DETENTION AND
CORRECTIONS
CASELAW CATALOG

26th Edition
2015-2016

Volume Four: Sec. 27-31
Rod C. Miller
Donald J. Walter
Research and Review:
Joseph Heltzel
Chris Dickey
Richard Drennon
Kyle McCarty

CRS, Inc.

A Non-Profit Organization
925 Johnson Drive
Gettysburg, PA 17325
(717) 338-9100
Fax (717) 718-6178
www.correction.org
rod@correction.org
Copyright 2017

Table of Contents
DETENTION AND CORRECTIONS CASELAW CATALOG
VOLUME 1
How to Use the Catalog
Index and Topic Finder
Table of Cases
1. Access to Courts
2. Administration

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Administrative Segregation
Assessment of Costs
Attorney Fees
Bail
Civil Rights

VOLUME 2
8. Classification and Separation
9. Conditions of Confinement
10. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
11. Discipline

12. Exercise and Recreation
13. Ex-Offenders
14. Failure to Protect

VOLUME 3
15. Facilities
16. False Imprisonment/Arrest
17. Female Prisoners
18. Food
19. Free Speech, Expression, Assoc.
20. Good Time

21. Grievance Procedures, Prisoner
22. Habeas Corpus
23. Hygiene-Prisoner Personal
24. Immunity
25. Intake and Admissions
26. Juveniles

VOLUME 4
27. Liability
28. Mail
29. Medical Care

30. Mental Problems (Prisoner)
31. Personnel

VOLUME 5
32. Pretrial Detention
33. Privacy
34. Programs-Prisoner
35. Property-Prisoner Personal

36. Release
37. Religion
38. Rules & Regulations-Prisoner

VOLUME 6
39. Safety and Security
40. Sanitation
41. Searches
42. Services-Prisoner
43. Sentence
44. Standards

45. Supervision
46. Training
47. Transfers
48. Use of Force
49. Visiting
50. Work- Prisoner

CRS, Inc.
925 Johnson Drive, Gettysburg, PA 17325 (717) 338-9100
www.correction.org Fax (717) 718-6178 rod@correction.org
All Rights Reserved

SECTION 27: LIABILITY
Detention and Corrections Caselaw Catalog All Righ.ta Balerved
CRS Inc, 9'J5 Johnson Dr., Gettysburg PA 17325 (717) 338-9100 www.correction.org/
The following pages present summaries of court decisions which address this topic area. These summaries provide
reade~ with highlights of each case, but are not intended to be a substitute for the review of the full case. The cases
do not represent all court decisions which address this topic area, but rather offer a sampling of relevant holdings.
The decisions summarized below were current as of the date indicated on the title page of this edition of the
Catalog. Prior to publication, the citation for each case was verified, and the case was researched in Shepard's
Citations to determine ifit had been altered upon appeal (reversed or modified). The Catalog is updated annually.
An annual supplement provides replacement pages fur cases in the prior edition which have changed, and adds new
cases. Readers are encouraged to consult the Topic Index to identify related topics of interest. The text in the
section entitled "How to Use The Catalog" at the bP.ginning of the Catalog provides an overview which may also be
helpful to some readers.
The case summaries which follow are organized by year, with the earliest case presented first. Within each year,
cases are organized alphabetically by the name of the plaintiff. The left margin offers a quick reference, highlighting
the type ofcourt involved and identifying appropriate subtopics addressed by each case.

SEE ALSO: CHAPTER 24, IMMUNITY

1945
U.S. Supreme Court
42 U.S.C.A.
Section 1983

GOVERNMENTAL
LIABILITY

Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945). Screws, Sheriff of Buker County, Georgia,
a policeman and a deputy sheriff arrested Robert Hall at his home late one night on a
warrant charging Hall with theft of a tire. Hall, a negro, was handcuffed and taken
by car to the court house. Upon alighting from the car at the court house, Hall was
beaten by the three men with fists and a blackjack for fifteen to thirty minutes. Hall
was later removed to a hospital where he died. Indictments were returned against the three
men, one count charging a violation of Section 20 of the Criminal Code (predecessor of 42
U.S.C. Section 1983) and another charging a conspiracy to violate Section 20. A district
court jury returned a verdict of guilty, and a fine and imprisonment on each count was
imposed. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed and Screws petitioned for a writ of
certiorari. (Reversed, remanded for new trial) In discussing allegations that "under color of
law" were designed to include only actions taken by officials pursuant to state law, the court
stated:
~ "It is clear that under 'color' of law means under 'pretense' of law. Thus acts of
officers in the ambit of their personal pursuit are plainly excluded. Acts of officers who
undertake to perform their official duties are included whether they hew to the line of their
authority or overstep it." 325 U.S. at 111 (emphasis added). (Buker County, Georgia)

1961
U.S. Supreme Court
42U.S.C.A.
Section 1983

GOVERNMENTAL
LIABILITY

Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). Thirteen Chicago policemen broke into the
Monroe family home in the early morning, routed them from bed, and made them
stand naked in the living room while they ransacked the house. Mr. Monroe was then
taken to the police station and detained on open charges for ten hours while being
interrogated about a two day old murder. Though a magistrate was available, Monroe
was not taken before him, and he was not permitted to call hia family or attorney. He was
fmally released with no charges. The Monroe family sued the city of Chicago and the police
underR.S.
Section 1979 (42 U.S.C. Section 1983) alleging that the warrantless search and arrest were
made "under the color of statutes, ordinances, regulations, customs and usages" of the state
and city. The district court dismissed the complaint, the court of appeals affirmed, and the
Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the lower court ruling.
HELD: Allegation of facts constituting a deprivation under color of state authority of the
fourth amendment guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizures, made applicable to
the various states by the fourteenth amendment due process clause, satisfies to that extent
the requirement ofR.S. Section 1979 (42 U.S.C. Section 1983)
HELD: Congress in enacting R.S. Section 1979 (42 U.S.C. Section 1983) meant to give a
remedy to parties deprived of constitutional rights, privileges, and immunities by an ofticial's
abuse of his position. 365 U.S. at 172.
HELD: The statutory words "under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any state of territory" do not exclude acts of an otii.cial or policeman who can
show no authority under state law, custom or usage, to do what he did. 365 U.S. at 172.
HELD: "It is abundantly clear that one reason the legislation [R.S.

27.1

Section 1979, 42 U.S.C. Section 1983] was passed was to afford a federal right in federal
courts because, by reasons of prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state
laws might not be enforced and the claims of citizens to the enjoyment of rights,
privileges, and immunities guarant.eed by the fourt.eenth unendment might be denied by
the state agencies." 365 U.S. at 180.
HET,D, The city of Chicago and the police argued that Monroe had the benefit of a
state remedy which provided adequate relief, therefore making the federal remedy
in.appropriate. The court ruled:
'The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latt.er need not
be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked."
I:m!.Q "Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only
because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law is action taken 'under
color of state law." 365 U.S. at 184 Citing United States v. Classic, 313 U.~. 299, (1940);
(Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
.
HELD: It is not necessary that a specific intent to deprive a person of a federal right
be found. "Section 1979 (42 U.S.C. Section 1983 should be seen against the background of
tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his actions."
365 U.S. at 187.
HELD: "[W]e are of the opinion that Congress did not undertake to bring municipal
corporations within the ambit of Section 1979 [42 U.S.C. Section 1983]."
EXPANSION: 'The response of the Congress to the proposal to make municipalities
liable for certain actions being brought within federal purview by the act of April 20, 1971
[Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 1983] was so antagonistic that we cannot believe that
the word 'person' was used in the particular act to include them." 365 U.S. at 191.
(Footnote Omitted.) (City of Chicago)

1970
U.S. District Court
VICARIOUS

LIABILITY

Davis v. Lindsay, 321 F.Supp. 1134 (S.D. N.Y. 1970). It is not proper for court to
abstain from adjudicating detainee's claim for relief. The Commissioner of Department
of Corrections is not liable in suit by city detainee seeking release from isolation on
basis of general authority over jails. Constitutionality of adminisb:-ative segregation must
be measured by its reasonableness and effect, not the motivation. of the actors. (City Jail,
New York)
1971

U.S. District Court

REMEDIES

Jones v. Wittenberg. 330 F.Supp. 707 (N.D. Oh. 1971), aff'd. 456 F.2d 854
(6th Cir. 1972). Defendants must comply with federal court's orders regardless of
division of responsibility under state law. (Lucas County Jail, Ohio)

U.S. Appeals Court
NEGUGENCE

Kish v. County of Milwaukee, 441 F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1971). Under negligence
concepts, in order for a prison. official to be held liable, there must be found both a
causal connection between the jailer's act and the resulting injury, and a duty for the
official to act. The courts have held that there is a fun.dam.ental duty for prison officials t.o
protect the lives and safety of inmates in their charge. (Milwaukee County Jail)

U.S. Appeals Court

Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971). Monetary liability "is entirely
personal in nature, intended to be satisfied out of the individual's pocket." (Green
Haven Correctional Facility)
·

PERSONAL
LIABILITY

1972
U.S. Appeals Court

QUALIFlED
IMMUNlTY

Christman v. Skinner, 468 F.2d 723 (2d Cir. 1972). Where the plain.tiff alleged that
jail guards had refused to mail his lett.ers to counsel, a suit against guards' superiors
could not be dismissed since the plain.tiff might be able to prove their participation or
acquiescence. Where defendants censored mail pursuant to state regulations, and it was
not claimed that they acted maliciously or in wan.ton disregard of plain.tiff's rights,
defendants are protected from suit by a qualified privilege. Monitoring of non.-att.orney
conversation is not prohibited. (Monroe County Jail, New York)
1973

U.S. District Court
42 U.S.C.A.
Section 1983

GOOD FAITH
DEFENSE

IJABJLITY

U.S. District Court
DEFENSES

Collins v. Scb.oomield. 363 F.Supp.• 1152 (D. Md. 1973). In. action by prisoner against
prison. officials under 42 U.S.C. Section. 1983 for damages again.st individual defendants,
individual actions rather than general prison practices must be critically examined to
determine if a constitutional violation has occurred. If an. official has acted in good
faith reliance on. standard prison. proc:edares, he shall not be required to respond
personally in damages. (Baltimore City Jail, Maryland)
Hamilton v. Love, 858 F.Supp. 338 (E.D. Ark. 1973). In.adequate resources c:ami.ot
justify deprivation of constitutional rights. (Palaski County Jail, Arkansas)

Zl.2

U.S. Appeals Court
42 U.S.C.A.
Section 1983

Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 (2nd Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033. Guard's
denial of prisoner's access to medical care may constitute a Section 1983 brutality
claim. (Manhattan House of Detention, New York)

U.S. Supreme Court
FEDERAL TORT
CLAIMS ACT

Logue v. United States, 412 U.S. 521 (1973). Logue was a federal prisoner being held
in a Texas county jail while awaiting trial. The county jail contracted with the federal
government to house federal prisoners. While in cust.ody, Logue committed suicide, and
his parents brought suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) which allows
individuals to sue the U.S. Government for negligent acts of an employee of the
government. The district court found the sheriff's employees failed to provide adequate
surveillance, and held the government liable. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
reversed the decision on th~ grounds that a "contractor exclusion" clause relieved the
government of liability for the sheriff's employees' acts, and that these employees were not
acting on behalf of a federal agency in an official capacity as the act int.ended. Logue's
parents then sought certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court. (Vacated and Remanded.)
HELD: The county jail was a contractor, not a federal agency within the meaning of
the Fl'CA. a) The U.S. Marshal had no control or authority over the Sheriff's employees;
b) The arrangement for keeping federal prisoners in the county jail clearly contemplated
that the day-to-day operation of the jail be left with contractor (sheriff).
HELD: The contention that the sheriffs employees were "acting on behalf of a federal
agency in an official capacity" and were thus employees of the government is not
consistent with the legislative intent of the Fl'CA.
NOTE: The court remanded for further proceedings the question of negligence on the
part of the U.S. Marshal in failing to order constant surveillance. (Nueces County, Corpus
Christi, Texas)
1974

U.S. District Court
42U.S.C.A.
Section 1983
GOOD FAITH
DEFENSE

Campise v. Hamilton, 382 F.Supp. 172 (S.D. Tex. 1974), cert denied, 429 U.S. 1102
(1976). Sheriff knew or should have known that the prisoner was kept under
inhumane conditions and is liable under Section 1983, which incorporates state
standards. The court rejected a sheriffs argument that he was immune from liability
in a prisoners' rights suit under theories of quasi-judicial immunity and "good faith and
probable cause.• (Brazos County Jail, Texas)
1975

U.S. District Court
42U.S.C.A.
Section 1983
TORT LAW

U.S. District Court
DEFENSES
PERSONAL
LIABILITY

DiFebo v. Keve, 395 F.Supp. 1350 (D. Del. 1975). Inmate's glasses were broken in a
scuffle, at which inmate was innocent bystander. Despite requests, he was not
examined for three months, at which time the physician found the inmate's vision to
have been permanently impaired. The court said the facts did not constitute a claim
under Section 1983, but the facts would be sufficient to establish a claim under tort law.
{Delaware Correctional Center)
Miller v. Carson, 401 F.Supp. 835 (M.D. Fla. 1975), affd, 563 F.2d 741
(5th Cir. 1977). Where jail officials are joined as defendants in prisoners' rights
litigation which commenced before said officials took office, they shall not be personally
liable in damages for events transpiring or action taken or not taken prior to the date
of their joinder, though they may be joined in both their individual and official capacities.
Financial difficulties do not provide a defense where conditions of confinement violate
minimum constitutional standards. (Duval County Jail, Florida)
1978

U.S. Appeals Court
GOOD FAITH
DEFENSE

Bryan v. Jones, 530 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 865. The jury
should be allowed to consider whether a sheriff is acting in good faith jf he relies on
the district attorney's office notice that the imprisonment was legal. (Dallas County
Jail, Texas) ·
·

U.S. District Court

Doe v. Swinson, 20 Crim. L. Rptr. 2272 (E.D. Vir. 1976). Sloppy classification is liable.

Sheriff is found liable for repeated beatings of prisoner. (Fairfax County Jail, Virginia)
U.S. Appeals Court
42U.S.C.A.
Section 1983

Harris v. Chanclor, 537 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1976). A supervisory officer is liable under
42 U.S.C. Section 1983 if he refuses to intervene when his subordinates are beating an
inmate in his presence. (Glynn County Jail, Georgia)

U.S. Appeals Court
42U.S.C.A.

disregard level is sufficient to maintain a section 1983 action. (St. Clair ~ 1983

Kimbrough v. O'Neil. 545 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1976). Culpability at the reckless
IDinois)

U.S. District Court
DEFENSES

Mitchell v. Untreiner, 421 F.Supp. 567 (D. Neb. 1976). Lack of funds does not excuse
unconstitutional conditions of confinement. (Escambia County Jail, Pensacola, Florida)
Z'/.3

U.S. District Court
DEFENSES

Moore v••Tanfog, 427 F.Supp. 567 (D. Neb. 1976). Lack of resources does not justify ·
denial of rights. (Douglas County Jail, Nebraska)

U.S. District Court
DEFENSES

Rodriguez v. Jiminez, 409 F.Supp. 582 (D. P.R. 1976). Inadequate resources can never
be an adequate justification for the state's depriving persons of constitutional rights.
(San Juan District Jail)

U.S. District Court

Sandlin v. Pearsall, 427 F.Supp. 494 (E.D. Tenn. 1976). Doctrine of respondeat
superior does not apply to sheriff for acts of deputies. (County Jail, Tennessee)

RESPONDEAT
SUPERIOR

U.S. District Court

Tucker v. Thompson. 421 F.Supp. 297 (M.D. Ga. 1976). In suit for wrongful death of a
detainee. liability of city may be predicated on maintenance of an actionable nuisance.
(Macon City Jail, Georgia)

1977
U.S. District Court

Cook v. Brockway. 424 F.Supp. 1046 (N.D. Tex. 1977). Where jail employee allegedly
stole prisoner's property after agreeing to sell it for the prisoner, the employee was acting
outside the scope of his duties, and the sheriff would not be held liable absent evidence of
personal involvement. (Kaufman County Jail, Texas)

U.S. Appeals Court
DEFENSES

Smith v. Sullivan, 553 F.2d 373 (5th Cir. 1977). Fiscal shortages are no defense to
constitutional violations. (El Paso County Jail, Texas)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO
SUPERVISE

Stevens v. County of Duchess, 445 F.Supp. 89 (S.D. N.Y. 1977). Sheriff is liable if
prisoner-on-prisoner attack occurs under conditions of inadequate supervision. (Duchess
County Jail, New York)

1978
U.S. District Court

Fowler v. Vincent, 452 F.Supp. 449 (S.D. N.Y. 1978). Not every batt.ery by a guard
automatically states a claim for violation of civil rights, but where the batt.ery is
unprovoked or has no relationship to the necessary operation of the institution, a claim
can be stated. (Green Haven Correctional Facility, New Yorlt)

U.S. District Court

Hamilton v. Covington, 445 F.Supp. 195 (W.D. Ark. 1978). A duty is owed by the
sheriff to provide adequate security. Liability may exist for deaths and injuries occurring
from a fire in an unatt.ended jail. (Nevada County Jail, Arkansas)

U.S. Supreme Court
42U.S.C.A.
Section 1983
GOVERNMENTAL

Monell v. Department.of Social Services of the City of New York, 98 S.Ct.
2018 (1978). Female employees of the Department of Social Services and the Board of
Education of New York City brought this class action against the department and its
commissioner, the board and its chancellor, the City of New York and its mayor under
42 U.S.C. Section 1983. In each instance, the individual defendants were sued solely
in their official capacity. The basis of the complaint was that the board and the
department had as a matt.er of official policy compelled pregnant employees to take
unpaid leaves of absence before such leaves were medically required.
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York found that the women's
constitutional rights had been violated, but held that their requests for injunctive relief
were mooted by a supervisory change in official maternity leave policy. On the basis of
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) the court denied recovery of back pay from the
department, board, and city. Additionally and also on the basis of Monroe, the court held
that persons sued in their official capacities as offi~s of a local government enjoy the
immunity inferred on local governments by Monroe. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals
aff"umed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. {Reversed.)
HELD: Our analysis of the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 compels
the conclusion that Congress did intend municipalities and other local government units to
be included among the person to whom Section 1983 applies. Local governing bodies,
therefore, can be sued directly under Section 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive
relief where, as here, the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or
executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and
promulgated by that body's officers. 98 S.Ct. at 2035-2036. (Footnotes omitt.ed.)
HELD: [A]lthough the touchstone of the Section 1983 action against a government
body is an allegation that official policy is responsible for a deprivation of rights protected
by the Constitution, local governments, like every other Section 1~83 'person' by the very
terms of the statute, may be sued for constitutional deprivations visited

LIABILITY

RESPONDEAT
SUPERIOR

pursuant to governmental 'custom' even though such a custom has not received formal
approval through the body's official decision-making channels. 98 S.Ct. at 2036.
HELD: [T]he language of Section 1983, read against the background of the same
legislative history, compels the conclusion that Congress did not intend municipalities to
be held liable unless action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused a
constitutional tort. In particular, we conclude that a municipality cannot be held liable
solely because it employs a tort-feasor, or in other words, a municipality cannot be held
under Section 1983 on a respondeat superior theory. 98 S.Ct. at 2036.
HELD: Monroe v. Pape. 365 U.S. 167 is overruled "insofar as it holds Section 1983." 98
S.Ct. at 2022. (footnote omitted)
.
HELD: As the question whether local government bodies should be afforded some form
of official immunity was not presented as a question to be decided in this case, the court
expressed no view on the scope of municipal immunity, "beyond holding that municipal
bodies sued under Section 1983 cannot be entitled to an absolute immunity, lest our
decision that such bodies are subject to suit under Section 1983 'be drained of meaning.'"
98 S.Ct. at 2041. (Quoting Scgeyr v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 248. See, Owen v. City of
Independence. Missouri, 100 S.Ct. 1398 (1980).
HELD: Considerations of stare decisis do not bar overruling of Monroe v. Pape, 361
U.S. 167, insofar as it is inconsistent with this opinion. 98 S.Ct. at 2041.
RATIONALE:
a. "Monroe v. Pape... insofar as it completely immunizes municipalities from suit
under section 1983 was a departure from prior practice." 98 S.Ct. 2938.
b. Extending absolute immunity to school boards would be inconsistent with several
instances in which Congress has refused to immunize school boards from federal
jurisdiction under Section 1983. 98 S.Ct. at 2039.
c. Municipalities cannot arrange their affairs on an assumption that they can violateconstitutional rights for an indefinite period. Accordingly, municipalities have no reliance
interest that would support an absolute immunity. 98 S.Ct. at 2040.
d. "It is simply beyond doubt that, under the 1871 Congress view of the law, were
Section 1983 liability unconstitutional as to local government, it would have been equally
unconstitutional as to state officers. Yet everyone•-proponents and opponents alike--knew
Section 1983 would be applied to state officers and nonetheless stated that Section 1983
was constitutional." 98 S.Ct. at 2041.
NOTE: "Nothing we say today affects the conclusion reached in Moor [v. County of
Alameda, 411 U.S. 693], that 42 U.S.C. Section 1988 cannot be used to create a federal
cause of action where Section 1983 or the conclusion reached in City of Kenosha [v.
Brunu, 412 U.S. 507] that 'nothing... suggests that the generic word 'person' in Section
1983 was intended to have a bifurcated application to municipal corporations depending
on the nature of the relief sought against them.'" 98 S.Ct. 2041 at 66. (Department of
Social Services and the Board of Education, New York City, New York)
U.S. Supreme Court
42U.S.C.A.
Section 1983
QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY

Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978). Navarette, an inmate of Soledad Prison,
California, brought this 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 action against the director of the State
Department of Corrections, the warden, and assistant warden, two correctional
counselors, and a member of the prison staff in charge of handling inmate mail. The
question on which the Supreme Court granted certiorari involved Navarette's third
claim for relief. In that claim, Navarette alleged that his personal mail had not been
mailed from the prison due to the subordinate staffs negligent application of prison mail
regulations and the supervisory officer's failure to provide sufficient training. and
direction, all in violation of Navarette's constitutional rights. The U.S. District Court
granted summary judgment for the prison officials, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed, and the officials petitioned for a writ of certiorari and the Supreme Court
reversed the lower court decision.
HELD: The court ruled that as prison officials, the defendants were not absolutely
immune from liability in the Section 1983 damages suit and could only rely on qualified
immunity as described in the cases of Scheur v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974); and Wood v.
Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975). 434 U.S. at 561 (Qig the Scheur holding).
HELD: Using the first standard put forth in Wood v. Strickland, the immunity defense
would be unavailing to [the prison officials] if the constitutional right allegedly infringed
by them was clearly established at the time of their challenged conduct, if they knew or
should have known of that right, and if they knew or should have known that their
conduct violated the constitutional norm. 434 U.S. at 562.
HELD: [T]here was no 'clearly established' first and fourteenth amendment right with
respect to the correspondence of convicted prisoners in 1971-1972. As a matter of law,
therefore, there was no basis for rejecting the immunity defense on the ground that
petitioners knew or should have known that their alleged conduct violated a constitutional
right. Because they could not reasonably have been expected to be aware of a
constitutional right that had not been yet declared, petitioners did not act with such
disregard for the established law that their conduct 'cannot reasonably be charact:erized as
being in good faith.' (QiBY'. Wood v. Strickland] 434 U.S. at 565.
HELD: In applying the second standard of Wood v. Strickland, authorizing liability
·where the official has acted with malicious intention to deprive a person of a
27.5

constitutional right or to cause him other injury the court ruled, "[t]he prison officers were
charged with neglect and inadvert:ent interference with the mail and the supervisory
personnel with negligent failure to provide proper training. To the extent that a malicious
intent to harm is a ground for denying immunity, that consideration is clearly not
implicated by the negligence claim now before us." 434 U.S. at 566.
DICTA: "Although the court has recognized that in enacting section 1983 Congress
intended to expose state officials to damages liability in some circumstances, the section
has been consistently construed as not intending wholesale revocation of the "commonlaw" immunity afforded government officials." 434 U.S. at 561.
NOTE: Navarette's complaint contained a total of nine claims for relief. The first
three involved interference with outgoing mail, and though this issue reached the
Supreme Court, it was disposed of by an immunity analysis. The six other claims for
relief were dismissed by the U.S. District Court for failure to state a federal claim. These
claims involved:
-Termination of a law student visitation program;
-Removal of inmate plaintiff from post of prison librarian;
-The remainder sought to hold supervisory officials liable on a theory of vicarious
rather than personal liability. 434 U.S. at 558 N.4.
(Soledad Prison, California)

1979
U.S. District Court

Carwile v. Ray, 481 F.Supp. 33 (E.D. Wash. 1979). If opening of "judicial mail"
actually occurred, it was in direct disobedience to the sheriffs orders and, therefore, the
sheriff could not be liable. (County-City Jail, Spokane County, Washington)

U.S. Appeals Court

Clappier v. Flynn, 605 F.2d 519 (10th Cir. 1979). Jail administration and staff are
held liable for an inmate-on-inmate attack where evidence reveals that living areas were
patrolled only once per shift. (Laramie County Jail, Wyoming)

U.S. Appeals Court

Daily v. Byrnes, 605 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1979). Where a guard struck the plaintiff
prisoner in retaliation for water being thrown at the guard, there is clear violation of civil
rights. Where county jail prisoner is struck and injured by a guard and no effort is made
to secure medical attention, guard and county could be held liable for deliberate
indifference. (Escambia County Jail, Alabama)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO
SUPERVISE
VICARIOUS
LIABILITY

Davis v. Zahradnick, 600 F.2d 458 (4th Cir. 1979). If a warden fails to properly
supervise his officers and if improper supervision resulted in the guards' denial of
access to medical treatment to a prisoner who had been beaten, the warden could be
found vicariously liable for his failure to carry out the duty of supervision. (State
Prison, Virginia)

U.S. Appeals Court
DAMAGES

Fielder v. Bosshard, 590 F.2d 105 (5th Cir. 1979). Jury awarded $99,000
damages against jailer and sheriff for death of county jail prisoner. The deceased
prisoner was arrested and jailed for nonsupport. Although informed of the prisoner's need
for medication jail officials did not respond to his repeated requests. The jury found the
officials were callously indifferent to the prisoner's known medical needs. (Williamson
County Jail, Texas)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO

Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242 (2nd Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980
(1979). The county may be held liable for failing to properly train jail staff if that
failure amounts to "gross negligence" or "deliberate indifference" to the inevitable
consequences of a lack of training. In addition, there need not be a "pattern" of abuse
for the county to be liable, but liability under Section 1983 can arise from a single
incident if that incident is serious enough to indicate some level of "official acquiescence"
(in this case, the incident was the beating of a prisoner who refused to leave his cell, by
the defendant Officer Haas and other officers). If the plaintiff can show an official
"custom or policy" stemming from or resulting in a conspiracy, and if the conspiracy
implicates the county itself, then the county may be liable as a "person" under Title 42,
Section 1985 (the conspiracy section of the Civil Rights Act).

TRAIN

42 U.S.C.A.
SECTION 1983

1980
State Appeals Court
NEGLIGENCE

Burns v. Town of Leesville, 383 So.2d 109 (Ct. App. La. 1980). Court of appeals
affirms judgment against pretrial detainee. The plaintiff, Bill Burns, was arrested
and charged with drunkenness and was admitted to the Leesville City Jail. He was
assigned an upper bunk in a double cell. After several hours, he attempted to leave the
bunk and fell across the bottom bunk, striking his back on its metal railing. He said that
he was not able to move after his fall. requested medical attention several times, and it
was refused. Burns was released from custody the following morning and sought
treatment for his back. His injuries were diagnosed as a contusion, abrasion and acute
sprain, and he spent several days in the hospital. Burns filed suit against

27.6

the t.own of Leesville, the chief of police, and the village of New Llano (where he was
initially arrested), claiming they were responsible for his injuries. The plaintiff claimed
that the defendants should not have placed him in an upper bunk because of his physical
condition, and that they were negligent in failing t.o provide medical services. The
defendants argued that the plaintiff was negligent in attempting t.o get down from his
bunk and should be held responsible for his own actions. The trial judge concluded that
the plaintiff was not unreasonably int.oxicat.ed, and was therefore responsible for his
actions. The appeals court concurred, and ordered Burns t.o pay all court costs. {Leesville
City Jail, Louisiana)
U.S. Appeals Court
DEFENSES

Campbell v. Cauthron, 623 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1980). Lack of funding is not a defense
t.o performance of a constitutional duty. (Sebastian County Jail, Arkansas)

U.S. Supreme Court
FEDERAL TORT
CLAIMS ACT
DAMAGES

Carlson v. Green, 100 S.Ct. 1468 (1980). In this case, Green as administratrix of the
estat.e of her deceased son, brought suit in an Indiana U.S. district court, alleging that
while her son was an inmat.e in a Federal prison, officials failed t.o give him proper
medical attention, causing personal injuries from which he died. Green claimed this
violat.ed her son's eighth amendment prot.ection against cruel and unusual punishment.
Asserting jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Section 1331 (a.), Green sought compensat.ory and
punitive damages. The U.S. District Court held that the complaint gave rise t.o a cause of
action under Bivens for damages, but dismissed the complaint because Illinois
survivorship and wrongful death laws limit.eel recoverable damages t.o less than the
$10,000 required t.o meet 1331 (a.) jurisdiction. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
agreed with the district court, but held that Section 1331 (a.) was satisfied because
whenever a stat.e survivorship statut.e would preclude a Bivens action, the federal common
law allows survival of the action.
HELD: In ruling that a Bivens remedy against individual federal agents was
permissible in this case, as well as an action against the federal government under the
Federal Tort Claims Act, the court stat.eel: "Plainly FTCA is not a sufficient prot.ector of the
citizens' constitutional rights, and without a clear congressional mandat.e we cannot hold
that Congress relegat.ed [Green] exclusively t.o the FTCA remedy." 100 S.Ct. at 1474.
(Federal Correctional Cent.er, Indiana)

U.S. District Court
FEDERAL TORT
CLAIMS ACT
DAMAGES

Garrett v. Unit.eel Stat.es, 501 F.Supp. 337 (N.D. Ga. 1980). An ex-inmat.e of Atlanta
Federal Penit.entiary sues for injuries inflicted upon him while he was incarcerat.ed.
The district court found that the prisoner who assault.eel the plaintiff prisoner
arrived at the federal penit.entiary in Atlanta accompanied by a file showing that he
had committed assault upon a correctional officer on three separat.e occasions, had
assault.eel another inmat.e, had murdered an inmat.e and threat.ened correctional officers,
as well as engaged in fighting and possession of dangerous weapons. The government was
negligent in failing t.o anticipate that he might harm another prisoner and
failed t.o provide closer supervision of him than was provided. He had been placed in a
large area housing 500 t.o 600 prisoners in multi-tiered cells, manned by two t.o three
guards. The court found that this negligence was proximat.e cause of prisoner's injuries so
that he would be entitled t.o damages for loss of earnings, pain he suffered after the
incident, and anxiety and mental distress. The legal standard for proximat.e cause requires
the injuries t.o have been a foreseeable result t.o the alleged negligence. However,
"foreseeability" does not require the anticipation of a particular injury t.o a particular
person but only that anticipation of a general type or cat.egory of harm which in ordinary
experience might be expected t.o flow from a particular type of negligence. Failure of the
institutional staff t.o take the individual's prior record of attacks on inmat.es and guards
int.o account when classifying him, which caused the individual t.o be placed in general
population where he was able t.o attack plaintiff, was negligence giving rise t.o liability
under the Federal Tort Claims Act. $5040 was awarded. (Federal Penit.entiary, Atlanta)

U.S. District Court
FEDERAL TORT
CLAIMS ACT

Guy v. Unit.ed Stat.es, 492 F.Supp. 571 (N.D. Calif. 1980). The evidence does not
indicat.e any negligence on the part of the institutional officials which result.eel in the
inmates who beat the plaintiff gaining access t.o alcohol. Therefore, no claim was
stat.eel under the Federal Tort Claims Act. (Federal Correctional Institut.e, California)

U.S. District Court
DEFENSES

Hutchings v. Corum, 501 F.Supp. 1276 (W.D. Mo. 1980). Class action is brought
challenging the constitutionality of numerous conditions and practices at the county
jail. The district court held that: (1) prison authorities' failure t.o immediat.ely evacuat.e
in.mat.es from any sewage contaminat.ed cell, pending thorough cleaning of cell, violat.ed
constitutional rights of inmat.es subject t.o that condition; (2) deficiencies in jail, including
lack of fire escape, absence of windows, lack of necessary fire doors, and limit.eel number of
f'll'e extinguishers amount.eel t.o constitutionally int.olerable conditions. Prison conditions
for an unconvicted person are t.o be judged against due process standards of the fifth and
fourteenth amendments and conditions within the penal institution which are
unconstitutional for the convicted person under eighth am.endmP.nt review are likewise an
abridgment of due process guarantees afforded unconvicted persons.

Deficiencies in the county jail, including lack of fire escapes, absence of windows, lack
of necessary fire doors, and limited number of fire extinguishers amounted to
constitutionally intolerable conditions. Failure of county jail authorities to provide each
inmate one hour per day of exercise outside cells was a constitutionally intolerable
condition. The claim that financial restrictions have prevented improvements in jail
conditions is not a defense to constitutional violations. (Clay County Jail, Missouri)
U.S. District Court

RESPONDEAT
SUPERIOR

Madewell v. Garmon, 484 F.Supp. 823 (E.D. Tenn. 1980). Where the state statutes
made the sheriff responsible for the operation of the jail and the plaintiff alleged the
personal involvement of the sheriff in acts directed against him, the case required a
trial to determine the sheriffs liability and could not be resolved on summary judgment on
the basis that respondent superior does not apply in civil rights cases. (County Jail,
Tennessee)

U.S. District Court
NEGLIGENCE
VICARIOUS
LIABILITY

Moomey v. City of Holland, 490 F.Supp. 188 (W.D. Mich. 1980). A superior officer is
not liable for the acts of his inferiors in a civil rights litigation without personal
involvement. Failure of the booking officer to remove the inmate's belt, with a
resulting suicide, is nothing more than negligence, and does not state a claim for
violation of civil rights. (Holland City Jail, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
FEDERAL TORT
CLAIMS ACT
DAMAGES

Picariello v. Fenton, 491 F.Supp. 1026 (M.D. Penn. 1980). Force employed by a guard
to restrain an inmate is privileged. Where the force employed is greater than
necessary or longer in duration than necessary, a claim under the Federal Tort Claims
Act is stated. An extended use of restraints (three days) was excessive under the facts.
$200 per inmate was awarded. (United States Penitentiary, Lewisburg, Pennsylvania)

U.S. Appeals Court

Streeter v. Hopper, 618 F.2d 1178 (5th Cir. 1980). The state has an obligation to
protect the safety of the inmates and where the courts have found a breach of this
duty, they have wide discretion in formulating a remedy. (State Prison, Reidsville,
Georgia)

REMEDIES

U.S. Appeals Court
GOOD FAITH
DEFENSE

Williams v. Kelly, 624 F.2d 695 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1019 (1980).
Mother of prisoner, whose death was apparently caused when jailers applied choke hold
to him, brought wrongful death action against the jailers resting on statute authorizing
a civil action for deprivation of rights. The United States District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia entered judgment in favor of the jailers and the prisoner's mother
appealed. The court of appeals held that the district court's findings that jailers applied
fatal choke hold to prisoner in order to protect their own safety and in a good faith effort
to maintain order or discipline were not clearly erroneous and therefore their conduct was
not constitutionally tortious. (Atlanta Police Station, Holding Room)

U.S. Appeals Court
42 u.s.c.A.
Section 1983

Withers v. Levine, 615 F.2d 158 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 849
(1979). The lack of a classification system which results in placements which promotes
inmate on inmate assaults was more than simple negligence and therefore, assaults
resulting from such a system stated a claim upon which relief could be granted under
U.S.C. Section 1983. (House of Corrections, Maryland)

U.S. Appeals Court

Wood v. Woracheck, 618 F.2d 1225 (7th Cir. 1980). Jailers are not liable for
incarceration of falsely arrested persons. (City Jail, Milwaukee, Wisconsin)

1981
U.S. District Court
42 U.S.C.A.
Section 1983
NEGLIGENT

RETENTION
VICARIOUS
LIABILITY

Brandon v. Allen, 516 F.Supp. 1355 (1981). A Civil Rights Act suit was brought
against a police officer and the Director of the police department seeking damages
because of assault and battery committed on the plaintiffs by the officer. Default
judgment was taken against the officer. The district court held that since the city
police director should have known of officer's dangerous propensities the director was
liable in his official capacity. For one to be held liable under Civil Rights Act of 1871
he must act under color of law and in doing so he must play an affirmative part in
deprivation of the constitutional rights of another. Although the police officer was
technically off duty at the time of the alleged assault and battery, he acted under "color of
law" within the meaning of Civil Rights Act of 1871 because off-duty officers were
authorized to be armed and were required to act if they observed commission of a crime.
Since the city police director should have known of officer's dangerous propensities the
director was liable in his official capacity for violation of plaintiffs' civil rights when they
were attacked by the officer, in that the director failed to take proper action to become
informed of the officer's dangerous propensities. The officer's reputation for maladaptive
behavior was widespread among fellow officers and although at least one officer personally
informed police precinct supervisors of the fellow officer's morbid tendencies, no
investigation and action were undertaken.

27.S

Police officers are vested by the law with great responsibility and must be held to high
standards of official conduct. Officials of the police department must become informed of
the presence in the department of officers who pose a threat of danger to the safety of the
community; when knowledge of a particular officer's dangerous propensities is widespread
among the ranks of police officers, the department officials ought to be held liable for the
officer's infringement of another's civil rights. 42 U.S.C.A. Section 1983. (M~mphis Police
Department)
U.S. Appeals Court
QUASI.JUDICIAL

IMMUNITY
GOOD FAITH
IMMUNITY

Jihaad v. O'Brien. 645 F.2d 556 (6th Cir. 1981). A prison disciplinary officer is not a
quasi-judicial officer for the purpose of immunity. Therefore he has potential liability
for civil rights violations committed while administering institutional discipline. To be
liable for a violation of civil rights, the act must be malicious, i.e., the individual must
be aware that he is violating the individual's civil rights. Here there was no
established law, and the individual was acting in good faith so that he wliS not liable.
(Federal Correctional Institution, Milan, Michigan)

U.S. Appeals Court
REMEDIES

Jones v. Diamond, 636 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 198l)(en bane). Where the conditions of the
institution have improved but there is nothing in the record which would suggest any
basis for an assurance that the conditions would not change, injunctive relief is
warranted. An injunction prohibiting racial segregation, overcrowding and discipline,
except in accordance with the newly prescribed rules, was entered. (Jackson County Jail,
Pascagoula, Mississippi)

U.S. District Court
REMEDIES

Mercer v. Griffm. 30 CrL 2253 (1981). A consent decree entered nearly a year ago
concerning the improvement of conditions at the Chatham County (Georgia) Jail "has
been all but ignored," according to the U.s; District Court for the Southern District of
Georgia. The court postponed a contempt adjudication but issued specific orders
concerning overcrowding and other issues, stating:
'The patience of the plaintiffs and the court has apparently only permitted further
deterioration in conditions which were already deplorable. The time for patience
is at an end. In the event that Sheriff Grifrm fails to meet the deadlines [imposed
in this order], the court will be compelled to remove the jail from his control.
Should it be shown that the county commissioners have failed to provide adequate
resources to permit meeting these fundamental
requirements, the court will similarly be compelled to act. I do not relish these
responsibilities. The jail is in the first instance the responsibility of elected
officials. I have no wish to remove this public facility from the control of
representatives of the taxpayers who must in any event support it. Nor do I have
any wish to expose the defendants to the political embarrassment of removal from
their official duties. Nonetheless, the court has its own duty to the citizens of the
community, including those who find themselves incarcerated. That duty will be
fulfilled."
(Chatham County Jail, Georgia)

U.S. District Court
GOOD FAITH
DEFENSE

Nees v. Bishop, 524 F.Supp. 1310 (D.C. Colo. 1981). An FBI agent who denies a
prisoner his sixth amendment right to counsel in a criminal proceeding is not immune
from liability. Although the agent acted in good faith, his action in instructing the
sheriff not to permit the public defender access to the prisoner was not reasonable. On
appeal, the lower court decision was reversed when the appeals court determined that the
arrestee's right to counsel had not yet attached at the time his request to see a public
defender was denied. (Colorado State Penitentiary)

U.S. District Court
PERSONAL

O'Conner v. Keller, 510 F.Supp. 1359 (D. Md. 1981). Confinement in a strip cell
(isolation) does not constitute a per se violation of the eighth amendment. Where the
purpose of placing the individual in strip cell was to permit him to calm down after an
incident in the institution, the placement was reasonable. However, the continuance of
the placement for two days without providing a mattress, toilet paper, or operational
plumbing was unreasonable and violated due process, particularly where the staff
providing regular checks of the condition of the inmate had indicated that he was calm
and normal. The Court finds that the stay was at least twenty-four hours too long.
Guards who failed to act on the reports of proper behavior in isolation are liable. $200
in damages was awarded. (Maryland Correctional Institution)

LIABILITY
DAMAGES

U.S. Supreme Court
42U.S.C.A.
Section 1983

Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981). The plaintiff, an inmate of a Nebraska prison,
ordered by mail certain hobby materials. After being delivered to the prison, the
packages containing the materials were lost when the normal procedures for receipt of
mail packages were not followed. The inmate brought an action in federal district court .
under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 against prison officials to recover the value of the hobby
materials, claiming that they had negligently lost the materials and thereby deprived the
inmate of property without due process of law in violation of the fourteenth amendment.
The district court entered summary judgment for the inmate, holding that negligent
actions by state officials can be a basis for an action under

Section 1983, that officials were not immune from liability, and that the deprivation of the
hobby materials implicated due process rights. The court of appeals affirmed. The United
States Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the inmate had not stated a claim for relief
under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. Pp. 531-544.
.
(a) In any Section 1983 action the initial inquiry must focus on whether the two
essential elements to a Section 1983 action are present: (1) whether the conduct
complained of was committ.ed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) whether
this conduct deprived a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
constitution or laws of the United States. Pp. 531-535.
(b) Although the inmate had been deprived of property under color of state law, he
had not sufficiently alleged a violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. The deprivation did not occur as the result of some established state
procedure, but as the result of the unauthorized failure of state agents to follow
established state procedure. Moreover, Nebraska has a tort claims procedure which
provides a remedy to persons who have suffered a tortious loss at the hands of the state,
but which the inmate did not use. This procedure could have fully compensated the
inmate for his property loss and was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of due process.
Pp. 535-544. 620 F.2d 30, reversed. (State Prison, Nebraska)
U.S. District Court
DAMAGES
PERSONAL

LIABILITY

Pitts v. Kee, 511 F.Supp. 497 (D. Del. 1981). A United States district judge has
ordered a Delaware Correctional Center guard captain to pay $680 in damages to an
inmate for keeping him in solitary conf'mement and for preventing him from answering
charges that he helped start a prison riot. The inmate was awarded thirty dollars a
day as compensatory damages for each day he was kept in isolation after authorities had
completed their investigation of the disturbance. He was also awarded $500 in punitive
damages. (Delaware Correctional Center)

U.S. Appeals Court

Tikalslcy v. City of Chicago, 687 F.2d 175 (Chicago, Ill. 1981). A federal jury awarded
$30,000 in damages to Mary Ann Tikalsky, a former city of Chicago Clinical therapist,
who was strip searched after being arrested for complaining about a parking ticket. The
verdict was made against the city and Norman Schmiedeknecht, the police watch
commander on duty when she was searched. Two other officers were found not guilty of
the charge. Following the verdict, James O'Grady, former police superintendent for the
city issued strict guidelines as to when strip searches could be made. The Illinois General
Assembly has since passed legislation restricting such searches. (Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
GOOD FAITH
DEFENSE

Wolfel v. Sanborn, 666 F.2d 1005 (1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1115. In an action for
damages under the civil rights laws, state officials have the burden of proving that
they are entitled to qualified immunity because they acted in good faith. (Ohio Adult
Parole Authority)
1982

U.S. Appeals Court
42 U.S.C.A.
Section 1983

Berry: v. McLemore, 670 F.2d 30 (5th Cir. 1982). A town can not be held liable under
Section 1983 for injuries sustained by an arrestee during an allegedly unlawful arrest.
No reasonable jury could have found from the evidence that the police officer's unlawful
arrest was made pursuant to any policy or custom of the town. (Maben, Mississippi)

U.S. District Court
42 U.S.C.A.
Section 1983

DiGiovanni v. City of Philadelphia, 531 F.Supp. 141 (E.D. Penn. 1982). A
municipality's immunity from any claim for punitive damages under 42 U.S.C.A.
Section 1983 does not necessarily apply to officials and employees of municipalities.
Punitive damages may be awarded against municipal officials aIJd employees in order to
punish gross violations of constitutional rights. (Philadelphia City Jail, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court

Dillon v. Director, Dept. of Corrections, 552 F.Supp. 30 (W.D. Vir. 1982).
Director of state corrections agency not liable for negligent acts in local jails. Although he
had a statutory duty to implement standards and goals for local correctional facilities, the
court found that the Director of the Virginia Department of Corrections was not liable for
isolated acts of negligence that occurred in local jails. The court held that since he had no
direct control over city jail employees he could not be held vicariously liable for their
negligent acts. The plaintiff had alleged that he was the victim of a sexual assault by an
adult and two juveniles while incarcerated in the juvenile section of the Roanoke City Jail
as a result of various officials' negligence. He was also suing the City of Roanoke, the
sheriff, aIJd several jail personnel. The director was dismissed from the suit. (Roanoke
City Jail, Virginia)

U.S. Appeals Court

Freeman v. Franzen, 695 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S.
1214 (1982). Guards are found to have used excessive force in moving inmat.e between
cells. The Seventh. Circuit Court of Appeals aff'irm.ed the decision of the lower court in
f'm.ding for the plaintiffs in this case. The court noted that action for excessive force
lies not only under the eighth amendment but under the due process clause of the
fourt.eenth. amendment as well.

PERSONAL
LIABILITY
DAMAGES

27.10

The incident occurred at the Stateville Correctional Cente; in Joliet, Illinois. The jury

awarded the plaintiff $2,500 compensat.ory and $1,000 punitive damages; $12,000 in
attorney fees were awarded. (Stateville Correctional Center, Illinois)
U.S. Appeals Court
NEGLIGENT
RETENTION
FAILURE TO
SUPERVISE

Hirst v. Gertzen, 676 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1982). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
sent back a Montana Civil rights case t.o the lower court based on allegations by the
plaintiff concerning negligent hiring and failure t.o· supervise a deputy sheriff. In 1975,
Clayton Hirst, a Native American, was found dead in his jail cell in Cutbank, Montana,
hanged by his belt. His family brought suit alleging that he had been electrocuted and
then made t.o appear as though he had committed suiqide or ~ t he actually did commit
suicide as a direct result of the negligence of the defendant city and county and their
officials in negligently hiring and failing t.o supervise jail personnel.
The district court divided the trial int.o two parts. In the first portion, the jury
·determined that the victim's cause of death was suicide rather than electrocution. The
second half dealt with the liability of the defendants, and the district court dismissed on
all counts, finding no liability. The court of appeals remanded the case on two theories:
(l) that the county and city and their officials had a duty under state law t.o exercise care
in hiring and supervising correctional officers and (2) that the negligent hiring and failure
t.o supervise resulted in a deprivation of constitutional rights under federal law. Under
this theory, the court noted that the plaintiffs had alleged gross negligence, but even
simple negligence (any failure t.o fulfill duties which should have reasonably been expected
t.o be done) would be sufficient t.o fmd that the defendants were liable. (Glacier County
Jail, Montana)

State Appeals Court
NEGLIGENCE

Iglesia v. Wells, 441 N.E.2d 1017 (Ind. App. 1982). Sheriff's department may be held
liable under a negligence theory for release of an indigent man. The First Circuit
Court of Appeals for Indiana held that the sheriff's department owed a man a duty t.o
release him in a manner which would not subject him t.o unreasonable danger, ordering
the trial court t.o hear the evidence and decide the case. The case involved an indigent
man who was arrested for public int.oxication. After pleading guilty t.o the charge, he was
ordered t.o pay costs and a fine, but having no money, spent one week in the county jail.
He was released at one minute past midnight on the final day of his sentence. The man's
clothing was unsuitable for the cold winter weather on the night of his release. He could
not speak or understand English, he lived far from the jail and had no transportation.
Becoming disoriented, the man wandered, lost his shoes, and suffered frostbite resulting
in partial amputation of his feet. (Marion County Jail, Indiana)

U.S. District Court
42 U.S.C.A.
Section 1983

Juncker v. Tinney, 549 F.Supp. 574 (D. Md., 1982). Section 1983 action is prevented
for negligent deprivation of liberty interest. The Federal District Court for Maryland
has held that the Supreme Court case of Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, prevents an
inmate from recovering, under Section 1983, for burns allegedly received from a coverless
radiat.or in his cell.
The court noted that Parratt has been used for two purposes: (l) for the notion that
simple negligence may sometimes be enough t.o state a claim of action under Section 1983,
and (2) that if a state remedy is available, a negligent deprivation of a property interest is
not actionable under Section 1983.
The Maryland court reasoned that a negligent deprivation should be treated the same
whether of a liberty interest or a property interest, and held that Parratt applies in this
case and thus prevents the inmate from recovery under Section 1983.
The court outlined a four-step analysis in determining that the plaintiff was not
entitled t.o recovery in this case:
(1) if the complaint states a claim under some constitutional provision other
than the fourteenth amendment, Parratt does not apply, because it deals only
with the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment;
(2) if the complaint alleges that the violation resulted from an established state
procedure, Parratt will not apply because the deprivation was not
negligent;
(3) jf the complaint alleges conduct which shocks the conscience of the court,
Parratt will not prevent the plaintiff from recovery because such conduct would
be a violation of substantive due process and Parratt deals only with procedural
due process; and
(4) even jf Parratt is applicable, if the court finds that there is no adequate state
remedy, the Section 1983 action will be allowed t.o proceed.
The plaintiff in this case did not meet any of the above criteria and the suit was
dismissed. (Maryland Correctional Institute)

U.S. District Court
REMEDIES

Miller v. Carson, 550 F.Supp. 543 (M.D. Fla. 1982). Defendants are found in contempt
for exceeding population limit. The court found the defendants individually and in
their official capacity for exceeding the capacity of the jail which was set in a permanent
injunction. A fine of $10,000 was imposed and fmes in excess of $5,000 per day were
authorized in the event of further violations. (Duval County Jail, Florida)
27.ll

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO
PROTECT

Mosby v. Mabry, 697 F.2d 213 (8th Cir. 1982). Administrative liability for an assault
on an inmat.e exists only if the warden or jailer knew of risk of such injury or should
have known of it and failed to prevent such an attack. (Arkansas Department of
Correction)

U.S. District Court
REMEDIES

Parnell v. Waldrep. 538 F.Supp. 1203 (W.D. N.C. 1982). County fails to take remedial
action to solve exercise deficiencies. The Unit.ed Stat.es district court for the West.em
District of North Carolina found that Gaston County and its Board of Commissioners were
liable for past and continuing injury to county prisoners for unconstitutional conditions
with regard to the lack of exercise facilities. Since the county defendants knew that the
unconstitutional conditions existed and failed to remedy the situation, they are subject to
any lawful equitable remedies the court might order.
The case was filed as a class action against the sheriff and jail sergeant, complaining
of several constitutional violations, including claims that prisoners in the jail were not
allowed to receive newspapers, that they were denied access to legal mat.erials, anci that
they were denied opportunities for adequat.e exercise. The court found all three policies
unconstitutional, and the defendants were enjoined from prohibiting inmat.es' receipt of
newspaper and books, and were ordered to submit plans to the court for providing inmat.es
with adequat.e access to the courts and opportunities for exercise.
The defendants complied with the order as to the receipt of written mat.erials but
otherwise objected on the grounds that they were without the funds or authority to
comply. As a result, the court added Gaston County and the County Board of
Commissioners as defendants. The court found that the county and the Board of
Commissioners knew of the unconstitutional conditions regarding the lack of exercise but
failed to take remedial action. (Gaston County Jail, North Carolina)

U.S. District Court
PERSONAL
LIABILITY

Roscom v. City of Chicago, 550 F.Supp. 153 (N.D. Ill. 1982). Sheriff and jail director
could be individually liable if they implemented a policy permitting unconstitutional
strip searches. A woman arrest.ed for writing dishonored checks has sued the sheriff,
jail director, and various city defendants for conducting a visual strip search. Taken from
a police station to a hospital when she complained of chest pains, she was subjected to a
visual strip search upon her admission to the Cook County Jail. The Court held that even
though the sheriff and jail director were not personally involved with the search, they
could be individually liable if the policy which they implement.ed is found
unconstitutional. (Cook County Jail)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAn.URETO
DIRECT

Salinas v. Breier, 695 F.2d 1073 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 119. Police
chief is not liable for failing to establish guidelines for strip searches. An appellat.e
court has overturned the findings of a federal district court which held that a strip
search was conducted by employees in a humiliating manner and that the chief was liable
for failing to establish specific guidelines for the conduct of searches. The case was
reversed by the appellat.e court which found that the police chief was not liable because
the strip search was conducted based on probable cause that the arrest.ees possessed
controlled substances. (Milwaukee Police Department)

U.S. Appeals Court
DAMAGES

Saunders v. Chatham County, 728 F.2d 1367 (11th Cir. 1982). $20,000 is awarded to a
prisoner who was assaulted by another prisoner. The suit alleged that jail officials in
Chatham County, Georgia, were guilty of "gross negligence" in failing to protect the safety
of an inmat.e who was beaten by another inmat.e. (Chatham County Jail, Georgia)

Stat.e Supreme Court
DAMAGES

Valadez v. City of Des Moines, 324 N.W.2d 475 (Iowa Sup. Ct. 1982). Award of
$3,800 overturned by appellat.e court. Arrested for hit and run and. assault on an
officer, Valadez was taken to a hospital shortly aft.er admission to the jail. Upon his
return to the jail. he was released on bail. In a jury trial, he was awarded $300 in
damages and $3,500 in punitive damages for false imprisonment. On appeal, the Iowa
Supreme Court reversed the decision and ordered the lower court to rule in favor of the
defendants. The Supreme Court noted that although the plaintiff proved that detention
and restraint were against his will, the evidence at the trial failed to prove the
unlawfulness of the restraint. (Des Moines Police Department, Iowa)

U.S. Appeals Court
GOOD FAITH
DEFENSE

Williams v. Bennett, 689 F.2d 1370 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 335 (1982).
Supreme Court will not review a decision denying prison officials a "good faith"
defense. The United Stat.es Supreme Court has declined to hear a case which
established that a prisoner who was injured in an attack could sue prison officials in their
personal capacity. Stat.e prison officials were told that they might personally be liable for
damages, under the eighth amendment, by the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals. When an
inmat.e of Holman Prison in Alabama was stabbed by another prisoner and was rendered
a permanent quadriplegic, he brought suit alleging violation of his constitutional rights
under the eighth amendment. (Holman Prison, Alabama)

27.12

U.S. District Court

GOOD FAITH
DEFENSE

U.S. Appeals Court

GOOD FAITH
DEFENSE

Williams v. Heard, 533 F.Supp. 1153 (S.D. Tex. 1982). The sheriff is liable for the
failure of his agents to release a prisoner after he was no billed by the grand jury. A
grand jury "no bill" constitutes a direction to the jailer that demands that a prisoner
be released when the grand jury fails to find a bill of indictment for the offense charged.
The failure to release the prisoner amounted to a deprivation of the prisoner's liberty
without due process. The sheriff was not immune from liability on the basis of good faith
since his actions were not reasonable. (Harris County Jail, Texas)
Williams v. Treen, 671 F.2d 892 (1982), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 762 (1982).
Insofar as the conditions of confinement at a Louisiana prison contravened clearly
established state law, the state prison officials' belief in the lawfulness of those
conditions was per se unreasonable. Thus, they could not claim an immunity based on
reasonable good faith. If the officials knowingly deprived a prisoner of needed medication,
they violated the constitutional prohibition against cruel and inhuman punishment and
would not be entitled to qualified immunity. (State Penitentiary, Angola, Louisiana)

1983
U.S. District Court

GOVERNMENTAL
LIABILITY

Brown v. City of Chicago, 573 F.Supp. 1375 (N.D. Ill. 1983). City officials could be
held liable for injuries caused by prisoner transportation practices. The plaintiff, now a
quadriplegic, accused the City of Chicago of purchasing unsafe "paddy wagons," and
handcuffing prisoners in a manner which produces injuries during transport. A federal
district court had found that the city may be liable for injuries which result from the
alleged practices. (City of Chicago, Illinois)

State Court
DAMAGES

Craven v. Richmond City. (Superior Court of CA, #207934, 1983). Diabetic awarded
$1,118,434 because city jail failed to provide three meals a day. A female arrested
in Richmond City, California, was housed in the Richmond City Jail. Upon admission her
husband notified jail personnel that she was diabetic, and that she required daily insulin
injections. She was taken to a hospital each day, and a hospital physician notified jail
staff in writing that she was to receive three meals each day, instead of the two meals
which were being served to all prisoners.
The written notice was lost, and the prisoner received only two meals. After three
days she was admitted to a local hospital by jail staff, where she lapsed into a coma.
After a jury trial, the plaintiff was awarded a total of $1,718,434, which was reduced
by $600,000, the amount of a previous settlement with the city. (City Jail,
Richmond, California)

State Appeals Court
REMEDIES
GOOD FAITH
DEFENSE

Daniels v. McKinney, 193 Cal. Rptr. 842 (App. 1983). California appeals court awards
fees to inmate counsel and finds that the sheriff is not in willful contempt. In a
previous court order, the sheriff had been instructed to provide three hours of exercise
per week to all inmates, without regard to sex. Female inmates sought to hold the
sheriff in contempt of court for failing to implement the order. They prevailed and
secured their exercise privileges. Their counsel was awarded attorney's fees.
The sheriff was not held in contempt because the court determined that he made a
good faith effort to comply with the previous order, and showed a willingness to comply.
However, the court ruled that personnel shortages did not justify the failure to provide
female prisoners with exercise. (Fresno County Jail, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
STATUTES

Holman v. Hilt.on, 712 F.2d 854 (3rd Cir. 1983) aff'd 542 F.Supp. 913 (D. N.J. 1982).
Statute preventing lawsuits during confinement is held unconstitutional. The New
Jersey state tort claims act prevents prisoners from filing suits against public
entities or employees until they are released from confinement. A prisoner serving a
life sentence, who was seeking the return of personal property, filed suit.
A federal district court found that the claims act was not constitutional, and on
appeal, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has aftirmed the lower court's fmding that the
statute denied prisoners sentenced to life due process, and that the time delay contributed
to governmental error in hearing the claims. The court also found that the state's
administrative remedies available during confinement were not a valid alternative.
(Trent.on State Prison, New Jersey)

(PREVENTING

LAWSUITS)

U.S. Appeals Court
DAMAGES

PERSONAL

LIABILITY

King v. Higgins, 702 F.2d 18 (1st Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 404.
Superintendent is to pay $390 to an inmate for impr9perly conducting a disciplinary
hearing. Following an incident, the plaintiff inmate was brought before a disciplinary
board and charged with refusing to work, refusing a direct order and inciting to riot.
He was not given prior notice of the hearing, nor was he advised of his right to seek
counsel, to confront the complaining officer, nor his right to present witnesses on his own
behalf. After the disciplinary hearing, a reclassif"1Cation hearing was conducted in which it
was recommended that because of his frequent disciplinary infractions, the inmate should
be transferred t.o a more secure institution. The plaintiff inmate

27.13

brought suit alleging that the disciplinary hearing had been improperly conducted and
adversely affected his reclassification hearing. The court ordered that the inmate be
awarded $37 5 for pain and suffering during the fifteen days he was placed in isolation as
a result of the disciplinary decision, and $15 for loss of wages. The superintendent of the
facility was held liable for the $390 since he was the official designated to hear prisoner's
appeals. (Massachusetts Correctional Institute, Concord, Massachusetts)
U.S. District Court
DAMAGES
GOOD FAITH
DEFENSE

Lyons v. C,,mningham, 583 F.Supp. 1147 (S.D. N.Y. 1983). Parents awarded $24,000
for mental anguish following son's jail suicide. After an eight day trial, a federal
jury found that two of nine defendants violated the deceased inmate's constitutional
rights and awarded each parent $12,000. A third defendant was also found to have
violated the son's rights, but was afforded a good faith defense. Six other defendants were
released from responsibility. The federal court granted attorney's fees to the parents.
(New York City Detention Facility)

U.S. District Court
42 U.S.C.A.
Section 1983
GOOD FAITH
DEFENSE

Marchant v. City of Little Rock, Ark., 557 F.Supp. 475 (E.D. Ark. 1983), aff'd, 741 F.2d
201 (8th Cir. 1984). Officials are not liable under Section 1983 for failing to give a
pretrial detainee prescribed medicine. A federal district court in Arkansas found no
liability on the part of the city or jail officials concerning a claim of improper medical
care. The court noted that although the jail matrons may have been negligent in not
giving the prisoner her prescribed medicine on a regular basis, there could be no recovery
for damages since the matrons defense of good faith entitled them to qualified immunity
in this Section 1983 action. Recovery under state laws was not prohibited because the
matron had not intentionally denied the detainee any constitutional rights. Because no
policy had been promulgated that violated the prisoner's constitutional rights, the city, the
chief of police, and the jail administrator could not be liable. (Little Rock City Jail,
Arkansas)

U.S. District Court
42 U.S.C.A.
Section 1983

Nelson v. Herdzik, 559 F.Supp. 27 (1983). Guard is not liable under Section 1983.
The plaintiff, an inmate incarcerated at the Attica Correctional Facility in New York,
filed suit under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging that a prison guard at the facility, A.
Herdzik, "intentionally and maliciously denied plaintiff his civil and constitutional rights
by refusing plaintiff an hour of exercise, and continuing to do so at will." The district court
dismissed the complaint, finding it frivolous. Noting that depriving inmates of an
opportunity to exercise over prolonged periods of time has been held by numerous courts
to constitute cruel and unusual punishment to be actionable under Section 1983, the trial
court noted that plaintiffs allegation involved a denial of only one hour of exercise and,
therefore, does not present a constitutional violation. (Attica Correctional Facility, New
York)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN
NEGLIGENT
SUPERVISION

Overbay v. Lilliman, 572 F.Supp. 174 (W.D. Mo. 1983). Sheriff and county could
be liable for failure to train and supervise deputy. A prisoner was allowed to
amend his complaint in federal district court, adding the county sheriff as a defendant.
The original complaint alleged that a deputy sheriff had violated his civil rights and
assaulted him. Later, the plaintiff asked to add the county sheriff as a defendant,
alleging that the sheriff knew of the past violent behavior of the deputy and failed to train
and supervise the deputy properly. The district court granted the plaintiffs motion, citing
several circuit court decisions which allow sheriffs to be held liable because they are
responsible for setting policy. (LaFayette County, Missouri)

U.S. District Court
42 U.S.C.A.
Section 1983
FAILURE TO
PROTECT

Reynolds v. Sheriff, City of Richmond, 574 F.Supp. 90 (E.D. Va. 1983). Sheriff may be
liable for pretrial detainee's beating while housed with convicted felons. The United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia has refused the motion of the
defendant sheriff to dismiss him from a suit brought by a pretrial detainee.
The detainee alleges that he was beaten by convicted felons while he was detained
at the sheriffs facility. He accuses the sheriff of directing the act or acquiescing to it after
it happened.
The court did not dismiss the sheriff from the suit because the plaintiff alleged that he
established and maintained a policy of not segregating convicted felons from pretrial
detainees. Because of a lack of separation, the plaintiff was attacked. Also, the court
ruled that the case could be pursued under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 because it alleged a
violation of the plaintiff's right to be free from bodily injury, and that cruel and unusual
punishment need not be alleged. (Richmond City Jail, Virginia)

U.S. Supreme Court
42 U.S.C.A.
Section 1983
DAMAGES
PERSONAL

Smith v. Wade, 103 S.Ct. 1625 (U.S. Sup. Ct. 1983). Punitive damages may be
assessed against a guard in Section 1983 action. A five-to-four decision by the U.S.
Supreme Court holds that a plaintiff in a 42 U.S.C.A. Section 1983 civil rights action
may be awarded punitive damages when a government official's conduct "involves
reckless or callous indifference to the federally prot.ected rights of others." The court
rejected the argument of the defendant prison guard that the test for an award of
punitive damages is one of "actual malicious intent." The decision came on appeal of a
lower court's assessment of damages against Missouri corrections officer William Smith for
placing inmate Daniel Wade in a cell where he was beat.en and sexually assaulted.

LIABILITY

27.14

(The appeal challenged only that portion of the award assessed for punitive damages.
Punitive damages are imposed as punishment over and above actual damages that simply
compensate a victim for losses incurred.)
Smith had argued that the standard which requires actual ill will or intent to injure is
less vague than the standard which the court approved. "Reckless or callous in.difference",
he argued, "is too uncertain to achieve deterrence rationally and fairly."
However, the court stated:
Smith seems to assume that prison guards and other state officials look mainly to
the standard for punitive damages in shaping their conduct. We question the
premise. We assume, and hope that most officials are guided primarily by the
underlying standards of federal substantive law--both out of devotion to duty, and
in the interest of avoiding liability for compensatory damages...The need for
exceptional clarity in the standard for punitive damages arises only if one assumes
that there are substantial numbers of officers who will not be deterred by
compensatory damages...The presence of such officers constitutes a powerful
argument against raising the threshold for punitive damages.
The dissent by Justice Rehnquist, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Powell,
states that the decision will encourage 1983 suits which already strain the federal
workload. Justice O'Connor, dissenting separately, said that the majority's ruling will
tend to "chill public officials in the performance of their duties.• (Missouri Reformatory For
Youths)
State Appeals Court
FAILURE TO

Solberg v. County of Yellowstone, 659 P.2d 290 (Mont. 1983). County may be liable for
alcoholic prisoner's death. An appeals court has remanded this case to trial for
resolution. A prisoner found lying face down in his cell died from a high temperature
resulting from alcohol withdrawal and delirium tremens (DT's). The plaintiff alleges that
the jailer should have recognized the symptoms of the DT's. (Yellowstone County Jail,
Montana)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO

State Bank of St. Charles v. Camic, 712 F.2d 1140 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104
S.Ct. 491 (1983). City not liable for prisoner's suicide. The Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals has decided that city officials were not liable for a prisoner's suicide because
they had no reason to suspect he was a danger to himself and because they had exercised
reasonable routine precautions before placing him in his cell. Upon admission, officers
observed that the prisoner was intoxicated, uncooperative and assaultive, but did not have
reason to believe that he would harm himself. The officers removed the prisoner's belt
and shoelaces prior to placing him in the cell. The prisoner subsequently hung himself by
tearing his shirt into strips which were tied together to form a rope. (Aurora Police
Lockup, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court

Stokes v. Delcambre, 710 F.2d 1120 (5th Cir. 1983). Award of $380,000 to a college
student is upheld by circuit court. In a civil rights suit, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit has upheld a lower court's decision to award $380,000 in
compensatory and punitive damages against a Louisiana sheriff and his deputy.
The twenty-one year old plaintiff was arrested with three other occupants of a truck
after a beer bottle was thrown at a pedestrian. While housed in the dayroom of the local
jail, the plaintiff was beaten and forced to engage in sexual acts by two inmates. His yells
and screams for help were ignored by jail staff.
The circuit court affirmed the jury award of $205,000 in punitive damages against the
sheriff, $105,000 in punitive damages against the deputy, and $70,000 in compensatory
damages against both defendants.
The court concurred that jailers owe a constitutional duty to prisoners to provide them
protection from injury, that the evidence indicated an indifference to the safety of
prisoners, that due to the indifference a "good faith" defense was not warranted, and that
punitive damages were appropriate because the actions of the defendants were malicious,
wanton and oppressive. (Vermillion Parish Jail, Louisiana)

PROTECT

PROTECT

DAMAGES
GOOD FAITH

DEFENSE

State Appeals Court
FAILURE TO

Stout v. City of Porterville. 196 Calif. Rptr. 301 (Ca. Ct. App. 1983).
Intoxicated person is not allowed to sue a city for failing to arrest him before he was
struck by car. Although not directly a detention case, the court decision indicates that
a person must show a special relationship between himself and a governmental agency if
he is to sue for failure to provide protection.
Stout was stopped by police officers while walking, and his drunkenness was observed.
The officers did not arrest him. Subsequently he was struck by a car. Stout sued the City
of Porterville, and the California Court of Appeals decided that the city did not take action
which contributed to the accident, nor did it offer the plaintiff any assurances that it
would take care of him. (City of Porterville, California)

U.S. Appeals Court

Wolfel v. Bates, 707 F.2d 932 (6th Cir. 1983). One dollar is awarded to inmate for
being improperly disciplined. No punitive damages awarded. The plaintiff inmate
drafted a petition alleging that prison guards were harassing inmates of the Southern
Ohio Correctional Facility. The petition was sent to tb:e prison superintendent.

PROTECT

DAMAGES
GOOD FAITH
DEFENSE

27.J.5

Subsequently, a guard charged the inmate with violating a rule prohibiting the making of
unfounded complaints against staff members with malicious intent. The inmate received
an informal hearing where he was found guilty of the rule violation. A verbal reprimand
was entered on his record.
The court found that the inmate's first amendment right to petition for redress of
grievances had been unduly restricted. The inmate was awarded one dollar in nominal
damages. The court refused to award punitive damages since the guard and hearing
officer had not acted willfully or in gross disregard of the inmate's rights. The guards
claim of qualified immunity failed since they had not acted in good faith. (Southern Ohio
Correctional Facility)
State Appeals Court
GOVERNMENTAL
IMMUNITY

Young v. City of Ann Arbor, 336 N.W.2d 24 (Mich. App. 1983). Governmental
immunity is granted to police chief for arrestee's suicide in lockup. A Michigan Court
of Appeals has ruled that a police chief be granted immunity for the death of an
arrestee who hung himself with a belt in his lockup. The court decided that immunity
should be granted when the act falls within the scope of employment and granted
immunity based on this rationale. A dissenting judge argued that a more stringent test of
"ministerial discretion" be applied for acts committed within the scope of employment.
(Ann Arbor Police Department, Michigan)

1984
U.S. District Court
42 U.S.C.A.
Section 1983
QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY

Anela v. City of Wildwood, 595 F.Supp. 511 (D. N.J. 1984), 790 F.2d 1063 (3rd Cir.
1986), U.S. cert. denied in 107 S.Ct. 434. Police chief granted summary judgment;
court finds qualified immunity against 42 U.S.C.A. 1983 action and immunity under
state tort claims act; pre-hearing detention period constitutional rights d~ssed. The
two plaintiffs, Connie Anela and Angela DiPietro, were arrested for violating a noise
ordinance and were detained overnight by city police. They brought suit in the United
States district court, claiming that the city police chief had violated their due process
rights by an unconstitutionally long detention ~ false imprisonment.
The constitutional right examined by the court was the right that the period of
detention following arrest and before the arrestee is brought before a magistrate (for bail
setting) be ''brief." In Fisher v. Wa11bingtn11 Metro Transit Authority, 690 F.2d 1133 (4th
Cir. 1982), ''brief" was defmed as no longer than is necessary for the taking of
"administrative steps incident to arrest."
As stated by Fisher:
Whether there are any direct constitutional limits on the post-arrest, pre-hearing
detention of arrested officers by state officers is a question that has not been much
before the federal courts... In a line of Section 1983 cases the former Fifth Circuit
has apparently accepted the view that there are no such constitutional limits... But
the lower federal courts have simply assumed, though fmding no violation on the
facts at hand, that independently of any state law requirements there are ultimate
durational limits derived from due process guarantees ... The Supreme Court has
not addressed the issue directly.
Based on this reasoning, the district court granted the defendant's motion for
summary judgment in its entirety. (City of Wildwood, New Jersey)

State Appeals Court
FAILURE TO
PROTECT

Brewer v. Perrin, 349 N.W.2d 198 (Mich. App. 1984). Detention staff may be liable
for juvenile's suicide because they failed to monitor actions and to make regular checks.
An appeals court in Michigan has ordered a case to proceed to trial in which the
plaintiffs charge the detention facility staff with responsibility for the suicide of their
fifteen year old son. The boy was arrested after assaulting his twin brother. He was
combative and belligerent during arrest and transport. Upon admission to a detention cell
he continued to yell and scream. A staff member turned off an audio monitor because he
decided the noise was interfering with department activities. After ninety minutes the
boy hanged himself. He was only checked one time by facility staff during that period.
The appeals court also instructed the jury to determine if liability might also result from
violation of the state statutes regarding juvenile detention. (Southgate City Jail,
Michigan)

U.S. District Court
DAMAGES

Bush v. Ware, 589 F.Supp. 1454 (E.D. Wisc. 1984). Two correctional officers
ordered to pay prisoner $2,000 for using excessive force. Although the prisoner
had swung a towel with a metal object wrapped inside at the guards, testimony at the
trial indicated that the guards entered the cell with a flashlight and ankle restraints with
the intent to use them as weapons. The county was not found-liable, even though no
written policy existed, because it had advised all guards to USfl minima] force. (Waukesha
County Jail, Wisconsin)

State Supreme Court
FAILURE TO
PROTECT

Cansler v. State, 34 CrL 2372 (Kan. Sup. Ct., 1984), Officials held liable for acts
of escapees. The Kanns Supreme Court found that the state has a duty to securely
confine inmates, and having failed to do so, resulting in the escape of seven convicted
murderers, the state officials were held liable for the subsequent wounding of a law
enforcement officer.
27.16

care

Finding that the corrections employees failed to exercise reasonable
commensurat.e with the risk present.ed by the escape of violent offenders, and having
failed to prevent the escape, not notifying area residents and law enforcement agencies
immediat.ely, the court held the stat.e liable for the subsequent incident. (Department of
Corrections, Kansas)
U.S. District Court
DAMAGES

Cole v. Snow, 586 F. Supp. 655 (D. Mass. 1984) and 588 F. Supp. 1386 (D. Mass.
1984). Visitor Receives Over $175,000 for Unconstitutional Strip Searches; Sheriff Held
Liable for Policies. A woman who was subject.ed to visual cavity searches on three
occasions was awarded $150,000 as compensation and $27,040 for future medical expenses
by a federal court in Massachusetts.
The court found that the sheriff had instituted unconstitutional strip search policies,
and that he was liable in his official and individual capacity. No punitive damages were
awarded. (Plymouth County Jail, Mass.)

