizing his property. (Federal Correctional Institution at Butner, North Carolina)
U.S. District Court
RELEASE
WORK STUDY

Castillo v. Bobelu, 1 F.Supp.3d 1190 (W.D.Okla. 2014). Five female inmates brought a § 1983 action against
state officials and employees, alleging they were subjected to sexual abuse while working outside a community
corrections center in which they were housed, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The inmates were
participating in the Prisoner Public Works Program (“PPWP”) that allowed offenders to work off-site at different
state offices. They were working during the day doing grounds maintenance at the Oklahoma Governor's
Mansion, where they were supervised by a groundskeeper and his immediate supervisor. When inmates work at
places such as the Governor's Mansion, the DOC does not have a guard stay with the women at the work site.
Instead, they are supervised by state workers employed at the work site, who function like guards. These
individuals go through an eight hour training program. The inmate claimed that they were sexually harassed and
sexually assaulted by the groundskeeper and by a cook employed at the Governor's Mansion. The defendants
moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that
summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to (1) whether prison guards were
deliberately indifferent. The court held that: (1) the prison district supervisor did not have knowledge of a
substantial risk of harm to the inmates because the supervisor did not know that the inmates were working only
with males while off-site; (2) the supervisor was not deliberately indifferent; (3) the prison supervising case
manager was not deliberately indifferent; and (4) there was no evidence that the employee had supervisory
authority over the inmate. The court noted that the inmate did not return to the work assignment where she was
allegedly abused by state employees or have contact with the alleged abusers, as required for the continuing
violation doctrine to apply to her § 1983 action that alleged violations of the Eighth Amendment. According to the
court, despite the supervisor being aware of misconduct by a groundskeeper under his supervision, the supervisor
was aware that the groundskeeper violated certain policies, but did not have knowledge of the sexual assaults, and
he investigated the groundskeeper's conduct and counseled the groundskeeper. The court also found that the
prison supervising case manager, who oversaw the off-site public works program, was not deliberately indifferent
to the excessive risk of sexual assaults of female inmates working at the governor's mansion as part of the
program, where the inmates did not complain to the manager and the manager was never informed of misconduct.
(Hillside Community Corrections Center, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma)

U.S. Appeals Court
HOBBIES
CRAFTS

Harrison v. Culliver, 746 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2014). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against prison
officials, relating to an inmate-on-inmate assault with a box cutter, and asserting an Eighth Amendment violation
based on deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm. The district court granted summary
judgment to the prison officials and denied the prisoner's motion to proceed in forma pauperis. The prisoner
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that: (1) past incidents of inmate-on-inmate violence
involving weapons did not constitute a substantial risk of serious harm; (2) the prison's policies for monitoring a
back hallway in which the prisoner was attacked did not create a substantial risk of serious harm; (3) lack of
oversight of the prison's hobby craft shop did not create a substantial risk of serious harm; and (4) prison officials
were not deliberately indifferent with respect to oversight of the hobby shop. (W.C. Holman Correctional Facility,
Alabama)

U.S. Appeals Court
DRUG
RELIGION

Jackson v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537 (8th Cir. 2014). A state prisoner brought an action against various state prison
officials, challenging the prison's drug treatment program as in violation of his free exercise rights under the First
Amendment. The district court dismissed the action. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and
remanded. The court held that the prisoner stated a § 1983 claim against prison officials for violation of his First
Amendment free exercise rights with allegations that he was an atheist, that he was required to attend and
complete a substance abuse treatment program that had religious components and invoked religious tenets in order
to be eligible for early parole, that due to the religious components of the program and the prison's failure to
transfer the prisoner to a secular treatment program, his choices were to withdraw from the program or remain
exposed to those religious elements. He chose to withdraw from the program, and was denied early release as a
result. The court found that the director of the state department of corrections (DOC) could be held personally
liable under § 1983 for the alleged violation of the atheist state prisoner's First Amendment free exercise rights,
where under Missouri law, the director was responsible for administering the treatment program, and establishing
rules and policies determining how, when, and where offenders could be admitted into or removed from the
treatment program. According to the court, the director of the prison's substance abuse treatment program could
be held personally liable under § 1983 for the alleged violation of the prisoner's First Amendment free exercise
rights, where the program director allegedly could have allowed the prisoner to avoid the religious portions of the
program, but still remain enrolled in the program. (Western Reception, Diagnostic, and Correctional Center,
Missouri)

U.S. District Court
SEX OFFENDER
TREATMENT PROGRAM
RIGHT TO TREATMENT
DUE PROCESS

Karsjens v. Jesson, 6 F.Supp.3d 916 (D.Minn. 2014). Patients who were civilly committed to the Minnesota Sex
Offender Program (MSOP) brought a § 1983 class action against officials, alleging various claims, including
failure to provide treatment, denial of the right to be free from inhumane treatment, and denial of the right to
religious freedom. The patients moved for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, and the officials moved to
dismiss. The district court granted the defendants’ motion in part and denied in part, and denied the plaintiffs’
motions. The court held that the patients’ allegations that commitment to MSOP essentially amounted to lifelong
confinement, equivalent to a lifetime of criminal incarceration in a facility resembling, and run like, a medium to
high security prison, sufficiently stated a § 1983 substantive due process claim pertaining to the punitive nature of
the patients' confinement. The court found that the patients’ allegations that, based on policies and procedures
created and implemented by state officials, patients spent no more than six or seven hours per week in treatment,
that their treatment plans were not detailed and individualized, that treatment staff was not qualified to treat sex

34.48

offenders, and that staffing levels were often far too low, sufficiently stated a § 1983 substantive due process
claim based on the officials' failure to provide adequate treatment. (Minnesota Sex Offender Program)
U.S. Appeals Court
EDUCATIONAL

Los Angeles Unified School Dist. v. Garcia, 741 F.3d 922 (9TH Cir. 2014). The question of who pays when a
student between the ages of 18 and 22 who is eligible for special education services in California and is
incarcerated in a county jail, was certified to the Supreme Court of California for the interpretation of the
California Education Code, section 56041. Reviewing the Supreme Court’s decision, the federal appeals court
held that the cost of the student's education is borne by the school district where the student's parent resides. (Los
Angeles County Sheriff's Department, County of Los Angeles, Los Angeles County Office of Education,
California Department of Education)

U.S. District Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
RIGHT TO TREATMENT

Meeks v. Schofield, 10 F.Supp.3d 774 (M.D.Tenn. 2014). A state prisoner, who allegedly suffered from paruresis,
a mental anxiety disorder that made it difficult to urinate without complete privacy, brought an action against the
Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Correction, its Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) officer, a
housing unit supervisor, a grievance board chairman, and a warden, asserting § 1983 claims for First Amendment
retaliation and violation of his right to privacy, and alleging violations of the ADA and Title VII. The defendants
moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the prisoner failed to
establish retaliation claims against the ADA officer, the housing unit supervisor, and the warden. The court found
that the prisoner, who was assisting other inmates with their legal work, was not engaged in “protected conduct,”
as required to establish a First Amendment retaliation claim against the housing unit supervisor, where the
prisoner was not authorized to help other inmates with legal work, and thus was in violation of department policy.
According to the court, the state prison's decision to remove exterior bathroom doors and refusal to put at least
one door back to accommodate the prisoner, who allegedly suffered from paruresis, a mental anxiety disorder that
made it difficult to urinate without complete privacy, was not intentionally discriminatory and did not violate the
ADA. The court held that the transfer of the prisoner to a medical housing unit did not result in denial of access to
prison programs and services available to the general population, so as to support an ADA claim of discrimination
on the basis of a perceived disability. The court noted that the transfer was intended to accommodate the prisoner's
complaints about bathroom doors being removed in the general housing unit, and the prisoner was allowed to
continue his prison job, have access to the law library, and participate in the same activities he was allowed to
participate in while he was housed with the general population. (Lois M. DeBerry Special Needs Facility,
Tennessee)

U.S. District Court
SEX OFFENDER
REQUIREMENTS

Reinhardt v. Kopcow, 66 F.Supp.3d 1348 (D.Colo. 2014). Inmates, parolees, and probationers, as well their
family members, brought a § 1983 action against various employees of the Colorado Department of Corrections
(CDOC) and members of the state’s Sex Offender Management Board, alleging that the state’s treatment of
persons convicted of sex crimes violated their rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment.
The plaintiffs sought monetary damages and injunctive and declaratory relief. The defendants moved to dismiss.
The district court granted the motion in part and a denied in part. The court held that the potential penalty
resulting from a Colorado policy that requires inmates in the state’s sex offender treatment program to admit to
prior acts, was so severe as to constitute compulsion to testify, and would violate their privilege against selfincrimination. The court noted that inmates who chose to participate in the program would be compelled to make
incriminating statements that could be used against them during any retrial. (Colorado Department of Corrections,
Sex Offender Management Board)

U.S. District Court
EQUAL PROTECTION
RELIGION

Richard v. Fischer, 38 F.Supp.3d 340 (W.D.N.Y. 2014). A multiracial Muslim inmate brought a civil rights action
alleging that prison officials and employees discriminated against him on the basis of race and religion and
retaliated against him for filing grievances. The officials moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district
court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that New York State Department of
Correctional Services (DOCS) employees were acting within scope of their employment, specifically, the duty of
assigning work positions to inmates, when they denied the multiracial Muslim inmate employment outside of his
cellblock. The court found that the inmate's allegations that no other inmate in the prison was “isolated by
programming” or restricted to an employment position in his or her cellblock, that the inmate was isolated to
programs in his cellblock, presumably because of his race and religion, and that prison employees tasked with
assigning work refused to place the inmate on a waiting list for his desired program, when waiting lists were open
to “all others,” sufficiently stated that the inmate was treated differently than similarly-situated individuals,
supporting the inmate's § 1983 claim that employees denied him equal protection by restricting him to
employment opportunities in his cellblock. (Five Points Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
EQUAL PROTECTION
PARITY MALE/FEMALE

Sassman v. Brown, 73 F.Supp.3d 1241 (E.D.Cal. 2014). A male prisoner filed a civil rights action against the
Governor of California and the Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR),
claiming violation of the Equal Protection Clause by exclusion of men from California’s Alternative Custody
Program (ACP). The California Penal Code allows only female inmates to participate in the voluntary ACP in lieu
of confinement in a state prison. The prisoner moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent continued exclusion
of male prisoners from ACP based on their gender. The district court denied the motion for an injunction. The
district court held that the prisoner had a likelihood of success on the merits of the claim, but that it was unlikely
that the prisoner could show irreparable harm absent an injunction. The prisoner had unsuccessfully applied to
participate in the ACP and was similarly situated to female state prisoners who applied and were approved.
According to the court, where the male prisoner met all gender-neutral eligibility criteria required by regulations
implementing the ACP, and assuming that female prisoners and their children would benefit more from ACP than
male prisoners and their children, perpetuated the stereotype that women were more fit to parent and more
important to their families than men. The court found that restricting applicants to only women state prisoners was
not substantially related to the important government interests of family reunification and community

34.49

reintegration, and thus, the male prisoner had a likelihood of success on the merits of his claim. (Alternative
Custody Program, California)
U.S. Appeals Court
SEX OFFENDER
DUE PROCESS
EQUAL PROTECTION
REHABILITATION

Stauffer v. Gearhart, 741 F.3d 574 (5th Cir. 2014). A state prisoner brought a civil rights action against prison
employees in their individual and official capacities, claiming that they violated his First Amendment rights by
confiscating his magazines under a Sex Offender Treatment Program (SOTP) rule, violated his due process rights
by failing to provide any meaningful review of a mailroom employee's decisions, and violated his equal protection
rights by applying the policy solely to inmates participating in the SOTP. The district court granted summary
judgment for the prison employees. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the
state prison's rule providing for confiscation of the magazines of prisoners in the Sex Offender Treatment Program
(SOTP) was neutral, as required to not violate the prisoner's free speech rights, despite not banning newspapers
and religious materials, since the purpose of the rule was to facilitate treatment and the prison did not have any
ulterior motive in promulgating the rule. According to the court, the rule was rationally related to the prison's
legitimate interest in sex-offender rehabilitation, as required to not violate the prisoner's free speech rights, since
the rule placed restrictions on reading material in order to facilitate treatment by preventing distractions. The court
noted that the magazines that the prisoner requested undermined the goals of the SOTP in the professional
judgments by prison officials tasked with overseeing program. According to the court, confiscation of the
magazines of the prisoner in the SOTP, pursuant to the rule, did not deprive the prisoner of due process, since the
prisoner could, and did, use the prison's grievance system to claim that he had been wrongly denied those
magazines, and prison administrators responded by investigating his claims and giving written justification that
explained why he was not entitled to relief. (Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Goree Unit)

U.S. District Court
SEX OFFENDER
REMOVAL FROM
PROGRAM
DUE PROCESS

Thomas v. Adams, 55 F.Supp.3d 552 (D.N.J. 2014). Civilly-committed sexually violent predators (SVP) brought
an action against corrections officials, and other defendants, challenging the adequacy of treatment after they were
transferred to a new facility for SVPs. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motions in
part and denied in part. The inmate’s claimed that he was diagnosed as a sexually violent predator (SVP) requiring
treatment, and after he was transferred to a different facility his prescribed amount of therapy was reduced, and
eventually denied without any mental health evaluation. The inmate alleged that the denials were based on his
placement in a segregated housing unit (SHU). The court held that the inmate sufficiently alleged a substantive
due process challenge against high-ranking, supervising corrections officers involved in the decision to transfer
SVPs to a new facility, despite the contention that the officials played no role in the inmate’s day-to-day affairs.
(New Jersey Sexually Violent Predator Act, Special Treatment Unit at East Jersey State Prison)
2015

U.S. District Court
ALCOHOL/DRUGS
RELEASE

Benedict v. Southwestern Pennsylvania Human Services, Inc., 98 F.Supp.3d 809 (W.D. Va. 2015). Parents of a
participant in a county drug treatment program brought an action against county defendants alleging state law
claims for negligence and wrongful death, and claims under § 1983 for violation of substantive due process rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment, and for deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The
participant had died from an overdose of heroin. Following removal to federal court, the defendants moved to
dismiss. The district court granted the motion. The court held that: (1) the participant’s intermittent custody did
not trigger Eighth Amendment protections; (2) the parents failed to allege that program operators were aware of
an excessive risk; (3) participation in the program did not create a special relationship that would impose a duty to
protect; and (4) the parents failed to allege a state created danger. The court noted that the participant was only
required to report to custody for three hours a day, he was able to live with his parents, and was able to engage in
any lawful activity he chose while not attending the program. (Westmoreland County Adult Probation/Parole
Office, Westmoreland County Jail, Pennsylvania)

U.S. Appeals Court
ALCOHOL/DRUG
RELIGION

Brooks v. Roy, 776 F.3d 957 (8th Cir. 2015). A Native American inmate brought an action against a state prison
official under § 1983, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), the American Indian
Religious Freedom Act (AIRFA), and the Minnesota Constitution. The inmate alleged that a required chemicaldependency program conflicted with his religious beliefs. The district court dismissed some claims and granted
summary judgment to the officials on the remaining claims. The inmate appealed. The court held that the inmate’s
complaint did not sufficiently put the officials on notice of the basis for his free exercise claims and give them
enough information to respond adequately to the allegations in the complaint. The court noted that the inmate’s
complaint never specified his Native American faith, his beliefs consistent with that faith, or how the available
program at his prison conflicted with his Native American beliefs. The inmate had received a chemicaldependency assessment, as all new inmates are required to have under Minnesota law, and was ordered to
complete treatment program in order to be transferred to a lower-security prison, qualify for work release, and
avoid disciplinary sanctions. (Minnesota Correctional Facility, Faribault)

U.S. District Court
I.D.E.A.- Individuals with
Disabilities Educ. Act
EQUAL PROTECTION

Buckley v. State Correctional Institution-Pine Grove, 98 F.Supp.3d 704 (M.D. Pa. 2015). A state prisoner, a
young adult offender, brought an action alleging that a prison had violated the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (IDEA) by failing to provide him with a free appropriate public education, and appealing a ruling
to the contrary by an administrative hearing officer. The parties filed cross motions for judgment on the
supplemented administrative record. The district court held that the prison violated IDEA, and the prison was
required to provide compensatory education as a remedy. The court noted that the prison failed to make a
particularized determination that the security interest specific to the prisoner could not otherwise be
accommodated, by effectively nullifying the prisoner’s individualized education program (IEP), and by not
providing a free appropriate public education. After placing the prisoner in restrictive housing in response to the
prisoner’s assaultive behavior and rules violations, the prison did not modify the prisoner’s IEP, but instead
merely applied a blanket policy requiring all prisoners in restrictive housing to receive in-cell instruction only,

34.50

using non-individualized “self-study” packets and with access to a teacher only once or twice a week through a
locked solid metal door in a cacophonously loud housing unit. (SCI–Pine Grove, Pennsylvania)
U.S. Appeals Court
EDUCATIONAL

Childress v. Walker, 787 F.3d 433 (7th Cir. 2015). A state prisoner brought an action under § 1983 alleging that
administrators and individuals affiliated with a correctional center violated his rights under the Eighth
Amendment and the Due Process Clause. The district court dismissed the action and the prisoner appealed. The
appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that the prisoner stated a claim for relief under the Eighth
Amendment with allegations that the prison administrator knew that conditions of his mandatory release included
a ban on computer-related material, but nevertheless instituted, condoned, or willfully turned a blind eye to the
practice that placed computer-related material among his possessions. The court also found that the district court
had to determine, upon the prisoner’s motion for appointment of counsel, whether the prisoner, from the confines
of his present institutional situation, could adequately investigate and articulate, in accordance with established
practices of § 1983 liability, familiarity of each defendant with the practices of the educational program that
placed computer-related material among his possessions, even though the conditions of his mandatory release
included a ban on computer-related material. (Big Muddy River Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEGREGATION

Incumaa v. Stirling, 791 F.3d 517 (4th Cir. 2015). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against the acting director of
a state department of corrections, alleging violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA) and Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process in his placement in solitary confinement for 20
year following his participation in a riot. The inmate was a member of the Nation of Gods and Earths (“NOGE”),
also known as the “Five Percenters.” Prison policy required the inmate to renounce his affiliation with NOGE as a
condition of being released from segregation. The inmate asserted that NOGE was a religion and that he was
being asked to renounce his religion in order to be released from solitary confinement, in violation of RLUIPA.
The district court granted the director’s motion for summary judgment and the inmate appealed. The appeals court
affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The appeals court held that the prison policy did not force the
inmate to choose between continued adherence to his religion or release from solitary confinement. But the court
held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the prison’s review
process for inmates in solitary confinement was adequate. The court noted that the inmate was subject to neardaily cavity and strip searches, he was confined to a small cell for all sleeping and waking hours, aside from 10
hours of activity outside the cell per month, he was denied educational, vocational, and therapy programs, the
inmate was socially isolated, and confinement was indefinite. (South Carolina Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
REHABILITATION
EDUCATIONAL
SEGREGATION

Linton v. O’Brien, 142 F.Supp.3d 215 (D. Mass. 2015). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against the
Commissioner of the Massachusetts Department of Corrections and prison officials, alleging that prison personnel
violated his due process, equal protection, and 8th Amendment rights by not providing rehabilitative educational
programs that awarded good time credits. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion,
dismissing the complaint. The court held that prison officials' refusal to allow the inmate, who was housed in a
disciplinary unit, an opportunity to participate in educational and rehabilitative programs in order to earn good
time credits to reduce his sentence, did not violate the inmate's due process rights. According to the court, the
inmate did not demonstrate that the officials' exercise of discretion to not provide good time credit opportunities to
inmates in a disciplinary unit constituted an imposition of an atypical and significant hardship not normally within
range of confinement expected for an inmate serving an indeterminate term. The court noted that the exercise of
discretion by the Department of Corrections in imposing different classifications upon inmates, with respect to
restricting the ability of an inmate housed in a prison disciplinary unit to earn good time credits to reduce his
sentence, did not lack a rational basis, was not otherwise based on suspect classification, and thus did not violate
the inmate's equal protection rights. The court found that the DOC had a legitimate public purpose in allocating
limited resources available for earned good time credit programs to inmates who were motivated to make best use
of them by improving their chances for successful return to society and as an inducement to control and reduce
those inmates' tendencies towards violence. (MCI—Cedar Junction, Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
HANDICAPPED

Pierce v. District of Columbia, 128 F.Supp.3d 250 (D.D.C. 2015). A deaf inmate who communicated with
American Sign Language (ASL), but who had been forced to communicate with staff and other inmates only
through lip-reading and written notes due to the lack of an interpreter to assist him, filed suit against the District of
Columbia alleging discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and
the Rehabilitation Act. Both sides moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the inmate’s motion in
part and denied the defendant’s motion. The court held that: (1) the prison had affirmative duty to evaluate the
newly incarcerated deaf inmate's accommodation requirements, and its failure to do so denied the inmate benefits
under the Rehabilitation Act and ADA; (2) the prison was deliberately indifferent to the deaf inmate's need
for accommodation, as would support an award of compensatory damages; and (3) summary judgment was
precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the prison had placed the inmate in protective custody,
and kept him there, because of the inmate's constant requests for accommodation. The court noted that the
inmate's need for accommodation was obvious, in that the inmate did not speak and communicated only through
American Sign Language (ASL), and the prison was required to identify precise limitations resulting from the
disability and potential reasonable accommodations by way of an interactive assessment of the inmate. According
to the court, the inmate's request for an American Sign Language (ASL) interpreter to assist him during anger
management and substance abuse classes was sufficient to put the prison on notice that deaf inmate might need a
similar accommodation to communicate effectively in other prison situations, such as in inmate programs, hall
meetings, the orientation process, protective custody proceedings, graphic arts class, and medical consultations.
(Correctional Treatment Facility, District of Columbia)

34.51

U.S. District Court
JUVENILES
ADMINISTRATIVE
SEGREGATION
EDUCATIONAL

Turner v. Palmer, 84 F.Supp.3d 880 (S.D.Iowa 2015). A 16-year-old who had been adjudicated delinquent and
who had prior psychiatric hospitalizations, brought an action against the operators of a state-run juvenile home
under § 1983 for violations of her due process rights under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, based
on the alleged systematic and excessive use of cement-walled isolation cells. The defendants moved to dismiss.
The district court denied the motion, finding that the juvenile stated a claim for due process violations and alleged
a continuing violation. The facility had several small cement isolation cells, labeled Quiet Rooms, Safety Rooms,
Comfort Rooms, and the Special Unit. The prisoner alleged that she spent numerous consecutive weeks locked in
isolation cells, spending 289 out of the 528 days she was at the facility in isolation. She claimed she was only
given one thin mat to sleep on, was only permitted to exit the cell to use the restroom; and during many of these
stays, she was not allowed any homework, classroom instruction, reading material, or outside communication.
(Iowa Juvenile Home, Toledo, Iowa)

34.52

XIX

XIX

XIX

XIX

make sure that the material was available for the prisoner's review in preparation for his trial, and the prisoner's defense
was in no way impaired as a result of having the material temporarily confiscated; (2) the alleged wrongful disciplinary
isolation imposed against the prisoner for possessing the legal material did not violate prisoner's right to due process; (3)
the sheriff had qualified immunity where the prisoner failed to show that the sheriff actually participated in acts that
allegedly deprived prisoner of his constitutional rights, formulated a policy of tolerating such violations, or was
deliberately indifferent; but (4) a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether a prison director, captain, and
deputy superintendent were personally involved in acts that allegedly deprived the prisoner of his constitutional rights,
precluding summary judgment for those officials on basis of qualified immunity. (Plymouth County Correctional
Facility, Massachusetts)
U.S. Appeals Court
STAMPS

Johnson v. Goord, 445 F.3d 532 (2nd Cir. 2006). An inmate brought a civil rights action against prison officials, challenging a regulation governing possession of stamps. The district court entered judgment in favor of the officials and
inmate appealed. The appeals court held that the inmate did not have a constitutional right to unlimited free postage for
non-legal mail, and the regulation was reasonably related to legitimate penological interests, and thus did not violate the
inmate's First Amendment right to send outgoing non-legal mail. The prison regulation prevented certain inmates in
keeplock from receiving stamps through the mail and permitted them to receive only one free stamp per month for personal use. The court noted that stamps could be used by inmates as a form of currency, and the regulation furthered the
legitimate goals of reducing thefts, disputes, and unregulated prisoner transactions. (New York State Department of
Correctional Services)

U.S. District Court
CROWDING

Jones v. Goord, 435 F.Supp.2d 221 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). Inmates brought an action against New York prison officials,
challenging the double-celling policy at maximum-security prisons. Double-celling is a practice in which two prisoners
are housed in a cell originally designed for one person. The complaint was filed in 1995, and was effectively stayed for
some time pending litigation of a companion case challenging the same practice in medium security prisons. After a
full trial on the merits, the district court in the medium security case denied the plaintiffs any relief. The district court
dismissed all of the inmates’ class claims, but reserved decisions on individual plaintiffs' claims for damages under the
Eighth Amendment and the First Amendment. The court held that the practice of double-celling, and the undesirable
conditions allegedly created by double-celling of inmates, including facts that inmates were forced to sleep near a toilet,
were exposed to cellmates' odors, and kept excess personal property in their cells, did not violate the Eighth
Amendment. (New York Department of Correctional Services)

U.S. District Court
CONFISCATION
LEGAL MATERIAL

Shidler v. Moore, 409 F.Supp.2d 1060 (N.D.Ind. 2006). A prisoner brought a pro se action against prison officials under
§ 1983 and Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), alleging denial of his rights to worship, to
petition for redress of grievances, and to have access to courts. The prisoner requested a preliminary injunction and the
district court denied the request. The court ruled that prison officials' alleged actions of denying the prisoner access to a
law library, denying him the ability to make copies, and confiscating his legal materials, if proven, did not violate his
constitutional right of access to courts, in that he could write to the court and thus could file a complaint, he could send
an original document and state that he was unable to obtain copies, and he did not maintain that unreturned legal papers
were not replaceable. The court noted that there is no abstract, freestanding right to a law library, and a prisoners'
constitutional right of access to courts goes no further than access. The court found that the confiscation of a prisoner's
legal paperwork is merely a property loss, not a denial of the constitutional right of access to courts, if the papers are
replaceable. (Miami Correctional Facility, Indiana)

U.S. District Court
INMATE FUNDS

Sickles v. Campbell County, Kentucky, 439 F.Supp.2d 751 (E.D.Ky. 2006). Inmates, former inmates, and relatives and
friends of inmates brought a § 1983 action against counties, alleging that the methods used by the counties to collect fees
imposed on prisoners for the cost of booking and incarceration violated the Due Process Clause. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court held that the Kentucky statute authorizing county
jailers to adopt prisoner fee and expense reimbursement policies did not require that prisoners be sentenced before fees
could be imposed, and that due process did not require a pre-deprivation hearing before prison fees were assessed.
According to the court, the First Amendment rights of non-prisoners who contributed funds to prisoners' accounts were
not violated. The court noted that the statute authorized jails to begin to impose fees, and to deduct them from prisoners'
canteen accounts, as soon as prisoners' were booked into the jail. (Campbell County and Kenton County, Kentucky)

U.S. Appeals Court
LIMITATIONS
INMATE FUNDS

Steffey v. Orman, 461 F.3d 1218 (10th Cir. 2006). A state prisoner filed a § 1983 civil rights complaint against prison
officials, alleging that they deprived him of his property in violation of his constitutional due process rights when they
confiscated a money order sent to him. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the
prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the prison regulation prohibiting an inmate from receiving
money from family members of any other inmate was a valid restriction on the inmate's right to receive money from
certain outside sources. The court found that the prisoner did not have a legitimate claim of entitlement to the $50 money
order sent to him by the mother of another inmate mother. (Oklahoma State Penitentiary)
2007

U.S. District Court
CONFISCATION

Greybuffalo v. Kingston, 581 F.Supp.2d 1034 (W.D.Wis. 2007). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action for declaratory
and injunctive relief, challenging, on First Amendment grounds, prison officials' actions in confiscating two documents
as “gang literature” and disciplining him for possessing the documents. One document was a publication of the
“American Indian Movement” (AIM). The other was a code of conduct for a prisoner group that was created to enable
“self-protection of Native Americans.” The court held that interpreting the prison regulation to prohibit inmates from
possessing literature of any group that had not been sanctioned by prison officials was an exaggerated response to
legitimate security interests that violated the First Amendment. The court found that the history of the civil rights
organization referenced in the seized document did not permit the reasonable conclusion that the inmate's possession of
the document implicated a legitimate interest in preventing gang activity or prison security. The court ordered the

35.35
XXI

expungement from prison records of the finding that the inmate's possession of the document violated prison rules. The
court held that officials could reasonably conclude that the inmate's possession of a code of conduct for a prisoner group
that was created to enable “self-protection” of Native American prisoners could lead to future security problems and that
the officials did not violate the inmate's free speech rights when it prohibited and disciplined the inmate for possessing
the code of conduct. (Waupun Correctional Institution, Wisconsin)
U.S. District Court
DISPOSITION OF
FUNDS

Samonte v. Frank, 517 F.Supp.2d 1238 (D.Hawai’i 2007). A prisoner, who had filed several civil rights actions, moved
to have funds withdrawn from his prison trust account sequentially, rather than simultaneously, to satisfy court orders
granting him in forma pauperis (IFP) status and directing collection and payment of filing fees. The district court denied
the motion. The court held that indigent prisoners are required to pay filing fees on a per case basis, rather than per
prisoner basis, and that per case payments did not burden the prisoner's constitutional right of meaningful access to the
courts. The court noted that the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) filing fee provision requiring indigent prisoners to
make monthly payments of 20 percent of the preceding month's income should be applied by simultaneously collecting
fees for all of a prisoner's outstanding cases, as long as a minimum of $10 remains in the prisoner's account. (Hawai’i)

U.S. District Court
LIMITATION

Sanders v. Ryan, 484 F.Supp.2d 1028 (D.Ariz. 2007). A hearing-impaired inmate brought a civil rights action against a
prison official and the State of Arizona, claiming his rights were violated under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), the First Amendment, Arizona civil rights laws, and the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court held that a prison official's
refusal to give the prisoner, who listened to audiotapes of Baptist church services as part of his faith, two new tapes
unless he exchanged two tapes already in his possession to be destroyed, rather than stored, did not “substantially burden” the prisoner's exercise of his religion, as required to establish a violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The inmate had alleged that such conduct violated a state statute requiring the return of
authorized inmate property to the inmate upon his release. The court noted that the new tapes were not authorized, as the
prisoner already had the maximum number of tapes allowed, and the prisoner failed to show that he was unable to practice his religion absent receipt of the new tapes. According to the court, the state department of corrections policy of
limiting property an inmate could possess in his cell or in storage did not violate the rights of prisoners under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), where the policy served the “compelling governmental
interest” of enhancing the safety and security of prison facilities. The court found that the policy was the “least restrictive means” available to accommodate the government's compelling interests in safety and security. The court noted that
the inmate was permitted to practice his religion by engaging in personal Bible study and prayer, receiving pastoral visits
from an accredited minister, and listening to religious tapes. The inmate was able to mail excess religious tapes back to
the church in exchange for new ones, and the inmate did not suggest an alternative that was less restrictive but which
would accommodate the State's interests of safety and security. (Arizona Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
DISPOSITION OF
FUNDS
INMATE FUNDS

Sickles v. Campbell County, Kentucky, 501 F.3d 726 (6th Cir. 2007). Inmates, former inmates, and relatives and friends
of inmates brought a § 1983 action against two counties, challenging methods used by the counties to collect fees
imposed on prisoners for the cost of booking and incarceration. The district court entered summary judgment for the
counties and the plaintiffs appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the county was not required under
the Due Process Clause to grant a pre-deprivation hearing to inmates prior to withholding a portion of money from their
canteen accounts to pay the costs of booking, room, and board. The court found that the relatives lacked a property
interest in the money they sent to inmates and that the counties did not violate the free speech rights of relatives of
inmates in withholding money. According to the court, the county inmates had a property interest protected by the Due
Process Clause in money withheld from their canteen accounts to pay the costs of booking, room, and board, but the
county was not required under the Due Process Clause to grant a pre-deprivation hearing to inmates prior to withholding
money from their canteen accounts where the amounts withheld were small, the risk of erroneous deprivation was minor
in that withholding involved elementary accounting and was non-discretionary, the potential benefits of a hearing were
small, and the government's interests of sharing costs and furthering offender accountability were substantial. The court
also found that the county did not violate the free speech rights of relatives of inmates in withholding a portion of money
that relatives had sent to the inmates for their canteen accounts, notwithstanding that if the money had not been withheld
the inmates might have spent it making telephone calls. (Campbell County and Kenton County, Kentucky)

U.S. District Court
DISPOSITION OF
FUNDS

Ward v. Stewart, 511 F.Supp.2d 981 (D.Ariz. 2007). A state inmate brought a pro se § 1983 action alleging violations of
his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights based on corrections officials' withholding of a portion of his wages for
“gate-money.” After dismissal of the inmate's claim was reversed by an appeals court, a partial summary judgment for
the corrections officials was granted. A supplemental briefing was ordered as to inmate's request for injunctive relief.
The district court denied the request for injunctive relief. The court found that the inmate had a constitutionally protected
property interest in his wages, based on an Arizona statute creating a cognizable property interest in inmate wages for
purposes of his action alleging that corrections officials violated his rights under the Takings Clause. The court
concluded that corrections officials did not violate the inmate's rights under the Takings Clause by withholding a portion
of his wages for “gate-money.” The court found that even though the money was the inmate's private property,
prison inmates forfeit all right to possess, control or dispose of private property. The court also held that state correction
officials did not act arbitrarily in withholding a portion of the inmate's wages for “gate-money” even though he was
serving a life sentence, and therefore he was not deprived of due process. The court noted that the withholding was
intended to promote public welfare and the common good, and that it was not arbitrary since the inmate might be able to
obtain release prior to the end of his life and if not, the money would be used to pay costs associated with his cremation
or other expenses. (Arizona Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
CONFISCATION
PROHIBITED
PROPERTY

Wesolowski v. Sullivan, 524 F.Supp.2d 251 (W.D.N.Y. 2007). An inmate in the custody of the New York State
Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) brought a § 1983 action against DOCS employees alleging his
constitutional rights were violated while he was confined at a correctional facility when employees confiscated
fundraising materials. The employees moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court
held that the inmate failed to comply with the Prison Litigation Reform Act's exhaustion requirement by never appealing

35.36
XXI

the denial of a grievance filed with the Inmate Grievance Resolution Committee (IGRC) to Central Office Review
Committee (CORC). The court found that the confiscation of materials describing how someone could conduct a
political fundraising event to benefit Families Against Mandatory Minimums (FAMM) did not violate the inmate's
rights under the First Amendment, considering the possibilities for abuse that would have arisen if inmates were
freely allowed to engage in fundraising from fellow inmates. According to the court, the restriction and regulation
of such activities by prisoners was unquestionably a legitimate penological interest, and it was uncontroverted that
the inmate did not follow established procedures for obtaining authorization to engage in such activities. The court
noted that even assuming the employees' actions in confiscating the materials violated the inmate's First
Amendment rights, the employees were entitled to qualified immunity, as no authority had clearly established the
inmate's First Amendment right to possess the materials in question at the time of events giving rise to lawsuit.
(New York State Department of Correctional Services)
U.S. Appeals Court
INMATE FUNDS

Whitington v. Ortiz, 472 F.3d 804 (10th Cir. 2007). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action alleging his rights
were violated by the denial of access to free hygiene items. The district court dismissed the action and the prisoner
appealed. The appeals court held that the prison’s failure to timely respond to the prisoner’s Step Three grievance
regarding access to hygiene products established that the prisoner exhausted his available administrative remedies,
as required by PLRA. A Step 3 grievance requires the prison to respond within 45 days. 196 days after he filed his
Step 3 grievance he still had not received a response and then filed suit. The court held that the prisoner’s
elaboration on the way the prison’s policies caused him to suffer dental problems satisfied his obligation to state an
injury to support his Eighth Amendment claim but did not equate to a delay in dental treatment claim. The prisoner
contended that he was unable to pay for hygiene items out of his prison income after the prison debits his prison
account to pay for restitution, medical care, legal photocopies, and legal postage. (Colorado Department of
Corrections)
2008

U.S. District Court
LEGAL MATERIAL
LIMITATIONS

Atwell v. Lavan, 557 F.Supp.2d 532 (M.D.Pa. 2008). A state inmate brought a pro se § 1983 action against prison
employees, probation and parole board members and medical personnel, alleging he was denied access to courts in
violation of the First Amendment. The district court held that the inmate’s allegation that he was denied access to
court because he was not provided with free photocopies and postage failed to state a claim under the First
Amendment. The court found that the allegation that the inmate was denied access to the courts because he was
denied access to stored legal material failed to state a claim under the First Amendment. The court noted that the
inmate was allowed access to his stored materials in exchange for a like number of items from his cell, and prison
staff did not care which of the inmate's items were in his cell as long as he kept within the allowed limit of items.
(State Correctional Institution at Dallas, Pennsylvania)

U.S. Appeals Court
INMATE FUNDS

Burns v. PA Dept. of Correction, 544 F.3d 279 (3rd Cir. 2008). An inmate brought a § 1983 due process claim
against a state department of corrections and prison officials arising out of the prison's disciplinary proceedings.
The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and the inmate appealed. The appeals
court reversed and remanded. The court held that as a matter of first impression, the department of corrections'
assessment of the inmate's institutional account, even absent an attempt to deduct funds from it, constituted a
deprivation of a protected property interest for the purposes of procedural due process. The court found that the
Department of Corrections' voluntary promise to refrain from the future seizure of funds from the inmate's account,
in a letter submitted more than three years after it originally assessed that account for medical and other fees, did
not render the inmate's appeal of his procedural due process claim moot. The court noted that the alleged violation
was complete at the moment the inmate was deprived of a property interest without being afforded the requisite
process, and, if proven, would entitle the inmate to at least an award of nominal damages. The inmate had been
disciplined for assaulting another inmate and he lost his prison job, good time credits, and was assessed for medical
costs for the inmate who was injured. (SCI-Graterford, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
CONFISCATION
LEGAL MATERIAL

Frazier v. Diguglielmo, 640 F.Supp.2d 593 (E.D.Pa. 2008). A prisoner brought an action against several prison
officers and supervisors, alleging that the defendants violated his rights by interfering with his mail and seizing
legal materials from his cell. The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court granted
the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the prisoner's bare allegation, that prison officials' seizure
of a writ of coram nobis “obstructed” his right to “petition the government for redress of grievances,” was
insufficient to allege the infringement of an exercise of a First Amendment right of access to the courts to secure
judicial relief, as required to state a claim for violation of the right of access. The court noted that the prisoner did
not describe the contents of the writ or the judgment he sought to challenge, nor did the prisoner allege or even
allude to any prejudice in any legal action caused by the writ's confiscation. The court found that the prisoner's
allegation that prison officials seized legal documents relating to his criminal and habeas cases was insufficient to
state a claim for violation of First Amendment right of access to the courts, absent an allegation that the alleged
seizure caused him prejudice in a legal challenge to his conviction or to his conditions of confinement. The court
held that the question of whether prison officials' confiscation of the prisoner's Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)
related materials violated free speech could not be resolved on a motion to dismiss, in light of a fact issue as to
whether the confiscation was an exaggerated response to a legitimate penological concern, which was based on the
officials' belief that such materials would be used to file fraudulent liens. (State Correctional Institution at
Graterford, Pennsylvania)

35.37

U.S. District Court
DISPOSITION OF
FUNDS

Johnson v. Ozmint, 567 F.Supp.2d 806 (D.S.C. 2008). A state prison inmate brought a state court § 1983 action
against the director of a state's department of corrections, alleging improper debiting of his trust account to pay for
legal copies and postage, improper classification, improper conditions of confinement, and denial of rehabilitative
opportunities. The director removed the action to federal court. The district court granted summary judgment for
the director and remanded. The court held that the state corrections department's policy of debiting prison inmates'
trust accounts to cover the cost of all legal correspondence did not infringe upon theinmate's right of access to
courts under the Due Process Clause, where the inmate was not denied the use of a writing instrument, paper or
postage for legal mail. The court noted that the department had provided notice of its policy to debit accounts for
the costs of such correspondence, the department had a compelling interest in maintaining an orderly assessment
process, the inmate could contest any allegedly erroneous assessment via the prison grievance process, and the state
offered an adequate post-deprivation remedy. (South Carolina Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONFISCATION
LEGAL MATERIAL
PROHIBITED
PROPERTY

Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198 (3rd Cir. 2008). Prisoners brought a § 1983 action against various prison employees
alleging their constitutional rights were violated when legal materials were confiscated. The district court granted
the defendants' motion to dismiss and their motion for summary judgment. The prisoners appealed. The appeals
court affirmed. The court held that the prisoners failed to state a claim for denial of right of access to courts. The
court held that the prisoners, claiming that prison officials confiscated all of their legal materials including legal
briefs and reference books, failed to state a claim for denial of right of access to courts, absent specific facts
demonstrating that underlying claims were non-frivolous or that underlying claims could no longer be pursued as a
result of the officials' actions. The court found that a rational nexus existed between the prison's penological
interest in preventing prisoners from filing fraudulent liens against public officials and a prison regulation
designating legal materials related to the filing of fraudulent liens as contraband, for the purpose of determining
whether the regulation violated the First Amendment. The court noted that a prisoner had filed a fraudulent lien
against a state court judge, officials had recovered partially completed financing statement and forms from the
prisoners under the regulation, and fraudulent liens were easy to file but burdensome to remove. According to the
court, the regulation did not prevent inmates from exercising their First Amendment right to possess publications
and legal materials because inmates still had available to them a wide range of legal materials and publications that
did not pertain to the filing of fraudulent liens. The court also noted that the prisoners were afforded a meaningful
post-deprivation remedy after prison officials confiscated legal materials related to the filing of fraudulent liens,
and thus the prisoners' Due Process rights were not violated. A grievance procedure was available to prisoners,
prisoners were given three opportunities to review materials and receive back non-contraband items, and prisoners
had a chance to give a legitimate, non-contraband reason for possessing the materials. (State Correctional Institute
at Graterford, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
DISPOSITION OF
PROPERTY

Nevada Dept of Corrections v. Cohen, 581 F.Supp.2d 1085 (D.Nev. 2008). The Nevada Department of Corrections
(DOC) brought an action against inmates, seeking declaratory judgment that its ban on the personal possession of
typewriters by inmates was constitutional. The DOC moved for summary judgment and the district court granted
the motion. The court held that the ban: (1) was reasonably related to legitimate penological interests; (2) did not
infringe upon inmates' right of access to courts; (3) reasonably advanced legitimate correctional goals; and (4) was
not an unconstitutional “taking” where the prison regulated property that prisoners could legitimately possess while
incarcerated and offered options to dispose of the property, and prisoners were not deprived of all economically
beneficial use of typewriters. The court noted that prison officials had determined that possession of typewriters
aided the ability of inmates to breach safety and security due to the potential use of typewriter parts as weapons.
According to the court, since inmates were not required to file typewritten documents with courts, there was no
evidence of actual injury or that the ban would foreclose any meaningful opportunities for inmates to pursue
claims. (Nevada Dept. of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONFISCATION
DISPOSITION OF
PROPERTY

Parrott v. U.S., 536 F.3d 629 (7th Cir. 2008). A federal inmate brought an action against the Bureau of Prisons
(BOP) and several of its employees under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), alleging the employees negligently
handled his personal property and failed to protect him from being attacked by another inmate. The inmate had
been stabbed 22 times in the head and arm by another inmate and he was hospitalized for two weeks. The district
court granted summary judgment for the government and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part,
vacated and remanded in part. The court held that the confiscation of the inmate's property, followed by sending
such property to the inmate's sister, was a “detention” for the purposes of the exception to liability under the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) for claims arising from detention of goods by a law enforcement officer. The
court found that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a former
separation order was in effect between the inmate and another inmate who attacked him. The court noted that if a
valid separation order is in effect between inmates, prison staff have no discretion in enforcing such an order, and
violation of the order will not be sheltered from liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). (U.S.
Penitentiary, Terre Haute, Indiana)

U.S. District Court
CONFISCATION
LEGAL MATERIAL

Rollins v. Magnusson, 542 F.Supp.2d 114 (D.Me. 2008). An inmate sued multiple defendants, alleging they were
responsible for the confiscation of his legal briefs and research notes stored on prison-owned hard drives and backup diskettes, in violation of his right of access to the courts. The district court held that the alleged confiscation did
not impede his ability to litigate his appeal to such an extent that it impacted the outcome of the appeal, as required
for an “actual injury” supporting his claim that he was denied his right of access to the courts. The court noted that
his complaint was that he was having difficulty complying with deadlines because of impaired vision/medical
conditions, and while he may not have had as much access to his legal materials as he wanted in the form he
wanted, he was able to see his appeal through and obtain a ruling on the merits. (Maine State Prison)

35.38

U.S. Appeals Court
CONFISCATION
LEGAL MATERIAL

U.S. v. Gabaldon, 522 F.3d 1121 (10th Cir. 2008). After a federal prisoner’s conviction for second-degree murder
and kidnapping resulting in death were affirmed, he moved for post conviction relief. The district court dismissed
the motion and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. The court held that confiscation of
the prisoner's legal materials constituted extraordinary circumstances, where the prisoner exercised requisite due
diligence by requesting the materials after they were seized. According to the court, confiscation of the prisoner's
legal materials upon his entry into disciplinary segregation, just six weeks before the expiration of the limitations
period on his post conviction relief claim, and the holding of such materials until two weeks after the limitations
period expired, constituted extraordinary circumstances for the purposes of equitable tolling of the one-year limitations period on the prisoner's post conviction relief petition. (New Mexico)
2009

U.S. District Court
LEGAL MATERIAL
LIMITATIONS
PROHIBITED
PROPERTY

Cox v. Ashcroft, 603 F.Supp.2d 1261 (E.D.Cal. 2009). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against the United States
Attorney General, several federal prosecutors, and the owner and employees of a privately-owned federal facility in
which the prisoner was incarcerated, alleging constitutional violations arising from his arrest, prosecution, and
incarceration. The district court dismissed the action. The court held that the prisoner did not have any Fourth
Amendment rights to privacy in his cell, and thus did not suffer any constitutional injury as a result of the search of
his cell and the confiscation of another inmate's legal materials. The court found that the prisoner did not have any
liberty or property interest in employment while in prison, and thus the prisoner did not suffer any violation of his
due process right related to his termination from his prison job as a result of discipline arising from the search of
his cell, precluding liability on the part of facility owner and its employees under § 1983. According to the court,
the prison facility's imposition of a 30-day suspension of the prisoner's telephone privileges related to a disciplinary
action arising from the search of his cell and the confiscation of another inmates' legal papers, did not constitute an
unreasonable limitation on the prisoner's First Amendment rights. The court noted that prisoners have a First
Amendment right to telephone access, subject to reasonable limitations. The court found that regulations at a privately-owned federal prison facility prohibiting the prisoner from having the legal papers of another inmates in his
cell did not chill the prisoner's exercise of his First Amendment right to provide legal assistance to fellow inmates,
thus precluding liability on the part of the prison and its employees in the prisoner's § 1983 action alleging First
Amendment retaliation. The court noted that the regulations reflected a legitimate penological objective in regulating when and where such assistance was provided. (Taft Corr'l Inst., Wackenhut Corrections Corp., California)

U.S. District Court
DISPOSITION OF
PROPERTY
LEGAL MATERIAL

Cusamano v. Sobek, 604 F.Supp.2d 416 (N.D.N.Y. 2009). A former state prisoner brought a pro se action against
department of corrections employees, alleging violation of his First, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights as
well as the New York Constitution. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants in part, and
denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact regarding
whether a corrections officer was present during, and participated in, the alleged assault of the prisoner. The court
noted that an officer's failure to intervene during another officer's use of excessive force can itself constitute excessive force. The court also held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact regarding
whether excessive force was used against the prisoner. The court found that a corrections officer's failure to include the prisoner's legal documents in the prisoner's personal items when the prisoner was transferred to a special
housing unit was unintentional and did not cause the prisoner to be prejudiced during legal proceedings, as required
for the prisoner's First Amendment denial of access to courts claim against the officer. (Gouverneur Correctional
Facility, Clinton Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
CONFISCATION
LEGAL MATERIAL
SEARCHES

Proctor v. Applegate, 661 F.Supp.2d 743 (E.D.Mich. 2009). State prisoners brought a § 1983 action against Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) employees and multiple prison facilities, alleging violations of their constitutional rights. The defendants moved to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds and for failure to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held
that state prison regulations which permitted the confiscation of certain types of mail and prohibited “copyrighting”
of names served a legitimate and neutral government purpose, and thus did not violate the prisoners' constitutional
rights. The court held that allegations in the prisoner's complaint that an MDOC employee would frequently shake
down his cell looking for prohibited Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) materials, and that the employee would
leave the cell in disarray, failed to state a § 1983 claim against the employee for violation of the prisoner's constitutional rights, given that the prisoner failed to even allege that any legal materials were confiscated. According to the
court, an employee's rejection of the prisoner's letters to nine state senators and representatives because the prisoner
did not pay for postage and because the letters did not qualify as legal mail, as they were not addressed to a court,
attorney, or a party to a lawsuit, did not implicate the prisoner's constitutional rights. (Mich. Dept. of Corrections)
2010

U.S. District Court
CONFISCATION

Antonetti v. Skolnik, 748 F.Supp.2d 1201 (D.Nev. 2010). A prisoner, proceeding pro se, brought a § 1983 action
against various prison officials, alleging various constitutional claims, including violations of the First, Fifth, Sixth,
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court dismissed in part. The court held that the prisoner's allegations were factually sufficient to state a colorable § 1983 claim that prison officials violated the Eighth Amendment
by depriving him of needed medical care. The prisoner alleged that he was housed in segregation/isolation, leading
to a mental health breakdown, and: (1) that he was seen by mental health professionals eight times over a five year
period instead of every 90 days as required by administrative regulations; (2) that mental health professionals recommended he pursue art and music for his mental health but that prison officials denied him the materials; (3) and
that the officials' actions resulted in the need to take anti-psychotic and anti-depression medications due to suffering
from bouts of aggression, extreme depression, voices, paranoia, hallucinations, emotional breakdowns and distress,
unreasonable fear, and systematic dehumanization. The court found that the prisoner's allegations were factually
sufficient to state a colorable § 1983 claim for a violation of his First Amendment right of access to courts, where

35.39

the prisoner alleged that he was housed in segregation for several years and was repeatedly denied materials such as
books, paper, pens and envelopes, as well as assistance from a law clerk. According to the court, the prisoner's
allegations that officials deprived him of incoming mail without notice and without a post-deprivation remedy were
factually sufficient to state a § 1983 claim under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The court found that the
prisoner's allegations were sufficient to state a § 1983 claim of deprivation of property without due process in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment where the prisoner alleged that prison officials confiscated various items
from his cell that they deemed to be contraband, but that he had purchased them at the prison or had the items given
to him by employees of the prison, and that officials told him he had no right to be made aware of rules, policies or
regulations. (High Desert State Prison, Nevada)
U.S. District Court
INMATE FUNDS

Bradshaw v. Lappin, 738 F.Supp.2d 1143 (D.Colo. 2010). Inmates of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) brought
actions against various prison defendants, alleging that the Director of the BOP violated the inmates' rights, under
the Inmate Financial Responsibility Program (IFRP), by requiring them to develop a financial plan addressing
payment of their restitution obligations. The inmates moved to consolidate, and defendants moved for summary
judgment. The district court consolidated the cases. The court held that allegations that prison officials improperly
collected the sum of $25 per quarter from each trust account of the two inmates, which in turn was credited against
a debt that it was undisputed the inmates actually owed, did not constitute a condition of confinement amounting to
a “sufficiently serious” deprivation of minimal civilized measure of life's necessities, thereby precluding the inmates' Eighth Amendment claims. The court held that the officials were entitled to qualified immunity from the
inmates' Bivens claims that they were improperly placed on Inmate Financial Responsibility Program (IFRP) “refusal” status, as it was not clear how, or even if, the inmates' constitutional rights would be implicated by being
improperly placed on IFRP “refusal” status, and if placement did violate some constitutional right, that right was
not so “clearly established” that officials could be expected to know their conduct violated the Constitution. The
court noted that participation in IFRP was voluntary and both inmates voluntarily entered into written agreements
to participate in the program, thereby expressly authorizing the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to begin deducting funds
from their accounts each quarter. (Federal Bureau of Prisons)

U.S. District Court
CONFISCATION

Johnson v. Roberts, 721 F.Supp.2d 1017 (D.Kan. 2010). A former county jail inmate brought an action against a
deputy, sheriff, and county board of commissioners, alleging use of excessive force when the deputy used a stun
gun on the inmate. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court held that the
use of a stun gun to subdue the county jail inmate was reasonable and did not violate the inmate's Eighth Amendment rights. The court noted that the inmate had placed a towel in front of a security camera in violation of a jail
rule, and when deputies responded to the inmate's cell to confiscate the towel and the inmate's property box, the
inmate refused to hand over the box and either dropped or threw the box to the floor and refused an order to pick it
up, placing the deputy in the position of bending down to retrieve the box from directly in front of the noncompliant inmate. The court found that the use of a stun gun was not a clearly established violation of the Eighth Amendment at the time of the incident and thus the deputy, sheriff, and county board of commissioners were entitled to
qualified immunity. The court noted that the deputy used the stun gun to ensure the inmate's compliance with orders and not to punish the inmate. (Miami County Jail, Kansas)

U.S. District Court
DESTRUCTION OF
PROPERTY

Kendrick v. Faust, 682 F.Supp.2d 932 (E.D. Ark. 2010). A female state prison inmate brought a § 1983 action
against employees of the Arkansas Department of Correction (ADC), alleging various violations of her constitutional rights. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the inmate failed to allege that she sustained an actual injury or that an Arkansas
Department of Correction (ADC) official denied her the opportunity to review her mail prior to its being confiscated, as required to support a claim that the official violated the inmate's constitutional right of access to the courts
and her First Amendment right to send and receive mail. The court found that summary judgment was precluded by
genuine issues of material fact as to whether there was a legitimate penological interest for the alleged destruction
of the prison inmate's bible, precluding summary judgment as to whether ADC employees violated the inmate's
right to freedom of religion by destroying her bible. (Arkansas Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
CONFISCATION
SEARCHES

Shariff v. Poole, 689 F.Supp.2d 470 (W.D.N.Y. 2010). A state prisoner who was a paraplegic brought a § 1983
action against current and former New York State Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) employees, alleging that the employees conspired and retaliated against him. The employees moved for summary judgment. The
district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the prisoner failed to show that the
employees acted with racial or related class-based discriminatory animus, as would support his claim that the employees conspired to interfere with his civil rights by denying him rights and privileges. The court held that the
alleged actions of the employees, including subjecting the prisoner who was paraplegic and who, as vice-chairman
of the prisoners' liaison committee, had filed grievances against employees, to an excessive number of cell
searches, filing false misbehavior reports, confiscating legal documents, verbally threatening the prisoner, and
excessively pat frisking and searching the prisoner, amounted to adverse actions for the purposes of the prisoner's §
1983 First Amendment retaliation claim against the employees, although such actions did not necessarily amount to
violations of the prisoner's constitutionally protected rights. The court held that summary judgment was precluded
by a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether a state correctional officer acted with retaliatory motive in
confiscating an unfinished grievance of the prisoner who was vice-chairman of prisoners' liaison committee. (Five
Points Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
INMATE FUNDS

Torres v. O'Quinn, 612 F.3d 237 (4th Cir. 2010). An inmate brought an action against state prison officials, complaining that the officials failed to repair a malfunctioning night-light in his prison cell, resulting in a disturbing
strobe effect. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted. The inmate appealed and the appeals court affirmed. The inmate then brought a separate action against
prison officials, alleging a constitutional violation due to the prison's prohibition of his subscription to commercially available pictures of nude women. The district court dismissed the action for failure to state a claim upon

35.40

which relief could be granted, the inmate appealed, and the appeals court dismissed the appeal. The inmate then
moved for a partial refund of filing fees that had been collected from his prison trust account, challenging the prison's practice of withholding 40 percent of his account to satisfy the filing fee requirement for his two appeals. The
appeals court found that PLRA required that no more than 20 percent of an inmate's monthly income be deducted
to pay filing fees, irrespective of the total number of cases or appeals the inmate had pending at any one time. The
court held that granting the inmate a partial refund of fees was not warranted since the amounts withheld from the
inmate's account were actually owed and were properly, if excessively, collected. (Red Onion State Prison, VA)
U.S. Appeals Court
INMATE FUNDS

Ward v. Ryan, 623 F.3d 807 (9th Cir. 2010). A state inmate who was serving a 197-year sentence brought a § 1983
action against the director of the Arizona Department of Corrections, alleging the Department's withholding of a
portion of his prison wages for “gate money,” to be paid to him upon his release from incarceration, violated his
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights since it was unlikely he would be released from prison prior to his death.
The appeals court reversed the dismissal of the claim. The district court subsequently denied the inmate injunctive
relief and granted summary judgment in favor of the director. The inmate appealed. The appeals court held that the
inmate did not have a current possessory property interest in wages withheld in a dedicated discharge account, as
required to establish a violation of the Takings Clause. The court noted that Arizona statutes creating a protected
property interest in prison inmate wages did not give inmates full and unfettered right to their property. (Arizona
Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
LEGAL MATERIAL

Watkins v. Kasper, 599 F.3d 791 (7th Cir. 2010). A state inmate who was a prison law clerk brought a § 1983 action
against a prison law librarian, alleging retaliation for the inmate's exercise of his free speech rights. Following a
jury verdict for the inmate, the district court denied the librarian's motions for judgment as a matter of law or for a
new trial. The librarian appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded with instructions. The court held that
the inmate law clerk's speech that criticized prison library policies requiring that clerks not help other inmates prepare their legal documents and not store the clerks' personal legal materials in the library was not protected by the
First Amendment. The court found that the speech had a negative impact on the prison librarian's legitimate interests in discipline and providing efficient library services, particularly since it amounted to advocacy on behalf of
other inmates, and the inmate had an alternative means to express his complaints. The court also found that the
inmate law clerk's oral complaint to the prison librarian about the placement of his personal materials in the library
was not protected by his First Amendment right to free speech, where the complaint was made in a confrontational,
disorderly manner. (Miami Correctional Facility, Indiana)
2011

U.S. District Court
DISPOSITION OF
FUNDS

English v. District of Columbia, 815 F.Supp.2d 254 (D.D.C. 2011). An involuntarily committed psychiatric patient
brought an action against the District of Columbia, the mayor and various other officials, alleging constitutional
claims pursuant to § 1983, and various violations of District of Columbia law. The defendants filed a motion to
dismiss and the district court granted the motion. The court held that the process received by the patient at a public
institution in regards to removal of money from his patient account was sufficient to satisfy Fifth Amendment
procedural due process. The court noted that the patient received a pre-deprivation notice reasonably calculated to
make him aware that he owed money and that this money would be taken from his account, the patient followed the
procedures listed on the notice to challenge the invoice and availed himself of the appeals process, he received a
response, and he requested and received an external review. (Saint Elizabeths, District of Columbia Department of
Mental Health)

U.S. District Court
DISPOSITION OF
FUNDS

Martin v. Benson, 827 F.Supp.2d 1022 (D.Minn.2011). A civilly committed sex offender and resident of the
Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP) facility brought a pro se action against the chief executive officer (CEO)
of MSOP, alleging the CEO violated the minimum wage provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) by
withholding 50% of his earnings as a work-related expense to be applied toward the cost of care. The CEO moved
to dismiss. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the economic reality of the civilly committed
sex offender's work within the MSOP vocational work program was not the type of employment covered by FLSA.
The court noted that the program was specifically designed to provide “meaningful work skills training, educational
training, and development of proper work habits and extended treatment services for civilly committed sex
offenders,” and to the extent that the program engaged in commercial activity, it was incidental to the program's
primary purpose of providing meaningful work for sex offenders. According to the court, the program had few of
the indicia of traditional, free market employment, as the limits on the program prevented it from operating in a
truly competitive manner, and the offender's basic needs were met almost entirely by the State. The court noted that
the conclusion that the FLSA does not apply to a civilly committed sex offender should not be arrived at just
because, as a committed individual, he is confined like those in prison or because his confinement is related to
criminal activity, “…it is not simply an individual's status as a prisoner that determines the applicability of the
FLSA, but the economic reality itself that determines the availability of the law's protections.” (Minnesota Sex
Offender Program)

U.S. Appeals Court
PROHIBITED
PROPERTY

Nevada Dept. of Corrections v. Greene, 648 F.3d 1014 (9th Cir. 2011). The Nevada Department of Corrections
brought an action against an inmate, seeking declaratory judgment that its ban on personal possession of typewriters by inmates was constitutional. Following intervention by additional inmates, the district court granted the Department’s motion for summary judgment. Several inmates appealed, and the appeals were consolidated. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that: (1) the typewriter ban did not constitute First Amendment retaliation; (2) the ban did not infringe upon the inmates' First Amendment right of access to the Nevada Supreme Court;
(3) the ban did not infringe upon the inmates’ Fourteenth Amendment due process rights; and (4) the district court
did not abuse its discretion in not affording the inmate the opportunity to conduct discovery prior to its ruling on
the Department’s motion for summary judgment. The court noted that the Department’s ban on personal possession

35.41

of typewriters by inmates reasonably advanced a legitimate correctional goal of institutional safety, and that the ban
was enacted after the murder of an inmate with a weapon fashioned from the roller pin of a typewriter. (Nevada
Department of Corrections)
U.S. Appeals Court
INMATE FUNDS

Norris v. Premier Integrity Solutions, Inc., 641 F.3d 695 (6th Cir. 2011). An inmate brought a § 1983 due process
claim against a state department of corrections and prison officials arising out of the prison's disciplinary proceedings. The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and the inmate appealed. The appeals
court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held that a hearing officer's reliance entirely on the statements
of a corrections officer, in determining whether videotape evidence was relevant in a prison disciplinary proceeding, deprived the inmate of his right to due process. According to the court, the inmate's right to present evidence
was completely undermined by the hearing officer's failure to independently determine whether the evidence was
relevant. But the court held that the hearing officer's denial of the inmate's request to call an alleged victim of the
assault by the inmate as a witness in the disciplinary hearing did not deprive the inmate of his right to due process.
The court noted that the hearing officer had asked the witness to testify, but the witness had refused, and the interest in protecting the witness and managing the difficult relationships within the prison setting far outweighed the
inmate's right to call the alleged victim as a witness. The court found that a reasonable official at the time of the
inmate's misconduct hearing would not have known that the inmate was entitled to due process with respect to an
assessment against his prison account, and thus the hearing officer was entitled to qualified immunity from the
inmate's § 1983 claim that the officer violated his due process rights by imposing an assessment prior to a hearing
to determine the amount of money to be deducted from the inmate's prison account. (State Correctional Institute at
Graterford, Pennsylvania)

U.S. Appeals Court
DISPOSITION OF
FUNDS
INMATE FUNDS

Reedy v. Werholtz, 660 F.3d 1270 (10th Cir. 2011). A group of state inmates brought an action against the Secretary
of the Kansas Department of Corrections, challenging two policies which required money obtained by inmates to
be saved for use upon release from prison. The Secretary filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, to grant
summary judgment. The district court granted the motion to dismiss and the inmates appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. According to the court, compulsory savings accounts for release-eligible prisoners did not violate
substantive due process because they were rationally related to a legitimate penological purpose of ensuring that
inmates had funds upon release to ease their transition into free society. (Kansas Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
INMATE FUNDS

U.S. v. Franco, 632 F.3d 880 (5th Cir. 2011). An inmate in a privately owned and operated county jail, who had
paid a corrections officer to bring contraband into a county correctional facility, was convicted after a district court
jury trial of aiding and abetting in the bribery of a public official. The defendant appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that it was constitutional to apply the federal bribery statute to the defendant, even though he
used his own money, and not federal funds, to pay the corrections officer. The officer had been paid a total of $425
over a period of time to bring peanut butter, tuna fish, and other small food items, a cell phone, enchiladas and a
box containing marijuana. (Ector County Correctional Center, Texas)

U.S. Appeals Court
INMATE FUNDS
INTEREST

Young v. Wall, 642 F.3d 49 (1st Cir. 2011). A state prisoner brought a civil rights action against the director of the
Rhode Island Department of Corrections (RIDOC), alleging that the director's decision to cease paying interest on
funds held in inmates' trust accounts constituted an unconstitutional taking and that the RIDOC's failure to afford
the prisoner notice and opportunity to be heard before abandoning the practice of accruing interest violated his right
to procedural due process. The district court granted summary judgment for the director and the prisoner appealed.
The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the prisoner did not have a constitutionally protected property right,
under Rhode Island law, in the interest not yet paid on his inmate trust accounts, and the prisoner did not have a due
process right to notice and the opportunity to be heard before the prison abandoned the practice of accruing interest.
(Rhode Island Department of Corrections)
2012

U.S. Appeals Court
DISPOSITION OF
FUNDS
INTEREST

Booker-El v. Superintendent, Indiana State Prison, 668 F.3d 896 (7th Cir. 2012). A state prisoner filed a civil rights
action alleging that prison officials misappropriated proceeds from a prison recreation fund in violation of his due
process rights. The district court dismissed the action and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The
court held that the prisoner suing under § 1983 sufficiently stated that he had suffered an injury in-fact, as required
for Article III standing, by prison officials' alleged misappropriation of proceeds from a prison recreation fund in
violation of his due process rights. According to the court, the prisoner had a high probability of receiving benefits
under a properly administered recreation fund, although the prisoner actually did not have a property interest in that
fund, and that the prisoner had a colorable claim to a property interest in that fund and the merits of the case. But
the court held that the prisoner did not have any legitimate expectation to any benefit derived from prison's
recreation fund, and thus he did not have any protected property interest in the fund, since the governing statute
required only that funds be spent for the direct benefit of prisoners if prison officials decided to utilize money from
the fund and the fund established from one prison could be transferred to another prison without consulting any
prisoner. (Indiana State Prison)

U.S. District Court
DISPOSITION OF
PROPERTY

Davis v. Abercrombie, 903 F.Supp.2d 975 (D.Hawai’i 2012). Inmates brought a state court action against the
governor of Hawai'i, the Director of the Hawai'i Department of Public Safety (DPS), and the private manager of a
correctional facility in Arizona at which they were housed, seeking declaratory relief that the defendants violated
their rights to free exercise of their religion by depriving them of their prayer objects. The action was removed to
federal court. The inmates moved for a preliminary injunction preventing the defendants from exercising the
policies that infringed on their right to exercise their religion. The district court denied the motion. The court held
that one inmate failed to exhaust his prison administrative remedies, as required under the Prison Litigation Reform
Act (PLRA), prior to bringing the action. After submitting an informal resolution form, the inmate did not obtain

35.42

the final recommendation from the warden or the administrative duty officer on his damaged property claim before
initiating the grievance process under a prison policy, and the inmate did not appeal denial of his formal grievance.
The court held that lack of an irreparable harm to the inmate as a result of damage to his prayer object, a turtle
pendant, precluded the issuance of a preliminary injunction, where there was no imminent danger the his sacred
items would be desecrated absent injunctive relief. The court noted that the inmate's possession and use of his
prayer object, a kukui nut, was a “religious exercise” for purposes of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA): the object was used in daily prayers and chants, in dances, and other individual religious
protocol and communal religious activities, it provided the inmate with spiritual comfort, and it symbolized
enlightenment, growth and accomplishment. The court found that the correctional facility's policy, prohibiting the
inmate from possessing his prayer object, a kukui nut, and requiring him to donate it to charity, destroy it, or send it
out of the institution, substantially burdened his religious exercise under RLUIPA. (Hawaii Department of Public
Safety, Corrections Corporation of America, Saguaro Correctional Center, Arizona, and Red Rock Correctional
Center, Arizona)
U.S. Appeals Court
SOCIAL SECURITY

Fowlkes v. Thomas, 667 F.3d 270 (2nd Cir. 2012). A state prisoner, whose supplemental security income (SSI)
benefits were suspended while incarcerated, brought a pro se civil rights action against Social Security
Administration officials. The district court dismissed the action and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court
affirmed in part and remanded in part. On remand, the district court refused to provide any relief to the prisoner and
the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the Social Security Administration was barred by
the “No Social Security Benefits for Prisoners Act” from tendering payment to the state prisoner while he remained
incarcerated, even though the underlying obligation to pay benefits arose before the Act's enactment. According to
the court, the Act was not impermissibly retroactive because it only altered the procedure and timing by which
certain individuals received their retroactive social security benefit payments, but it did not affect their substantive
right to those benefits. (Social Security Administration, New York)

U.S. District Court
CONFISCATION
LEGAL MATERIAL
LIMITATIONS

Joseph v. Fischer, 900 F.Supp.2d 320 (W.D.N.Y. 2012). A state prisoner who observed the Nation of Gods and
Earths (NGE) faith brought an action against correctional officials, alleging that the officials violated his right to
practice his religion, denied his right of access to courts, and retaliated against him. The prisoner sought declaratory
and injunctive relief, as well as money damages. The officials moved for judgment on the pleadings. The district
court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the issue of whether correctional officials'
restrictions on NGE activities were adequately justified by legitimate security concerns, as required under the First
Amendment and RLUIPA, could not be resolved on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, since it was not
possible, based solely on the pleadings, to determine whether the actions of the officials had unjustifiably burdened
the prisoner's religious exercise. The court held that individual correctional officials were qualifiedly immune from
the prisoner's claim for damages based on the officials' preventing the prisoner from participating in such activities,
where the rights of the prisoner, who observed the NGE faith, to hold study group classes, wear certain articles of
clothing or emblems, and observe NGE holy days, were not clearly established First Amendment rights, given that
department of corrections protocols did not specifically protect such religious activities. The court found that the
prisoner's allegations, that he was denied access to courts due to a correctional official's confiscation or destruction
of documents, failed to state a claim for denial of access to courts, where the allegations were conclusory, and the
prisoner failed to show what prejudice he suffered as a result of the official's alleged actions. (Attica Correctional
Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONFISCATION
SEARCHES

Kendrick v. Pope, 671 F.3d 686 (8th Cir. 2012). A female state inmate brought a civil rights action against a
corrections officer who allegedly confiscated religious items during a cell shakedown. The district court dismissed
the inmate's claims and she appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that genuine issues of
material fact precluded summary judgment. According to the court, summary judgment was precluded by a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether the corrections officer confiscated the inmate's Catholic Bible, rosary beads, and
other religious materials during a cell shakedown, and subsequently failed to return those items. (McPherson Unit,
Arkansas Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
CONFISCATION

Knows His Gun v. Montana, 866 F.Supp.2d 1235 (D.Mont. 2012). Native American state prisoners brought an
action against a state, the state department of corrections (DOC), a private prison facility, and wardens, alleging
violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). Defendants filed motion to
dismiss. The district court held that: (1) the allegations were sufficient to plead the searches were a substantial
burden on their religious exercise; (2) the allegations were sufficient plead the confiscations and prohibitions were
a substantial burden on their religious exercise; (3) the allegations about relieving a prisoner from the pipe carrier
position were sufficient to plead it was a substantial burden on his religious exercise; (4) transferred prisoners did
not have standing for claims for injunctive and declaratory relief; (5) the private facility was a state actor; and (6)
the private facility was an instrumentality of the state. The Native American prisoners' alleged that the prison
subjected them to en masse strip searches before and after sweat lodge ceremonies, that the searches sometimes
occurred in a hallway where other inmates could see them and at least one occurred in a gym with video cameras
monitored by a female guard, and that some inmates declined to participate in the ceremony due to the degrading
nature of the searches. According to the court, the prisoners' allegations that sacred items were confiscated or
prohibited by the prison for their sweat lodge ceremonies, including smudge tobacco and antlers, and that the items
were essential for the ceremony to be meaningful and proper were sufficient to plead confiscations and prohibitions
were a substantial burden on their religious exercise, as required for their claims under RLUIPA. The prisoner also
alleged that they were subject to pat down searches before and after entering the ceremonial sweat lodge grounds,
that they were provided insufficient water and toilet facilities, that the size of the sweat lodge and the frequency of
the ceremonies was inadequate, and that they were not provided a Native American spiritual advisor. (Montana
Department of Corrections; Corrections Corporation of America; Crossroads Correctional Center)

35.43

U.S. Appeals Court
INMATE FUNDS

Moussazadeh v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, 703 F.3d 781 (5th Cir. 2012). A Jewish state prisoner brought an
action against the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, alleging that the defendant denied his grievances and
requests for kosher meals in violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and
the Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendant and
the prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that the state Jewish prisoner
exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to his claim that a prison's failure to provide him with kosher
meals violated RLUIPA, where the prisoner went through the state's entire grievance process before filing suit. The
court found that sufficient evidence established that the prisoner's religious beliefs were sincere, as required to
support a claim against state's department of criminal justice for violation of RLUIPA, where the prisoner stated
that he was born and raised Jewish and had always kept a kosher household, the prisoner offered evidence that he
requested kosher meals from the chaplain, kitchen staff, and the department, and while at another prison, he ate
kosher meals provided to him from the dining hall. The court noted that the prisoner was harassed for his adherence
to his religious beliefs and for his demands for kosher food, and that the department transferred the prisoner for a
time so he could receive kosher food. The court held that the prisoner was denied a generally available benefit
because of his religious beliefs, and thus, the state's department of criminal justice imposed a substantial burden on
the prisoner's religious exercise under RLUIPA, where every prisoner in the department's custody received a
nutritionally sufficient diet, every observant Jewish prisoner at the designated prison received a kosher diet free of
charge, and the Jewish prisoner at issue was forced to pay for his kosher meals. The court found that there was no
evidence of a compelling government interest in forcing the Jewish prisoner to pay for all of his kosher meals. The
court also found that summary judgment was precluded by a general dispute of material fact as to whether the
state's department of criminal justice employed the least restrictive means of minimizing costs and maintaining
security by forcing the Jewish prisoner to pay for all of his kosher meals. (Eastham Unit of the Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division)

U.S. Appeals Court
PROHIBITED
PROPERTY

Munson v. Gaetz, 673 F.3d 630 (7th Cir. 2012). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that prison officials
violated his constitutional rights by barring him from personally possessing books he had shipped to a prison. The
district court dismissed the complaint, and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the
decision to prohibit the inmate from personally possessing books containing drug-related information did not
violate the First Amendment, the Eighth Amendment or due process. According to the court, the state prison
officials had a legitimate and neutral governmental objective of restricting prisoner access to drug-related
information, despite the inmate's contention that he wanted the books to educate himself about his prescribed
medications, where the prison officials made an individualized determination, and the books were available in
prison library. (Illinois Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
INMATE FUNDS

Poole v. Isaacs, 703 F.3d 1024 (7th Cir. 2012). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action against prison officials,
alleging that a required $2.00 copayment for dental care furnished at a correctional center violated his Eighth
Amendment rights. The district court allowed the action to proceed against the center's healthcare administrator
after screening the complaint, but then granted summary judgment for the administrator. The inmate appealed. The
appeals court held that the imposition of a modest fee for medical services provided to inmates with adequate
resources to pay the fee, standing alone, does not violate the United States Constitution. According to the court, the
issue of whether the inmate should have been given the benefit of an exemption from the required copayment was
state-law question that could not be pursued under § 1983. (Big Muddy River Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONFISCATION
DESTRUCTION OF
PROPERTY
LEGAL MATERIAL

Surles v. Andison, 678 F.3d 452 (6th Cir. 2012). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that prison officials
had confiscated his legal papers and computer disks on multiple occasions, damaged or destroyed legal and
religious papers and property, taken actions to deprive him of access to courts, violated his First Amendment rights,
retaliated against him by filing false misconduct charges and transferring him to other prisons, and conspired
against him to violate his rights. The district court entered summary judgment in the officials' favor, and the inmate
appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by
genuine issues of material fact as to whether the state inmate exhausted his administrative remedies, and whether
prison officials prevented the inmate from filing grievances and exhausting his administrative remedies. (Michigan
Department of Corrections, Gus Harrison Correctional Facility)

U.S. District Court
RETIREMENT
DISPOSITION OF
FUNDS

U.S. v. Beulke, 892 F.Supp.2d 1176 (D.S.D. 2012). After a defendant was convicted of embezzlement, sentenced to
prison, and ordered to pay restitution, the Government moved to enforce collection and to order the defendant to
apply all of his pension payments while in prison to the restitution order. The district court granted the motion in
part. The court held that, pursuant to the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), the Government could seize
the defendant's interest in his 401(k) and that any interest the defendant's wife had in his 401(k) account was
subject to the Government's perfected lien. The court decided to exercise its statutory discretion so as to allow
garnishment of 25% of the defendant's net monthly pension, while allowing his estranged wife to continue to
receive half of the pension payments during the pendency of their divorce. (South Dakota)
2013

U.S. District Court
STORAGE

Ayotte v. Barnhart, 973 F.Supp.2d 70 (D.Me. 2013). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that prison
officials failed to protect him from a padlock assault by a fellow prisoner, and retaliated against him for filing
complaints about prison conditions. The officials moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the
motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the decision by state prison officials to provide inmates with
padlocks to secure their personal belongings did not demonstrate deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of
serious harm, as required to establish an Eighth Amendment violation, despite the history of padlocks being used as
weapons by some prisoners. The court noted that a state statute required officials to provide inmates with a
reasonably secure area for their personal belongings, and there were generally only one or two padlock assaults per
year. (Maine State Prison)

35.44

U.S. Appeals Court
CONFISCATION
DESTRUCTION OF
PROPERTY
LEGAL MATERIAL
LIMITATIONS
SEARCHES

Devbrow v. Gallegos, 735 F.3d 584 (7th Cir. 2013). A prisoner brought a § 1983 claim against two prison officials,
claiming that the officials denied him access to the courts by confiscating and then destroying his legal papers in
retaliation for a prior lawsuit he filed. The district court granted the prison officials' motion for summary judgment,
and denied the prisoner's motion for reconsideration. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The
appeals court held that the prisoner failed to authenticate a purported e-mail from a prison official to a law librarian
supervisor, where there was no circumstantial evidence that supported the authenticity of the e-mail, and no
evidence that the prisoner or anyone else saw the official actually compose or transmit the purported e-mail. The
court held that the official's removal of the prisoner's excessive legal materials from his cell, to eliminate a fire
hazard and to make it easier for officials to conduct searches and inventories of the prisoner's property during
prison searches, was not retaliation for the prisoner's filing of a prior lawsuit. According to the court, the prisoner's
speculation regarding the officials' motive could not overcome the officials' sworn statements on the motion for
summary judgment. (Westville Correctional Facility, Indiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
LIMITATIONS

Earl v. Racine County Jail, 718 F.3d 689 (7th Cir. 2013). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against a county jail
and various jail officers, asserting claims for denial of due process and deliberate indifference to his serious
medical condition. The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, and the inmate
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the inmate's five days on suicide watch were
neither long enough nor harsh enough to deprive him of a due-process-protected liberty interest, where: (1) the only
changes to the inmate's meals were that trays upon which food was served were disposable foam rather than plastic;
(2) eating utensils were quickly removed after each meal; (3) the inmate was not denied bedding but was given a
mattress and a blanket; (4) the inmate was denied writing materials for only the first 48 hours; and (5) rather than
being prohibited human contact, deputies were assigned to closely and personally monitor the inmate to ensure his
safety. The court found that jail officers were not deliberately indifferent to the inmate's allergic reaction to suicide
garments in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The court noted that after the inmate told an officer about his
allergic reaction to a suicide gown, the officer called a nurse who immediately examined the inmate and gave him
cream and medication, and the officers appropriately deferred to the nurse's medical decision that the inmate did
not need different garments because there was no sign of rash or bumps on the inmate. (Racine County Jail,
Wisconsin)

U.S. Appeals Court
LIMITATIONS
TRANSFER
BETWEEN
PRISONERS

Pesci v. Budz, 730 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2013). A civil detainee, who was involuntarily committed as a sexually
violent predator, brought a civil rights action against a facility director, claiming that the facility's policy barring
residents from copying the detainee's newsletter violated his expressive freedoms under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. The district court granted final summary judgment in favor of the facility director, and the detainee
appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. The court held that the constitutionality of the facility's policy
of banning outright all possession and distribution of the detainee's newsletter should have been considered along
with the facility's prior policy limiting the means of the newsletter's propagation in the ruling on the facility
director's motion for summary judgment. The appeals court found that Turner 's rational relation standard was the
appropriate standard against which to measure the detainee's First Amendment claims, however, the government
could not justify limitation on the detainee's expressive freedoms based on retribution or general deterrence.
(Florida Civil Commitment Center)

U.S. District Court
LEGAL MATERIAL
LIMITATIONS

Randolph v. Wetzel, 987 F.Supp.2d 605 (E.D.Pa. 2013). A state inmate brought an action against public officials
employed by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and prison medical providers, alleging, among other things, that
the defendants violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and provided inadequate medical treatment.
The defendants moved for summary judgment, and the inmate cross-moved for partial summary judgment. The
district court granted the defendants’ motions in part and denied in part, and denied the inmate’s motion. The
district court held that state prison officials were not deliberately indifferent to the inmate's allegedly serious
medical condition, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, in requiring the inmate to use a wheelchair to access
outdoors for “yard time” or to see visitors, rather than transporting the inmate on a gurney. The court noted that the
officials relied on the medical providers' judgment that the inmate was able to sit up and get into a wheelchair. The
court found that the inmate's alleged restricted access to his personal effects and legal mail when he was moved
between cells, and his alleged denial of access to a law library, did not result in an actual injury to inmate, thus
precluding his § 1983 access to courts claim. The court noted that the inmate proceeded with all of his legal claims
in addition to his complaint of denial of access to courts. (SCI Graterford, SCI Greene, Pennsylvania)
2014

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES
CONFISCATION

Ballard v. Johns, 17 F.Supp.3d 511 (E.D.N.C. 2014). A civil detainee being considered for certification as a
sexually dangerous person brought an action against federal employees, in their official capacities and in their
individual capacities under Bivens, challenging various conditions of his detention, including claims concerning
due process violations and inability to attend religious services. The employees moved to dismiss or for summary
judgment and the detainee moved to overrule objections to requests for document production. The district court
granted the employees’ motion and denied the detainee’s motion. The court held that: (1) the detainee did not show
that federal employees, by following Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) regulations and policies, violated his
constitutional rights; (2) the detainee was properly subjected to restrictions and disciplinary consequences of the
BOP commitment and treatment program; (3) denial of the detainee's request to attend or receive religious services
while in disciplinary segregation did not unduly burden his free exercise of religion; and (4) the employees did not
violate detainee's right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures by searching his cell and seizing his
property. (Federal Correctional Institution at Butner, North Carolina)

35.45

U.S. District Court
DESTRUCTION OF
PROPERTY
LEGAL MATERIAL

Banks v. Annucci, 48 F.Supp.3d 394 (N.D.N.Y. 2014). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that
correctional officers harassed him, tampered with his food and contaminated his Kosher meals, interfered with his
mail, mishandled his grievances, and interfered with his access to courts, and that prison medical employees were
deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs and involuntarily administered psychotropic drugs to him. The
district court held that prison officials' alleged unauthorized intentional taking or destruction of the inmate's
property did not violate the inmate's due process rights, where the state afforded an adequate post-deprivation
remedy. The court noted that the officials did not violate the inmate's First Amendment right of access to courts
when they allegedly confiscated a rough draft of his civil rights complaint, where the inmate did not allege that he
suffered an actual injury as a result, or that officials acted deliberately or maliciously. (Upstate Correctional
Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
DESTRUCTION OF
PROPERTY
LEGAL MATERIAL

Cash v. Wetzel, 8 F.Supp.3d 644 (E.D. Pa. 2014). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against prison officials,
alleging, among other things, violations of his civil rights in connection with destruction of his legal materials. The
officials moved to dismiss, and the prisoner moved for leave to file a supplemental complaint alleging retaliation,
and for entry of default. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that the
claims against officials in their official capacities were barred by the Eleventh Amendment The court held that the
allegation that two prison officials separated the prisoner from his legal materials, causing him to be unable to
adequately litigate his direct appeal, stated a claim for denial of his right of access to courts. But the court found
that because the prisoner did not lose a legal claim as the result of the officials' alleged withholding of the prisoner's
legal material during a meeting with his attorney, the officials could not be held liable for denying the prisoner's
access to courts. The court found that the prisoner stated a claim under § 1983 for failure to intervene against two
prison officials by alleging that the officials were present as another prison official destroyed prisoner's legal
materials, and that two officials were aware of a conspiracy to deprive the prisoner of his right of access to courts,
and that they did not investigate and stop the conspiracy. According to the court, a claim was also stated by
allegations that two officials decided to withhold mitigation evidence from the prisoner in retaliation for bringing a
lawsuit, in presence of the other official, and that each official failed to intervene in the other's withholding. The
court held that the prisoner stated a claim under § 1983 for supervisory liability against a prison official by alleging
that the official acquiesced in his subordinates' removal of the prisoner's legal documents. (State Correctional
Institution- Graterford, SCI-Albion, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
INMATE FUNDS
DISPOSITION OF
FUNDS

Edmondson v. Fremgen, 17 F.Supp.3d 833 (E.D.Wis. 2014). An indigent prisoner brought a § 1983 action against
the clerk of the state courts of appeals, alleging that the clerk violated various of his civil rights when she froze his
inmate trust accounts until filing fees had been paid in two of his state appeals. The clerk moved to dismiss, and the
prisoner moved for appointment of counsel. The district court granted the motion to dismiss and denied the motion
to appoint counsel. The court held that freezing the prisoner's trust accounts did not violate his right to access the
courts, did not violate the prisoner's right to procedural due process, and was not an illegal seizure. . According to
the court, the indigent prisoner's right to access the courts were not violated, although not having the ability to
spend money in his accounts prevented him from copying legal materials, where allowing the prisoner's appeals to
proceed in the first place, by having deductions for filing fees made from his inmate trust accounts, did not injure
his ability to access the courts. (Wisconsin)

U.S. Appeals Court
INMATE FUNDS
DISPOSITION OF
FUNDS

Montanez v. Secretary Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections, 773 F.3d 472 (3rd Cir. 2014). Inmates brought a § 1983
action against Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC) officials, alleging that the DOC's implementation of
a policy that allowed automatic deduction of funds from their inmate accounts to cover court-ordered restitution,
fines, and costs violated their procedural due process rights. The district court granted the officials' motion for
summary judgment. The inmates appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held
that the DOC’s refusal to provide exceptions to its across-the-board 20% rate of deduction, pursuant to a DOC
policy that allowed automatic deduction of funds from inmate accounts to cover court-ordered restitution, fines,
and costs, did not violate due process, in light of the fact that the DOC would not make deductions when an
inmate's account fell below a certain minimum. The court found that summary judgment was precluded by a
genuine issue of material fact regarding the extent of the notice the inmate received with respect to his sentence and
the DOC policy that permitted automatic deduction of funds from his inmate account to cover court-ordered
restitution, fines, and costs. (Pennsylvania Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
INMATE FUNDS

Morris v. Livingston, 739 F.3d 740 (5th Cir. 2014). A state inmate, proceeding pro se, brought a § 1983 action
against a governor, challenging the constitutionality of a statute requiring inmates to pay a $100 annual health care
services fee when they receive medical treatment. The district court dismissed the action. The inmate appealed. The
appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that: (1) the governor was entitled to Eleventh Amendment
sovereign immunity where the state department of criminal justice was the agency responsible for administration
and enforcement of the statute; (2) allegations were insufficient to plead deliberate indifference where the inmate
did not allege he was denied medical care or that he was forced to choose between medical care or basic
necessities; (3) the inmate received sufficient notice that he would be deprived of funds; and (4) it was not
unreasonable for the prison to take funds from the state inmate's trust fund account to pay for medical care. The
court noted that the prison posted notices about the statute, the notices informed inmates of the fee and what it
covered, and a regulation was promulgated that provided additional notice. (Texas Department of Criminal Justice,
Stevenson Unit, Cuero, Texas)

U.S. Appeals Court
LOSS OF
PROPERTY

Wall v. Wade, 741 F.3d 492 (4th Cir. 2014). A Muslim state inmate filed an action under the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and § 1983 alleging that prison officials interfered with his Ramadan
observance. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the officials, and the inmate appealed. The
appeals court vacated and remanded. The appeals court held that state prison officials' decision to abandon the
policy of requiring inmates to provide some physical indicia of the Islamic faith, such as a Quran, Kufi, prayer rug,

35.46

or written religious material obtained from the prison Chaplain's office, in order to receive accommodations for a
Ramadan observance did not moot the inmate's challenge to the policy as violative of his rights under the Free
Exercise Clause and RLUIPA, where the officials retained the authority and the capacity to reinstate the policy. The
court found that the policy violated the inmate's rights under the Free Exercise Clause, where the inmate provided a
reasonable explanation for the fact that he lacked physical manifestations of his faith, officials ignored numerous
signs that he was a practicing Muslim, and there was no evidence that the requested accommodation would have
been unduly burdensome. The inmate provided a state court judgment against the Commonwealth as proof that the
VDOC had lost his possessions, and also produced documents showing that he was receiving common fare meals
in accordance with his faith, and he informed officers that he had observed Ramadan in 2008 and 2009. Despite
this, an official responded, “that don't mean anything.” The court held that the officials were not entitled to
qualified immunity from liability in the inmate's action under RLUIPA and § 1983. (Red Onion State Prison,
Virginia)
2015
U.S. District Court
CONFISCATION

Burroughs v. Petrone, 138 F.Supp.3d 182 (N.D.N.Y. 2015). An inmate brought a pro se § 1983 action against
employees of the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS), alleging
Eighth Amendment violations and asserting a claim for retaliation under First Amendment. The inmate sought
leave to proceed in forma pauperis. The court granted the motion. The court held that the inmate sufficiently pled a
First Amendment retaliation claim based on confiscated property. The inmate alleged that correction officers
confiscated two bags of his property in retaliation for his grievances. (Downstate Correctional Facility, Coxsackie
Correctional Facility, N.Y.)

U.S. District Court
INMATE FUNDS

Harris v. Doe, 78 F.Supp.3d 894 (N.D. Ill. 2015). In two related actions, an inmate, proceeding pro se, alleged §
1983 claims against prison officers for deprivations of his civil rights. The inmate sought to proceed in forma
pauperis in these suits. The district court dismissed the suits, holding that the inmate’s allegation of poverty in his
applications to proceed in forma pauperis was untrue. The court noted that the inmate represented that he had not
received more than $200 in funds over the preceding 12 months from any of numerous categories listed in the
application, including a catch-all category of “any other source.” According to the court, his prisoner trust fund
account reflected a $3,000 deposit, the inmate quickly withdrew most of that $3,000 by writing checks to a “friend”
or “friends” who in turn later re-deposited those funds into his account over the next several months, and the inmate
promptly expended these re-deposits on commissary items well before he filed his suits. (Cook County Jail,
Illinois)

U.S. District Court
SOCIAL SECURITY

Mackey v. United States, 79 F.Supp.3d 57 (D.D.C. 2015). An inmate incarcerated in Indiana sought a court order
directing the Commissioner of Social Security to pay benefits for a period prior to his incarceration. The
Commissioner filed a motion to dismiss for improper venue. The inmate in turn requested transfer to another
venue, rather than dismissal. The court granted the motion to dismiss the case, holding that transfer to a federal
court in Indiana, where the inmate was incarcerated, was not in the interests of justice. (Federal Correctional
Facility, Terre Haute, Indiana)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES
CONFISCATION

Quiroz v. Horel, 85 F.Supp.3d 1115 (N.D.Cal. 2015). A state prisoner brought an action against prison officials,
alleging that the officials retaliated against him for filing a prior federal civil rights complaint and for participating
in another inmate’s civil rights suit. The officials moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the
motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of
material fact as to: (1) whether the official had a retaliatory motive for issuing a Rules Violation Report (RVR)
against the prisoner; (2) whether officials had a retaliatory motive when they searched the prisoner’s cell; and (3)
whether prison officials had an agreement to retaliate against the prisoner by searching his cell, confiscating his
paperwork, and issuing a Rules Violation Report (RVR) against him. (Pelican Bay State Prison, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
INMATE FUNDS
DISPOSITION OF
FUNDS

Shinault v. Hawks, 782 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2015). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that prison officials
violated his constitutional rights when they froze funds in his inmate trust account to recover the cost of his
incarceration. The district court entered summary judgment in the officials’ favor and the inmate appealed. The
appeals court affirmed, holding that the decision to freeze and withdraw funds from the inmate’s trust account did
not violate the Eighth Amendment. According to the court, the inmate’s interest in the funds was substantial and
there was risk of an erroneous deprivation, but the officials were entitled to qualified immunity because it was not
clearly established that state prison officials were required by the Due Process Clause to provide a pre-deprivation
hearing before freezing funds in an inmate’s trust account. The Department of Corrections transferred $65,353 into
an account in the inmate’s name and the inmate did not have access to the fund. (Oregon Department of
Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
DISPOSITION OF
PROPERTY
STORAGE
PROHIBITED PROPERTY
CONFISCATION

Sorrentino v. Godinez, 777 F.3d 410 (7th Cir. 2015). Two inmates purchased several items from a prison’s
commissary, but the prison later forbade the inmates to possess those items in their cells. Their property was
removed, as the new rule required. They responded by filing a proposed class action in the district court, alleging
that confiscation of their property was an unconstitutional taking and a breach of contract. The district court
dismissed the action. The appeals court held that the district court was correct to dismiss the action, although the
dismissal should have been without prejudice. One inmate had purchased a fan and signed a “personal property
contract” which obligated him to follow all Department of Corrections (DOC) rules related to use, ownership, and
possession of the fan. The other inmate purchased a typewriter and a fan, and he also signed a personal property
contract for his fan. When a new policy banned these items from prisoners’ cell, the new policy offered several
options for inmates who owned the newly prohibited types of property. Inmates with typewriters could have them
destroyed, give them to visitors, ship them to someone outside the prison at no cost, store them in “offender

35.47

personal property” which is returned to inmates upon release from prison, or donate them to the prison library. Fans
were simply placed in storage as “offender personal property.” (Stateville Correctional Facility, Illinois)

35.48

XIX

XIX

XIX

XIX

XIX

XIX

XIX

XIX

XIX

XIX

the inmate's First Amendment right not to be compelled to speak. The court found that the
requirement did not constitute sufficient compulsion to implicate the inmate's Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination, even though the inmate's chance at parole was diminished if he
did not successfully complete the program, where the inmate's failure to accept responsibility for
his sexual behavior did not automatically preclude him from parole. (State Correctional
Institution, Houtzdale, Pennsylvania)
U.S. District Court
SEX OFFENDERS
PRE-RELEASE

Fox v. Lappin, 409 F.Supp.2d 79 (D.Mass. 2006). A federal prisoner brought suit against the

U.S. Appeals Court
EX POST FACTO
PAROLE- GRANTING
SEX OFFENDER

Grennier v. Frank, 453 F.3d 442 (7th Cir. 2006). A state prisoner brought § 1983 action alleging a
violation of the due process and ex post facto clauses, in connection with the denial of his parole
application based on his classification as a sex offender. The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the defendants and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed and
held that: (1) the prisoner did not have a due process liberty or property interest in release on
parole or in a parole hearing: and (2) parole officials’ failure to grant a parole, based upon their
increased concern with public safety, did not violate the ex post facto clause. The court noted that
although the Wisconsin statute provided for the opportunity for parole after 20 years in prison,
release was wholly discretionary. According to the court, officials did not violate the ex post facto
clause, where the officials applied the same parole laws that were in force when the prisoner
committed his crime. The court noted that parole officials who become more concerned with public
safety, and who act on that concern by insisting that prisoners complete sex-offender treatment
programs before release on parole, do not violate the ex post facto clause or the due process
clause. (Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
PAROLE- DUE
PROCESS
EX POST FACTO

Michael v. Ghee, 411 F.Supp.2d 813 (N.D.Ohio 2006). Ohio “old law” inmates serving
indeterminate sentences brought a § 1983 action, alleging that the state's parole system was
unconstitutional. The state moved to dismiss and for summary judgment. The district court
granted summary judgment for the state. The court held that the inmates had no valid
procedural due process claim and that the state had rational reasons, satisfying equal protection,
for requiring “old law” inmates to continue to serve their indeterminate sentences, subject to
parole board determinations, after the law was changed to provide for exact sentences and the
elimination of parole. According to the court, the parole guidelines promulgated in 1998 had a
rational basis and the parole guidelines were not laws, subject to the ex post facto clause. The
court noted that state law makes parole discretionary, and therefore inmates do not have a due
process liberty interest in parole under state law. Since the inmates did not have a liberty
interest in parole itself, they could not have a liberty interest in parole consideration or other
aspects of parole procedures, and thus had no procedural due process claim. The court found that
the state had several rational reasons, satisfying equal protection, for requiring so-called “old
law” inmates to continue to serve their indeterminate sentences. The reasons included the desire
to avoid retroactive legislation and alteration of sentences, to give “old law” inmates an incentive
to obey prison regulations, and to acknowledge the seriousness of the convicted offenses. (Ohio
Adult Parole Authority and Chillicothe Correctional Institution)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONAL
RELEASE
ALIEN

Nguyen v. B.I. Inc., 435 F.Supp.2d 1109 (D.Or. 2006). Aliens from Cuba and Vietnam, who had

Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons and a warden, seeking declaratory judgment that his
classification as a sex offender based on a 1981 state sexual assault conviction was improper. The
prisoner also challenged the Bureau's failure to consider him for community center placement
based on his failure to participate in a sex offender program. The district court held that a federal
prisoner cannot be designated as a sex offender based on a state sex offense for purposes of the
federal statute requiring that notice be given to state and local authorities of an inmate's release
if the inmate has been designated as a sex offender, and that designated sex offender register in
the state in which he will reside, because the Attorney General's authority under the statute is
limited to designating federal offenses as sex offenses. The court found that as a matter of inmate
classification, a prisoner's classification as a sex offender on basis of state sexual assault
conviction was not an abuse of discretion. The court held that the BOP policy that categorically
excludes inmates with sex offender safety factors from placement in community corrections
centers is a permissible interpretation of the rule and that the BOP did not abuse its discretion in
denying an inmate designated as a sex offender placement in a community corrections center
based on his failure to participate in a mandatory sex offender program. The court noted that the
federal statute governing pre-release custody of a federal prisoner does not create a liberty
interest in the prisoner's transfer to the less restrictive environment of community center
placement, as the statute does not mandate community center placement nor any placement in a
less restrictive environment, it merely insures placement under pre-release conditions except
where no such placement is practicable. (Federal Medical Center, Devens, Massachusetts)

final orders of removal and had been released from custody on general orders of supervision, but
who had violated their orders by committing crimes, petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus
challenging the validity of the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Intensive Supervision
Appearance Program (ISAP). The district court denied the petition, holding that: (1) ISAP
regulations requiring participating aliens to remain in their residences between eight and 12

36.79
XX

hours per day was not “detention” outside the statutory authority of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE); (2) ISAP requirements did not violate the aliens' liberty interests under the
Fifth Amendment; (3) placement of the aliens in ISAP did not violate their procedural due process
rights; and (4) ISAP was not subject to Administrative Procedure Act (APA) requirements.
(Department of Homeland Security (DHS)'s Intensive Supervision Appearance Program, Oregon)
U.S. District Court
PAROLE- DUE
PROCESS
EQUAL PROTECTION
EX POST FACTO
PARDON

Pennsylvania Prison Society v. Rendell, 419 F.Supp.2d 651 (M.D.Pa. 2006). An advocacy group

brought an action in state court challenging the legality of proposed changes to the state
constitution with regard to pardoning powers and the state Board of Pardons. Following approval
of the changes by the electorate, the defendants removed the action to federal court. After statelaw claims were remanded and the defendants prevailed on appeal before the state supreme
court, the group filed an amended complaint, alleging that the constitutional amendments
violated the Due Process Clause, the Ex Post Facto Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, the
Eighth Amendment, and the Guarantee Clause. The parties cross-moved for summary judgment.
The district court held that including a crime victim on a state pardon board, even when the
recommendation for a pardon or commutation must be unanimous before it may be considered by
the governor, does not violate due process. The court found that the retroactive application of the
amendments providing for the inclusion of a crime victim on the Board of Pardons did not violate
the Ex Post Facto Clause, but the court held that the retroactive application of the amendments
requiring a unanimous vote for the Board of Pardons to recommend a commutation violated the
Ex Post Facto Clause. The ballot question that proposed the amendments read: Shall the

Pennsylvania Constitution be amended to require a unanimous recommendation of the Board of
Pardons before the Governor can pardon or commute the death sentence of an individual
sentenced in a criminal case to death or life imprisonment, to require only a majority vote of the
Senate to approve the Governor's appointments to the Board, and to substitute a crime victim for
an attorney and a corrections expert for a penologist as Board members? (Pennsylvania Board of
Pardons)

U.S. Appeals Court
ELECTRONIC
MONITORING
EX POST FACTO

Rivera-Feliciano v. Acevedo-Vila, 438 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 2006). A class of prisoners convicted of
murder, who had been released pursuant to an electronic surveillance program (ESP), filed a
complaint under § 1983 seeking a preliminary injunction that would prevent their reincarceration
pursuant to a regulation which became effective after their releases. The district court granted
the preliminary injunction and the officials appealed. The appeals court held that a stay of
proceedings while parallel state proceedings presenting the same legal issues ran their course
was appropriate, remanding with instructions. (Puerto Rico Administration of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
PAROLE- SEARCHES

U.S. v. Massey, 461 F.3d 177 (2d Cir. 2006). A parolee was convicted in the district court of
unlawful possession of a firearm, and the parolee appealed. The appeals court affirmed, holding
that the search of the apartment where the parolee was living, during a home visit, was
reasonable. The court noted that the parolee agreed to home visits as a condition of parole, the
parolee was living in his mother's apartment, the officer designated the bedroom assigned to
parolee as the room she wished to visit and immediately upon entering the apartment the officer
requested to see the bedroom and proceeded directly to it, and the bedroom was the only room the
officer visited during the home visit until after she discovered weapons. (New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
PAROLE VIOLATIONS

Williams v. Consovoy, 453 F.3d 173 (3rd Cir. 2006). A former state prisoner brought a § 1983
action against parole board members, a psychologist who contracted with the state to provide
mental health services, and others, alleging that his arrest for a parole violation and the
subsequent decisions of the parole board violated his Fourth and Eighth Amendment rights. The
district court granted summary judgment for some parole board members and the arresting
officer on immunity grounds, and granted the psychologist’s motion for summary judgment. The
former prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed and held that: (1) the claim against parole
board members and the arresting officer was not cognizable under § 1983; and (2) the
psychologist enjoyed absolute immunity. According to the court, regardless of the fact that federal
habeas relief was no longer available, the parole revocation decision had not been rendered
invalid, and success on the former prisoner’s claims would necessarily invalidate a revocation
decision. The court held that the private psychologist who contracted with the state to perform
the evaluation and presented his findings to the adjudicative parole board, which then relied on
his report and expertise in reaching its ultimate decision to deny the inmate parole, acted as an
arm of the court and enjoyed absolute immunity from the inmate’s § 1983 action alleging the
wrongful denial of parole. (New Jersey State Parole Board)

U.S. District Court
PAROLE- VIOLATION
ELECTRONIC
MONITORING

Yahweh v. U.S. Parole Com'n, 428 F.Supp.2d 1293 (S.D.Fla. 2006). A parolee brought an action

against the United States Parole Commission (USPC), seeking declaratory judgment or other
relief from his placement on the Home Detention Electronic Monitoring Program upon the
USPC's determination that he violated his parole by submitting incomplete and untruthful
information to his probation officer. USPC objected to a magistrate judge's report and
recommendation that the parolee's motion for a preliminary injunction should be granted. The
district court held that the USPC was within its discretion in placing the parolee on the program

36.80
XX

for violating his parole, and that a preliminary injunction was not warranted. (United States Parole Commission)
2007
U.S. District Court
TIMELY RELEASE

Avalos v. Baca, 517 F.Supp.2d 1156 (C.D.Cal. 2007). A county jail detainee brought an action against a county
sheriff and under-sheriff, alleging claims arising out of his over-detention and involuntary waiver of an overdetention claim. The defendants moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the motion. The court
held that the defendants did not maintain an unconstitutional policy, practice, or custom of over-detention and that
the sheriff and under-sheriff were not individually liable for the detainee’s over-detention under § 1983. According
to the court, evidence demonstrated that only 0.4 percent of persons released by the department during the relevant
time period were over-detained, the department had taken steps to reduce the number of over-detentions in recent
years, and the total number of over-detentions by the department had dramatically decreased over time. The court
noted that the detainee had no freestanding constitutional right to be free of a coercive waiver of rights and that the
detainee failed to establish that the county sheriff and others conspired to violate his constitutional rights. A member
of the department’s risk management team had approached the detainee and offered him $500 if he would release all
claims. (Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, California)

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
LIBERTY INTEREST
TIMELY RELEASE

Banks v. York, 515 F.Supp.2d 89 (D.D.C. 2007). A detainee in a jail operated by the District of Columbia
Department of Corrections (DOC), and in a correctional treatment facility operated by the District's private
contractor, brought a § 1983 action against District employees and contractor's employees alleging negligent
supervision under District of Columbia law, over-detention, deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, harsh
living conditions in jail, and extradition to Virginia without a hearing. The district court granted the defendants’
motion to dismiss in part and denied in part. The court held that the detainee sufficiently alleged that the Director of
District of Columbia Department of Corrections (DOC) was directly involved in violations of the detainee's
constitutional rights, as required to state a claim under § 1983 against a government official in his individual
capacity. The detainee alleged that the Director refused to transfer the detainee from the jail to a correctional
treatment facility and failed to train DOC employees under his supervision in such a way as to prevent the detainee's
over-detention (detention beyond proper release date). The court found that the Director of District of Columbia
Department of Corrections (DOC) could not be liable in his individual capacity, under the theory of respondeat
superior, to the jail detainee for allegedly unconstitutional actions or omissions of his subordinates. The appeals
court found that the detainee's allegation that policies or practices of the District of Columbia Department of
Corrections (DOC) pertaining to training, supervision and discipline of employees responsible for the detainees'
release from DOC custody resulted in his untimely release from jail, in violation of his constitutional rights, stated a
claim for municipal liability under § 1983. The court found that the detainee's allegations that the Director of the
Department of Corrections (DOC), despite his actual and constructive knowledge that DOC employees were
engaged in conduct that posed a pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury through over-detention,
failed to train, monitor, and discipline DOC employees with regard to the timely release of inmates from DOC
custody, and that the Director's deliberate failure to do so caused the detainee's over-detention, were sufficient when
construed liberally to state a claim under § 1983 for violation of due process and violation of protection against cruel
and unusual punishment. The court noted that the detainee had a clearly established constitutional protection against
over-detention and thus, the Director was not entitled to qualified immunity. (Central Detention Facility. D.C. and
Correctional Treatment Facility operated by the Corrections Corporation of America)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Bullock v. Sheahan, 519 F.Supp.2d 760 (N.D.Ill. 2007). Male former inmates of a county jail brought a class action
against a county and a sheriff, alleging that the defendants had a policy and/or practice of subjecting male inmates to
strip-searches prior to their release, and that such differing treatment of male inmates violated their rights under the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The defendants moved to strike the plaintiffs' expert. The district court denied
the motion, finding that the expert’s testimony was admissible. According to the court, the expert testimony of a
registered architect who specialized in the design of prisons and jails, concerning whether there was adequate space
in the jail for the construction of additional bullpens to hold male detainees was relevant and reliable. The court
noted that while the expert did not review all of the written discovery in the case, the expert reached his opinions
after a tour of the jail and after reviewing other expert reports, jail floor plans, a sheriff's status report and charts
summarizing certain computer records on male detainees. (Cook County Department of Corrections, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
RELEASE

Bullock v. Sheahan, 519 F.Supp.2d 763 (N.D.Ill. 2007). Male jail inmates brought a class action against a county
and county sheriff alleging violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments based on an alleged policy and/or
practice under which male inmates were subjected to strip searches upon returning to a county department of
corrections for out-processing after having been ordered released. The sheriff and county moved to strike certain
portions of the inmates' motion for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in
part. The court held that the sheriff and county had notice of the male jail inmates' claims challenging the policy and
practice, despite allegations that the claims regarding the inmates having to strip in a large non-private group setting
came as a surprise to the county and the sheriff because they were never addressed by inmates during fact or expert
discovery. The court found that factual allegations contained in the complaint satisfied the notice pleading standards
with respect to all claims, and that the county and sheriff did not provide specific evidence of any misrepresentations
or sandbagging other than an affidavit stating that discovery did not focus on the privacy issue. (Cook County
Department of Corrections, Illinois)

36.81
XXII

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT

Dickens v. District of Columbia, 502 F.Supp.2d 90 (D.D.C. 2007). A decedent's sister brought a wrongful death
action against a railroad and the District of Columbia after the decedent was struck and killed by a train shortly after
his release from prison. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint. The district court granted the railroad’s
motion and denied the District’s motion. The decedent’s sister alleged that her brother was severely mentally ill and
was released from the D.C. Jail without adequate preparation and without informing his relatives, which led to his
death. (District of Columbia)

U.S. District Court
SEX OFFENDERS

Doe v. Schwarzenegger, 476 F.Supp.2d 1178 (E.D.Cal. 2007). Registered sex offenders brought an action
challenging the constitutionality of California's Sexual Predator Punishment and Control Act (SPPCA), which
imposed residency restrictions and global positioning system (GPS) monitoring requirements on registered sex
offenders. The offenders moved for a preliminary injunction to enjoin enforcement of the SPPCA's residency and
GPS monitoring provisions. The district court denied the motion. The court held that SPPCA did not apply
retroactively to offenders who were convicted, paroled, or otherwise released from incarceration prior to the
effective date of the statute. The court noted that the SPPCA was a voter initiative that was silent on the issue of
retroactivity, and extrinsic sources did not show that voters intended for it to apply retroactively. (California Sexual
Predator Punishment and Control Act)

U.S. District Court
RELEASE ON RECOGNIZANCE

Doe No. 1 v. Balaam, 494 F.Supp.2d 1173 (D.Nev. 2007). Arrestees who were subjected to strip searches when they
self-surrendered at a county jail and were then released on their own recognizance, pursuant to the sheriff
department's contraband control policy, brought an action against the county and county sheriff. The arrestees sought
damages, attorney fees, and a permanent injunction prohibiting the defendants from conducting certain strip
searches, prohibiting the defendants from engaging in similar unconstitutional conduct in the future, and requiring
and ordering the defendants to institute proper training and policy changes. The inmates moved for partial summary
judgment and the district court granted the motion. The court held that the county's policy of strip searching all
arrestees who self-surrendered to the county jail, absent reasonable suspicion that any arrestee was smuggling
contraband, was unreasonable, and thus amounted to deliberate indifference to the arrestees' Fourth Amendment
rights, especially given that all of the arrestees were booked and then released on their own recognizance without
ever being housed with the general jail population. (Washoe County Detention Facility, Nevada)

U.S. District Court
EX POST FACTO
PAROLE-DENIAL
RETALIATION

Edwards v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 523 F.Supp.2d 462 (E.D.Pa. 2007). A prisoner filed a § 1983 suit, seeking
injunctive and declaratory relief against a Board of Probation and Parole, claiming violations of the Ex Post Facto
Clause and Eighth Amendment, and asserting that his parole was denied in retaliation for exercising his
constitutional rights. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the board. The court noted that the Ex
Post Facto Clause applies to a statute or policy change that alters the definition of criminal conduct or increases the
penalty by which a crime is punishable. Under Pennsylvania law, although parole is an alteration of the terms of
confinement, a parolee continues to serve his unexpired sentence until its conclusion. According to the court, under
Pennsylvania law, a “parole” is not an act of clemency but a penological measure for the disciplinary treatment of
prisoners who seem capable of rehabilitation outside of prison walls; parole does not set aside or affect the sentence,
and the convict remains in the legal custody of the state and under the control of its agents, subject at any time for
breach of condition to be returned to the penal institution. The court held that denial of the prisoner's re-parole by
Board of Probation and Parole, after his conviction as a parole violator, was not re-imposition of the prisoner's
unexpired life sentence, in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause, but rather, under Pennsylvania law, the prisoner's
sentence was not set aside by his parole. According to the court, the prisoner remained in the legal custody of the
warden until expiration of his sentence, and the prisoner had no protected liberty interest beyond that of any other
prisoner eligible to be considered for parole while serving out the remainder of a maximum sentence. The court held
that changes to the Pennsylvania Parole Act did not create a significant risk of increasing the prisoner's punishment
in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause, based on the Board of Probation and Parole's denial of the prisoner's reparole due to factors of prior parole failures and lack of remorse, since the relative weight of such factors in the
parole calculus of amendments to the Parole Act did not change, and the prisoner produced no evidence that the
change in the Parole Act had any effect on the Board's decision. (Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole)

U.S. District Court
TIMELY RELEASE

Gary v. Floyd, 582 F.Supp.2d 741 (D.S.C. 2007). An arrestee brought a civil rights action against an arresting
officer and a police department, alleging he was arrested pursuant to improperly obtained warrants. The arrestee
sought compensatory and punitive damages for allegedly being held for approximately one month after the charges
against him were dropped. The district court held that the arresting officer had probable cause to make the arrest and
that the department could not be held liable under the theory of respondeat superior. But the court found that the
arrestee was entitled to amend his complaint to include as defendants a sergeant and directors of the detention center.
According to the court, an amendment to the arrestee's complaint, alleging that he was not released from
confinement within a reasonable time after charges of forgery were dismissed, would not be futile, even though the
sergeant's affidavit indicated that the arrestee was released within 48 hours after the detention center received
notification that he was to be released. The arrestee alleged that the detention center was immediately notified when
the charges were dismissed, but that he was not released for nearly one month. (Greenville City Police Department,
Greenville County Detention Center, South Carolina)

U.S. District Court
GRADUATED
RELEASE
MEDICAL CARE

Giddings v. Joseph Coleman Center, 473 F.Supp.2d 617 (E.D.Pa. 2007). A parolee brought a civil rights action
against a parole officer and warrant officers who transported him back to prison from a halfway house, alleging that
they were deliberately indifferent to his serious physical and mental health needs in violation of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments. The defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity. The
district court granted the motion. The court held that the parole officer was entitled to qualified immunity from the
Eighth Amendment claim that she was deliberately indifferent to the parolee’s need for medical treatment for a selfinflicted cut on his arm, noting that the cut was not serious because the parolee did not experience significant blood
loss or infection, and the officer was not indifferent to the cut as evidenced by her offer to take the parolee to the

36.82
XXII

hospital the next day. The court ruled that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity from the claim that she was
deliberately indifferent to parolee’s mental health needs, where evidence did not show that the parolee’s mental
health needs were serious on the day he cut himself, as there was no indication of a genuine suicide attempt, and the
officer was not indifferent to those needs as she sent the parolee to the mental health unit of the halfway house.
(Joseph Coleman Center, Pennsylvania)
U.S. District Court
DISCRIMINATION
HOME DETENTION
WORK RELEASE

Goldhaber v. Higgins, 576 F.Supp.2d 694 (W.D.Pa. 2007). An attorney brought an action against state officials,
county officials and a prison board, alleging civil rights violations in connection with his incarceration. The district
court granted the defendants’ motion for dismissal in part and denied in part. The court held that the attorney
adequately alleged that officials retaliated against him for filing a motion for house arrest or work release, as
required to state a claim under the Petition Clause. According to the court, the attorney's application to the court
made it clear that a prior judicial order had afforded him work release subject to the rules and regulations of the
facility where he was housed, and that he was requesting release to house arrest to facilitate work release. The court
found that the attorney asserted that he had been subjected to arbitrary and irrational terms of confinement, as
required to state an equal protection claim. The court noted that the attorney’s complaint alleged conduct on the part
of the defendants indicating the presence of discrimination against the attorney for the specific purpose of preventing
him from participating in a work release program. (Bedford County Prison Board, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
TEMPORARY
RELEASE
DUE PROCESS

Gutierrez v. Joy, 502 F.Supp.2d 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). A pro se prisoner brought a § 1983 action against the state
and various state corrections officials in their official and individual capacities, alleging that the officials violated his
due process rights when he was removed from a temporary release program. The officials moved for summary
judgment. The district court granted the motion in part, and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment
was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether state corrections officials followed required
procedures governing state temporary release program hearings, specifically whether a prisoner participating in the
program received notice of the reasons for a Temporary Release Committee hearing and an opportunity to reply to
the charges against him before he was transferred to another location and removed from the temporary release
program. According to the court, the proceeding that was held in the prisoner's absence to determine his status in the
temporary release program, without an opportunity for him to speak on his own behalf, did not fulfill the
requirements of fairness and due process, and resulted in prejudice toward the inmate, notwithstanding the fact that
the prisoner was under investigation. The court noted that even if the facts of the case were undisputed and made it
clear that the prisoner violated the regulations of the program, the Temporary Release Committee retained discretion
to recommend that he not be removed from the program. According to the court, the short letter provided by
corrections officials to the prisoner could not cure any deprivation of due process resulting from his absence from a
hearing regarding his program status, as the letter did not afford the prisoner the ability to dispute the claims against
him pertaining to his alleged violation of program rules. (Fulton Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
PAROLE –
CONDITIONS
PAROLE –
REVOCATION

Inouye v. Kemna, 504 F.3d 705 (9th Cir. 2007). A parolee brought a § 1983 action in state court against his parole
officer, alleging that the officer violated his First Amendment rights by requiring him to attend a drug treatment
program that required participation in meetings that were rooted in a regard for a higher power, The case was
removed to federal court. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the parole officer, and parolee
appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that the parole officer violated the Establishment
Clause, and that pertinent Establishment Clause law was clearly established at the time of officer's violation. The
parole officer had recommended the revocation of the parolee's parole because he refused to participate. (Hawaii)

U.S. Appeals Court
GRADUATED
RELEASE
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Jackson v. Johnson, 475 F.3d 261 (5th Cir. 2007). An individual who had been released from prison on mandatory
supervision and who resided in a privately operated halfway house, apparently as a condition of his mandatory
supervision, brought an action under § 1983 and § 1985, asserting that his access to the courts had been diminished
in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court dismissed his suit, denied his motion for
reconsideration, and, following his appeal, denied his request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) on appeal.
The court of appeals held that the individual was a “prisoner” within the meaning of the Prison Litigation Reform
Act’s (PLRA) three strikes provision and, thus, could not proceed IFP on appeal. The appeals court denied the
motion to proceed in forma pauperis and dismissed the appeal. The court noted that, to the extent that the halfway
house resident argued that the state could not detain him in the halfway house because his residence there was
voluntary and not a condition of his release, the proper vehicle for his challenge was a habeas petition rather than a §
1983 action. According to the court, PLRA’s three-strikes provision does not bar prisoners from proceeding in
forma pauperis (IFP) in a habeas action, even if the prisoner has accumulated three strikes. According to the court,
although the supervisee had been released from confinement in prison, his release was not to the general public, but
was to a facility where he was locked up 16 to 24 hours a day and from which he could leave only for very limited
purposes. The court noted that even if the supervisee’s time at the halfway house was for primarily non-punitive
purposes, that is, to reintegrate him into society, his confinement resulted from his criminal violation, as he remained
under the supervision of the Pardons and Paroles Division. (Pardons and Paroles Division of the Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Fort Worth, Texas)

U.S. District Court
EARLY RELEASE
LIBERTY INTEREST

Kotz v. Lappin, 515 F.Supp.2d 143 (D.D.C. 2007). A federal prisoner moved for injunctive relief ordering the
Bureau of Prisons (BOP) and BOP director to reverse its refusal for the second time to allow the prisoner to
participate in a Residential Drug Abuse Program (RDAP) and receive a sentence reduction. The district court denied
the motion. The court held that the RDAP statute did not the grant prisoner a liberty interest in the possibility of
early release. The court found that the BOP program statement restricting early release for participation in RDAP to
one time was an interpretive rule not subject to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). (Federal Correctional
Institute, Cumberland, Maryland)

36.83
XXII

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
PAROLEREVOCATION

L.H. v. Schwarzenegger, 519 F.Supp.2d 1072 (E.D.Cal. 2007). Juvenile parolees brought a class action against a
parole board, claiming that regulations denied their due process rights to have two hearings prior to a parole
revocation, or alternatively one prompt comprehensive hearing. The parolees moved for summary judgment on the
due process claim, and the claim for injunctive relief. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part.
The court held that the requirement that a hearing take place within 60 days following the parolee being taken into
custody violated the parolees' due process rights. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by fact
issues as to whether an injunction should be issued mandating that the parole board issue a regulation requiring a
hearing within 10 days of assumption of custody over a juvenile parolee. (California Juvenile Parole System)

U.S. Appeals Court
PAROLE
EX POST FACTO
DUE PROCESS
EQUAL PROTECTION

Michael v. Ghee, 498 F.3d 372 (6th Cir. 2007). Inmates in Ohio correctional facilities who were sentenced prior to
Ohio's enactment of a revised sentencing system on July 1, 1996, brought an action in state court claiming that lack
of retroactivity of the new sentencing scheme and the implementation of the 1998 parole guidelines violated the Ex
Post Facto, Due Process, and Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitution, as well as various provisions of state law.
After the case was removed to federal district court, the court granted the state defendants' motion for dismissal and
for summary judgment. The inmates appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the state's decision
not to apply the new sentencing law retroactively and to adopt new parole guidelines had a rational basis, and the
retroactive application of the 1998 Ohio parole guidelines did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.(Ohio Adult
Parole Authority)

U.S. District Court
RELEASE DATE
TIMELY RELEASE

Peterson v. Tomaselli, 469 F.Supp.2d 146 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). A former state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against
an assistant district attorney (ADA), a city, the commissioner of a city corrections department, and unnamed
defendants, alleging that his constitutional rights were violated when he was held in a state prison longer than legally
prescribed. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court held that the ADA
did not violate the prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights and that the ADA did not violate the prisoner’s due process
rights. The court held that the prisoner’s claim that he was being kept in a state prison for eight months beyond his
properly-calculated conditional release date, if proven, did not violate the prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights,
where the prosecutor had no knowledge that the unwarranted punishment would be inflicted, the prosecutor
reasonably believed that the prisoner would receive credit for his federal sentence when serving the state sentence,
and there was no causal connection between the prosecutor’s alleged actions and the prisoner’s extended
incarceration. (Federal Correctional Institution, Ray Brook, New Jersey)

U.S. District Court
TIMELY RELEASE

Portis v. City of Chicago, 510 F.Supp.2d 461 (N.D.Ill. 2007). Arrestees brought a class action challenging the
unconstitutional practice of delaying the release of persons arrested for ordinance violations that were punishable by
only a fine. After their class was certified, the arrestees moved for summary judgment. The district court denied the
motion. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to when the
steps necessary to process persons arrested for fine-only ordinance violations were completed. (City of Chicago,
Illinois)

U.S. District Court
EARLY RELEASE

Roberts v. Mahoning County, 495 F.Supp.2d 719 (N.D.Ohio 2007). Pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners being
held in the custody of an Ohio sheriff at one of two correctional facilities that were allegedly understaffed and
overcrowded brought a § 1983 class action against the county, sheriff, and county commissioners alleging that
conditions of confinement at those facilities were unconstitutional. The district court held that there was clear and
convincing evidence that crowding was the primary cause of the violation of a federal right, and that no other relief
besides a prisoner release order would remedy that violation. The release order provided for incarceration of all
violent felons and for reopening of all jail facilities under the control of the county to maximum occupancy, while at
the same time protecting the constitutional rights of inmates in the county jail facilities. (Mahoning County Justice
Center, Ohio)

U.S. District Court
PAROLE-LIABILITY

Smith v. U.S., 518 F.Supp.2d 139 (D.D.C. 2007). The mother of a child who was murdered by a parolee brought an
action under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) against the United States. The district court granted the
defendants’ motion for dismissal. The court held that an FTCA claim did not accrue until the mother knew or should
have known that the parolee was the person who killed her daughter, and that his presence in the community was
connected to the government in some way. The court found that the mother failed to make a necessary showing to
delay the accrual of her claim, the mother was not entitled to deviation from the objective standard for determining
whether she established that she could not have discovered her injury and its cause with the exercise of due
diligence. According to the court, even if extreme circumstances could justify a deviation from the objective
standard for whether an FTCA plaintiff established that she could not have discovered her injury and its cause with
the exercise of due diligence, the mother’s affidavit and declaration of her psychiatrist demonstrated that she had
suffered tremendously since the death of her daughter, but it did not establish sufficiently extreme mental disability.
(District of Columbia)

U.S. District Court
CREDIT
PAROLEREVOCATION

Thompson v. District of Columbia Dept. of Corrections, 511 F.Supp.2d 111 (D.D.C. 2007). A federal prisoner filed a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that his custody, based on a parole violator warrant issued by the United
States Parole Commission, unlawfully extended his sentence beyond the expiration date. The district court denied
the petition. The court held that the prisoner's custody did not unlawfully extend his sentence beyond the expiration
date. According to the court, the Commission did not usurp a judicial function in violation of the separation of
powers when it rescinded the prisoner's street-time credit upon each of his parole revocations. The court noted that
the number of days he spent on parole was properly rescinded for each of his revocations, and therefore the days no
longer counted towards the service of his prison term. (District of Columbia Department of Corrections)

36.84
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U.S. Appeals Court
PAROLE- CONDITIONS
SUPERVISED RELEASE

U.S. v. Betts, 511 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2007). A defendant appealed the sentence imposed by the district court for
conspiracy, challenging various conditions of supervised release. The appeals court vacated the sentence and
remanded the case. The court held that the conditions of supervised release improperly delegated to a probation
officer the decision as to how much of any windfall received by defendant would be applied to his restitution
obligation. The court also found that the condition of supervised release prohibiting the defendant from drinking
alcohol was improper, where there was nothing in the record to suggest that the judge thought there was any past
abuse of alcohol or any relationship between alcohol and the defendant's crime. (United States District Court for the
Central District of California)

U.S. District Court
SEX OFFENDERS
CIVIL COMMITMENT

U.S. v. Carta, 503 F.Supp.2d 405 (D.Mass. 2007). The government sought an order against federal inmates whose
sentences had expired, finding that they were sexually dangerous and committing them to the custody of the
Attorney General. The inmates moved to dismiss, arguing that the commitment regime was facially unconstitutional.
The district court dismissed the motions, finding that the statute was a valid exercise of legislative power, did not
violate the Equal Protection Clause, was civil rather than criminal in nature, and did not violate the Due Process
Clause. (Federal Bureau of Prisons)

U.S. Appeals Court
SUPERVISED RELEASE

U.S. v. Kriesel, 508 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2007). The government petitioned to revoke supervised release of a felon who
refused to submit a DNA sample. In response, the convicted felon challenged the constitutionality of the Justice for
All Act, which expanded coverage of the DNA Act to require DNA samples from all convicted felons on supervised
release. The felon also challenged the regulation issued pursuant to the Justice for All Act. The district court upheld
the constitutionality of the Justice for All Act and the validity of the regulation. The felon appealed. The appeals
court affirmed. The court held that requiring a convicted felon on supervised release to provide a DNA sample, even
through drawing of blood, did not constitute an illegal search. The court found that the government's significant
interests in identifying supervised releasees, preventing recidivism, and solving past crimes outweighed the
diminished privacy interests of the convicted felon. (United States District Court for the Western District of
Washington)

U.S. District Court
RELEASE DATE
CREDIT

West v. Whitehead, 484 F.Supp.2d 1011 (D.S.D. 2007). A federal prisoner filed petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
challenging calculation by the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) of his release date. The district court denied the
petition. The court held that the prisoner received credit against his Utah sentences for imprisonment which occurred
prior to the date his federal sentence commenced, and, thus, any additional credit for time served on the Utah
sentences would be a prohibited award of double credit for prior custody. (Federal Prison Camp, Yankton, South
Dakota)
2008

U.S. Appeals Court
CONDITIONAL
RELEASE
PAROLE- CONDITIONS
PRE-RELEASE
RELEASE DATE

Alexander v. U.S. Parole Com'n., 514 F.3d 1083 (10th Cir. 2008). A federal prison inmate sentenced under the
Federal Youth Corrections Act (YCA) petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus after the Parole Commission denied
parole. The district court ordered the Commission to proceed with development of an appropriate pre-release
program and the Commission appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part. The
court held that the district court’s order was the functional equivalent of a conditional release order and thus was
final and reviewable. The court found that the Commission could not determine jeopardy to public welfare from the
inmate's release without considering potential conditions of release, but that the district court lacked the authority to
order the Commission to set a pre-release date and begin the process toward parole. (FCI Sheridan, Colorado)

U.S. Appeals Court
EARLY RELEASE

Arrington v. Daniels, 516 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2008). Prisoners filed numerous petitions for a writ of habeas corpus,
asserting that a regulation implemented by the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) violated the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) by categorically excluding prisoners convicted of offenses involving possession, carrying, or
use of firearms from early release for the successful completion of a residential substance abuse program. The
district court denied the petitions and the prisoners appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court
held that the regulation was invalid under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), since the BOP failed to
articulate a rationale for the regulation so as to provide a means for reviewing the reasonableness of the agency's
categorical exclusion of a class of nonviolent offenders from eligibility for early release. The court noted that the
BOP's general desire for uniformity in the application of the regulation did not explain why the exclusion rule was
promulgated, as the uniformity could have been accomplished in any number of ways. (Sheridan Correctional
Institution, Federal Bureau of Prisons, Oregon)

U.S. District Court
PAROLEREVOCATION

Brown v. McNeil, 591 F.Supp.2d 1245 (M.D.Fla. 2008). An inmate of the Florida penal system whose conditional
release supervision had been revoked, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The district court granted summary
judgment. The court held that the state court's decision to uphold revocation for failure to make supervision
payments was unreasonable, and the state court's decision to uphold revocation based on violation of curfew
provisions was unreasonable given that the inmate violated curfew only one time, and had been given permission to
violate curfew several times. According to the court, the state court's decision to uphold the parole commission's
revocation of the inmate's conditional release supervision for failure to make $30.00 per month cost of supervision
payments and being $312.41 in arrears, was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented, and an unreasonable application of clearly established federal due process principles. The court
noted that the state court’s finding that the failure to pay costs was willful, substantial, and material, was incorrect by
clear and convincing evidence, where testimony and evidence of record revealed that inmate did not have the ability
to remain current with his supervision payments given his other financial obligations at the time. (Florida Parole
Commission)

36.85
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U.S. District Court
TIMELY RELEASE

Bullock v. Sheahan, 568 F.Supp.2d 965 (N.D.Ill. 2008). Two county inmates who were ordered released after being
found not guilty of the charges against them brought an action individually and on behalf of a class against a county
sheriff and county, challenging the constitutionality of a policy under which male inmates, in the custody of the
Cook County Department of Corrections (CCDC), were subjected to strip searches upon returning to CCDC after
being ordered released. The district court held that male inmates in the custody of CCDC who were potentially
discharged were similarly situated to female potential discharges, as supported the male inmates' claim that the
county's policy of strip searching all male discharges and not all female discharges violated the Equal Protection
Clause. The court noted that the two groups of inmates were housed within the same facility, there were varying
security classifications within each group that corresponded to each other, statistics concerning inmate violence
clearly indicated that it took place among female as well as male inmates, and the county's primary justification for
distinguishing between male and female discharges, namely, its alleged inability to hold them in a receiving,
classification, and diagnosis center (RCDC) while their records were reviewed, was a logistical rather than a security
concern. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
delays of eight and eight-and-a-half hours in releasing inmates from CCDC after they received court-ordered
discharges were reasonable. (Cook County Department of Corrections, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
LIBERTY INTEREST
PAROLE-DENIAL
PAROLE-DUE
PROCESS

Carlin v. Wong, 552 F.Supp.2d 1023 (N.D.Cal. 2008). A state prisoner brought a federal habeas petition challenging
a parole board's denial of parole. The district court granted the petition, finding that denial of parole violated the
prisoner's due process liberty interest in parole arising under California law. The court found that the parole board's
denial of parole was not supported by any evidence that the prisoner's release, after having served 27 years in prison
for second degree murder, would threaten public safety, and, thus, violated the prisoner's due process liberty interest
in parole under California law. The court noted that the prisoner, who was 61 years old, had served beyond his
minimum sentence of 17 years, had stopped using drugs, participated in self-help programs and taken academic
courses, had never had a major disciplinary violation in prison and his prison record had been free of any infractions
for twenty years. The district attorney supported granting parole. (San Quentin State Prison, California)

U.S. District Court
RELEASE DATE
TIMELY RELEASE

Davis v. Dallas County, Tex., 541 F.Supp.2d 844 (N.D.Tex. 2008). Inmates filed a state court action alleging that a
new computer system designed and installed by a county and contractors prevented county officials from receiving
relevant inmate information, causing them to be retained beyond their correct release dates. The case was removed to
federal court. The district court denied the contractor’s motion to dismiss. The court held that the contractor had a
duty of care to the inmates to ensure that they were not incarcerated beyond their proper term. The court found that
fact issues remained as to whether the county's negligent reliance on a new computer system was the concurrent,
rather than the superseding, cause of the inmates' detention. (Dallas County, Jail, Texas)

U.S. Appeals Court
HOME DETENTION
LIBERTY INTEREST
WORK RELEASE

Domka v. Portage County, Wis., 523 F.3d 776 (7th Cir. 2008). A former county jail inmate brought a § 1983 action
against a county, alleging that revocation of his work-release and home-detention privileges, granted through a plea
bargain in his prosecution for his third offense of driving under the influence (DUI), had constituted deprivation of
due process. The district court granted summary judgment for the county, and the inmate appealed. The appeals
court affirmed. The court held that the plea agreement did not give rise to protected liberty interests in home
detention and work-release, and that the inmate had knowingly and intelligently waived any due process rights he
may have had in the home-detention program by signing an agreement as to the program's terms. The agreement
unambiguously stated that the inmate could, and would, be removed from the program without notice if, among
other reasons, he tested positive for alcohol use. According to the court, the waiver was knowing and intelligent,
regardless of the prisoner's reliance on an allegedly false oral promise that any positive test would be verified by a
personally administered retest, since the written agreement conditioned removal on a positive initial test only, not on
the prisoner's actually consuming alcohol. The court noted that the inmate received what he bargained for, the
opportunity to serve a portion of his time under home detention with work release. (Portage County's Home
Detention Program, Wisconsin)

U.S. Appeals Court
PAROLE-POLICIES
RELEASE DATE

Furnari v. U.S. Parole Com'n, 531 F.3d 241 (3rd Cir. 2008). A federal prisoner filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus claiming that the United States Parole Commission had improperly denied parole to him. The district court
dismissed the petition and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court found that the commission
had timely performed its duties to set a “release date” early enough to permit the prisoner to appeal from that release
date to the National Appeals Board before the Parole Commission expired. The court held that grant of parole was
not warranted on the basis of a 100 year sentence, as a mitigating circumstance. (United States Parole Commission)

U.S. District Court
CREDIT
PAROLE-CONDITIONS
PAROLEREVOCATION

Garner v. Caulfield, 584 F.Supp.2d 167 (D.D.C. 2008). A parolee filed a habeas petition to challenge his detention
following revocation of his parole. The district court denied the petition. The court held that the parolee was not
entitled to credit toward service of his sentence for his stay at a residential program akin to placement in a halfway
house, which was a condition of parole. The court found that the Parole Commission issued a valid parole violator
warrant before the date on which the petitioner would have reached his full-term expiration date, and therefore it was
authorized to revoke the petitioner's parole. (United States Parole Commission, District of Columbia)

U.S. District Court
PAROLE-CONDITIONS
PAROLE-POLICIES

Hall v. Eichenlaub, 559 F.Supp.2d 777 (E.D.Mich. 2008). A federal prisoner filed a § 2241 petition for a writ of
habeas corpus, challenging the Parole Commission's decision to impose successive terms of special parole after the
prisoner's original special term of parole was revoked. The district court granted the petition, finding that the Parole
Commission could not reimpose a successive term of special parole. The court noted that special parole is different
from regular parole in three aspects: (1) it follows the term of imprisonment, while regular parole entails release
before the end of the prison term; (2) it is imposed, and its length is selected by the sentencing judge, rather than by
the Parole Commission; and (3) if the conditions of special parole are violated, the parolee is returned to prison to
serve the entire parole term, and he does not receive credit for the time spent in non-custodial supervision. (Federal
Correctional Institution in Milan, Michigan)

36.86
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U.S. District Court
PAROLE
TIMELY RELEASE

Johnson v. U.S., 590 F.Supp.2d 101 (D.D.C. 2008). A former inmate brought a civil rights action against the federal
Bureau of Prisons and others, alleging violations of his constitutional rights. The district court granted the
defendants’ motion to dismiss.The court held that absent a showing that the former inmate's conviction or sentence
had been invalidated, or that his parole violator term had been invalidated, the former inmate could not recover
damages on his civil rights claims for time spent in custody beyond the date on which he should have been released
on parole. The court held that the former inmate's denial of placement on parole in a community corrections program
due to an insufficient number of beds did not equate to an “atypical and significant hardship” worthy of due process
protection. (Federal Bureau of Prisons)

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
PAROLE-DENIAL

Opalec v. Curry, 556 F.Supp.2d 1036 (N.D.Cal. 2008). An inmate brought a pro se action for a writ of habeas
corpus, challenging a parole board's decision that he was not suitable for parole. The district court granted the
petition, finding that denial of parole violated due process. According to the court, the board identified only one
main reason for its decision that the inmate was not suitable for parole-- the commitment offense. The inmate had no
disciplinary record in his 12 years in prison or in the 2 years he was in a county jail before he went to prison, had
favorable psychological reports, had a stable social history, was remorseful, and had made realistic plans for his
release and developed marketable skills. (Corr’l Training Facility, Soledad, California)

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
EQUAL PROTECTION
LIBERTY INTEREST
PAROLE
SEX OFFENDER

Patrick v. Raemisch, 550 F.Supp.2d 859 (W.D.Wis. 2008). A state prisoner brought a civil rights action under §
1983 against prison officials and employees, alleging the defendants violated his Eighth Amendment, equal
protection, and due process rights by impeding his access to discretionary and mandatory parole and to a sex
offender treatment program. The district court dismissed the case. The court held that the prisoner's claim
challenging the legality of his ongoing incarceration was not cognizable under § 1983. According to the court, the
prisoner did not have protected liberty interest in treatment programs or discretionary parole that would support his
due process claim. The court found that the prisoner's right to equal protection was not violated. (Racine
Correctional Institution, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
PAROLE-CONDITIONS
PAROLE VIOLATIONS
SEARCHES

Portentoso v. Kern, 532 F.Supp.2d 920 (N.D.Ohio 2008). A parolee brought a § 1983 action against a state parole
authority and officers, stemming from an alleged illegal search of his residential property and his arrest. The
defendants moved for dismissal and for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied
in part. The court held that the state parole officers had probable cause to search the parolee's barn, for the purposes
of the parolee's Fourth Amendment claim alleging warrantless and illegal search, since the parolee's ex-wife had
reported to officers that her daughter told her there were weapons in the barn. The court held that summary judgment
was precluded by genuine issues of material fact, regarding whether the parolee consented to the state parole
officers' search of his house after searching the barn for weapons. The court found that the state parole officers had
probable cause to arrest the parolee after finding ammunition in his house, since possession of ammunition
contravened the parolee's conditions of supervision. (Ohio)

U.S. Appeals Court
TIMELY RELEASE

Powell v. Barrett, 541 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2008). Former detainees at a county jail initiated a class action
complaining about being subjected to “blanket strip searches” upon entering and/or returning to the jail, as well as
their continued detention past their scheduled release dates. The county and city defendants filed motions to dismiss.
The district court granted the county defendants' motion in part and denied it in part, and denied the city defendants'
motion. The defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and remanded. On rehearing en banc, the
appeals court held that the practice of conducting full body visual strip searches on all jail detainees being booked
into the general population for the first time did not violate the Fourth Amendment, regardless of whether there was
any reasonable suspicion to believe that the inmates were concealing contraband, and regardless of whether the
inmates were arrested for minor offenses or misdemeanors. The plaintiffs were 11 former detainees at the Fulton
County Jail in Georgia, all of whom were strip searched upon entering or re-entering the general population. The
court divided the plaintiffs into three groups, which overlapped to some extent. The court addressed the detainees in
the “the Arrestee Strip Search Class” which consists of the eight plaintiffs who were strip searched as part of the
point-of-entry booking process before they were placed into the general jail population for the first time. (Fulton Co.
Jail, Georgia)

U.S. Appeals Court
GRADUATED
RELEASE
RELEASE SITE

Rodriguez v. Smith, 541 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2008). A federal prison inmate brought a habeas corpus petition to
compel the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to immediately consider transferring him to a residential reentry center (RRC).
The district court granted the petition, and the government appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the
statute governing BOP's prisoner placement did not authorize regulations restricting placement in RRCs. According
to the court, the statute governing the designation of the place of imprisonment did not authorize restricting
prisoners' placement in residential reentry centers to lesser of the last 10% or the last six months of their sentences.
The court found that the regulations violated the statute's clear instruction that all placement and transfer
determinations take into consideration each of the fiveenumerated factors. (California)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
WORK RELEASE

Sandage v. Board of Com'rs of Vanderburgh County, 548 F.3d 595 (7th Cir. 2008). The family of murder victims
brought a civil rights action under § 1983 against county officials, alleging that a county sheriff's department's failure
to act on the victims' complaint deprived the victims of their lives without due process of law, in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The victims had complained that they were being harassed by a murderer who was a county
jail inmate and they asked county officials to revoke the inmate’s work-release privilege and re-imprison him. The
inmate ultimately murdered the victims while he was on work release. The inmate had been serving a four-year
sentence for robbery. The district court dismissed the complaint, and the plaintiffs appealed. The appeals court
affirmed, finding that the sheriff's department's failure to act on the victims' complaint did not deprive the victims of
due process. The court noted that the county officials had no duty to protect the victims against private violence, and
the officials' failure to revoke the inmate's work release did not create the danger that the inmate posed to the
victims. (Vanderburgh County Jail, Indiana)

36.87
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U.S. District Court
EX POST FACTO
PAROLE-POLICIES

Sellmon v. Reilly, 551 F.Supp.2d 66 (D.D.C. 2008). District of Columbia inmates, each of whom committed his
crime and was sentenced prior to the date when the United States Parole Commission (USPC) took over
responsibility from the District of Columbia Parole Board for conducting parole hearings for D.C. Code offenders,
brought a § 1983 action against the USPC chairman and its commissioners. The inmates alleged that USPC
retroactively applied its own parole guidelines and practices in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause of the
Constitution. The district court held that the inmates established a prima facie case of an ex post facto violation
resulting from the retroactive application of the USPC parole regime, rather than the D.C. parole regime, to their
parole applications. But the court held that only those inmates who demonstrated that the practical effect of the new
policies was to substantially increase the risk that they each would serve lengthier terms of incarceration were
entitled to relief on their ex post facto claims. (District of Columbia)

U.S. District Court
TIMELY RELEASE

Sheppard v. U.S., 537 F.Supp.2d 785 (D.Md. 2008). A detainee brought an action against the federal Bureau of
Prisons (BOP) claiming negligence pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) for his illegal detention for over
nine months. The district court denied the government’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction or, in the
alternative, for summary judgment. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of
material fact as to the role and duties of BOP personnel who were allegedly responsible for the continued
confinement of the detainee during his false imprisonment. The BOP asserted that the employees were “investigative
or law enforcement officers” for the purposes of the government's waiver of sovereign immunity. The detainee had
been sentenced to 121 months of incarceration in a federal prison in Leavenworth, Kansas. The district court granted
the request of the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia to reduce his sentence to time served and
ordered his release. The detainee was not released for approximately ten months after the court’s order. (District of
Columbia and U.S. Penitentiary, Leavenworth, KS)

U.S. Appeals Court
EX POST FACTO
LIBERTY INTEREST
COMMUTATION

Snodgrass v. Robinson, 512 F.3d 999 (8th Cir. 2008). A state prisoner brought a suit against the Iowa Board of
Parole, the Board's members and the governor of Iowa alleging that her constitutional rights were violated by
applying laws and regulations governing commutation requests, even though the laws were passed after her
conviction. The district court granted a motion to dismiss and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The
court held that the retroactive application of an amendment to the Iowa commutation provisions did not violate the
Ex Post Facto Clause and that the state prisoner had no liberty interest in commutations. The court noted that the
retroactive application of the amendment to Iowa Code did not raise a significant risk that the state prisoner would
be denied a commutation she otherwise would have received from the governor given the unpredictability of the
wholly discretionary grant of a governor's commutation. The court noted that the new provisions limited a Class A
felon serving a life sentence to commutation applications no more frequently than once every ten years rather than
previous standards which provided for regular review. (Iowa Board of Parole)

U.S. District Court
RELEASE DATE

Strother v. Nardolillo, 583 F.Supp.2d 645 (E.D.Pa. 2008). A petitioner moved for a writ of habeas corpus to
challenge the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole's decision to detain him after the completion of his
maximum sentence in a state prison for a parole violation related to a prior conviction in Delaware. The district court
dismissed the petition as second or successive to a previous habeas petition and the petitioner appealed. The appeals
court reversed. On remand, the district court held that the petitioner was required to show collateral consequences or
continuing injury to maintain the petition. The court noted that the petitioner was released from custody during the
pendency of the proceedings, and thus collateral consequences could not be presumed. (George W. Hill Correctional
Facility, and Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole)

U.S. Appeals Court
SUPERVISED RELEASE

U.S. v. Goddard, 537 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2008). A defendant was convicted in district court of possession of child
pornography. The defendant appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and remanded in part. The court found that
several special conditions of supervised release were not an abuse of discretion. The conditions included requiring
monitoring of the defendant's computer, conditions regarding the defendant's use of computers while at work,
conditions related to the defendant's work environment, a condition requiring prior approval of his residence, and a
condition requiring the defendant to obtain prior approval before using a post office box. (U. S. District Court for the
Central District of California)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICATION
SUPERVISED RELEASE

U.S. v. Holman, 532 F.3d 284 (4th Cir. 2008). After a defendant was released from prison and began serving his term
of supervised release for drug and weapons offenses, the district court imposed as a special condition of supervised
release a requirement that the defendant take all prescribed medication, including intramuscular injections of an antipsychotic drug. Upon the second revocation of the defendant's supervised release, the district court sentenced him to
12 months imprisonment to be followed by 37 months of supervised release with the same conditions previously
imposed, and the defendant appealed. The appeals court held that the requirement of intramuscular injections of
antipsychotic medications did not violate the defendant's right to due process. According to the court, the
requirement significantly furthered and was clearly necessary to further the government's interests in protecting the
defendant and the public. The court noted that the defendant had several episodes of violent behavior in prison, and
threatened prison employees and threatened to commit suicide, all during periods when he refused to take his
medication. (Virginia)

U.S. Appeals Court
PRE-RELEASE
SUPERVISED RELEASE
WORK RELEASE

U.S. v. Miller, 547 F.3d 1207 (9th Cir. 2008). A federal supervisee who had been transferred to a county workrelease program at the midpoint of his federal prison term, pursuant to a “prerelease custody” statute, moved to
dismiss the government's petition to revoke his supervised release. The supervisee contended that his period of
supervised release had expired prior to the revocation petition. The district court denied the supervisee's motion, and
he appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that transfer to the work-release program did not mark the
beginning of the supervised release period, given the continuing Bureau of Prisons (BOP) control. The court noted
that the period of work-release was “imprisonment” within the meaning of the statute, and thus the period of
supervised release commenced only upon the inmate's release from work-release. (Bannock County Jail Work
Release Program, Montana)

36.88
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U.S. District Court
PAROLE-POLICIES
PAROLEREVOCATION

Valdivia v. Schwarzenegger, 548 F.Supp.2d 852 (E.D.Cal. 2008). Parolees filed a class action alleging that a state's
parole revocation procedures were unconstitutional. Following partial summary judgment, the parolees moved to
enforce a paragraph of a permanent injunction pertaining to the use of hearsay evidence in revocation proceedings.
The court held that the use of hearsay evidence would be limited by parolees' confrontation rights in a manner set
forth under the controlling law. The court would be required to weigh parolees' interest in their confrontation rights
against the importance of hearsay evidence to the court's ultimate finding and the nature of facts to be proven by
such evidence. (California)

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
LIBERTY INTEREST
PAROLE-DENIAL

Wilborn v. Walsh, 584 F.Supp.2d 384 (D.Mass. 2008). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action against state parole board
members alleging that he was denied parole because of his sexual orientation. The members moved to dismiss. The
district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. According to the court, the issue of whether the state
parole board denied the homosexual prisoner parole because of his sexual orientation involved fact questions that
could not be resolved on a motion to dismiss the prisoner's due process claims against parole board members. The
court noted that even though a prisoner has no right to a valuable government benefit and even though the government may deny him benefit for any number of reasons, it may not deny the benefit to the prisoner on the basis that
infringes his constitutionally protected interests. (Bay State Correctional Center, Massachusetts Parole Board)

U.S. Appeals Court
DUE PROCESS
PAROLEREVOCATION

Wilkins v. Timmerman-Cooper, 512 F.3d 768 (6th Cir. 2008). An offender convicted in state court of rape filed a
habeas petition challenging his parole revocation. The district court dismissed the petition and the offender appealed.
The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the state court's determination that the use of videoconferencing
technology for witness testimony at the parole revocation hearing did not violate the offender’s right to confront
witnesses and did not violate due process. The court found that the determination-- that the use of videoconferencing
was sufficiently similar to live testimony to permit the parolee to observe and confront witnesses-- was not an unreasonable determination of the facts. The court noted that relevant Supreme Court decisions recognized that parolees
had fewer rights in parole revocation hearings than in criminal trials and provided that conventional substitutes for
live testimony were permitted at revocation hearings. The court noted that videoconferencing provided the parolee
with the ability to observe and respond to the testimony of an accuser. The court commented that a videotape of the
parole revocation hearing demonstrated that the parolee and counsel observed, heard and questioned in real time the
witnesses who testified via videoconferencing. (Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, Southern Ohio
Correctional Facility)

U.S. Appeals Court
RELEASE DATE

Wilson v. Johnson, 535 F.3d 262 (4th Cir. 2008). A former prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a department of
corrections alleging wrongful imprisonment. The district court dismissed the action and the prisoner appealed. The
appeals court reversed and remanded, finding the claim was cognizable. The court noted that the prisoner was not
eligible for habeas relief since his sentence had expired and he would be left without any access to federal court if
his § 1983 claim was barred. The prisoner had filed grievances with the prison administration when his release date
was moved back by nearly three months but no formal administrative proceedings were initiated to resolve the complaint. (Virginia Department of Corrections)
2009

U.S. District Court
RELEASE DATE
RELEASE ON BOND
TIMELY RELEASE

Blandford v. District of Columbia Jail, 593 F.Supp.2d 255 (D.D.C. 2009). An arrestee brought a civil rights action
against a District of Columbia jail, alleging that he was detained for seven days without a lawful basis. The district
court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The court held that the arrestee failed to demonstrate
that he was detained beyond his purported release date, as required to state a § 1983 claim against the jail for unlawful detention. The court noted that the arrestee appended to his complaint a document that showed he was freed two
days after his purported release date and voluntarily appeared in court on that date, and jail records showed that the
arrestee was released on the same day that bond was posted on his behalf, and was not in jail at any time after the
purported release date. (District of Columbia Jail)

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
EARLY RELEASE
EQUAL PROTECTION

Bowdry v. Ochalla, 605 F.Supp.2d 1009 (N.D.Ill. 2009). A former state prison inmate brought a § 1983 action
against attorneys employed by a county public defender's office, alleging that the attorneys' respective failure to
notice and correct a mittimus error had resulted in the inmate's incarceration for an extra three months, asserting
violations of due process, equal protection, and the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The district court dismissed the action. The court held that the attorneys had not acted under the color of
state law in failing to correct the mittimus error, where the review of mittimus fell within the scope of a lawyer's
traditional functions, contrary to the defendant's contention that it was “essentially administrative.” (Cook County
Public Defenders, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
EQUAL PROTECTION

Bullock v. Dart, 599 F.Supp.2d 947 (N.D.Ill. 2009). Inmates filed a § 1983 action challenging the constitutionality a
county's policies of performing blanket strip searches on male, but not female, inmates returning to county jail from
court hearings at which charges against them were dismissed, and of providing privacy screens for female discharges
but not male discharges. After entry of summary judgment in the inmates' favor, the defendants moved for reconsideration. The district court granted the motion in part. The court held that male inmates were similarly situated to
female potential discharges. The court found that fact issues remained as to whether the county's policies were justified, and whether security considerations prevented the county from segregating inmates against whom charges had
been dismissed before they returned to their divisions. The defendants asserted that the much greater number of male
inmates in county custody and the differences in the nature and frequency of dangerous incidents in each population
justified the policy. The court held that the county's policy and practice of segregating female possible discharges
from the remainder of female court returns, such that female actual returns could elect to avoid strip searches, but not
segregating male possible discharges in a similar manner, was not gender-neutral on its face, for the purposes of the
Equal Protection Clause. (Cook County Department of Corrections, Illinois)

XXIII

36.89

U.S. Appeals Court
DELAY
RELEASE ON BOND

Campbell v. Johnson, 586 F.3d 835 (11th Cir. 2009). An inmate whom a jail allegedly refused release on bail after a
court approved a property bond, sued a sheriff under § 1983, claiming violation of his constitutional rights. The
sheriff moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in the sheriff's favor on the constitutional
claims and against him in his official and individual capacities. The inmate appealed. The appeals court reversed and
remanded. The appeals court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the sheriff personally participated in the inmate's alleged false imprisonment, The court noted that the parties disputed whether the sheriff directed the jail not to accept property in satisfaction of the inmate's bail bond, and
whether the sheriff knew that property had been judicially approved prior to the date he sent a brief memorandum
advising a corrections officer at the jail to accept a property bond. The appeals court held that the district court decision sidestepped the issue of whether the sheriff had the authority in the first instance to modify the conditions of the
prisoner's bail, and there was little evidentiary basis for the conclusion that an in-county property requirement was
not excessive. (Walton County Jail, Florida)

U.S. Appeals Court
DUE PROCESS
EARLY RELEASE
GOOD-TIME
SEX OFFENDERS

Carver v. Lehman, 558 F.3d 869 (9th Cir. 2009). A former inmate of the Washington Department of Corrections
(DOC), who had been sentenced to a term of imprisonment plus a term of community custody based on his status as
a sex offender, brought a § 1983 action against the secretary of the DOC. The former inmate alleged that denial of
his application for early release into community custody constituted a violation of his due process rights. The district
court granted summary judgment for the DOC secretary, and the former inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that state statutes did not create a liberty interest in early release into community custody for
sex offenders who earned a good-time early release date. Rather, according to the court, the statutes only made such
offenders eligible for discretionary transfer at an earlier date, if appropriate. (Washington State Dept. of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
PAROLE-CONDITIONS
DUE PROCESS
LIBERTY INTEREST
RETALIATION

Cusamano v. Alexander, 691 F.Supp.2d 312 (N.D.N.Y. 2009). A parolee brought a civil rights action for alleged
violations of his constitutional rights against, among others, the chairman of the New York State Parole Division,
parole officers, the New York State Department of Correctional Services (DOCS), commissioner of DOCS, and the
New York State Division of Parole (DOP). These defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and the
parolee cross-moved for summary judgment. The court held that the parolee does not have a due process-protected
liberty interest in being free from special conditions of parole and the parolee failed to state claim for violation of his
Fourth, Fifth Sixth and Eighth Amendment rights. The court held that the parolee adequately alleged the adverse
action element of his First Amendment retaliation claim against the chairman of New York State Parole Division,
which was based upon the chairman's purported conduct in requiring the parolee's enrollment in a drug treatment
program in response to the parolee's speech, via letters, challenging his special conditions of confinement. The court
also found that the parolee sufficiently alleged the personal involvement of the chairman where the parolee alleged
that his parole officer identified the chairman as the individual responsible for ordering the parolee's enrollment in a
drug treatment program. (New York State Division of Parole, Bare Hill Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
EX POST FACTO
GOOD-TIME
TIMELY RELEASE

Dahl v. Weber, 580 F.3d 730 (8th Cir 2009). A former state prisoner filed § 1983 action against the Secretary of the
South Dakota Department of Corrections (DOC) and two wardens, seeking money damages for unconstitutionally
prolonged incarceration based on violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause by the DOC's retroactive withholding of the
prisoner's mandatory good-time credits pursuant to a statute enacted after his sex offense was committed. The district
court granted the secretary and one warden qualified immunity, but denied the other warden qualified immunity. The
warden appealed. The appeals court reversed in part and remanded. The court held that although the prison warden
accepted service of the state prisoner's habeas petition challenging the Department’s withholding of good-time credits, the warden was entitled to qualified immunity from the prisoner's § 1983 claims for money damages for
unconstitutionally prolonged incarceration. According to the court, at the time the warden accepted service he had no
duty to review the prisoner's status to determine that he was entitled to be released, and the warden lacked unilateral
authority to restore good-time credits and release the prisoner. (South Dakota Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
TIMELY RELEASE

Drogosch v. Metcalf, 557 F.3d 372 (6th Cir. 2009). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action against a parole agent and
others, alleging false arrest and unlawful detention in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all claims but the one against the parole agent for unlawful detention. The district court denied the agent’s motion for reconsideration and the agent appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the arrestee's 13-day confinement in jail without a probable cause hearing violated the
Fourth Amendment. The court found that the parole agent was the person responsible for ensuring that the arrestee
received a prompt probable cause hearing after his warrantless arrest for allegedly violating probation. The court
held that the parole agent was not entitled to qualified immunity because he logged the arrestee into jail incorrectly
as a parole violator, which ensured that the arrestee would not receive a prompt probable cause hearing. (Michigan
Department of Corrections and Wayne County Jail, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
LIBERTY INTEREST
PAROLE- DUE
PROCESS
PAROLEREVOCATION

Gordon v. Alexander, 592 F.Supp.2d 644 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). State inmates brought an action against the New York
State Division of Parole and its chairman, asserting various violations arising out of the Division's failure to resolve
administrative appeals within 120 days, its failure to advise parole appellants of the right to institute judicial proceedings, and its failure to give proper consideration to statutory and regulatory factors. The district court granted the
defendants motion to dismiss. The court held that the parole system did not vest inmates with a liberty interest, and
the failure of the state to inform the inmates of their right to judicial review did not violate due process. According to
the court, the New York parole scheme is not one that creates in any prisoner a legitimate expectancy of release and
accordingly, prisoners have no liberty interest in parole, and the protections of the Due Process Clause are inapplicable. (New York State Division of Parole)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELAY
PRETRIAL RELEASE

Harper v. Sheriff of Cook County, 581 F.3d 511 (7th Cir. 2009). A former detainee filed a class action against a sheriff, claiming that new detainees remanded to the sheriff's custody after a probable cause hearing were unconstitutionally required to undergo intake procedures at the county jail before release on bond. The district court certified the
class and the sheriff appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. The court held that the former detainee's
class action lacked a predominance of common issues, precluding certification of the class, where the detainee had

XXIII

36.90

not challenged any particular intake procedure. The court noted that the reasonableness of the delay between posting
bond and release and the reasonableness of the time and manner of assigning identification numbers prior to release
required individual determinations based on the length of delay for each detainee and the conditions and exigencies
of the jail existing on that particular day. According to the court, resolution of an equal protection claim could be
satisfied in an individual suit. The court noted that the detainee was not interested in a large damage award, and his
constitutional claims required individualized liability and damages determinations that could be better litigated in an
individual suit. (Sheriff of Cook County, Cook County Jail, Illinois)
U.S. District Court
ADA-Americans with
Disabilities Act
MEDICAL CARE
PAROLE-GRANTING

Hughes v. Colorado Dept. of Corrections, 594 F.Supp.2d 1226 (D.Colo. 2009). A state prisoner brought a § 1983
action against the Colorado Department of Corrections (CDOC), the Colorado Parole Board, and the operator of a
residential community corrections facility, alleging failure to adequately respond to the prisoner's mental health
needs in violation of his constitutional rights and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The district court dismissed the complaint in part and denied dismissal in part. The court held that the prisoner's § 1983 claims against the
Colorado Department of Corrections (CDOC) and the Colorado Parole Board were barred by the Eleventh Amendment, where Colorado had not waived Eleventh Amendment immunity, Congress had not abrogated state sovereign
immunity for § 1983 claims, and both the CDOC and Board were state agencies. (Sterling Correctional Facility,
Independence House, Colorado)

U.S. District Court
PAROLE- DUE
PROCESS
PAROLE- VIOLATION

Lorando v. Waldren, 629 F.Supp.2d 60 (D.D.C. 2009). A parolee filed a petition for habeas corpus challenging the
loss of good time credits due to a parole violation. The district court denied the petition. The court held that the parolee's rights were not violated when he was not afforded a probable cause hearing before the United States Parole
Commission (USPC) within five days after he was taken into custody pursuant to a parole violation warrant. According to the court, the parolee suffered no prejudice from the delay, and to the extent that he sought release from
custody due to the delay, his request was mooted by his re-parole. The court found that even if the United States
Parole Commission (USPC) had incorrectly determined that the parolee had five, not four, prior convictions in revoking parole, the parolee was not prejudiced by determination, since the salient factor score would have been identical because four or more prior convictions were accorded the same weight. ((District of Columbia Central Detention Facility, U.S. Parole Commission)

U.S. District Court
ELECTRONIC
MONITORING
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
EQUAL PROTECTION

Phipps v. Sheriff of Cook County, 681 F.Supp.2d 899 (N.D.Ill. 2009). Paraplegic and partially-paralyzed pretrial
detainees currently and formerly housed at a county prison brought a class action against the county and county
sheriff, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act. The parties
cross-moved for summary judgment. The district court denied the motions for summary judgment. According to the
court, the county and county sheriff failed to establish that they were not recipients of federal funds, as would render
them beyond the reach of the Rehabilitation Act's requirements. The court found that summary judgment was
precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the paraplegic and partially-paralyzed pretrial detainees
were intentionally discriminated against, and as to whether modifications to county prison facilities requested by the
detainees were reasonable. The court found no evidence that the detainees were excluded from electronic monitoring
or drug rehabilitation programs by the county department of corrections, as would support their Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) claim. (Cook County Department of Corrections, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
WORK RELEASE

Schaub v. County of Olmsted, 656 F.Supp.2d 990 (D.Minn. 2009). An inmate at a county detention center brought an
action against a county, detention center, center director, probation officer, and several unnamed defendants, alleging
that he was injured as result of failure to accommodate his medical condition of paraplegia. The district court denied
the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine
issues of material fact as to whether the county detention center's unwritten policy barring medical care to workrelease inmates was the “moving force” behind the inmate's injuries during his first two months in the center, and
whether the county detention center's modifications in permitting the inmate to attend to his hygiene at home, or rely
on nursing staff to bathe him, were reasonable, and whether the inmate was excluded from appropriate medical care
because of his disability. (Olmsted County Adult Detention Center, Minnesota)

U.S. District Court
EX POST FACTO
PAROLE-GUIDELINES
SENTENCE TO
PAROLE

Smith v. Reilly, 604 F.Supp.2d 124 (D.D.C. 2009). An inmate brought a § 1983 suit against members of the United
States Parole Commission (USPC), asserting an ex post facto challenge to the application of the USPC's parole
guidelines. The district court granted the summary judgment for the defendants. The court held that the Ex Post
Facto Clause barred application of the new parole guidelines, which increased the risk that the inmate would serve a
longer period of incarceration. According to the court, the new USPC guidelines, but not the old ones, prevented a
candidate who, like the inmate, had committed a crime of violence resulting in death, from even being found suitable
for parole when he first became eligible after serving a minimum sentence. The new guidelines also translated disciplinary infractions directly into additional months of incarceration, and considered all disciplinary infractions were
considered. (District of Columbia Board of Parole)

U.S. Appeals Court
DUE PROCESS
LIBERTY INTEREST
SENTENCE

Straley v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 582 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2009). A prisoner brought a habeas petition challenging the
constitutionality of Utah's indeterminate sentencing scheme. The district court dismissed the petition and the prisoner
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that Utah's indeterminate sentencing scheme did not
violate the prisoner’s due process rights and Utah parole statutes did not create a liberty interest entitling the prisoner
to federal due process protections. (Utah Board of Pardons)

U.S. Appeals Court
PAROLE-GUIDELINES
PAROLE-POLICIES
VIDEO
COMMUNICATION

Terrell v. U.S., 564 F.3d 442 (6th Cir. 2009). A federal prisoner serving a life sentence for murder filed a petition for
a writ of habeas corpus asking the court to order in-person parole determination hearings. The district court granted
the petition, and the government appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the United States Parole
Commission's use of videoconferencing to conduct parole determination proceedings violated the Parole Commission Reorganization Act's requirement that a prisoner shall be allowed to “appear and testify” on his own behalf at
the parole determination hearing. According to the court, the meaning of the term “appear” at the time the Parole

XXIII

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Commission Reorganization Act was enacted was unambiguous and required an in-person hearing, given that other
methods, such as videoconferencing, did not exist at the time of the enactment. The court noted that relief for a prisoner under the federal habeas statute and under § 1983 are not necessarily mutually exclusive remedies in the parole
context, and that the claim brought by the prisoner pursuant to habeas statute was cognizable under habeas statute as
a challenge to the execution of his sentence. (Branch Prison, Marquette, Michigan)
U.S. Appeals Court
PAROLEREVOCATION
SUPERVISED RELEASE

U.S. v. Anderson, 583 F.3d 504 (7th Cir. 2009). The Government separately petitioned to revoke the supervised release of three defendants. The district court entered revocation orders and imposed new terms of imprisonment with
recommendations to the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) that each defendant be placed in a halfway house during the last
six months of his sentence. The defendants appealed, and the cases were consolidated for appeal. The appeals court
remanded. The appeals court held that the district court had the authority to impose halfway-house confinement as a
condition of supervised release. According to the court, the district courts had the authority to impose halfway-house
confinement as a condition of supervised release under the catch-all provision of the supervised release statute which
conferred broad discretion on district courts to fashion appropriate conditions of supervised release that complied
with the broad goals of sentencing, notwithstanding the exclusion of halfway-house confinement from the statutory
list of permissible conditions of supervised release. (Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
SENTENCE
CONDITIONS
SUPERVISED RELEASE

U.S. v. Bender, 566 F.3d 748 (8th Cir. 2009). Following revocation of supervised release, the district court imposed
an 18-month sentence and special conditions on a 10-year supervised release term. The defendant appealed. The
appeals court reversed and remanded. The appeals court held that: (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion by
imposing a special condition of supervised release banning the defendant's use of computers and internet access; (2)
the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a special condition requiring the defendant to submit to
“lifestyle restrictions” imposed by a therapist; (3) the district court did not provide sufficient individualized findings
to support the imposition of a special condition banning sexually stimulating materials; (4) as a matter of first
impression, the district court abused its discretion by imposing a special condition banning the defendant from entering any library; and (5) a special condition barring the defendant from frequenting places where minors were
known to frequent without prior approval and then only in the presence of a responsible adult, imposed a greater
deprivation of liberty than was reasonably necessary. (Missouri)

U.S. District Court
BAIL
CONDITIONAL
RELEASE
DUE PROCESS

U.S. v. Cossey, 637 F.Supp.2d 881 (D.Mont. 2009). After prerelease conditions mandated by the Adam Walsh Child
Protection and Safety Act (AWA) amendments to the Bail Reform Act were imposed on a defendant indicted on
charges of receiving and possessing child pornography, the defendant moved for a declaration that the AWA
amendments were unconstitutional. The district court denied the motion. The court held that the AWA amendments
did not violate the Excessive Bail Clause, the Due Process Clause, or separation of powers principles as applied to
the defendant. The amendments mandated that certain prerelease conditions be imposed on persons accused of receiving child pornography. The court noted the conditions were not imposed on the defendant as a blanket prescription without making an individualized determination, and the conditions imposed did not unduly restrict the defendant's movement or interfere with his ability to work. (Montana)

U.S. Appeals Court
PROBATION/
REVOCATION
SENTENCE
SUPERVISED RELEASE

U.S. v. Perez, 565 F.3d 344 (7th Cir. 2009). Following violation of his conditions of supervised release, the district
court imposed sentence. The defendant appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. The court held that the
district court judge lacked jurisdiction to reopen the revocation of supervised release proceedings to make a substantive change to the sentence, and remand was required since the sentence was unclear as to whether the judge intended to impose a sentence of 12 months imprisonment regardless of the sentence imposed by another judge, or
whether the judge intended the defendant to stay in jail for a total of 36 months in light of the other judge's sentence.
(United States Attorney, Chicago, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
PAROLE- SEARCHES

U.S. v. Warren, 566 F.3d 1211 (10th Cir. 2009). Following a warrantless search of his residence, a parolee was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm and possessing with intent to distribute cocaine base. The parolee
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that a police officer's warrantless search of the parolee's residence was justified under the special-needs exception to the warrant and probable cause requirements, as
well as under Colorado law, where the officer searched the residence at the direction of a parole officer. The parolee
had signed a written agreement which required him to allow the parole officer to search his person, residence, any
premises under his control, or his vehicle. (Colorado)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL
WORK RELEASE

Vuncannon v. U.S., 650 F.Supp.2d 577 (N.D.Miss. 2009). A parolee brought an action against a county and others,
alleging claims under § 1983 arising out of injuries he sustained in an accident while operating a forklift as part of a
work release project. The court held that summary judgment for the county on the hospital’s claim was precluded by
a genuine issues of material fact as to (1) whether the parolee was a county prisoner, indigent, and unable to pay; (2)
whether the parolee was in need of hospitalization for the entire length of time; and (3) whether the hospital's
charges were reasonable and customary. (Shelby County Health Care Corporation, Tennessee, and Tippah County,
Mississippi)

U.S. Appeals Court
TIMELY RELEASE

Wasserman v. Rodacker, 557 F.3d 635 (D.C. Cir. 2009). An arrestee brought an action against the government and a
police officer, alleging tort and constitutional claims based on his arrest for violating a leash law and assaulting a
police officer. The government substituted itself as a defendant and moved to dismiss. The district court dismissed
the tort claims and granted summary judgment on the constitutional claims. The arrestee appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The court held that the government properly substituted itself as a party defendant and that the force used
in the arrest was reasonable. The court found that the arrestee's detention was not unreasonable, in violation of
Fourth Amendment, despite having been premised on an assault charge that was later dropped by the government,
where the length of detention was less than 48 hours, and the arrestee failed to allege that the delay of a probable
cause hearing was a result of ill will or some other malicious purpose. (District of Columbia, Metropolitan Police
Department Central Cell Block)

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U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
TIMELY RELEASE

Wilson v. Taylor, 597 F.Supp.2d 451 (D.Del. 2009). The mother of a deceased prisoner, who died in his solitary cell
as a result of asphyxia due to hanging after an apparent attempt to feign suicide, brought a § 1983 action against
Delaware Corrections officials. The district court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court
held that fact issues precluded summary judgment on the mother’s § 1983 claim, custom or policies claim, deliberate
indifference claim, qualified immunity grounds, wrongful death claim, and claim for punitive damages. The court
found genuine issues of material fact as to: (1) whether the prisoner's detention was valid at the time of his death; (2)
whether Delaware Corrections officials failed to train and or maintain customs, policies, practices, or procedures,
relating to the prisoner's repeated release inquiry; (3) whether Delaware Corrections officials' ignored the prisoner's
risk of hurting himself to get the attention of guards as to his repeated release inquiries; and (4) whether Delaware
Corrections officials' conduct in ignoring the prisoner's repeated release inquiries was a proximate cause of the
prisoner's ultimate death. The court also found that fact issues existed as to whether Delaware Corrections officials
acted outrageously and with reckless indifference to the rights of others, precluding summary judgment on the
mother's § 1983 claim for punitive damages. (Delaware Correctional Center)

U.S. District Court
TIMELY RELEASE

Wormley v. U.S., 601 F.Supp.2d 27 (D.D.C. 2009). A detainee brought an action against private correctional entities,
the District of Columbia, the federal government and officials, stemming from an alleged five-month jail over-detention. The court held that the conduct of federal officials in allegedly causing the five-month jail over-detention did
not violate a clearly established federal right of which a reasonable officer would have known, for the purposes of
the officials' qualified immunity defense to the detainee's Fifth Amendment claim, since the officials did not participate in the actual over-detention. The court found that the private correctional vendor sued by the detainee, stemming from an alleged five-month jail over-detention, was acting “under color of state law,” for purposes of the detainee's § 1983 claims, since the vendor was performing a traditional government function by administering the District of Columbia Correctional Treatment Facility. (Washington Halfway Homes, Fairview Halfway House, Correctional Treatment Facility, Corrections Corporation of America, District of Columbia)
2010

U.S. Appeals Court
DELAY
TIMELY RELEASE

Avalos v. Baca, 596 F.3d 583 (9th Cir. 2010). A detainee brought an action against officers of a county sheriff's department in their official and individual capacities for alleged violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights based on his over-detention and the officers' alleged efforts to procure an involuntary waiver of his civil rights
claim. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the officers. The detainee appealed. The appeals
court affirmed. The court held that the officers were not liable under § 1983 in their official capacities on the overdetention claim, absent evidence that they had a policy, practice, or custom of over-detaining inmates. According to
the court, the detainee had no freestanding constitutional right to be free of a coercive waiver, and even if the detainee had a right to be free from a coercive waiver, the officers were entitled to qualified immunity on the involuntary waiver claim. The detainee had been arrested on a warrant from another county for domestic abuse and was
transported to the arresting county jail. The arresting county had the responsibility to notify the other county, under
state law, but failed to do so. Over two months later the arresting county realized that the detainee had been overdetained and released him. On the day of his release, a deputy in street clothing asked the detainee, who did not
speak English, to sign papers that were an offer to settle his claim for over-detention for $500. The detainee asserted
that he did not know what was in the papers. (Los Angeles Sheriff's Department, California)

U.S. District Court
CIVIL COMMITMENT
DUE PROCESS

Bailey v. Pataki, 722 F.Supp.2d 443 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). State prisoners brought a § 1983 action against the former
governor and governor's staff, alleging violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether civil confinements of prison inmates comported with Fourteenth
Amendment procedural due process. The court also found a genuine issue of material fact as to whether state inmates' right to a pre-deprivation hearing prior to a civil commitment at the end of their prison sentences was clearly
established. (New York Department of Correctional Services)

U.S. Appeals Court
BAIL
DUE PROCESS
LIBERTY INTEREST

Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185 (10th Cir. 2010). An arrestee filed a § 1983 action against a former county
sheriff, in his individual capacity, for alleged violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights by depriving
the arrestee of his protected liberty interest in posting bail. The district court denied summary judgment for the sheriff as to qualified immunity and the sheriff appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that summary
judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the arrestee's due process rights were violated by deprivation of his protected liberty interest in posting preset bail during his detention in the county jail. The
court also found a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the county sheriff caused the deprivation of the arrestee's due process rights by the sheriff's personal involvement in maintaining policies at the county jail that prohibited the arrestee from posting preset bail during his detention. (Logan County Jail, Oklahoma)

U.S. Appeals Court
ELECTRONIC
MONITORING
EX POST FACTO
LIBERTY INTEREST
DUE PROCESS

Gonzalez-Fuentes v. Molina, 607 F.3d 864 (1st Cir. 2010). A class of prisoners convicted of murder, who had been
released pursuant to an electronic supervision program (ESP), filed a complaint under § 1983, seeking a preliminary
injunction against their re-incarceration pursuant to a regulation which became effective after their releases. The
district court granted a preliminary injunction and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico appealed. Another class of
prisoners who had been re-incarcerated filed a separate petition for a writ of habeas corpus and the district court
granted the petition. The district court consolidated the two cases, and denied the Commonwealth's motion to dismiss. The commonwealth appealed. The appeals court reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court
held that re-incarceration of the prisoners convicted of murder under a new regulation eliminating the ESP program
for prisoners convicted of murder, did not violate the ex post facto clause, where the prisoners had committed their
crimes of conviction at times predating the creation of the ESP, so that Puerto Rico's decision to disqualify prisoners
from participating in the ESP had no effect on the punishment assigned by law. The court also heldd the reincarceration of the prisoners convicted of murder did not violate substantive due process. The court found that
although the impact of re-incarceration on the prisoners was substantial, Puerto Rico had a justifiable interest in

XXIII

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faithfully applying the new statute which barred prisoners convicted of murder from the ESP program. According to
the court, there was no showing that Puerto Rico acted with deliberate indifference or that re-imprisonment was
conscience-shocking. But the court found that the prisoners convicted of murder, who had been released for several
years pursuant to the ESP, had a protected due process liberty interest in their continued participation in the ESP
program, despite the fact that their releases were premised on lower court determination, which was later overturned,
that the statute eliminating such prisoners from the program violated the ex post facto clause. The prisoners were
serving out the remainder of their sentences in their homes, where they lived either with close relatives, significant
others, or spouses and children, and although they were subject to monitoring with an electronic tracking anklet, and
routine drug and alcohol testing, they were authorized to work at a job or attend school. The court also found that the
re-incarceration of the prisoners deprived them of procedural due process, where the prisoners were not given any
pre-hearing notice as to the reason their ESP status was revoked, and the prisoners had to wait two weeks after their
arrest before receiving any opportunity to contest it. The court concluded that the prisoners whose procedural due
process rights were violated by their re-incarceration or their imminent future re-incarceration after determination
that they had been unlawfully admitted into the ESP were not entitled to either habeas relief, for those already reimprisoned, or preliminary injunctive relief for those yet to be re-imprisoned, where the subsequent Puerto Rico
statute provided a valid, independent, constitutional basis for the prisoners' re-incarceration. (Puerto Rico Department of Justice, Puerto Rico Administration of Corrections)
U.S. Appeals Court
PRETRIAL RELEASE
CONDITIONAL
RELEASE

Harrington v. City of Nashua, 610 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2010). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action against a city and
others alleging false imprisonment and malicious prosecution. The district court granted the city's motion for summary judgment and the arrestee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the limitations period for a
Fourth Amendment claim of false imprisonment begins to run when the false imprisonment ends, when the plaintiff
is either released or detained pursuant to a legal process. The arrestee was released on personal recognizance after
charges were brought against him. The court noted that the commencement of a criminal case by the institution of a
legal process marks the dividing line between claims of false imprisonment and claims of malicious prosecution. The
court found that pretrial release conditions imposed on the arrestee did not constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure,
as required to support a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim against the city, where the conditions required the arrestee to notify the court of any change in address, to refrain from committing crimes, and to forebear from consuming either controlled substances or excessive quantities of alcohol. (City of Nashua, New Hampshire)

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
LIBERTY INTEREST
PAROLE-DENIAL
PAROLE-POLICIES

Hart v. Curry, 716 F.Supp.2d 863 (N.D.Cal. 2010). A state inmate filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging a state court decision upholding a governor's reversal of the state parole board's grant of parole. The district
court granted the petition. The court held that California law created a due process liberty interest in having the governor's reversal be supported by some evidence as to how aggravated circumstances of commitment the offense
indicated a risk of current dangerousness. The court found that the determination that the governor's reversal based
solely on circumstances surrounding commitment of the offense was supported by some evidence was unreasonable.
(Correctional Training Facility, Soledad, California, and California Board of Parole)

U.S. District Court
GOOD-TIME
RELEASE DATE
DELAY

Hill v. Cowin, 717 F.Supp.2d 268 (N.D.N.Y. 2010). A prisoner filed a § 2241 habeas petition alleging he was being
unlawfully held in prison beyond his release date because the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) improperly calculated his
Good Conduct Time (GCT). The district court granted the petition, finding that the BOP improperly calculated the
prisoner's GCT, resulting in his being held beyond his release date. (Federal Bureau of Prisons)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
MEDICAL CARE

Lum v. County of San Joaquin, 756 F.Supp.2d 1243 (E.D.Cal. 2010). An arrestee's survivors brought an action
against a county, city, and several city and county employees, alleging § 1983 claims for various civil rights violations and a state law claim for wrongful death arising from the arrestee's accidental drowning after his release from
the county jail. The defendants moved to dismiss portions of the complaint and the survivors moved for leave to
amend. The district court granted the defendants' motion in part and denied in part, and granted the plaintiffs' motion. The survivors alleged that the city's police sergeants made a decision to arrest the individual for being under the
influence in public, despite lack of evidence of alcohol use and knowledge that the individual was being medicated
for bipolar disorder, and to book him on a “kickout” charge so that he would be released from jail six hours later.
The court found that the arresting officers, by taking the arrestee into custody, created a special relationship with the
arrestee, similar to the special relationship between a jailer and a prisoner, so as to create a duty of care for the purposes of wrongful death claim under California law, arising from the arrestee's accidental drowning following his
release from the county jail. The court noted that it was foreseeable that the arrestee needed medical attention and
that there was a risk posed by releasing him without providing such attention. The court held that the county, city,
and arresting officers were entitled to immunity, under a California Tort Claims Act section related to liability of
public entities and employees for the release of prisoners, for the wrongful death of the arrestee, only as to the basic
decision to release the arrestee from the county jail, but not as to the defendants' ministerial acts after the initial
decision to release the arrestee. The court noted that the arrestee had a lacerated foot, was covered with vomit and
had trouble walking, and had a seizure while he was in a holding cell. The arrestee’s body was found floating in the
San Joaquin River, approximately two miles west of the county jail, shortly after he was released. (San Joaquin
County Jail, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
PAROLE- CONDITIONS
PAROLE- HEARING
PAROLE- POLICIES
SEX OFFENDERS
DUE PROCESS

Meza v. Livingston, 607 F.3d 392 (5th Cir. 2010). A parolee, who had never been convicted of a sex offense, brought
an action against the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) and officials, alleging that defendants denied
him due process when they imposed and enforced sex-offender conditions as part of mandatory supervision following his term of incarceration. The district court found that the procedural protections given to the parolee were constitutionally insufficient and ordered that the parolee be provided with an appropriate hearing. Cross-appeals were
taken. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The appeals court held that: (1) the procedure provided by TDCJ to parolees who had never been convicted of a sex offense and faced possible sex offender
registration and therapy violated due process; (2) a parolee subject to imposition and enforcement of sex-offender
conditions as part of mandatory supervision was owed a hearing that meets due process requirements; (3) the state

XXIII

36.94

was not required to provide counsel to a parolee facing registration as a sex offender and sex therapy as part of mandatory supervision; and (4) TDCJ officials were not entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment from the
parolee's claim for injunctive relief. (Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles, Texas Department of Criminal Justice—
Parole Division)
U.S. Appeals Court
EXPIRATION OF
SENTENCE
TIMELY RELEASE

Montanez v. Thompson, 603 F.3d 243 (3rd Cir. 2010). A state prisoner filed a § 1983 action against corrections officials, alleging that he was incarcerated beyond the expiration of his maximum term of imprisonment as the result of
officials' deliberate indifference. The district court denied one official's motion for summary judgment based on
qualified immunity. The official appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The appeals court held that it
had jurisdiction to review the district court's denial of the official's motion for summary judgment, and that the official was entitled to qualified immunity. According to the court, the state prison records specialist was entitled to
qualified immunity in the prisoner's § 1983 Eighth Amendment claim, alleging that the records specialist was
deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's unlawful incarceration beyond the expiration of his maximum term of imprisonment. The court noted that the records specialist responded quickly to the prisoner's requests for information
about his commitment records, she communicated the prisoner's concerns to her supervisor, the sentencing judge,
and the state Department of Corrections (DOC) central office, and there was no showing that she ever ignored the
prisoner's claims or failed to follow established DOC policy. (Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, State Correctional Institution at Albion)

U.S. Appeals Court
PARDON
EX POST FACTO

PA Prison Soc. v. Cortes, 622 F.3d 215 (3rd Cir. 2010). State prisoners, several non-profit advocacy and prisoner
rights groups, and several state voters and qualified taxpayers brought an action challenging an amendment to the
Pennsylvania constitution changing the composition of the Board of Pardons and the voting requirements for obtaining a pardon or commutation of sentence. The district court granted in part, and denied in part, the parties' crossmotions for summary judgment, and they appealed. The appeals court remanded. On remand, the district court ruled
that one of the groups had standing to challenge the constitutionality of the amendment and reinstated its prior summary judgment ruling, and appeal was again taken. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The appeals court held
that the prisoner advocacy group had organization standing to challenge the constitutionality of the amendment, but
the amendment did not violate the ex post facto clause. The court noted that allegations that the changes in the law
have produced some ambiguous sort of disadvantage, or affected a prisoner's opportunity to take advantage of provisions for early release, are not sufficient grounds for bringing an ex post facto claim. According to the court, there is
no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid
sentence. (Pennsylvania Board of Pardons)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
MEDICAL CARE

Paine v. Johnson, 689 F.Supp.2d 1027 (N.D.Ill. 2010) affirmed 678 500. The guardian of the estate of a pretrial
detainee, who allegedly suffered from bipolar disorder, brought a § 1983 action against a city and city police officers, alleging civil rights violations in connection with the detainee's arrest and subsequent release from custody
without being provided access to mental health treatment. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the detainee, who exhibited drastic and unnatural behavior throughout
her 28-hour detention, had a serious mental health condition. The court also found a genuine issue of material fact as
to whether the arresting city police officer, and other police employees, who witnessed the arrestee singing rap lyrics, taking her clothes off and dancing provocatively for different men, acting erratically, discussing the price of oil,
and screaming bizarre and vulgar statements, among other things, had notice that the arrestee had a serious mental
health condition that required medical attention. The court noted that a city police officer, who spoke on the telephone with the detainee's mother, and was informed by her mother that the detainee was likely bipolar and might be
having an episode, had notice that the detainee had a serious mental health condition that required medical attention,
precluding summary judgment. The court also found genuine issues of material fact as to whether a city police
officer, who had actual knowledge of the pretrial detainee's mental health condition based on observations of her
behavior while in custody, placed the detainee in a position of heightened risk when she released the detainee from
the police station and pointed her toward an area known for violent crime, without providing the detainee with food,
money, or medication, and as to whether the officer's conduct “shocked the conscience.” The court identified a fact
issue as to whether the detainee would not have been raped and seriously injured absent a city police officers' failure
to provide the detainee with psychiatric care. The court held that city police officers were not entitled to qualified
immunity from the § 1983 claim brought by the mother of the detainee, for unreasonably failing to provide the
detainee with mental health care under the Fourth Amendment, as it was clearly established that pretrial detainees
were entitled to mental health treatment for serious mental health conditions. On appeal (678 F.3d 500), the appeals
court held that the arresting officer was entitled to qualified immunity. The district court also denied qualified
immunity for the city police officer who released the detainee, where the law was clearly established that the officer
could not release the detainee from custody in a manner that increased her risk of harm. (Chicago Police
Department, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELAY
TIMELY RELEASE