U.S. Appeals Court
DAMAGES
NEGIJGENCE

Estat.e of Davis v. Johnson, 745 F.2d 1066 (7th Cir. 1984). Court of appeals vacat.es
district court decision to award $875,000 for wrongful death; upholds jury award for
negligence in the amount of $50,000. The decedent was a patient in a nursing home
who was picked up by police after he wandered away. He exhibit.ed obvious bizarre
behavior when he arrived at the city jail. A commander ordered the desk clerk to have
the decedent taken from the city jail to a t.emporary placement in the county jail. The
desk clerk did not transfer the inmat.e because the jail floors were being waxed and
cleaning personnel did not want transfers on the day of cleaning.
As a result, he was placed in a cell with a man arrest.ed for murdering his girlfriend.
The alleged murderer asked city jail staff not to place the decedent in the cell and stated
he was high on drugs and was hallucinating at the time. Following the placement in the
cell, the decedent was beat.en to death by his cell mat.e.
On appeal, the United Stat.es Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found that
police officials and staff were negligent in placing a mentally ill arrestee in a holding cell
with another prisoner who subsequently beat him to death. The court did not agree with
the federal district court jury finding that the defendants were callously indifferent to the
decedent and that they had violated his civil rights.
The appeals court upheld only the negligence finding of the jury and an award of
$50,000 to the son. (Holding Facility, Police Department, Decatur, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO
PROTECT

Gibson v. Babcock, 601 F.Supp. 1156 (N.D. Ill. 1984). Supervisors liable for
detainee beating. A federal district court has held supervisors responsible for failing to
prot.ect a detainee from an assault by another prisoner. The court found that
knowledge of a history of violence within a jail, rather than a specific risk of harm to a
particular prisoner, was enough to hold the supervisors liable. The court found that the
eighth amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment does not apply to
pretrial detainees, and that a detainee need not demonstrat.e deliberat.e indifference to
stat.e a claim for denial of medical care under the due process clause of the eighth
amendment. (Lake County Jail, Waukegan, Illinois)

Stat.e Appeals Court
DAMAGES
PERSONAL

Harris County v. Jenkins, 678 S.W.2d 639 (Tex. App. 1984). Prisoner receives
$60,000 from sheriff, county and stat.e because medication withheld. A prisoner who
suffers from epilepsy reached a $20,000 settlement with the Stat.e of Texas and was
awarded $40,000 by a stat.e jury because he suffered seizures after his medication was
taken from him upon admission to the Harris County Jail.
A jury found the sheriff seventy percent liable and the county thirty percent liable for
the $40,000 award. The jury found the sheriff liable not only for withholding the
medication, but for failing to forward the prisoner's medical records when he was
transferred to a stat.e facility. The verdict was upheld upon appeal. (Harris County Jail,
Texas)

LIABILITY

Stat.e Court
NEGLIGENCE

Kanayurak v. North Slope Borough, 677 P.2d 893 (Alaska Sup. Ct. 1984). Liability for
suicide of intoxicated prisoner could result if extra precautions not taken. A stat.e court
in Alaska has ordered a case to proceed to trial in which the family of a woman who
committ.ed suicide in a lockup has alleged negligence on the part of police officials.
Testimony revealed that the officials were aware that the woman was very intoxicated,
and that she had reason to be depressed. Citing a case which held that a jailer must take
extra precautions for the safety of a prisoner if he knows the prisoner is int.oxicat.ed or
insane (Wilson v. City of Kotzebue). the court ordered the case to proceed to trial. (North
Slope Borough Lockup, Alaska)

Stat.e Court
NEGIJGENT
SUPERVISION

Kemp v. Waldron, 479 N.Y.S.2d 440 (Sup. Ct. 1984). Stat.e court finds that sheriff
and subordinat.e could be liable for negligent supervision- prisoner sues as a
result of assault by another prisoner. A New York court det.ermined that the
sheriff had a statutory duty to protect prisoners from harm while in his cust.ody, and that
he has discretion with regard to prisoner segregation.
The court referred det.ermination of whether discretion was abused to a jury, along
with a determination of the adequacy of supervision.

The county defendants were dismissed from the suit when the court found that they
were not responsible for the sheriff's actions. However, the sheriff could be held liable
along with the subordinate officer who failed to provide supervision. (Schenectady County
Jail, New York)
U.S. District Court
42 U.S.C.A.
Section 1983
NEGLIGENCE

Martini v. Russell, 582 F.Supp. 136 (C.D. Ca. 1984). Federal court finds city liable
for locking children up with mother. After an officer arrested a woman for traffic ·
offenses and locked her children up with her, a federal district court found the city
liable under Section 1983, citing gross negligence on the part of the officer. State law
requires minors to be taken to the custody of probation officers and prohibits detention
under these circumstances. (Huntington Park Police Station, California)

U.S. District Court
DAMAGES
GOVERNMENTAL
LIABILITY

McElveen v. Prince William County, 725 F.2d 954 (N.D. Vir. 1984), cert.
denied, 105 S.Ct. 88. $210,000 is awarded to inmates held in jail. A federal jury
awarded $210,000 to approximately 7,000 inmates held in the Prince William County
(Virginia) jail between August 1980 and January 1982. Two months before, the jury
had found that the facility was unconstitutionally crowded, exceeding at times its inmate
capacity by 400 percent. Witnesses had testified that the facility lacked medical care and
security and was unsafe. Pretrial detainees are to receive $170,000 of the award, with the
remaining funds to be divided among the sentenced prisoners held at the jail.
Meanwhile, the county has filed its own case against Virginia state corrections
officials, claiming that a chronic backlog of prisoners awaiting transfer to state facilities
contributed to the jail crowding. The jury had rejected county claims during the class
action suit that state officials should accept or share liability, after U.S. District Judge
Richard L. Williams ruled that state employees are immune under the eleventh
amendment from civil damages in their role as officials. The court continued them in the
case as individuals, but instructed the jury that they were entitled to claim they had acted
in good faith. (Prince William County Jail, Virginia)

U.S. Appeals Court
PERSONAL
LIABILITY
DAMAGES

McKinley v. Trattles, 732 F. 2d 1320 (7th Cir. 1984). Officer to pay $6,000 to
prisoner for unnecessary strip search. The United States Court of Appeals
affirmed a lower court judgment against a correctional officer but reduced the amount
of punitive damages from $15,000 to $6,000. The plaintiff, a prisoner, claimed that he
had already been searched once before returning to his cell. He was then handcuffed and
sprayed with mace in a forced attempt to subject him to a second search. The federal jury
believed the plaintiff's version of the events.

U.S. District Court
DAMAGES

Pino v. Dalsheim, 605 F.Supp. 1305 (1984). Liability of several defendants, who were
personally involved in a hearing that consisted of several basic constitutional flaws,
would be joint and several, ruled a federal district court in New York. The inmate was
awarded twenty-five dollars a day for the forty-five days he spent in a special housing
unit, and the fifty-two dollars per month income from his library clerk's job that he lost
during the forty-five-day period. Due process violations included a right to gather facts
around the marijuana incident, the failure of his assigned assistant to gather facts or
respond to his requests, and the denied right to call live witnesses. His being assigned an
employee assistant rather than choosing one from a list was in itself a violation, ruled the
court. (Downstate Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
CONSENT DECREE

Poston v. Fox, 577 F.Supp. 915 (D. N.J. 1984). Plaintiffs entitled to attorney's fees
as prevailing party after consent decree signed. County jail officials agreed in a
consent decree to take steps to comply with New Jersey jail standards in a suit which
alleged constitutional violations (physical conditions, admission and processing of
prisoners, health care, discipline, grievance procedures, food and diet, recreation,
educational programs, visitation, clothing and preferential treatment). The Federal
District Court awarded $39,794 in attorney's fees to the plaintiffs, which was forty percent
less than requested because the action achieved only partial success. The court found that
the consent decree was sufficiently favorable to render the prisoners the prevailing party.
(Cape May County Jail, New Jersey)

U.S. Appeals Court
DAMAGES
42 U.S.C.A.
Section 1983

Raley v. Fraser, 747 F.2d 287 (5th Cir. 1984). Arrestee awarded only $1,000 for
claims of alleged excessive force during arrest and detention; court determines plaintiff
is not considered "prevailing party" for purposes of attorney's fees. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has affirmed the decision of a federal district
court in a civil rights action against two police officers.
The plaintiff, Robert Dean Raley, was arrested for public intoxication by two Amarillo
police officers (Thomas Fraser and Gary Trupe). The officers observed Raley knock over a
sign after leaving his car at 1:00 a.m., and in the ensuing encounter Raley was not
cooperative. Raley was booked at the police station, and officer Fraser applied choke holds
on Raley four times during the process. Raley's arms were bruised, his face scraped, and
the handcuffs raised welts on his wrists. There was no permanent injury.

27.18

Raley filed civil rights actions, under Section 1983, U.S.C.A. The district court found
that Officer Fraser acted "overzealously" rather than maliciously, and therefore the
plaintiff was not entitled t.o punitive damages under Section 1983. Raley was awarded
$1,000 as actual damages for pain and mental suffering, after the court found that
Fraser's actions were not want.on or malicious. The damages were awarded on a stat.e tort
claim, the court fmding against his Section 1983 claim. Raley appealed, arguing that the
trial court erred in its fmdings. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed all aspects of the
lower court decision. (Amarillo Police Department, Texas)
U.S. District Court
DAMAGES
NEGLIGENT
SUPERVISION

Slakan v. Port.er, 737 F.2d 368 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 1413 (1984).
Prisoner awarded $32,500 for officer brutality; warden and other officials not immune
and held liable for failmg t.o supervise. An inmat.e injured when prison guards used
high-pressure wat.er hoses, t.ear gas and billy clubs t.o subdue him while he was confined
in a one man cell brought a civil rights suit under Section 1983 against three gµards and
high ranking prison officials, alleging excessive force in violation of the eighth ·
amendment, and that supervisory officials were deliberat.ely indifferent t.o a known risk of
harm. The federal district court found for the plaintiff inmat.e, awarding $32,500
damages. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court
decision, holding that: (1) the guards' heavy-handed use of force crossed the line ·
separating necessary force from brutality; (2) evidence established the supervisory liability
of the warden, direct.or of prisons and secretary of corrections; (3) supervisory officials
were not entitled t.o qualified immunity since they had explicit legal guideposts t.o follow
and were aware, or should have been aware, of a duty t.o ensure that instruments of
control were not misused. (Central Prison, Raleigh, North Carolina)

U.S. Appeals Court
42 U.S.C.A.
Section 1983
FAILURE TO TRAIN
GOVERNMENTAL

Tuttle v. City of Oklahoma City, 728 F.2d 456 (10th Cir. 1984), reh'g denied, 106 S.Ct.
16 (1983). Reversed by City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle. 105 S.Ct. 2427 (1985).
Proof of single instance of unconstitutional activity not sufficient t.o impose
liability under Monell rule unless....
The widow of a man shot by a police officer brought a civil rights suit against the
officer and his employer city. The federal district court held against the city but
absolved the officer. On appeal (728 F.2d 456) the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
affirmed the lower court decision. On appeal t.o the Unit.ed Stat.es Supreme Court, the
majority reversed the lower courts' decisions, holdmg that it was a reversible error t.o
allow the jury t.o infer a thoroughly nebulous "policy" of "inadequat.e training" on the city's
part from the single shooting incident in question and at the same time sanction the
inference that the policy was the cause of the incident, thereby givmg rise t.o liability
under the Civil Rights Act of 1861.
To impose a civil rights liability on the city under Monell v. New York City
Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, for a single incident, the plaintiff must prove
that the incident was caused by an existing unconstitutional municipal policy which can
be attribut.ed t.o a municipal policymaker. The existence of the unconstitutional policy and
its origin must be separat.ely proved and where the policy relied on is not itself
unconstitutional, considerably more proof than the single incident is necessary in every
case t.o establish both the requisit.e fault on the part of the municipality and the causal
connection between the "policy" and the constitutional deprivation.
The court also held that there must be an affirmative link between the training and
adequacies alleged in the particular constitutional violation at issue. The court found that
the fact that a municipal "policy" might lead t.o police misconduct is hardly sufficient t.o
satisfy the Monell requirement for municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.
(Oklahoma City)

LIABILITY

1985
U.S. Supreme Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN
DAMAGES
GOVERNMENTAL

LIABILITY

City of Shepherdsville, Kentucky v. Rymer, 105 S.Ct. 3518 (6th Cir. 1985)
(Memorandum Decision). Supreme court remands case for further consideration
in light of Oklahoma city ruling. Ruling on Rymer v. Davis, 754 F.2d 198
(1984). City police were found by the federal district court t.o have used excessive force
during the arrest of the plaintiff. The court of appeals upheld the finding of the lower
court, including award of $32,000 compensatory damages against the police officer,
$50,000 punitive damages against the city and $25,000 compensatory damages against the
city. The appeals court ruled that the city's failure t.o train police officers regarding arrest
procedures was a proper basis for liability in a civil rights action arising from injuries
sustained by the arrestee, and that official acquiescence in police misconduct may be
inferred from lack of training even in the face of only one incident of brutal misconduct.
The Supreme Court vacat.ed the appeals court decision, remanding it for further
consideration in light of its decision in City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 105 S.Ct. 2427
(1985). In that decision, the court ruled that proof of a single instance of unconstitutional
activity is not sufficient t.o impose civil rights liability on a city under the Monell rwe
unless proof of the incident includes proof that it was caused by an existing
unconstitutional municipal policy, which can be attribut.ed t.o a municipal policymaker.
(City of Shepherdsville, Kentucky)
27.19

U.S. District Court
GOVERNMENTAL
LIABILlTY

Cook v. Housewright, 611 F.Supp. 828 (D. Nev. 1985). Officials not liable for
isolated incident of improper medical care. A prisoner sued officials of the
Nevada Department of Prisoners alleging indifference to his medical needs (in delaying
a knee operation). The director of the department and the warden argued that they were
not liable because they were not directly involved with the incident. Although the court
noted that direct involvement is not the only basis for determining liability. it found that
the prisoner's rights had not been violated. Since other prisoners were regularly provided
with medical care and there was no evidence of a policy discouraging the provision of care,
the court viewed this as an isolated incident, relieving officials from responsibility.
(Nevada State Prison)

State Appeals Court
CONTRACT
SERVICES

Craven County Hosp. Corp. v. Lenoir County, 331 S.E.2d 690 (N.C. App. 1985).
A hospital tried to collect medical costs from a sheriff, the county, or the city for
treating a man who died in the hospital, after city police had him transported there.
Police found him intoxicated and were making arrangements to place him in the jail until
he was sober, when he fell and injured his head, requiring immediat.e medical treatment.
The court refused to hold the city liable. because it had not contracted with the
hospital to pay the medical costs. nor did it have a statutory duty t.o pay medical services
for people in its custody. The court said it was up to the legislature, not it, to create such
a duty. Whether the man was considered to be in the "custody" of police was not relevant
to finding an absence of liability. However. the court determined that the man had not
been arrest.ed but was merely being assisted by the officers, who were authorized to take
to the county jail people found drunk in public. (Kingst.on Police Department, North
Carolina)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO
PROTECT

Estate of Cartwright v. City of Concord, Cal., 618 F.Supp. 722 (U.S. D.C., N.D. Cal.
1985). Jail defendants were not liable for a prisoner suicide that occurred aft.er the
decedent had "joked" about it with a friend by shouting back and forth between their
separate cells. The decedent and his female companion were brought to jail under the
influence of alcohol and Valium. The two were laughing, shouting, and joking from their
individual cells that they were going to kill themselves. His female friend faked a suicide,
and when the jailers responded to it seriously. she bragged out loud that she had fooled
them. Thereafter. the jailers increased the frequency of jail inspections. In fact, the
decedent was checked about fifteen minutes to a half hour before he was found hanging by
a torn bed blanket. The evidence was inconclusive as to whether the decedent was merely
trying to fake a suicide, and lost consciousness due to his intoxicated and drugged state, or
whether his suicide was actually motivated by serious intentions. Jailers had talked to
him earlier and found no reason to believe he was suicidal or depressed. He hung himself
by using the edge of his bed to tear a strip off a blanket and tied it around one of the high
bars of his cell. The defendants were not liable for failing to prevent the death or for their
actions after discovering the hanging. The aid given following the discovering was
adequat.e and so was the investigation of events. (Concord City Jail, California)

U.S. District Court
DAMAGES

Ferola v. Moran. 622 F.Supp. 814 (D.C. R.I. 1985). An inmate brought a civil rights
action charging that defendants subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment by
deeying him psychiatric care and by cruelly and abusively shackling him to his bed. The
United States District Court held that: (1) a record of care afforded the prisoner did not
reflect denial of psychiatric care or deliberate indifference to his psychiatric needs; (2)
shackling of the defendant violated the eighth amendment: (3) the director of Department
of Corrections was liable; (4) the inmate was entitled to damages of $1,000 for physical
and psychological injury suffered; and (5) shackling of the inmate warranted equitable
relief. Because the warden had set no policies that would safeguard inmates against the
unconstitutional conduct of his subordinates. he was responsible for damages in the
amount of $1,000 for the plaintiff's trauma, pain, and suffering. Judgment was also
entered against a supervisor on duty who participated in the shackling. (Adult
Correctional Institution, Rhode Island)

U.S. Appeals Court
42U.S.C.A.
Section 1983

Ganey v. Edwards, 759 F.2d 337 {4th Cir. 1985). Attorney fees awarded although
no damages obtained. A federal jury found that a state prisoner had been denied
access to a prison law library but awarded no actual or nominal damages. On appeal,
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the finding and lack of damages award,
but concluded that the prisoner was entitled to an award of costs and attorney fees as the
prevailing party in this Section 1983 acti~n. (North Carolina Central Prison, Raleigh,
North Carolina)

U.S. Appeals Court
DAMAGES
FAILURE TO TRAIN
NEGLIGENT
SUPERVISION

Goodson v. City of Atlanta, 763 F.2d 1381 (11th Cir. 1985). Detainee awarded
$50,000 damages for conditions of detention. The plaintiff was held as a rape
suspect in the Atlanta jail. A jury concluded that he was subjected to unconstitutional
conditions of confinement (sanitation, toilet facilities, medical care, lack of bedding. lack
of heating, roach infested food). The jury believed th.at the City of Atlanta and the jail

administrat.or knew of these conditions and had even made public statements t.o the media
that the jail was "unfit for human habitation". Concluding that the administrat.or had
failed t.o properly train and supervise staff, they held him liable for $5,000 damages, and
held the city liable for $45,000 compensat.ory damages. (Atlanta City Jail, Georgia)
U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO
PROTECT
DAMAGES

Hayes v. Vessey. 777 F.2d 1149 (6th Cir. 1985). Although a corrections officer was
perhaps incompetent and held animosity t.oward a teacher because she was a woman,
he was not liable for failing t.o protect her from being raped while he was on lunch
reak., ruled the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. The teacher claimed discrimination and
denial of equal protection because the guard had not ticketed the rapist earlier in the day
when discovered on the grounds without authorization. She claimed he set the t.one for
extremely lax security which caused her t.o be raped. He was not liable on such a theory
because as a subordinate employee he had no authority t.o set a security policy, nor was he
responsible for not ticketing the rapist earlier because such action was t.oo remote from
causatjon. Another teacher allowed the rapist t.o regain entry during lunch by unlocking
the gate in violation of school rules. Finally, even if the guard had been at his station
during the fifteen minute attack, he would not have been able t.o hear the woman's cries
for help. His station was located at the end of the hall, and her room was soundproof.
The court reversed a jury's judgment against the officer for $200,000 in compensat.ory
damages and $100,000 in punitive damages. Also at issue was whether the teacher could
collect from other prison officials for negligence in ignoring high levels of sexual tension,
condoning an attitude of indifference t.oward danger t.o female employees, failing t.o require
adequate security for female employees, assigning her t.o work in a remot.e area more
dangerous than areas assigned t.o male teachers, and defeating aut.omatic locking systems
which led t.o the unauthorized entry of the rapist. The court found no liability for the
random act and ruled that the plaintiff's remedy in worker's compensation precluded suit.
She received compensation disability benefits which contained special provisions for prison
employees injured by inmates, provisions not applicable t.o other employees. (State Prison
at Jackson, Michigan)

U.S. Supreme Court
PERSONAL

Kentucky v. Graham, 105 S.Ct. 3099 (1985). A Section 1983 suit was brought against
the commissioner of the Kentucky State Police "individually and as the Commissioner"
seeking damages for alleged deprivation of federal constitutional rights in a warrantless
raid and arrest by the state police. The commonwealth, which was sued only for fees
should the plaintiff eventually prevail, was dismissed on eleventh amendment grounds.
Following a settlement, the plaintiff moved for costs and attorney's fees. The United
States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky awarded costs and fees against
the Commonwealth. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in an unpublished
opinion, 742 F.2d 1455, affirmed. Certiorari was granted. The Supreme Court, held that:
(1) liability on the merits and responsibilities for fees go hand in hand and, hence, where
a defendant has not been prevailed against, Section 1988 does not authorize a fee award
against that defendant; (2) a suit against a government official in hilf}ier personal
capacity cannot lead t.o imposition of fee liability on the governmental entity; and (3) the
instant suit was necessarily litigated as a personal-capacity action, thereby precluding a
fee award against the Commonwealth, notwithstanding that the Commissioner was sued
in both his "individual" and "official" capacities. Personal-capacity civil rights suits seek
t.o impose personal liability on a government official for actions he takes under color of
state law; in contrast, official-capacity suits generally represent only another way of
pleading an action against the entity of which the officer is an agent. (State Police,
Kentucky)

LIABILITY

U.S. Appeals Court
PERSONAL

LIABILITY
DAMAGES

U.S. District Court
42U.S.C.A.
Section 1983
PERSONAL

LIABILITY

Leggett v. Badger, 759 F.2d 1556 (11th Cir. 1985). State t.o pay attorney's fees for
judgment against officer in his individual capacity. Using the Glover v. Alabama
Department of Corrections, (734 F.2d 691) decision as precedent the court determined
that the state could be asse~ attorney's fees for the defendant officer, even th~h
the state was not held liable. The lower court had found that the officer intentionally beat
a prisoner, and awarded $1,500 compensat.ory damages and $25,000 punitive damages
against the officer. (Florida State Prison)
Madden v. City of Meriden, 602 F.Supp. 1160 (D. Conn. 1985). Police officers can
be held liable under Section 1983 for beating mentally ill arrestee. The
adrninist.rat.or of the estate of a mentally ill man who hanged himself while detained by
police itled suit against two officers and the city, alleging that the officers beat the
prisoner, denied him medical care for the resulting serious injuries and placed him
alone in a cell where he hanged himself. The prisoner could not be observed in his cell
because the television monit.oring system was not operating, nor was there an audio
monit.oring system. The plaintiff further alleged that although the officers knew of
previous suicide attempts they did not take away objects that the prisoner could use t.o
injUl'f! himself. The defendants f'tled a motion for dismissal which was denied by a
magistrat.e. On appeal, the federal district court affirmed the magistrate's order, finding
that the police officers could be liable under Section 1983. (Meriden Police Lockup,
Connecticut)
27.21

U.S. Appeals Court
DAMAGES

Madison County Jail Inmates v. Thompson, 773 F.2d 834 (7th Cir. 1985), Appeals.
court does not reinstate jury verdict for $500,000 damages; nominal damages upheld.
Having convinced a federal jury that conditions at the jail were substandard, they
awarded damages of between ten to thirteen dollars. per day to plaintiff prisoners in this
class action suit.
The award would have exceeded $500,000. The trial court entered a judgment
reducing the award to nominal damages. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit concurred with
the jury fmding of unconstitutional conditions, but concluded that "the plaintiffs failed to
present evidence which would support a finding of consequential injury to the class as a
whole." The majority refused to permit damages, citing the courts reluctance in Doe v.
District of Columbia, 697 F.2d 1115 (CADC 1983). "to grant money damages to a class of
prisoners in mass that includes many prisoners who are causing the conditions
complained of and who will not cooperate to correct them." (Madison County Jail, Indiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN
GOVERNMENTAL
IJABILJTY

Marchese v. Lucas, 758 F.2d 181 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 1369. Court
upholds $125,000 award for failure to train and discipline officers; sheriff and county
held liable. The plaintiff alleged that he was beaten upon entering the detention area
following his arrest, and that a deputy later opened his cell door, allowing another
beating to be administered. A federal jury believed his story, awarding $125,000 to the
plaintiff. Under the Michigan constitution, the sheriff is the law enforcement arm of the
county and makes policy in police matters for the county. The court held that the ·
government entity is responsible when the execution of a government's policy (in this case,
brutality), inflicts an injury.
The plaintiff alleged that the county and the sheriff failed to train and discipline the
officers and failed to order an investigation of the incident after it came to the attention of
county officials. The sheriff claimed that he knew nothing of the incident until years
later, just before the trial. The court ruled that even though the sheriff did not know of
the incident, he should have known and found him jointly liable with the county. The
county shared liability with the sheriff because of its close relationship with the sheriff,
who was an elected official and made policy for the county. The county board of
supervisors appropriated funds and established the budget for the sheriffs department.
(Wayne County Jail, Michigan)

U.S. Supreme Court
42U.S.C.A.
Section 1983
FAILURE TO TRAIN
GOVERNMENTAL

Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 105 S.Ct. 2427 (1985), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 16 (1983).
Supreme court limits municipal liability for police acts. In an important clarification of
Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services (1978), a seven member
majority ruled that absent "an affirmative link between the policy and the
particular constitutional violation alleged," a municipality may not be held liable for a
police officer's violations of a citizen's constitutional rights on the grounds that the
officer's act resulted from government policy. In Monell the court ruled that
municipalities are liable for civil damages for such acts if the violations occur pursuant to
that government's "policy or custom."
In this case, the widow of a man who was shot by a rookie police officer sued under
Section 1983, claiming that the shooting unconstitutionally deprived Tuttle of his life
without due process, or that the officer had used excessive force in Tuttle's apprehension
in violation of his civil rights. Although the plaintiff acknowledged that a municipalicy is
not liable under civil rights laws for an employee's single act but argued that the act was
so excessive that it indicated grossly inadequate training, resulting from a government
training policy.
In this case, the court held that even if it could be established under Monell that the
city had a policy of inadequate training, "some limitation must be placed on establishing
municipal liability through policies that are not themselves unconstitutional." The court
further stated that "where the policy relied upon is not itself unconstitutional,
considerably more proof than the single incident will be necessary in every case to
establish both the requisite fault on the part of the municipality and the causal connection
between the policy and the constitutional deprivation." (Oklahoma City)

LIABILITY

U.S. Appeals Court

FAILURE TO
PROTECT

U.S. Appeals Court

FAILURE TO
PROTECT

O'Quinn v. Manuel, 767 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1985). Local government can be liable
for jail conditions. A jail prisoner filed suit against Louisiana parish officials alleging
that while he was detained he was beaten by prisoners and suffered severe injuries.
The plaintiff argued that the assault and resulting injuries were the result of a failure to
adequately supervise and protect prisoners. The appeals court found that parish officials
could be held liable for the assault if they knew of jail defu:iencies and failed to fund or
otherwise support corrective actions. The case was remanded to the district court.
(Caleasieu Parish Jail, Louisiana)
Partridge v. Two Unknown Police Officers. 751 F.2d 1448 (5th Cir. 1985). City can be
sued for failing to prevent prisoner suicide in lockup. An arrestee apparently became
violent and agitated when he was arrest.eel, attempting to kick the doors and windows
out of the police car in which he was transported. By the time he arrived at the city jail
he was composed, and the transporting off:icers did not call attention to his

27.22

behavior during booking. The booking officer did not check the prisoner's previous record,
which showed a prior suicide attempt. The prisoner's father told officials that his son was
unstable, and the son was wearing medical alert bracelets.
The prisoner was placed in solitary confinement, where he hanged himself within a
few hours of his arrest. The parents sued the City of Houston, and the Circuit Court of
Appeals ruled that their suit alleged a legitimate constitutional claim because the city had
been deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's serious medical needs, determining that
suicidal behavior constituted a serious need and that protecting prisoners from themselves
is "an aspect of the broader constitutional duty to provide medical care.... " (City Jail,
Houston, Texas)
U.S. Appeals Court
GOVERNMENTAL

LIABILITY
42 U.S.C.A.
Section 1983

Roberts v. City of Troy, 773 F.2d 720 (6th Cir. 1985). Pretrial detainees not
protected by eighth amendment, but rights are analogized to those of detainees under
fourteenth amendment to avoid ext.ending greater constitutional protection to sentenced
offenders. Shortly after admission to the City of Troy jail, a prisoner committed
suicide. His mother sued the city under 42 U.S.C.A. Section 1983 and under state law,
claiming that officials should have identified him as suicidal during admission and
should have supervised him more closely. A federal jury found for the defendants; on
appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the jury verdict concerning Section 1983
claims but reversed the prior summary judgment which released Chief of Police Fisher
from liability for state claims. In reaching its conclusions, the appeals court noted that
although pretrial detainees are not protected by the eighth amendment, those protections
must be analogized under the fourteenth amendment. (Troy City Jail, Michigan)

U.S. Appeals Court
DAMAGES

Thomas v. Booker, 762 F.2d 654 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied in 106 S.Ct. 1975. City
jail chief of security held liable for prisoner-on-prisoner attack; plaintiff awarded
$13,000. The defendant was initially assigned to a one man cell in the St. Louis City Jail's
administrative segregation unit. He was subsequently assigned to the general population
but was placed in disciplinary segregation when a homemade knife was found in his cell.
He was returned to the general population, where he was attacked by another prisoner.
After treatment, he was again returned to the same four man cell where he was again
injured in a fight between cell mates. The prisoner filed suit against several city jail
officials for violating his constitutional rights by not adequately protecting him from
physical assaults from other prisoners. During the trial, testimony indicated that he had
asked to be placed in administrative segregation because he feared injury and that he told
the defendant several times that he feared for his safety. The court found that the
defendant had acted with reckless disregard for the safety of the plaintiff, awarding
$13,000 in damages. Other defendants were not found liable. (St. Louis City Jail,
Missouri)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO DIRECT
DAMAGES

Thomson v. Jones. 619 F.Supp. 745 (7th Cir. 1985). A state prison inmate brought
action under the Federal Civil Rights statute against correctional officers and warden
seeking damages arising out of beating and hearing loss. The district court held that:
(1) the guards' use of excessive force violated the inmate's eighth and fourteenth
amendment rights; (2) a warden was not liable on ratification theory for failure to
discipline guards; (3) an award of $25,000 was neither inadequate nor excessive
compensation for permanent hearing loss; and (4) a punitive damages award of $10,000
against the guard who actually caused the hearing loss, and $5,000 against the guard who
acquiesced in the first guard's use of force, was proper.
A prison guard's acquiescence and failure to intercede in another guard's beating of an
inmate was proximate cause of the inmate's injuries, rendering the acquiescing guard
·jointly and severally liable with other guard for compensatory damages due inmate as
result of consequent hearing loss. (Stateville Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court

Thorne v. Jones. 765 F.2d 1270 (lrst Cir. 1985). cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016. Strip
search of prisoners' mother upheld, se~ of father not proper but no civil liability
results. Prison officials required the mother of two prisoners, one of whom was known to
be receiving drugs, to submit to a strip search as a condition of visiting her sons.
The plaintiffs sued, alleging that the requirement infringed on their first amendment
rights for association. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the search
requirement for the mother, who was suspected of supplying drugs, was constitutional
because it was reasonably related to security concerns. The court noted that the
Constitution affords convicted prisoners and their families no absolute right of visitation,
and that any qualified right which may exist is derived from a source other than the first
amendment. The court held that the fourth amendment was infringed when the prisoners'
father was required to submit to a strip search to visit his sons, because officials had no
suspicion as to the father. Since the law on this point was not clear in late 1981 (when
the search took place), the officials escaped civil liability according to the court.
(Louisiana State Penitentiary)

CIVIL LIABILITY

27.23

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO
PROTECT

Warner v. County of Washoe. 620 F.Supp. 59 (D.C.Nev. 1985). The court ordered
further proceedings to determine whether county commissioners had a duty to prisoners
by virtue of a Nevada statute requiring periodic inspection and supervision. The
statute reads, in part. as follows:
... Duty of County commissioners: Supervision; inspection; precautions. The
board of county commissioners:
1. Is responsible for building, inspecting and repairing any county or branch county
jail locat.ed in its county,
2. Once every 3 months, shall inquire int.o the security of the jail and the
treatment and condition of prisoners.
3. Shall take all necessary precautions against escape, sickness or infection.
The commissioners could possibly be found liable for a brutal rape and attack of a county
jail inmate by fellow inmates. (Washoe County Jail, Nevada)
1986

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN
FAILURE TO
DIRECT

Albert v. DePint.o. 638 F.Supp. 1307 (D,Conn. 1986). The plaintiffs brought a civil
rights action against police officers and the city alleging use of excessive force by
officers. The district court held that: (1) the city was not liable for damages under the
civil rights statute for the acts of individual officers; (2) there was evidence from which
a reasonable jury could have found that the officers either used unconstitutionally
excessive force against one plaintiff or knew that other officers were using force but did
nothing t.o st.op them; and (3) a reasonable jury could have found sufficient evidence of
pain and suffering experienced by plaintiffs, and reckless and callous disregard of
constitutional rights t.o justify substantial compensat.ory and punitive damages.
A plaintiff. who seeks t.o hold a municipality liable in damages under a civil rights
statute must establish that an official policy or cust.om was cause of deprivation of
constitutional rights.
The city was not liable for damages because evidence established that police officers
were provided with police department rules and regulations. stating that the use of
physical and deadly force would be in accordance with current departmental directives
and state statutes; that police officers were unaware of any recent "directives" on the
subject of physical force that might have been issued by the police department; and that.
while they received training in the appropriate use of physical force at the time they
joined the police department they received no refresher courses. (New Britain Police
Department, Connecticut)

U.S. Appeals Court
GOVERNMENTAL
LIABILITY

Anela v. City of Wildwood. 790 F.2d 1063 (3rd Cir. 1986). cert. denied, 479 U.S. 949.
Female detainees confined overnight were denied fourt.eenth amendment rights; city
could be held liable for conditions. Nine females and one male, ages seventeen t.o
twenty, were arrest.ed at 11:15 p.m. by city police for loud radio playing. The male
arrestee was able t.o post bail and was released. The females were held until 11:00 the
following morning. The females filed suit, alleging that their confinement in cells without
drinking water. food or mattresses violat.ed their constitutional rights. The federal district
court dismissed several counts prior t.o trial and direct.ed a verdict against the plaintiffs
following a trial.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that: (1) the district court
properly denied the plaintiffs' motion t.o reopen the case and did not err in its direct.ed
verdict for the individual defendants on the plaintiffs' denial of equal prot.ection claim; (2)
the District Court erred in dismissing the plaintiffs' fourth amendment claims on the
ground of collateral est.oppel; (3) the city is responsible for the use of a bail schedule in
violation of a rule of the New Jersey Supreme Court; (4) the conditions of confmement t.o
which the non-disruptive. non-violent, non-alcoholic women were subject.ed constitut.ed
privation and punishment in violation of the fourteenth amendment; and (5) the city may
be held liable under Monell for the conditions of conf"mement, even if the practices with
respect t.o jail conditions were followed without formal city action. because it appears that
they were the norm and had become acceptable standard and practice for the city. (City of
Wildwood. New Jersey)

State Appeals Court
FAILURE-TO
PROTECT

Baker v. State Dept. of Rehabilitation, 502 N.E.2d 261 (Ohio App. 1986). An inmate
filed a complaint against the state alleging that injuries following an assault by other
inmates were the result of correctional officers' negligence. The Court of Claims
entered judgment for the state, and the inmate appealed. The Court of Appeals for
Franklin County held that: (1) the state was not liable for failure t.o provide protective
cust.ody, as guards did not have adequate notice of the impending assault because the
inmate's vague statements regarding a need t.o be moved, unaccompanied by a specific
request for prot.ection or direct expression of fear of being assaulted, did not provide
guards with adequate notice of an impending assault; and (2) the state was not liable for
failure to have sufficient guards. in view of expert testimony that procedures followed
were adequate. (Columbus Correctional Facility, Ohio)

27.24

U.S. District Court
DAMAGES

Burris v. Kirkpatrick, 649 F.Supp. 740 (N.D. Ind. 1986). An inmate brought action
against a prison guard for injuries resulting when the guard threw hot water into the
inmate's cell. The district court held that the guard who threw hot water into cell of two
inmates following argument between guard and one inmate was liable to the non- ·
offending inmate for resulting injuries, as his act amounted to deliberate indifference to
the inmate's constitutional rights. Where substantive constitutional rights are violated,
damages can be presumed even in absence of discernible consequential damages. (Indiana
State Prison)

U.S. Appeals Court
PERSONAL

Burt.on v. Livingst.on, 791 F.2d 97 (8th Cir. 1986). A prisoner stated a claim against a
guard for cruel and unusual punishment. The complaint stated that the guard pointed
a lethal weapon at the prisoner, cocked it and threatened him with instant death. The
incident occurred immediately after the prisoner had given testimony against another
guard in a Section 1983 action. The death threat was accompanied by racial epithets. In
determining whether the conduct of a prison guard has impermissibly infringed the
protected right of a prisoner, the court of appeals must consider need for guard's action,
the relationship between that necessity and amount of force actually used, the degree of
injury to the prisoner's retained rights, and whether the conduct was a good-faith effort to
maintain discipline or engaged in maliciously and sadistically for the sole purpose of
causing harm. (Department of Corrections, Arkansas)

LIABILITY

U.S. Appeals Court
PERSONAL

LIABILITY

Chapman v. Pickett, 801 F.2d 912 (7th Cir. 1986). A prison warden was personally
liable to a prisoner whose eighth amendment rights were violated when he was kept in
segregation for nine months as a result of his refusal on religious grounds to clean
pork off food trays. The warden admitted to knowing of the prisoner's confinement and
doing nothing about it, even after he received a letter from his supervisor. He was in the
best position to know that a constitutional deprivation had occurred and had the authority
to remedy the situation but did nothing. The United States District Court for the Central
District of Illinois awarded the inmate $7,000 against prison officials, and the officials
appealed. The Court of Appeals held that: (1) the award of $7,000 was not an abuse of
discretion; (2) the court could properly deny punitive damages on the grounds that
defendants acted in good faith; and (3) the warden, associate warden, and members of
adjustment committee were all properly held liable. (Federal Penitentiary, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN

Chinchello v. Fenton, 805 F,2d 126 (3rd Cir. 1986). A prisoner failed to establish a
Bivens claim against the director of the Bureau of Prisons for failing to train officers
allegedly responsible for opening the prisoner's mail and keeping the prisoner in
administrative detention. The prisoner did not allege that the director had
contemporaneous knowledge of the offending incidents or knowledge of a prior pattern of
similar incidents and did not allege circumstances under which the director's inaction
could have been found to have communicated a message of approval to the offending
officers. "Special mail" is mail from a federal prisoner directed to attorneys, designated
state and federal officials, and representatives of news media, and it is not to be opened
by prison officials. (Federal Correctional Institution in El Reno, Oklahoma)

U.S. Supreme Court
NEGLIGENCE

Daniels v. Williams, 106 S.Ct. 662 (1986). Supreme Court rules that prisoners may
not use -civil rights actions to sue prison officials for negligence. Finding that
the fourteenth amendment due process clause was not intended to be •a font of tort law to
be superimposed upon whatever systems may already be administered by the states," the
Supreme Court affirmed its conclusion that civil rights suits are not appropriate avenues
for pursuing claims which involve negligence (!!!! parallel ruling in Davidson v. Cannon,
106 S.Ct. 668). In this case a county jail inmate slipped on a pillow which had been
negligently left by a jail officer on a flight of stairs. The prisoner claimed that he was
provided a constitutional right to be free from injury under the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment.
In this decision, the Court overturned one part of a recent decision which had
suggested that negligence could state a claim under the due process clause when the
plaintiff had no other effective state remedy; in Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981) the
Court had conditioned pursuit of claims on the lack of effective state remedies. (Richmond
Jail, Virginia)

U.S. Supreme Court
NEGLIGENCE

Davidson v. Cannon, 106 S.Ct. 668 (1986). Supreme Court rules the prisoners may
not use civil rights actions to sue prison officials for negligence. According to the U.S.
Supreme Court, prisoners do not have a constitutional right to sue prison officials or the
state in a civil rights action for negligence when they are injured, alleging due process
violations. In this case, the plaintiff prisoner alleged that prison officials ignored his plea
for assistance before he was stabbed by a fellow prisoner. The prisoner sued in federal
court that this violated his due process rights under the Constitution.

27.25

The Supreme Court held that "... lack of care simply does not approach the sort of
abusive government conduct that the due process clause was designed to prevent. The
guaranty of due process has never been understood to mean that the state must guarantee
due care on the part of its officials."
The Court noted that remedies for such injuries are usually available through other
actions, such as tort claims, although in this case the New Jersey prison officials are
protected from liability for injuries caused by one prisoner to another.
The ruling followed a companion case, Daniels v. Williams. which reached a similar
conclusion. In reaching this conclusion, the Court overturned one part of a recent decision
which had suggested that negligence could state a claim under the due process clause
when the plaintiff had no other effective state remedy; in Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527
(1981) the Court had conditioned pursuit of claims on the lack of effective state remedies.
(New Jersey State Prison)
U.S. Appeals Court
PERSONAL
LIABILITY

H.C. by Hewett v. Jarrard, 786 F.2d 1080 (11th Cir. 1986). A juvenile, who had been
confined at a juvenile detention center pending a trial on delinquency charges, brought
action for imposition of isolation without notice or hearing, excessive length and
conditions of isolation, unjustified and excessive force applied to him by superintendent of
the center, and denial of medical care. The United States District Court awarded nominal
damages on claims that isolation without notice and hearing and conditions of isolation
violated due process and determined that the juvenile had not been deliberately deprived
of medical attention, and that battery of the juvenile by the superintendent did not rise to
a constitutional violation.
The juvenile appealed. The court of appeals held that: (1) the superintendent's battery
of the juvenile violated the juvenile's liberty interests protected by the fourteenth
amendment; (2) the superintendent was liable both personally and in his capacity as the
center's superintendent for denying the juvenile medical care; (3) compensatory damages
should have been awarded to the juvenile for imposition of isolation without procedural
due process, for being a period beyond the maximum period set out in relevant
regulations, and for his humiliation and dejection sustained as a result of such isolation;
and (4) the superintendent's conduct warranted the award of punitive damages. (Volusia
Regional Juvenile Detention Center, Florida)

U.S. Appeals Court
NEGLIGENCE

Johnston v. Lucas, 786 F.2d 1254 (5th Cir. 1986). Prison officials released from
liability for prisoner stabbing by appeals court in light of recent Supreme Court rulings. A
federal district court awarded a prisoner monetary damages from guards and prison
officials for improperly placing him with another prisoner who had known animosity
toward him. The appeals court noted that the eighth amendment affords prisoners
protection against injury at the hands of another prisoner, but that the Supreme Court
had recently stated that ''the protections of the Due Process Clause, whether procedural or
substantive, are not just triggered by lack of due care by prison officials." Davidson v.
Cannon, 106 S.Ct. 668 (1986).
While each official bore responsibility for exposing the prisoner to danger, the court
found it arguable that their default could be considered an abuse of power and an eighth
amendment deprivation. As stated in Whitley v. Albers, 106 S.Ct. 1078 (1986), the
deliberate indifference standard articulated in Estelle v. Gamble is appropriate in this
case. The appeals court concluded that none of the defendants could be shown to be liable
because none of them was guilty of conscious indifference to the danger of or infliction of
unnecessary pain. (Parchman State Penitentiary, Mississippi)

U.S. Appeals Court
NEGLIGENCE

Justice v. Dennis, 793 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1986). The lower court's jury instruction,
setting out a spectrum in which intentional conduct was contrasted with simple
negligence and failing to suggest that conduct short of intentional wrongdoing, such as
wantonness. recklessness, or gross negligence, was sufficient for imposition of liability,
constituted reversible error in the pretrial detainee's action against a state highway patrol
trooper for alleged unconstitutionally excessive force used while the detainee was held in
the county courthouse jail.
The source of constitutional protection against the use of excessive force on a pretrial
detainee is the detainee's liberty interest in bodily security, grounded in the fifth and
fourteenth amendments rather than the fourth amendment. The fundamental inquiry in
all excessive force cases, regardless of protected interest's fourth, fifth, or eighth
amendment origins, is whether the degree of force used against the arrestee was necessary
to protect legitimate state interest and, thus, was permissible under all the circumstances.
(Onslow County, North Carolina)

U.S. District Court
NEGLIGENCE

Lewis v. O'Leary. 631 F.Supp. 60 (N.D. Ill. 1986). State prison officials not liable
for prisoner-on-prisoner assault in light of recent Supreme Court decisions. Given the
recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions in Davidson v. Cannon and Daniels v. Williams, a
federal district court concluded that prison officials could not be held liable for failing to
protect a prisoner because: "... the law in this area has been significantly altered. It is
now definitively established that while a correctional official who recklessly disregards a
substantial risk of danger to an inmate may be liable under the Eighth Amendment, one
who negligently fails to take reasonable steps is not." In this case,
2:[ .2R,

prison officials called the plaintiff prisoner t.o their office t.o t.ell him that they had received
anonymous t.elephone calls threatening his life. When the prisoner did not express
concern, they t.ook no action. He was attacked and repeat.edly stabbed several days lat.er.
The court ruled that prison officials failure t.o transfer the inmat.e did not rise t.o "reckless"
conduct, since the inmat.e himself t.old officials there was only a "mere possibility" not a
"strong likelihood" of attack. (Stat.eville Correctional Cent.er, Illinois)
U.S. Appeals Court
42U.S.C.A.
Section 1983
NEGLJGENCE

Maddox v. City of Los Angeles, 792 F.2d 1408 (9th Cir. 1986). The jury was not
erroneously instructed t.o consider the police officers' •stat.e of mind" in det.ermining
whether the officers violat.ed the arrest.ee's fourt.eenth amendment due process rights.
The plaintiff brought an action alleging that the death of the arrestee was due t.o the
police officers' use of a chokehold. Negligent conduct by a stat.e official is not enough t.o
stat.e a claim under Section 1983 based on an alleged violation of the due process clause.
(City of Los Angeles, California)

U.S. Supreme Court
DAMAGES
42 u.s.c.A.
Section 1983

Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 106 S.Ct 2537 (1986). Supreme Court
rules that damages in U.S.C.A. Section 1983 action must be real; abstract "yalue" or
"importance" of constitutional rights are not an element of compensat.ory damages. A
t.enured elementary school t.eacher sued his school district after he was suspended
because parents complained about his t.eaching methods in a seventh grade science course,
alleging violation of his first and fourt.eenth amendment rights. A federal district court
jury awarded the plaintiff $275,000 in compensat.ory damages and $46,000 in punitive
damages.. This award was reduced by the district court judge t.o $266,750 compensatory
and $36,000 punitive damages. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed
the lower court actions. The Supreme Court reviewed the lower court decisions t.o
det.ermine the appropriat.eness of the district court instructions t.o the jury, authorizing not
only compensat.ory and punitive damages, but also damages for the deprivation of "any
constitutional right." The Court concluded that the district court had erred, and that the
abstract "value" or "importance" of constitutional rights are not an element of
compensat.ory damages. The case was remanded for a new trial on compensat.ory
damages. (Memphis Community School District, Michigan)

U.S. Appeals Court

Owens v. City of Atlanta, 780 F.2d 1564 (11th Cir. 1986). City not liable for
prisoner death in police det.ention facility. The decedent was arrest.ed while int.oxicat.ed by
Atlanta police. He became disruptive while in cust.ody and was placed on a wooden bench
in the back of his cell. His arms were crossed in front of him and were cuffed t.o the
bench. His ankles were locked in leg irons, stretched and attached t.o the cell wall (called
the "stretch" hold position). He died from asphyxiation after he fell off the bench, with his
face forward. The district court found that the individual officers were not liable in this
civil rights suit for merely negligent conduct, and that the city was not liable for its policy,
as there was no evidence that police had previously misused the restraining device. The
appeals court affirmed. (Atlanta, Georgia)

U.S. Supreme Court
42U.S.C.A.
Section 1988
MUNICIPAL

Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 106 S.Ct. 1292 (1986). Municipal liability under 42
U.S.C.A. Section 1988 m!.'l be imposed for a single decision by municipal
policymakers under appropriat.e circumstances. A physician who was indicted and
eventually acquitt.ed of fraud charges was convicted for obstructing police. He f"tled suit
alleging violation of his rights under the fourth and fourt.eenth amendments. Sheriffs'
deputies had att.empt.ed t.o serve capiases on two of the physician's employees at his clinic
and were refused entry; ·after receiving instructions from the county prosecut.or t.o "go in
and get" the employees, the deputies tried t.o force the door and then chopped the door
down with an axe. The physician's suit was dismissed by the federal district court on the
grounds that the deputies were not acting pursuant t.o the kind of "official policy" that is a
requisit.e for liability under Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 98 S.Ct
2018. The appeals court aff"mned, holding that the plaintiff failed t.o prove the existence
of a policy because he had shown nothing more than that on "this one occasion" the
prosecut.or and the sheriff decided t.o force entry. The Supreme Court reversed the lower
court decisions. The majority held that the "official policy" requirement of Monell was
int.ended t.o distinguish the acts of the municipality from the acts of its employees; in this
case, the municipality should be held liable for the actions of its employees because it
officially ordered and sanctioned them. "With this undemanding, it is plain that
municipal liability may be imposed for a single decision of municipal policymakers under
appropriat.e circumstances. If the decision t.o adopt a particular course of action is directed
by those who establish governmental policy, the municipality is equally responsible
whether the action is t.o be taken only once or t.o be taken repeat.edly." (City of Cincinnati,
Hamilt.on County, Ohio)

LIABILJTY

U.S. District Court
PERSONAL

LIABILITY

Quinones v. Durkis, 638. F.Supp. 856 (S.D. Fla. 1986). A sheriff could be sued
individually under Section 1988 for his actions which allegedly result.ed in the
deprivation of the plaintiffs' constitutional rights. However, the plaintiffs would be
required t.o establish that the sheriff was either personally involved in the wrongful acts,
or that he breached a duty imposed by stat.e law in order t.o be held accountable for his
actions. (Hendry County, Florida)
·
7'1:J:1

U.S. District Court
CONSENT DECREE

Ruiz v. McCotter, 661 F.Supp. 112 (S.D.Tex. 1986). The Texas Department of
Corrections was in contempt of court for failure to afford sufficient single-occupancy
cells, in failing to assign housing to prisoners according to their respective custody
classifications, in failing to maintain a specified number of personnel, and to deploy staff
in the housing areas, in failing to employ a substantial number of health care
professionals, in failing to meet the needs of the physically handicapped, in failing to
afford prisoners in administrative segregation appropriate housing facilities, and in failing
to build and properly equip recreation yards and gymnasiums. On the whole, the court
found, TDC had been habitually and inexcusably dilatory in complying with the orders in
question. The court noted that contempt represents more than delay in performance or
lack of perfection. It is, instead, failure to accomplish what was ordered in meaningful
respects. Defendants may defeat finding of contempt by demonstrating that they
employed, in good faith, utmost diligence in discharging their responsibilities. Prison
inmates were not required to show that Texas Department of Corrections had violated the
Eighth Amendment or to develop a method by which the Department could achieve
compliance with consent decree in order to support a finding of contempt for violating the
decree. Rather, inmates were required to establish by clear and 'convincing· evidence that
the Department had inappropriately mixed custody classifications or had housed prisoners
not in minimum custody status in dormitories, and had done both, in violation of
stipulations forming bases for district court orders. Motions to modify so as to alleviate or
eliminate conditions or restrictions imposed by prior court order require a clear showing of
grievous wrong evoked by new and unforeseen conditions. Texas Department of
Corrections' alleged change in philosophy to a belief that dormitories provide adequate,
secure housing for women prisoners in medium and close custody classifications was not
sufficient to require modification of stipulations incorporated in court orders requiring
inmates to be housed with inmates of like classification, in light of the fact that certain
women inmates had been moved to cell housing, and conflicting testimony regarding
appropriateness of dormitory housing for women requiring medium or close custody.
(Texas Department of Corrections)

State Appeals Court
42 U.S.C.A.
SECTION 1983
FAILURE TO
PROTECT

Smith v. City of Westland, 404 N.W. 2d 214 (Mich. App. 1986). The placement of an
intoxicated arrestee in a regular jail cell, instead of a detoxification cell, was not a
violation of his rights and did not constitute a deliberate indifference to his medical
needs. The arrestee was intoxicated at the time he was placed in the cell and had not
exhibited any dangerous behavior. The detainee committed suicide by hanging himself
with his shirt. The court noted that "intoxication in and of itself is not normally a serious
medical need." Although there was an insufficient basis for attaching liability under
federal law for a civil rights violation, the defendants had reached a settlement on the
state law claims for negligence. (Westland City Jail, Michigan)

U.S. Appeals Court
DAMAGES

Thomas v. Booker, 784 F.2d 299 (8th Cir, 1986), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 1975.
Damages awarded to prisoner against jail employees as a result of prisoner-on-prisoner
beating. The plaintiff sued the chief of security, the supervisor of _correctional officers, and
a correctional officer. The appeals court affirmed a judgment awarding $3,000 actual
damages and $10,000 punitive damages against the chief of security, and $1,000 actual
damages against the correctional officer. The court also reinstated a jury verdict of
$10,000 against the correctional officer which had been set aside by the trial court. The
supervisor was not found liable, because he had instructed the plaintiff to discuss his
fears with the chief of security when he was told of them. The correctional officer was on
duty when the assault occurred and was supposed to have made rounds every fifteen or
twenty minutes. Apparently, rounds were not made as appropriate, and the fight was not
discovered. (St. Louis City Jail, Missouri)

U.S. Appeals Court
DAMAGES

Walker v. Rowe, 791 F.2d 507 (7th Cir. 1986), U.S. cert. denied in 107 S.Ct. 597.
Appeals court rules that due process clause does not assure safe working conditions for
public employees and reverses lower court awards. On July 22, 1978, inmates of the
Pontiac Correctional Center, a maximum security prison, were being returned t.o their
cells after exercise in the courtyard. The prisoners killed three guards, injured others,
and set fire to part of the prison. Three of the injured guards and the estates of the three
deceased guards filed suit against the director of the Illinois Department of Corrections,
and the Assistant Warden of Operations at Pontiac, alleging that they deprived them of
their constitutional right to a safe working environment.
A federal district court jury returned verdicts against the defendants totalling
$706,845, and the district court added $145,792 in attorney's fees and costs. These
recoveries were in addition to workers' compensation awards ($250,000 death benefits and
burial expenses for each of the three deceased guards) and other benefits afforded by state
law. (Pontiac Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court

Weber v. Dell, 804 F.2d 796 (2nd Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1020. The arrestee
brought a civil rights action challenging the county jail policy authorizing strip.b\BtLITY
cavity searches of arrestees, regardless of whether they were reasonably suspected of
concealing contraband. The district court, 630 F.Supp. 255, granted summary judgment

GOVERNMENTAL

27.28

in favor of county and sheriff, and the arrest.ee appealed. The court of appeals held that:
(1) the strip-body cavity search of an arrestee who had been arrest.ed for misdemeanor
offenses was unconstitutional, where jail authorities had no reasonable suspicion that the
arrestee was concealing weapons or other contraband; (2) .the county could be held liable
for search because the highest ranking law enforcement official in the county, the sheriff,
established the policy; and (3) the sheriff was not entitled t.o good faith immunity defense.
The county was liable for damages caused by a policy providing for strip-body cavity
searches of all arrestees, where the sheriff, who was highest ranking law enforcement
official in county, established such policy. The sheriff who promulgated unconstitutional
jail policy authorizing strip-body cavity searches of arrestees, regardless of whether they
were reasonably suspected of concealing contraband, was not entitled t.o good-faith
immunity from Section 1983 claim brought by arrestee who was subjected t.o strip-body
cavity search, considering that three circuit court decisions holding similar policies
unconstitutional antedated the search in question, and thus law was clearly established at
time of search. (Rochest.er Police Depar1m.ent, New York)
1987
State Appeals Court
NEGLIGENCE

Baker v. North Carolina Dept. of Corrections, 354 S.E.2d 733 (N.C. App. 1987). The
North Carolina Dept. of Corrections was found liable for inmate employee's negligently
injuring a fellow inmate during job performance. Although the State Industrial
Commission had ruled that an employee inmate was negligent when he shut a window
and it slammed on a fellow inmate's fingers, the State Appeals Court reversed this ruling
and found that the employee inmate was not negligent because, although he knew fellow
inmates were cleaning windows, he had no reason t.o believe that the plaintiff was at the
very window he was about t.o shut. (Iredell County Unit, North Carolina Department of
Corrections)

U.S. District Court
NEGLIGENCE
TORI' LIABILITY

Beck v. Kansas University Ps;ychiatey Foundation, 671 F.Supp. 1552 (D. Kan. 1987).
Two persons who worked in a hospital emergency room were shot by a paroled prisoner
with mental problems. Their families filed a lawsuit against the members of the
Kansas Adult Authority, charging that the prisoner's release was negligent under state
law and that the two persons who were killed were denied ·constitutional rights by the
release. The court held that the individual members of the Kansas Adult Authority were
immune from liability on the basis of the Kansas Tort Claims Act, but allowed claims
against the Secretary of Corrections and the direct.or of the Penitentiary t.o proceed
because they had not raised their immunity under Kansas Tort Claims Act as a defense.
(Kansas Adult Authority)

U.S. Appeals Court
GOOD FAITH
DEFENSE

Brown v. Smith, 813 F.2d 1187 (11th Cir. 1987). Whether a prison guard's application
of force t.o an inmate is actionable turns on whether that force was applied in a good
faith effort t.o maintain or restore discipline. According t.o an appeals court, neither
judge nor jury is free t.o substitute its own judgment for that of prison officials. A mere
conclusory allegation by a prison inmate that a guard acted with malice when he placed
his riot stick across the inmate's throat after the inmate refused t.o go back int.o his cell
was not sufficient t.o establish the liability of the guard where the actual facts would not
support a reliable inference of want.onness. (West Jefferson yorrectional Facility,
Alabama)

U.S. Appeals Court
42 U.S.C.A.
SECTION 1983
PERSONAL
LIABILITY
FAILURE TO
SUPERVISE

Carlson v. Conklin, 813 F.2d 769 (6th Cir. 1987). The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
ruled that placing a man convicted of armed robbery in a community corrections center
("half-way house") was no basis t.o find the Direct.or of the Depar1m.ent of Corrections
liable for the man's subsequently abducting a woman and sexually assaulting her. The
court found that the crime was "too remote" from the actions of the Director t.o attach
liability. The court's decision t.o dismiss the Section 1983 suit reversed the district
court's ruling. The district court had allowed the claim t.o continue based on the
following allegations: (1) the defendant authorized departmental policies in placing known
dangerous prisoners in half-way houses; (2) that it was foreseeable that assaults would
occur in the surrounding communities; and (3) that the defendant owed the victim a duty
of care t.o prevent injury. The appeals court ruled that there is no duty t.o protect the
general public from criminals, unless promises of protection are made t.o individual
members. According t.o the appeals ruling, no duty was owed t.o the woman as a member
of the public absent a special relationship. (Department of Corrections, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
42U.S.C.A.
SECTION 1983

Davis v. City of Camden, 657 F.Supp. 396 (D.N.J. 1987) A suit was filed against
county officials by a woman who came t.o the police station t.o file a complaint against
her neighbors was arrest.eel and strip searched. Police officials found that the woman
had several outstanding arrest warrants when they ran an identification check. She was
arrest.ed and sent t.o the Camden County Jail in New Je~y. At the jail a strip search
was conducted by a female officer. The policy at the jail was t.o conduct a strip

search on any person arrested who could not post bail. The court found that policy
unconstitutional. The suit was filed against the sheriff and the matron who performed the
search claiming the strip search was illegal. While the court did not hold the sheriff and
matron liable, it did find the county liable because "We believe that a municipality should
be held liable under Section 1983 when it officially adopts a policy that subsequently is
declared unconstitutional, notwithstanding the fact that the policy was mandated by state
law." The court reasoned that, for purposes of determining whether a particular strip
search is justified, reasonable suspicion that a particular arrestee is concealing weapons or
contraband can arise not only from specific circumstances relating to the arrestee or
arrests, but also from the nature of the charged offense. (Camden County Jail, New
Jersey)
U.S. District Court
42 U.S.C.A.
SECTION 1983
FAILURE TO
SUPERVISE

Doe v. United Social and Mental Health Services, 670 F.Supp. 1121 (D. Conn. 1987).
A prisoner who had a history of psychiatric problems and alcohol and drug abuse was
sentenced to seven to seventeen years in custody for the shooting of a female bank
teller during a robbery. After being paroled, he was sent to a halfway house drug
treatment center where he had a prohibition on traveling. Having immediately
violated his parole, he stabbed a woman to death in another state. Shortly after being
returned to custody, and reparoled, he kidnapped a woman, sexually assaulted her and
attempted to strangle her. Section 1983 lawsuits against members of the Parole Board,
parole officers, and a number of other defendants were brought by the estate of the
murdered woman and the victim of the sexual assault. Members of the Parole Board were
found absolutely immune from liability. The court found the parole officers who allegedly
failed to supervise the second parole properly or order the parolee's arrest at the
appropriate time, were not absolutely immune. However, the officers were still not found
liable, since they did not assume any "special relationship" with the woman who was
sexually assaulted, even though they allegedly knew that the parolee had violated a nodrinking condition of parole shortly before the assault. (Connecticut Parole Board)

State Appeals Court
RESPONDEAT
SUPERIOR

Duhon v. Calcasieu Parish Police Jury. 517 So.2d 1016 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1987).
According to a state appeals court, the Louisiana Department of Corrections owes
prison inmates the duty of providing equipment and machinery that is safe for tasks
the inmates are required to perform. However, the Department is not the insurer of the
safety of inmates in prison, and is not required to anticipate and warn against every
possible danger to which inmates may be exposed. While participating as a farm crew
member in the work program of a minimum security facility, an inmate suffered back
injuries when the tractor/trailer he rode on hit a rut in the road and bounced him to the
ground. Since the inmate driver was acting within the scope of his employment, the
sheriff was found liable for $6,515.60 under the doctrine of respondeat superior. (Calcasieu
Parish Vocational Rehabilitation Center)

U.S. Appeals Court
PERSONAL
LIABILITY

Gill v. Mooney. 824 F.2d 192 (2nd Cir. 1987). According to a federal court of appeals,
employees may be liable if they overrule a doctor's orders that an inmate participate in
a prescribed exercise program. As treatment for injuries sustained from falling off a
ladder during a work assignment, a doctor ordered Anthony Gill to be permitted
additional time in the facility gym for rehabilitative therapy. On two separate occasions,
Gill was refused access to the prescribed exercise program by both the gym supervisor and
a correctional officer. Gill was again denied access to the gym after the doctor had heard
about the incidents and allegedly signed a new order directing additional exercise. The
deliberate defiance of expressed instructions of a prisoner's doctor by prison officials is
deliberate indifference to the prisoner's medical needs, ruled the federal appeals court.
Further, if Gill's allegations are true, the employees could be liable for causing him
unnecessary pain, even though he suffered no permanent injuries. (Great Meadow
Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
CONSENT DECREES

Gill v. Neaves, 657 F.Supp. 1394 (W.D. Tex. 1987). Having previously accepted over 12
petitions by an inmate who had also filed at least 16 in another court, the court clerk
was ordered not to accept any more of his filings unless directed to do so. The inmate was
described as an "abuser of the judicial process" because he filed numerous frivolous,
malicious, bad faith or meritless motions or petitions which include claims that his legal
papers were destroyed, his property was illegally searched, and that he was subjected to
bodily injury from other inmates because of correctional guards informing fellow prisoners
that he passed information about them to officials. The inmate also brought a civil suit
claiming that the Sheriff and Bexar County Jail officials violated his constitutional rights
by violating a consent decree concerning jail conditions. It was ruled by the court that the
inmates' claim was without merit because ''the mere approval by the Court of a consent
decree by parties to a civil action does not raise the status of that decree to the status of
"rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws" of the United
States. Any violation of a court-ordered consent decree in a jail case is more properly
brought through the enforcement provisions of the decree rather than an individual civil
rights suit, the court rationalized. (Bexar County Jail)

'l:1.30

U.S. Appeals Court
DAMAGES

Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950 (6th Cir. 1987). · A federal appeals court found that
alleged verbal abuse and harassment did not constitute punishment, let alone "cruel
and unusual punishment," and that strip searches and testing for intoxicants were
reasonable. The case was filed by an inmate who was charged with interfering with a
correctional officer because he threatened t.o file a grievance when he was strip searched
and subjected t.o a body cavity search. The inmate was also tested for alcohol and drug
use because officers thought they smelled "home brew" on his breath. Since no evil
motive, recklessness or callous disregard t.o the inmate's rights were shown, the appeals
court reversed a punitive damage award from the lower court, but it upheld an award of
$51 in damages against one defendant and $76 against three others. (Kentucky State
Penitentiary)

U.S. District Court
PERSONAL

Jackson v. Elrod. 671 F.Supp. 1508 (N.D.lll. 1987). A pretrial detainee challenged a
policy of barring the receipt of all hardcover books and failing t.o notify detainees of the
rejection of these books when mailed t.o them by filing a federal lawsuit. A federal
district court ruled that a policy of prohibiting all hardcover books, regardless of content
or source, could not meet a test of being reasonably related t.o a legitimate penological
interest. While the court held that the jail's corrections head, security chief and division
superintendents were properly liable for making and administering these policies, it
ordered further proceedings on whether the sheriff was liable, since the policy differed
from a written handbook sent out by his office. (Cook County Jail, Illinois)

LIABILITY

U.S. Appeals Court

POLicmw

PROCEDURES
42U.S.C.A.
SECTION 1983

U.S. District Court
GOOD FAITH
DEFENSE
QUALIFIED

IMMUNITY

U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED

IMMUNITY

U.S. District Court
CONSENT DECREE

LaBoy v. Coughlin, 822 F.2d 3 (2nd Cir. 1987). A federal district court upheld the
dismissal of a Section 1983 lawsuit by a prisoner. The plaintiff sued the commission of
correctional services and various correctional officers alleging that they violated the
prisoner's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights when they t.ook discipiinary
actions against the prisoner based on prison regulations which had not been filed with
the New York Secretary of State. The court noted that the inmate did not claim that the
hearings conducted were otherwise inadequate, or that he did not have adequate notice of
the regulations. The mere allegation that a state procedural requirement was not followed
is not adequate grounds for a federal civil rights claim. (Clint.on Correctional Facility.
New York)
LaMarca v. Turner, 662 F.Supp. 647 (S.D. Fla. 1987). As a result of a former prison
superintendent's indifference t.o prisoners' rights, prisoners who were gang raped or
assaulted were entitled t.o relief under SectiQn 1983 according t.o a federal district
court. With respect t.o all of the inmates except two, the superintendent was in a
position t.o take steps that could have averted the attacks but, through his callous
indifference, failed t.o do so. The prisoners were entitled t.o injunctive relief, including
establishment of committees t.o advise the court in the formulation of specific injunctive
relief. The court ruled that a prisoner has a right t.o be protected from the constant threat
of violence and from sexual assault. Prison officials' failure t.o control or segregate
prisoners who endanger the safety of other prisoners and who cause a high level of
violence, constitutes "cruel and unusual punishment. A law was clearly established that
required a prison superintendent with knowledge of the pervasive risk of harm t.o inmates
t.o take reasonable steps t.o prevent that harm, and, thus, the former prison
superintendent did not act in good faith and was not entitled t.o qualified immunity for
liability for violating the prisoners' Eighth Amendment right t.o reasonable protection from
rapes and assaults. (Glades Correctional Institution)
Lane v. Griffin, 834 F.2d 403 (4th Cir. 1987). A federal appeals court ruled that a
restriction on inmates' constitutional·rights that is reasonably related t.o legitimate
penological interest is valid, whether imposed by a prison regulation or by a policy
decision made by a prison official and that the lower court had improperly informed the
jury that the prison regulation had t.o be no broader than necessary rather than
reasonably related t.o a legitimate security interest. A state prisoner brought a civil rights
action against the prison superintendent, alleging that a prison restriction imposed by the
superintendent violated the prisoner's First Amendment right of freedom of religion. The
trial court was directed t.o consider, on remand, whether the superintendent was entitled
t.o qualified immunity for his action. This is based on whether the law governing the
scope of the inmate's right t.o participate in religious services, at the time of his request,
was sufficiently clear so that the superintendent could have known whether his conduct
violated the inmate's constitutional rights. (McCain Correctional Center, McCain, North
Carolina)

Morales Feliciano v. Hernandez Colon, 672 F.Supp. 627 (D. Puerto Rico 1987). Puerto
Rican prison authorities moved t.o modify stipulation and an order that they provide
each prisoner with at least 35 square feet of living space. The District Court held that: (1)
prison authorities were not entitled t.o relief under subsection of federal rule allowing
modification on the ground that changed circumstances would make further compliance
with order unjust; (2) prison authorities failed t.o show that compliance would result in
pernicious consequences, and failed t.o show changed circwnstances

27.31

warranting relief; and (3) building project undertaken to increase dramatically available
beds for housing did not entitle prison authorities to relief. The possible release_ of
prisoners by Puerto Rican prison authorities as a result of compliance with a court order
that they provide each prisoner with at least 35 square feet of living space was not a

"pernicious consequence" of compliance and did not entitle them to relief from order under
Rule 60(b)(6); there was little factual support for assertion that all persons presently
incarcerated in Puerto Rico would present danger to the community if released, argument
had an undertone of disingenuity, and compliance would not int.erfere with efforts of
Commonwealth as to enforcement of criminal law or any other policy decision of that
entity. The court ruled that prison authorities should have known that the population
projection figure on which they relied was, in all probability, inaccurat.e, and, even if they
did not properly assess information available at that time, they certainly knew by the end
of 1986 that they had drastically underestimated the actual rat.e of growth, but did not
make the motion for relief from the stipulation, informally apprise the court of predictable
problems in compliance, solicit assistance of monitor or seek discussions with plaintiffs'
counsel. (Puerto.Rico System)
U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO
SUPERVISE
42 U.S.C.A.
SECTION 1983

N"ishiyama v. Dickson County, Tenn., 814 F.2d 277 (6th Cir. 1987). Reversing a lower
court ruling, an appeals court held that the practice of allowing an inmat.e to drive an
official patrol car was action taken under the color of stat.e law, establishing a claim
that the conduct of a sheriff and deputy deprived their daught.er of constitutionally
prot.ected int.erest in life. The court found reckless indifference to risk posed by actions
of the sheriff and deputy sheriff in permitting the inmat.e to have the use of an official
patrol car--resulting in an inmat.e murdered their daught.er while driving an official car
with permission--and that this was sufficient to establish violation of substantive due
process under section 1983. (Dickson County Sheriff Department)

U.S. District Court

Ortiz v. Turner, 651 F.Supp. 309 (S.D. Ill. 1987). A proceeding was institut.ed on the
motion of Illinois correction officials to dismiss a complaint alleging a failure to enforce
minimum physical standards for the county jail. The district court held that the
obligation imposed upon correction officials by an Illinois statut.e to set minimum physical
standards for the county jail and to petition an appropriat.e court in the event of
noncompliance did not include enforcement and, hence, did not impose liability upon
correction officials for acts of noncompliance by county officials who were given
responsibility by other Illinois statut.es for maint.erumce of the jail. The failure of
correction officials in Illinois to ensure compliance with minimum physical standards for
the county jail could not be causally linked to conditions existing at the jail so as to place
liability on the correction officials, notwithstanding a stat.ement of the sheriff that he
would have acted to comply with minimum standards had the correction officials
threat.ened him with legal action, where the stat.ement could not be given credence in view
of the sheriff's repeated history of false assurances that the county jail would be brought
up to minimum standards. A decision by a federal court as to whether county officials
were in compliance with minimum physical standards set for the county jail would have
amounted to an intrusion by the federal court into a decision making process of stat.e
officials offensive to the eleventh amendment. (Alexander Co., Illinois)

Stat.e Appeals Court
NEGLIGENCE
FAILURE TO

Perro v. Stat.e, 517 So.2d 258 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1987). An inmat.e who cut off two of his