Portis v. City of Chicago, Ill., 613 F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 2010). Arrestees brought a class action against a city, alleging
that the city had a practice of unconstitutionally delaying the release of persons arrested for non-jailable ordinance
violations that were punishable by a fine only. The arrestees alleged that release was delayed for more than two
hours after all the administrative steps necessary to determine their eligibility for release was completed. The district
court granted the arrestees' motion for summary judgment and the city appealed. The appeals court reversed and
remanded. The appeals court held that the district court, in finding the city's delay in releasing arrestees for nonjailable offenses unreasonable, erred in prescribing a two-hour limit between the city's completion of all the administrative steps necessary to identify the arrestees correctly and to determine their eligibility for release. Instead, according to the court, the arrestees bore the burden of proof and persuasion on the contention that any particular detention was excessive, and the court was required to examine not only the length of a given detention but also the
reasons why the release was deferred. (City of Chicago, Illinois)

XXIII

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U.S. District Court
BAIL
TIMELY RELEASE

Schneyder v. Smith, 709 F.Supp.2d 368 (E.D.Pa. 2010). A detainee who was being held as a material witness whose
testimony was vital to a homicide prosecution brought a civil rights action against the prosecutor who had secured
the material witness warrant for her arrest, alleging the prosecutor failed to notify the judge that the case had been
continued for nearly four months. The detainee sought her release. The district court granted the prosecutor’s motion
to dismiss in part and the detainee appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. On remand, the district court
denied the prosecutor’s motion for summary judgment. The court held that the detainee had a clearly established
constitutional right to be free from detention without probable cause and that a triable issue existed regarding
whether a reasonable prosecutor would have been aware of her duty to inform the judge of the status of any detained
material witness. The detainee had sought bail, but at the bail hearing, the judge articulated his dislike for “setting
bail on people who are not accused of a crime.” In open court, he told the plaintiff, “[i]f the case breaks down, let me
know early and I'll let you out.” (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
PAROLE-DENIAL

Sieu Phong Ngo v. Curry, 745 F.Supp.2d 1031 (N.D.Cal. 2010). A state prisoner, proceeding pro se sought a writ of
habeas corpus, challenging a decision by the California Board of Parole Hearings finding him unsuitable for parole.
The district court granted the motion, finding that the prisoner was entitled to habeas relief because the state court
unreasonably applied California's “some evidence” requirement when finding him unsuitable for parole. The court
noted that the record demonstrated that, since being incarcerated, the prisoner had not been involved with gang-related activities or engaged in any violence, the prisoner's commitment offense for murder did not amount to “some
evidence,” he repeatedly apologized for his role in the victim's death, he accepted responsibility for the murder, and
psychological reports indicated that the prisoner was remorseful, showed significant insight into his commitment
offense, and recognized the negative aspects of gang involvement. (California Board of Parole Hearings)

U.S. District Court
SEX OFFENDER
SUPERVISED RELEASE

U.S. v. Broncheau, 759 F.Supp.2d 694 (E.D.N.C. 2010). Former federal prisoners who had been certified as sexually
dangerous persons moved to dismiss the government's petitions for their commitment. The district court granted the
motion and the government moved to stay the order. The district court denied the motion. The court held that a motion to determine mental competency was the proper way for the government to seek commitment, and the public
interest was served by having a federal inmate transition from incarceration with a period of supervised release.
(Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Federal Bureau of Prisons)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEX OFFENDER

U.S. v. Sanders, 622 F.3d 779 (7th Cir. 2010). A defendant charged with violating the Sex Offender Registration and
Notification Act (SORNA) by traveling in interstate commerce without updating his sex offender registration,
moved to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that SORNA's registration requirement exceeded Congressional
authority under the Commerce Clause. The district court denied the motion. The appeals court affirmed, finding that
SORNA did not exceed Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause. (Mississippi and Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
ADA-Americans with
Disabilities Act
FAILURE TO PROTECT

Ulibarri v. City & County of Denver, 742 F.Supp.2d 1192 (D.Colo. 2010). Deaf detainees, and the estate of one
detainee who committed suicide, brought a civil rights action challenging their arrests and detentions by the members of city and county's police and sheriff departments. The district court granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment in part and denied in part. The court held that failure to provide a deaf detainee with a sign language
interpreter during the intake process did not constitute disability discrimination. The court found that jail deputies
were not deliberately indifferent to a deaf detainee's needs. But the court held that summary judgment was precluded
by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the deaf detainee had access to the jail's services after he was booked
and placed in his housing assignment to the same extent as inmates who could communicate verbally, and whether
the detainee could access the jail's services without assistance. The court held that jail deputies were not deliberately
indifferent to needs of a deaf detainee who committed suicide, and because there was no underlying Eighth
Amendment violation, supervisor defendants were not liable in either their official or individual capacities for the
detainee's suicide, and the municipality was not liable for failure to adequately train and supervise the deputies. The
court noted that no evidence indicated that the detainee had been suicidal prior to his incarceration or at the time of
his medical screening, but rather, evidence established that the detainee could communicate through writing and
otherwise sufficiently to at least alert medical staff that he needed assistance. The court noted that medical staff
made regular and frequent visits to the jail. But the court also held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine
issues of material fact existed as to whether the sheriff's department breached a duty to the detainee to take
reasonable care to prevent the detainee from committing suicide, and whether any such breach proximately caused
the detainee's suicide. The court held that jail officials' late night release of the deaf detainee and the potential harm
from being unable to communicate or get herself home did not demonstrate the level of outrageousness required to
establish a substantive due process violation under a state-created danger theory. According to the court, the detainee
failed to show that officers would have been aware of the risk that, instead of waiting in the facility for public
transportation to begin, the detainee would leave and accept a ride from a stranger. The detainee was released at 2:00
a.m. and she was given bus tokens by a deputy sheriff. Her husband had called the facility to say that he was on his
way to pick her up, but the message was not relayed to the detainee. There was a waiting area in the lobby of the
facility but she did not notice it and attempted to get herself home on her own. (City and County of Denver Police
and Sheriff Departments, Pre-arraignment Detention Facility, Denver County Jail, Colorado)

U.S. Appeals Court
PAROLEREVOCATION
DUE PROCESS

Valdivia v. Schwarzenegger, 599 F.3d 984 (9th Cir. 2010). Parolees brought a class action alleging a state's parole
revocation procedures violated their due process rights. After entering a permanent injunction for the parolees, the
district court entered an order granting the parolees' motion to enforce a paragraph of the injunction concerning the
use of hearsay evidence, and subsequently entered an order granting their motion to enforce the injunction notwithstanding passage of an allegedly conflicting voter proposition. An appeal was taken. The appeals court held that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the use of hearsay evidence was subject to balancing,
but the district court abused its discretion in denying the state's motion to modify the injunction to conform with the
voter proposition. (California)

XXIII

36.96

U.S. District Court
DELAY
TIMELY RELEASE
PRETRIAL RELEASE

Waker v. Brown, 754 F.Supp.2d 62 (D.D.C. 2010). An arrestee, proceeding pro se, brought a § 1983 action against
various defendants, including the District of Columbia mayor and police chief. The defendants filed motions to dismiss and the arrestee filed a motion to compel the identities of police and Department of Corrections (DOC) officers.
The district court granted the defendants’ motions in part and denied in part, and denied the plaintiff's motion. The
court held that police officers did not violate the arrestee's due process rights in arresting him and detaining him for
several days, where the arrest was based upon a fugitive warrant from another county that was not invalidated or
based upon mistaken identity, and the arrestee appeared before a court and was released on his own recognizance.
The arrestee had been held for six days in jail prior to his release. (District of Columbia Jail)
2011

U.S. Appeals Court
TIMELY RELEASE
RELEASE DATE
SENTENCE

Alston v. Read, 663 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 2011). A former state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against corrections
officials, alleging that he was over-detained in violation of his due process rights and the Eighth Amendment. The
district court denied the officials' motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity and the officials
appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that the officials did not have a clearly
established duty to seek out court records in response to the prisoner's unsupported assertion that he was being overdetained, and thus, the officials were entitled to qualified immunity. The court noted that the officials relied on state
law and the prisoner's institutional file in calculating the prisoner's sentence, the prisoner offered no documentation
to put officials on notice that his sentence had been miscalculated, and no caselaw established that the officials were
required to examine any other records. (Offender Management Office of Hawaii's Department of Public Safety)

U.S. District Court
CREDIT
DUE PROCESS
GOOD-TIME

Baggett v. Keller, 796 F.Supp.2d 718 (E.D.N.C. 2011.) State prisoners, who were each convicted of first-degree
murder and sentenced to life imprisonment, petitioned for federal habeas relief on the ground that their accrued good
time, gain time, and merit time credits entitled them to unconditional release. The district court dismissed the petitions. The court held that the decision to withhold application of credits from the calculation of the date for unconditional release did not violate the prisoners' due process rights. The court noted that the credits were solely for the
purpose of allowing prisoners serving life sentences to move to less restrictive custody grades, not for allowing unconditional release. The court held that the decision did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, where the DOC never
promulgated a regulation under state law shortening or modifying prisoner's sentences and never applied sentence
reduction credits toward calculating the date of their unconditional release. (North Carolina Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
ALCOHOL/DRUGS
PARTICIPATION
RELEASE

Banker v. County of Livingston, 782 F.Supp.2d 39 (W.D.N.Y. 2011.) A female patient brought an action against a
county and the company that provided court-ordered alcohol treatment and counseling services, alleging she was
sexually abused by a counselor while undergoing treatment and counseling. The defendants moved to dismiss and
the district court granted the motions. The court held that the plaintiff's allegation that she was required to make
unescorted visits to a male area of the jail in order to receive alcohol abuse medication that was mandated as a condition of probation, did not state a claim of a constitutional magnitude as would give rise to the county's municipal
liability under § 1983. According to the court, the county's alleged requirement that the plaintiff walk unescorted
through portions of the male population jail to receive her medication was not so outrageous as could give rise to the
county's liability for negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) under New York law, where nothing indicated
that the plaintiff's physical safety was threatened. (Livingston County Council on Alcohol and Substance Abuse,
Livingston County Jail, New York)

U.S. District Court
DELAY
DUE PROCESS
TIMELY RELEASE

Barnes v. District of Columbia, 793 F.Supp.2d 260 (D.D.C. 2011.) Inmates at local jails brought a putative class
action, under § 1983, against the District of Columbia, alleging that their over-detentions violated their Fourth, Fifth
and Eighth Amendments rights. Following certification of the over-detention class, the parties moved and cross–
moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that
the District of Columbia's over-detention of jail inmates did not constitute a “seizure,” precluding § 1983 claims
alleging Fourth Amendment violations related to over-detentions stemming from the time it took to process inmates'
court–ordered releases. The court noted that the inmates were already in custody at the time they were ordered released or their sentences expired, such that their freedom of movement had already been terminated, and there was
no evidence that the plaintiffs' over-detentions involved fresh “seizures” warranting a Fourth Amendment analysis.
The court found that the District of Columbia's enforcement of a local ordinance with a “10 p.m. cut-off” rule, under
which jail inmates were kept overnight if their court–ordered releases were not processed prior to 10 p.m., violated
the inmates' substantive due process rights for purposes of a § 1983 action. According to the court, the enforcement
of the rule resulted in over-detention of individuals who were entitled to release, such over-detentions were not the
result of necessary administrative tasks or other reasonable delays, and the District could have promoted a claimed
interest in inmate welfare while simultaneously respecting the entitlement of persons with court orders for release to
prompt release.
The court held that the District of Columbia violated the inmates' substantive due process rights, for the purposes
of a § 1983 action, by over-detaining inmates and failing to release them by the end of the day on which they were
entitled to release. According to the court, although processing of releases generally should have taken between two
and two–and–a–half hours to complete, the average over-detention time for inmates was approximately 36 hours,
even though the District was on notice, via another litigation involving over-detention, that prevailing release practices were deeply inadequate and that a fundamental change was required.
The court found that a significant reduction in the number of over-detentions after the District of Columbia implemented measures to improve the manner in which inmate releases were processed demonstrated that the District
was not deliberately indifferent to inmates' substantive due process rights, precluding the inmates' § 1983 action
against the District. (District of Columbia Department of Corrections)

36.97

U.S. Appeals Court
SEX OFFENDERS
DUE PROCESS
EQUAL PROTECTION
LIBERTY INTEREST

Brown v. Montoya, 662 F.3d 1152 (10th Cir. 2011). A probationer, who had been convicted of false imprisonment
under New Mexico law, brought § 1983 claims against a probation officer and the New Mexico Secretary of
Corrections, alleging that he was wrongly directed to register as a sex offender and was wrongly placed in a sex
offender probation unit, in violation of his rights to substantive due process, procedural due process, and equal
protection. The district court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss and the defendants appealed. The appeals
court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that the complaint was insufficient to
overcome the Secretary's qualified immunity defense, but the probation officer's alleged actions, if proven, denied
the probationer of a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. According to the court, the probation
officer's alleged actions of placing the probationer in a sex offender probation unit and directing him to register as a
sex offender, after the probationer had been convicted of false imprisonment under New Mexico law, if proven,
denied the probationer of a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. The court noted that false
imprisonment was not a sex offense in New Mexico unless the victim was a minor. (New Mexico Department of
Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
LIABILITY-RELEASE
OF PRISONER
FAILURE TO PROTECT
MEDICAL CARE

Coscia v. Town of Pembroke, Mass., 659 F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 2011). The estate of a detainee who committed suicide
after being released from custody brought a § 1983 action against police officers, their supervisors, and a town,
alleging that the officers and supervisors were deliberately indifferent to the arrestee's medical needs and that the
town failed to train the officers to prevent detainee suicides. The district court denied the individual defendants'
motion for judgment on the pleadings and they appealed. The appeals court reversed. The appeals court held that the
estate failed to state a claim for deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to health under the
Fourteenth Amendment. According to the court, the estate failed to allege facts sufficient to demonstrate a causal
relationship between the police officers' failure to furnish medical care to the detainee during a seven-hour period of
custody and the detainee's act of committing suicide by walking in front of a train 14 hours after his release from
custody. The court noted that the detainee had been thinking about suicide at the time he was arrested, the detainee
was thinking about suicide at the time he was released from custody, and when the police released the detainee from
custody they placed him in no worse position than that in which he would have been had they not acted at all. The
court found that in the absence of a risk of harm created or intensified by a state action, there is no due process
liability for harm suffered by a prior detainee after release from custody in circumstances that do not effectively
extend any state impediment to exercising self-help or to receiving whatever aid by others may normally be
available. The twenty-one-year-old detainee had been involved in a one-car accident, he was arrested about eleven
o'clock in the morning and brought to the police station. On the way there he said he intended to throw himself in
front of a train, and he continued to utter suicide threats at the station house accompanied by self-destructive
behavior, to the point of licking an electrical outlet. As a consequence, the police did not lock him in a cell, but
placed him in leg restraints and followed an evaluation protocol that showed a high suicide risk. He was not
examined by a doctor, but was released on his own recognizance about six o'clock that evening. (Town of Pembroke,
Massachusetts)

U.S. Appeals Court
ALIEN
BAIL

Diouf v. Napolitano, 634 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2011). A Senegalese detainee, who was subject to a voluntary departure
order or an alternate removal order, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus requesting a preliminary injunction
for immediate release from prolonged immigration detention. The district court denied the petitioner's motion, and
the petitioner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that an alien subject facing prolonged detention is entitled to a bond hearing before an immigration judge and is entitled to be released from detention unless the government establishes that the alien poses a risk of flight or a danger to the community. (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, San Pedro Detention Facility, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
DUE PROCESS
EX POST FACTO
PAROLE- HEARING

Gilman v. Schwarzenegger, 638 F.3d 1101(9th Cir. 2011). California state prisoners serving life imprisonment sentences with the possibility of parole filed a class action under § 1983, alleging that a provision of California's Victims' Bill of Rights Act of 2008, which reduced the availability and frequency of parole hearings for prisoners initially found not suitable for parole, violated the Ex Post Facto Clause and prisoners' substantive due process rights.
The prisoners moved for a preliminary injunction to bar enforcement of the Act, and the state moved to dismiss. The
district court granted preliminary injunctive relief in part, and the State appealed. The appeals court reversed. The
appeals court held that, even assuming that the Act threatened to create the risk of prolonged incarceration for those
convicted prior to its enactment, the prisoners' ability to apply for expedited hearings remedied any possible Ex Post
Facto violation and warranted denial of the inmates' request for a preliminary injunction. (California)

U.S. District Court
TIMELY RELEASE

Harbeck v. Smith, 814 F.Supp.2d 608 (E.D.Va. 2011). A former pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against a
public defender, clerk of court, and deputy clerk of court, alleging that she was unlawfully imprisoned for 87 days
after criminal charges against her were dismissed, in violation of her rights under Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments, and false imprisonment under Virginia law. The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state
claim. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that the detainee failed to state
§ 1983 and false imprisonment claims against public defender and that the public defender was entitled to
governmental immunity against a legal malpractice claim. The court found that the detainee's allegations were
sufficient to state a § 1983 claim against the clerk and that the clerk was not entitled to quasi–judicial immunity
against the § 1983 claim and was not entitled to sovereign immunity against the negligence claim. The court also
found that the detainee alleged necessary conduct by the clerk and deputy clerk to state a claim for punitive damages.
According to the court, the allegations that the clerk of court received at least two letters notifying her that the
pretrial detainee should be released, and that she still failed to take action to effectuate that release after criminal
charges against the detainee were dismissed, were sufficient to allege the clerk's personal involvement in the
detainee's continued detention. The court noted that the clerk's alleged inaction in procuring the detainee's release
after criminal charges were dismissed was not a choice within the clerk's discretion and was not taken pursuant to the
state court's direction. The court also held that the clerk of court failed in her execution of a ministerial duty,

36.98

precluding her entitlement to sovereign immunity against the pretrial detainee's negligence claim, where the clerk
received orders for detainee to be released, which the clerk's office was then required to notify the jail of the
detainee's change in status so as to effectuate her release. (Hampton Roads Regional Jail, and Circuit Court of the
City of Hampton, Virginia)
U.S. District Court
WORK RELEASE

Maxwell v. South Bend Work Release Center, 787 F.Supp.2d 819 (N.D.Ind. 2011.) An inmate who worked for a
metal products production facility pursuant to a work release program brought an action against the employer alleging discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act. The employer
moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the metal products production facility which employed prisoners in a work-release center was not a public entity within the meaning of Title II
of the ADA, where the facility was a private for-profit corporation, and merely contracting with a public entity for
the provision of some service did not make the facility an instrumentality of the state. The court noted that the production facility was not a program or activity receiving federal assistance, as required to support the prisoner's claim
under the Rehabilitation Act, where the facility was a private employer, and even if the facility participated in a joint
venture with the state's department of corrections, it did not actually receive federal financial assistance. (Indiana
Department of Corrections, South Bend Work Release Center, Indiana)

U.S. District Court
ELECTRONIC
MONITORING
HOME DETENTION
LIBERTY INTEREST

McBride v. Cahoone, 820 F.Supp.2d 623 (E.D.Pa. 2011). A state prisoner filed § 1983 action against his probation
officer, and others, alleging violation of his constitutional rights after he was sent to prison for 83 days without a
hearing for violation of his electronic monitoring program. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court
granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that: (1) the state prisoner had a due process liberty
interest in serving his sentence in home confinement; (2) his claim was not barred by Heck v. Humphrey; (3) the
prisoner had standing to seek injunctive and declaratory relief; (4) the claim against the director of the state
probation and parole department was not barred by the Eleventh Amendment; (5) the probation officer was not
entitled to qualified immunity; (6) the probation officer was not entitled to quasi-judicial immunity; and (7) the
director of the state probation and parole department was not entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. The court noted
that the prisoner pled guilty after a judge advised him repeatedly that if he accepted the government's plea offer, he
would not serve any time in prison, but would carry out his sentence in electronically-monitored home confinement.
(Delaware County Office of Adult Probation and Parole Services, Pennsylvania)

U.S. Appeals Court
EQUAL PROTECTION
PAROLE- VIOLATIONS
VICTIM

McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611 (7th Cir. 2011). The administrator of a decedent's estate brought a state
court action against the City of Chicago and several of its officials, and the Illinois Department of Corrections
(IDOC) and its director, alleging an equal protection violation arising from a shooting incident. The action was
removed to federal court. The district court dismissed the action for failure to state a claim. After the district court
denied the administrator's request for leave to conduct limited discovery in the hope of finding a basis for a personalcapacity equal-protection claim against the IDOC director, the administrator appealed. The appeals court affirmed.
The court found that the administrator failed to state a Monell claim against the City of Chicago for violation of the
right to equal protection of the decedent, who was killed by her ex-boyfriend while he was in violation of parole.
According to the court, the complaint contained only generalized legal allegations that the City failed to have
specific policies in effect to protect victims of domestic violence from harm inflicted by those who violated parole or
court orders of protection by committing acts of domestic violence. The court noted that the complaint did not
contain factual allegations required to support plausibility of the claims, as the allegations were entirely consistent
with lawful conduct, a lawful allocation of limited police resources. (Cook County, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
PAROLE-DENIAL

Neff v. Bryant, 772 F.Supp.2d 1318 (D.Nev. 2011). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a warden, caseworker
and correctional officers, alleging violations of the First, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. After dismissal of the
prisoner's claims, the prisoner filed an amended complaint. The court held that the prisoner's allegations that he was
denied parole due to his security classification were insufficient to state a § 1983 claim for denial of Fourteenth
Amendment due process. The court found that the prisoner's allegations that legal materials mailed to him were intercepted and withheld, and that as a result he lost a motion related to a civil claim, were insufficient to state a §
1983 claim for denial of access to the courts in violation of the First Amendment, absent allegations as to the nature
of the motion, or that the result of the failed motion was the loss of a non-frivolous direct criminal appeal, habeas
corpus petition, or § 1983 claim. (Ely State Prison, Nevada)

U.S. Appeals Court
TIMELY RELEASE
DUE PROCESS

Porter v. Epps, 659 F.3d 440 (5th Cir. 2011). A prisoner who was detained for 15 months beyond his release date as
the result of a mistake by employees of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC) brought suit under §
1983 to recover for alleged violation of his due process rights. The district court denied a motion for judgment as a
matter of law filed by the Commissioner of the MDOC on a qualified immunity theory, and the Commissioner
appealed. The appeals court reversed, finding that the prisoner did not satisfy the burden of showing that failure on
the part of the Commissioner of the MDOC to promulgate a policy to prevent such mistakes by his subordinates was
objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law. The court found that the prisoner failed to satisfy burden
of showing that failure on the part of the Commissioner of the MDOC to train employees to prevent such mistakes
was objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law, and the Commissioner was qualifiedly immune
from liability under § 1983 on a failure-to-train theory, given evidence that the employees of the MDOC's records
department had all attended training sessions with a lawyer to ensure that they better understood court orders.
According to the court, the fact that an employee erred in one instance did not show that the Commissioner's alleged
actions in failing to train were objectively unreasonable. (Mississippi Department of Corrections, Intensive
Supervision Program)

36.99

U.S. District Court
BAIL
TIMELY RELEASE

Rivas v. Martin, 781 F.Supp.2d 775 (N.D.Ind. 2011.) A female detainee brought a § 1983 action against a sheriff and
jail officials, alleging they violated her right to due process by detaining her beyond their authority to do so. The
district court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court held that the detainee stated a § 1983 claim for
violation of her right to due process by alleging that the sheriff and jail officials held her, after she had posted bond,
without a probable cause determination for five days beyond the 48 hour limit in her immigration detainer. The court
found that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity because the defendants allegedly violated the detainee's clearly established constitutional rights. (LaGrange County Jail, Indiana)

U.S. District Court
EX POST FACTO
EARLY RELEASE

Santiago-Lebron v. Florida Parole Com'm, 767 F.Supp.2d 1340 (S.D.Fla. 2011). A federal inmate petitioned for
habeas relief, seeking immediate release based on the Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) cancellation of the Spanish Residential Drug and Alcohol Program (RDAP). The district court dismissed the action. The court held that: (1) BOP did not
violate the Ex Post Facto Clause in canceling the Spanish RDAP; (2) the prisoner was not “similarly situated” to
English-speaking inmates who took the English RDAP; (3) termination of the Spanish RDAP was rationally related
to a legitimate government purpose; (4) BOP was not required to comply with APA's “notice and comment” requirement before canceling the Spanish RDAP; and (5) cancellation of the Spanish RDAP was a permissible construction of the statute requiring BOP to provide substance abuse treatment to eligible inmates. The court noted that
the prisoner had not started the program, much less successfully completed it or been provided with a determination
of eligibility for early release, prior to the date the amended policy became effective. According to the court, the
prisoner did not have a settled expectation of participating in the Spanish Residential Drug and Alcohol Program
(RDAP) and potentially receiving a sentence reduction, and thus no ex post facto violation occurred when the Spanish RDAP was cancelled, where the prisoner had not yet begun RDAP when it was cancelled. (Federal Correctional
Institution, Miami, Florida)

U.S. Appeals Court
TIMELY RELEASE
CIVIL COMMITMENT

Schneyder v. Smith, 653 F.3d 313 (3rd Cir. 2011). A detainee who was being held as a material witness in a homicide
prosecution brought a civil rights action against the prosecutor who secured her arrest warrant, alleging the prosecutor failed to have her released from custody knowing that her testimony was not required for several months. The
district court entered an order granting the prosecutor's motion to dismiss and the detainee appealed. The appeals
court reversed and remanded. On remand, the district court entered an order denying the prosecutor's motion for
summary judgment, and the prosecutor appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the prosecutor's conduct was sufficient to establish prima facie violation of the detainee's Fourth Amendment rights. According to the court, the detainee's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures was clearly established
and the prosecutor was not entitled to prosecutorial immunity. (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania)

U.S. Appeals Court
LIBERTY INTEREST
SENTENCE
DUE PROCESS

Stein v. Ryan, 662 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2011). A former prisoner brought an action in state court against the state and
prison officials, alleging claims for negligence and violations of his civil rights, and seeking damages for the time he
spent in prison pursuant to an illegal sentence. Following removal to the federal court, the district court dismissed
the complaint. The former prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed, holding that the officials had no duty to
discover that an Arizona court imposed an illegal sentence, they did not violate the former prisoner's right to due
process, and the officials were not deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's liberty interest, as would violate his
Eighth Amendment rights. (Arizona Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
RELEASE DATE

Swiggett v. Batcho, 826 F.Supp.2d 722 (E.D.Pa. 2011). A former prisoner filed a § 1983 action against a parole
officer, in his individual capacity, alleging that the prisoner's incarceration beyond his maximum date for release
violated his Eighth amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. The officer moved for summary
judgment. The district court granted the motion, finding that the prisoner was mistakenly released over nine months
earlier than his maximum date for release. (Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole)

U.S. District Court
ALIEN
BAIL
DUE PROCESS
TIMELY RELEASE

Tkochenko v. Sabol, 792 F.Supp.2d 733 (M.D.Pa. 2011.) An immigration detainee filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking review of her continuing custody by immigration officials. The district court granted the petition. The court held that although the immigration detainee, a native and citizen of Ukraine who was convicted of
possessing small quantities of drugs, was subject to immigration laws' mandatory detention provisions applicable to
aliens convicted of drug offenses, the two-year duration of her detention by immigration officials pending entry of a
final removal order offended due process considerations. The court held that the detainee was entitled to federal
habeas relief in the form of bail consideration. The court noted that the detainee's detention was almost five times the
typical 5-month length of detention acknowledged as presumptively reasonable by the Supreme Court, and the
lengthy period of detention was largely attributable to litigation decisions made by the government, and the period of
detention had no fixed, finite, or identifiable duration. (York County Prison, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
MEDICATION
SUPERVISED RELEASE

U.S. v. Barnard, 770 F.Supp.2d 366 (D.Me. 2011). A federal supervisee, who under the terms of his federal supervised release could not unlawfully possess or use a controlled substance, moved to be allowed to use medicinal marijuana. The district court held that the supervisee was not an appropriate candidate for using medicinal marijuana
while under supervision, even though the supervisee obtained a registry card authorizing him to participate in
Maine's medicinal use of marijuana program. The court noted that at the time the terms of supervised release were
imposed, neither federal nor Maine law permitted physicians to prescribe marijuana. According to the court, the
supervisee had demonstrated a determination to flout substance abuse laws during the period of his release, by testing positive for marijuana 23 times before the medicinal use program went into effect, continuing his use of marijuana despite stern admonitions from both his probation officer and the court that further use would not be tolerated,
continuing his use after stating that he had and would cease, and admitting to using marijuana for “gratuitous reasons.” (Maine)

36.100

U.S. Appeals Court
CIVIL COMMITMENT
SEX OFFENDERS
SUPERVISED
RELEASE

U.S. v. Broncheau, 645 F.3d 676 (4th Cir. 2011). Former federal prisoners, who had been certified, pursuant to the
Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, as sexually dangerous persons and were being detained pending
hearings on the government's petitions for their commitment, moved to dismiss those petitions. The district court
granted the motions and denied the government's motion for a stay. The government appealed. The appeals court
vacated and remanded. The appeals court held that the district court improperly ordered the government to release
from the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) custody prisoners who had upcoming terms of supervised release, and whom the
government had certified as sexually dangerous under the civil commitment provisions of the Adam Walsh Child
Protection and Safety Act, and that the district court further improperly required the government to first seek a commitment order under a competency statute before seeking civil commitment under the Adam Walsh Act. The court
noted that although the prisoners' sentences included terms of supervised release, they fell within the class of persons
in the custody of the BOP subject to certification as being sexually dangerous, and the competency statute did not
provide for a commitment on the basis of the prisoners' sexual dangerousness. (Federal Bureau of Prisons, Adam
Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006)

U.S. District Court
EARLY RELEASE
ELECTRONIC
MONITORING

U.S. v. Cook County, Illinois, 761 F.Supp.2d 794 (N.D.Ill. 2011). The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) brought an
action against a county, alleging conditions in a county jail violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment. Following entry of a consent decree, the county moved for entry of a prisoner release order. The district court denied the
motion. The court held that while overcrowding was a primary cause of the unconstitutional conditions at the jail and
a prisoner release order was the least intrusive form of relief for overcrowding in the jail, the proposed prisoner
release order was not narrowly drawn or sufficiently specific, and thus the grant of the order was not warranted. The
court noted that conditions of overcrowding caused guards to resort to excessive force, incidents involving guards'
use of excessive force were more frequent on days the jail was overcrowded, overcrowding caused grossly unsanitary and unhealthy conditions, and chronic overcrowding of the jail's medical facilities resulted in inadequate medical and mental-health care. According to the court, the proposed order did not explain or justify the number of inmates who would be affected by the order or the number of inmates that would be released annually, did not specify
which class or classes of prisoners would be eligible for release or what grounds were to be used in deciding whether
an inmate should be released on their own recognizance or released on electronic monitoring, or provide assurance
that adequate funding would be available for electronic monitoring equipment or that prisoners released to electronic
monitoring would be effectively monitored. (Cook County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
EARLY RELEASE
COMPASSIONATE
RELEASE

U.S. v. Dresbach, 806 F.Supp.2d 1039 (E.D.Mich. 2011.) A defendant moved for reduction in his sentence. The
district court held that the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) properly exercised its discretion in considering the medical condition of the defendant's wife and daughter in denying his request for compassionate release. According to the
court, the BOP had noted that the sentencing court was aware of the developing medical conditions of the prisoner's
wife and daughter at the time of sentencing, and that the prisoner was presumably eligible for home confinement in
eight months and release six months thereafter. According to the court, the BOP has the authority to consider reasons
other than a defendant's own medical condition in determining whether compassionate release is warranted. (Federal
Bureau of Prisons, Michigan)

U.S. Appeals Court
SUPERVISED
RELEASE

U.S. v. Mike, 632 F.3d 686 (10th Cir. 2011). A defendant, who was sentenced for assault resulting in serious bodily
injury, appealed a district court order that overruled his objections to special conditions of supervised release based
on his prior sex offense. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that the
condition calling for monitoring of the defend ant's computer usage did not constitute an abuse of discretion, but the
condition was impermissibly vague. The court also found that a condition prohibiting the defendant from engaging
in an occupation with access to children was improper, where the court failed to make findings required by the Sentencing Guidelines that an occupational restriction was the minimum restriction necessary. (U.S. Dist. Court, New
Mexico)
2012

U.S. District Court
PAROLE-GUIDELINES
SUPERVISED RELEASE

Bentley v. Dennison, 852 F.Supp.2d 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). Parolees, on behalf of themselves and a presumed class,
brought a § 1983 action against officials at a state's department of corrections and department of parole, alleging that
the officials subjected them to unlawful custody by continuing to impose terms of post-release supervision (PRS)
that had been declared unlawful, and arresting and re-incarcerating them for technical violations of those terms. The
defendants moved to dismiss. The district court denied the motion, finding that the officials were not entitled to
qualified immunity at the motion to dismiss stage, and that the parolees stated a § 1983 claim against each individual
official. The officials' contended that the appeals court decision that found the practice to be unlawful created
confusion about the appropriate remedy for parolees who had been given the terms unlawfully. The court held that
the appeals court decision clearly established that the administrative imposition of mandatory PRS was
unconstitutional, that the court clearly explained that the remedy for such a legal infirmity was that the term of PRS
should be vacated and the state should be given the opportunity to seek appropriate resentencing, and the officials
had an obligation to treat the appeals court decision as binding on all terms of administratively imposed PRS. (New
York State Department of Correctional Services, Department of Parole)

U.S. Appeals Court
EX POST FACTO
LIBERTY INTEREST
PAROLE- GUIDELINES
PAROLE- POLICIES
DUE PROCESS

Burnette v. Fahey, 687 F.3d 171 (4th Cir. 2012). State prisoners filed an action against members of the Virginia
Parole Board in their official capacities, contending that the Board had adopted policies and procedures with respect
to parole-eligible inmates imprisoned for violent offenses that violated the Due Process and Ex Post Facto Clauses.
The district court dismissed the action and denied a motion to amend. The plaintiffs appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The appeals court held that Virginia had created a limited due process liberty interest in being considered
for parole at a specified time, and in being furnished with a written explanation for denial of parole, through passage
of its parole statute. But the court held that the prisoners’ complaint supported an inference, at most, that the parole
board was exercising its discretion, but that in doing so the board was taking a stricter view towards violent

36.101

offenders than it had in past, which did not implicate the Ex Post Facto Clause. According to the court, the mere fact
that the parole board had implemented procedural changes during the same multi-year period that the rate of release
decreased did not produce a plausible inference of a causal connection to an alleged Ex Post Facto Clause violation
due to a significant risk of extended punishment. (Virginia Parole Board)
U.S. District Court
SEX OFFENDERS
FAILURE TO PROTECT

Carmichael v. City of Cleveland, 881 F.Supp.2d 833 (N.D.Ohio 2012).The estate of a murder victim brought an
action against police officers, cities, and other defendants under § 1981, § 1983, and state law. The defendants
moved for dismissal and judgment on the pleadings. The district court granted the motions. The court held that the
wrongful death claims brought by the estate of the murder victim against the County Board of Commissioners,
alleging actions or inactions of the County through its officials and employees, with respect to the monitoring of the
murderer as a registered sex offender, were based on the County's provision or non-provision of police services or
protection, and/or enforcement of the law, and therefore they fell within the general grant of immunity in the Ohio
Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act for political subdivisions engaged in governmental functions. The court
found that the wrongful death claims brought by the estate against the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and
Corrections (ODRC) were barred by the Eleventh Amendment, since the ODRC had not consented to suit in the
district court. The court noted that as a state agency, ODRC is not a “person” that can be held liable for money
damages under § 1983. (Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections, Cuyahoga County Board of
Commissioners, Ohio)

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
EARLY RELEASE
PAROLE-CONDITIONS
SEX OFFENDERS

Catanzaro v. Harry, 848 F.Supp.2d 780 (W.D.Mich. 2012). A state prisoner, proceeding pro se, brought a § 1983
action against a state department of corrections, department officials, a warden, parole board members, and
numerous prison and department employees, alleging violation of his due process rights, violation of the Fourth
Amendment, denial of adequate medical care, his right to free exercise of religion, equal protection, access to courts,
and retaliation. The district court held that: (1) the prisoner had no protected interest in early release on parole; (2)
the requirement that the prisoner complete a sex-offender treatment program as condition for parole did not violate
the Due Process Clause as the condition for parole did not exceed the sentence imposed on the prisoner; (3) the
prisoner's conditions at sex-offender treatment facility did not implicate the prisoner's right to procedural due
process, notwithstanding the fact that the prisoner did not have access to recreational facilities or a law library, the
prisoner could not work, the prisoner had to arrange for his own health care, and the prisoner did not have the
opportunity to attend religious services; (4) the transfer of the prisoner to facility for sex-offender treatment program
did not violate his right to substantive due process; and (5) the prisoner stated a claim for violation of Free Exercise
Clause. According to the court, the prisoner's complaint, alleging that a parole agent prevented him from bringing his
own legal papers with him during his transfer from a sex-offender treatment facility to a prison, and that as a result,
the prisoner was unable to notify the court of his address change and a lost opportunity to object to dismissal of two
retaliation claims, failed to state a claim for violation of prisoner's right of access to the courts. (Cooper Street
Correctional Facility, Residential Sex Offender Program (RSOP) at the Kalamazoo, and Probation Enhancement
Program in Muskegon, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
EX POST FACTO
PAROLE- HEARING
PAROLE- POLICIES
DUE PROCESS

Daniel v. Fulwood, 893 F.Supp.2d 42 (D.D.C. 2012). Federal inmates convicted of violating District of Columbia
laws filed suit against the Commissioners of United States Parole Commission, alleging that retroactive application
of parole regulations to prisoners convicted prior to the issuance of those regulations violated the ex post facto
clause, and that they were deprived of fair parole review hearings, in violation of the due process clause. The inmates
moved for reconsideration. The district court denied the motion. The court held that the inmates failed to make a
plausible showing of non-speculative evidence that retroactive application of the parole guidelines violated the Ex
Post Facto Clause, where the prior regulations involved so much discretion that the court could not compare how the
Parole Commission might have evaluated a parole under those regulations with how the Commission did evaluate
parole under the modern guidelines. (U.S. Parole Commission)

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
EQUAL PROTECTION
PAROLE-POLICIES

De Luna v. Hidalgo County, Tex., 853 F.Supp.2d 623(S.D.Tex. 2012). Two students, on behalf of themselves and a
purported class, brought a § 1983 action against state magistrates and a county, alleging violation of federal due
process and equal protection rights based on their placement in jail for unpaid fines or costs related to violations of
the Texas Education Code. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment and the students also moved for
class certification. The district court held that: (1) the students lacked standing to seek equitable and declaratory
relief from magistrates' practice of incarcerating individuals without an indigency determination; (2) the county's
policy of jailing individuals charged with fine-only misdemeanor offenses who had failed to directly inform the
arraigning magistrate of their indigency violated due process; and (3) the students did not waive their right to an
affirmative indigency determination by waiving their right to counsel at arraignment. The court held that summary
judgment was precluded on the § 1983 claim by a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether one of the
students placed in jail for unpaid fines or costs related to violations of Texas Education Code knew that she could tell
a state magistrate that she could not pay the fines on her outstanding charges and obtain either a payment plan or
community service. (Hidalgo County Jail, Texas)

U.S. District Court
EQUAL PROTECTION
SEX OFFENDERS

Doe v. Caldwell, 913 F.Supp.2d 262 (E.D.La. 2012). Offenders convicted of violating Louisiana's Crime Against
Nature by Solicitation statute filed a class action against state officials, challenging the enforcement of Louisiana's
sex offender registry law. State officials moved to dismiss, and the offenders moved for class certification and for
summary judgment. The district court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss. The court held that allegations that a
provision of the sex offender registry law requiring individuals convicted of violating Louisiana's Crime Against
Nature by Solicitation statute to register as sex offenders, but not requiring individuals convicted under the Louisiana
Prostitution statute to register as sex offenders, was without any rational basis, and stated a § 1983 equal protection
claim. (Louisiana Crime Against Nature by Solicitation Statute)

36.102

U.S. District Court
EQUAL PROTECTION
PAROLE-CONDITIONS
SEX OFFENDERS

Doe v. Jindal, 851 F.Supp.2d 995 (E.D.La. 2012). Individuals convicted of violating Louisiana's Crime Against
Nature by Solicitation (CANS) statute brought a § 1983 action against Louisiana's Governor, Attorney General, and
other state and municipal officials, challenging the statute's requirement that they register as sex offenders under
Louisiana's sex offender registry law. The individuals moved for summary judgment and the district court granted
the motion. The court held that the individuals were treated differently than those convicted of engaging in the same
conduct under the solicitation provision of Louisiana's prostitution statute, which did not require registration as sex
offender, and thus the provision of the sex offender registry law requiring individuals convicted of CANS to register
as sex offenders deprived the individuals of equal protection of laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
(Crime Against Nature by Solicitation Statute, Louisiana)

U.S. District Court
EX POST FACTO
SEX OFFENDERS

Doe v. Nebraska, 898 F.Supp.2d 1086 (D.Neb. 2012). Sex offenders who were required to register under the
Nebraska Sex Offender Registration Act and the offenders' family members brought an action against a state
alleging that portions of the Act violated the First Amendment, the Due Process Clause, the Ex Post Facto Clause,
and the Fourth Amendment. The district court held that: (1) the statute criminalizing registrants' use of social
networking web sites, instant messaging, and chat room services accessible by minors was not narrowly tailored; (2)
the statute criminalizing registrants' use of web sites was overbroad; (3) the statute requiring registrants' disclosure of
domain names and blog sites used was not narrowly tailored; (4) the statute criminalizing registrants' use of web
sites was vague under the Due Process Clause; and, (5) the statutes violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. The court
noted that a statute is “narrowly tailored” to regulate content-neutral speech under the First Amendment, if it targets
and eliminates no more than the exact source of the evil it seeks to remedy. The district court opened its opinion with
the following: “Earlier I paraphrased Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes and observed that if the people of Nebraska
wanted to go to hell, it was my job to help them get there. By that, I meant that it is not my prerogative to secondguess Nebraska's policy judgments so long as those judgments are within constitutional parameters. Accordingly, I
upheld many portions of Nebraska's new sex offender registration laws even though it was my firm personal view
that those laws were both wrongheaded and counterproductive. However, I had serious constitutional concerns about
three sections of Nebraska's new law…. I have decided that the remaining portions of Nebraska's sex offender
registry laws are unconstitutional.” (Nebraska)

U.S. District Court
EX POST FACTO
SEX OFFENDERS
DUE PROCESS
EQUAL PROTECTION

Doe v. Raemisch, 895 F.Supp.2d 897 (E.D.Wis. 2012). Two offenders, one from Connecticut and one from Florida,
who were subject to Wisconsin's sex offender registration and notification statutes, sued the Wisconsin Department
of Corrections (DOC), its Secretary, and the Director of the DOC's Sex Offender Program, alleging that application
and enforcement of registration requirements violated their constitutional and statutory rights. The parties crossmoved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that:
(1) the registration requirement was not punitive; but, (2) a provision authorizing the imposition of a $100 annual fee
violated the Ex Post Facto Clause; (3) the statutes did not violate the offenders' constitutional equal protection rights;
(4) the statutes did not violate the offenders' equal protection or substantive due process rights by denying them an
individualized, risk-determination-based judicial system; (5) the registration law did not constitute an
unconstitutional legislative impairment of the offenders' plea agreements; (6) the offenders had no First Amendment
cause of action regarding requirements to provide e-mail addresses and websites they maintained; and (7) the
defendant officials were entitled to qualified immunity. The court noted that, except for an annual fee requirement,
Wisconsin's sex offender registration law was reasonable in light of its non-punitive objective, and thus did not
violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, and the fact that the registration law might deter sex offenders from violating the
law did not establish that the registration requirement itself was punitive, and the fact that offenders had to travel to
specified law enforcement facilities to have their photographs taken and to be fingerprinted was not sufficiently
severe to transform an otherwise non-punitive measure into a punitive one. (Wisconsin Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
PAROLE- CONDITIONS
PAROLE- GUIDELINES
SEX OFFENDERS
DUE PROCESS
EQUAL PROTECTION

Edmond v. Clements, 896 F.Supp.2d 960 (D.Colo. 2012). A parolee brought a civil rights action alleging that his
constitutional rights were violated when he failed to receive a $100 cash payment upon his release from a state
prison to parole, and by state corrections officials' failure to perform a proper sex offender evaluation, which resulted
in the parolee being improperly ordered to participate in sex offense treatment that included a requirement that he
have no contact with his children. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion. The
district court held that: (1) the private sex offender treatment program that contracted with the state and its
employees did not qualify as “state actors,” and thus, could not be liable in the parolee's § 1983 claim; (2) the claim
against the executive director of the state department of corrections in his official capacity for recovery of a cash
payment was barred by the Eleventh Amendment; (3) the executive director was not personally liable for the cash
payable to the parolee upon release; (4) the officials were not liable under § 1983 for their alleged negligent
supervision, failure to instruct or warn, or failure to implement proper training procedures for parole officers; (5) the
parolee's equal protection rights were not violated; and (6) the allegations stated a due process claim against
corrections officials. According to the court, allegations by the parolee that Colorado department of corrections
officials failed to perform a proper sex offender evaluation prior to releasing him on parole, as required by Colorado
law, which allegedly resulted in a parole condition that he have no contact with his children, stated a due process
claim against the corrections officials. (Bijou Treatment & Training Institute, under contract to the Colorado
Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELAY
BAIL
DUE PROCESS
LIBERTY INTEREST
RELEASE ON BOND
RELEASE ON
RECOGNIZANCE

Fields v. Henry County, Tenn., 701 F.3d 180 (6th Cir. 2012). An arrestee filed a civil rights action alleging that a
county had violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from excessive bail and his Fourteenth Amendment right
to procedural due process. The district court granted summary judgment for the county and the arrestee appealed.
The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that setting the arrestee's bail at the same amount as other
defendants facing domestic-assault charges through the county's use of a bond schedule without particularized
examination of his situation did not violate the arrestee's Eighth Amendment right to be free from excessive bail. The
court noted that the mere use of a bond schedule does not itself pose a constitutional problem under the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition of excessive bail, since a schedule is aimed at assuring the presence of a defendant, and the
bond schedule represents an assessment of what bail amount would ensure the appearance of the average defendant

36.103

facing such a charge. The court found that a liberty interest protected by due process had not been implicated by the
county's policy of automatically detaining domestic-assault defendants for 12 hours without bail. The court noted
that a Tennessee statute providing that a person could not “be committed to prison” until he had a hearing before a
magistrate did not create a liberty interest, and release on personal recognizance under Tennessee law lacked
explicitly mandatory language needed to create a liberty interest. (Henry County Sherriff's Office and Henry County
Jail, Tennessee)
U.S. Appeals Court
TIMELY RELEASE

Handt v. Lynch, 681 F.3d 939 (8th Cir. 2012). A detainee, who suffered a month-long incarceration following
sentencing for operating while intoxicated, even though a state court had not ordered his incarceration, brought a §
1983 action against prison intake officers and a counselor. The district court denied the officers' and counselor's
motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, and they appealed. The appeals court vacated and
remanded. The appeals court held that the district court failed to engage in a full qualified immunity analysis as to
each of the detainee's § 1983.claims, setting aside the district court's order denying summary judgment to the prison
intake officers and counselor on qualified immunity grounds. The court noted that, although the district court did an
admirable job of explaining the facts of the case and construing those facts in the light most favorable to the
detainee, the court nevertheless repeatedly stated in its analysis that there were material issues of fact in dispute, and
its decision lacked consideration of the individual defendants' actions with respect to each of the constitutional
claims. (Iowa Medical Classification Center, Oakdale, Iowa)

U.S. District Court
DELAY
DUE PROCESS
EQUAL PROTECTION
LIBERTY INTEREST
TIMELY RELEASE

Harris v. Hammon, 914 F.Supp.2d 1026 (D.Minn. 2012). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a county and
various officials with the state department of corrections (DOC), alleging violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments, as well as state law claims for false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED),
and negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED). The defendants moved for summary judgment and for
judgment on the pleadings. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that there
was no evidence of a continuing, widespread pattern of misconduct on account of county employees in not releasing
prisoners pursuant to court orders, as required for the prisoner's § 1983 failure-to-train claims against the county for
alleged violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The prisoner had been held for more than five days
after a judge ordered his release pending his appeal.
According to the court, the former prisoner's allegations were sufficient to plead that department of corrections
(DOC) employees were deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's liberty rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, as
required to state a § 1983 claim for violations of his due process rights based on his continued detention after a court
ordered his release. The prisoner alleged that he had a court order for his release but he was returned to prison, that a
judge faxed and mailed the release order to the prison after being contacted by the prisoner's attorney the next day,
that the judge's clerk also telephoned employees to inform them that the prisoner was to be released, that one
employee did not respond to calls from the prisoner's attorney, that another employee told the attorney he would
have to hand deliver a certified copy of order by the end of her shift in three minutes so that the prisoner could be
released before the weekend, and that employees told the attorney several days later that they might not be able to
release the prisoner because the order could be invalid. The court also held that the prisoner's allegations were
sufficient to plead that his continued detention, after his release was ordered by a judge, violated a clearly established
right, as required to overcome qualified immunity for department of corrections (DOC) employees. (Lino Lakes
Correctional Facility, Ramsey County Jail, Minnesota)

U.S. Appeals Court
TIMELY RELEASE

Holloway v. Delaware County Sheriff, 700 F.3d 1063 (7th Cir. 2012). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action, alleging
that a sheriff, who was sued in his official capacity, violated his rights by detaining him without charges for nine
days, The district court granted summary judgment for the sheriff and the arrestee appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The appeals court held that the sheriff did not violate the substantive due process rights of the arrestee,
where the sheriff brought the arrestee before court for an initial hearing within 72 hours of his arrest, followed the
court's order in holding the arrestee without bond, and released the arrestee promptly, within 72 hours of the initial
hearing, excluding intervening weekend days, when the prosecutor did not file charges within the time permitted by
the court. (Delaware County Jail, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
ALIEN
BAIL
CONDITIONAL
RELEASE

Leslie v. Holder, 865 F.Supp.2d 627 (M.D.Pa. 2012). An alien, a native, and citizen of Jamaica, petitioned for a writ
of habeas corpus contending that his continued detention by United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) for four years without a bond hearing was unconstitutional. The district court denied the petition. The alien
appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded for the purpose of a bond hearing. The district court released the
alien on bond with conditions. The court held that the alien was entitled to the grant of bail, pending a final removal
order. The court noted that although the alien had prior drug convictions and a history of drug abuse, all of the
convictions were over a decade old, the alien suffered from multiple health problems, including degenerative spine
disease, high blood pressure, and gastro-intestinal ailments, he credibly asserted that the passage of time and his age
of 59 years tempered his conduct, the alien earned his high school equivalency certificate in prison, he participated in
drug treatment and counseling, one immigration judge had found that the alien had learned his lesson and was not a
danger to community, the alien had an extensive and supportive family in the United States, two family members
agreed to serve as custodians for the alien upon his release, and the habeas claim that he was subjected to
unreasonably prolonged detention had substantial merit. The court imposed bail conditions that the alien not violate
any laws while on release, that the alien advise the District Court and immigration officials before making a change
of residence or phone number, that the alien appear as required for removal proceedings, that the alien be supervised
by immigration authorities, and that the alien be released to the custody of a third-party custodian, the alien's sisterin-law, who was required to certify that she would ensure the alien's compliance with all bail conditions. (United
States Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Pennsylvania)

36.104

U.S. Appeals Court
CONDITIONAL
RELEASE
PAROLE-GUIDELINES
SUPERVISED RELEASE

Marlowe v. Fabian, 676 F.3d 743 (8th Cir, 2012). A former state prisoner filed a § 1983 action against two
Department of Corrections (DOC) officials for his allegedly unconstitutional imprisonment 375 days beyond the
date on which he became eligible for supervised release, purportedly violating his Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court granted the officials summary judgment. The former prisoner
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that a state court of appeals' decision, remanding to the
trial court the petitioner's habeas claim seeking immediate release from state prison, was not “favorable termination,”
thus barring his § 1983 claim, since the remand decision did not reverse, expunge, invalidate, or impugn his
incarceration by grant of writ of habeas corpus, but rather directed the Department of Corrections (DOC) to consider
restructuring his release plan and to seek to develop a plan that could lead to his release from prison by satisfying all
conditions of supervised release. (Minnesota Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
DUE PROCESS
FAILURE TO PROTECT
LIABILITY-RELEASE
OF PRISONER
MEDICAL CARE

Paine v. Cason, 678 F.3d 500 (7th Cir. 2012). The guardian of the estate of an arrestee, who allegedly suffered from
bipolar disorder, brought a § 1983 action against a municipality and police officers, alleging civil rights violations in
connection with the arrest and subsequent release from custody without being provided access to mental health
treatment. The arrestee was raped at knifepoint after her release and either jumped or was pushed from a window,
causing permanent brain damage. The district court denied summary judgment in part for the defendants. The
defendants sought relief through interlocutory appeal. The appeals court affirmed in part, denied in part, and
remanded. The appeals held that: (1) the arrestee, as a person in custody, had clearly a established right for police to
provide care for her serious medical condition; (2) whether the police should have understood that the arrestee had a
serious medical condition, and thus should have provided care, was a factual issue that could not be decided on
interlocutory appeal; (3) causation was a factual issue not suited to resolution on interlocutory appeal of denial of
qualified immunity; (4) the arrestee did not have a clearly established constitutional right for her release to be
delayed pending mental-health treatment; (5) the arrestee had a clearly established due process right for the police to
not create danger, without justification, by arresting her in a safe place and releasing her in a hazardous one while
unable to protect herself; (6) the arresting officer was entitled to qualified immunity; (7) the watch officer was not
entitled to qualified immunity; and (8) a detention aide was not entitled to qualified immunity. According to the
court, a police officer who was responsible for preparing the arrestee's individual-recognizance bond and collecting
possessions that were to be returned on her release, and who received a telephone call from the mother of the
arrestee regarding the arrestee's bi-polar condition and did nothing in response and who did not even note the call in
a log, was not entitled to qualified immunity to the civil rights claims that the police had created a danger, without
justification. The court found that the detention aide who was responsible for evaluating inmates, observed the
arrestee behaving in a mentally unstable way, such as smearing menstrual blood on her cell walls, and transferred
another person out of the arrestee's cell because of her inappropriate behavior, and yet did nothing to alert other
personnel at the stationhouse, was not entitled to qualified immunity to the civil rights claims that the police did not
arrange for medical treatment of serious conditions while the arrestee's custody continued. (Eighth District Station,
Second District Station, Chicago Police Department)

U.S. District Court
PAROLE- DENIAL
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Rahim v. Holden, 882 F.Supp.2d 638 (D.Del. 2012). A state prisoner, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis,
brought an action against prison officials, alleging violations of his due process rights related to his parole. The
officials moved for dismissal. The district court denied the motion. The court held that a grievance procedure was
unavailable to the state prisoner with regard to claims against prison officials as to alleged Fourteenth Amendment
due process violations related to his parole, and therefore, the prisoner was excused from the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (PLRA) requirement to exhaust administrative remedies. The prisoner was denied parole, which he
believed was for arbitrary and constitutionally impermissible reasons, but instructions for filing a grievance
specifically stated that parole decisions were non-grievable. The court noted that another form indicated he could
appeal a parole decision to the Board of Parole by writing a letter to the Board, and he wrote letters to Board. (James
T. Vaughn Correctional Center, Delaware)

U.S. District Court
GOOD- TIME
TIMELY RELEASE

Rogers v. District of Columbia, 880 F.Supp.2d 163 (D.D.C. 2012). A former prisoner brought an action against the
District of Columbia, alleging he was over-detained and asserting claims for negligent training and supervision. The
district moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court
held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to when the prisoner was to be
released. The district court began its opinion as follows: “Our saga begins with the tale of plaintiff's numerous
arrests. Plaintiff was arrested on four different charges in 2007: two felony charges for violating the Bail Reform
Act, one felony charge for Possession with Intent to Distribute a Controlled Substance and one misdemeanor charge
for carrying an open can of alcohol without a permit.” During the prisoner’s time in jail he was sentenced for all of
the remaining charges. The prisoner claimed he was over-detained by approximately two months, and that this was
the direct result of the D.C. Jail's negligent training and supervision of its employees with regard to calculating jail
credits. (District of Columbia Jail)

U.S. Appeals Court
PAROLE-CONDITIONS
SEX OFFENDER

Roman v. DiGuglielmo, 675 F.3d 204 (3rd Cir. 2012). A state prisoner petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, after a
state court denied habeas relief, alleging that state's decision to deny him parole, unless he admitted his guilt and
participated in sex offender treatment program, violated his Fifth Amendment right against self incrimination. The
district court denied the petition and the prisoner appealed. The court held that the parole condition did not violate
the prisoner's right against self incrimination. The court noted that the state had a legitimate interest in rehabilitating
prisoners, the prisoner did not have any right or entitlement to parole under state law, his sentence was not
lengthened, and the actual conditions of his imprisonment had not been altered. (Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
SUPERVISED
RELEASE

Ruffins v. Department of Correctional Services, 907 F.Supp.2d 290 (E.D.N.Y. 2012). A plaintiff brought a § 1983
action against a state's Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) and its commissioner and several employees,
and the state's Division of Parole and its chairperson and several employees, alleging wrongful detention for
violations of an allegedly illegally-imposed term of post-release supervision (PRS), false arrest and imprisonment,
negligence, and a New York state claim for gross negligence. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court

36.105

granted the motion. The court held that the individual defendants, who were employees of New York's Department
of Correctional Services (DOCS) or Division of Parole, were entitled to qualified immunity for their actions during
the time between the administrative imposition of a term of post-release supervision (PRS) and a court decision,
which found that such imposition of PRS violated due process guarantees. (New York State Division of Parole,
Department of Correctional Services for the State of New York)
U.S. District Court
PAROLEREVOCATION

Singletary v. District of Columbia, 876 F.Supp.2d 106 (D.D.C. 2012). A parolee brought a § 1983 action against the
District of Columbia, seeking money damages for unlawful revocation of his parole by the Parole Board. The district
court granted summary judgment in the parolee's favor as to the issue of liability. After a trial on damages, the jury
returned a verdict of $2.3 million for the parolee. The District of Columbia moved for a new trial. The district court
denied the motion. The court held that the damages award was not excessive, that the parolee was properly allowed
to testify as to what he experienced for the ten years that he was wrongly incarcerated, and that evidence concerning
an alleged prior traffic offense was properly excluded. The court found that the jury's damage award to the parolee
whose parole was unlawfully revoked, resulting in his serving an additional ten years in prison, of $230,000 per
year—or about forty-four cents per minute—for each year that he was stripped of the privileges of individual choice
and physical freedom and subjected to the indignity of incarceration, was not excessive. (District of Columbia Parole
Board)

U.S. Appeals Court
GOOD- TIME
TIMELY RELEASE

Sudler v. City of New York, 689 F.3d 159 (2nd Cir. 2012). Inmates of state and city prison systems brought an action
against corrections defendants, alleging violations of their due process rights when they were imprisoned for periods
of time longer than their judicially imposed sentences. The district court dismissed the claims against some
defendants, and granted summary judgment as to the remaining defendants. The prisoners appealed. The appeals
court affirmed, finding that state prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity on the inmates' claim that their
procedural due process rights were violated when prison officials failed to promptly afford them PJT (parole jail
time) credits for the time served in local custody on sentences ordered to run concurrently with undischarged parole
revocation sentences. (New York State and New York City prison systems)

U.S. Appeals Court
PAROLE-CONDITIONS
SENTENCE
CONDITIONS
SEX OFFENDERS

U.S. v. Juvenile Male, 670 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 2012). Three juvenile defendants, each of whom was a member of an
Indian tribe and who pleaded true to a charge of aggravated sexual abuse with children in the district court, appealed
their conditions of probation or supervision requiring registration under the Sex Offender Registration and
Notification Act (SORNA). The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the SORNA registration requirement as
applied to certain juvenile delinquents in cases of aggravated sexual abuse superseded the conflicting confidentiality
provisions of the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act (FJDA), and that the SORNA registration requirement did not
violate the juveniles' constitutional rights. (Fort Peck Tribes, Montana)

U.S. Appeals Court
PAROLE-GUIDELINES
SUPERVISED RELEASE

U.S. v. Taylor, 679 F.3d 1005 (8th Cir. 2012). Following release from prison, the district court sentenced a defendant
to 24 months in prison after he admitted to violating two conditions of supervised release. The defendant appealed.
The appeals court vacated and remanded, finding that consideration of the defendant's eligibility to participate in a
rehabilitation program for sentencing purposes was plain error. The district court had considered the defendant's
eligibility to participate in a 500–hour drug program available from the Bureau of Prisons when sentencing the
defendant to 24 months for violation of supervised release. The appeals court held that this affected the defendant’s
rights in a manner that seriously affected fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings, and thus
amounted to plain error. The court noted that the advisory guideline range was 6 to 12 months, and the district court
may have imposed a lesser sentence if it had not focused on a particular drug treatment program within a federal
institution. The defendant had failed to report to a residential facility where he was to spend 120 days and admitted
to consuming alcohol. (Nebraska)

U.S. District Court
DELAY
RELEASE DATE

Ward v. Brown, 891 F.Supp.2d 1149 (E.D.Cal. 2012). A former prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a state
prison, the state's department of corrections, and prison officials, alleging violation of various constitutional rights,
negligence, false imprisonment, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Following the grant of
the defendants' motions to dismiss the federal claims, and denial of the defendants' motion to dismiss the state
claims, the defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in
part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by: (1) a material fact issue as to whether a prison
official was deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's right to be free from state custody; (2) material factual disputes
as to whether the prison official properly retained the prisoner's release date; (3) a material dispute of fact as to
whether the department of corrections was put on notice of the prison official's alleged miscalculation of the
prisoner's release date; and (4) material disputes of fact as to whether the department of corrections falsely
imprisoned prisoner. The inmate challenged the defendants' alleged refusal to correct his release date from a state
prison, causing him to be over-incarcerated in a federal prison, in violation of his constitutional rights. (California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
TIMELY RELEASE

Wells v. City of Chicago, 896 F.Supp.2d 725 (N.D.Ill. 2012). The representative of the estate of a detainee who died
on the night he was to be released from custody brought an action against a city and city police officers, alleging
under § 1983 that the defendants unlawfully detained the detainee and denied him medical care. Following a trial,
the jury returned a verdict for the representative and against four defendants on the unlawful detention claim, and for
the defendants on claims relating to denial of medical care. The defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law
or, in the alternative, a new trial or remittitur on the issue of damages. The district court granted the motions in part
and denied in part. The district court held that: (1) the issue of whether the defendants held the detainee for more
than 48 hours before being taken before a judge or being released, or for less than 48 hours for an improper purpose,
was for the the jury; (2) the officers had probable cause to arrest the detainee for a crime with an intent element; (3)
the issue of whether individual officers participated in the unlawful detention was for the jury; (4) the officers were
not entitled to qualified immunity from the unlawful detention claim; (5) the award of $1 million in compensatory

36.106

damages was excessive; and (6) the award of $150,500 in punitive damages was not warranted where there was little
to indicate that the defendants acted with evil intent or callous indifference to the detainee's rights.. The court noted
that, although the detainee suffered significant physical pain during the time he was detained, as well as intense
humiliation and severe mental and emotional distress, he was in custody for, at most, 53 hours, and only the final
five hours of his detention were unlawful. The detainee had driven a semi-trailer truck through a bus stop and into a
Chicago Transit Authority “L” Station, killing two women and injuring 20 people. After brief treatment in a hospital,
the police transported him to a police station, where he was interviewed and then placed in a holding cell. He
ultimately only received a traffic citation, though police kept investigating the collision until the time of his death.
Officers were making arrangements to take the detainee to a hospital for evaluation after finding that he had
difficulty walking once removed from his cell. He died in the hospital 6 weeks later. (City of Chicago Police
Department, Illinois)
U.S. District Court
INVOLUNTARY
COMMITMENT
TIMELY RELEASE

Wiley v. Buncombe County, 846 F.Supp.2d 480 (W.D.N.C. 2012). A pretrial detainee brought an action under §
1983 and § 1985 against a county, sheriff, jail, and court official, alleging that the defendants unlawfully subjected
him to multiple periods of involuntary commitment and failed to take proper action on a state habeas corpus petition
that he filed challenging the periods of commitment. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the
motion. The court held that: (1) the detainee could not maintain a § 1983 action challenging the terms of his
confinement; (2) the clerk had quasi-judicial immunity from the pretrial detainee's § 1983 claim; (3) the jail was not
a “person” subject to suit under § 1983; (4) the county could not be liable to the pretrial detainee under § 1983 for
the actions of the sheriff; and (5) the county could not be liable to the pretrial detainee under § 1983 for the actions
of the county clerk. The court noted that under North Carolina law, the county had no control over the sheriff's
employees and/or control over the jail, and therefore county could not be liable to the detainee under § 1983 for the
actions of the sheriff or those of his detention officers for events that occurred at a jail operated by the sheriff.
(Buncombe County Detention Facility, North Carolina)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEX OFFENDERS

Wilson v. Flaherty, 689 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2012). An ex-convict petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus to challenge
his state rape conviction after he had fully served his sentence, alleging that the sex offender registration
requirements of Virginia and Texas law imposed sufficiently substantial restraints on his liberty so as to amount to
custody. The district court dismissed the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but granted a certificate of
appealability (COA). The petitioner appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that sex offender registration
requirements did not place a sex offender in custody for the purposes of federal habeas jurisdiction, since they did
not constitute physical restraints. According to the court, the requirements did not dis-incentivize moving by making
it more onerous for offender to live in other places because registration and notification requirements were the same
from state to state, and the particularized collateral consequences stemming from the way that states and individuals
have reacted to persons who have been convicted of sex offenses were same as the collateral consequences generally
faced by other persons convicted of felony. (Virginia)
2013

U.S. District Court
RELEASE DATE
SEX OFFENDERS
DELAY
TIMELY RELEASE

Armato v. Grounds, 944 F.Supp.2d 627 (C.D.Ill. 2013). A former inmate, a sex offender, brought an action against
Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) employees, alleging under § 1983 that the employees violated his rights
under Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment by allowing him to be held beyond the term of his incarceration, and
asserting a claim for false imprisonment under state law. The employees moved for summary judgment. The district
court allowed the motion. The court held that the employees complied with the terms of a state court judge's
handwritten sentencing order and the employees were not deliberately indifferent in allegedly allowing the inmate to
be held beyond his release date. (Lake County Jail, Robinson Correctional Center, Illinois Department of
Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
EQUAL PROTECTION
PAROLE-CONDITIONS

Armstrong v. Brown, 732 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2013). Disabled state prisoners and parolees brought a class action
against state prison officials, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the
Rehabilitation Act. Seventeen years later, the plaintiffs moved for an order requiring officials to track and
accommodate the needs of the class members housed in county jails and to provide a workable grievance procedure.
The prisoners and parolees filed a renewed motion, which the district court granted. The defendants appealed. The
appeals court affirmed in part and dismissed in part. The court held that: (1) Amendments to the California Penal
Code relating to the legal custody of parolees did not relieve officials of responsibility for the discrimination suffered
by disabled parolees housed in county jails, past and present, or of their obligation to assist in preventing further
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) violations; and (2) orders requiring officials to track and accommodate the
needs of disabled prisoners and parolees housed in county jails and to provide a workable grievance procedure were
consistent with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act and did not infringe on
California's prerogative to structure its internal affairs. (California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation)

U.S. District Court
DELAY
TIMELY RELEASE

Barnes v. District of Columbia, 924 F.Supp.2d 74 (D.D.C. 2013). Inmates at local jails brought a class action, under
§ 1983, against the District of Columbia, alleging that their over-detentions violated their Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth
Amendment rights. Following certification of the classes, the parties filed pretrial motions to exclude or limit certain
evidence from being introduced at the liability trial. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part.
The court held that: (1) records of inmate over-detentions constituted admissible hearsay evidence; (2) evidence of a
settlement in a related class action was admissible under the “other purposes” exception of the rule governing
admission of settlement evidence; (3) an expert's testimony regarding the total number of over-detentions occurring
during particular periods was admissible; and (4) evidence regarding strip searches performed on inmates was not
admissible. The District of Columbia attacked the methodology of the expert, but the court noted that the expert had
years of experience reviewing inmate jackets and other data to determine whether an inmate was over-detained, had
personally reviewed hundreds of inmate jackets, and had educated himself on the system of collecting inmate data.
(District of Columbia Department of Corrections)

36.107

U.S. Appeals Court
EX POST FACTO
PAROLE-GRANTING
PAROLE-GUIDELINES

Biggs v. Secretary of California Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 717 F.3d 678 (9th Cir. 2013). After
California's Governor reversed the parole board's decision finding the petitioner suitable for parole, the petitioner
sought habeas relief, alleging that retroactive application of an interim change to the California Constitution violated
the Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The district court denied relief and the petitioner appealed. The
appeals court affirmed. The court held that the federal habeas court did not unreasonably apply clearly established
federal law in determining, without an as-applied analysis of the significance of the risk of increased punishment,
that retroactive application of the interim change to the California Constitution giving the Governor final say over
grants of parole, did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. (California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation,
Parole Hearing Board)

U.S. District Court
MEDICATION

Bustetter v. Armor Correctional Health Services, Inc., 919 F.Supp.2d 1282 (M.D.Fla. 2013). A former inmate
brought an action against a sheriff's department, the sheriff, a medical services contractor, a doctor, a nurse, and a
pharmacy, alleging medical malpractice, negligence, and violations of § 1983. The inmate alleged that the medical
services contractor had a policy of not telling an inmate what medications he was being given, that the contractor had
another policy of providing no medications if an inmate refused to take any of his medications, that measurement of
his blood sugar levels and administration of his insulin to treat his diabetes was limited to twice a day, that he was
given excess levels of statins, and that he was not informed, upon his release, of what medication he was given or of
its side-effects. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part.
The court held that the inmate’s allegations were sufficient to state Eighth Amendment claims against the contractor,
nurse, and doctor. When he was taken into custody at the jail for a non-violent traffic offense, the inmate informed
the medical staff of his medical conditions and current medications. The inmate’s medical conditions included Type
I diabetes, for which he was insulin dependent and taking two types of insulin three to five times per day, a prior
heart attack, and blindness in one eye. (Sarasota County Jail, Florida)

U.S. Appeals Court
LIBERTY INTEREST
PROBATION/
REVOCATION

Engebretson v. Mahoney, 724 F.3d 1034 (9th Cir. 2013). A former state inmate brought a pro se § 1983 action
against a state and prison officials, alleging, among other things, that the defendants unconstitutionally restrained his
liberty during an illegal term of probation. The district court granted the defendants' motions to dismiss, and the
former inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the former inmate's allegations were
sufficient to establish standing to assert a § 1983 claim, but as a matter of apparent first impression, the prison
officials charged with executing a facially valid court order enjoy absolute immunity from § 1983 liability for the
conduct prescribed by those orders. (Montana Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
ALIEN
BAIL
DUE PROCESS
TIMELY RELEASE

Gordon v. Johnson, 991 F.Supp.2d 258 (D.Mass. 2013). An alien, a lawful permanent resident who was subjected to
mandatory detention pending removal five years after his arrest for narcotics possession, petitioned for a writ of
habeas corpus on his own behalf and on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals, seeking an individualized
bond hearing to challenge his ongoing detention. The government moved to dismiss. The district court allowed the
petition, finding that the phrase “when the alien is released” in the statute authorizing mandatory detention of
criminal aliens meant “at the time of release,” and that the petitioner was entitled to a bond hearing for consideration
of the possibility of his release on conditions. (Franklin County Jail and House of Correction, Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security, Sheriff of Bristol County, Sheriff of Plymouth County, Sheriff of Suffolk
County, Massachusetts)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONDITIONAL
RELEASE
PAROLE-POLICIES
PAROLEREVOCATION

Hazle v. Crofoot, 727 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2013). A parolee, who was an atheist, brought an action against various state
officials and a state contractor, seeking damages and injunctive relief for the deprivation of his First Amendment
rights, after his parole was revoked following his refusal to participate in a residential drug treatment program that
required him to acknowledge a higher power, as a condition of his parole. The contractor, Westcare, was a private
regional substance abuse coordination agency, and made the arrangements for the parolee’s placement in the
program. After the parolee was granted partial summary judgment by the district court, a jury awarded the parolee
zero damages. The district court denied the parolee’s motion for a new trial, and the parolee appealed. The appeals
court reversed and remanded. The court held that the parolee was entitled to an award of compensatory damages for
each day that he spent in prison as a result of the violation of his First Amendment rights by various state officials.
The appeals court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
contractor's conduct was the proximate cause of the parolee's unconstitutional imprisonment, when it contracted only
with drug treatment facilities offering solely religious based programs or services, and counseled and arranged for
the parolee to attend a religion-based facility as part of his state-imposed parole program, despite having been
informed that the parolee was an atheist and that he objected to such religious programming.
The court held that the parolee's claim under California law for an injunction preventing both a state contractor
and various state officials from expending state funds in an unconstitutional manner that required parolees to
participate in religious treatment programs in order to be eligible for parole, failed to provide parolees with secular
or non-religious treatment alternatives, and revoked the parole of those who protested or resisted participation in
religion-based treatment programs, was not rendered moot after the state issued a directive stating that parole agents
could not require a parolee to attend any religious based program if the parolee refused to participate for religious
reasons, where the state directive had not been implemented in any meaningful fashion. (California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitations, Board of Parole Hearings, Westcare, and Empire Recovery Center, California)

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
EX POST FACTO
SEX OFFENDERS

John Does 1-4 v. Snyder, 932 F.Supp.2d 803 (E.D.Mich. 2013). Sex offenders filed suit challenging the
constitutionality of the Michigan Sex Offender Registry Act (SORA). The state defendants moved to dismiss the
complaint. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that: (1) SORA did not
violate the Ex Post Facto Clause; (2) SORA's quarterly reporting requirement did not offend due process or
substantially burden registrants' rights to interstate or intrastate travel; (3) SORA did not implicate registrants' due
process right to engage in common occupations of life; (4) the registrants satisfactorily alleged that SORA's loitering
prohibition, which did not contain any exemption for parental activities, could be proven to infringe upon their

36.108

fundamental due process right to direct and participate in their children's education and upbringing; (5) a jury
question was presented as to whether retroactively extending the registration period of sex offenders from twentyfive years to life was justified by a legitimate legislative purpose; and (6) jury questions were presented as to
whether provisions of SORA requiring sex offenders to report information about their online accounts and activities
violated their First Amendment rights. (Michigan Sex Offender Registry Act)
U.S. District Court
TIMELY RELEASE

Page v. Mancuso, 999 F.Supp.2d 269 (D.D.C. 2013). A pretrial detainee brought an action in the Superior Court for
the District of Columbia, against the District of Columbia and a police officer, alleging unlawful arrest in violation
of the Fourth Amendment, and deliberate indifference to the arrestee's over-detention and strip search. The detainee
also alleged that the District maintained a custom and practice of strip searches in violation of the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments. The defendants removed the action to federal court and filed a partial motion to dismiss. The district
court granted the motion. The court held that the detainee's complaint failed to allege that the District of Columbia
was deliberately indifferent to Fourth and Fifth Amendment violations jail officials inflicted upon the detainee when
they subjected him to “over-detention” and strip searches, as required to state a claim against District for Fourth and
Fifth Amendment violations under the theory of municipal liability. (D.C. Jail)

U.S. District Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
BAIL
DISCRIMINATION
DUE PROCESS
EQUAL PROTECTION
TIMELY RELEASE

Poche v. Gautreaux, 973 F.Supp.2d 658 (M.D.La. 2013). A pretrial detainee brought an action against a district
attorney and prison officials, among others, alleging various constitutional violations pursuant to § 1983, statutory
violations under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act (RA), as well as state law
claims, all related to her alleged unlawful detention for seven months. The district attorney and prison officials
moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that the detainee
sufficiently alleged an official policy or custom, as required to establish local government liability for constitutional
torts, by alleging that failures of the district attorney and the prison officials to implement policies designed to
prevent the constitutional deprivations alleged, and to adequately train their employees in such tasks as processing
paperwork related to detention, created such obvious dangers of constitutional violations that the district attorney
and the prison officials could all be reasonably said to have acted with conscious indifference. The court found that
the pretrial detainee stated a procedural due process claim against the district attorney and the prison officials under
§ 1983 related to her alleged unlawful detention for seven months, by alleging that it was official policy and custom
of the officials to skirt constitutional requirements related to procedures for: (1) establishing probable cause to
detain; (2) arraignment; (3) bail; and (4) appointment of counsel, and that the officials' policy and custom resulted in
a deprivation of her liberty without due process.
The court also found a procedural due process claim against the district attorney under § 1983 by the detainee’s
allegation that it was the district attorney's policy and custom to sign charging papers such as bills of information
without reading them, without checking their correctness, and without even knowing what he was signing, and that
the attorney's policy and custom resulted in a deprivation of her liberty without due process. The court found a
substantive due process claim against the district attorney in the detainee’s allegation that after obtaining clear direct
knowledge that the detainee was being wrongfully and illegally held, the district attorney still failed to correct the
mistakes that caused the detention, and to cover up his failures in connection with the case, the district attorney made
a conscious decision to bring belated charges against the detainee.
The court held that the detainee stated an equal protection claim against the prison officials under § 1983, by
alleging that the officials acted with a discriminatory animus toward her because she was mentally disabled, and that
she was repeatedly and deliberately punished for, and discriminated against, on that basis. (East Baton Rouge Prison,
Louisiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
ALIEN
BAIL
DUE PROCESS
RELEASE ON BOND

Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2013). Aliens subject to detention pursuant to federal immigration
statutes brought a class action against Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and others, challenging
prolonged detention without individualized bond hearings and determinations to justify their continued detention.
The district court entered a preliminary injunction requiring the holding of bond hearings before an immigration
judge (IJ). The government appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that: (1) the statute authorizing the
Attorney General to take into custody any alien who is inadmissible or deportable by reason of having committed
certain offenses for as long as removal proceedings are “pending” cannot be read to authorize mandatory detention
of criminal aliens with no limit on the duration of imprisonment; (2) aliens subject to prolonged detention were
entitled to bond hearings before IJs; (3) irreparable harm was likely to result from the government's reading of the
immigration detention statutes as not requiring a bond hearing for aliens subject to prolonged detention; and, (4) the
public interest would benefit from a preliminary injunction. The court ruled that the class was comprised of all noncitizens within the Central District of California who: (1) are or were detained for longer than six months pursuant to
one of the general immigration detention statutes pending completion of removal proceedings, including judicial
review, (2) are not and have not been detained pursuant to a national security detention statute, and (3) have not been
afforded a hearing to determine whether their detention is justified. (Los Angeles Field Office of ICE, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELAY
CREDIT
DUE PROCESS
RELEASE DATE
REVIEW

Scott v. Baldwin, 720 F.3d 1034 (8th Cir. 2013). Former state inmates brought an action against a director of a
Department of Corrections (DOC), alleging that their detention beyond their release dates violated their rights. The
district court granted qualified immunity to the director. The inmates appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The
appeals court held that the director’s taking of 43 to 60 days beyond the state inmates' release dates to recalculate the
inmates' release dates after a judicial decision required credit for time served for supervision or services, was not
clearly unlawful, as would be deliberate indifference, and therefore, the director was entitled to qualified immunity
in the inmates' § 1983 action alleging that over-detention violated Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process.
The court noted that the judicial decision did not order the immediate release of the inmates, the director was not
notified of the over-detentions, the inmates did not request recalculation of their release dates, and the director had to
recalculate thousands of release dates. (Iowa Department of Corrections)

36.109

U.S. Appeals Court
FURLOUGH
TEMPORARY
RELEASE
MEDICAL CARE

Spavone v. New York State Dept. of Correctional Services, 719 F.3d 127 (2nd Cir. 2013). A state prisoner brought a
suit against corrections officials under § 1983 and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), alleging, among other
things, that the defendants' denial of his request for a medical leave to obtain additional treatment for his posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of the law and his
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment. The prisoner had traveled to
Nicaragua in the 1980s to join the Contra rebel forces and saw combat while fighting with them in that country's
civil war. He also was working on the scaffolding of a building across the street from the World Trade Center on
September 11, 2001, and was credited with risking his life to rescue several of his coworkers. He witnessed victims
of the attack jump from the towers. The district court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment based on
qualified immunity, and the defendants appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The appeals court held
that the corrections officials were entitled to qualified immunity on prisoner's equal protection claim, and on the
prisoner's Eighth Amendment claim. According to the court, even if the prisoner was in need of absolutely necessary
medical care, neither official had reason to conclude that such care was not available to him in the prison, and thus
there was a rational basis for distinguishing between leaves of absence for the treatment of mental illness as opposed
to other sorts of illness for which leave was available. The court noted that there no evidence that either official
thought that denying the prisoner's request for a leave of absence would cause him harm, much less harm so serious
that it would be objectively unreasonable for them to believe that the policy of restricting leaves of absence for
mental health treatment was consistent with prisoner's right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment. (New York
State Department of Correctional Services)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEX OFFENDERS
SUPERVISED RELEASE

U.S. v. Crowder, 738 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 2013). The United States District Court for the District of Montana
revoked an offender’s supervised release, imposed for failure to register under the Sex Offender Registration and
Notification Act (SORNA), and sentenced the offender to two terms of 14 months' imprisonment to run
concurrently, and to a lifetime term of supervised release. The defendant appealed. The appeals court affirmed,
finding that reduction of a renewed lifetime term of supervised release by the length of time spent in prison for the
violation was not warranted. (Montana)
2014

U.S. District Court
WORK RELEASE

Castillo v. Bobelu, 1 F.Supp.3d 1190 (W.D.Okla. 2014). Five female inmates brought a § 1983 action against state
officials and employees, alleging they were subjected to sexual abuse while working outside a community
corrections center in which they were housed, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The inmates were participating
in the Prisoner Public Works Program (“PPWP”) that allowed offenders to work off-site at different state offices.
They were working during the day doing grounds maintenance at the Oklahoma Governor's Mansion, where they
were supervised by a groundskeeper and his immediate supervisor. When inmates work at places such as the
Governor's Mansion, the DOC does not have a guard stay with the women at the work site. Instead, they are
supervised by state workers employed at the work site, who function like guards. These individuals go through an
eight hour training program. The inmate claimed that they were sexually harassed and sexually assaulted by the
groundskeeper and by a cook employed at the Governor's Mansion. The defendants moved for summary judgment.
The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was
precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to (1) whether prison guards were deliberately indifferent. The court
held that: (1) the prison district supervisor did not have knowledge of a substantial risk of harm to the inmates
because the supervisor did not know that the inmates were working only with males while off-site; (2) the supervisor
was not deliberately indifferent; (3) the prison supervising case manager was not deliberately indifferent; and (4)
there was no evidence that the employee had supervisory authority over the inmate. The court noted that the inmate
did not return to the work assignment where she was allegedly abused by state employees or have contact with the
alleged abusers, as required for the continuing violation doctrine to apply to her § 1983 action that alleged violations
of the Eighth Amendment. According to the court, despite the supervisor being aware of misconduct by a
groundskeeper under his supervision, the supervisor was aware that the groundskeeper violated certain policies, but
did not have knowledge of the sexual assaults, and he investigated the groundskeeper's conduct and counseled the
groundskeeper. The court also found that the prison supervising case manager, who oversaw the off-site public
works program, was not deliberately indifferent to the excessive risk of sexual assaults of female inmates working at
the governor's mansion as part of the program, where the inmates did not complain to the manager and the manager
was never informed of misconduct. (Hillside Community Corrections Center, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma)

U.S. District Court
TIMELY RELEASE
DUE PROCESS

Chavez v. County of Bernalillo, 3 F.Supp.3d 936 (D.N.M. 2014). An arrestee brought § 1983 claims and state-law
claims against a county and its jail director, relating to the arrestee's detention pursuant to a bench warrant that had
been cancelled before the arrest. After removal to federal court, the defendants filed a motion for summary
judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part, and remanded to the state court. The court
held that the arrestee's § 1983 claims against a county and its jail director, relating to detention pursuant to a bench
warrant that had been cancelled before the arrest, were properly characterized as Fourth Amendment claims for false
arrest and false imprisonment, rather than for malicious prosecution. The court found that county jail employees did
not violate the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unlawful seizure, when they booked him into the
jail following a city police officer's arrest of the plaintiff pursuant to a bench warrant that was facially valid, but that
had been cancelled before the arrest. According to the court, county jail employees, upon learning from the arrestee's
attorney about the pre-arrest cancellation of the facially valid bench warrant pursuant to which city police officers
had conducted the arrest, did not act with deliberate or reckless intent to falsely imprison the arrestee by requiring a
release order from a judge, and thus, the arrestee's continued detention for two days, until the release order was
issued, did not constitute false imprisonment in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The court noted that jail
employees acted reasonably, since a judge could better determine why a bench warrant remained available to city
police at the time of arrest, and whether any other basis for detaining the arrestee existed. (Metropolitan Detention
Center, Bernalillo County, New Mexico)

36.110

U.S. District Court
TIMELY RELEASE

Hill v. Hoisington, 28 F.Supp.3d 725 (E.D.Mich. 2014). A detainee filed an action alleging that a deputy sheriff used
excessive force and committed battery against him while he was in custody, after he was acquitted of criminal
charges against him. After a jury verdict in the detainee's favor, the detainee moved for entry of judgment on the jury
verdict, for costs, and for judgment as matter of law. The district court denied the motion as moot, where the award
of exemplary damages was justifiable and the detention of the detainee after he was acquitted was unlawful, where
the jury found that the deputy's conduct was malicious, or so willful and wanton as to demonstrate reckless disregard
of the detainee's rights. The court noted that the proper post-acquittal procedure requires immediate release of a
detainee following acquittal, allowing for any possible out-processing to occur without continued or required
detention. (Oakland County Jail, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
HOME DETENTION

Liska v. Dart, 60 F.Supp.3d 889 (N.D. Ill. 2014). A pretrial detainee brought an action against a county and a county
sheriff, alleging under § 1983 that the defendants deprived him of liberty without procedural due process, and
asserting claims under state law for false imprisonment and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The
defendants moved to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim. The district court granted the motion in part and
denied in part. The court held that: (1) as a matter of first impression, the detainee had a liberty interest protected by
procedural due process in remaining on home confinement; (2) the defendants violated the detainee’s procedural due
process rights; (3) the detainee sufficiently stated the sheriff’s personal involvement in the alleged procedural due
process violation; and (4) the sheriff was not entitled to qualified immunity. The court noted that the pretrial detainee
had a liberty interest protected by procedural due process in remaining on home confinement, and thus the county
and county sheriff were required to afford the detainee procedural due process prior to transferring the detainee to
jail due to his alleged violation of the terms of home confinement. The detainee alleged that the sheriff was
responsible for implementing the cell-box system used in the detainee’s home during his home confinement, that the
sheriff was aware of issues with the type and brand of system assigned to the detainee and many other home
detainees, that the sheriff knew or should have known of the malfunctions of the system in the detainee’s home, and
that the sheriff allowed the detainee’s incarceration in the county jail for violation of the terms of his home
confinement despite knowledge of numerous false alarms registered by the system. (Cook County Sheriff’s
Department, Cook County Jail)

U.S. Appeals Court
EX POST FACTO
SEX OFFENDERS

Mueller v. Raemisch, 740 F.3d 1128 (7th Cir. 2014). Two convicted sex offenders brought an action challenging
Wisconsin's statutory scheme of sex offender registration, notification, and monitoring, alleging violation of the
prohibition against states enacting ex post facto laws. The district court ruled that the act's $100 annual registration
fee was unconstitutional, but upheld other provisions of the act. The parties appealed. The appeals court affirmed in
part, modified in part, and reversed in part. The appeals court held that: (1) the sex offenders had standing to
challenge the registration requirement, even though they did not intend to ever return to the state; (2) the sex
offenders did not have standing to challenge provisions of a monitoring requirement relating to working with and
photographing minors because the offenders no longer resided in the state; (3) the sex offenders did not have
standing to challenge Wisconsin's prohibition against a sex offender changing his name, where neither offender had
expressed the intent to change his name; (4) the sex offenders had standing to challenge monitoring of the act's
requirements of continual updating of information supplied to the sex offender registry; (5) the monitoring act's
requirements that sex offenders continually update information supplied to the sex offender registry were not
punitive and therefore did not trigger the constitutional prohibition of ex post factor laws; (6) the $100 annual
registration fee was not punitive; and (7) allowing the sex offenders to litigate pseudonymously was not warranted
where the sex offenders' convictions were matters of public record and both sex offenders were currently registered
in Wisconsin, making their names and other information freely available. The court noted that the annual fee was
intended to compensate the state for the expenses of maintaining the sex offender registry, and since the offenders
were responsible for the expense, there was nothing “punitive” about making them pay for it. (Wisconsin)

U.S. Appeals Court
LIBERTY INTEREST
EXPIRATION OF
SENTENCE
GRADUATED RELEASE
RELEASE SITE
PAROLE

Powell v. Weiss, 757 F.3d 338 (3rd Cir. 2014). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action against Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections employees and officials, alleging the defendants deprived him of liberty without due
process of law when it revoked its decision to release him to a community correctional center. The district court
granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The inmate appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The court held that: (1) the inmate did not have a protected independent due process liberty interest in the
expectation of release to a community correctional center; (2) the inmate did not have a state-created liberty interest
in the expectation of release to a community correctional center; and (3) the inmate failed to state a claim that he was
deprived of a protected liberty interest when he was supervised on parole seven months past his maximum sentence
date. (Pennsylvania)

U.S. Appeals Court
PAROLE
RESIDENCY
ELECTRONIC MONITORING
DISCRIMINATION

Thornton v. Brown, 757 F.3d 834 (9th Cir. 2014). A state parolee filed a civil rights action against the Governor of
the State of California, Secretary of Corrections, and parole personnel to challenge the imposition and enforcement
of a residency restriction and a requirement that he submit to electronic monitoring using a Global Positioning
System (GPS) device as conditions of his parole. The district court dismissed the action. The parolee appealed. The
appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that: (1) neither absolute nor qualified immunity barred the
parolee's civil rights claims against the State of California, Secretary of Corrections, and parole personnel that were
limited to injunctive relief; (2) absolute immunity barred the state parolee's civil rights claims for damages against
his parole officers for imposing allegedly unconstitutional parole conditions; (3) absolute immunity did not extend to
the state parolee's civil rights claim that parole officers enforced conditions of his parole in an unconstitutionally
arbitrary or discriminatory manner; and (4) the parolee could challenge a condition of parole under § 1983 if his or
her claim, if successful, would neither result in speedier release from parole nor imply, either directly or indirectly,
the invalidity of criminal judgments underlying that parole term. (California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation)

36.111

U.S. Appeals Court
CIVIL COMMITMENT
SEX OFFENDERS

U.S. v. Antone, 742 F.3d 151 (4th Cir. 2014). The government filed a certification attesting that an inmate was a
sexually dangerous person under the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, and seeking the inmate's civil
commitment. The district court committed the inmate to civil custody. The inmate appealed. The appeals court
reversed. The court held that the government failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the sex
offender, who suffered from an antisocial personality disorder and polysubstance abuse, would have serious
difficulty in refraining from sexually violent conduct or child molestation if released. The court noted that the
offender did not test positive for any substances or engage in any sexual misconduct or hostility toward women
during his extended incarceration, the offender had no disciplinary infractions, the offender completed his GED as
well as other professional programs, and readily sought out the prison's mental health resources, and the offender
expressed remorse for his past acts. (Federal Bureau of Prisons, FCI–Butner, North Carolina)
2015

U.S. Appeals Court
SENTENCE CONDITIONS

Childress v. Walker, 787 F.3d 433 (7th Cir. 2015). A state prisoner brought an action under § 1983 alleging that
administrators and individuals affiliated with a correctional center violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment
and the Due Process Clause. The district court dismissed the action and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court
reversed and remanded. The court held that the prisoner stated a claim for relief under the Eighth Amendment with
allegations that the prison administrator knew that conditions of his mandatory release included a ban on computerrelated material, but nevertheless instituted, condoned, or willfully turned a blind eye to the practice that placed
computer-related material among his possessions. The court also found that the district court had to determine, upon
the prisoner’s motion for appointment of counsel, whether the prisoner, from the confines of his present institutional
situation, could adequately investigate and articulate, in accordance with established practices of § 1983 liability,
familiarity of each defendant with the practices of the educational program that placed computer-related material
among his possessions, even though the conditions of his mandatory release included a ban on computer-related
material. (Big Muddy River Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
DELAY
RELEASE DATE
TIMELY RELEASE

Downey v. Sheahan, 136 F.Supp.3d 472 (W.D.N.Y. 2015). A former prisoner sued state corrections officials under
§ 1983, alleging that they caused him to serve a sentence of incarceration for five days longer than he should have.
The officials moved to dismiss and the district court granted the motion. The court held that the officials’ alleged
actions did not subject the prisoner to cruel and unusual punishment or violate his due process rights. The court ruled
that the officials were entitled to qualified immunity, where the officials did not violate any clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. The court noted that the prisoner
had been sentenced to “only” three years, nine months, and fifteen days. (Five Points Corr. Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
PRETRIAL RELEASE

Fant v. City of Ferguson, 107 F.Supp.3d 1016 (E.D. Mo. 2015). City residents brought a class action lawsuit against
a city, asserting claims under § 1983 for violations of Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments based on allegations that they were repeatedly jailed by the city for being unable to pay fines owed from traffic tickets and other
minor offenses. The residents alleged that pre-appearance detentions lasting days, weeks, and in one case, nearly two
months, in allegedly poor conditions, based on alleged violations of a municipal code that did not warrant incarceration in the first instance, and which were alleged to have continued until an arbitrarily determined payment was
made, violated their Due Process rights. The residents alleged that they were forced to sleep on the floor in dirty
cells with blood, mucus, and feces, were denied basic hygiene and feminine hygiene products, were denied access to
a shower, laundry, and clean undergarments for several days at a time, were denied medications, and were provided
little or inadequate food and water. The plaintiffs sought a declaration that the city’s policies and practices violated
their constitutional rights, and sought a permanent injunction preventing the city from enforcing the policies and
practices. The city moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held
that: (1) allegations that residents were jailed for failure to pay fines without inquiry into their ability to pay and
without any consideration of alternative measures of punishment were sufficient to state a claim that the city violated
the residents’ Due Process and Equal Protection rights; (2) the residents plausibly stated a claim that the city’s failure to appoint counsel violated their Due Process rights; (3) allegations of pre-appearance detentions plausibly stated
a pattern and practice of Due Process violations; (4) allegations of conditions of confinement were sufficient to state
a plausible claim for Due Process violations; and (5) the residents could not state an Equal Protection claim for being
treated differently, with respect to fines, than civil judgment debtors. The court noted that the residents alleged they
were not afforded counsel at initial hearings on traffic and other offenses, nor were they afforded counsel prior to
their incarceration for failing to pay court-ordered fines for those offenses. (City of Ferguson, Missouri)

U.S. Appeals Court
PAROLE-VIOLATIONS
PAROLE- REVOCATION
LIBERTY INTEREST

Fantone v. Latini, 780 F.3d 184 (3rd Cir. 2015). A state parole violator filed a § 1983 action alleging that prison
officials caused him to be confined in a prison restrictive housing unit (RHU) in retaliation for exercising his
constitutional rights, which, in turn, led the state parole board to rescind his parole. The district court dismissed the
complaint and the violator appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed. The court held that the violator
did not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in being paroled before his actual release, and thus prison
officials did not violate the violator’s due process rights when they caused him to be confined in a prison restrictive
housing unit (RHU), even though the violator was later cleared of misconduct. But the appeals court found that the
violator’s allegations that a prison officer retaliated against him because he refused to provide a written confession to
a disciplinary charge and because he filed a grievance against the officer for threatening him during his interrogation,
were sufficient to state a plausible claim against the officer for retaliation for exercising his Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination, even though the officer’s threats all came before the violator filed his grievance, where
the disciplinary charge alleged criminal conduct. (Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, State Correctional
Institution–Pittsburgh)

36.112

U.S. District Court
JUVENILE
PAROLE
EQUAL PROTECTION

Hayden v. Keller, 134 F.Supp.3d 1000 (E.D.N.C. 2015). A prisoner, a non-homicide juvenile offender, brought a §
1983 action against a parole commission and others, alleging denial of his constitutional right to be free from cruel
and unusual punishment and due process under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments as a result of being denied a
meaningful opportunity to obtain parole release. The parties moved for summary judgment. The district court denied
the defendants’ motion and granted the prisoner’s motion in part. The court held that the prisoner was denied a
meaningful opportunity to obtain parole release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation, as required by
the Eighth Amendment. According to the court, the parole commissioners and case analysts did not distinguish
parole reviews for juvenile offenders from adult offenders, thus failing to consider the children's diminished
culpability and heightened capacity for change. The court noted that caseloads were enormous, with each parole case
analyst having responsibility for approximately 4,338 offenders, and the opportunity to appear for a parole hearing
seemed to exist mainly for those who were on notice, with no notice to the offender being required. (North Carolina
Post–Release Supervision and Parole Commission, and North Carolina Department of Public Safety)

U.S. District Court
SEX OFFENDER
CIVIL COMMITMENT

Karsjens v. Jesson, 109 F.Supp.3d 1139 (D. Minn. 2015). Patients civilly committed to the Minnesota Sex Offender
Program (MSOP) brought an action against various officials and employees of the MSOP pursuant to § 1983,
asserting Fourteenth Amendment due process clause challenges to the Minnesota statute governing civil
commitment and treatment of sex offenders. The district court granted the patients’ motion for class certification and
granted in part and denied in part the officials’ motion to dismiss. After a bench trial, the court held that: (1) the
patients had standing to bring a class action; (2) the statute was unconstitutional on its face; and (3) the statute was
unconstitutional as applied.
According to the court, each patient was harmed by not knowing whether he continued to meet the criteria for
commitment through regular risk assessments, each patient was harmed by the program’s structural problems that
resulted in delays, patients were deprived of their right to liberty, and a favorable decision would likely redress their
injuries. The court noted that no patient had been released from MSOP in over 20 years and MSOP failed to initiate
the petitioning process when it was aware that individual patients were likely to meet statutory discharge criteria.
(Minnesota Sex Offender Program)

U.S. District Court
PAROLE

Knighten v. United States Parole Commission, 105 F.Supp.3d 30 (D.D.C. 2015). A parolee sentenced under the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) brought an action, construed as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
challenging the United States Parole Commission’s refusal to terminate his supervision. The district court denied the
motion, finding that the Parole Commission did not have the authority to grant an early termination of the parolee’s
supervision, and that a rational basis in the record supported denial of the parolee’s request for early termination of
parole supervision. (United States Disciplinary Barracks, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas)

U.S. District Court
SUPERVISED RELEASE

Malloy v. Gray, 79 F.Supp.3d 53 (D.D.C. 2015). A District of Columbia felony offender brought a Bivens action in
the District of Columbia Superior Court against the District of Columbia’s mayor, the District’s contractor for
operation of a correctional mental health treatment facility, and the United States Parole Commission (USPC). The
offender sought damages for an Eighth Amendment violation based on allegations that the offender was detained
beyond the USPC-imposed term of imprisonment following revocation of his supervised release. The case was
moved to federal court and the defendants filed motions for dismissal or summary judgment. The district court
granted the motions, finding that the mayor and the contractor lacked statutory authority to participate in the
proceedings for revocation of supervised release, and a 12-month term of imprisonment, upon revocation of
supervised release, was within the authority of the USPC. (District of Columbia, Corrections Corporation of
America, Correctional Treatment Facility)

U.S. District Court
PRE-RELEASE

McGowan v. U.S., 94 F.Supp.3d 382 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). A federal prisoner, who was serving the remainder of his
sentence at a halfway house, brought an action against a U. S. Bureau of Prisons (BOP) employee who managed the
halfway house, alleging violations of his right to free speech, and asserting claims for false arrest, false
imprisonment, and negligence under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The defendants moved to dismiss. The
district court granted the motion and dismissed the action. The court held that the prisoner could not bring a Bivens
claim alleging his free speech right was violated when he was transferred from the halfway house to a prison for
violating a BOP regulation against publishing under a byline, where the prisoner could have challenged his transfer
through a habeas petition after exhausting BOP’s administrative remediation process. The court noted that the
prisoner’s reassignment to prison was rescinded when his lawyers notified the BOP that the byline regulation had
been repealed. The court held that the prisoner’s confinement was uncategorically privileged, and thus, under state
law, he could not assert a claim for false imprisonment against the United States pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims
Act (FTCA) based on his brief transfer from the halfway house. (Community First Services, Inc., and Metropolitan
Detention Center, New York)

U.S. District Court
EX POST FACTO
SEX OFFENDER

McGuire v. Strange, 83 F.Supp.3d 1231 (M.D.Ala. 2015). A sex offender registrant, who had previously been
convicted of sexual assault in Colorado, brought an action against an Alabama city, county, and state officials,
challenging the Alabama Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Act (ASORCNA), which required
a citizen to register as a homeless sex offender in-person at both the city police department and the county sheriff’s
department every week. After the defendants’ motion to dismiss was granted in part and denied in part, leaving only
the registrant’s claim that ASORCNA violated the Ex Post Facto Clause, a bench trial was held. The district court
held that the in-person registration requirement and the travel-permit requirement were so punitive in effect as to
negate the Alabama legislature’s stated nonpunitive intent, in violation of the Ex Post Factor Clause. (City of
Montgomery and Montgomery County, Alabama)

36.113

U.S. District Court
PAROLE- REVOCATION
PAROLE- DUE PROCESS
RETALIATION
LIBERTY INTEREST

Moore v. Peters, 92 F.Supp.3d 109 (W.D.N.Y. 2015). A former parolee attending drug treatment program brought a
§ 1983 action against correction officers for violation of his due process rights and retaliation. The Parolee moved
for partial summary judgment and the officers cross-moved for judgment on the pleadings. The district court granted
the defendants’ motion in part and denied in part, and denied the plaintiff’s motion. The court held that the parolee
assigned to a drug treatment program engaged in a protected activity, for purposes of a § 1983 First Amendment
retaliation claim, when he filed a statement accusing a correction officer of assaulting another participant in the
program. But the court held that the parolee did not have liberty interest protected by procedural due process in
remaining at drug treatment facility, and thus he did not have right to procedural due process procedures in
connection with his removal from facility. According to the court, the fact that parolee’s removal from the drug
treatment program resulted in a 10-month prison assessment did not implicate his procedural due process rights in
connection with his removal from program, where the parolee was called before the program’s evaluation review
committee (ERC) for “poor program progress” and misbehavior, not for violation of his parole. The court held that
the inmate’s allegations that the correction officer who presided over his disciplinary hearing denied his request for
employee assistant, and that the inmate was detained in an isolation cell and transferred prior to the hearing,
rendering him unable to conduct his own investigation of the disciplinary charges, stated a § 1983 procedural due
process claim. (Willard Drug Treatment Campus, Five Points Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
TIMELY RELEASE

Purvis. v. City of Atlanta, 142 F.Supp.3d 1337 (N.D. Ga. 2015). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action against a city,
county, and the county sheriff, asserting claims for unlawful arrest and detention in violation of the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments. The arrestee alleged that, following his lawful arrest for drinking in public, he was
unlawfully held by the city and county for an additional five to six days on an invalid warrant. The city, county, and
sheriff moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion and denied in part. The court held that: (1) the
allegation was insufficient to establish a pattern or practice on the part of the county or city arising out of an official
policy or custom; (2) the sheriff, in his official capacity, was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity; (3) the
allegations were sufficient to support an inference that the sheriff directed subordinates to act unlawfully; (4) the
sheriff was not entitled to qualified immunity from the claim for violation of the arrestee's due process right to timely
release; and (5) the sheriff was entitled to qualified immunity from the claim alleging violation of the arrestee's
Fourth Amendment rights. (Atlanta City Detention Center, Fulton County Jail, Georgia)

U.S. District Court
EARLY RELEASE

Sassman v. Brown, 99 F.Supp.3d 1223 (E.D. Cal. 2015). A male prisoner filed a civil rights action against the
Governor of California and the Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR),
alleging that the exclusion of male prisoners from California’s Alternative Custody Program (ACP), under which
female prisoners were allowed to apply for release from prison to serve the last 24 months of their sentence in the
community, violated the Equal Protection Clause. The male prisoner moved for summary judgment. The district
court granted the motion. The court held that California’s ACP violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and the provision excluding male prisoners from applying to the ACP would be stricken to
expand the ACP to male prisoners. (California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation)

U.S. Appeals Court
PRE-RELEASE

U.S. v. Goad, 788 F.3d 873 (8th Cir. 2015). After a federal district court denied a motion to dismiss an indictment,
the defendant conditionally pled guilty to escape from custody. The defendant appealed. The appeals court affirmed,
finding that the defendant was in “custody” at a residential reentry center, such that his unauthorized departure from
the center constituted an escape from custody. The court noted that a person may be in custody for the purposes of a
statute prohibiting escape from custody, even though the physical restraints upon him are minimal and even though
the custody may be deemed constructive, rather than actual. (Gerald R. Hinzman Residential Reentry Center, Iowa)
2016

U.S. Appeals Court
ELECTRONIC MONITORING
SEX OFFENDERS

Belleau v. Wall, 811 F.3d 929 (7th Cir. 2016). A citizen, who had previously been convicted of second degree sexual
assault of a child but was no longer under any form of court-ordered supervision, brought an action against
Wisconsin state officials, alleging that a Wisconsin statute, requiring certain persons who had been convicted of
serious child sex offenses to wear global positioning system (GPS) tracking devices for the rest of their lives,
violated his rights under the Ex Post Facto Clause and the Fourth Amendment. The district court entered summary
judgment in the citizen’s favor. The appeals court reversed the decision. The court held that the statute did not
violate the Fourth Amendment, where the loss of privacy from the requirement to wear the device-- that the
Department of Corrections used device to map the wearer’s whereabouts so that police would be alerted to the need
to conduct an investigation if the wearer was present at a place where a sex crime was committed-- was very slight
compared to the societal gain of deterring future offenses by making persons who were likely to commit offenses
aware that they were being monitored. According to the court, the statute did not impose punishment, and thus did
not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. (Wisconsin Department of Corrections)

36.114

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XIX

XIX

XIX

XIX

XIX

(Montgomery County Jail, Tennessee)
U.S. District Court
RESTRICTIONS
ARTICLES
OPPORTUNITY TO
WORSHIP

Hastings v. Marciulionis, 434 F.Supp.2d 585 (W.D.Wis. 2006). A state inmate brought an action

alleging that his First Amendment right to practice his Native American religion was violated
while he was on supervised probation in an alcohol treatment program. The district court entered
summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court held that the probationer's First
Amendment right to practice his Native American religion was not violated when he was not
allowed to go to church and a Native American Pow Wow during his initial 14-day restriction and
evaluation period, because the restriction rule did not target a specific religion or religious
practice. All new residents of alcohol treatment program must complete a 14-day restriction
period, and during this period a resident may not leave the facility for any reason except for
employment or emergency situations. This rule allows new residents to become acclimated to the
rules and treatment programs and allows staff-time to conduct an evaluation to determine if the
resident is appropriate for the program. During this period the staff is provided the opportunity to
assess the resident to ensure the safety of the community. The court also held that the
probationer’s First Amendment right was not violated when he was not allowed to keep his eagle
feather at the program, noting that the feather was illegal because the probationer did not have a
required permit. (Wazee House, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act

Jean-Laurent v. Wilkerson, 438 F.Supp.2d 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). A detainee in a state facility sued
officers and supervisors under § 1983, claiming that he was searched in violation of his due process
rights. The district court held that the detainee stated a claim of unconstitutional strip search,
under the Fourth Amendment, when he alleged that officers, having conducted a legitimate search
in connection with prison-wide strip searches, took him out of his cell and subjected him to a
second search, even though he had been in their custody ever since the first search, precluding any
hiding of contraband on his person. The court also found that the detainee stated claim that the
second of two strip searches violated his First Amendment rights as a Muslim, to avoid being seen
naked. The court noted that while first search was in furtherance of a compelling government need
to maintain order, allowing the search despite religious objection, there was no compelling
government need for the second search. The court held that the detainee stated a claim that
officers imposed a substantial burden on the religious exercise of the Muslim inmate, in violation
of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), by forcing him to submit to
the second strip search. (George Motchan Detention Center, New York City)

U.S. District Court
PUBLICATIONS
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act

Jesus Christ Prison Ministry v. California Department of Corrections, 456 F.Supp.2d 1188
(E.D.Cal. 2006). A prison ministry program and state prisoners brought an action against the
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), alleging that a correctional
facility's policy prohibiting the sending of free softbound Christian literature, compact discs, and
tapes to prisoners who have requested those materials violated the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and their First Amendment rights. The court held that the
policy violated prisoners' free exercise and free speech rights under First Amendment. According to
the court, the asserted penological goals of preventing the receipt of contraband, reducing fire
hazards, increasing the efficiency of random cell inspections or enhancing prison security did not
justify the policy, and the distinction between approved vendors and unapproved vendors was
arbitrary and not reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. The court also found that
the policy violated prisoners' rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act (RLUIPA) where the approved vendor policy placed a “substantial burden” on the exercise of
the prisoners' religious beliefs because prisoners were unable to engage in conduct that is
motivated by their sincere religious beliefs without access to the materials provided by the
unapproved vendor at no cost, and the unique study and worship materials provided by the
unapproved vendor were unavailable through any of the approved vendors. (California State
Substance Abuse Treatment Facility)

U.S. District Court
OPPORTUNITY TO
PRACTICE
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act

Jones v. Goord, 435 F.Supp.2d 221 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). Inmates brought an action against New York
prison officials, challenging the double-celling policy at maximum-security prisons. Double-celling
is a practice in which two prisoners are housed in a cell originally designed for one person. The
complaint was filed in 1995, and was effectively stayed for some time pending litigation of a
companion case challenging the same practice in medium security prisons. After a full trial on the
merits, the district court in the medium security case denied the plaintiffs any relief. The court
found that Muslim inmates' claim that double-celling interfered with their First Amendment right
to free exercise of religion was not moot after they were no longer being double-celled, where many
of the inmates were double-celled on numerous occasions for short periods of time, and the policy of
double-celling inmates continued. The defendant's voluntary cessation of a challenged practice
does not deprive a federal court of its power to determine the legality of the practice. According to
the court, even assuming that the policy of double-celling some inmates in New York's maximumsecurity prisons burdened religious practices of Muslim inmates by making it difficult for them to
pray in their cells. According to the court, the policy was rationally related to the legitimate goal of
finding sufficient bed space to house all maximum security inmates, and thus did not violate the
inmates' right to free exercise of religion. The court ruled that the inmates were not entitled to
37.77

XX

amend their complaint to add a claim under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act (RLUIPA). (Department of Correctional Services)
U.S. District Court
OPPORTUNITY TO
PRACTICE
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act

Kaufman v. McCaughtry, 422 F.Supp.2d 1016 (W.D.Wis. 2006). A state prison inmate brought a §
1983 action against prison officials, challenging their refusal to permit him to organize an atheist
study group. Following remand from the court of appeals, the officials moved for summary
judgment. The district court held that it was not clearly established in 2002 that atheism was a
“religion,” and the officials were qualifiedly immune from suit. The court noted that the Free
Exercise clause and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) limit the
government's ability to burden a prisoners' exercise of sincerely-held religious beliefs, even when
governmental burdens are imposed neutrally upon believer and non-believer alike. The court noted
that the courts had recognized that secular humanism and other non-theistic belief systems were
protected by the Free Exercise Clause, but the inmate did not tell officials he was an adherent of
any such belief system, and did not indicate that his proposed group was connected to “religious”
principles. (Waupun Correctional Institution, Wisconsin)

U.S. Appeals Court
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use and
Institutionalized
Persons Act
FREE EXERCISE

Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174 (4th Cir. 2006). A Muslim prisoner sued state prison officials for
violating his free exercise and due process rights, as well as his rights under the Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), by removing him from a list of Ramadan
participants, because he allegedly broke Ramadan fast. The district court entered summary
judgment for prison officials and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part,
vacated in part, and remanded. The court held that the removal of the prisoner from a Ramadan
observance pass list imposed a “substantial burden” within the meaning of RLUIPA in that it
excluded him from pre-dawn and post-sunset Ramadan meals, prevented him from fulfilling one of
the five pillars of Islam, could not participate in group prayers or services before or after the
special breakfast meal, and because the weekly services were canceled during Ramadan, he was
barred from participating in all congregational religious exercises during Ramadan once he
allegedly broke the fast. According to the court, the officials did not fulfill their burden of showing
that their policies were the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling government interest,
as required for the policies to conform to RLUIPA. The prison officials’ explanation for the policies,
a “legitimate interest in removing inmates from religious dietary programs where the inmate
flouts prison rules reasonably established in order to accommodate the program,” did not fulfill the
officials' burden of showing that the policies were the least restrictive means of furthering a
compelling government interest. The court noted that because the Virginia Department of
Corrections (VDOC) received federal monies, it was subject to the RLUIPA provision that generally
prohibited the government from imposing a substantial burden on prisoner’s religious exercise.
(Keen Mountain Correctional Center, Virginia)

U.S. District Court
DIET
RLUIPA-Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act

Madison v. Riter, 411 F.Supp.2d 645 (W.D.Va. 2006). A state prisoner brought an action against

U.S. Appeals Court
RLUIPA-Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
DIET

Madison v. Virginia, 474 F.3d 118 (4th Cir. 2006). A state prisoner brought an action against the

prison officials and others under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA), challenging the denial of his requests for kosher meals. The district court found that
the applicable RLUIPA section increasing the level of protection of prisoners' religious rights
violated the Establishment Clause and the prisoner appealed. The court of appeals reversed and
remanded. On remand, the defendants brought a motion to dismiss which was dismissed by the
court. The district court held that RLUIPA was a valid exercise of Congress' Spending Clause
authority and that Congress' use of its Spending Clause authority was in pursuit of “the general
Welfare.” The court held that the RLUIPA conditions were related to federal interests and that
conditioning the award of federal corrections funds on a state's compliance with RLUIPA was not
coercive. According to the court, the federal corrections funding conditions imposed upon states
through RLUIPA did not violate the Tenth Amendment and the state waived its Eleventh
Amendment immunity to the prisoner's claims for damages under RLUIPA. The court also held
that the “common fare diet” available to prison inmates upon approval from the appropriate prison
authorities would satisfy the inmate’s religious dietary needs and allow him to celebrate Passover.
(Bland Correction Center, Virginia)

Commonwealth of Virginia, prison officials, and others under the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), challenging the denial of his request for kosher meals.
The district court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss all claims and the state appealed. The
appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded. The court held that RLUIPA is a
valid exercise of Congress’ spending power, such that Virginia could not avoid the RLUIPA
protections of inmates’ religious liberty. According to the court, the restrictions under RLUIPA
against the States’ imposition of substantial burdens on the religious liberty of the inmates did not
impose an unconstitutional condition in violation of Spending Clauses, as RLUIPA did not induce
the States to engage in unconstitutional activities. The court found that RLUIPA was not
unconstitutionally coercive, in violation of Spending Clause restrictions, because it conditioned all
federal funding for Virginia state prisons on the compliance with its ban on substantial state
restrictions on religious liberty of inmates. The court also held that the state’s waiver of Eleventh
Amendment immunity did not extend to suits for monetary damages. (Greenville Correctional

37.78
XX

Center and Bland Correction Center, Virginia)
U.S. District Court
RLUIPA-Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act

Mark v. Gustafson, 482 F.Supp.2d 1084 (W.D.Wis. 2006). A state prison inmate sued a prison and

U.S. District Court
SERVICES
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act

Meyer v. Teslik, 411 F.Supp.2d 983 (W.D.Wis. 2006). A state prison inmate sued a chaplain,

U.S. District Court
ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE
FREE EXERCISE
FORCED EXPOSURE

Moeller v. Bradford County, 444 F.Supp.2d 316 (M.D.Pa. 2006). Taxpayers and a former inmate of
a county prison sued the county, the U.S. Department of Justice, and a private organization
providing vocational rehabilitation services to inmates, claiming that funding of the group, which
proselytized for the Christian religion, was a violation of Establishment Clause. The district court
dismissed the case in part, and the county moved for judgment on the pleadings. The court held
that it had jurisdiction over claims that payments to religious organizations violated the state
constitution and that the plaintiffs sufficiently stated a claim that the county violated the
Establishment Clause, despite the claim that funding was race neutral, where there was no other
vocational program funded in the county prison system. According to the court, the county was
coercing inmates into involvement with Christianity, as the only way to get valuable rehabilitation
benefits. The court also found that a claim was stated that the county engaged in employment
discrimination based on religion. The court held that the taxpayers had standing to bring suit
when Congressional appropriations were used to finance the organization's efforts to proselytize
for the Christian religion, undertaken concurrently with vocational training. The court described
the program, operated by the Firm Foundation as follows: “The program not only provides
vocational training, but spends a significant amount of time and resources on religious discussions,
religious lectures, and prayer. The Firm Foundation describes its program as a prison ministry. It
requires its staff to adhere to Christian beliefs and to share these beliefs when the opportunity
arises. The Firm Foundation routinely proselytizes to the inmates in the vocational training
program, and does not make an effort to segregate government funds for the purely secular
purpose of vocational training.” Funding for the program was derived from a federal grant under
the Workforce Investment Act from the United States Department of Labor. The Firm Foundation
also received funds from Bradford County and the Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and
Delinquency. (Bradford County Correctional Facility, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
DIET
FREE EXERCISE
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act

Omar v. Casterline, 414 F.Supp.2d 582 (W.D.La. 2006). A detainee brought an action pursuant to
Bivens and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), alleging that federal prison officials

individuals, alleging that “magic seals” were removed from the interior of his prison cell in
violation of his religious rights, and that officials conspired to transfer him to another facility. The
district court entered judgment for the defendants. The court held that prison officials did not
violate the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) when they prohibited
the inmate from affixing “magic seals,” presumably part of the inmate's practice of religion
involving magic, to the walls of his cell. According to the court, the prohibition furthered a
compelling government security interest in minimizing opportunities to hide undesirable items,
and the prohibition was the least restrictive way of intruding upon religious rights, as it left open
the opportunity to deploy seals within the cell in variety of ways. (Oakhill Corr’l Institution,
Wisconsin)

claiming that the omission of his name from a list of those allowed to attend Native American
religious ceremonies violated his rights under the First Amendment and the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The chaplain moved for summary judgment. The
district court held that the inmate's exercise of his Native American religion was “substantially
burdened,” for the purpose of determining whether RLUIPA was violated when, over a threemonth period, the prison chaplain did not include him on the list of inmates allowed to attend
religious services when there was no compelling reason for omission. The court found that
summary judgment was precluded by material issues of fact as to whether the chaplain
deliberately left the inmate’s name off the list, resulting in a denial of his First Amendment right
to exercise his core beliefs by participating in pipe and drum ceremonies. The court held that the
chaplain was not entitled to qualified immunity from liability for violating First Amendment and
RLUIPA rights of the inmate where the right of the inmate to participate in core activities of
religion, including services, was clearly established. (Fox Lake Correctional Institution, Wisconsin)

subjected him to an unconstitutional search and failed to accommodate his religious needs. The
defendants moved for summary judgment and the court granted the motion. The district court held
that: the warden of the federal penitentiary at which the detainee was held was not liable for
alleged violations of the detainee's right to free exercise of religion; the detainee failed to show that
officials served him pork in violation of his right to free exercise of religion; qualified immunity
shielded the officials from liability to the extent that their alleged failure to inform the detainee
that he was being served pork substitutes violated his right to free exercise of religion; prison
officials did not violate the detainee's free exercise rights by not informing him of the time so that
he could pray at appropriate times of day; officials' refusal to hold three of the detainee's meals
during Ramadan did not violate his free exercise rights; allegations that prison officials mocked
the detainee's religion at most asserted a de minimis violation of the detainee's free exercise rights;
and, the detainee did not establish a violation of his rights under RFRA. According to the court,
allegations that the Muslim detainee asked his case manager at the federal penitentiary for a clock

37.79
XX

so that the he would know when to say his prayers, and that the case manager said “You think this
is going to work?” after the detainee was praying, sufficiently alleged the case manager's personal
participation in alleged violations of the detainee's right to free exercise of religion. (United States
Penitentiary, Pollock, Louisiana)
U.S. District Court
EQUAL PROTECTION
RLUIPA - Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE
RESTRICTIONS

Perez v. Frank, 433 F.Supp.2d 955 (W.D.Wis. 2006). A Sunni Muslim inmate sued a state prison,
claiming violation of his rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA) and the First Amendment. The inmate petitioned for permission to proceed in forma
pauperis. The district court held that: (1) the prison did not violate RLUIPA by refusing to leave a
dayroom open all hours, to allow for ritual washing (Wudu) at any time; (2) the inmate could
proceed with his claim that he was barred from participating in named religious ceremonies and
from joining in a group prayer, in violation of RLUIPA; (3) the inmate could proceed with his claim
that he was denied prayer oil, in violation of RLUIPA; (4) the inmate could proceed with his claim
that his exercise of religion rights under First Amendment were violated; (5) the denial of desired
quantities of prayer oil and the opportunity for inmate-led services was not an Establishment
Clause violation; (6) the inmate could proceed with his claim that the disparity of treatment for
feast days, for various religions, was an Establishment Clause violation; and (7) the inmate could
proceed with his claim that denial of access to Muslim lectures was a freedom of speech violation.
(New Lisbon Correctional Institution, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
NAME
DIET

Porter v. Caruso, 431 F.Supp.2d 768 (W.D.Mich. 2006). A state inmate filed an action alleging that
prison officials violated his First Amendment free exercise rights by refusing to refer to him by his
new legal name, and by denying his request to be placed on a kosher meal plan. The officials
moved to dismiss and the district court held that dismissal of the inmate's exhausted claims was
not warranted. The inmate asserted that he was an adherent of an ancient Egyptian religion
known as Kemetic Spiritual Science, and that as part of his religious faith he legally changed his
name. The inmate alleged that corrections officials repeatedly failed to comply with their own
policy directives and forced him to refer to himself by his former name. The inmate also asserted
that the dietary requirements of his religion are comparable to those observed in the Jewish faith
and he requested to be placed on the kosher meal plan, but the officials denied his request.
(Michigan Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
OPPORTUNITY TO
WORSHIP

Price v. Caruso, 451 F.Supp.2d 889 (E.D.Mich. 2006). A state prison inmate brought a pro se suit

U.S. District Court
HAIR
BEARDS
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act

Ragland v. Angelone, 420 F.Supp.2d 507 (W.D.Va. 2006). A state prisoner challenged a prison's
grooming policy as violative of his constitutional rights and the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The Rastafarian prisoner sought to wear his hair and
beard uncut but he was punished under the prison’s policy. The state moved for summary
judgment. The district court granted the motion, holding that the policy was constitutional, that
RLUIPA was constitutional, that prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity, and that the
policy did not violate RLUIPA. According to the court, the inmate grooming policy was rationally
related to legitimate penological interests and thus did not violate the Rastafarian prisoner's
rights under the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause, the Eighth Amendment, or the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. The court found that the
policy furthered compelling penological interests in security, staff safety, inmate identification,
and inmate health, and that a proposed religious exception to the policy was unworkable. (Virginia
Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
BEARDS
RESTRICTIONS
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act

Rasul v. Rumsfeld, 433 F.Supp.2d 58 (D.D.C. 2006). Detainees at the United States naval facility
in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, sued the government, claiming that their treatment violated the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). The district court denied the government’s motion to
dismiss holding that: (1) RFRA applied outside of the continental United States; (2) RFRA applied
to Guantanamo Bay; (3) a claim of liability under RFRA was stated; and (4) there was no qualified
immunity from suit under RFRA. The Muslim inmates claimed harassment when practicing their
religion, forced shaving of religious beards, and placement of the Koran in a toilet. (United States
Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba)

against the director of the state corrections department, claiming that failure to provide
transportation to another facility in order to permit his minimum attendance requirement for
Jewish services to be satisfied, was a violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA). The court found material issues of fact, as to whether there were sufficient
Jewish inmates in the prison to conduct services, precluded summary judgment. The court found
that the inmate's claim for damages, arising from the refusal of authorities to transport him to
another facility, was not rendered moot when he was transferred to another facility where need for
transportation no longer existed. According to the court, the inmate could pursue his damages
claim against the director in her official capacity, claiming that his rights under the RLUIPA were
violated because it was not clear whether, in accepting federal funding, the state had waived
sovereign immunity, and with it the director's official capacity immunity. (Southern Michigan
Correctional Facility)

37.80
XX

U.S. Appeals Court
FREE EXERCISE
RLUIPA-Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act

Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263 (2nd Cir. 2006). An inmate brought an action against prison
officials, alleging that they violated his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion and his
free-exercise right under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), by
forcing Shi'ite and Sunni Muslims to conduct Ramadan services jointly. The district court entered
summary judgment for the prison officials; the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed in
part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court held that it was clearly established, for the
purposes of qualified immunity, that prison officials could not substantially burden an inmate's
right to religious exercise without some justification. The court held that a prison policy under
which Shi'ite and Sunni Muslims were required to conduct Ramadan services jointly, if proven not
to be justified by a legitimate penological interest or a compelling governmental interest as
required by RLUIPA, violated the inmate’s free-exercise and RLUIPA rights. (Woodbourne
Correctional Facility, Eastern Correctional Facility, Downstate Correctional Facility, Auburn
Correctional Facility, Lakeview Correctional Facility, Attica Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
OPPORTUNITY TO
PRACTICE
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
RFRA- Religious
Freedom
Restoration Act

Sample v. Lappin, 424 F.Supp.2d 187 (D.D.C. 2006). An inmate brought suit for declaratory and

U.S. District Court
RECOGNIZED
RELIGIONS
SERVICES

Scott v. Ozmint, 467 F.Supp.2d 564 (D.S.C. 2006). A state prisoner brought a civil rights action

U.S. District Court
NAME
OPPORTUNITY TO
WORSHIP
RLUIPA-Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act

Shidler v. Moore, 409 F.Supp.2d 1060 (N.D.Ind. 2006). A prisoner brought a pro se action against

injunctive relief, claiming that a denial of his request for wine violated the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA) and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA),
and that the Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) Director failed to train, supervise, and promulgate policies
requiring his subordinates to comply with RFRA and RLUIPA. The defense moved to dismiss, and
the parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The district court held that genuine issues of
material fact existed as to whether an outright ban on an inmate's consumption of wine was the
least restrictive means of furthering the government's compelling interest in controlling
intoxicants. The inmate described himself as “an observant Jew” who “practiced Judaism before
his incarceration and continues his practice of Judaism while confined,” and who “sincerely
believes that he must drink at least 3.5 ounces of red wine (a reviit) while saying Kiddush, a
prayer sanctifying the Sabbath, during Friday night and Saturday shabbos services.” The court
found that the inmate exhausted his administrative remedies, as required by the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (PLRA), with respect to his request for wine, regardless of whether he asked that a
rabbi, a chaplain, or a Bureau of Prisons (BOP) staff member administer the wine to him.
According to the court, the inmate's obligation to exhaust his administrative remedies did not
require that he posit every conceivable alternative means by which to achieve his goal, which was
the unburdened exercise of his sincere religious belief. (Federal Correctional Institution,
Beaumont, Texas)

seeking an injunction requiring a state corrections director and prison chaplains to recognize the
Neterian faith as a religion. The defendants moved for summary judgment and the district court
granted the motion. The court held that: (1) the prisoner did not satisfy the requirement of the
Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) that he show physical injury as required for a civil rights suit
for mental or emotional injury; and (2) the decision was reasonably related to legitimate
penological concerns. According to the court, the decision not to recognize the prisoner’s Neterian
faith, which meant that the prisoner could not hold group religious meetings, but still could
practice his faith individually, was reasonable related to legitimate penological interests, and thus
did not violate the prisoner’s free exercise rights. The court noted that the prisoner failed to
provide information about the faith and names of religious leaders who could be contacted
regarding its practice, as required under the prison regulation. Limited information available
about the faith indicated that group worship was not necessary for its practice, and
accommodating the prisoner’s request for twice-weekly group meeting for the three inmates would
have unduly burdened the prison resources. (McCormick Correctional Institution, South Carolina)
prison officials under § 1983 and Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA),
alleging denial of his rights to worship, to petition for redress of grievances, and to have access to
courts. The prisoner requested a preliminary injunction and the district court denied the request.
The court held that the prisoner stated cause of action against prison officials under § 1983
seeking monetary damages for First Amendment and RLUIPA violations by alleging that all
inmates in his housing unit were denied communal worship. The court noted that the statute
prohibiting prisoners from bringing federal civil actions for mental or emotional injury absent a
showing of physical injury does not restrict damages in a First Amendment constitutional claim.
The court found that the prisoner stated cause of action for First Amendment violations in § 1983
complaint against a prison chaplain and administrative assistant, in connection with alleged
denial of communal worship, in that it was reasonable to infer from the prisoner's factual
allegations that such officials might have implemented or enforced, or could have lifted, the
restrictions at issue while the prisoner was in certain housing units. According to the court, the
alleged failure of state prison officials to quickly correct records that listed the prisoner's religion,
with the result that the prisoner was prevented from engaging in communal worship for 39 days, if
proven, did not violate the prisoner's First Amendment rights where any such actions were the
result of negligence, not an intent to deny the prisoner access to worship. The court found that
allegations of the prisoner's complaint against prison officials, stating that he was not allowed to

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use his religious name to send or receive mail, stated a cause of action under the First Amendment
and RLUIPA for monetary damages and injunctive relief. The court ruled that prison officials'
alleged actions of denying the prisoner access to a law library, denying him the ability to make
copies, and confiscating his legal materials, if proven, did not violate his constitutional right of
access to courts, in that he could write to the court and thus could file a complaint, he could send
an original document and state that he was unable to obtain copies, and he did not maintain that
unreturned legal papers were not replaceable. The court noted that there is no abstract,
freestanding right to a law library, and a prisoners' constitutional right of access to courts goes no
further than access. The court found that the confiscation of a prisoner's legal paperwork is merely
a property loss, not a denial of the constitutional right of access to courts, if the papers are
replaceable. (Miami Correctional Facility, Indiana)
U.S. District Court
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
OPPORTUNITY TO
WORSHIP
NAME
RESTRICTIONS

Shidler v. Moore, 446 F.Supp.2d 942 (N.D.Ind. 2006). A Sunni Muslim inmate brought a civil

U.S. District Court
ARTICLES
EQUAL PROTECTION
OPPORTUNITY TO
PRACTICE

Thunderhorse v. Pierce, 418 F.Supp.2d 875 (E.D.Tex. 2006). A Native American inmate brought a

U.S. Appeals Court
FREE EXERCISE

rights action against prison officials who allegedly prevented him from practicing his religion. The
district court held that the inmate's allegations regarding the prison's prayer oil policy stated
claims for declaratory relief, monetary and punitive damages for a violation of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments, and for declaratory relief as well as nominal and punitive damages for a
violation of Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The inmate alleged
that a prison official created and enforced a policy prohibiting the use of prayer oil, that when the
policy was changed, only one type of oil was available and that he was allergic to it, and that the
official refused to permit him to purchase an alternative to which he was not allergic. The court
found that the inmate's allegation that he was denied communal worship even though Christians
were permitted communal worship, that he was denied the ability to participate in Ramadan
activities, and that he was classified as a Christian for the purpose of preventing him from
practicing his religion, also stated a claim. But the court found that the prison policy that
prevented the inmate from using his religious name on his mail did not violate his First
Amendment right to free exercise of religion, absent an allegation that the inmate had legally
changed his name in state court, or that members of other religious groups were able to change
their names more easily. (Miami Correctional Facility, Indiana)

pro se action against state prison officials, alleging violations of his free exercise rights and of the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The district court granted the
officials’ motion for summary judgment. The court held that prison officials did not violate the
inmate's free exercise rights by requiring him to send a medicine bag obtained from a nonapproved vendor through a unit warden's office for visual inspection. The court found that officials
were not required to distinguish between those who practiced shamanism and those who did not,
where only 1.66 percent of prisoners identified their religious preference as “Native American.”
The court noted that members of small religious groups must be afforded a reasonable opportunity
to practice their faith in prisons, but need not be provided with facilities or personnel identical to
those given to members of more populous denominations. The court held that the officials' denial
of the inmate's access to a sacred pipe did not violate his free exercise rights, where inmates were
not allowed to possess pipes, the inmate's classification in administrative segregation precluded
him from attending pipe ceremonies for security reasons, and the lack of services congruent with
inmate's beliefs was due to a lack of volunteers rather than a discriminatory purpose. According to
the court, if the state prison policy designating holy days for Native Americans was oriented
toward the Plains Indian culture, the policy did not violate the free exercise rights of the
Algonquin inmate where prison officials could not reasonably be expected to differentiate between
holy days for all branches of Native American religion, the inmate was in administrative
segregation and so did not require lay-ins from work, and inmates were permitted to request
additional holy days. The inmate explained that he is a practitioner of Native American religion
and referred to himself as a “shaman.” He stated that the Native American religious program
existing in the corrections department gives preferential treatment to “Christian-oriented” Native
American beliefs while “disfavoring and excluding” traditionalist Native American ceremonial
leaders known as shamans. The officials quoted a law review article entitled Sacred Standards:
Honoring the Establishment Clause in Protecting Native American Sacred Sites, as follows: “[I]t is
difficult to describe one Native American religion, because Native Americans identify themselves
by tribe, and many beliefs differ by tribe. Native American religions reflect traditions that have
existed in the Americas for over 30,000 years and a rich plurality of religions have evolved.” (Texas
Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division)

Williams v. Bitner, 455 F.3d 186 (3rd Cir. 2006). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against prison

officials. The district court denied the officials’ motion for summary judgment on the inmate’s First
Amendment claim, and the officials appealed. The court of appeals affirmed. The court held that
the First Amendment right of Muslin inmate to avoid handling pork was clearly established for
purposes of qualified immunity. According to the court, the First Amendment right that was
violated when prison officials punished the inmate for refusing to handle or assist in preparing
pork while working in a prison kitchen was a clearly established right, and thus, officials were not
entitled to qualified immunity on the inmate’s § 1983 claim that officials violated his right to free

37.82
XX

exercise of religion. The court noted that although neither the Supreme Court nor court of appeals
had directly addressed whether requiring Muslim inmates to handle pork violated their right to
free exercise of religion, other courts that had considered this precise question had uniformly held that prison
officials had to respect and accommodate, when practicable, Muslim inmates’ religious beliefs regarding
prohibitions on handling pork. (State Correctional Institution at Rockview, Pennsylvania)
2007
U.S. Appeals Court
ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE
FORCED EXPOSURE

Americans United for Separation of Church and State v. Prison Fellowship Ministries, Inc., 509 F.3d 406 (8th Cir.
2007). A separation of church and state advocacy group, state prison inmates, and others, sued the State of Iowa
and a Christian provider of rehabilitation services, claiming that funding of a contract with the Christian
organization providing pre-release rehabilitation services to inmates violated the Establishment Clause. The
district court granted declaratory and equitable relief in favor of advocacy group and the inmates. The provider
and state corrections officials appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The appeals court
held that the state funding constituted an endorsement of religion, but that the district court abused its discretion in
awarding recoupment of state funds that had been paid to the provider. The court noted that even though the
provider had the ability to repay the funds, the district court gave no weight to the fact that specific statutes
authorized the funding, made no finding of bad faith by the state legislature and governor, and did not consider the
testimony of state prison officials that the program was beneficial and that the state received much more value
than it paid for. (Iowa Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
DIET
OPPORTUNITY TO
PRACTICE
SERVICES
EQUAL PROTECTION
FREE EXERCISE
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act

Baranowski v. Hart, 486 F.3d 112 (5th Cir. 2007). A Jewish inmate incarcerated in a Texas prison brought a cause
of action under § 1983, challenging prison policies that affected his ability to participate in Sabbath and Jewish
holiday services and to eat a kosher diet. He alleged that these policies violated his free exercise and equal
protection rights, as well as rights accorded to him under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act (RLUIPA). The district court entered an order granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants, and the
inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed, holding that: (1) prison policies on the availability of religious
services to the less than 1% of the prison population practicing the Jewish faith, which resulted in the inmate’s
being denied weekly Sabbath and other holy day services when a rabbi or approved volunteer was not present, did
not violate the inmate’s free exercise rights; (2) prison officials’ failure to provide kosher meals did not violate the
inmate’s free exercise rights; (3) it was not a violation of the inmate’s equal protection rights for prison officials to
consider the demand and needs of groups requesting access to the prison chapel; (4) refusal to allow the Jewish
inmates to congregate for religious services when a rabbi or outside volunteer was not available did not place a
“substantial burden” on the inmate’s free exercise of religion; and (5) “compelling governmental interests”
supported the decision by prison officials not to provide the kosher meals. According to the court, the inmate
retained the ability to participate in alternative means of exercising his religious beliefs, including the ability to
worship in his cell using religious materials and the ability to access the chapel and the lockers containing
religious materials on certain days and times. The inmate had the option of receiving vegetarian or pork-free
meals and prison officials had a legitimate governmental interest in running a simplified food service rather than a
full-scale restaurant. The court found that it was not a violation of the Jewish inmate’s equal protection rights for
prison officials to consider demand and need of groups requesting access to the prison chapel, along with space
and staffing limitations, in deciding where religious groups would be allowed to conduct their services, and the
mere fact that other religious groups may have enjoyed greater access to the chapel than the Jewish inmates, who
constituted less than 1% of the prison population, was not constitutionally impermissible. The court noted that
there were “compelling governmental interests” within the meaning of RLUIPA, that supported the decision of
the prison officials not to provide kosher meals to its Jewish inmates and to require them to chose vegetarian or
pork-free meals instead; the administrative and budgetary interests at stake could not be achieved by any different
or lesser means. (Huntsville Unit, Texas Department of Criminal Justice)

U.S. Appeals Court
CLOTHING

Boles v. Neet, 486 F.3d 1177 (10th Cir. 2007). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that a warden violated
his rights under the First Amendment by refusing to allow him to wear religious garments required to be worn by
Orthodox Jews while he was being transported outside the facility for medical treatment. The district court denied
the warden’s motions to dismiss and for summary judgment. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the
inmate established a violation of his free exercise rights, as required to preclude a qualified immunity defense, and
the warden failed to identify any legitimate penological interests served by refusing the inmate’s request. The
court found that the warden was not entitled to immunity simply because he was following the prison regulations,
and nothing indicated that the regulation requiring inmates to be transported in orange jumpsuits was related to a
legitimate penological interest. (Freemont Correctional Facility, Colorado)

U.S. District Court
BEARDS
OPPORTUNITY TO
PRACTICE

Daker v. Wetherington, 469 F.Supp.2d 1231 (N.D.Ga. 2007). A Muslim inmate brought a suit under § 1983 and
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), alleging that his religious beliefs were not
accommodated adequately while he was incarcerated at several prison facilities. The defendants moved for
summary judgment, which the district court granted in part and denied in part. The Georgia Department of
Corrections’ shaving policy provides that goatees, beards, and similar facial adornments are prohibited unless
medically indicated. The court held that the Department’s shaving policy was not rendered constitutionally infirm
by speculating that the Department could, without undermining security, allow a very small percentage of its
prisoners to grow facial hair. The inmate had suggested that the prison accommodate his beliefs by transferring
him out of the state prison system. The Muslim inmate had challenged a requirement at one of the prisons that he
recite the Prison’s Code of Ethics, but the court found that he did not have standing to pursue that claim. The court
noted that the inmate was no longer required to recite the purportedly offensive Code, and that among the four

37.83
37.83
XXII

prisons in which the inmate had been incarcerated, only one prison warden required him to recite the Code of
Ethics. The court held that the Muslim inmate was unlawfully denied a weekly Ta’lim class, which was an Islamic
educational class. Although the prison policy previously denying Muslim prisoners access to Ta’lim had been
revised, the Department provided no assurance that the inmate would not be subjected to a similar policy should
he be transferred to another prison facility in the future. The court allowed this claim to go forward in view of the
frequency of transfer of the inmate between the Department facilities in the previous seven years, and the
likelihood that he would be transferred to another facility in the future where there was little assurance that he
would not be denied Ta’lim. (Ray James State Prison, Arrendale State Prison, Hancock State Prison and Spalding
County Correctional Institution, Georgia)
U.S. District Court
DIET
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act

Guzzi v. Thompson, 470 F.Supp.2d 17 (D.Mass. 2007). A state prisoner brought a suit challenging the denial of
his request for a kosher diet. The court held that the prisoner failed to show the likelihood of success on the merits
of his claim that keeping kosher was a protected religious exercise under the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) for an Orthodox Catholic, precluding preliminary injunctive relief.
According to the court, the prisoner was not likely to succeed in demonstrating that a kosher diet, separate from
the practice of Judaism, was a protected religious activity under RLUIPA. On appeal (2008 WL 2059321) the
appeals court reversed and remanded. (MCI-Shirley, Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
FREE EXERCISE
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act
WORK

Henderson v. Ayers, 476 F.Supp.2d 1168 (C.D.Cal. 2007). An inmate brought a pro se and in forma pauperis suit
under § 1983 against an acting warden, in his individual and official capacities, claiming that the warden had
denied the inmate his right to attend Friday Islamic prayer services and seeking injunctive relief. The warden
moved to dismiss. The district court denied the motion. The court held that the inmate satisfied the exhaustion
requirement of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), even though he did not specifically name the warden in
his grievance. The court noted that exhaustion under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) is not necessarily
inadequate simply because an individual later sued was not named in the grievances, but rather, compliance with
prison grievance procedures is all that is required by the PLRA to properly exhaust. The court held that the inmate
stated a claim for violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA) and
stated a claim for violation of his First Amendment rights. The inmate alleged that he had been denied excused
time-off work to attend Friday Islamic prayer services, as his religion required, and that he had been subjected to
progressive discipline, including loss of privileges, for attempting to attend these prayer services. (California State
Prison, Los Angeles County)

U.S. Appeals Court
ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE
FORCED EXPOSURE

Inouye v. Kemna, 504 F.3d 705 (9th Cir. 2007). A parolee brought a § 1983 action in state court against his parole
officer, alleging that the officer violated his First Amendment rights by requiring him to attend a drug treatment
program that required participation in meetings that were rooted in a regard for a higher power, The case was
removed to federal court. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the parole officer, and parolee
appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that the parole officer violated the Establishment
Clause, and that pertinent Establishment Clause law was clearly established at the time of officer's violation. The
parole officer had recommended the revocation of the parolee's parole because he refused to participate. (Hawaii)

U.S. District Court
OPPORTUNITY TO
PRACTICE
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act

Kaufman v. Schneiter, 474 F.Supp.2d 1014 (W.D.Wis. 2007). An inmate at a supermaximum security prison filed
a § 1983 action alleging that prison officials violated his constitutional rights. The inmate filed a motion seeking
leave to proceed in forma pauperis. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held
that the inmate’s claim that he was transferred to a maximum security facility in retaliation for his decision to
name a warden as a defendant in a civil rights action was not frivolous, and thus the inmate was entitled to
proceed in forma pauperis in his § 1983 action, where fact issues remained as to whether the lawsuit motivated the
warden’s decision to transfer the inmate. The court found that the inmate’s claim that prison officials violated his
First Amendment free speech and free exercise rights, and violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA) as a result of their decision to prohibit the inmate from possessing any written materials
was not frivolous, and thus the inmate was entitled to proceed in forma pauperis. But the court held that the
officials’ refusal to authorize a study group for inmates who described themselves as atheists, freethinkers,
humanists and “other,” and those who identified themselves to prison officials as having no religious preference,
did not violate the atheist inmate’s First Amendment free exercise rights, absent a showing that reading books
about atheism or meeting in study group with inmates of various philosophical bents constituted observation of
central religious beliefs or the practices of atheism. (Wisconsin Secure Program Facility)

U.S. District Court
PUBLICATIONS
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act

Kaufman v. Schneiter, 524 F.Supp.2d 1101 (W.D.Wis. 2007). A former state inmate sued prison officials for
declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, alleging that he was subjected to retaliatory transfer and that his
rights under the First and Eighth Amendments and Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA) were violated. The court granted the officials’ motion for summary judgment. The court held that the
warden was not involved in the inmate's transfer to a maximum security institution, precluding the warden's
liability on the claim alleging that he transferred the inmate in retaliation for the inmate's filing of an earlier
lawsuit against him. The court found that there was no evidence that any of the prison officials sued by the inmate
were personally involved in denying delivery to the inmate of the letter underlying his free speech claim, and
therefore the officials could not be held liable under § 1983. According to the court, there were no facts in
evidence that the former state inmate was prevented from ordering publications about his religion of atheism
while incarcerated at a maximum security facility, was in the facility's step program, or was in any other way
injured by the step program's no-publications policy, and therefore the former inmate lacked standing to litigate
his claim that the policy violated his free exercise rights and rights under Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA). The court held that the former state inmate did not show that while he was incarcerated
at a maximum security facility, he ever chose to use out-of-cell time to visit the law library, as opposed to out-ofdoor exercise, and thus to show an injury-in-fact required for the former inmate to have standing to challenge the
prison official's policy of requiring inmates to choose between out-of-cell exercise time and law library time under
the Eighth Amendment. (Wisconsin Secure Program Facility)

37.84
37.84
XXII

U.S. Appeals Court
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act
BOOKS
ARTICLES
OPPORTUNITY TO
PRACTICE

Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir. 2007). A prisoner, proceeding in forma pauperis, brought a § 1983 action
against prison officials claiming multiple violations of his constitutional rights arising from his imprisonment. The
district court dismissed the claims and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part,
and remanded. The court held that allegations made by the prisoner, who identified his religion as Wicca, that he
persistently asked prison officials for permission to possess tarot cards to practice his religion and that he twice
surreptitiously brought tarot cards into prison and was punished, established that he was a sincere devotee of the
Wiccan faith and that he sincerely believed that use of tarot cards was required to practice his religion, as required
to support his claim that prison officials violated his First Amendment right to freely exercise his religion by
denying him tarot cards, incense, and religious books. The court found that it was unnecessary for the prisoner to
show that the use of tarot cards and other items was necessary to the practice of the religion of Wicca if his belief
in their use was sincerely held, to support his free exercise claim. The court remanded the case to address the
prisoner's claim that prison officials violated RLUIPA by denying him tarot cards, incense, and religious books.
(Bonneville Community Correctional Facility, Utah)

U.S. Appeals Court
HAIR LENGTH
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act

Longoria v. Dretke, 507 F.3d 898 (5th Cir. 2007). A prisoner brought a pro se action against prison officials,
claiming his right to exercise his religion was denied when they denied him permission to grow his hair. The
district court dismissed the action and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the
prison's grooming policy did not violate the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and
did not violate equal protection. The court noted that even if the grooming policy created a substantial burden on
the prisoner's religious exercise, the policy served the prison's compelling interest in maintaining order and safety
in the prison, since long hair facilitated the transfer of contraband and weapons and long hair could allow escaped
prisoners to more easily alter their appearance. The court held that the policy was the least restrictive means to
achieve that interest. According to the court, although female prisoners were not subject to the same grooming
policy, the policy applied to all prisoners incarcerated in the male prison, and the application of different
grooming regulations to male and female inmates did not implicate equal protection concerns. (Robertson Unit,
Texas Department of Criminal Justice-Institutional Division)

U.S. District Court
FREE EXERCISE
OPP. TO PRACTICE
RLUIPA- Relig. Land Use
and Instit. Persons Act
SERVICES

Larry v. Goetz, 575 F.Supp.2d 965 (W.D.Wis. 2007). A prisoner brought an action against a volunteer chaplain,
alleging that the chaplain violated his rights under the free exercise clause of the First Amendment and the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) when he failed to arrange for Jumah services at a
county jail. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the chaplain. The court held that the chaplain
could not be held liable where there was no showing that the chaplain had either a responsibility or the authority
to arrange Jumah services at the jail. (Dane County Jail, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
OPPORTUNITY TO
WORSHIP

Monk v. Williams, 516 F.Supp.2d 343 (D.Del.2007). An inmate brought an action against a warden and a prison
administrator, alleging retaliation based upon his practice of religion. The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the defendants. The court held that the inmate's removal from a drug treatment program
would not have deterred a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his right to practice religion. The inmate
told responding officers that he had just finished praying and to let another inmate finish prayer, and thus his own
religious conduct was not disturbed. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), a prisoner must complete
an administrative review process in accordance with applicable procedural rules, including deadlines, as a
precondition to bringing suit in federal court. The court held that the inmate failed to exhaust all administrative
remedies before filing action because the inmate failed to appeal the prison administrator’s denial of his
grievance. (Howard R. Young Correctional Institution, Delaware)

U.S. Appeals Court
EQUAL PROTECTION
SINCERITY
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act

Murphy v. Missouri Dept. of Corrections, 506 F.3d 1111 (8th Cir. 2007). A prisoner brought an action under §
1983 and under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) against prison officials,
alleging that he was improperly denied privileges that had been given to other religious groups, including
communal worship, religious funding and institutional TV airtime for religious videos. The prisoner was a
member of the Christian Separatist Church. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the prison
officials, and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. On
remand, the district court denied the prisoner's motion for a new trial after a jury returned a verdict in favor of the
defendants, and the prisoner again appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the prisoner was
required to prove that racially-segregated services were a sincerely held tenet or belief central or fundamental to
church doctrine in order to recover under his claim that prison officials substantially burdened his ability to
exercise his religion in violation of RLUIPA. (Crossroads Correctional Center, Cameron, Missouri)

U.S. District Court
OPPORTUNITY TO
PRACTICE
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act

Sanders v. Ryan, 484 F.Supp.2d 1028 (D.Ariz. 2007). A hearing-impaired inmate brought a civil rights action
against a prison official and the State of Arizona, claiming his rights were violated under the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), the First Amendment, Arizona civil rights laws, and the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court
held that a prison official's refusal to give the prisoner, who listened to audiotapes of Baptist church services as
part of his faith, two new tapes unless he exchanged two tapes already in his possession to be destroyed, rather
than stored, did not “substantially burden” the prisoner's exercise of his religion, as required to establish a
violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The inmate had alleged that
such conduct violated a state statute requiring the return of authorized inmate property to the inmate upon his
release. According to the court, the state department of corrections policy of limiting property an inmate could
possess in his cell or in storage did not violate the rights of prisoners under the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), where the policy served the “compelling governmental interest” of
enhancing the safety and security of prison facilities. The court found that the policy was the “least restrictive
means” available to accommodate the government's compelling interests in safety and security. The court noted
that the inmate was permitted to practice his religion by engaging in personal Bible study and prayer, receiving

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XXII

pastoral visits from an accredited minister, and listening to religious tapes. The inmate was able to mail excess
religious tapes back to the church in exchange for new ones, and the inmate did not suggest an alternative that was
less restrictive but which would accommodate the State's interests of safety and security. (Arizona Dept. Corr.)
U.S. District Court
FREE EXERCISE
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act

Schnitzler v. Reisch, 518 F.Supp.2d 1098 (D.S.D. 2007). An inmate who was a practicing Jehovah’s Witness
brought a § 1983 action against a secretary of corrections, warden, and prison officials, alleging that a prison's sex
offender treatment program violated his religious beliefs by requiring his participation in explicit group
discussions of a sexual nature as well as viewing certain images. The defendants moved for summary judgment
and the district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the prisoner's First
Amendment rights were not violated by participation in the program, but the prisoner stated a claim for violation
of his statutory free exercise of religion under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA). The court held that the § 1983 claims against the secretary and warden were not based upon the theory
of respondeat superior. The court found that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact
as to the level of personal involvement of the warden and the Secretary of the South Dakota Department of
Corrections in the determination that no alternative form of sex offender treatment program should be provided to
the prisoner. (Mike Durfee State Penitentiary, Springfield, South Dakota)

U.S. District Court
CLOTHING
FREE EXERCISE
HAIR
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act
RESTRICTIONS

Singh v. Goord, 520 F.Supp.2d 487 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). An inmate who professed a belief in the Sikh faith brought
an action against various officials of the New York State Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) under the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment, the New York State Constitution, and various other constitutional provisions. The DOCS moved for
summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the inmate
failed to exhaust administrative remedies, as required under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), with
respect to his free exercise clause claim regarding his right to wear a Kacchera, which was a religious
undergarment. The court found that summary judgment for the defendants was precluded by an issue of fact as to
whether the inmate received the decision of the Superintendent, but failed to appeal it.
The court also found that the inmate sincerely believed that he was required to possess a second Kanga, which
was a Sikh religious comb, and therefore the prison's policy of limiting the inmate to a single Kanga placed a
substantial burden on his religious beliefs under RLUIPA. Summary judgment was denied because of fact issues
regarding the security risk posed by the Kara, which was a steel bracelet worn by Sikhs, and whether there was a
compelling governmental interest to allow the Sikh inmate to only wear the Kara for 30 minutes at a time during
meals. The court held that the inmate established a First Amendment free exercise claim with respect to his free
exercise clause claim regarding his right to use a reading lamp at night for prayer purposes. The court concluded
that the DOCS speculation that the beliefs of the inmate might not be sincere and could instead be “partly”
motivated by his resistance to the prison environment was insufficient to defeat the inmate's motion for summary
judgment on his free exercise clause claim. According to the court, given that the Sikh inmate would be unable to
tie his turban in one of the traditional ways, in a manner sufficient to cover his head using a cloth that was merely
30 inches by 36 inches, the inmate established that the prison's policy regarding cloth length substantially
burdened his religious beliefs. The court also found that because the inmate was required to shower with his
turban, and to wash his turban every day, the limitation of two turbans was a substantial burden on the inmate's
religious practice. The inmate also challenged several other prison policies that involved his hair, separate storage
of his religious materials, and other restrictions. (Fishkill Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
FREE EXERCISE
RESTRICTION
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act

Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2007). An inmate brought a civil rights action against prison officials to
recover for alleged violation of his free exercise rights under the First Amendment and under the Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), based on prison officials' denial of requests for religious
accommodations allegedly associated with his practice of Odinism. The district court granted the officials' motion
for summary judgment, and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the term
“appropriate relief,” as used in section of RLUIPA creating a private cause of action in favor of prison inmates
whose free exercise rights are violated, and further providing that, if the inmate successfully sues, then he/she may
“obtain appropriate relief,” is broad enough to include monetary damages, but the provision could not be
construed as creating a private right of action against individual prison officials in their personal capacity for
award of monetary damages. The court found that the inmate's practice of Odinism constituted a “religious
exercise” for purposes of the RLUIPA, but decisions by the prison officials did not substantially burden the
inmate's free exercise rights. Prison officials provided the inmate with a secure location in which to practice the
rites of his religion and did not allow him to observe these rites in general prison area. They denied his request for
a small fire pit and instead provided only a candle to represent “pine fire of purification.” (Religious Activities
Review Committee of the Alabama Department of Corrections, Limestone Correctional Facility, Alabama)

U.S. Appeals Court
RESTRICTIONS
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act
OPPORTUNITY TO
PRACTICE

Spratt v. Rhode Island Dept. Of Corrections, 482 F.3d 33 (1st.Cir. 2007). A state prison inmate sued a state
corrections department, alleging that the department's policy that prohibited inmates from preaching to fellow
inmates violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The district court granted
summary judgment for the department, and inmate appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The
court held that summary judgment was precluded by fact questions as to whether the department's total ban on
preaching by inmates promoted the department's compelling interest in prison security, as applied to the inmate
who was an ordained minister and who had preached to fellow inmates without incident for several years. The
court found that no substantial evidence was offered in support of the theory that any inmate preacher would be
seen as an inmate leader, and that inmate leaders threatened security. The court also held that the department
could not satisfy RLUIPA’s “least restrictive means” requirement by making blanket statements that all
alternatives to a total ban had been considered and rejected, and that any amount of inmate preaching was
dangerous to institutional security. The court required the department to explain why alternative policies would be
infeasible, or why they would be less effective in maintaining security. (Adult Corr’l Institution, Rhode Island)

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XXII

U.S. District Court
FREE EXERCISE
PUBLICATIONS

Wares v. Simmons, 524 F.Supp.2d 1313 (D.Kan. 2007). A prisoner brought suit pursuant to § 1983, claiming
violations of the Fifth Amendment and the free exercise clause of the First Amendment, arising from the prison
defendants' prohibition on his possession of certain religious texts. The court granted summary judgment in favor
of the defendants. The court held that the prisoner's exercise of his religion was not substantially burdened by
prison regulations preventing him from possessing a Psalm book (which he had in another form) and a book of
teachings by a particular rabbi, and therefore his rights under the free exercise clause of the First Amendment
were not violated. According to the court, by virtue of the other religious materials and items that the prisoner was
permitted to possess and ceremonies that he was permitted to engage in, his religious conduct or expression was
not significantly inhibited or constrained, he remained able to express adherence to his faith, and he had a
reasonable opportunity to exercise his sincerely-held religious beliefs. The court found that even if the prisoner's
exercise of his religion was substantially burdened by the prison regulations, prison administrators did not violate
the prisoner's First Amendment rights since they identified legitimate penological interests in security, safety,
rehabilitation, and sound correctional management that justified the impinging conduct, and alternative means of
achieving the prisoner's right to freely exercise his religion were available. (Hutchinson Corr. Facility, Kansas)

U.S. Appeals Court
OPPORTUNITY TO
PRACTICE
BOOKS
RESTRICTIONS
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act

Washington v. Klem, 497 F.3d 272 (3rd Cir. 2007). A prisoner filed a pro se action against a Department of
Corrections (DOC), pursuant to § 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA),
alleging the DOC's policy of only allowing ten books in a prisoner's cell violated his religious exercise. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the DOC and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court
reversed and remanded. The court held that the policy “substantially burdened” the prisoner's religious exercise
under RLUIPA, since the prisoner could not practice his religion in the absence of reading 4 books per day about
Africa and African people and then proselytizing about what he had read. The court noted that the DOC allowed
only one weekly visit to the prison library which precluded the prisoner from reading 4 books daily, or 28 books
per week, that the DOC provided no evidence that the prisoner could freely trade books located inside the prison,
and that the DOC forced the indigent prisoner to have outsiders continuously mail books to him which severely
inhibited his ability to read 4 new books daily. The court found that the valid interests of the DOC in the safety
and health of prisoners and DOC employees were not furthered by the DOC's policy of limiting the prisoner to 10
books in his cell, as required to uphold the policy against the prisoner's claim that the policy violated RLUIPA by
substantially burdening his religious exercise. The court concluded that the book limitation policy did not
decrease the likelihood of fire or hiding places for contraband in a cell, given the DOC's permission for the
prisoner to have magazines and newspapers in addition to the 10 books. The court also held that the policy was
not the least restrictive means of achieving the DOC's valid interests in safety and health, as required to uphold the
policy against the prisoner's challenge, given the DOC's other policies allowing the prisoner to have 4 storage
boxes of personal property in his cell and permitting more than 10 books if approved for educational purposes.
According to the court, the least restrictive means would have been to allow the prisoner to choose what property
he could keep in his storage units, as long as the property did not violate a prison policy for an independently
legitimate reason. (State Correctional Institution-Retreat, Pennsylvania)
2008

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Abdur-Raqiyb v. Erie County Medical Center, 536 F.Supp.2d 299 (W.D.N.Y. 2008). A jail prisoner brought a
federal civil rights suit against public hospitals and a physician, alleging violation of his First and Eighth
Amendment rights during emergency treatment for a suspected heart attack. The district court granted the
defendants’ motions for summary judgment. The court held that the Muslim prisoner's First Amendment right to
free exercise of religion was not violated when hospital personnel administered drugs that were pork-derived and
gave him a CT scan in which shellfish-derived dye was used to rule out a possible heart attack, in response to his
complaints of chest pain, without informing him in advance of the nature of the substances involved. The court
noted that the prisoner acknowledged that his religion permitted the administration of otherwise forbidden
substances in emergencies, and hospital staff would have exposed themselves to liability had they not
administered the medications and CT test. (Groveland Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
OPPORTUNITY TO
PRACTICE
SWEAT LODGE
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act

Alvarez v. Hill, 518 F.3d 1152 (9th Cir. 2008). A prisoner brought an action against prison officials alleging that
they substantially burdened his religious exercise by denying him various accommodations. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the officials and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part,
reversed in part and remanded. The court held that the complaint established a plausible entitlement to relief under
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), thereby satisfying the short and plain
statement pleading standard, even though the complaint did not cite RLUIPA. The court noted that the prisoner
did reference RLUIPA in a subsequent motion and in his opposition to summary judgment. The inmate alleged
that officials burdened his religion by denying him the “right to participate and practice the Sweat Lodge
Ceremony and Sacred Pipe Ceremony” and by making it “difficult if not impossible to communicate with any of
his tribe[']s religious representatives.” He also alleged that they forbade him from wearing a headband,
consuming tobacco for ceremonial purposes and participating in group worship. (Snake River
Correctional Institution, Oregon)

U.S. District Court
ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE
FORCED EXPOSURE

Bader v. Wren, 532 F.Supp.2d 308, (D.N.H. 2008). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against the
commissioner of a Department of Corrections, alleging that a prison rehabilitation program violated the
Establishment Clause by improperly endorsing religion as part of the rehabilitative process. The parties crossmoved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The court held
that the rehabilitation program, Alternatives to Violence,” was not religious. According to the court, the state
prison's recommendation that the prisoner participate in a violence rehabilitation program did not constitute
coercive pressure advancing a religion, or excessive governmental entanglement in religion, as required to support
a finding that primary effect of recommendation was to advance religion in violation of the Establishment Clause.

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XXII

The court noted that although the program was rooted in the non-violent philosophy of a certain religion, the
program was secular, not religious, given that nothing about the program promoted, advanced, or even subtly
endorsed that religion. The court found that program guides did not allude to, invoke, or call upon any religious
books, scriptures, passages or moral code, the program did not implement any cognizable religious practice or
methodology, and, notwithstanding the program's identification of a “Transforming Power,” the program was
explicitly individualistic, relying primarily on the participant's ability to change himself. (New Hampshire State
Prison)
U.S. District Court
DIET

Bey v. Douglas County Correctional Facility, 540 F.Supp.2d 1194 (D.Kan. 2008). A prisoner brought an action
against prison officials for violation of his constitutional rights. Following denial of his prior motion the prisoner
filed a second motion for a preliminary injunction. The district court granted the motion, finding that the prisoner
was entitled to a preliminary injunction requiring prison officials to provide him with Kosher food in accordance
with his sincerely held Jewish faith. The court found that irreparable harm was shown because the prisoner's claim
was for violation of his First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. According to the court, the harm to
prison officials if the injunction was issued was de minimus, and there was no hardship to the public in view of
the fact that the prison was under an agreement with a food supplier that carried Kosher foods. (Douglas County
Correctional Facility, Kansas)

U.S. District Court
DIET

Campbell v. Cornell Corrections of Rhode Island, Inc., 564 F.Supp.2d 99 (D.R.I. 2008). A former inmate brought
a § 1983 action against a privately-owned correction facility and corrections employees, alleging violations of his
rights under the First and Eighth Amendments. The district court denied summary judgment in part. The court
held that failure to serve the inmate a vegetarian diet consistent with his religious beliefs did not constitute an
Eighth Amendment violation, absent an allegation that the prison failed to provide the inmate with food that was
adequate in quantity, nutritional value or in any other respect. The court held that summary judgment was
precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the prison's refusal to provide the inmate a vegetarian
diet consistent with his religious beliefs was reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. (Wyatt
Detention Facility, Rhode Island)

U.S. District Court
DIET
FREE EXERCISE
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act

Dean v. Corrections Corp. of America, 540 F.Supp.2d 691 (N.D.Miss. 2008). An Hawai’i inmate housed in a
private correctional facility in Mississippi brought a pro se suit claiming violation of the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The inmate alleged that he was depriced of a diet that conformed with
his religion and a magistrate had recommended that an injunction be entered ordering the facility to provide a
religious diet to the inmate. The district court held that the Hawai’I Department of Public Safety was responsible
for a program or activity that placed a burden on the inmate's exercise of his religion, and the court thus had
jurisdiction to hear the inmate's RLUIPA claims because the state received federal financial assistance. The court
noted that the Hawai’i Department of Public Safety entered into a contract with a private corrections corporation
to take custody of various Hawai'i inmates, such that the corporation was an instrumentality of the Department.
The court held that the inmate alleged and proved no more than a de minimis injury from violations of his right to
free exercise of religion, and thus, was only entitled to nominal damages in his action. (Tallahatchie County
Correctional Facility, Corrections Corporation of America, Mississippi)

U.S. Appeals Court
DIET
EQUAL PROTECTION
FREE EXERCISE
HAIR LENGTH
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act

Fegans v. Norris, 537 F.3d 897 (8th Cir. 2008). A state inmate sued prison officials, alleging that they violated the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), as well as his free exercise and equal protection
rights, by enforcing a grooming policy and denying him Kosher meals. The district court entered judgment for the
inmate with respect to the Kosher meals, but entered judgment for the prison officials with respect to the
grooming policy. The inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed.
The court held that the prison policy prohibiting male inmates from wearing hair below their collar, which
prevented the inmate, who followed the Assemblies of Yahweh, from leaving his hair untrimmed, did not violate
RLUIPA. Prison officials gave examples of inmates using hair to conceal contraband and to change their
appearance after escaping, and, although the officials allowed shoulder-length hair in the women's barracks, the
women were housed in a single unit and thus had less opportunity to obtain and transport contraband. The court
also found that the policy did not violate the inmate’s free exercise rights. According to the court, the policy did
not violate the inmate's equal protection rights, inasmuch as differences in security risks between male and female
inmates was a valid reason for differing hair-length rules for men and women, and the policy was reasonably
related to the state's legitimate, penological interests of safety and security. The court noted that the district court's
finding that the corrections department director's expert testimony that male inmates presented greater security
risks than female inmates was credible, and was not clearly erroneous.
The court found that a policy that generally prohibits inmates from wearing beards, which prevented the
inmate from refraining from “rounding the corners” of his beard, did not violate RLUIPA, even though inmates
with medical conditions were allowed to have a quarter-inch beard. The court ruled that safety and security
concerns constituted a compelling penological interest, and the prohibition was the least restrictive means
available to further that interest. The court found that the beard policy did not violate the inmate’s free exercise or
equal protection rights.
The appeals court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding nominal damages, as
limited by PLRA, of $1,500 for the prison officials' constitutional violation of failing to provide Kosher meals,
which amounted to $1.44 for each constitutional violation. The court also held that the district court did not abuse
its discretion in declining to award punitive damages for the prison officials' constitutional violation of failing to
provide Kosher meals. The district court accurately stated the legal standard for the award of punitive damages,
but found that prison officials did not act with malice, and that punitive damages were not warranted to deter
future unlawful conduct, because the officials already had instituted a policy for providing Kosher meals. (East
Arkansas Regional Unit of the Arkansas Department of Corrections)

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XXII

U.S. Appeals Court
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act
SWEAT LODGE

Fowler v. Crawford, 534 F.3d 931 (8th Cir. 2008). A state prisoner brought an action against prison officials,
alleging that the officials' refusal to grant him access to a sweat lodge in which to practice his Native American
faith violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The district court granted
summary judgment to the prison officials. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that
the prohibition on the sweat lodge on the grounds of a maximum-security prison was in furtherance of a
compelling governmental interest, and that the ban was the least restrictive means by which to further that
compelling interest. The court noted that serious safety and security concerns arose due to the burning of embers
and hot coals, blunt instruments such as split wood and large scalding rocks, sharper objects such as shovels and
deer antlers, and an enclosed area inaccessible to outside view, and the sweat lodge would have drained prison
security's manpower over the 6 to 7 hour duration of the ceremony. The court noted that even though another
prison within the state had previously operated a sweat lodge, ordering every prison to do so would result in a
requirement that every institution within the jurisdiction accommodate inmates of the Native American faith,
which would discourage officials from accommodating other religious practices, knowing that all institutions
would likely have to accommodate the same practices. Prison officials had suggested alternatives to, and sought a
compromise with, the prisoner to no avail, offering him an outdoor area where he could smoke a ceremonial pipe
and practice other aspects of his faith in open view. The prisoner rejected anything short of a sweat lodge with a
minimum of 17 times per year. (Jefferson City Correctional Center, Missouri)

U.S. District Court
ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE

Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Olson, 566 F.Supp.2d 980 (D.N.D. 2008). An organization that
opposed government endorsement of religion and its members brought an action against the state of North
Dakota, and officials from various state and county agencies, alleging that they improperly directed taxpayer
funds to the support of religion in violation of the Establishment Clause. The organization sought declaratory and
injunctive relief. The district court dismissed the case. The court held that the members of the organization lacked
standing to sue state officials and lacked municipal taxpayer standing to sue county officials. The court noted that
the action did not attack any legislative action or appropriation, but rather challenged the discretionary distribution
of funds made by executive branch officials carrying out their official duties. The suit challenged public funding
of the Dakota Boys and Girls Ranch that provides residential treatment and educational services to children
referred for treatment by North Dakota government agencies, including state correctional agencies. The ranch is a
publicly accredited Christian organization, and receives taxpayer appropriations pursuant to disbursement
programs authorized by the North Dakota Legislative Assembly. The organization alleged that allocation of public
funds to the ranch violates “the fundamental principle prohibiting government endorsement of religion by
disbursing taxpayer appropriations for the operation of a faith-based organization that includes the integration of
religion as an inherent component of services provided.” (North Dakota Department of Corrections and other state
and local agencies)

U.S. Appeals Court
OPPORTUNITY TO
WORSHIP
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act

Greene v. Solano County Jail, 513 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2008). A former prisoner sued a county jail official asserting
statutory and constitutional challenges to the county jail's policy of prohibiting maximum security prisoners from
participating in group worship. The district court entered summary judgment for the official and the prisoner
appealed. The appeals court reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court held that the religious
exercise at issue in the prisoner's suit under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA)
was engaging in group worship, not practicing his religion as a whole. Therefore, even if the ban on group
worship did not place a substantial burden on the prisoner's practice of Christianity, such fact would not ensure
that ban was in compliance with RLUIPA. According to the court, the jail's policy of prohibiting the maximum
security prisoner from attending group religious worship services substantially burdened the prisoner’s ability to
exercise his religion as required for the ban to violate RLUIPA. The court found that summary judgment was
precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the jail's policy was the least restrictive means of
maintaining security. (Solano County Jail, Claybank Facility, California)

U.S. District Court
DIET
OPPORTUNITY TO
PRACTICE
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act

Harnett v. Barr, 538 F.Supp.2d 511 (N.D.N.Y. 2008). A prisoner brought a civil rights action against corrections
defendants, alleging they interfered with the practice of his religion in violation of the First Amendment and the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The district court denied the defendants’ motion
to dismiss. The court held that, without more, it could not be stated that the prisoner could prove no set of facts
that would entitle him to relief under the First Amendment or RLUIPA. The prisoner alleged that the corrections
defendants confiscated his religious meal, denied a sweet breakfast at the end of Ramadan, denied the ability to
retain food in his cell on Mondays and Thursdays, and denied permission to hem his pants. The court found that
failure of a supervisory official to investigate a letter of protest written by the inmate is not sufficient to show
personal involvement for the purposes of establishing § 1983 liability. According to the court, the same is true if
the only involvement of the supervisory official is to refer the inmate's complaint to the appropriate staff for
investigation. (Upstate Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
DIET
FREE EXERCISE

Holloway v. Bizzaro, 571 F.Supp.2d 1270 (S.D.Fla. 2008). A prisoner brought a pro se civil rights complaint
pursuant to § 1983 on the claim that prison officials denied his requests for pork-free meals. The district court
dismissed the case finding that the prisoner failed to allege any physical injury as a result of the alleged free
exercise violation, as required to seek compensatory damages against the prison officials. (Miami-Dade Co. Fla.)

U.S. District Court
DIET
PLACE OF WORSHIP
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act

Hudson v. Dennehy, 538 F.Supp.2d 400 (D.Mass. 2008). Inmates in a state prison, who adhered to the religious
teachings of Elijah Muhammad and the Nation of Islam, filed a civil rights action against the commissioner of the
state department of correction, alleging violation of their First and Fourteenth Amendments and Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and Massachusetts laws. Following a non-jury trial, the
commissioner moved for judgment on partial findings. The court held that refusal to provide a daily Halal menu to
Muslim inmates substantially burdened the Muslim inmates' exercise of their religious beliefs and that the refusal
did not further a compelling state interest. The court found that the use of a towel provided by the department of
corrections for daily prayer did not substantially burden the Muslim inmates' ability to perform daily prayer.