PROTECT

U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO
PROTECT
NEGLIGENCE

fingers and damaged his thumb while using a skillsaw to cut some plastic to fut a
toilet seat sued claiming negligence on the part of the stat.e. He noted that there was
no guard on the blade. The court found the stat.e was negligent in not providing a
safe place to work. However, since the inmat.e had worked in the shop for eight months
and had enough experience to know the saw was for cutting wood, not plastic, he could
not recover for injuries since a more appropriat.e tool was available and he chose to use
the skillsaw. The court also barred the inmat.e from recovering under the theory that the
saw, as a dangerous instrument, was in the care and custody of the institution and was
def~ve. (Jackson Barracks, New Orleans, Louisiana)
Rios v. Lane, 812 F.2d 1032 (7th Cir. 1987). A federal appeals court denied prison
officials a defense of qualified immunity for disciplining an inmat.e pursuant to a vague
rule forbidding gang activity. The inmat.e was given no prior warning that his conduct
in passing a 3" by 5" not.ecard to another inmat.e containing information about the
schedule of Spanish speaking radio stations violated any regulation. The court explained
that aside from the sparse ten of the rule itself, there was no material available to fully
explain what conduct was prohibited by the rule. (Graham Correctional Cent.er, Illinois)
Rondon Pinto v. Jimenez Nettleship, 660 F.Supp. 255 (D. Puerto Rico 1987). A prison
official's detailed swom stat.ement explaining the actions he took to improve prison
safety, and his lack of knowledge that the plaintiffs' son was in any particular danger,
clearly showed an absence of deliberat.e or gross indifference. Therefore, the official ·
was not liable for the son's death. Moreover, the situation did not even rise to the level of
mere negligence, unless prison cust.odians are held to absolut.e standard of liability,
responsible for any injuries suffered by any inmat.e. (Bayamon Regional Jail)

27.32

State Supreme Court
NEGLIGENCE
TORI' LIABILITY
FAILURE TO
PROTECT

Silva v. State, 745 P.2d 380 (N.M. 1987) After an inmate committed suicide, using his
shirt to hang himself his personal representatives brought a wrongful death action
against the State Corrections Department and others. The court rejected the argument
that the inmate's shirt was "machinery" within the Tort Claims Act's waiver of
immunity for negligence in the operation or maintenance of machinery or building.
The plaintiff claimed that because the prison officials had not removed the clothing from
the inmate there was failure to "properly maintain machinery" and that the "design of the
building" allowed him to hang himself. The claims were dismissed. (Corrections and
Criminal Rehabilitation Department of the State of New Mexico)

U.S. District Court
DEFENSES

Shropshire v. Duckworth, 654 F.Supp. 369 (N.D. Ind. 1987). An inmate filed a suit
alleging that his civil rights had been violated. Prison officials filed a motion for
summary judgment. The district court held that: (1) the state policy governing
institutional transfers did not create a liberty interest protected by the fourteenth
amendment; (2) any claims against prison officials in their official capacities were barred
by the eleventh amendment; and (3) the procedures used, before the inmate was placed in
administrativ~ segregation, satisfied the minimµm.requirements of due propess. .
Procedures accorded an inmate when he was placed in administrative segregation satisfied
minim.um requirements of due process. The inmate received a hearing within eight days
of being placed in administrative segregation. He received notice of the hearing three
days prior to it. He was permitted to speak on his own behalf and present evidence, call
witnesses and have lay advocate. He was in fact assisted by lay advocate of his choice.
(Indianapolis, Indiana)

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY

Vaughn v. Ricketts, 663 F.Supp. 401 (D. Ariz. 1987). Prisoners brought action against
prison officials to challenge legality of digital, rectal cavity searches. A federal district
court held that: (1) prison officials needed reasonable grounds to conduct digital. body
cavity searches of prisoners, and (2) the law governing cavity searches was clearly
established when searches were conducted, and thus, officials did not enjoy qualified ·
immunity from liability. According t.o the court, rectal cavity searches of prisoners must
be reasonably conducted in order t.o withstand fourth amendment scrutiny. Prison
officials had duty to conduct digital, rectal cavity searches of prisoners in a manner that
was not brutal, offensive t.o human dignity, or shocking to conscience and had duty not t.o
violate due process. (State Prison, Florence, Arizona)
1988

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO
PROTECT

Anderson v. Gutschenritter, 836 F.2d 346 (7th Cir. 1988). A pretrial detainee was
stabbed by his cellmate. The detainee had informed the prison authorities .that he had
heard rumors that "someone was out to get him." The due process clause protects
pretrial detainees from both deliberat.e exposure to violence, and from a failure to prot.ect
when prison authorities know of a strong likelihood that an inmate will be assaulted or
injured. According t.o the appeals court, evidence presented by the pretrial detainee would
have permitted a reasonable jury t.o conclude that a sheriff and a warden failed to protect
the detainee. (Sangamon County Jail)

Anderson v. Sullivan, 702 F.Supp. 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). An inmate sued correction
U.S. District Court
PERSONAL LIABILITY officials alleging excessive use of force, in violation of his civil rights. The U.S. District
Court held that officers did not use excessive force in handcuffing the inmate. According
t.o the court, an inmate's constitutional protection against excessive force by correction
officers is nowhere nearly so extensive as that afforded by common-law t.ort action for
battery.
The court found that the officers did not use excessive force on the prisoner, in
violation of his eighth amendment rights, when they pushed him int.o a bar and put his
hands behind his back t.o apply handcuffs. The amount of force was not significantly
disproportional t.o a legitimate goal of handcuffing the inmate while transporting him
within the facility, and the incident resulted in little or no harm t.o the inmate.
The court also ruled that the prison superintendent could not be held liable for the
correction officers' alleged excessive use of force against an inmate absent an allegation
that the superintendent was directly involved in the incident, that he had an opportunity
to remedy an alleged wrong, that he created the policy under which the violation occurred,
or that he was grossly negligent in managing subordinates•. (Sing Sing Correctional
Facility, New York)
U.S. District Court
RESPONDEAT
SUPERIOR

Brassfield v. County of Cook, 701 F.Supp. 679 (N.D. Ill. 1988). A prisoner ftled a civil
rights action against the county, former county department of corrections' executive
direct.or, the executive director's immediate subordinate, unnamed supervisor of guards
at the county jail, and a guard, alleging the failure to provide the prisoner with prompt
and effective medical care after he suffered a severe beating at the hands of fellow
inmates. In a sua sponte opinion, the district court found that the responsibility for the
county jail was vested in the sheriff, not the county, and the potential respond.eat

27.33

superior liability on the county for the jail officials' actions did not extend to civil rights
actions. The court also found a complaint alleging that the sheriff, executive director,
executive director's immediate subordinate, and the guard supervisor failed to train and
supervise jail personnel was insufficient to sustain a civil rights action against them.
(Cook County Jail, Illinois)
U.S. District Court
PERSONAL
LIABILITY

Brody v. McMahon, 684 F.Supp. 354 (N.D.N.Y. 1988). An inmate filed a complaint
against the New York Commission of Corrections seeking to hold individual members
liable for the conditions of the prison. The court ruled that members of the
Commission could not be held personally liable for conditions at the prison because the
Commission is simply a "watchdog" agency and has no direct power to control or direct
customs and policies of prison facilities in New York. (New York State Commission of
Correction)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
FAILURE TO
PROTECT

Cabrales v. County of Los Angeles, 864 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir. 1988). A civil rights suit
was brought against the county, the commander of the county jail, _and others for the
death of a pretrial detainee. Following a verdict again.st the county and-jail
commander, motion for judgment was denied by the U.S. District Court and attorney
fees were awarded. The appeals court affirmed the lower court ruling, noting that the
sufficiency of evidence could not be reviewed except for plain error absent a motion for
directed verdict at the close of all the evidence.
There were issues of the fact as to the liability of the county and the jail commander
on the ground of the policy of deliberate indifference to the detainee's medical needs. In
order to impose liability on the county under a civil rights statute in the suicide on a
theory that the county had a policy of deliberate indifference to the detainee's medical
needs, it was not necessary to establish that any policymaker may have, by affirmative
acts, established or adopted such a policy; rather, the notion of deliberate indifference
connoted a regime where neglect of medical and psychological needs would suffice to prove
a constitutional violation; acts of omission, as well as commission, may constitute
predicate for finding of liability.
Even though the detainee was not denied access to medical and psychiatric help, but
was in fact evaluated on several occasions by medical personnel, this did not preclude the
finding of deprivation of constitutional rights without due process based on a deliberate
indifference to medical needs, in light of the demonstration of inadequate staff such that
psychiatric staff could only spend minutes per month with disturbed inmates, so that any
psychological illness would go undiagnosed and untreated.
It was also found by the court that the plaintiff's unsuccessful claims against
individual county officers were related to successful claims against the county and the
commander of the county jail that inadequate psychiatric care led to the pretrial detainee's
suicide. There was no abuse of discretion in reducing the attorney fee award by 25% to
reflect limited success, where the plaintiff's overall relief was materially diminished for a
failure to make out claims against individual defendants who could have been found
individually liable for their own deliberate indifference to a detainee's medical and
psychiatric needs. (Los Angeles County Jail, California)

State Appeals Court
NEGLIGENCE
DAMAGES

Calloway v. City of New Orleans, 524 So.2d 182 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1988). The mother of
a prematurely born infant brought a wrongful death action against the sheriff of the
jail in which she was held prior to the birth. She also sued the hospital. A lower
court found the sheriff and hospital liable and awarded the mother $150,000 in damages.
On appeal, the court reduced the damages award to $30,000, cited the mother's neglect to
seek out and carry out proper medical care and contracting syphilis, as well as her
reluctance to see the child. According to the court, in all negligence cases, the responsible
party must have breached a duty which encompasses a foreseeable risk of harm to the
plaintiff. While the court ruled that a jail corpsman should not be held to the same
standard of care as a medical doctor, his standard is above that of an ordinary layman.
When determining an award of damages for the wrongful death of a baby, the
determination is predicated on the bond between parent and child, and presumably the
longer a child lives, the greater parental bond and greater loss upon a child's death.
Finally, when a damage award is excessive, the reviewing court's function is to lower it to
the highest reasonable amount. (Orleans Parish Prison)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO
PROTECT
42 U.S.C.A.
SECTION 1983

Colburn v. Upper Darby Township. 838 F. 2d 663 (3rd Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109
S.Ct. 1338. The estate of a detainee who committed suicide while incarcerated brought
action against township and police officials. The district court dismissed the case and
the plaintiffs appealed. The appeals court held that: (1) the allegation that custodial
personnel knew or should have known that the detainee was a suicide risk was
sufficient to state a Section 1983 claim against official; and (2) the allegation that the
township had a custom of inadequately monitoring jail for potential suicides was sufficient
to state a cause of action. Further, the court found that the fact that the deceased inmate
was the third person to commit suicide while in custody of the same jail was reason to
state a Section 1983 claim. The court noted that a detainee is

27.34

entitled under a due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment t.o, at minimum, no less
protection for personal security than that afforded to convicted prisoners under the
Fourteenth Amendment and, no less a level of medical care than that required for
convicted prisoners by the Eighth Amendment. Though custodial officials cannot be
placed in a position of guaranteeing that inmates will not commit suicide, such officials
know or should know of a particular vulnerability. Prior suicides could be viewed as
providing a governing body with knowledge of its alleged custom. The appeals court
ruled, however, that the police commissioner and mayor could not be held personally liable
in a Section 1983 action arising out of suicide of a detainee absent allegations that either
was personally involved in any activity related to detainee's death. (Upper Darby Police
Department)
·
U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO
PROTECT

State Appeals Court
SOVEREIGN

IMMUNITY
FAILURE TO
PROTECT

U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED

IMMUNITY
42U.S.C.A.
SECTION 1983

U.S; Court of Appeals
GOVERNMENTAL
IMMUNITY
FAILURE TO

Cort.es-Quinones v. Jimenez-Nettleship. 842 F.2d 556 (1st Cir. 1988), cert. denied. 109
S.Ct. 68. The death of a psychiatrically disturbed prisoner whose body was
dismembered a few months aft.er his transfer to a district jail was caused by the
deliberate indifference" of prison officials to his health or safety problems, accol'.(ling to a
federal appeals court. The court ruled found that information about the prisoner's
psychiatric history was, or should have been, in his prison files, and that prison officials
who approved of the transfer should have known of the inmate's psychological problem
and that there was evidence that the inmate should never have been in the general prison
population. According to the court, it was unlikely that the inmate would have been killed
if any of the officials had acted t.o segregate him from mentally sound prisoners at the jail.
According to the appeals court, when prison officials intentionally place prisoners in
dangerous circumstances, when they intentionally ignore prisoners' serious medical needs,
or when they are deliberately indifferent either to a prisoner's health or safety, they
violate the constitution. (Arecibo District Jail)
Dept. of Health & Rehab. Serv. v. WhaleY, 531 So.2d 723 (Fla.App. 4 Dist. 1988). A
juvenile detainee was awarded $100,000 in damages and his father was awarded $5,575
in damages, for injuries sustained as a result of an alleged sexual assault by a fellow
detainee in a juvenile detention intake facility. The white, 14-year-old, 98 pound
youth, was arrested for burglary and placed in a holding cell with two older black
youths, 15 and 16 years old, weighing 160 and 195 pounds respectively. The other two
youths were charged with burglary and armed robbery. While one had a history of several
violent crimes charged (most of which had been dismissed), there was no past history of
sexual assault. The two allegedly forced him to perform fellatio on one of them.
Following the youth's release, he received psychiatric treatment for "post-traumatic stress
syndrome", but no medical treatment for any physical injury was required. The appeals
court upheld the jury verdict, noting that there was a duty to protect an alleged juvenile
delinquent in custody from potential harm by third persons where the risk of such harm is
foreseeable. The court rejected an argument that sovereign immunity applied in this
instance, noting that insurance for just such liability exist.eel. (Juvenile Detention Intake
Facility, West Palm Beach, Florida)
Eastwood v. Dept. of Corrections of State of Okl., 846 F.2d 627 (10th Cir. 1988). A
federal appeals court ruled that a Department of Corrections investigator who asked
irrelevant questions concerning the sexual history of a female employee who had
charged a fellow employee with sexual assault was not entitled to qualified immunity.
When the female employee reported the sexual assault incident, the departmental
investigator allegedly told her that she would not be harassed or fired if she revealed
everything about the assault. She filed a lawsuit claiming that she was threatened with
termination if she did not sign a statement promising to forget the incident if the other
employee resigned. The lawsuit also claimed that the investigator forced her to reveal
facts about her sexual history. Furthermore, the investigator and several other
Department of Corrections employees created an offensive work environment by harassing
her with additional questions about her sexual history, "publishing offensive and insulting
drawings" within the Department of Corrections facility, and repeatedly making insulting
remarks, which led up to her resignation when she could no longer tolerate the abuse.
The court found that under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, these allegations were sufficient to
state a claim. Since the unlawfulness of such questions were clearly established by prior
case law establishing a right of privacy, citing Thorne v. City of. EI Segundo, 726 F.2d
459 (9th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 469 U.S. 979 (1984), ("unbounded, standardless inquiry"
in personal life of applicant for police job violated right to privacy). An individual's
interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters and interest in being independent when
making certain kinds of personal decisions are two kinds of privacy interests prot.ect.ed by
the penumbra of the Bill of Rights. (Oklahoma Department of Corrections)
Farrish v. Mississippi State Parole Board, 836 F.2d 969 (5th Cir. 1988). A form.er
director of corrections was held liable for failure to establish adequate procedures
governing the use of hearsay testimony at parole revocation hearings. The plaintiff, a
parolee, was subjected to a preliminary parole revocation hearing following hili)~or
the sale of marijuana. He continually objected to the introduction of statements

27.35

given at the hearing by a person whose statement to the police provided the soie basis for
the charge against him. The statements were admitted and the plaintiff's parole was
revoked even though he contended that the statements should not be considered unless he
was present for confrontation and cross-examination. The federal appeals court noted that
the U.S. Supreme Court held in 1972 that "on the request of a parolee, a person who has
given adverse information on which parole revocation is based is to be made available for
questioning" in the presence of the parolee, except when the hearing officer determines
that an informant would be subject to harm if his identity was revealed. According to the
court, this case presented a classic example of when the use of hearsay impermissibly
violates the right to confront and cross-examine because the statements were the sole
evidence against the plaintiff. The director of corrections was not entitled to absolute
immunity and was liable for failing to establish. adequate policies or procedures to govern
the calling of witnesses _in preliminary hearings. The court said the direct.or should have
known that this violated Farrish's clearly established rights. (Mississippi Department of
Corrections)
U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO
PROTECT
FAILURE TO
TRAIN
42U.S.C.A.
SECTION 1983

Francis v. Pike County. Ohio, 708 F.Supp. 170 (S.D. Ohio 1988)_. The administrator
and personal representative of a deceased arrestee brought a Section 1983 action
against the city, county, and their law enforcement officers for the failure to remove a
belt of the deceased arrestee who then committed suicide while in a cell. The
defendants moved for a summary judgment. The district court found that the police
officers did not use excessive force in arresting the arrestee. It was also found that
neither the city nor its police officers were liable for the arrestee's suicide while in the
county jail following the arrest assisted by the city officer. Since the arrestee was not in
their custody or control at the time of the suicide, the county deputies' failure to remove
the drunk driving arrestee's belt before placing him in a holding cell, without knowledge
or reason to know that the arrestee would commit suicide, did not impose a civil rights
liability on them after the arrestee committed suicide. The lack of allegations or evidence
that the county was grossly negligent in training its law enforcement officers precluded its
liability. (Pike County Jail, Ohio)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO
TRAIN
42U.S.C.A.
SECTION 1983
NEGLIGENCE

Freedman v. City of Allentown, Pa.• 853 F.2d 1111 (3rd Cir. 1988). The
parent of an inmate who committed suicide while detained in jail brought an
Section 1983 action against the city, chief of police, individual police officers,
and a state probation officer. The U.S. District Court dismissed the complaint
and appeal was taken. The appeals court, affirming the lower court decision,
found that the failure of jail officials to recognize scars on the inmate's wrists,
inside of his elbows and neck as suicide hesitation cuts amounted only to negligence and
would not support a Section 1983 claim. The civil rights claimant failed to establish that
the city deliberately elected not to fund or carry out the training of police officers in the
handling of mentally disturbed persons. The state probation officer's action in failing to
caution detaining officers about the jail inmate's prior suicide attempt and suicidal
tendencies was at most negligent and did not rise to a level of reckless indifference of the
inmate's rights as to support the Section 1983 action. The parent of the prisoner failed to
establish that the city and supervisory officials did not have a procedure, system, or
equipment whereby prison officials could maintain visual surveillance or otherwise
monitor prisoners with known suicidal tendencies for the purpose of maintaining a Section
1983 action, especially in light of the fact that the complainant referred to the existence of
a booking cell in the detective bureau where prisoners could be watched closely.
(Allentown Police Station, Pennsylvania)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO
PROTECT
NEGLIGENCE
42 U.S.C.A.
SECTION 1983

Gardner v. Cato, 841 F.2d 105 (5th Cir. 1988). An inmate f'tled a civil rights lawsuit
against the county jail and its personnel, after he had without notice or warning,
gotten a dark liquid thrown in his face by his mentally unstable cellmate. The court
found that placement of the prisoner in a cell with a mentally unstable inmate who
had access to cleaning chemicals at best raised an issue of negligence by the
defendants, a claim not seen as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment in a civil
rights action. Because he was given extensive medical treatment, the court found that it
was "frivolous" to claim that the defendants displayed a deliberate indifference or
disregard for the inmate's medical needs. (Guadalupe County Jail)

State Supreme Court
PERSONAL
LIABllJTY
SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY

Grantham v. Dept. of Corrections, 522 So.2d 219 (Miss. 1988). The Supreme
Court of Mississippi held that a woman attacked by a paroled prisoner can
bring a lawsuit against individual members of the Parole Board for their
alleged gross disregard for her safety in granting the parole. The paroled
prisoner served twelve years and three months of a life sentence for murder.
The court noted that the plain.tiff alleged that the parolee and seventy-two other inmates
were approved for parole and release on the same day and that the Parole Board members
approved the parolee's petition without reviewing all the pertinent information required
by state law, such as the circumstances of the prisoner's offense,

27.36

his previous social hist.ory and criminal record, his conduct, employment and attitude
while in the cust.ody of the Department, and the reports of such physical and mental
examinations as have been made. Claims against the Parole Board, Department of
Corrections and Commissioner of Corrections were dismissed on the basis of sovereign
immunity. The individual Board members, however, the court stat.eel, were charged in the
plaintiff's complaint with "reckless disregard" for her safety. It was alleged that their
failure t.o consider pertinent information was a substantial departure from their duties.
The court found these allegations sufficient t.o "pierce the shield of these officials' qualified
immunity t.o suit.• The court carefully not.ed that it int.ended that "not the slightest hint
be perceived how this case ought ultimately be decided." (Mississippi Department of
Corrections)

U.S. District Court
NEGLIGENCE
FEDERAL TORT
CLAIMS ACT

Harris v. U.S., 677 F.Supp. 403 (W.D.N.C. 1988). A mother brought an action
against the government in damages for the death of her son, a federal prison ·
inmate. The district court found that the intentional t.ort proviso of the Tort
Claims Act did not restrict the category of intentional t.orts for which
sovereign immunity w~ waived on those committed in the course of the search, seizure, or
arrest, and the mother's action against the government for the death of her son, who died
when a government employee wrongfully or negligently applied an elastic bandage and
duct tape over substantially all of his head and face, could be maintained under the
intentional t.ort proviso of the Tort Claims Act. The court rejected the government's
motion for summary judgment. The government argued that 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1346, the
Federal Tort Claims Act, waiving sovereign immunity for intentional t.orts in Section
2680(h), only applied t.o actions of law enforcement officials committed during the course
. of a search, a seizure or an arrest, citing Pooler v. Unit.ed Stat.es, 787 F.2d 868 (3d Cir.
1986), which so held. This court rejected that limitation, finding that the context in which
the intentional wrongdoing was committed was not limited, as long as the officer fit the
definition of "investigative or law enforcement officer." The court also cited Crow v.
Unit.eel States, 659 F.Supp. 556 (D.Kan. 1987), which also rejected the holding in Pooler.
(Unit.ed States Bureau of Prisons)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO
PROTECT
42 U.S.C.A.
SECTION 1983

Harris by and Through Harris v. MaYI181'd, 843 F.2d 414 (10th Cir. 1988). Prison
officials were not immune from liability under 42 U;S.C.A. Section 1983 for_ a deceased
inmate's unexplained and violent murder in the prison facility. Want.on or obdurate
disregard of or deliberate indifference t.o· a prisoner's right t.o life as a condition of
confinement was a substantive constitutional deprivation. Material issues of fact
exist.ed as t.o whether state correctional officials evidenced deliberate indifference in
connection with an inmate's unexplained death. Summary judgment was precluded. The
inmate's mother had made phone calls t.o prison officials expressing her son's _need for
protection from other inmates. The order requiring separation of the inmate from fellow
inmates was not enforced, and the inmate's mother had been denied access t.o the deceased
inmate's personal effects, including threatening letters from the other inmate. (McAlester,
Oklahoma Priso~

U.S. District Court
CONSENT DECREE

Heath v. DeCourcy. 704 F.Supp. 799 (S.D. Ohio 1988). An action was brought
challenging conditions of confinement at a county facility. A motion was Illed
t.o modify an agreed modification of a consent decree. The district court, denying the
motion in part and granting the motion in part, found that the agreed modification would
be modified in part as requested with respect t.o the classification of inmates permitted t.o
be double-celled at the facility. According t.o the court, a consent decree may be modified
where a better appreciation of facts in light .of experience indicates that the decree is not
properly adopt.eel t.o accomplishing its purposes. The defendant seeking t.o modify the
consent decree has a burden of showing his entitlement t.o relief sought based on
evidentiary record. The parties in this class action suit entered int.o a Consent Decree
which became a final judgment in this case in 1985. An Agreed Modif'ication of Agreed
Final Judgment (Agreed Moc:lif'lcation) was negotiated by the parties and ~ a final
judgment in this case in 1988. This modified Consent Decree permitted double-celling of
inmates in the Justice Complex in 168 cells, set an inmate population _limit in the Jail
Annex of 162 and in the Justice Complex of 1016, provided for an inmate safety and wellbeing, gave defendants the authority t.o comply with the maximum population limits by
releasing inmates based upon set criteria and by refusing admission of inmates, and
authority t.o set staffmg limits. Over the inmates objections, the court approved as eligible
for double-celling inmates being held pretrial on misdemeanor or felony charges and
eligible inmates split-sentenced on felony charges, provided the double-celling should be
implemented only when absolutely necessary and required by the penological program,
and then ocly for the minimum time required, and that other requirements for "minimum
security" classif'u:ation be met. All parties agreed that the classification requirements
paragraph in the agreed modif"Jcation was in error. (Hamilt.on County Jail and Justice
Complex, Ohio)

U.S. District Court
REMEDIES

Inmates of the Allegheny County Jail v. Wecht. 699 F.Supp. 1137 (W.D. Pa.
1988). Pl-ison inmates sued county and state officials t.o relieve the
overcrowding at the county jail. The district court found that conditions at the jail
Zl.37

including overcrowding, deplorable mental health facilities, fire hazards and the lack of
reliable climate control rendered the jail constitutionally maclequate. The Commonwealth
was partially responsible for the conditions and would be required to shoulder partial
responsibility of remedial measures; and the jail would be closed and a new facility was
required to be constructed. (Allegheny Co. Jail, Pennsylvania)
U.S. District Court
GOVERNMENTAL
LIABILITY

Kennedy v. Hardiman, 684 F.Supp. 540 (N.D. ID. 1988). A county corrections official
received a phone call from a man purporting to be an FBI agent informing him that a
correctional officer would be transporting heroin into the facility on that date. When
the officer arrived, a body cavity search was conducted by three investigators who found
no heroin. The correctional officer sued corrections officials alleging violation of his fourth
amendment rights. The federal district court held that there was nothing improper in the
plaintiff naming several defendants in their official capacities, as this was an entirely
appropriate way to allege municipal liability and there was no reason to limit the plaintiff
to a single official capacity defendant. The court also denied summary judgment for the
defendants, ruling that jury must decide if the ~arch was based on reasonable suspicion.
Since the law regarding strip searches was .clearly established and an anonymous tip
would not provide "reasonable suspicion," prison officials were not be entitled to qualified
immunity for the strip search. (Cook County Dept. of Corrections, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
NEGLIGENCE
FEDERAL TORI'

Lewis v. U.S., 702 F.Supp. 231 (E.D. Mo. 1988). A visitor at a federal prison
brought an action under the Federal Tort Claims Act to recover damages for
injuries sustained when she slipped and fell outside of prison. When the
visitor came to the prison to see her imprisoned husband, there was no ice or
water on the ground when she entered the building on the cold but sunny winter day.
While she was inside, however, an inmate hosed down the driveway, which caused ice to
form. When she left, she slipped and fell on a patch of ice, which she did not see because
she was talking and looking- straight ahead. Her injuries required chiropractic treatment
and she sued for negligence under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1346. The
United States moved to dismiss. The district court found that a prison visitor was a
"public invitee," and the United States, as owner of the prison, was guilty of negligence
and was 60% at fault. (United States Penitentiary, Terre Haute, Indiana)

CLAIMS ACT

U.S. Appeals Court
GOVERNMENTAL

LIABILITY

Lowe v. City of St. Louis, 843 F.2d 1158 (8th Cir. 1988). An inmate alleged that while
correctional officer entered his cell, beat him with his fists, and severely injured him.
According to the inmate's suit, the allegedly city knew that the officer had previously
attacked other individuals, but had done nothing about it. A jury decided that the officer
acted unconstitutionally in beating the inmate, but this single act is an insufficient
predicate for municipal liability. Although the officer had been involved in an earlier
assault on a prisoner, and an earlier knife fight with another correctional officer, he had
been disciplined both times. (St. Louis City Jail)

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED

O'Brien v. Borough of Woodbury Heights, 679 F.Supp 429 (D. N.J. 1988).
According to a federal district court, a municipality was liable under section 1983 for
causing arrestees to be subjected to unconstitutional stri:wbody cavity searches at the
county jail, where it had a policy of bringing arrestees to the county jail and was aware of
the county jail's policy of conducting strii:vbodY cavity searches on all arrestees. Two
arrestees filed claims against the Borough, County, and other law enforcement officials
alleging that they were unlawfully detained and striJ.¥body cavity searches were
performed on them even though there was no suspicion that either arrestee was
concealing contraband. The federal court held that the county jail's rule of performing
routine striJ¥'body cavity searches on anyone arrested, regardless of the offeDBe, was
unconstitutional. The court also denied a qualified immunity claim by officers, stating
that the law against such searches was clearly established at the time of arrest.
(Gloucest.er County Jail, New Jersey)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONSENT DECREE

Plyler v. Evatt, 846 F.2d 208 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 241. The State
requested modification of a consent decree so as to allow double-celling at new prisons
and also appealed a court-ordered release of 700 inmates. This request was denied by the
district court. The federal appeals court found that the State had made a good-faith effort
to comply with the consent decree and had faced an unanticipated increase in the prison
population and that it was an abuse of discretion not to allow double-celling--ordering the
district court to modify the consent decree to allow double-celling at the five new facilities.
The appeals court noted that the stat.e had embarked on an aggressive program of new
prison construction, involvmg the spending of over one-hundred million dollars, as well as
instituting early release programs to alleviate overcrowding. The court also noted that
there were pot.ential dangers from the early release of high risk mm.ates- dangers which
"far outweigh any imposition on the inmates from double-celling" in some of the "modern,
air-conditioned facilities• which have been constructed. The court retamed jurisdiction to
order farther remedies should the double-celling result in any unconstitutional conditions
of confinement. (South Carolina Department of Corrections)

IMMUNITY

27.38

U.S. District Court
42U.S.C.A.
SECTION 1983
GOOD FAITH
IMMUNITY
QUALIFIED

IMMUNITY

U.S. Appeals Court

FAILURE TO
PROTECT

U.S. Appeals Court

LIABILITY
QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY
PERSONAL

LIABILITY

U.S. District Court
DAMAGES
NOMINAL
DAMAGES

PUNITIVE
DAMAGES
QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY

State Appeals Court

FAILURE TO
PROTECT
NEGLIGENCE

Reutcke v. Dahm, 707 F.Supp. 1121 (D.Neb. 1988). A prisoner sued prison
officials alleging that the prison's policy regarding access to legal materials
denied the prisoner his right to access to the courts. Following an evidentiary
hearing and report and recommendation by a U.S. Magistrate, the district
court adopted the report and recommendation. and found that the prison's
policy regarding access to legal materials denied the prisoner his right to
access to the courts. The warden was not entitled to qualified good faith
immunity. The prisoner was entitled only to nominal damages; he was not entitled to
punitive damages.
The prison warden was liable under Section 1983 for denial of the prisoner's right of
access to the courts. because the warden was ultimately responsible for the policy of the
prison concerning access to legal materials and assistance. The warden was not entitled
to qualified immunity in the prisoner's action claiming a denial of his right of access to the
courts, since the prison's policy concerning access to legal materials and assistance was in
violation of clearly established constitutional law. A reasonable prison administrator
would have determined that the prison's policy was unconstitutional. The associate
warden was not liable to the prisoner under Section 1983 for the denial of the prisoner's
right of access to the courts because the associate warden did not possess the final
decision-making authority with respect to the policy concerning access to legal materials
and assistance. (Diagnostic and Evaluation Center, Nebraska Department of Corrections)
Richardson v. Penfold. 839 F.2d 392 (7th Cir. 1988). There were genuine issues of
material fact. precluding summary judgment, on whether a prison official acted with
"deliberate indifference" in failing to prevent an inmate's rape. The inmate filed an
affidavit by another imnate which stated that the alleged attackers had an arrangement
with the official to let the attackers have sex "with any new kid they wanted to have sex
with," in return for information on contraband within the unit. If that was true, a jury
could permissibly infer that the official knew about the rape, and deliberately chose to
ignore it. (Indiana State Prison)
Shabazz v. Coughlin, 852 F.2d 697 (2nd Cir. 1988). An inmate brought a civil
rights action against the superintendent of a correctional facility and the
Commissioner of the New York State Department of Correctional Services
alleging that the imnate was unconstitutionally disciplined for violating
regulations prohibiting group prayer and prayer in the prison yard. The U.S.
District Court denied the prison officials' motion for summary judgment, and
appeal was taken. The appeals court, reversing the decision, found that officials could
assert personal immunity defenses, such as qualified immunity, but not an eleventh
amendment bar, and qualified immunity shielded the prison officials from civil rights
liability for disciplining the inmate. At the time the discipline was imposed, a legitimate
question existed as to whether a prisoner had a right to engage in group prayer in the
prison yard. Muslims must offer "demonstrative prayer" (involving kneeling down,
bending forward, etc.) five times a day at times determined by the sun's position. They
also believe that group prayer is preferable to individual prayer. The court of appeals
noted, however, that it had not, at the time of the discipline, or since then, directly
addressed the constitutionality of restrictions on group prayer and prayer in prison yards,
nor were there cases in other circuits clearly condemning or condoning such policies.
(Attica Correctional Facility, New York)
Soto v. Lord. 693 F.Supp. 8 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). An inmate brought an action
against a correctional facility program coordinator for violations of his
constitutional rights in conducting a prison disciplinary hearing. The district
court found that although the official was entitled to qualified immunity for
failure to confirm positive test results, he was not entitled to qualified
immunity for failure to establish a chain of custody for the narcotics test
results. The defendant was therefore held liable for violating the inmate's
right to procedural due process. The inmate was entitled to damages
resulting from punitive segregation, lost wages and nominal damages for distress, but w.as
not entitled to punitive damages or injunctive relief. Damages of $3,243.50 were assessed
($3,000 for punitive segregation, $242.50 for lost wages and $1 nominal damages for
distress caused by the punitive segregation). The court found that, "assuming without
deciding that as a constitutional rule reliance on an unconf'1rmed EMIT test violated due
process,• the defendant was entitled to qualiiied immunity from liability because such a
rule was not "clearly established" law at the date of the test. (Downstate Correctional
Facility, New York)
State Dept. of Corrections v. Romero, 524 So.2d 1032 (Fla. App. 1988). An inmate who
was injured when he fell from the seat of a tract.or he was driving as part of a prison
work detail sued the ~partment of Corrections, alleging that it was negligent not to
provide a seat belt on the tract.or. A jury agreed, awarding the inmate $100,000, and
found the inmate t.o be free of any negligencf, himself. On appeal, the court noted that the
inmate had stopped the tractor t.o fix his shoelaces. Under the facts as alleged by

27.39

the inmate, the appeals court found that the inmate could not have been guiltless of all
negligence, concluding that the jury verdict could only be a result of misunderstanding the
law or "a disregard of that law because of sympathy or prejudice." The appeals court
ordered a new trial on the issue of comparative negligence, instructing the amount
awarded to be reduced proportionate to the percentage of the inmate's fault for the
accident. (Brevard Correctional Institution, Florida)
U.S. Appeals Court
CONSENT DECREEMODIFICATION

Twelve John Does v. District of Columbia, 861 F.2d 295 (D.C. Cir. 1988). The
District of Columbia's motion to modify a consent decree establishing a
population lid on a prison facility was denied by the U.S. District Court, and
the District appealed. The appeals court, affirming in part and vacating and remanding
in part, found that the increase in the number of inmates in the District of Columbia
prison system was not unforeseeable, and thus was not a change of conditions entitling
the District to modification of the consent decree establishing a population lid for the
pri~n facility. Evidence failed to establish that the District made 11, good-faith attempt to
comply with the consent decree. The district court· order requiring that, before inmates
subject to the consent decree be transferred to another District facility, the Director of the
Department of Corrections was required to certify to the court that a transfer would not
threaten to violate the obligation to provide adequate care to the inmates in other facility
extended relief to inmates who were not party to the original proceedings and not
encompassed by the provisions of the consent decree. Thus, the certification requirement
was not a valid means of enforcing the consent decree. (Central Facility, Lorton, District
of Columbia)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO
PROTECT
DAMAGES

Vaughn v. Willis, 853 F.2d 1372 (7th Cir. 1988). A prisoner who had been
raped by four other inmates brought a Section 1983 action against correctional
officials and a guard. The U.S. District Court directed the verdict in favor of
the supervisory personnel and entered a verdict against the guard, and appeal
was taken. The appeals court, affirming the decision, found that the jury instruction
which explained the grant of directed verdict in favor of the supervisory personnel did not
erroneously indicate that by not granting a directed verdict in favor of the guard, the
guard's liability was established. Even if the jury instruction was in error, the guard was
not prejudiced. The court also found that the deposition of a witness to the assault who
later refused to testify was properly admitted at the trial. The prisoner alleged that he
was raped and otherwise sexually abused by four inmate-members of a street gang. His
civil rights lawsuit also claimed that a prison guard had forced him into a cell where two
of the inmates raped him and then returned him to his own cell and allowed two other
inmates to rape him. A medical examination confirmed that the inmate had been
sodomized. The trial court granted a directed verdict in favor of the supervisory prison
personnel because there was insufficient evidence showing their alleged reckless
indifference to the prisoner's rights. A jury returned a $125,000 verdict against the prison
guard who allegedly aided and abetted the prisoners in their assault. (Stateville
Correctional Center, Joliet, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO
PROTECT
42 U.S.C.A.
SECTION 1983

Vosburg v. Solem, 845 F.2d 763 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 313. A former
inmate brought a section 1983 action against prison wardens to recover for violation of
his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment arising out of sexual assaults
by fellow inmates. A federal appeals court ruled: (1) evidence created a jury question
whether wardens violated the inmate's right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment; (2) an erroneous damage instruction that permitted a jury to award damages
for an abstract violation of Eighth Amendment was harmless; and (3) the inmate was
entitled to post-judgment interest from the date of the verdict. Prison officials may be
liable for deliberate indifference to prisoner's constitutional right to be free from sexual
attacks by other inmates, if they actually intend to deprive him of that right or if they act
with reckless disregard of right. Reckless disregard of prisoner's right to be free from
sexual attacks by other inmates may be shown by existence of pervasive risk of harm to
inmates from other prisoner and failure of prison officials reasonably to respond to risk.
Pervasive risk of harm to inmates by other prisoners may not ordinarily be shown by
pointing to a single incident or to isolated incidents, but it may be established by much
less than proof of reign of violence and terror in a particular institution. It is enough that
violence and sexual assaults occur with sufficient frequency to put prisoners in reasonable
fear for their safety and reasonably to apprise prison officials of existence of problem and
need for protective measures. To establish pervasive risk of harm to inmates by other
prisoners, it is not necessary to show that all prisoners suffer pervasive risk of harm, but
it is enough that identifiable group of prisoners do, if the complainant is member of that
group. (South Dakota State Penitentiary)

U.S. Appeals Court
NEGLIGENCE
FAILURE TO
PROTECT

Wells v. Walker. 852 F.2d 368 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 1121. A federal
trial court had found no federal civil rights liability for prison officials who authorized
the early release of an inmate because of overcrowding. After his release, he allegedly
murdered a female proprietor of a store where he was taken to board a bus. This

2:1.40

ruling was upheld by the federal appeals court that, although the circumstances gave rise

to a right of the victim to be protected against an assault by the inmate, the allegation
that the defendants failed to conduct an adequate background investigation and did not
know of the inmate's potential for violence amounted to "a claim of ordinary negligence" at
most. The court expressed no opinion on state law claims which may now be filed in state
court. (Arkansas State Board of Corrections)
U.S. Supreme Court
42 U.S.C.A.
SECTION 1983
CONTRACT
SERVICES

West v. Atkins, 108 S.Ct. 2250 (1988). Private doctor who provides medical
services to inmates under contract can be held liable under civil rights
statute. The Supreme Court ruled that a private doctor who renders medical services
to prison inmates pursuant to a contract with the state acts "under color of state law"
pursuant t.o the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.A. Section 1983, and thus can be sued
under that Act for services that fall below constitutional minimum standards under the
cruel and unusual punishment or deliberate indifference aspects of the Eighth
Amendment. The fact that such a doctor is an independent-contractor rather than- a state
employee does not change this result: "It is the physician's function within the state
syst:em, not the precise terms of his employment, that determines whether his actions can
fairly be attributed t.o the State." The United States District Court for the East.ern
District of North Carolina entered summary judgment for the defendants, holding that, as
a "contract physician," the doctor was not acting ''under color of state law," a jurisdictional
prerequisite for a Section 1983 action. The inmate appealed the summary judgment. The
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit remanded the case t.o the district court for
rehearing. 799 F.2d 923. The district court then dismissed the claim and the inmate once
again appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the
complaint and the inmate filed an appeal with the Supreme Court. 815 F.2d 993. Justice
Blackmun wrote the majority opinion for the Supreme Court, which held that a physician
who was under contract with a state to provide medical services to inmates at a state
prison hospital on a part-time basis acted under the color of state law, within meaning of
42 U.S. C. Section 1983, when he treated inmate. The Supreme Court reversed the lower
court decision, and remanded the case for rehearing. The Supreme Court found that
generally, a public employee acts under the color of state law within the meaning of
Section 1983 while acting in his official capacity or while exercising his responsib_ilities
pursuant t.o state law. Therefore, a physician who was under contract with the state to
provide medical services t.o inmates at a state prison hospital on a part-time basis acted
under the color of state law, within meaning of Section 1983, when he treated the inmate,
and such conduct was fairly attributable t.o state. The Supreme Court noted that
physicians are not removed from the purview of a Section 1983 action simply because they
are professionals acting in accordance with professional discretion and judgment.
However, there is no rule that professionals are subject t.o suit under Section 1983 unless
they were exercising cust.odial or supervisory authority. According to the Court, it is a
physician's function within a state system, providing treaiment t.o prison inmates, not the
precise terms of his employment, that determines whether his actions can fairly be
attributed to the state under Section 1983. The fact that the physician's employment
contract with the state did not require him to work exclusively for the prison in treating
prisoners did not make him any less a state actor than if he performed duties as a full.
time, permanent member of the state prison medical staff. Rather, it was the physician's
function while working for the state, not the amount of time he spent in performance of
those duties or the fact that he might be employed by others t.o perform similar duties,
that determined whether he was acting under the color of state law.
The Court also held that contracting out prison medical care does not relieve the state of
its constitutional duty to provide adequate medical treatment to those in its cust.ody, and
does not deprive the state's prisoners of a means of vindication of their eighth amendment
rights under Section 1983. Finally, the Supreme Court noted that the fact that a state
employee's role parallels one in the private sector is not, by itself, reason t.o conclude that
the employee is not acting under color of state law within the meaning of Section 1983 in
performing his duties.

U.S. Appeals Court
42 U.S.C.A.
SECTION 1983

Williams v. Cash, 836 F.2d 1318 (11th Cir. 1988). According to a federal appeals court
a warden cannot be held automatically liable for the wrongful acts of his subordinates.
An inmate sued a warden and other after his arm was broken by a correctional officer
trying to force him back int.o his cell. While the question of whether the officer
intentionally or accidentally broke Williams' arm had not yet been decided, it was clear,
said the court, that the warden could not be held liable. Unless the inmate could show
that the officer was implementing a policy or practice established by the warden or that a
hist.ory of widespread abuse or improper behavior had put the warden on notice of the
need to take corrective action, the warden could not be held liable. In a federal civil rights
action under Section 1983, a supervisor is not automatically liable for the acts of his
subordinates, the court said. (West Jefferson Correctional Facility, Alabama)

RESPONDEAT

SUPERIOR

U.S. Appeals Court
VICARIOUS

LIABILITY

Wood v. Sunn, 865 F.2d 982 (9th Cir. 1988). A prisoner brought a suit
against state prison officials alleging that they had been deliberately
indifferent to his serious medical problems, thus violating his right to be free
27.41

QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY

of cruel and unusual punishment. The U.S..District Court entered judgment

in favor of the prisoner, and the state defendants appealed. The appeals
court, affirming in part, reversing in part, and remanding, found that the issue of whether
defendants were entitled to qualified immunity was not preserved for appeal. The prison's
physician consultant and its registered nurse engaged in deliberate indifference to serious
medical problems of the prisoner in violation of his eighth amendment rights. The
director of the State Social Services Department and the administrator of the prison could
not be held vicariously liable. The failure to consider appropriate factors in d~termining
the reasonableness of the award of attorney fees was an abuse of discretion. (Oahu
Community Correctional Center, Hawaii)

1989
U.S. Appeals Court
42U.S.C.A.
SECTION 1983
QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY

Al.Jundi v. Estate of Rockefeller, 885 F.2d 1060 (2nd Cir. 1989). An inmate
brought a class action against the former New York Governor and state
officials and correctional personnel to recover for injuries resulting from poli~
action to quell a prison uprising and to rescue hostages. The U.S. District
Court dismissed the action against the Governor's estate, and the inmate
appealed. The appeals court affirmed the decision and found that the Governor's
involvement was insufficient to establish a Section 1983 liability, and the Governor
enjoyed qualified immunity. The Governor's involvement in the decisions and formulation
and implementation of the plan to retake the prison from the inmates and to rescue the
hostages was insufficient to establish a Section 1983 liability for injury to the inmate,
even though the Governor was abreast of the events. The Governor ratified the decision
by the New York State Commissioner of the Department of Correctional Services to
abandon negotiations, to order the state police to formulate a plan to regain control of the
prison, and to approve commencement of the actual retaking. (Attica Correctional
Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY

Allen v. Lowder, 875 F.2d 82 (4th Cir. 1989). A defendant whose conviction for
possession of stolen goods was reversed f'tled a civil rights action against the Secretary
of the Department of Corrections, the prison warden, and the prosecutor whose acts
allegedly caused him to be illegally kept in custody for 52 days following the reversal of
his conviction. The U.S. District Court denied the defendants' motion for summary
judgment, and they appealed. The court of appeals held that the secretary and prison
warden played no role in causing the defendant's incarceration beyond the date of his
lawful release and that they had qualified immunity from liability because they were
completely ignorant of incidents involving the defendant and had lawfully complied with
nondiscretionary state law requirements. The court also ruled that the prosecutor was not
entitled to absolute immunity from liability. The prosecutor attempted to secure
continued incarceration of the criminal defendant in "safekeeping" custody after reversal
of the defendant's conviction and his release from the state prison to the county jail, under
the theory that the defendant had previously "caused trouble" in the county jail. At best,
according to the court, the prosecutor was acting in purely administrative capacity when
he assisted the sheriff's o~ce in obtaining a safekeeping order from the superior court.
(Union County Jail, North Carolina)

U.S. Appeals Court
VICARIOUS

Bolin v. Black, 875 F.2d 1343 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 542. State
prisoners sued prison officials and corrections officers claiming that beatings by prison
guards following a prison riot violated their constitutional rights. The district court
ruled in favor of the prisoners awarding both compensatory and punitive damages. The
appeals court affirmed the lower court decision, finding that the evidence was sufficient to
hold prison supervisors liable for excessive use of force by other corrections officers.
During an interview with an inmate, the associate warden made reference to the
possibility of retaliatory punishment. He took no steps to avoid the possibility of
retaliatory punishment, even though he knew or should have known that flaring tempers
among prison guards would lead them to retaliate against inmates. He chose not to ride
on the bus transporting inmates from one pr~n to another despite his knowledge that a
guard had been killed and that the entire staff, including the officers riding with the
inmates, were upset. There was sufficient evidence to hold the captain of corrections
officers liable for excess use of force against the prisoners by subordinate corrections
officers following the prison riot. Inmates testified that the captain was present when
guards removed certain inmates from their cells to administer beatings on the laundry
table. The captain himself testified that he saw five or six inmates brought to rotunda of
prison and laid on the laundry table and that he gave the order that he did not want
anybody killed. The captain's later statement to highway patrol investigators that "I've
seen a lot more ass kicking than was done in there" implied that he knew of beatings.
A jury found in favor of the plaintiffs and assessed damages against each defendant.
One inmate was awarded $9,500 compensatory damages and $56,000 punitive dam.ages,
the second $14,500 compensatory and $74,000 punitive damages, and the third $14,000
compensatory and $73,000 punitive damages, for a total award of $241,000. A federal
appeals court upheld these awards. (Missouri Training Center for Men)

LIABILITY

27.42

U.S. Appeals Court
DAMAGES
COVENANT- NOT-TO-

SUE

Berry v. Peterson. 887 F.2d 635 (5th Cir. 1989). An inmate who was injured in a fire
at the county jail brought a suit against the county, county board of supervisors, and
the sheriff. The district court entered judgment in favor of the inmate and awarded
him $200,000. The appeals court reversed the award aft.er finding that the inmate who
was injured in the fire ''voluntarily" executed a covenant-not-to-sue, notwithstanding the
attorney's alleged failure to adequately explain that the inmate thereby waived any claims
against the county. The covenant-not-to-sue was not against public interest and could be
enforced by the county. The court stated that the enforceability of the inmat.e's covenantnot-to-sue for injuries sustained during the fire was one of law for the court. The o:cly
issue which was even arguably suitable for the jury was the voluntariness of the
agreement. (Hancock County Jail, Bay St. Louis, Mississippi)

U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED

Cleveland-Perdue v. Brutsche, 881 F.2d 427 (7th Cir. 1989). The mother. of a deceased
inmate brought an action against prison officials to recover for allegedly inadequate
medical treatment of the inmate. The death of William Lowe prompted an
investigation by the defendant Robert Brqtsche; the medical .director of the federal prison
system. Based on int.erviews and his own observations, Brutsche recommended that the
prison hospitals' o:cly full-time physician be relieved of his duties and that the recordkeeping procedures at the hospital be improved. He did not, however, check to see if his
proposed changes were implemented. Between January 6, 1975, which was the date of
Lowe's death, and August, 1975, two more inmates died at the prison's hospital. These
deaths prompted another investigation by Brutsche. As a result of this investigation, a
series of recommendations were made to the warden by Brutsche. These recommendations
included keeping full in-patient records on anyone admitted to the prison hospital,
utilizing outside facilities, encouraging better communications among the staff, and
implementing a policy concerning the availability of physicians during off-duty hours. The
court of appeals found that the failure to correct systematic deficiencies in the delivery of
the health care services at the prison violated clearly established law in 1975, and, thus,
the medical director was not entitled to qualified immunity for allegedly deliberate
indifference to the inmate's medical needs in violation of the eighth amendment; the right
was established by federal appellate courts in the second, fifth, and eighth circuits.
(Federal Penitentiary, Terre Haute Prison, Indhma)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO
DIRECT
FAILURE TO
SUPERVISE
CONTRACT
.SERVICES

Crooks v. Nix. 872 F.2d 800 (8th Cir. 1989). An inmate suffering from granulocytic
leukemia brought a Section 1983 action against prison officials for the officials' alleged
improper denial of pain medication and necessary treatment. The U.S. District Court
granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. and the inmate appealed. The
appeals court found that the material question of fact, whether prison policy
contributed to the health professionals' alleged improper denial of pain medication to
the inmate, precluded the entry of a summary judgment for the defendants on the
inmate's "denial of medication" claims. According to the court, the state may not, by
contracting with other parties to provide medical treatment to prisoners, immunize itself
from a claim for damages arising from the failure to provide necessary medical treatment
to prisoners. Although the officials had contracted with a private company, Correction
Medical Services, to furnish medical services, this did not give them absolute immunity,
the court said. If a prisoner claims that prison policies contributed to the denial of proper
medical care, the state can still be liable. On the other hand, "if the alleged denial of
medical care was based on a wrongful diagnostic judgment by a physician, the warden or
prison director, lacking professional medical expertise, would not be liable for any
constitutional wrong." The courts held that Iowa officials could be liable in this case if
they failed to properly train, supervise, direct or control the actions of the private
contractor. (Iowa State Penitentiary)

U.S. Appeals Court

Danese v. Asman, 875 F.2d 1239 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 1473. A
pretrial detainee's family and estate brought a civil rights action against police officers,
police supervisors, and the city after the detainee committed suicide. The U.S. District
Court found that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity. Interlocutory
appeal was taken. The appeals court reversed the lower court's decision and found
that the police officers and supervisors enjoyed qualified immunity from liability. The
law which existed at the time of the police officers' action did not clearly establish the
right to have the officers diagnose the pretrial detainee's condition as prone to suicide and
to take extraordinary measures to restrain the pretrial detainee; therefore, the police
officers had qualified immunity from liability. The police officers were not subject to a
clearly established constitutional.duty to diagnose the pretrial detainee's condition as
prone to suicide; and given that, the supervisors could not be held liable. (Roseville City
Jail, Michigan)

IMMUNITY

QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY
VICARIOUS

LIABILITY
FAILURE TO
TRAIN

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO
SUPERVISE
FAILURE TO TRAIN

Davis v. City of Ellensburg, 869 F.2d 1230 (9th Cir. 1989). A civil rights action was
brought against the city and police officers for injuries suffered by an arrestee who
died. The U.S. District Court granted a summary judgment for the city, and the
plaintiffs appealed. The appeals court found that the city was not liable on the theory
it had a policy of inadequate training of officers, inadequate medical treatment of
27.43

prisoners, or a deliberate indifference t.o the use of excessive force. The city's failure t.o
have written policy regarding the proper use of force in a misdemeanor arrest did not
amount t.o delegation of policymaking authority t.o rank and file police officers so as t.o
render the city liable in a civil rights action for injuries suffered by an arrestee by
transforming the individual police officers int.o municipal policymakers whose decisions in
individual cases might give rise t.o a municipal liability. The court also found that the city
was not liable on the theory it had a policy or cust.om of inadequately supervising its
police officers. According t.o the court, the plaintiff cannot prove the existence of a
municipal policy or cust.om for purposes of a civil rights action under Section 1983 based
solely on the occurrence of a single incident of unconstitutional action by a
nonpolicymaking employee.
The city was not liable for injuries suffered by the arrestee who died on the theory the
city had a policy or cust.om of inadequately su~rvising its police officers;· the ~ef sent an
officer with an alleged alcohol problem and an officer with
alleged mental disorder t.o
the police psychologist for an evaluation. The chief allowed the officers t.o remain on
active duty only after receiving written reports that both were competent t.o perform their
duties, and the chief received informal reports that the officer with an alleged alcohol
problem was no longer drinking, so the evidence did not establish that the chief acted with
deliberate indifference in failing t.o remove the officers from active duty. (Ellensburg
Police Deparbnent, W ashingt.on)

an·

U.S. District Court
CONSENT DECREE
REMEDIES

DeGidio v. Pung. 704 F.Supp. 922 and 723 F.Supp. 135 (D. Minn. 1989). State prison
im:nates sought relief from prison officials' allegedly inadequate response t.o a
tuberculosis epidemic. The federal district court found that the prison officials'
inadequate response t.o a tuberculosis epidemic, even if violative of the im:nates' eighth
amendment rights, did not warrant injunctive relief in that, since the initiation of the
litigation, the officials had significantly remedied the deficiencies t.o a point where the
medical care and tuberculosis control were not inconsistent with contemporary standarcls
of decency, and there was no evidence that past problems were likely t.o recur unless
enjoined. The court also ruled that a consent decree setting forth the level of medical care
t.o be provided for prison ~ates did not create any procedural due process interest in
im:nates actionable under Section 1983, in that the decree did not create any procedural
standards t.o guide the prison officials' conduct with regard t.o any particular im:nate. To
the degree that the decree was violated, it was through omission or neglect, rather than
intentional conduct; the im:nates' remedies for breaches of the decree lay in either action
for breach of contract or motion for contempt.
The district court found that the prisoners were prevailing parties entitled t.o an
award of attorneys' fees, even though some of their claims were unsuccessful, and they
were ultimately denied injunctive relief and that an hourly rate of $150 was reasonable
for the prisoners' attorneys. The court also found that the award of attorneys' fees would
be 35% of the lodestar figure, t.o reflect the limited relief that was obtained and the
incomplete and otherwise deficient time records. The prisoners would be awarded 25% of
the amount of costs and expenses which they claimed, t.o reflect the partial relief obtained,
and t.o avoid any award for expenses which were not properly assessed. (State Prison,
Minnesota)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO
PROTECT
FAILURE TO
TRAIN
42 U.S.C.A.
SECTION 1983

Dorman v. District of Columbia, 888 F.2d 159 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The representatives of
a detainee's estate brought a Section 1983 action against a municipality t.o recover for
the suicide of the detainee in a cell. The U.S. District Court denied the municipality's
motion for judgment notwithstanding a verdict and the municipality appealed. The
court of appeals, reversing and remanding the lower court's decision, found that the
municipality was not liable. According t.o the court, the training of police officers on
suicide prevention did not rise to the level of a conscious choice by the municipality or
the policy of deliberate indifference t.o the eighth amendment rights of the detainee who
committed suicide in his cell and, therefore, did not permit the imposition of a Section
1983 liability upon the municipality, even though the police officers did not_ receive a
specific course on suicide prevention. The officers were trained t.o recogl!,ize abnormal
behavior, could not accept arrestees who showed signs of mental illness or abnormal
behavior, and utilized "WALES" computer system with information about previous arrests
and suicide attempts. The detainee's suicide was the f"irst in the cell block in the
memories of the sergeant and the inspector who had been assigned thel'.e for eight years.
The alleged def"iciencies in the training of police officers on suicide prevention did not
cause the suicide of the young male detainee in his cell. The mere fact that the detainee
was somewhat docile at the time of the arrest and closed his eyes at the police station
during lulls in the processing was insufficient t.o give the officers notice that he might be
suicidal. The court found that the case presented was insufficient t.o be submitted t.o a
jury and the verdict for the plain.tiff was therefore reversed. (Fifth District, Metropolitan
Police Department, District of Columbia)

U.S. Appeals Court
COMPENSATORY
DAMAGES

Erwin v. County of Manit.owoc, 872 F.2d 1292 (7th Cir. 1989). The plaintiffs
sued the defendants under 42 U.S.C.A. Section 1983 for civil rights violations
and for damages resulting from a police search of a private residence. The

27.44:

PUNITIVE
DAMAGES
FAILURE TO
TRAIN

individuals whose residence had been searched brought a civil rights action
against deputies who conducted the search and against the county. The jury
awarded the plaintiffs compensatory and punitive damages amounting to
$85,000, and the defendants moved for a new trial or judgment notwithstanding the
verdict. The U.S. District Court grant.eel judgment n.o.v. vacating most of the damage
award, and appeal and cross appeal were taken. The appeals court, remanding the
decision, found that although it was clear that the jury concluded liability properly
attached to some defendants, confusing jury form and conflicting answers did not
sufficiently disclose the jury's intent, and thus, a new trial was warrant.eel. The U.S.
Appeals Court has found that a county cannot be held liable for a failure to train unless
this failure represents a deliberate or conscious choice by the county. The court noted that
if it was obvious from the duties assigned to specific officers that enhanced training was so
necessary that any inadequacy of training would likely result" in the violation of
.
constitutional rights, then a county's failure to provide such training would amount to
deliberate indifference. But a particular officer's unsatisfactory training cannot alone
suffice to attach liability to the county, said the court. "An officer's faults may result from
factors other than the deficient training program," according to the court. Nor can an
injured party prevail merely by proving that an accident or injury could have been
avoided had an officer received enhanced training. Even adequately trained officers
sometimes err, and such error says little about their training program or the legal basis
for liability, the court noted. (Manitowoc County Sheriff's Department)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO
PROTECT
FAILURE TO
TRAIN

Feigley v. Fulcomer, 720 F.Supp. 475 (M.D. Pa. 1989). An inmate brought action
against prison officials, alleging officials were violating his eighth amendment rights by
not protecting him adequately from contracting Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(AIDS). On the prison officials' motion for summary judgment, the district court found
that the officials' practice of not testing inmates routinely for AIDS.causing virus at the
time they were received or subsequently, and not testing other inmates for the virus upon
request, did not violate the plaintiff inmate's eighth amendment rights. The court also
found that the material issue of fact precluded a summary judgment as to whether the
officials' refusal to test the inmate for the virus upon request involved unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain which is a violation of the eighth amendment. It allowed the
inmate to continue with this claim that it constitutes such a punishment to fail to relieve
the anxiety which might accompany an inmate's uncertainty as to whether he or she has a
fatal disease. It was further found by the court that the absence of evidence that prison
officials had knowledge and acquiesced in behavior by any of their subordinates who
allegedly failed to prevent, or tacitly condoned and allowed, such conduct, precluded
recovery by the inmate on the claim that officials failed adequately to prevent the spread
of the virus in violation of his eighth amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment. (State Correctional Institution, Huntingdon, Pennsylvania)

U.S. Appeals Court
FEDERAL TORI'
CLAIMS ACT

Free v. U.S.• 879 F.2d 1535 (7th Cir. 1989). A federal prisoner brought a federal tort
claims action alleging that during a shakedown of his cell, prison guards either
negligently or intentionally destroyed various items of personal hygiene, including
toothpaste and baby powder, plus a tennis shoe. The parties consent.eel to have the suit
tried by a magistrate, who held a bench trial in the penitentiary and at its conclusion
entered a judgment for the Unit.eel States. The prisoner then sought permission to appeal
in forma pauperis. The U.S. District Court denied the petition, and appeal was taken.
The appeals court found that the federal prisoner who threatened to bring a tort-claim
suit every time his cell was searched. apparently trying both to deter prison guards from
searching his cell and to obtain replacement for lost, damaged, or worn out items of
personal property at the government's expense, was abusing the judicial process in a
classic sense of using courts to pursue ends other than vindication of claims believed to be
meritorious. Thus, he was not entitled to in forma pauperis status in appeal of the
magistrate's decision in favor of the government. The request for leave to appeal in forma
pauperis was denied, and the appeal was dismissed. The court ruled that abusers of the
judicial process are not entitled to sue and appeal without paying normal f'lling fees-indeed, they are not entitled to sue and appeal, and they are not merely not to be
subsidized; they are to be sanctioned. (Federal Penitentiary, Marion, ~inois)

U.S. Appeals Court
42 U.S.C.A.
SECTION 1983

Gillihan v. Shillinger, 872 F.2d 935 (10th Cir. 1989). An inmate who had been
transferred from another prison brought a civil rights action against prison officials
after the off'JCials froze funds in his prison account until he paid for transportation
expenses. The U.S. District Court entered a judgment in favor of the off'JCials, and the
inmate appealed. The appeals court, affirming in part, reversing in part, and remanding
the case, found that the inmate's allegations were sufficient to state a civil rights claim
based on the deprivation of property without due process, but freezing of the inmate's
account was not cruel and unusual pnnishment in violation of the eighth amendment.
According to the court, the inmate had a property interest in funds in his

27.45

prison account for due process purposes, to the extent the funds constituted monies
received from friends and family outside prisons or represented wages earned while
incarcerated. Section 1983 does not distinguish between personal liberties and property
rights, and the deprivation of the latter without due process gives rise to a claim under
Section 1983. Prison officials argued that the suit should have been dismissed because
the inmate had adequate administrative and state remedies. But the court disagreed,
noting that this was not a random and unauthorized act, but one taken pursuant to
institution policy. "In such cases, the availability of an adequate state p_ost-deprivation
remedy is irrelevant... " said the court. The case was sent back to the district court to
determine the exact nature and timing of the hearing due to the inmate. (Wyoming State
~iso~
.