37.89
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XXII

According to the court, a ban on the Muslim inmates' participation in obligatory weekly group prayer services
while in a separate confined housing unit substantially burdened the inmates' practice of a core tenet of their faith.
The court held that a ban on participation by the Muslim inmates confined in a separate housing unit in obligatory
weekly group prayer services by closed-circuit television was not the least restrictive means of furthering a
compelling State interest. (Massachusetts Correctional Institution-Cedar Junction)
U.S. District Court
BEARDS

Jacobs v. Wilkinson, 529 F.Supp.2d 804 (N.D.Ohio 2008). An inmate brought a § 1983 suit, claiming
constitutional violations arising from prison officials' forcing him to shave his beard in contravention of his
religious beliefs. The inmate also alleged denial of proper medical work restrictions. The district court dismissed
the suit for failure to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA).
The inmate moved to reopen, and to consolidate his complaint and the court's prior screening order. The court
held that a Supreme Court decision holding that courts should not dismiss prisoner complaints under the PLRA in
their entirety when the prisoner presents both exhausted and unexhausted claims did not apply retroactively to the
inmate's case. (Mansfield Correctional Institution, Ohio)

U.S. District Court
RFRA-Religious Freedom
Restoration Act

Jama v. Esmor Correctional Services Inc., 549 F.Supp.2d 602 (D.N.J. 2008). An alien brought an action alleging
that a government contractor that detained her pending asylum proceedings violated the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA) and state law. After a jury verdict in the alien's favor, the alien moved for attorney fees
and expenses. The district court granted the motion, finding that the alien was the “prevailing party, and that the
alien's calculation of the percentage of attorney hours devoted to her RFRA claims was reasonable. The attorney
fees and expenses approved by the court totaled $642,399. The decision was vacated and the case was remanded
by an appeals court in 2009. The district court noted that “…the case arose out of the appalling conditions that
prevailed at the detention center in Elizabeth, New Jersey”. The appeals court held that the district court could not
attribute a portion of the alien’s state law tort award to her RFRA claim but that the court may consider the results
on the tort claims. The appeals court affirmed the district court’s determination of market billing rates. (Esmor
Correctional Services, Inc., Elizabeth, New Jersey)

U.S. District Court
HAIR LENGTH
OPPORTUNITY TO
PRACTICE
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act

Johnson v. Collins, 564 F.Supp.2d 759 (N.D.Ohio 2008). A state prisoner brought a civil rights suit against a
prison warden and others, seeking injunctive relief against the enforcement of a prison policy that banned the
wearing of shoulder-length dreadlocks. The district court denied the warden’s motion for judgment on the
pleadings. The court held that the possibility that the prisoner could show that the warden, by adhering to a prison
policy that prohibited the wearing of shoulder-length dreadlocks for security reasons, was continuing to violate
the prisoner’s federal rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) by
substantially burdening the exercise of his Rastafarian religion, precluding the Eleventh Amendment from barring
the suit seeking injunctive relief against the warden in his official capacity.
The court found that the warden was not entitled to qualified immunity as a government official performing
discretionary functions on the claim that he substantially burdened the prisoner's rights under RLUIPA to practice
his Rastafarian religion. The court held that the prisoner's suit for injunctive relief against ongoing enforcement of
the prison policy banning the wearing of shoulder-length dreadlocks was not mooted by his transfer to another
prison within the same state system, nor did a change in the prison grooming code to allow for religious-based
exemptions. (Madison Correctional Institution, Toledo Correctional Institution, Mansfield Correctional
Institution, Lebanon Correctional Institution, Ohio)

U.S. District Court
FREE EXERCISE
RFRA-Religious Freedom
Restoration Act

Kaemmerling v. Lappin, 553 F.3d 669 (D.C.Cir. 2008). A federal prisoner sought to enjoin application of the
DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act (DNA Act), alleging the Act violated his rights under the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments. The district court dismissed the
action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The
court held that the prisoner’s allegation that DNA collection burdened his free exercise of religion failed to state a
claim under the First Amendment and RFRA. The court found that the potential criminal penalty for failure to
cooperate with the collection of a DNA sample did not violate RFRA. According to the court, the collection of
prisoner DNA furthers a compelling government interest using the least restrictive means. The court also found
that the DNA Act does not violate equal protection despite the fact that it requires collection of DNA only from
felons who are incarcerated or on supervised release, rather than those who are no longer under the supervision of
the Bureau of Prisons (BOP), where the BOP's measure of control over supervised and incarcerated felons makes
it significantly easier to collect their DNA samples. The court noted that the extraction, analysis, and storage of
the prisoner's DNA information did not call for the prisoner to modify his religious behavior in any way, did not
involve any action or forbearance on the prisoner's part, and did not interfere with any religious act in which the
prisoner was engaged. (Federal Correctional Institution, Seagoville, Texas)

U.S. Appeals Court
DIET
FREE EXERCISE
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act
RESTRICTIONS

Koger v. Bryan, 523 F.3d 789 (7th Cir. 2008). A prisoner, who was a member of the Ordo Templi Orientis (OTO)
group, which was associated with the Thelema religion, sued prison officials, alleging that they violated the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) by denying him a non-meat diet. The district
court entered summary judgment for the officials and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and
remanded. The court held that the request for a non-meat diet was a request rooted in sincerely held beliefs, even
though OTO had no general dietary restrictions. According to the court, to the extent that officials denied the
prisoner's requests because OTO had no general dietary restrictions, such denials violated RLUIPA. The court
found that the requirement, that an OTO clergy member submit written verification of the prisoner's membership
in OTO and its tenets, imposed a substantial burden on the prisoner's religious exercise, where OTO lacked clergy
members as traditionally understood, and had no universal requirements that could be verified by its leaders, at
least when it came to dietary restrictions. The court held that the orderly administration of the prison dietary
system did not constitute a compelling governmental interest and that such a requirement was not the least
restrictive means of achieving the officials' ends. According to the court, the prisoner's right to a non-meat diet
was clearly established, as required for the prisoner to overcome the officials' qualified immunity defense. The

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XXII

court noted that the prison already served two diets that would have satisfied the prisoner's request, and they failed
to show what effort would have been involved in providing him a meatless diet or how it would have hampered
prison administration. (Pontiac Correctional Center, Illinois)
U.S. District Court
DIET
EQUAL PROTECTION

Kole v. Lappin, 551 F.Supp.2d 149 (D.Conn. 2008). A Jewish inmate filed a complaint against federal prison
officials alleging that a reduction in the number of kosher-for-Passover food items available to inmates for
purchase for the Passover holiday violated her First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court
entered judgment in favor of the defendants. The court held that the prison's limitation on the number of
supplemental kosher-for-Passover foods available for purchase by Jewish inmates did not substantially burden the
plaintiff's religious practice in violation of the First Amendment, where the prison provided her with two Seder
dinners during Passover, and otherwise provided her with three kosher-for-Passover meals and a box of Matzoh
each day during the eight days of the holiday. The court found that the differences between food available for
inmate purchase on a special holiday list available between Thanksgiving and Christmas and the more limited list
of kosher-for-Passover food available for purchase did not violate the plaintiff's right to equal protection. The
court noted that the prison's stated penological interests in limiting a small group of inmates' access to special
goods to avoid hoarding and illegal trade, and in the efficient financial operation of the prison commissary, were
logically advanced by offering a smaller number of “best sellers” for sale on Passover. (Federal Correction
Institution, Danbury, Connecticut)

U.S. District Court
CLOTHING
OPPORTUNITY TO
PRACTICE
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act

Lewis v. Ollison, 571 F.Supp.2d 1162 (C.D.Cal. 2008). A state prisoner filed a § 1983 action against prison
officials, alleging violation of the First Amendment and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA). The court held that a temporary shower policy of escorting prisoners from their cells to the shower
room and back wearing only boxer shorts and shower shoes, which was adopted by the prison due to security
concerns, created at most an inconvenience, but not a significant interference with the Islamic religious clothing
requirement. The clothing requirement directs Muslim men to exercise modesty by covering their “awrah,” which
is a portion of the body from the navel to the knee, from others' gaze. The court found that the policy did not
violate RLUIPA, since Muslims did not have to shower every day to practice their religion and the prisoner could
have cleansed himself in his cell sink. The court also found that the policy was reasonably related to a legitimate
penological interest in maintaining prison safety and security. The court held that the rights of the Muslim
prisoner under RLUIPA to practice his religion of Islam had not been subjected to a substantial burden by the
policy that limited the prisoner to the possession of no more than 12 ounces of scented oil in his cell, and limited
him to buying no more than 8 ounces of scented oil per purchase order. According to the court, the rule had been
drafted after consultation with a Muslim imam and permitted prisoners to be in the possession of religious prayer
oil that served their religious purposes for many weeks, if not many months. (Ironwood State Prison, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
PLACE TO WORSHIP
PUBLICATIONS
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act
VOLUNTEERS

Mayfield v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, 529 F.3d 599 (5th Cir. 2008). A state prisoner, who practiced the
Odinist/Asatru faith, brought claims pursuant to § 1983 against a state criminal justice department and prison
officials, alleging First Amendment violations, as well as violations of the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment,
and appeal was taken. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The
court held that the claims brought by the prisoner pursuant to the § 1983 action alleging First Amendment
violations and pursuant to RLUIPA seeking declaratory relief as well as a permanent injunction against prison
officials in their official capacity were not barred by sovereign immunity. The court found that the prisoner's
claims for compensatory damages against prison officials in their official capacity on claims brought pursuant to §
1983 alleging First Amendment violations and RLUIPA violations were barred by the provision of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) prohibiting actions for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody
without a prior showing of physical injury. According to the court, a state criminal justice department's regulation
of not allowing an Odinist group to assemble for religious services in the absence of an outside volunteer was
reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest, for the purposes of determining whether the regulation
encroached on the prisoner's First Amendment right to free exercise. The court noted that officials asserted
justifications for the volunteer requirement that involved prison security concerns, as well as staff and space
limitations. The court held that summary judgment for the state was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact
as to the neutrality of the prison's enforcement of the policy of not allowing religious groups to assemble for
religious services in the absence of an outside volunteer. The court also found that summary judgment was
precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether rune literature was banned from the prison library, as to
whether the prison's policy of not allowing the Odinist group to assemble for religious services in the absence of
an outside volunteer imposed a substantial burden on the prisoner's religious exercise, and as to whether the
prison's policy of preventing the possession of runestones substantially burdened the prisoner's religious exercise.
(Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Hughes Unit)

U.S. Appeals Court
DIET
ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE
FREE EXERCISE
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act
RFRA- Religious Freedom
Restoration Act

Patel v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 515 F.3d 807 (8th Cir. 2008). A federal prisoner sued the Bureau of Prisons
(BOP) and prison officials alleging that they violated his right to practice his Muslim religion in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause, the Establishment Clause, the Free Exercise Clause, the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act (RFRA), and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The prisoner alleged that
prison officials failed to provide him with appropriate meals. The district court entered summary judgment for the
BOP and the officials. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court held that the prisoner's ability to practice his
religion was not substantially burdened in violation of the Free Exercise Clause, RFRA or RLUIPA. The court
found that the officials did not violate the prisoner's equal protection rights. According to the court, limitations in
dietary accommodations did not substantially burden the Muslim prisoner's ability to practice his religion, where
the prisoner had an option of purchasing halal vegetarian entrees on days that allegedly inadequate kosher meat
entrees were served. The court noted that the prisoner received money from work and family members and had
not pursued alternatives such as requesting to be first in line at the food bar to avoid cross-contamination. (Federal
Correctional Institution in Forrest City, Arkansas)

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U.S. Appeals Court
FREE EXERCISE
RESTRICTIONS

Pierce v. County of Orange, 526 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 2008). Pretrial detainees in a county's jail facilities brought a
§ 1983 class action suit against the county and its sheriff, seeking relief for violations of their constitutional and
statutory rights. After consolidating the case with a prior case challenging jail conditions, the district court
rejected the detainees' claims, and the detainees appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded. The court held that injunctive orders relating to the county jail’s reading materials, mattresses and
beds, law books, population caps, sleep, blankets, telephone access, and communication with jailhouse lawyers
were not necessary to current the current and ongoing violations of pretrial detainees' constitutional rights.
The court found that an injunction relating to restrictions of detainees' religious rights based on security
concerns was narrowly drawn and extended no further than necessary to correct the violation of the federal right
of pretrial detainees in administrative segregation. The injunctive order, with its provision for the curtailment or
elimination of pretrial detainees' religious rights based on security concerns, provided for no more than a
minimum level of ongoing participation in religious activities.
The court held that providing pretrial detainees housed in administrative segregation only 90 minutes of
exercise per week, less than 13 minutes per day, constituted punishment in violation of due process standards. The
court found that an order requiring that inmates in administrative segregation be permitted exercise at least twice
each week for a total of not less than 2 hours per week was necessary to correct the current and ongoing violation.
The court found that the county failed to reasonably accommodate mobility-impaired and dexterity-impaired
pretrial detainees in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The county did not offer any
legitimate rationale for maintaining inaccessible bathrooms, sinks, showers, and other fixtures in the housing areas
and common spaces assigned to mobility and dexterity impaired detainees, and the county offered no explanation
or justification for the significant differences between the vocational and recreational activities available to nondisabled and disabled detainees. Termination of injunctive orders requiring that inmates be provided with seating
while detained in holding cells, or elsewhere, awaiting transport to or from court and requiring that inmates be
given at least fifteen minutes within which to complete each meal did not constitute an abuse of discretion since
the treatment of detainees in the county's holding cells and the time allowed for meals did not violate the
detainees' constitutional rights. The court held that restrictions placed on use of the day room, limiting
administrative segregation detainees' use of the room to one or two inmates at a time, were reasonably related to
institutional security concerns. (Orange County Jail System, California)

U.S. District Court
EQUAL PROTECTION
ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE
FREE EXERCISE
OPPORTUNITY TO
PRACTICE
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act

Pugh v. Goord, 571 F.Supp.2d 477 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). State prisoners sued prison officials, alleging violations of
their constitutional and statutory rights to free exercise of Shi'a Islam and to be free from the establishment of
Sunni Islam. Following remand from the appeals court, the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment. The district
court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that one prisoner's claim for injunctive relief
qualified for a “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception, and therefore was not rendered moot by his
transfer to another facility. The court noted that the corrections department had the ability to freely transfer the
prisoner between facilities prior to the full litigation of his claims, and there was a reasonable expectation that the
prisoner would be subject to the same action again, given that the department's policies were applicable to all of
its prison facilities. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to
whether the corrections department's regulations relating to Shi'ite prisoners, which failed to provide for Friday
prayer services independent of Sunni participation, were reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.
The court also held that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the corrections department was able
to accommodate Shi'ite prisoners so as not to violate their rights under the Establishment Clause at de minimis
cost. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the
Shi'ite prisoners' religious beliefs were substantially burdened by attendance at a Sunni-led, Sunni-dominated
Friday Jumah service, and/or use of a Zohr prayer as a substitute for attending Jumah services. The court found
that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether Shi'ite prisoners were
similarly situated to other religious denominations and yet treated differently, and as to whether the distinctions
made between Shi'ites and other religious denominations, including the denial of independent services, were
reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. According to the court, summary judgment was precluded
by genuine issues of material fact as to whether a prison policy denying Shi'ite prisoners Friday prayer services
independent of Sunni participation was the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling government interest,
precluding summary judgment in the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The court
held that the state did not waive immunity under the Eleventh Amendment as to money damages by accepting
federal funds pursuant RLUIPA. The court found that Shi'ite prisoners' right to a reasonable opportunity to
worship by way of separate Jumah services for Shi'ites and Sunnis was clearly established, for the purposes of
determining whether prison officials were qualifiedly immune from the prisoners' free exercise claim. (New York
State Department of Correctional Services, Mid-Orange Correctional Facility and Fishkill Correctional Facility)

U.S. Appeals Court
RFRA- Religious Freedom
Restoration Act

Rasul v. Myers, 512 F.3d 644 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Former detainees at a military facility in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
sued the Secretary of Defense and commanding officers alleging they were tortured. The detainees asserted claims
under the Alien Torture Statute, under the Geneva Conventions, under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA) and also asserted Fifth and Eighth Amendment claims on a Bivens cause of action. The defendants
moved to dismiss and the district court granted the motion in part and denied the motion as to the RFRA claim.
Both sides appealed. The district court affirmed in part and reversed as to the RFRA claim. The court held that the
acts of torture allegedly committed against aliens detained at the military base in Cuba were “within the scope of
employment” of military personnel who were allegedly committing such acts, for the purpose of deciding whether
the United states should be substituted as defendant. The court found that the aliens were without property or
presence in the United States and lacked any constitutional rights and therefore could not assert a Bivens claim
against military personnel for alleged due process violations and cruel and unusual punishment inflicted upon
them. The court held that the term “persons” as used in the RFRA to generally prohibit the government from
substantially burdening a “person's exercise of religion” did not extend to non-resident aliens. (United States
Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba)

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U.S. Appeals Court
DIET
FREE EXERCISE
EQUAL PROTECTION
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act

Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878 (9th Cir. 2008). A Muslim inmate brought a pro se civil rights action against state
prison officials alleging violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), the
Free Exercise Clause and the Equal Protection Clause after he was denied a requested religious dietary
accommodation. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The inmate appealed. The
appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that factual issues precluded summary judgment on the
inmate's free exercise, RLUIPA and Equal Protection claims. The fact issues included the impact of
accommodating the inmate's request for a kosher meat diet and the availability of ready alternatives, the extent of
the burden imposed on the inmate's religious activities by the prison's refusal to serve him the requested kosher
meat diet, the extent of the burden that would be created by accommodating the inmate's request, and the
existence of less restrictive alternatives. The court also found that material issues of fact existed as to whether the
costs of providing a kosher meat diet to Muslim inmates in the prison justified different treatment of the Muslim
inmate whose request for a kosher diet was denied, and that of Jewish inmates who received kosher or orthodox
kosher meals. The court held that the prison's refusal to provide the inmate with a kosher meat diet implicated the
Free Exercise Clause, given the inmate's sincere belief that he was personally required to consume kosher meat to
maintain his spirituality. (Arizona Department of Corrections, Florence)

U.S. District Court
DIET
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act

Shilling v. Crawford, 536 F.Supp.2d 1227 (D.Nev. 2008). A Washington prisoner who was being housed in
Nevada brought an action against prison officials, claiming violation of his rights under the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The district court granted the officials’ motion for summary
judgment. The court held that prison authorities imposed a substantial burden on the prisoner's religious beliefs
when they conditioned the prisoner's receipt of a kosher meal on his relinquishment of the benefits of living in a
lower-security facility. But the court held that even if the prisoner could bring an individual capacity claim against
prison officials under RLUIPA, the officials would be entitled to qualified immunity since it would not have been
clear to a reasonable official in April 2004 that offering the prisoner a transfer to a higher security prison to
accommodate his religious diet would violate his rights under RLUIPA. (High Desert State Prison, Nevada, and
Washington Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
DIET
ITEMS PERMITTED
PLACE TO WORSHIP
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act

Sisney v. Reisch, 533 F.Supp.2d 952 (D.S.D. 2008). A state inmate brought an action under § 1983 and the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), alleging corrections officials refused to make
various accommodations for his practice of the Jewish religion. The district court held that the State of South
Dakota, by accepting Federal prison funding, waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity in claims for monetary
damages under RLUIPA. The court found that the officials' denial of the inmate's request for a permanent space
for Jewish inmates' religious services did not impose a substantial burden on his exercise of the inmate’s religion.
The court noted that the inmate admitted that Jewish inmates had sufficient space for their services and that lack
of a permanently designated room for their services did not prevent him from practicing his religion. The court
also found that summary judgment was precluded by fact issues as to whether officials' denial of the inmate's
request, that Jewish inmates be given additional time to conduct group Torah, Kabalistic and language studies,
was the least restrictive means of furthering any legitimate penological interest. The court held that denial of the
inmate's request to be provided with kosher coffee was not an equal protection deprivation. The court held that the
officials' alleged denial of the inmate's request to possess or use a commercially-prepared Jewish religious
calendar did not impose a substantial burden on his exercise of his religion, within the meaning of RLUIPA,
where the inmate was allowed to make his own calendar and was not denied access to materials from which he
could learn the dates of religious holidays. The court found that officials' denial of the inmate's request to possess
and use a lightbulb diffuser and to use oils and burn herbs in his cell appeared to be the least restrictive means for
furthering a compelling governmental interest, where diffusers posed a serious fire hazard, other inmates and staff
might be allergic to the fumes or find the aroma offensive, and they could be used to conceal prohibited activities
such as smoking. (South Dakota State Penitentiary)

U.S. District Court
DIET

Smith v. Bruce, 568 F.Supp.2d 1277 (D.Kan. 2008). A Muslim prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a prison
food supplier, alleging that the supplier violated his First Amendment freedom of religion rights by serving gelatin
with an animal byproduct in a religious vegetarian diet. The district court denied the supplier’s motion for
summary judgment. The court held that summary judgment was denied by genuine issues of material fact as to the
sincerity of the prisoner's religious beliefs and whether the supplier personally participated in the alleged First
Amendment violation through policy or custom. The court noted that the Muslim prisoner was not required to
show deliberate indifference on the part of the prison food supplier in order to establish a violation of his First
Amendment freedom of religion rights via the supplier's alleged custom or policy of providing nonvegetarian
gelatin to prisoners with religious diets, but rather that the alleged violation was an affirmative act rather than a
failure to act. (Aramark Correctional Services, Hutchinson Correctional Facility, Kansas)

U.S. District Court
DIET
RECOGNIZED
RELIGIONS

Stanko v. Patton, 568 F.Supp.2d 1061 (D.Neb. 2008). A pretrial detainee brought two actions against jail
personnel alleging a number of constitutional violations. The district court granted summary judgment for the
defendants. The court noted that the detainee “…is a white supremacist. He is also a prolific pro se litigator who
makes a habit of suing jail and prison officials when he is charged with a crime. Those facts are central to
understanding these related civil cases.” The court held that the detainee's alleged belief in the Church of the
Creator and “White Man's Bible” was not protected and the jail had valid reasons for denying the detainee's
alleged religious dietary requests. (Douglas County Correctional Center, Nebraska)

U.S. District Court
DIET

Thomas v. Northern, 574 F.Supp.2d 1029 (E.D.Mo. 2008). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action against
correctional officers alleging that they violated his constitutional rights. The district court granted summary
judgment for the officers and denied in part. The court held that the correctional officers did not violate the
inmate's Eighth Amendment rights by refusing to provide him with a replacement meal after he refused the meal
initially offered to him. The inmate had refused the meal because it contained pork. The court noted that there was

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no evidence that the inmate ever told officials that he had a religious preference. (Southeast Correctional Center,
Missouri)
U.S. District Court
BEARDS
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act

Williams v. Beltran, 569 F.Supp.2d 1057 (C.D.Cal. 2008). A state inmate brought an action against a prison,
alleging violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) by forcing him to shave
his beard, which he had worn for religious reasons. The district court dismissed the case. The court held that
RLUIPA unambiguously conditions receipt of federal prison funds on the waiver of Eleventh Amendment
sovereign immunity, and the remedial clause in RLUIPA providing for “appropriate relief” was not sufficiently
broad to waive state sovereign immunity from money damages. The court noted that there are three main
exceptions to the broad grant of sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment: first, Congress may
authorize such a suit in the exercise of its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment; second, a state may waive
its sovereign immunity by consenting to suit; and third, suit may be brought to enjoin a state official rather than
against the state itself. The court concluded that California had not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity
from money damages under RLUIPA and absent the availability of monetary relief, the plaintiff lacked any
remedy for his alleged RLUIPA claim. (California State Prison Lancaster)
2009

U.S. District Court
ARTICLES
EQUAL PROTECTION
FREE EXERCISE
OPPORTUNITY TO
PRACTICE

Burke v. North Dakota Dept. of Correction and Rehabilitation, 620 F.Supp.2d 1035 (D.N.D. 2009). A state
inmate filed a § 1983 action against prison officials alleging statutory and constitutional violations, including
interference with his free exercise of religion, lack of adequate medical care, retaliation for exercising his
constitutional rights, failure to protect, refusal to accommodate his disability, and cruel and unusual punishment.
The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The court held that: (1) failure to provide Hindu
worship services on Thursdays did not violate the inmate's equal protection rights; (2) the decision to reduce
Hindu worship services at the facility did not violate the Free Exercise Clause; (3) restriction of the Hindu
inmate's use of camphor, kumkum, incense, and a butter lamp during worship services did not violate the Free
Exercise Clause; and (4) failure to find a qualified Hindu representative to assist the inmate in the study of his
religion did not violate the Free Exercise Clause. (North Dakota State Penitentiary)

U.S. Appeals Court
DIET
RLUIPA-Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act

Cardinal v. Metrish, 564 F.3d 794 (6th Cir. 2009). A prisoner brought an action against a warden seeking
monetary damages, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief. The prisoner asserted violations of the Eighth
Amendment and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) based on the failure to
provide him with kosher food which resulted in his not eating for eight days. The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the warden. The prisoner appealed. The court held that the warden was entitled to Eleventh
Amendment immunity on the prisoner's claim seeking monetary damages for the alleged violation of the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) for not providing him with kosher meals.
According to the court, even though the state accepted federal funds for its prisons, RLUIPA did not contain a
clear indication that receipt of federal prison funds was unambiguously conditioned on a state's consent to be sued
for monetary damages. The court held that there was no evidence that the warden knew of and disregarded an
excessive risk to the prisoner's health or safety, as required to support the prisoner's claim against the warden for
deliberate indifference to his medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment based on failure to provide him
with kosher food. (Hiawatha Correctional Facility, Michigan)

U.S. Appeals Court
FREE EXERCISE
OPPORTUNITY TO
WORSHIP
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act

Crawford v. Clarke, 578 F.3d 39 (1st Cir. 2009). Muslim inmates confined in a special management unit (SMU)
sued the Commissioner of the Massachusetts Department of Correction (DOC) under the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), alleging that he violated their right to freely exercise their religion by
preventing them from participating in Jum'ah Friday group prayer. The district court entered an injunction
requiring closed-circuit broadcasting of Jum'ah in any SMU in which the plaintiff inmates were housed or might
be housed in the future, and subsequently denied the commissioner's motion for reconsideration. The
commissioner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in issuing the injunction requiring corrections officials to provide closed circuit television broadcasts of
services in any SMU in which the plaintiff inmates were housed or might be housed in the future, as opposed to
the SMU in which they were currently housed, without making findings as to whether other SMUs were suitable
for closed circuit broadcasts. The court found that the injunction did not violate the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(PLRA), where the prospective relief was narrowly drawn and providing closed-circuit broadcasting was the least
intrusive means to alleviate the burden on the inmates’ rights. The court noted that the commissioner put nothing
in the record to differentiate other SMUs on the issues of a compelling governmental interest or least restrictive
means. (Massachusetts Department of Correction, MCI-Cedar Junction)

U.S. District Court
DIET
COSTS
RLUIPA-Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act

Dawson v. Burnett, 631 F.Supp.2d 878 (W.D.Mich. 2009). A state prisoner, who was a practicing Buddhist,
brought an action against prison officials arising out of the alleged denial of the prisoner's request to eat a strict
vegetarian (vegan) diet. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in
part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact
as to whether the prisoner's desire to eat a vegan diet was based upon or required by his Buddhist religious belief.
According to the court, the prison officials' argument that a strict vegan menu was more costly than the vegetarian
menu already available to the prisoner was irrelevant to demonstrating a legitimate penological interest, since
prison officials already provided a vegan menu to those prisoners whose religious beliefs compelled such a diet.
The court held that the State of Michigan, by accepting federal prison funds, did not waive Eleventh Amendment
sovereign immunity from a monetary suit brought by the prisoner under the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), arising out of his alleged denial of a strict vegan diet as a practicing
Buddhist. The court found that the prisoner could not recover monetary damages against individual prison
officials in their personal capacity under RLUIPA, since neither were recipients of federal prison funds and
RLUIPA did not provide for the recovery. (Michigan Department of Corrections)

37.94
37.94
XXII

U.S. District Court
APPEARANCE
CHAPLAIN
HATS
OPPORTUNITY TO
PRACTICE
RFRA-Religious Freedom
Restoration Act
SEARCHES

Forde v. Zickefoose, 612 F.Supp.2d 171 (D.Conn. 2009). A federal prisoner petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus,
alleging that she was being denied freedom of religious expression, in violation of the First and Fourth
Amendments and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). The district court granted the government's
motion for summary judgment in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by
issues of fact as to: (1) whether the prisoner’s exercise of her religion was substantially burdened by the prison's
non-emergency cross-gender pat-down search policy; (2) whether the prisoner’s exercise of her religion was
substantially burdened by the prison's policy of requiring her to carry an identification photograph that showed her
without a hijab to cover her head; and, (3) whether the prisoner’s exercise of her religion was substantially
burdened by the prison's failure to provide an imam during Ramadan. The court held that the prison's nonemergency cross-gender pat-down search policy did not violate the prisoner’s limited right, under the Fourth
Amendment, to bodily privacy. According to the court, although the prisoner made a sufficient showing of a
subjective expectation of privacy, the expectation would not be considered reasonable by society, since the prison
had a legitimate penological interest in security and in providing equal employment opportunities to both male
and female staff, and no available further accommodation was reasonable under the circumstances. (Federal
Correctional Institution, Danbury, Connecticut)

U.S. Appeals Court
DIET
EQUAL PROTECTION
FREE EXERCISE

Gallagher v. Shelton, 587 F.3d 1063 (10th Cir. 2009). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against various prison
officials alleging his right to free exercise of religion and equal treatment were violated. The district court
dismissed the action and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.
The court held that isolated acts of negligence, in which prison officials failed to approve the state prisoner's
requests for religious accommodations in a timely fashion, did not amount to a violation of the prisoner's right to
free exercise of religion. The court noted that on one occasion the prisoner requested fried food on a religious
holiday and the request was approved one month after the holiday, and on another occasion the prisoner requested
two sack lunch meal accommodations for days of religious fasting and the requests were approved two days after
the days of fasting had already passed. The court found that prison officials' improper cleaning of serving utensils
reserved for kosher food, by washing those utensils with non-kosher utensils, did not amount to a violation of the
state prisoner's right to free exercise of religion. According to the court, the act amounted to a single violation of a
kosher diet, not a prison policy, and the allegation showed only that the prison imperfectly implemented kosher
requirements or were negligent in implementing a kosher diet, not that prison officials deliberately contaminated
the kosher utensils. (Norton Correctional Facility, Kansas)

U.S. Appeals Court
FREE EXERCISE
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act

Gladson v. Iowa Dept. of Corrections, 551 F.3d 825 (8th Cir. 2009). State inmates sued an assistant warden,
alleging that he violated their free exercise and Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA)
rights by limiting their observance of a Wiccan holiday. The inmates sought damages and injunctive relief. The
district court denied injunctive relief and the inmates appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the
prison did not substantially burden the Wiccan inmates' observance of the Samhain religious holiday, and thus did
not violate their free exercise or RLUIPA rights. According to the court, the inmates failed to offer any evidence
that a grant of only three hours for the celebration significantly inhibited or constrained their conduct or
expression, meaningfully curtailed their ability to express adherence to their faith, or denied them reasonable
opportunities to engage in activities fundamental to their religion. The court noted that a former prison treatment
director had reduced the quantity of food available for the celebration but that the current treatment director had
not continued that practice. (Iowa State Penitentiary)

U.S. District Court
DIET
EQUAL PROTECTION
FREE EXERCISE
RLUIPA-Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act

Goodvine v. Swiekatowski, 594 F.Supp.2d 1049 (W.D.Wis. 2009). A state inmate brought an action against a
state, its department of corrections, and various prison officials, alleging that interference with the practice of his
Muslim faith violated § 1983, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and state law.
A screening of the complaint for frivolous claims was required under the provisions of the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (PLRA). The court held that the inmate's allegations stated a claim against prison officials under
RLUIPA. The court found that a rule that limited religious materials he could own to one soft cover text and that
he was unable to practice his faith without his tariqah materials and additional religious texts did not violate the
Free Exercise Clause. The court held that the denial of the inmate's request to purchase a Qur'an while in
segregation, and the denial of the inmate's request for a halal diet did not violate the Free Exercise Clause.
According to the court, refusal to provide sandwiches to the inmate to break fast did not violate RLUIPA, and
prison officials' failure to “establish the Qiblah” for the inmate did not violate the Free Exercise Clause or
RLUIPA. The court found that the inmate's allegations, that a prison chaplain discriminated against him by
providing Christian inmates with free copies of the Bible and denied him an available free copy of the Qur'an,
stated a claim against the chaplain under the Establishment Clause and Equal Protection Clause, The court held
that the inmate's allegations that prison officials modified meal schedules for Christians wishing to fast for
religious purposes but not for Muslims, stated a claim against prison officials under the Establishment Clause and
the Equal Protection Clause. (Green Bay Correctional Institution, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
EQUAL PROTECTION
FREE EXERCISE
RECOGNIZED RELIGION
RFRA-Religious Freedom
Restoration Act

Harrison v. Watts, 609 F.Supp.2d 561 (E.D.Va. 2009). A former federal inmate brought a Bivens action against
various employees and administrators within the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), asserting that his free exercise,
equal protection, and rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) were violated. The
district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss. The court denied the inmate’s motion for reconsideration.
The court held that the inmate's practice of the “Nation of Gods and Earths” was not a religion. According to the
court, the inmate's practice of the “Nation of Gods and Earths” (NOGE) was a “way of life” and not a religion
warranting free exercise protection, where the inmate had a long-standing and adamant position that the NOGE
was not a religion and that its precepts were not religious in nature. (Federal Correctional Complex Petersburg,
Virginia)

XXIII

37.95

U.S. District Court
FREE EXERCISE
RESTRICTIONS
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act

Houseknecht v. Doe, 653 F.Supp.2d 547 (E.D.Pa. 2009). An inmate brought an action against current and former
deputy wardens alleging they violated his right to freely exercise his religion under the First Amendment. The
defendants moved for summary judgment. The court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held
that the restriction of the inmate's religious rights due to his election to enter into protective custody, under which
there were no formal religious ceremonies or formal classes similar to those provided to general population
inmates, was rationally related to legitimate penological interest in maintaining security and order, and thus did
not violate inmate's First Amendment right to free exercise of religion. According to the court, it was reasonable
for an inmate who opted for more protective conditions to enjoy fewer amenities. The court noted that the inmate
had regular communication with a chaplain who regularly brought reading materials to the inmates in protective
custody, and the inmate was not prevented from sitting with other inmates and doing his own Bible study in the
unit day room. The court held that it could not require the prison to permit inmates in protective custody to attend
formal gatherings with other inmates, given the purpose of protective custody to segregate inmates who believed
that other inmates posed a danger to them, and the provision of additional reading materials or access to additional
religious media programming could likely not be accomplished without significant cost. The court found that the
Inmate's religious exercise was not substantially burdened by his election to enter into protective custody, under
which there were no formal religious ceremonies or formal classes similar to those provided to general population
inmates, as required to establish a violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA). The court found that there was no suggestion that prison officials placed substantial pressure on the
inmate to substantially modify his behavior or to violate his beliefs, he was not forced to choose between
following the precepts of his religion and forfeiting benefits otherwise generally available to other inmates, and he
acknowledged that he received and read the inmate handbook, which advised that protective custody carried with
it restrictions on religious access. (Berks County Prison, Pennsylvania)

U.S. Appeals Court
DIET
OPPORTUNITY TO
PRACTICE
RESTRICTIONS
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act

Jova v. Smith, 582 F.3d 410 (2nd Cir. 2009). Prisoners brought a pro se action against prison officials alleging
violation of their rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of officials. The prisoners appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part,
vacated in part, and remanded. The appeals court held that the prison's restrictions on the prisoners' practice of the
Tulukeesh religion, which limited the practice to the privacy of the prisoner's cell and keeping a holy book with
the prison chaplain from whom the prisoners' could seek permission to read it, served prison officials' compelling
security and administrative interests, for the purposes of the prisoners' action alleging violation of their rights
under RLUIPA. The court held that prison officials' restrictions which allowed a prisoner to serve as a facilitator
of meetings only if the religion was known outside of the prison and prohibited the prisoners' demand to spar and
receive professional martial arts training, was the least restrictive means of furthering their compelling interests of
safety and institutional security, for the purposes of prisoners' action alleging violation of their rights under
RLUIPA. According to the court, the restriction struck a delicate balance between allowing prisoners to
participate in congregational activities while ensuring the meetings did not serve as proxies for gang recruitment
and organization, while furthering the officials' compelling interests in safety and institutional security.
The court found that prison officials' refusal to comply with some of the prisoners' dietary demands, which
were allegedly required by the prisoners' Tulukeesh religion, was the least restrictive means of satisfying the
officials' compelling administrative burden, where the dietary requests were highly detailed and required specific
foods (and portions thereof) on individual days of the week, and that such foods be prepared by Tulukeesh
adherents. The appeals court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether prison officials could provide a less restrictive substitute for the religious alternative menu. Officials'
refused to comply with their request for a vegan diet that did not include soybeans, as required by their Tulukeesh
religion. (Shawangunk Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
FREE EXERCISE
BOOKS

Johnson v. Boyd, 676 F.Supp.2d 800 (E.D. Ark. 2009). A state prisoner filed a civil rights action against a
detention center and its personnel alleging several violations. The defendants moved for summary judgment and
the district court granted the motion in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether detention center personnel failed to protect the prisoner from an attack by
another prisoner. The court held that the prisoner stated a free exercise of religion claim under the First
Amendment by alleging that detention center personnel prevented him from practicing the central tenet of his
faith of regularly reading his Bible for 19 days while he was in protective custody. According to the court, the
prisoner's First Amendment freedom of association and speech rights had not been violated by denial of his
visitation, phone, and mailing privileges for two days as the direct result of the prisoner committing a disciplinary
infraction while he was in protective custody. (Crittenden County Detention Center, Arkansas)

U.S. District Court
CHAPLAIN
EQUAL PROTECTION
OPPORTUNITY TO
PRACTICE
PLACE TO WORSHIP
VOLUNTEERS

McCollum v. California, 610 F.Supp.2d 1053 (N.D.Cal. 2009). A volunteer Wiccan chaplain for inmates
incarcerated by the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) filed suit alleging disparate
treatment from volunteers of other faiths and retaliation for his complaints about the CDCR's treatment of
Wiccans. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court held that equal
protection was not denied to the volunteer Wiccan chaplain who alleged he was not being permitted to see
inmates at times and in locations when and where other chaplains were permitted, and that being denied access to
chapel time for religious instruction and benefits extended to other administrative volunteer chaplains including
access to telephone and computer, and being subjected to more rigorous security scrutiny. According to the court,
there was no evidence that other voluntary clergy did not encounter the same difficulties or as to inmates that were
denied access to his services. The court found that the CDCR did not retaliate against the volunteer Wiccan
chaplain for protected speech complaining against the mistreatment of Wiccans by “denigrating” him while
addressing a group of Protestant chaplains or by refusing to hire him as community partnership manager at a
women's facility and a state prison. The court noted that the claimed denigration, even if true, did not result in the
loss of a valuable government benefit, and that the decision not to hire him was based on the superior
qualifications of those ultimately hired rather than on his religion. (California Corrections Institution)

XXIII

37.96

U.S. Appeals Court
DIET
RLUIPA-Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act

Nelson v. Miller, 570 F.3d 868 (7th Cir. 2009). A Roman Catholic prisoner sued a prison chaplain in his official
and individual capacities for alleged violations of his rights under the free exercise and establishment clauses of
the First Amendment, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), and the Illinois
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (IRFRA). The district court entered partial summary judgment in favor of the
chaplain, and, after a bench trial on the remaining issues, found against the prisoner on all counts. The prisoner
appealed. The appeals court held that the Roman Catholic prisoner's practice of his religion, which compelled him
to abstain from all meat on all Fridays and during Lent and to avoid the meat of four-legged animals, was
substantially burdened under the First Amendment, RLUIPA, and IRFRA by the requirement that he document
that his preferred diet was compelled by his religion. The court found that denial of the prisoner's request that he
not be given the meat of four-legged animals did not constitute a substantial burden on his religious exercise for
the purposes of the First Amendment, RLUIPA, and IRFRA since a regular diet would still be nutritionally
adequate if all meat of four-legged animals were skipped, and thus the prisoner was not put to a choice between
his religious beliefs and adequate nutrition. But the denial of a non-meat diet on Fridays and during Lent
substantially burdened the prisoner's practice of his religion. According to the court, since the prisoner currently
received a non-meat diet and there was no evidence that the prison intended to revoke the prisoner's religious diet,
the prisoner's claim for injunctive relief was moot. The court noted that RLUIPA, which was enacted pursuant to
the Spending Clause, could not subject state officials to suit in their individual capacities. (Tamms Correctional
Center, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
FREE EXERCISE
RLUIPA-Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act

Ortiz v. Downey, 561 F.3d 664 (7th Cir. 2009). A federal pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against the chief
of corrections at a detention center, alleging his rights under the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause were
violated. The district court dismissed the complaint and the detainee appealed. The appeals court reversed and
remanded. The court held that the detainee stated a § 1983 claim that his First Amendment free exercise rights
were violated by alleging that he was denied a religious rosary and a prayer booklet solely because a jail official
did not find those items vital to worship. The court also found the alleged denial stated a claim under the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). (Jerome Combs Det. Center, Kankakee, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
DIET
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act

Owens-Ali v. Pennell, 672 F.Supp.2d 647 (D.Del. 2009). A pro se state prisoner, a Moorish American National
adherent, brought an action pursuant to § 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA) against prison officials, in their individual and official capacities, alleging that the officials violated his
constitutional rights when they denied his request for a religious diet, and that the officials retaliated against him
for his attempts to exercise his religious beliefs. The prisoner requested counsel. The court held that the prisoner's
claims under § 1983 and RLUIPA for monetary damages against prison officials in their official capacities were
essentially claims against the state, and thus those claims were barred by the state’s Eleventh Amendment
immunity. The court held that prison supervisory officials could not be held liable under § 1983 for alleged
violations of the prisoner's constitutional rights in connection with his request for a religious diet absent a showing
that those officials were aware of his allegations and remained “deliberately indifferent” to his plight. (James T.
Vaughn Correctional Center, Smyrna, Delaware)

U.S. District Court
FREE EXERCISE
RFRA-Religious Freedom
Restoration Act

Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F.Supp.2d 1005 (N.D.Cal.2009). Reversed 678 F3d 748. A detainee, a United States citizen
who was designated an “enemy combatant” and detained in a military brig in South Carolina, brought an action
against a senior government official, alleging denial of access to counsel, denial of access to court,
unconstitutional conditions of confinement, unconstitutional interrogations, denial of freedom of religion, denial
of right of information, denial of right to association, unconstitutional military detention, denial of right to be free
from unreasonable seizures, and denial of due process. The defendant moved to dismiss. The district court granted
the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the detainee, who was a United States citizen, had no
other means of redress for alleged injuries he sustained as a result of his detention, as required for Bivens claim
against the senior government official, alleging the official's actions violated constitutional rights. The court noted
that the Military Commissions Act was only applicable to alien, or non-citizen, unlawful enemy combatants, and
the Detainee Treatment Act did not “affect the rights under the United States Constitution of any person in the
custody of the United States.” The court found that national security was not a special factor counseling hesitation
and precluding judicial review in the Bivens action brought by the detainee. Documents drafted by the official
were public record, and litigation may be necessary to ensure compliance with the law. The court held that federal
officials were cognizant of basic fundamental civil rights afforded to detainees under the United States
Constitution, and thus a senior government official was not entitled to qualified immunity from claims brought by
the detainee. The court also held that the official was not qualifiedly immune from claims brought by the detainee
under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). On appeal, 678 F3d 748, the appeals court reversed the
district court decision, finding that the official was entitled to qualified immunity because there had not been a
violation of well established law. (Military Brig, South Carolina)

U.S. District Court
DIET
FREE EXERCISE

Ramsey v. Goord, 661 F.Supp.2d 370 (W.D.N.Y. 2009). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against
employees of the New York State Department of Correctional Services (DOCS), alleging due process violations
in connection with a disciplinary hearing and violations of his constitutional rights relative to his temporary
removal from a kosher cold alternative diet (CAD) program. The employees moved for summary judgment. The
district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded
by genuine issues of material fact as to whether a state prison correction officers' captain, correction officer,
and/or prison counselor were personally involved in the temporary removal of the Jewish prisoner from a kosher
cold alternative diet (CAD) program. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether the Jewish prisoner's missing of more than 30 days of kosher meals during his
temporary removal from a kosher cold alternative diet (CAD) program constituted more than a de minimus injury
to the prisoner. The court also held that DOCS employees were not entitled to qualified immunity from the Jewish
prisoner's § 1983 claim that his temporary removal from a kosher cold alternative diet (CAD) program violated

37.97

his rights under the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause, where it was clearly established that a prisoner was
entitled to a diet consistent with his religious beliefs, and that such beliefs were protected under the Free Exercise
Clause. (Southport Correctional Facility, New York)
U.S. Appeals Court
DIET
EQUAL PROTECTION
RLUIPA-Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act

Rendelman v. Rouse, 569 F.3d 182 (4th Cir. 2009). A state prisoner brought an action against state prison officials
in their official and individual capacities, seeking injunctive relief and damages under the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and § 1983 based on the officials' refusal to make any accommodation
for his kosher dietary restrictions. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the officials and the
prisoner appealed. The appeals court dismissed in part and affirmed in part. The appeals court held that RLUIPA
did not authorize a claim for money damages against an official sued in her individual capacity when invoked as a
spending clause statute. The court held that the prisoner's claim for injunctive relief under RLUIPA based on the
state prison officials' refusal to make accommodations for his kosher dietary restrictions was rendered moot by his
transfer to a federal prison. The court noted that even if the prisoner's claim was capable of repetition because
there was a possibility that he could return to state prison if his appeal of a federal conviction was successful, the
claim would not likely persist in evading judicial review, as the prisoner would have sufficient opportunity to reinitiate an action seeking injunctive relief if he returned to state prison. (Maryland Corr. Institution-Hagerstown)

U.S. District Court
CHAPLAIN
OPPORTUNITY TO
PRACTICE
RELIGIOUS ARTICLES
RLUIPA-Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act

Rouser v. White, 630 F.Supp.2d 1165 (E.D.Cal. 2009). A California state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against
current and former directors of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) and wardens
at two prisons at which the prisoner was housed, alleging violations of federal and state constitutions, and the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), related to his practice of the Wiccan religion.
The defendants moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the motion in part and denied in part.
The court held that the officials significantly burdened the prisoner's exercise of the Wiccan religion under
RLUIPA by inhibiting the prisoner's timely receipt of religious articles, restricting Wiccans' use of chapel space,
failing to announce Wiccan group worship to the general population, prohibiting use of certain items that are part
of group worship, blocking access to religious items, and failing to retain a paid chaplain to provide services to the
prisoner and other Wiccans. According to the court, the officials made no deliberate change in policies to prevent
the recurrence of the events that caused understaffing that resulted in the prisoner being barred from attending
group services. The court held that the failure of the officials to hire a paid chaplain to attend to the religious
needs of the prisoner and other Wiccans constituted a substantial burden on the prisoner's religious exercise under
RLUIPA, where paid chaplains had certain rights and authority within institutions, which volunteer chaplains and
inmates themselves were denied, thus hindering the prisoner's religious exercise. The court found that neither
limited resources, nor lack of necessary accommodations to facilitate the religious needs in prisons, constituted a
compelling interest under RLUIPA, and thus the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation could
not avoid liability under RLUIPA in the prisoner's action. The court held that a prison warden, but not the
director of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, was liable for violation of the prisoner's
free exercise of the Wiccan religion arising from denial of the prisoner’s request for a “Witches Bible” while the
prisoner was in administrative segregation. According to the court, even if the warden did not personally sign the
form denying the request, it was reasonable to assume that the person who signed the form did so with the
warden's authority. But the court found that the proffered reasons were rationally related to the denial of the
prisoner's request for incense and candles, and thus did not violate the prisoner's right of free exercise of religion.
The director and warden denied the request based on fire safety concerns. The court held that California prison
officials instituted a policy of denominational preference by harassing the prisoner on the basis of his Wiccan
faith, and denying him access to religious articles, group worship, and a spiritual leader, thus weighing against the
officials under the test to determine whether they violated the prisoner's rights under the Establishment Clause.
The court noted that the officials' policy to announce to the general population times for certain religious services,
but not to announce Wiccan services, had the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion. The court denied
qualified immunity to the director and the warden because the law was well-settled at the time. The court
concluded that the prisoner was entitled to injunctive relief on his claims, even though officials had changed some
policies to facilitate the prisoner's access to religious items and group worship. The court found that these changes
had not improved the process for approving orders for religious items nor altered the way in which religious
groups gained access to items in lockers, and a pattern of constitutional violations existed sufficient to call into
question the permanence of any changes the defendants had made. (Pleasant Valley State Prison, California)

U.S. District Court
FREE EXERCISE
OPPORTUNITY TO
PRACTICE
RESTRICTIONS
VOLUNTEERS

Shepard v. Peryam, 657 F.Supp.2d 1331 (S.D.Fla. 2009). A pro se inmate at a county jail, who professed to
follow the Muslim faith, brought a § 1983 action against a former county sheriff, the jail's director of program
services, and the jail's former and current directors of food services, alleging that the defendants' acts or omissions
abridged his First Amendment religious rights. The inmate sought preliminary injunctive relief. The district court
granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court held that: (1) the fact that organized Muslim
religious services were not provided at the jail did not amount to deprivation of the inmate's rights under the Free
Exercise Clause; (2) the sheriff and the program services director were entitled to qualified immunity from the
inmate's claim that a policy restricting religious headwear violated the First Amendment; (3) the fact that Jewish
inmates may have been permitted to wear religious headwear did not render the no-headwear policy
unconstitutional; (4) a policy preventing inmates' use of non-breakaway prayer beads did not violate the inmate's
First Amendment rights; (5) a policy banning the possession of prayer rugs by inmates did not violate the inmate's
First Amendment rights; (6) the revocation of the inmate's Kosher diet due to his non-compliance with that diet
did not constitute a violation of his First Amendment rights; and (7) the inmate was not entitled to preliminary
injunctive relief. The court noted that the jail depends entirely on volunteer religious leaders and there were no
volunteer leaders from the Muslim faith. (Monroe County Detention Center, Florida)

37.98

U.S. Appeals Court
OPPORTUNITY TO
PRACTICE
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act
RESTRICTIONS

Singson v. Norris, 553 F.3d 660 (8th Cir. 2009). A prisoner brought an action against a state department of
corrections, alleging its policy prohibiting in-cell use of tarot cards violated the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The prisoner was a follower of Wiccan and asserted that tarot cards were
part of his religious practices. Following a trial, the district court ruled in favor of the department of corrections.
The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the policy did not violate RLUIPA, where
the potential effect of in-cell use of tarot cards on the guards and allocation of prison resources outweighed the
restrictions felt by any interested inmate-users. (Arkansas Department of Correction)

U.S. Appeals Court
HAIR LENGTH
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act

Smith v. Ozmint, 578 F.3d 246 (4th Cir. 2009). A South Carolina prisoner brought an action alleging that a prison
grooming policy violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The South
Carolina Department of Corrections moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the motion. The
prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court held that the
prison's policy requiring maximum security inmates to wear closely cropped hair, and which allowed for
implementation of that policy through physical force, imposed a substantial burden on the inmate's religious
practice within the meaning of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), where the
policy compelled an inmate to modify his behavior in violation of his genuinely held religious beliefs. According
to the court, an affidavit offered by the Department of Corrections in support of summary judgment did not
demonstrate that the prison policy of forcibly shaving the heads of maximum security unit prisoners who wore
long hair as a matter of religious belief furthered a compelling governmental interest in space utilization, hygiene,
or security by the least restrictive means under RLUIPA. The court noted that the affidavit dealt solely with the
grooming policy applied to special management unit prisoners, and the Department failed to explain how the
rationale offered for not accommodating special management unit prisoners applied to maximum security unit
prisoners. (South Carolina Department of Corrections, Maximum Security Unit at Kirkland Corr. Institution)

U.S. Appeals Court
PLACE TO WORSHIP
RLUIPA-Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act

Sossamon v. Lone Star State of Texas, 560 F.3d 316 (5th Cir. 2009). A prison inmate brought a civil rights action
challenging prison officials' refusal to allow him to participate in religious services while he was on cell
restriction, and refusal to make a chapel available for religious services due to security concerns allegedly
presented by holding such services in the chapel. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants
and the inmate appealed. The appeals court dismissed as moot in part, reversed in part, affirmed in part and
remanded. The court held that the state-wide cessation, in all correctional facilities in Texas, of the policy of
preventing general-population prisoners on cell restriction from attending religious services had the effect of
mooting the civil rights claim. The court found that the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA) did not create an individual-capacity cause of action in favor of the prison inmate against prison
officials who had denied him access to a prison chapel. According to the court, RLUIPA did not provide clear
notice that, by accepting federal funds, the state was waiving its sovereign immunity from liability for such
monetary damages. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact on
the inmate's claims for injunctive relief challenging the denial of access to a chapel. The inmate alleged that his
exercise of religion was substantially burdened because he could not use the prison chapel where he could kneel
in front of an alter in view of a cross, and due to his being able to attend religious services only at other locations
in the prison that were not specifically designed for Christian worship. (Robertson Unit of the Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division)

U.S. Appeals Court
FREE EXERCISE
RELIGIOUS ITEMS
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act

Van Wyhe v. Reisch, 581 F.3d 639 (8th Cir. 2009). Two inmates each brought an action against state prison
officials, asserting various claims of interference with their free exercise of religion under the First Amendment
and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The district court denied the officials'
motions for summary judgment in part, and the officials appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in
part, dismissed in part, and remanded. The appeals court held: (1) the section of RLUIPA protecting inmates from
imposition of substantial burdens on their religious exercise not justified by compelling state interests was a valid
exercise of Congress's Spending Clause authority; (2) the section of RLUIPA conditioning a state's acceptance of
federal funds on its consent to suit for appropriate relief did not unambiguously encompass monetary damages so
as to effect a waiver of sovereign immunity from suit for monetary claims by acceptance of the federal money; (3)
the section of RLUIPA protecting inmates from substantial burdens on religious exercise was not a statute
prohibiting discrimination within the meaning of the Civil Rights Remedies Equalization Act of 1986 (CRREA);
(4) the inmate made a threshold showing of a substantial burden on his religious exercise by alleging that officials
denied his request to possess and use a succah and that the succah was a mandatory part of the Sukkot Festival
and essential to the practice of his Jewish faith; but (5) the officials did not substantially burden the inmate's
religious exercise by denying his request for additional weekly group religious and language study time; and (6)
the officials did not substantially burden the inmate's religious exercise by denying his request to have and use a
tape player in his cell for religious language studies. The court noted that RLUIPA promoted the general welfare
by furthering society's goal of rehabilitating inmates and respecting individual religious worship. (South Dakota
State Penitentiary)

U.S. District Court
DIET
COSTS
FREE EXERCISE

Yaacov v. Collins, 649 F.Supp.2d 679 (N.D.Ohio 2009). A Jewish inmate brought a § 1983 suit alleging that his
First Amendment rights to free exercise were violated when he was denied a Kosher meal plan for three years.
The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, finding that the decision to restrict
Kosher meals to prisoners registered as Orthodox Jews had a reasonable relationship to the legitimate penological
interest of cost control for budgetary reasons. The officials asserted that to properly prepare Kosher meals would
require expensive kitchens and that purchasing pre-packaged Kosher meals would cost $7.00 per meal as
compared to $0.80 per main-line meal. The court noted that the policy did not exclude all available means for free
exercise, but afforded the alternative of eating cereal, peanut butter, and fresh fruits and vegetables. (Ohio
Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections, Mansfield Correctional Institution)

37.99

U.S. District Court
CLOTHING
FREE EXERCISE

Zargary v. The City of New York, 607 F.Supp.2d 609 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). A prisoner, who wore a headscarf as an
Orthodox Jew, brought an action against a city, alleging that the city's practice or custom of removing head
coverings from prisoners before taking photographs during admittance to a correctional facility violated her rights
under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The court entered judgment in favor of the city. The
court held that the city correctional facility's practice or custom of removing head coverings from prisoners before
taking photographs during their admittance to a facility was rationally related to the legitimate penological interest
of being able to identify prisoners accurately to maintain security, and that the practice did not violate the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The court noted that the prisoner could dramatically change her
appearance by removing the headscarf, making it more difficult to identify her, which would pose a security risk.
According to the court, the prisoner had other means to express her religious beliefs in prison, the corrections
officers attempted to accommodate the prisoner by minimizing the presence of male officers in the room when the
photograph was taken, and the alternative of not removing the headscarf could not be said to pose only a de
minimis security risk. (Rose M. Singer Correctional Facility, New York)
2010

U.S. Appeals Court
DIET
OPPORTUNITY TO
PRACTICE
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act
CHAPLAIN
EQUAL PROTECTION

Abdulhaseeb v. Calbone, 600 F.3d 1301 (10th Cir. 2010). A state prisoner who followed the Islamic faith brought
an action against prison employees and prison canteen workers under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA) and § 1983. The prisoner asserted claims challenging his conditions of incarceration. The
district court dismissed several of the prisoner's claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and granted
summary judgment in favor of workers and employees on the remaining claims. The prisoner appealed. The
appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The appeals court held that the Islamic prisoner's
claims against prison employees in their official capacities for violations of RLUIPA based on their denial of his
dietary requests were not moot, even though the prisoner had been transferred away from the prisons where some
of the employees worked. The court noted that the reasons given for denying the prisoner's requests involved
Oklahoma Department of Corrections (ODOC) policies, the director of ODOC had final policymaking authority
for ODOC and remained a party to the litigation, the prisoner was still incarcerated in ODOC's custody and was
subject to its policies, and a judgment in his favor could have required ODOC to modify those policies.
The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
denial of the prisoner's requests for a lawful Islamic diet substantially burdened his religious exercise. The court
also found a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the denial of the prisoner's request for meat for a
religious feast that complied with Islamic dietary laws substantially burdened his religious exercise. According to
the court, RLUIPA did not require state department of corrections to provide a full-time paid Muslim spiritual
leader, as RLUIPA required governments to refrain from substantially burdening religion, not to affirmatively
subsidize religion. The court held that the state department of corrections' policy of not paying for soft-cover
Islamic books for prisoners who could not keep their hardback Islamic books did not violate RLUIPA, as
RLUIPA required governments to refrain from substantially burdening religion, not to affirmatively subsidize
religion. According to the court, forcing the Islamic prisoner to accept pudding and gelatin on his food tray on one
occasion, which allegedly rendered all food on the tray contaminated and inedible for him, did not amount to a
substantial burden on the prisoner's religious exercise in violation of RLUIPA. The court held that the state
department of corrections' policy of spending money on nonreligious items but not on religious ones did not
violate the Islamic prisoner's right to equal protection. (Oklahoma State Penitentiary, Great Plains Correctional
Facility, Oklahoma Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
DIET
FREE EXERCISE
PLACE OF WORSHIP

Antonetti v. Skolnik, 748 F.Supp.2d 1201 (D.Nev. 2010). A prisoner, proceeding pro se, brought a § 1983 action
against various prison officials, alleging various constitutional claims, including violations of the First, Fifth,
Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court dismissed in part. The court held that the prisoner's
allegations were factually sufficient to state a colorable § 1983 claim that prison officials violated the Eighth
Amendment by depriving him of needed medical care. The prisoner alleged that he was housed in
segregation/isolation, leading to a mental health breakdown, and: (1) that he was seen by mental health
professionals eight times over a five year period instead of every 90 days as required by administrative
regulations; (2) that mental health professionals recommended he pursue art and music for his mental health but
that prison officials denied him the materials; (3) and that the officials' actions resulted in the need to take antipsychotic and anti-depression medications due to suffering from bouts of aggression, extreme depression, voices,
paranoia, hallucinations, emotional breakdowns and distress, unreasonable fear, and systematic dehumanization.
According to the court, the prisoner's allegations that he was denied access to a priest, a place of worship,
communion, confessional, congregation with those of his faith and a kosher diet in accordance with his beliefs
were sufficient to state a colorable § 1983 claim for violations of First Amendment right to free exercise of his
religion. (High Desert State Prison, Nevada)

U.S. District Court
BEARDS
FREE EXERCISE

Braithwaite v. Hinkle, 752 F.Supp.2d 692 (E.D.Va. 2010). A prisoner, proceeding pro se, brought a § 1983 action
against a prison officer, alleging violations of his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion and his Eighth
Amendment right to reasonable medical care. Following dismissal of the Eighth Amendment claim, the officer
filed a motion for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the prison policy
requiring prisoners to shave unless exempted for medical reasons did not violate the Sunni Muslim prisoner's First
Amendment right to free exercise of religion, where the policy promoted the prison's strong interests in safety,
sanitation and identification of inmates. The court noted that the inmate had other methods to practice his religion,
and the policy did not allow forcible shaving of inmates. (Greensville Correctional Center, Virginia)

U.S. District Court
ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE
FREE EXERCISE
FORCED EXPOSURE

Chappell v. Helder, 696 F.Supp.2d 1021 (W.D.Ark. 2010). An inmate brought a § 1983 suit claiming that
religious presentations in a dayroom during lockout times contravened the Free Exercise Clause of the
Constitution. The court held that the presentations contravened the inmate's rights under the Free Exercise Clause.
The court noted that although he was not told to sit and listen, nor was he forced to participate, there was a forced
inculcation in the fact that he was unable to remove himself to a place where he did not have to hear the
presentations. The court found that allowing only the “Holy Bible” to be possessed by inmates during a morning

37.100

lockout violated the inmate's rights under the Establishment Clause, but the inmate's right of meaningful access to
the courts was not violated. (Washington County Detention Center, Arkansas)
U.S. District Court
BOOKS
DIET
FREE EXERCISE
PLACE OF WORSHIP
PUBLICATIONS
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use & Institutionalized
Persons Act

Ciempa v. Jones, 745 F.Supp.2d 1171 (N.D.Okla. 2010). An inmate brought claims against state prison officials
under § 1983 for alleged violations of the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments and the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The officials moved for summary judgment. The district court
granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that prison officials did not violate the inmate's First
Amendment right to free exercise of religion, RLUIPA, the inmate’s due process rights, or equal protection, by
denying him access to particular issues of a religious publication based on guidelines prohibiting publications that
advocate terrorism, criminal behavior, racial, religious, or national hatred. According to the court, the guidelines
were reasonably related to the legitimate penological goal of maintaining order and security, individual review of
incoming publications was a rational means of achieving that goal and did not deprive the inmate of all means of
exercising his religion, and allowing such materials would have a significant negative impact on other inmates and
guards. The court also found no violation from the officials’ denial of access to a book containing instructions for
scaling walls, traveling under or over barbed wire, and combat techniques, since preventing the book was the least
restrictive means of ensuring that the inmate did not receive information that would facilitate violence or escape.
But the court held that the officials failed to meet their burden to show that prohibiting a book about the
warrior ethos and the history of stoicism in the military was the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling
interest, as required for summary judgment on the inmate's RLUIPA claim. The court found that prison officials
did not violate the inmate's First Amendment rights by denying him meeting space and time in a prison chapel to
conduct religious classes or meetings, based on a state-wide policy of denying meeting space and time to the
religious group due to the racial and hate filled nature of the materials and doctrine of the group. But the court
found that the officials failed to meet their burden to show that banning the religious group from the chapel was
the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling interest, as required for summary judgment on the inmate's
RLUIPA claim. According to the court, prison officials' failure to provide the inmate with a Halal diet did not
violate his rights under First Amendment or RLUIPA, where the inmate failed to establish that such failure
imposed a substantial burden on his religious exercise, since the inmate stated that his religious needs could be
satisfied by the provision of a Kosher diet. (Dick Conner Corr'l Center, Jess Dunn Corr'l Center, Oklahoma)

U.S. Appeals Court
DIET
OPPORTUNITY TO
WORSHIP
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act

Colvin v. Caruso, 605 F.3d 282 (6th Cir. 2010). A state prisoner brought pro se action against prison officials,
asserting that the prison's 16–day denial of kosher meals, multiple mistakes in administering the kosher-meal
program, and the lack of Jewish services and literature at the prison, violated his constitutional rights and the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The district court denied the prisoner's motion
for a preliminary injunction, and subsequently granted summary judgment in favor of the officials. The prisoner
appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court held that the prisoner's pro
se claims for injunctive and declaratory relief under RLUIPA, challenging a particular prison's kosher meal
program and the alleged denial of Jewish services and literature at the prison, were rendered moot by the
prisoner’s transfer to another prison. The court noted that the claims were directed specifically at the particular
prison's policies and procedures, not at the state prison system's programs as a whole.
The court found that the prison chaplain was entitled to qualified immunity from liability, where, consistent
with his job function, he received the prisoner's request for kosher meals, checked the prisoner's eligibility, and
was informed that the prisoner was a Muslim and therefore not eligible for kosher meals. Once the mistake was
discovered, the chaplain and other prison officials worked as quickly as possible to ensure that the prisoner began
receiving kosher meals. The court found that the prisoner's First Amendment right of freedom of religion was not
violated by the prison's lack of Jewish services and literature, and thus, the prisoner could not prevail in his § 1983
First Amendment claim on that basis. The court noted that the prisoner was the only inmate requesting Jewish
services and literature, that prison policies reasonably required a minimum number of inmates to request religious
services before they would be held, and there was no showing that the prisoner was restricted from practicing
Judaism privately or that the prison prevented him from requesting religious literature.
The appeals court held that the prisoner's pro se claims for injunctive and declaratory relief under RLUIPA,
challenging his removal from a kosher meal program and his failure to be reinstated into the kosher meal program,
were not rendered moot by his transfer to another prison, noting that the prisoner's non-kosher status traveled with
him to the transferee prison. The court held that the prisoner’s amended claims against prison officials,
challenging his removal from a kosher meal program and his failure to be reinstated into the kosher meal program
following his transfer to a different prison, were not futile, for the purpose of the prisoner's motion to amend. The
court noted that the prisoner consistently stated his religious preference as Jewish throughout his incarceration,
and he submitted numerous grievances concerning alleged violations of kosher practice by prison kitchen staff.
(Michigan Department of Corrections, Alger Maximum Correctional Facility)

U.S. Appeals Court
CLOTHING

E.E.O.C. v. GEO Group, Inc., 616 F.3d 265 (3rd Cir. 2010). The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) brought an action on behalf of a group of female Muslim employees against their employer, a private
company that was contracted to run a prison, alleging that the employer violated Title VII's prohibitions on
religious discrimination when it failed to accommodate the employees by providing them an exemption to the
prison's dress policy which precluded them from wearing Muslim head coverings-- called khimars--at work. The
district court granted the employer's motion for summary judgment and denied the EEOC's cross-motion for
summary judgment. The EEOC appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the employer's refusal
to allow employees to wear khimars at work did not violate Title VII. According to the court, the employer, a
private company, was not required under Title VII to provide to female Muslim employees an exemption to the
prison's dress policy, as such a religious accommodation would have caused a safety or security risk and resulted
in undue hardship to the employer. The court noted that khimars, like hats, could have been used to smuggle
contraband into and around the prison, khimars could have been used to conceal the identity of the wearer,
creating problems of misidentification, khimars could have been used against prison employees in an attack, and
accommodating the employees would have necessarily required additional time and resources of prison officials.
(GEO Group, Inc., George W. Hill Correctional Facility, Delaware County, Pennsylvania)

37.101

U.S. District Court
DIET
FREE EXERCISE
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use & Institutionalized
Persons Act

Florer v. Bales-Johnson, 752 F.Supp.2d 1185 (W.D.Wash. 2010). A state prisoner brought an action under § 1983
and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) against former and current food program
managers for a Department of Corrections (DOC) and a registered dietician employed by a prison, alleging that
the defendants violated his First and Eighth Amendment rights and his rights under RLUIPA in their creation of
kosher and mainline diets. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary
judgment. The court held that: (1) the kosher diet menus did not deprive the prisoner of sufficient calories and
nutrients to sustain him and maintain his health; (2) a Passover menu did not deprive the prisoner of sufficient
calories and nutrients to sustain him and maintain his health; (3) provision of kosher food to the prisoner did not
substantially interfere with his ability to freely exercise his religion, as would violate the First Amendment and
RLUIPA; and (4) the use of a fortified fruit drink in lieu of milk did not violate the Eighth Amendment.
(Washington State Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
FREE EXERCISE
RFRA-Religious Freedom
Restoration Act
SEARCHES

Forde v. Baird, 720 F.Supp.2d 170 (D.Conn. 2010). A federal inmate petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus,
alleging that she was being denied freedom of religious expression, in violation of the First Amendment and the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, in
part, and denied in part. The court held that the Muslim inmate's right to free exercise of religion was substantially
burdened, as required to support her claim under RFRA, by a prison policy allowing for non-emergency pat
searches of female inmates by male guards, despite prison officials' claim that the inmate's belief was not
accurate. The court found that the choice offered the inmate, of violating her understanding of the precepts of
Islam, or refusing a search and risking punishment, constituted a substantial burden.
The court found that the prison's interest in maintaining safety and security of the female prison through the
use of cross-gender pat searches was not compelling, as required to justify a substantial burden on the inmate's
right of free exercise of religion under RFRA, where the prison's arguments regarding how and why the crossgender pat searches promoted safety and security at the prison were actually related to the staffing of the facility,
not to its safety and security. According to the court, the prison's interest in avoiding staffing and employment
issues at the female prison through the use of cross-gender pat searches was not compelling, as required to justify
a substantial burden on the inmate's right of free exercise of religion under RFRA. The court noted that even if the
prison's interests in maintaining safety and security and avoiding staffing and employment issues were
compelling, cross-gender pat searches were not the least restrictive means of addressing these interests, as
required to justify the substantial burden on an inmate's right of free exercise of religion under RFRA, absent
evidence that the prison considered and rejected less restrictive practices to cross-gender pat searches. (Federal
Correctional Institution in Danbury, Connecticut)

U.S. District Court
EQUAL PROTECTION
OPPORTUNITY TO
WORSHIP
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use & Institutionalized
Persons Act

Gordon v. Caruso, 720 F.Supp.2d 896 (W.D.Mich. 2010). An inmate sued corrections officials under § 1983 and
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), claiming that they violated his rights by
preventing him from engaging in group worship services with other adherents of his faith. Following denial of a
defense motion for summary judgment, officials moved for reconsideration. The appeals court held that summary
judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether prison officials' ban on Asatru group
worship was the least restrictive means of furthering their interest in maintaining prison security. The court found
that prison officials who banned Asatru group worship had a rational basis for treating members of the Asatru
faith differently from other groups that promoted racist and supremacist teachings, based on a demonstrated
connection between the practice of Asatru and violence and racial conflict in the prison setting, and thus, there
was no violation of the inmate's equal protection rights. The court noted that the other groups that were allowed to
engage in group activity were not shown to present similar security concerns. (Mich. Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
FORCED EXPOSURE
DIET
EQUAL PROTECTION
ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE
FREE EXERCISE

Green v. Tudor, 685 F.Supp.2d 678 (W.D.Mich. 2010). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action against four
employees at a prison for claims arising from his access to a prison law library and the adequacy of the prison's
food service. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held
that the inmate failed to exhaust administrative remedies prior to bringing his claim against an assistant librarian
alleging denial of access to courts through a denied “call-out” request. The court found that the assistant librarian
did not engage in retaliatory conduct against the inmate and did not deny the inmate equal protection.
According to the court, the failure of the prison's assistant food service director to provide hot meals during a
religious holiday observed by the inmate did not violate the inmate's right to equal protection, absent evidence that
the director supplied prisoners of other faiths with hot meals during non-daylight hours.
The court held that the assistant food service director did not coerce the inmate, an Orthodox Muslim, into
participating in Jewish religious practices, and did not take any actions establishing a state religion, so as to
violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The court held that the alleged denial by the prison's
assistant food service director of adequate advance notice of meal substitutions, hot meals during non-daylight
hours during a religious holiday, and adequate nutritional calories to the Muslim inmate was rationally related to
legitimate governmental and penological interests of prison security and fiscal budgetary discipline, and thus the
denials did not violate the inmate's First Amendment free exercise rights. The court noted that the inmate retained
alternative means for practicing his Muslim faith, and granting requests for specialized diets would be expensive
and would divert resources from other penological goals. (Muskegon Correctional Facility, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
FREE EXERCISE
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use & Institutionalized
Persons Act
SATANISM

Indreland v. Yellowstone County Bd. of Comr's, 693 F.Supp.2d 1230 (D.Mont. 2010). A state prisoner brought a §
1983 action against a county board of commissioners and prison officials, alleging, among other things, that the
defendants' actions, including denying him access to satanic materials and holding him in maximum security,
interfered with his free exercise of religion in violation of First Amendment and Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The court held that prison officials' denial of access to his satanic
medallion did not interfere with his free exercise of religion in violation of First Amendment and RLUIPA, where
the officials had a legitimate penological interest in denying the prisoner a chain that the officials believed could
be used to strangle another inmate. According to the court, prison officials segregated the prisoner because he was
involved in fights with other inmates, and not solely on account of his alleged satanic religion, and thus the

37.102

prisoner's segregation did not interfere with his free exercise of religion in violation of First Amendment and
RLUIPA. The court held that the county detention facility was not required under the First Amendment or
RLUIPA to purchase religious materials for the prisoner at its own expense. But the court held that summary
judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the prison chaplain was working in
conjunction with prison staff to deny the prisoner, who claimed to practice satanism, his free exercise of religion,
and therefore, whether the chaplain was state actor. (Yellowstone County Detention Facility, Montana)
U.S. District Court
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use & Institutionalized
Persons Act
WORK

Jackson v. Raemisch, 726 F.Supp.2d 991 (W.D.Wis. 2010). A Muslim inmate brought an action against
correctional officials, alleging civil rights violations due to a prohibition against workplace prayer. The defendants
moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that
the claim brought under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) stemming from the
defendants' alleged refusal to allow the inmate to pray in a kitchen facility, was moot, since only injunctive or
declaratory relief was available under the statute, and the inmate no longer worked in the kitchen and was unlikely
to return to work there. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact,
regarding whether a correctional official issued a conduct report to the Muslim inmate because of a grievance he
filed concerning the prohibition against workplace prayer. The court also found that summary judgment was
precluded by genuine issues of material fact, regarding whether a correctional official directed her staff to take
retaliatory action against the Muslim inmate because of a grievance he filed concerning the prohibition against
workplace prayer. (Waupun Correctional Institution, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
BOOKS
FREEDOM OF RELIGION

Kendrick v. Faust, 682 F.Supp.2d 932 (E.D. Ark. 2010). A female state prison inmate brought a § 1983 action
against employees of the Arkansas Department of Correction (ADC), alleging various violations of her
constitutional rights. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part
and denied in part. The court held that the inmate failed to allege that she sustained an actual injury or that an
Arkansas Department of Correction (ADC) official denied her the opportunity to review her mail prior to its being
confiscated, as required to support a claim that the official violated the inmate's constitutional right of access to
the courts and her First Amendment right to send and receive mail. The court found that summary judgment was
precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether there was a legitimate penological interest for the
alleged destruction of the prison inmate's bible, precluding summary judgment as to whether ADC employees
violated the inmate's right to freedom of religion by destroying her bible. (Arkansas Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
DIET

Little v. Jones, 607 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2010). A state prisoner, who was a Seventh Day Adventist, brought a §
1983 action against the Oklahoma Department of Corrections (ODOC) employees, alleging that employees
violated his constitutional rights in denying him a vegan diet. The district court granted the defendants' motion to
dismiss the complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and denied the prisoner's motion for
preliminary injunction. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
The court held that, under the Oklahoma Department of Corrections (ODOC) grievance procedures, the
Administrative Reviewing Authority (ARA) exceeded its authority when it rejected the prisoner's grievance
appeal regarding his claim to a vegan diet as part of his religious practices because it contained multiple issues,
thereby preventing the prisoner from completing the grievance process. According to the court, the prisoner's
failure to exhaust his administrative remedies with regard to the vegan diet claim, in accordance with PLRA’s
exhaustion requirement, would be excused, and the prisoner could pursue that claim in his § 1983 action against
ODOC employees. (Oklahoma Department of Corrections, Mack Alford Correctional Center)

U.S. District Court
ARTICLES
OPPORTUNITY TO
PRACTICE
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use & Institutionalized
Persons Act

Rouser v. White, 707 F.Supp.2d 1055 (E.D.Cal. 2010). A state prisoner, who was a practicing Wiccan, brought an
action under § 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) against prison
officials, alleging, among other things, that the officials retaliated against his filing of grievances and litigation
arising out of the officials' alleged failure to accommodate the practice of his religion. The prisoner moved for a
preliminary injunction, seeking an order enjoining officials from taking his religious articles and requiring them to
satisfy certain requirements with respect to his religious services. The district court granted the motion. The court
held that the prisoner's § 1983 claims were likely to succeed on their merits. According to the court, the prisoner
demonstrated a causal connection between the officials' actions and his treatment at a prison and that it was likely
that the officials were violating his rights. The court noted that the alleged conduct that infringed upon the
prisoner's religious practice extended through decades, rendering it nearly impossible for the officials to show that
their conduct, which, according to the officials, they had voluntarily ceased, could not be expected to start up
again. The prisoner asked the court to enjoin prison officials from taking his religious items, allow him to keep
and maintain religious texts, allow him to obtain group Wiccan items prior to Wiccan group services, allow him
access to an outdoor, nature-based religious area for Wiccan group services, and grant him access to a fire pit. The
court found that the requested relief conformed with RLUIPA because the relief was narrowly drawn, extended no
further than necessary to correct the harm requiring preliminary relief, and was the least intrusive means necessary
to correct that harm. (Calif. State Prison—Sacramento, Mule Creek State Prison and Pleasant Valley State Prison)

U.S. District Court
EQUAL PROTECTION
FREE EXERCISE
OPPORTUNITY TO
PRACTICE
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act

Rupe v. Cate, 688 F.Supp.2d 1035 (E.D.Cal. 2010). A state prisoner brought an action against prison officials for
violation of his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), alleging that the officials failed to accommodate his Druid religious
practices and retaliated against him for protected activities. The officials moved to dismiss. The district court
granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court found that the prisoner's claims for injunctive relief based
on the California Department of Corrections' (DOC) alleged systemic discrimination against those practicing the
Pagan religion were not moot, even though he had been transferred from the prison where many of the alleged
violations of his rights occurred, where he was still incarcerated in a prison run by the DOC. The court held that
the prisoner's claims for damages under RLUIPA against state prison officials in their official capacity were
barred by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, since RLUIPA did not provide a clear statement requiring
states to waive immunity from liability for money damages.

37.103

According to the court, the issue of whether prison officials violated the prisoner's rights under the Free
Exercise Clause by failing to reasonably accommodate his Druid religious faith could not be resolved at the
motion to dismiss phase because of factual disputes as to what interest justified the officials' alleged failure, the
existing and potential alternatives for Druid religious exercise, and the impact of requested accommodations on
prison officials and other inmates. The court found that the prisoner stated claim for retaliation by prison officials
for conduct protected by the Free Exercise Clause by alleging that he was strip-searched as harassment for writing
letters to prison and government officials in which he complained about the lack of accommodations for his
religion. The prisoner also alleged that officials conspired to place him in administrative segregation and
ultimately to transfer him to requite his complaints about their previous adverse actions against him, and that the
actions taken against him were motivated solely by the officials' desire to inhibit his religious worship.
The court found that the prisoner stated a claim against prison officials for violation of his right to equal
protection by alleging that he and other Pagans were denied opportunities to practice their religion that were
available to mainstream religions and that the officials engaged in a pattern of discrimination against Pagan
practitioners. (Mule Creek State Prison, California Department of Corrections)
U.S. District Court
FREEDOM OF RELIGION
OPPORTUNITY TO
PRACTICE

Sayed v. Profitt, 743 F.Supp.2d 1217 (D.Colo. 2010). An Islamic inmate brought a § 1983 suit against a regional
coordinator for faith and citizens programs with the Colorado Department of Corrections (CDOC) and others,
claiming a violation of his First Amendment right to freedom of religion. The district court granted the
coordinator’s motion for summary judgment. The court held that the court lacked any ability to grant injunctive
relief against the state on the inmate's § 1983 claim for violation of his First Amendment right to freedom of
religion where the inmate failed to identify practices at his current correctional facility that were constitutionally
deficient. The court found that the Islamic inmate's practice of ablution prior to prayer was not prevented by a
denial of his request to shower prior to services, where the inmate was fully able to engage in a sufficient and
adequate alternative that satisfied the requirements of his religious practice, specifically substitute ablution.
(Limon Correctional Facility, Colorado)

U.S. District Court
CHAPLAIN
DIET
EQUAL PROTECTION
OPPORTUNITY TO
PRACTICE

Ward v. Rabideau, 732 F.Supp.2d 162 (W.D.N.Y. 2010). Jewish prison inmates at a state correctional facility
brought a § 1983 action against prison officials, alleging their First Amendment rights were violated by the
defendants' failure to properly accommodate their religious needs. The defendants moved for summary judgment.
The district court denied the motion. The court found that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of
material fact as to whether “special circumstances” existed so as to excuse the two inmates' failure to exhaust
administrative remedies, pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), prior to bringing a § 1983 action
against prison officials. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact
as to whether a correctional officer treated Jewish prison inmates differently on account of their religion. The
court also found a genuine issue of material fact as to whether cold alternative meals available in a state
correctional institution violated the Jewish inmates' constitutional right to a kosher diet, pursuant to the inmates'
rights to religious liberty under First Amendment. According to the court, summary judgment was precluded by a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether prison officials prevented Jewish inmates from having materials
necessary to their worship, on the inmates' claim that the officials failed to make reasonable accommodation to
their religious beliefs in violation of the First Amendment, by not providing a rabbi or religious materials in the
correctional facility. (Groveland Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
DIET
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use & Institutionalized
Persons Act

Willis v. Commissioner, Indiana Dept. of Correction, 753 F.Supp.2d 768 (S.D.Ind. 2010). A Jewish inmate
brought a class action against a Department of Corrections (DOC), alleging denial of kosher meals in violation of
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and his First Amendment free exercise of
religion rights. Cross motions for summary judgment were filed. The motions were granted in part and denied in
part. The district court held that: (1) the denial of a kosher diet substantially burdened the inmate's religious
exercise; (2) the increased costs of providing kosher meals to inmates was not a compelling interest; (3) the DOC
did not establish that providing vegan meals to Jewish inmates was the least restrictive means of furthering a
compelling government interest; (4) enforcement of a prison policy violated the First Amendment as applied to
the Jewish inmate; and (5) the chaplain knowingly applied the policy in violation of the Jewish inmate's First
Amendment rights. According to the court, requiring inmates with religious diet cards to eat 75% of their meals
using the card or have the card suspended violated the First Amendment as applied to the Jewish inmate who
could only eat kosher meals pursuant to his beliefs. The court noted that the inmate used his card for all available
meals, which was only two-thirds of mealtimes as the prison did not provide kosher breakfasts, and the inmate
had no alternative to the kosher diet once the prison suspended his card. (New Castle Corr'l Facility, Indiana)

U.S. District Court
OPPORTUNITY TO
WORSHIP
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use & Institutionalized
Persons Act

Young v. Ericksen, 758 F.Supp.2d 777 (E.D.Wis. 2010). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action claiming
correctional officers and staff violated his constitutional rights by refusing to allow him to exercise outside his cell
for almost an entire year and that they violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Person Act
(RLUIPA) by refusing to allow him to attend religious services and meet with an Imam. The district court denied
the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether prison officials fairly denied the state prisoner out-of-cell exercise.
According to the court, for the purposes of the prison officials' claim of qualified immunity from the state
prisoner's § 1983 claim, it was clearly established that denying a prisoner out-of-cell exercise for almost an entire
year without legitimate penological concerns would constitute a violation of the prisoner's Eighth Amendment
rights. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
denying the state prisoner, who was on protective confinement (PC) status, the opportunity to attend public
worship services was reasonably related to the prison's interest in protecting the prisoner and maintaining overall
security. (Green Bay Correctional Institution, Wisconsin)

37.104

2011
U.S. District Court
DIET
EQUAL PROTECTION
HATS

Barnes v. Fedele, 760 F.Supp.2d 296 (W.D.N.Y. 2011). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against officials
or employees of New York's Department of Correctional Services (DOCS), alleging that the defendants violated
his constitutional rights while he was incarcerated. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss in
part and denied in part. The court held that the state prisoner failed to allege that he was treated differently on
account of his religion, as would support his equal protection claim, where nothing in the prisoner's complaint
suggested that any similarly situated inmates of a different faith were treated more favorably than him, or that he
was singled out for discriminatory treatment on account of his religion. The prisoner had alleged that Rastafarian,
but not Jewish, inmates were permitted to wear crowns. The court also found that the prisoner failed to assert any
factual allegations to support his claim under § 1983 that a prison employee denied him a Kosher diet. According
to the court, a prison rabbi did not violate the prisoner's constitutional rights, and thus was not liable under § 1983,
by allegedly failing to respond to one of the prisoner’s letters, and by responding to the prisoner's complaints
regarding religion rules in a way in which the prisoner was unhappy. The court held that the prisoner had no
constitutional right to have his grievances processed or investigated in any particular manner, as would support his
§ 1983 claim against prison employee who allegedly covered up an investigation into the confiscation of his
purportedly religious head wear. (Southport Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
FREE EXERCISE
REGULATIONS
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use & Institutionalized
Persons Act

Cryer v. Massachusetts Dept. of Correction, 763 F.Supp.2d 237 (D.Mass. 2011). A Native American inmate
brought a civil rights action against the Massachusetts Department of Correction and officials, challenging denial
of access to ceremonial tobacco to be used for religious purposes. The court held that summary judgment was
precluded by genuine issues of material fact, regarding whether the correctional anti-smoking policy which
banned tobacco in all forms including ceremonial tobacco, created a substantial burden on the Native American
inmate's religious practice, in violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA).
The court found that the conduct of state correctional officials in denying the Native American inmate's access to
ceremonial tobacco did not violate a clearly established federal right of which a reasonable officer would have
known, entitling the officials to qualified immunity on the inmate's § 1983 claim under the Free Exercise Clause
of the First Amendment. The court noted that the policy of state correctional officials in denying the Native
American inmate's access to ceremonial tobacco did not contravene a Massachusetts statute governing smoking in
public workplaces, since the provision stated that smoking “may be permitted” in specifically enumerated places
and circumstances, including religious ceremonies where smoking was part of a ritual. (Souza–Baranowski
Correctional Center, Massachusetts)

U.S. Appeals Court
BEARDS
BOOKS
OPPORTUNITY TO
WORSHIP
PLACE TO WORSHIP
PRIVACY
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use & Institutionalized
Persons Act

DeMoss v. Crain, 636 F.3d 145 (5th Cir. 2011). A Texas state prisoner brought an action against the Texas
Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) and several prison officials in their individual and official capacities,
alleging that several TDCJ policies impermissibly interfered with his ability to practice his religion in violation of
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The prisoner also asserted several claims
under § 1983, alleging that those same policies violated his constitutional rights under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. Following a bench trial, the district court entered judgment in favor of the defendants. The prisoner
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the district court did not clearly err by
concluding that TDCJ's grooming policy, requiring all inmates except those with medical exceptions to be clean
shaven, did not violate RLUIPA. According to the court, the prisoner's allegation that TDCJ policies had
prevented him from carrying a pocket Qur'an with him out into the recreation yard, on two medical visits, and
while on job assignment was insufficient to state a claim under RLUIPA entitling him to relief regarding TDCJ's
religious text policy. The court noted that the prisoner did not allege that TDCJ's restrictions required him to act in
a way that violated his religious beliefs by forcing him to abandon his study of the Qur'an, nor did the prisoner
allege facts suggesting he was forced to choose between studying the Qur'an as his faith required and a generally
available, non-trivial benefit. The court found that TDCJ’s abandonment of the policy that inmates confined to
their cells be prohibited from attending religious services mooted the prisoner's claim for injunctive and
declaratory relief relating to the policy. The court noted that an affidavit from the TDCJ director stated that the
cell restriction policy had been abandoned and that all inmates on cell restriction would be allowed to attend
religious services. The court found that the TDCJ policy against allowing inmates to stand for long periods of time
in prison dayrooms was not a substantial burden on the exercise of religious beliefs of the prisoner whose
religious practice required him to pray five times a day at set times for anywhere from four to 20 minutes, during
which time he had to stand, kneel, and bow, and therefore TDCJ's dayroom policy did not violate RLUIPA. The
court noted that the prisoner's ability to stand, kneel, and bow was not restricted in the recreation yard or in his
cell, and he had hourly access to those locations from the dayroom. The court held that the district court's finding,
concluding that the TDCJ policy of tape-recording all inmate-led Muslim religious services to ensure that
religious services take place and to aid in investigating potential disciplinary violations, did not impose a
substantial burden on the prisoner's religious practice under RLUIPA. (Texas Department of Criminal Justice)

U.S. Appeals Court
ARTICLES
CLASSIFICATION
FREE EXERCISE
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use & Institutionalized
Persons Act

Florer v. Congregation Pidyon Shevuyim, N.A., 639 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2011). A state prisoner brought an action
under § 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) against a Jewish
organization that contracted with the prison to provide Jewish religious services to prisoners, a rabbi who was
president of the organization, and an outreach program of the organization. The prisoner alleged that the
defendants refused to provide basic religious reading materials, other basic materials, and spiritual leadership. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the organization and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The court held that the prisoner, whose requests for a Torah, Jewish calendar, and rabbi visit were
denied by the private Jewish organization could not establish that such denial was the result of a governmental
policy, as required to hold the organization liable for any deprivation of the prisoner's free exercise rights under §
1983 or his rights under the RLUIPA. According to the court, there was no evidence that the organization was
enforcing a department of corrections (DOC) or governmental policy, or that the organization's internal policy
was adopted by the DOC. The court also held that the prisoner could not establish that the organization helped

37.105

DOC staff determine whether other prisoners should be classified by the DOC as Jewish, as required to hold the
organization liable. The court noted that the private Jewish organization and its rabbi were not “state actors” under
the public function analysis, as would allow the defendants to be held liable on the prisoner's claims. (Washington
State Penitentiary)
U.S. Appeals Court
CLOTHING
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use & Institutionalized
Persons Act

Khatib v. County of Orange, 639 F.3d 898 (9th Cir. 2011). A former detainee sued a county for allegedly violating
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) by requiring her to remove her headscarf, in
public, against her Muslim religious beliefs and practice, while she was held on two occasions in a county
courthouse holding facility pending disposition of her probation violation. The district court granted the county's
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and the detainee appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded,
finding that the holding facility was an “institution” under RLUIPA. According to the court, the county
courthouse holding facility was a “pretrial detention facility,” and thus was an “institution” under RLUIPA, where
the facility's main purpose was to temporarily hold individuals who were awaiting court proceedings, including
individuals awaiting trial. The court noted that although the facility housed inmates for relatively short periods, it
held up to 600 inmates a day, and was described by the county as a secure detention facility for the confinement
of persons making a court appearance. According to the court, the short-term detainee was not required to satisfy
PLRA's exhaustion requirements before suing for the county's alleged violation of RLUIPA in failing to
accommodate her religious beliefs. (Orange County Santa Ana Courthouse, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
BEARDS
EQUAL PROTECTION
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use & Institutionalized
Persons Act

Kuperman v. Wrenn, 645 F.3d 69 (1st Cir. 2011). A Jewish former state inmate brought a § 1983 action against
prison officials, alleging a prison regulation prohibiting inmates from growing facial hair longer than one quarter
of an inch violated his First Amendment exercise of religion rights, as well as Fourteenth Amendment equal
protection and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Person Act (RLUIPA). The district court granted
summary judgment for the officials and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the
regulation was reasonably related to the penological interests of prison safety and security and did not prohibit the
inmate from alternative means of exercising his rights. The court found that accommodating the inmate's desire to
grow a beard would adversely impact prison resources and that there was no ready alternative to the prison
regulation. According to the court, the regulation did not violate the inmate’s Fourteenth Amendment equal
protection rights, and the regulation furthered the compelling government interest of prison safety and security in
the least restrictive means of doing so. (New Hampshire State Prison)

U.S. District Court
ARTICLES
CHAPLAIN
OPPORTUNITY TO
WORSHIP
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use & Institutionalized
Persons Act

Lee v. Johnson, 793 F.Supp.2d 798 (W.D.Va. 2011.) A prisoner, proceeding pro se, brought a § 1983 action
against several prison officials, alleging violations of the First Amendment and the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The prisoner filed a motion to amend, and the officials filed a motion for
summary judgment. The district court granted the motions. The court held that: (1) the chaplain's failure to
affirmatively provide the prisoner with religious materials upon the prisoner's request did not violate the prisoner's
First Amendment exercise of religion rights; (2) it was not clearly established that the prison chaplain's posting of
a sign-up sheet for Catholic services, but not for the House of Yahweh, violated the First Amendment; (3) a prison
policy that allowed for group worship only if a minimum of five inmates expressed interest in such services did
not violate the First Amendment; and (4) a prison policy that allowed for group worship only if a minimum of five
inmates expressed interest in such services did not substantially burden the religious rights of the prisoner under
RLUIPA. (Pocahontas State Correctional Center, Virginia)

U.S. Appeals Court
OPPORTUNITY TO
PRACTICE
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use & Institutionalized
Persons Act

Maddox v. Love, 655 F.3d 709 (7th Cir. 2011). An inmate filed a pro se § 1983 complaint against a prison chaplain
and prison wardens, claiming that they violated his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), and asserting related state law claims. The
district court dismissed some claims, and subsequently granted summary judgment against the inmate on the
remaining claims. The inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The
court held that the inmate's allegations that prison officials singled out African Hebrew Israelite (AHI) services for
cancellation, purportedly due to budget cuts, disproportionately allocated the prison's religious budget and
resources to other religions, and failed to pursue alternatives to allow the inmates to pursue their faith. According
to the court, this sufficiently stated a facially plausible claim under § 1983 for denial of a reasonable opportunity
to exercise his religion without adequate penological justification. (Lawrence Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
ARTICLES
CHAPLAIN
ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE
FREE EXERCISE
VISITS

McCollum v. California Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 647 F.3d 870 (9th Cir. 2011). Inmates and a
volunteer prison chaplain brought an action against the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
(CDCR) and others, challenging CDCR's paid chaplaincy program, and alleging retaliation for bringing such a
suit. The defendants moved to dismiss and for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion to
dismiss the inmates' claims in part, dismissed the chaplain's Establishment Clause claim for lack of standing, and
granted summary judgment on the chaplain's remaining claims. The plaintiffs appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The appeals court held that the inmates' grievances failed to alert CDCR that inmates sought redress for
wrongs allegedly perpetuated by CDCR's chaplaincy-hiring program, as required to exhaust under the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). According to the court, while the inmates' grievances gave notice that the inmates
alleged the prison policies failed to provide for certain general Wiccan religious needs and free exercise, they did
not provide notice that the source of the perceived problem was the absence of a paid Wiccan chaplaincy. But the
court found that an inmate’s grievance alleging he requested that the prison's administration contact and allow
visitation by clergy of his own Wiccan faith, which was denied because his chaplain was not a regular paid
chaplain, was sufficient to put CDCR on notice that the paid-chaplaincy hiring policy was the root cause of the
inmate's complaint and thus preserved his ability to challenge that policy under PLRA.
The court held that a volunteer Wiccan prison chaplain lacked taxpayer standing to challenge CDCR’s paid
chaplaincy program, based on violations of his First Amendment right to freedom of religion, where the chaplain
did not challenge the expenditure of government funds to provide paid chaplaincies nor even the existence of
denomination-specific paid chaplaincies, but rather challenged only the current allocation of chaplaincies among

37.106

religious denominations and the procedure for determining such allocations. According to the court, there was no
direct evidence of a retaliatory motive by the prison employee who restricted the Wiccan prison chaplain's access
to a prison, as required to support the chaplain's First Amendment retaliation claim. The court noted that the
incident resulting in restricted access occurred nearly three years after the chaplain filed a lawsuit against CDCR,
and an employee's knowledge of the suit, alone, was insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to a
retaliatory motive. (California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation)
U.S. District Court
FREE EXERCISE
PUBLICATIONS

Murphy v. Lockhart, 826 F.Supp.2d 1016 (E.D.Mich. 2011). An inmate at a maximum correctional facility in
Michigan brought a § 1983 action against various Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) employees
alleging that his placement in long-term and/or indefinite segregation was unconstitutional, that he was prohibited
from communicating with his friends and family, and that his ability to practice his Christian religion was being
hampered in violation of his First Amendment rights. The inmate also alleged that the MDOC's mail policy was
unconstitutional. The defendants moved for summary judgment and for a protective order. The court held that the
prisoner's statements in a published magazine article discussing an escape attempt were protected speech, and that
a fact issue precluded summary judgment on the retaliation claims against the other facility's warden, resident unit
manager, and assistant resident unit supervisor stemming from the prisoner's participation in that article. The
Esquire Magazine article discussed security flaws at the correctional facility, detailing the prisoners' escape plan
and revealing which prison staff he manipulated and how he obtained and built necessary tools to dig a tunnel.
The court noted that the prisoner's statements were not directed to fellow inmates, and rather he spoke on issues
relating to prison security and was critical of the conduct of Michigan Department of Corrections personnel,
which resulted in his near-successful prison break.
The court found that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact, as to whether the
defendants' proffered legitimate grounds for removing the prisoner from his coveted administrative segregation
work assignment as a porter/painter/laundry worker--discovery that he possessed contraband--were a pretext to
retaliate for his protected speech in the published magazine article. The court found that the alleged violation of
the prisoner's right to free exercise of his religion from the rejection of a claimed religious publication, Codex
Magica, was justified by the prison's legitimate penological interest in limiting prisoners' access to books that
included instructions on how to write in code. According to the court, because the prison had a valid penological
interest in restricting access to the publication, which contained instructions on how to write in code, the prisoner
mail regulation used to censor that book could not be unconstitutional as applied on the ground that it prevented
the prisoner's access to that publication. (Ionia Maximum Correctional Facility, Kinross Correctional Facility,
Standish Correctional Facility, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
DIET
EQUAL PROTECTION
FREE EXERCISE
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use & Institutionalized
Persons Act
WORK

Roberts v. Klein, 770 F.Supp.2d 1102 (D.Nev. 2011). A Black state prisoner filed a civil rights action against
prison administrators and employees alleging violation of his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion,
his statutory rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), and the Equal
Protection Clause. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in
part. The court held that the prisoner stated a claim that prison officials and employees violated his religious rights
under the First Amendment, RLUIPA, and the Equal Protection Clause on allegations that they implemented and
enforced a policy that denied him kosher meals because his Jewish faith had not been verified by an outside
entity, and the prison did not show that there was valid rational connection between the prison regulation and a
legitimate government interest. The court found that the prisoner stated a claim that a prison employee retaliated
against him for exercising his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion, on allegations that he sincerely
believed that he must attend religious services and his work assignment was terminated soon after he attended
Jewish services, after which the employee stated that “You're no damn Jew,” “You're right I'm firing you,” and
“Around here I'm your God.” According to the court, the prisoner also stated a claim that a prison employee
retaliated against him for exercising his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion and deprived him of
Equal Protection under Fourteenth Amendment, on allegations that he was written up on disciplinary charges for
attending Jewish services, as a protected activity, while white inmates of the Jewish faith were not written up on
disciplinary charges for attending services, and that he was placed on disciplinary charges two days later because
he attended the services. The court held that the prison employees were not entitled to qualified immunity.
(Southern Desert Correctional Center, Nevada)

U.S. Appeals Court
DIET
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use & Institutionalized
Persons Act

Vinning-El v. Evans, 657 F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 2011). A state inmate brought an action against correctional facility
officials, alleging violations of § 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA)
based on their denial of his request for a vegan diet, which he claimed was required by his religious practices. The
district court entered an order granting in part and denying in part the officials' motion for summary judgment, and
they appealed. The appeals court held that the inmate could not recover monetary damages against officials under
RLUIPA. According to the court, the inmate's action against the officials was treated as an action against the state,
and monetary damages were not available against a state under RLUIPA. (Pinckneyville Correctional Center,
Illinois)
2012

U.S. Appeals Court
FREE EXERCISE
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use & Institutionalized
Persons Act

Alvarez v. Hill, 667 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2012). A former inmate in the Oregon Department of Corrections (ODOC)
sued prison officials, alleging that ODOC employees substantially burdened the practice of his religion in
violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The district court granted
summary judgment for the defendants and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that
Oregon's sovereign immunity barred the former inmate's Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA) claims for money damages against corrections officials sued in their official capacity, where, for
sovereign-immunity purposes, the official capacity claims were treated as claims against the state. The court
found that the former inmate lacked a legally cognizable interest in the outcome of his claims for declaratory and
injunctive relief, despite his contentions that his claims were capable of repetition, yet would continue to evade

37.107

review, and that his claims challenged ongoing prison policies to which other inmates would remain subject.
According to the court, there was no indication that the inmate, who had completed his sentence and his postincarceration supervision, would again be subjected to the challenged prison policies, and current inmates could
bring their own RLUIPA claims challenging the policies at issue. The court noted that an Inmate's release from
prison while his claims are pending generally will moot any claims for injunctive relief relating to the prison's
policies unless the suit has been certified as a class action. (Oregon Department of Corrections)
U.S. Appeals Court
OPPORTUNITY TO
WORSHIP
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use & Institutionalized
Persons Act

Bader v. Wrenn, 675 F.3d 95 (1st Cir. 2012). A state prisoner filed an action against a Department of Corrections
under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The district court denied the prisoner's
motion for a preliminary injunction and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that RLUIPA
did not constrain prison transfers based on disadvantages at the transferee prison that were not themselves of the
government's creation. According to the court, transfer of the state prisoner for reasons that had not been based on
the prisoner's religious practice did not violate RLUIPA although the transfer had the result of restricting his
religious opportunities. (Northern Correctional Facility, New Hampshire)

U.S. District Court
HAIR LENGTH
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use & Institutionalized
Persons Act
SINCERITY

Benning v. Georgia, 845 F.Supp.2d 1372 (M.D.Ga. 2012). An inmate, who was a Torah-Observant Jew,
proceeding pro se, brought an action against a state, a board of corrections, a department of corrections (DOC)
and its commissioner, seeking injunctive relief on allegations that grooming policies violated the Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The district court held that: (1) the inmate's beliefs were
sincerely held; (2) the policy requiring the inmate to remove his earlocks substantially burdened a tenet of his
religion; (3) requiring the inmate to purchase or obtain from a charity a depilatory to comply with the policy did
not substantially burden a tenet of the inmate's religion; and (4) summary judgment was precluded by a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether the prison policy of refusing to allow the inmate to grow earlocks was the least
restrictive means of protecting the prison's compelling interests. The court noted that the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) affords to prison inmates a heightened protection from governmentimposed burdens by requiring that the government demonstrate that the substantial burden on the prisoner's
religious exercise is justified by a compelling, rather than merely a legitimate, governmental interest. The court
noted that the inmate had changed his religion of record with the department of corrections (DOC) to Judaism 10
years previously, he had not changed his religion since, and inmate had spent much of his time grieving and
litigating issues related to his Jewish faith. (Autry State Prison, Georgia)

U.S. District Court
HAIR LENGTH
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use & Institutionalized
Persons Act

Benning v. Georgia, 864 F.Supp.2d 1358 (M.D.Ga. 2012). A Jewish inmate brought an action against the State of
Georgia, the Georgia Board of Corrections, the Georgia Department of Corrections (GDC), and its Commissioner,
in his official capacity, alleging that the defendants violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act (RLUIPA) by refusing to allow him to grow earlocks in accordance with his religious beliefs. The court held
that: (1) the inmate's religious belief that he was forbidden from shaving his earlocks was sincerely held; (2) the
inmate's religious beliefs were substantially burdened by the defendants' refusal to allow him to grow earlocks; (3)
uniformity was not a compelling government interest justifying the defendants' refusal to allow the inmate to grow
earlocks; and (4) the defendants failed to prove that banning earlocks completely was the least restrictive means of
furthering compelling governmental interests. (Autry State Prison, Georgia)

U.S. District Court
FREE EXERCISE
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use & Institutionalized
Persons Act
SINCERITY
AIRFA- American Indian
Religious Freedom Act

Brooks v. Roy, 881 F.Supp.2d 1034 (D.Minn. 2012). A Native American state prisoner filed a § 1983 action,
claiming that his required participation in a prison's substance abuse treatment program violated the Free Exercise
Clause, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), the American Indian Religious
Freedom Act (AIRFA), and the Minnesota Constitution. The prisoner sought an injunction assigning him at his
own expense to a privately-run, Native American inpatient treatment program 200 miles from the prison, or
readmitting him to the prison's program so that he would be eligible for prison benefits. The prisoner moved for a
temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction. The district court denied the motion. The court held that:
(1) the Free Exercise Clause and RLUIPA claims were not actionable; (2) the First Amendment retaliation claim
was not actionable; (3) the prisoner would not likely suffer irreparable harm absent a preliminary injunction; (4)
the balance of hardships did not favor a preliminary injunction; (5) the public interest did not support a
preliminary injunction; and (6) AIRFA lacked a private cause of action. The court noted that the prisoner failed to
delineate any sincerely-held religious belief that was in any way infringed on by his participation in the prison
substance abuse treatment program, as required to support his claim for infringement of his right to free exercise
of religion. The prisoner referenced the Native American belief that a person must confront the root causes of
substance abuse, but he did not allege that he held such a belief himself, and the program explicitly required the
prisoner to examine the cause of his substance abuse and encouraged him to speak and write freely and to develop
his own program for rehabilitation incorporating whatever Native American beliefs and practices he wanted, but
he refused to do so. (Minnesota Correctional Facility, Faribault)

U.S. District Court
EQUAL PROTECTION
FREE EXXERCISE
OPPORTUNITY TO
WORSHIP

Catanzaro v. Harry, 848 F.Supp.2d 780 (W.D.Mich. 2012). A state prisoner, proceeding pro se, brought a § 1983
action against a state department of corrections, department officials, a warden, parole board members, and
numerous prison and department employees, alleging violation of his due process rights, violation of the Fourth
Amendment, denial of adequate medical care, his right to free exercise of religion, equal protection, access to
courts, and retaliation. The district court held that: (1) the prisoner had no protected interest in early release on
parole; (2) the requirement that the prisoner complete a sex-offender treatment program as condition for parole
did not violate the Due Process Clause as the condition for parole did not exceed the sentence imposed on the
prisoner; (3) the prisoner's conditions at sex-offender treatment facility did not implicate the prisoner's right to
procedural due process, notwithstanding the fact that the prisoner did not have access to recreational facilities or a
law library, the prisoner could not work, the prisoner had to arrange for his own health care, and the prisoner did
not have the opportunity to attend religious services; (4) the transfer of the prisoner to facility for sex-offender
treatment program did not violate his right to substantive due process; and (5) the prisoner stated a claim for
violation of Free Exercise Clause. (Cooper Street Correctional Facility, Residential Sex Offender Program
(RSOP) at the Kalamazoo, and Probation Enhancement Program in Muskegon, Michigan)

37.108

U.S. District Court
DIET
FREE EXERCISE
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use & Institutionalized
Persons Act

Colvin v. Caruso, 852 F.Supp.2d 862 (W.D.Mich. 2012). A state prisoner filed a § 1983 action against prison
officials, asserting that the prison's 16-day denial of kosher meals, mistakes in administering the kosher-meal
program, and lack of Jewish services and literature at the prison violated his constitutional rights and Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The district court denied the prisoner's motion for a
preliminary injunction, and subsequently granted summary judgment in favor of the officials, and denied
prisoner's motion to amend and second motion for preliminary injunction. The prisoner appealed. The appeals
court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. On remand, the district court held that the prison's “zero
tolerance” policy for possession of even one non-kosher food item violated the Free Exercise Clause and
RLUIPA. But the court determined that the officials were entitled to qualified immunity where there had not been
any determination that the regulation was in any way deficient at the time of the officials' actions. The court held
that the prison's use of questionnaire about the inmate's knowledge of his designated religion was proper.
According to the court, the officials' failure to reinstate the inmate to his kosher diet regimen violated the inmate's
rights but punitive damages were not warranted. The court awarded $1 in nominal damages where the inmate did
not look like he missed many meals as a result of the officials' actions, and there was no evidence of physical
injury. The court noted that even though the prison had economic interest in restricting kosher diet to prisoners
who had a sincere belief that the diet was necessary to practice their religion, where the inmate had no other
means of eating, there was no evidence that providing a modicum of flexibility would have a ripple effect on
prison staff or inmates or would escalate the cost of providing kosher meals. (Michigan Department of
Corrections, Alger Correctional Facility)

U.S. Appeals Court
BEARDS
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use & Institutionalized
Persons Act

Couch v. Jabe, 679 F.3d 197 (4th Cir. 2012). A state inmate brought an action alleging that prison officials
violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) by refusing to permit him to grow a
one-eighth-inch beard in compliance with the requirements of his faith. The district court entered summary
judgment in the officials' favor, and the inmate appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. The court held
that the Muslim inmate's maintenance of a beard was a qualifying “religious exercise” under RLUIPA. The court
found that state prison officials failed to satisfy their burden of showing that the policy banning beards for
religious purposes was the least restrictive means of furthering the prison's compelling interests in hygiene,
prohibiting contraband and gang identification, and facilitating identification of prisoners, and thus officials'
refusal to permit Muslim inmates to grow a one-eighth-inch beard in compliance with requirements of his faith
violated RLUIPA. The court noted that the officials failed to address the feasibility of implementing a religious
exemption, or to explain how the prison was able to deal with the beards of medically exempt inmates but could
not similarly accommodate religious exemptions. (Augusta Correctional Center, Virginia)

U.S. District Court
FREE EXERCISE
JEWELRY/
ORNAMENTS
RLUIPA- Religious
Land Use and
Institutionalized
Persons Act

Davis v. Abercrombie, 903 F.Supp.2d 975 (D.Hawai’I 2012). Inmates brought a state court action against the
governor of Hawai'i, the Director of the Hawai'i Department of Public Safety (DPS), and the private manager of a
correctional facility in Arizona at which they were housed, seeking declaratory relief that the defendants violated
their rights to free exercise of their religion by depriving them of their prayer objects. The action was removed to
federal court. The inmates moved for a preliminary injunction preventing the defendants from exercising the
policies that infringed on their right to exercise their religion. The district court denied the motion. The court held
that one inmate failed to exhaust his prison administrative remedies, as required under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (PLRA), prior to bringing the action. After submitting an informal resolution form, the inmate did not
obtain the final recommendation from the warden or the administrative duty officer on his damaged property
claim before initiating the grievance process under a prison policy, and the inmate did not appeal denial of his
formal grievance. The court held that lack of an irreparable harm to the inmate as a result of damage to his prayer
object, a turtle pendant, precluded the issuance of a preliminary injunction, where there was no imminent danger
the his sacred items would be desecrated absent injunctive relief. The court noted that the inmate's possession and
use of his prayer object, a kukui nut, was a “religious exercise” for purposes of the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA): the object was used in daily prayers and chants, in dances, and other
individual religious protocol and communal religious activities, it provided the inmate with spiritual comfort, and
it symbolized enlightenment, growth and accomplishment. The court found that the correctional facility's policy,
prohibiting the inmate from possessing his prayer object, a kukui nut, and requiring him to donate it to charity,
destroy it, or send it out of the institution, substantially burdened his religious exercise under RLUIPA. (Hawaii
Department of Public Safety, Corrections Corporation of America, Saguaro Correctional Center, Arizona, and
Red Rock Correctional Center, Arizona)

U.S. District Court
ARTICLES
EQUAL PROTECTION
FREE EXERCISE
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use & Institutionalized
Persons Act

Davis v. Powell, 901 F.Supp.2d 1196 (S.D.Cal. 2012). A state prisoner who was a Muslim brought a pro se §
1983 action against a prison warden and other prison employees for claims arising out of the prison's ban on
prayer oil. The court held that allegations that a prison warden issued an addendum to a Department Operations
Manual (DOM) that implemented a policy that only orders for certain religious items would be counted under the
quarterly package program was sufficient to state First Amendment retaliation claim against warden. The court
noted that: (1) the policy made it more burdensome to obtain items required for the inmate to practice his religion
or practice it as easily as inmates of different faiths; (2) that there existed a causal link between the policy and his
faith; (3) that his required religious oil was banned approximately five months after the inmate appealed the
policy; (4) that the policy would chill a person of ordinary firmness from practicing his religion, and (5) that a
legitimate penological interest was not furthered by the policy. The court found that the inmate’s allegation that a
prison warden enacted a policy which considered special orders for religious packages to be counted as quarterly
packages for inmates, because of its adverse effects on plaintiffs of a particular religion, stated an equal protection
claim. According to the court, the articles listed in the policy were those ordered by only prisoners of that religion.
The court held that the warden and officials were not entitled to qualified immunity from the inmate's claim
alleging a violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), where a reasonable
person in the position of the prison warden and related officials would believe that his or her conduct in enacting a
policy banning the purchase and receipt of prayer oil by inmates for 14 months violated inmates' First Amendment
right to freely exercise his or her religion and of the inmate’s Equal Protection rights. (Calipatria State Prison,
California)

37.109

U.S. District Court
EQUAL PROTECTION
FREE EXERCISE
PUBLICATIONS
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use & Institutionalized
Persons Act

Forter v. Geer, 868 F.Supp.2d 1091 (D.Or. 2012). A state inmate, who was a member of the Christian Identity
Faith and proceeding pro se, brought a § 1983 action against department of corrections (DOC) employees,
alleging violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The defendants filed a motion to dismiss and for summary judgment. The
district court granted the motions. The court held that the inmate did not file grievances for most claims, even
though such procedures were available to him, and he did not appeal those grievances that he did file, and
therefore failed to exhaust his administrative remedies under the provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of
1995. The court held that withholding of a religious poster did not substantially burden the religious exercise of
the inmate, who was a member of the Christian Identity Faith, as would violate the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The court also held that size restrictions which prevented the inmate
from possessing the religious poster did not violate his First Amendment free exercise rights, where the
regulations prevented any items, except subscription newspapers, over a certain size. According to the court,
prison officials withholding of certain religious pamphlets from the mail of the inmate, was validly and rationally
connected to a legitimate interest in ensuring order and safety, for the purposes of the inmate's § 1983 claim
alleging that the withholding violated his First Amendment free exercise and Fourteenth Amendment equal
protection rights. The court noted that the pamphlets contained racially inflammatory material and that the prison
population was racially mixed. (Oregon Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
FREE EXERCISE
HAIR LENGTH
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use & Institutionalized
Persons Act

Grayson v. Schuler, 666 F.3d 450 (7th Cir. 2012). A former state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a
correctional officer, alleging the forcible shearing of his dreadlocks violated the free exercise clause of the First
Amendment. The defendant moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The former
prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The appeals court held that while the prisoner's
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) claim against the correctional officer in his
official capacity was barred by the state's sovereign immunity, the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity.
The court noted that the Act does not create a cause of action against state employees in their personal capacity.
The court held that the taking of a Nazirite vow, which barred the cutting of hair, by the state prisoner who was a
member of the orthodox African Hebrew Israelites of Jerusalem was religiously motivated, for purposes of the
prisoner's claim that prison officials failed to accommodate his religious beliefs and thus violated the free exercise
clause of the First Amendment. The court found that the officer was not entitled to quality immunity because there
was no suggestion that the officer who ordered shearing of prisoner's dreadlocks due to a reasonable belief that the
prisoner was insincere in his religious beliefs, or was a security threat. (Big Muddy Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
PLACE TO WORSHIP
RFRA-Religious Freedom
Restoration Act

Johnson v. Killian, 680 F.3d 234 (2nd Cir. 2012). A federal prisoner brought an action against a warden, prison
rabbi, and prison chaplain alleging violation of his rights under the First Amendment and the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The prisoner
appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded, finding that the prisoner exhausted his administrative
remedies. According to the court, the prisoner's grievance challenging the prison's limitations on congregational
prayer at the prison, which was limited to only one time a day, five days a week, in a chapel, was sufficient to
exhaust his administrative remedies, under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (RFRA), with respect to the
continuing limitation on congregational prayer at the prison following a warden's replacement. According to the
court, the grievance provided prison administration an opportunity to resolve the same problem that would
continue intermittently until the lawsuit was filed, and issues raised in the lawsuit regarding the alleged
inadequacy of spaces and times allotted for congregational prayer were identical to issues exhausted in the
grievance. (Federal Correctional Institution, Otisville, New York)

U.S. District Court
DIET
OPPORTUNITY TO
PRACTICE
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use & Institutionalized
Persons Act

Jones v. Hobbs, 864 F.Supp.2d 808 (E.D.Ark. 2012). A prisoner brought an action against various state
department of correction (DOC) officials, alleging violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The defendants filed a motion for summary
judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment
was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to: (1) whether officials impeded the prisoner's efforts to
secure a diet which comported with the dictates of his religion; (2) whether fiscal and security concerns were
rationally connected to the denial of a religious diet; (3) whether the prisoner had a sufficient alternative means to
practice his religion; (4) whether there was an alternative way to accommodate the prisoner's request for a vegan
meal at de minimis cost to valid penological interests; and (5) whether the prisoner's right to a diet suiting his
religious beliefs was clearly established. (Arkansas Department of Correction)

U.S. District Court
OPPORTUNITY TO
PRACTICE
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use & Institutionalized
Persons Act
RESTRICTIONS
ARTICLES

Joseph v. Fischer, 900 F.Supp.2d 320 (W.D.N.Y. 2012). A state prisoner who observed the Nation of Gods and
Earths (NGE) faith brought an action against correctional officials, alleging that the officials violated his right to
practice his religion, denied his right of access to courts, and retaliated against him. The prisoner sought
declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as money damages. The officials moved for judgment on the pleadings.
The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the issue of whether
correctional officials' restrictions on NGE activities were adequately justified by legitimate security concerns, as
required under the First Amendment and RLUIPA, could not be resolved on a motion for judgment on the
pleadings, since it was not possible, based solely on the pleadings, to determine whether the actions of the
officials had unjustifiably burdened the prisoner's religious exercise. The court held that individual correctional
officials were qualifiedly immune from the prisoner's claim for damages based on the officials' preventing the
prisoner from participating in such activities, where the rights of the prisoner, who observed the NGE faith, to
hold study group classes, wear certain articles of clothing or emblems, and observe NGE holy days, were not
clearly established First Amendment rights, given that department of corrections protocols did not specifically
protect such religious activities. (Attica Correctional Facility, New York)

37.110

U.S. Appeals Court
ARTICLES
BOOKS

Kendrick v. Pope, 671 F.3d 686 (8th Cir. 2012). A female state inmate brought a civil rights action against a
corrections officer who allegedly confiscated religious items during a cell shakedown. The district court dismissed
the inmate's claims and she appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that genuine issues of
material fact precluded summary judgment. According to the court, summary judgment was precluded by a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the corrections officer confiscated the inmate's Catholic Bible, rosary
beads, and other religious materials during a cell shakedown, and subsequently failed to return those items.
(McPherson Unit, Arkansas Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
ARTICLES
CHAPLAIN
FREE EXERCISE
PRIVACY
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use & Institutionalized
Persons Act
SEARCHES
SWEAT LODGE

Knows His Gun v. Montana, 866 F.Supp.2d 1235 (D.Mont. 2012). Native American state prisoners brought an
action against a state, the state department of corrections (DOC), a private prison facility, and wardens, alleging
violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). Defendants filed motion to
dismiss. The district court held that: (1) the allegations were sufficient to plead the searches were a substantial
burden on their religious exercise; (2) the allegations were sufficient plead the confiscations and prohibitions were
a substantial burden on their religious exercise; (3) the allegations about relieving a prisoner from the pipe carrier
position were sufficient to plead it was a substantial burden on his religious exercise; (4) transferred prisoners did
not have standing for claims for injunctive and declaratory relief; (5) the private facility was a state actor; and (6)
the private facility was an instrumentality of the state. The Native American prisoners' alleged that the prison
subjected them to en masse strip searches before and after sweat lodge ceremonies, that the searches sometimes
occurred in a hallway where other inmates could see them and at least one occurred in a gym with video cameras
monitored by a female guard, and that some inmates declined to participate in the ceremony due to the degrading
nature of the searches. According to the court, the prisoners' allegations that sacred items were confiscated or
prohibited by the prison for their sweat lodge ceremonies, including smudge tobacco and antlers, and that the
items were essential for the ceremony to be meaningful and proper were sufficient to plead confiscations and
prohibitions were a substantial burden on their religious exercise, as required for their claims under RLUIPA. The
prisoner also alleged that they were subject to pat down searches before and after entering the ceremonial sweat
lodge grounds, that they were provided insufficient water and toilet facilities, that the size of the sweat lodge and
the frequency of the ceremonies was inadequate, and that they were not provided a Native American spiritual
advisor. (Montana Dept. of Corrections; Corrections Corporation of America; Crossroads Correctional Center)

U.S. Appeals Court
EQUAL PROTECTION
FREE EXERCISE
JEWELRY/ORNAMENTS
REGULATIONS
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use & Institutionalized
Persons Act

McFaul v. Valenzuela, 684 F.3d 564 (5th Cir. 2012). A prisoner brought a pro se civil rights action against prison
officials who had denied his request for a religious medallion to use in Celtic Druid ceremonies. The district court
entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed,
finding that the prison's prohibitions on nonconforming neo-Pagan medallions and medallions costing more than
$25 did not violate the prisoner's First Amendment right to free exercise of religion, and the prisoner failed to
meet his burden of showing that the prohibitions substantially burdened his ability to practice his religion, in violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The appeals court also held that
enforcement of the prohibitions against the prisoner did not violate equal protection. Officials had prevented the
prisoner from having a black onyx pentagram for use in Celtic Druid ceremonies, and the court found that the
prohibitions were reasonably related to penological interests, including safety, security, and discipline, did not
discriminate against nontraditional religions, and did not prevent the prisoner from performing some religious
rituals. The court noted that permitting prisoners to possess nonconforming medallions would have forced guards
to determine whether the items were permitted religious medallions or contraband items. (Preston Smith Unit,
Texas Department of Criminal Justice)

U.S. District Court
CORRESPONDENCE
OPPORTUNITY TO
WORSHIP
VOLUNTEERS

Moorehead v. Keller, 845 F.Supp.2d 689 (W.D.N.C. 2012). A state inmate, a Messianic Jew, brought a pro se §
1983 action against North Carolina Department of Corrections (DOC) officials, alleging that the officials prevented him from writing to his “spiritual advisor” and discontinued Messianic Jewish services at the prison, in
violation of his constitutional rights. The defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings. The district court
granted the motion. The court held that the state prison regulation prohibiting prison volunteers from corresponding with inmates was reasonably related to the prison's legitimate penological interest in preventing volunteers
from becoming unduly familiar with inmates, and thus the actions of North Carolina Department of Corrections
(DOC) officials in preventing the Messianic Jewish inmate from corresponding with his “spiritual advisor,” who
was a volunteer at the prison, pursuant to regulation did not violate the inmate's constitutional rights. (Mountain
View Correctional Institution, North Carolina)

U.S. Appeals Court
DIET
EQUAL PROTECTION
RLUIPA- Religious
Land Use and
Institutionalized
Persons Act
SINCERITY

Moussazadeh v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, 703 F.3d 781 (5th Cir. 2012). A Jewish state prisoner brought an
action against the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, alleging that the defendant denied his grievances and
requests for kosher meals in violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and
the Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendant and
the prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that the state Jewish prisoner
exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to his claim that a prison's failure to provide him with kosher
meals violated RLUIPA, where the prisoner went through the state's entire grievance process before filing suit.
The court found that sufficient evidence established that the prisoner's religious beliefs were sincere, as required
to support a claim against state's department of criminal justice for violation of RLUIPA, where the prisoner
stated that he was born and raised Jewish and had always kept a kosher household, the prisoner offered evidence
that he requested kosher meals from the chaplain, kitchen staff, and the department, and while at another prison,
he ate kosher meals provided to him from the dining hall. The court noted that the prisoner was harassed for his
adherence to his religious beliefs and for his demands for kosher food, and that the department transferred the
prisoner for a time so he could receive kosher food.
The court held that the prisoner was denied a generally available benefit because of his religious beliefs, and
thus, the state's department of criminal justice imposed a substantial burden on the prisoner's religious exercise
under RLUIPA, where every prisoner in the department's custody received a nutritionally sufficient diet, every
observant Jewish prisoner at the designated prison received a kosher diet free of charge, and the Jewish prisoner at

37.111

issue was forced to pay for his kosher meals. The court found that there was no evidence of a compelling government interest in forcing the Jewish prisoner to pay for all of his kosher meals. The court also found that summary
judgment was precluded by a general dispute of material fact as to whether the state's department of criminal justice employed the least restrictive means of minimizing costs and maintaining security by forcing the Jewish prisoner to pay for all of his kosher meals. (Eastham Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional
Institutions Division)
U.S. District Court
TOBACCO
ARTICLES
RESTRICTIONS
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use & Institutionalized
Persons Act

Native American Council of Tribes v. Weber, 897 F.Supp.2d 828 (D.S.D. 2012). A Native American organization
and inmates brought an action against the Secretary of the South Dakota Department of Corrections, alleging the
Department's policy banning all tobacco from its facilities violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA). The district court found that the inmates' use of tobacco was a religious exercise protected
under RLUIPA, that the policy placed a substantial burden on the inmates' exercise of their religious beliefs, and
the policy was not supported by a compelling governmental interest where there was little evidence that tobacco
from the Native American religious ceremonies created a security or safety risk. According to the court, the Native American inmates' use of tobacco in pipes, tobacco ties, and prayer flags was a religious exercise protected
under RLUIPA, notwithstanding the use of red willow bark instead of tobacco by other members of their tribe.
The court noted that the inmates used tobacco prior to their incarceration as part of traditional healing and other
religious ceremonies. (South Dakota Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
EQUAL PROTECTION
FREE EXERCISE
RECOGNIZED RELIGION
REGULATIONS
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use & Institutionalized
Persons Act

Panayoty v. Annucci, 898 F.Supp.2d 469 (N.D.N.Y. 2012). Inmates in a state prison who were affiliated with the
religious group Nation of Gods and Earth filed a § 1983 action against prison officials seeking declarative and
injunctive relief concerning constraints the prison placed on the practice of their religion, which allegedly violated
the First Amendment and Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), as well as the equal
protection clause of Fourteenth Amendment. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court
granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court found that the inmates' practice of congregating with each
other and wearing crowns, as part of their affiliation with the Nation of Gods and Earth group, was religious in the
inmates' scheme of beliefs, and sincerely held, as required to demonstrate a prima facie showing of First Amendment free exercise and RLUIPA violations against the prison officials who had established protocols prohibiting
such practices. The court noted that one inmate had a twelve-year history of the religious practice, dating back to
before he was incarcerated, another inmate's practice extended back 25 years, and both expressed that the Nation
of Gods and Earth religion had helped them draw closer to a life of righteousness and had shaped their character.
The court held that there was no evidence that the inmates' practice of displaying the Nation of Gods and
Earth's Universal Flag, symbols, and texts in their cells, as part of their affiliation with the group, was religious in
the inmates' scheme of beliefs, and sincerely held, and the inmates failed to adequately assert First Amendment
free exercise and RLUIPA violations against prison officials. Although the inmates asserted that the prison's prohibition of this practice required them to live under a shroud of secrecy, members of the group were required to
register with the facility deputy superintendent for programs, so their practice was well known. The court held that
summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the prison prohibition on the
practice of congregating with each other and wearing religious crowns was reasonably related to security concerns
that the religion was affiliated with gang activity, and whether the measures were the least restrictive means of
accomplishing security concerns. (New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision, Mid–
Orange Correctional Facility, Riverview Correctional Facility)

U.S. Appeals Court
OPPORTUNITY TO
PRACTICE
RLUIPA- Religious
Land Use and
Institutionalized
Persons Act

Pouncil v. Tilton, 704 F.3d 568 (9th Cir. 2012). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action alleging that denials by
prison officials of his request for a conjugal visit with his wife violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and the First Amendment by interfering with his practice of a tenet of his Islamic
faith requiring him to marry, consummate his marriage, and father children. The district court denied a prison
official's motion to dismiss the prisoner's claims as untimely, and the official appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that notwithstanding a prior denial pursuant to the same regulation, denial of the prisoner's
second request for a conjugal visit was a separate, discrete act, triggering running of the statute of limitations on
the prisoner's Section 1983 claim against prison officials for violation of his First Amendment and RLUIPA
rights. (Mule Creek State Prison, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
FREE EXERCISE
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use & Institutionalized
Persons Act

Sharp v. Johnson, 669 F.3d 144 (3rd Cir. 2012). An inmate, who was a Sunni Muslim of the Habashi sect, brought
an action against officials at two prisons, alleging violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments and the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The district court entered judgment in favor of
the defendants after a bench trial. The inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that:
(1) RLUIPA did not permit the inmate's action against prison officials; (2) the error in placing the burden upon the
inmate was not harmful; (3) it was not an abuse of discretion to permit prison officials to raise a qualified immunity defense at trial; and (4) the officials were entitled to qualified immunity. (Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, SCI–Pittsburgh and SCI–Greene)

U.S. Appeals Court
DIET
FREE EXERCISE
PLACE TO WORSHIP

Sisney v. Reisch, 674 F.3d 839 (8th Cir. 2012). A state prisoner brought a civil rights action against prison officials, alleging that the officials violated his First Amendment free exercise rights when they denied his requests to
erect, and eat his meals in, a temporary structure during a Jewish festival. The district court entered judgment in
favor of the officials, and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that prison
officials did not violate the prisoner's clearly established First Amendment free exercise rights when they denied
his requests to erect and eat his meals in a temporary structure or “succah” during a Jewish festival, entitling them
to qualified immunity. According to the court, it was not apparent that the contours of a prisoner's right to reasonable dietary and meal accommodations extended to the use of a succah. (South Dakota State Penitentiary)

37.112

U.S. Appeals Court
FREE EXERCISE
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use & Institutionalized
Persons Act

Stewart v. Beach, 701 F.3d 1322 (10th Cir. 2012). An inmate sued corrections officers, alleging violations of his
rights under the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA). The district court entered judgment for the defendants, and the inmate appealed. The
appeals court affirmed. The court found that the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000
(RLUIPA) does not permit a claim against individual defendants in their individual capacities. The court noted
that Congress enacted RLUIPA pursuant to the Spending Clause of the Constitution, and the spending power
cannot be used to subject individual defendants, such as state employees, to individual liability in a private cause
of action. (El Dorado Correctional Facility, Kansas)

U.S. District Court
FREE EXERCISE
PLACE OF WORSHIP

Sweet v. Northern Neck Regional Jail, 857 F.Supp.2d 595 (E.D.Va. 2012). An inmate, proceeding in forma
pauperis, brought a § 1983 action against a sergeant and a jail, alleging that a prohibition against speaking in Arabic during prayer violated his First Amendment rights. The district court dismissed the case. The court held that
the jail policy requiring prayers or services be spoken in English when inmates from different housing units and
classification levels congregated, but allowing prayers to be offered in Arabic within individual housing units, was
reasonably related to legitimate penological interests of security and did not substantially burden inmates' right to
free exercise of their First Amendment rights. The court noted that the jail was concerned about inmates plotting
riots or escapes while congregating with other units, jail officers did not speak Arabic, and inmates could gather
within their housing units and pray in Arabic. (Northern Neck Regional Jail, Virginia)
2013

U.S. District Court
DIET
SINCERITY
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use & Institutionalized
Persons Act

Borkholder v. Lemmon, 983 F.Supp.2d 1013 (N.D.Ind. 2013). A prisoner brought an action against state prison
officials seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to challenge the officials' decision to revoke his vegan diet. Both
parties moved for summary judgment. The district court denied the officials’ motion, granted the prisoner’s
motion, and entered an injunction. The court held that the fact that the prisoner's vegan diet had been restored did
not render moot his declaratory judgment action against state prison officials, in which he alleged that they
violated his religious rights by revoking his vegan diet for purchasing chicken-flavored ramen noodles, because
no vegetarian noodles were available to him, and his vegan diet was subject to revocation anytime he ordered
ramen noodles, regardless of whether he consumed the seasoning packet containing chicken. The court found that
the prisoner demonstrated a substantial burden to his religious practice, satisfying his initial burden under The
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), where the prisoner held a religious belief that
required him to adhere to a vegan diet, he purchased chicken-flavored ramen noodles from the state prison
commissary, the commissary did not carry a vegetarian noodle option, the prisoner did not eat the meat flavoring
packet but instead discarded it, and the prisoner's vegan diet was revoked solely due to his noodle purchase.
According to the court, prison officials' revocation of the prisoner's vegan diet was not the least restrictive
means to further a compelling governmental interest, and thus the officials did not meet their burden under
RLUIPA to justify such action,. The court noted that although the state prison policy dictated that personal
preference diet cards could be confiscated if a prisoner abused or misused the privilege by voluntarily consuming
self-prohibited foods, and such policy was legitimately geared toward weeding out insincere requests, the
prisoner's purchase of noodles with a meat seasoning packet did not mean that his beliefs were insincere. The
district court decision opened by stating: “It is not every day that someone makes a federal case out of ramen
noodles. But unfortunately that's what Joshus Borkholder had to do.” (Miami Correctional Facility, Indiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
HAIR
OPPORTUNITY TO
WORSHIP
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use & Institutionalized
Persons Act
RESTRICTIONS
NATIVE AMERICANS

Chance v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, 730 F.3d 404 (5th Cir. 2013). A state prisoner brought an action
against prison officials, challenging restrictions on his Native American religious practices under the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The district court granted the defendants' motion for
summary judgment. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The
appeals court held that: (1) the prison's complete ban on communal pipe-smoking did not violate RLUIPA; (2) the
prison's schedule of Native American religious services did not violate RLUIPA; (3) the prison policy limiting the
Native American Smudging ritual to outdoor ceremonies did not violate RLUIPA; but (4) summary judgment was
precluded by a genuine issue of material fact with regard to whether the prison's refusal to allow the prisoner to
possess locks of relatives' hair in accordance with his Native American religious practice was the least restrictive
means of furthering the prison's compelling interests. (Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Michael Unit in
Tennessee Colony)

U.S. District Court
DIET
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use & Institutionalized
Persons Act

Conway v. Purves, 963 F.Supp.2d 708 (E.D.Mich. 2013). State prisoners brought an action against a state
department of corrections (DOC) and its officials challenging the nutritional adequacy of the meals provided to
the prisoners during the Islamic month of Ramadan, and asserting claims for violation of the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and constitutional violations. The plaintiffs moved for a preliminary
injunction or a temporary restraining order (TRO) to require the department of corrections and its officials to
provide nutritionally balanced meals containing between 2600 and 2900 calories on any given day during
Ramadan. The district court denied the motion, finding that the prisoners failed to show certain and immediate
irreparable harm, as required for a preliminary injunction. The court noted that Ramadan had recently concluded,
that any harm that the prisoners could suffer approximately one year in the future was speculative, and the action
would likely be resolved prior to the next Ramadan observance. (Michigan Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
BOOKS
FREE EXERCISE
RFRA- Religious
Freedom Restoration
Act

Cooke v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 926 F.Supp.2d 720 (E.D.N.C. 2013). Detainees who used wheelchairs and who
were civilly committed at a federal corrections facility as sexually dangerous persons filed suit, seeking injunctive
relief against the United States Bureau of Prisons for its alleged failure to accommodate their disabilities in violation of the Architectural Barriers Act (ABA), the Rehabilitation Act, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA), and the First and Fifth Amendments. The government moved to dismiss and for summary judgment, and
the detainees moved for discovery and to deny the government's motions. The district court granted the motions in

37.113

part and denied in part. The court found that although the detainees failed to exhaust administrative remedies prior
to filing suit under the ABA, the detainees were not “prisoners” as defined by the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(PLRA) and thus did not have to exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit. The court found that the detainees, by alleging that, unlike detainees without disabilities, they could not access the prison's religious library
or an outdoor pagan worship area, stated claims under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) in their action seeking injunctive relief against the Bureau of Prisons
for failing to accommodate their disabilities. The court held that the detainees failed to state a claim for a violation
of the constitutional right to privacy. According to the court, even assuming that the detainees had a limited
constitutional right to privacy in medical treatment, the inmates alleged that the prison medical facility had no
private, wheelchair-accessible examination room, but did not allege harm from the use or disclosure of their
medical information. (Butner Federal Correctional Complex, North Carolina)
U.S. Appeals Court
DIET
EQUAL PROTECTION

Furnace v. Sullivan, 705 F.3d 1021 (9th Cir. 2013). A state prison inmate brought a § 1983 action against correctional officers, alleging they used excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment by spraying him with an
excessive quantity of pepper spray, and that they violated his rights to equal protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment rights when they denied him a vegetarian breakfast as required by his religion. The officers moved
for summary judgment. The district court granted the motions, and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine
issues of material fact as to whether the inmate posed a threat to correctional officers, and as to whether the
officers' discharge of pepper spray on the inmate was required to gain his compliance. The court found that
correctional officers who refused to provide the inmate with a vegetarian meal required by his religion did not
treat the inmate any differently than others who were similarly situated, and thus the officers did not violate the
inmate's Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection. The court noted that although other prisoners were
provided with vegetarian meals for religious reasons, they were not similarly situated to the inmate because the
officers did not know the inmate had also been approved for a vegetarian meal. (Salinas Valley State Prison,
California)

U.S. Appeals Court
BEARDS
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use & Institutionalized
Person Act

Garner v. Kennedy, 713 F.3d 237 (5th Cir. 2013). A Muslim state prisoner brought an action against prison
officials alleging the Texas Department of Criminal Justice's (TDCJ) policy of prohibiting prisoners from wearing
beards for religious reasons violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and his
constitutional rights. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, and the prisoner appealed.
The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. On remand, and after a bench trial, the district
court granted declaratory and injunctive relief in favor of the prisoner. The defendants appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The appeals court held that TDCJ's no-beard policy was not the least restrictive means of advancing the
compelling government interest in controlling costs, and the no-beard policy was not the least restrictive means of
advancing the compelling government interest in security. According to the court, although prison officials
testified that there would be additional costs from allowing prisoners to wear quarter-inch beards for religious
reasons due to the construction of barbershops, the purchase of barbering supplies, or the creation of new
identification cards, almost all of that testimony was speculative, the officials admitted that no specific studies of
costs had been done, and there was no evidence that TDCJ, which already imposed limits on hair length, would
encounter greater or added difficulty if it enforced a one-quarter-inch as opposed to a clean-shaven rule. Although
TDCJ presented evidence that allowing inmates to have beards hindered inmate identification, TDCJ allowed
inmates to shave their heads, and there was testimony that shaved heads posed just as many identification
problems as allowing prisoners to grow and shave beards. (Texas Department of Criminal Justice, McConnell
Unit, Beeville, Texas)

U.S. District Court
DIET
MEDICAL CARE
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use & Institutionalized
Persons Act

Garnica v. Washington Dept. of Corrections, 965 F.Supp.2d 1250 (W.D. Wash. 2013). A state prisoner brought
an action in state court against the Washington Department of Corrections (DOC) and DOC personnel, alleging
violations of First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act (RLUIPA). The action was removed to federal court, and the defendants moved for summary judgment. The
district court granted the motion. The court held that even if the ailments that the Muslim prisoner experienced
during a Ramadan fast were related to meals provided to him by prison personnel during the fast, those ailments
were not sufficiently serious to constitute a serious medical need, as required to establish prison personnel's
deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The court found that
prison personnel did not act with deliberate indifference to the Muslim prisoner's health and safety with respect to
the meals provided to the prisoner during his Ramadan fast, and thus, there was no violation of the prisoner's
Eighth Amendment rights. The court noted that prison personnel acted with the intent to provide the prisoner and
other Ramadan participants with proper nutrition and calories during Ramadan, and when they learned the caloric
value of the prison's Ramadan meals had been miscalculated, they corrected the caloric values and added
supplements to the meals to ensure that the goal of 2700 average calories was met. When the prisoner complained
of diarrhea, constipation, and headaches during Ramadan, he was seen by a DOC medical professional and was
treated for his complaints.
The court held that the prisoner's right to practice his Muslim religion was not substantially burdened, within
the meaning of RLUIPA, by the nature or quantity of food provided to him by prison personnel during the
Ramadan fast. According to the court, although the prisoner was not satisfied with the quality or quantity of the
food provided, he and other Ramadan participants were given a daily meal and supplements. The court found that
meals contained an average of 2700 calories and he and other vegetarian participants received additional snacks to
compensate for meat items they could not consume. The court noted that even though one meal that was provided
contained only approximately 1900 calories due to a mistake in packaging the Ramadan meals, the mistake was
corrected the next day and thereafter the prisoner was given calorically and nutritionally adequate meals
throughout the Ramadan fast. (Clallam Bay Corrections Center, Washington Department of Corrections)

37.114

U.S. Appeals Court
CHAPLAIN
EQUAL PROTECTION
ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE
FREE EXERCISE
RLUIPA- Religious
Land Use and
Institutionalized
Persons Act
VOLUNTEERS

Hartmann v. California Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 707 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2013). California state
prisoners brought a § 1983 action against, among others, the California Department of Corrections (CDCR),
alleging that the defendants violated their state and federal constitutional rights to exercise their religious beliefs
by refusing to hire a paid, full–time, Wiccan chaplain and by failing to apply neutral criteria in determining
whether paid chaplaincy positions were necessary to meet the religious exercise needs of inmates adhering to
certain religions. The district court dismissed claims against the California State Personnel Board and its
individual members, and, dismissed claims against the state, its governor, and various other agencies and
individuals. The prisoners appealed.
The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held that: (1) the First Amendment did not
require CDCR to provide inmates with chaplain of their choice, regardless of whether the number of Wiccan
inmates was greater than the number of inmates practicing faiths for which CDCR did provide staff chaplain,
because the prisoners had a reasonable opportunity to exercise their faith via the services of staff chaplains and a
volunteer Wiccan chaplain that they already received; (2) the prison policy did not violate prisoners' rights under
the Equal Protection Clause where the prison provided the plaintiffs with a volunteer Wiccan chaplain when
available, made staff chaplains available to all prisoners to assist in their religious exercise, and the prison
administration considered the prisoners' requests at three different levels of review before determining that
services were sufficient without hiring a full–time Wiccan chaplain; (3) the prisoners did not plead that their
religious exercise was so burdened as to pressure them to abandon their beliefs, precluding their claim that the
prison administration violated their rights under Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA);
(4) two prison officials were proper official–capacity defendants on the prisoners' claim for injunctive relief where
the prisoners sought an affirmative injunction requiring the prison administration to adopt and apply neutral
criteria in determining chaplain hiring needs and they alleged that each official was responsible for the policies
and practices of the California Department of Corrections (CDCR), as well as the day–to–day operation of the
prison; and, (5) permitting prisoners to amend complaint was unwarranted on futility grounds.
But the court found that the prisoners did state a claim for violation of the First Amendment's Establishment
Clause by alleging that the prison administration created staff chaplain positions for five conventional faiths,
refused to hire a paid, full–time, Wiccan chaplain, and failed to apply neutral criteria in evaluating whether the
growing membership in minority religions warranted reallocation of resources used in accommodating inmates'
religious exercise needs. (California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation)

U.S. Appeals Court
PAROLE

Hazle v. Crofoot, 727 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2013). A parolee, who was an atheist, brought an action against various
state officials and a state contractor, seeking damages and injunctive relief for the deprivation of his First
Amendment rights, after his parole was revoked following his refusal to participate in a residential drug treatment
program that required him to acknowledge a higher power, as a condition of his parole. The contractor, Westcare,
was a private regional substance abuse coordination agency, and made the arrangements for the parolee’s
placement in the program. After the parolee was granted partial summary judgment by the district court, a jury
awarded the parolee zero damages. The district court denied the parolee’s motion for a new trial, and the parolee
appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that the parolee was entitled to an award of
compensatory damages for each day that he spent in prison as a result of the violation of his First Amendment
rights by various state officials. The appeals court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue
of material fact as to whether the contractor's conduct was the proximate cause of the parolee's unconstitutional
imprisonment, when it contracted only with drug treatment facilities offering solely religious based programs or
services, and counseled and arranged for the parolee to attend a religion-based facility as part of his state-imposed
parole program, despite having been informed that the parolee was an atheist and that he objected to such
religious programming. The court held that the parolee's claim under California law for an injunction preventing
both a state contractor and various state officials from expending state funds in an unconstitutional manner that
required parolees to participate in religious treatment programs in order to be eligible for parole, failed to provide
parolees with secular or non-religious treatment alternatives, and revoked the parole of those who protested or
resisted participation in religion-based treatment programs, was not rendered moot after the state issued a
directive stating that parole agents could not require a parolee to attend any religious based program if the parolee
refused to participate for religious reasons, where the state directive had not been implemented in any meaningful
fashion. (California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitations, Board of Parole Hearings, Westcare, and
Empire Recovery Center, California)

U.S. District Court
DIET
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use & Institutionalized
Persons Act

Johns v. Lemmon, 980 F.Supp.2d 1055 (N.D.Ind. 2013). An inmate, who was an Observant Jew, brought an
action against a prison superintendent and a commissioner of the department of corrections (DOC), alleging that
denial of food on Friday to consume on the Sabbath violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act (RLUIPA). The parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the plaintiff’s motion
and denied the defendants’ motion. The court held that the prison's failure to provide food on Friday to the inmate
was a substantial burden on his religious exercise, and that the practice did not serve a compelling governmental
interest of food safety. The inmate sought to have food provided on Friday to consume on the Sabbath, and the
prison’s refusal required him to buy his Sabbath food from the commissary. The court noted that the inmate's
preferred practice was permitted for a period of about five months and during that time the inmate stored meals in
a cooler for a day, which other prisoners were permitted to do. (Miami Correctional Facility, Indiana Department
of Corrections)

37.115

U.S. Appeals Court
BOOKS
ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE
FREE EXERCISE
OPPORTUNITY TO
PRACTICE
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use & Institutionalized
Persons Act
SERVICES

Kaufman v. Pugh, 733 F.3d 692 (7th Cir. 2013). A state prisoner brought an action against prison officials,
challenging their refusal to permit a weekly atheist study group, their refusal to allow the prisoner to wear a
“knowledge thought ring” that he regarded as a religious symbol, and their failure to make atheist books that he
donated available in the prison library. The prisoner asserted claims under the Free Exercise Clause, the
Establishment Clause, and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The district court
granted summary judgment to the prison officials. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part,
vacated in part, and remanded. The appeals court held that summary judgment was precluded by fact issue as to
how many prisoners in the state prison would be interested in forming a weekly atheism study group.
The court found that refusal to allow the prisoner to wear a “knowledge thought ring” did not discriminate
against atheism. The court noted that the prisoner conceded that the ring was an individualized symbol, thereby
admitting that his inability to wear the ring did not impose a substantial burden on his ability to practice atheism.
According to the court, the prison officials were entitled to draw a distinction between, on the one hand, religious
emblems that were common to members of other umbrella religious groups, easy to recognize, and difficult to
abuse as a gang symbol, and on the other hand, emblems that were unique to each prisoner and that posed a
potential security risks. According to the court, prison officials' refusal to allow the state prisoner to form a
weekly atheism study group did not violate the prisoner's rights under the Free Exercise Clause or the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), in the absence of evidence that the prisoner would be
unable to practice atheism effectively without the benefit of a weekly study group. The court found that the
alleged failure of state prison officials to make available in the prison library three used books on atheism that had
been mailed to the prisoner, did not violate the prisoner's rights under the Free Exercise Clause and the RLUIPA,
absent evidence of a substantial burden on the prisoner's ability to follow his atheistic beliefs. (Stanley
Correctional Facility, Wisconsin)

U.S. Appeals Court
EQUAL PROTECTION
HAIR LENGTH
NATIVE AMERICANS
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use & Institutionalized
Persons Act

Knight v. Thompson, 723 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2013). Native American inmates brought an action against the
Alabama Department of Corrections, challenging its short-hair policy under the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The district court entered judgment for the Department and the inmates
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the Department’s short-hair policy for male
inmates furthered compelling governmental interests in security, discipline, hygiene, and safety, as required to
survive a challenge under RLUIPA by inmates who wished to wear their hair long in accordance with dictates of
their Native American religion. The court noted that long hair was used to conceal weapons and contraband, it
concealed inmates' fungus outbreaks, sores, cysts, and tumors, and it impeded the ability of prison staff to identify
inmates. According to the court, allowing an exception for Native American inmates would not eliminate the
Department's concerns, as inmates could manipulate searches of their own hair to conceal weapons, and it would
do nothing to assuage the Department's concerns about hair-pulling during fights. The court held that the
Department’s short-hair policy, which applied to all male inmates without exception, did not discriminate on the
basis of race or religion in violation of the Native American inmates' equal protection rights. (Alabama
Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
BOOKS
FREE EXERCISE
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use & Institutionalized
Persons Act

Kramer v. Conway, 962 F.Supp.2d 1333 (N.D.Ga. 2013). A pretrial detainee at a county jail brought an action
against the jail, the jail administrator, and a county sheriff, alleging that conditions of his confinement violated his
right to practice his Orthodox Jewish faith, that the defendants violated his right to possess legal reference books,
and that the defendants failed to accommodate his physical disabilities. The detainee moved for a preliminary and
a permanent injunction and moved for leave to file a second amendment to his verified complaint. The defendants
moved for summary judgment. The district court denied the motions in part and granted the motion in part. The
court held that the pretrial detainee’s allegation that the county jail denied him books needed to practice his
Orthodox Jewish religious faith failed to establish a violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA), absent evidence that the county jail received federal funds in connection with its policies
limiting the number and type of books allowed in cells. The court held that the county jail's policy of limiting the
number of religious books that the pretrial detainee, an Orthodox Jew, could keep in his cell, but providing him
access to others that were not in his cell, was based on legitimate penological interests, and thus, did not violate
the detainee's rights under the Free Exercise Clause. According to the court, a uniformly applied books-in-cell
limitation was reasonable in a facility that housed 2,200 inmates, the limitation was applied in a neutral way and
the expressive content of books was not considered, books in sufficient quantities could be used as weapons and
presented fire and obstacle hazards, access to other books was made by exchanging out titles and by allowing the
copying of parts or all of a text, and the detainee was not denied access to nine religious books he claimed were
required in practicing his faith, but rather, argued only that access was required to be more convenient.
The court found that the jail's policy of prohibiting hard cover books in cells, including limiting religious
texts to those that did not have hard covers, was based on legitimate penological interests, and thus, did not violate
rights of the pretrial detainee, an Orthodox Jew, under the Free Exercise Clause. The court noted that evidence at
hearing on the detainee's motion for injunctive relief showed that hardcover books posed safety and security risks
because hard covers could be used to conceal contraband and because of their potential use as weapons, the policy
was applied in a neutral way, and the expressive content of books was not considered.
The court found that the jail's policy of limiting package mail to four pounds was based on legitimate
penological interests, and thus, did not violate rights as applied to the pretrial detainee, an Orthodox Jew, under
the Free Exercise Clause when the jail rejected one of detainee's packages that contained more than four pounds
of books. The court noted that the jail received a large volume of mail and other items each day, all of which had
to be searched for contraband and threats their contents could pose to the safety and security of inmates and jail
officials, the policy was applied in a neutral way, and the expressive content of books was not considered. The
court held that the jail's policy that limited the number and type of books allowed in a cell did not violate the
pretrial detainee's Due Process rights, where there was no evidence that the policy was intended to punish the
detainee, the jail's policies prohibiting hard cover books and limiting the number of books allowed in a cell were
reasonably related to legitimate penological interests, and the jail gave the detainee substantial access to legal
materials by increasing the time he was allowed in the library and liberally allowing him to copy legal materials to
keep in his cell. (Gwinnett County Jail, Georgia)

37.116

U.S. Appeals Court
EQUAL PROTECTION
HAIR LENGTH
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use & Institutionalized
Persons Act

Lewis v. Sternes, 712 F.3d 1083 (7th Cir. 2013). A state prisoner brought an action against prison officials under §
1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), alleging removal of his dreadlocks
violated his religious rights and denied him equal protection. The district court granted the defendants' motion for
summary judgment. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that there was no
evidence that the prison had no need to regulate hair length or hairstyle, or that the need was not great enough to
warrant interference with the inmate's religious observance. (Dixon Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
DIET
FREE EXERCISE

Lewis v. Zon, 920 F.Supp.2d 379 (W.D.N.Y. 2013). A Jewish inmate brought an action against a state's
department of corrections and approximately 50 of its officials and employees pursuant to § 1983 and the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), alleging denial of religious accommodations in
violation of the First Amendment and RLUIPA. The inmate moved for summary judgment and the defendants
cross moved to dismiss and/or for summary judgment. The district court denied the plaintiff’s motion, and granted
in part and denied in part the defendant’s motion. The court held that: (1) there was no evidence that the prison's
practice of inspecting the inmate's meals substantially burdened the prisoner's free exercise of his faith; (2) the
prison's policy of inspecting the prisoners' meals for dangerous items was objectively reasonable; (3) the prison's
offering of religious meal plans to inmates who demonstrated entitlement thereto preserved the inmates' free
exercise freedoms; (4) the prison's failure to provide the inmate with food during Jewish holy day fast days was
not cruel and unusual punishment; (5) there was no evidence that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to
the inmate's medical needs during his hunger strike; (6) a material fact dispute regarding whether the inmate was
denied medical treatment when he began experiencing pain after the culmination of his hunger strike precluded
summary judgment on the claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need; and (7) the inmate's having
to forego fresh bedding for a few hours after soiling his bedding was not a serious medical situation requiring
treatment.(New York State Department of Correctional Services, Upstate Correctional Facility, Downstate
Correctional Facility, Wende Correctional Facility, and Auburn Correctional Facility)

U.S. Appeals Court
RELIGIOUS DIET

Mays v. Springborn, 719 F.3d 631 (7th Cir. 2013). A former state prisoner brought an action against prison
officials, asserting claims based on strip searches at prisons and alleging retaliation for his complaints about the
searches, denial of his request for a dietary supplements which he considered to be religious necessities,
inadequacy of his diet, failure to issue certain winter clothing items, and censorship of pages in a magazine mailed
to him. The district granted summary judgment in favor of the officials on the claims about prison food and
clothing and granted the officials judgment as a matter of law on the claims about strip searches, retaliation, and
censorship. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated the judgment with respect to the
strip searches, and remanded. On remand, the district court entered judgment, upon a jury verdict, in favor of the
officials as to the strip search claims, and the prisoner again appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded.
The appeals court held that: (1) even if there was a valid penological reason for the strip searches conducted on a
prisoner, the manner in which the searches were conducted was itself required to pass constitutional muster, and
(2) a jury instruction requiring the prisoner to negate the possibility that strip searches would have occurred even
if there had been no retaliatory motive was plain error. (Stateville Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
OPPORTUNITY TO
WORSHIP
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use & Institutionalized
Persons Act

McCreary v. Richardson, 738 F.3d 651 (5th Cir. 2013). A Muslim state inmate brought an action against a prison
captain in his individual capacity, alleging that the captain ordered an unconstitutional strip search and prevented
him from attending religious services in violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Person's Act
(RLUIPA), and the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court denied the inmate's motion for
default judgment and granted the captain's motion for summary judgment. The inmate appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The appeals court held that: (1) the inmate was not entitled to monetary damages against a correctional
officer under the provisions of RLUIPA; (2) the strip search did not violate the inmate's Fourth Amendment
rights; (3) a reasonable officer would not know that a lengthy strip search in the presence of female officers
violated clearly established law, and thus the captain was entitled to qualified immunity; and (4) the captain did
not act in an objectively unreasonable manner by refusing to permit the inmate to attend a religious service after
the search, where the inmate had created a disturbance during the search. According to the court, the inmate’s
potentially provocative questions in a public hallway constituted a disturbance, where during the strip search, the
inmate asked the captain why he was singling out Muslims and subjecting them to harassment in a hallway with
several other Muslim inmates who were waiting to attend a religious service. (H.H. Coffield Unit, Texas
Department of Criminal Justice)

U.S. District Court
DIET
FREE EXERCISE

Munson v. Gaetz, 957 F.Supp.2d 951 (S.D.Ill. 2013). A Buddhist inmate brought a § 1983 action against prison
officials, alleging failure to provide him with an adequate diet, deliberate indifference to his serious medical
needs, and violations of his right to free exercise of religion. The officials moved for summary judgment. The
district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the officials were not aware that
feeding the inmate a soy-rich diet posed a substantial risk of serious harm to the inmate, and therefore, the
officials were entitled to qualified immunity from the inmate's § 1983 claim alleging violations of the Eighth
Amendment. The court found that there was no evidence that a vegetarian diet containing soy was nutritionally
inadequate, as required for the Buddhist inmate's § 1983 claim alleging violations of his First Amendment free
exercise rights. The court held that the Buddhist inmate had administratively exhausted his claims that a high-soy
diet fed to him violated the Eighth Amendment and his First Amendment free exercise rights, where he had
submitted grievances about the diet to the grievance office, he wrote to a warden and an assistant warden
regarding his grievances, and the prison officials did not respond to the grievances. (Menard Correctional Center,
Illinois)

37.117

U.S. Appeals Court
NAME
EQUAL PROTECTION
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use & Institutionalized
Persons Act

Mutawakkil v. Huibregtse, 735 F.3d 524 (7th Cir. 2013). An inmate brought an action alleging that a Wisconsin
prison policy that required inmates to use their committed names in conjunction with a second name unless a state
court approved a change-of-name application, in violation of the First Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause,
and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The district court entered judgment for
the defendants and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the policy did not
violate either the speech clause or the free-exercise clause of the First Amendment. The court found that the
policy did not violate the Equal Protection Clause, absent an allegation that any inmate, of any race or religion,
was allowed to change his name on his own say-so after being convicted. The court found that the policy did not
create a substantial burden on the inmate's religious exercise, as would violate RLUIPA. The court noted that the
dual name requirement served the compelling governmental interest of maintaining prison security, and the
requirement was the least restrictive means of satisfying that interest. The court commented on the name of the
statute: “…which often goes by the unpronounceable initialism RLUIPA but which we call ‘the Act’ so that the
opinion can be understood by normal people.” (Wisconsin Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
DIET

Parkell v. Morgan, 917 F.Supp.2d 328 (D.Del. 2013). A pretrial detainee, proceeding pro se and in forma
pauperis, brought a § 1983 action against a medical provider and various officials, alleging violations of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court found that the detainee’s allegations
that he did not have adequate law library access were insufficient to state a § 1983 claim for violation of the First
Amendment right of access to the courts, where the detainee alleged he was provided access to a law library, just
not type he desired. The court held that the detainee's allegations that he adhered to a mystic branch of Wicca and
that the prison offered limited selection of diets to satisfy his religious needs were sufficient to state a § 1983
claim for violation of his First Amendment religious rights. (Howard R. Young Correctional Institution,
Delaware)

U.S. Appeals Court
DIET
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use & Institutionalized
Persons Act

Rich v. Secretary, Florida Dept. of Corrections, 716 F.3d 525 (11th Cir. 2013). A prisoner brought an action
against the Florida Department of Corrections and corrections officials for money damages and injunctive relief,
alleging violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), based on their failure
to provide him with a strictly kosher diet. The district court entered summary judgment for the Department and
the officials. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that Florida's plan
to provide kosher meals to prisoners did not render the prisoner's claim moot because the new plan was not an
unambiguous termination of its policy which had deprived the prisoner of kosher meals. The court found that
summary judgment was precluded by fact issues as to whether denial of kosher meals was in furtherance of a
compelling government interest, and as to whether denial of kosher meals was the least restrictive means to
further the cost and security interests that were asserted. (Union Correctional Institution, Florida)

U.S. District Court
OPPORTUNITY TO
PRACTICE
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use & Institutionalized
Persons Act

Simmons v. Adamy, 987 F.Supp.2d 302 (W.D.N.Y. 2013). A Muslim inmate brought a § 1983 action against
Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) officials and a corrections officer, alleging, among other things, that
the defendants subjected him to unlawful retaliation. The defendants moved for summary judgment, and inmate
cross-moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the defendants’ motion. The court held that the
alleged actions of prison officials in restricting the law library access of the Muslim inmate after he filed
grievances, scheduling his library “call-outs” to conflict with religious celebrations and classes, and filing a false
misbehavior report, were not adverse actions that could support the inmate's § 1983 First Amendment retaliation
claim. The court noted that there was no evidence that: (1) the inmate was treated differently from other inmates
who had not pursued grievances; (2) he was afforded less than reasonable, or less than typical, access to the law
library; (3) his free exercise rights were affected in more than a de minimis fashion; or (4) he was unfairly
disciplined as a result of the report. According to the court, the prison's scheduling of the Muslim inmate's law
library call-outs to conflict with Muslim classes, services, and observances, did not place a substantial burden on
the inmate's ability to practice his religion, and thus did not amount to denial of the inmate's religious freedom
under the First Amendment or the Religious Land Use Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), where the overlap
occurred less than 20% of the time. (Attica Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
EQUAL PROTECTION
FREE EXERCISE
SINCERITY

Tavares v. Amato, 954 F.Supp.2d 79 (N.D.N.Y.2013). An inmate who had recently been released from the
custody of a county jail filed a pro se suit against a sheriff and jail administrator, claiming his First Amendment
rights were violated by his inability to access a law library and to engage in religious worship while confined in
involuntary protective custody (IPC). The inmate also alleged that he was discriminated against and placed in IPC
because he was a sex offender, in contravention of the Equal Protection Clause, and that his conditions of
confinement violated the Eighth Amendment. Both sides moved for summary judgment. The district court denied
the plaintiff's motion, and granted the defendants' motion in part and denied in part. The court held that: (1) there
was no evidence of injury, as required to support a claim for violation of the First Amendment's right of access to
the courts; (2) there was no evidence that the inmate had firmly held religious beliefs, as required to support a
claim for violation of his First Amendment's right to free exercise of religion; (3) confinement of the inmate in
administrative segregation for 132 days was not cruel or unusual punishment, in violation of the Eighth
Amendment; and (4) the inmate's initial five-day segregation, for purposes of a determining a housing
classification, was insufficient to establish a liberty interest. The court found that the inmate’s claims, even if
proven, that jail officials confined him in administrative segregation for 132 days, for 23 hours each day, only
allowing him to shower during his one hour long recreation period, prohibiting him from wandering around
outside of his cell, and forcing him to pick and choose which amenities he wanted to avail himself to given his
limited amount of time outside of his cell, did not amount to cruel or unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth Amendment, since the officials' actions involved no specific deprivation of any human need. (Montgomery
County Jail, New York)

37.118

U.S. District Court
EQUAL PROTECTION
OPPORTUNITY TO
WORSHIP
OPPORTUNITY TO
PRACTICE
RFRA-Religious Freedom
Restoration Act
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use & Institutionalized
Persons Act

Uduko v. Cozzens, 975 F.Supp.2d 750 (E.D.Mich. 2013). A prisoner bought claims under Bivens, the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000
(RLUIPA), and conspiracy, against corrections officers, alleging that the officers had retaliated and discriminated
against him for lodging complaints and filing various grievances, by restricting his participation as a religious
inmate representative and in religious activities. The officers moved to dismiss. The district court granted the
motions in part and denied in part. The court held that the prisoner alleged a substantial burden on his ability to
perform religious acts of significance to his faith. The court held that claims that corrections officers restricted the
prisoner's active participation in religious services, banned him from attending and participating in any and all
religious services and programs held in the chapel area, and prohibited him from prophesying and laying hands on
and praying for anyone, alleged a substantial burden on prisoner's ability to perform religious acts of significance
to his faith, as required to support prisoner's First Amendment retaliation claims, and claimed violations of RFRA
and RLUIPA. (Federal Correctional Institution in Milan, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
EQUAL PROTECTION
FREE EXERCISE
OPPORTUNITY TO
WORSHIP
WORK
DIET

Washington v. Afify, 968 F.Supp.2d 532 (W.D.N.Y. 2013). A Muslim inmate, proceeding pro se, brought an
action against the department of correctional services (DOCS) employees, alleging violations of the First, Eighth,
and Fourteenth Amendments. The employees moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and
denied in part. The district court held that: (1) ordering the inmate to clean up human waste did not violate the
Eighth Amendment; (2) housing the inmate with a cellmate who allegedly exposed the inmate to pornographic
images and prevented him from reciting his daily prayers with necessary humility and tranquility did not violate
the inmate's First Amendment free exercise right; (3) the inmate's allegations that he was denied two religious
breakfast meals and one evening meal during a Muslim holy month unless he signed up to work in the mess hall
were insufficient to state a claim; (4) the Muslim inmate's allegations that he was singled out in being ordered to
clean up feces, being transferred to a different cell, and transferred to new prison job were insufficient to state a
claim for violations of Fourteenth Amendment equal protection. (Southport Correctional Facility, New York)
2014

U.S. District Court
EQUAL PROTECTION
FREE EXERCISE

American Humanist Ass’n v. U.S., 63 F.Supp.3d 1274 (D.Or. 2014). A federal prison inmate and a secular
humanist organization brought an action against the federal government, a prison, and prison officials, alleging
that the inmate’s constitutional rights were violated when the prison failed to provide accommodations to secular
humanists. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court denied the motion. The court held that secular
humanism was a religion for Establishment Clause purposes, and thus the federal prison inmate stated First
Amendment claims arising from the prison’s failure to provide accommodations to secular humanists equal to
those provided to other religious groups. The court held that the officials were not entitled to qualified immunity
against the inmate’s claims. The court noted that by affirming denial of the inmate’s requests to allow secular
humanists to meet as a group in a federal prison located in Oregon, and to deny recognition of humanism as a
religious preference assignment at the prison, the regional director of the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) intentionally
directed the activity as required for the district court to have specific personal jurisdiction over the director with
regard to the inmate’s claims. (Federal Correctional Institution, Sheridan, Oregon)

U.S. District Court
SERVICES

Ballard v. Johns, 17 F.Supp.3d 511 (E.D.N.C. 2014). A civil detainee being considered for certification as a
sexually dangerous person brought an action against federal employees, in their official capacities and in their
individual capacities under Bivens, challenging various conditions of his detention, including claims concerning
due process violations and inability to attend religious services. The employees moved to dismiss or for summary
judgment and the detainee moved to overrule objections to requests for document production. The district court
granted the employees’ motion and denied the detainee’s motion. The court held that: (1) the detainee did not
show that federal employees, by following Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) regulations and policies, violated his
constitutional rights; (2) the detainee was properly subjected to restrictions and disciplinary consequences of the
BOP commitment and treatment program; (3) denial of the detainee's request to attend or receive religious
services while in disciplinary segregation did not unduly burden his free exercise of religion; and (4) the
employees did not violate detainee's right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures by searching his cell
and seizing his property. (Federal Correctional Institution at Butner, North Carolina)

U.S. District Court
DIET

Banks v. Annucci, 48 F.Supp.3d 394 (N.D.N.Y. 2014). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that
correctional officers harassed him, tampered with his food and contaminated his Kosher meals, interfered with his
mail, mishandled his grievances, and interfered with his access to courts, and that prison medical employees were
deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs and involuntarily administered psychotropic drugs to him.
The district court held that the inmate's allegation that correctional officers tampered with or contaminated his
meals was sufficient to state a claim for violation of his Eighth Amendment right to nutritionally adequate food
prepared and served under conditions that did not present an immediate danger to his health and well-being. The
court found that the Jewish inmate's allegation that prison employees tampered with his sealed Kosher meals on
several occasions by unsealing items and/or contaminating them was sufficient to state a claim against an
employee for violation of his rights under the Free Exercise Clause. (Upstate Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
OPPORTUNITY TO
WORSHIP
PUBLICATIONS

Boyd v. Arnone, 48 F.Supp.3d 210 (D.Conn. 2014). A state inmate, who was allegedly not permitted to engage in
collective worship as a member of the Nation of Gods and Earths religion, brought an action against the state
assistant attorney general and various correctional officials, asserting claims under § 1983, the Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), and Connecticut law. The defendants moved to dismiss for
failure to state a claim. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the
inmate sufficiently alleged that a deputy warden was personally involved in the alleged violation of his First
Amendment rights, based on the denial of access to a religious newspaper and collective worship, as required to
state a § 1983 claim, by alleging that the deputy warden was involved in the unlawful rejection of volumes of
religious newspapers and in responding to grievances that he filed regarding the rejection of those newspaper

37.119

volumes, and by alleging that the deputy warden denied his requests for televised religious programming and
failed to provide him access to collective worship or other religious programming for his faith. The court found
that the inmate sufficiently alleged that correctional officials were personally involved in the alleged violation of
his First Amendment rights, as required to state a § 1983 claim against the officials, by alleging that the officials
were involved in the decision to designate his religion as a disruptive group, helped establish a media review
board, which rejected or banned multiple volumes of the religion's newspaper, and were involved in denying
grievances related to the inmate's requests to worship collectively. (Osborn Correctional Institution, Connecticut)
U.S. District Court
VOLUNTEERS
WORSHIP
EQUAL PROTECTION
FREE EXERCISE
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use & Institutionalized
Persons Act

Brown v. Livingston, 17 F.Supp.3d 616 (S.D.Tex. 2014). A prisoner brought an action, individually and on behalf
of others similarly situated, alleging that various policies of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ)
violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and the First Amendment. TDCJ
moved to terminate a consent decree that prohibited it from discriminating against Muslims in the pursuit of their
right to profess their religious beliefs and to exercise their religious practices. The district court denied the motion.
The court held that TDCJ's volunteer policy violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, and RLUIPA. The policy required that all religious activities not
supervised by a prison chaplain or guard have an outside volunteer in attendance. According to the court, the
policy meant that Muslim inmates who were in prisons near populations centers from which Muslim volunteers
could not be recruited in greater numbers being able to participate in religious activities only one hour per week,
while Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish inmates who could procure more outside volunteers had access to six hours
or more of religious activities per week. The court noted that the policy imposed a substantial burden on Muslim
inmates' practice of their religion because it substantially limited the opportunity for Muslims to engage in
necessary religious aspects of their faith. Muslim inmates had no alternate way to exercise their religious rights
because communal worship and instruction were integral to the practice of their faith, and there was no legitimate
security interest advanced by prohibiting Muslim inmates from continuing to participate in inmate-led religious
activities without an outside volunteer. (Texas Department of Criminal Justice)

U.S. District Court
ARTICLES
CHAPLAIN
FREE EXERCISE
OPPORTUNITY TO
PRACTICE
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use & Institutionalized
Persons Act
VOLUNTEERS

Cryer v. Spencer, 934 F.Supp.2d 323 (D.Mass. 2013). A state prisoner, claiming to be partially of Native
American descent, brought a pro se § 1983 action alleging that prison officials violated his First Amendment right
to free exercise of his religion and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), as well as
his rights under Massachusetts law. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court allowed the motion in
part and denied in part. The district court held that the allegations were sufficient to state claims for violations of
RLUIPA, the First Amendment and of a Massachusetts statute prohibiting prisoners from being denied the free
exercise of religious belief. The court held that in light of undisputed evidence concerning the importance of
Native American languages in Native American religious practices, the allegation that state prison officials
limited the prisoner's access to a cassette player and Native American languages audiotapes to use during Native
American religious ceremonies were sufficient to state a claim for violations of RLUIPA. According to the court,
restricting the prisoner's use of the tapes forced him to choose whether to listen to the tapes and forego
participation in the ceremonies, or participate in the ceremonies and give up all opportunities to listen to the tapes.
The court also found that the alleged failure of the prison to make available a Native American clergy member or
volunteer, or comparable clergy, was sufficient to state an RLUIPA claim. (Souza–Baranowski Correctional
Center, Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
DIET
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act

Dean v. Corrections Corporation of America, 108 F.Supp.3d 702 (D. Ariz. 2014). A state prisoner, who was an
adherent of the Essene faith, brought a § 1983 action against a private prison management company, warden, and
the State of Hawai’i Department of Public Safety, alleging that, following his assignment to a prison in Arizona,
he was denied a raw-food, vegetarian diet that had been requested, consistent with his religious beliefs, in
violation of the First Amendment and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The
district court granted the defendants’ motion for a change of venue to the District of Arizona. The defendants
moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion, finding that: (1) material fact issues existed
as to the sincerity of the prisoner’s beliefs and whether those beliefs were substantially burdened; (2) the potential
perception of preferential treatment was not a compelling interest to justify a burden on the prisoner’s religious
practice under RLUIPA; (3) an inconsistency with simplified food service and additional costs presented a
compelling interest to justify the burden on the prisoner’s religious practice under RLUIPA; (4) rejecting the
prisoner’s requested diet was the least restrictive means to further a compelling government interest; and (5)
refusing the prisoner’s requested diet did not violate his First Amendment rights. (Saguaro Correctional Center,
operated by Corrections Corporation of America, Arizona)

U.S. Appeals Court
SWEAT LODGE
RESTRICTIONS
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use & Institutionalized
Persons Act

Haight v. Thompson, 763 F.3d 554 (6th Cir. 2014). Death-row inmates brought an action against prison officials
alleging violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The district court
granted summary judgment to the officials, and the prisoners appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated
in part, and remanded. The court held that: (1) issues of fact precluded summary judgment on the inmates' claim
that denial of access to a sweat lodge for Native American religious ceremonies violated RLUIPA; (2) officials'
decision to deny certain Native American foods for a powwow imposed a substantial burden on their religious
practices; (3) issues of fact precluded summary judgment on the inmates' RLUIPA claim arising from denial of
these foods; and (4) RLUIPA did not permit inmates to collect money damages from prison officials sued in their
individual capacities. The court noted that although prison officials allowed the prisoners to have some traditional
foods, including fry bread, at the powwow ceremony, the powwow was a religious ceremony for members of the
Native American Church, the prisoners sincerely believed that a meal accompanied by corn pemmican and
buffalo meat was part of that ceremony, and the decision to bar corn pemmican and buffalo meat effectively
barred them from this religious practice and forced them to modify their behavior by performing less-thancomplete powwows with less-than-complete meals. (Kentucky State Penitentiary)

37.120

U.S. Appeals Court
FAST
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use & Institutionalized
Persons Act

Holland v. Goord, 758 F.3d 215 (2nd Cir. 2014). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that prison officials
burdened his religious exercise, in violation of Free Exercise Clause and Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA), when they ordered him to provide a urine sample while he fasted in observance of
Ramadan, breached his due process rights, and retaliated against him. The district court entered summary
judgment in the officials' favor, and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and
remanded. The court held that state prison officials substantially burdened the Muslim inmate's free exercise
rights, in violation of the First Amendment, when they ordered him to drink water in order to provide a urine
sample while he fasted in observance of Ramadan. The court noted that breaking his fast prior to sunset would
have been a grave sin, regardless of whether atonement was possible. (Wende Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
FORCED EXPOSURE

Jackson v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537 (8th Cir. 2014). A state prisoner brought an action against various state prison
officials, challenging the prison's drug treatment program as in violation of his free exercise rights under the First
Amendment. The district court dismissed the action. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and
remanded. The court held that the prisoner stated a § 1983 claim against prison officials for violation of his First
Amendment free exercise rights with allegations that he was an atheist, that he was required to attend and
complete a substance abuse treatment program that had religious components and invoked religious tenets in order
to be eligible for early parole, that due to the religious components of the program and the prison's failure to
transfer the prisoner to a secular treatment program, his choices were to withdraw from the program or remain
exposed to those religious elements. He chose to withdraw from the program, and was denied early release as a
result. The court found that the director of the state department of corrections (DOC) could be held personally
liable under § 1983 for the alleged violation of the atheist state prisoner's First Amendment free exercise rights,
where under Missouri law, the director was responsible for administering the treatment program, and establishing
rules and policies determining how, when, and where offenders could be admitted into or removed from the
treatment program. According to the court, the director of the prison's substance abuse treatment program could
be held personally liable under § 1983 for the alleged violation of the prisoner's First Amendment free exercise
rights, where the program director allegedly could have allowed the prisoner to avoid the religious portions of the
program, but still remain enrolled in the program. (Western Reception, Diagnostic, and Corr. Center, Missouri)

U.S. District Court
PRIVACY
CLOTHING
FREE EXERCISE
RESTRICTIONS
SERVICES
OPPORTUNITY TO
PRACTICE
RELIGIOUS ARTICLES

Karsjens v. Jesson, 6 F.Supp.3d 916 (D.Minn. 2014). Patients who were civilly committed to the Minnesota Sex
Offender Program (MSOP) brought a § 1983 class action against officials, alleging various claims, including
failure to provide treatment, denial of the right to be free from inhumane treatment, and denial of the right to
religious freedom. The patients moved for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, and the officials moved to
dismiss. The district court granted the defendants’ motion in part and denied in part, and denied the plaintiffs’
motions. The court found that the patients’ allegations that, based on policies and procedures created and
implemented by state officials, patients spent no more than six or seven hours per week in treatment, that their
treatment plans were not detailed and individualized, that treatment staff was not qualified to treat sex offenders,
and that staffing levels were often far too low, sufficiently stated a § 1983 substantive due process claim based on
the officials' failure to provide adequate treatment. According to the court, the patients stated a § 1983 First
Amendment free exercise claim against state officials with allegations that MSOP's policies, procedures, and
practices caused the patients to be monitored during religious services and during private meetings with clergy,
did not permit patients to wear religious apparel or to possess certain religious property, and did not allow patients
to “communally celebrate their religious beliefs by having feasts,” and that such policies and practices were not
related to legitimate institutional or therapeutic interests. The court also found that the patients’ allegations that
state officials limited their phone use, limited their access to certain newspapers and magazines, and removed or
censored articles from newspapers and magazines, stated a § 1983 First Amendment claim that officials
unreasonably restricted their right to free speech. (Minnesota Sex Offender Program)

U.S. District Court
EQUAL PROTECTION
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use & Institutionalized
Persons Act
PLACE TO WORSHIP

Lloyd v. City of New York, 43 F.Supp.3d 254 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). Muslim inmates brought an action against the New
York City Department of Correction, the Department's Commissioner, and the warden of a correctional facility,
alleging violation of their free exercise rights under the First Amendment, discrimination in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of Fourteenth Amendment, and violation of their free exercise rights as generated by the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court
granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the Muslim inmates sufficiently alleged that the
city's department of correction and prison officials placed a substantial burden on their sincerely held religious
beliefs, as required to state a free exercise claim under the First Amendment and RLUIPA, where the inmates
asserted that they were forced to conduct regular religious services and daily prayers in the correctional facility's
gymnasium, which was frequently flooded, and that they were sometimes forced to conduct Muslim services in a
Christian chapel, where pews prevented inmates from kneeling for prayer, and which displayed Christian images
that were discordant with their beliefs. The court found that the Muslim inmates stated an equal protection claim
by alleging that there was a Christian chapel at the correctional facility, full of Christian imagery and pews for
prayer, while Muslim inmates were not provided with an adequate or appropriate worship space, or with a place
where they could wash their hands and feet before prayer. (N.Y. City Dept. of Correction, Anna M. Kross Center)

U.S. Appeals Court
TOBACCO
FREE EXERCISE
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use & Institutionalized
Persons Act
RESTRICTIONS
REGULATIONS

Native American Council of Tribes v. Weber, 750 F.3d 742 (8th Cir. 2014). A Native American organization and
inmates brought an action against prison officials, claiming that the prison's policy of prohibiting tobacco use by
Native American inmates during religious activities substantially burdened the exercise of their religious beliefs in
violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The district court found the
restrictions violated RLUIPA and ordered the parties to confer. After the parties failed to agree on a new tobacco
policy, the district court entered a remedial order granting injunctive relief. The prison officials appealed. The
appeals court affirmed. The court held that: (1) the inmates' use of tobacco during Native American ceremonies
was a religious exercise; (2) the prison's complete ban on tobacco use substantially burdened the exercise of the
inmates' religious beliefs; (3) a complete ban was not the least restrictive means of furthering the prison's interest
in order and security; and (4) the district court's remedial order was narrowly tailored to remedy the violation of

37.121

inmates' rights. The court noted that Lakota inmates had been taught the importance of tobacco to the exercise of
their religious beliefs from a young age and had continued to use tobacco in religious ceremonies throughout
adulthood. According to the court, the prison failed to consider the feasibility of reducing the percentage of
tobacco in a mixture used by Native American inmates, and other correctional facilities permitted inmates to use
tobacco in religious ceremonies. (South Dakota Department of Corrections)
U.S. District Court
DISCRIMINATION
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use & Institutionalized
Persons Act
FREE EXERCISE
VOLUNTEERS
BOOKS

Pfeil v. Lampert, 11 F.Supp.3d 1099 (D.Wyo. 2014). A pro se prisoner brought an action against prison officials
under § 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), alleging that the officials
denied him access to religious books and priests. The parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The district
court denied the prisoner’s motion and granted the officials’ motion. The court held that: (1) the fact that a
religious volunteer missed a single visit to the prison did not impose a substantial burden on the prisoner's
religious exercise; (2) the prison's policy of prohibiting inmates from possessing hardbound books did not impose
a substantial burden on the prisoner's religious exercise; (3) the hardbound book policy served to further a
compelling governmental interest and was the least restrictive means to do so; (4) the prison's requirement that
each volunteer at the prison provide current contract information before being admitted to prison furthered the
compelling government interest of maintaining security and safety and was least restrictive means for doing so;
(5) the prison's policies were rationally related to a legitimate penological interest; (6) any relaxation of the
prison's policies would have an adverse impact on guards, other inmates, and prison resources; (7) prison officials
did not impermissibly retaliate against the prisoner for filing a lawsuit; and (8) any limitation on the prisoner's
eyesight was not substantial, and thus was not a disability for the purposes of ADA discrimination claim.
(Wyoming Honor Farm, Wyoming Honor Conservation Camp)

U.S. District Court
DISCRIMINATION

Richard v. Fischer, 38 F.Supp.3d 340 (W.D.N.Y. 2014). A multiracial Muslim inmate brought a civil rights action
alleging that prison officials and employees discriminated against him on the basis of race and religion and
retaliated against him for filing grievances. The officials moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district
court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that New York State Department of
Correctional Services (DOCS) employees were acting within scope of their employment, specifically, the duty of
assigning work positions to inmates, when they denied the multiracial Muslim inmate employment outside of his
cellblock. The court found that the inmate's allegations that no other inmate in the prison was “isolated by
programming” or restricted to an employment position in his or her cellblock, that the inmate was isolated to
programs in his cellblock, presumably because of his race and religion, and that prison employees tasked with
assigning work refused to place the inmate on a waiting list for his desired program, when waiting lists were open
to “all others,” sufficiently stated that the inmate was treated differently than similarly-situated individuals,
supporting the inmate's § 1983 claim that employees denied him equal protection by restricting him to
employment opportunities in his cellblock. (Five Points Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
DIET
DISCRIMINATION
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use & Institutionalized
Persons Act

Sutton v. City of Philadelphia, 21 F.Supp.3d 474 (E.D.Pa. 2014). A Muslim inmate in a city prison system
brought an action against the city, the company that provided food to the prison, and the company's regional
manager, alleging violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted
the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that: (1) claims seeking injunctive and declaratory relief were
moot because the inmate had been moved from the city’s prison system; (2) the company could be sued under §
1983; (3) failure to provide appropriate meals to the inmate was not the result of the company's policies or
customs; (4) a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the company was jointly responsible for
maintaining a discriminatory religious alternative meal system; (5) a genuine issue of material fact existed as to
whether the regional manager acquiesced to a policy that on its face discriminated against Muslim inmates; (6) the
company did not violate RLUIPA; and (7) a city custom or policy did not cause the Muslim inmate to fail to
receive meals required by his religion. The court noted that an instruction to the Muslim inmate by a single
unidentified employee of the company that provided food to prisoners, to remove non-Halal meat from his
breakfast tray and to eat the remainder, did not establish a custom or policy of the company that caused the inmate
to be provided food that did not meet his religious requirements. (Philadelphia Prison System, Curran–Fromhold
Correctional Facility, Philadelphia Industrial Correctional Center, Pennsylvania, and Aramark Corporation)

U.S. District Court
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act
EQUAL PROTECTION
OPPORTUNITY TO
PRACTICE

Thompson v. Smeal, 54 F.Supp.3d 339 (M.D.Pa. 2014). A state prisoner brought a case against prison officials,
alleging that denial of his request that Christian inmates be granted communal feasts on Christmas and Easter
violated his religious and equal protection rights, and violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA). The district court granted the officials’ motion for summary judgment and the inmate
appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. On remand, the officials again moved for summary judgment,
and the inmate moved for partial summary judgment. The district court denied the motions. The court held that
summary judgment on the prisoner’s First Amendment claim was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as
to: (1) whether the prison’s policy of refusing to provide Christmas and Easter communal meals for Christians
only, with a group prayer over the food, was legitimately and neutrally applied; (2) whether the prison’s
penological interests were served by allowing some religious meals and not others; and (3) whether there were
alternative means of exercising the prisoner’s right to free religious expression. According to the court, summary
judgment on the RLUIPA claim was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether denying
communal meals to Christian inmates at the state prison was the least restrictive means to achieve the prison’s
alleged compelling interests of security, space limitations, and food safety concerns. (State Correctional
Institution in Camp Hill, Pennsylvania)

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U.S. District Court
SERVICES
VOLUNTEERS
FREE EXERCISE
OPPORTUNITY TO
WORSHIP

Turner v. Hamblin, 995 F.Supp.2d 859 (W.D.Wis. 2014). A pro se prisoner brought an action against various
prison officials, alleging that the officials violated his rights under the Free Exercise Clause by failing to provide
services to Muslim prisoners when an outside volunteer was not available to lead the service. The prison officials
moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the prison officials were
entitled to qualified immunity on the prisoner's claim, where the law was not clearly established that the Free
Exercise Clause required prison officials to hold religious services for prisoners if no qualified non-prisoners were
available to lead the service. (Columbia Correctional Institution, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
COSTS
FREE EXERCISE
OPPORTUNITY TO
WORSHIP
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use & Institutionalized
Persons Act

Walker v. Artus, 998 F.Supp.2d 18 N.D.N.Y. 2014). A Muslim inmate housed in a state prison special housing
unit (SHU) brought a § 1983 action alleging that state prison officials deprived him of his rights in violation of the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment. The officials moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held
that denial of the inmate's requests to participate in congregate religious services by audio or video feed was
reasonably related to legitimate security and cost concerns, and the inmate had adequate means to exercise his
burdened right, including weekly visits from an Imam, and thus denial of the inmate's requests did not violate the
inmate's free exercise rights under the First Amendment. The court also found that the officials' denial furthered
compelling government interests of promoting prison security and managing costs, and the burden placed on the
inmate was the least restrictive means necessary to serve those interests, and thus denial of inmate's requests did
not violate RLUIPA. (Clinton Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
ARTICLES
FREE EXERCISE
DIET
OPPORTUNITY TO
PRACTICE
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use & Institutionalized
Persons Act

Wall v. Wade, 741 F.3d 492 (4th Cir. 2014). A Muslim state inmate filed an action under the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and § 1983 alleging that prison officials interfered with his Ramadan
observance. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the officials, and the inmate appealed. The
appeals court vacated and remanded. The appeals court held that state prison officials' decision to abandon the
policy of requiring inmates to provide some physical indicia of the Islamic faith, such as a Quran, Kufi, prayer
rug, or written religious material obtained from the prison Chaplain's office, in order to receive accommodations
for a Ramadan observance did not moot the inmate's challenge to the policy as violative of his rights under the
Free Exercise Clause and RLUIPA, where the officials retained the authority and the capacity to reinstate the
policy. The court found that the policy violated the inmate's rights under the Free Exercise Clause, where the
inmate provided a reasonable explanation for the fact that he lacked physical manifestations of his faith, officials
ignored numerous signs that he was a practicing Muslim, and there was no evidence that the requested
accommodation would have been unduly burdensome. The inmate provided a state court judgment against the
Commonwealth as proof that the VDOC had lost his possessions, and also produced documents showing that he
was receiving common fare meals in accordance with his faith, and he informed officers that he had observed
Ramadan in 2008 and 2009. Despite this, an official responded, “that don't mean anything.” The court held that
the officials were not entitled to qualified immunity from liability in the inmate's action under RLUIPA and §
1983. (Red Onion State Prison, Virginia)

U.S. District Court
HAIR LENGTH
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use & Institutionalized
Persons Act

Williams v. Champagne, 13 F.Supp.3d 624 (E.D.La. 2014). A former inmate who was a practicing Rastafarian
brought an action against a sheriff and prison officials under § 1983, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA), and state law arising out of a grooming policy which he contended substantially burdened
his Rastafarian religious practices, and an alleged incident of excessive force. The defendants moved for summary
judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The district court held that summary
judgment was precluded by: (1) issues of fact as to whether the grooming policy prohibiting dreadlocks and
requiring men's hair to be no more than two inches long was the least restrictive means of serving compelling
government interests on the RLUIPA claim; (2) issues of fact as to the incident in which the inmate had complied
with orders to leave his cell, whether there was any basis for prison officers to use any force at all to maintain
discipline after the prisoner had complied with orders to leave his cell, let alone with force sufficient to rip a
dreadlock from his scalp; (3) issues of fact as to whether it was objectively unreasonable for prison officers to pull
on the chain connecting the prisoner's handcuffs while he was fully restrained in the “suicide chair,” and for one
officer to strike the prisoner forcefully in the head after the prisoner spit on him, and, (4) issues of fact on the
inmate's assault and battery claims. (Nelson Coleman Correctional Center, Louisiana)

U.S. District Court
EQUAL PROTECTION
OPPORTUNITY TO
PRACTICE
CHAPLAIN

Williams v. King, 56 F.Supp.3d 308 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action alleging that prison
officials violated his rights to free exercise of religion and due process. The officials moved for summary
judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment
was precluded by issues of fact as to: (1) whether the alleged burdens imposed on the free exercise rights of Shiite
Muslim State prison inmates actually served, or were intended to serve, any legitimate penological interests; (2)
whether the inmate was denied the right to participate in a religious celebration despite having complied with the
prison’s registration policy; and, (3) whether the prison’s selective registration policy was reasonably related to
legitimate penological interests rather than motivated by discriminatory purposes. The court found that the
prisoner’s allegations that the prison’s Muslim chaplain and superintendent of programs were personally involved
in the discriminatory policies were sufficient to state a free exercise claim and that the chaplain and
superintendent were not entitled to qualified immunity. The inmate alleged that the chaplain made various
decisions regarding inmates’ celebrations of Muslim holy days which had the effect of allowing Sunni Muslim
inmates to follow their practices while not allowing Shiite Muslim inmates to follow certain Shiite practices. He
also alleged that the superintendent, despite responding to several grievances based on the chaplain’s alleged
denials of religious accommodations, allowed those denials to continue and consciously administered an alleged
selectively discriminatory policy. (Woodbourne Correctional Facility, New York)

37.123

U.S. District Court
DIET
EQUAL PROTECTION
FREE EXERCISE
OPPORTUNITY TO
PRACTICE
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use & Institutionalized
Persons Act

Winder v. Maynard, 2 F.Supp.3d 709 (D.Md. 2014). An inmate, proceeding pro se, brought a § 1983 action
against a prison official, asserting that the official hindered his religious practice. The official filed a motion to
dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The district court held
that denial of the inmate's request for pork products for a Wiccan ceremonial meal did not substantially impede
the inmate’s ability to practice his religious beliefs in violation of the Free Exercise Clause or the Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The court noted that the inmate's request for a religious
ceremonial meal had been approved and he was directed that while the requested pork products could not be
provided through the dietary department or prepared in Department of Corrections (DOC) kitchen facilities, pork
products could nevertheless be purchased through the commissary and consumed at the ceremonial meal.
According to the court, the prison's accommodation of other religious prisoners through the adoption of a religious
diet while allegedly refusing to provide pork products for Wiccan practitioners did not violate the equal protection
rights of the inmate because: (1) the kosher Jewish diet demanded certain food preparation and food choices not
required for Wiccan inmates; (2) neither Jewish nor Muslim inmates received ritually slaughtered meat; (3) no
pork was prepared in Department of Corrections (DOC) kitchens in order to respect the religious dietary
requirements of Jewish and Muslim inmates; (4) the prison was unable to provide pork through dietary services
due to legitimate penological goals regarding budget and security; (5) the prisoner was free to purchase pork
products through the commissary; and (6) prison meal plans were created in order to see that the needs of all
religious groups are accommodated. (Jessup Correctional Institution, Maryland)

U.S. Appeals Court
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use & Institutionalized
Persons Act
PLACE OF WORSHIP

Wood v. Yordy, 753 F.3d 899 (9th Cir. 2014). A state inmate filed an action under the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and § 1983 alleging that prison officials had imposed an unwarranted
burden on his exercise of religion. The district court entered summary judgment in the officials' favor, and the
inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the state inmate failed to establish that prison
officials retaliated against him, in violation of the First Amendment, for his earlier suit, in which he prevailed on
appeal in a § 1983 due process claim, when they restricted his access to a prison chapel during the investigation of
his relationship with another guard. (Idaho Correctional Institute–Orofino, Idaho State Correctional Institution)

U.S. Appeals Court
SWEAT LODGE
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use & Institutionalized
Persons Act
SINCERITY

Yellowbear v. Lampert, 741 F.3d 48 (10th Cir. 2014). A state prisoner brought an action against individual prison
officials, seeking prospective injunctive relief against them for violations of the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The district court granted summary judgment for the officials and the
prisoner appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. The appeals court held that summary judgment was
precluded by a factual issue as to whether preventing the state prisoner from exercising his sincerely held religious
belief --using a sweat lodge -- served a compelling governmental interest, and that it was the least restrictive
means of furthering that interest. The appeals court began its opinion by stating: “Andrew Yellowbear will
probably spend the rest of his life in prison. Time he must serve for murdering his daughter. With that much lying
behind and still before him, Mr. Yellowbear has found sustenance in his faith. No one doubts the sincerity of his
religious beliefs or that they are the reason he seeks access to his prison's sweat lodge—a house of prayer and
meditation the prison has supplied for those who share his Native American religious tradition. Yet the prison
refuses to open the doors of that sweat lodge to Mr. Yellowbear alone, and so we have this litigation.” The
prison's sweat lodge is located in the general prison yard and Yellowbear was housed in a special protective unit
because of threats against him, not because of any disciplinary infraction he had committed. Prison officials
asserted that the cost of providing the necessary security to take the prisoner from the special protective unit to the
sweat lodge and back was “unduly burdensome.” (Wyoming Medium Correctional Institution)
2015

U.S. District Court
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act
CLOTHING
OPPORTUNITY TO
WORSHIP

Ajala v. West, 106 F.Supp.3d 976 (W.D. Wisc. 2015). An inmate brought an action against prison officials for
alleged violation of his rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), the Free
Exercise Clause, the Establishment Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause. The inmate challenged a prison
policy that allegedly prohibited the inmate from wearing a “kufi,” a head covering worn by some Muslims, unless
he was in his cell or participating in congregate services. The prison officials moved for summary judgment, and
the inmate moved for an extension. The district court held that: (1) the policy imposed a substantial burden on the
inmate’s religious exercise; (2) the policy was not the least restrictive means of furthering the prison’s interest of
preventing prisoners from using a religious head covering as a potential gang identifier; (3) the policy was not the
least restrictive means of furthering the prison’s interest in preventing prisoners from hiding contraband; (4) the
policy was not the least restrictive means of furthering the prison’s interest in preventing prison violence; and (5)
prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity from the inmate’s constitutional claims. The court noted that
the law was not clearly established that the inmate had a constitutional right to wear a kufi at all times. (Wisconsin
Secure Program Facility)

U.S. Appeals Court
FREE EXERCISE
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act
AIRFA- American Indian
Religious Freedom Act

Brooks v. Roy, 776 F.3d 957 (8th Cir. 2015). A Native American inmate brought an action against a state prison
official under § 1983, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), the American Indian
Religious Freedom Act (AIRFA), and the Minnesota Constitution. The inmate alleged that a required chemicaldependency program conflicted with his religious beliefs. The district court dismissed some claims and granted
summary judgment to the officials on the remaining claims. The inmate appealed. The court held that the inmate’s
complaint did not sufficiently put the officials on notice of the basis for his free exercise claims and give them
enough information to respond adequately to the allegations in the complaint. The court noted that the inmate’s
complaint never specified his Native American faith, his beliefs consistent with that faith, or how the available
program at his prison conflicted with his Native American beliefs. The inmate had received a chemicaldependency assessment, as all new inmates are required to have under Minnesota law, and was ordered to
complete treatment program in order to be transferred to a lower-security prison, qualify for work release, and
avoid disciplinary sanctions. (Minnesota Correctional Facility, Faribault)

37.124

U.S. Appeals Court
RFRA- Religious Freedom
Reformation Act
ARTICLES
JEWELRY/ORNAMENTS

Davila v. Gladden, 777 F.3d 1198 (11th Cir. 2015). A prisoner, a Santeria priest, brought an action against federal
prison employees in their official and individual capacities, alleging their refusal to allow him to obtain his
personal religious bead and shell necklaces violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the First
Amendment. The district court dismissed the prisoner’s claims for money damages under RFRA and granted
summary judgment to defendants on the prisoner’s remaining claims. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court
affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held that the prisoner’s sincerely held religious belief was
substantially burdened. According to the court, summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material
fact as to whether the prison’s refusal to allow the prisoner to obtain his personal bead and shell necklaces
furthered a compelling government interest, and whether the prison’s policy decision constituted the least
restrictive means to further that interest. The court held that refusal to allow the prisoner to obtain his personal
religious necklaces did not violate the First Amendment, finding that: (1) the refusal was rationally connected to
legitimate government interests in prison safety and resource allocation; (2) the prisoner had alternative means of
practicing his religion even without his personal beads; (3) allowing the prisoner to receive religious items from
outside the prison would have an impact on prison staff, other inmates, and the allocation of prison resources;
and, (4) the only alternative that would allow the prisoner to obtain his beads and shells would be to permit
prisoners to receive religious items from outside the prison, which would result in a more than de minimis cost to
the prison’s interests. (Federal Correctional Institution, Jesup, Georgia)

U.S. Appeals Court
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act

Incumaa v. Stirling, 791 F.3d 517 (4th Cir. 2015). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against the acting director of
a state department of corrections, alleging violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA) and Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process in his placement in solitary confinement for 20
year following his participation in a riot. The inmate was a member of the Nation of Gods and Earths (“NOGE”),
also known as the “Five Percenters.” Prison policy required the inmate to renounce his affiliation with NOGE as a
condition of being released from segregation. The inmate asserted that NOGE was a religion and that he was
being asked to renounce his religion in order to be released from solitary confinement, in violation of RLUIPA.
The district court granted the director’s motion for summary judgment and the inmate appealed. The appeals court
affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The appeals court held that the prison policy did not force the
inmate to choose between continued adherence to his religion or release from solitary confinement. But the court
held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the prison’s review
process for inmates in solitary confinement was adequate. The court noted that the inmate was subject to neardaily cavity and strip searches, he was confined to a small cell for all sleeping and waking hours, aside from 10
hours of activity outside the cell per month, he was denied educational, vocational, and therapy programs, the
inmate was socially isolated, and confinement was indefinite. (South Carolina Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
WORK
OPPORTUNITY TO
PRACTICE

Jehovah v. Clarke, 798 F.3d 169 (4th Cir. 2015). A Christian inmate brought a § 1983 action against the
Commonwealth of Virginia and various employees and contractors of the Virginia Department of Corrections
(VDOC), alleging that the defendants violated his free exercise rights under the First Amendment and the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) by prohibiting him from consuming wine during
communion, requiring him to work on Sabbath days, and assigning him non-Christian cellmates. Following
dismissal of some claims, the district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The inmate
appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by fact
issues regarding the wine ban. The court also found that the inmate stated an RLUIPA claim based on cell
assignment, a First Amendment claim based on cell assignment, and an Eighth Amendment deliberate
indifference claim. The court noted that the inmate alleged that he was required to share a cell with a particular
inmate who subjected him to “anti-Christian” rhetoric, and that he was “burdened, mocked, and harassed” on
account of his religious views by being housed in a cell with that inmate. The inmate alleged that his religion
required him to abstain from working during the “Old Jewish” and “New Christic” Sabbaths, that his cleaning job
would not accommodate his Sabbath observations, that his requests for job transfers were denied, that prison
officials had not approved him for any job for which he applied in over three years. The inmate alleged that he
would face sanctions and lose the opportunity to accrue good conduct allowances and earned sentence credits if he
failed to work for 30 to 40 hours per week. (Sussex I Prison, Waverly, Virginia)