U.S. District Court
VICARIOUS
LIABILITY
FAILURE TO

PROTECT

FAILURE TO
SUPERVISE

State Court

DAMAGES
NEGLIGENCE

U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED

IMMUNITY
RESPONDEAT
SUPERIOR

DAMAGES

U.S. Appeals Court
VICARIOUS
. LIABll.ITY
42 U.S.C.A.
SECTION 1983

Heine v. Receiving Area Personnel, 711 F.Supp. 178 (D. Del. 1989). A new
inmate who was sexually assaulted by another inmat.-! filed a federal civil ·
rights action and pendent state law claims against two correctional officers
and three supervisory officials of the State Department of Corrections. The
district court found that the corrections officers who entrusted the plaintiff to
the other inmate were not liable under Section 1983 absent evidence that
either officer was aware that the other inmate presented a specific risk of
violent homosexual attack to new prisoners. The supervisory officials were not liable
under a civil rights provision absent any evidence that they approved of or acquiesced in
the prison policy violation. For the purposes of a federal civil rights claim, the risk that
homosexual rape will occur cannot be presumed as a matter of law every time an
individual is left unattended with a prisoner. The Commissioner of the State Department
of Corrections was not liable absent any evidence that the Commissioner played any role
in planning or development of the facility at which the assault occurred. (Multi-Purpose
Criminal Justice Facility, Delaware)
Hill v. Com., Bureau of Corrections, 555 A.2d 1362 (Pa.Cmwlth 1989). A
prisoner who was injured when he stepped in an uncovered goal post hole
while trying out for a prison baseball team on a field also used for football
sued the Bureau of Corrections. Following a verdict for the prisoner, the prisoner's motion
for a new trial on the ground of inadequacy of damages was denied by the Common Pleas
Court, and the prisoner appealed. The Commonwealth Court, reversing and remanding
with instructions, found that an award of general damages of only $1,800 in connection
with the trimalleolar fracture of the ankle was inadequate. The award of, at most, $1,800
for pain and suffering to the prisoner was inadequate, where the prisoner suffered severe
pain at the time of the accident and following the first operation and continued to
experience substantial pain for over a year, where the $1,800 general damages covered
some permanent impairment as well as pain and suffering, and was only 30% of the
special damages. The possibility of prejudice against the plaintiff as a convicted prisoner
or as a black person could not be ruled out, and there was no claim of contributory
negligence or likelihood of compromise. (State Correctional Institution, Graterford,
Pennsylvania)
Howard v. Adkison, 887 F.2d 134 (8th Cir. 1989). An inmate brought an
action against the supervisory officers at the facility at which he was confmed,
alleging the violation of his eighth amendment rights. The U.S. District Court
entered a judgment in favor of the inmate, and the defendants appealed. The
appeals court affirmed and found that the evidence concerning itlthy
conditions in the inmate's cell was suff"i.cient to support a finding that the
inmate's eighth amendment rights were violated. Supervisors at the prison are not liable
for eighth amendment claims brought under Section 1983 under the respondeat superior
theory. ~ of actual knowledge of constitutional violations is not an absolute
prerequisite for imposing supervisory liability in an action based on alleged eighth
amendment violations. The inmate's action against supervisory officers based on alleged
violation of the eighth amendment, instructing the jury to assign liability only upon a
finding that the supervisors either intentionally deprived the inmate of his right of be free
from cruel and unusual punishment or acted in reckless disregard of the inmate's rights
was proper. The difference between negligence, recklessness, and actual knowledge were
not spelled out in detail. Qualified immunity is not available to all government officials
acting within the scope of their employment. It is only for those officials who possess
discretion to decide matters in the name of public interest. The trial court set aside a jury
award of $2,000 in punitive damages against the warden. The appeals court upheld an
award of $500 actual damages, $1 nominal damages and $750 punitive damages against
the special unit manager, and $1,000 punitive damages against the lieutenant. (Missouri
DOC and Human Resources)
Hunt v. Dental Dept., 865 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1989). An inmate at the
Arizona State ~ n at Florence sued prison officials for failing to promptly
replace dentures which he lost during a prison riot. (He claimed that he was
not involved in the riot, that his dentures wen- soaking in a cup in the area
of the prison where he lived, that the riot extended into this area, and when
27.46

the riot ended his dentures were gone). He made his request for replacement of the lost
dentures in October 1986, but it wasn't until July 1987 that they were finally delivered to
him. He claimed that in the interim his remaining teeth were breaking off and his gums
were bleeding and infected. He also complained that he suffered pain and weight loss due
to his inability to eat properly.
.
The inmate appealed from an order of the district court which granted a summary
judgment for defendants in the inmate's action under Section 1983 to recover for the
defendants' deliberate indifference to his serious dental needs in violation of the eighth
amendment. The appeals court found that the director of the state Department of
Corrections could not be vicariously liable for the fault of the prison personnel. The dental
department of the state prison was immune from Section 1983 actions; and fact question
as to whether prison employees were deliberately indifferent to the inmate's serious dental
needs precluded a summary judgment. The inmate's allegations that prison officials were
aware of his bleeding gums, breaking teeth and his inability to eat properly due to the loss
of his dentures, and failed to take any action to relieve his pain or to prescribe a soft food
diet until new dentures could be fitted were sufficient to state a claim of deliberate
medical indifference under Section 1983. (State Prison, Florence, Arizona)
U.S. Appeals Court
CONTEMPI'
REMEDIES

Inmates of Allegheny County Jail v. Wecht, 874 F.2d 147 (3rd Cir. 1989).
County officials appealed from an order of the U.S. District Court entered in a
dispute over the conditions at the county jail. The court of appeals found that
an order imposing contempt sanctions for the county's violation of inmate population caps
at the jail, along with an order to close the jail was reasonable; however, an order
requiring county officials to prepare a plan for the construction of a new jail facility was
appealable. County officials could be held in contempt for failing to provide the warden at
the county jail and his staff with the ability to comply with prior orders imposing inmate
population caps and requiring trained psychiatric nurses at the jail's mental health unit.
According to the court, when the totality of conditions in a jail violates the Constitution,
the district court need not confine itself to the elimination of specific conditions; rather,
the nature of overall violation determines the permissible scope of an effective remedy.
The order prohibiting the county jail from being used to house inmates was an appropriate
remedy in the action challenging conditions at the jail, in view of the jail's lack of
adequate space. for mental health facilities, its age, size and deteriorating condition, its
persistent overcrowding problem and its small cell size. An order requiring county
officials to submit a plan for accommodating at least 900 inmates was not fmal. The order
was separable from a contempt order issued in connection with the county's violation of a
population cap at the county jail, and was not sufficiently specific to be more than a step
toward the selection of the remedy for constitutional violations addressed. (Allegheny
County Jail, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
42 U.S.C.A.
SECTION 1983
QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY

Langley v. Coughlin, 709 F.Supp. 482 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). Female inmates
brought a class action against correctional authorities alleging violations of
their eighth amendment rights arising from conditions of commement in a
"solitary" unit. Correctional authorities moved for summary judgment on the
grounds of qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion for
summary judgment, finding that the correctional authorities responsible for designing and
implementing the inmate programs were not entitled to qualified immunity against the
claims that female inmates were not provided .with medical treatment and that mentally
balanced inmates were housed with inmates who suffered from chronic mental illness.
The Commissioner of the New York State Department of Correctional Services could be
held liable in the Section 1983 suit to the ext.ent he failed to develop and implement
programs and policies regarding the treatment of mentally ill inmates or delegated that
responsibility to others whom he then failed to supervise adequately. (Bedford Hills
Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONTRACT·
SERVICES

Leach v. ShelhY County Sheriff, 891 F.2d 1241 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct.
2173. A paraplegic inmate filed a suit against the mayor and county sheriff, claiming
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The U.S. District Court entered a
judgment awarding $10,000 to the inmate. The mayor and sheriff appealed. The appeals
court found that the evidence demonstrated a policy or custom of deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs of paraplegic inmates, for purposes of holding the mayor and sheriff
liable in their official capacities. The sheriff had the responsibility of conforming to at
least minimal constitutional standards in providing and maintaining adequate bedding,
toiletries, and cleanliness. The court held that this rose to the level of a policy of ·
deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. And it rejected the argument that
because the state law of Tennessee allowed the sheriff to subcontract away the medical
care of inmates, this excused the county from liability. (Shelby County Jail, Tennessee)

71.47

U.S. Appeals Court
42 U.S.C.A.
SECTION 1983
DAMAGES
DETJBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Mandel v. Doe. 888 F.2d 783 (11th Cir. 1989). A prisoner brought a civil
rights action under Section 1983 against the county. alleging he was injured
by a physician assistant's deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs
while he was a prisoner at a county road prison. The U.S. District Court
rendered a judgment for the prisoner on a jury verdict and awarded $500.000
damages, and the county appealed. The appeals court affirmed the decision,
finding that the evidence established that the physician's assistant's treatment of the
prisoner after he injured his leg constituted deliberate indifference to the prisoner's
serious medical needs, and evidence established the physician's assistant was acting as a
final policymaker for the county with respect to medical affairs at the road prison. The
prisoner had serious medical needs once he injured his leg while jumping off the truck
bed, the physician's assistant's knowledge of the need for medical care was·conelusively
established, the physician's assistant never apprised his superior; a medical doctor, of the
prisoner's situation, obtained an x-ray of the prisoner's leg, or had the prisoner examined
by a doctor or taken to a hospital, despite repeated requests by the prisoner and his
parents directed toward the physician's assistant and the prison superintendent. The ·
county maintained that the mere denial of Mandel's request for an x-ray did not amount
to deliberate indifference. However, the court found that the record was "replete with
evidence of serious medical need, grossly deficient treatment and callous indifference.•
(Escambia County Prison, Cantonment, Florida)

U.S. Appeals Court
VIOLATION OF
COURl' ORDER

Morales-Feliciano v. Parole Bd. of Com. of P.R.. 887 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
110 S.Ct. 1511. The U.S. Supreme Court has refused to overturn a lower court
decision which held the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in contempt for keeping
prisoners confined in less than 35 square feet of space in violation of a 1987 court order.
The U.S. Court of Appeals had affirmed the decision and found that the civil contempt
order was appealable. The Commonwealth's compliance was not so substantial as to
invalidate a finding of contempt, and the Commonwealth's good-faith efforts to comply
with the remedial order did not excuse the noncompliance. The sanction of $50 per excess
prisoner per day, with a rate increase of $10 per month, was not unlawfully high, and the
Commonwealth was not entitled to an oral hearing prior to the entry of the contempt
order. (Commonwealth, Puerto Rico)

U.S. District Court
42 U.S.C.A.
SECTION 1983
PUNITIVE
DAMAGES

Mosier v. Robinson. 722 F.Supp. 555 (W.D. Ark. 1989). An arrestee who was
allegedly beaten by an intoxicated sheriff sued the sheriff, deputy sheriff, and
the county which employed them. In his complaint, the plaintiff alleged that
he was taken into custody and transported to the county jail. The plaintiff
stated that upon his arrival at the jail, the sheriff beat and choked him
without provocation, that the plaintiff offered no resistance, and that the
arresting officer made no attempt to stop the attack. The plaintiff further
contended that at the time of the attack, the sheriff was under the influence of alcohol,
and that he had acted in his official capacity as sheriff while under the influence of
alcohol on previous occasions. The county moved for summary judgment. The district
court found that the county was not subject to tort li~bility or liability for punitive
damages, and the county was potentially liable for the arrestee's Section 1983 claim. The
county policy of condoning violations by the sheriff could be inferred from the failure to
take action on the sheriff's alleged violations of department policies occurring over a
period of time. (Ashley County Jail, Arkansas)

TORT

LIABILITY

U.S. District Court
42 U.S.C.A.
SECTION 1983
MUNICIPAL

LIABILITY

U.S. District Court
CONTEMPI'
VIOLATION OF
COURl' ORDER

Muhammad v. McMickens, 708 F.Supp. 007 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). A former prison
inmate brought an action under Section 1983 against prison authorities
alleging that they violated his rights under the first and fourteenth
amendments to the free exercise of his Muslim faith. Upon the defendants'
motions for summary judgment, the district court found that single instances
of missing one meal prepared in a manner consistent with dictates of the inmate's Muslim
religion and of being required to pray in unsanitary surroundings did not invoke
municipal liability under Section 1983, absent proof of a municipal policy. The court also
found that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the inmate's religious
dietary obligations were suff"iciently accommodated during his incarceration. (House of
Detention for Men, Rilters Island, New York)
Palmigiano v. DiPrete, 710 F.Supp. 875 (D. R.I. 1989). Rhode Island officials
failed to rid themselves of contempt by bringing a correctional facility into
compliance with standing orders of the district court governing the conditions
of conf"mement of pretrial detainees. The f"tling by the Governor and Director
of the Rhode Island Department of Corrections of a long-range plan designed to address
the growing need for additional space throughout the state correctional system was not
the specif"ic and detailed plan that the district court had ordered to take care of the
overcrowding problem for the pretrial detainees. Thus, the Governor and Direct.or were in
contempt. The crm of an impossibility defense to a contempt charge is a lack of power to
carry out orders of the court due to circwnstances beyond one's control and means literal
inability to take steps necessary to comply with a judicial order or
27.48

consent decree, not simply the unwillingness to take action because contemn.or perceives
st.eps that actually can be taken as politically costly or ideologically repugnant. In light of
many st.eps available to the Rhode Island Governor and the Director of the State
Department of Corrections to take care of overcrowding at the prison in.take service center,
compliance with previous district court orders regarding overcrowding was within the
power of the Governor and the Director, and factual impossibility was not a defense to the
con.tempt proceedings for failure to comply with those orders. (Adult Correction.al
Institutions, Rhode Island)
.
U.S. Appeals Court
COMPENSATORY .
DAMAGES
42U.S.C.A.
SECTION 1983
PUNITIVE
DAMAGES

Parker v. Williams, 862 F.2d 1471 (11th Cir. 1989). An arrestee who was
kidnapped and raped by a county jail chief jailer brought action under state
law and federal civil rights law against the chief jailer, the county sheriff, the
county, and individual county commissioners. The U.S. District Court entered
a judgment on jury verdict awarding compensatory damages of $100,000, and
punitive damages of $100,000 against the sheriff and the county, and appeal
was taken. The appeals court certified the question. to the Supreme Court
and received a response, 519 So.2d 442; thereafter, the court of appeals withdrew its
initial opinion, 855 F.2d 763. As a result, the judgments against the sheriff and county
were vacated and the case was reversed and remanded. The court found that the chief
jailer's criminal conviction. for kidnapping and rape did not collaterally est.op the sheriff
and county from challenging the fact of the rape. The sheriff and county could not be held
liable on the arrestee's state law claims. The eleven.th amendment barred the claim
against the sheriff in his official capacity. The sheriff was not en.titled to qualified
immunity from the suit in his individual capacity; and the county could be sued under
Section 1983 for the actions taken by the sheriff in hiring and training the chief jailer.
The court stated that the county did not have to exercise a direct control over the county
sheriff with respect to the sheriff's hiring and promoting the chief jailer who subsequently
kidnapped and raped the arrestee in order to be held liable under Section 1983. (Macon
County Jail, Alabama)

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY

Rain.es v. Lack, 714 F.Supp. 889 (M.D. Tenn. 1989). An in.mate brought an
action again.st prison officials alleging a deprivation. of due process in
connection. with his administrative segregation.. On the in.mate's motion for
summary judgment, the district court found that the in.mate was afforded all process he
was due at the transferee prison, and although the warden at the first prison deprived the
in.mate of due process, the warden was en.titled to qualified immunity from liability for
damages. The in.mate was confmed to administrative segregation. and transferred to
another institution. based upon allegations that he had instigated or participated in a
prison riot and had the due process right only to receive the notice of the charges again.st
him and an opportunity to present his views to prison officials. More formal procedures
afforded to in.mates faced with losing good-time credits and disciplinary segregation. were
not required. The in.mate, who was placed in administrative segregation. because of his
suspected role in a prison riot was not denied due process upon his transfer to the state
prison. The defendant received an informal review eight days after his transfer, at which
time he was aware of charges against him and had an opportunity to present his views to
the review board, though the hearing involved no additional review of evidence underlying
the initial segregation.. The warden who deprived the in.mate of due process by failing to
in.form him and the disciplinary board of the factual basis for his disagreement with the
board's recommendation. that the in.mate be released from administrative segregation, was
en.titled to qualified immunity. It was not clear that the warden needed to provide
aeything more than a general statement of charges, or that a more specific statement was
required in the event the warden disagreed with the board's recommendation.. (Turney
Center Prison, Only, Tennessee)

State Court
DAMAGES
NEGLIGENCE
CONTRACT
SERVICES

Rivers v. State, 537 N.Y.S.2d 968 (Ct.Cl. 1989). An in.mate sued the State to
recover for damages resulting from the performance of a wrong operation. by a
private physician. in an outside facility at the request of the State. The court
of claims found that the State was not negligent for the failure to forward the
in.mate's medical records to the outside hospital, or to insist that the surgeon
examine the in.mate, prior to surgery. Evidence supported the imding that the doct.or was
negligent, despite the absence of expert testimony as to the standards of care in the
community, the State was vicariously liable for the negligence of the doctor, by virtue of
owing a non.delegable duty to the in.mate to provide reason.able and adequate medical care,
regardless of whether the doctor was characterized as an employee or an in.dependent
con.tractor, and the amount recovered by the doctor in an in.dependent lawsuit would be
deducted from recovery against the State. The State owed the inmate a non.delegable duty
to provide reason.able and adequate medical care, and thus was liable when the outside
surgeon it retained performed the wrong surgery on the in.mate, following the in.mate's
transfer to an outside facility, regardless of whether the outside surgeon was characterized
as an employee or in.dependent con.tractor. (Greene Correction.al Facility, New York)

27.49

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO
PROTECT
42 U.S.C.A.
SECTION 1983

Robinson v. Estat.e of Williams, 721 F.Supp. 806 (S.D.Miss. 1989). The wife of
a man who was killed by two escaped jail prisoners sued the county sheriff,
alleging that it was negligence on his part or on the part of his agents,
servants or employees that allowed them to escape, that security at the jail
was dangerously inadequat.e and that it was negligent to fail to properly
inform the public of the escape. The court noted that the sheriff in Mississippi is charged
with the duty to safely keep his prisoners in the jail and to seek to prevent escape.
However, as these duties are owed to the general public, rather than to any individual
person, the court found that there could be no liability in the absence of a "special
relationship" with the deceased man. The sheriff owed no duty of care to the deceased
man or his spouse. (Clarke County Jail, Mississippi)

U.S. Appeals Court
COMPENSATORY
DAMAGES
NOMINAL
DAMAGES
PUNITIVE
DAMAGES

Taylor v. Green, 868 F.2d 162 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 127. A state
inmat.e brought an action for damages against various prison officials, alle~ :the
defendants violated his rights by causing three "Support Service Ininat.es" to attack and
seriously injure him. The U.S. District Court ent.ered a judgment jury verdict
awarding punitive but no compensatory damages to the inmat.e, and the
inmat.e appealed. The appeals court found that the inmat.e was not entitled to
a new trial; the court could not add to the amount of the verdict either
compensatory or punitive damages; and the inmate was entitled to nominal damages. The
jury awarded punitive damages of $200 from each of the defendants, but no compensatory
damages. On appeal, the court upheld the jury verdict but also awarded the inmat.e
nominal damages of $1. (Texas Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
42 U.S.C.A.
SECTION 1983
CONTRACT
SERVICES
VICARIOUS

Temple v. Albert, 719 F.Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). A prison inmate brought
a civil rights action against hospital and special officers and a privat.e doctor
employed by the hospital, alleging a violation of his civil rights. The plaintiff
was arrested in connection with a crime that allegedly occurred at the
Columbia Presbyterian Hospital. The plaintiff was apprehended by the
officers, who were employed as security guards by the hospital. The plaintiff's
complaint raised two distinct claims. First, the plaintiff asserted that he was
assaulted by the security staff at the hospital upon his arrest, and continuously thereafter
while he was handcuffed and unable to resist. Second, the plaintiff contended that he was
denied medical attention by the medical staff at the hospital. The officers and the doctor
claim that they are privat.e citizens, and that therefore they did not act ''under color of
stat.e law," depriving the court of subject matt.er jurisdiction. The hospital avers that it
may not be held vicariously liable in a Section 1983 action.
The district court found that the officers were stat.e actors; the allegations that the
doctor conspired with the officers satisfied the requirement for maintaining a civil rights
action against the doctor; and the privat.e corporate employer was not vicariously liable.
Special officers paid by the privat.e hospital were stat.e actors for the purposes of the
prison inmate's civil rights action where they were also special patrolmen appointed by
the city police commissioner and acted pursuant to the statutory grant of police power.
(Fishkill Correctional Facility, New York)

LIABILITY

U.S. Supreme Court
42 U.S.C.A.
SECTION 1983
GOVERNMENTAL

LIABILITY

Will v. Michigan Dept. of Stat.e Police, 109 S.Ct. 2304 (1989). A Michigan
stat.e employee brought an action against the Department of Stat.e Police and
its director under the federal civil rights statute. The court of claims ent.ered
a judgment for the employee, and the Department and director appealed. The
court of appeals vacated in part and remanded in part. On appeal, the
Michigan Supreme Court aff'll'Dled in part and reversed in part, and certiorari was
granted. The U.S. Supreme Court, aff'll'Dling the decision, found that neither the state nor
its officials acting in their official capacities were "persons" under the federal civil rights
statut.e.
The petitioner filed Michigan stat.e court suits under 42 U.S.C.A. Section 1983 alleging
that the respondents, the Department of State Police and the Director of State Police in
his official capacity, had denied him a promotion for an improper reason. The stat.e court
judge ruled for the petitioner, finding that both respondents were "persons" under Section
1983, which provides that any person who deprives an individual of his or her
constitutional rights under color of stat.e law shall be liable to that individual. However,
the stat.e court of appeals vacated the judgment against the Department, holding that a
Stat.e is not a person under Section 1983, and remanded the case for a determination of
the Director's possible immunity. The Michigan Supreme Court affirmed in part and
reversed in part, agreeing that the Stat.e is not a person under Section 1983, but holding
that a stat.e official acting in his or her official capacity also is not such a person.
Held: Neither States nor Stat.e officials acting in their official capacities are "persons"
within the meaning of Section 1983. Pp. 2307-2312.
(a) That a Stat.e is not a person under Section 1983 is supported by the statute's
language, congressional purpose, and legislative history. In common usage, the term
"person" does not include a Stat.e. This usage is particularly applicable where it is claimed
that Congress had subjected the Stat.es to liability to which they had not been subject
before. Reading Section 1983 t.o include States would be a decidedly awkward
27.50

way of expressing such a congressional intent. The statute's language also falls short of
satisfying the ordinary rule of statutory construction that Congress must make its
intention t.o alt.er the constitutional balance between the stat.es and the federal
government unmistakably clear in a statute's language. Moreover, the doc;trine of
sovereign immunity is one of the well-established common-law immunities and defenses
that Congress did not int.end t.o override in enacting section 1983. Cf. City of Newport v.
Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 101 S.Ct. 2748, 69 L.Ed.2d 616; Railroad Co. v.
Tennessee, 101 U.S. 337, 25 LEd. 960. The "Dictionary Act" provision that a "person"
includes ''bodies politic and corporate" fails t.o evidence such an intent. This Court's ruling
in Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56
L.Ed.2d 611-- which held that a municipality is a person under Section 1983-- is not t.o the
contrary, since Stat.es are prot.ected by the eleventh amendment while municipalities are
not. Pp. 2307-2311.
(b) A suit against state officials in their official capacities is not a suit against the
officials but rather is a suit against the officials' offices and, thus, is no different from a
suit against the State itself. (Michigan Department of State Police)
U.S. Appeals Court
42 U.S.C.A.
SECTION 1983

Wilson v. Brown, 889 F.2d 1195 (1st Cir. 1989). A prisoner sued the warden
of a Rhode Island state prison in his official capacity for money damages
under 42 U.S.C.A. Section 1983, alleging that his transfer to a Massachusetts
prison was unconstitutional as a violation of due process and the New England Interstate
Corrections Compact. The inmate sought compensation for alleged resulting mental and
physical anguish, his divorce from his wife, psychological assistance his son required as a
result of the transfer, his inability t.o see relatives, and other purported injuries. The
court entered a summary judgment for the defendant. The appellate court affirmed,
noting that each of these allegations sought monetary damages and that injunctive relief
would not be an appropriate remedy for any of the alleged injustices. Because the U.S.
Supreme Court, in Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 108 S.Ct. 1466 (1989) held that
state are not "persons" amendable t.o suit under 42 U.S.C.A. Section 1983, the court found
that the inmate could not sue the warden in his official capacity for such damages. While
a state official may be enjoined against future violations of an inmate's rights,
"retrospective relief" is barred, the court noted, and in any event, the inmate in this case
did not seek injunctive relief. (Rhode Island Adult Correctional Institution)
1990

U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY

Alexander v. Perrill, 916 F.2d 1392 (9th Cir. 1990). An inmate brought an action against
a warden and administrative systems manager for failure t.o investigate a claim that his
sentence was miscalculated. The district court denied the defendant's motion for summary
judgment on defense of qualified immunity, and the defendant appealed. The appeals
court affirmed the district court decision and found that the obligation of the warden and
administrative systems manager t.o investigate an inmate's claim of miscalculation of a
sentence did not need t.o be set out in decisional law in order t.o be a clearly established
duty under the qualified immunity doctrine. Prison officials who were under a duty t.o
investigate claims of computational errors in the calculation of prison sentences may be
liable for failure t.o do so when a reasonable request is made. (Federal Correctional
Institution, Tucson, Arizona)

U.S. Appeals Court
VICARIOUS

Bailey v. Wood. 909 F.2d 1197 (8th Cir. 1990). An inmate who had been assaulted by
another inmate brought a civil rights action against the warden for allegedly subjecting
him t.o cruel and unusual punishment contrary t.o the eighth amendment. The U.S.
District Court entered judgment in favor of the prisoner and the· warden appealed. The
court of appeals held that the warden t.ook reasonable steps t.o prevent the assault and
was not "deliberately indifferent" t.o the prisoner's rights, reversing the lower court
decision. According t.o the court, vicarious civil rights liability could not be imposed on the
warden for a guard's negligence and possible deliberate indifference t.o the inmate's right
t.o be free from violent attacks. The guard left his post, permitting a prisoner who had
previously been involved in altercations with the inmate t.o enter the inmate's cell and
stab him with a homemade weapon. To make out an eighth amendment claim against the
warden, the prisoner had t.o show that the warden was "deliberately indifferent" t.o his
rights, ie., that the warden either intentionally deprived the prisoner of rights or acted in
reckless disregard of rights. To establish that the warden acted in "reckless disregard" of
eighth amendment rights, the prisqner had t.o show that he was faced with pervasive risk
of harm and that the warden failed t.o reasonably respond t.o that risk. According t.o·the
court, the warden t.ook reasonable steps t.o respond t.o threats which the prisoner faced
from another inmate by transferring the inmate t.o a complex at the other end of the
prison, and was not "deliberately indifferent" t.o the prisoner's rights, within the meaning
of the eighth amendment, merely because he failed t.o anticipate that the guard would
leave his post and permit the inmate t.o gain access t.o the prisoner's cell. The court noted
that •... this case is one of an increasing number involving an assault by one prisoner on
another in a state prison." (Minnesota Correctional Facility, Oak Park Heights,

LIABILITY

Minnesota)

27.51

U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED

IMMUNITY

Bee v. Greaves. 910 F.2d 686 (10th Cir. 1990). A former pretrial detainee brought an
action. against a physician., challenging his involuntary medication. while confined.
According to the court. law relative to forced medication. clearly established the
detain.ee's right to refuse the unwant.ed administration. of antipsychotic drugs. The jail
psychiatrist administered the medication. to the pretrial detainee again.st his wishes.
appeals court found that a Utah law allowing involuntary medication. of a mental patient
did not give a jail psychiatrist qualified immunity from liability for involuntary medication.
of a pretrial detainee since Utah law applied only aft.er a judicial involuntary commitment
proceeding, which was not provided to the detainee. (Salt Lake County Jail, Utah)

The

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO

PROTECT

Berey v. City of Muskogee, 900 F.2d· 1489 (10th Cir, 1990). The widow of an. in.mate
who was killed by fellow inmates brought a civil rights action. again.st the city. In.
vacating and remanding the district court's decision., the appeals court stat.eel that
eighth amendment standards, rather than due process standards that are applicable to
pretrial detainees. apply to incarcerat.ed persons whose guilt has been. adjudicat.ed
formally but who await sentencing.
The safety and bodily integrity of a convicted prisonef implicates both the eighth
amendment's prohibition. against cruel and unusual punishment and the fourteen.th
amendment's substantive protection. against state deprivation. of life and liberty without
due process of law. The city can.not absolutely guarantee the safety of its jailed prisoners,
but it has a constitutional duty to take reason.able steps to protect the prisoners' safety
and bodily integrity. A municipality is liable under Section. 1983 if there is a direct causal
connection. between. the municipality policies in question. and the constitution.al
deprivation.. (Muskogee City-Federal Jail. Oklahoma)

U.S. District Court
DAMAGES

Davis v. Village of Calumet Park. 737 F.Supp. 1039 (N.D. Ill. 1990), reversed. 936 F.2d
971. A defendant brought a Section. 1983 action. alleging that village officials
unconstitutionally denied the defendant, while a pretrial detainee, access to adequate
medical care. After a trial by jury, the defendant was awarded $1 in compensatory
damages and $1,500 in punitive damages. The federal appeals court reversed the
decision.. fmding that an. objectively reason.able officer would not have thought the injuries
were serious. (Village of Calumet Park. Illinois Jail)

U.S. Appeals Court
RESPONDEAT
SUPERIOR

Fruit v. Norris. 905 F.2d 1147 (8th Cir. 1990). Inmates brought a civil rights action.
against prison. officials asserting constitutional violations in relation. to their being
disciplined for refusing to assist the prison. maintenance supervisor in cleaning out the
wet-well portion. of the prison's raw sewage lift-pump station. without protective clothing
and equipment. The U.S. District Court dismissed aft.er presentation. of the inmates' case
and the inmates appealed. The appeals court found that the in.mates established a prima
facie eighth amendment violation. and the warden. could be held liable for such a violation..
It was found by the court that the prison. in.mates are protected from punishment for
refusing to perform an unconstitutional assignment, as they are protected from having to
perform assignment. Certain. acts or omissions are so dangerous in respect to health or
safety that the knowledge of risk on. the part of the prison. officials can. be inferred, for the
purposes of the inmates' eighth amendment claim. Irrespective of whether the officials
had actual or constructive knowledge of the presence of toxic or explosive gases in wetwell, in view of the evidence present.eel regarding the danger of heat stroke, risk of
contracting a disease from con.tact with raw sewage, and general undesirability of being in
close prmimity to humane waste; forcing in.mates to work in shower of human excrement
without protective clothing and equipment would be inconsistent with any standard of
decency.
While supervisors are not liable under Section. 1983 on. a respon.deat superior theory,
they can. be liable for their person.al involvement in a constitution.al violation., or when.
their corrective action. amounts to deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization. of
violative practices. While the deprivation. of good-time credits claimed in. a civil rights
action. would have been. properly brought in a habeas action., rather than a civil rights
action., the state waived the ezhaustion. requirement by failing to notify the district court
that inmates had not exhausted their claims in. state court. (Tucker Maximum Security
Un.it, Arkansas Dept. of Corr.)

U.S. District Court
CONSENT DECREE

Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail v. Kearney:. 734 F.Supp. 561 (D. Mass. 1990). The
county sheriff f':ded a motion to modify a consent decree. The district court found that the
con.sent decree requiring the con.st.ruction. of a new jail with single occupancy cells would
not be modif'ied to permit double occupancy in most of the cells, despite a U.S. Supreme
Court ruling upholding the practice of double-bunking, increases in the pretrial detainee
population., and a possibility that the release of some pretrial detainees would result if
double occupancy were not permitted. Ac:cordiDg to the court, for purposes of determining
whether to modify a consent decree, the party uncertain. as to whether the law would
require results proposed to be included in a consent decree could have withheld the
consent, and appealed the decision. of the district court if it held against that party.
(Suffolk County Jail, Massachusetts)

27.52

U.S. Appeals Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
PERSONAL
LIABILITY

Johnson v. Hardin County. Ky., 908 F.2d 1280 (6th Cir. 1990). A prisoner
brought a suit against an elected county jailer, his first assistant, and the
county, as well as other defendants, alleging a deliberate indifference to his
serious medical needs. The U.S. District Court entered a judgment on jury
verdicts of $15,000 against the county and $1,000 each against the jailer and his
first assistant and awarded the prisoner $20,173 in attorney fees and expenses, and the
defendants appealed. The court of appeals, reversing and remanding, found that a
reasonable jury could determine that jail officials were deliberately indifferent 'b> the
prisoner's serious medical needs. The county could not be held liable for the jailers'
actions, where there was no evidence indicating that the jailer was invested with the
authority 'b> make all of the county's medical policy decisions and there was no evidence
demonstrating that mistreatment had become cus'b>m in the jail tantamount 'b> rule of law.
Remand was required on the award of attorneys fees in light. of the reversal on the part of
the judgment in favor of the prisoner and the district court's failure 'b> explain a reason for
applying a multiplier.
The evidence was sufficient 'b> support a jury determination that the jailer and the
officer who was his chief assistant were deliberately indifferent 'b> the prisoner's medical
needs, given the credible testimoey that the prisoner was denied a prescribed pain relief
medication for leg problems and hairline fracture, denied access 'b> the shower facilities,
denied crutches and denied additional bedding 'b> elevate his legs, in spite of his repeated
requests and complaints made personally 'b> jailers. The authorization given 'b> an elected
jailer for the county detention center 'b> make policy decisions on prisoner care did not
constitute policy decision of the state so as 'b> render the county liable for the jailer's
deliberate indifference 'b> the prisoner's serious medical needs. Recovery was not
permissible where evidence would not permit a conclusion that the elected jailer was
vested with the final authority 'b> set medical treatment policies for the county's prisoners.
The county could not be held liable for the jail officials' deliberate indifference 'b> the
prisoner's serious medical needs based on the fact that the doc'b>r visited the prison only
one day per week, where the prisoner showed no causal connection between the failure 'b>
have a doc'b>r on site and his injuries. The county jail prisoner did not produce enough
evidence 'b> demonstrate that his mistreatment was emblematic of mistreatment which
had become a custom in the prison tantamount 'b> rule of law, so as 'b> hold the county
liable for the jailer's deliberate indifference 'b> his serious medical needs, even though
evidence did show that the prisoner was denied proper medical care during his more than
three-month recovery from a prison fall. The mistreatment of the prisoner alone was
insufficient 'b> establish a custom of mistreatment.
Where the success in the prisoner's civil rights claim was reduced on appeal, as a
result of the finding that the county could not be held liable for the jailers' deliberate
indifference 'b> the prisoner's serious medical needs, a remand was required on the issue of
the application of the 1.5 multiplier 'b> lodestar figure for the attorney fees, particularly in
light of the district court's failure to explain the reasons for its enhancement of the case.
(Hardin County Detention Center, Kentucky)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO
PROTECT
PUNITIVE
DAMAGES

Lewis v. Parish of Terrebonne, 894.F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1990). The widow and
children of an inmate who committed suicide while placed in solitary
confinement brought a civil rights action against the warden of the jail, the
parish and other defendants. The U.S. District Court entered a judgment in
favor of the plaintiffs, but awarded only punitive damages, and both sides
appealed. The appeals court found that the finding that the warden had been deliberately
indifferent 'b> the inmate's serious medical needs was sufficiently supported by evidence.
The exclusion of evidence of the defendants' liability insurance was not an abuse of
discretion, notwithstanding that the plaintiffs had made a punitive damages claim; but
the action would be remanded 'b> a district judge for determination as 'b> damages suffered
by the inmate immediately prior 'b> death. A punitive damages award was sufficiently
supported by evidence of the warden's callous indifference 'b> the inmate's serious medical
needs, in failing 'b> deprive him of death dealing instrumentalities and placing him in
solitary conf'mement even though he knew or should have known of the inmate's suicidal
tendencies. (Terrebonne Parish Jail, Houma, Louisiana)

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED

Lvons v. Powell, 729 F.Supp. 1404 (D. N.H. 1990). A pretrial detainee, who had been at a
state prison and was transferred 'b> a federal facility, filed a civil rights lawsuit
complaining that he was commed 'b> a cell for 22-23 hours per day during a 27 day period
at the federal facility, during which time he was forced 'b> sleep on a mattress on the floor.
The federal prison officials filed a motion, stating that they were entitled 'b> qualified
immunity. The court denied the motion, noting that the defendants had a duty 'b> check
on the institutions where federal pre-trial detainees were lodged and were also respoDSl'ble
for aey omissions they made in a supervisory capacity. (New Hampshire State Prison)

IMMUNITY

U.S. Appeals Court
CONSENT DECREE

McDonald v. Armontrout, 908 F.2d 388 (8th Cir. 1990). An appeal was taken
from an order of the U.S. District Court modifying a consent decree entered in
an action concerning the conditions in the prison's capital punishment unit. The appeals
court affirmed the decision, finding that the plan 'b> move the prison's capital p 11nisbment
27.53

unit to a new facility was a change in circumstance that warranted modification of the
consent decree governing conditions at the old facility, and the modifications of the
consent decree satisfied constitutional requirements, although access to recreational
activities and telephones would be more restricted at the new facility for some inmates.
The new facility could accommodate a larger classification syst.em, entitling inmates with
less restrictive classifications to more recreation time and other additional benefits.
(Missouri State Penitentiary)
U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO
PROTECT
PUNITIVE
DAMAGES

McHenry v. Chadwick, 896 F.2d 184 (6th Cir. 1990). An inmate brought a
civil rights action against correctional officers alleging that they assaulted
him. The U.S. District Court entered a judgment in favor of the inmate, and
the correctional officers appealed. The appeals court affirmed the decision and
found that is was not necessary that the inmate suffer severe injury for the
correctional officers' infliction of unnecessary and wanton pain on him to amount to an
eighth amendment violation. Evidence supported a claim that correctional officers
breached a duty to protect the inmate from other correctional officers' assault. It was also
found that evidence that correctional officers did not conduct an investigation as to
allegations made by.fellow inmates who "checked in" to protAtctive custodY, allegedly to
avoid the plaintiff inmate was admissible in the inmate's civil rights action against the
correctional officers claiming he was assaulted by police officers. The evidence was
relevant to the issue of whether the officers acted willfully and maliciously in their
treatment of the inmate which would have subjected them to liability for punitive
damages. (BrU;Shy Mountain Penitentiary, Petros, Tennessee)

U.S. District Court
STATUTES
(PREVENTING
LAWSUITS)
42 U.S.C.A.
SECTION 1983

McKenzie v. Crotty. 738 F.Supp. 1287 (D.S.D. 1990). A former jail inmate
sued the sheriff and the county board under Section 1983, seeking damages
for treatment while he was in the county jail and requesting a class action
certification. The sheriff and board moved for a partial summary judgment, a
summary judgment and a judgment on the pleadings. The district court found
that the state statutes conferring immunity on public employees with respect
to jail conditions were preempted by Section 1983; an immunity claim was sufficiently
frivolous to warrant a holding of a hearing to determine whether sanctions should be
applied under Rule 11; and the former inmate was an adequate representative of the
class, for class action purposes, even though he had been released from jail one day aft.er
the suit was instituted; sufficient guarantees that the suit would be properly prosecuted
were provided by the representative seeking monetary damages and from the experience
and competency of his trial counsel. (Lawrence County Jail, South Dakota)

U.S. District Court
42 U.S.C.A.
SECTION 1983
NEGLIGENCE

Rocheleau v. Cumberland County Sheriff's Department, 733 F.Supp. 140 (D ..
Me. 1990). An inmate brought a civil rights action against jail officials
alleging he sustained injuries while incarcerated at a county jail when he
tripped on an open floor drain, hit the jail wall, and broke his nose. The
court found that the plaintiff's complaint alleged nothing more than mere negligence on
the part of the defendants. The plaintiff did not allege either a deliberate or conscious
indifference on the part of the jail officials. Rather, the uncontroverted facts demonstrate,
and the plaintiff conceded in his complaint, that immediately following the mishap, jail
officials rushed the plaintiff to the hospital for treatment and a few days later took him to
a specialist. The district court found that the complaint alleged nothing more than
negligence and failed to state a claim under Section 1983. (Cumberland County Jail,
Maine)

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED

Scott v. Coughlin, 727 F.Supp. 806 (W.D.N.Y. 1990). An inmate filed a prose
civil rights petition alleging that prison officials improperly confined him to
"keeplock" for a total of 14 days. On the inmate's motion for summary
judgment on the issue of improper confinement, the district court found that the officials'
placement of an inmate in'"keeplock" without issuing a misbehavior report or conducting a
disciplinary hearing violated the inmate's due process rights, and the officials were not
entitled to qualified immunity for failure to f'lle a misbehavior report at any point during
the inmate's stay in keeplock., which clearly defied well-delineated boundaries of official
discretion. The inmate was inexcusably denied an opportunity to be heard for an
"indefinite period of time," particularly absent an allegation of any circumstances
justifying postponement. (Southport Correctional Facility and Elmira Correctional
Facility, New York)

IMMUNITY

U.S. Appeals Court
FEDERAL TORT
CLAIMS ACT

Sellers v. U.S., 902 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1990). An inmate whose property had
been lost following confiscation during a prison lockdown brought a Bivens
action against the warden and three guards. The U.S. District Court entered
judgment in favor of the inmate pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act, aft.er the Bivens
action had previously been dismissed against the individuals, and appeal was taken. The
. court of appeals, affirming in part, reversing and remanding in part, found that remand
was required to permit the district court to address the issue of the lost books, and the
marshals' failure to take appropriate st.eps in att.empting to obtain service upon the former
27.54

guards and the warden constituted good cause why the service was not effectuated within
a 120-day period. The magistrate's award to the inmate of $100 for an oil painting lost by
guards in the federal prison during the inmate's incarceration was not improper; nothing
in record suggested that the painting had any market value, and although the inmate
attached a value of $200 to it, the magistrate was not required to accept it. A letter from
a prisoner-artist supporting the inmate's valuation of the painting was inadmissible in the
inmate's action brought pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act. The letter was hearsay
and speculative. (Federal Prison, Marion Illinois)
U.S. District Court
CONTEMPI'

Shaw v. Allen, 771 F.Supp. 760 (S.D. W.Va. 1990). A class of inmates brought a petition
for contempt, alleging that prison officials were in contempt of previous orders requiring
that conditions of the county jail be in compliance with constitutional standards. The
district court found that the failure of officials to bring the conditions in the county jail up
to constitutional standards warranted appointment of a receiver to operate the jail.
According to the court, there was a dismal hist.ory of no~mpliance and allowing
additional time for compliance would only likely result in additional injunctions or
contempt proceedings and would offer little hope of anything other than further
confrontations and delays. (McDowell County Jail, West Virginia)

U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED

Simpson v. Hines, 903 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1990). A prisoner's survivors brought a Section
1983 action against police officers to recover for the death of a prisoner from alleged
use of excessive force and lack of medical care. The officers moved for summary judgment
on the basis of qualified immunity. The U.S. District Court denied the motion, and the
officers appealed. The court of appeals, affirming in part, reversing in part, and
dismissing in part, found that the officers who had entered the cell were not entitled to
qualified immunity.
The police officers were not entitled to qualified immunity in the 1983 action to
recover for the death of the prisoner from asphyxia after being searched and subdued,
even though no evidence indicated that each officer's actions caused severe injuries. The
captain admitted placing the prisoner in a neck hold and exerting sufficient pressure to
subdue him, another officer sat on the prisoner, a tape recording allegedly indicated the
prisoner's screams and repeated cries for mercy and contained statements from which the
trier-of-fact could infer malice, and the officers discussed beforehand how to handle the
situation and functioned as a unit once inside the cell. The officers knew that the
prisoner heavily exerted himself and was "strung out" on drugs, and the tape recording
indicated that the officers paid scant attention to the prisoner's physical condition during
the approximately five minutes between the lapse into silence and the officers' exit from
the cell. (Cleveland City Jail, Texas)

IMMUNITY

U.S. District Court
42 U.S.C.A.
SECTION 1983
PUNITIVE
DAMAGES
REMEDIES

Tasker v. Moore, 738 F.Supp. 1005 (S.D. W.Va. 1990). Former inmates
brought a Section 1983 action against the former Commissioner of the
Department of Corrections, the former prison warden and the former Governor
of West Virginia, alleging that a violation of their civil rights occurred when
the Commissioner and the warden, upon orders of the Governor, refused to
release them, in violation of court orders that they be released to cure
unconstitutional overcrowding. On a variety of motions by the defendants seeking relief
from the adverse jury verdict, the district court found that the Commissioner and the
warden were not entitled to qualified immunity. The Governor was bound to respect and·.
refrain from interfering with the implementation of orders requiring the release of
inmates and his willful interference and refusal to comply with orders rendered him liable
under Section 1983. The orders to release inmates did not violate the doctrine of
separation of powers and, under the eighth and fourteenth amendments, created a liberty
interest in inmates; but the punitive damage awards in the amount of $100,000 in favor of
each inmate against the Governor was excessive. According to the court, officials knew
that prisoners had been ordered released and that further incarceration was a violation of
clearly established constitutional rights. The Governor, having knowledge of the orders
requiring the release of inmates to cure the unconstitutional overcrowding, was bound to
respect and refrain from interfering with the implementation of those orders, even though
the Governor was not a party to the orders or underlying action, and the Governor's
willful interference and refusal to comply with orders rendered him liable to inmates
under Section 1983. In ordering the Commissioner of the Department of Corrections and
the prison warden to refrain from releasing the inmates, the Governor was in violation of
the State court order requiring such release to cure the unconstitutional overcrowding,
acted with reckless indifference to federally protected rights of inmates who were to be
released, warranting the imposition of punitive damages in the inmates' Section 1983
action. (Huttonsville Correctional Center, West Virginia)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONSENT DECREEMODIFICATION

Thompson v. Enomoto, 915 F.2d 1883 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 117 LE2 131. Death
row prisoners in a state prison sued prison officials, seeking enforcement of a consent
decree regarding their treatment. The U.S. District Court entered judgment on a
.
monitor's report ordering prison officials to comply with terms of the consent decree and
also recommending t.bat dangerous prisoners be denied certain privileges, and appeals
27.55

were taken. The court of appeals found that a district court has the power to modify a
consent decree if experience with the administration of the decree shows a need for
modification in order to accomplish primary goals. The prison officials waived any right
they may have had to the claim that the district court lost juridication to modify the
consent decree covering treatment of prisoners in the state prison's death row, as the
parties had continued to operate under the decree for several years without objection by
the officials. In addition, the prison officials waived a right to object that the consent
decree covering treatment of prisoners in the state prison's death row applied only to
prisoners in a certain location and did not apply to those moved to a second location due
to overcrowding, as over a period of several years, the prison officials had acted as though
the decree applied to prisoners at all locations. It was also found that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion by granting modifications to the consent decree covering ~atment
of the death row prisoners in the state prison, to take away from the prisoners deemed
dangerous yard equipment, cell equipment, personal property, canteen items, and access
to telephones. (California State Prison, San Quentin, California)
U.S. Appeals Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
PRIVATE PROVIDER

Toombs v. Bell, 915 F.2d 345 (8th Cir. 1990). An inmate at an Arkansas correctional
facility filed a _pro se complaint, asserting a claim under a federal civil rights statute for
lack of medical treatment he received during his incarceration. The U.S. District Court
dismissed the complaint, and the inmate appealed. The court of appeals appointed counsel
and reversed and remanded with instructions to permit the inmate to amend the
pleadings and develop a claim. On remand, the district court directed a verdict for the
defendants on the civil rights claim, declined to instruct the jury on breach of contract
claim or on punitive damages, and granted summary judgment for a medical technician
notwithstanding the jury's damages award against him, and the inmate appealed. The
court of appeals found that although the prison warden and state correctional officials
could not relieve themselves of the duty to provide adequate medical treatment to those in
custody by contracting the provision of inmate health care to a private organization, there
was no evidence of any Board of Corrections policy of deliberate indifference to the
inmate's medical needs, and, thus, the effective directed verdict on the civil rights claims
in favor of those defendants was proper. In addition, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in excluding a report prepared by the Institute for Law and Policy Planning as
part of an audit conducted at the request of the Board of Corrections to evaluate the
private health care provider's compliance with its contractual obligations regarding care of
inmates. Although those findings reflected a failure of performance, they did not tend to
show a policy of deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of the plaintiff or
other inmates. However, a jury could award damages against the medical technician
employed by the private health care provider at the prison for negligent care of the
inmate, based on the inmate's testimony that the technician failed to examine him
notwithstanding his complaints of pain, swelling and fever, and the jury could find the
t.echnician's contrary testimony incredible, in light of a supervisor's report characterizing
the technician's performance as napathetic, lithesome, and lazyn and concluding that the
technician should be dismissed immediately. (0.nmmins Unit, Arkansas Dept. of Corr.)

U.S. District Court
FEDERAL TORI'

Williams v. U.S., 747 F.Supp. 967 (S.D. N.Y. 1990). A former prisoner brought suit under
the Federal Tort Claims Act seeking damages for a below-the-knee amputation of his right
leg. The U.S. District Court found that the medical staff at the federal prison seriously
departed from and breached basic standards of care owed to the diabetic prisoner in the
diagnosis and treatment of a foot infection, which culminated in gangrene necessitating
the amputation. The medical staff failed to provide appropriate testillg, clinical
examinations and diagnostic modalities consistent with a diabetic condition, failed to
provide the prisoner with proper treatment for a possible foot infection, and failed to
furnish a hospital with the prisoner's medical chart or a summary thereof when the
prisoner had a spreading E. Coli infection and was transferred for intravenous antibiotic
therapy. The court also found that the fifty-two-year-old former prisoner was entitled to
an award of $500,000 for his pain and suffering. (Fed. Corr. Inst., Otisville, New York)

CLAIMS ACT

DAMAGES

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO
SUPERVISE
FAILURE TO

TRAIN
42 U.S.C.A.
SECTION 1983

Williams v. White, 897 F.2d 942 (8th Cir. 1990). An inmate proceeding in
forma pauperis brought a pro se complaint against the prison superintendent
under Section 1983. The U.S. District Court dismissed, and the prisoner
appealed. The appeals court, vacating and remanding with instructions, found
that the inmate's claim was not frivolous. The prisoner asserted he was
placed in solitary, punitive confinement for no articulated reason and without
a hearing and alleged that he was placed in a single cell with another
prisoner with no hot water and no ventilation or air from outside and that he was
required to use a mattress infested with bugs and insects. The prison superintendent can
be liable under Section 1983 for operating the prison with unsanitary and inhumane
conditions and can be directly liable if he fails to properly train, supervise or cori.trol
subordinates. Dismissals under the in forma pauperis statut.e on the ground of frivolity
are to be made early in the proceedings, before the service of the process on the defendant
and before burdening the defendant with the necessity of making a responsive answer
under Rules of Civil Procedure. (Missouri)
27.56

U.S. Appeals Court
DAMAGES
PUNITIVE
DAMAGES
FAILURE TO
PROTECT

Wright v. Jones, 907 F.2d 848 (8th Cir. 1990). Former inmates brought a
Section 1983 action against prison guards based on an assault by• fellow
inmates. The U.S. District Court directed a verdict against one inmate but
awarded the other inmate actual and punitive damages, and the guards·
appealed. The appeals court, affirming the decision, found that the question
of whether prison guards knew of conditions making it highly foreseeable that
some inmates might be attacked by other inmates was for the jury, and punitive damages
could be awarded if the jury found that guards acted in reckless or callous disregard of, or
indifference t.o, the rights or safety of others. (Training Center for Men, Moberly,
Missouri)

1991
U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY

Al-Jundi v. Mancusi, 926 F.2d 235 (2nd Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 182. Inmates
brought a civil rights action against prison officials based on their conduct in planning and
implementing the retaking of a prison and the treatment of inmates after the prison was
retaken. The U.S. District Court denied the motion for summary judgment on qualified
immunity grounds, and the prison officials appealed. The court of appeals found that the
officials were entitled t.o qualified immunity in connection with most claims based on the
planning and implementation of the plan t.o retake the prison, but the officials were not
entitled t.o qualified immunity in connection with the alleged deficiencies in medical
planning and their condoning of reprisals against the inmates after the prison was
retaken. (Attica Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
VICARIOUS

Corrente v. State of R.I. 1 Dept. of Corrections, 759 F.Supp. 73 (D.R.I. 1991). Correctional
officers brought a civil rights action against the Governor of Rhode Island, the Director of
the Department of Corrections, union officials and union members alleging that they were
harassed and subjected t.o threats after reporting an assault on an inmate by fellow
correctional officers and identifying the officers responsible for the assault. The
defendants moved to dismiss. The U.S. District Court found that the correctional officers
failed t.o state a Section 1983 cause of action against the Governor based on the alleged
harassment as the correctional officers' assertion that the governor knew of and
acquiesced in the harassment was purely conclusory and failed to state exactly what was
reported to the governor and what he actually knew of the harassment. It was also found
that the correctional officers failed t.o state a cause of action for civil rights conspiracy
against union officials and members as the complaint did not contain any allegations that
the defendants were motivated by the intent to deprive the victims of equal protection of
the law or that the defendants conspired to injure the plaintiffs on account of their
attendance or testimony in the court. The correctional officers did, however, state a
Section 1983 cause of action against the Direct.or of the Rhode Island Department of
Corrections by alleging that the Director not only knew of the harassment of the
correctional officers for their reporting the assault, but failed to act to cure the incidents of
harassment when he had an obligation t.o do so. (Rhode Island Adult Correctional
Institution)

LIABILITY
FAILURE TO
PROTECT

U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED

IMMUNITY

Felix v. McCarthy, 939 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1165. A prisoner
brought a civil rights action against guards, asserting use of excessive force. The U.S.
District Court denied the guards' motion for summary judgment, and the guards appealed.
The court of appeals found that under the state of law in 1985, reasonable prison guards
should have been on notice that they would violate the prisoner's constitutional rights by
throwing the prisoner across the hallway and against a wall, and by pushing the prisoner
without provocation. Therefore, although injuries inflicted were minor, the guards were
not entitled to qualified immunity. (San Quentin Prison, California)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO
PROTECT

Flechsig v. U.S., 786 F.Supp. 646 (E.D. Ky. 1991). An inmate brought an action against
the Federal Bureau of Prisons, alleging that she had been sexually assaulted by a
corrections officer in the course of being transported to a medical appointment. The
Bureau moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion, finding that tjle federal
prison warden did not have reason t.o anticipate that the corrections officer would sexually
assault the inmate, thus, the warden did not breach a duty t.o keep the inmate from harm.
The assault did not occur during the course of search, seizure, or arrest, and the officer
was not acting within the scope of his employment when he committed the assault.
(Federal Correction Institution, Lexington, Kentucky)

U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY

Henderson v. DeRobertis, 940 F.2d 1055 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1578.
Inmates brought an action against prison officials alleging that their constitutional rights
were violated when they were subjected t.o freezing temperatures. Following a jury trial,
the U.S. District Court entered judgment in favor of off'icials notwithstanding the jury
verdict in favor of the inmates, on the basis of qualified immunity. Thereafter, two other

inmates f'iled Section 1983 complaints based upon the same factual circumstances and
sought to certify as a class the prisoners confined during a four-day period when adequate
heat was not provided. The U.S. District Court dismissed the cases with prejudice, and on
consoli!iated appeal, the court of appeals found that even though the inmates were
subjected during a period of abnormally cold weather due to a malfunctioning heating
system, the inmates had a clearly established constitutional right, established in 1982,.to
have adequate heat and shelter, and the prison officials were not entitled to qualified
immunity. (Stat.eville Correctional Center, IDinois)
U.S. District Court
CONSENT DECREEMODIFICATION
CONTEMPI'
REMEDIES

Kroll v. St. Charles County, Mo., 766 F.Supp. 744 (E.D. Mo. 1991). On a motion to hold a
county in cont.empt of court for failing to comply with the provisions of a consent order, the
district court found that the county courthouse, government building and administration
building violated accessibility standards and federal handicapped laws. The buildings
lacked electronic doors, sufficient space to accommodate wheelchairs, and ramps or
elevators. If the county failed to fund improvements to bring the courthouse, government
building and administration building into compliance with accessibility standards and
federal handicapped laws, the court would consider an imposition of a property tax
increase of 25 cents per one hundred dollars of assessed valuation on all property located
in the county for a period of ten years. It might also enjoin a roll back of local taxes. (St.
Charles County, Missouri)

U.S. District Court
ABSOLUTE

Lipinski v. Skinner, 781 F.Supp. 131 (N.D.N.Y. 1991). An arrestee brought an action
against law enforcement and prison officials alleging that they violated his constitutional
rights by disclosing his HIV-positive status to a newspaper. The arrestee sought to depose
the newspaper's reporters and editors in order to learn the source of their information.
The newspaper moved to quash the depositions and to obtain a protective order. The
district court found that the editorial writer failed to demonstrate that the confidentiality
of his sources or information were jeopardized by the mere taking of his deposition and,
thus, was not entitled to absolute immunity under New York's Shield Law. Under New
York law, journalists for the newspaper were entitled to qualified immunity from the
arrestee's attempt to depose them. The journalists were responsible for articles which
appeared some time after the original article disclosing the HIV-positive status and, thus,
it was unlikely that the journalists possessed information regarding the initial disclosure.
The newspaper editors were not entitled to qualified immunity under New York law. The
report.er who had originally reported the story ~d told the arrestee that she was assigned
the story by one of her editors. Discovering whQ gave the report.er the lead and where
that individual acquired that information was critical to the arrestee's claim that law
enforcement or prison officials released confidential medical information about him in
violation of his rights, and the information the arrestee sought was not obtainable from
other sources. The arrestee's discovery, however, was limited to questions relative to the
initial disclosure of his HIV test results to the newspaper. (Broome County Jail, New
York)

IMMUNITY
QUALIFIED

IMMUNITY

U.S. Appeals Court
42 U.S.C.A.
Section 1983
QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY

Moore v. Morgan. 922 F.2d 1553 (11th Cir. 1991). A county jail inmate brought a civil
rights action against a county sheriff and county commissioners, challenging jail
conditions. After determining that the inmate proved conditions at the county jail violated
the Eighth Amendment due to overcrowding and lack of out-of-cell time, the magistrate
judge concluded that the sheriff and county commissioners were entitled to qualified
immunity. The U.S. District Court adopted the magistrate judge's recommendation and
directed judgment against the inmate, who appealed. The court of appeals found that the
defense of qualified immunity was not available with respect to official ~pacity claims. In
addition, the county failed to satisfy its constitutional responsibility in maintaining the
county jail by its delay in rectifying jail overcrowding, and it was liable for compensatory
damages, despite voters' overwhelming rejection of a proposal to levy a tax to build a new
jail. According to the court, the ways in which the commissioners actually obtained money
to finance necessary jail improvements, when put under the threat of litigation, provided
compelling evidence of fact that the commissioners could have taken steps to improve the
jail at a much earlier date. It was also found that the· sheriff and county commissioners
waived qualified immunity as a defense to personal liability on the inmate's
unconstitutional jail conditions claim, where the sheriff and commissioners never raised
· this aff'irmative defense. The qualified immunity defense w'as not tried by implied consent
of parties where neither the issue, nor words, of qualified immunity was ever raised before
or during trial. Although the inmate f"tled a brief at the qualified immunity hearing, it
was unlikely that the inmate, acting without assistance of counsel, would object to the
court's order to conduct a hearing, particularly when the magistrate judge was not
prompted by any motion of the defendants. (Chambers County Jail, Alabama)

27.58

U.S. Appeals Court
CONSENT DECREE
CONTEMPI'

Picon v. Morris, 933 F.2d 660 (8th Cir. 1991). A prisoner sought relief from dismissal of a
consent decree so that he could file an action for civil cont.empt t.o enforce the decree
regarding the use of emergency segregation cells. The United Stat.es District Court denied
relief, and appeal was taken. The appeals court, reversing and remanding, found that the
prisoner was entitled t.o proceed with the action. The fact that the district court had found
compliance with the decree and entered a dismissal order did not justify the denial of the
prisoner's motion for release. The compliance fmding had been issued based on allegedly
erroneous statements by prison officials that the cells in which the prisoner was housed
had been abandoned. (Missouri Training Center for Men)

U.S. District Court
42U.S.C.A.
Section 1983

Roman v. Koehler, 775 F.Supp. 695 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). A prisoner brought a Section 1983
claim alleging that the commissioner of the department of corrections, a former warden,
unnamed corrections officers and the prison health service violated his Section 1983 right
by failing t.o provide medical treatment for an injury t.o his finger. The district court found
that the prisoner did not state a Section 1983 claim against the commissioner or warden
absent a showing that they were responsible for the conduct of the unnamed corrections
officers or the health service. In order t.o state a claim of inadequate medical care against
prison officials, a plaintiff must allege "that his access t.o physicians for necessary medical
care was unreasonably delayed or denied, or the prescribed medical treatment was not
administered." However, under Section 1983, liability can only be imposed on prison
officials who were directly and personally responsible for the alleged violation of civil
rights. (Rikers Island, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONSENT DECREE

Welch v. Spangler, 939 F.2d 570 (8th Cir. 1991). An inmate brought an action against
prison officials alleging that the search of his legal papers by prison officials violated a
policy governing such searches established in a consent decree in prior litigation. The
U.S. District Court ordered the officials t.o pay a $500 contempt fme t.o the court, $10 in
nominal damages t.o the inmate, and reasonable attorneys' fees, and the officials appealed.
The court of appeals, affirming the decision, found that the prison officials' search of the
inmate's legal materials outside of his presence in violation of policy governing such
searches established in a consent decree promulgated in prior litigation was supported by
evidence, and the prison officials' violation of the consent decree warranted a fmding of
contempt. The search warranted a payment of a $500 contempt fme as the fine imposed
reflected concerns over future compliance, and not imposing a fme would be an invitation
t.o ignore di~tes of the consent decree. It was also found that the district court could
properly assess nominal damages of $10 against prison officials for the search whether or
not there was proof of actual injury or damages; the award of the nominal damages t.o the
inmate personalized a remedy for the violation of the consent decree and substantially
ensured that the inmate's legal papers would not be illegally interfered with in the future.
(Iowa State Penitentiary)

U.S. District Court
CONSENT DECREEMODIFICATION
CONTRA.CT SERVICES

Wyatt By and Through Rawlins v. Horsely, 793 F.Supp. 1053 (M.D. Ala. 1991). A request
was filed for approval and entry of consent decrees in a class action arising out of health
care providers' alleged failure t.o comply with certain minimum constitutional standards
for adequate care of the mentally ill. The district court found that it could not approve the
proposed consent decrees given the counsel's apparent failure t.o solicit comments on, let
alone t.o obtain any backing for, the proposed changes in the court's previous orders.
(Alabama Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation)

1992
U.S. District Court
MUNICIPAL
LIABILITY

Berry v. City of Phillipsburg, Kan., 796 F.Supp. 1400 (D.Kan. 1992). An arrestee brought
an action against a police officer, the chief of police, and a city, alleging that excessive
force was used in effecting her arrest. On the defendants' motions for partial summary
judgment, the district court found that evidence raised a triable issue of fact as t.o whether
the police officers used excessive force. Evidence indicated that the plaintiff was arrested
for littering, att.empted t.o evade arrest by fleeing t.o her home, and that the officers broke
down the door t.o the arrestee's home, tackled and choked her, and dragged her from her
home by handcuffs and her hair. In addition, the arrestee did not commit an offense of
obstructing legal process under Kansas law when she initially refused tickets given t.o her
by the first police officer, then threw them ont.o the ground, for the purposes of arrestee's
claim that she was arrest.eel without probable cause. There was evidence that the mayor
was aware that the city chief of police had a history of being unnecessarily rough with
persons he stopped, investigated or arrested. He communicated his knowledge t.o the city
counsel and recommended that the chief be f'lred. This was sufficient t.o raise a question
of fact regarding municipal liability for the police chiefs alleged use of excessive force
while effecting the arrest. (Phillipsburg Police Department, Kansas)

2J7.59

U.S. Appeals Court
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Bogan v. Stroud. 958 F.2d 180 (7th Cir. 1992). A former inmate at a state prison filed an
action under 42 U.S.C.A. Section 1983 against correctional officers. alleging the officers
violated his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by using excessive force
against him. The U.S. Di.stzict Court entered judgments for the inmate on jury verdicts.
awarding him punitive but not compensatory damages, and the officers appealed. The
appeals court affirmed finding that evidence supported the jury's determination that
prison officers used excessive force against the inmate in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. Witnesses supported the inmate's claim that he was repeatedly stabbed,
beaten and kicked after he had been disarmed and subdued. In addition, a physician
confirmed that the inmate sustained numerous stab wounds. Punitive damages awards of
$5,000 against one officer and $1,000 each against the other two officers were not
excessive. (Stateville Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED

Diercks v. Durham. 959 F.2d 710 (8th Cir. 1992). An inmate brought a civil rights action
against a prison supervisor, claiming that the supervisor had violatea his right to due
process by sitting in judgment on her own complaint in disciplinary proceedings against
the inmate. The U.S. District Court directed a verdict in favor of the inmate, and
subsequently denied the supervisor's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict,
and the supervisor appealed. The court of appeals found that the supervisor was not
entitled to qualified immunity against the inmate's civil rights claim because the law was
clearly established that any prison official actively involved in conducting an investigation
could not sit as a member of the disciplinary committee, and a reasonable prison official
would have known about the law. The supervisor was subject to liability under Section
1983 where, although a prison guard wrote the actual conduct violation report, the guard
did so at the express direction and insistence of the supervisor. (Algoa Corr. Center.
Missouri)

IMMUNITY

U.S. Appeals Court
CONTEMPT

Elkin v. Fauver. 969 F.2d 48 (3rd Cir. 1992), cert; denied, 113 S.Ct. 473. A state prison
inmate brought a civil rights action against various prison officials concerning a
disciplinary proceeding. The U.S. Di.stzict Court found the defendants in civil contempt
because the chain-of-cust.ody form used in connection with the collection and testing of a
urine sample for drug use did not comply with previous district court orders. The
defendants appealed. The appeals court, reversing the decision, found that sanctions
selected by the district court upon finding the state prison officials in civil contempt-vacating of all punishment imposed on the prisoner for illegal drug use in the prison and
expungement of his record--were not consistent with the sound exercise of discretion,
where the use of a wrong form was harmless in that it contained a complete record of the
chain of custody, so that use of the required form would not have changed the result.
(New Jersey's Bayside State Prison)

U.S. Di.stzict Court
COMPENSATORY
DAMAGES
DAMAGES
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Giroux v. Sherman, 807 F.Supp. 1182 (E.D. Pa. 1992). An inmate brought a Section 1983
action against eight corrections officers, claiming that, on four separate occasions, various
officers beat and tormented him without provocation. The district court found that the
inmate was entitled to compensatory damages of $10,000 from one officer who beat him
without provocation after refusing to allow the inmate into the prison kit.chen to do his job.
The inmate subsequently underwent surgery to repair damage caused by repeated blows
to his kidneys. In addition. the inmate was entitled to compensatory damages of $10,000
and to an award of $10,000 in punitive damages from a second corrections officer who
forced the inmate, who had a medical hist.ory of heart trouble, to walk the long distance
from the prison infirmary to his cell, all the while jabbing and hitting the inmate in the
kidney area, despite the fact that the inmate had earlier been taken to the inf'1rmary on a
stret.cher complaining of severe chest pains. The inmate was also entitled to an award of
compensatory damages of $1,000 for pain, humiliation, and mental anguish from a third
corrections officer who, without provocation, st.epped on the inmate's sneaker and punched
him in the throat and head, although the att.ac:k did not result in any serious physical
injury. Finally, the inmate was entitled to damages of $5,000 from a fourth corrections
officer who wantonly and without provocation beat the inmate in the kidneys, causing
further injury. (Gatherford State Prison, East.em Pennsylvania)
Prison)

U.S. Di.stzict Court

Gross v. Buescher, 791 F.Supp. 796 (E.D. Mo. 1992). An inmate brought a civil rights
action against corrections officials and state officials who moved for summary judgment.
The district court found that the inmate's allegations that corrections officials and the
governor failed to submit or appropriate an adequate medical budget for the correctional
facility did not state a deliberate indifference claim under the Eighth Amendment.
(Missouri East.em Correctional Cent.er)

DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

U.S. Appeals Court
PERSONAL

LIABILITY

U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED

IMMUNITY

Hardin v. Straub, 954 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1992). An inmat.e sued a stat.e prison official
under Section 1983 alleging that his assignment t.o administrative segregation without a
hearing in violation of a Michigan Administrative Code deprived him of due process. The
U.S. District Court dismissed the complaint, and the court of appeals affirmed. Upon
grant of certiorari, the Unit.ed Stat.es Supreme Court reversed and remanded. On remand,
the court of appeals reversed and remanded. On remand, the district court denied, in
part, the official's motion for summary judgment, and the prison official appealed. The
court of appeals found that the prison official was not personally involved in the initial
classification of the inmat.e t.o "top lock" upon arrival at the prison so as t.o make the
official liable for violation of the Fourt.eenth Amendment, but a genuine issue of mat.erial
fact exist.ed as t.o whether the prison official's personal involvement in the subsequent
classification decision was sufficient t.o creat.e liability for violating the inmat.e's due
process right. In addition, it was found that the prison official was not personally
involved in the treatment which the inmat.e received after his classification t.o
administrative segregation so as t.o make the prison official liable under Section 1983 for
violation of the inmat.e's Fourt.eenth Amendment rights due. t.o the failure t.o provide
periodic review of the inmat.e status, but the official was not absolut.ely immune in the
action from personal liability under the Eleventh Amendment solely by virtue of the
official nature of his acts; the inmat.e was not required t.o prove that the official act.ed
outside the scope of his authority, but only that the official act.ed in his position as a stat.e
official. (Michigan Department of Corrections Reception and Guidance Cent.er, Stat.e
Prison of Southern Michigan in Jackson)
Henderson v. Lane, 979 F.2d 466 (7th Cir. 1992). An allegedly fractious inmat.e who had
been placed in a stat.e's "circuit rider" security program brought a Section 1983 action for
prison officials' alleged violation of his civil rights. The U.S. District Court denied the
inmat.e's request for preliminary injunctive relief and the defendants' motion for partial
summary judgment on a qualified immunity claim, and both parties appealed. The
appeals court found that the inmat.e had "adequat.e remedy at law" for the alleged
restriction on his right of access t.o courts, and was not entitled t.o preliminary injunctive
relief, as claims could be pursued in the pending Section 1983 action. The prison officials
were entitled t.o qualified immunity for their alleged wrongful denial of the inmat.e's civil
rights in placing him in the "circuit rider" security program that allegedly prevent.ed him
from having more than one shower or more than one hour of exercise per week, as the
inmat.e's alleged right t.o additional showers and exercise was not "clearly established" at
the time of the alleged violations. (Illinois Correctional Syst.em)

U.S. Appeals Court
DAMAGES
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Hill v. Marshall, 962 F.2d 1209 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 2992. An inmat.e
brought a civil rights action against prison officials. A U.S. District Court judgment in
favor of prison officials was reversed on appeal. On remand, the U.S. District Court
entered judgment on a jury verdict awarding actual damages, but ordered remittitur of the
entire punitive damages award, and appeals were taken. The court of appeals found that
evidence sustained a finding that a prison official had violat.ed the inmat.e's rights with
respect t.o prescription medication and the prison official could be liable for failure t.o
respond t.o the inmat.e's medical needs on the basis of evidence that he personally ignored
the inmat.e's complaint and referred the inmat.e's complaints of not getting medication t.o
the head nurse whom he knew was wrongly alt.ering and destroying some of the inmat.e's
prescriptions. The award of $95,000 in compensat.ory damages t.o the inmat.e was not
excessive in view of evidence that the denial of medication result.ed in increasing the risk
that he would develop active tuberculosis and evidence that he suffered a great deal of
anguish on that account. But, with regards t.o the ordered remittitur of the entire
punitive damages award, it was found that when a court sets aside the entire punitive
damages award, rather than merely the excessive portion, it had not grant.ed a
"remittitur," but, rather, has granted a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and the
jury's det.ermination t.o award the punitive damages in the inmat.e's civil rights action was
support.ed by evidence of deliberat.e indifference t.o the inmat.e's need for prescription
medication, with the result that there was a significant increase in the possibility that he
would develop active tuberculosis. (So. Ohio Corr. Fae.)

U.S. Appeals Court
COMPENSATORY
DAMAGES
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Jolivet v. Deland, 966 F.2d 573 (10th Cir. 1992). An inmat.e brought a civil rights action
against prison employees who were allegedly responsible for int.ercepting his personal
mail. The U.S. District Court awarded the inmat.e $250 against one employee, and the
inmat.e appealed. The court of appeals, aff'll'Dling the decision, found that awarding the
inmat.e $250 in compensat.ory damages for emotional distress he suffered when a prison
employee copied love letters the inmat.e had written t.o another inmat.e's ex-wife and
showed the copies t.o the other inmat.e was not an abuse of discretion in the inmat.e's civil
rights action. Denying punitive damages was also not an abuse of discretion where the
employee thought his actions were permissible and st.opped his actions after he was
informed they were unconstitutional. (Utah Stat.e Prison)

111.61

U.S. Appeals Court
GOVERNMENTAL
lMMUNITY
42U.S.C.A.
Section 1983

McArdle v. Tronetti, 961 F.2d 1083 (3rd Cir. 1992). An inmate who had been sentenced
for disorderly conduct filed a civil rights action against a prison physician and a prison
counselor who diagnosed the inmate's alleged psychiatric condition and instituted
involuntary commitment proceedings. The U.S. District Court found that the physician
and counselor were entitled to official immunity and grant.eel a motion to dismiss, and
appeal was taken. The court of appeals found that the prison physician and prison
counselor were immune from the Section 1983 liability with respect to claims of false
diagnosis, false testimony and conspiracy, but were not immune from Section 1983
liability with respect to filing of the petition for involuntary commitment. The prison
counselor and prison physician were not protected by either witness or judicial immunity
with respect to allegations by the prisoner that they were responsible for filing a petition
for involuntary commitment which they knew contained lies. (Erie Co. Jail, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY

Munir v. Scott. 792 F.Supp. 1472 (E.D. Mich. 1992), reversed. 12 F.3d 213. Muslim
inmates brought a civil rights action against a prison official alleging violation of their
religious rights due to a total ban on prayer oils and incense. The district court held that
the total ban on prayer oils was unconstitutional. The prison official should have been
aware that religious oils used by the Muslims during prayer could be accommodat.ed in
prison and that the total ban was contrary to the Department of Corrections policy, and he
thus was not entitled to qualified immunity. The appeals court reversed the lower court
decision. (Joseph Cotton Facility, Jackson, Michigan)

U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED
IMMUN1TY

Murphv v. Dowd, 975 F.2d 435 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 1310. A prison
inmate brought a Section 1983 action against a state prison official. The U.S. District
Court entered judgment for the official and the inmate appealed. The appeals court,
affirming the decision, found that the official was entitled to qualified immunity. There
was a split of authority among circuits about whether tobacco smoke exposure was cruel
and unusual punishment, and under those circumstances the official could not be deemed
to know he was violating the prisoner's rights by exposing him to smoke. (Farmingt.on
Correctional Center, Missouri)

U.S. Appeals Court
PERSONAL

Pletka v. Nix. 957 F.2d 1480 (8th Cir. 1992). An Iowa state prisoner who had been placed
in disciplinary confinement and then transferred to a Texas prison where he was released
into general population sued Iowa prison officials upon his return, alleging that officials
violated his due process rights by returning him to disciplinary confinement without a new
hearing. The U.S. District Court denied a claim for damages. Upon rehearing en bane,
the court of appeals found that the Texas prison authorities' release of the prisoner into
general population did not result in a complete exoneration of his disciplinary sentence,
and thus, the inmate's due process rights were not violated. Neither the Interstate
Corrections Compact nor Iowa prison regulations confer liberty interest in prisoners who
have been released into general population. (Iowa State Penitentiary)

LIABILITY
QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY

U.S. Appeals Court
CONSENT ORDER
CONTEMPr
COURT ORDER

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY

Stone v. City and County of San Francisco, 968 F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113
S.Ct. 1050. In connection with a consent decree governing city jail population levels, the
United States District Court entered a contempt order, and appeal was taken. The
appeals court, aff'Jl'Dling in part and vacating in part, found that the entry of the contempt
order was appropriate. However, the sheriff-should not have been allowed to override
applicable state laws by conducting early release as state law override provisions were not
the least intrusive option on state government operation. The district court should have
waited to see whether the threat of sanctions would induce compliance or at least have
made a finding that other alternatives were inadequate. (San Francisco Jail, Hall of
Justice, California)
Taylor v. Foltz, 803 F.Supp. 1261 (E.D.Mich. 1992), aff"U'Dled. 14 F.3d 602. A state prison
inmate brought a civil rights action against a state prison warden, state prison assistant
resident unit manager, and members of a correctional facility security classif1Cation
committee. He alleged denial of an Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and
unusual pnnjshm,.ut and Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights not to be subjected to
arbitrary and capricious decisions. The warden and committee members moved for
summary judgment. The district court found that a genuine issue of material fact existed
at to whether the warden's operating procedure in reviewing and authorizing transfers of
inmates was defective so as to create an um:onstitutional condition under the Eighth
Amendment, precluding summary judgment for the warden on a qualiiied immunity basis.
The court also found that the classification committee members were entitled to qualified
immunity from the state prison inmate's claim that because the inmate was mislabeled as
a homosexual, he was improperly classified, transferred, and denied a prison job. The
inmate had failed to show that the committee members' conduct violated a right so clearly
established that any official in their position would have clearly understood that he should
refrain from such conduct. (State Prison of Southern Michigan)

27.62

U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED
1MMUNITY

Zavaro v. Coughlin, 970 F.2d 1148 (2nd Cir. 1992). An inmat.e brought a Section 1983
action against a disciplinary hearing officer alleging violation of his due process rights.
The U.S. District Court granted summary judgment for the inmat.e, and the hearing officer
appealed. The appeals court, affirming the decisi<>ll, found that the prison hearing
officer's determination that the inmat.e participated in the riot and his consequent
punishment violated the inmat.e's rights under the due process clause. Evidence only
showed that the inmat.e was observed in the large mess hall where the riot occurred.
There was nothing to point to the inmat.e as a participant or to call into question his
assertion that he remained at his table without throwing anything or assaulting anybody
or even rising from his chair until ordered to lie down on the floor. Additionally, the
hearing officer was not entitled to qualified immunity from liability as there was not
reliable evidence of the inmat.e's guilt. The inmat.e's right not to be adjudicated guilty
without some evidence to support the finding was clearly established when the hearing
occurred. (Great Meadows Prison, New York)

1993
U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED

IMMUNITY

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN
QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY

RESPONDEA.T
SUPERIOR

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED

IMMUNITY.