U.S. Appeals Court
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act
WORK

Jones v. Williams, 791 F.3d 1023 (9th Cir. 2015). A Muslim former inmate brought civil rights claims against
prison officials under § 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), seeking
monetary and injunctive relief. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the officials and the
former inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated, and remanded in part. The court held that the
inmate’s claims for injunctive relief, arising from an alleged requirement that he handle pork while working in a
kitchen, were moot because he had been released from custody. The court found that unsworn statements of an
inmate cook who told the Muslim inmate that the food service coordinator had directed the inmate cook to mix
pork in with meat used in a tamale pie were hearsay, and thus could not properly be considered in opposition to
the prison officials’ motion for summary judgment as to the Muslim inmate’s claim that his free exercise rights
were violated when he was served and ate the pie without notice that it contained pork. But the court held that
prison officials were not entitled to qualified immunity from the Muslim inmate’s § 1983 claim that he was
ordered in 2007 to cook pork loins as part of his job duties in a kitchen, in violation of his religious beliefs. The
court noted that the penitentiary implemented a policy prior to the incident in question, providing that an inmate
could opt out of handling pork on religious grounds, the inmate alleged that he told the officers in charge that he
had the right to not handle pork, and the fact that some officers claimed they were not personally aware of the
policy change was not sufficient to show that the inmate’s right to avoid handling pork was not clearly
established. (Oregon State Penitentiary)

37.125

U.S. Appeals Court
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act
HAIR LENGTH

Knight v. Thompson, 796 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2015). Male inmates brought an action alleging that a state prison’s
short-hair policy violated the dictates of their Native American religion, in violation of the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The district court entered judgment in the state’s favor, and the
inmates appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated and remanded. Upon remand, the
appeals court reinstated the decision with modifications, affirming. The appeals court held that the district court
engaged in a sufficiently focused inquiry, did not impermissibly defer to prison officials, and did not
impermissibly disregard the inmates’ assertion that prison systems of 39 other states would allow the
accommodation they requested. (Alabama Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act
HAIR LENGTH

Knight v. Thompson, 797 F.3d 934 (11th Cir. 2015). Native American inmates brought an action against the
Alabama Department of Corrections (ADOC), challenging its male short-hair policy under the Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). After a bench trial, the district court entered judgment for the
Department. The inmates appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded for further consideration in light of Holt v. Hobbs. On remand, the
appeals court held that the challenged policy furthered a compelling interest and that the policy was the least
restrictive means of furthering those compelling interests. According to the court, evidence established that the
Alabama Department of Corrections’ (ADOC) male short-hair policy substantially burdened religious exercise by
Native American prisoners, as an element for violation of the RLUIPA. The prisoners’ expert on Native
American spirituality offered extensive, undisputed testimony that long hair had great religious significance for
many Native Americans, and each prisoner confirmed that his desire to wear unshorn hair stemmed from deep
religious convictions, and the prisoners’ expert further gave an uncontradicted opinion that forcing Native
Americans to cut their long hair would amount to an “assault on their sacredness.” (Ala. Dept. of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act
ARTICLES
RESTRICTIONS

Lagar v. Tegels, 94 F.Supp.3d 998 (W.D. Wis. 2015). An inmate brought an action against a prison’s warden,
program manager, and chaplain, alleging they impinged on his religious freedom in violation of the First
Amendment and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), by denying him the right to
wear a “Rosicrucian” emblem. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the
motion. The court held that the inmate failed to show that denial by prison officials of his request to wear a
“Rosicrucian” emblem, consisting of a five-pointed star without a circle around it, a Christian cross, and seven
roses arranged around the cross, imposed a substantial burden on the exercise of his religion, as required to
establish a prima facie case under RLUIPA. The court noted that the only support the inmate offered as to the
importance of the emblem to the exercise of his religion was his own conclusory statement that the emblem
contained the key to man’s past evolution, his present condition and future development, together with the method
of attainment, and that it assisted in the process of empowering one’s higher self by directing the wearer’s focus
toward spiritual, rather than material, purposes. The court noted that even if the denial imposed a substantial
burden on the exercise of his religion, the denial was the least restrictive means of furthering compelling
governmental interests in maintaining institutional security and quelling gang activity, and thus did not violate
RLUIPA. (Jackson Correctional Institution, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
ARTICLES
OPPORTUNITY TO
WORSHIP
RESTRICTIONS
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act

LaPlante v. Massachusetts Dept. of Correction, 89 F.Supp.3d 235 (D.Mass. 2015). A state inmate brought an
action against the Massachusetts Department of Correction (DOC) and its superintendent under the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from what he
claimed were unlawful burdens on the practice of his Wicca faith. The parties moved for summary judgment. The
district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded
by fact issues regarding the limitation on the use of ritual oils and the limitation on the use of ritual herbs. The
court found that rules regarding corporate worship, that limited corporate worship to Sundays rather than around
the phases of the moon as mandated by the Wiccan faith, substantially burdened the inmate’s religious exercise.
According to the court, refusal to provide nuts and fruits violated RLUIPA. But the court held that refusal to allow
the inmate to wear ceremonial robes during corporate worship, and refusal to provide the inmate with different
varieties of cake, did not substantially burden the inmate’s religious exercise. (Mass. Corr. Institution-Norfolk)

U.S. District Court
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act
EQUAL PROTECTION
FREE EXERCISE
SERVICES

Lopez v. Cipolini, 136 F.Supp.3d 570 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against prison
officials, asserting claims for violation of her Free Exercise Clause rights under the First Amendment, the
Religious Land and Institutionalized Person Act (RLUIPA), and the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause, alleging that she was prohibited from attending religious services. The officials moved to dismiss the
action. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the prisoner's allegation
that prison officials prevented her from attending religious services was sufficient to support a claim for violation
of the Equal Protection Clause. According to the court, the prisoner's allegation that a prison official prevented her
from attending two religious services “because of her hair” and because of “her sexuality,” while other prisoners
in the facility were not prevented from attending those services, was sufficient to allege that she was treated
differently from others similarly situated, as required to support a claim that prison officials discriminated against
her in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The court noted that there was no legitimate penological interest
that would be served by denying the prisoner the right to attend religious services based on her hair and/or
sexuality. (Downstate Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act
ARTICLES
DIET
JEWELRY/ORNAMENTS

Schlemm v. Wall, 784 F.3d 362 (7th Cir. 2015). A prisoner, a Navajo Tribe member, brought an action under the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) against the Wisconsin Department of
Corrections, seeking an order requiring the state prison system to accommodate some of his religious practices.
The district court granted the prison’s summary judgment motion. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court
affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of
material fact as to whether the prisoner’s inability to eat game meat for a religious feast substantially burdened his
religious exercise, and as to whether the prisoner’s inability to wear a multicolored headband while praying in his
cell and during group religious ceremonies substantially burdened his religious exercise, and whether prison had a
compelling justification for prohibiting multicolored headbands. (Wisconsin Department of Corrections)

37.126

U.S. District Court
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act
ARTICLES
SERVICES
OPPORTUNITY TO
PRACTICE

Strickland v. Godinez, 104 F.Supp.3d 940 (S.D. Ill. 2015). A state inmate brought an action against prison
officials alleging that a state’s policies and practices interfered with his ability to practice his religion, in violation
of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and the First Amendment. The inmate
moved for a preliminary injunction and/or a protective order. The district court denied the motion finding that an
injunction was premature. The inmate practiced Asatru (also known as Odinism). The inmate alleged that officials
threatened or retaliated against him and refused to permit him and other inmates who practiced Asatru to have full
participation in proper group and individual worship including the ownership of personal ritual items and
medallions central to their beliefs. The inmate also sought to participate in outdoor worship and ritual feasts and
further sought the “setting aside of sacred land on which blots [i.e rituals] could be conducted.” (Lawrence
Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act

U.S. v. Secretary, Florida Dept. of Corrections, 778 F.3d 1223 (11th Cir. 2015). The federal government brought
an action against the Florida Department of Corrections (DOC), alleging that the DOC’s failure to provide a
kosher diet to all of its prisoners with sincere religious grounds for keeping kosher violated the Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The district court granted the DOC’s motion for a preliminary
injunction and the federal government appealed. The appeals court vacated the district court decision and
dismissed the appeal. The court held that the preliminary injunction did not comply with the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (PLRA), and thus, expired after 90 days. The court noted that injunctive relief was not narrowly
drawn, extended further than necessary to correct the violation of the federal right, and was not the least intrusive
means necessary to correct the violation, in violation of PLRA. (Florida Dept. of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act
OPPORTUNITY TO
PRACTICE

Walker v. Beard, 789 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2015). A state prisoner brought an action against prison officials
challenging their classification of him as eligible to occupy a prison cell with an individual of a different race,
alleging that such placement would interfere with his religious practice as an Aryan Christian Odinist, violating
his rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and the First Amendment.
The district court held that the prison officials’ actions did not violate the prisoner’s rights. The prisoner appealed.
The appeals court affirmed, finding that: (1) the Aryan Christian Odinist warding ritual was a “religious exercise”
under RLUIPA; (2) prison officials’ classification of the state prisoner under a housing policy substantially
burdened the prisoner’s ritual; (3) prison officials’ compliance with constitutional restrictions on racial
segregation in prisons was a compelling governmental interest under RLUIPA; (4) prison officials’ refusal to
exempt the prisoner from the housing policy’s classification scheme was the least restrictive means of furthering a
compelling interest, and thus the officials’ actions did not violate the prisoner’s rights under RLUIPA; and (5)
prison officials’ interest in complying with the Equal Protection Clause was reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests, and thus the officials’ refusal to exempt the state prisoner from the housing policy’s
classification scheme did not infringe on the prisoner’s rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment. (California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation)
2016

U.S. Appeals Court
FAST
DIET
FREE EXERCISE

Thompson v. Holm, 809 F.3d 376 (7th Cir. 2016). A Wisconsin state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against
prison staff, alleging violations of his First Amendment right to exercise his religion freely, specifically by
preventing him from fasting properly during a Muslim holy month. The district court granted the staff’s motion
for summary judgment. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. The appeals court held
that: (1) denial of meal bags substantially burdened the prisoner’s free exercise rights; (2) fact issues existed as to
whether staff members were personally involved; (3) fact issues existed as to whether staff members acted
intentionally; and (4) qualified immunity did not shield the staff members, where the prisoner had a clearly
established right to a diet consistent with his religious beliefs. The court noted that the denial of meal bags to the
Muslim prisoner substantially burdened his First Amendment rights to free exercise of religion, where, without
meal bags, the prisoner was forced to choose between foregoing adequate nutrition or violating a central tenant of
his religion, i.e., fasting properly during holy month. According to the court, the prisoner was thereby denied a
proper meal for a 55–hour period, which left him weak and tired, unsure if he would ever be put back on the
appropriate list to receive meal bags, and pressured to use the cafeteria during daylight hours, contrary to his
religious beliefs. (Waupun Correctional Institution, Wisconsin)

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XIX

XIX

XIX

of a prison policy that prohibited all religious services for prisoners in administrative segregation.
(Michigan Department of Corrections)
U.S. District Court
RELIGIOUS ARTICLES

Smith v. Haley, 401 F.Supp.2d 1240 (M.D.Ala. 2005). A former inmate brought a § 1983 action
against prison officials, stemming from the alleged denial of his requests for religious
accommodations for his practice of Odinism while he was incarcerated. Odinism is an ancient preChristian faith whose theology is based on historic Icelandic sagas and runic mysticism. The
inmate had asked officials to allow him to light a small fire or light a candle, wear a Thor’s
hammer necklace, and possess a small crystal. The district court granted summary judgment in
favor of the officials. The court held that the inmate’s right to possess a crystal as part of his
practice of Odinism was not clearly established by any law at the time of the actions at issue, and
therefore the officials were entitled to qualified immunity from liability. The court noted that
even if the refusal to allow the crystal violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA) or the First Amendment, the contours of the inmate’s rights were not
sufficiently clear at the time. (Limestone Correctional facility, Alabama)

U.S. Appeals Court
HAIR LENGTH

Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2005). A Native American inmate sued state

U.S. District Court
MAIL

Willson v. Buss, 370 F.Supp.2d 782 (N.D.Ind. 2005). A former inmate sued a prison
superintendent, claiming that a rule that denied him receipt of magazines having homosexual
content violated his First Amendment rights. The district court entered judgment in favor of the
superintendent. The court held that there was a valid, rational connection between the prison’s
ban on inmate receipt of “blatantly homosexual material” and that the ban furthered a legitimate,
penological objective of protecting homosexual inmates from injury by the prison population
which is traditionally hostile to them. The court noted that the impact of accommodating the
inmate’s interest in having access to the magazines included the possibility that the materials
could get into the hands of other inmates who were not homosexual, and they could be subjected
to assaults by homophobic fellow inmates. The court found that the rule was not void for
vagueness under the First Amendment. (Westville Correctional Facility, Indiana)

corrections officials challenging a prison hair grooming policy that required male inmates to
maintain hair no longer than three inches, alleging it violated his rights under the Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The district court denied the inmate’s request
for a preliminary injunction and the inmate appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded,
finding that the policy imposed a substantial burden on the inmate’s religious practice and that
the policy was not the least restrictive alternative to achieve the state’s interest in prison
security. The court noted that the inmate was not physically forced to cut his hair, but that he
was subjected to punishments including confinement to his cell, imposition of additional duty
hours, and reclassification into a less desirable work group. The court also noted that the state
failed to explain why its women’s prisons did not adhere to an equally strict grooming policy. The
court concluded that the inmate faced the possibility of irreparable injury absent the issuance of
an injunction and the balance of hardships favored the inmate. (Adelanto Community
Correctional Facility, California)

2006
U.S. District Court
RELIGION

Beasley v. Konteh, 433 F.Supp.2d 874 (N.D.Ohio 2006). A state prisoner brought a civil rights

U.S. Appeals Court
BOOKS
RELIGION

Borzych v. Frank, 439 F.3d 388 (7th Cir. 2006). An inmate sued state prison officials under § 1983
and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), challenging a ban on
books the inmate deemed necessary for the practice of his Odinist religion. The district court
entered summary judgment for the officials and the inmate appealed. The appeals court held
that, even if the state substantially burdened the inmate's religious exercise by banning books he
deemed necessary to practice his Odinist religion, the ban on such books was the least restrictive
means to promote a compelling state interest in safety, and thus did not violate the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The court noted that the books promoted
violence to exalt the status of whites and demean other races, and that redaction of offensive
material was not a realistic option. According to the court, a state prison procedure that

action against prison officials, alleging violation of his First Amendment right to practice his
religion. The prisoner moved for an order to require officials to transport him to an orthodox
Jewish synagogue for conversion to Judaism. The district court held that the prisoner was not
entitled to a court order requiring officials to transport him to the synagogue, even if failure to
transport the prisoner would frustrate his ability to convert to Judaism, where the officials
claimed that the trip would create a serious security risk and disrupt the prison's normal
administration. The court noted that prisoners do not have the right to leave prison to: (1) be
present in court at any stage of civil proceedings they bring, (2) attend funerals of relatives, or (3)
visit court to satisfy the personal appearance requirement for obtaining a marriage license.
According to the court, prison officials need not affirmatively assist inmates by allowing them to
leave prison temporarily to accomplish a lawful objective that implicates a constitutional right,
such as the right to marry. (Toledo Correctional Institution, Ohio)

38.51
XX

prohibited activities and literature that advocate racial or ethnic supremacy or purity was not
overbroad, in violation of free speech guarantees or RLUIPA, where the overbreadth of the
regulation was not substantial in relation to its proper applications. Officials had refused to allow
the inmate to possess the books Creed of Iron, Temple of Wotan, and The NPKA Book of Blotar,
which he said were necessary to practice his religion. The inmate identified his religion as
Odinism (or Odinic Rite), which like Asatru and Wotanism entails the worship of Norse gods. The
inmate maintained that the books were religious texts. The officials conceded that Odinism is a
religion. (Wisconsin Department of Corrections)
U.S. District Court
PUBLICATIONS

Calia v. Werholtz, 426 F.Supp.2d 1210 (D.Kan. 2006). A former state prison inmate, proceeding

U.S. Appeals Court
SUPERMAX

Freeman v. Berge, 441 F.3d 543 (7th Cir. 2006). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against
prison officials, alleging cruel and unusual punishment. After a jury returned a verdict in favor of
the inmate, the district court granted judgment as a matter of law for the defendants, and the
inmate appealed. The court of appeals affirmed. The court held that the prison's feeding rule
requiring that, when meals were delivered to an inmate's cell, the inmate had to be wearing
trousers or gym shorts, was a reasonable condition to the receipt of food in light of security issues
and respect for female security officers' privacy. The court found that prison officials' withholding
of food from the inmate when he refused to put on trousers or shorts did not constitute the use of
food deprivation as punishment, for the purposes of the Eighth Amendment prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment. The court found that prison officials' withholding of food from the
inmate when he wore a sock on his head when meals were delivered to his cell was a reasonable
condition to the receipt of the food, in light of security issues presented by the possibility that a
sock could be used as a weapon if something was inside it. According to the court, withholding of
food from the inmate when he refused to remove the sock from his head did not constitute the use
of food deprivation as punishment. Inmates in the Supermax are fed their three meals a day in
their cells. The prison's feeding rule requires that the prisoner stand in the middle of his cell,
with the lights on, when the meal is delivered and that he be wearing trousers or gym shorts. If
the inmate does not comply with the rule, the meal is not served to him. The inmate wanted to
eat in his underwear, so on a number of occasions over a two-and-a-half-year period he refused to
put on pants or gym shorts and as a result was not served. Because he skipped so many meals he
lost 45 pounds. (Wisconsin Maximum Security Facility, “Supermax”)

U.S. District Court
PUBLICATIONS

George v. Smith, 467 F.Supp.2d 906 (W.D.Wis. 2006). A state prisoner sued prison officials under

U.S. District Court
RELIGIOUS ARTICLES

Hastings v. Marciulionis, 434 F.Supp.2d 585 (W.D.Wis. 2006). A state inmate brought an action

pro se, brought a § 1983 action against corrections officials, alleging that their enforcement
against him of rules restricting certain inmates' ability to subscribe to newspaper, magazine, and
newsletter publications violated his First Amendment rights. The court granted summary
judgment for the officials. The court held that the inmate’s\l claims for injunctive relief were
moot and that the officials were entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity insofar as the
inmate's action sought monetary damages and was brought against the officials in their official
capacities. The court found that the officials were entitled to qualified immunity because
enforcement of the rules did not violate a clearly established constitutional right. (Lansing
Correctional Facility, Kansas)

§ 1983, alleging deprivation of his free speech rights and deliberate indifference to his serious
medical needs. The officials moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the
motion in part and stayed in part. The court held that: (1) the officials’ ban on the prisoner’s
receipt of a newsletter on the ground that the newsletter solicited gifts did not violate the
prisoner’s free speech rights; (2) a prohibition against the prisoner possessing an atlas did not
violate his free speech rights; (3) the officials did not violate the prisoner’s speech rights in
concluding that a magazine advocated behavior consistent with a gang and thus was prohibited
by regulation; and (4) the prisoner was not exposed to unreasonably high levels of environmental
tobacco smoke. The court found that the prison officials’ ban on the prisoner’s receipt of a
newsletter that advocated for healthcare improvements in the prison and encouraged readers to
“(s)end donations” and to urge their families to “join in the fight,” did not violate the prisoner’s
free speech rights, in that it was a reasonable application of the prison policy prohibiting delivery
of correspondence soliciting gifts. Similarly, the court held that the prohibition against the
prisoner possessing an atlas had a reasonable relationship to a legitimate penological interest,
and thus did not violate his free speech rights, in that the possession of an atlas might allow the
prisoner to plot escape routes. The court held that prison officials did not violate the prisoner’s
speech rights in concluding that a magazine advocated behavior consistent with a gang, and thus
was prohibited by a prison regulation, in as much as it was neither arbitrary nor irrational for the
prison officials to conclude that a picture in the magazine portrayed gang-related hand signs.
(Oshkosh Correctional Institution, Wisconsin)

alleging that his First Amendment right to practice his Native American religion was violated
while he was on supervised probation in an alcohol treatment program. The district court entered
summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court held that the probationer's First
Amendment right to practice his Native American religion was not violated when he was not

38.52
XX

allowed to go to church and a Native American Pow Wow during his initial 14-day restriction and
evaluation period, because the restriction rule did not target a specific religion or religious
practice. All new residents of alcohol treatment program must complete a 14-day restriction
period, and during this period a resident may not leave the facility for any reason except for
employment or emergency situations. This rule allows new residents to become acclimated to the
rules and treatment programs and allows staff-time to conduct an evaluation to determine if the
resident is appropriate for the program. During this period the staff is provided the opportunity
to assess the resident to ensure the safety of the community. The court also held that the
probationer’s First Amendment right was not violated when he was not allowed to keep his eagle
feather at the program, noting that the feather was illegal because the probationer did not have a
required permit. (Wazee House, Wisconsin)
U.S. District Court
MAIL
PUBLICATIONS
RELIGION

Jesus Christ Prison Ministry v. California Department of Corrections, 456 F.Supp.2d 1188
(E.D.Cal. 2006). A prison ministry program and state prisoners brought an action against the
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), alleging that a correctional
facility's policy prohibiting the sending of free softbound Christian literature, compact discs, and
tapes to prisoners who have requested those materials violated the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and their First Amendment rights. The court held that
the policy violated prisoners' free exercise and free speech rights under First Amendment.
According to the court, the asserted penological goals of preventing the receipt of contraband,
reducing fire hazards, increasing the efficiency of random cell inspections or enhancing prison
security did not justify the policy, and the distinction between approved vendors and unapproved
vendors was arbitrary and not reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. The court
also found that the policy violated prisoners' rights under the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) where the approved vendor policy placed a “substantial
burden” on the exercise of the prisoners' religious beliefs because prisoners were unable to engage
in conduct that is motivated by their sincere religious beliefs without access to the materials
provided by the unapproved vendor at no cost, and the unique study and worship materials
provided by the unapproved vendor were unavailable through any of the approved vendors.
(California State Substance Abuse Treatment Facility)

U.S. Appeals Court
MAIL

Johnson v. Goord, 445 F.3d 532 (2nd Cir. 2006). An inmate brought a civil rights action against

prison officials, challenging a regulation governing possession of stamps. The district court
entered judgment in favor of the officials and inmate appealed. The appeals court held that the
inmate did not have a constitutional right to unlimited free postage for non-legal mail, and the
regulation was reasonably related to legitimate penological interests, and thus did not violate the
inmate's First Amendment right to send outgoing non-legal mail. The prison regulation prevented
certain inmates in keeplock from receiving stamps through the mail and permitted them to
receive only one free stamp per month for personal use. The court noted that stamps could be
used by inmates as a form of currency, and the regulation furthered the legitimate goals of
reducing thefts, disputes, and unregulated prisoner transactions. (New York State Department of
Correctional Services)

U.S. Appeals Court
MAIL

Jones v. Brown, 461 F.3d 353 (3d Cir. 2006). State prisoners brought an action against prison

U.S. Appeals Court
MAIL

Koutnik v. Brown, 456 F.3d 777 (7th Cir. 2006). A state prisoner brought a pro se § 1983 action,

officials, claiming that a policy of opening and inspecting their legal mail outside of their presence
violated their First Amendment rights. The district court granted judgment for the prisoners and
the officials appealed. Another district court on similar claims granted judgment for the officials
and the prisoners in that case also appealed. The cases were consolidated on appeal. The court
entered judgment for the prisoner, finding that the policy of opening legal mail outside the
presence of the addressee prisoner impinged upon the prisoner's right to freedom of speech under
the First Amendment, and that the legal mail policy was not reasonably related to the prison's
legitimate penological interest in protecting the health and safety of prisoners and staff. The
court held that reasonable prison administrators would not have realized that they were violating
the prisoners' First Amendment free speech rights by opening prisoners' legal mail outside of the
prisoners' presence, entitling them to qualified immunity. The court noted that although the
administrators maintained the policy after three relatively uneventful years had passed after the
September 11 terrorist attacks and subsequent anthrax concerns, the policy was reasonable when
it was established. (New Jersey Department of Corrections)

challenging the confiscation of his outgoing letter, which contained a swastika and a reference to
the Ku Klux Klan. The prisoner alleged violations of his First Amendment free speech rights, and
his due process rights. The district court dismissed the due process claim, and granted summary
judgment in favor of defendants on remaining claim. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The court held that the prison regulation, prohibiting prisoners from possessing
symbolism that could be associated with any inmate group not approved by the warden, was not
impermissibly vague, for the purpose of determining whether the regulation was facially violative
of the prisoner's First Amendment free speech rights. According to the court, although the
regulation gave some discretion and flexibility to prison officials, the prison setting required it to

38.53
XX

ensure order and safety. The appeals court deferred to state prison officials' assessment of
whether a swastika and a reference to the Ku Klux Klan in the prisoner's outgoing letter were
gang-related symbols, for the purpose of the prisoner's claim that seizure of the letter by prison
officials violated his First Amendment right to free speech, where knowledge of gang symbolism
was acquired primarily through interaction with and observation of prisoners, and the symbolism
was constantly changing. According to the court, the confiscation of the prisoner's outgoing letter
furthered the substantial governmental interest in prisoner rehabilitation, and thus, it did not
violate the prisoner's First Amendment free speech rights. The court noted that the letter was an
attempt to express the prisoner's affiliation with racially intolerant groups, which thwarted the
state's goals of encouraging the prisoner to live crime-free when released from custody, and
fostering the prisoner's ability to resolve conflicts without violence. (Wisc. Secure Program Facil.)
U.S. District Court
RELIGION

Meyer v. Teslik, 411 F.Supp.2d 983 (W.D.Wis. 2006). A state prison inmate sued a chaplain,
claiming that the omission of his name from a list of those allowed to attend Native American
religious ceremonies violated his rights under the First Amendment and the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The chaplain moved for summary judgment. The
district court held that the inmate's exercise of his Native American religion was “substantially
burdened,” for the purpose of determining whether RLUIPA was violated when, over a threemonth period, the prison chaplain did not include him on the list of inmates allowed to attend
religious services when there was no compelling reason for omission. The court found that
summary judgment was precluded by material issues of fact as to whether the chaplain
deliberately left the inmate’s name off the list, resulting in a denial of his First Amendment right
to exercise his core beliefs by participating in pipe and drum ceremonies. The court held that the
chaplain was not entitled to qualified immunity from liability for violating First Amendment and
RLUIPA rights of the inmate where the right of the inmate to participate in core activities of
religion, including services, was clearly established. (Fox Lake Correctional Institution,
Wisconsin)

U.S. Appeals Court
FREE EXPRESSION
ACCESS TO COURT

Myron v. Terhune, 457 F.3d 996 (9th Cir. 2006). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against
several correctional officers and medical personnel at a prison. The district court dismissed the
action and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that a state
regulation governing the security classification of prisoners did not give the state prisoner a
liberty interest, protected by the due process clause, in the security level to which he was
classified, noting that the regulation provided that prison officials retained discretion in making
placement decisions. The court found that a state regulation governing prison publications did
not give the prisoner a liberty interest, protected by the due process clause, in participating in the
publication and distribution of an inmate publication, where the regulation granted unfettered
discretion to prison officials to restrict prisoner publications. According to the court, a regulation
governing library services in prisons did not give the prisoner a liberty interest, protected by the
due process clause, in library access hours. The court noted that while the regulation may have
created a liberty interest in requiring prison officials to have a law library, the warden was vested
with discretion to regulate access to library facilities. (Salinas Valley State Prison, California)

U.S. District Court
HAIR
BEARDS

Ragland v. Angelone, 420 F.Supp.2d 507 (W.D.Va. 2006). A state prisoner challenged a prison's
grooming policy as violative of his constitutional rights and the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The Rastafarian prisoner sought to wear his hair and
beard uncut but he was punished under the prison’s policy. The state moved for summary
judgment. The district court granted the motion, holding that the policy was constitutional, that
RLUIPA was constitutional, that prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity, and that the
policy did not violate RLUIPA. According to the court, the inmate grooming policy was rationally
related to legitimate penological interests and thus did not violate the Rastafarian prisoner's
rights under the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause, the Eighth Amendment, or the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. The court found that the
policy furthered compelling penological interests in security, staff safety, inmate identification,
and inmate health, and that a proposed religious exception to the policy was unworkable.
(Virginia Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
RELIGIOUS ARTICLES

Sample v. Lappin, 424 F.Supp.2d 187 (D.D.C. 2006). An inmate brought suit for declaratory and

injunctive relief, claiming that a denial of his request for wine violated the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA) and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA),
and that the Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) Director failed to train, supervise, and promulgate policies
requiring his subordinates to comply with RFRA and RLUIPA. The defense moved to dismiss, and
the parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The district court held that genuine issues of
material fact existed as to whether an outright ban on an inmate's consumption of wine was the
least restrictive means of furthering the government's compelling interest in controlling
intoxicants. The inmate described himself as “an observant Jew” who “practiced Judaism before
his incarceration and continues his practice of Judaism while confined,” and who “sincerely
believes that he must drink at least 3.5 ounces of red wine (a reviit) while saying Kiddush, a
prayer sanctifying the Sabbath, during Friday night and Saturday shabbos services.” The court

38.54
XX

found that the inmate exhausted his administrative remedies, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(PLRA), with respect to his request for wine, regardless of whether he asked that a rabbi, a chaplain, or a Bureau of
Prisons (BOP) staff member administer the wine to him. According to the court, the inmate's obligation to exhaust
his administrative remedies did not require that he posit every conceivable alternative means by which to achieve
his goal, which was the unburdened exercise of his sincere religious belief. (Federal Correctional Institution,
Beaumont, Texas)
U.S. District Court
RELIGIOUS ARTICLES

Shidler v. Moore, 446 F.Supp.2d 942 (N.D.Ind. 2006). A Sunni Muslim inmate brought a civil rights action against
prison officials who allegedly prevented him from practicing his religion. The district court held that the inmate's
allegations regarding the prison's prayer oil policy stated claims for declaratory relief, monetary and punitive
damages for a violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and for declaratory relief as well as nominal and
punitive damages for a violation of Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The inmate
alleged that a prison official created and enforced a policy prohibiting the use of prayer oil, that when the policy
was changed, only one type of oil was available and that he was allergic to it, and that the official refused to permit
him to purchase an alternative to which he was not allergic. The court found that the inmate's allegation that he was
denied communal worship even though Christians were permitted communal worship, that he was denied the
ability to participate in Ramadan activities, and that he was classified as a Christian for the purpose of preventing
him from practicing his religion, also stated a claim. But the court found that the prison policy that prevented the
inmate from using his religious name on his mail did not violate his First Amendment right to free exercise of
religion, absent an allegation that the inmate had legally changed his name in state court, or that members of other
religious groups were able to change their names more easily. (Miami Correctional Facility, Indiana)

U.S. District Court
PUBLICATIONS

Smith v. Miller, 423 F.Supp.2d 859 (N.D.Ind. 2006). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action challenging prison
officials' decision to confiscate his anarchist materials. The officials moved for summary judgment. The district
court held that fact issues remained as to whether mere possession of anarchist literature presented a clear and
present danger to prison security. The court opened its opinion by stating: “The issue of anarchism has raised its
ugly face again, this time in a prison context…The question here focuses on whether or not prison officials at the
Indiana State Prison are authorized to confiscate anarchist materials from inmates incarcerated there…While the
question presented here is a very close one, and it may be one on which the prison authorities will later
prevail….there needs to be a more extensive factual record.” The court noted that if a trial were to be held, the
court would attempt to appoint counsel for the plaintiff and make every effort to keep the case as narrowly confined
as possible. According to the court, “Although it is a close case, there is enough here, if only barely enough, to keep
the courthouse doors open for this claim which necessarily involves overruling and denying the defendants'
motion.” (Indiana State Prison)

U.S. Appeals Court
MAIL
PROPERTY

Steffey v. Orman, 461 F.3d 1218 (10th Cir. 2006). A state prisoner filed a § 1983 civil rights complaint against
prison officials, alleging that they deprived him of his property in violation of his constitutional due process rights
when they confiscated a money order sent to him. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendants and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the prison regulation prohibiting an
inmate from receiving money from family members of any other inmate was a valid restriction on the inmate's right
to receive money from certain outside sources. The court found that the prisoner did not have a legitimate claim of
entitlement to the $50 money order sent to him by the mother of another inmate mother. (Oklahoma State
Penitentiary)

U.S. District Court
RELIGION
RELIGIOUS ARTICLES

Thunderhorse v. Pierce, 418 F.Supp.2d 875 (E.D.Tex. 2006). A Native American inmate brought a pro se action
against state prison officials, alleging violations of his free exercise rights and of the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The district court granted the officials’ motion for summary judgment.
The court held that prison officials did not violate the inmate's free exercise rights by requiring him to send a
medicine bag obtained from a non-approved vendor through a unit warden's office for visual inspection. The court
found that officials were not required to distinguish between those who practiced shamanism and those who did
not, where only 1.66 percent of prisoners identified their religious preference as “Native American.” The court
noted that members of small religious groups must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to practice their faith in
prisons, but need not be provided with facilities or personnel identical to those given to members of more populous
denominations. The court held that the officials' denial of the inmate's access to a sacred pipe did not violate his
free exercise rights, where inmates were not allowed to possess pipes, the inmate's classification in administrative
segregation precluded him from attending pipe ceremonies for security reasons, and the lack of services congruent
with inmate's beliefs was due to a lack of volunteers rather than a discriminatory purpose. According to the court,
if the state prison policy designating holy days for Native Americans was oriented toward the Plains Indian culture,
the policy did not violate the free exercise rights of the Algonquin inmate where prison officials could not
reasonably be expected to differentiate between holy days for all branches of Native American religion, the inmate
was in administrative segregation and so did not require lay-ins from work, and inmates were permitted to request
additional holy days. The inmate explained that he is a practitioner of Native American religion and referred to
himself as a “shaman.” He stated that the Native American religious program existing in the corrections department
gives preferential treatment to “Christian-oriented” Native American beliefs while “disfavoring and excluding”
traditionalist Native American ceremonial leaders known as shamans. The officials quoted a law review article
entitled Sacred Standards: Honoring the Establishment Clause in Protecting Native American Sacred Sites, as
follows: “[I]t is difficult to describe one Native American religion, because Native Americans identify themselves
by tribe, and many beliefs differ by tribe. Native American religions reflect traditions that have existed in the
Americas for over 30,000 years and a rich plurality of religions have evolved.” (Texas Department of Criminal
Justice, Institutional Division)

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2007
U.S. District Court
LANGUAGE
WORK

Allah v. Poole, 506 F.Supp.2d 174 (W.D.N.Y. 2007). A state inmate sued correctional officers under § 1983,
alleging various violations of his constitutional rights. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district
court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that a commissary supervisor's directive to the
inmate and other prisoners working at the commissary, that they speak to each other only in English, did not violate
any constitutional right the inmate may have had to converse with fellow prisoners in Spanish. According to the
court, the stated rationale for the directive, to ensure the supervisor's own safety, was indisputably legitimate and
the restriction on the inmate's use of Spanish applied only while he was working in the commissary. (Five Points
Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
BOOKS
PUBLICATIONS
RESTRICTIONS

Daker v. Ferrero, 506 F.Supp.2d 1295 (N.D.Ga. 2007). A former prison inmate brought a § 1983 action against
corrections officials, challenging alleged denials of publications and mail, as well as alleged retaliatory acts by
officials. The district court granted summary judgment as to certain claims and the officials moved for
reconsideration as to a portion of that order and for summary judgment, and the inmate moved for summary
judgment. The district court held that reconsideration of summary judgment was warranted by genuine issues of
fact that existed as to whether prison officials violated the inmate's First Amendment rights by retaliating against
him after he brought numerous grievances and a civil rights action. The court found that the officials were entitled
to qualified immunity as to books containing sexually explicit materials, instructions on fighting techniques and
military procedures and materials, criminal investigatory techniques, and instructions on building electronic
devices, but issues of fact existed as to whether prison officials denied a book about revolution and four legal books
based on their content. (Georgia Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
FACIAL HAIR
RELIGION
RULES

Daker v. Wetherington, 469 F.Supp.2d 1231 (N.D.Ga. 2007). A Muslim inmate brought a suit under § 1983 and the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), alleging that his religious beliefs were not
accommodated adequately while he was incarcerated at several prison facilities. The defendants moved for
summary judgment, which the district court granted in part and denied in part. The Georgia Department of
Corrections’ shaving policy provides that goatees, beards, and similar facial adornments are prohibited unless
medically indicated. The court held that the Department’s shaving policy was not rendered constitutionally infirm
by speculating that the Department could, without undermining security, allow a very small percentage of its
prisoners to grow facial hair. The inmate had suggested that the prison accommodate his beliefs by transferring him
out of the state prison system. (Ray James State Prison, Arrendale State Prison, Hancock State Prison and Spalding
County Correctional Institution, Georgia)

U.S. District Court
BOOKS
MAIL

Farid v. Ellen, 514 F.Supp.2d 482 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). A state inmate brought a suit against correctional officials
under § 1983, alleging that he was deprived of rights protected by the First Amendment when he was disciplined by
prison officials for possessing and distributing a booklet of which he was the principal author. The parties filed
motions for summary judgment which the district court granted in part and denied in part. The court held that the
prison's catch-all contraband rule was unconstitutionally vague as applied to the inmate's possession of the booklet.
According to the court, the prison rule prohibiting “smuggling” in or out of a prison facility was unconstitutionally
vague as it applied to the inmate's mailing or attempted mailing of the booklet because it did not contain explicit
standards and gave prison officers unfettered discretion in interpreting what conduct was prohibited. According to
the court, such unfettered discretion impermissibly permitted the viewpoint expressed by the inmate to enter into an
evaluation of whether the conduct was violative of the rules. The court found that prison officials were entitled to
qualified immunity from money damages because the right of the inmate not to be punished for possession or
distribution of written expression of ideas, pursuant to prison rules that did not give notice of the basis on which
such written expression would be determined to be improper, was not clearly established. On appeal (593 F.3d 233)
the appeals court found that fact issues as to basis for the prisoner's punishment precluded summary judgment on
the qualified immunity issue, and officials reasonably should have known that the prisoner's rights were clearly
established and that their actions violated those rights. (Woodborne Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
ITEMS PERMITTED

Jackson v. Frank, 509 F.3d 389 (7th Cir. 2007). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against prison officials,
challenging a prison's policy of preventing prisoners from possessing individual, commercially published
photographs. The prisoner had asked to display a picture of the actress Jennifer Aniston in his cell. The district
court entered summary judgment for the officials and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court
held that the policy did not violate the prisoner’s First Amendment right to receive information, where the policy
rationally advanced the prison's interest in saving staff resources, the prisoner had an alternative means of
exercising his right through subscribing to magazines, and the prisoner put forward no evidence of a cost savings of
capping the volume of mail that inmates might receive compared to the benefits of banning individual, commercial
photographs. (Green Bay Correctional Institute, Wisconsin)

U.S. Appeals Court
PUBLICATIONS
RESTRICTIONS

Jones v. Salt Lake County, 503 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2007). County jail prisoners and a legal publication for
prisoners filed § 1983 suits against county jails, county officials, and a state Department of Corrections (DOC),
challenging the constitutionality of mail regulations in the jails and state prisons. The district court dismissed the
actions and the plaintiffs appealed. The two actions were consolidated for appeal. The appeals court affirmed in
part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that: (1) a jail regulation banning prisoners' receipt of technical
and sexually explicit publications did not violate the First Amendment; (2) the jail regulation barring prisoners
from ordering books from the outside did not violate the First Amendment; and (3) the prison's refusal to accept
legal publications did not amount to a violation of prisoners' First Amendment or due process rights where the
refusal to accept the magazines was not based on any prison policy, but was due to a prison mailroom personnel's
negligence. The court remanded the case to the district court to conduct a four-part Turner analysis of the validity
of the county jail's ban on prisoners' receipt of all catalogs. The court held that the regulation banning ordering

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books from outside was reasonably related to the jail's legitimate penological goal of security, as it prevented
contraband from being smuggled into the jail, and that prisoners had access to thousands of paperbacks through the
jail library, prisoners could request permission to order books directly from a publisher, prisoners could also obtain
paperback books donated to them through a program at local bookstore, prisoners had access to other reading
materials such as newspapers and certain magazines. The court noted that allowing prisoners to have unrestricted
access to books from all outside sources would significantly impact jail resources. (Utah State Prison, Salt Lake &
San Juan County Jails Utah)
U.S. District Court
CORRESPONDENCE
MEDIA ACCESS

Jordan v. Pugh, 504 F.Supp.2d 1109 (D.Colo. 2007). A federal inmate brought an action alleging that a prison
regulation prohibiting inmates from acting as reporters or publishing under bylines violated the First Amendment.
After a bench trial was held, the district court entered judgment for the inmate. The court found that the inmate had
constitutional standing to raise the First Amendment challenge against the regulation, where the inmate had been
punished twice for publishing under a byline. The court held that the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) regulation
violated the First Amendment, despite the BOP's concerns of creating “big wheel” inmates who presented a
security risk, a chilling effect on the performance or speech of prison staff, or permitting inmates to conduct
business. The court noted that a myriad of similar publishing opportunities were available to inmates, there was no
particular security risk associated with an inmate publishing under a byline in the news media that was not present
with other inmate publications, the BOP had adequate authority to screen and exclude dangerous content coming
into the prison, and there was no evidence linking inmates' outgoing news media correspondence to inmates
conducting business. (Federal Bureau of Prisons, Administrative Maximum Unit [“ADX”], Florence, Colorado)

U.S. District Court
MAIL
PUBLICATIONS
RELIGION

Kaufman v. Schneiter, 524 F.Supp.2d 1101 (W.D.Wis. 2007). A former state inmate sued prison officials for
declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, alleging that he was subjected to retaliatory transfer and that his rights
under the First and Eighth Amendments and Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) were
violated. The court granted the officials’ motion for summary judgment. The court held that the warden was not
involved in the inmate's transfer to a maximum security institution, precluding the warden's liability on the claim
alleging that he transferred the inmate in retaliation for the inmate's filing of an earlier lawsuit against him. The
court found that there was no evidence that any of the prison officials sued by the inmate were personally involved
in denying delivery to the inmate of the letter underlying his free speech claim, and therefore the officials could not
be held liable under § 1983. According to the court, there were no facts in evidence that the former state inmate was
prevented from ordering publications about his religion of atheism while incarcerated at a maximum security
facility, was in the facility's step program, or was in any other way injured by the step program's no-publications
policy, and therefore the former inmate lacked standing to litigate his claim that the policy violated his free exercise
rights and rights under Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The court held that the
former state inmate did not show that while he was incarcerated at a maximum security facility, he ever chose to
use out-of-cell time to visit the law library, as opposed to out-of-door exercise, and thus to show an injury-in-fact
required for the former inmate to have standing to challenge the prison official's policy of requiring inmates to
choose between out-of-cell exercise time and law library time under the Eighth Amendment. (Wisconsin Secure
Program Facility)

U.S. Appeals Court
RELIGIOUS ARTICLES

Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir. 2007). A prisoner, proceeding in forma pauperis, brought a § 1983 action
against prison officials claiming multiple violations of his constitutional rights arising from his imprisonment. The
district court dismissed the claims and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part,
and remanded. The court held that allegations made by the prisoner, who identified his religion as Wicca, that he
persistently asked prison officials for permission to possess tarot cards to practice his religion and that he twice
surreptitiously brought tarot cards into prison and was punished, established that he was a sincere devotee of the
Wiccan faith and that he sincerely believed that use of tarot cards was required to practice his religion, as required
to support his claim that prison officials violated his First Amendment right to freely exercise his religion by
denying him tarot cards, incense, and religious books. The court found that it was unnecessary for the prisoner to
show that the use of tarot cards and other items was necessary to the practice of the religion of Wicca if his belief in
their use was sincerely held, to support his free exercise claim. The court remanded the case to address the
prisoner's claim that prison officials violated RLUIPA by denying him tarot cards, incense, and religious books.
(Bonneville Community Correctional Facility, Utah)

U.S. Appeals Court
HAIR LENGTH
RELIGION

Longoria v. Dretke, 507 F.3d 898 (5th Cir. 2007). A prisoner brought a pro se action against prison officials,
claiming his right to exercise his religion was denied when they denied him permission to grow his hair. The
district court dismissed the action and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the
prison's grooming policy did not violate the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and
did not violate equal protection. The court noted that even if the grooming policy created a substantial burden on
the prisoner's religious exercise, the policy served the prison's compelling interest in maintaining order and safety
in the prison, since long hair facilitated the transfer of contraband and weapons and long hair could allow escaped
prisoners to more easily alter their appearance. The court held that the policy was the least restrictive means to
achieve that interest. According to the court, although female prisoners were not subject to the same grooming
policy, the policy applied to all prisoners incarcerated in the male prison, and the application of different grooming
regulations to male and female inmates did not implicate equal protection concerns. (Robertson Unit, Texas
Department of Criminal Justice-Institutional Division)

U.S. District Court
PUBLICATIONS

Moses v. Dennehy, 523 F.Supp.2d 57 (D.Mass. 2007). Prison inmates sued a department of corrections, claiming
that a regulation banning possession of sexually explicit materials violated their First Amendment rights. The
department moved for summary judgment. The district court entered judgment for the department. The court held
that there was a rational relationship between the regulation banning inmates' possession of sexually explicit
materials and a legitimate interest in prison security. According to the court, the regulation satisfied the First

38.57
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Amendment requirement that alternative means of expression be provided because inmates were afforded an
opportunity to receive materials on a wide range of subjects, other than those involving sexuality or nudity, and
there was even an exception allowing for nude images having medical, educational, or anthropological content.
According to the court, the possibility of harm to other inmates supported the validity of the regulation. The court
concluded that the administration of the regulation did not violate the First Amendment, where publications known
always to feature sexually explicit materials were banned outright, and others were banned following prison staff
inspection of individual issues. (Massachusetts Department of Correction)
U.S. District Court
PUBLICATIONS

Ramirez v. Pugh, 486 F.Supp.2d 421 (M.D.Pa. 2007). An inmate at a federal minimum security correctional facility
brought an action claiming that a federal statute banning the use of federal funds to distribute certain sexually
explicit material to prisoners violated his First Amendment right to free speech. The district court dismissed the
action. The inmate appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded with instructions that an evidentiary hearing
be held. Upon remand, the district court entered judgment in favor of the prison. The court held that the statute and
accompanying regulations were reasonably related to the legitimate penological goals of rehabilitating sex
offenders, rehabilitating other inmates, and preserving institutional security. The court noted that the statute,
interpreted to prohibit prison inmates from receiving publicly available soft-core pornographic materials, satisfied
the First Amendment requirement that it be reasonably related to the penological goal of rehabilitating sex
offenders, even though sex offenders represented only 2.8% of the prison population. According to the court, the
need to rehabilitate sex offenders was much more important than the rights of other inmates to view the material in
question. (Allenwood Low Security Correctional Institution, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
PROPERTY

Sanders v. Ryan, 484 F.Supp.2d 1028 (D.Ariz. 2007). A hearing-impaired inmate brought a civil rights action
against a prison official and the State of Arizona, claiming his rights were violated under the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), the First Amendment, Arizona civil rights laws, and the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court
held that a prison official's refusal to give the prisoner, who listened to audiotapes of Baptist church services as part
of his faith, two new tapes unless he exchanged two tapes already in his possession to be destroyed, rather than
stored, did not “substantially burden” the prisoner's exercise of his religion, as required to establish a violation of
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The inmate had alleged that such conduct
violated a state statute requiring the return of authorized inmate property to the inmate upon his release. The court
noted that the new tapes were not authorized, as the prisoner already had the maximum number of tapes allowed,
and the prisoner failed to show that he was unable to practice his religion absent receipt of the new tapes.
According to the court, the state department of corrections policy of limiting property an inmate could possess in
his cell or in storage did not violate the rights of prisoners under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA), where the policy served the “compelling governmental interest” of enhancing the safety
and security of prison facilities. The court found that the policy was the “least restrictive means” available to
accommodate the government's compelling interests in safety and security. The inmate was able to mail excess
religious tapes back to the church in exchange for new ones. (Arizona Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
CLOTHING
HAIR
RELIGIOUS ARTICLES

Singh v. Goord, 520 F.Supp.2d 487 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). An inmate who professed a belief in the Sikh faith brought an
action against various officials of the New York State Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) under the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment, the New York State Constitution, and various other constitutional provisions. The DOCS moved for
summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the inmate
failed to exhaust administrative remedies, as required under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), with respect
to his free exercise clause claim regarding his right to wear a Kacchera, which was a religious undergarment. The
court found that summary judgment for the defendants was precluded by an issue of fact as to whether the inmate
received the decision of the Superintendent, but failed to appeal it.
The court also found that the inmate sincerely believed that he was required to possess a second Kanga, which
was a Sikh religious comb, and therefore the prison's policy of limiting the inmate to a single Kanga placed a
substantial burden on his religious beliefs under RLUIPA. Summary judgment was denied because of fact issues
regarding the security risk posed by the Kara, which was a steel bracelet worn by Sikhs, and whether there was a
compelling governmental interest to allow the Sikh inmate to only wear the Kara for 30 minutes at a time during
meals. The court held that the inmate established a First Amendment free exercise claim with respect to his free
exercise clause claim regarding his right to use a reading lamp at night for prayer purposes. The court concluded
that the DOCS speculation that the beliefs of the inmate might not be sincere and could instead be “partly”
motivated by his resistance to the prison environment was insufficient to defeat the inmate's motion for summary
judgment on his free exercise clause claim. According to the court, given that the Sikh inmate would be unable to
tie his turban in one of the traditional ways, in a manner sufficient to cover his head using a cloth that was merely
30 inches by 36 inches, the inmate established that the prison's policy regarding cloth length substantially burdened
his religious beliefs. The court also found that because the inmate was required to shower with his turban, and to
wash his turban every day, the limitation of two turbans was a substantial burden on the inmate's religious practice.
The inmate also challenged several other prison policies that involved his hair, separate storage of his religious
materials, and other restrictions. (Fishkill Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
RELIGION

Spratt v. Rhode Island Dept. Of Corrections, 482 F.3d 33 (1st.Cir. 2007). A state prison inmate sued a state
corrections department, alleging that the department's policy that prohibited inmates from preaching to fellow
inmates violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The district court granted
summary judgment for the department, and inmate appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court
held that summary judgment was precluded by fact questions as to whether the department's total ban on preaching
by inmates promoted the department's compelling interest in prison security, as applied to the inmate who was an
ordained minister and who had preached to fellow inmates without incident for several years. The court found that

38.58
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no substantial evidence was offered in support of the theory that any inmate preacher would be seen as an inmate
leader, and that inmate leaders threatened security. The court also held that the department could not satisfy
RLUIPA’s “ least restrictive means” requirement by making blanket statements that all alternatives to a total ban
had been considered and rejected, and that any amount of inmate preaching was dangerous to institutional security.
The court required the department to explain why alternative policies would be infeasible, or why they would be
less effective in maintaining security. (Adult Correctional Institution, Rhode Island)
U.S. District Court
PUBLICATIONS

Strope v. Collins, 492 F.Supp.2d 1289 (D.Kan. 2007). Inmates brought a civil rights action against prison officials,
stemming from censorship of magazines containing alleged nudity. The parties moved for summary judgment. The
district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The district court held that summary judgment on the
inmates’ claims alleging First Amendment violations was precluded by genuine issues of material fact, regarding
whether prison officials' withholding of publications containing alleged nudity was reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests. The court found that an inmate who sued prison officials was afforded adequate procedural
due process in the denial of access to magazines containing alleged nudity, where the inmate was given written
notice of withholding of the magazine by way of an “Appeal of Censored Material,” was told verbally about the
refusal to process a Special Purpose Order (SPO) for a supplemental issue, and had the opportunity to grieve the
censorship and appeal decisions to prison officials who were not involved in original process. According to the
court, the prison officials were not entitled to sovereign immunity to the extent that the inmates were seeking
prospective injunctive relief from the officials in their official capacities, where the inmates adequately indicated
that they were challenging the nudity regulation itself and the manner in which it could be applied prospectively.
The court held that officials were not entitled to qualified immunity to the extent that they were being sued in their
individual capacities, where the claim that the censorship was not related to legitimate penological interests
implicated clearly-established First Amendment rights. The court held that genuine issues of material fact,
regarding the extent to which the prison warden personally participated in the alleged deprivation of the inmates'
First Amendment right to receive information by censoring magazines containing alleged nudity, precluded
summary judgment on claims alleging the warden's vicarious liability under a federal civil rights statute. (Lansing
Correctional Facility, Kansas)

U.S. District Court
PUBLICATIONS
RELIGION

Wares v. Simmons, 524 F.Supp.2d 1313 (D.Kan. 2007). A prisoner brought suit pursuant to § 1983, claiming
violations of the Fifth Amendment and the free exercise clause of the First Amendment, arising from the prison
defendants' prohibition on his possession of certain religious texts. The court granted summary judgment in favor
of the defendants. The court held that the prisoner's exercise of his religion was not substantially burdened by
prison regulations preventing him from possessing a Psalm book (which he had in another form) and a book of
teachings by a particular rabbi, and therefore his rights under the free exercise clause of the First Amendment were
not violated. According to the court, by virtue of the other religious materials and items that the prisoner was
permitted to possess and ceremonies that he was permitted to engage in, his religious conduct or expression was not
significantly inhibited or constrained, he remained able to express adherence to his faith, and he had a reasonable
opportunity to exercise his sincerely-held religious beliefs. The court found that even if the prisoner's exercise of
his religion was substantially burdened by the prison regulations, prison administrators did not violate the prisoner's
First Amendment rights since they identified legitimate penological interests in security, safety, rehabilitation, and
sound correctional management that justified the impinging conduct, and alternative means of achieving the
prisoner's right to freely exercise his religion were available. (Hutchinson Correctional Facility, Kansas)

U.S. Appeals Court
BOOKS
RELIGION

Washington v. Klem, 497 F.3d 272 (3rd Cir. 2007). A prisoner filed a pro se action against a Department of
Corrections (DOC), pursuant to § 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA),
alleging the DOC's policy of only allowing ten books in a prisoner's cell violated his religious exercise. The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of the DOC and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and
remanded. The court held that the policy “substantially burdened” the prisoner's religious exercise under RLUIPA,
since the prisoner could not practice his religion in the absence of reading 4 books per day about Africa and African
people and then proselytizing about what he had read. The court noted that the DOC allowed only one weekly visit
to the prison library which precluded the prisoner from reading 4 books daily, or 28 books per week, that the DOC
provided no evidence that the prisoner could freely trade books located inside the prison, and that the DOC forced
the indigent prisoner to have outsiders continuously mail books to him which severely inhibited his ability to read 4
new books daily. The court found that the valid interests of the DOC in the safety and health of prisoners and DOC
employees were not furthered by the DOC's policy of limiting the prisoner to 10 books in his cell, as required to
uphold the policy against the prisoner's claim that the policy violated RLUIPA by substantially burdening his
religious exercise. The court concluded that the book limitation policy did not decrease the likelihood of fire or
hiding places for contraband in a cell, given the DOC's permission for the prisoner to have magazines and
newspapers in addition to the 10 books. The court also held that the policy was not the least restrictive means of
achieving the DOC's valid interests in safety and health, as required to uphold the policy against the prisoner's
challenge, given the DOC's other policies allowing the prisoner to have 4 storage boxes of personal property in his
cell and permitting more than 10 books if approved for educational purposes. According to the court, the least
restrictive means would have been to allow the prisoner to choose what property he could keep in his storage units,
as long as the property did not violate a prison policy for an independently legitimate reason. (State Correctional
Institution-Retreat, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
PROPERTY
RESTRICTIONS

Wesolowski v. Sullivan, 524 F.Supp.2d 251 (W.D.N.Y. 2007). An inmate in the custody of the New York State
Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) brought a § 1983 action against DOCS employees alleging his
constitutional rights were violated while he was confined at a correctional facility when employees confiscated
fundraising materials. The employees moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The
court held that the inmate failed to comply with the Prison Litigation Reform Act's exhaustion requirement by
never appealing the denial of a grievance filed with the Inmate Grievance Resolution Committee (IGRC) to Central
Office Review Committee (CORC). The court found that the confiscation of materials describing how someone

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could conduct a political fundraising event to benefit Families Against Mandatory Minimums (FAMM) did not
violate the inmate's rights under the First Amendment, considering the possibilities for abuse that would have
arisen if inmates were freely allowed to engage in fundraising from fellow inmates. According to the court, the
restriction and regulation of such activities by prisoners was unquestionably a legitimate penological interest, and it
was uncontroverted that the inmate did not follow established procedures for obtaining authorization to engage in
such activities. The court noted that even assuming the employees' actions in confiscating the materials violated the
inmate's First Amendment rights, the employees were entitled to qualified immunity, as no authority had clearly
established the inmate's First Amendment right to possess the materials in question at the time of events giving rise
to lawsuit. (New York State Department of Correctional Services)
U.S. District Court
PUBLICATIONS

West v. Frank, 492 F.Supp.2d 1040 (W.D.Wis. 2007). A prisoner sued prison officials under § 1983, alleging that
they violated his speech and equal protection rights by enforcing a policy prohibiting prisoners from receiving
publications in the mail. The prisoner wanted to stay abreast of the nation's current events while he was
incarcerated and had subscribed to USA Today using his own funds. Authorities at the Wisconsin Secure Program
Facility where the prisoner was incarcerated refused to deliver the newspaper. The officials moved for summary
judgment. The court granted the motion. The court held that the officials who had no involvement in the adoption
or implementation of the policy could not be liable under § 1983 for any violation of the prisoner's speech rights
that occurred when the policy was applied to him. The court held that genuine issues of material fact existed as to
whether the prison violated the prisoner's free speech rights by enforcing its policy against him, instituted as part of
a behavior modification program, precluding summary judgment. But the court found that the action was moot,
where the state had abandoned the policy, and the prisoner had been transferred from the only prison in the state
that imposed such a policy. (Wisconsin Secure Program Facility)
2008

U.S. District Court
SMOKING

Abdullah v. Washington, 530 F.Supp.2d 112 (D.D.C. 2008.) An inmate filed a § 1983 action seeking damages for
violation of his Eighth Amendment rights stemming from his alleged exposure to second-hand tobacco smoke
while confined at a District of Columbia detention facility. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
the defendants. The court held that the plaintiff’s expert's testimony failed to demonstrate a causal relationship
between environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) and the increased risk of harm to the inmate. The court noted that the
expert was a biophysicist, not a medical doctor, never went to the jail, and never examined the inmate or his
medical records. The court held that the officials were not deliberately indifferent to the health risks caused by
environmental tobacco smoke (ETS), even if the officials inadequately enforced no-smoking rules, where a nonsmoking policy was in existence during the inmate's incarceration, and the jail was undergoing extensive
renovation to improve air quality, including the ventilation system. (District of Columbia Department of
Corrections, Central Detention Facility)

U.S. District Court
CLOTHING
VISITS

Adeyola v. Gibon, 537 F.Supp.2d 479 (W.D.N.Y. 2008). An inmate brought a pro se action against a sheriff and
correctional facility officials, alleging that they violated his constitutional rights by refusing to allow females to
visit him unless they removed their head scarves for a search or presented proof that they were practicing Muslims.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the sheriff and officials. The court held that the inmate
failed to allege any injury in fact and thus lacked standing. The court held that the allegations, even if proven, did
not violate any First Amendment right of the inmate to have visitors, in that it was reasonable for officials to
require visitors to remove scarves to determine that they were not attempting to bring in contraband, and he was not
denied visitors, given that visitors were simply required to agree to certain conditions before being allowed to see
an inmate. (Erie County Holding Center, New York State Department of Correctional Services)

U.S. District Court
ACCESS TO COURT
PROPERTY
RULES-ITEMS
PERMITTED

Atwell v. Lavan, 557 F.Supp.2d 532 (M.D.Pa. 2008). A state inmate brought a pro se § 1983 action against prison
employees, probation and parole board members and medical personnel, alleging he was denied access to courts in
violation of the First Amendment. The district court held that the inmate’s allegation that he was denied access to
court because he was not provided with free photocopies and postage failed to state a claim under the First
Amendment. The court found that the allegation that the inmate was denied access to the courts because he was
denied access to stored legal material failed to state a claim under the First Amendment. The court noted that the
inmate was allowed access to his stored materials in exchange for a like number of items from his cell, and prison
staff did not care which of the inmate's items were in his cell as long as he kept within the allowed limit of items.
(State Correctional Institution at Dallas, Pennsylvania)

U.S. Appeals Court
LANGUAGE
OUTGOING MAIL

Barrett v. Belleque, 544 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2008). A prisoner brought a pro se § 1983 action alleging that prison
officials violated his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments by punishing him for writing letters using
vulgar and offensive racist language to describe prison officials. The district court dismissed the complaint and the
prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that the prisoner's allegations that the
prison censored his outgoing mail and punished him for its contents stated a § 1983 claim that his First Amendment
rights were violated. The prisoner had attempted to mail a series of letters to his grandmother and mother. The
letters used vulgar and offensive racist language to describe prison officials. After reviewing the letters, prison
officials cited the prisoner for violation of various prison disciplinary rules, resulting in a loss of good time,
revocation of certain privileges, and other punitive measures. The appeals court found that the district court's
dismissal relied on an incorrect legal standard. (Oregon State Penitentiary)

U.S. Appeals Court
BEARDS
DUE PROCESS
HAIR LENGTH

Fegans v. Norris, 537 F.3d 897 (8th Cir. 2008). A state inmate sued prison officials, alleging that they violated the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), as well as his free exercise and equal protection
rights, by enforcing a grooming policy and denying him Kosher meals. The district court entered judgment for the
inmate with respect to the Kosher meals, but entered judgment for the prison officials with respect to the grooming
policy. The inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the prison policy prohibiting male
inmates from wearing hair below their collar, which prevented the inmate, who followed the Assemblies of

38.60
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Yahweh, from leaving his hair untrimmed, did not violate RLUIPA. Prison officials gave examples of inmates
using hair to conceal contraband and to change their appearance after escaping, and, although the officials allowed
shoulder-length hair in the women's barracks, the women were housed in a single unit and thus had less opportunity
to obtain and transport contraband. The court also found that the policy did not violate the inmate’s free exercise
rights. According to the court, the policy did not violate the inmate's equal protection rights, inasmuch as
differences in security risks between male and female inmates was a valid reason for differing hair-length rules for
men and women, and the policy was reasonably related to the state's legitimate, penological interests of safety and
security. The court noted that the district court's finding that the corrections department director's expert testimony
that male inmates presented greater security risks than female inmates was credible, and was not clearly erroneous.
The court found that a policy that generally prohibits inmates from wearing beards, which prevented the inmate
from refraining from “rounding the corners” of his beard, did not violate RLUIPA, even though inmates with
medical conditions were allowed to have a quarter-inch beard. The court ruled that safety and security concerns
constituted a compelling penological interest, and the prohibition was the least restrictive means available to further
that interest. The court found that the beard policy did not violate the inmate’s free exercise or equal protection
rights. The appeals court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding nominal damages, as
limited by PLRA, of $1,500 for the prison officials' constitutional violation of failing to provide Kosher meals,
which amounted to $1.44 for each constitutional violation. The court also held that the district court did not abuse
its discretion in declining to award punitive damages for the prison officials' constitutional violation of failing to
provide Kosher meals. The district court accurately stated the legal standard for the award of punitive damages, but
found that prison officials did not act with malice, and that punitive damages were not warranted to deter future
unlawful conduct, because the officials already had instituted a policy for providing Kosher meals. (East Arkansas
Regional Unit of the Arkansas Department of Corrections)
U.S. Appeals Court
ACCESS TO RELIGION
RELIGION

Greene v. Solano County Jail, 513 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2008). A former prisoner sued a county jail official asserting
statutory and constitutional challenges to the county jail's policy of prohibiting maximum security prisoners from
participating in group worship. The district court entered summary judgment for the official and the prisoner
appealed. The appeals court reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court held that the religious
exercise at issue in the prisoner's suit under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA)
was engaging in group worship, not practicing his religion as a whole. Therefore, even if the ban on group worship
did not place a substantial burden on the prisoner's practice of Christianity, such fact would not ensure that ban was
in compliance with RLUIPA. According to the court, the jail's policy of prohibiting the maximum security prisoner
from attending group religious worship services substantially burdened the prisoner’s ability to exercise his religion
as required for the ban to violate RLUIPA. The court found that summary judgment was precluded by genuine
issues of material fact as to whether the jail's policy was the least restrictive means of maintaining security. (Solano
County Jail, Claybank Facility, California)

U.S. District Court
RELIGION

Hudson v. Dennehy, 538 F.Supp.2d 400 (D.Mass. 2008). Inmates in a state prison, who adhered to the religious
teachings of Elijah Muhammad and the Nation of Islam, filed a civil rights action against the commissioner of the
state department of correction, alleging violation of their First and Fourteenth Amendments and Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and Massachusetts laws. Following a non-jury trial, the
commissioner moved for judgment on partial findings. The court held that refusal to provide a daily Halal menu to
Muslim inmates substantially burdened the Muslim inmates' exercise of their religious beliefs and that the refusal
did not further a compelling state interest. The court found that the use of a towel provided by the department of
corrections for daily prayer did not substantially burden the Muslim inmates' ability to perform daily prayer.
According to the court, a ban on the Muslim inmates' participation in obligatory weekly group prayer services
while in a separate confined housing unit substantially burdened the inmates' practice of a core tenet of their faith.
The court held that a ban on participation by the Muslim inmates confined in a separate housing unit in obligatory
weekly group prayer services by closed-circuit television was not the least restrictive means of furthering a
compelling State interest. (Massachusetts Correctional Institution-Cedar Junction)

U.S. District Court
HAIR LENGTH
RELIGION

Johnson v. Collins, 564 F.Supp.2d 759 (N.D.Ohio 2008). A state prisoner brought a civil rights suit against a prison
warden and others, seeking injunctive relief against the enforcement of a prison policy that banned the wearing of
shoulder-length dreadlocks. The district court denied the warden’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court
held that the possibility that the prisoner could show that the warden, by adhering to a prison policy that prohibited
the wearing of shoulder-length dreadlocks for security reasons, was continuing to violate the prisoner’s federal
rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) by substantially burdening the
exercise of his Rastafarian religion, precluding the Eleventh Amendment from barring the suit seeking injunctive
relief against the warden in his official capacity. The court found that the warden was not entitled to qualified
immunity as a government official performing discretionary functions on the claim that he substantially burdened
the prisoner's rights under RLUIPA to practice his Rastafarian religion. The court held that the prisoner's suit for
injunctive relief against ongoing enforcement of the prison policy banning the wearing of shoulder-length
dreadlocks was not mooted by his transfer to another prison within the same state system, nor did a change in the
prison grooming code to allow for religious-based exemptions. (Madison Correctional Institution, Toledo
Correctional Institution, Mansfield Correctional Institution, Lebanon Correctional Institution, Ohio)

U.S. District Court
PUBLICATIONS

Jordan v. Sosa, 577 F.Supp.2d 1162 (D.Colo. 2008). A federal prisoner brought an action against a prison and
officials, alleging a prison regulation prohibiting the prisoner from receiving sexually explicit material in the mail
was unconstitutional. The district court held that the regulation did not violate the prisoner's First Amendment
rights nor did it violate the inmate's or publishers' due process rights. But the court found that the portion of the
regulation that allowed the prison to fail to retain the rejected publication violated due process. (United States
Penitentiary-Administrative Maximum, Florence, Colorado)

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U.S. District Court
CLOTHING
RELIGIOUS ARTICLES
RESTRICTIONS

Lewis v. Ollison, 571 F.Supp.2d 1162 (C.D.Cal. 2008). A state prisoner filed a § 1983 action against prison
officials, alleging violation of the First Amendment and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA). The court held that a temporary shower policy of escorting prisoners from their cells to the shower
room and back wearing only boxer shorts and shower shoes, which was adopted by the prison due to security
concerns, created at most an inconvenience, but not a significant interference with the Islamic religious clothing
requirement. The court found that the policy did not violate RLUIPA, since Muslims did not have to shower every
day to practice their religion and the prisoner could have cleansed himself in his cell sink. The court also found that
the policy was reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest in maintaining prison safety and security. The
court held that the rights of the Muslim prisoner under RLUIPA to practice his religion of Islam had not been
subjected to a substantial burden by the policy that limited the prisoner to the possession of no more than 12 ounces
of scented oil in his cell, and limited him to buying no more than 8 ounces of scented oil per purchase order. The
court noted that the rule had been drafted after consultation with a Muslim imam and permitted prisoners to be in
the possession of religious prayer oil that served their religious purposes for many weeks, if not many months.
(Ironwood State Prison, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
ACCESS TO RELIGION
VOLUNTEERS

Mayfield v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, 529 F.3d 599 (5th Cir. 2008). A state prisoner, who practiced the
Odinist/Asatru faith, brought claims pursuant to § 1983 against a state criminal justice department and prison
officials, alleging First Amendment violations, as well as violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA). The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, and appeal was
taken. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that the
claims brought by the prisoner pursuant to the § 1983 action alleging First Amendment violations and pursuant to
RLUIPA seeking declaratory relief as well as a permanent injunction against prison officials in their official
capacity were not barred by sovereign immunity. The court found that the prisoner's claims for compensatory
damages against prison officials in their official capacity on claims brought pursuant to § 1983 alleging First
Amendment violations and RLUIPA violations were barred by the provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(PLRA) prohibiting actions for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of
physical injury. According to the court, a state criminal justice department's regulation of not allowing an Odinist
group to assemble for religious services in the absence of an outside volunteer was reasonably related to a
legitimate penological interest, for the purposes of determining whether the regulation encroached on the prisoner's
First Amendment right to free exercise. The court noted that officials asserted justifications for the volunteer
requirement that involved prison security concerns, as well as staff and space limitations. The court held that
summary judgment for the state was precluded by a genuine issues of material fact as to the neutrality of the
prison's enforcement of the policy of not allowing religious groups to assemble for religious services in the absence
of an outside volunteer. The court also found that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material
fact as to whether rune literature was banned from the prison library, as to whether the prison's policy of not
allowing the Odinist group to assemble for religious services in the absence of an outside volunteer imposed a
substantial burden on the prisoner's religious exercise, and as to whether the prison's policy of preventing the
possession of runestones substantially burdened the prisoner's religious exercise. (Texas Department of Criminal
Justice, Hughes Unit)

U.S. District Court
PROPERTY

Nevada Dept of Corrections v. Cohen, 581 F.Supp.2d 1085 (D.Nev. 2008).The Nevada Department of Corrections
(DOC) brought an action against inmates, seeking declaratory judgment that its ban on the personal possession of
typewriters by inmates was constitutional. The DOC moved for summary judgment and the district court granted
the motion. The court held that the ban: (1) was reasonably related to legitimate penological interests; (2) did not
infringe upon inmates' right of access to courts; (3) reasonably advanced legitimate correctional goals; and (4) was
not an unconstitutional “taking” where the prison regulated property that prisoners could legitimately possess and
offered options to dispose of the property, and prisoners were not deprived of all economically beneficial use of
typewriters. The court noted that prison officials had determined that possession of typewriters aided the ability of
inmates to breach safety and security due to the potential use of typewriter parts as weapons. According to the
court, since inmates were not required to file typewritten documents with courts, there was no evidence of actual
injury or that the ban would foreclose any meaningful opportunities for inmates to pursue arguable claims. (Nevada
Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
CORRESPONDENCE
RULES

Smith v. Mosley, 532 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir. 2008). A prison inmate brought a civil rights action against a warden,
assistant warden, and hearing review officer for allegedly retaliating against him for exercising his free speech
rights in complaining of certain practices at the prison. The district court granted the defendants' motion for
summary judgment, and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the inmate's letter to
the assistant warden, complaining that prisoners like himself, with “compromised immune systems,” were required
to go outside in “thirty-something degree temperatures, wearing substandard clothing,” and that he was given a
“diet composed of 95% starch” when prison officials knew that he was diabetic, constituted a protected exercise of
his free speech rights. But the court held that a reasonable jury could not find that prison officials would not have
disciplined the inmate but for his having filed such grievances. The court found that objective administrators
standing in the prison officials' shoes would assume that the gist of what the inmate said in his letter and the
language that he employed, which “reeked of disrespect for the administrators' authority, would be noised about the
prison's population and, if ignored, could seriously impede their ability to maintain order and thus achieve the
institution's penological objectives.” (Easterling Correctional Facility, Alabama)
2009

U.S. Appeals Court
MAIL
PACKAGES

Bonner v. Outlaw, 552 F.3d 673 (8th Cir. 2009). An inmate filed a Bivens action against prison officials, alleging
their handling of his incoming legal mail violated his constitutional rights. The district court granted the defendants'
motion to dismiss. The appeals court affirmed in part and remanded in part. On remand, the district court denied the
warden's motion to dismiss and his motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The warden

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appealed. The appeals court held that the inmate's allegations were sufficient to state a procedural due process
claim against the warden, and that the due process right to receive notice was clearly established. The court held
that the Federal Bureau of Prison's (BOP) regulation governing an inmate's notification of rejected correspondence,
which distinguished between letters and other correspondence by requiring notification for rejections of the former
but not for the latter, was unreasonable under procedural due process principles. The court found that there was no
governmental interest advanced by the regulation, that inmates did not have an alternative means of receiving
notice, and that there was no additional burden placed on prison officials by having to give notice. According to the
court, the inmate's allegations that the warden had responsibility for lack of notice as to the prison's rejection of
packages containing legal mail were sufficient to state a procedural due process claim against the warden. The
inmate had alleged that the warden was personally involved in creating, applying, or interpreting a policy that
failed to adhere to notice requirements, and that even if the warden had no role in deciding what notice procedures
to follow, the inmate alleged that the warden failed to train or supervise mail room employees to follow notice
requirements. (Federal Correctional Institution, Waseca, Minnesota)
U.S. District Court
RELIGIOUS ARTICLES

Burke v. North Dakota Dept. of Correction and Rehabilitation, 620 F.Supp.2d 1035 (D.N.D. 2009). A state inmate
filed a § 1983 action against prison officials alleging statutory and constitutional violations, including interference
with his free exercise of religion, lack of adequate medical care, retaliation for exercising his constitutional rights,
failure to protect, refusal to accommodate his disability, and cruel and unusual punishment. The district court
granted summary judgment for the defendants. The court held that: (1) failure to provide Hindu worship services on
Thursdays did not violate the inmate's equal protection rights; (2) the decision to reduce Hindu worship services at
the facility did not violate the Free Exercise Clause; (3) restriction of the Hindu inmate's use of camphor, kumkum,
incense, and a butter lamp during worship services did not violate the Free Exercise Clause; and (4) failure to find a
qualified Hindu representative to assist the inmate in the study of his religion did not violate the Free Exercise
Clause. (North Dakota State Penitentiary)

U.S. District Court
MAIL

Covell v. Arpaio, 662 F.Supp.2d 1146 (D.Ariz. 2009). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a county sheriff,
alleging that the sheriff violated his First Amendment rights by instituting a policy that banned incoming letters and
restricted incoming mail to metered postcards. The prisoner alleged that the mail policy prevented him from
receiving legal mail from witnesses in his criminal case. The sheriff moved for summary judgment and the district
court granted the motion. The court held that the jail’s non-privileged mail policy which banned incoming letters
and restricted incoming mail to metered postcards was reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest in
reducing contraband smuggling. The court noted that alternative means, including postcards, telephones, and jail
visits, existed. According to the court, allowing stamped mails would increase the likelihood of smuggling
contraband into the jail, which would in turn lead to conflicts and violence, and there was no evidence that the
prisoner's suggested alternative, by having staff inspect each piece of mail and remove the stamps, would
accommodate the right at a de minimis cost to the jail. (Maricopa County Lower Buckeye Jail, Arizona)

U.S. District Court
RULES-ITEMS
PERMITTED

Cox v. Ashcroft, 603 F.Supp.2d 1261 (E.D.Cal. 2009). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against the United States
Attorney General, several federal prosecutors, and the owner and employees of a privately-owned federal facility in
which the prisoner was incarcerated, alleging constitutional violations arising from his arrest, prosecution, and
incarceration. The district court dismissed the action. The court held that the prisoner did not have any Fourth
Amendment rights to privacy in his cell, and thus did not suffer any constitutional injury as a result of the search of
his cell and the confiscation of another inmate's legal materials. The court found that the prisoner did not have any
liberty or property interest in employment while in prison, and thus the prisoner did not suffer any violation of his
due process right related to his termination from his prison job as a result of discipline arising from the search of
his cell, precluding liability on the part of facility owner and its employees under § 1983. According to the court,
the prison facility's imposition of a 30-day suspension of the prisoner's telephone privileges related to a disciplinary
action arising from the search of his cell and the confiscation of another inmates' legal papers, did not constitute an
unreasonable limitation on the prisoner's First Amendment rights. The court noted that prisoners have a First
Amendment right to telephone access, subject to reasonable limitations. The court found that regulations at a
privately-owned federal prison facility prohibiting the prisoner from having the legal papers of another inmates in
his cell did not chill the prisoner's exercise of his First Amendment right to provide legal assistance to fellow
inmates, thus precluding liability on the part of the prison and its employees in the prisoner's § 1983 action alleging
First Amendment retaliation. The court noted that the regulations reflected a legitimate penological objective in
regulating when and where such assistance was provided. The court found that the prisoner lacked standing to bring
a claim against the warden of a privately-owned federal prison facility, alleging that paying the prisoner at a rate
below minimum wage violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The court noted that prisoners were not
“employees” within the meaning of FLSA. (Taft Corr. Institution, Wackenhut Corrections Corporation, California)

U.S. District Court
CORRESPONDENCE
DUE PROCESS
MAIL

Doss v. Gilkey, 649 F.Supp.2d 905 (S.D.Ill. 2009). Federal prisoners brought an action against prison officials,
alleging that the officials' failure to acknowledge the validity of their marriage and to grant them a spousal
exemption to the rule that inmates could not correspond with each other violated their equal protection and due
process rights. The officials moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. According to the
court, the prison officials' failure to acknowledge the validity of the marriage of two prisoners and to grant them a
spousal exemption to the rule that inmates could not correspond with each other did not violate the prisoners' equal
protection rights where there was no showing that officials singled out the prisoners based on their Islamic religion
or any other improper consideration. The court found that the prison had a legitimate security interest in generally
preventing unrelated prisoners from corresponding, the face of the prisoners' marriage certificate did not strictly
comport with the statutory requirements, the marriage certificate was not registered, as required by state law, and
there was some evidence that the marriage was not valid due to one prisoner's failure to terminate a prior marriage.
(Federal Correctional Institution, Greenville, Illinois)

38.63
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U.S. District Court
RELIGIOUS ARTICLES
RULES-ITEMS
PERMITTED

Goodvine v. Swiekatowski, 594 F.Supp.2d 1049 (W.D.Wis. 2009). A state inmate brought an action against a state,
its department of corrections, and various prison officials, alleging that interference with the practice of his Muslim
faith violated § 1983, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and state law. A
screening of the complaint for frivolous claims was required under the provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform
Act (PLRA). The court held that the inmate's allegations stated a claim against prison officials under RLUIPA. The
court found that a rule that limited religious materials he could own to one soft cover text and that he was unable to
practice his faith without his tariqah materials and additional religious texts did not violate the Free Exercise
Clause. The court held that the denial of the inmate's request to purchase a Qur'an while in segregation, and the
denial of the inmate's request for a halal diet did not violate the Free Exercise Clause. According to the court,
refusal to provide sandwiches to the inmate to break fast did not violate RLUIPA, and prison officials' failure to
“establish the Qiblah” for the inmate did not violate the Free Exercise Clause or RLUIPA. The court found that the
inmate's allegations, that a prison chaplain discriminated against him by providing Christian inmates with free
copies of the Bible and denied him an available free copy of the Qur'an, stated a claim against the chaplain under
the Establishment Clause and Equal Protection Clause, The court held that the inmate's allegations that prison
officials modified meal schedules for Christians wishing to fast for religious purposes but not for Muslims, stated a
claim against prison officials under the Establishment Clause and the Equal Protection Clause. (Green Bay
Correctional Institution, Wisconsin)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDIA ACCESS

Hammer v. Ashcroft, 570 F.3d 798 (7th Cir. 2009). A federal prisoner who was formerly on death row and was
housed in a special confinement unit, filed a pro se lawsuit against various officials of the Bureau of Prisons (BOP),
alleging that they violated his First Amendment and equal protection rights by enforcing a policy that prevented
prisoners in a special confinement unit from giving face-to-face interviews with the media. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The
court held that the BOP policy that prevented prisoners in special confinement units at maximum security prisons
from giving face-to-face or video interviews with the media did not violate the equal protection clause. According
to the court, although the BOP did not prevent such media interviews with other prisoners in a less secure
confinement, the policy was rationally related to the BOP's need for greater security in situations involving
prisoners in special confinement units in maximum security prisons, since media attention could increase tensions
among prisoners, leading to an increased risk of violence among the more violent prisoners. The court found that
the BOP did not violate the prisoner’s free speech rights where the policy was rationally related to the prison's need
for greater security in situations involving prisoners in special confinement units in maximum security prisons,
since media attention could increase tensions among prisoners, glamorize violence, and promote celebrity, leading
to an increased risk of violence. The court noted that the BOP did allow correspondence from prisoners in special
confinement units to media representatives, prisoners were free to file lawsuits, and correspondence sent to courts
and attorneys by prisoners could not be censored. (“Special Confinement Unit,” U.S. Penitentiary, Terre Haute,
Indiana)

U.S. District Court
VISITS

Hill v. Washington State Dept. of Corrections, 628 F.Supp.2d 1250 (W.D.Wash. 2009). An inmate and his wife
brought a § 1983 action against a state department of corrections and various prison officials, alleging a prison
regulation regarding extended family visits (EFV) violated their equal protection rights. The district court
dismissed the action as moot. On subsequent determination, the district court held that: (1) the inmate did not have
a constitutionally protected right to conjugal visits with his wife; (2) the inmate and his wife were not absolutely
entitled to equal treatment under EFV policy; (3) EFV regulations were rationally related to a legitimate
penological interest; (4) prison officials were entitled to summary judgment; and (5) prison officials had Eleventh
Amendment immunity from the § 1983 action. The court noted that denial of prison access to a particular visitor is
well within the terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a prison sentence, and access to a particular visitor
is not independently protected by the Due Process Clause. The challenged EFV policy only allowed those spouses
who were legally married to inmates prior to incarceration to participate in extended family visitation. (Washington
State Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
CUSTODY LEVEL
RELIGION
RESTRICTIONS

Houseknecht v. Doe, 653 F.Supp.2d 547 (E.D.Pa. 2009). An inmate brought an action against current and former
deputy wardens alleging they violated his right to freely exercise his religion under the First Amendment. The
defendants moved for summary judgment. The court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held
that the restriction of the inmate's religious rights due to his election to enter into protective custody, under which
there were no formal religious ceremonies or formal classes similar to those provided to general population
inmates, was rationally related to legitimate penological interest in maintaining security and order, and thus did not
violate inmate's First Amendment right to free exercise of religion. According to the court, it was reasonable for an
inmate who opted for more protective conditions to enjoy fewer amenities. The court noted that the inmate had
regular communication with a chaplain who regularly brought reading materials to the inmates in protective
custody, and the inmate was not prevented from sitting with other inmates and doing his own Bible study in the
unit day room. The court held that it could not require the prison to permit inmates in protective custody to attend
formal gatherings with other inmates, given the purpose of protective custody to segregate inmates who believed
that other inmates posed a danger to them, and the provision of additional reading materials or access to additional
religious media programming could likely not be accomplished without significant cost. The court found that the
Inmate's religious exercise was not substantially burdened by his election to enter into protective custody, under
which there were no formal religious ceremonies or formal classes similar to those provided to general population
inmates, as required to establish a violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA).
The court found that there was no suggestion that prison officials placed substantial pressure on the inmate to
substantially modify his behavior or to violate his beliefs, he was not forced to choose between following the
precepts of his religion and forfeiting benefits otherwise generally available to other inmates, and he acknowledged
that he received and read the inmate handbook, which advised that protective custody carried with it restrictions on
religious access. (Berks County Prison, Pennsylvania)

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XXII

XXIII

U.S. Appeals Court
OUTGOING MAIL

Jones v. Caruso, 569 F.3d 258 (6th Cir. 2009). State prison officials filed a motion to reconsider an order enjoining
them from enforcing a rule preventing prisoners from possessing books, pamphlets, forms or other material regarding actions that could be taken under Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). The district court denied the motion,
and the prison officials appealed. The appeals court affirmed and remanded. The appeals court held that the letter
which the prisoner attempted to mail to the Michigan Secretary of State's office, requesting information about copyrighting and trademark registration in Michigan, was not “legal mail,” and thus its confiscation pursuant to the
prison regulation was not subject to heightened review under the First Amendment. But the court found that the
prisoner was likely to succeed on the merits of his First Amendment claim and the balancing of the relevant factors
favored issuance of a preliminary injunction. The court noted that the harms that prisoners would face from the
enforcement of the rule outweighed those which the prison defendants would face if the court upheld the injunction, and public interest in preventing prisoners' abusive filings would not be harmed by the preliminary injunction.
(Saginaw Correctional Facility, Michigan)

U.S. Appeals Court
PUBLICATIONS

Mays v. Springborn, 575 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2009). A prisoner brought an action against prison officials, asserting
claims based on strip searches at prisons and alleged retaliation for his complaints about the searches, denial of his
request for dietary supplements which he considered to be religious necessities, alleged inadequacy of his diet,
failure to issue certain winter clothing items, and censorship of pages in a magazine mailed to him. The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of the officials on the claims about prison food and clothing and granted
the officials judgment as a matter of law on the claims about strip searches, retaliation, and censorship. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court held that the prison's
censorship of a magazine mailed to the prisoner, by removing an article that described a prison riot and pictures of
people believed to have been making gang signs, was reasonable, even if the prisoner had access to other writings
and to television shows about prison riots. (Stateville Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
RELIGIOUS
ARTICLES

Ortiz v. Downey, 561 F.3d 664 (7th Cir. 2009). A federal pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against the chief
of corrections at a detention center, alleging his rights under the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause were
violated. The district court dismissed the complaint and the detainee appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that the detainee stated a § 1983 claim that his First Amendment free exercise rights were
violated by alleging that he was denied a religious rosary and a prayer booklet solely because a jail official did not
find those items vital to worship. The court also found the alleged denial stated a claim under the Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). (Jerome Combs Detention Center, Kankakee, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
CORRESPONDENCE
OUTGOING MAIL

Proctor v. Applegate, 661 F.Supp.2d 743 (E.D.Mich. 2009). State prisoners brought a § 1983 action against Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) employees and multiple prison facilities, alleging violations of their constitutional rights. The defendants moved to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds and for failure to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held
that state prison regulations which permitted the confiscation of certain types of mail and prohibited “copyrighting”
of names served a legitimate and neutral government purpose, and thus did not violate the prisoners' constitutional
rights. According to the court, an employee's rejection of the prisoner's letters to nine state senators and representatives because the prisoner did not pay for postage and because the letters did not qualify as legal mail, as they
were not addressed to a court, attorney, or a party to a lawsuit, did not implicate the prisoner's constitutional rights.
(Michigan Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
MAIL
RESTRICTIONS
VISITS

Samford v. Dretke, 562 F.3d 674 (5th Cir. 2009). A state prison inmate brought an in forma pauperis § 1983 action
against a corrections official, alleging that a prohibition against any communication between the inmate and his
sons constituted a violation of his First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and association. The district court
dismissed the petition and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the enforcement of
a “negative mail list” that included the inmate's sons did not unduly infringe upon the inmate's First Amendment
rights, and the officials' removal of the inmate's sons from the approved visitors list was reasonable. The court
found that the restriction was rationally related to the prison's legitimate interest in protecting crime victims and
their families from unwanted communications, given the inmate's wife's request that the sons be placed on the list
and the fact that the inmate had been imprisoned after violating a probation condition of no contact with the sons.
The court noted that an alternate means of communication remained open via the inmate's mother. (Texas Department of Criminal Justice)

U.S. District Court
HATS
RELIGIOUS
ARTICLES
VOLUNTEERS

Shepard v. Peryam, 657 F.Supp.2d 1331 (S.D.Fla. 2009). A pro se inmate at a county jail, who professed to follow
the Muslim faith, brought a § 1983 action against a former county sheriff, the jail's director of program services,
and the jail's former and current directors of food services, alleging that the defendants' acts or omissions abridged
his First Amendment religious rights. The inmate sought preliminary injunctive relief. The district court granted the
defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court held that:; (1) the sheriff and the program services director
were entitled to qualified immunity from the inmate's claim that a policy restricting religious headwear violated the
First Amendment; (2) the fact that Jewish inmates may have been permitted to wear religious headwear did not
render the no-headwear policy unconstitutional; (3) a policy preventing inmates' use of non-breakaway prayer
beads did not violate the inmate's First Amendment rights; (4) a policy banning the possession of prayer rugs by
inmates did not violate the inmate's First Amendment rights; and (5) the inmate was not entitled to preliminary
injunctive relief. The court noted that the jail depends entirely on volunteer religious leaders and there were no
volunteer leaders from the Muslim faith. (Monroe County Detention Center, Florida)

U.S. Appeals Court
RELIGIOUS
ARTICLES

Singson v. Norris, 553 F.3d 660 (8th Cir. 2009). A prisoner brought an action against a state department of corrections, alleging its policy prohibiting in-cell use of tarot cards violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA). The prisoner was a follower of Wiccan and asserted that tarot cards were part of his religious practices. Following a trial, the district court ruled in favor of the department of corrections. The prisoner
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the policy did not violate RLUIPA, where the potential
effect of in-cell use of tarot cards on the guards and allocation of prison resources outweighed the restrictions felt
by any interested inmate-users. (Arkansas Department of Correction)

38.65

U.S. Appeals Court
HAIR LENGTH
RELIGION

Smith v. Ozmint, 578 F.3d 246 (4th Cir. 2009). A South Carolina prisoner brought an action alleging that a prison
grooming policy violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The South Carolina
Department of Corrections moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the motion. The prisoner
appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court held that the prison's policy
requiring maximum security inmates to wear closely cropped hair, and which allowed for implementation of that
policy through physical force, imposed a substantial burden on the inmate's religious practice within the meaning of
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), where the policy compelled an inmate to
modify his behavior in violation of his genuinely held religious beliefs. According to the court, an affidavit offered
by the Department of Corrections in support of summary judgment did not demonstrate that the prison policy of
forcibly shaving the heads of maximum security unit prisoners who wore long hair as a matter of religious belief
furthered a compelling governmental interest in space utilization, hygiene, or security by the least restrictive means
under RLUIPA. The court noted that the affidavit dealt solely with the grooming policy applied to special management unit prisoners, and the Department failed to explain how the rationale offered for not accommodating
special management unit prisoners applied to maximum security unit prisoners. (South Carolina Department of
Corrections, Maximum Security Unit at Kirkland Correctional Institution)

U.S. Appeals Court
ACCESS TO
ATTORNEY
RESTRICTIONS

U.S. v. Mikhel, 552 F.3d 961 (9th Cir. 2009). An alien inmate convicted of capital offenses moved to allow attorney-client access without special administrative measures (SAM) restrictions that allegedly violated the Due Process Clause and Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of appellate counsel. The appeals court held that
modification of the SAM was warranted to permit the attorney to use a translator in a meeting with the inmate, and
modification of the SAM was warranted to allow the attorney's investigators to disseminate the inmate's communications. The court also found that modification of the SAM was warranted to allow the attorney's investigator to
meet with the inmate. The court found that the SAM was an exaggerated response to the prison's legitimate security
interests and unacceptably burdened the inmate's due process and Sixth Amendment rights. (Central District, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
RELIGIOUS
ARTICLES

Van Wyhe v. Reisch, 581 F.3d 639 (8th Cir. 2009). Two inmates each brought an action against state prison officials, asserting various claims of interference with their free exercise of religion under the First Amendment and the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The district court denied the officials' motions for
summary judgment in part, and the officials appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, dismissed in part, and remanded. The appeals court held: (1) the section of RLUIPA protecting inmates from imposition of substantial burdens on their religious exercise not justified by compelling state interests was a valid exercise
of Congress's Spending Clause authority; (2) the section of RLUIPA conditioning a state's acceptance of federal
funds on its consent to suit for appropriate relief did not unambiguously encompass monetary damages so as to
effect a waiver of sovereign immunity from suit for monetary claims by acceptance of the federal money; (3) the
section of RLUIPA protecting inmates from substantial burdens on religious exercise was not a statute prohibiting
discrimination within the meaning of the Civil Rights Remedies Equalization Act of 1986 (CRREA); (4) the inmate
made a threshold showing of a substantial burden on his religious exercise by alleging that officials denied his
request to possess and use a succah and that the succah was a mandatory part of the Sukkot Festival and essential to
the practice of his Jewish faith; but (5) the officials did not substantially burden the inmate's religious exercise by
denying his request for additional weekly group religious and language study time; and (6) the officials did not
substantially burden the inmate's religious exercise by denying his request to have and use a tape player in his cell
for religious language studies. The court noted that RLUIPA promoted the general welfare by furthering society's
goal of rehabilitating inmates and respecting individual religious worship. (South Dakota State Penitentiary)
2010