U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY

Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 4 F.3d 195 (3rd Cir. 1993). A prisoner brought a Section 1983
action challenging the constitutional adequacy of legal services provided to inmat.es in a
maximum security unit. The United Stat.es District Court found in favor of the prisoner
and appeals were taken. The appeals court, vacating and remanding, found that the
prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity from liability for the alleged denial of
court access for the prisoner who was not allowed to use the main law library. The
prisoner was provided with a sat.ellit.e law library, a paging syst.em to obtain photocopies
of mat.erials at the main law library, and varying degrees of assistance by paralegals and
an att.orney. The constitutional standard was inexplicitly defmed, and reasonable officials
could conclude that their conduct was not unlawful. (Maximum Security Unit, Delaware
Correctional Cent.er)
Camps v. City of Warner Robins, 822 F.Supp. 724 (M.D. Ga. 1993). The administrators of
an arrest.ee's estat.e brought a civil rights action against city, county, and various law
enforcement officers, alleging they were deliberat.ely indifferent to the psychological needs
of the arrest.ee, who lapsed into a coma after a suicide att.empt and died approximately one
year lat.er. On motions for summary judgment, the district court found that the decision of
a municipal holding facility supervisor to transport the arrest.ee to a county jail rather
than the hospital or a psychiatric facility was, at most, negligent, rather than deliberat.ely
indifferent to the arrest.ee's serious psychological needs. Although the supervisor was
aware that the arrestee ·had att.empted suicide while at the det.ention facility, the
supervisor directed officers who transferred the arrest.ee to inform jail officials that the
arrest.ee was acting suicidal. Triable issues exist.ed regarding whether deputies and a
supervising officer at the county jail were aware that the arrest.ee was suicidal but were
deliberately indifferent to his psychological needs. However, absent any allegation that
the sheriff was personally involved in any way with the arrest.ee's suicide att.empt while in
custody at the county jail, or that any failure to train by the sheriff caused this injury, the
sheriff was not subject to supervisory liability. The administrators of the arrest.ee's estat.e
failed to creat.e a genuine issue of mat.erial fact that the county jail's suicide prevention
policy was inadequat.e, as would preclude summary judgment for the county of the civil
rights municipal liability claim, where the administrators made only general allegations
that policies regarding suicide prevention were grossly inadequat.e, and otherwise charged
violations of county policy. (Houston County Jail, Georgia)
Canell v. Beyers, 840 F.Supp. 1378 (D.Or. 1993). A prison inmat.e brought a suit against
prison officials and a county, challenging body cavity searches allegedly conducted in full
view of clerical workers, other inmat.es, or other bystanders. On a defense motion to
dismiss for summary judgment on grounds of qualified immunity, the district court found
that the prison officials were not entitled to qualified immunity from civil rights liability
even if such viewings by clerical workers, other inmat.es, and other bystanders were
inadvertent. There was evidence that screening was not always in place. The county,
which jointly operated the prison facility, which assisted in its design and construction,
and which had considerable input in its procedures and duty to implement its policies,
was a proper defendant. (Oregon Department of Corrections Intake Cent.er)
Chapman v. Nichols. 989 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1993). Detainees brought a civil rights
action against a sheriff to recover damages after they were subjected to strip searches at a
jail following arrest. The U.S. District Court denied the sheriff's motion for summary
judgment on grounds of qualified immunity, and the sheriff appealed. The appeals court,
affirming and remanding. found that it was clearly established law in lat.e 1991 and early
1992 when the arrests took place, that a blanket policy of strip searches for detainees was
unconstitutional, so that the sheriff was not entitled to qualified immunity. (Creek
County Jail, Sapulpa, Oklahoma)

27.63

U.S. Appeals Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Choate v. Lockhart, 7 F.3d 1370 (8th Cir. 1993). An inmate who fell off a roof while
working on a construction crew on a state-owned residence sued the supervising prison
officials and the director of the Department of Corrections. The U.S. District Court found
the prison officials liable and awarded the inmate damages for pain and suffering. The
inmate appealed the denial of punitive and other compensatory damages, and the prison
officials cross-appealed on the finding of liability. The appeals court, reversing and
dismissing, found that the immediate supervisors' conduct did not rise to a level of
deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The supervisors had no
knowledge of the inmate's physical limitations. In addition, the supervisors did not choose
which inmates would work on a project, and they had no duty to check the medical records
of crew members assigned to them in determining whether they could do the work
assigned. The appeals court also ruled that the Director of the Department of Corrections
was not liable to the inmate. The director could not have known about the inmate's
suffering on the job, had no duty to check the inmate's medical records, and had no
relevant connection with the project at all. The overall supervisor of the construction
projects on which inmates were working was not deliberately indifferent to the in.n:iate
who had a pre-existing knee injury. The inmate never complained to the overall
supervisor about anything. In addition, the supervisor visited the worksite only periodically and there was nothing suggesting that the supervisor should have known
about the severity of the inmate's knee injury or his attempts to be taken off of the crew.
The supervisor did not assign the inmate to duty and did not have a duty to check the
inmate's medical history. (Arkansas Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED

Fortner v. Thomas, 983 F.2d 1024 (11th Cir. 1993). Inmates brought a Section 1983 action
against prison officials alleging violations of their constitutional right to privacy. The
United States District Court denied an amendment to the complaint to add disciplinary
officers as additional defendants, dismissed the due process claims, and dismissed the
complaint on the ground of qualified immunity. The inmates appealed. The appeals
court, affirming in part, reversing in part and remanding, found that the inmates have a
constitutional right to bodily privacy. However, the inmates' constitutional right to bodily
privacy was not clearly established at the time female correctional officers viewed inmates
while they were nude and, thus, the correctional officials were entitled to qualified
immunity from civil damages liability. (Georgia State Prison)

IMMUNITY

U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED

IMMUNITY

Hemphill v. Kincheloe, 987 F.2d 589 (9th Cir. 1993). A state inmate brought an action
against prison officials challenging a policy of subjecting all prisoners transferred to a
secure area to an involuntary digital rectal probe for possible contraband without a
showing of probable cause. The U.S. District Court denied the officials qualified immunity
and denied their motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and the officials
appealed. The appeals court, reversing the decision, found that state prison officials were
entitled to qualified immunity from liability in the Section 1983 action based on their
implementation of the policy. Reasonable officials could have believed that their conduct
was lawful at the time given that such a policy was permissible and sanctioned by federal
regulations, and officials testified that they had researched the legality of the searches
before implementing the policy. (Washington State Penitentiary)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
FAILURE TO
PROTECT

Herman v. Clearfield County, PA, 836 F.Supp. 1178 (W.D. Pa. 1993). The estate of a
pretrial detainee who committed suicide while detained brought a Section 1983 civil rights
claim alleging that jail officials failed to identify and treat the decedent's obvious suicidal
intent and that the county consciously followed a policy or custom of failing to train jail
employees. The county and its officials moved for summary judgment. The district court
found that the jail officials were adequately trained in suicide prevention. Claims of
inadequate training are not enough to establish liability. The plaintiff must identify
specific training that the municipality did not give, explain how lack of that training
actually caused the ultimate injury, and show that alleged failure to train was part of
official municipal policy of deliberate indifference. The plaintiff must present evidence
that the alleged indifference was a conscious choice that resulted either from a decision
officially adopted and promulgated or from a permanent and well settled practice. The
county's alleged failure to train jail personnel to recognize and respond to the suicidal
tendencies of pretrial detainees did not support the Section 1983 civil rights claim by the
detainee's estate. The jail did not have a history of numerous suicides and suicide
attempts. In addition, the county employed a suicide prevention program for screening
detainees. Also, the jail correction officials did receive training regarding detention of
suicidal detainees and appropriate responses. (Clearfield County Prison, Pennsylvania)

U.S. Appeals Court

Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Rufo, 12 F.3d 286 (1st Cir. 1993). The Commissioner of
Corrections moved to vacate a consent decree between a county sheriff. the Commissioner,
and inmates of the county jail after the county sheriff moved to modify the decree to allow
double-bunking of pretrial detainees. The U.S. District Court denied the motion and the
Commissioner appealed. The appeals court, affirming the decision, found that the
Commissioner was not entitled to have the decree vacated in the absence of adequate

CONSENT DECREEMODIFICATION

27.64

record and in light of the prospect of further proceedings. The approach proposed by the
Commissioner for vacating the consent decree gave insufficient weight to the problem of
recurrence of the constitutional violations. The court could not assume that double-celling
of inmates, contemplated by the county sheriff in the foreseeable future, was clearly
constitutional. (Suffolk County Jail, Massachusetts)
U.S. Appeals Court
CONSENT DECREEMODIFICATION

Johnson v. Robinson, 987 F.2d 1043 {4th Cir. 1993). Prisoners brought a class action
challenging conditions of conim.ement at Maryland correctional facilities. Upon motion of
prisoners, the United States District Court converted a timetable into a court order, and
the prison officials appealed. The court of appeals, reversed and remanded with
instructions. It found that the district court exceeded its authority when it adopted the
order specifying a timetable in which Maryland prison officials had to make 83
improvements at prison facilities. The parties never formally agreed upon duties specified
in the timetable, which added substantially to those accepted by prison officials in the
original consent decree. (Maryland House of Corrections and Maryland Correctional
Institution in Hagerstown)
·

U.S. District Court
DAMAGES
PERSONAL

Jones v. Thompson, 818 F.Supp. 1263 (S.D. Ind. 1993). A pretrial detainee filed a Section
1983 civil rights action arising from the use of three-way restraints on the detainee
following his suicide attempt. The district court found that the extended use of three-way
restraints on the detainee, coupled with the absence of medical review or treatment and
the denial of even basic amenities such as personal hygiene and toilet usage constituted
deprivation of his due process rights. Various officers at the jail were found liable for
$5,000 compensatory damages in their individual capacities. In addition, an officer
responsible for management of the jail was liable for $2,000 punitive damages in her
individual capacity and the county was liable for $5,000 compensatory damages. (Madison
County Jail, Indiana)

LIABILITY

U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY

Leeks v. Ounningham, 997 F.2d 1330 (11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 609. A
pretrial detainee brought action under Section 1983 for a jail physician's alleged violation
of his constitutional rights in subjecting him t.o antipsychotic medication against his will.
The U.S. District Court denied the physician's motion for summary judgment, and he
appealed. The appeals court, reversing and remanding, found that the pretrial detainee's
right to refuse administration of an antipsychotic drug was not "clearly established" at the
time of the alleged constitutional violation, so that the physician was entitled to qualified
immunity for his acts. (Lake County Jail, Tavares, Florida)
·

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY

Martin v. Ezeagu, 816 F.Supp. 20 (D.D.C. 1993). An inmate brought a Section 1983 action
against a chief librarian and prison supervisors allegedly responsible for providing inmates
with adequate access to library facilities. The librarian and supervisors moved t.o dismiss.
The district court found that the inmate's complaint that alleged an ongoing pattern, and
not an isolated episode of interference with his right of access to the prison law library
and which specifically stated how litigation he was pursuing was hampered and delayed
by actions of the chief librarian was sufficient to survive a Rule 12{b)(6) motion. The
complaint stated that the inmate was prevented from filing a sentencing memorandum, a
motion for a new trial and a motion to dismiss the indictment before his sentencing
hearing due to alleged actions by the chief librarian. Furthermore, the prison supervisors
who were allegedly responsible for providing the inmates with adequate access to the
library facility were not entitled to qualified immunity in the Section 1983 action as the
complaint posited "acquiescence" on the part of the supervisors that encouraged the chief
librarian's conduct of harassing the inmate and of arbitrarily excluding him from the
library. These allegations, coupled with specific allegations revealing the supervisors'
knowledge and inaction, were adequate to support a claim of deliberate or reckless
indifference to foreseeable disruptive effect. The inmate's complaint, including racial
epithets and profanity allegedly directed at the inmate, and implicating a constitutional
right of meaningful access to courts stated a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress. (Occoquan Facility, Lort.on, District of Columbia)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO
PROTECT
QUALIFIED
IMMUNlTY

Nelson v. Overberg, 999 F.2d 162 (6th Cir. 1993). A prison inmate who had been beaten
by fellow prisoners brought a civil rights suit against a prison official. The official's
motion for summary judgment was denied by the U.S. District Court and the official
appealed. The appeals court, aff"irming the decision, found that two letters by the prison
inmate indicating that he had enemies at the prison where he was being placed, and that
he would like to be transferred, would have alerted a reasonable prison official that more
action needed to be taken to protect the inmate; therefore, the official was not protected by
qualified immunity. In addition, genuine issues of fact existed as to whether the prison
official knew of the threat to the inmate by fellow prisoners yet disregarded it, despite the
availability of relatively effortless ways of addressing the threat, and whether that
conduct amounted to a conscious lack of concern or aloofness, precluding summary
judgment. (Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections)

27.65

U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY

Quinn v. Nix, 983 F.2d 115 (8th Cir. 1993). Inmat.es with shag haircuts sued prison
officials for civil rights violations arising out of an order directing the inmat.es to cut their
hair. The U.S. District Court ent.ered ju,dgment for the inmat.es, and the prison officials
appealed. The appeals court, affirming the decision, found that the prison officials
violated the inmat.e's civil rights by ordering them to cut their hair. Although the officials
had a legitimat.e penological int.erest in curbing gang activity, the district court's
det.ermination that the proffered explanation that the hairstyle at issue was gang-related
was pretextual was not clearly erroneous, where officials never told the inmat.es why their
hairstyle was considered extreme and officials did not receive a memo depicting gangrelated hairstyles until after they ordered the inmat.es to get haircuts. In addition, the
prison officials were not entitled to qualified immunity for violating the prisoners' civil
rights, where the district court found that the officials did not act out of legitimate
penological concerns. (Iowa Stat.e Penit.entiary)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONTRACT
SERVICES

Sandoval v. U.S., 980 F.2d 1057 (5th Cir. 1993). An inmat.e who was injured in a beating
administered by another inmat.e brought an action against the Unit.ed Stat.es under the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The U.S. District Court dismissed the action and the
inmate appealed. The court of appeals, vacating and remanding, found that the inmat.e's
allegation that he was injured because of negligence of the United States Marshal in
placing him in a facility for t.emporary housing of federal prisoners operated by a
government contractor, where he was exposed to improper conduct of guards and other
prisoners, was sufficient to state a nonfrivolous claim against the Unit.ed Stat.es under
FTCA. (Central Texas Violators Facility)

U.S. District Court
OFFICIAL
CAPACITY
PERSONAL
LIABILITY

Searer v. Wells, 837 F.Supp. 1198 (M.D. Fla. 1993). An arrestee brought an action against
a county sheriff in his official capacity and deputies in their individual capacities alleging
use of excessive force. The district court found that the arrestee's allegations that the
county sheriff, in his official capacity, failed to investigat.e the alleged use of excessive
force by deputies and failed to discipline the deputies were sufficient to stat.e a Section
1983 action against the county. The arrestee also stated a cause of action against
deputies under Florida statut.es allowing an officer to be held personally liable in an
action for injury or damage resulting from an act undertaken in the scope of employment
if undertaken in bad faith. with malicious purpose, or in a manner exhibiting wanton and
willful disregard of human rights, safety or property. According to the court, the sheriff
had immunity from liability in the action against him in his official capacity. (Manatee
County Jail, Florida)

U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY

Severino v. Negron, 996 F.2d 1439 (2nd Cir. 1993). An imprisoned resident alien brought
a civil rights action against stat.e correctional officials, alleging that revocation of his
participation in a work release program following the issuance of an immigration warrant
violated due process. The U.S. District Court dismissed the complaint and the alien
appealed. The appeals court, affirming the decision, found that officials were entitled to
qualified immunity. While it was clear that a liberty int.erest existed in the work release
program, the boundaries of that int.erest were not drawn with such clarity that officials
could know precisely what was required to remove an alien from the program. (New York
Department of Correctional Services)

U.S. District Court
NEGIGENCE
DAMAGES

Sheehan v. U.S., 822 F.Supp. 13 (D.D.C. 1993). An arrestee brought a tort claim suit
against the United Stat.es to recover for injuries caused by a fall while in custody. The
district court found that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur supported a finding of liability of
the United Stat.es for the handcuffed arrestee's fall at the top of a ramp. The arrestee
would not have fallen was it not for police officers' negligence, and the arrestee could not
have been responsible since she was handcuffed and had been drinking. The arrestee was
entitled to $5,000 for emotional distress and pain and suffering and to $10,000 for
apparently slight impairment of vision in one eye, scars on her face, and t.emporary
aggravation of prior symptoms of memory loss, inability to concentrat.e, severe headaches,
amnesia, fatigue, lack of stamina, and impaired mobility. (United Stat.es Capitol Police
Headquarters, Washington D.C.)

U.S. Appeals Court
DAMAGES
QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY

Valencia v. Wiggins. 981 F.2d 1440 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 2998. A pretrial
detainee brought a civil rights action against a jail official, alleging that the official used
excessive force against him during a jail disturbance. The U.S. District Court ent.ered
judgment in favor of the detainee, and the official appealed. The appeals court, affirming
the decision, found that the substantive due process standard, rather than the Fourth
Amendment excessive force standard, applied to the pretrial detainee's excessive force
case, where the alleged use of excessive force occurred three weeks after the initial arrest.
The court also found that the jail official's use of a choke hold and other force to subdue
the nonresisting pretrial detainee during the jail disturbance was a malicious and sadistic
use of force to cause harm, rather than a good-faith effort to maintain or restore security,
violating due process. The use of force rendered the detainee t.emporarily unconscious.

Zl.66

The officer then struck the detainee while the detainee was handcuffed, kneeling, and
nonresisting. The court found that the jail official's use of force was not objectively
reasonable, so that the official was not entitled to qualified immunity in the detainee's
civil rights action, where the detainee suffered severe injuries as a result. The detainee
was awarded damages in the amount of $2,500 from the jail official, and was also granted
approximately $27,600 in attorneys' fees and costs. (Brewster County Jail, Texas)
U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED

IMMUNITY

U.S. Appeals Court
DAMAGES

Walters v. Grossheim, 990 F.2d 381 (8th Cir. 1993). A prison inmate brought a civil rights
suit against prison officials, alleging that the officials' failure to comply with a judgment
requiring the inmate to be returned to a less restrictive environment constituted a
violation of his rights. The U.S. District Court awarded the inmate compensatory
damages of $4 per day for the time the inmate spent in Level III custody after the entry of
the state court judgment and before he was restored to Level IV, for a total of $276 in
damages; the parties cross appealed. The court of appeals, affirming the decision, found
that the prison officials did not have qualified immunity for their failure to comply with
the judgment ordering them to return the inmate to a less restrictive environment,
regardless of whether the officials disagreed with the order and thought it lacked proper
legal foundation. The judgment could serve as a basis for the inmate's constitutionally
protected liberty interests, thus the prison officials violated the inmate's due process rights
when they failed to carry out the state court judgment. The prison inmate, who was the
prevailing party, was entitled to an allowance of costs although he had not requested them
in the trial court. (Iowa)
Weeks v. Chaboudy, 984 F.2d 185 (6th Cir. 1993). A paralyzed prisoner brought a Section
1983 civil rights suit against a prison medical director alleging that refusal to prescribe a
wheelchair was deliberat.ely indifferent to the prisoner's serious medical needs. The U.S.
District Court granted the prisoner's motion for summary judgment on liability,
determined damages to be $50,000, and ordered the prison medical director to pay $5,000.
The prisoner appealed. The appeals court, affirming in part, reversing in part and
remanding, found that the prison doctor's deliberate indifference to the serious medical
needs of the paralyzed prisoner was established where the doctor knew of the prisoner's
paraplegia. The court found that the prison doctor's liability to the prisoner could not be
apportioned, although security personnel and other unnamed parties may have also been
liable for damages; the liability of other persons did not diminish the doctor's liability.
(Southern Ohio Correctional Facility)

1994
U.S. District Court
FEDERAL TORI'
CLAIMS ACT

Barrett v. U.S., 845 F.Supp. 774 (D.Kan. 1994). An inmate's mother brought a Federal
Tort Claims Act (Fl'CA) action against prison officials aft.er the inmate was fatally stabbed
at the federal penitentiary. The district court found that the failure of the prison officials
to investigate a death threat against the inmate made by a religious group or to segregate
the inmate from other prisoners was not the proximate cause of the inmate's stabbing
death. The inmate's death was a result of a personal conflict with another inmate who
was not a member of the religious group. In addition, the prison officials had no
knowledge of that conflict and could not have been aware of that conflict even with
reasonable diligence. (United States Penitentiary, Leavenworth, Kansas)

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY

Brown v. Thompson, 868 F.Supp. 326 (S.D.Ga. 1994). An inmate brought a Section 1983
action against a warden and prison medical staff for deliberate indifference to his medical
needs. On the defendants' motions for summary judgment, the district court found that
the prison warden was not liable for the allegedly poor medical treatment the inmate
received. There was no evidence that the warden condoned or directly participated in the
allegedly unconstitutional treatment. In addition, the inmate's claim against medical staff
for failing to provide a wheelchair was barred by their qualified immunity. (Coastal
Correctional Institute, Georgia)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONTRACT
SERVICES
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Conner v. Donnelly, 42 F.Sd 220 (4th Cir. 1994). A prison inmate brought a Section 1983
action against a private physician who treated him on the referral of a prison physician,
alleging that the private physician was deliberately indifferent _to the inmate's serious
medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The U.S. District Court granted
summary judgment for the private physician, concluding that he ditl not act "under color
of stat.e law." The inmate appealed. The appeals court, reversing and l'f"rnanding, found
that a physician who treats a prisoner acts "under color of state law" for purpose of
Section 1983, even in the absence of a contractual relationship between the prison and the
physician, because the stat.e has incarcerated the prisoner and denied him the possibility
of obtaining adequate medical care on his own. The outside physician had no obligation to
accept the prisoner as a patient, and provided treatment at a private facility using his own
equipment. The physician acted "under color of state law" for purposes of Section 1983,
because he assumed his state's con.stitutional obligation to provide medical care to the
prisoner. (Bland ~ o n a l Center, Virginia)

Zl.67

U.S. Appeals Court
CONSENT DECREE
CONTEMPI'

Cooper v. Noble, 33 F.3d 540 (5th Cir. 1994), modified, 41 F.3d 212. County jail inmates
brought a class action against county officials challenging jail conditions. Following the
entry of a final consent judgment governing jail conditions, the officials moved for relief
from the consent judgment. The inmat.es requested that officials be held in cont.empt for
violations of the consent judgment. The U.S. District Court denied the motion for relief
and held the officials in cont.empt. The officials appealed. The appeals court, afflrming
the decision, found that the officials failed to demonstrat.e that changes in factual ·
conditions compelled the magistrat.e judge to grant their motion for relief from the f"mal
consent judgment governing jail conditions. Despit.e cont.entions that the new jail housed
more prisoners than the old jail, and received prisoners from different governmental
agencies with diverse criminal records, and was subject to inspections by governmental
agencies. the officials did not adequat.ely explain how increased inspections and changes
in the number and diversity of inmat.es affect.ed the workability of the final judgment,
compliance with the judgment, or enforcement of the judgment. The court found that the
officials failed to demonstrat.e that changes in the factual conditions compelled the
magistrat.e judge to grant their motion for relief. Also, the magistrat.e judge's finding that
county officials were in cont.empt for failure to comply with the final consent judgment
governing jail conditions was neither clearly erron(!Ous nor an abuse of his discretion,,
where the officials asserted only substantial compliance with the judgment. admitting. to
noncompliance in some areas. (Madison County Jail, Mississippi)

U.S. District Court
COMPENSATORY
DAMAGES
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Culver By and Through Bell v. Fowler, 862 F.Supp. 369 (M.D.Ga. 1994). A former
detainee brought a Section 1983 action against police officers, a police chief, and a city.
alleging they violat.ed his Eighth Amendment rights. After granting summary judgment to
the city and police chief, the district court found that a police officer who was attemptmg
to control the heavily intoxicat.ed, middle aged, mentally retarded male detainee violated
the detainee's Eighth Amendment rights by kneeing him twice in the groin. The court
ruled that the use of force was of the sort repugnant to the conscience of mankind, and the
force was used not in a good faith effort to maintain discipline, but to maliciously and
sadistically cause the detainee harm. Punitive damages in the amount of $25,000 were
awarded against the police officer as the officer act.ed with malicious int.ent to harm the
detainee and lmeeing him in the groin represent.ed a barbaric and cruel means of control.
The detainee was also entitle4 to $25,000 in compensatory damages and special damages
for reimbursement of medical costs in the amount of $6,012. Another officer, who did not
physically assault the detainee in aey manner except to slap his hand away during an
attempt to control the detainee, did not violat.e the detainee's Eighth Amendment rights.
(Sparta Police Department, Georgia)

U.S. District Court
COMPENSATORY
DAMAGES
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Davis v. Moss, 841 F.Supp. 1193 (M.D.Ga. 1994). A former inmate brought a Section 1983
action against correctional officers alleging cruel and unusual punishment in violation of
the Eighth Amendment in connection with defendants' treatment during a riot. The
district court found that the former inmat.e was not entitled to recover for lost earning
capacity in connection with violation of his Eighth Amendment rights by a correctional
officer who shoved the inmat.e down a fire escape during the riot. Such an award would
have been speculative in light of the inmat.e's meager past work history. The inmat.e had
worked only sporadically at farm jobs and, aft.er being paroled, had failed to go to either
the unemployment office or the department of vocational rehabilitation. The inmat.e was
entitled to a damage award of $10,000 for pain and suffering as the fall down the stairs
permanently damaged two discs in the inmat.e's lower back, causing him to undergo
surgery. In addition, the inmat.e was entitled to $25,000 in punitive damages. The
imposition of punitive damages was necessary to det.er the officer and other correctional
officers from using ·unnecessary and malicious force against inmat.es. (Rivers Correctional
Institution, Hardwick. Georgia)

U.S. Supreme Court
FAILURE TO

Farmer v. Brennan, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (1994). A prisoner who was transsexual brought a
Bivens suit against prison officials, claiming that officials showed "deliberat.e indifference"
by placing the prisoner in the general prison population, thus failing to keep him from
harm allegedly inflict.ed by other inmat.es. The U.S. District Court ent.ered judgment for
the officials and the inmat.e appealed. The appeals court affirmed and certiorari was
grant.ed. The Supreme Court, vacating and remanding, found that prison officials may be
held liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying humane conditions of confinement
only if they know that inmat.es face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregard that
risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abat.e it. Remand would be required to
det.ermine whether prison officials would have liability, under the above standards, for not
preventing harm allegedly occurring in this case. (Federal Correctional Institut.e, Oxford,
Wisconsin and Unit.ed Stat.es Penit.entiary, Terre Haut.e, Indiana)

PROTECT

LIABllJTY

U.S. Appeals Court
COMPENSATORY
DAMAGES
NOMINAL DAMAGES

Gibeau v. Nellis, 18 F.3d 107 (2nd Cir. 1994). An incarcerat.ed criminal cont.emnor
brought a Section 1983 action against a jail officer, alleging excessive use of force. The
U.S. District Court entered judgment on a jury verdict finding that the officer had used
excessive force, but awarded no damages, and the inmat.e appealed. The appeals court

27.88

found that whether the contemn.or suffered even a minor compensable mjury proximately
caused by the officer's use of excessive force, so as to mandate an award of compensatory
damages, was a question for the jury. The district court should have instruc:t.ed the jury
that it was required to award nominal damages if it found that the plaintiff's Eighth
Amendment rights were violated, and the court should have provided a corresponding
verdict form. (Oswego County Jail, New York)
U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO
TRAIN

LIABILITY

Gilbert v. Selsky, 867 F.Supp. 159 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). An inmate brought a Section 1983
action, alleging that a prison disciplinary hearing had been conduc:t.ed in violation of his
due process rights. The district court found that the judgment that the inmate had
committ.ed theft was not support.ed by the requisite "some evidence." Given the evidence
that others, but not the inmate, had access to the area during the relevant time, an
informant's accusation was hearsay that could not constitute "some evidence" absent an
objective foundation establishing reliability. In addition, the refusal to call relevant
witnesses requested by the inmate deprived the inmate of due process. There was no
showing that witnesses' testimony would have been unduly hazardous to institutional
safety or correctional goals. Supervisory prison officials were personally involved with the
violations of the inmate's constitutional rights at the disciplinary hearing and could be
held liable under Section 1983. They failed to remedy violations on administrative appeal
and failed to train the hearing officer. (Eastern Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
CONSENT DECREE
CONTEMPI'
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Harrelson v. Elmore County, Ala., 859 F.Supp. 1465 (M.D. Ala. 1994). A paraplegic
inmate brought an action against a city and county, alleging a violation of the Americans
With Disabilities Act (ADA), Section 1983, constitutional rights, and a consent decree, and
seeking compensatory and punitive damages, costs, and attorney fees. The defendants
moved to dismiss the punitive damages claims. The district court found that cities and
counties are immune from punitive damages under Section 1983. Also, punitive damages
are not available to a plaintiff asserting a claim under the Americans With Disabilities
Act (ADA) Title II, guaranteeing for qualified individuals with disabilities equal access to
services and benefits provided by state and local governments. The court also ruled that
an alleged violation of a consent decree cannot be the basis for the inmate's Section 1983
suit; the appropriate vehicle for enforcement of a consent decree is a contempt action
brought before the court responsible for the decree. (Elmore County Jail, Alabama)

U.S. District Court
42U.S.C.A.
Section 1983
OFFICIAL
CAPACITY

Haston v. Tatham, 842 F.Supp. 483 (D. Utah 1994). An inmate sued Utah Correctional
Industries (UCI) and UCI officials, alleging that the defendants' failure to hire the inmate
was based upon the inmate's alleged disabilities, in violation of Sections 1983 and 1985.
The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court found that the
individual defendants could not be liable under Section 1983 in their official capacities
and that the UCI director was not liable under Section 1983 to the inmate. The director
stated that he did not personally participate in the consideration of any of the inmate's job
applications, there was no allegation that UCI hiring policies were unconstitutional, and
there was no constitutional or other requirement that UCI have an affirmative action
policy. (Utah State Prison)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN

Hirsch v. Burke, 40 F.3d 900 (7th Cir. 1994). A wife, as the administratrix of the estate of
her husband, brought a civil rights action under Section 1983 against a police officer and
a county sheriff. The U.S. District Court dismissed the claims and entered judgment in
favor of the defendants. On appeal, the court of appeals, afr1rming the decision found that
the police officer had probable cause to arrest the individual for public intoxication, even
though the individual was, in fact, a diabetic in a state of insulin shock. The individual
had trouble balancing himself and appeared incoherent, smelled of alcohol and had
bloodshot eyes, was unable to state his name or date of birth, and did not indicate that he
was a diabetic. In addition, the municipality was not liable under Section 1983 based on a
"failure to train" theory for alleged violation of the individual's civil rights which occurred
when the police officer arrested and jailed the individual. There was no evidence that the
municipality engaged in a pattern of mistakenly detaining people with symptoms of
diabetic shock or a pattern of failing to medically treat those same individuals when their
true affliction was discovered. (Marion County Jail, Indiana)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Holloway v. Wittry, 842 F.Supp. 1193 (S.D.Iowa 1994). An inmate brought an action
against prison officials and a staff member arising from the assault of the inmate by four
other prisoners. The district court found that the inmate had failed to establish deliberate
indifference on the part of the prison officials, but that a staff member violated the
inmate's Eighth Amendment rights. A staff member was required to remain on the floor
of the prison industries at all times, a security officer roved through the industry building
all day, security checks were made of tools, and staff members carried emergency beepers.
But the court found that a staff member's failure to seek assistance by failing to use an
emergency beeper and intervene during the assault violated the inmate's Eighth
Amendrnen.t rights. As a result, the inmate was awarded $500 in compensatory damages
and $1,000 in punitive damages. (Iowa State Penitentiary, Fort Madison, Iowa)

27.69

U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED

IMMUNITY

Housley v. Dodson, 41 F.3d 597 (10th Cir. 1994). An inmate in a county jail brought a
civil rights suit against various public officials. The·U.S. District Court dismissed the
action and the in.mate appealed. The appeals court found that the in.mat.e's allegation.
that he was denied all access t.o any legal resources during his six-month co:cifin.emen.t in
the county jail was sufficient t.o state a claim against jail officials based on denial of right
of access t.o courts. In addition., the court found that the inmate's allegation. that he
received only 30 minutes of out-of-cell exercise during a three-month period in which he
was con.fined in the county jail was sufficient t.o state a civil rights claim against jail
officials based on a violation. of the prohibition. against cruel and unusual punishment.
The sheriff and jailer were :not en.titled t.o qualified immunity where such rights were
clearly established at the time of the incarceration.. (Custer County Jail, Oklahoma)

U.S. District Court
CLASS ACTION
OFFICIAL
CAPACITY

Hvorcik v. Sheahan., 847 F.Supp. 1414 (N.D.ID. 1994). A class action suit was brought
against a sheriff in his official capacity charging the sheriff with illegal custodial
detention., false arrest under state law, and civil cont.empt of court for alleged failure of the·
sheriff t.o maintain accurate records of traffic warrants. The district court found that the
sheriff's policy of :not maintaining accurate records of traffic warrants was d~liberat.ely
in.different t.o the constitution.al rights of persons being subjected t.o arrests and detention.
on recalled warrants. The sheriff's policy of not maintaining accurate records of traffic
warrants was :not the proximate cause of the unlawful arrests of the named plaintiffs, and
thus the municipality was not liable for a Section. 1983 violation. as t.o the named
plaintiffs. However, the sheriff's policy was the proximate cause of the unlawful arrests of
the class of plaintiffs, and thus the municipality was liable for Section. 1983 violations as
t.o the class. The court also found that the sheriff's policy, although willful and want.on.,
was not the proximate cause of the unlawful arrests of named plaintiffs, and thus the
municipality was not liable for false imprisonment as t.o named plaintiffs, but the
municipality was liable for false imprisonment as t.o the class of plaintiffs. The sheriff
was :not en.titled t.o absolut.e immunity from the suit under the Eleven.th Amendment.
(Cook County Sheriff's Office, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
CONTEMPI'
REMEDIES

In.mat.es of the· Allegheny County Jail v. Wecht, 848 F.Supp. 52 (W.D.Pa. 1994). In a civil
rights litigation. pertaining t.o conditions at a county detention. facility, the district court
found that upon the county's compliance with court orders concerning jail conditions, the
court would relieve the county of the obligation. t.o pay further f'mes. In addition., fines
already paid would be returned for the exclusive purpose of contribution. t.o jail
construction. or drug rehabilitation. programs. (Allegheny County Jail, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
CONSENT DECREE
MODIFICATION

In.mat.es of Suffolk County Jail v. Rufo. 844 F.Supp. 31 (D. Mass. 1994). A county sheriff
moved t.o modify a con.sent decree requiring construction. of a new jail. The U.S. District
Court denied the motion and the sheriff appealed. The court of appeals affirmed and
certiorari was granted. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the case for
reconsideration.. On. remand, the district court found that the matt.er would not be
reassigned t.o an.other judge and that the sheriff was not en.titled t.o modification. of the
decree t.o permit double-bunking. The Commission.er of Corrections appealed. The court
of appeals affirmed. The sheriff subsequently revised the motion t.o modify the con.sent
decree t.o permit double-bunking. The district court found that the proposed modification.
t.o the con.sent decree, proposing an in.crease in capacity by double-bunking in 161 cells,
was :not tailored t.o fit the changed circwnstan.ce of an in.creased number of pretrial
detainees. The court found that the consent decree would be modified t.o allow alteration.
of up t.o 100 cells t.o permit double occupancy, even though this would impair some
inmate's access t.o common areas. In addition., the f'mal order closing the case was not
immediately entered. The court provision.ally found that it was appropriate t.o allow a five
year period before closing the case, t.o allow parties t.o seek relief from the order. (Suffolk
County Jail, Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
COMPENSATORY

Lowrance v. Coughlin, 862 F.Supp. 1090 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). A Muslim prison.er brought a
Section. 1983 action. against various prison officials alleging violation. of the First, Eighth,
and Fourteen.th Amendments. The district court found that the in.mate who was
repeatedly transferred from prison t.o prison in retaliation. for his exercise of First
Amendment free expression. and religion. rights, who spent 115 days in segregative
cnnfinemen.t as a result of such retaliation., who was subjected t.o retaliat.ory cell searches,
and whose knee surgery was delayed for nearly two years after the diagnosis, was entitled
to recover from prison. officials responsible for those acts $132,000 in compen.sat.ory
damages and $25,000 in punitive damages. (Green Haven Correction.al Facility, and other
facilities, New York)

DAMAGES
PUNITIVE

DAMAGES

U.S. Appeals Court
CONSENT DECREE
CONTEMP'l'

Mahers v. Hedgepeth, 32 F.3d 1273 (8th Cir. 1994). In.mat.es brought a civil rights action
for damages against a warden seeking to hold him in cont.empt of a con.sent decree arising
from a search for contraband. The U.S. District Court dismissed t.be civil rights claim, but
held the warden. in cont.empt for allowing staff to violate the decree, and the warden.
appealed. The appeals court, reversing the decision.,· found that the district court

Zl.70

improperly held the warden in contempt for conduct not prescn"bed within the consent decree.
Although the warden's staff disobeyed the Iowa Stat.e Penit.entiary compliance policy in failing
to have an authorizing official make an exigent circumstances determination before conducting
a shakedown search of cells, the consent decree did not incorporate the compliance policy. The
district court made no finding regarding exigent circumstances to justify the search of the
inmat.es' legal papers outside their presence in violation of the consent decree. (Iowa Stat.e
Penit.entiary)
U.S. District Court
CONTRACT
SERVICES
QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY

Manis v. Corrections Corp. of America. 859 F.Supp. 302 (M.D. Tenn. 1994). An inmat.e
brought a civil rights action against a privat.e corporation and one of its employees who
operat.ed a prison under contract with the stat.e, alleging deliberat.e indifference to serious
medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The defendants moved ~ dismiss
the action. The district court found that the privat.e corporation and its employees were
not protected from the suit by the qualified immunity of public officials. (South Central
Correctional Cent.er, Tennessee)

U.S. District Court
DAMAGES
INDMDUAL
CAPACITY
PERSONAL
LIABILITY

McCann v. Phillips, 864 F.Supp. 330 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). A former jail inmat.e brought a c~vii
rights suit against a county sheriff and a correctional facility officer alleging a violation of
procedural due process resulting from the inmat.e's confinement as part of a 24-hour
keeplock. of his jail tier. The district court found that the sheriff and the correctional
officer were liable in their official capacities for any damages attributable to their not
affording the jail inmat.e an opportunity to make a stat.ement prior to being confined in 24
hour keeplock., where denying the inmat.e that opportunity was consist.ent with a standard
policy followed in the jail, as set forth in a rules and infraction notice. In addition, the
correctional officer could be held personally liable for failing to afford the inmat.e an opportunity
to make a stat.ement prior to being confined for administrative reasons, even though the defect
was a result of a lack of a provision for such a right in the jail's rules, where the officer had not
assert.ed official immunity. (Orange County Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
DAMAGES
DEFENSES
FAILURE1'0
PROTECT
NEGLIGENCE

Myers v. County of Lake, Ind.• 30 F.3d 847 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 666. A
county was found by a jury to have negligently failed to prevent a juvenile delinquent's
suicide attempt and damages were awarded to the parent and juvenile by the U.S. District
Court. The county appealed. The appeals court found that Indiana law requires stat.e
institutions to use reasonable care to prevent their wards from committing suicide. The
court also found that whether the county negligently provided so few funds to the juvenile
det.ention cent.er that the staff could not exercise reasonable care to prevent the juvenile's
suicide attempt was a jury question under Indiana law. Although Indiana recognizes
int.ervening cause, reckless disregard of one's own safety, and incurred risk as defenses to a
negligence claim, Indiana would probably not recognize the int.entional efforts to coimnit suicide ·
as a defense. Both the parent and child were entitled to separat.e per person awards under the
statut.e limiting the government's liability. (Lake County Juvenile Cent.er, Indiana)

U.S. District Court
NOMINAL DAMAGES

Sanford v. Brookshire, 879 F.Supp. 691 (W.D. Tex. 1994). An inmat.e filed a Section 1983
action asserting cruel and unusual punishment resulting from confinement to a filthy cell
in a county jail for six days without functional plumbing or hygienic supplies. The district
court found that the county jailer and her supervisor violat.ed the inmat.e's Eighth Amendment
rights, for purposes of the inmat.e's Section 1983 claim, by acting with deliberat.e indifference to
complaints about filth in the cell and a nonfunctioning toilet and sink, lack of toilet paper, and
a shower head which produced only a thin stream of cold wit.t.er. The jailer left the inmat.e in
the cell for six days while a written maint.enance request was processed, and the jailer's
supervisor told the inmat.e he could not receive cleaning supplies until cleaning day. However.
the inmat.e failed to present any evidence of actual damages from violation of his civil rights
and, thus, was only entitled to recover nominal damages of one dollar from the county jailer
and her supervisor who were deliberat.ely indifferent to the inmat.e's complaints. (Ector County
Jail, Texas)

U.S. District Court
FAIWRE1'0 .
TRAIN
42U.S.C.A.
Section 1983

Women Prisoners v. District of Columbia, 877 F.Supp. 634 (D.D.C. 1994). A class action
was brought on behalf of female prisoners in the District of Columbia. The district court
found that prison officials were liable for civil rights violations of female prisoners who
were subject to sexual harassment, notwithstanding official policies regarding sexual
misconduct, as the harassment was the result of governmental custom and officials failed
to properly train employees in the area of sexual harassment. Longstanding health hazards
which exist.ed in prison as a result of the failure of the department of corrections to properly
abat.e hazardous conditions result.ed in prison officials being liable for civil rights violations.
(District of Columbia Correctional Syst.em- the Lorton Minimum Security Annex, the
Correctional Treatment Facility, the Central Detention Facility)

U.S. Appeals Court
DAMAGES

Wright v. Smith. 21 F.3d 496 (2nd Cir. 1994). A prison inmat.e brought a Section 1983
action against the superint.endent of the Attica Correctional Facility and the Commissioner
of the New York Department of Correcti.onal Services seeking damages on the grounds
that he was confined in a specie.I housing unit (SHU) for 67 days without a hearing. The U.S.
District Court dismissed the complaint with prejudice and the inmat.e appealed. The appeals
court, affirming in part, reversing in part and remanding, found that the Commissioner, who
did not have actual or constructive notice of the violation, was not personally involved in the

LIABILITY

27.71

constitutional dtU>rlvation and was not liable for damages. However, the superintendent was a
supervisory official who, after learning of the violation through a report or appeal, failed to
remedy the wrong and could not escape liability for damages by denying personal involvement.
(Attica Correctional Facility, New York)

1995
U.S. Appea1s Court

CONSENT DECREE
COURT MONITOR
FINES

REMEDIES
STATE LIABILITY

U.S. Appeals Court

Alberti v. Klevenhagen, 46 F.3d 1347 (5th Cir. 1995). Appeal was taken from remedial
orders in an action challenging conditions in a county jail syst.em. The appeals court
found that the stat.e could be held liable for conditions in the county's jail if deliberat.ely
indifferent, and remanded. On remand, the U.S. District Court found the stat.e and county
liable. The county and stat.e appealed and the appeals court affirmed. Subsequently, the
district court denied the stat.e's motion to modify a final order or stay the imposition of
fines and modified conditions imposed in the consent decree. The stat.e appealed and the
plaintiff-prisoners cross-appealed. The appeals court found that the court order mandating a
maximum inmat.e population and imposing a fine if that order were violated, based on the
extent of the violation, was not improper. In addition, the district court did not abuse its
discretion by concluding that it could ensure compliance with the population cap order by fining
the stat.e for overcrowding, even though it did not identically fine the county to ensure its
compliance with the court order. The court found the majority of problems at the county jail
resulted from the large number of transfer-ready felons which the stat.e would not receive, and
found that the primary responsibility for the overcrowding crises at the jail lay with the stat.e
defendants. The district court did not abuse its discretion by holding the state responsible for
90% of the costs of the monitors for the time period after the stat.e ent.ered the litigation. The
stat.e's actions in failing to accept transfer-ready felons were the primary cause of overcrowding
in the county's jails and it was that overcrowding that predominat.ely necessitated the presence
of the monitors under the consent decree. The district court had authority to modify the jail
conditions consent decree. (Harris County Jails, Texas)
Anderson y. Romero. 72 F.3d 518 (7th Cir. 1995). An inmate who was infected with the human

QUALIFIED IMMUNITY immunodeficiency virus (HIV) sued prison officials alleging violation of his constitutional right
of privacy and the Illinois AIDS Confidentiality Act. The district court denied the officials'
motion to dismiss and they appealed. The appeals court found that the inmat.e's claim
regarding disclosure of his HIV status to other inmates or prison staff and other measures
taken against him on the basis of his HIV status was barred by the doctrine of official
immunity. The court noted that HIV-positive inmates can be segregated from the rest of the
population, in view of the prevalence of HIV in prisons, the amount of violence and homosexual
int.ercourse. However, the court found that the inmat.e's claim to damages based on the denial
of barber services was not barred. The court also found that to deny all opportunity for exercise
outside his cell would violat.e the Eighth Amendment unless the prisoner posed an acut.e
security risk. If the only reason that prison officials denied the inmat.e haircuts and yard
privileges was that he was HIV-positive, and there was no conceivable justification for the
denial as an HIV-fighting measure, then prison officials could not be immune even in the
absence of a case involving this type of arbitrary treatment. (Stat.eville Penitentiary, Illinois)
U.S. District Court

CONSENT DECREE

U.S. Appea1s Court
LlABILITY

Austin v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections. 876 F.Supp. 1437 (E.D.Pa. 1995). Imnat.es
brought a class action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. Section 1983 and the Rehabilitation Act.
contesting the practices and conditions of confinement in stat.e correctional institutions. After
e:r:tensive discovery and numerous court proceedings, the parties engaged in settlement
negotiations and submitted a proposed settlement agreement for court approval. The district
court found that any applicable notice requirements for settlement of the class action were
satisfied where on three separat.e occasions the Department of Corrections posted notices of the
prospec:five settlement in common areas of all institutions housing class members as well as the
location of copies of the settlement agreement and the ways in which to file objections with the
court. The court found that the proposed settlement agreement fairly, reasonably, and
adequately advanced and prot.ected the int.erests of the plaintiff class and thus was approved.
(State Correctional Institution ["SCI"]· Camp Hill, SCI-Cresson, SCI-Dallas, SCI-Frackville,
SCI-Graterford, SCI-Greensburg, SCI-Huntingdon, the State Regional Correctional Facility at
Mercer, SCI-Retreat, SCI-Rockview, SCI-Smithfield, SCI-Waymart, and SCI-Waynesburg,
Pennsylvania)
Boyd v. Knox. 47 F.3d 966 (8th Cir. 1995). A prisoner sued various prison officials for

Eighth Amendment violations as a result of the delay of dental care for an infected and
impact.eel tooth. 'Ihe U.S. District Court denied summary judgment and the parties appealed.
'lhe appeals court found that supervisors could not be held liable for any Eighth Amendment
violations absent a showing of personal involvement in a violation or inaction constituting
deliberat.e indifference toward a violation. Waiting three weeks to complete a referral form for
dental care of the impact.eel and infect.ed wisdom tooth created a genuine issue of mat.erial fact,
precluding summary judgment for one prison official, as to whether the official violated the
Eighth Amendment prolu"bition against deh"berate indifference to a serious medical need. 'lbe
medical need was obvious from the extent of the swelling. (Missouri Department of
Corrections)

27.72

U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED

IMMUNITY

Browning v. Vernon, 44 F.3d 818 (9th Cir. 1995). A class of inmates brought an action
against prison officials, alleging due process violations in connection with a program under
which individuals were placed in correctional institutions to be evaluated for potential
release on probation. The U.S. District Court denied the officials' motion for summary
judgment and the officials appealed. The appeals court, affirming the decision, found that
the inmates had a protected libeify interest in objective and reliable rehabilitation reports and
that the libeify interest was clearly established when the prison officials allegedly denied such
interest. An Idaho Supreme Court decision explicitly stated that such interest existed, and
such a decision was binding. In addition, prison officials did not act reasonably in light of a
preexisting law mandating due process in connection with the program, and therefore, the
officials were not qualifiedly immune from the suit alleging denial of due process. The officials
should have known, even though no court had found, that they violated the inmates' rights
when they informed the inmates only 24 hours in advance of an evaluation rebuttal hearing,
failed to give the inmates copies of recommendations regarding probation, and immediately
placed inmates in solitary confinement so that they could not contact wi1nesses or use the law
library. The lower court found that due process requires that the prison provide such inmates
with staff assistance to contact witnesses and access to a telephone to contact legal counsel. An
inmate does not have the due process right to personally contact witnesses. The court also
found that inmates are entitled to a written notice of the right to call witnesses at the rebuttal
hearing. They are also entitled to copies of staff evaluations or chronological reports, as well as
full psychiatric evaluations completed on sex offenders or others. (North Idaho Correctional
Institution)

U.S. District Court
CONTRA.CT
SERVICES

Burton v. Cameron County, Tex.• 884 F.Supp. 234 (S.D. Tex. 1995). A detainee who
suffered from AIDS brought Section 1983 and Texas tort claims actions against a sheriff, a
physician for the jail, and the county for insufficient medical care. On motions for
summary judgment by the ·county and the physician, the district court found that the physician
under contract to provide medical services to the county jail was not liable to the detainee for
alleged insufficient medical treatment. The detainee was given reasonable medical care and
suffered no adverse effects from the time spent in jail. In addition, the physician was not liable
to the detainee for alleged medical negligence because the detainee was not harmed by any
alleged shortcomings of treatment, and any failure by the infirmary staff to properly provide
the detainee with AZT trea1ment was not conduct which could be imputed on the physician.
The physician was not liable to the detainee for intentional infliction of emotional distress
regarding allegedly insufficient medical treatment. The administration of a placebo did not
constitute extreme or outrageous conduct and significant care was provided by the infirmary
staff in coordination with the care provided by the detainee's private physician. The detainee's
private physician testified that the confinement had not affected the detainee's medical
conditions or his mental health. (Cameron County Jail, Texas)

U.S. District Court
OFFICIAL
CAPACITY
QUALIFIED

Caffey v. Johnson. 883 F.Supp. 128 (E.D. Tex. 1995). A prisoner, proceeding pro se,
brought a Section 1983 action against a prison officer and against the director of the Texas
Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, alleging that the officer wrongfully
seized and either destroyed or lost the prisoner's Holy Koran, handkerchief with an
Islamic prayer on it, and Islamic papers. The officer moved for summary judgment and
the director moved to dismiss. The district court found that the director was being sued in his
official capacity and was shielded by the Eleventh Amendment. The inmate claimed no
individual actions or participation in any wrongdoing by the director, and the inmate stated
explicitly and unequivocally that there was no personal action or knowledge by the director in
the prison officer's alleged wrongful seizure and destruction of the inmate's religious items. The
inmate sued the director on the sole basis of his public status. Since the inmate did not
designate himself a Muslim in accordance with a prison regulation stating that only those
prisoners who designated themselves with a particular religious group may possess religious
paraphernalia, the inmate's Holy Koran, handkerchief with an Islamic prayer on it, and Islamic
papers were contraband and it was not unreasonable for the prison officer to seize and discard
these items. The officer was entitled to qualified immunity for purposes of the inmate's Section
1983 action. Cl'exas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, Stiles Unit)

IMMUNITY

U.S. District Court
CONTRA.CT SERVICES

STATE LIABILITY

Citrano v. Allen Correctional Center, 891 F.Supp. 312 (W.D.La. 1995). A civil rights case was
filed in forma pauperis by pro se prisoners alleging that they were assaulted by prison officials
while at a correctional facility operated by a private contractor (Wackenhut Corporation). The
district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, finding that officials at a corrections
facility operated by a private contractor were entitled to the same qualified immunity afforded
to state prison officials, and that the facility was an arm of the state and was therefore immune
from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. The court noted that the mere fact that the
contractual ties of the private prison officers were different than that of state employees did not
provide a logical basis for denying those workers the benefit of qualified immunity. The state
legislature had indicated that private contracts for corrections are for the safety and welfare of
the people of the state, as opposed to local interests; Eleventh Amendment immunity ezt.ends to
state agencies that act as arms of the state, but does not ezt.end to counties, cities or other
political subdivisions of the state. In determining whether a suit against a state agency or
similar agency i,s in fact a suit against a state, the court identified six fact.ors that must be
determined: (1) whether state statutes and case law characterize the agency as an arm of the
state; (2) the source of funds for the entity; {3) the degree of local autonomy the entity enjoys;
'Jf'l.'13

(4) whether the entity is concerned primarily with local, as opposed to statewide, problems; (5)
whether the entity has the authority to sue and be sued in its own name; and (6) whether the
entity has the right to hold and use property. (Allen Correctional Center, Louisiana)
U.S. District Court

DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
NEGLlGENCE
SOVEREIGN

IMMUNITY

U.S. District Court
POSTAGE

INDIGENT INMATES

U.S. Appeals Court

SPECIAL MASTER
REMEDIES

U.S. Distris:t Court
COMPENSATORY
DAMAGES
PUNITIVE
DAMAGES

Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F.Supp. 1282 (E.D.Cal. 1995). Inmates challenged the adequacy of
mental health care provided at institutions operated by the California Department of
Corrections, alleging that the inadequacies were cruel and unusual punishment in violation of
the Eighth Amendment. 'lhe district court reviewed the findings and recommendations of the
chief magistrate judge after objections were filed by the defendants. 'lhe court found that
evidence supported the magistrate's findings and recommendations regarding many aspects of
the Department's mental health services, and ordered that a special master be appointed to
monitor the Department's compliance with court-ordered injunctive relief. The court denied
immunity for the governor, finding that he failed to establish that he lacked lmowledge of
systemic deficiencies, and ruling that he demonstrated deliberate indifference for Eighth
Amendment purposes. The court suggested that after five years of litigation on this issue, the
claimed lack of awareness was not plausible. 'lhe court made similar findings for other state
officials, including the Direct.or of the Department of Corrections. Applying the "deliberate
indifference" standard, rather than the "malicious and sadistic" standard, the court found that
the use of tasers and 37mm guns against inmates with serious mental disorders had caused
serious and substantial harm to mentally ill inmates, whether or not they were on psychotropic
medication. (California Department of Corrections)
Coppage v. Mann, 906 F.Supp. 1025 (E.D.Va. 1995). A former Virginia prison inmate brought a
§ 1983 action alleging Eighth Amendment violations against a prison superintendent,

physician, nurse and private consulting physician. 'lhe plaintiff also asserted state-law claims
for medical malpractice, intentional infliction of emotional distress and assault and battery.
'lhe plaintiff claimed that his cancerous condition was misdiagnosed and that he was subjected
to inhumane living conditions during his course of treatment. The district court granted
summary judgment, in part, for the defendants, dismissing all federal claims. 'lhe district court
retained jurisdiction over state-law claims. 'lhe court ruled that the inmate did not have claims
for intentional infliction of emotional distress or assault and battery, that the inmate failed to
establish deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, and that the defendants were
entitled to qualified immunity. 'lhe court also found that the acknowledged fact that the
inmate sometimes had to lie in his own waste, was not immediately provided with a wheelchair,
and was handcuffed to his bed as a last resort to treat his bedsores, did not make out an Eighth
Amendment claim. However, the court found that a fact issue existed as to whether the prison
physician's conduct amounted to gross negligence so as to deprive him of sovereign immunity.
Although the prison was short-staffed with nurses, this did not establish an Eighth Amendment
·violation absent any evidence that nurses were not hired with the lmowledge that, as a result,
the inmate would be placed at substantial risk of living in inhumane conditions.
(Rappahannock Security Center, Virginia)
Dawes v. Carpenter, 899 F.Supp. 892 (N.D.N.Y. 1995). A prison inmate sued state officials
alleging civil rights violations. 'lhe district court dismissed the case, finding that the prison's
restriction on free postage did not violate the inmate's rights. 'lhe inmate had alleged that the
prison's elimination of a postage subsidy for non-legal mail violated the First Amendment. The
court found that the new policy did not overly restrict most prisoners' ability to conduct
nonprivileged communication with people outside prisons, where the inmates could receive
incoming mail and visitors, make collect phone calls, and purchase stamps with money earned
while in prison. (Great Meadow Correctional Facility, New York).
Dilley v_. Gunn, 64 F.3d 1365 (9th Cir. 1995). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against prison
officials alleging violation of his right of access to courts by their failure to provide reasonable
access to the prison's law library. 'lhe district court granted summary judgment for the inmate
and entered an injunction requiring improvements to the library. 'lhe appeals court held that
the appeal was moot because the inmate was transferred, but that remand was warranted to
determine if the officials' conduct caused the mootness such that the injunction should not be
vacated. A special master had been appointed by the district court, who recommended:
expanding both the size of the library and its holdings; permitting inmates to have open access
to the stacks or to check out four rather than three books at a time; a training program for
inmate law clerks; increasing both the length and frequency of inmates' visits to the library;
implementing a system for scheduling inmates' use of the h'brary; and providing more
opportunities for inmates with jobs to use the h'brary. (Calipatria State Prison, California)

Frazier v. Forgione. 881 F.Supp. 879 (W.D.N.Y. 1995). An inmate brought a civil rights
action under Section 1983 against prison officials for intentionally withholding legal
papers from him in violation of his constitutional rights. 1he district court found that
nominal compensatory damages were appropriate against a prison official for intentionally
withholding the inmate's legal papers for more than two years, though the inmate did not
suffer any actual damages because he was able to pursue all of his intended actions without the
papers at issue. In addition, the inmate was entitled to punitive damages of $500 against the
prison official for acting deh'berately over a two-year period to deny the inmate's righ1ful access
to courts by confiscating papers that the inmate was using to proceed in court actions, though
the inmat.e had c:opies or could reconstruct his notes. (Collins Correctional Facility, New York)
2'1.'14

U.S. District Court
CONSENT DECREEMODIFICATION

Glover v. Johnson. 879 F.Supp. 752 (E.D. Mich. 1995). Prison officials sought to modify a
remedial plan and a plan for vocational programs designed to remedy equal protection
violations identified in a civil rights action brought by female inmates. The district court found
that the prison officials' failure to substantially comply with a remed,ial plan designed to
provide female inmates with educational. and vocational opportunities comparable to those
provided to male inmates precluded termination of the court's jurisdiction over the civil rights
case by deleting the role of the compliance monitor and modifying the termination language of
the plans. The prison officials were required to substantially comply with goals of the
negotiated settlement before the court would rule that finality had been reached and its
involvement was no longer required. (Huron Valley Women's Facility, Michigan)

U.S. Appeals Court

Hale v. Tallapoosa County, 50 F.8d 1579 (11th Cir. 1995). A pretrial detainee filed a •
Section 1983 action against a county, its sheriff and a jailer arising from an alleged
beating of the detainee by other inmates in a group cell. The U.S. District Court entered
summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the detainee appealed. The appeals
court. affirming in part, reversing in part and remanding, found that evidence that the
jailer failed to check on the group cell during the hour between the last check and the
beating was not sufficient to show deliberate indifference and causation necessary to hold the
jailer individually liable for the detainee's injuries. However, genuine issues of material fact
existed, precluding summary judgment for the sheriff and the county, on whether conditions of
the cell subjected the detainee to a substantial risk of serious harm, whether the sheriff was
deliberately indifferent to the risk, and whether the beating of the detainee was caused by the
excessive risk of violence in the group cell resulting from an atmosphere of deliberate
indifference. The evidence showed that the jail was overcrowded during the time in question.
In addition, the sheriff testified that he knew of inmate violence during periods of overcrowding
and that incidents had required hospitalization of inmates. Although the sheriff worked toward
the construction of a new jail, the existing jail had no policy for classifying and segregating
inmates, the jailer had received no professional training, and the jailer was stationed out of
eyesight and earshot of the cell. (Tallapoosa County Jail, Alabama)

DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

FAILURE TO
PROTECT
LIABILITY

U.S. Appeals Court
CONSENT DECREE-

MODIFICATION
CONTEMPr
REMEDIES

Harris v. City of Philadelphia. 47 F.8d 1311 and 1333 and 1342 (3rd Cir. 1995). In a jail
conditions case, appeals were taken from orders of the United States District Court
assessing stipulated penalties against a city. directing production of a facilities audit
required under a consent decree, declaring the city in contempt and dismissing a motion to
modify the decree. The appeals court found that the imposition of penalties stipulated in
the decree to be imposed for a delay in submitting planning documents "without any further
direction from the Court." did not require notice and a hearing that would be required for a civil
contempt sanction. In addition. the court was not required to find that there was no good cause
for the city's delays for imposition of the penalties. Any additional cost if a facilities audit was
submitted before the physical standards were approved did not make submission of the audit
"impossible." The court also found that changes in administrative policy resulting from the
election of a new mayor did not pennit the city to unilaterally default on its obligations to the
court and other litigants under the consent decree and did not preclude an imposition of a
contempt sanction. In the jail conditions litigation, the dismissal of the city's motion to modify
the consent decree was an inappropriate sanction for civil contempt based on a delay in
submitting plans, as the sanction was not compensatory nor was it denied to have a coercive
effect because it had no provision explicitly pennitting the city to refile a motion once the
documents were submitted. In addition. the dismissal could not be upheld as within the district
court's discretion as a sanction for failure to comply with discovery. The U.S. District Court
held the city in contempt for failing to comply with an order requiring the city to maintain a
90% occupancy rate in a residential drug treatment facility. The appeals court found that the
city was provided notice and a hearing sufficient to satisfy its due process rights before the
district court imposed a contempt sanction of $125,000. Furthermore, the alleged unclean
hands of some class members did not justify denying relief to the entire class. The appeals
court found that absent any provision in a consent decree or an order of the court requiring the
city to seek court approval before modifying its prisoner relief practice, the city's mere failure to
do so before changing its procedures was not alone enough to sustain a finding of contempt.
The court also found that the city violated the unambiguous provision of the consent decree in
the prison overcrowding case, which supported a finding of contempt, when it failed to list for
release inmates who fell into categories the city deemed "dangerous." i.e., those whose bail was
set at $75,000 or hig}:ier or who required mental health treaiment. A paragraph of the decree
from which the city derived its authority to not list "dangerous" inmates was superseded by a
subsequent decree. (Philadelphia Prison System. Pennsylvania)

Hayes y. ~ 72 F.8d 70 (8th Cir. 1995). A Muslim inmat.e brought a § 1983 action against
U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY prison officials after he was disciplined for refusing to handle pork while he was working in a
prison kit.chen. The district court granted summary judgment for the prison officials based on
qualified immunity and the inmate appealed. The appeals court reversed the lower court
decision, finding that Muslim inmates had clearly established rights not to handle pork at the
time the plaintiff was disciplined and that it would be unreasonable for prison officials to be
unaware of such rights. (Cummins IJnit, Arkansas Department of Correction)

<J:l.'15

U.S. District Court
CONSENT DECREEMODIFICATION
COURI' MONITOR
SPECIAL MASTER
CONTEMPI'
SANCTIONS

Hooky. Stat.e of Ariz., 907 F.Supp. 1326 (D.Ariz. 1995). Three separat.e civil rights cases filed
by prisoners were consolid.at.ed t.o resolve the issue of payment of speciaJ, masters'·fees. The
court grant.eel the plaintiffs' motion for contempt and denied the defendants' motion t.o modify
previous orders. The court also held unconstitutional a stat.e statut.e which purport.ed t.o ·affect
lawful orders of the U.S. District Court requiring payment of special mast.ers fees; the statut.e
prohibit.eel payment of the fees absent legislative appropriations. The court ruled that it could
properly order the stat.e t.o pay special mast.ers fees without violating the Eleventh Amendment.
The court held that the Direct.or of the Arizona Department of Corrections was subject t.o civil
contempt for refusing t.o pay special masters fees noting that there was no "good faith"
exception t.o the requirement of obedience t.o a court order. (Arizona Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT

Plumeau v. Yamhill~ §Sh Dist., 907 F.Supp. 1423 (D.Or. 1995). A student who was
sexually abused by a janit.or sued the school district and the janit.or claiming that the school
district had an affirmative duty t.o prot.ect the student from the criminal actions of its
employees. The district court found for the defendants, noting that the stat.e's affirmative
constitutional duty t.o prot.ect only arises with respect t.o particular individuals, such as those
persons the stat.e has taken int.o its custody such as prison inmat.es or involuntarily committed
mental patients. (Yamhill County School District #40, Oregon)
·

u.s. District Court

Landfair v. Sheahan. 878 F.Supp. 1106 (N.D. Ill. 1995). A former pretrial detainee at a
county jail brought a pro se civil rights complaint against a sheriff and various corrections
officials complaining of conditions at the jail. On a motion t.o dismiss, the district court
found that the plaintiff sufficiently stat.ed a claim against the sheriff in his individual
capacity with respect t.o jail conditions, as it was reasonable that the sheriff was aware of
the overcrowding at the county jail and the problems which accompanied it. In addition,
the detainee stat.ed a claim against the executive direct.or of the county department of
corrections and the superintendent of the county jail, by arguing that they were aware of the
jail conditions since the detainee submitted grievance reports t.o them and they visit.ed his wing
periodically. (Cook County Jail, Illinois)

GOVERNMENTAL

LIABILITY
INDMDUAL
CAPACITY

U.S. Appeals Court
DAMAGES
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
42U.S.C.A.
Section 1983

Marsh v. Jones, 53 F.3d 707 (5th Cir. 1995). A stat.e prisoner filed a Section 1983 action
against prison officials asserting claims seeking recovery for personal injury, inadequat.e
medical care, and damage t.o her engagement ring arising from a slip and fall accident.
The U.S. District Court dismissed the case for failure t.o exhaust administrative remedies
and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court, affirming the decision, found that
administrative procedures could have allowed the prisoner t.o recover monetary damages
for personal injury and for allegedly deliberat.e indifference t.o her medical needs and, thus, the
district court did not abuse its discretion under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act
by dismissing such claims for failure t.o justifiably explain her failure t.o exhaust administrative
remedies. Furthermore, the prisoner's claim for monetary relief for damage t.o her engagement
rink during the slip and fall accident present.ed a negligence claim that was not actionable
under Section 1983. (Louisiana Correctional lnstitut.e for Women, St. Gabriel, Louisiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
NEGIJGENCE

Morissette v. Pet.ers. 45 F.3d 1119 (7th Cir. 1995). An inmat.e sued a prison and prison
officials for violations of Section 1983 based on confinement st.emming from alleged drug
possession in prison. The U.S. District Court grant.eel summary judgment t.o the defendants
and the inmat.e appealed. The appeals court found that the prison officials could not be liable
under the Eighth Amendment for denying humane conditions of confinement absent a showing
that the officials were even remot.ely aware of the alleged unsanitary conditions in the cell in
which the inmat.e was confined. Even if the guards were aware of the exposed wires in the cell
and failed t.o fix the problem during the inmat.e's brief stay in controlled segregation, the guards
were only guilty of negligence which would not support an Eighth Amendment claim. (Pontiac
Correctional Facility, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
DAMAGES
PUNITIVE
DAMAGES

Nettles v. Griffith. 883 F.Supp. 136 (E.D. Tex. 1995). A prisoner who was placed in
administrative segregation without a hearing and was injured when he exit.ed his cell
aft.er it was set on fire, brought a Section 1983 action against the county sheriff and other
officials. The district court found that the appropriat.e damage award for the prisoner was
$50 per day of segregation. The prisoner was placed in a section of the jail designat.ed
primarily for the mentally imbalanced, where his cell was set on fire and he was doused with
hot water, feces, and urine. The prisoner suffered mental and emotional t.oll, and the prisoner's
privileges such as the ability t.o attend church services and the day room area were diminished.
However, the prisoner was not entitled to punitive damages. The only willfulness with regard
t.o his claim was the willful decision t.o place him in administrative segregation, and the lack of
procedure accorded to the prisoner was more the result of a misstatement and
·
miscommunication than malice. (Jefferson County Det.ention Cent.er, Beaumont, Texas)

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY'
QUASI.JUDICIAL
IMMUNITY'

Parisie v. Morris. 873 F.Supp. 1560 (N.D.Ga. 1995). A stat.e inmat.e brought a Section
1983 action against members of a stat.e parole board clainung that members depart.ed from
parole decision guidelines in setting his t.entative release dat.e, which violat.ed his due
process and equal protection rights. On motions to dismiss the district court found that
the alleged failure by the members of the parole board to set the inmat.e's release d.at.e in
accordance with parole decision guidelines did not violat.e due process. Inmat.es have no
legitimat.e expectation of, and no h"berty interest in, receiving parole. However, the inmat.e did

27.76

state an equal protection claim against the director of the parole board despite the contention
that state law did not empower the director to make parole decisions. The inmate alleged that
he wrote to the director after discovering that the board had incorrectly calculated his parole
success likelihood factor to let him know of the error. The inmate received a letter in response
in which the director contended to write on behalf of the board and explained the board's
reasoning as his own. It was also found that the inmate did not have to exhaust administrative
remedies where the inmate's claim was cognizable under Section 1983. The inmate was
challenging the process employed by the board rather than the result reached, claiming that the
board members violated his equal protection rights by impermissibly considering his ethnicity
in making its decision. Although the chairman of the state parole board was entitled to quasijudicial immunity from the suit for damages under Section 1983 and the board members
performed a quasi-judicial function in considering the inmate for parole, the board members
were not entitled to qualified immunity in connection with the claim that they considered the
inmate's ethnicity in setting his release date. (Ware Correctional Institution, Waycross,
Georgia)
U.S. Appeals Court
CONSENT DECREE
CONTEMPI'

Saahir v. Estelle, 47 F.3d 758 (5th Cir. 1995). An inmate filed a motion for civil contempt
against state prison officials alleging that they violated a consent decree in a Section 19~3
action by confiscating and not returning nonreligious tapes. The U.S. District Court
granted the motion and required the prison officials to return the tapes or reimburse the
. inmate. The prison officials appealed. The appeals court found that the state prison officials
did not waive their Eleventh Amendment immunity from the enforcement of a provision of the
Section 1983 consent decree by entering into a settlement agreement. The prison officials did
not expressly waive their immunity and in fact argued that the settlement agreement did not
cover non-religious tapes. (Texas Department of Criminal Justice)

U.S. District Court
COMPENSATORY
DAMAGES
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Sisneros y. Nix, 884 F.Supp. 1313 (S.D.Iowa 1995). A prisoner incarcerated in an Arizona
facility brought suit against Iowa prison officials alleging deprivation of his First Amendment
rights while he was confined in Iowa before his transfer. The district court held that the prison
regulation which required that mail sent and received by the prisoner be in the English
language did not violate the inmate's First Amendment rights. However, the court found that
Iowa officials had erred by transferring the prisoner to Arizona in retaliation for his assertion of
his First Amendment rights, and that the prisoner was entitled to compensatory and punitive
damages. The court issued an injunction which required Iowa officials to exercise all available
efforts to secure the prisoner's return to Iowa, although it was asserted that it would be
ineffectual because it could not be applied to Arizona officials who have the ultimate transfer
decision authority. This case compelled the district court judge to begin his decision with the
following: "Given the crescendo of public uproar over frivolous prisoner litigation clogging the
federal courts, this case is an important reminder that however fortissimo the public clamor, the
court must always listen for a solo voice with a legitimate complaint of a constitutional
violation. This is such a case." The prisoner was transferred from Arizona to Iowa under an
int.erstate compact. Prison officials ordered him transferred back to Arizona in retaliation for
having brought grievances and lawsuits. The court found that the prisoner was entitled to
compensatory damages of $5,000, which was approximately $10.50 per day, covering out-of-cell
time lost when Arizona authorities placed him in involuntary protective custody, loss of access
to yard and exercise facilities and loss of access to communal activities including meals and
sports. The court also awarded punitive damages of $1,000 against each Iowa official who had
been involved in the wrongful transfer. On appeal (95 F.3d 749) the court found that the
transfer was warranted and granted qualified immunity for the officials. (Iowa State
Penitentiary)

U.S. District Court
CONI'EMPI'

Smith v. Norris, 877 F.Supp. 1296 (E.D. Ark. 1995). An inmate sought declaratory and
injunctive relief based on alleged unconstitutional conditions of confinement. The district
court found that the inmate was entitled to injunctive relief based on the failure of prison
officials to comply with a previous court order regarding security checks of an open
barracks unit in the prison. The record clearly demonstrated that priaon officials and the state
agreed in a prior case that a serious problem existed and they agreed on how to solve the
problem and funds were actually appropriated to alleviate the problem. The prison officials did
not carry through on their agreement with the Department of Justice, instead making a
unilateral decision to ignore the problem and use the funding elsewhere. The prison officials
were not entitled to qualified immunity from liability. The inmat.e's constitutional right to
reasonable protection from inmate-on-inmate violence was clearly established at the time of his
assault, and a previous court opinion had set forth conditions of confinement for the open
barracks unit. It required a correctional officer in the hallway to constantly monitor two
opposing open barracks containing up to 100 inmates each and hourly security patrols. Prison
officials failed to carry out the required security patrols and knew that they were violating
clearly established constitutional rights. The inmated had been stabbed by a fellow inmate.
The district court found that risks occasioned by prison officials' policy which permitted inmates
who had received special permission to possess dangerous hobby craft tools in an open barracks
unit created not only an obvious risk of serious harm to other inmates but a pervasive risk of
such harm and constituted deliberate indifference to an inmate's constitutional rights under the
Eighth Amendment. The inmate was entitled to monetary damages under Section 1983.
(Cummins Unit, Arkansas Department of Correction)

QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY
DAMAGES

'J/1.77

U.S. District Court
DEIJBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

St.one-El v. Sheahan. 914 F.Supp. 202 (N.D.Ill. 1995). A pretrial detainee brought a§ 1983 civil
rights action against a sheriff, executive director of the county department of corrections, and
the superintendent of the county jail. The detainee alleged that various conditions of his
confinement violated his right t.o due process. The district court granted the defendants' motion
t.o dismiss. The court found that the defendants had not personally caused the conditions at the
jail, nor could they limit the number of pretrial detainees assigned there or appropriate funds t.o
improve conditions. The court also found that the detainee failed t.o allege conditions of
confinement serious enough t.o violate the objective component of a due process claim. The
detainee had asserted that he had slept on the floor without a mattress. that the jail was noisy,
that the jail lacked showers, that he was not able t.o maintain his personal hygiene, that
ventilation was poor, and that inadequate security permitted gangs t.o intimidate him. The
detainee also alleged a lack of exercise opportunities. but the court found that even dramatic
restrictions on outdoor exercise do not violate due process as long as detainees have ample
opportunities t.o participate in indoor activity. The court noted that the detainee failed t.o allege
any harm caused by the poor ventilation or any adverse health effects from the alleged lack of
exercise. (Cook County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
OFFICIAL
CAPACITY

Summers v. Sheahan, 883 F.Supp. 1163 (N.D. Ill. 1995). An inmate brought a pro se
action against prison officials seeking compensat.ory and punitive damages for alleged
violations of his constitutional rights. On the defendant officials' motion t.o dismiss, the
district court found that the inmate's allegation, that supervisors' failure t.o deal with the
overcrowding problem constituted a decision or cust.om, failed t.o state an official capacity claim
under Section 1983. The inmate failed t.o point t.o any conduct by the supervisors approving or
condoning any policy or regulation that promoted inmates living in overcrowded or unsanitary
conditions. In addition, the inmate did not allege that the supervisors. were personally involved
in the overcrowded or unsanitary conditions, and the inmate did not allege a pattern of conduct
by the supervisors regarding the denial of adequate medical attention or unsanitary conditions.
(Cook County Department of Corrections, Illinois)
·

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
QUASI.JUDICIAL
IMMUNITY

Viero v. Bufano, 901 F.Supp. 1387 (N.D.Ill. 1995). A parent of a juvenile who committed
suicide while in custody filed a § 1983 action against a probation officer and corrections
employees. The district court denied the defendants' motion for dismissal, finding that the
complaint sufficiently alleged that the son had presented a substantial suicide risk of serious
medical needs, where it was alleged that the 14-year-old had a history of severe psychological
and psychosocial problems, that just a few months before his death he was confined for mental
treatment and given a prescription, and that he had expressed suicidal tendencies on at least
two occasions. The court found that the complaint sufficiently alleged that the defendants were
deliberately indifferent t.o the son's risk or need. where the complaint alleged that the parent
personally advised both individuals of the son's mental history and medication needs, and also
advised a department employee that the son had suicidal thoughts. The complaint asserted
that the probation officer did not communicate information on the son's mental health t.o the
department and that a department employee did not ensure that the son received adequate
counseling and observation. The court found that the defendants were not entitled t.o qualified
immunity on the basis of the objective reasonableness of their actions nor were they entitled t.o
a dismissal on the basis that the complaint appeared t.o seek damages against them in their
official capacities. The court also found that the probation officer was not entitled t.o quasijudicial immunity. (St. Charles Youth Correctional Facility, Illinois)

FAILURE TO

PROTECT

OFFICIAL CAPACITY

U.S. District Court
42 U.S.C.A.
Section 1983

Westmoreland v. Brown, 883 F.Supp. 67 (E.D. Va. 1995). A pretrial detainee sued a city
and city officials for a violation of Section 1983 based on injuries he suffered when a jail
guard arranged for an attack by other inmates. The district court found that the city and
the city officials were not liable for injuries suffered by the pretrial detainee as they could be
held liable only for the guard's actions taken under color of law. (Richmond City Jail, Virginia)

U.S. Appeals Court

Zames :!· Rhodes. 64 F.3d 285 (7th Cir. 1995). A pretrial detainee filed a prose§ 1983 action
against guards, alleging violation of her due process rights. The district court dismissed in part
and entered summary judgment for the guards in part. The appeals court affirmed in part and
reversed in part, finding that allegations that a guard showed deliberate indifference for the
detainee's rights by placing her in a cell with a mentally ill inmate who presented an imminent
potential for assault were sufficient t.o state a § 1983 claim. But the appeals court found that
allegations that a guard failed t.o supervise subordinate guards and allowed them t.o provide
inadequate medical care failed t.o state a claim. The court also found that the detainee was not
entitled t.o a presegregation hearing; she had been segregated for her own protection and that of
other inmates after a verbal confrontation. (Sangamon County Jail, Illinois)

FAILURE TO
SUPERVISE

1996
U.S. Supreme Court
DAMAGES

BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore. 116 S.Ct. 1589 (1996). After a jury awarded a purchaser
of an automobile compensat.ory damages of $4,000 and punitive damages of $4,000,000, the
defendant appealed. The appeals court reduce the punitive damages award t.o $2,000,,000. '1he
U. S. Supreme Court ruled that the punitive damages award was grossly excessive. (Alabama)

27.78

U.S. Appeals Court
DAMAGES

GOVERNMENTAL
IMMUNITY

Brooks:!· George County Miss., 84 F.3d 157 (5th Cir. 1996). A pretrial detainee whose charges
were dropped brought a § 1983 action against a county and various officials. The district court
ent.ered a judgment upon jury verdict for the detainee for cl8llll8 of involuntary servitude and
violation of due process based on lost wages. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in
part, rendered in part and remanded. The court held that the work performed by the detainee
during his incarceration was not involuntary servitude and that he was not deprived of
property under the due process clause when he did not receive additional wages for work on
privat.e property. The court found that the sheriff, but not a deputy, deprived the detainee of a
property right in wages for work performed on public property and that the sheriff was not
entitled to qualified immunity. The court held that the sheriff had a policy of not paying wages
to detainees, thus rendering the county liable for the constitutional deprivation. The sheriff
had a statutory duty under Mississippi law to keep records of work performed by pretrial
detainees and to transmit such records to ensure that detainees were paid for their work. This
duty was mandatory, not discretionary and therefore the sheriff was not entitled to qualified
immunity. The statut.e created a legitimat.e expectation of entitlement to compensation for work
on public property by pretrial d~tainees. While the detainee was confined in the jail he
requested and was granted trusty status which allowed him the freedom to roam in and out of
his cell, the Sheriff's office, the jail, and the surrounding grounds. While incarcerat.ed the
detainee performed, at his own request, various services for the sheriff, the county and others
on public and privat.e property. He performed these services to secure his release from the jail
during the day and to earn extra money by working on the outside. But the detainee was not
compensat.ed for the services he performed on public property, although he was sometimes paid
money '?r received goods in exchange for services rendered on privat.e property. After a five-day
trial the jury returned a verdict for the detainee against the sheriff and two deputies, and
against the county, awarding $50,000 damages for the claim of involuntary servitude and
$20,000 for lost wages under his due process claim. The jury also awarded punitive damages
against the sheriff ($5,000) and a deputy ($500) in their individual capacities. (George County
Jail, Mississippi)

U.S. District Court
42 U.S.C.A Sec. 1983

Byrd v. Mosele:y. 942 F.Supp. 642 (D.D.C. 1996). An inm.at.e brought a pro se § 1983
action alleging that he was denied permission to participat.e in a program in retaliation
for filing a previous lawsuit. The district court dismissed the case in part, and grant.ed
summary judgment to the defendants. The court found that the inmat.e had no constitutional
right to participat.e in a particular educational or vocational program, and that he failed to show
that he had been the victim of retaliation. The court also found that a nonprofit corporation,
which operated the "Take it From Me" program at the prison, did not act under the color of
stat.e law. (District of Columbia Maximum Security Facility, Lorton, Virginia)

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED

Cart.er v. Kane, 938 F.Supp. 282 (E.D.Pa. 1996). A stat.e inmat.e brought an action
against a prison hearing examiner who presided over two of his disciplinary
proceedings, alleging violation of his due process rights and retaliation for bringing a
suit against the examiner. The district court found that the examiner's alleged conduct-•
imposing a harsher penalty due to the fact that the inm.at.e would not plead guilty to a
disciplinary charge--did not "shock the conscience" and therefore did not violat.e the inmat.e's
substantive due process rights. The court noted that the harsher penalty involved only an
additional 15 days of disciplinary custody. However, the court denied qualified immunity for
the examiner in connection with the inm.at.e's procedural due process claim, finding that
treating inmat.es who invoke the hearing process as a burden undermines the purpose of the
hearing process itself. The court denied summary judgment for the examiner on the procedural
due process claim. (Pennsylvania)

IMMUNITY

U.S. Appeals Court

Davis :!· Fulton County,

Ark-, 90 F.3d 1346 (8th Cir. 1996).

A victim of rape and assault by a

FAILURE TO PROTECT prisoner who had escaped from a county det.ention center brought an action alleging claims
under § 1983 against county staff and officials. The district court dismissed. the cl8llll8 and the
appeals court affirmed. The court found that the victim failed to establish that the danger to
her resulting from the prisoner leaving the det.ention cent.er was any great.er than that faced by
the general public in the area, as required to maintain a § 1983 claim. The court also found
that the victim failed to allege that the duty jailer acted int.entionally, or was not performing
official county functions in failing to prevent the prisoner from escaping. (Fulton County
· Det.ention Cent.er, Arkansas)
Dean:!· Thomas, 933 F.Supp. 600 (S.D.Miss. 1996). Pretrial detainees filed a § 1983 action
U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY against jail officials and members of an inm.at.e disciplinary board alleging violation of their due
process rights when they were placed in lockdown without any hearing. Lockdown consist.ed of
DAMAGES
confinement in a one-man cell for approximat.ely 23 hours each day; access to a dayroom which
offered access to a shower and t.elephone was allowed one hour daily. The detainees were
locked down for 34-35 days. The district court found that the inm.at.es' due process rights were
violated and that board members were not entitled to qualified immunity. Two officers who
reported the disciplinary infractions were immune from liability because they were not involved
with the subsequent disciplinary process. Each detainee was awarded $300 damages which the
court found was reasonable under the circumstances. The court noted that the U.S. Supreme
Court decision in Sandin did not stand for the proposition. that pretrial detainees may be
punished without due process if the punishment does not impose atypical and significant
hardships on the detainees. (Hinds County Det.ention Cent.er, Mississippi)

2"1.79

U.S. District Court
Dugas v. Jefferson County. 931 F.Supp. 1315 (E.D.Tex. 1996). A female arrest.ee brought a. §
QUALlFIED IMMUNITY 1983 action against a county and a sheriffs deputy claiming that a strip search ordered by the
deputy following her arrest for a misdemeanor violated her Fourth Amendment rights; The
district court denied the deputy's motion for summary judgment, fmding that he was not
entitled t.o a qualified immunity defense because it was clear at the time of the deputy's order
that a strip search of a minor offense arrestee violated the Fourth Amendment. The court also
found that the deputy was not shielded from civil liability for illegal acts simply because he was
following orders. (Jefferson County Jail, Texas)
U.S. District Court
DELIBERA1E

INDIFFERENCE

Est.ep v. Dent. 914 F.Supp. 1462 (W.D.Ky. 1996). An inmat.e moved for a preliminary
injunction in this suit against prison officials. The district court denied the motion with regard
t.o the inmat.e's allegation that he was deprived of opportunities for out.door exercise while he
was housed in a particular housing unit. The court not.ed that prison officials had alread;y
begun t.o build an outdoor recreation sit.e for that unit and therefore recognized the need and
were resolving the problem. The court also denied the motion with regard t.o the inmat.e's
assertion that his safety was endangered because prison officials allowed inmat.es of different
classifications t.o exercise t.ogether. The court granted the inmat.e's motion with regard t.o his
claim that the prison policy which required him t.o.cut his earlocks violated the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act. The court found that the inmat.e established the likelihood of success
on his claim that earlocks were a component of the Orthodox Hasidic Judaism faith, and that
the inmat.e adhered t.o the t.enets of his faith religiously. Requiring the inmat.e t.o cut his
earlocks would substantially burden the inmat.e's faith, according t.o the court, and prison
officials had failed t.o establish that the policy was the least restrictive means of furthering its
int.erest in maintaining security, particularly in light of the fact that there was a three-month
delay before the inmat.e's earlocks were cut. (Kentucky Stat.e Penit.entiary)
·

U.S. District Court
DAMAGES

Evans~- Hennessy, 934 F.Supp. 127 (D.Del. 1996). An inmat.e sued a guard alleging violation
of his civil rights when the guard struck him twice on the head with a closed fist. The court
found that evidence established that the guard struck the inmat.e without justification or
reasonable apprehension of physical harm, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The court
awarded damages in the amount of $7,500. However, the court found that moving the inmat.e
awa.y from other prisoners t.o a cell closer t.o the guard post t.o prevent him from disrupting and
inciting other inmat.es was not a violation of the inmat.e's First Amendment right of free speech,
and the change of cells did not violat.e any constitutionally protected liberty int.erest because the
inmat.e was not moved t.o a more restrictive unit. (Sussex Correctional Institution, Delaware)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE

Freeman v. Fairman, 916 F.Supp. 786 (N.D.ID. 1996). A deceased inmat.e's children and the
special administrat.or of his estat.e filed a § 1983 civil rights action against a county and county
officials, alleging an Eighth Amendment violation in connection with the death of the inmat.e.
The district court dismissed the federal court claims but retained jurisdiction for related stat.e
court claims. The court found that a single instance of improper medical care, such as the one
at issue, was insufficient t.o show a governmental policy or cust.om t.o support § 1983 liability.
The court also found that the plaintiffs failed t.o sufficiently allege the requisit.e deliberat.e.
indifference t.o stat.e an Eighth Amendment claim. The plaintiffs had alleged that the county
failed t.o identify any abnormality in the size of the inmat.e's liver and administ.ered tuberculosis
medication t.o him at several times the normal dosage, leading t.o his death while in custod;y.
(Cook County Department of Corrections, Illinois)

INDIFFERENCE

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY

Garrett v. Angelone, 940 F.Supp. 933 (W.D.Va. 1996). A stat.e prisoner brought a prose
action against prison officials asserting § 1983 claims and violation of the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA). The district court found that prison officials were entitled
t.o qualified immunity from monetary damages on the inmate's ADA claims because of
uncertainty about the applicability of ADA t.o stat.e prisons. The court also found that the
prisoner's allegations were insufficient t.o support a claim under ADA. The court also found
that changes in the prisoner's custod;y status, security status, and earning rates for good
conduct time did not violate due process. The court noted that an inmate's security level,
custody status and opportunity t.o earn good conduct time are subject to change at any time
during incarceration based on the behavior of the inmate and discretion of prison officials. The
court also noted that an inmat.e's parole eligibility dat.e and mandat.ory parole release dat.e are
estimates only, subject t.o change based on changes in an inmate's other classifications.
(Virginia Dept. of Corrections)

U.S. District Court

Glover v. Johnson. 931 F.Supp. 1360 (E.D.Mich. 1996). Female prisoners moved t.o hold prison
officials in an ongoing class action which challenged educational and vocational opportunities
available t.o female prisoners in Michigan. The district court held prison officials in contempt of
various orders relating t.o court access, vocational programs, and apprenticeship programs at
women's facilities. The court assessed fines of S5()(Vday until compliance with all court orders
regarding access t.o courts was achieved and ordered prison officials t.o submit policies and plans
t.o achieve compliance in this and other areas. 'lhe court also levied a S5()(Vday fine until
compliance was achieved in the areas of vocational programming and another S5()(Vday fine
until compliance was achieved in the area of apprenticeship progw-ernming. The court found
that the officials' clear, positive and repeat.eel violation of orders warrant.eel Slgnificant monetary
contempt sanctions. (Michigan Department of Corrections)

CONTEMPI'
FINES
SANCTIONS

27.80

U.S. Appeals Court
DAMAGES

Goff v. Burton. 91 F.3d 1188 (8th Cir. 1996). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against
prison officials alleging damages arising out of retaliatory transfer and punishment.
The district court entered judgment for the prisoner and the appeals court affirmed. The
appeals court found that the sequence of events· supported the determination that the prisoner
was transferred from a correctional center to a penitentiary in retaliation for a civil rights
action the prisoner had brought against the prison. The appeals court also found that the
district court could conclude that a disciplinary action imposed on the prisonel'. was in
retaliation for filing a suit, as the penitentiary did not put forward "some evidence" in support
of its disciplinary action. The appeals court held that the trial court could impose damages of
$2,250 for 225 days spent in segregation. The court noted that although prison officials had
information tending to implicate the prisoner in an assault, they took no action until after the
civil complaint had been received. (Iowa State Penitentiary)

U.S. District Court
CLASSACTION

Hancock y. Thalacker. 933 F.Supp. 1449 (N.D.lowa 1996). Prisoners sued a warden and other
prison officials alleging that being disciplined for filing grievances containing false or
defamatory statements violated their constitutional right to petition for the redress of
grievances. The district court refused to certify the suit as a class action but denied summary
judgment for the defendants, allowing the inmates to pursue their claims for declaratory and
injunctive relief. The court found that disciplining inmates for false or defamatory statements
in grievances based on less than a preponderance. or greater weight, of evidence that the
inmate lmowingly made such statements, would violate an inmate's right of petition. The court
also found that an inmate's rights would also be violated if the inmate were not provided with
notice of the burden of proof to sustain the charge. The court noted that interference with an
inmate's "kite," which was the routine means of direct communication with the warden. would
constitute a chilling of the inmate's right to petition for redress of grievances. (Iowa Men's
Reformatory)

U.S. Appeals Court
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Harris v. Chapman. 97 F.3d 499 (11th Cir. 1996). A Rastafarian inmate brought a §
1983 action against officers of a "closed custody" facility alleging that they forcibly ·
removed him from his cell and had his hair cut while beating him and using racial slurs. The
district court jury exonerated five defendants but awarded $500 in punitive damages against
the sixth. The appeals court held that evidence supported the punitive damages award against
the sixth officer. The officer allegedly kicked and beat the inmate, snapped his head back with a
towel, "mugged" or slapped him twice in the face, and harassed him with several racial epithets
and other taunts. The court also held that Florida's hair length rule does not violate the First
Amendment or RFRA. (Martin Correctional Institution, Florida)

U.S. Appeals Court
REMEDIES
QUALIFIED

Jensen v. Clarke. 94 F.3d 1191 (8th Cir. 1996). State prison inmates brought a§ 1983
action against prison officials alleging that randomly assigning new inmates to double
cells substantially increased the risk of violence by cellmates. On remand from an
appeal of a remedial plan, the district court ruled that prison officials had actual
lmowledge of and disregarded a substantial risk of safety to inmates posed by random cell
assignments. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the practice was cruel and unusual
punishment and noting that this suit was a failure-to-protect case focusing on the manner of
assigning new inmates to cells, rather than a prison crowding case. The court found that cruel
and unusual punishment was established by evidence that demonstrated the increased number
of inmates found guilty of violent offenses, the number of inmates requesting protective custody,
and anecdotal evidence of violence from prisoners. The appeals court held that prison officials
were entitled to qualified immunity in their individual capacities in light of the diversity of
precedent on the need for classifying cellmates. The appeals court found that a district court
injunction which required prison officials to use available classification information to
determine cellmate compatibility was a proper remedy, after officials chose to take a premature
appeal rather than remedy the constitutional violation. The appeals court held that the
Eleventh Amendment did not bar the award of attomey fees as an ancillary to prospective relief
and that limits on fee awards under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (Pl.RA) did not apply
retroactively. The court found that reductions used to make a lodestar award of attomey fees
were not abuses of discretion. The court had used a 10% reduction of the number of hours
sought by the attomeys, while the state had requested a 50% reduction. The court had also
made a 15% reduction of attomey fees for partial success despite the state's request for a 75%
reduction. noting that the inmates had prevailed on the primary claim that the prison was
unsafe.
(Nebraska State Penitentiary)

IMMUNITY

U.S. District Court

FAILURE TO PROTECT

Lacy v. Berge, 921 F.Supp. 600 (E.D.Wis. 1996). An inmate filed a suit seeking injunctive relief
and monetary damages for alleged violation of his civil rights. The district court held that a
prison guard did not act with deh'berate indifference toward a serious risk of harm faced by the
inmate, even assuming that the guard watched a fight briefly and did not intervene. The
inmate claimed his attacker was armed with a shampoo brush with which he was beating him
unconscious, the inmate did not establish that the fight was readily preventable or that it
would have been reasonable for the guard t.o have tried t.o st.op the fight, or that the guard
acting alone could have ended the fight any sooner. The court also held that the alleged failure
of prison officials t.o investigate the fight thoroughly and t.o refer the attacking inmate t.o the
district attorney for criminal prosecution did not violate the inmate's constitutional rights, as
the inmate suffered no harm from the nonprosecution of his attacker. The court found that the
attacking inmate was not subject to suit under § 1983. (Fe>% Lake Corr. Institution, Wisconsin)

27.81

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED

IMMUNITY
COMPENSATORY
DAMAGES
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED

IMMUNITY

Mathie v. Fries, 935 F.Supp. 1284 (E.D.N.Y. 1996). A former inmate of a cowity
correctional facility brought an action llgainst the facility's Director of Security alleging
that the direct.or sexually abused him while he was confined as a pretrial detainee. The
district court ent.ered judgment for the inmate, finding that evidence was sufficient t.o
support findings that the director repeatedly sexually abused the inmate and that the
direct.or sodomized the inmate while he was handcuffed t.o pipes in the security office.
The court fowid that these acts violated the inmate's due process rights and that the direct.or
was not qualifiedly immune from § 1983 claims, awarding c:ompensat.ory damages of $250,000
and pnnitive damages of $500,000. 'lhe court noted that evidence showed that the inmate
sustained physical injury t.o his anal area and suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder as a
result of sexual abuse by the direct.or. The court called the direct.or"s action an outrageous abuse
of power and authority. (Suffolk County Correctional Facility, New York)
Sisneros v. Nix. 95 F.3d 749 (8th Cir. 1996). A prisoner incarcerated in an Arizona
facility sued Iowa prison officials alleging First Amendment violations as a result of his
retaliat.ory transfer. The district court granted summary judgment t.o the inmate on a
damage claim but the appeals court reversed in part and remanded. The appeals court found
that the officials were entitled t.o qualified immunity. (Iowa State Penitentiary)

U.S. District Court
QUAIJFIED
IMMUNITY

Warren v. Keane, 937 F.Supp. 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). Prisoners brought a§ 1983 action
against prison officials alleging that their exposure t.o environmental t.obacco smoke
(ETS) violated their Eighth Amendment rights. The district court denied the defendants'
motion for summary judgment, finding a fact question as t.o whether the level of smoke
permeating the prison was so severe as t.o be a danger t,o the health of prisoners. The court also
found that a fact question as t.o whether a prison corrections officer and fire and safety officer
were entitled t.o qualified immunity precluded summary judgment. The court ruled that
supervisors did not have qualified immunity because they were chargeable with the knowledge
of the conditions of the prison and with the knowledge that second-hand smoke could cause
serious health problems. The prisoners alleged that smoke permeated the facility due t.o
underenforcement, inadequate smoking rules. overcrowding, and poor ventilation. (Ossining
State Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
PERSONAL LlABILITY

Webb v. Lawrence Cowity. 950 F.Supp. 960 (D.S.D. 1996). A prisoner sued county
correctional officials alleging civil rights violations under§ 1983 and common-law
negligence, seeking compensat.ory and punitive damages in connection with a sexual assault by
another prisoner. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants and
dismissed the negligence and punitive damages claims. The court ruled that the incarceration of
the plaintiff in the same cell as a prisoner who sexually assaulted him did not give rise t.o a
cause of action against corrections officials under § 1983. The court found that the officials had
no reason t.o be aware and were not in fact aware of an excessive risk t.o the plaintiffs health or
safety, noting that the prisoner who committed the assault had assaulted no other prisoners
while incarcerated nor had the plaintiff notified officials of his fear of his cellmate or of any
assaults witil he had been assaulted for four straight days. The court also fowid that under
South Dakota law, the purchase of liability insurance by the cowity on behalf of prison officials
did not waive the officials' statut.ory immunity from personal liability for negligence. (Lawrence
Cowity Jail, South Dakota)

1997
U.S. District Court
42 USCA Sec. 1983
RICO-Racket.eer Infl.
& Corrupt Organ. Act

Alley v. Angelone. 962 F.Supp. 827 (E.D.Va. 1997). Prisoners brought a civil rights
action against corrections officials and the district court dismissed the case. The court
found that the prisoners could not recover wider the civil remedies section of the
Racket.eer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) where they did not allege
that they were injured in their business. The court held that the prisoners did not have a
constitutional right to prison work assignments or a constitutionally protected interest m
continued prison employment. The prisoners also failed to state a § 1985 claim with their
allegations that corrections officials engaged in a conspiracy t.o wider-staff facilities and t.o
incite riots. The court fowid that due process was not required before a prison lockdown, as
lockdowns were within the normal range of incarceration. (Virginia Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act
CONSENT DECREEMODIFICATION

Benjamin v. Jacobson. 124 F.3d 162 (2nd Cir. 1997). Prison officials who had entered

int.o a consent decree governing conditions at New York City jails moved for the
i:mrnediate t.ermination of those decz-ees wider the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA).
Pretrial detainees opposed the motion. The district court vacated the decrees and the
detainees appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed in part, finding
that the PLRA's consent decree termination provision did not violate the separation of powers
principle. equal protection or due process. The court fowid, however, that the provision refers to
constitutional termination of federal remedies arising out of consent decrees, but does not
mandate the t.ermination of the decrees them.selves. The court also found that the PLRA
provision made only the nonfederal aspects of a consent decree unenforceable by federal courts;
nonfederal provisions remained binding but could only be enforced by state courts. (New York
City Department of Correction)

27.82

U.S. Supreme Court
MUNICIPAL LIABILITY
42 USCA SEC. 1983

Board of County Com'rs. of Bryan County, Ok.ls. v. Brown, 117 S.Ct. 1382 (1997).
Respondent Jill Brown brought a claim for damages against petitioner Bryan County
under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. She alleged that a county police officer used excessive force
in arresting her, and that the county itself was liable for her injuries based on its sheriffs
hiring and training decisions. She prevailed on her claims against the county following a jury
trial, and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment against the county
on the basis of the hiring claim alone. The United States Supreme Court held that the Court of
Appeals' decision "cannot be squared with our recognition that, in enacting Sec. 1983, Congress
did not intend to impose liability on a municipality unless deliberate action attributable to the
municipality itself is the 'moving force' behind the plaintiffs deprivation of federal rights."
(Bryan County, Oklahoma)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
FAILURE TO PROTECT

Carrigan v. State of Del., 957 F.Supp. 1376 (D.Del. 1997). A female inmate brought a
civil rights action against prison officials and a guard as the result of an alleged rape by
the guard. The district court found that the inmate did not establish deliberate
indifference by prison officials where the officials had a policy forbidding sexual contact
between correctional officers and inmates, the alleged rapist had received a total of 64 hours of
training, and the inmate offered no expert opinion to rebut an expert report that the training
was adequate. The court found that prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity. The
court noted that the inmate's transfer to protective custody following her alleged rape by a
guard did not show deliberate indifference but, rather, showed the prison officials' attentiveness
to her condition as they were aware that her claims put her at risk of attack by other inmates.
The court found that the inmate failed to establish an Eighth Amendment violation through
evidence of other incidents because nearly all of those incidents occurred aft.er the alleged rape,
and those which occurred prior took place at a different institution or were unsubstantiated by
the inmate involved. However, the court found that the inmate had stated a claim based on
gross or wanton negligence, or bad faith, against the guard. (Delaware Department of
Correction)

U.S. District Court
CONSENT DECREEMODIFICATION
CONTEMPI'

Carty v. Farrelly, 957 F.Supp. 727 (D.Virgin Islands 1997). Detainees and inmates
housed in a criminal justice complex asked the court to find officials in civil contempt of
a consent decree. The district court found that the consent decree comported with the
principles of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) because it was narrowly drawn,
extended no further than necessary to correct the violation of federal rights, and was the least
intrusive means necessary to correct the violations. The court found the officials in contempt for
failing to comply with the terms of the consent decree, and continued noncompliance with a
court order requiring officials to pay detainees' and inmates' attorney fees. The officials
admitted they never fully complied with the order and failed to make meaningful progress
toward reducing the inmate population. The officials had paid only $50,000 of the $155,000
attorney fees that the court had ordered paid to the National Prison Project of the American
Civil Liberties Union. (Criminal Justice Complex, St. Thomas, Virgin Islands)

U:S. Appeals Court
Doby v. Hickerson, 120 F.3d 111 (8th Cir. 1997). A former prisoner brought a§ 1983
DAMAGES
action alleging that a psychiatrist and other corrections personnel violated his due
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY process rights by administering antipsychotic medications to him without his consent.
The district court awarded the prisoner $9,500 in compensatory damages and the defendants
appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the psychiatrist was only qualifiedly immune
for a portion of the treatments in question, and that the record supported the amount of
damages awarded. According to the court, the psychiatrist should have known of the Supreme
Court's Harper decision when she met with the prisoner three weeks aft.er it was handed down,
and she was therefore not entitled to qualified immunity for administrations that occurred
thereafter. The court noted that the prisoner was afforded virtually no procedural protections,
and experienced severe side effects that continued for weeks aft.er the medications were
discontinued. (ADC Special Programs Unit, Arkansas)
U.S. Appeals Court
DAMAGES

Downey v. Denton County, Tex., 119 F.3d 381 (5th Cir. 1997). An inmate who was
sexually assaulted by an employee of a county sheriffs department sued the county and
jail officials and employees under§ 1983 and the Texas Tort Claims Act, alleging they were
negligent in failing to prevent the assault. The district court entered judgment for all
defendants on the § 1983 claim, and entered judgment for the inmate on the remaining claims.
The district court held the county liable for $100,000 and the assailant liable for $1 million. The
county and inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed as amended, finding that the inmate's
tort claim did not "arise out of' the assailant's intentional tort but rather from a co-employee's
negligence. The assailant left his post and went to the women's unit and asked another officer
to have the plaintiff brought from her cell to repair a short tear in his uniform pants. The
employee explained that the plaintiff was not a trustee and it was customary for trustees to
repair guards' uniforms. Although the employee thought the assailant's request was strange,
she did not call her supervisor and instead brought the plaintiff down to repair the uniform as
requested by the assailant. Although the employee initially remained with the plaintiff and
assailant aft.er admitting them to a multipurpose room, she eventually left them unsupervised
for nearly two hours. (Denton County Jail, Texas)
·

27.83

U.S. Appeals Court
COMPENSATORY
DAMAGES
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
NEGLIGENT
RETENTION
FAILURE TO PROTECT

Esta.t.e of Davis by Ostenfeld. v. Delo. 115 F.3d 1388 (8th Cir. 1997). A state inmate
brought a § 1983 action against correctional officers and prison administrators alleging
the use of excessive force when he was removed from his cell. The district court entered
judgment against the defendants and they appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding
that evidence supported the determination that a correctional officer used excessive force
against the inmate in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The court also found that
evidence supported the determination that other officers and a supervisor were liable for
failing to protect the inmate from the use of excessive force, and that the prison
superintendent's failure to investigate or take remedial action subjected him to liability. The
court held that qualified immunity was not available to the defendants, and that punitive
damages were warranted against the correctional officer and prison superintendent. The inmate
alleged that the correctional officer struck him in the head and face 20 to 25 times while four
other officers were restraining his limbs, after the inmate had complied with an order to lie face
down on the floor without resistance. The district court had found that the inmate sustained
serious injuries and that the correctional officer used force maliciously and sadistically for the
purpose of causing the inmate harm. The prison superintendent had authorized an
investigation into the correctional officer's failure to report the use of force, was advised that
the officer should be discharged because of persistent complaints, but took no responsive action.
The district court had awarded $10,000 in compensatory damages against seven defendants
jointly and severally, and awarded punitive damages in the amount of $5,000 each against the
correctional officer and the supervisor. (Potosi Correctional Center, Missouri)

U.S. Appeals Court
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform.Act
CONSENT DECREE

Gavin v. Branstad. 122 F.3d 1081 (8th Cir. 1997). After a consent decree was entered in
an action challenging conditions in a state prison, and after the subsequent
enactment of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLR.A), a state moved to terminate
prospective relief. The district court denied the motion, declaring unconstitutional the
"immediate termination" provisions of PLRA. The appeals court reversed and remanded,
holding that the provisions did not violate the separation of powers doctrine, equal protection,
or due process. The court noted that the nature of a remedy to be applied in the future is not
established in perpetuity upon approval of a consent decree. Oowa State Prison)

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED

Holt Bonding Co.• Inc. v. Nichols, 988 F.Supp. 1232 (W.D.Ark. 1997). A bail bond company
brought a § 1983 action against a sheriff, alleging that the sheriff violated its due process
rights by effectively suspending its license. The district court concluded that the company
had proven the essential elements of its § 1983 claim and ordered the parties to advise the
court about possible damages. The court found that the sherifrs action, suspending the
company's authority to issue bonds in the county, was equivalent to suspending the company's
license and that the sheriff was not entitled to qualified immunity because a reasonable official
would have lmown that refusing to accept all bonds written by the company without notice or a
hearing violated the company's clearly established rights. The court noted that the sheriff had
not given the company adequate notice by simply telling one of its bail bondsmen that the
county would no longer accept bonds from the company. (Sheriff of Nichols County, Arkansas)

IMMUNITY

U.S. Appeals Court
CONSENT DECREEMODIFICATION
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Rouse, 129 F.3d 649 (1st Cir. 1997). A sheriff moved to
terminate a 1979 consent decree pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The
decree arose from a class action challenging conditions of confinement. The district court
granted the sheriffs motion in part, but denied the Massachusetts Commission of
Correction's motion to vacate the decree. The appeals court held that PLRA did not violate
the separation of powers principle, the detainees' due process rights, or the detainees' equal
protection rights. The appeals court found that PLRA mandates the termination of extant
consent decrees unless the district court makes specific findings that are necessary to keep a
particular decree alive. The court also found that the district court was not required to conduct
an inquiry into whether violation of a federal right currently existed, or would come into
existence, before it terminated a consent decree governing confinement conditions for pretrial
detainees. The district court determined that double-bunking of the county jail's pretrial
detainees did not violate the federal rights of detainees, given that such conduct, in and of
itself, was not a constitutional violation. (Suffolk County Jail, Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
CONSENT DECREEMODIFICATION
ADA-Americans with
Disabilities Act

Jensen v. County of Lake, 958 F.Supp. 397 (N.D.Ind. 1997). A county filed a motion to
tenninate a consent decree and judgment order through the provisions of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The district court held that Congress could, through the
Prison Litigation Reform Act, modify the authority of a court to award relief greater
than that required by federal law, and thus the PLRA section providing for immediate
termination of prospective consent decrees in pending cases did not violate the separation of
powers doctrine, nor did retroactive application of the section. The court also found that PLRA
did not violate equal protection. However, the court found that inmates had adequately alleged
that overcrowding made it difficult for jail personnel to ensure the safety of inmates and
therefore further proceedings were necessary before the district court could terminate the
consent judgment. The court held that PLRA does not violate the separation of powers doctrine,
even though by altering prospective relief PLRA makes futile the careful negotiations that have
gone into crafting a consent decree, the parties' strategy to save time and effort in litigating,
and compromises made in exchange for giving up risk. According to the court, even if a consent
27.84

decree in prison reform litigation was a "contract" for the purposes of the contract clause,
Congress did not act irrationally or arbitrarily when it enacted PLRA and therefore did not
impermissibly impair contract rights. The initial lawsuit was filed in 1974 on behalf of inmates
of the Lake County Jail and a consent decree was entered in 1980. Two years later the
defendants admitted that they had not complied and a broader and more detailed agreement
was entered, encompassed in a judgment order in 1982. Since then, the district court has
maintained continuing supervision over the operation of the jail in order to enforce the 1980
decree and the 1982 judgment. (Lake County Jail, Indiana)
U.S. District Court
REMEDIES
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Jones v. City and County of San Francisco, 976 F.Supp. 896 (N.D.Cal. 1997). Pretrial
detainees brought a class action against the City and County of San Francisco and various
city officials challenging the constitutionality of their conditions of confinement at a jail.
The district court granted various summary judgment motions filed by the plaintiffs and
the defendants, enjoining future overcrowding based on past unconstitutional overcrowding.
The court found due process violations based on the defendants' inadequate response to fire
safety risks at the jail, excessive risks of harm from earthquakes, physical defects in the jail's
water, plumbing and sewage systems, excessive noise levels, and poor lighting. The court held
that the plaintiffs failed to show deliberate indifference or another basis for liability on the
claims of current overcrowding, inadequate food preparation and storage, provision of medical
services, personal visitation, hours and accessibility of legal visitation, legal materials and
assistance, and outdoor recreation. The court noted that pretrial detainees enjoy the greater
protections afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause, rather than the Eighth
Amendment's protection against cruel and unusual punishment. The district court stated it
would assume that any unreasonable failure of the defendants to remedy obvious deficiencies in
the jail constituted deliberate indifference based on a Special Master's findings that the
defendant officials had actual and constructive knowledge of every significant deficiency in the
jail for several years. This was evidenced by newspaper accounts, grand jury reports,
defendants' own written correspondence, and repeated proposal of bond measures to finance
improvements.
The court concluded that development and implementation of a narrowly tailored remedial
plan was an appropriate remedy, and that the plan was to address each condition that was
found unconstitutional including fire safety, seismic safety, water, plumbing, sewage, noise,
lighting and overcrowding. (San Francisco Jail No. 3, California)

U.S. District Court
PRIVATE PROVIDER

McDuffie v. Hopper, 982 F.Supp. 817 (M.D.Ala. 1997). The son of a prisoner who committed
suicide while in the custody of a state department of corrections sued corrections officials,
private party doctors, and health care providers under § 1983. The son alleged wrongful death
caused by negligence, indifference, or recklessness and malpractice. The district court denied
summary judgment for the private party doctors and mental health care providers. The court
determined that although these parties were government contractors, they were performing at
their own behest motivated by a desire to make a profit, rather than at the behest of the
sovereign government. The court found that genuine issues of material fact regarding whether
treatment received by the prisoner was deliberately indifferent precluded summary judgment.
The prisoner had tried to commit suicide at least four times and was receiving large doses of a
psychotropic drug. The prisoner requested that all personal items be removed from his cell
because his hallucinations were intensifying and made statements to prison personnel about
suicide or self harm. But despite these reports of suicidal thoughts a decision was made to
discontinue his psychotropic medication. He was placed in an isolation cell, which the court
suggested might not have been the proper situation for his treatment. Although the prisoner
complained about the discontinuation of his medication, he was not appropriately visited by the
medical defendants and was not transferred from the isolation cell. He committed suicide by
hanging himself with a bedsheet tied to the bars of his isolation cell. (Kilby Correctional
Facility, Alabama, and Correctional Medical Services, Inc.)

U.S. District Court
FEDERAL TORT
CLAIMS ACT

Melvin v. U.S., 963 F.Supp. 1052 (D.Kan. 1997). A pro se inmate brought an action
against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act for loss of personal
property from his cell. The district court denied summary judgment for the defendants,
finding that once a federal prison officer agreed to lock the inmate's cell, the officer had a duty
to act with reasonable care, and that fact issues as to whether the officer met that duty
precluded summary judgment. The inmate alleged that the officer negligently unlocked his
prison cell, allowing other prisoners to enter and take his belongings. The inmate valued the
missing property at $226.30. (United States Penitentiary, Leavenworth, Kansas)

U.S. District Court
SUPERVISORY LIA-

Mitchell v. Keane, 974 F.Supp. 332 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). A prisoner brought a civil rights
action against prison officials alleging that they inflicted pain on him by twisting a
baton in his chains while he was shackled. The district court found that the prisoner's
allegations stated a civil rights claim for excessive use of force, and that the prisoner's
allegation that a sergeant was present at the time of the incident stated a claim of supervisory
liability. (Sing Sing Correctional Facility, New York)

BILITY

27.85

U.S. District Court
Nelson v. Prison Health Services, Inc., 991 F.Supp. 1452 (M.D.Fla. 1997). The personal
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY representative of an inmate who died of an acute myocardial infarction while awaiting
PRIVATE PROVIDER
trial in a county jail brought a § 1983 action against a county, county sheriff, the private
company that provided medical services to the jail, and individual nurses employed by the
company. The district court held that the sheriff was protected from individual liability under
the qualified immunity doctrine, but that the nurses were not entitled to raise a defense of
qualified immunity even though they were considered state actors under § 1983. The court held
that the evidence was sufficient to establish that the nurses were deliberately indifferent to the
inmate's medical needs and failed to provide treatment. According to the court, the nurses
delayed giving the inmate her prescription medication for her cardiac condition for 36 hours,
failed to verify her medications after she disclosed them to the screening nurse, failed to
examine the inmate when she complained of chest pains, and failed to call for an emergency
response team until the inmate had stopped breathing. The court held that reports of a court
appointed monitor regarding the pervasive failure of the private medical service company to
provide medical care to the inmates of the county jail, and the company's own internal
memoranda characterizing the attitude of the nurses at the jail as one of deliberate
indifference, were sufficient to establish a custom of violating inmates' constitutional rights to
medical trea1ment. (Pinellas County Jail, Florida)
U.S. Appeals Court
DAMAGES

Newman v. Hohnes, 122 F.3d 650 (8th Cir. 1997). Two state inmates brought a § 1983
action against a corrections officer alleging Eighth Amendment violations as the result
of the officer"s failure to protect them from an attack by another prisoner. A district court jury
returned a verdict for the inmates, awarding each $500 damages. The appeals court affirmed,
fmding that evidence supported the fmding that the officer's act of opening the door to the cell
of an inmate in isolated confmement created an excessive risk of harm to the other inmates,
and that evidence supported the fmding that the officer was deliberately indifferent to such
risk. (Tucker Maximum Security Unit, Arkansas)

U.S. Supreme Court
42 USCA SEC. 1983
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
PRIVATE OPERA1'0R

Richardson v. McKnight, 117 S.Ct. 2100 (1997). McKnight, a prisoner at a Tennessee
correctional center whose management had been privatized, filed an action under 42
U.S.C. Sec. 1983 for physical injuries inflicted by petitioner prison guards. The District
Court denied McKnight's motion to dismiss, finding that, since the guards were employed by a
private prison management firm, they were not entitled to qualified immunity from Sec. 1983
lawsuits. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court held that prison guards employed
by a private firm are not entitled to qualified immunity from suit by prisoners charging a Sec.
1983 violation.

U.S. Appeals Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFENCE
FAILURE 1'0 PROTECT
FAILURE1'0
SUPERVISE

Scott v. Moore, 114 F.3d 51 (5th Cir. 1997). A pretrial detainee who alleged she was
sexually assaulted by a correctional officer brought a§ 1983 action against a city and its
police chief. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants, but the
appeals court remanded the case on the claim of inadequate staffmg. On remand, the
district court again entered summary judgment for the defendants and the detainee
appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. On rehearing en bane, the court of
appeals affirmed, holding that the detainee met the burden or establishing a constitutional
violation but that the city's failure to adopt a policy of adding jail staff did not constitute
deliberat.e indifference. According to the majority of the appeals court, there was no showing
that the city had actual knowledge that its staffing policy created a substantial risk of hann to
female detainees. As a condition of employment, jailers underwent background investigations,
medical examinations and polygraph tests, none of which revealed any concerns about the jailer
who allegedly sexually assaulted the detainee. The majority noted that the jailer had been a
commissioned police officer for four years prior to his employment with the jail, without
incident, and that he had been trained in the official policies of jail management by experienced
jailers. The detainee had been arrested for public intoxication, assault and resisting arrest, and
was taken to a city jail, processed by a female jailer who was on duty at the time, and placed in
a holding cell pending arraignment. A male jailer subsequently replaced the female officer,
entered the detainee's cell, and sexually assaulted her repeatedly during the course of his eighthour shift. The jailer resigned and pleaded guilty to criminal charges. The majority of the
appeals court rejected the detainee's argument that constitutionally adequate staffmg would
have included, at a minimum, a female jail officer, or at least two male officers, whenever a
female pretrial detainee is in custody. The majority noted that the jail is located on the first
floor of the police department, in the patrol division area, and a patrol duty sergeant
periodically checks on jail personnel. However, four appeals judges dissented, suggesting that
the city's policy of inadequate staffmg enabled the harm to be committed and actually
facilitated the sexual assault. While the majority asserted that the assault was episodic--by
definition incidental or occasional, rather than regular and systematic. The minority argued
that the long established custom of inadequate staffmg was far from episodic, and that the city
only offered financial justifications for its staffmg policy. In the dissenting opinion, the judges
stated they were unwilling to "classify the issues in this case as 'minutia.'" (City of Killeen
Police Department, Texas)

27.86

U.S. Appeals Court
GOVERNMENTAL
LIABILITY

Triplett v. District of Columbia, 108 F.3d 1450 (D.C.Cir. 1997). A prisoner sued the
District of Columbia alleging he was injured by correctional officers. The district court
awarded the prisoner $135,000 in compensatory damages after finding that the District was liable
for negligence, assault and battery and for the use of excessive force in violation of the Eight
Amendment. The prisoner's neck was broken as a result of the assault by staff. The District
appealed and the appeals court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The appeals court held that
evidence sustained the determination that the correctional officers had committed assault and
battery for which the District could be held liable, but that the alleged practice of excessive force
by correctional officers was not part of a policy of the District for the purposes of establishing
municipal liability. The court held that even if low-level supervisors covered up other alleged
incidents of excessive force through falsified disciplinary reports, that practice would actually
reduce the likelihood that policymakers would learn of the practice. (District of Columbia
Occoquan Facility, Lorton, Virginia)

U.S. Appeals Court
NEGLIGENCE

Walker v. Reed, 104 F.3d 156 (8th Cir. 1997). A state prisoner brought a civil rights suit
to recover for injuries sustained from a fall in a bathroom. The district court dismissed the case
as frivolous and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the complaint,
which alleged only negligence, lacked an arguable basis in law and was properly dismissed as
frivolous. The prisoner had alleged that he slipped and fell because of water on the floor in the
prison barracks bathroom, injuring his arm and shoulder. The prisoner asserted that the water
had accumulated on the floor because of leaks from the shower wall and from the sinks.
(Cummins Unit, Arkansas Department of Correction)

U.S. Appeals Court
COMPENSATORY
DAMAGES
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Williams v. Brimeyer, 116 F.3d 351 (8th Cir. 1997). A prison inmate brought a§ 1983
action against a deputy warden and mail room clerk, alleging they violated his First
Amendment free exercise rights by twice denying him materials sent by the Church of
Jesus Christ Christian (CJCC). The district court awarded the inmate $1 in compensatory
damages and $500 punitive damages from each of the two defendants. The appeals court affirmed,
finding that a blanket ban on CJCC materials··without review of their individual contents··was
unconstitutional and that punitive damages were warranted. According to the court, the inmate
had a right to receive materials mailed to him by the Church of Jesus Christ Christian (CJCC),
even though those materials expressed racist and separatist views, because the materials did not
counsel violence and there was no evidence that they ever caused a disruption. The court found
that the deputy warden and mail room clerk were "callously indifferent" to the inmate's First
Amendment free exercise rights, warranting punitive damages. The deputy warden knew that the
blanket ban on CJCC materials was unconstitutional when the materials were first withheld, and
the clerk did not consult a list naming CJCC materials as approved because she believed the
blanket ban remained in effect, despite her knowledge that the ban was unconstitutional. (Iowa
Men's Reformatory)

U.S. District Court
DAMAGERS
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Wilson v. Philadelphia Detention Center, 986 F.Supp. 282 (E.D.Pa. 1997). An inmate
brought a § 1983 action against corrections officials alleging they had used excessive force
and violated his due process rights by placing him in administrative segregation. A jury ruled
against the three defendants and they moved for judgment as a matter of law. The district court
held that evidence supported the jury verdict against members of the prison disciplinary board
and supported the award of punitive damages. The court upheld the jury's award of punitive
damages in the amount of $5,000. The inmate was held in administrative segregation for ten days
without a determination of guilt on charges that he violated prison disciplinary rules, although
prison regulations required a hearing within three days. (Philadelphia Detention Center,
Pennsylvania)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
FAILURE TO PROTECT

Woods v. Lecureux, 110 F.3d 1215 (6th Cir. 1997). A murdered inmate's mother brought
a§ 1983 action against prison officials alleging violation of the inmate's Eighth
Amendment rights. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants
and the mother appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
The appeals court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding from
evidence all materials from ongoing litigation challenging prison conditions in Michigan, or by
prohibiting an expert witness from using the term "deliberately indifferent" to describe the
defendants' conduct. According to the court, the use of the term "deliberately indifferent" by the
expert attempted to tell the jury what result to reach and ran the risk of interfering with jury
instructions. The court held that the issue of whether an official acted with deliberate indifference
depended on that official's state of mind, of which the expert witness had no knowledge. However,
the appeals court held that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment for a
deputy warden but that there was insufficient evidence to support the imposition of liability
against the deputy warden. <state Prison of Southern Michigan)

U.S. District Court
CONSENT DECREEMODIFICATION

Wyatt By And Through Rawlins v. Rogers, 985 F.Supp. 1356 (M.D.Ala. 1997). The state
commissioner of mental health and mental retardation moved to have a federal court find
that the state had complied with the provisions of a consent decree and to terminate the prior
lawsuit. The class action plaintiffs moved to enforce the decree. The district court granted partial
release from the provisions of the decree but did not release the state from mental retardation
standards. According to the court, accreditation of state mental health facilities by the Joint
27.87

Commission on the Accreditation of Health Care Organizations (JCAHO), and certification of the
facilities through Title XIX of the Social Security Act, did not establish compliance with minimum
constitutional standards which govern the treatment of patients at such facilities. Wabama
Mental Health and Mental Retardation System).
1998

U.S. District Court
COMPENSATORY
DAMAGES
PUNITIVE
DAMAGES

Arroyo Lopez v. Nuttall, 25 F.Supp.2d 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). A Muslim inmate brought a§ 1983
action against a corrections officer alleging violation of his First Amendment right to freedom
of religion. The district court found that the officer violated the inmate's right to freedom of
religion and held that the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity. The court awarded
compensatory damages of $2,000 and punitive damages of $5,000. The court found that the officer
violated the inmate's right by shoving him and disrupting his prayer, acted without justification
or provocation, and his actions were not reasonably related to any legitimate penological
objectives. The court concluded that a reasonable officer would have known that he could not
shove the inmate and disrupt his prayer when he was praying quietly during quiet time without
disturbing others. The court awarded compensatory damages, even though the inmate was not
physically injured and his emotional anguish was minimal. The court found punitive damages
were appropriate because the officer, at the least, acted recklessly and with callous indifference to
the inmate's rights, the officer had been embroiled in a "running battle" with Muslim inmates,
and the officer was simply wrong about the ability of inmates to pray quietly during quiet time.
(Downstate Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY

Ayers y,_ Ryan, 152 F.3d 77 (2nd Cir. 1998). A prison inmate who had been the
subject of a prison disciplinary proceeding brought a § 1983 action against a
hearing officer and a facility superintendent, alleging violation of his due process rights. The
district court dismissed the case, but the appeals court vacated the decision and remanded the
case. The appeals court held that the failure of the hearing officer to provide any assistance or to
obtain the testimony of witnesses requested by the inmate violated the inmate's due process
rights. The appeals court denied qualified immunity to the hearing officer because the right in
question was clearly established at the time of the hearing. According of the court, the decision of
the inmate to have the hearing officer assist him, rather than a properly appointed assistant, did
not result in a waiver of the inmate's due process right to pre-hearing assistance. (Southport
Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN

Barney y,_ Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299 (10th Cir. 1998). Two female former inmates
who were sexually assaulted by a jailer each brought a § 1983 action against jailer, county, sheriff
and county commissioners based on their assault and other conditions of confinement. The actions
were consolidated and all defendants except the jailer were granted summary judgment by the
district court. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the county was not liable on the grounds of
failure to train or inadequate hiring. The court held that the inmates did not show that the
training received by the jailer was deficient and that even if it was, the sexual assault of the
inmates was not plainly the obvious consequence of a deficient training program. The court noted
that the sheriff should not have been expected to conclude that the jailer was highly likely to
inflict sexual assault on female inmates if he was hired as a correctional officer.
The court found that the sheriff and commissioners did not violate the inmates' rights by
permitting the jailer to be the sole guard on duty in the county jail. The court noted that
permitting a single officer to be on duty when a second jailer was sick or on vacation did not
impose liability on the county, where there were no previous incidents of sexual harassment or
assault of female inmates that would have given notice to the county that its one-jailer policy
would result in injuries. The court also noted that the sheriff acknowledged problems with
crowding and inadequate monitoring, and its inability to house female inmates for extended
periods of time. The county contracted out female inmates to neighboring jails that had better
facilities and limited confinement of female inmates to 24-36 hours whenever possible.
According to the appeals court the inmates failed to establish an equal protection claim. The
court also found that the sheriff and commissioners did not act with deliberate indifference to the
female inmates' health and safety with regard to conditions of confinement. The inmates'
allegations regarding a filthy cell, inadequate lighting and ventilation, lack of enclosure around a
shower, unappetizing food, and lack of access to recreational facilities, did not rise to the level of a
constitutional violation given that the inmates were confined for only 48 hours. (Box Elder County
Jail, Utah)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO
SUPERVISE
FAILURE TO
TRAIN
NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION

Bednar v. County of Schuylkill, 29 F.Supp.2d 250 (E.D.Pa. 1998). A county prison
inmate brought a § 1983 suit against a prison physician and others alleging
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, negligent hiring, negligent
supervision and medical negligence. The district court granted summary judgment
in favor of the defendants. The court held that the physician's failure to diagnose
the inmate's hip fracture and failure to order an x-ray was not deliberate
indifference to the inmate's serious medical needs, where there was no evidence that
the doctor recognized the inmate's need for an x·ray and refused to order it, or that the doctor
possessed the requisite mental intent to sustain a deliberate indifference claim. The court held
that the county was not liable to the inmate for failing to adequately screen him before hiring him,
27.88

even though the physician had five previous medical malpractice actions filed against him, and
had his staff privileges suspended at one hospital based upon "chart delinquency." The court noted
that the previous actions had been settled or dismissed, the physician was licensed to practice
medicine in the state, and he had experience as an emergency room physician as well as a prison
physician in two state correctional facilities. The court also held that the county prison warden
was not liable to the inmate for failing to supervise the doctor, even though the warden failed to
provide the doctor with a copy of the prison's written policies regarding medical treatment, and
the warden had knowledge of four accident reports concerning the inmate. (Schuylkill County
Prison, Pennsylvania)
U.S. Appeals Court
DAMAGES

Berry v-' Oswalt, 143 F.3d 1127 (8th Cir. 1998). A female inmate at a state
corrections center who was allegedly raped by one correctional officer and sexually harassed by a
second officer, brought a§ 1983 action against corrections officials. The district court granted
summary judgment for a warden and director of corrections, but entered judgment against other
officials, awarding reduced damages. The inmate and an officer appealed. The appeals court found
that the inmate was entitled to damages against the first officer for both outrage and
constitutional violation, and that the finding that a second officer's conduct violated the Eighth
Amendment was supported by evidence. The second officer was found to have harassed the
inmate by attempting to perform non-routine patdown searches, propositioning the inmate, and
making sexual comments. The appeals court reversed the district court's decision to eliminate a
jury award for outrage, ordering the district court to fully effectuate the jury's verdict on remand.
The jury had originally awarded the inmate compensatory damages of $40,000 on her § 1983
claim and $25,000 in compensatory damages on her state tort claim, along with $15,000 in
punitive damages. (Tucker Women's Unit, Arkansas Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Boyce v. Fairman. 24 F.Supp.2d 880 (N.D.Ill. 1998). An inmate who was attacked
by other inmates sued county corrections officials alleging that they failed to protect him and
failed to provide adequate medical care. The district court held that the inmate could pursue his
claim against a corrections director in his official capacity and against lieutenants in their
individual capacity and could seek punitive damages from them. The court held that the inmate
adequately stated a § 1983 action against the director. alleging that it was the practice and policy
of the department to refuse protective custody requested by prisoners who had been beaten by
other inmates, and that it was the practice and policy of officials to deny specialized medical care
to prisoners. The court found that the inmate stated a claim against corrections lieutenants,
alleging that they were aware he was the target of, and vulnerable to assaults by other prisoners,
but failed to take reasonable steps to abate the risk of attack and place him in protective custody.
The inmate also alleged that the lieutenants breached their duty to provide adequate medical
care, which resulted in the total loss of vision in one eye. The inmate had asked to be excused from
"yard" because he was afraid of being attacked. but his request was denied and he was told that
yard was mandatory for all inmates. He was subsequently attacked by several inmates upon
returning from yard on a stairwell leading to the tiers, and was beaten for about twenty minutes.
(Cook County Department of Corrections, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
PRIVATE PROVIDER

Callaway v. Smith County, 991 F.Supp. 801 (E.D.Tex. 1998). An inmate at a county jail
sued a county and a sheriff alleging mistreatment. The district court held that the
inmate's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were not violated when he was not
given the correct dosage of medication where there was no evidence that the conduct of
jail personnel evinced deliberate indifference to his condition as opposed to a mistake or simple
negligence. The court held that the inmate's rights were violated because he was not seen by
doctors in a timely manner. According to the court, a state university hospital center, which
provided medical care to inmates in the county jail, had sovereign immunity from a suit by the
inmate claiming improper medical care because the center is an agency of the State of Texas.
(Smith County Jail, Texas)

U.S. District Court
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
COMPENSATORY
DAMAGES

Castle v. Clymer, 15 F.Supp.2d 640 (E.D.Pa. 1998). A state prisoner brought a §
1983 action against prison officials alleging that he was transferred to another
facility in retaliation for exercise of his First Amendment free speech rights. The
district court entered judgment for the prisoner, finding that transferring him based on his
correspondence with a newspaper reporter violated his right to free speech. The court held that
transferring the prisoner because he participated in a preauthorized interview with a reporter
violated his right to procedural due process. as did transferring him based on his activities as
president of an advocacy group for life prisoners. The court found that the prisoner had a free
speech right to send outgoing correspondence to a newspaper reporter, subject to reasonable
prison regulations. The court held that compensatory damages were not warranted for the
prisoner's loss of his position as a para·law library clerk, and that punitive damages were not
warranted because there was no finding that the officials acted with callous indifference or an evil
motive; the court awarded the prisoner nominal damages of $1. The court declined to order the
receiving facility to give the prisoner the same job and the single-cell status the prisoner enjoyed
at the original facility, because the receiving facility was not involved in the constitutional
violations that gave rise to the case. In its decision, the court outlined three tests to determine
whether the prisoner was transferred in retaliation for exercising his constitutional rights: the
"but for" test, the "significant factor" test, and the "narrowly tailored" test. (State Correctional
Institution· Dallas, Pennsylvania)
27.89

U.S. District Court
CONSENT DECREE
CONTEMPT

Chairs v. Burgess, 25 F.Supp.2d 1333 (N.D.Ala. 1998). A county sheriff and county
moved to enforce a consent decree which had been entered in a class action suit
brought by county jail inmates to remedy overcrowding. The district court entered an order
holding the state of Alabama in contempt for violating the consent decree and imposed sanctions.
The appeals court reversed and remanded. On remand, the district court held that the state had
not made reasonable, good faith efforts to comply with the transfer provision of the consent
decree, and therefore a judgment of contempt was appropriate. According to the court, state
corrections officials had not reviewed the consent decree which had been entered 11 years earlier,
even prior to the show cause hearing for this case. The decree called for the state to transfer
county jail inmates to state facilities, which the court found did not happen despite available
space in state prisons and increases in programs to decrease state overcrowding. The court found
that attorneys for the class of inmates and the county were entitled to reasonable attorney fees as
the prevailing parties. (Morgan County Jail and Alabama Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act
NOMINAL DAMAGES

Davis v. District of Columbia, 158 F.3d 1342 (D.C.Cir. 1998). An inmate brought a
§ 1983 action against the District of Columbia and correctional officials, alleging
violation of his right to privacy. The district court dismissed the action, citing the
provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) that prohibits inmates from bring federal
action for a mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without making a prior showing
of a physical injury. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the fact that the inmate may have
been entitled to nominal damages did not save his action from dismissal under PLRA. The court
noted that PLRA does not prevent actions for injunctions or declaratory judgments in which no
allegation of prior physical injury are made. The inmate had sought compensatory damages,
alleging that officials violated his right of privacy by disclosing his HIV status. The inmate alleged
that he suffered weight loss, appetite loss and insomnia as the result of officials' disclosure of his
status to others. (District of Columbia Central Prison at Lorton, Virginia)

U.S. District Court
CONSENT DECREE
CONTEMPT
FINES

Essex County Jail Annex Inmates v. Treffinger, 18 F.Supp.2d 445 (D.N.J. 1998).
Inmates filed a motion to hold county corrections defendants in civil contempt for
noncompliance with a consent decree addressing unconstitutional conditions of
confinement. The district court held that monetary sanctions for civil contempt were not
appropriate in light of the county's efforts to attain full compliance by investing over $200 million
in new facilities and improving existing ones. The court concluded that contempt sanctions would
be counterproductive and would impede the county's efforts to build a new jail. The court held
that it could not consider whether a classification plan satisfied the consent decree until an
independent analysis was conducted. The court noted that the Special Master reported that
staffing was inadequate, and as a result inmates and staff are exposed to danger and other
problems. The court adopted the Master's recommendation that an independent, professional
staffing analysis be conducted to address staff training, coverage and operations. The Master also
reported that there was an insufficient supply of personal hygiene items, and the court ordered
the defendants to comply with the consent order's terms by issuing adequate amounts of personal
hygiene items, including toilet paper, soap, shampoo, toothpaste, toothbrush, comb, mirror,
individual razors and shaving cream or powder. (Essex County Jail and Essex County Jail Annex,
New Jersey)

U.S. District Court
PRIVATE OPERATOR
COMPENSATORY
DAMAGES
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
FEDERAL TORT
CLAIMS ACT

Giron v. Corrections Corp. of America, 14 F.Supp.2d 1245 (D.N.M. 1998). A female
prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a correctional officer, alleging he had
raped her. The district court denied the officer's motion for summary judgment,
finding that the officer was acting under color of state law when he raped the
prisoner, and the officer was not a state employee immune from suit for
compensatory and punitive damages under the Tort Claims Act. According to the
court, even though a private firm ran the correctional facility, the officer exercised
coercive authority over the prisoner through his employment, used his employment status to gain
access to her prison cell, and the state was directly involved in aspects of prison life. The court
noted that the delegation of a governmental function must carry with it the delegation of
constitutional responsibilities. (New Mexico Women's Correctional Facility, operated by the
Corrections Corporation of America)

U.S. District Court
PRIVATE PROVIDER

Gwynn v. Transcor America, Inc., 26 F.Supp.2d 1256 (D.Colo. 1998). A former
prisoner who had been transported from Oregon to Colorado by employees of a Tennessee
corporation which contracted with the Colorado Department of Corrections to transport prisoners
to other states, sued the corporation under§ 1983 alleging that she had been sexually assaulted
and otherwise endangered during the trip. The district court held that the corporation and its
employees, who were nonresidents of Colorado, were subject to personal jurisdiction in Colorado.
The court found that the prisoner stated a § 1983 claim by alleging that she had been sexually
assaulted by one employee and that another employee failed to stop the assaults. The court found
that the employees were acting as agents and prison guards of the State of Colorado, and used
state power as a coercive force to further their wrongful acts. (Colorado Dept. of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
PRIVATE OPERATOR

Halvorsen v. Baird, 146 F.3d 680 (9th Cir. 1998). A detainee who was questioned
by police a~ then involuntarily committed to a detoxification facility overnight
27.90

filed a § 1983 action alleging constitutional violations. The district court entered judgment in
favor of the defendants on a jury verdict and the appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part
and remanded. The appeals court held that a private non-profit firm that provided involuntary
detoxification services did not enjoy qualified immunity from § 1983 liability. The court found that
the private firm was not a private individual that was briefly deputized to assist government
actors, in light of its nature as a company that was organized to assume a major lengthy
administrative task. The appeals court also held that confinement for six hours overnight was not
too short, as a matter of law, to trigger a due process right to communicate with someone outside
the facility. But the court found that a facility can control the manner and timing of a telephone
call from a detainee, so that it comports with reasonable institutional requirements. The court
found that the detainee was given sufficient notice or opportunity to demonstrate sobriety to
satisfy due process, where testimony indicated that he was told why he was at the facility and
that he was observed for indications of drunkenness or sobriety. (Central City Concern, and City
of Portland, Oregon)
U.S. District Court
PRIVATE OPERATOR
FAILURE TO
SUPERVISE
FAILURE TO
TRAIN
FAILURE TO DIRECT
OFFICIAL CAPACITY
QUALIFIED IMMUN·
ITY

Kesler v. King. 29 F.Supp.2d 356 (S.D.Tex. 1998). Former inmates from Missouri
who had served time in a privately-operated unit leased from a county in Texas
brought a § 1983 action. The district court found that the county sheriff, his chief
deputy, and a county official in charge of the detention center's emergency response
team were not entitled to qualified immunity from claims alleging the use of
excessive force, failure to train or supervise staff, or failure to screen job applicants.
The suit addressed staff actions that had become nationally-publicized through a
videotape that depicted staff use of force, including the use of stun guns and dogs.
The court held that triable issues existed regarding whether the sheriff's conduct
was extreme and outrageous. A private firm, Capital Correctional Resources, Inc. (CCRI) leased
512 of the detention center's 1,163 beds at a cost of $10/bed per day plus expenses. In 1996 CCRI
entered into a contract to house low· to medium-security inmates from Missouri. The terms of
CCRl's contract with the county included the following provisions: all CCR! hiring and training
decisions and policies are subject to the sheriff's review and approval; the county and the sheriff
are obligated to provide CCR! with all information necessary for the screening of applicants; the
county and sheriff are obligated to certify all jailers prior to their assuming duties; and the sheriff
is required to monitor CCRl's operations.
CCR! hired, with the support of the sheriff, a warden for the. privately-operated portion of the
facility. The sheriff subsequently asked CCR! to hire two individuals, one as a lieutenant and one
as a sergeant, each of whom had been previously convicted and had served sentences for a 1983
beating of a department of corrections inmate, and they were hired by CCRI.
The court held that a defendant's conduct of allowing a canine unit dog to bite five inmates
without provocation during a shakedown was not objectively reasonable and the defendant was
not entitled to qualified immunity from liability. The court also denied qualified immunity for
another defendant who failed to intercede to protect the inmates from excessive force used by
officers, failing to stop an officer from allowing a dog to bite inmates, and failing to remove an
officer who was using his stun gun on inmates. (Brazoria County Detention Center, Texas, and
Capital Correctional Resources, Inc.)

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY

Lee v. Coughlin, 26 F.Supp.2d 615 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). An inmate brought a prose
civil rights action against a hearing officer and corrections commissioner
alleging deprivation of due process by denying his request for employee assistance
during a disciplinary hearing. The district court held that the inmate's confmement in disciplinary
segregation for 376 days was an atypical and significant hardship for the purposes of establishing
a liberty interest. The court held that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity
because it was clearly established at the time of the hearing that the inmate had a right to an
assistant. (Sing Sing Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
OFFICIAL CAPACITY
INDMDUAL
CAPACITY

Lewis v. Cook County Dept. of Corrections, 28 F.Supp.2d 1073 (N.D.ID. 1998). An
inmate brought a pro se § 1983 case against county correctional officers in their
individual and official capacities. The district court that the inmate stated a claim
for retaliation against the officers in their individual capacities by alleging that he
was terminated from his position as law library cleaner one month after he filed a grievance
against a corrections officer. The court held that the inmate's complaint did not adequately allege
that the officers were policymakers of the county department of corrections, so as to support a §
1983 claim against the officers in their ofiICial capacities. The court also held that an officer's
conduct in forbidding the inmate from continuing with his law library job due to a "hickey" on his
neck did not violate the inmate's equal protection rights. (Cook County Department of
Corrections, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
NEGLIGENCE

Martinez v. City of Los Angeles, 141 F.3d 1373 (9th Cir. 1998). A defendant who was
arrested in Mexico at the request of a U.S. police department sued a city and police
officials. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. but the appeals court
affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The appeals court held that material fact issues
precluded summary judgment on the plaintiff's false imprisonment and negligence claims based
on his prolonged detention. The court held that under California law, a jailer and the public entity
that employs a jailer may be liable for false imprisonment if the jailer knows that imprisonment is
27.91

unlawful or if there is some notice sufficient to put him, as a reasonable man, under a duty to
investigate the validity of incarceration. Los Angeles police had asked Mexican authorities to
arrest a murder suspect. The plaintiff was arrested, but was innocent and was nevertheless held
in a Mexican prison for 59 days. Ten days after his arrest and detention, the plaintiffs lawyer sent
a letter to a Los Angeles detective telling him that the Mexican authorities had arrested the
wrong man, providing information that challenged the validity of the arrest, but the two witnesses
to the Los Angeles murder were never given the opportunity to identify the plaintiff at the prison
or to view a picture of him. The plaintiff was eventually released when the true suspect was
identified. (Los Angeles Police Department)
U.S. District Court
DEFENSES

Morales Feliciano v. Rossello Gonzalez, 13 F.Supp.2d 151 (D.Puerto Rico 1998). In
an ongoing action against a corrections system seeking improvement of medical and mental
health care provided to inmates, an expert witness prepared a report documenting the state of
compliance with prior orders that had been entered. The district court held that the correctional
system continued to violate inmates' Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights by failing
to provide adequate medical care. The court found that the officials' actions or lack thereof
contributed to the deaths of inmates and to the infliction of pain and suffering. The court ruled
that there were systematic deficiencies in staffing, facilities, procedures and administration, and
that officials acted in a manner that was deliberately indifferent to the basic human and health
needs of inmates. The court noted that budgetary limitations or inadequate resources can never
be a valid justification for constitutional violations. The court concluded that the system had
failed to provide adequate facilities and equipment necessary for the provision of adequate health
care of inmates pursuant to acceptable professional standards. But the court noted that despite
the findings of the expert, the National Commission on Correctional Health Care had accredited
the medical care programs in four prisons and awarded provisional accreditation to four more in
1992. But an expert found noncompliance with at least one essential standard at every accredited
facility, and the Department of Health provided the court monitor's staff with credible evidence
that employees had falsified documents in support of accreditation. (Administration of Correction,
Puerto Rico)

U.S. District Court
NEGLIGENCE
FEDERAL TORT
CLAIMS ACT

Muhammed v. U.S., 6 F.Supp.2d 582 (N.D.Tex. 1998). A prison inmate sued the
United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) for failing to transfer him
to a medical facility. The district court awarded a total of $45,000 to the inmate,
finding that the statute that defines the government's duty to provide suitable
quarters for inmates creates a private cause of action under the Tort Claims Act. According to the
court, Bureau of Prisons employees were negligent in not assigning the inmate to a medical
facility during the two and one-half years following the inmate's complaint that he was unable to
walk and his request for a cane or a wheelchair, causing him physical pain and mental anguish.
The court awarded the inmate $30,000 for physical pain and $15,000 for mental anguish. (Federal
Correctional Institution at Texarkana, Texas)

U.S. Appeals Court
NEGLIGENCE
DAMAGES
QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY

Newton v. Black, 133 F.3d 301 (5th Cir. 1998). A state prisoner who was beaten by another
prisoner sued prison officials under§ 1983 asserting claims for failure to protect, inadequate
medical care, and negligence. The district court dismissed all claims except the negligence
claim against one official, on which it awarded a $10,000 judgment. The appeals court
affirmed in part and reversed and rendered in part, finding that the official was entitled to
qualified immunity under Mississippi law. The court found that although the prison official was
mistaken in his assessment of the seriousness of one prisoner's threat against another, this did
not deprive him of qualified immunity. (Mississippi State Penitentiary)

U.S. District Court
FEDERAL TORT
CLAIMS ACT

Petrazzoulo v. U.S. Marshals Service, 999 F.Supp. 401 (W.D.N.Y. 1998). A pretrial
detainee alleged that the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS) and a county which housed
the detainee under contract to the USMS failed to provide him with dentures, in
violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. The district court held that the USMS was not
deliberately indifferent to the detainee's dental needs and that the detainee failed to state a §
1983 claim against county officials. The inmate's teeth had been extracted to treat a broken jaw,
and a dentist had "recommended" that the detainee obtain dentures. The USMS concluded that
the dentist's recommendation was not a prescription and that the dentures were an elective
treatment. The detainee received prompt treatment for his broken jaw, pain medication and a soft
food diet. The court also held that the detainee could not bring an action under the Federal Tort
Claim Act. (Chautauqua County Jail, New York)

U.S. District Court
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Ramirez v. U.S., 998 F.Supp. 425 (D.N.J. 1998). A person who was arrested and
imprisoned pursuant to an arrest warrant issued for a different individual with a
similar name brought an action against the United States, the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS), and various federal and county officials. The court held that the INS and its agents
were immune from claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) but the United States was
not immune. The court found that the alleged conduct stated claims against the county and
county officials. The court noted that under New Jersey law, punitive damages may be awarded in
a false imprisonment case even where there are no compensatory damages. (Hudson County, New
Jersey)
27.92

U.S. Appeals Court
RESPONDEAT
SUPERIOR
ABSOLUTE
IMMUNITY
QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY

Scotto LAlmenas. 143 F.3d 105 (2nd Cir. 1998). A parolee brought a§ 1983 action
against state parole officers. The district court dismissed the action. The appeals
court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The appeals court held that the parole
officer who recommended that a warrant be issued for the parolee was not
entitled to absolute immunity, where he allegedly fabricated a parole violation and
arrested the parolee knowing he lacked probable cause to do so. But the appeals
court held that the parole division supervisor who signed the arrest warrant upon the parole
officer's recommendation was entitled to absolute immunity because his actions were
prosecutorial in nature. (New York State Division of Parole)

U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY
COMPENSATORY
DAMAGES

Simmons v. Cook, 154 F.3d 805 (8th Cir. 1998). Paraplegic inmates brought a §
1983 suit challenging their placement in solitary confinement. The district court
ruled in favor of the inmates and the appeals court affirmed. The appeals court
held that the inmates' Eighth Amendment rights were violated and that damage
awards of $2,000 for each inmate for their 32·hour period of solitary confinement were not
excessive . The court found that corrections officials violated the inmates' rights because the
inmates did not receive adequate food or medical care while in solitary confinement. The inmates'
wheelchairs did not fit through the solitary confinement cell doors. so they were lifted onto their
beds and their wheelchairs were folded and then reopened inside their cells. Because their
wheelchairs could not pass their cell bunks to reach the barred door where food trays were set, the
inmates missed four consecutive meals. The inmates were unable to use a toilet during their 32·
hours in solitary confinement because the facilities were not accessible and no assistance was
provided. <Arkansas Department of Corrections. Diagnostic Unit)

U.S. Appeals Court
DAMAGES
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Stanley v. Hejirika. 134 F.3d 629 (4th Cir. 1998). An inmate brought a§ 1983 action against
correctional officers who subdued him during a prison disturbance. alleging that they used
unconstitutionally excessive force. The district court awarded the inmate $1,000 in
compensatory damages and $2,000 in punitive damages. The officers appealed and the appeals
court reversed, finding that evidence did not support the finding that the officers acted
sadistically and maliciously for the sole purpose of causing harm when they subdued the inmate.
The appeals court cited a videotape of the incident which showed that the officers treated the
inmate roughly but did not demonstrate wanton sadism. The court also held that as a matter of
law. the injuries suffered by the inmate were insufficient to establish the use of unconstitutionally
excessive force. The inmate suffered bruises, swelling and a loosened tooth. (A-Wing Tier.
Maryland Correction Annex. Jessup. Maryland)

U.S. Appeals Court
GOVERNMENTAL
LIABILITY

Turguitt v. Jefferson County. Ala .• 137 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 1998). The estate of a pretrial
detainee who was killed during an altercation with another inmate at a county jail filed a
civil rights action against the county. The district court denied the county's motion to
dismiss and the county appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded, finding that an
Alabama county cannot be liable in a civil rights case for harms that befall jail inmates due to
improper operation of the jail or negligent supervision of its inmates because the county has no
responsibility in that area. According to the court. the sheriff, not the county, is responsible for jail
conditions under Alabama law; counties have no duties with respect to daily operation of county
jails and have no authority to dictate how jails are run. The deceased inmate was fatally injured
in a fight with another inmate, who was a convicted felon. in the dayroom of the jail. (Jefferson
County Jail, Alabama)

U.S. District Court
LIEN

U.S. v. Barker, 19 F.Supp.2d 1380 (S.D.Ga. 1998). The United States brought an
action against prison inmates seeking to enjoin the inmates from filing "commercial
liens" against federal employees who had allegedly failed to perform their duties by taking
positions adverse to the inmates. The district court held that the inmates' claims had no basis in
federal and state law and declared the "liens" null and void. (Federal Correctional Institution.
Jesup, Georgia)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONTRACT SERVICES

Zinn y. McKune, 143 F.3d 1353 (10th Cir. 1998). A nurse who was employed by a
private corporation that had contracted with a state corrections department to provide medical
services sued corrections officials alleging discrimination, retaliation, violation of Title VII and
violations of§ 1983 and the Kansas law protection whistleblowers. The district court entered
summary judgment for the defendants and the appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held
that the nurse was not an employee of the corrections department for the purpose of Title VII,
where she received compensation from the medical corporation rather than the department, and
was supervised and evaluated by the corporation. The appeals court found that the nurse failed to
show the existence of a causal connection between her whistle-blowing and any retaliation against
her. (Prison Health Services. Osawatomie Correctional Facility, Kansas)

1999
U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED IMMUN.

Baker v. Willett, 42 F.Supp.2d 192 (N.D.N.Y. 1999). A jail inmate brought an action against a
county and county officials alleging excessive use of force in violation of§ 1983. The district
court denied. in part. the defendants' motion to dismiss, finding that a named sheriffs deputy was
not entitled to qualified immunity because it was clearly established at the time of the incident
27.93

that unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain constituted cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Eighth Amendment. The deputy allegedly pushed the inmate in the back, causing
him to fall off of a table and strike his head on metal bars approximately four or five feet from
where he had been sitting. The inmate sustained a laceration on his forehead which required
sutures. The county Undersheriffreviewed the incident and spoke to the inmate and the deputy,
but did not conduct a formal investigation nor discipline the deputy. The district court dismissed
the sheriffs department and county from the suit, finding that they could not be held liable on the
ground that the sheriffs department had a practice of not investigating use of force complaints or
disciplining officers. The court noted that three of five meritorious complaints in the past ten
years had been directed toward one officer who had been terminated after disciplinary
proceedings. (Warren County Jail, New York)
U.S. District Court
COMPENSATORY
DAMAGES
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
PERSONAL LIABILITY
SUPERVISORY
LIABILITY