XXIII

U.S. District Court
RULES-ITEMS
PERMITTED

Antonetti v. Skolnik, 748 F.Supp.2d 1201 (D.Nev. 2010). A prisoner, proceeding pro se, brought a § 1983 action
against various prison officials, alleging various constitutional claims, including violations of the First, Fifth, Sixth,
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court dismissed in part. The court held that the prisoner's allegations were factually sufficient to state a colorable § 1983 claim that prison officials violated the Eighth Amendment
by depriving him of needed medical care. The prisoner alleged that he was housed in segregation/isolation, leading
to a mental health breakdown, and: (1) that he was seen by mental health professionals eight times over a five year
period instead of every 90 days as required by administrative regulations; (2) that mental health professionals recommended he pursue art and music for his mental health but that prison officials denied him the materials; (3) and
that the officials' actions resulted in the need to take anti-psychotic and anti-depression medications due to suffering
from bouts of aggression, extreme depression, voices, paranoia, hallucinations, emotional breakdowns and distress,
unreasonable fear, and systematic dehumanization. The court found that the prisoner's allegations were factually
sufficient to state a colorable § 1983 claim for a violation of his First Amendment right of access to courts, where
the prisoner alleged that he was housed in segregation for several years and was repeatedly denied materials such as
books, paper, pens and envelopes, as well as assistance from a law clerk. The court found that the prisoner's allegations were sufficient to state a § 1983 claim of deprivation of property without due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment where the prisoner alleged that prison officials confiscated various items from his cell that they
deemed to be contraband, but that he had purchased them at the prison or had the items given to him by employees
of the prison, and that officials told him he had no right to be made aware of rules, policies or regulations. (High
Desert State Prison, Nevada)

U.S. District Court
BEARDS
RELIGION
RULES

Braithwaite v. Hinkle, 752 F.Supp.2d 692 (E.D.Va. 2010). A prisoner, proceeding pro se, brought a § 1983 action
against a prison officer, alleging violations of his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion and his Eighth
Amendment right to reasonable medical care. Following dismissal of the Eighth Amendment claim, the officer
filed a motion for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the prison policy
requiring prisoners to shave unless exempted for medical reasons did not violate the Sunni Muslim prisoner's First
Amendment right to free exercise of religion, where the policy promoted the prison's strong interests in safety,

38.66

sanitation and identification of inmates. The court noted that the inmate had other methods to practice his religion,
and the policy did not allow forcible shaving of inmates. (Greensville Correctional Center, Virginia)
U.S. District Court
ACCESS TO
RELIGION

Chappell v. Helder, 696 F.Supp.2d 1021 (W.D.Ark. 2010). An inmate brought a § 1983 suit claiming that religious
presentations in a dayroom during lockout times contravened the Free Exercise Clause of the Constitution. The
court held that the presentations contravened the inmate's rights under the Free Exercise Clause. The court noted
that although he was not told to sit and listen, nor was he forced to participate, there was a forced inculcation in the
fact that he was unable to remove himself to a place where he did not have to hear the presentations. The court
found that allowing only the “Holy Bible” to be possessed by inmates during a morning lockout violated the inmate's rights under the Establishment Clause, but the inmate's right of meaningful access to the courts was not
violated. (Washington County Detention Center, Arkansas)

U.S. Appeals Court
RELIGIOUS
ARTICLES
RULES

Colvin v. Caruso, 605 F.3d 282 (6th Cir. 2010). A state prisoner brought pro se action against prison officials, asserting that the prison's 16–day denial of kosher meals, multiple mistakes in administering the kosher-meal program, and the lack of Jewish services and literature at the prison, violated his constitutional rights and the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The district court denied the prisoner's motion for a preliminary injunction, and subsequently granted summary judgment in favor of the officials. The prisoner appealed.
The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court held that the prisoner's pro se claims
for injunctive and declaratory relief under RLUIPA, challenging a particular prison's kosher meal program and the
alleged denial of Jewish services and literature at the prison, were rendered moot by the prisoner’s transfer to another prison. The court noted that the claims were directed specifically at the particular prison's policies and procedures, not at the state prison system's programs as a whole. The court found that the prisoner's First Amendment
right of freedom of religion was not violated by the prison's lack of Jewish services and literature, and thus, the
prisoner could not prevail in his § 1983 First Amendment claim on that basis. The court noted that the prisoner was
the only inmate requesting Jewish services and literature, that prison policies reasonably required a minimum number of inmates to request religious services before they would be held, and there was no showing that the prisoner
was restricted from practicing Judaism privately or that the prison prevented him from requesting religious literature. The appeals court held that the prisoner's pro se claims for injunctive and declaratory relief under RLUIPA,
challenging his removal from a kosher meal program and his failure to be reinstated into the kosher meal program,
were not rendered moot by his transfer to another prison, noting that the prisoner's non-kosher status traveled with
him to the transferee prison. The court held that the prisoner’s amended claims against prison officials, challenging
his removal from a kosher meal program and his failure to be reinstated into the kosher meal program following his
transfer to a different prison, were not futile, for the purpose of the prisoner's motion to amend. The court noted that
the prisoner consistently stated his religious preference as Jewish throughout his incarceration, and he submitted
numerous grievances concerning alleged violations of kosher practice by prison kitchen staff. (Michigan Department of Corrections, Alger Maximum Correctional Facility)

U.S. District Court
BOOKS

Couch v. Jabe, 737 F.Supp.2d 561 (W.D.Va. 2010). An inmate, proceeding pro se, brought a § 1983 action claiming that prison officials violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights when they applied a Virginia Department of Corrections (VDOC) regulation to exclude the books Ulysses and Lady Chatterley's Lover from the prison
library and prevented him from ordering those books from a private, approved vendor. The parties cross-moved for
summary judgment. The district granted the inmate’s motion, finding that the regulation violated the First Amendment, and that injunctive relief was warranted. The court held that the regulation was not reasonably related to
legitimate penological interests, and thus, was overbroad, in violation of the First Amendment. The court noted that
legitimate government interests in security, discipline, good order and offender rehabilitation were not rationally
related to the regulation, which forbid all “explicit ... descriptions of sexual acts” including “sexual acts in violation
of state or federal law,” and encompassed much of the world's finest literature, but did not extend to “soft core”
pornography. According to the court, while the inmate had no right to a general purpose reading library under the
First Amendment, where the Virginia Department of Corrections (VDOC) decided to provide a general literary
library to offenders, VDOC officials were constrained by the First Amendment in how they regulated the library.
The court concluded that the appropriate remedy following a determination that the First Amendment was violated
by a prison regulation, which excluded the books Ulysses and Lady Chatterley's Lover from a prison library, was
injunctive relief against the enforcement and application of the regulation. (Augusta Correctional Center, Virginia)

U.S. Appeals Court
PRETRIAL
DETAINEES
SMOKING
DUE PROCESS

Davis v. Oregon County, Missouri, 607 F.3d 543 (8th Cir. 2010). A pretrial detainee brought an action under § 1983
and various state law authority against a county, county sheriff's department, and a sheriff, alleging the defendants
violated his rights in failing to ensure his safety after a fire broke out at the county jail. The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held
that the county jail's smoking policy did not demonstrate that the sheriff acted with deliberate indifference in violation of the due process rights of the detainee caught in his cell during a jail fire, even if a jailer supplied cigarettes
to inmates, since the jail had an anti-smoking policy in effect at all relevant times. The court noted that the jailer
who allegedly supplied the cigarettes to the inmates had retired nine months before the fire occurred, and jail officials made sweeps for contraband as recently as five days before the fire. According to the court, the county jail's
inoperable sprinklers and lack of extra fire safety equipment such as oxygen tanks did not amount to deliberate
indifference in violation of the due process rights of the detainee caught in his cell during a fire, where jail officials
took action to deal with fire hazards by prohibiting smoking and searching for contraband, and fire extinguishers
and smoke detectors were present at the time of the fire. The court held that any failure of the sheriff to engage his
officers in more exhaustive emergency training did not amount to deliberate indifference in violation of the due
process rights of the detainee caught in his cell during a fire, even if the officers' lack of training presented a substantial safety risk. The court noted that the officers' actions in removing inmates from their cells after they discovered the fire demonstrated that they did not disregard the risk. (Oregon County Jail, Missouri)

38.67

U.S. Appeals Court
VISITS

Dunn v. Castro, 621 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 2010). A state prisoner, proceeding pro se, brought a § 1983 action against
prison officials, alleging violations of the First, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court denied the
officials' motion to dismiss. The officials appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that
the right of the prisoner to receive visits from his children was not clearly established and the officials were entitled
to qualified immunity. The court noted that the restriction was temporary and the prisoner had violated prison rules
by participating in a sexually-oriented telephone call involving a minor. (Corcoran State Prison, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
PUBLICATIONS
RULES

Farid v. Ellen, 593 F.3d 233 (2nd Cir. 2010). A state prisoner brought suit against correctional officials under §
1983, alleging that he was deprived of rights protected by the First Amendment when he was disciplined by prison
officials for possessing and distributing a booklet of which he was the principal author. The district court granted in
part and denied in part the parties' summary judgment motions. The parties appealed and cross-appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part. The court held that the prison disciplinary rule prohibiting contraband was unconstitutionally vague as applied to the state prisoner. The prisoner was disciplined for
possessing and distributing a brochure that violated an inmate group's internal bylaws by not having been approved
by the group's staff advisor. The court noted that the bylaws did not indicate that violation of the group's bylaws
constituted a violation of the prison contraband rule, thus exposing the prisoner to far greater penalties than the
group could have imposed, and prison rules conferred almost complete enforcement discretion on prison officials.
According to the court, the prisoner's right to not be punished under prison rules for violation of an inmate group's
internal bylaws was clearly established, weighing against the prison officials' claim of qualified immunity in the §
1983 action. The court noted that the essence of constitutional prohibitions on vagueness was that the rules must
give notice of conduct that they, rather than another set of rules, prohibit and must constrain discretion of officials
who apply them. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to
whether state prison officials actually intended to punish the prisoner under the prison's contraband rule or for
violating an internal bylaw of an inmate group. (Woodbourne Corr'l Facility, Clinton Corr'l Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
MAIL

Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178 (10th Cir. 2010). A state prisoner, proceeding pro se, brought a § 1983 action
against prison officials, alleging violations of the First, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court
dismissed the complaint with prejudice. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part,
and remanded. The court held that the prisoner's allegations that a prison official intentionally confiscated and destroyed letters sent to him by persons outside the prison “under the guise” of sticker and perfume violations, for the
purpose of harassing him, were sufficient to plead violations of his First Amendment speech rights. The court also
found that the prisoner's allegations that a prison official returned to him outgoing letters that had “appropriate
postage affixed without reason” for failure to mail them, were sufficient to plead a violation of the prisoner's First
Amendment speech rights. The court found an alleged First Amendment speech rights violation with the prisoner's
allegations that he was given a letter from his sister and that it was confiscated from him due to his incommunicado
status, but that it was never returned to him. The court held that the prisoner's allegations that prison officials confiscated canteen items, deprived him of hygiene items for 25 hours and incarcerated him for four weeks in an isolation cell with limited outdoor recreation and lack of access to hygiene items, were insufficient to state a § 1983
claim for violations of the Eighth Amendment. (Wyoming State Penitentiary)

U.S. District Court
RELIGION
RESTRICTIONS

Gordon v. Caruso, 720 F.Supp.2d 896 (W.D.Mich. 2010). An inmate sued corrections officials under § 1983 and
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), claiming that they violated his rights by preventing him from engaging in group worship services with other adherents of his faith. Following denial of a defense motion for summary judgment, officials moved for reconsideration. The appeals court held that summary
judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether prison officials' ban on Asatru group worship was the least restrictive means of furthering their interest in maintaining prison security. The court found that
prison officials who banned Asatru group worship had a rational basis for treating members of the Asatru faith
differently from other groups that promoted racist and supremacist teachings, based on a demonstrated connection
between the practice of Asatru and violence and racial conflict in the prison setting, and thus, there was no violation of the inmate's equal protection rights. The court noted that the other groups that were allowed to engage in
group activity were not shown to present similar security concerns. (Michigan Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
RELIGIOUS
ARTICLES

Indreland v. Yellowstone County Bd. of Comr's, 693 F.Supp.2d 1230 (D.Mont. 2010). A state prisoner brought a §
1983 action against a county board of commissioners and prison officials, alleging, among other things, that the
defendants' actions, including denying him access to satanic materials and holding him in maximum security, interfered with his free exercise of religion in violation of First Amendment and Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The court held that prison officials' denial of access to his satanic medallion did not
interfere with his free exercise of religion in violation of First Amendment and RLUIPA, where the officials had a
legitimate penological interest in denying the prisoner a chain that the officials believed could be used to strangle
another inmate. According to the court, prison officials segregated the prisoner because he was involved in fights
with other inmates, and not solely on account of his alleged satanic religion, and thus the prisoner's segregation did
not interfere with his free exercise of religion in violation of First Amendment and RLUIPA. The court held that
the county detention facility was not required under the First Amendment or RLUIPA to purchase religious materials for the prisoner at its own expense. But the court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue
of material fact as to whether the prison chaplain was working in conjunction with prison staff to deny the prisoner,
who claimed to practice satanism, his free exercise of religion, and therefore, whether the chaplain was state actor.
(Yellowstone County Detention Facility, Montana)

U.S. District Court
ACCESS TO
RELIGION
RELIGIOUS
ARTICLES

Rouser v. White, 707 F.Supp.2d 1055 (E.D.Cal. 2010). A state prisoner, who was a practicing Wiccan, brought an
action under § 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) against prison officials, alleging, among other things, that the officials retaliated against his filing of grievances and litigation arising
out of the officials' alleged failure to accommodate the practice of his religion. The prisoner moved for a preliminary injunction, seeking an order enjoining officials from taking his religious articles and requiring them to satisfy

38.68

certain requirements with respect to his religious services. The district court granted the motion. The prisoner
asked the court to enjoin prison officials from taking his religious items, allow him to keep and maintain religious
texts, allow him to obtain group Wiccan items prior to Wiccan group services, allow him access to an outdoor,
nature-based religious area for Wiccan group services, and grant him access to a fire pit. The court found that the
requested relief conformed with RLUIPA because the relief was narrowly drawn, extended no further than
necessary to correct the harm requiring preliminary relief, and was the least intrusive means necessary to correct
that harm. (California State Prison—Sacramento, Mule Creek State Prison and Pleasant Valley State Prison)
U.S. Appeals Court
PUBLICATIONS

Singer v. Raemisch, 593 F.3d 529 (7th Cir. 2010). An inmate, whose books, magazines and manuscript about the
fantasy role-playing game Dungeons and Dragons were confiscated by prison officials under a prison's policy banning fantasy games, filed a § 1983 action alleging violation of his First Amendment right to free speech. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court
held that despite the inmate's contention that a fantasy role-playing game had never incited prison violence or motivated devotees to form stereotypical street or prison gangs in the past, prison officials were rational in their belief
that, if left unchecked, fantasy role-playing games could lead to gang behavior among inmates and undermine
prison security in the future. The court also found that, despite the inmate's contention that fantasy role-playing
games had a positive rehabilitative effect on prisoners, prison officials were rational in their belief that fantasy roleplaying games could impede inmates' rehabilitation, lead to escapist tendencies or result in more dire consequences,
and thus the prison ban on fantasy role-playing games did not violate the inmate's First Amendment free speech
rights. The court noted that officials were concerned about potential inmate obsession with escape, both figurative
and literal and based the ban on the possibility that games could foster inmates' obsession with escaping from both
real life and the correctional environment, placing legitimate penological goals of prison security and inmate rehabilitation in peril. According to the court, the prison policy prohibiting possession of fantasy role-playing game
manuals, strategy guides, character novellas, and other related materials was rationally related to the goal of
preventing susceptible inmates from embarking upon a dangerous escapist path, and thus confiscation of the
inmate's role-playing books, magazines and manuscript did not violate his First Amendment free speech rights. The
court found that prison officials' ban on fantasy role-playing games and publications met the requirement that
inmates have alternative means of exercising a restricted right, under the Turner test for reviewing the
reasonableness of prison regulations impacting constitutional rights, since the inmate whose fantasy role-playing
game materials were confiscated could express himself by writing another work of fiction, could possess other
reading materials, or could engage with other inmates in allowable games. (Waupun Corr'l Institution, Wisconsin)

U.S. Appeals Court
LIBERTY INTEREST
MAIL
DUE PROCESS

Stanley v. Vining, 602 F.3d 767 (6th Cir. 2010). A prisoner filed a § 1983 action against prison officials, claiming
deprivation of his constitutional rights by a prison guard who was allegedly reading the prisoner's legal mail in the
prisoner's presence in his cell in violation of a prison regulation, and by issuing a prison misconduct charge against
the prisoner after an exchange of angry words. The district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that although the prisoner
had a liberty interest in receiving his mail, under the First Amendment, the prisoner was not deprived of his procedural due process rights based on the prison guard allegedly violating a prison regulation by reading the prisoner's
mail in the prisoner's presence in his cell. The court noted that the prisoner received a post-deprivation hearing, as
part of the prison grievance procedure, which determined that the guard had not read mail in violation of regulation.
The court found that the prisoner's allegation that the guard issued a misconduct charge against him over their dispute that the guard allegedly read the prisoner's legal mail did not rise to the level of a valid § 1983 claim, where
the prisoner failed to allege that the charge interfered in any way with his rights to counsel, access to courts, equal
protection, or procedural due process. The court noted that the complaint stated no facts or theories from which the
court could devise a plausible constitutional claim, and did not even divulge what the disposition of the charge was.
According to the court, no constitutional provision flatly prohibits, as unlawful censorship, a prison from opening
and reading a prisoner's mail, unless it can be shown that the conduct interferes with the prisoner's right to counsel
or access to the courts, or violates his rights of equal protection or procedural due process. “We find no per se
constitutional rule that such conduct automatically violates a broad, general rule prohibiting censorship, as our
dissenting colleague seems to imagine. (Alger Maximum Corr'l Facility, Michigan Department of Corrections)
2011

U.S. District Court
HATS
RELIGIOUS
ARTICLES

Barnes v. Fedele, 760 F.Supp.2d 296 (W.D.N.Y. 2011). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against officials
or employees of New York's Department of Correctional Services (DOCS), alleging that the defendants violated his
constitutional rights while he was incarcerated. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss in part
and denied in part. The court held that the state prisoner failed to allege that he was treated differently on account
of his religion, as would support his equal protection claim, where nothing in the prisoner's complaint suggested
that any similarly situated inmates of a different faith were treated more favorably than him, or that he was singled
out for discriminatory treatment on account of his religion. The prisoner had alleged that Rastafarian, but not Jewish, inmates were permitted to wear crowns. The court also found that the prisoner failed to assert any factual allegations to support his claim under § 1983 that a prison employee denied him a Kosher diet. According to the court,
a prison rabbi did not violate the prisoner's constitutional rights, and thus was not liable under § 1983, by allegedly
failing to respond to one of the prisoner’s letters, and by responding to the prisoner's complaints regarding religion
rules in a way in which the prisoner was unhappy. The court held that the prisoner had no constitutional right to
have his grievances processed or investigated in any particular manner, as would support his § 1983 claim against
prison employee who allegedly covered up an investigation into the confiscation of his purportedly religious head
wear. (Southport Correctional Facility, New York)

38.69

U.S. District Court
RELIGION
SMOKING

Cryer v. Massachusetts Dept. of Correction, 763 F.Supp.2d 237 (D.Mass. 2011). A Native American inmate
brought a civil rights action against the Massachusetts Department of Correction and officials, challenging denial of
access to ceremonial tobacco to be used for religious purposes. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact, regarding whether the correctional anti-smoking policy which banned
tobacco in all forms including ceremonial tobacco, created a substantial burden on the Native American inmate's
religious practice, in violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The court
found that the conduct of state correctional officials in denying the Native American inmate's access to ceremonial
tobacco did not violate a clearly established federal right of which a reasonable officer would have known, entitling
the officials to qualified immunity on the inmate's § 1983 claim under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The court noted that the policy of state correctional officials in denying the Native American inmate's access
to ceremonial tobacco did not contravene a Massachusetts statute governing smoking in public workplaces, since
the provision stated that smoking “may be permitted” in specifically enumerated places and circumstances, including religious ceremonies where smoking was part of a ritual. (Souza–Baranowski Corr'l Center, Massachusetts)

U.S. Appeals Court
PUBLICATIONS

Hrdlicka v. Reniff, 631 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2011). A publisher and his criminal justice publication brought two suits
claiming that their First Amendment rights were being violated by the mail policies at two county jails in California
that refused to distribute unsolicited copies of the publication to inmates. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, and the plaintiffs appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that
summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the jails were justified in refusing to distribute unsolicited copies of the publication to inmates. According to the court, the facts to be considered
included the degree to which allowing distribution of the publication would produce additional clutter in cells or
otherwise adversely affect jail security, the extent to which the jails would be forced to expend additional resources
to deliver the publication, and whether the publisher could effectively reach inmates by delivery only upon request.
(Sacramento County, Butte County, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
PUBLICATIONS

Jordan v. Sosa, 654 F.3d 1012 (10th Cir. 2011). A federal inmate brought an action against Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) officials challenging the constitutionality of a statutory and regulatory ban on the use of federal funds to
distribute to federal prisoners commercially published materials that were sexually explicit or which featured nudity. The district court entered judgment in the government's favor and the inmate appealed. The appeals court
dismissed the action, finding that the action was rendered constitutionally moot by the inmate's transfer to another
facility and the action was rendered prudentially moot by the transfer. (Administrative Maximum Security Facility,
Federal Bureau of Prisons, Florence, Colorado)

U.S. Appeals Court
FACIAL HAIR
RELIGION

Kuperman v. Wrenn, 645 F.3d 69 (1st Cir. 2011). A Jewish former state inmate brought a § 1983 action against
prison officials, alleging a prison regulation prohibiting inmates from growing facial hair longer than one quarter of
an inch violated his First Amendment exercise of religion rights, as well as Fourteenth Amendment equal protection and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Person Act (RLUIPA). The district court granted summary
judgment for the officials and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the regulation was
reasonably related to the penological interests of prison safety and security and did not prohibit the inmate from
alternative means of exercising his rights. The court found that accommodating the inmate's desire to grow a beard
would adversely impact prison resources and that there was no ready alternative to the prison regulation. According
to the court, the regulation did not violate the inmate’s Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights, and the
regulation furthered the compelling government interest of prison safety and security in the least restrictive means
of doing so. (New Hampshire State Prison)

U.S. Appeals Court
PROPERTY
RESTRICTIONS

Nevada Dept. of Corrections v. Greene, 648 F.3d 1014 (9th Cir. 2011). The Nevada Department of Corrections
brought an action against an inmate, seeking declaratory judgment that its ban on personal possession of typewriters by inmates was constitutional. Following intervention by additional inmates, the district court granted the Department’s motion for summary judgment. Several inmates appealed, and the appeals were consolidated. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that: (1) the typewriter ban did not constitute First Amendment retaliation; (2) the ban did not infringe upon the inmates' First Amendment right of access to the Nevada Supreme Court;
(3) the ban did not infringe upon the inmates’ Fourteenth Amendment due process rights; and (4) the district court
did not abuse its discretion in not affording the inmate the opportunity to conduct discovery prior to its ruling on
the Department’s motion for summary judgment. The court noted that the Department’s ban on personal possession
of typewriters by inmates reasonably advanced a legitimate correctional goal of institutional safety, and that the ban
was enacted after the murder of an inmate with a weapon fashioned from the roller pin of a typewriter. (Nevada
Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
CORRESPONDENCE
RESTRICTIONS

Perry v. Secretary, Florida Dept. of Corrections, 664 F.3d 1359 (11th Cir. 2011). An individual who operated two
pen pal services that solicited pen pals for prisoners, as well as another pen pal service, brought a civil rights action
challenging the constitutionality of a Florida Department of Corrections (FDOC) rule prohibiting inmates from
soliciting pen pals. The district court granted the FDOC's motion for summary judgment and the plaintiffs
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the plaintiffs, whose interests as publishers in
accessing prisoners had been harmed, had standing to bring their claims, but that the FDOC rule at issue was
rationally related to a legitimate penological interest. The court found that the plaintiffs had a liberty interest in
accessing inmates and they were afforded constitutionally required due process. The court noted that the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in Procunier v. Martinez set forth a three-part test to decide whether there are proper
procedural safeguards for inmate correspondence of a personal nature: (1) the inmate must receive notice of the
rejection of a letter written by or addressed to him, (2) the author of the letter must be given reasonable opportunity
to protest that decision, and (3) complaints must be referred to a prison official other than the person who originally
disapproved the correspondence. (Florida Department of Corrections)

38.70

2012
U.S. Appeals Court
BOOKS
CORRESPONDENCE
PUBLICATIONS

Al-Owhali v. Holder, 687 F.3d 1236 (10th Cir. 2012). A federal inmate brought a suit against the Attorney General,
the Director of theFederal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), a prison warden, and the FBI, alleging that several special
administrative measures imposed upon him violated his First and Fifth Amendment rights. The inmate had been
convicted of several terrorism-related offenses stemming from the 1998 bombing of the United States embassy in
Nairobi, Kenya. The district court dismissed the complaint and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed.
The appeals court held that: (1) the inmate failed to address whether the ban on his communications with his nieces
and nephews was supported by a rational penal interest; (2) the measure preventing the inmate's subscription to two
Arabic–language newspapers fell within the warden's broad discretion to limit incoming information, and was
rationally related to a penal interest to prevent the inmate from acting upon contemporary information or receiving
coded messages; and (3) the inmate offered only a vague allegation regarding the measure that purportedly barred
him from obtaining a book authored by former President Jimmy Carter, where the inmate offered no factual context
to show that the measure was unrelated to any legitimate penal interest, and instead merely implied the existence of
a secret list of banned publications. (United States Penitentiary, Administrative Maximum, Florence, Colorado)

U.S. District Court
GROOMING
HAIR LENGTH
RELIGION

Benning v. Georgia, 845 F.Supp.2d 1372 (M.D.Ga. 2012). An inmate, who was a Torah-Observant Jew,
proceeding pro se, brought an action against a state, a board of corrections, a department of corrections (DOC) and
its commissioner, seeking injunctive relief on allegations that grooming policies violated the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The district court held that: (1) the inmate's beliefs were sincerely
held; (2) the policy requiring the inmate to remove his earlocks substantially burdened a tenet of his religion; (3)
requiring the inmate to purchase or obtain from a charity a depilatory to comply with the policy did not
substantially burden a tenet of the inmate's religion; and (4) summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue
of material fact as to whether the prison policy of refusing to allow the inmate to grow earlocks was the least
restrictive means of protecting the prison's compelling interests. The court noted that the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) affords to prison inmates a heightened protection from governmentimposed burdens by requiring that the government demonstrate that the substantial burden on the prisoner's
religious exercise is justified by a compelling, rather than merely a legitimate, governmental interest. The court
noted that the inmate had changed his religion of record with the department of corrections (DOC) to Judaism 10
years previously, he had not changed his religion since, and inmate had spent much of his time grieving and
litigating issues related to his Jewish faith. (Autry State Prison, Georgia)

U.S. District Court
HAIR LENGTH
RELIGION

Benning v. Georgia, 864 F.Supp.2d 1358 (M.D.Ga. 2012). A Jewish inmate brought an action against the State of
Georgia, the Georgia Board of Corrections, the Georgia Department of Corrections (GDC), and its Commissioner,
in his official capacity, alleging that the defendants violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act (RLUIPA) by refusing to allow him to grow earlocks in accordance with his religious beliefs. The court held
that: (1) the inmate's religious belief that he was forbidden from shaving his earlocks was sincerely held; (2) the
inmate's religious beliefs were substantially burdened by the defendants' refusal to allow him to grow earlocks; (3)
uniformity was not a compelling government interest justifying the defendants' refusal to allow the inmate to grow
earlocks; and (4) the defendants failed to prove that banning earlocks completely was the least restrictive means of
furthering compelling governmental interests. (Autry State Prison, Georgia)

U.S. Appeals Court
BEARDS
RELIGION
RULES

Couch v. Jabe, 679 F.3d 197 (4th Cir. 2012). A state inmate brought an action alleging that prison officials violated
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) by refusing to permit him to grow a oneeighth-inch beard in compliance with the requirements of his faith. The district court entered summary judgment in
the officials' favor, and the inmate appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. The court held that the
Muslim inmate's maintenance of a beard was a qualifying “religious exercise” under RLUIPA. The court found that
state prison officials failed to satisfy their burden of showing that the policy banning beards for religious purposes
was the least restrictive means of furthering the prison's compelling interests in hygiene, prohibiting contraband and
gang identification, and facilitating identification of prisoners, and thus officials' refusal to permit Muslim inmates
to grow a one-eighth-inch beard in compliance with requirements of his faith violated RLUIPA. The court noted
that the officials failed to address the feasibility of implementing a religious exemption, or to explain how the
prison was able to deal with the beards of medically exempt inmates but could not similarly accommodate religious
exemptions. (Augusta Correctional Center, Virginia)

U.S. District Court
RELIGIOUS
ARTICLES
RESTRICTIONS

Davis v. Powell, 901 F.Supp.2d 1196 (S.D.Cal. 2012). A state prisoner who was a Muslim brought a pro se § 1983
action against a prison warden and other prison employees for claims arising out of the prison's ban on prayer oil.
The court held that allegations that a prison warden issued an addendum to a Department Operations Manual
(DOM) that implemented a policy that only orders for certain religious items would be counted under the quarterly
package program was sufficient to state First Amendment retaliation claim against warden. The court noted that:
(1) the policy made it more burdensome to obtain items required for the inmate to practice his religion or practice it
as easily as inmates of different faiths; (2) that there existed a causal link between the policy and his faith; (3) that
his required religious oil was banned approximately five months after the inmate appealed the policy; (4) that the
policy would chill a person of ordinary firmness from practicing his religion, and (5) that a legitimate penological
interest was not furthered by the policy. The court found that the inmate’s allegation that a prison warden enacted a
policy which considered special orders for religious packages to be counted as quarterly packages for inmates,
because of its adverse effects on plaintiffs of a particular religion, stated an equal protection claim. According to
the court, the articles listed in the policy were those ordered by only prisoners of that religion. The court held that
the warden and officials were not entitled to qualified immunity from the inmate's claim alleging a violation of the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), where a reasonable person in the position of the
prison warden and related officials would believe that his or her conduct in enacting a policy banning the purchase
and receipt of prayer oil by inmates for 14 months violated inmates' First Amendment right to freely exercise his or
her religion and of the inmate’s Equal Protection rights. (Calipatria State Prison, California)

38.71

U.S. District Court
RELIGIOUS
ARTICLES
RULES-ITEMS
PERMITTED

Davis v. Abercrombie, 903 F.Supp.2d 975 (D.Hawai’i 2012). Inmates brought a state court action against the
governor of Hawai'i, the Director of the Hawai'i Department of Public Safety (DPS), and the private manager of a
correctional facility in Arizona at which they were housed, seeking declaratory relief that the defendants violated
their rights to free exercise of their religion by depriving them of their prayer objects. The action was removed to
federal court. The inmates moved for a preliminary injunction preventing the defendants from exercising the
policies that infringed on their right to exercise their religion. The district court denied the motion. The court held
that one inmate failed to exhaust his prison administrative remedies, as required under the Prison Litigation Reform
Act (PLRA), prior to bringing the action. After submitting an informal resolution form, the inmate did not obtain
the final recommendation from the warden or the administrative duty officer on his damaged property claim before
initiating the grievance process under a prison policy, and the inmate did not appeal denial of his formal grievance.
The court held that lack of an irreparable harm to the inmate as a result of damage to his prayer object, a turtle
pendant, precluded the issuance of a preliminary injunction, where there was no imminent danger the his sacred
items would be desecrated absent injunctive relief. The court noted that the inmate's possession and use of his
prayer object, a kukui nut, was a “religious exercise” for purposes of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA): the object was used in daily prayers and chants, in dances, and other individual religious
protocol and communal religious activities, it provided the inmate with spiritual comfort, and it symbolized
enlightenment, growth and accomplishment.
The court found that the correctional facility's policy, prohibiting the inmate from possessing his prayer
object, a kukui nut, and requiring him to donate it to charity, destroy it, or send it out of the institution,
substantially burdened his religious exercise under RLUIPA. (Hawaii Department of Public Safety, Corrections
Corporation of America, Saguaro Correctional Center, Arizona, and Red Rock Correctional Center, Arizona)

U.S. District Court
PUBLICATIONS
RELIGION

Forter v. Geer, 868 F.Supp.2d 1091 (D.Or. 2012). A state inmate, who was a member of the Christian Identity Faith
and proceeding pro se, brought a § 1983 action against department of corrections (DOC) employees, alleging
violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act (RLUIPA). The defendants filed a motion to dismiss and for summary judgment. The district court granted the
motions. The court held that the inmate did not file grievances for most claims, even though such procedures were
available to him, and he did not appeal those grievances that he did file, and therefore failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies under the provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995.
The court held that withholding of a religious poster did not substantially burden the religious exercise of the
inmate, who was a member of the Christian Identity Faith, as would violate the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The court also held that size restrictions which prevented the inmate from
possessing the religious poster did not violate his First Amendment free exercise rights, where the regulations
prevented any items, except subscription newspapers, over a certain size. According to the court, prison officials
withholding of certain religious pamphlets from the mail of the inmate, was validly and rationally connected to a
legitimate interest in ensuring order and safety, for the purposes of the inmate's § 1983 claim alleging that the
withholding violated his First Amendment free exercise and Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights. The
court noted that the pamphlets contained racially inflammatory material and that the prison population was racially
mixed. (Oregon Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
HAIR LENGTH
RELIGION

Grayson v. Schuler, 666 F.3d 450 (7th Cir. 2012). A former state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a
correctional officer, alleging the forcible shearing of his dreadlocks violated the free exercise clause of the First
Amendment. The defendant moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The former
prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The appeals court held that while the prisoner's
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) claim against the correctional officer in his
official capacity was barred by the state's sovereign immunity, the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity.
The court noted that the Act does not create a cause of action against state employees in their personal capacity.
The court held that the taking of a Nazirite vow, which barred the cutting of hair, by the state prisoner who was a
member of the orthodox African Hebrew Israelites of Jerusalem was religiously motivated, for purposes of the
prisoner's claim that prison officials failed to accommodate his religious beliefs and thus violated the free exercise
clause of the First Amendment. The court found that the officer was not entitled to quality immunity because there
was no suggestion that the officer who ordered shearing of prisoner's dreadlocks due to a reasonable belief that the
prisoner was insincere in his religious beliefs, or was a security threat. (Big Muddy Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
AIDS- Acquired
Immune Deficiency
Syndrome

Henderson v. Thomas, 913 F.Supp.2d 1267 (M.D.Ala. 2012). Seven HIV-positive inmates brought an action on
behalf of themselves and class of all current and future HIV-positive inmates incarcerated in Alabama Department
of Corrections (ADOC) facilities, alleging that ADOC's HIV segregation policy discriminated against them on the
basis of their disability, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Rehabilitation Act. After a
non-jury trial, the district court held that: (1) the class representatives had standing to sue; (2) the claims were not
moot even though one inmate had been transferred, where it was reasonable to believe that the challenged practices
would continue; (3) inmates housed in a special housing unit were “otherwise qualified,” or reasonable
accommodation would render them “otherwise qualified;” (4) the blanket policy of categorically segregating all
HIV-positive inmates in a special housing unit violated ADA and the Rehabilitation Act; (5) housing HIV-positive
inmates at other facilities would not impose an undue burden on the state; and (6) food-service policies that
excluded HIV-positive inmates from kitchen jobs within prisons and prohibited HIV-positive inmates from holding
food-service jobs in the work-release program irrationally excluded HIV-positive inmates from programs for which
they were unquestionably qualified and therefore violated ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.
The court also found that female HIV-positive class representative had standing to challenge ADOC policies
that HIV-positive women were segregated within the prison from general-population prisoners and that women
were allowed work-release housing at one facility, but not at ADOC's other work-release facility for women. The
court held that modification of the ADOC medical classification system to afford HIV-positive inmates
individualized determinations, instead of treating HIV status as a dispositive criterion regardless of viral load,

38.72

history of high-risk behavior, physical and mental health, and any other individual aspects of inmates, was a
reasonable accommodation to ensure that HIV-positive inmates housed in the prison's special housing unit were
“otherwise qualified,” under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act, for integration
into the general prison population. According to the court, requiring ADOC to dismantle its policy of segregating
IV-positive female inmates in a particular dormitory at a prison would neither impose undue financial and
administrative burdens nor require fundamental alteration in the nature of ADOC's operations. The court suggested
that it was almost certain that ADOC was wasting valuable resources by maintaining its segregation policy, in that
a large space at a prison filled with empty beds was being used to house only a few women. (Alabama Department
of Corrections)
U.S. Appeals Court
RELIGION

Johnson v. Killian, 680 F.3d 234 (2nd Cir. 2012). A federal prisoner brought an action against a warden, prison
rabbi, and prison chaplain alleging violation of his rights under the First Amendment and the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The prisoner
appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded, finding that the prisoner exhausted his administrative remedies.
According to the court, the prisoner's grievance challenging the prison's limitations on congregational prayer at the
prison, which was limited to only one time a day, five days a week, in a chapel, was sufficient to exhaust his
administrative remedies, under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (RFRA), with respect to the continuing limitation
on congregational prayer at the prison following a warden's replacement. According to the court, the grievance
provided prison administration an opportunity to resolve the same problem that would continue intermittently until
the lawsuit was filed, and issues raised in the lawsuit regarding the alleged inadequacy of spaces and times allotted
for congregational prayer were identical to issues exhausted in the grievance. (Fed. Correctional Institution,
Otisville, New York)

U.S. District Court
RELIGIOUS
ARTICLES

Knows His Gun v. Montana, 866 F.Supp.2d 1235 (D.Mont. 2012). Native American state prisoners brought an
action against a state, the state department of corrections (DOC), a private prison facility, and wardens, alleging
violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). Defendants filed motion to
dismiss. The district court held that: (1) the allegations were sufficient to plead the searches were a substantial
burden on their religious exercise; (2) the allegations were sufficient plead the confiscations and prohibitions were
a substantial burden on their religious exercise; (3) the allegations about relieving a prisoner from the pipe carrier
position were sufficient to plead it was a substantial burden on his religious exercise; (4) transferred prisoners did
not have standing for claims for injunctive and declaratory relief; (5) the private facility was a state actor; and (6)
the private facility was an instrumentality of the state. The Native American prisoners' alleged that the prison
subjected them to en masse strip searches before and after sweat lodge ceremonies, that the searches sometimes
occurred in a hallway where other inmates could see them and at least one occurred in a gym with video cameras
monitored by a female guard, and that some inmates declined to participate in the ceremony due to the degrading
nature of the searches. According to the court, the prisoners' allegations that sacred items were confiscated or
prohibited by the prison for their sweat lodge ceremonies, including smudge tobacco and antlers, and that the items
were essential for the ceremony to be meaningful and proper were sufficient to plead confiscations and prohibitions
were a substantial burden on their religious exercise, as required for their claims under RLUIPA. The prisoner also
alleged that they were subject to pat down searches before and after entering the ceremonial sweat lodge grounds,
that they were provided insufficient water and toilet facilities, that the size of the sweat lodge and the frequency of
the ceremonies was inadequate, and that they were not provided a Native American spiritual advisor. (Montana
Department of Corrections; Corrections Corporation of America; Crossroads Correctional Center)

U.S. Appeals Court
RELIGIOUS
ARTICLES

McFaul v. Valenzuela, 684 F.3d 564 (5th Cir. 2012). A prisoner brought a pro se civil rights action against prison
officials who had denied his request for a religious medallion to use in Celtic Druid ceremonies. The district court
entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed,
finding that the prison's prohibitions on nonconforming neo-Pagan medallions and medallions costing more than
$25 did not violate the prisoner's First Amendment right to free exercise of religion, and the prisoner failed to meet
his burden of showing that the prohibitions substantially burdened his ability to practice his religion, in violation of
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The appeals court also held that enforcement
of the prohibitions against the prisoner did not violate equal protection. Officials had prevented the prisoner from
having a black onyx pentagram for use in Celtic Druid ceremonies, and the court found that the prohibitions were
reasonably related to penological interests, including safety, security, and discipline, did not discriminate against
nontraditional religions, and did not prevent the prisoner from performing some religious rituals. The court noted
that permitting prisoners to possess nonconforming medallions would have forced guards to determine whether the
items were permitted religious medallions or contraband items. (Preston Smith Unit, Texas Department of Criminal
Justice)

U.S. District Court
CORRESPONDENCE
RELIGION
VOLUNTEERS

Moorehead v. Keller, 845 F.Supp.2d 689 (W.D.N.C. 2012). A state inmate, a Messianic Jew, brought a pro se §
1983 action against North Carolina Department of Corrections (DOC) officials, alleging that the officials prevented
him from writing to his “spiritual advisor” and discontinued Messianic Jewish services at the prison, in violation of
his constitutional rights. The defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings. The district court granted the
motion. The court held that the state prison regulation prohibiting prison volunteers from corresponding with
inmates was reasonably related to the prison's legitimate penological interest in preventing volunteers from
becoming unduly familiar with inmates, and thus the actions of North Carolina Department of Corrections (DOC)
officials in preventing the Messianic Jewish inmate from corresponding with his “spiritual advisor,” who was a
volunteer at the prison, pursuant to regulation did not violate the inmate's constitutional rights. (Mountain View
Correctional Institution, North Carolina)

38.73

U.S. Appeals Court
BOOKS

Munson v. Gaetz, 673 F.3d 630 (7th Cir. 2012). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that prison officials
violated his constitutional rights by barring him from personally possessing books he had shipped to a prison. The
district court dismissed the complaint, and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the
decision to prohibit the inmate from personally possessing books containing drug-related information did not
violate the First Amendment, the Eighth Amendment or due process. According to the court, the state prison
officials had a legitimate and neutral governmental objective of restricting prisoner access to drug-related
information, despite the inmate's contention that he wanted the books to educate himself about his prescribed
medications, where the prison officials made an individualized determination, and the books were available in
prison library. (Illinois Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
RELIGION

Native American Council of Tribes v. Weber, 897 F.Supp.2d 828 (D.S.D. 2012). A Native American organization
and inmates brought an action against the Secretary of the South Dakota Department of Corrections, alleging the
Department's policy banning all tobacco from its facilities violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA). The district court found that the inmates' use of tobacco was a religious exercise protected
under RLUIPA, that the policy placed a substantial burden on the inmates' exercise of their religious beliefs, and
the policy was not supported by a compelling governmental interest where there was little evidence that tobacco
from the Native American religious ceremonies created a security or safety risk. According to the court, the Native
American inmates' use of tobacco in pipes, tobacco ties, and prayer flags was a religious exercise protected under
RLUIPA, notwithstanding the use of red willow bark instead of tobacco by other members of their tribe. The court
noted that the inmates used tobacco prior to their incarceration as part of traditional healing and other religious
ceremonies. (South Dakota Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
RELIGIOUS
ARTICLES

Panayoty v. Annucci, 898 F.Supp.2d 469 (N.D.N.Y. 2012). Inmates in a state prison who were affiliated with the
religious group Nation of Gods and Earth filed a § 1983 action against prison officials seeking declarative and
injunctive relief concerning constraints the prison placed on the practice of their religion, which allegedly violated
the First Amendment and Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), as well as the equal
protection clause of Fourteenth Amendment. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court
granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court found that the inmates' practice of congregating with each
other and wearing crowns, as part of their affiliation with the Nation of Gods and Earth group, was religious in the
inmates' scheme of beliefs, and sincerely held, as required to demonstrate a prima facie showing of First
Amendment free exercise and RLUIPA violations against the prison officials who had established protocols
prohibiting such practices. The court noted that one inmate had a twelve-year history of the religious practice,
dating back to before he was incarcerated, another inmate's practice extended back 25 years, and both expressed
that the Nation of Gods and Earth religion had helped them draw closer to a life of righteousness and had shaped
their character. The court held that there was no evidence that the inmates' practice of displaying the Nation of
Gods and Earth's Universal Flag, symbols, and texts in their cells, as part of their affiliation with the group, was
religious in the inmates' scheme of beliefs, and sincerely held, and the inmates failed to adequately assert First
Amendment free exercise and RLUIPA violations against prison officials. Although the inmates asserted that the
prison's prohibition of this practice required them to live under a shroud of secrecy, members of the group were
required to register with the facility deputy superintendent for programs, so their practice was well known. (New
York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision, Mid–Orange Correctional Facility, Riverview
Correctional Facility)

U.S. Appeals Court
BOOKS
DUE PROCESS
RULES- ITEMS
PERMITTED

Prison Legal News v. Livingston, 683 F.3d 201 (5th Cir. 2012). A non-profit publisher of a magazine about
prisoners' rights filed a § 1983 suit claiming violation of the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause by the
Texas Department of Criminal Justice's (TDCJ) book censorship policy and procedures, as applied to the publisher
that was prohibited from distributing five books to prisoners. The district court granted the TDCJ summary
judgment. The publisher appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the TDCJ book censorship
policy that prohibited the publisher's distribution of two books graphically depicting prison rape was rationally
related to a legitimate penological goal of protecting prisoners from a threat to safety and security by use of
descriptions as templates to commit similar rapes, and thus, the policy as applied to the publisher's distribution of
the two books to prisoners did not contravene the publisher's First Amendment right to free speech. According to
the court, the TDCJ book censorship policy that prohibited the publisher's distribution of a book containing racial
slurs and advocating overthrow of prisons by riot and revolt was rationally related to the legitimate penological
goal of protecting the prison's safety and security from race riots, and thus, the policy as applied to the publisher's
distribution of book to prisoners did not contravene the publisher's First Amendment right to free speech. The court
also noted that the prison had a legitimate penological goal of protecting prisoners from the threat of violence due
to the existence of race-based prison gangs and the prevalence of racial discord. The court found that the TDCJ
book censorship policy that formerly prohibited the publisher's distribution of a book recounting sexual molestation
of a young child was rationally related to the legitimate penological goal of protecting the prison from impairment
of the rehabilitation of sex offenders and from disruptive outbursts by prisoners who were similarly victimized, and
thus, the policy as applied to the publisher's distribution of the book to prisoners did not contravene the publisher's
First Amendment right to free speech. The court noted that the TDCJ policy left prisoners and the publisher with
ample alternatives for exercising their free speech rights by permitting prisoners to read the publisher's newsletter
and the majority of books that the publisher distributed. (Prison Legal News, Texas Dept.of Criminal Justice)

U.S. District Court
FREE EXPRESSION
RELIGION

Sweet v. Northern Neck Regional Jail, 857 F.Supp.2d 595 (E.D.Va. 2012). An inmate, proceeding in forma
pauperis, brought a § 1983 action against a sergeant and a jail, alleging that a prohibition against speaking in Arabic
during prayer violated his First Amendment rights. The district court dismissed the case. The court held that the jail
policy requiring prayers or services be spoken in English when inmates from different housing units and
classification levels congregated, but allowing prayers to be offered in Arabic within individual housing units, was
reasonably related to legitimate penological interests of security and did not substantially burden inmates' right to

38.74

free exercise of their First Amendment rights. The court noted that the jail was concerned about inmates plotting
riots or escapes while congregating with other units, jail officers did not speak Arabic, and inmates could gather
within their housing units and pray in Arabic. (Northern Neck Regional Jail, Virginia)
U.S. District Court
CUSTODY LEVEL

U.S. v. Jones, 869 F.Supp.2d 373 (E.D.N.Y. 2012). After a defendant, convicted of racketeering and racketeering
conspiracy, conspiracy to distribute marijuana, use of a firearm in furtherance of the distribution conspiracy, and
four instances of small-scale marijuana distribution, but found not guilty of charges relating to a murder, was
sentenced, he filed a motion challenging the decision of the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to classify his security
level as “high” and designate him for incarceration at a high-security facility. The district court held that the remedy
for the inmate's alleged misclassification lay primarily with the BOP. The court noted that the classification and
designation of inmates is a matter within BOP’s sole discretion. According to the court, although a district court has
habeas jurisdiction to address the execution of a sentence, it does not have jurisdiction over a habeas petition
challenging the petitioner's classification by the Bureau of Prisons. (United States Penitentiary, Big Sandy,
Kentucky)

U.S. District Court
CORRESPONDENCE
MAIL

U.S. v. Ligambi, 886 F.Supp.2d 492 (E.D.Pa. 2012). A detainee who was charged with various crimes, including
racketeering, moved to suppress an outgoing prison letter seized by prison officials. The district court denied the
motion. The court held that the defendant, who was in prison while charged with various crimes, including
racketeering, did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his outgoing non-privileged mail. The court noted
that prison regulations permitted officials to seize correspondence when it might contain information concerning
criminal activities, it was established practice to inspect non-privileged mailings to promote discipline in the
institution, and the defendant had a reputation for involvement with organized crime. (South Woods State Prison,
Southern State Correctional Facility, New Jersey)

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
LANGUAGE

U.S. v. Maricopa County, Ariz., 915 F.Supp.2d 1073 (D.Ariz. 2012). The United States filed an action against a
county, the county sheriff's office, and the sheriff in his official capacity, relating to treatment of Latinos, including
jail detainees, and asserting claims for violations of the Fourth Amendment, retaliation in violation of the First
Amendment, violations of equal protection and due process, and discrimination on the basis of race, color, or
national origin in violation of Title VI and the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act. The defendants
filed motions to dismiss. The district court denied the county's motion, and granted the sheriff and sheriff's office
motions in part and denied in part. The court held that the sheriff's office was an entity that was not capable of
being sued in its own name. The court held that the allegations stated a claim under Title VI for disparate impact
discrimination, stated a claim for retaliation in violation of the First Amendment, and that the allegations satisfied
the requirements for pleading the municipal liability of the county. According to the court, allegations by the
United States, that officers from the county sheriff's office routinely and unlawfully targeted Latinos through
pretextual traffic stops, crime suppression sweeps, and worksite raids, and that as a result Latinos were far more
likely to be deprived of their constitutional rights than non-Latinos, stated a claim for disparate impact
discrimination under Title VI by programs or activities receiving federal financial assistance. The court found that
allegations that the county sheriff's office and the sheriff conducted jail operations in English and provided
inadequate language assistance to the large jail population of Latino inmates who were limited English proficient
(LEP) individuals, thereby denying the Latino LEP inmates meaningful access to jail programs such as sanitary
needs, food, clothing, legal information, and religious services, stated a claim for disparate impact discrimination
under Title VI by programs or activities receiving federal financial assistance. (Maricopa County Sheriff's Office,
Sheriff Joseph M. Arpaio, Arizona)
2013

U.S. Appeals Court
RELIGION
RELIGIOUS
ARTICLES
RESTRICTIONS

Chance v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, 730 F.3d 404 (5th Cir. 2013). A state prisoner brought an action against
prison officials, challenging restrictions on his Native American religious practices under the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary
judgment. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The appeals
court held that: (1) the prison's complete ban on communal pipe-smoking did not violate RLUIPA; (2) the prison's
schedule of Native American religious services did not violate RLUIPA; (3) the prison policy limiting the Native
American Smudging ritual to outdoor ceremonies did not violate RLUIPA; but (4) summary judgment was
precluded by a genuine issue of material fact with regard to whether the prison's refusal to allow the prisoner to
possess locks of relatives' hair in accordance with his Native American religious practice was the least restrictive
means of furthering the prison's compelling interests. (Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Michael Unit in
Tennessee Colony)

U.S. District Court
ACCESS TO
RELIGION
RELIGIOUS
ARTICLES
RESTRICTIONS

Cryer v. Spencer, 934 F.Supp.2d 323 (D.Mass. 2013). A state prisoner, claiming to be partially of Native American
descent, brought a pro se § 1983 action alleging that prison officials violated his First Amendment right to free
exercise of his religion and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), as well as his
rights under Massachusetts law. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court allowed the motion in part and
denied in part. The district court held that the allegations were sufficient to state claims for violations of RLUIPA,
the First Amendment and of a Massachusetts statute prohibiting prisoners from being denied the free exercise of
religious belief. The court held that in light of undisputed evidence concerning the importance of Native American
languages in Native American religious practices, the allegation that state prison officials limited the prisoner's
access to a cassette player and Native American languages audiotapes to use during Native American religious
ceremonies were sufficient to state a claim for violations of RLUIPA. According to the court, restricting the
prisoner's use of the tapes forced him to choose whether to listen to the tapes and forego participation in the
ceremonies, or participate in the ceremonies and give up all opportunities to listen to the tapes. The court also
found that the alleged failure of the prison to make available a Native American clergy member or volunteer, or

38.75

comparable clergy, was sufficient to state an RLUIPA claim. (Souza–Baranowski Correctional Center,
Massachusetts)
U.S. Appeals Court
ACCESS TO COURT
ITEMS PERMITTED

Devbrow v. Gallegos, 735 F.3d 584 (7th Cir. 2013). A prisoner brought a § 1983 claim against two prison officials,
claiming that the officials denied him access to the courts by confiscating and then destroying his legal papers in
retaliation for a prior lawsuit he filed. The district court granted the prison officials' motion for summary judgment,
and denied the prisoner's motion for reconsideration. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The
appeals court held that the prisoner failed to authenticate a purported e-mail from a prison official to a law librarian
supervisor, where there was no circumstantial evidence that supported the authenticity of the e-mail, and no
evidence that the prisoner or anyone else saw the official actually compose or transmit the purported e-mail. The
court held that the official's removal of the prisoner's excessive legal materials from his cell, to eliminate a fire
hazard and to make it easier for officials to conduct searches and inventories of the prisoner's property during
prison searches, was not retaliation for the prisoner's filing of a prior lawsuit. According to the court, the prisoner's
speculation regarding the officials' motive could not overcome the officials' sworn statements on the motion for
summary judgment. (Westville Correctional Facility, Indiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
BEARDS
RELIGION

Garner v. Kennedy, 713 F.3d 237 (5th Cir. 2013). A Muslim state prisoner brought an action against prison officials
alleging the Texas Department of Criminal Justice's (TDCJ) policy of prohibiting prisoners from wearing beards
for religious reasons violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and his
constitutional rights. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, and the prisoner appealed.
The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. On remand, and after a bench trial, the district
court granted declaratory and injunctive relief in favor of the prisoner. The defendants appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The appeals court held that TDCJ's no-beard policy was not the least restrictive means of advancing the
compelling government interest in controlling costs, and the no-beard policy was not the least restrictive means of
advancing the compelling government interest in security. According to the court, although prison officials testified
that there would be additional costs from allowing prisoners to wear quarter-inch beards for religious reasons due
to the construction of barbershops, the purchase of barbering supplies, or the creation of new identification cards,
almost all of that testimony was speculative, the officials admitted that no specific studies of costs had been done,
and there was no evidence that TDCJ, which already imposed limits on hair length, would encounter greater or
added difficulty if it enforced a one-quarter-inch as opposed to a clean-shaven rule. Although TDCJ presented
evidence that allowing inmates to have beards hindered inmate identification, TDCJ allowed inmates to shave their
heads, and there was testimony that shaved heads posed just as many identification problems as allowing prisoners
to grow and shave beards. (Texas Department of Criminal Justice, McConnell Unit, Beeville, Texas)

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
PUBLICATIONS

Gray v. Cannon, 974 F.Supp.2d 1150 (N.D.Ill. 2013). State inmates brought an action against prison officials,
alleging that the officials' refusal to let them receive mail that included photographs depicting nudity and sexual
activity violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment, and that grievance procedures for challenging the
refusals violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court granted the officials’
motion for summary judgment. The court held that a state prison regulation preventing inmates from obtaining
nude or sexually explicit photographs was reasonably related to legitimate penological interests, and thus did not
violate the inmates' First Amendment rights. The court noted that: (1) the regulation was expressly aimed at
protecting prison security; (2) the regulation permitted withholding reading materials only if it furthered interests in
security, good order, or discipline, and there existed a valid and rational connection between the regulation and
prison security; (3) the prison left open alternative means of exercising the restricted right by permitting inmates to
receive a wide range of publications; (4) the restrictions fell within the broad limits of deference to prison officials
regarding what was detrimental to security; and (5) the inmates did not point to an alternative that fully
accommodated inmates' rights at a de minimus cost to valid penological interests. The court found that there was no
evidence regarding how the state prison's grievance and appeal procedures operated, as required to support the
inmates’ claim that they were provided with insufficient opportunities to challenge prison's rejections of sexually
explicit photographs and publications sent to them, in violation of due process. (Stateville Correctional Center,
Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
BOOKS
JEWELRY
RELIGIOUS
ARTICLES

Kaufman v. Pugh, 733 F.3d 692 (7th Cir. 2013). A state prisoner brought an action against prison officials,
challenging their refusal to permit a weekly atheist study group, their refusal to allow the prisoner to wear a
“knowledge thought ring” that he regarded as a religious symbol, and their failure to make atheist books that he
donated available in the prison library. The prisoner asserted claims under the Free Exercise Clause, the
Establishment Clause, and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The district court
granted summary judgment to the prison officials. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part,
vacated in part, and remanded. The appeals court held that summary judgment was precluded by fact issue as to
how many prisoners in the state prison would be interested in forming a weekly atheism study group.
The court found that refusal to allow the prisoner to wear a “knowledge thought ring” did not discriminate
against atheism. The court noted that the prisoner conceded that the ring was an individualized symbol, thereby
admitting that his inability to wear the ring did not impose a substantial burden on his ability to practice atheism.
According to the court, the prison officials were entitled to draw a distinction between, on the one hand, religious
emblems that were common to members of other umbrella religious groups, easy to recognize, and difficult to
abuse as a gang symbol, and on the other hand, emblems that were unique to each prisoner and that posed a
potential security risks. According to the court, prison officials' refusal to allow the state prisoner to form a weekly
atheism study group did not violate the prisoner's rights under the Free Exercise Clause or the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), in the absence of evidence that the prisoner would be unable to
practice atheism effectively without the benefit of a weekly study group.
The court found that the alleged failure of state prison officials to make available in the prison library three
used books on atheism that had been mailed to the prisoner, did not violate the prisoner's rights under the Free

38.76

Exercise Clause and the RLUIPA, absent evidence of a substantial burden on the prisoner's ability to follow his
atheistic beliefs. (Stanley Correctional Facility, Wisconsin)
U.S. Appeals Court
CONTRABAND
HAIR LENGTH
RELIGION

Knight v. Thompson, 723 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2013). Native American inmates brought an action against the
Alabama Department of Corrections, challenging its short-hair policy under the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The district court entered judgment for the Department and the inmates
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the Department’s short-hair policy for male
inmates furthered compelling governmental interests in security, discipline, hygiene, and safety, as required to
survive a challenge under RLUIPA by inmates who wished to wear their hair long in accordance with dictates of
their Native American religion. The court noted that long hair was used to conceal weapons and contraband, it
concealed inmates' fungus outbreaks, sores, cysts, and tumors, and it impeded the ability of prison staff to identify
inmates. According to the court, allowing an exception for Native American inmates would not eliminate the
Department's concerns, as inmates could manipulate searches of their own hair to conceal weapons, and it would do
nothing to assuage the Department's concerns about hair-pulling during fights. The court held that the Department’s
short-hair policy, which applied to all male inmates without exception, did not discriminate on the basis of race or
religion in violation of the Native American inmates' equal protection rights. (Alabama Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
BOOKS
CORRESPONDENCE
DUE PROCESS
PACKAGES
RELIGIOUS
ARTICLES

Kramer v. Conway, 962 F.Supp.2d 1333 (N.D.Ga. 2013). A pretrial detainee at a county jail brought an action
against the jail, the jail administrator, and a county sheriff, alleging that conditions of his confinement violated his
right to practice his Orthodox Jewish faith, that the defendants violated his right to possess legal reference books,
and that the defendants failed to accommodate his physical disabilities. The detainee moved for a preliminary and a
permanent injunction and moved for leave to file a second amendment to his verified complaint. The defendants
moved for summary judgment. The district court denied the motions in part and granted the motion in part. The
court held that the pretrial detainee’s allegation that the county jail denied him books needed to practice his
Orthodox Jewish religious faith failed to establish a violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA), absent evidence that the county jail received federal funds in connection with its policies
limiting the number and type of books allowed in cells. The court held that the county jail's policy of limiting the
number of religious books that the pretrial detainee, an Orthodox Jew, could keep in his cell, but providing him
access to others that were not in his cell, was based on legitimate penological interests, and thus, did not violate the
detainee's rights under the Free Exercise Clause. According to the court, a uniformly applied books-in-cell
limitation was reasonable in a facility that housed 2,200 inmates, the limitation was applied in a neutral way and
the expressive content of books was not considered, books in sufficient quantities could be used as weapons and
presented fire and obstacle hazards, access to other books was made by exchanging out titles and by allowing the
copying of parts or all of a text, and the detainee was not denied access to nine religious books he claimed were
required in practicing his faith, but rather, argued only that access was required to be more convenient.
The court found that the jail's policy of prohibiting hard cover books in cells, including limiting religious texts
to those that did not have hard covers, was based on legitimate penological interests, and thus, did not violate rights
of the pretrial detainee, an Orthodox Jew, under the Free Exercise Clause. The court noted that evidence at hearing
on the detainee's motion for injunctive relief showed that hardcover books posed safety and security risks because
hard covers could be used to conceal contraband and because of their potential use as weapons, the policy was
applied in a neutral way, and the expressive content of books was not considered.
The court found that the jail's policy of limiting package mail to four pounds was based on legitimate
penological interests, and thus, did not violate rights as applied to the pretrial detainee, an Orthodox Jew, under the
Free Exercise Clause when the jail rejected one of detainee's packages that contained more than four pounds of
books. The court noted that the jail received a large volume of mail and other items each day, all of which had to be
searched for contraband and threats their contents could pose to the safety and security of inmates and jail officials,
the policy was applied in a neutral way, and the expressive content of books was not considered. The court held
that the jail's policy that limited the number and type of books allowed in a cell did not violate the pretrial
detainee's Due Process rights, where there was no evidence that the policy was intended to punish the detainee, the
jail's policies prohibiting hard cover books and limiting the number of books allowed in a cell were reasonably
related to legitimate penological interests, and the jail gave the detainee substantial access to legal materials by
increasing the time he was allowed in the library and liberally allowing him to copy legal materials to keep in his
cell. The court held that the jail, the jail administrator, and the county sheriff's denial of a typewriter in the pretrial
detainee's cell to accommodate his alleged handwriting disability did not violate the detainee's rights under Title II
of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The court noted that the detainee was able to write by hand,
although he stated he experienced pain when doing so. According to the court, if the detainee chose to avoid
writing by hand he had substantial access to a typewriter in the jail's law library, there was no permanent harm from
the handwriting he performed, there was no evidence the detainee was not able to adequately communicate with
lawyers and jail officials without a typewriter in his cell, and the accommodation of an in-cell typewriter would
impose an undue burden on jail personnel because metal and moving parts of typewriter could be used as weapons.
(Gwinnett County Jail, Georgia)

U.S. Appeals Court
HAIR LENGTH
RELIGION

Lewis v. Sternes, 712 F.3d 1083 (7th Cir. 2013). A state prisoner brought an action against prison officials under §
1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), alleging removal of his dreadlocks
violated his religious rights and denied him equal protection. The district court granted the defendants' motion for
summary judgment. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that there was no
evidence that the prison had no need to regulate hair length or hairstyle, or that the need was not great enough to
warrant interference with the inmate's religious observance. (Dixon Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
ENFORCEMENT
SMOKING

Mearin v. Swartz, 951 F.Supp.2d 776 (W.D.Pa. 2013). State inmates, proceeding pro se, brought an action against
prison officials and employees, alleging that exposure to environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) violated the Eighth
Amendment, as well as asserting First Amendment retaliation claims. The defendants moved to dismiss. The

38.77

district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the prisoners' allegations were
sufficient to plead they were exposed to unreasonably high levels of environmental tobacco smoke (ETS), as
required to state a § 1983 claim for violations of the Eighth Amendment against various prison officials and
employees. One prisoner alleged that he was exposed to constant smoking by cellmates, inmates in neighboring
cells, and by corrections officers and staff, which resulted in his suffering from constant coughs, headaches, chest
pains, shortness of breath, vomiting, and fatigue. A second prisoner alleged that he was constantly exposed to
second hand smoke by other inmates and employees while in certain housing, which resulted in his suffering from
constant headaches, coughs, dizziness, breathing difficulties, and burning sensations in his chest. The prisoners
alleged that officials and employees had actual knowledge of their exposure to ETS and of the risks of harm to the
prisoners' health, but failed to rectify conditions and to enforce the prison's zero tolerance smoking policy.
The court found that the prisoners' allegations that they had made requests to unit managers to be housed with
non-smoking cellmates, that the managers had knowledge of the prisoners' need to be housed with non-smokers,
that the managers denied the requests, that the prisoners suffered various health conditions from exposure to smoke,
and that the prisoners submitted grievances about smoke exposure, were sufficient to state a § 1983 claim against
case managers for violations of the Eighth Amendment. (State Correctional Institution at Greene, Pennsylvania)
U.S. District Court
PUBLICATIONS

Prison Legal News v. Babeu, 933 F.Supp.2d 1188 (D.Ariz. 2013). A non-profit organization that produced and
distributed a monthly journal and books to inmates brought an action against county jail officers and mailroom
employees, alleging that the defendants violated its First Amendment and due process rights by failing to deliver its
materials to its subscribers at the jail. The parties cross-moved for partial summary judgment. The court granted the
motions in part, denied in part, and deferred in part. The court held that the jail's policy limiting incoming inmate
correspondence to one-page and postcards did not violate the First Amendment, where there was an apparent
common-sense connection between the jail's goal of reducing contraband and limiting the number of pages a
particular piece of correspondence contained, and sufficient alternative avenues of communication remained open
for publishers who wished to communicate with inmates at the jail. But the court held that the jail’s failure to give
the non-profit organization notice and the opportunity to appeal the jail's refusal to deliver its materials to inmates
violated the organization's procedural due process rights.
The court ruled that the blanket ban on newspapers and magazines violated clearly established law, and
therefore neither the county jail mailroom employees nor their supervisors were entitled to qualified immunity from
the § 1983 First Amendment claim arising from employees' failure to deliver the organization's materials to
inmates. According to the court, the law was clear that blanket bans on newspapers and magazines in prisons
violated the First Amendment, and it was objectively unreasonable for the employees to throw away mail, or refuse
to deliver it, based upon a perceived blanket ban on newspapers and magazines. Because the county jail mailroom
uniformly enforced the unconstitutional county policy and allowed books from only four publishers, the county was
subject to liability for First Amendment violations in § 1983 action.
The court held that there was no evidence that mailroom employees, their supervisors, or command staff at the
county jail were motivated by evil motive or intent when they violated the non-profit publisher's First Amendment
and due process rights by discarding publisher's materials without providing the publisher opportunity to contest or
appeal the non-deliverability decision, or that those individuals' unconstitutional actions involved reckless or
callous indifference to the publisher's federally protected rights, as would support an award of punitive damages
against the individuals in the publisher's § 1983 action. (Pinal County Jail, Arizona)

U.S. District Court
PUBLICATIONS

Prison Legal News v. Columbia County, 942 F.Supp.2d 1068 (D.Or. 2013). A publisher filed a § 1983 action
alleging that a county and its officials violated the First Amendment by rejecting dozens of its publications and
letters mailed to inmates incarcerated in its jail and violated the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to provide it or
the inmates with the notice of, and opportunity to, appeal the jail's rejection of its publications and letters. A bench
trial was held, resulting in a judgment for the publisher. The court held that: (1) the policy prohibiting inmates from
receiving mail that was not on a postcard violated the First Amendment; (2) the county had a policy of prohibiting
inmates from receiving magazines; (3) the county failed to provide adequate notice of withholding of incoming
mail by jail authorities; (4) entry of a permanent injunction prohibiting officials from enforcing the postcard-only
policy was warranted; and (5) a permanent injunction prohibiting officials from enforcing the prohibition against
magazines was not warranted. (Columbia County Jail, Oregon)

U.S. District Court
MAIL
VISITS

Royer v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 933 F.Supp.2d 170 (D.D.C. 2013). A federal prisoner brought an action
against Bureau of Prisoners (BOP), alleging classification as a “terrorist inmate” resulted in violations of the
Privacy Act and the First and Fifth Amendments. The BOP moved for summary judgment and to dismiss. The
district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that BOP rules prohibiting contact visits
and limiting noncontact visits and telephone time for federal inmates labeled as “terrorist inmates”, more than other
inmates, had a rational connection to a legitimate government interest, for the purpose of the inmate's action
alleging the rules violated his First Amendment rights of speech and association. According to the court, the prison
had an interest in monitoring the inmate's communications and the prison isolated inmates who could pose a threat
to others or to the orderly operation of the institution. The court noted that the rules did not preclude the inmate
from using alternative means to communicate with his family, where the inmate could send letters, the telephone
was available to him, and he could send messages through others allowed to visit.
The court found that the inmate's assertions that the prison already had multiple cameras and hypersensitive
microphones, and that officers strip searched inmates before and after contact visits, did not establish ready
alternatives to a prohibition on contact visits for the inmate and limits on phone usage and noncontact visits due to
being labeled as a “terrorist inmate.” The court noted that increasing the number of inmates subject to strip searches
increased the cost of visitation, and microphones and cameras did not obviate all security concerns that arose from
contact visits, such as covert notes or hand signals.
The court held that the inmate's allegations that he was segregated from the prison's general population for over
six years, that he was subject to restrictions on recreational, religious, and educational opportunities available to

38.78

other inmates, that contact with his family was limited to one 15 minute phone call per week during business hours
when his children were in school, and that he was limited to two 2-hour noncontact visits per month, were
sufficient to plead harsh and atypical conditions, as required for his Fifth Amendment procedural due process
claim. According to the court, the inmate's allegations that he was taken from his cell without warning, that he was
only provided an administrative detention order that stated he was being moved due to his classification, that he
was eventually told he was classified as a “terrorist inmate,” that such classification imposed greater restrictions
upon his confinement, and that he was never provided with a hearing, notice of criteria for release from conditions,
or notice of a projected date for release from conditions were sufficient to plead denial of due process, as required
for his claim alleging violations of the Fifth Amendment procedural due process. (Special Housing Units at FCI
Allenwood and USP Lewisburg, CMU at FCI Terre Haute, SHU at FCI Greenville, Supermax Facility at Florence,
Colorado, and CMU at USP Marion)
U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
PRETRIAL
DETAINEES
TRANSSEXUAL

Shaw v. District of Columbia, 944 F.Supp.2d 43 (D.D.C. 2013). A former pretrial detainee, a transgender woman,
who underwent sex reassignment surgery and had her sex legally changed to female, brought an action against the
United States Marshals Service (USMS), USMS marshals, District of Columbia, a police chief, and police officers,
alleging under § 1983 that the defendants violated her Fourth Amendment rights in connection with her arrests, and
asserting claims under the District of Columbia Human Rights Act and tort law. The police chief, officer, and
USMS defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The district
court held that the USMS marshals were not entitled to qualified immunity from the unlawful search claim, where a
reasonable officer would have known that a cross-gender search of a female detainee by male USMS employees
that included intimate physical contact, exposure of private body parts, and verbal harassment, all in front of male
detainees and male USMS employees, in the absence of an emergency, was unreasonable. The court also found that
the USMS marshals and the police officer were not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 Fifth Amendment
conditions of confinement claim brought by the pretrial detainee, arising from the defendants' actions in holding the
detainee with male detainees and otherwise treating her as if she were male. According to the court, a reasonable
officer would know that treating the female detainee as the detainee was treated exposed her to a substantial risk of
serious harm, and, therefore, would know that those actions violated the detainee's due process rights. (D.C. Metro.
Police Department, 6th Dist. Police Station and MPD's Central Cellblock, and U.S. Marshals Service)

U.S. District Court
DRUG TESTING

Terbush v. Massachusetts ex rel. Hampden County Sheriff's Office, 987 F.Supp.2d 109 (D.Mass. 2013). An inmate
brought a state court action against the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, a medical doctor, a registered nurse, and
a physician assistant, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs and asserting claims under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act. The inmate alleged that his inability to provide
a urine sample while participating in a day reporting program, was due to an alleged “Shy Bladder Syndrome”
condition as well as subsequent medical issues following his return to a correctional facility. The day reporting
program provided home-based incarceration for selected inmates with the goal of transitioning them back to the
community. Inmates were still “incarcerated” but were allowed to live at home under strict reporting conditions,
including drug testing. When the inmate could not produce a urine sample upon his admission to the program, he
was returned to jail. The defendants removed the action to federal court, and moved for summary judgment. The
district court granted the motion. The court found that the inmate's alleged “Shy Bladder Syndrome” condition was
not a “disability” under the ADA, and even if the condition was a disability, the inmate did not meet the essential
eligibility requirements for participation in the program and, therefore, was not a “qualified individual with a
disability” under the ADA. The court noted that inmate had often refused to cooperate with medical advice, he
received extensive medical care on practically a daily basis, sometimes multiple times a day, the inmate failed to
inform anyone at the facility of his urinary retention until two or three days after returning to the facility, the inmate
was sent to a hospital when he complained about his urinary retention, and while the inmate did not see an outside
urologist until approximately one month later, at that point his medical issues were resolved. (Hampden County
Sheriff's Department Day Reporting Program, Hampden County Correctional Center, Massachusetts)
2014

U.S. District Court
RELIGION
VOLUNTEERS

Brown v. Livingston, 17 F.Supp.3d 616 (S.D.Tex. 2014). A prisoner brought an action, individually and on behalf
of others similarly situated, alleging that various policies of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ)
violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and the First Amendment. TDCJ
moved to terminate a consent decree that prohibited it from discriminating against Muslims in the pursuit of their
right to profess their religious beliefs and to exercise their religious practices. The district court denied the motion.
The court held that TDCJ's volunteer policy violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, and RLUIPA. The policy required that all religious activities not
supervised by a prison chaplain or guard have an outside volunteer in attendance. According to the court, the policy
meant that Muslim inmates who were in prisons near populations centers from which Muslim volunteers could not
be recruited in greater numbers being able to participate in religious activities only one hour per week, while
Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish inmates who could procure more outside volunteers had access to six hours or
more of religious activities per week. The court noted that the policy imposed a substantial burden on Muslim
inmates' practice of their religion because it substantially limited the opportunity for Muslims to engage in
necessary religious aspects of their faith. Muslim inmates had no alternate way to exercise their religious rights
because communal worship and instruction were integral to the practice of their faith, and there was no legitimate
security interest advanced by prohibiting Muslim inmates from continuing to participate in inmate-led religious
activities without an outside volunteer. (Texas Department of Criminal Justice)

U.S. District Court
MEDIA ACCESS

Brown v. Pepe, 42 F.Supp.3d 310 (D.Mass. 2014). An inmate, a convicted felon who was recaptured following
escape from custody, brought an action against a correctional facility officer and a state police trooper under § 1983
and § 1985 for violations of his Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights after the officer and trooper

38.79

required him to perform a “perp walk” in front the news media to be photographed following his recapture, and
after the trooper photographed himself with the inmate by taking a “selfie.” The trooper moved for judgment on the
pleadings. The district court granted the motion, finding that: (1) the “perp walk” did not violate the defendant's
Fourth Amendment rights; (2) the trooper's privately-taken “selfie” was a de minimis intrusion; (3) the walk was
not cruel and unusual; and (4) the walk did not affect a tangible protectable interest. (Dekalb County Jail, Georgia)
U.S. Appeals Court
RELIGIOUS
ARTICLES
RELIGION

Native American Council of Tribes v. Weber, 750 F.3d 742 (8th Cir. 2014). A Native American organization and
inmates brought an action against prison officials, claiming that the prison's policy of prohibiting tobacco use by
Native American inmates during religious activities substantially burdened the exercise of their religious beliefs in
violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The district court found the
restrictions violated RLUIPA and ordered the parties to confer. After the parties failed to agree on a new tobacco
policy, the district court entered a remedial order granting injunctive relief. The prison officials appealed. The
appeals court affirmed. The court held that: (1) the inmates' use of tobacco during Native American ceremonies was
a religious exercise; (2) the prison's complete ban on tobacco use substantially burdened the exercise of the inmates'
religious beliefs; (3) a complete ban was not the least restrictive means of furthering the prison's interest in order
and security; and (4) the district court's remedial order was narrowly tailored to remedy the violation of inmates'
rights. The court noted that Lakota inmates had been taught the importance of tobacco to the exercise of their
religious beliefs from a young age and had continued to use tobacco in religious ceremonies throughout adulthood.
According to the court, the prison failed to consider the feasibility of reducing the percentage of tobacco in a
mixture used by Native American inmates, and other correctional facilities permitted inmates to use tobacco in
religious ceremonies. (South Dakota Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
VOLUNTEERS
BOOKS
RELIGION

Pfeil v. Lampert, 11 F.Supp.3d 1099 (D.Wyo. 2014). A pro se prisoner brought an action against prison officials
under § 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), alleging that the officials
denied him access to religious books and priests. The parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The district court
denied the prisoner’s motion and granted the officials’ motion. The court held that: (1) the fact that a religious
volunteer missed a single visit to the prison did not impose a substantial burden on the prisoner's religious exercise;
(2) the prison's policy of prohibiting inmates from possessing hardbound books did not impose a substantial burden
on the prisoner's religious exercise; (3) the hardbound book policy served to further a compelling governmental
interest and was the least restrictive means to do so; (4) the prison's requirement that each volunteer at the prison
provide current contract information before being admitted to prison furthered the compelling government interest
of maintaining security and safety and was least restrictive means for doing so; (5) the prison's policies were
rationally related to a legitimate penological interest; (6) any relaxation of the prison's policies would have an
adverse impact on guards, other inmates, and prison resources; (7) prison officials did not impermissibly retaliate
against the prisoner for filing a lawsuit; and (8) any limitation on the prisoner's eyesight was not substantial, and
thus was not a disability for the purposes of ADA discrimination claim. (Wyoming Honor Farm, Wyoming Honor
Conservation Camp)

U.S. District Court
MAIL
PUBLICATIONS

Prison Legal News v. Chapman, 44 F.Supp.3d 1289 (M.D.Ga. 2014). The publisher of a periodical that addressed
prisoners' rights brought a civil rights action against a county sheriff and a county jail commander, alleging that
mail policies at the jail restricting the distribution of the periodical violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
A bench trial was held. The district court entered judgment in favor of the publisher in part and in favor of the
defendants in part. The court held that: (1) the jail's postcard-only policy did not violate the publisher's First
Amendment right of free speech; (2) the jail policy totally banning individual inmates' receipt of publications
through the mail violated the First Amendment; and, (3) the postcard-only policy violated due process. According
to the court, the jail's postcard-only policy, which restricted a jail inmate's receipt of mail to postcards only, was
reasonably related to the jail's legitimate penological interests in security and efficiency, and thus, did not violate
the periodical publisher's First Amendment right to communicate with inmates. The court noted that by limiting the
space in which correspondents could communicate with inmates, the policy impeded the ability to conceal illegal
schemes in lengthy correspondence, reduced the likelihood of inmates' receipt of contraband, saved jail employees'
four to six hours per day screening inmate mail, and the publisher could still communicate via postcards or by
phone, and no easy, low-cost alternative existed. But the court found that the postcard-only policy did not provide
appropriate notice and appeal procedures for non-postcard mail, and thus, violated the publisher's procedural due
process rights, where no jail policy required the sender to be notified each time the jail decided not to deliver to an
inmate a book, a magazine, or a multi-page letter. (Walton County Jail, Georgia)

U.S. District Court
RELIGION

Thompson v. Smeal, 54 F.Supp.3d 339 (M.D.Pa. 2014). A state prisoner brought a case against prison officials,
alleging that denial of his request that Christian inmates be granted communal feasts on Christmas and Easter
violated his religious and equal protection rights, and violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act (RLUIPA). The district court granted the officials’ motion for summary judgment and the inmate appealed.
The appeals court vacated and remanded. On remand, the officials again moved for summary judgment, and the
inmate moved for partial summary judgment. The district court denied the motions. The court held that summary
judgment on the prisoner’s First Amendment claim was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to: (1)
whether the prison’s policy of refusing to provide Christmas and Easter communal meals for Christians only, with a
group prayer over the food, was legitimately and neutrally applied; (2) whether the prison’s penological interests
were served by allowing some religious meals and not others; and (3) whether there were alternative means of
exercising the prisoner’s right to free religious expression. According to the court, summary judgment on the
RLUIPA claim was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether denying communal meals to
Christian inmates at the state prison was the least restrictive means to achieve the prison’s alleged compelling
interests of security, space limitations, and food safety concerns. (State Correctional Institution in Camp Hill,
Pennsylvania)

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U.S. District Court
GROOMING
HAIR LENGTH
RELIGION

Williams v. Champagne, 13 F.Supp.3d 624 (E.D.La. 2014). A former inmate who was a practicing Rastafarian
brought an action against a sheriff and prison officials under § 1983, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA), and state law arising out of a grooming policy which he contended substantially burdened
his Rastafarian religious practices, and an alleged incident of excessive force. The defendants moved for summary
judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The district court held that summary
judgment was precluded by: (1) issues of fact as to whether the grooming policy prohibiting dreadlocks and
requiring men's hair to be no more than two inches long was the least restrictive means of serving compelling
government interests on the RLUIPA claim; (2) issues of fact as to the incident in which the inmate had complied
with orders to leave his cell, whether there was any basis for prison officers to use any force at all to maintain
discipline after the prisoner had complied with orders to leave his cell, let alone with force sufficient to rip a
dreadlock from his scalp; (3) issues of fact as to whether it was objectively unreasonable for prison officers to pull
on the chain connecting the prisoner's handcuffs while he was fully restrained in the “suicide chair,” and for one
officer to strike the prisoner forcefully in the head after the prisoner spit on him, and, (4) issues of fact on the
inmate's assault and battery claims. (Nelson Coleman Correctional Center, Louisiana)
2015

U.S. District Court
RELIGIOUS ARTICLES
RELIGION

Ajala v. West, 106 F.Supp.3d 976 (W.D. Wisc. 2015). An inmate brought an action against prison officials for
alleged violation of his rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), the Free
Exercise Clause, the Establishment Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause. The inmate challenged a prison policy
that allegedly prohibited the inmate from wearing a “kufi,” a head covering worn by some Muslims, unless he was
in his cell or participating in congregate services. The prison officials moved for summary judgment, and the
inmate moved for an extension. The district court held that: (1) the policy imposed a substantial burden on the
inmate’s religious exercise; (2) the policy was not the least restrictive means of furthering the prison’s interest of
preventing prisoners from using a religious head covering as a potential gang identifier; (3) the policy was not the
least restrictive means of furthering the prison’s interest in preventing prisoners from hiding contraband; (4) the
policy was not the least restrictive means of furthering the prison’s interest in preventing prison violence; and (5)
prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity from the inmate’s constitutional claims. The court noted that
the law was not clearly established that the inmate had a constitutional right to wear a kufi at all times. (Wisconsin
Secure Program Facility)

U.S. District Court
PUBLICATIONS

Crime, Justice & America, Inc. v. Honea, 110 F.Supp.3d 1027 (E.D. Cal. 2015). The publisher of a magazine
intended for newly arrested county jail detainees awaiting trial brought an action against a county alleging violation
of the right to free speech protected under the First Amendment after the county barred general distribution of
unsolicited paper products to detainees. After a bench trial, the district court held that: (1) the county jail’s policy of
limiting written publications was rationally related to legitimate a penological interest in preventing inmates from
using paper to conduct illicit activity; (2) electronic touch-screen kiosks that displayed the publisher’s magazine in
the jail were sufficient alternative means; (3) the impact of accommodating the asserted right weighed in favor of
the county policy; and (4) the policy was not an exaggerated response. The court found that a corrections officer’s
testimony regarding the nefarious uses of paper in county jails, including that he could not recall a time when the
publisher’s law-oriented magazine had been used by detainees for such purposes was not, without more, sufficient
to refute the county’s explanation that its policy limiting detainee’s access to paper was rationally related to a
legitimate penological interest. The court ruled that the publisher’s proposal to provide two copies of the
publisher’s law-oriented magazine in the county jail law library, standing alone, was not a sufficient alternative
means for the publisher to communicate the existence of the magazine to county jail detainees, where most inmates
would likely have left the jail before they would receive it from the library. (Butte County Jail, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
RELIGIOUS ARTICLES

Davila v. Gladden, 777 F.3d 1198 (11th Cir. 2015). A prisoner, a Santeria priest, brought an action against federal
prison employees in their official and individual capacities, alleging their refusal to allow him to obtain his personal
religious bead and shell necklaces violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the First
Amendment. The district court dismissed the prisoner’s claims for money damages under RFRA and granted
summary judgment to defendants on the prisoner’s remaining claims. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court
affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held that the prisoner’s sincerely held religious belief was
substantially burdened. According to the court, summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material
fact as to whether the prison’s refusal to allow the prisoner to obtain his personal bead and shell necklaces furthered
a compelling government interest, and whether the prison’s policy decision constituted the least restrictive means to
further that interest. The court held that refusal to allow the prisoner to obtain his personal religious necklaces did
not violate the First Amendment, finding that: (1) the refusal was rationally connected to legitimate government
interests in prison safety and resource allocation; (2) the prisoner had alternative means of practicing his religion
even without his personal beads; (3) allowing the prisoner to receive religious items from outside the prison would
have an impact on prison staff, other inmates, and the allocation of prison resources; and, (4) the only alternative
that would allow the prisoner to obtain his beads and shells would be to permit prisoners to receive religious items
from outside the prison, which would result in a more than de minimis cost to the prison’s interests. (Federal
Correctional Institution, Jesup, Georgia)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEGREGATION
RELIGION
RIOT

Incumaa v. Stirling, 791 F.3d 517 (4th Cir. 2015). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against the acting director of a
state department of corrections, alleging violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA) and Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process in his placement in solitary confinement for 20 year
following his participation in a riot. The inmate was a member of the Nation of Gods and Earths (“NOGE”), also
known as the “Five Percenters.” Prison policy required the inmate to renounce his affiliation with NOGE as a
condition of being released from segregation. The inmate asserted that NOGE was a religion and that he was being
asked to renounce his religion in order to be released from solitary confinement, in violation of RLUIPA. The

38.81

district court granted the director’s motion for summary judgment and the inmate appealed. The appeals court
affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The appeals court held that the prison policy did not force the
inmate to choose between continued adherence to his religion or release from solitary confinement. But the court
held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the prison’s review
process for inmates in solitary confinement was adequate. The court noted that the inmate was subject to near-daily
cavity and strip searches, he was confined to a small cell for all sleeping and waking hours, aside from 10 hours of
activity outside the cell per month, he was denied educational, vocational, and therapy programs, the inmate was
socially isolated, and confinement was indefinite. (South Carolina Department of Corrections)
U.S. Appeals Court
HAIR LENGTH

Knight v. Thompson, 796 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2015). Male inmates brought an action alleging that a state prison’s
short-hair policy violated the dictates of their Native American religion, in violation of the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The district court entered judgment in the state’s favor, and the inmates
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated and remanded. Upon remand, the appeals
court reinstated the decision with modifications, affirming. The appeals court held that the district court engaged in
a sufficiently focused inquiry, did not impermissibly defer to prison officials, and did not impermissibly disregard
the inmates’ assertion that prison systems of 39 other states would allow the accommodation they requested.
(Alabama Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
HAIR LENGTH

Knight v. Thompson, 797 F.3d 934 (11th Cir. 2015). Native American inmates brought an action against the
Alabama Department of Corrections (ADOC), challenging its male short-hair policy under the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). After a bench trial, the district court entered judgment for the
Department. The inmates appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded for further consideration in light of Holt v. Hobbs. On remand, the
appeals court held that the challenged policy furthered a compelling interest and that the policy was the least
restrictive means of furthering those compelling interests. According to the court, evidence established that the
Alabama Department of Corrections’ (ADOC) male short-hair policy substantially burdened religious exercise by
Native American prisoners, as an element for violation of the RLUIPA. The prisoners’ expert on Native American
spirituality offered extensive, undisputed testimony that long hair had great religious significance for many Native
Americans, and each prisoner confirmed that his desire to wear unshorn hair stemmed from deep religious
convictions, and the prisoners’ expert further gave an uncontradicted opinion that forcing Native Americans to cut
their long hair would amount to an “assault on their sacredness.” (Alabama Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
ACCESS TO RELIGION
ITEMS PERMITTED
RELIGIOUS ARTICLES
RELIGION

LaPlante v. Massachusetts Dept. of Correction, 89 F.Supp.3d 235 (D.Mass. 2015). A state inmate brought an
action against the Massachusetts Department of Correction (DOC) and its superintendent under the Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from what he claimed
were unlawful burdens on the practice of his Wicca faith. The parties moved for summary judgment. The district
court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by fact
issues regarding the limitation on the use of ritual oils and the limitation on the use of ritual herbs. The court found
that rules regarding corporate worship, that limited corporate worship to Sundays rather than around the phases of
the moon as mandated by the Wiccan faith, substantially burdened the inmate’s religious exercise. According to the
court, refusal to provide nuts and fruits violated RLUIPA. But the court held that refusal to allow the inmate to
wear ceremonial robes during corporate worship, and refusal to provide the inmate with different varieties of cake,
did not substantially burden the inmate’s religious exercise. (Massachusetts Correctional Institution-Norfolk)

U.S. District Court
BOOKS

Minton v. Childers, 113 F.Supp.3d 796 (D. Md. 2015). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against prison officials,
seeking injunctive relief, along with nominal and punitive damages, after the officials barred his receipt of used
books pursuant to prison directives. The officials and the prisoner both filed motions for summary judgment. The
district court granted the officials’ motion and denied the prisoner’s motion. The court held that the prisoner failed
to exhaust administrative remedies under Maryland law prior to filing the § 1983 action in federal court, in
violation of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA).
The court found that a prison directive banning inmate possession of incoming used books not sent directly by a
publisher was reasonably related to legitimate penological interests, as required by due process. The court noted
that the prisoner was allowed to receive new books sent directly from a publisher, the ban was expressly aimed at
advancing jail security and protecting the safety of jail personnel and other inmates, the ban was logically
connected to those goals, to allow inmates to possess used books from stores or e-commerce companies could have
had significant impact on the safety and security of prison personnel and other inmates. The court noted that the
prisoner did not point to an alternative that fully accommodated his rights while at same time imposed de minimis
cost to valid penological interests. (Eastern Correctional Institution, Maryland)

U.S. Appeals Court
PROPERTY
ITEMS PERMITTED

Sorrentino v. Godinez, 777 F.3d 410 (7th Cir. 2015). Two inmates purchased several items from a prison’s
commissary, but the prison later forbade the inmates to possess those items in their cells. Their property was
removed, as the new rule required. They responded by filing a proposed class action in the district court, alleging
that confiscation of their property was an unconstitutional taking and a breach of contract. The district court
dismissed the action. The appeals court held that the district court was correct to dismiss the action, although the
dismissal should have been without prejudice. One inmate had purchased a fan and signed a “personal property
contract” which obligated him to follow all Department of Corrections (DOC) rules related to use, ownership, and
possession of the fan. The other inmate purchased a typewriter and a fan, and he also signed a personal property
contract for his fan. When a new policy banned these items from prisoners’ cell, the new policy offered several
options for inmates who owned the newly prohibited types of property. Inmates with typewriters could have them
destroyed, give them to visitors, ship them to someone outside the prison at no cost, store them in “offender
personal property” which is returned to inmates upon release from prison, or donate them to the prison library. Fans
were simply placed in storage as “offender personal property.” (Stateville Correctional Facility, Illinois)

38.82

U.S. District Court
RELIGIOUS ARTICLES
RELIGIOUS GROUPS

Strickland v. Godinez, 104 F.Supp.3d 940 (S.D. Ill. 2015). A state inmate brought an action against prison officials
alleging that a state’s policies and practices interfered with his ability to practice his religion, in violation of the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and the First Amendment. The inmate moved for
a preliminary injunction and/or a protective order. The district court denied the motion finding that an injunction
was premature. The inmate practiced Asatru (also known as Odinism). The inmate alleged that officials threatened
or retaliated against him and refused to permit him and other inmates who practiced Asatru to have full
participation in proper group and individual worship including the ownership of personal ritual items and
medallions central to their beliefs. The inmate also sought to participate in outdoor worship and ritual feasts and
further sought the “setting aside of sacred land on which blots [i.e rituals] could be conducted.” (Lawrence
Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
RULES

Thomas v. Reese, 787 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2015). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that county
correctional officers unlawfully used excessive force in the course of handcuffing him after he disobeyed an order.
The district court entered summary judgment in the officers’ favor and inmate the appealed. The appeals court
reversed and remanded, finding that the inmate was not barred by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) from
bringing the action. The court noted that the inmate did not have an available administrative remedy, where the
inmate did not have access to an inmate handbook that set forth the proper grievance procedure, the officer
informed the inmate that he could not file a grievance, the handbook only permitted inmates to dispute alleged
violations, and the inmate was not contesting his discipline, but rather was challenging the officers’ conduct that
occurred after his offenses. (Dane County Jail, Wisconsin)

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38.84