Beckford v. Irvin, 49 F.Supp.2d 170 (W.D.N.Y. 1999). Defendants moved to set aside a jury
verdict and dismiss an inmate's case against them. The district court denied the motions,
finding that the award of compensatory and punitive damages was not excessive. The inmate
had been confined to a wheelchair since 1984. In 1994 he was transferred from a psychiatric
center to another correctional facility where he was assigned to a Mental Health Observation
Unit (MHU). The court noted that the inmate was "... not placed in MHU for mental health
treatment. He was placed in MHU because the cell was bigger and because his wheelchair fit
in the cell." But shortly after his transfer officials took away his wheelchair and denied him access
to it for the majority of his time at the facility. The inmate repeatedly requested permission to use
his wheelchair and his requests were denied. The jury concluded that the inmate's rights had
been violated because he was unable to participate in outdoor exercise or to take a shower because
he was not allowed to use his wheelchair. The jury awarded $125,000 in compensatory damages
for violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and punitive damages totaling $25,000
against two supervisory officials for being deliberately indifferent to the inmate's serious medical
needs. The court noted that the fact that the jury did not assess liability on the part oflower
ranking prison officials did not preclude the jury from assessing liability on the supervisory
officials. (Wende Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONSENT DECREETERMINATION
PLRA-Pris. Litigation
Reform Act
TERMINATION OF
ORDER

Benjamin v. Jacobsen, 172 F.3d 144 (2nd Cir. 1999). Officials who had entered into a consent
decree governing New York City jail conditions moved for immediate termination of the decree
under provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). Pretrial detainees opposed the
action. The district court vacated the decree and the appeals court affirmed in part and reversed
in part. A rehearing en bane was granted and the appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in
part and remanded. The appeals court held that the detainees were entitled to present evidence
of current and ongoing violations of federal rights and of the need for continuation of the
prospective relief provided in the decrees. According to the court PLRA provides for decrees to be
terminated, but it does not require that decrees be vacated. The appeals court found that the
PLRA termination provision does not violate the Constitutional separation of powers principle nor
does it strip the courts of their Article III power and duty to remedy constitutional wrongs. (New
York City Department Correction)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONSENT-DECREE
TERMINATION
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Berwanger v. Cottey, 178 F.3d 834 (7th Cir. 1999). A county jail moved under the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) to terminate the maximum population features of a court
injunction. The district court entered an order terminating all prisoner release orders but the
appeals court remanded the case. The appeals court held that the district court had erred by
letting more than a year pass without action on the motion to terminate prospective relief,
and then terminating the decree without making any findings. (Marion County Jail, Indiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
PLRA·Pris. Litigation
Reform Act
CONSENT DECREE

Cagle v. Hutto, 177 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 1999). A state moved to terminate a prison conditions
consent decree under the provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The district
court granted the motion and the inmates appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that
the PLRA is constitutional and does not mandate an evidentiary hearing in all cases. (Powhatan
Correctional Center, Virginia)

U.S. District Court
INDMDUAL
CAPACITY

Caldwell v. Hammonds, 53 F.Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999). A prisoner brought a§ 1983 action
for damages for injuries allegedly suffered. The district court held that the prisoner failed to
state a claim with his allegations of limited access to legal materials because he did not allege a
specific injury as a result. But the court held that the prisoner stated a claim for deliberate
indifference because his prescribed treatment for skin cancer was delayed. The court also found a
claim for deliberate indifference in the prisoner's allegations that he was exposed to secondary
tobacco smoke and to smoke from fires set in his cell block. The court noted that although prison
policy prohibited smoking in the prison, tobacco products were sold in the prison canteen and
correctional officers permitted smoking in cell blocks. The court found that pervasive unsanitary
and unhealthy conditions in his cell block existed for a long time and were obvious to any
observer. Because the Director of the Department of Corrections had notice of these conditions,
the prisoner stated a § 1983 claim for violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Cell Block 3,
Maximum Security Facility, District of Columbia Department of Corrections, Lorton, Virginia)

27.94

U.S. District Court
NOMINAL DAMAGES
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Cassidy v. Indiana Dept. of Correction. 59 F.Supp.2d 787 (S.D.lnd. 1999). A blind inmate
brought an action against a state corrections department alleging violations of the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act. The district court held that the
Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) barred the inmate's claims to the extent that he
asserted mental or emotional injuries. and that nominal damages were available to the plaintiff.
According to the court. to the extent that the inmate's claims under ADA and the Rehabilitation
Act addressed the extra offender pay that the inmate lost as the result of being denied the
opportunity to work at the prison, the claims would not be barred by the section of PLRA that
prohibits a prisoner from bring an action for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody
without the showing of a physica~ injury. The court also held that nominal damages are available
for intentional violations of ADA or the Rehabilitation Act, even if no other damages are available.
The inmate had sought relief for the emotional and mental harm he suffered from his inability to
pursue the same activities at his newly-assigned prison which did not accommodate his
disabilities, compared to his opportunities at a previous facility. (Wabash Valley Correctional
Facility, Indiana)

U.S. District Court
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
DAMAGES

Gaston v. Coughlin. 81 F.Supp.2d 381 (N.D.N.Y. 1999). In a§ 1983 suit a state prisoner alleged
retaliation in violation of his constitutional rights for his complaints about work conditions. The
district court found that prison officers were liable for First Amendment retaliation and that they
were not entitled to qualified immunity. The court ruled that the prisoner was entitled to pre·
judgment compounded interest for lost wages and for monetary awards for educational costs
incurred because of the loss of financial aid. The court held that the officers filed false accusations
against the prisoner after he met with prison officials to discuss the prison's violation of a state
law that limited the number of hours that inmates were required to work. The prisoner was
allegedly disciplined for instigating a work stoppage but the court found no evidence that a work
stoppage occurred. The prisoner was restricted from his job in the prison kitchen and was
transferred to another prison. depriving him of wages and forcing him to delay and alter his
educational plans and to incur additional educational costs. The court ruled that the prisoner was
not entitled to punitive damages because there was no evidence that the officers were motivated
by evil motive or intent or that they acted with reckless or callous indifference to the prisoner's
federally-protected rights. (Eastern Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
CONSENT DECREEMODIFICATION
PLRA-Pris. Litigation
Reform Act

Glover v. Johnson. 35 F.Supp.2d 1010 (E.D.Mich. 1999). Prison officials moved to terminate the
district court's continuing jurisdiction over a plan to remedy equal protection violations
identified in a civil rights action by female inmates. The district court denied the motion and
the appeals court affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part. On remand, the district
court found that post-secondary and college educational opportunities provided to male and
female inmates of state prison were sufficiently comparable, noting that male and female inmates
had equal access to degree programs and the state's expenditures on college programming were
similar for both genders. The court also held that vocational and apprenticeship opportunities
provided to each gender were sufficiently comparable. The court noted that although ten more
vocational programs were offered to male inmates, the six most frequently offered male vocational
programs were offered to female inmates and enrollment rates of male and female inmates were
similar. The court also noted that despite the fact that male inmates were offered twelve different
types of apprenticeships and female inmates were offered seven. all eligible female inmates could
participate in apprenticeship while only a small portion of eligible male inmates could participate.
<Michigan Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONSENT DECREETERMINATION

Glover v. Johnson. 198 F.3d 557 (6th Cir. 1999). Prison officials moved to terminate the district
court's continuing jurisdiction over a plan to remedy equal protection violations identified in a 20·
year·old action by female inmates. The district court denied the motion and prison officials
appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded in part and on remand the district court
granted the motion. The plaintiffs appealed and the appeals court affirmed. The appeals court
reviewed the district court's finding that the state had achieved parity between male and female
inmates in educational, vocational. apprenticeship and work-pass opportunities. as well as access
to courts. The appeals court found that the district court's decision to terminate jurisdiction was
not clearly erroneous. <Michigan Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT

Gonzalez v. Angelilli, 40 F.Supp.2d 615 (E.D.Pa. 1999). A civil rights action was brought
against state parole and prison authorities by the relatives of a police officer killed by a former
prison inmate and the owner of a trailer to which the former inmate moved upon release. The
district court dismissed the case finding that as a general rule. the state has no affirmative
obligation to protect its citizens from the violent acts of private individuals. The court held that
the plaintiffs failed to state a § 1983 claim under a state-created danger theory where they failed
to allege that it was foreseeable that the paroled offender would direct his violence at police
officers in general, or that police would destroy trailer park property while looking for evidence.
The court also found that the plaintiffs failed to state a § 1983 claim based on a failure to train
theory where they did not identify what policies or procedures were defective, how they were
defective or whether a training program was involved. (Pennsylvania Board of Probation and
Parole, Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections)

27.96

Hinson v. Edmond, 192 F.3d 1342 (11th Cir. 1999). An inmate brought a§ 1983 action against a jail's
U.S. Appeals Court
medical director who was an employee of a private, for-profit company that had contracted with the
PRIVATE PROVIDER
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY county to provide medical services to the jail. The district court denied the medical director's motion
for summary judgment and he appealed. The appeals court affirmed and remanded the case. The
appeals court held that a privately employed jail physician was ineligible to advance the defense of
qualified immunity. The inmate had alleged he was subjected to an unreasonable delay in his medical
treatment. (DeKalb County Jail, Georgia, and Wexford Health Services)
U.S. Appeals Court
CONSENT DECREEMODIFICATION
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Imprisoned Citizens Union v. Ridge, 169 F.3d 178 (3rd Cir. 1999). Pennsylvania
prison officials moved to terminate a 1978 prison conditions consent decree under
the provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). Inmates opposed the
motion and the United States intervened to defend the PLRA. The district court
granted the termination motion and the inmates appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding
that the PLRA's termination provision did not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine nor equal
protection principles. The appeals court also held that the district court did not abuse its power by
refusing to hold officials in civil contempt for failing to comply with portions of the consent decree
in the past. Inmates had sued in 1970 challenging conditions of confinement in seven state
prisons. The resulting consent decree, according to the court, "governs nearly every aspect of
prison management." (Pennsylvania Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
CONSENT DECREEMODIFICATION
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act

King v. Greenblatt, 53 F.Supp.2d 117 (D.Mass. 1999). A state moved to terminate consent
decrees which were in place approximately 25 years to govern operations at a treatment
facility for civilly-committed sexually dangerous persons. The district court terminated the
consent decrees, finding that the underlying conditions that existed when the decrees were
entered had been remedied. The court noted that the provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform
Act (PLRA) did not apply to civilly committee persons, who were not "prisoners" under the Act.
(Massachusetts Treatment Center for Sexually Dangerous Persons, Bridgewater, Massachusetts)

U.S. Appeals Court
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act
FAILURE TO PROTECT

Liner v. Goord, 196 F.3d 132 (2nd Cir. 1999). A prisoner brought a§ 1983 action against prison
officials alleging he was sexually assaulted on three separate occasions by correctional officers. The
district court dismissed the complaint and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part,
reversed in part and remanded. The appeals court held that the alleged policy or practice of the
Commissioner of the Department of Correctional Services that permitted corrections officers to
conduct intrusive body searches without "therapeutic supervision" supported a§ 1983 claim, even if
the emotional distress claim required a showing of prior injury because the alleged sexual assaults
qualified as more than de minimis physical injuries. The appeals court held that although the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) restricts an inmate's right to sue for emotional distress, "the law
concerning the PLRA's exhaustion requirement is in great flux." {Attica Corr'l Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
OFFICIAL CAPACITY
INDMDUAL
CAPACITY

Luck v. Rovenstine, 168 F.3d 323 (7th Cir. 1999). An arrestee who was jailed for a
week without a probable cause hearing following his warrantless arrest brought a §
1983 action against a sheriff in his personal and official capacities. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the sheriff. The appeals court affirmed in
part and reversed and remanded in part. The appeals court held that the sheriff could not be held
liable in his individual capacity. Fact issues as to whether the arrestee's detention without a
probable cause hearing resulted from the sheriff's deliberate decision not to monitor detainees
who were brought to the jail by outside agencies precluded summary judgment on the official
capacity claim. According to the court, the sheriff, as the custodian of persons incarcerated in the
county jail, had a duty to ensure that detainees arrested without warrants received probable
cause hearings or gained release. The court noted that according to the Supreme Court, "prompt"
in this context means, under most circumstances, within 48 hours. (Kosciusko Co. Jail, Indiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
COMPENSATORY
DAMAGES

Makin v. Colorado Dept. of Corrections, 183 F.3d 1205 (10th Cir. 1999). A former inmate
brought a § 1983 action against prison officials alleging that they violated his right of free
exercise of his religion. The district court entered judgment for the inmate and the appeals
court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. According to the appeals court, the officials'
failure to accommodate the inmate's meal requirements during the Muslim holy month of
Ramadan violated his First Amendment right to freely exercise his religion. The court also found
that evidence that the inmate suffered mental or emotional distress as the result of the officials'
actions supported more than a mere nominal damage award, but the trial court had incorrectly
based its compensatory damages award on the abstract value of a constitutional right rather than
on actual injuries the inmate suffered from the denial of that right. The trial court had awarded
$9000 in compensatory damages, which the appeals court ordered it to review on remand.
(Colorado State Penitentiary)

U.S. District Court
INDMDUAL
CAPACITY
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
ADA-Americans with
Disabilities Act

Montez v. Romer, 32 F.Supp.2d 1235 (D.Colo. 1999). State prisoners with various
disabilities brought a class action suit claiming violation of their rights under the
Rehabilitation Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments. The district court held that the prisoners stated legally
cognizable claims under both Acts, but that the individual defendants were not
liable under either Act, nor under § 1983, and were entitled to qualified immunity
because it was not clearly established at the time of the alleged discriminatory
27.96

conduct that either Act applied to prisons. The court allowed claims against the state to proceed.
(Colorado Department of Corrections)
U.S. Appeals Court
PLRA·Pris. Litigation
Reform Act
CONSENT DECREE·
TERMINATION

Nichols v. Hopper. 173 F.3d 820 (11th Cir. 1999). A state moved to terminate a consent order
that had been entered in civil litigation regarding prison conditions for women, under the
provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The district court granted the motio'
and the appeals court affirmed. The appeals court noted that the PLRA provision allowing
termination did not violate the separation of powers doctrine. (Alabama)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
QUALIFIED IMMUN·
ITY

Ralston v. McGovern, 167 F.3d 1160 (7th Cir. 1999). An inmate brought a civil rights action
against a state prison officer, alleging that the officer denied him medical care in violation of the
Eight Amendment. The district court entered summary judgment for the officer. The appeals
court reversed and remanded, finding that the inmate could maintain a claim based on
allegations that the officer refused to give him medicine prescribed to alleviate pain caused by
radiation treatment for Hodgkin's Disease. The appeals court ruled that the officer was not
entitled to qualified immunity from suit. The appeals court stated that the officer's "refusal to
treat, at trivial cost, the pain caused by cancer and cancer treatments bordered on barbarous, and
the guard's deliberate refusal of request for pain medication was gratuitous cruelty, even if the
context of cancer were ignored." (Green Bay Correctional Institution, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
Schmidt v. Odell, 64 F.Supp.2d 1014 (D.Kan. 1999). A former county jail inmate, a double amputee
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY without legs from a point below his knees, brought a civil rights action against jail officials
asserting claims under the Eighth Amendment. The district court denied summary judgment for
the defendants, finding that it was precluded on all claims. The court held that refusal to provide
the inmate with a wheelchair while confined in the county jail did not violate the Eighth
Amendment since jail exits, entrances and hallways were too narrow to accommodate wheelchairs
and there were legitimate safety concerns about placing a wheelchair among the jail's general
population. The court also found that deficiencies such as plumbing problems, overcrowding,
inadequate exercise areas, and other defects during the inmate's confinement in the county jail
did not rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment; there were opportunities to exercise in
dayrooms, plumbing problems and other allegedly unsanitary conditions did not pose a serious
threat to the health, safety or well-being of the inmate, and overcrowding did not result in denial
of the minimal measures of life's necessities. But the court denied summary judgment for jail
officials on the issue of whether they were deliberately indifferent to the basic needs of the inmate
while he was confined at the jail. The court noted that the fact that the inmate was able to use
most of the jail services did not preclude his Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) or
Rehabilitation Act claims against jail officials. (Cowley County Jail, Kansas)
U.S. Appeals Court
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
NOMINAL DAMAGES

Trobaugh v. Hall, 176 F.3d 1087 (8th Cir. 1999). An inmate brought a§ 1983 action against
county officials alleging violation of his First Amendment right to petition for the redress of
grievances was violated when he was placed in administrative segregation for filing repeated
grievances. The district court entered summary judgment for the jail administrator and awarded
$1 nominal damages against the deputy. The inmate appealed and the appeals court affirmed in
part, reversed in part and remanded. The appeals court held that the district court abused its
discretion by awarding only $1 in compensatory damages. which was "patently insufficient" to
compensate for the injury suffered by the inmate by being placed in segregation. The appeals
court also held that the deputy who placed the inmate in segregation was potentially subject to
punitive damages for his conduct. The inmate had filed a grievance to contest his transportation
to court early and when it was denied he filed a second grievance which was also denied. The
inmate filed a third grievance challenging the apparent lack of an appeal process, which was also
denied. The day after his third grievance was denied he was awakened at 12:30 a.m. and was
escorted to an isolation cell. (Linn County Correctional Center, Iowa)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO DIRECT
FAILURETO
SUPERVISE

Wilson v. City of Chanute, 43 F.Supp.2d 1202 CD.Kan. 1999). The parents of a detainee who
died of a drug overdose shortly after being released from police custody brought a § 1983 action
alleging conspiracy and violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The
defendants moved for summary judgment. which was granted in part and denied in part by the
district court. The court held that the police officers were not entitled to qualified immunity because
there was sufficient evidence of deliberate indifference to the detainee"s serious medical needs. The
court also held that there was sufficient evidence that the police chief failed to properly direct or
supervise officers. Summary judgment was also denied for the city because the court found fact
questions as to whether municipal policy or custom was the moving force behind the officers' alleged
violation of the detainee·s due process rights. The court found sufficient evidence to create an
inference that two police officers and a detective had agreed to deprive the detainee of his due process
rights by releasing him rather than providing medical treatment, for the purposes of a § 1983
conspiracy claim. (City of Chanute, Kansas)

2000
U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES

Andrews v. Camden County. 95 F.Supp.2d 217 (D.N.J. 2000). A former inmate brought an action
alleging that jail officials were deliberately indifferent to his need for medical treatment for a life·
threatening infection that caused him to suffer severe injuries and nearly caused his death. The
district court declined the defendant's motion for summary judgment, finding that it was precluded

27.97

by fact issues of whether the inmate's right to adequate medical treatment was violated during his
eight days of confinement. The court noted that when contracting for correctional health care
services, the county or municipality still remains liable for constitutional deprivations. The court
found that jail officials may have knowingly failed to follow their own policy of having a jail medical
director, which was essential to the safe functioning of the jail's health services, and may have
abandoned a sick call system. (Camden County Correctional Center, New Jersey)
U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES

Bowman v. Corrections Corp. of America, 188 F.Supp.2d 870 (M.D.Tenn. 2000). The mother of a
deceased inmate brought a§ 1983 action against a corporation that managed a correctional facility,
the warden, a hospital and physicians, alleging violations of his Eighth Amendment right to
adequate medical care for sickle cell anemia. After a jury trial judgment was entered in favor of
the defendants the plaintiff moved for judgment as a matter of law. The district court held that the
corporation's medical policy violated contemporary standards of decency. According to the court, it
was proper to consider the constitutionality of the medical policy of the corporation that managed
the correctional facility, even though the mother's claims for damages against the physicians were
unsuccessful, because the corporation's liability for its medical policy was measured by a different
legal standard. The court concluded that the corporation would be treated as a municipal
corporation for§ 1983 liability purposes and noted that the corporation could not "contract away"
its obligation to provide adequate medical care to inmates in its custody. The court held that the
corporation that managed the facility violated contemporary standards of decency by contracting
with a physician who provided exclusive medical services with substantial financial incentives to
reduce necessary medical services. The court noted that the contract exceeded proper levels ofrisk
to the physician under the American Medical Association and federal regulatory standards, and
that the state had set higher cost requirements for services than were expended under the
contract. The contract with the physician had a capitation agreement that governed referral of
inmates to medical specialists, decisions to do laboratory tests, and the issue of prescriptions.
According to the court, the contract and "its extreme financial incentives" to the physician "poses a
significant risk for the denial of necessary medical treatment for the inmates." The court found that
these covered services involved the existence of perceived or actual serious medical conditions that
required treatment or analysis. The court entered an injunction, prohibiting the corporation from
enforcing its contract with the physician. The court also awarded attorney fees to the plaintiff for
the time expended on the motion. (Corrections Corporation of America's South Central Correctional
Facility, Tennessee.)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
FAILURE TO SUPERVISE
NEGLIGENT RETENTION
NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION

Brown v. Youth Services Intern. of South Dakota, 89 F.Supp.2d 1095 (D.S.D. 2000). Residents of a
juvenile treatment facility who were allegedly sexually assaulted by a counselor brought an action
alleging negligent hiring, supervision and retention, and negligent and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. The district court found that fact issues precluded summary judgment with
respect to the negligent hiring, retention and supervision claims. The court found that the plaintiffs
may collect damages for emotional injuries resulting from their alleged physical assaults.
According to the court, the retention of the employee after allegedly receiving reports of sexual
abuse constituted extreme and outrageous behavior as needed to support a claim of intentional
infliction of emotional distress. The court found that there were genuine material issues of fact as
to whether the facility administrators knew, or should have known, of the counselor's alleged
propensity for abusing children when they hired the counselor. (Youth Services International of
South Dakota, Inc., operating under the name Chamberlain Academy)

U.S. Appeals Court
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Cassidy v. Indiana Dept. of Corrections, 199 F.3d 37 4 (7th Cir. 2000). A blind inmate brought an
action against the Indiana Department of Corrections alleging violations of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act. The district court granted partial judgment in
favor of the defendants and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the
provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) that banned prisoner civil actions for mental
or emotional damages without a prior showing of physical injury applies to constitutional torts and
that the provision barred the inmate's claims. The inmate had alleged that the department had
denied him access to programs, services, activities and benefits that it provides to non-disabled
inmates in its custody. (Wabash Valley Correctional Facility, Indiana)

U.S. District Court
VAWA-Violence
Against Women Act
FAILURE TO TRAIN

Daniels v. Delaware, 120 F.Supp.2d 411 (D.Del. 2000). A state inmate who had been raped by a
correctional officer and became pregnant as a result, sued prison officials under § 1983 and the
Violence Against Women Act (VAWA). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendants. The court held that the inmate failed to establish that the officials had been
deliberately indifferent to her health and safety, even though they had previously investigated the
correctional officer for taking female inmates outside their cells after lockdown. The court noted
that there was no evidence that the previous incident involved sexual misconduct and the officials
had disciplined the officer and changed lock down procedures following the investigation.
The court found that the inmate failed to establish a failure to train violation because the
prison's training programs were found to be sufficient under national standards promulgated by
the American Correctional Association. The offending officer had received an adequate number of
training hours and the prison had received an award of excellence for its training programs. The
officer's training had included training in cultural awareness, which included training in sexual
harassment and inmate treatment, and he was trained regarding the prison's code of conduct,
which prohibited sexual contact between inmates and guards. The court noted that personnel
training standards for correctional institutions that were promulgated by national groups do not

27.98

necessarily equate with the training standards required by the Eighth Amendment. According to
the court, while the recommendations of such groups may be instructive in certain cases they
simply do not establish constitutional minima, but rather establish goals recommended by the
organization. <Delaware Women's Correctional Institute)
U.S. Appeals Court
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
COMPENSATORY
DAMAGES
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Daskalea v. District of Columbia, 227 F.3d 433 (D.C.Cir. 2000). A former District of Columbia jail
inmate who had been forced to perform a striptease in front of other prisons and male and female
guards, sued the District and corrections officials for § 1983 violations. The district court entered a
jury verdict awarding $350,000 in compensatory and $5 million in punitive damages, and denied
the defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law. The appeals court affirmed in part and
reversed in part. The appeals court held that the $350,000 award for mental and emotional distress
resulting from the § 1983 violation was reasonable, but that the former inmate was not entitled to
punitive damages from the District for negligent supervision, because District law bars the
imposition of such awards against the District. The mental and emotional distress award was
supported, according to the court, by the fact that the inmate was denied library assistance because
she refused to have sex with the librarian, she was attacked with the assistance of correctional
officers, she was confined in isolation without underwear or a mattress, she felt constant stress,
anxiety and dread of imminent sexual attack, she had to sleep during the day for fear of what
guards might do to her at night, she suffered from insomnia and eating disorders, and spent
months emotionally and psychologically debilitated, withdrawn and depressed. The appeals court
agreed with the jury finding that the District's failure to train or supervise jail employees
amounted to deliberate indifference toward the female inmate's constitutional rights, so that the
District was liable under § 1983. The court noted that seven months prior to this incident the
district court had found the District liable under § 1983 for being deliberately indifferent to
repeated sexual abuse and harassment of female prisoners by correctional officers and for failing to
train staff to prevent such misconduct. According to the court, the fact that the District jail officers
sought to conceal the incident did not insulate the District from § 1983 liability based on its
deliberate indifference. (District of Columbia Jail)

U.S. District Court
RESPONDEAT
SUPERIOR

Delaney v. Detella, 123 F.Supp.2d 429 (N.D.Ill. 2000). A prison inmate filed a§ 1983 action against
a warden and other correctional officials alleging that denial of exercise opportunities during a six·
month lockdown violated his Eighth Amendment rights. The district court denied summary
judgment for the defendants, finding that denial of out-of-cell exercise for six months presented a
cognizable § 1983 claim. The only out·of·cell opportunities offered to the inmate were for weekly
showers and a handful of family and medical visits. The court found that the six month lockdown
was a large scale policy such that the warden and upper level officials could be said to have
personally participated in the alleged violation. (Stateville Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
FAIR HOUSING ACT

Garcia v. Condarco, 114 F.Supp.2d 1158 (D.N.M. 2000). A female detainee filed a Fair Housing Act
claim alleging that the city jail in which she had been confined was a "dwelling" within the
meaning of FHA. The district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, finding that the jail
was not a dwelling for FHA purposes. The detainee alleged she had been sexually abused by a jail
officer. The officer had pled guilty to a criminal sexual penetration charge. The detainee asserted
that the city defendants had discriminated against her on the basis of her sex in the provision of
services and facilities. (Hobbs City Jail, New Mexico)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONSENT DECREETERMINATION
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Gilmore v. People of the State of California, 220 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2000). A corrections department
moved under the Prison Litigation Reform Act to terminate the prospective relief provisions of a
consent decree governing certain conditions of confinement for condemned prisoners. The federal
district court granted the motion for termination and prisoners under the sentence of death
appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The appeals court held that the PLRA
termination provision is not a unilateral mandate to courts to unconditionally terminate
prospective relief in prison conditions cases and does not unconstitutionally prescribe the rule of
decision. The appeals court found that the PLRA termination provision does not violate prisoners'
due process or equal protection rights. The appeals court held that the district court should have
examined the court record and the relief granted by the decree in order to determine whether it
was narrowly tailored and minimally intrusive, and should have simply considered whether there
were any explicit findings to this effect. (San Quentin State Prison, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONSENT DECREETERMINATION
PLRA·Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Hazen Ex Rel. LeGear v. Reagen, 208 F.3d 697 (8th Cir. 2000). Iowa prison officials moved to
terminate consent decrees that had regulated prison conditions. The district court terminated the
decrees and the inmates appealed. The appeals court afl"rrmed, finding that it was within the power
of Congress to remove state-court jurisdiction to enforce federal consent decrees that are subject to
termination under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). (Iowa State Penitentiary)

U.S. District Court
COMPENSATORY
DAMAGES

Kelleher v. New York State Trooper Fearon, 90 F.Supp.2d 354 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). An arrestee
brought a§ 1983 action against a police officer, alleging that he was subjected to an unlawful strip
search. The district court held that the issue of whether the officer had an objectively reasonable
suspicion to strip search the arrestee was for the jury, but that the jury award of damages in the
amount of $125,000 as compensation for emotional distress were excessive to the extent that they
exceeded $25,000. According to the court, although the unlawful strip search in which the arrestee
was touched by the offi.cer was an "egregious intrusion" on the arrestee's person, there was no
corroborating medical evidence concerning the arrestee's emotional distress. (State Police Barracks
in Brewster, New York)
27.99

U.S. District Court
PRIVATE OPERATOR
BIVENS CLAIM

Lawson v. Liburdi, 114 F.Supp.2d 31 (D.R.I. 2000). A federal pretrial detainee filed a complaint
against employees of a private company that operated a detention facility, alleging violation of his
First Amendment free exercise rights. The district court held that the detainee could not assert a
Bivens action against the employees because they were not affiliated in any way with the federal
government. (Cornell Corrections, Donald Wyatt Detention Facility, Rhode Island)

U.S. District Court
FEDERAL TORT
CLAIMS ACT

Maurello v. U.S., 111 F.Supp.2d 475 (D.N.J. 2000). A prisoner brought a Federal Tort Claims Act
action alleging that the federal Bureau of Prisons negligently delayed enrolling him in a statutory
drug treatment program and caused his release to be delayed by 51 days. The district court granted
summary judgment for the Bureau, finding that the delay was within the Act's false imprisonment
exception. (Federal Bureau of Prisons)

U.S. District Court
DAMAGES

McClary v. Coughlin, 87 F.Supp.2d 205 (W.D.N.Y. 2000). A prisoner brought an action against
prison officials alleging violation of his due process rights by failing to provide him with meaningful
"periodic review" of his administrative segregation status during his four uninterrupted years. A
jury found in favor of the prisoner and awarded $600,000 in damages to the prisoner. The district
court denied judgment for the defendants as a matter of law but found that the damage award was
excessive and reduced it to $237,500. The court noted that the initial award amounted to nearly
$500 per day of confinement while the prisoner had only sought $125 per day and $50,000 for
mental and emotional distress. (Attica Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
DAMAGES
FAILURE TO PROTECT

Miller v. Shelby County. 93 F.Supp.2d 892 (W.D.Tenn. 2000). A county jail inmate brought a§ 1983
action against a county alleging injuries suffered in an attack by fellow inmates were the result of
the jail's practice of permitting inmates of different security levels to take recreation together. The
district court entered judgment for the plaintiff, finding that the jail's recreation policy posed a
substantial risk of harm and that jail officials showed deliberate indifference to the risk posed by
the policy. The court noted that whether the policy was official or not, it was pervasive enough to be
considered a de facto policy. The jail policy allowed inmates of different security levels to take
recreation together, including gang members who were allowed to mix with protective-custody
inmates. The inmate had been attacked by gang members and the court found that jail officials had
both general and specific knowledge of threats against the inmate by gang members yet took no
affirmative steps to protect the inmate, including the "readily available step of ending [the) mixedrecreation practice." The inmate suffered permanent impairment to his shoulder. The district court
awarded $40,000 to the inmate. (Shelby County Correctional Center, Tennessee)

U.S. District Court
DAMAGES
PLRA.-Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Morrison v. Davis, 88 F.Supp.2d 799 (S.D.Ohio 2000). A prisoner who prevailed on a § 1983
excessive force action against corrections officers moved for an attorney fee award and brought an
equal protection challenge against the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The district court held
that the PLRA limit on attorney fees comported with equal protection. The court found that a fee
award of $53,000 was not inherently disproportionate to the $15,000 awarded to the inmate and
that only $1 of the damages would apply to the attorney fees. The court noted that the prisoner had
vindicated a significant Eighth Amendment right and obtained a judgment that would arguably
have a deterrent impact on others who might violate the same right. Although PLRA prescribed
application ofup to 25% of the damage award toward attorney fees the court decided that only $1
should be applied because of the significant violation involved and because the jury had sent a clear
signal, through its inclusion of $3,000 in punitive damages, that the defendant correctional officers
should be punished. (Ross Correctional Institute, Ohio)

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY

Pahk v. Hawaii, 109 F.Supp.2d 1262 (D.Hawai'i 2000). A parolee brought state court and § 1983
actions against a state and individual parole board officials alleging he had been discharged from
parole without notice and that when the discharge was rescinded he also did not receive notice. The
parolee alleged that the paroling authority discharged him from parole and then continued to treat
him as if he were still on parole. The district court held that the officials' alleged actions violated
well-established due process rights and that the officials did not enjoy quasi-judicial immunity
against§ 1983 claims. (Hawaii Paroling Authority)

U.S. District Court
COMPENSATORY
DAMAGES
QUALIFIED

Quartararo v. Hoy. 113 F.Supp.2d 405(E.D.N.Y. 2000). A prisoner brought a civil rights action
against prison officials alleging violation of his due process rights when he was removed from a
temporary work release program. The district court restored the prisoner to the program and held
that the prisoner was entitled to compensatory damages for the loss of income and benefits
attributable to his unlawful removal from the work release program, as well as emotional distress
that he may have suffered. The court held that the officials' actions were not objectively reasonable
and that they were not entitled to qualified immunity, noting that the officials failed to comply with
their own regulations and failed to provide the prisoner any due process at all. According to the
court, the prisoner established that he would not have been removed from the program if he had
been afforded the due process to which he was entitled. The court found that prior to removal of a
New York prisoner from temporary work release a prisoner must be given the following: written
notice of the alleged violation; statement of the actual reason for which removal is being
considered; a report or summary of the evidence against him/her; an opportunity to be heard and to
present evidence; advance notice of a temporary release committee hearing; the right to confront
and cross examine adverse witnesses; a committee composed of neutral decision-makers; and a
post-hearing written account of the actual reason for removal. (Queensboro Correctional Facility,
New York)

IMMUNITY

27.100

U.S. Appeals Court
DAMAGES
NEGLIGENCE

Rangolan v. County of Nassau, 217 F.3d 77 (2nd Cir. 2000). An inmate who was beaten by fellow
prisoners brought an action against the county and county sheriff's department alleging negligence
and violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. The district court entered judgment for the inmate
on the negligence claim and ordered remitittur of damages. The appeals court affirmed in part and
certified the question to the state court, finding that the county's conduct, in placing the inmate
with a prisoner against whom the inmate had acted as a confidential informant, did not rise to the
level of an Eighth Amendment violation. The court noted that although the inmate's records
indicated that he should not be assigned to the same dormitory as a prisoner against whom he had
informed, the correctional officer who assigned the prisoner to the inmate's dormitory failed to
notice the warning in the inmate's records. The district court jury had found that the inmate's pain
and suffering damages totaled $1.55 million but the inmate agreed to a reduced award totaling
$800,000. The appeals court sent the case to the state court to resolve liability questions. (Nassau
Co. Jail, N.Y.)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONSENT DECREE·
TERMINATION

Sharp v. Weston, 233 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2000). Officials moved to dissolve an injunction against a
state commitment center for persons civilly committed as sexually violent predators. The district
court denied relief and issued an order detailing additional steps to be taken to provide center
residents with constitutionally adequate treatment. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the
officials failed to show that dissolution of the injunction was warranted, and that the scope of the
order detailing additional steps to be taken by the center was not an abuse of discretion. (Special
Commitment Center, Washington)

U.S. District Court
SUPERVISORY
LIABILITY

Souffront v. Alvarado, 115 F.Supp.2d 237 (D.Puerto Rico 2000). A prisoner brought a§ 1983 action
against prison officials alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The district
court found that the prisoner stated a valid claim for deliberate indifference and a claim for
supervisory liability against the administrator of correctional services. The court also ruled that a
Puerto Rico statute that shielded government physicians from civil liability for medical malpractice
suits was preempted. The prisoner had suffered from abdominal pain and allegedly writhed in
excruciating pain for three days before officials, who knew of his condition, followed up on his
sonogram and sought care for his condition. (Guerrero Correctional Complex, Puerto Rico)

U.S. Appeals Court
BIVENS CLAIMS

Tellier v. Fields, 280 F.3d 69 (2nd Cir. 2000). A prisoner brought a Bivens action against federal
prison officials alleging he was wrongfully confined in administrative detention for 514 days in
violation of his due process rights. The district court denied summary judgment for the defendants
and they appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that there was a fact issue, precluding
summary judgment, as to whether the 514 days in administrative detention was atypical and
significant. According to the court, a prison regulation concerning administrative detention orders
created a liberty interest for the prisoner, which was protected by procedural due process. The
court denied qualified immunity to prison officials, fmding that no objectively reasonable person in
their position could have believed that he or she was not violating the prisoner's constitutional
rights by confining the prisoner in administrative segregation for 514 days without the hearing
required by the prison regulation. (Federal Metropolitan Correctional Center, New York)

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY
DELIBERATE INDIF·
FERENCE

Verser v. Elyea, 113 F.Supp.2d 1211 (N.D.Ill. 2000). A prisoner brought a§ 1983 action against a
prison's current and former medical directors and other officials, alleging that he was denied
proper medical attention for an injury. The district denied the defendants' motion to dismiss,
finding that the medical director's alleged conduct in declining to follow the recommendations of an
orthopedic specialist, without even examining the prisoner and despite the prisoner's repeatedly
complaints of pain and injury, rose to the level of deliberate indifference. The inmate injured his
knee while playing basketball and an orthopedic specialist ordered physical therapy three times a
week and instructed the prisoner to wear a knee brace. The former medical director of the prison
denied the knee brace, stating that is was "not indicated for this problem." The prisoner was unable
to participate in most of his physical therapy sessions due to the refusal of correctional officers and
others to give him passes. When he was again examined by the orthopedic specialist and ordered to
have more physical therapy and to wear an ace bandage, the medical director again contravened
the recommendations, even though he had never examined the prisoner himself. Several weeks
later the prisoner fell down a flight of stairs and injured his back, attributing the fall to his weak
knee. The court found that the prison's chief administrative officer and the director of the state
corrections department were not entitled to qualified immunity because they concurred in the
denial of the prisoner's medical grievance appeal. In its decision the court stated that "...a plaintiff
need not use magic words like 'reckless' or 'intentional' to make out a case for deliberate
indifference. He must merely plead that the defendant behaved in a way that can be construed to
show reckless or intentional conduct." (Stateville Correctional Center, Illinois)

2001
U.S. District Court
PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION

AA. v. New Jersey. 176 F.Supp.2d 274 (D.N.J. 2001). Convicted sex offenders challenged the
constitutionality of a New Jersey constitutional provision and the Internet Registry Act
amendment to the state's "Megan's Law" statute, that authorized a system for making sex offender
registration information publicly available on the Internet. The offenders moved for preliminary
injunctive relief and the court granted the motion in part. The court found that the Internet
disclosure statute was not punitive in its effects or intent and that the compilation and
dissemination of publicly-available information on offenders did not violate their privacy rights.
27.101

The court noted that the legislature expressly disavowed any intent to inflict additional
punishment on offenders and stated that the statute was intended solely for the protection of the
public. The legislature prescribed penalties to deter the misuse of information. But the court found
that offenders' home addresses were not adequately safeguarded-by the Internet disclosure system
and the court issued a preliminary injunction limiting disclosure to offenders' county of residence.
(New Jersey)
U.S. Appeals Court
FTCA- Federal Tort
Claims Act
BIVENS CLAIMS

Alfrey v. U.S., 276 F.3d 557 (9th Cir. 2002). The personal representative of a federal prisoner who
was killed by his cellmate brought Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and Bivens actions against the
government and corrections officials. The district court dismissed the Bivens claim and granted
summary judgment for the defendants based on the discretionary-function exception to FTCA. The
appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The appeals court held that the
plaintiff failed to state a Bivens claim and that the discretionary-function exception barred an
FTCA claim based on the officers' response to the report of the cellmate's threat. But the appeals
court found that federal correctional officers had a non-discretionary duty to perform a "Central
Inmate Monitoring" evaluation of the prisoner, who was to be held at a federal facility pending trial
on a federal charge, before assigning the inmate to share a cell with a federal prisoner, precluding
summary judgment on the FTCA claim. (Sheridan Federal Correctional Facility, Oregon)

U.S. Appeals Court
BIVENS CLAIM
QUAIJFIED
IMMUNITY

Benefield v. McDowall, 241 F.3d 1267 (10th Cir. 2001). A prison inmate brought a Bivens action
against prison officials alleging that he had been exposed to a risk of harm at the hands of other
inmates after an officer labeled him as a "snitch." The officer moved for dismissal on the basis of
qualified immunity and the district court denied the motion. The appeals court affirmed, finding
that it was clearly established at the time of the incident (1998) that labeling a prison inmate as a
"snitch" to other inmates violated the inmate's Eighth Amendment rights. The appeals court held
that the inmate stated an Eighth Amendment claim with his allegation that he had suffered
psychological injury due to the fear of harm to which the officer exposed him, even though the
inmate had not in fact been assaulted. (United States Penitentiary, Florence, Colorado)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONSENT DECREETERMINATION
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Benjamin v. Fraser, 264 F.3d 175 (2 nd Cir. 2001). A city corrections department moved for
immediate termination of consent decrees requiring judicial supervision over restrictive housing,
inmate correspondence, and law libraries at city jails, pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(PLRA). The district court vacated the decrees and pretrial detainees appealed. The appeals court
affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. On remand the district court granted the motion
in part and denied it in part and the city appealed. The appeals affirmed. The appeals court held
that the detainees were not required to show actual injury when they challenged regulations that
allegedly adversely affected their Sixth Amendment right to counsel by impeding attorney
visitation. The appeals court concluded that there was a continuing need for prospective relief with
respect to the detainees' right to counsel, and the relief granted by the district court satisfied the
requirements of PLRA. The appeals court held that the restraints used when moving certain
detainees within, or outside, the jail, had a "severe and deleterious effect" on the detainees given
that such restraints were often painful and could result in injury. (N.Y. City Dept. of Correction)

U.S. Supreme Court
DAMAGES
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Booth v. Churner,121 S.Ct. 1819 (2001). A state prison inmate who claimed that correctional
officers assaulted him and then denied him adequate medical care for resulting injuries filed a civil
rights action, seeking both injunctive relief and money damages. He had pursued an administrative
grievance, but he did not seek an administrative review after prison officials denied relief. Money
damages were not available through the administrative process. The federal appeals court upheld
the dismissal of the inmate's civil rights lawsuit, for failure to pursue the administrative appeal
under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held that
prisoners must seek administrative appeal, even if they are seeking only money damages as
remedies, and despite the fact that money damages may not be available in an administrative
grievance procedure. The Court held that Congress intended to require procedural exhaustion of
available administrative remedies "regardless of the relief offered through administrative
remedies." (Pennsylvania Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act
DAMAGES

Caldwell v. District of Columbia, 201 F.Supp.2d 27 (D.D.C. 2001). An inmate filed a§ 1983 action
against the District of Columbia and several employees of its corrections department, alleging
unconstitutional conditions of confinement and denial of medical care. A jury entered a verdict in
favor of the inmate, on all claims, and awarded $174,178. The appeals court granted judgment for
the defendants as a matter of law, in part, denied judgment for the defendants in part, and did not
reduce the damage award. The court found that statements by the inmate's attorney during his
closing argument, suggesting specific dollar amounts to be considered by the jury, did not warrant
a new trial. The appeals court held that the Prison Litigation Reform At (PLRA) does not require a
prisoner to allege or prove serious, permanent physical injury in order to bring an action for
violation of his constitutional rights. The appeals court held that the prisoner sufficiently alleged a
"physical injury" for the purposes of PLRA, with allegations that excessive heat in his cell made
him dizzy, dehydrated, and disoriented, gave him a severe rash, and that smoke from rolled toilet
paper "wicks" and frequent use of mace gave him bronchial irritation and a runny nose.(Maximum
Security Facility, Lorton Correctional Complex, District of Columbia)

U.S. District Court
CONTEMPT

Carty v. Turnbull, 144 F.Supp.2d 395 (D.Virgin Islands 2001). On its own motion, the district court
held that Virgin Islands officials did not make all reasonable efforts to comply with the court's

27.102

orders in a class action alleging unconstitutional conditions of confinement. The court held the
officials in civil contempt of the settlement agreement and subsequent remedial orders. The court
noted that lack of financing is not a defense to the failure to provide minimum constitutional
standards in the operation of a jail. (Criminal Justice Complex, Virgin Islands)
U.S. Appea1s Court
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act
CONSENT DECREE··
TERMINATION

Castillo v. Cameron County. Tex., 238 F.3d 339 (5th Cir. 2001). Pretrial detainees and convicted
inmates held at a jail brought a class action under § 1983 against a county, state and various
individua1s, alleging that overcrowding at the jail resulted in cruel and unusual punishment. The
state moved to terminate previously-entered injunctions and the district court dismissed the state
from the action and ordered continuation of injunctive relief designed to reduce the jail population.
The appea1s court vacated the decision and remanded the case. The appeals court found that the
order continuing injunctive relief was a "prisoner release order" within the meaning of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (pLRA) and that the state had standing to appeal the continuation of
injunctive relief. The appeals court held that on remand, the district court must determine if a
continuing and ongoing constitutional violation exists, and if so, whether the remaining
requirements of PLRA are met. (Cameron County Jail, Texas)

U.S. Supreme Court
BIVENS CLAIM
PRIVATE OPERATOR

Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko. 534 U.S. 61 (2001). A federal prisoner diagnosed with a
heart condition was transferred to a halfway house where he was to serve the remainder of his
sentence. and was assigned to living quarters on the fifth floor. The company who operated the
facility had a policy that required inmates residing below the sixth floor to use the staircase rather
than the elevator to travel from the first·floor lobby to their rooms. Although the prisoner was
exempted from this policy. he claimed that one of the company's employees forbade him to use the
elevator to reach his fifth-floor bedroom, and that he then suffered a heart attack and fell after
climbing the stairs. In addition to suing individual employees of the facility. he sought to impose
liability on the company for alleged violation of his constitutional rights. The U.S. Supreme Court,
in a 5·4 decision, ruled that federal prisoners may not file civil rights claims against private
corporations operating a halfway house under a contract with the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP).
The Court declined to extend the implied damage remedy for violation of constitutional rights first
recognized in Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) to claims
against private companies allegedly acting under color of federal law. The Court noted that federal
prisoners' only remedy for an alleged constitutional deprivation lies against the individual officer.
and not against the federal government itself. The Court concluded that it should not "impose
asymmetrical liability costs on private prison facilities alone." IT such a decision is to be made, the
Court said, that is a "question for Congress. not us, to decide." (Le Marquis Community
Correctional Center, New York)

U.S. District Court
BIVENS CLAIM

Dekoven v. Bell. 140 F.Supp.2d 748 (E.D.Mich. 2001). A prisoner sued individuals, a state, the
United States and foreign counties, alleging they failed to recognize him as the "God-Messiah" of
the Holy Bible. The district court dismissed the case, finding it was "patently frivolous, implausible,
and devoid of merit." According to the court. the prisoner had no constitutional right to be
recognized and treated as the "Messiah-God" or any other holy, extra-worldly, or supernatural
being or power. The court found the prisoner's request of payment from the federal government of
certain precious and semi·precious metals to be the equivalent of a BivellS type of claim for money
damages, which is barred by sovereign immunity absent a waiver. (Standish Maximum
Correctional Facility, Michigan)

U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY

Despain v. Uphoff, 264 F.3d 965 (10th Cir. 2001). A prison inmate brought a § 1983 action against
prison officials alleging Eighth Amendment violations. The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the officials and the inmate appealed. The appea1s court reversed and
remanded. The appeals court held that flooding of the prison's administrative segregation unit was
a significant deprivation, as required to support an Eighth Amendment claim, and that there was
an issue of material fact as to whether there was an ongoing threat to safety during the flooding
that would justify the inmate's exposure to human waste. Because the inmate's extended exposure
to human waste as a result of flooding was a violation of clearly established law, the court found
that an associate prison warden was not entitled to qualified immunity. The court also found that
the inmate stated a claim of excessive use of force in his allegation that a corrections officer
indiscriminately discharged pepper spray. (Wyoming State Penitentiary)

U.S. Appea1s Court
NOMINAL DAMAGES
PLRA·Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Foulk v. Charrier, 262 F.3d 687 (8th Cir. 2001). A prisoner brought a§ 1983 action against a
corrections officer alleging the use of excessive force in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights.
The district court entered judgment on a jury verdict, awarded nominal damages of $1 plus interest
and costs, and awarded attorney fees. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and
reversed in part. The appeals court held that the award of nominal damages for an Eighth
Amendment violation was permissible, and that the finding of use of excessive force was supported
by evidence. The appeals court found that the award of attorney fees was subject to the cap
established by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), and that the PLRA cap on attorney fees
did not violate the equal protection clause. The court noted that under the provisions of PLRA, if
non-monetary relief of some kind had been ordered, whether or not there was also a monetary
award, the attorney fees cap would not apply. (Moberly Correctional Center, Missouri)

27.103

U.S. District Court
COMPENSATORY
DAMAGES
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Glaspy v. Malicoat, 134 F.Supp.2d 890 (W.D.Mich. 2001). A prison visitor sued a corrections officer,
alleging that the officer violated his constitutional rights when the officer refused the visitor's
request to use the bathroom during a visit to an inmate. The district court held that the officer
violated the visitor's substantive due process rights by refusing to permit him to use the restroom,
and awarded $5,000 in compensatory damages and $5,000 in punitive damages. The 69-year-old
visitor and the inmate he was visiting had informed the officer several times that the visitor was in
pain and that he needed urgently to use the restroom. The officer, who laughed at the visitor's
situation, was found to have been deliberately indifferent to the visitor's due process rights. The
court noted that the visitor suffered pain and discomfort for a period of time, as well as extreme
humiliation when he urinated in his pants in front of others, and inconvenience in having to deal
with his wet pants at the facility and on the way home. (Newberry Correctional Facility, Michigan)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONSENT DECREETERMINATION
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Harvey v. Schoen, 245 F.3d 718 (8th Cir. 2001). State officials moved to terminate a 1973 prison
conditions consent decree, pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The district court
granted the motion and inmates appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the mandatory
termination provision of PLRA did not violate separation of powers principles. The district court
had found that there were no current and ongoing federal rights violations, and the appeals court
held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the request for additional
discovery in order to permit prisoners to supplement the record to show ongoing violations.
<Minnesota Correctional Facilities at Stillwater and St. Cloud)

U.S. Appeals Court
CLASS ACTION

Hawkins v. Comparet·Cassani, 251 F.3d 1230 (9th Cir. 2001). A convicted prisoner who had a "stun
belt" placed on him, and activated, when he appeared in court for sentencing, brought a§ 1983
action. The district court certified a class action and granted a preliminary injunction. The appeals
court reversed in part and remanded. The appeals court held that the class of all persons in the
custody of the county sheriff was improperly certified since the convicted prisoner could not serve
as a representative for those prisoners who had not yet been convicted. The appeals court also
found the district court injunction against the use of the belt was overbroad because it did not allow
for use of the belt to protect courtroom security, such as restricting violence or preventing escape.
But the court noted that even at sentencing, where a defendant's guilt is no longer in dispute,
shackling is inherently prejudicial and detracts from the dignity and decorum of the proceeding,
and impedes the defendant's ability to communicate with his counsel. (Los Angeles County,
California)

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Johnson v. Herman, 132 F.Supp.2d 1130 (N.D.lnd. 2001). A detainee who was incarcerated beyond
his release date brought a § 1983 action against jail authorities, alleging violation of his
substantive due process rights. The district court denied summary judgment for the defendants,
finding that a jailer's record notations that a judge had ordered the detainee to remain in jail and
later had ordered the detainee released, were admissible as non-hearsay evidence that the jailer
did not act with deliberate indifference in retaining custody. The court held that summary
judgment was precluded by an issue of material fact as to whether the jail's "Inmate Request Form"
policy, which was used to correct defects in its "will call" policy for holding detainees following their
appearances in court, was being implemented in a manner suggesting deliberate indifference to the
right of detainees to be timely released. The court noted that the jailers were not entitled to
qualified immunity because the right of a detainee not to be held without a court order was clearly
established at the time of the incident. (Allen County Jail, Indiana)

U.S. District Court
PRIVATE OPERATOR
42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1983

Keeling v. Schaefer, 181 F.Supp.2d 1206 (D.Kan. 2001). A prison inmate brought a § 1983 action
against corrections officials and a private corporation that employs inmates within a corrections
facility. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on some of the claims. The
court held that an employee of the private corporation was not a "state actor" for the purpose of an
action alleging Eighth Amendment violations. The court noted that the corporation was not
performing a function··correction and rehabilitation of criminals··traditionally performed only by
the state. Rather, the corporation was engaged in making a profit through its embroidery business,
and the use of inmate labor and its location inside the facility were merely incidental to its business
plan. The court held that corrections officials were not "persons" for the purposes of a§ 1983 action
to the extent that the prisoner was seeking monetary damages from the defendants in their official
capacities. But the court found that fact issues existed, precluding summary judgment, as to
whether the employee of the private corporation became a state actor by using prison disciplinary
proceedings to obtain a "judgment" against the inmate. The court noted that as private persons,
employees of a private corporation operating in a correctional facility were not entitled to a
qualified immunity defense in a § 1983 action. The court also found that fact issues as to whether
the inmate received procedural due process during a disciplinary hearing precluded summary
judgment. The inmate alleged that he was attacked by another inmate while he was working. The
following day he was charged by prison officials with violating two prison regulations··fighting, and
poor work performance. The inmate was subsequently found guilty of the fighting charge and was
sentenced to 21 days in disciplinary segregation. The inmate was charged by prison officials with
deliberately miscalculating a thread inventory that resulted in a loss of customer orders. The
inmate argued that he was unable to complete the inventory because he was attacked by another
inmate. An employee of Impact requested restitution for its losses and the prison disciplinary board
ordered the inmate to pay $2,965 in restitution. The inmate's prison account was frozen as a result
of the judgment. (Lansing Corr1 Facility, Kansas)
27.104

U.S. District Court
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
FAILURE TO TRAIN
DELIBERATE INDIF·
FERENCE

Lewis v. Board of Sedgwick County Com'rs., 140 F.Supp.2d 1125 CD.Kan. 2001). A detainee brought
a federal civil rights suit against a county alleging that jail officers used excessive force against
him. A jury returned a verdict of $500,000 in favor of the inmate and the county asked for a new
trial or for judgment as a matter of law. The district court granted judgment as a matter of law,
finding that evidence was insufficient to show that the county had been deliberately indifferent to
the use of excessive force against detainees at the county detention facility. According to the court,
the size of the damage award suggested that the jury was excessively or improperly motivated by
its desire to punish the county. The court held that the cOunty was not deliberately indifferent to
the rights of the detainee because it provided training designed to prevent the use of excessive force
at both a training academy and on·the·job, and had established a use·of·force policy of which its
detention officers were aware. The court found that it was not a "glaring omission" to fail to
instruct detention officers during training that they were prohibited from standing on a detainee's
back in an effort to restrain a person. The court held that it was not deliberate indifference by the
county to state in county training manuals that it was permissible to use pressure point tactics
when inmates were being placed in a restraint chair, where the manuals cautioned that the tactics
were to be used with the minimal amount of force necessary to gain compliance. The court noted
that the county had encountered only 22 complaints of excessive force in its jail from approximately
90,000 detainees who went through the facility. (Sedgwick County Adult Detention Facility,
Kansas)

U.S. District Court
LIABILITY

Naumoffv. Old, 167 F.Supp.2d 1250 CD.Kan. 2001). A mother whose son had committed suicide
while confined in a jail brought a § 1983 action against a county sheriff. The sheriff moved for
summary judgment and the court granted the motion, finding that the mother failed to allege an
injury to her own constitutional rights. The court held that the mother lacked standing to bring the
§ 1983 action because she brought the action in her individual capacity rather than as
representative of her son's estate. The mother did not make a claim for deprivation of familial
association or otherwise allege injury to her own constitutional rights. (Wabaunsee Co. Jail,
Kansas)

U.S. District Court
ELEVENTH AMEND·
MENT
OFFICIAL CAPACITY

Ramsey v. Schauble, 141 F.Supp.2d 584 (W.D.N.C. 2001). A former detainee whose finger tip was
severed after a sheriff's deputy allegedly shut a cell window on it, brought a pro se complaint
against the deputy and the sheriff. The district court held that the detainee stated a cognizable
civil rights complaint against the sheriff, and the detainee pied a cause of action under a state law
that provided that a keeper of a jail must pay treble damages if he/she does any wrong or injury to
a detainee, and is guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor. The court found that jail officials ignored the
detainee's cries for help after he was injured by the deputy and displayed deliberate indifference to
his need for quick medical attention to preserve the possibility of reattaching the finger. The
detainee was released from custody several hours after he was returned from the hospital, but
officials refused to give the detainee pain medication prescribed by the hospital, requiring him to
return to the jail periodically over the next several days to receive each pill individually. (Watauga
Co. Law Enf. Ctr, N.C.)

U.S. District Court
COMPENSATORY
DAMAGES
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Reilly v. Grayson, 157 F.Supp.2d 762 (E.D.Mich. 2001). A prisoner brought a§ 1983 action against
a warden, deputy warden, and Michigan Department of Corrections physicians, alleging violation
of his Eighth Amendment rights. After a bench trial, the district court ruled that the warden and
deputy wardens were deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's serious medical need to be placed in
a smoke-free environment, supporting the prisoner's cruel and unusual punishment claims. The
court found that the wardens were reckless in their disregard of the prisoner's rights, and awarded
the prisoner $18,250 in punitive damages and $36,500 in compensatory damages for the five years
of inaction by the wardens. The prisoner had two Individual Management Plans (IMP) which
required that he be placed in a smoke-free environment, but the non-smoking regulations in the
prisoner's cell block were consistently violated and the wardens were aware of the violations. After
receiving notice that the !MPs were not being followed. the wardens continued to do nothing to
remedy the situation. The court concluded that the three wardens "...each clearly ignored his
supervisory obligations and, as a consequence, should suffer the opprobrium of punitive damages,
not so much to deter each of them in the future, but to deter other officials in like positions of
ignoring their responsibility." (Trustee Division. State Prison of Southern Michigan)

U.S. District Court
PLRA·Prison Litigation
Reform Act
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY

Romaine v. Rawson, 140 F.Supp.2d 204 (N.D.N.Y. 2001). A state prison inmate brought a§ 1983
action against a prison guard, alleging Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment violations resulting
from an assault on the inmate. The district court ruled that the guard's actions were wanton and
malicious, and were objectively unreasonable even though the inmate's injuries were de minimis.
The court denied the guard qualified immunity and awarded the inmate $1,000 in compensatory
damages and $500 in punitive damages. The court found that the guard struck the inmate three
times across the face even though the guard admitted that there was no need to use force against
the inmate, and he did not temper his response by utilizing non-forcible means available to him.
(Mt. McGregor Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
PLRA·Prison Litigation
Reform Act
CONSENT DECREE··
TERMINATION

Ruiz v. U.S., 243 F.3d 941 (5th Cir. 2001). Texas prison officials moved to terminate a judgment
that found aspects of the prison system to be in violation of prisoners' constitutional rights. The
district court found that provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act CPLRA) that authorized a
court to terminate prospective relief were unconstitutional The district court also held that the
Texas prison system suffered from constitutional violations. The appeals court reversed and

27.105

remanded, finding that the PLRA provisions did not violate separation of powers principles or the
due process clause, and that the failure of the district court to make statutory findings under PLRA
required remand. (Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division)
U.S. Appeals Court
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act
DAMAGES

Searles v. Van Bebber, 251 F.3d 869 (10th Cir. 2001). A state inmate sued corrections officials and
a prison chaplain asserting violation of his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion by
denying him approval for a kosher diet. The district court entered judgment on a jury verdict
awarding the inmate $3,650 in compensatory damages and $42,500 in punitive damages against
the chaplain, finding no liability on the part of the corrections officials. The appeals court affirmed
in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The appeals court held that the punitive damages award
had to be vacated in light of the district court's instruction to consider actual damages, that the
Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) does not bar punitive damages, and whether punitive
damages were warranted was a question for the jury on remand. (Hutchinson Corr1 Facil., Kansas)

U.S. District Court
DAMAGES
REMEDIES

Spruytte v. Hoffner, 181 F.Supp.2d 736 (W.D.Mich. 2001). Prisoners brought an action alleging
they were transferred to other facilities in retaliation for exercise of their First Amendment rights.
The district court found in favor of the inmates, holding that the prisoners were subjected to
adverse actions in retaliation for writing a letter to a newspaper editor. (Lakeland Corr'l Facil.,
Michigan)

U.S. Appeals Court
CLASS ACTION

Streit v. County of Los Angeles, 236 F.3d 552 (9th Cir. 2001). Detainees brought a § 1983 action
against a county and sheriff's department seeking damages for overdetention. The district court
denied the defendants' motion to dismiss and the appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held
that the county would be subject to liability under§ 1983 and that the sheriff's department was not
entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity because the department was not acting as an arm of
the state when it administered county jails. Before an inmate is released from custody the sheriff's
department conducts a check of a computerized database to confirm that the inmate is not wanted
by any other law enforcement agency. But the department's policy requires this check to be run
only after all wants and holds that arrive on a given day are entered into the database. Entering
wants and holds can take up to two days, resulting in extended incarceration for inmates beyond
their release date. (Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
FAILURE TO DIRECT
QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY

Thompson v. Upshur County, TX, 245 F.3d 447 (5th Cir. 2001). Parents whose son had died of
medical conditions associated with his delirium tremens while he was a pretrial detainee in a
county jail, sued under§ 1983. The district court denied the defendants' motion for summary
judgment on qualified immunity grounds and the defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed
in part and reversed in part. The appeals court held that the sheriff of the jail to which the
detainee was first admitted was entitled to qualified immunity in connection with the death of the
detainee, which occurred following his transfer to another county jail that had the detoxification
facilities that his jail lacked. The sheriff of the jail in the receiving county did not violate any
clearly established right in failing to instruct his staff on the potentially life-threatening nature of
medical conditions associated with delirium tremens and was entitled to qualified immunity,
according to the appeals court. But the appeals court found that a sergeant at the jail in which the
detainee died was not entitled to qualified immunity because of fact questions as to whether she
had instructed her subordinates not to disturb her at home unless a detainee was on the verge of
death, or whether she had otherwise interfered with the detainee's receipt of medical care. (Upshur
Co. Jail and Marion Co. Jail, Texas)
2002

U.S. District Court
FCA- False Claims Act

Alexander v. Gilmore, 202 F.Supp.2d 478 (E.D.Va. 2002). Two prisoners, one a current prisoner and
one a former prisoner, sued a prison and officials. The district court found that a prisoner's
placement in segregated housing following an institutional conviction for being under the influence
of drugs, even though a confirmatory urine test was not conducted, was not sufficiently severe to
support an Eighth Amendment claim. The court also held that the prisoners did not state a claim
under the False Claims Act (FCA) by alleging that the prison had obtained federal funding for drug
testing by falsely certifying that the requirements for testing and disposal of samples were being
followed. According to the court, the prison, and employees who were acting in their official
capacities, were exempt from the FCA and there was no showing that the employees were acting in
their individual capacities. (Virginia Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
CONSENT DECREETERMINATION

Armstrong v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville, 196 F.Supp.2d 673 (M.D.Tenn. 2002).
Inmates and pretrial detainees brought a class action against a metropolitan government in 1987,
alleging that overcrowding in jails was unsanitary and unsafe. The district court issued an
injunction and set population caps. The district court granted the government's motion to lift the
injunction in 2002, finding that conditions in new jails met the requirements of the Eighth
Amendment. The court found that the new jails' environment, sanitation and fire safety complied
with the Eighth Amendment, providing adequate levels of personal security for inmates and staff.
The court held that food service was adequate and acceptable and that there was adequate physical
space available for recreation. The court noted that two of the four jails had achieved accreditation
by the American Correctional Association and the other two had applied, and would also probably
receive accreditation. The court called the jail administration at the time of the 1987 suit "a brutal
and corrupt regime" The court praised the government's correctional experts who assisted the
27.106

county, and the plaintiffs' counsel "for the enormous service she has performed for the class of
plaintiffs and the community. <Metro. Gov't of Nashville, Tennessee)
U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY
FAILURE TO PROTECT
COMPENSATORY
DAMAGES

Cantu v. Jones, 293 F.3d 839 (5th Cir. 2002). A prison inmate who had been slashed with a razor by
another inmate, brought a civil rights action to recover on a deliberate indifference theory from
prison officials, who allegedly orchestrated the assault. A jury ruled in favor of the inmate and
awarded $22,500 in compensatory damages; the prison officials appealed. The appeals court
affirmed the district court verdict. The appeals court held that the question of whether officials
manifested deliberate indifference to the inmate's safety when they allegedly left a door to another
inmate's cell open and allowed him to escape and assault the first inmate, was a matter for the
jury. The plaintiff inmate had previously complained about prison guards. The appeals court
affmned that the officials were not entitled to qualified immunity. (Connally Unit, Texas
Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division)

U.S. District Court
CONSENT DECREE
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Carruthers v. Jenne, 209 F.Supp.2d 1294 (S.D.Fla. 2002). A consent agreement was entered, calling
for improvements in conditions of county jails. The county ceased payment of attorney fees and
compliance monitoring costs, relying on a provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA)
that automatically stayed enforcement of prospective relief under consent decrees. The district
court ordered the county to pay the fees, finding that the PLRA stay provision only applied to
prospective relief engendered within a consent decree, not to the entire decree. The court noted
that the stay provision did not bar the payment of attorney fees nor did it bar payment of
monitoring fees. (Broward County Jail, Florida)

U.S. District Court
COMPENSATORY
DAMAGES
NOMINAL DAMAGES
ATTORNEY FEES

Ciaprazi v. County of Nassau, 195 F.Supp.2d 398 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). An inmate filed a § 1983 action
alleging that county correction officers used excessive force against him. After a jury awarded
nominal damages on one count, the inmate applied for attorney fees and costs. The district court
held that the inmate was the "prevailing party" but that the award of attorney fees was not
warranted, where the inmate recovered only $1 in nominal damages against one officer, the jury
found in favor of the other officer, the case did not involve a significant legal issue, and there was
no award of injunctive relief. (Nassau County Correctional Center, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONSENT DECREE-CONTEMPT

Floyd v. Ortiz, 300 F.3d 1223 (10th Cir. 2002). An inmate filed a petition to enforce the terms of a
prior settlement agreement and to obtain contempt citations against a state director of corrections.
The district court denied the petition and the inmate appealed. The appeals court reversed, finding
that the district court abused its discretion by denying the inmate's request for a rehearing. The
appeals court noted that the inmate, who benefited from the settlement agreement, could invoke
the district court's continuing jurisdiction over the matter even though he was not a party to the
original settlement agreement. The settlement addressed procedures for handling income from the
inmate canteen program and interest on individual inmate accounts. The inmates alleged that
income from the operation of the inmate canteen program was being deposited in the state treasury
and not properly accounted for. (Colorado Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
PRIVATE OPERATOR

Gabriel v. Corrections Corp. of America, 211 F.Supp.2d 132 (D.D.C. 2002). An HIV-positive inmate
housed in a facility operated under a contract with the District of Columbia brought a § 1983 action
alleging inadequate medical treatment against a private prison operator, the District, and the
federal Bureau of Prisons. The district court granted the defendants' motions for summary
judgment and dismissal. The district court held that the contractor could not be liable, absent a
showing that the allegedly inadequate treatment resulted from the contractor's or the District's
custom or policy. The prisoner had been held at a federal prison in Kansas and was transferred to
the privately-operated facility near the District of Columbia. Prior to his transfer he was diagnosed
as being HIV positive. When the inmate was transferred, the Bureau did not transfer his actual
medical jacket and the medical history that was sent did not explicitly state that the inmate was
HIV positive, although instructions to provide the inmate with AZT were included. The inmate
alleged that he was not provided with any further treatment for eight years, when his condition
was rediscovered. He alleged that as a result of his failure to receive treatment, he suffered a
decline in his T·cell count and experienced the onset of premature dementia and depression.
(Lorton Correctional Complex, Virginia, operated by Corrections Corporation of America under
contract to the District of Columbia)

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED

Gonzalez v. Cecil County, Maryland, 221 F.Supp.2d 611 (D.Md. 2002). The widow of a pretrial
detainee who died while in custody filed a§ 1983 action against a county, sheriff, and detention
center medical personnel. The district court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss, in part,
finding that fact issues remained as to whether the care provided to the detainee amounted to
deliberate indifference. The detainee was admitted to a county detention center at approximately
5:00 p.m. Shortly after his admission he identified himself as a heroin user during a standard
intake medical screening. He told three nurses employed by the detention center, upon his arrival,
that he was likely to undergo acute heroin withdrawal symptoms. The only treatment provided to
him at this time was to be placed on twice-daily doses of Clonidine, a blood pressure medication.
The detainee allegedly became violently ill and progressed to acute pulmonary distress, disease and
pneumonia during the night and during the next day. He complained to the nurses but was only
given an over-the·counter stomach remedy, Kaopectate. Two days later he was found in his cell,
unresponsive, and was pronounced dead twenty minutes later. His body was taken to a nearby
hospital where an autopsy revealed he died from "pneumonia, complicating narcotics abuse." The

IMMUNITY

27.107

district court held that the fact that the nurses were acting in conformity with the county's
established protocol in treating the inmate did not entitle them to qualified immunity from liability
under§ 1983. (Cecil County Detention Center, Maryland)
U.S. District Court
FrCA- Federal Tort
Claims Act

Gonzalez-Jimenez De Ruiz v. U.S., 231 F.Supp.2d 1187 (M.D.Fla. 2002). Survivors of a federal
prison inmate who died while in custody brought claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FrCA). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court held
that the family failed to state a claim under Florida law. The family alleged that prison officials
deceived the inmate's family regarding the inmate's terminal condition, failed to provide the family
with reasonable access to the inmate during his illness, failed to inform the family of the inmate's
death, offered the inmate substandard care, and delayed transporting the inmate's remains for
nine days after his death. The inmate had been transferred from a correctional facility in Florida to
a nearby hospital, and then to a correctional medical facility in Texas where he died after nine
days. The family claimed that the officials' conduct exacerbated one of the family member's pre·
existing medical conditions, caused one child to experience difficulty in school, and triggered
another child's asthma. (Coleman Federal Correctional Institution, Florida, and Fed'l Bur. of
Prisons Medical Facil., Fort Worth, Texas)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONSENT DECREETERMINATION

Hallett v. Morgan, 287 F.3d 1193 (9 th Cir. 2002). In a class action, female prisoners at a state prison
secured a consent decree that addressed health care concerns. The prisoners challenged the
prison's attempt to end the decree, sought additional time for court involvement and moved to have
prison officials held in contempt for past violations of the decree. The district court denied the
prisoners' motions and granted the prison officials' motion to terminate the consent decree. The
prisoners appealed and the appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded. The
appeals court held that dental care and mental health care did not violate the Eighth Amendment,
but ordered the district court to consider retrospective relief on remand. The court noted that the
district court should have considered whether officials were in contempt for failing to comply with
other medical care provisions of the consent decree. (Washington Corrections Center for Women)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONSENT DECREETERMINATION

Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732 (9th Cir. 2002). A class of prisoners at a women's state prison who
brought a § 1983 action against prison officials moved to extend jurisdiction over a consent decree
for an additional period of time, to have prison officials held in contempt, and to compel discovery.
The district court denied the motions and granted the prison officials' motion to terminate the
consent decree. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The appeals
court found that dental care and mental health conditions at the prison did not violate the Eighth
Amendment. The appeals court found that officials' substantial compliance with the consent decree
judgment was an acceptable defense to the prisoners motion to hold the officials in civil contempt
for past violations of the decree. The court remanded the case for reconsideration of allegations
that the officials failed to comply with consent decree requirements regarding medical care.
(Washington Corrections Center for Women)

U.S. District Court
FTCA- Federal Tort
Claims Act

Helton v. U.S., 191 F.Supp.2d 179 (D.D.C. 2002). Female arrestees brought an action under the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FrCA) alleging that United States Marshals conducted unlawful searches
and invasions of their privacy. The district court held that the alleged strip search of arrestees
satisfied the elements of a tort intrusion upon seclusion. The court noted that the Fourth
Amendment precludes police or prison officials from conducting a strip search of an individual
arrested for misdemeanors or other minor offenses, unless there is reasonable suspicion that the
individual is concealing contraband or weapons. The five women plaintiffs had been arrested for
unlawful entry in connection with an "anti-fur" demonstration at a department store. According to
their complaint, they were compelled "to remove clothing and submit to a strip and squat search"
while six men arrested with them were not subjected to such searches. (U.S. Marshals Service)

U.S. District Court
PRIVATE OPERATOR

Herrera v. County of Santa Fe, 213 F.Supp.2d 1288 (D.N.M. 2002). A prisoner filed a §1983 suit
against a county, the county's detention center, and the privately-owned corporation that operated
the detention center. The prisoner alleged that he had been assaulted and injured by corporation
employees. The court denied the county's motion to dismiss, finding that the county could be held
liable under §1983 for the corporation's customs and policies. The court reasoned that operation of
a detention center was a significant public function over which the county retained oversight
responsibilities, and the county could be held responsible for the actions of the private company it
had hired to manage and operate its detention center. (Santa Fe County Detention Center, New
Mexico, operated by Cornell Corrections, Inc.)

U.S. Supreme Court
QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY

Hope v. Pelzer, 122 S.Ct. 2508 (2002). An Alabama prison inmate who was allegedly handcuffed to
a "hitching post" twice in 1995 for disruptive conduct, brought a civil rights action against three
correctional officers involved in the incidents. The federal appeals court held that the hitching
post's use for punitive purposes violated the Eighth Amendment but found that the officers were
entitled to qualified immunity. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, finding that the defense of
qualified immunity was not available to the officers at the summary judgment phase of the case.
The Court found that the prisoner's allegations, if true, established an Eighth Amendment claim
for cruel and unusual punishment because the alleged conduct would be "unnecessary and wanton"
infliction of pain for reasons "totally without penological justification." The Court held that a
reasonable officer would have known that using a hitching post as the prisoner alleged was
unlawful. During a 2-hour period in May of 1995, when the inmate was handcuffed to the hitching

27.108

post, the inmate was offered drinking water and a bathroom break every 15 minutes. He was
handcuffed above shoulder height, and when he tried moving his arms to improve circulation, the
handcuffs cut into his wrists, causing pain and discomfort. In a second incident after a fight with
anofficer at his chain gang's worksite in June, he was subdued, handcuffed, placed in leg irons, and
transported back to the prison. Once there, he was ordered to take off his shirt, thus exposing
himself to the sun, and spent seven hours on the hitching post. He was given one or two water
breaks, but no bathroom breaks, and he claimed that an officer taunted him about his thirst.
(Alabama Department of Corrections)
U.S. Appeals Court
COMPENSATORY
DAMAGES
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
PLRA·Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Johnson v. Breeden, 280 F.3d 1308 (11 th Cir. 2002). A state prisoner brought a§ 1983 action
against corrections officers alleging that they used excessive force on him in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. The district court entered judgment for the prisoner and awarded $25,000 in
compensatory damages, $45,000 in punitive damages and attorney fees and expenses in the
amount of $85,268. The officers appealed and the appeals court affirmed the award of
compensatory damages but vacated the punitive damages and attorney fee awards and remanded
the case for determination. The appeals court held that the action was a "civil action with respect
to prison conditions'' and was therefore subject to limitation on prospective relief under the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The appeals court also held that the application of the lodestar
method in calculating the attorney's fee award was an abuse of discretion. <Phillips Correctional
Institution, Georgia)

U.S. District Court
SUPERVISORY
LIABILITY

Kosilek v. Maloney, 221 F.Supp.2d 156 (D.Mass. 2002). An inmate brought an action against a
director of corrections, seeking an injunction that would require medical treatment for gender
identity disorder. The district court held that the corrections department's medical treatment plans
for the inmate were not adequate, but that the director was not deliberately indifferent to the
serious medical needs of the inmate. The inmate suffered from a severe form of a rare, medically
recognized, major mental illness·· gender identity disorder-· and was a transsexual. The court
found that the treatment plans were not developed pursuant to any clinical decision by a doctor or
social worker concerning the inmate's condition or particular needs, but were derived from an
administrative decision that created a blanket policy that prohibited initiation of hormones for
inmates who were not prescribed hormones prior to their incarceration. Although the inmate's
treatment was found inadequate, the court declined to provide injunctive relief, reasoning that the
director was no longer likely to be indifferent to the inmate's needs in the future as a result of the
litigation. The court noted that "ordinarily, the Commissioner of the DOC would not be the
appropriate defendant in a case involving the inmate's claim alleging denial of medical care. As
Commissioner, Maloney does not usually make decisions concerning medical care... Because of
Kosilek's lawsuit, Maloney, as a practical matter, has made the major decisions relating to
Kosilek's medical care." After the lawsuit was filed, the Commissioner consulted with attorneys
and doctors employed by the department and adopted a blanket policy that was aimed at "freezing"
a transsexual in the condition he was in when incarcerated. The policy prohibited the provision of
hormones to inmates such as the plaintiff who had only taken "black market" hormones previously,
and categorically excluded the possibility that an inmate would receive sex reassignment surgery.
The court concluded that "Because Maloney removed from the professionals employed by the DOC
their usual discretion concerning Kosilek's medical needs and care, Maloney's conduct is properly
the focus of this case." (Massachusetts Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
COMPENSATORY
DAMAGES
STATE LIABILITY

Livingston v. Goord, 225 F.Supp.2d 321 (W.D.N.Y. 2002). A prose state prisoner brought a§ 1983
action against corrections officials and employees. The prisoner had previously brought a claim in
state court and was awarded compensatory damages. The district court held that the state court
compensatory damages award barred his § 1983 claim for punitive damages. The court found that
the prisoner chose to litigate his claim in state court, where he was fully compensated for his
injuries. A state claims court judge found that more force than was necessary had been used
against the prisoner and awarded the prisoner $3,151 in damages. The award included $3,000 "for
all past and future pain, suffering, lack of proper medical attention, and any and all other damages
he sustained as a result of the incidents." (Attica Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
CONSENT DECREE·
TERMINATION
PLRA·Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Merriweather v. Sherwood, 235 F.Supp.2d 339 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). Prison officials moved, under the
Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), to dissolve a prison conditions consent decree entered 24
years earlier. Prisoners moved to postpone the automatic stay of the consent decree's provisions.
The district court held that it lacked the discretion to postpone the automatic stay once the stay
came into effect 30 days after the motion to dissolve was filed. The court noted that even assuming
it had the discretion to postpone the automatic stay, the prisoners failed to show that they were
entitled to a postponement, where the record did not demonstrate widespread or ongoing
constitutional violations of rights to religious freedom, medical care, or access to counsel. (Orange
County Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
PRIVATE PROVIDER
PLRA·Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Milledge v. McCall, 43 Fed.Appx. 196 (10th Cir. 2002) [unpublished]. A male state prisoner brought
a § 1983 action alleging Fourth Amendment violations resulting from a strip search that was
allegedly conducted in the presence of female correctional officers. The district court dismissed the
action and the appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that a private correctional facility
that provided services on behalf of a state was a "facility" for the purposes of the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (pLRA), but a provision of the Act barred a prisoner civil action alleging emotional
injury while in custody without a prior showing of a physical injury. (Crowley County Correctional
27.109

Facility, Colorado)
U.S. Appeals Court
DAMAGES
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Mitchell v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 294 F.3d 1309 (11 th Cir. 2002). A federal prisoner
brought an action against cigarette manufacturers, alleging deceptive advertising,
misrepresentation and strict liability under a state tort law. The district court dismissed the case
as frivolous and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and vacated in part. The
appeals court held that allegations satisfied the amount·in·controversy requirement for diversity
jurisdiction, and that the section of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PRLA) that prohibited action
for mental or emotional suffering while in custody did not apply to the prisoner's action against the
manufacturers. (Wisconsin)

U.S. Appeals Court
NEGLIGENT
RETENTION

Morris v. Crawford County, 299 F.3d 919 (8th Cir. 2002). A county detention center detainee
brought§ 1983 and state law battery claims against a sheriff, county, and deputies. The district
court granted summary judgment for the defendants, in part, and the remaining claims were
voluntarily dismissed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that there was not a strong causal
connection between a deputy sheriff's background and the specific constitutional violation alleged
by the detainee. The detainee had been arrested and charged with driving while intoxicated and
disorderly conduct. After arriving at a county detention center, he refused to take a breathalyzer
test and began to yell and bang on his cell door. Four deputies responded, and according to the
detainee, they repeatedly assaulted him as they dragged him to another cell. One deputy allegedly
used excessive force on the detainee by utilizing a "knee drop" on him, which severed the detainee's
intestine. The court noted that the only violent act in the deputy's record was an incident in which
he slapped an inmate, although ex parte protective orders were obtained against the deputy by
both his ex·wife and girlfriend. The appeals court held that the sheriff and the county were not
liable under § 1983 on the theory of deliberate indifference in hiring the deputy. (Crawford County
Detention Center, Arkansas)

U.S. Appeals Court
PLRA·Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Napier v. Preslicka, 314 F.3d 528 (11th Cir. 2002). A prisoner brought a prose action against police
officers for emotional injury allegedly resulting from mistaken arrest on a charge unrelated to his
current incarceration. The district court dismissed the case as frivolous and the appeals court
affirmed. The appeals court held that the alleged emotional harm occurred while the prisoner was
in custody, for the purpose of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) section that prohibited a
prisoner from bring an action for mental or emotional injury absent a prior showing of physical
injury. (Jacksonville, Florida)

U.S. Appeals Court
ALIEN
BIVENS ACTION
ALIEN TORT CLAIMS
ACT

Papa v. U.S., 281 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2002). The widow and children of an alien who had been killed
by another detainee while being held by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) brought
Bivens and Federal Tort Claim Act (FTCA) claims against the INS. The district court granted the
defendants' motion to dismiss and the plaintiffs appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, and
reversed and remanded in part. The appeals court held that allegations that guards knowingly
placed the alien in danger in disregard of, or with deliberate indifference to, his due process rights,
stated a Bivens claim. The appeals court noted that limited rights under the due process clause
extend to detained aliens. (Immigration and Naturalization Service, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
NEGLIGENCE
STATE LIABILITY

Perkins v. Lawson, 312 F.3d 872 (7th Cir. 2002). An inmate brought a state court action against a
sheriff in his official capacity under§ 1983, and under state negligence laws, seeking damages for
injuries sustained in an attack by another inmate. The case was removed to federal court, where
the district court entered summary judgment for the sheriff. The inmate appealed and the appeals
court affirmed in part, vacated and remanded in part. The appeals court remanded the inmate's
negligence claim to the state courts because the appeals court was not convinced that there could
be no finding of negligence under state law. The inmate had been beaten by another inmate and
was provided with some treatment by jail medical staff. He did not eat or drink anything for
several days after the attack, claiming he was unable to swallow. The inmate was released on his
own recognizance, "probably because of his condition··though the record does not make this clear."
His wife immediately took him to a hospital where he was placed on life support in an intensive
care unit, in critical condition with a neurological problem. (Grant County Jail, Indiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
COMPENSATORY
DAMAGES
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Reilly v. Grayson, 310 F.3d 519 (6th Cir. 2002). A prisoner brought a§ 1983 action against prison
officials alleging violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment. The district court entered judgment for the prisoner and awarded damages. The
defendants appealed and the appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the prisoner had
a right not to be exposed to environmental tobacco smoke that presented a serious risk to his
health, and to removed from places where smoke hovered. The court affirmed the lower court
findings that the prisoner's asthma was a serious medical condition and that it was exacerbated by
exposure to second-hand smoke, and that the defendants repeatedly failed to respond to repeated
recommendations by medical personnel that the prisoner be moved to a smoke-free setting. The
appeals court affirmed the award of actual damages rather than nominal damages in the amount of
$36,500, and the award of punitive damages in the amount of $18,250. The court found no abuse of
discretion in the district court's award of $51,786 in attorney's fees. (Michigan Department of
Corrections)

27.110

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
FAILURE TO
SUPERVISE
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
COMPENSATORY
DAMAGES

Riley v. Olk-Long, 282 F.3d 592 (8th Cir. 2002). A female inmate brought a§ 1983 action against
prison officials arising from a sexual assault by a prison guard. A jury found in the inmate's favor
and the officials moved for judgment as a matter of law or for a new trial. The district court denied
the motions and the appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the issue of whether a
warden and a director of security were deliberately indifferent to the substantial risk of harm that
the guard presented to female inmates was a matter for the jury. The guard had asked the inmate
whether she was having a sexual relationship with her roommate at the facility and if so, if he
could watch. The guard later attempted to reach under the inmate's nightshirt but she backed
away. The guard continued to harass the inmate and at one point grabbed her from behind and
rubbed up against her while grabbing her breasts. The inmate did not report these incidents to
prison officials because she doubted she would be believed and feared the resulting discipline.
Later, the guard entered the inmate's cell and forcibly had intercourse with her. Fearing she would
become pregnant she began performing oral sex on him. Another inmate witnessed the sexual
encounter and reported it to prison officials. The officials investigated and subsequently allowed
the guard to resign. He was later charged with, and pleaded guilty to, sexual misconduct with an
inmate. The district court jury found in favor of the inmate, awarding her compensatory damages
of $15,000 and a total of $30,000 in punitive damages. (Iowa Correctional Institution for Women)

U.S. District Court
CONSENT DECREETERMINATION

Sheppard v. Phoenix, 210 F.Supp.2d 450 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). Current and former inmates filed a class
action alleging that city corrections officials engaged in a pattern of brutality and used gratuitous
and excessive physical violence at a segregation unit. A detailed consent decree was implemented.
The city moved to terminate the decree and the district court granted the motion. The district court
noted positive trends for four years of reduced incidents involving serious injuries and head strikes,
reduced acts of self-mutilation, unprecedented levels of command discipline, and the institution of
procedures to safely and effectively manage the inmate population. (Central Punitive Segregation
Unit, Rikers Island, New York City Department of Correction)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO
SUPERVISE
FAILURE TO TRAIN

Smith v. Board of County Com'rs. of County of Lyon, 216 F.Supp.2d 1209 (D.Kan. 2002). A prisoner
brought state tort and federal Eighth Amendment claims against county officials arising out of a
serious spinal chord injury he allegedly suffered in a fall, and for which he did not receive
requested medical attention. The defendants moved for summary judgment and the district court
granted the motions in part, and denied in part. The district court found no Eighth Amendment
violation from the failure of jail staff to provide clean bedding and clothing to the inmate who
suffered from incontinence, on four or five occasions. The court concluded that the inmate's
complaint that officials failed to supervise jail staff to ensure compliance with procedures was "far
too generic" to support an Eighth Amendment claim, and that he failed to show systemic and gross
deficiencies in training jail personnel. The inmate was a trustee in the jail and alleged that he fell
while working in the kitchen and sustained injuries. An officer noticed the inmate limping about a
week after the alleged fall and immediately took the inmate to the jail medical room for evaluation.
The inmate also alleged that the jail failed to follow certain national standards, but according to
the court, failed to show that the jail had any duty to follow those national standards. The officials
asserted that the minimum legal standards for the operation of county jails are established in state
law, rather than by national standards. (Lyon County Jail, Kansas)

U.S. District Court
DAMAGES
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Todd v. Graves, 217 F.Supp.2d 958 (S.D.lowa 2002). An African·American state prisoner brought a
§ 1983 action against past and current prison wardens, alleging that their denial of his requests for
furloughs to visit his hospitalized mother and then to attend her funeral constituted racial
discrimination. The prisoner sought compensatory and punitive damages for stress and mental
anguish. The district court dismissed the action, finding that the prisoner failed to allege a physical
injury, as required under the provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). Uowa State
Prison)

U.S. Appeals Court
42. U.S.C.A. Sec. 1983

Townsend v. Moya, 291 F.3d 859 (5th Cir. 2002). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against a prison
officer seeking damages for the officer's action in cutting the inmate with a knife. The district court
granted summary judgment for the officer and the appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held
that the officer's action with a knife was not taken "under color of state law" for the purposes of§
1983. The court noted that if a state officer pursues personal objectives without using or misusing
the power granted to him by the state, then he is not acting under the color of state law. The
inmate had been working as a trusty caring for the officer's tracking dogs. The officer approached
the inmate from behind with a pocketknife, saying "I told you I was going to get you, whore" and
stabbed the inmate on his buttocks. The officer was eventually terminated for his actions, but
criminal charges were dropped for insufficient evidence. (Hughes Unit, Texas Department of
Criminal Justice· Institutional Division)

U.S. Appeals Court
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Troville v. Venz, 303 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir. 2002). A civilly committed detainee filed a§ 1983 action
challenging his conditions of confinement. The district court dismissed the case for failure to state a
claim and the detainee appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that the civil
detainee is not a "prisoner" for purposes of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (pLRA) and therefore
the PLRA provision requiring full payment of the filing fee on appeal did not apply. The appeals
court held that the district court should have permitted the detainee to amend his complaint.
According to the court, the definition of "prisoner" in the in forma pauperis statute applies only to
persons incarcerated as punishment for a criminal conviction, and a civil detainee is not a
"prisoner." (South Bay Detainee Unit, South Bay Correctional Facility, Florida)
27.111

U.S. Appeals Court
FTCA- Federal Tort
Claims Act

Deland v. U.S., 291 F.3d 993 (7 th Cir. 2002). An inmate sued the United States under the Federal
Tort Claims Act (FCTA) alleging that he was injured in a collision between a prison van in which
he had been riding and a "chase car." The district court entered judgment in favor of the
defendants and the inmate appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that the
deposition of a fellow federal inmate was admissible, and the federal government was entitled to
discuss the inmate's medical history and condition with a prison physician. The appeals court
ordered the district court to hold a hearing to determine the qualifications of the inmate's
chiropractor to testify. (Metropolitan Correctional Center, U.S. Bureau of Prisons, Chicago,
Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
FEDERAL TORT
CLAIMS ACT

U.S. v. Lemons, 302 F.3d 769 (7th Cir. 2002). A pretrial detainee held in a federal jail sued the
United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, seeking compensation for injuries he sustained
when he slipped and fell on a wet floor while working in the jail kitchen. The district court
dismissed the action and the appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the Inmate
Compensation Program applied to the detainee, even though previous definitions had excluded
pretrial detainees. The court noted "We cannot think of any reason why Congress would have
wanted two classes of prison workers distinguished." (Metropolitan Corr'l Center, Federal Bureau
of Prisons, Chicago)

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY

Wares v. VanBebber, 231 F.Supp.2d 1120 (D.Kan. 2002). A state prisoner brought a prose§ 1983
action against a prison chaplain, alleging that the chaplain violated his First Amendment right to
freely exercise his religion by intentionally interfering with the prisoner's ability to observe a
religious holiday. The district court held that the prisoner's allegations stated a claim for violation
of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and § 1983. The court held that the chaplain
was not entitled to qualified immunity from liability in his personal capacity because the right of
prisoners to reasonable opportunities to practice their religion was clearly established at the time.
The prisoner alleged that the chaplain's intentional interference was motivated by his personal
animus toward followers of the prisoner's religion. The prisoner had converted Orthodox Chassidic
Judaism and had asked the chaplain for permission to eat his meals under a Sukka in observance
of the Sukkot holiday. The chaplain allegedly refused to accommodate the prisoner's request and
intentionally misled the prisoner and other Jewish inmates by suggesting that Torah law
permitted inmates to observe Sukkot by wearing a napkin on their head. The chaplain apparently
ignored state corrections department manuals and other information that described Sukkot
requirements. (Hutchinson Correctional Facility, Kansas)

2003
U.S. District Court
REHABILITATION ACT
SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY

Bane v. Virginia Dept. of Corrections, 267 F.Supp.2d 514 (W.D.Va. 2003). An inmate brought action
against a state corrections department and prison officials, stemming from injuries allegedly
suffered while being handcuffed. The district court denied motions to dismiss and for summary
judgment. The court found that the inmate properly stated a prima facie claim under the
Rehabilitation Act by alleging that he suffered from a chronically unstable right shoulder and that
he had been issued a "cuff-front" pass by the corrections department medical personnel. The pass
required prison personnel to cuff the inmate with his hands in front to accommodate his injury, but
prison officers failed to heed the cuff pass and handcuffed the inmate's arms behind his back. The
court noted that acceptance of federal funds by the state corrections department was a waiver of its
sovereign immunity from liability under the federal Rehabilitation Act. The court ordered further
proceedings to determine if officers destroyed a posted medical order pertaining to the inmate,
whether another officer stood by as an officer handcuffed the inmate in a manner contrary to the
posted medical order, and whether the officers maliciously intended to cause harm to the inmate.
(Wallens Ridge State Prison, Virginia)

U.S. District Court
FTCA- Federal Tort
Claims Act

Beckwith v. Hart, 263 F.Supp.2d 1018 (D.Md. 2003). An inmate filed an action against the Federal
Bureau of Prisons (BOP) under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), alleging claims of defamation
of character, negligence, battery and constitutional claims. The district court dismissed the action.
The court held that the inmate failed to establish that he was subjected to excessive force in
violation of his Eighth Amendment rights, when a BOP employee closed the door of a conference
room on the inmate's foot after he had interrupted a meeting to request forms, and stuck his foot in
the door when the employee attempted to shut it to regain the privacy of the meeting. The court
noted that even if the employee's actions contained the requisite application of force to rise to a
constitutional violation, the inmate failed to establish that the employee closed the door maliciously
for the purpose of causing him harm. (Federal Correctional Institution, Cumberland, Maryland)

U.S. Appeals Court
PRIVATE OPERATOR

Bowman v. Corrections Corp. of America, 350 F.3d 537 (6th Cir. 2003). The mother of a deceased
prisoner sued a private company that managed a prison, a warden and a physician, under § 1983
alleging failure to provide adequate medical care to the prisoner. The district court entered
judgment on a jury verdict finding that the defendants were not indifferent to the prisoner's serious
medical condition. The district court granted judgment as a matter of law that the company's
medical policy, as reflected in its contract with the physician, was unconstitutional. The parties
appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The appeals court reversed the
district court's holding with respect to the constitutionality of the medical policy, along with the
injunction awarded on that basis, finding that the issue is moot for the plaintiff and she had no
standing to bring such a claim for prospective relief. The appeals court also reversed the district
27.112

court's award of attorney fees to the mother, as she was no longer the prevailing party. (South
Central Correctional Center, Tennessee)
U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY

Ford v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 582 (2 nd Cir. 2003). A Muslim inmate brought a § 1983 action alleging
infringement of his religious rights because corrections officials refused to serve a religious feast in
a high-security area. The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and
the inmate appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. The appeals court held that
whether the inmate had a Free Exercise Clause claim depended on whether the inmate sincerely
believed in the postponed feast's religious significance. The court found that the fact that the
officials' religious authorities had determined that participation in the feast was not mandated by
the religion of Islam did not, by itself, render the burden on the inmate's free exercise non·
substantial. (Downstate Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
INDIVIDUAL
CAPACITY

Gaines v. Choctaw County Com'n., 242 F.Supp.2d 1153 (S.D.Ala. 2003). Administrators of a
deceased inmate's estate asserted state and federal law claims against a sheriff and county,
alleging that the inmate's death resulted from the denial of medical treatment while the inmate
was a pretrial detainee in a county jail. The district court held that the county could not be held
liable for any alleged lack of training or supervision of the sheriff, or sheriff's employees. The court
found that allegations failed to support a claim against the county based on its statutory duty to
maintain a jail, but that the allegations supported a claim against the county for an alleged breach
of duty to fund medical care, where the alleged failure to provide adequate funding to meet the
medical needs of inmates supported a claim for deliberate indifference under § 1983. The court
noted that although the county did not have a duty to appoint a physician, but merely had the
authority to do so, the county had the authority to act and its failure to do so could be construed as
a county policy. The court held that the allegations stated a§ 1983 claim under the Fourteenth
Amendment against the sheriff in his individual capacity, based on his direct participation. The
sheriff allegedly removed the inmate from the hospital against medical advice, failed to provide
adequate treatment during his subsequent incarceration, and refused to readmit the inmate to the
hospital. At the time of his arrest, the inmate was a patient at an infirmary where he was being
treated for acute renal failure and pneumonia. The sheriff personally removed the inmate from the
hospital, over the strenuous objections of the inmate's physician. He was placed in jail, where his
condition deteriorated to the point that he was unable to walk or to feed himself. His family found
him in worsening condition during their visits and eventually paid other inmates to help bathe and
feed the inmate. Jail staff allegedly refused to administer prescription medication because,
according to the family, the Sheriffs policies did not require them to do so. The sheriff finally took
the inmate to a nearby medical clinic where the treating physician recommended that the inmate
be hospitalized, but the sheriff refused. The family contacted the state human resources agency,
which intervened and caused the inmate to be admitted to the hospital. Upon admission, he was.
found to be dehydrated and malnourished and his illness had become irreversible; he died a few
days later. (Choctaw County Jail, Alabama)

U.S. District Court
COMPENSATORY
DAMAGES

Hayes v. Faulkner County, Ark., 285 F.Supp.2d 1132 (E.D.Ark. 2003). An arrestee brought a § 1983
action against a county, sheriff and jail administrator, complaining of his long detention prior to an
initial court appearance. The district court entered judgment in favor of the arrestee, finding that
the county's detention policy was deliberately indifferent to the arrestee's constitutional rights. The
court held that the sheriff did not possess the requisite level of personal know ledge to be
individually liable, but that the jail administrator was not entitled to qualified immunity. The
sheriff and jail administrator were responsible for the policy under which the sheriff's office
submitted the names of those confined in jail to the court, and then waited for the court to schedule
a hearing. The policy resulted in a 38·day delay for the arrestee, in violation of his Fourth
Amendment right to a judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended
restraint of liberty following arrest. The court held that it would enter an order awarding
compensatory damages and attorney fees and costs, if the parties were unable to settle the
amounts between them. The court found that the arrestee was entitled to compensatory damages
because his reputation in the community was compromised as the result of his confinement, he
suffered mental anguish, emotional distress and physical pain while incarcerated, and he was
financially injured when his home and property were left unattended for the 38 days he was
confined. The arrestee had been brought to the jail when two outstanding warrants were
discovered during a traffic stop. (Faulkner County Detention Center, Arkansas)

U.S. District Court
COMPENSATORY
DAMAGES
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Jackson v. Austin, 241 F.Supp.2d 1313 CD.Kan. 2003). A state prisoner brought a§ 1983 action
against state corrections officers, alleging they subjected him to excessive force. The district court
entered judgment in favor of the prisoner, finding that the officers used excessive force to restrain
him. The court held that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity, and that the prisoner
was not required to prove that he sustained significant or permanent injuries. The court also found
that an officer who did not participate in the altercation was liable for failing to intervene. The
court ordered the officers to pay $15,000 in compensatory damages, and $30,000 in punitive
damages. One officer had grabbed the prisoner, pushed him to the floor and handcuffed him while
the prisoner attempted to explain that he was permitted to sit in a medical clinic's waiting room
since his knee injury prevented him from standing for long periods. The officer had ordered the
prisoner to stand in line and refused to look at the prisoner's written medical restriction. The court
noted that the prisoner was 60 years old and the officers were aware that the prisoner had a knee
injury. (El Dorado Corr'l Facility, Kansas)
27.113

U.S. District Court
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Laube v. Haley, 242 F.Supp.2d 1150 (M.D.Ala. 2003). Female prisoners brought an action against
prison officials, challenging conditions of their confinement at certain state prisons. The district
court granted injunctive relief, including an order that the officials submit a plan for alleviating the
conditions. Following submission of the plan, the court rejected the plan, finding it unacceptable to
the extent that it asked the federal court to enjoin further transfer from county jails of prisoners
eligible for state incarceration. The court noted that under the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(PLRA), it could not prohibit the transfer, and in any event, such an order would conflict with a
state court order that prisons accept those prisoners. The court held that lack of funding was no
excuse for the deficiencies in the plan. (Alabama State Prison System, Tutwiler Prison for Women)

U.S. Appeals Court
VICARIOUS LIABILITY

Lumley v. City of Dade City, Fla., 327 F.3d 1186 (11 th Cir. 2003). An arrestee who was wounded in
a shoot-out brought a suit against police officials. The district court granted summary judgment in
favor of the defendants on the arrestee's Sixth Amendment claim, but rejected their qualified
immunity defense, and both sides appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed in
part. The court held that a law enforcement officer's decision while he was present in the hospital
watching the arrestee as he awaited surgery for a bullet wound, that the arrestee should be
strapped to the hospital bed in order to minimize the risk of flight, did not rise to the level of a
substantive due process violation. The court found that the officers who took no part in a doctor's
decision to remove a bullet from the arrestee's jaw but not to treat a fracture of his right cheek
bone, could not be held vicariously liable for the doctor's conduct. (Dade City Police Dept., Florida)

U.S. District Court
DAMAGES

Lynn v. Maryland, 295 F.Supp.2d 594 CD.Md. 2003). An arrestee sued state prison officials alleging
excessive force. The district court entered judgment in the arrestee's favor on a single claim against
a single defendant and awarded damages of approximately $2,500. The arrestee's counsel sought
attorney fees of approximately $130,000 and costs of $12,000. The district court reduced the
requested attorney fee award to $25,000, and costs to $2,158, finding the reduction was warranted
by the counsel's unnecessary prolonging of the action and other factors. The court held that the
arrestee could not recover the cost of hiring an expert whose testimony was excluded. The court
noted that the counsel prolonged the trial with inartful questioning and extensive examination of
witnesses on immaterial points. The arrestee had been visiting his son at a state correctional
facility when he was subjected to an unconstitutional search and arrest as the result of a false alert
by a drug dog. (Maryland)

U.S. Appeals Court
TERMINATION OF
ORDER
PLRA·Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Para-Profess. Law Clinic, SCI·Graterford v. Beard, 334 F.3d 301 (3th Cir. 2003). Prison officials
moved, under the provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), to terminate a nearly 14·
year-old permanent injunction that required a prison law clinic to remain open. The district court
granted the motion and prison inmates appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that PLRA
did not encompass future violations, and an injunction was not needed to correct a current and
ongoing violation. (State Correctional Institute at Graterford, Pennsylvania)

U.S. Appeals Court
PRIVATE OPERATOR

Rosborough v. Management & Training Corp., 350 F.3d 459 (5th Cir. 2003). A state prisoner
brought a § 1983 action against the private operator of a prison and against a corrections officer
employed by the operator, alleging violation of his rights as the result of injuries he sustained··two
severed fingers··when the officer slammed a door on his hand. The district court dismissed the
action, but the appeals court reversed and remanded. The appeals court held that private prison
management corporations and their employees perform a public function and can be sued under §
1983. (Bradshaw State Jail, Texas)

U.S. District Court
PRIVATE OPERATOR
BIVENS CLAIM
42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1983

Sarro v. Cornell Corrections, Inc., 248 F.Supp.2d 52 (D.R.I. 2003). A federal pretrial detainee
brought a Bivens and/or§ 1983 suit against the private operator of a prison facility, officers
employed by the operator, and others. A federal magistrate recommended that summary judgment
be entered for the defendants and the inmate filed objections. The district court held that the
inmate could maintain Bivens claims against the officers who were employed by the private
operator, but that the private corporation that operated the facility could not be sued under Bivens.
The court held that officers and operators were not subject to § 1983 liability because they did not
act under the color of state law, because only federal prisoners were housed in the facility. (Donald
Wyatt Detention Center, Rhode Island)

U.S. District Court
POLICIES AND
PROCEDURES

Sulton v. Wright, 265 F.Supp.2d 292 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). A prison inmate sued physicians and a state
corrections department's medical director, alleging that his Eighth Amendment rights were
violated when surgery to repair his torn knee ligaments was delayed for four years. The district
court denied qualified immunity for the defendants. The court held that the inmate stated a claim
of deliberate indifference against the physicians, and against the medical director based on a policy
that contributed to the delay. The policy required transferee inmates to be evaluated as new cases,
causing a delay in the inmate's surgery. (Wende Correctional Facility, Green Haven Correctional
Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
PRIVATE PROVIDER

Wall v. Dion, 257 F.Supp.2d 316 (D.Me. 2003). A county jail inmate suffering from hepatitis C
brought a pro se state court § 1983 action against private contractors that provided medical
services to inmates, alleging inadequate dental care. The district court denied the contractors'
motion to dismiss, finding that the inmate's failure to allege a blanket custom or policy of not
treating inmates with hepatitis C, did not preclude his § 1983 claim. The court noted that even
absent a blanket policy, if the inmate could demonstrate that the contractor's employee was a final
27.114

policymaker with respect to treatment, and decided not to treat the inmate pursuant to an
unconstitutional policy, the contractors could be liable. (Cumberland County Jail, Maine)
U.S. Appeals Court
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Williams v. Kaufman County, 352 F.3d 994 (5th Cir. 2003). Detainees brought a § 1983 action
against a sheriff and county, alleging violation of their civil rights during the execution of a search
warrant at a night club. The district court entered judgment against the defendants and they
appealed. The appeals court held that the strip searches of the detainees were unlawful, absent
individualized suspicion or probable cause, and that the law on this matter was clearly established
at the time of the searches. The court found that the prolonged detention of the detainees was
unlawful, but that the law was not clearly established at the time of the detention and the district
court had properly granted qualified immunity to the defendants on the unlawful detention claims.
The court held that the detainees established the county's municipal liability for their strip search
and detention, and that the district court did not err in imposing nominal damages of $100 per
plaintiff. The searches and detention were conducted according to a sheriff department's unwritten
policy for executing "hazardous" warrants, according to the court. The appeals court found that the
record supported the district court's conclusion that the sheriff acted with reckless indifference
toward the plaintiffs' constitutional rights, justifying an award of punitive damages, and held that
punitive damage awards of $15,000 per plaintiff were not excessive. The plaintiffs had been held
for three hours and were subjected to highly intrusive strip searches, and the sheriff kept the
plaintiffs handcuffed after they had been searched and no weapons or contraband had been found.
(Kaufman County, Texas)

2004
U.S. Appeals Court
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
CLASS ACTION
PLRA·Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Austin v. Wilkinson, 372 F.3d 346 (6th Cir. 2004). State inmates housed at a supermaximum
security prison facility brought a class action against corrections officials under § 1983, alleging
violations of their procedural due process rights. The district court ruled that officials had violated
the inmates' due process right and granted injunctive relief. The court ordered the adoption of a
revised version of placement regulations and the officials appealed. The appeals court affirmed in
part, reversed in part and remanded. The appeals court held that state inmates enjoyed a due
process protected liberty interest in not being placed at a supermaximum facility, but that the
district court did not have the power to order state officials to modify their predicates. The appeals
court upheld the procedural modifications made by the district court to the state's placement and
retention policies, which included increased notice requirements and changes to the administrative
appellate procedure. The court noted past erroneous and haphazard placements at the facility, and
the availability of administrative segregation to ensure the state's interest in safety. The appeals
court found that the proper comparison was within the state's prison system, not between other
supermaximum facilities in other states. The court held that confinement at the supermaximum
facility imposed an atypical and significant hardship, given the extreme isolation visited upon
inmates, lack of outdoor recreation, limitations on personal property rights and access to telephone
and counsel, and ineligibility for parole. (Ohio State Penitentiary. Youngstown)

U.S. District Court
CONSENT DECREE·
TERMINATION
PLRA·Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Baker v. Haun, 333 F.Supp.2d 1162 (D.Utah 2004). Injunctive relief was granted prohibiting the
practice of double·celling in certain areas of a prison, in a state prison inmates' class action
challenging their conditions of confinement. The prison moved to terminate the injunction under
the provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The district court held that the
continuation of the injunction was not warranted where there was no evidence of any present
unwillingness on the part of prison officials to comply with the injunction. The court found that
prison officials who resumed double-celling in one area without court permission did not engage in
contemptuous conduct because the officials had renovated the area in accordance with court
requirements. (Wasatch Unit, Utah State Prison)

U.S. District Court
CONSENT DECREE
ADA·Americans with
Disabilities Act

Bolden v. Stroger, 306 F.Supp.2d 792 (N.D.Ill. 2004). Pretrial detainees brought an action
challenging a county's policy of barring individuals with mental illness from various pre-release
programs, and its policy of discharging mentally ill individuals without providing them with
medication and referrals necessary to manage their illnesses. The district court dismissed the
action, finding that a court monitoring consent decree that had created pre-release programs at the
jail was the proper forum for claims regarding eligibility for the programs, and for challenging the
treatment of mentally ill detainees, even though the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) was
not in existence at the time the decree was originally entered. (Cook County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
NEGLIGENT
RETENTION
FAILURE TO
SUPERVISE

Bolton v. U.S., 347 F.Supp.2d 1218 (N.D.Fla. 2004). A female inmate brought an action against the
federal Bureau of Prisons and a correctional officer, alleging that the officer coerced her into sex by
threats of adverse official action. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants
in part, and denied it in part. The district court held that the government did not negligently hire
and train the officer, but that fact issues remained as to whether the government negligently
supervised and retained the officer. The court found that genuine issues of material fact, regarding
whether the officer's supervisor knew that the female inmate was at risk of sexual assault by the
officer, precluding summary judgment. The officer purportedly threatened to send the inmate to a
special housing unit and affect her release date unless she submitted to his sexual demands.
(Federal Bureau of Prisons, Florida)

27.115

U.S. Appeals Court
PRIVATE OPERATOR
PLRA·Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Boyd v. Corrections Corp. of America, 380 F.3d 989 (6th Cir. 2004). A group of prisoners at a private
correctional facility brought an action against the operator of the facility and individuals, alleging
they were severely beaten and subjected to racial epithets by workers at the facility. The district
court dismissed the action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the provisions of
the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The prisoners appealed. The appeals court affirmed in
pa.rt, reversed in part, and remanded. The appeals court held that the PLRA exhaustion
requirement applied to private correctional facilities. (Whiteville Correctional Facility, Tennessee)

U.S. District Court
DAMAGES
PLRA· Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Brewster v. Nassau County. 349 F.Supp.2d 540 (E.D.N.Y. 2004). A detainee brought a § 1983
action. The district court dismissed the complaint, finding that the detainee failed to state a§ 1983
conspiracy claim against a legal aid society, which had sent three successive attorneys work with
the detainee. The court considered these to be state law malpractice claims and declined to exercise
jurisdiction. The court found that even if the detainee suffered all of the psychological and
emotional injuries that he alleged, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) precluded recovery
against corrections officials under§ 1983 because the detainee did not allege any physical injury.
(Nassau County Correctional Facility, and Nassau County Legal Aid Society, New York)

U.S. District Court
42 U.S.C.A Sec. 1983
MUNICIPAL
LIABILITY

Brown v. Mitchell, 327 F.Supp.2d 615 (E.D.Va. 2004). The administratrix of the estate of a jail
inmate who contracted and died from bacterial meningitis while in jail brought a civil rights action.
The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants in pa.rt, and denied it in part. The
court held that summary judgment was precluded by fact issues as to whether the city had a policy
or custom of jail mismanagement, and whether any policy or custom caused the inmate's death.
The court also found that the.re were fact issues as to whether the sheriff violated the Eighth
Amendment r_egarding jail overcrowding. The court ordered further proceedings to determine if the
city council was aware of the long history of overcrowding, poor ventilation and structural defects
in the jail. The court found that the sheriff did not violate the Eighth Amendment by failing to
maintain sanitation in the jail, because sanitation deficiencies were caused by overcrowding, not by
her failure to perform. The sheriff was also not found liable for failure to train her staff, where she
had an illness-recognition and response program in place which consisted of initial and follow-up
training, combined with surprise inspections. The court noted that the guards' failure to respond to
the obvious illness of the inmate could be attributed to their failure to apply their training, for
which the sheriff was not responsible. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by
material issues of fact as to whether the jail physician showed deliberate indifference when he
ordered the inmate returned to overcrowded and ill-ventilated quarters, essentially without
treatment. (Richmond City Jail, Virginia)

U.S. Appeals Court
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
PLRA·Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Clement v. California Dept. of Corrections, 364 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2004). A state inmate brought a
§ 1983 action, alleging that a regulation prohibiting inmates from receiving mail that contained
material downloaded from the Internet violated his First Amendment rights. The district court
granted summary judgment for the inmate and issued a permanent. statewide injunction against
enforcement of the Internet mail policy. The state corrections department appealed, and the
appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the regulation violated the First Amendment
and that a statewide injunction was appropriate. The court found that the regulation was an
arbitrary way to achieve a reduction in the volume of mail, and that the corrections department did
not support its assertion that coded messages were more likely to be inserted into Internet·
generated materials than into word-processed documents. The court noted that the origin of
printed electronic mail was usually easier to trace than that of handwritten or typed mail. The
court held that entering a statewide injunction barring enforcement of the policy was consistent
with the provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, where evidence showed that at least eight
state prisons had adopted virtually identical policies and other prisons were considering it. The
court held that the injunction was no broader than necessary to remedy the First Amendment
violations. (Pelican Bay State Prison, California)

U.S. District Court
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Colton v. Ashcroft, 299 F.Supp.2d 681 (E.D.Ky. 2004). A federal prisoner filed a petition for habeas
corpus relief alleging that the federal Bureau of Prison's new regulation, which would delay his
release to a halfway house until only ten percent of his sentence remained, violated the notice and
comment provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). The district court granted the
prisoner's motion for a preliminary injunction. The court held that the Prison Litigation Reform
Act's (PLRA) exhaustion requirements did not apply to a habeas petition. The court noted that the
public interest would be served by the grant of an injunction and that the prisoner would be
irreparably harmed in the absence of an injunction. The court ordered the prisoner to be
immediately transferred to a halfway house without regard to the new regulation. (FMC·
Lexington, Kentucky, Federal Bureau of Prisons)

U.S. District Court
RESPONDEAT
SUPERIOR

Cooper v. Office of Sheriff of Will County, 333 F.Supp.2d 728 (N.D.Ill. 2004). A pretrial detainee's
surviving father brought an action against a county, sheriff, and deputies after his son died as the
result of an asthma attack while he was incarcerated. The district court held that state law did not
preclude the possibility of respondeat superior liability on the sheriff for a deputy's intentional or
willful conduct. According to the court, the father's allegations were sufficient to state a § 1983
claim against the deputies based on deliberate indifference to the detainee's serious medical
condition. The court noted that the central allegation in the complaint was that the deputies failed
to provide timely medical care and treatment to the detainee. The detainee had been placed in the
general population of the jail, and had previously had an asthma attack that required inhaler
27.116

medication. When the detainee had a subsequent attack, he and other inmates informed deputies
on duty that immediate medical care was necessary, but the deputies failed to act in a timely
manner and the detainee died. (Will County Jail, Illinois)
U.S. District Court
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Donhauser v. Goord. 314 F.Supp.2d 139 CN.D.N.Y. 2004). A state prisoner inmate brought a prose
civil rights action seeking declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief. The district court held that
the inmate's allegations supported a claim for violation of the inmate's Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination and that preliminary injunctive relief was warranted. The court enjoined
prison officials from requiring, as part of the Sexual Offender Counseling Program, participant.a to
divulge their history of sexual conduct, including illegal acts for which no criminal charges had
been filed. (Oneida Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
CONSENT DECREE

Ginest v. Board of County Com'rs. of Carbon County, 306 F.Supp.2d 1158 CD.Wyo. 2004). A motion
was filed seeking to hold a board of county commissioners in contempt for violating the
requirements of a 1987 consent decree concerning inmate medical care. The county board refused
to comply with the plaintiffs' request for inmate records, unless a signed release was provided for
each inmate whose file was requested. The court held that the plaintiffs' counsel was entitled to
examine client medical records to determine whether a systematic failure occurred in the jail's
health care system, without signed releases. The court ordered the information to be kept
confidential, except to the extent necessary to advise the court of any violations of federal law.
(Carbon County, Wyoming)

U.S. District Court
CONSENT DECREE
CONTEMPT
FAILURE TO TRAIN

Ginest v. Board of County Com'rs. of Carbon County, 333 F.Supp.2d 1190 (D. Wyo. 2004). County
jail inmates brought a class action against a county and sheriff, alleging deliberate indifference to
the inmates' medical needs, and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Following the entry of a
consent decree governing medical care, the inmates sought a contempt order, alleging specific
violations of the decree's terms. The defendants moved to terminate the consent decree. The
district court held that the county was potentially liable, and the sheriff was potentially liable for
failure to train. The court found that the constitutional rights of the inmates were violated by
inadequate medical care and inadequate medical records at the jail, including lack of training in
suicide prevention. According to the court, jail medical records that are inadequate, inaccurate and
unprofessionally maintained are actionable under the Eighth Amendment. The court found that
many physician progress notes and other medical records were missing, there was no written
definition of a medical emergency requiring immediate care, there were numerous delays in
responding to inmate requests for medical care, there was no suicide prevention training nor
written policies, and potentially suicidal inmates were often isolated physically and provided with
little or no counseling. (Carbon County Jail, Wyoming)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONSENT DECREE·
TERMINATION
PLRA· Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Guajardo v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, 363 F.3d 392 (5th Cir. 2004). A state sought to
terminate prospective relief provided by a consent decree that modified correspondence rules and
practices in the state's prisons. The district court granted the state's motion and inmates appealed.
The appeals court affirmed, finding that once the state established that the statutory two·year
period after enactment of the Prison Litigation Reform Act CPLRA) had elapsed, the inmates had
the burden of proof to demonstrate that there were ongoing violations and that the relief was
narrowly drawn. (Texas Department of Criminal Justice)

U.S. Appeals Court
DAMAGES

Guerra v. Drake, 371 F.3d 404 (8th Cir. 2004). A pretrial detainee brought civil rights claims
seeking damages from correctional officers, alleging they used excessive force and left him in a
"restraint" chair for prolonged periods. The district court entered judgment against a Captain for
$1,500 on the restraint chair claim and against another officer for $500 on the excessive force
claim. The district court refused to award punitive damages and the detainee appealed. The
appeals court affirmed, finding that the district court's refusal to award punitive damages was not
an abuse of discretion. The inmate had alleged that during his first six days of detention he was
subjected to unprovoked beatings and was placed in a "torture chair" for long periods. (Benton
County Detention Center, Arkansas)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONSENT DECREE·
TERMINATION

Radix v. Johnson. 367 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2004). State inmates filed a class action under§ 1983
alleging that their conditions of confinement violated their constitutional rights. Their claims were
settled by a consent decree. The district court denied prison officials' motion to terminate the
consent decree and issued an injunction ordering the departmentalization of facilities as a fire
safety remedy. The officials appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded. The appeals court held that the consent decree encompassed the cell blocks in question
but that the district court judge abused his discretion when he found that current conditions
violated the Eighth Amendment, because the court incorporated its principal findings from two
years earlier, despite the fact that a number of issues had since been resolved. The appeals court
also noted that the district court did not state the standard it was applying to find that conditions
relating to fire safety and fire prevention were inadequate, and failed to identify the point at which
certain fire safety deficiencies ceased being mere deficiencies and instead became constitutional
violations. (State Prison of Southern Michigan, Central Complex)

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY

Hernandez v. Goord, 312 F.Supp.2d 537 CS.D.N.Y. 2004). An inmate brought a prose civil rights
action against state prison employees and the employees moved to dismiss the complaint for failure
to provide a short and plain statement of the claim, and for failure to state a claim. The district
27.117

SUPERVISORY
LIABILITY

court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that the inmate's allegations
were sufficient to state a claim for conspiracy under§ 1983 and that the inmate adequately alleged
the personal involvement of a supervisory prison official in an alleged campaign of harassment and
retaliation. The court denied qualified immunity for the defendants because their alleged acts
violated clearly established law. The inmate alleged.that prison employees retaliated against him
after he filed a state court action. (Sing Sing Correctional Facility, and Green Haven Correctional
Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
VICARIOUS LIABILITY
CONTRACT SERVICES
PRIVATE PROVIDER

Jackson v. Fauver, 334 F.Supp.2d 697 (D.N.J. 2004). Fifteen former and current prisoners brought
separate actions against corrections officials and employees and a contractor hired to operate a
prison, alleging deliberate indifferent to their serious medical needs and medical malpractice. The
district court held that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether the prison
defendants were deliberately indifferent to one inmate's prostrate cancer and to another inmate's
another inmate's HIV/AIDS condition and Hodgkins disease. The court found genuine issues of
material fact as to whether the contractor hired to operate the prison was aware of grave
deficiencies in the medical care provided to inmates, as well as the acute risks created by those
deficiencies. The court denied summary judgment for the prison defendants on some of the medical
malpractice claims, and held that the corrections department and contractor could be held
vicariously liable for independent contractors' medical negligence. (East Jersey State Prison, New
Jersey)

U.S. District Court
PRIVATE OPERATOR
ACTA· Alien Tort Claims
Act

Jama v. U.S.I.N.S .• 343 F.Supp.2d 338 (D.N.J. 2004). Undocumented aliens who were detained
pending determination of their asylum status brought an action alleging inadequate living
conditions, torture, beatings, and other mistreatment at a facility operated by a private contractor.
The court held that officials of the contractor were not government employees, and therefore the
aliens' claims were not barred by a previous settlement agreement between the aliens and the
United States, which included non-tort claims. The district court denied summary judgment in
part, finding that issues of fact as to whether the burdens placed on the aliens' exercise of religion
were in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and were the least restrictive means of
furthering that interest. The court found that the aliens could seek money damages against guards,
in their individual capacities, for alleged violation of their rights under the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA). (Facility operated by Esmor, Elizabeth, New Jersey)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONSENT DECREE
PLRA·Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Jones-El v. Berge, 374 F.3d 541 (7th Cir. 2004). Prisoners of a "supermax" prison brought a suit
challenging their conditions of confinement. After the plaintiff class was certified and a preliminary
injunction was entered, a consent decree was approved by the court. The prisoners subsequently
moved to enforce the decree. The district court entered an order directing the installation of air
conditioning and the defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the district
court's order was not a grant of "prospective relief' that was subject to the requirements of the
Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). (Wisconsin Secure Program Facility)

U.S. District Court
CONSENT DECREE
PLRA·Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Laube v. Campbell, 333 F.Supp.2d 1234 CM.D.Ala. 2004). A class action lawsuit was brought on
behalf of women incarcerated by the Alabama Department of Corrections. The district court
approved two four-year settlement agreements, finding them in full compliance with the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) and to be fair, adequate and reasonable. The court found that the
healthcare monitor position that was created under the medical settlement agreement was not a
special master for the purposes of PLRA, where the position served a monitoring function and did
not exercise quasi-judicial power. (Alabama Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
PLRA·Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Lindell v. Frank, 377 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2004). A prisoner brought an in forma pauperis civil rights
suit against state prison officials, alleging numerous constitutional violations and seeking
injunctive, declaratory and monetary relief. The district court dismissed some claims, entered
summary judgment in favor of the defendants on other claims, and granted injunctive relief to the
prisoner on the one remaining claim. The prisoner and the defendants appealed. The appeals court
affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The appeals court held that a general ban on the
receipt of clippings from noncommercial sources violated the prisoner's First Amendment right to
receive information, but that the district court injunction was overly broad and violated the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA.) The state prison had applied a general policy, that banned the
receipt of publications from noncommercial sources, to the prisoner's receipt of magazine clippings
and photocopies of clippings. According to the appeals court, the injunction should have been
limited to the receipt of clippings by the litigating prisoner, but the injunction improperly
prevented the prison from banning any photocopies rather than just photocopies from published
sources. (Wisconsin Secure Program Facility)

U.S. District Court
NOMINAL DAMAGES
COMPENSATORY
DAMAGESPUNITIVE DAMAGES
PLRA· Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Meade v. Plummer, 344 F.Supp.2d 569 (E.D.Mich. 2004). A prisoner brought a§ 1983 action
against a prison's resident unit manager, alleging retaliation in violation of his First Amendment
rights. The district court held that the prisoner's failure to allege physical injury caused his claim
to be barred by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) to the extent that he sought damages for
mental and emotional injury, but not to the extent that he sought nominal, compensatory and
punitive damages. (Kinross Correctional Facility, Michigan)

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U.S. Appeals Court
NEGLIGENCE
FI'CA· Federal Tort
Claims Act

Montez Estate ofHearlson v. U.S., 359 F.3d 392 (6th Cir. 2004). The administratrix of the estate of
a murdered federal inmate brought a negligence claim against the United States under the Federal
Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The district court dismissed the case and the administratrix appealed.
The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court that the allegations in the complaint were
insufficient to rebut the presumption that prison officials' decisions regarding the inmate's safety
at the time of his death were of the type that could be said to be grounded in Bureau of Prisons
(BOP) policy, and thus the FrCA's discretionary function exception shielded the United States
from liability for the inmate's death. (Federal Medical Center, Lexington, Kentucky)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONSENT DECREE·
TERMINATION
PLRA·Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Morales Feliciano v. Rullan, 378 F.3d 42 (1•t Cir. 2004). The government moved to terminate an
injunction issued pursuant to a consent decree that addressed unconstitutional conditions of an
inmate health care system. The district court denied the motion and the government appealed. The
appeals court affirmed. The court held that there was an adequate record of continuing
constitutional violations and that the district court's order to privatize the system met the Prison
Litigation Reform Act's (PLRA) requirements for narrowness, need, and lack of intrusiveness. The
district court had found substandard conditions that included the following findings: one-fourth of
all inmates who requested sick call did not get it; only 55% of all ambulatory care appointments
actually took place; only 49% of specialist consultations deemed necessary for serious conditions
were arranged; medically prescribed diets were routinely ignored; mortality rates were rising; and
only 31.3% of inmates who had been diagnosed HIV-positive were receiving treatment. The appeals
court voiced frustration with this case: "Like the legendary Phoenix, this class action litigation
involving prison conditions in Puerto Rico is seemingly incapable of eternal rest...given the long
and tortuous history of this litigation··two years ago, we acknowledged that 'the lore of this case is
Byzantine."' <Puerto Rico)

INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
PRIVATE PROVIDER

U.S. District Court
PRIVATE PROVIDER

Page v. Kirby, 314 F.Supp.2d 619 (N.D.W.Va. 2004). A state inmate filed a§ 1983 action
challenging his conditions of confinement. The district court dismissed the complaint, finding that
private corporations that provided food and medical services at a state prison were not subject to
liability under § 1983, absent an allegation that the inmate's constitutional rights were denied
because of a corporation's policy or custom. (Huttonsville Correctional Center, West Virginia)

U.S. Appeals Court
ELEVENTH AMEND·
MENT

Phiffer v. Columbia River Correctional Inst., 384 F.3d 791 (9th Cir. 2004). A state inmate filed an
action alleging that the state's failure to accommodate his osteoarthritis and osteoporosis violated
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act. After the United States
Supreme Court vacated the appeals court decision, the case was remanded. On remand, the
Appeals Court affirmed and remanded, finding that the state waived its Eleventh Amendment
immunity under the Rehabilitation Act by accepting federal funds. (Columbia River Correctional
Institution, Oregon)

U.S. District Court
PRIVATE OPERATOR

Purkey v. CCA Detention Center, 339 F.Supp.2d 1145 (D.Kan. 2004). A federal prisoner brought a
Bivens action against private prison employees. The district court denied the defendants' motion to
dismiss. The district court held that employees at a private company under contract to house
federal pretrial detainees were "federal actors" for the purposes of potential Bivens liability, since
the detainees were in the custody of the United States Marshal and held under the authority of the
United States pending disposition of federal charges against them. According to the court, the
prisoner sufficiently stated that he was prejudiced by the employee's destruction of his legal
papers, for the purpose of his claim under Bivens that he was denied access to court. The court also
found that the prisoner stated a claim for violation of his free speech and association rights. The
court noted that prisoners incarcerated at prisons under contract to the federal government
enjoyed the same constitutional protections as those inmates incarcerated at prisons that are
actually run by the federal government. The court held that the prisoner was prejudiced by the
employee's destruction of his legal papers because the papers contained written recollections of
police interrogations shortly after they were conducted and also recounted representations that
were made to him to elicit his cooperation in return for a lighter sentence. The court found that the
prisoner stated a Bivens claim by alleging that employees disciplined him because he assisted other
inmates in the preparation of grievances against the prisoner. According to the prisoner, the prison
did not provide a law library and an attorney employed by the prison to answer legal research
requests refused requests for assistance in preparing legal actions against the prison and its
personnel. The prisoner alleged that employees harassed and threatened him, placed him in
segregation, entered his cell and scattered his papers and belongings, denied him visits with his
wife, and confiscated his legal materials because he filed grievances. (Corrections Corporation of
America, Leavenworth, Kansas)

U.S. Appeals Court
DAMAGES

Riley v. Kurtz, 361 F.3d 906 (6th Cir. 2004). A prisoner brought an action against a corrections
officer, alleging that his legal mail was opened by the officer outside of the prisoner's presence, in
violation of both prison policy and his First Amendment rights. The prisonern also alleged that the
officer wrote a false misconduct report against him, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. A jury
entered a verdict in favor of the prisoner, the district court awarded attorney fees and the officer
appealed. The appeals court reversed in part and ordered remittitur to reduce a punitive damages
award. On remand, the district court entered an amended judgment and awarded attorney fees.
The officer appealed, challenging the attorney fees awards. The appeals court affirmed in part and
reversed in part. The appeals court held that the prisoner was the prevailing party within the
meaning of§ 1988 and the prisoner, who prevailed on appeal, was entitled to attorney fees for the
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appellate work under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA).(Michigan)
U.S. Appeals Court
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
NOMINAL DAMAGES
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Royal v. Kautzky, 375 F.3d 720 (8th Cir. 2004). A prisoner filed a civil rights action against a prison
employee, alleging retaliation against his First Amendment rights and access to the courts. Finding
that the prisoner did not sustain a physical injury, the district court denied mental or emotional
damages, awarding only nominal damages, and further denied an award of punitive damages. The
prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that Prison Litigation
Reform Act's (PLRA) limitation on damages to those who sustain a physical injury applied to First
Amendment violations. The court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion by not
awarding punitive damages. (Iowa Medical Classification Center)

U.S. Appeals Court
DAMAGES
NOMINAL DAMAGES

Shain v. Ellison, 356 F.3d 211 (2nd Cir. 2004). A misdemeanor detainee in a county correctional
facility challenged a blanket policy that required strip searches of all detainees, regardless of the
nature of the crime for which they were detained. The detainee sought a declaration that the policy
was unconstitutional, monetary damages, and injunctive relief. The district court entered judgment
in favor of the detainee and awarded $1 in nominal damages. The parties appealed and the appeals
court affirmed in part, and remanded on the issue of injunctive relief. On remand, the district court
granted injunctive relief to the detainee and the defendants again appealed. The appeals court
vacated and remanded, finding that the detainee lacked standing to seek prospective injunctive
relief because he failed to show that he was likely to be rearrested or that he would be remanded to
the county correctional facility overnight if he was rearrested. The court noted that the county had
implemented a new policy that required reasonable suspicion that a detainee is concealing
contraband to justify a search. (Nassau County Correctional Center, New York)

U.S. District Court
VICARIOUS LIABILITY

Shaw v. Coosa County Com'n., 330 F.Supp.2d 1285 (M.D.Ala. 2004). The daughter and the
administratrix of an estate brought a civil rights action against a county, sheriff and other persons
after her father died while in jail. The district court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss, in
part. The court held that the plaintiff stated a claim against the county for an alleged breach of
duty to provide adequate funding for medical treatment of, and medicines for, the inmate. The
father had died while he was serving a 90 day sentenced for domestic violence, and allegedly was
not screened for a determination of proper medical care. (Coosa County Jail, Alabama)

U.S. Appeals Court
PRIVATE PROVIDER

Warren v. District of Columbia, 353 F.3d 36 (D.C.Cir. 2004). A prisoner brought a prose§ 1983
action against the District of Columbia, alleging that he suffered constitutional violations while
incarcerated in a private prison operated under contract with the District. The district court
dismissed the claim and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded, finding
that the prisoner's allegations that the District had, or should have had, knowledge of alleged
constitutional violations were sufficient to state a claim against the District under § 1983. The
prisoner alleged that private prison officials used common needles to draw blood from prisoners.
(Corrections Corporation of America, Youngstown, Ohio)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO
SUPERVISE
FAILURE TO PROTECT

Wever v. Lincoln County, Nebraska, 388 F.3d 601 (8th Cir. 2004). A personal representative brought
a civil rights action against a county and county sheriff alleging that an arrestee's Fourteenth
Amendment rights were violated. The district court denied the sheriffs motion for summary
judgment and the sheriff appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the arrestee
had a clearly established Fourteenth Amendment right to be protected from the known risks of
suicide, and two prior suicides in the county jail should have put the sheriff on notice that his
suicide prevention training needed revision. The court held that the representative stated a
supervisory liability claim under the due process clause, noting that a supervisor may be held liable
under § 1983 if a failure to properly supervise and train an employee causes a deprivation of
constitutional rights. (Lincoln County Jail, Nebraska)

U.S. Appeals Court
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Woodward v. Correctional Medical Services, 368 F.3d 917 (7 th Cir. 2004). The administratrix of the
estate of a pretrial detainee who had committed suicide in a county jail brought a § 1983 action
against a private contractor hired by the county to provide medical and mental health services at
the jail, and against the contractor's agents. The district court entered judgment on a jury verdict
against the contractor and the contractor's social worker, awarding $250,000 in compensatory
damages and $1.5 million in punitive damages, and denied motions for summary judgment as a
matter of law. The contractor appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the contractor's
employee's lack of training and carelessness were relevant toward establishing deliberate
indifference, even though the employee herself was not found liable. The court held that the fact
that no previous suicides had occurred in the jail did not preclude the contractor's liability.
According to the appeals court, the district court did not abuse its discretion by letting the punitive
damages award stand. The estate proffered evidence that the contractor failed to adequately train
its employees and condoned employees' failure to complete mental health intake forms and the
social worker's practice of challenging suicide watch referrals. According to the court, employees
knew that the detainee was suicidal but failed several time to place him on suicide watch, in
violation of its own written procedures. The court found that evidence of an alcohol-impaired nurse,
intake backlogs, and claims of delayed or denied medical care to other inmates was relevant to the
contractor's state of mind and was therefore admissible. (Lake County Jail, Illinois)

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2005
U.S. Appeals Court
DAMAGES
COMPENSATORY
DAMAGES
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Bell v. Johnson, 404 F.3d 997 (6th Cir. 2005). A former state prisoner sued corrections officers,
alleging that they had retaliated against him for filing a civil rights suit. The case was remanded
by the appeals court. A jury verdict awarded the former prisoner $1,500 in compensatory damages
but no punitive damages. The district court granted a new trial on damages and subsequently
entered judgment on verdict against an officer for $6,000 in compensatory damages and $28,000 in
punitive damages. The officer appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that
the district court did not abuse its discretion by granting a new trial on damages. The officer had
searched the prisoner's cell while the prisoner was in the prison yard for his daily hour of "yard
time." When the prisoner returned to his cell he found it in disarray and he noticed that some of
his legal papers and medical snacks had been taken. (State Prison of Southern Michigan)

U.S. District Court
SUPERVISORY
LIABILITY

Billops v. Sandoval, 401 F.Supp.2d 766 (S.D.Tex. 2005). A representative of a prisoner's estate
brought a § 1983 action against prison doctors, alleging that by failing to adequately supervise
their medical staff, they were deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's serious medical condition,
resulting in the prisoner's death. The doctors moved to dismiss the action and the district court
denied the motion. The court held that the representative stated a cause of action by alleging that
the doctors were the persons who were ultimately responsible for the prisoner's treatment and that
they had the legal authority and duty to supervise their nursing and physician's assistant staff.
The representative alleged that the doctors, despite their duty, entirely failed to supervise staffs
treatment of the prisoner, and were therefore deliberately indifferent to his care. According to the
representative, the doctors' indifference for a period of two months caused the prisoner's death.
(Clemons Unit, Texas Department of Criminal Justice)

U.S. District Court
SUPERVISORY
LIABILITY

Collins v. Graham, 377 F.Supp.2d 241 (D.Me. 2005). An inmate brought a civil rights action
against corrections officers and their supervisors alleging that the officers subjected him to sexual
harassment. The district court held that the inmate failed to state a claim for sexual harassment
with allegations that the officers made statements to him referring to sexual acts and tried to grab
him in a sexual manner. According to the court, an attempted touching, with no accompanying
allegation of pain or injury, cannot support an inmate's claim of constitutional injury. The court
found that the inmate failed to state a claim for supervisory liability. The court also found that the
inmate's allegation that an officer exposed his testicles to him did not meet the "unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain" standard necessary to support a § 1983 claim. The court noted that
sexual abuse or harassment of an inmate by a correctional officer can never serve a legitimate
penological purpose and may well result in severe physical and psychological harm, and that in
some circumstances such abuse can constitute the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain that
is forbidden by the Eighth Amendment. (Maine Correctional Center)

U.S. Appeals Court
VICARIOUS LIABILITY

Cook Ex Rel. Tessier v. Sheriff ofMonroe County, 402 F.3d 1092 (11 th Cir. 2005). The personal
representative of the estate of a pretrial detainee who committed suicide while incarcerated
brought an action against a sheriff, in his official capacity, asserting claims for deliberate
indifference to the detainee's medical needs in violation of§ 1983, negligent training and
supervision of jail employees, and vicarious liability for the employees' negligence. The district
court excluded the representative's expert witness testimony, precluded reference to other suicides
at the facility, and granted judgment as a matter of law for the sheriff. The representative
appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The appeals court
held that the district court acted within its discretion in excluding evidence of other suicides at the
jail. The court found that the plaintiff failed to establish that the detainee's suicide was foreseeable
to the sheriff and therefore any deficiencies in the sheriffs training or supervision did not rise to
the level of deliberate indifference. But the court held that evidence was sufficient to support a
jury verdict on the plaintiffs claim that the sheriff was vicariously liable under state law for
employees' alleged negligence. The court noted that the detainee made two written requests to see
a psychiatrist, one on each of the two days immediately preceding his suicide, and that the
detainee stated in one request that he was "mentally sick" and asked to see the psychiatrist "as
soon as possible." Three deputies observed the detainee as nervous and anxious, and one
specifically observed the detainee apparently having an anxiety attack and complaining of chest
pains. (Monroe County Detention Center, Florida)

U.S. Appeals Court
DAMAGES
TORT LIABILITY

Copeland v. County ofMacon, Ill., 403 F.3d 929 (7 th Cir. 2005). A former pretrial detainee who had
been beaten by another inmate sued a county seeking indemnification under the "scope of
employment" provision of the state's local government tort immunity statute. The detainee alleged
that a county correctional officer recruited and encouraged other inmates to commit the beating.
The district court jury awarded the detainee $400,000 and the county appealed. The appeals court
reversed, finding that the corrections officer was not acting within the scope of his employment
within the meaning of the tort immunity statute, and that the county jail, not the citizens of the
county, was the officer's employer. (Macon County Jail, Illinois)

XIX

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U.S. District Court
SUPERVISORY
LIABILITY

Davis v. Carroll, 390 F.Supp.2d (D.Del. 2005). An inmate brought a§ 1983 action against prison
personnel alleging violations of his Eighth Amendment rights. The district court denied the
defendants' motion to dismiss. The court held that the inmate stated a claim of excessive force with
his allegations that correctional officers harmed him on two different occasions while he was
handcuffed. The court found that the inmate stated a claim for supervisory liability with his
allegations that correctional officers planned his beating and encouraged him to act out, and that a
deputy warden witnessed the attack and took no action to stop it or punish the officers who were
involved. The inmate also alleged that a sergeant stood by as correctional officers harmed him
while he was handcuffed. (Delaware Correctional Center)

U.S. District Court
NEGLIGENCE

Drake ex rel. Cotton v. Koss, 393 F.Supp.2d 756 (D.Minn. 2005). The legal guardian for an
incapacitated person, who attempted to commit suicide while he was a pretrial detainee in a
county jail, and the state human services department sued a county and various officials under§
1983 alleging Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment violations and a state law claim for negligence.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court held that the
officials did not act with deliberate indifference in failing to recognize and respond to the risk that
the detainee was suicidal, even assuming there was a 72-minute gap between the last time the
detainee was checked and when he was found. According to the court, the officials did not know
that the detainee presented a substantial risk of suicide, based on a physician's reports describing
the detainee's depression as only "mild" or "situational." There was nothing in the reports to
suggest that anti-anxiety medication would have helped prevent the detainee's depression and
attempted suicide. The court held that the county was not shown to have any official policy or
custom of overcrowding or understaffing that played a role in the detainee's attempted suicide. The
court held that the officials acted with discretion with respect to their placement and treatment of
the detainee, and in accordance with a physician's orders, and they promptly took the detainee to
the hospital when they discovered he had harmed himself, and were therefore entitled to official
immunity as to the negligence claims. (McLeod County Jail, Minnesota)

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY
SUPERVISORY
LIABILITY

Dunbar v. County of Saratoga, 358 F.Supp.2d 115 (N.D.N.Y. 2005). A female correctional officer at
a county jail brought an action alleging sexual harassment in violation of Title VII and§ 1983. The
district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, in part, and denied in part. The court
held that summary judgment was precluded on the officer's hostile environment sexual
harassment claim. The officer alleged that co-workers made unwelcome sexual advances, directed
graphic sexual comments and jokes at her, left sexual notes on her car, called her at home several
times, and made obscene and offensive gestures toward her. The court held that the officer failed
to establish that she was constructively discharged because of her gender in violation of Title VII,
absent evidence that the defendants intentionally created an intolerable work atmosphere that
forced the officer to quit voluntarily. The court found that the sheriff was entitled to qualified
immunity under§ 1983 from the officer's claims of sexual harassment, where the sheriff never
sexually harassed the officer, never observed her alleged sexual harassment, never took any
adverse employment action against her, and was never personally aware of allegations of sexual
harassment. (Saratoga County Sheriffs Department, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
COMPENSATORY
DAMAGES
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
FAILURE TO PROTECT

Estate ofMoreland v. Dieter, 395 F.3d 74 7 (7th Cir. 2005). Family members of a county jail
detainee who died in custody, brought a§ 1983 action alleging the use of unnecessary and
excessive force. The district court entered judgment, upon jury verdict, in favor of the family
members and against county deputies, and awarded $29 million in compensatory damages, and
$27.5 million in punitive damages. The parties appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that
the punitive damages award was not excessive, where evidence showed that the deputies threw
the detainee' s head against a concrete wall, discharged a can of pepper spray into his face when he
was fully restrained, and repeatedly assaulted him, without attending to the detainee's medical
needs. The detainee died of a fatal hematoma caused by one of the head traumas inflicted by the
deputies. The deputies lied to a jail nurse about the detainee's injuries and filed false reports to
conceal their wrongdoing. The court held that neither multiple prior incidents involving the use of
pepper spray, nor alleged jail overcrowding, established that a sheriff was deliberately indifferent
to a substantial risk of harm to the detainee. The detainee had been admitted to jail after he was
arrested for driving under the influence. Shortly after his admission to the jail, the detainee
provoked a confrontation with another detainee by directing racial slurs at him. Jail staff
responded to the altercation with excessive force. (St. Joseph County Jail, Indiana)

U.S. District Court
CONTEMPT

Little v. Shelby County, Tenn., 384 F.Supp.2d 1169 (W.D.Tenn. 2005). An inmate brought a§ 1983
action against a county and sheriff, alleging that he had been raped in jail in violation of his
Eighth Amendment rights. The county stipulated to liability and an order of injunctive relief was
issued. Later, the district court found the county in contempt, and the county sought to purge itself
of the contempt finding. The court entered a purgation order. The court held that the county and
sheriff complied with the Eighth Amendment and purged themselves of contempt through the
adoption of a structured reform to correct conditions that included violence, rape and gang control
among inmates. In reaching its conclusion, the court considered whether officials took all
reasonable steps within their power to comply with the order, which included whether they

XIX

27.122

marshaled their own resources, asserted their highest authority, and demanded the results needed
from subordinate persons and agencies in order to effectuate the course of action required by the
order. The court praised the county, noting that it had adopted a focused, systemic and
information-driven structural reform based on critical exert assessment of essential institutional
functions. The county adopted a 14·point remedial scheme that included implementing direct
supervision management of inmate cellblocks, improving population management, collecting and
utilizing data, and installing an objective inmate classification system. (Shelby County Jail,
Tennessee)
U.S. Appeals Court
FTCA- Federal Tort
Claims Act

Myles v. US., 416 F.3d 551 (7 th Cir. 2005). A federal inmate brought a suit against the government
seeking compensation under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), alleging that officers failed to
protect him from being beaten by other inmates. The district court dismissed the suit as untimely
and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the complaint could not be
deemed to assert Bivens claims. (Federal Bureau of Prisons, Terre Haute, Indiana)

U.S. District Court
CLASS ACTION
SETTLEMENT

Nilsen v. York County, 382 F.Supp.2d 206 (D.Me. 2005). County jail inmates brought a class action
suit against a county, claiming that the practice of forced disrobing of all incoming inmates, in the
presence of an officer, was an unauthorized strip search. The parties submitted a proposed
settlement for court approval. The district court approved the settlement, in part. The court found
that the practice of having inmates remove their clothing in the presence of an officer was the
equivalent of a strip search conducted without cause. The county agreed to create a $3.3 million
settlement fund, from which members of the class would be compensated. The court approved
higher "incentive" payments of $6,500 to the first class representative, and $5,500 and $5,000 to
the other two class representatives, noting that they put considerable time into the case and were
required to give embarrassing deposition testimony. They also received unfavorable publicity
regarding their arrest and humiliation, due to the small size of the county and the ease of their
recognition. The court noted that a privacy factor was strong in this case, and that requiring
individual class members to prove damages would stifle individuals who are too embarrassed to
discuss their searches. The court rejected the proposal that would have awarded twice as much to
females. The proposal had been based on the assertion that females had two areas of the body
subject to privacy protection. The county contended, even when the settlement was offered, that its
policy was constitutional because the officers were looking for contraband in the clothing and were
not intentionally viewing arrestees' naked bodies. (York County Jail, Maine)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO
SUPERVISE

Perez v. Oakland County, 380 F.Supp.2d 830 (E.D.Mich. 2005). The father and personal
representative of the estate of an inmate brought a suit under § 1983, alleging that the defendants
violated the inmate's Eighth Amendment rights by failing to provide appropriate mental health
treatment or monitoring when the inmate was being held in the county jail, leading to the inmate's
suicide. The court found that allegations that the sheriff failed to ensure that the county's deputies
enforced and followed the law could not sustain a § 1983 claim absent evidence that the sheriff
himself engaged in active unconstitutional behavior by directly participating, encouraging,
authorizing, or acquiescing in the allegedly offending conduct of the sheriffs deputy. (Oakland
County Jail, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Roe v. Crawford, 396 F.Supp.2d 1041 (W.D.Mo. 2005). A female inmate sued prison officials,
requesting a preliminary injunction requiring them to transport her to a local health care provider
for the purpose of providing medical services to terminate her pregnancy. The district court held
that the inmate was entitled to injunctive relief and ordered accordingly. The court found that
denying the inmate the right to choose to terminate her pregnancy constituted irreparable injury
and that substantial delay in the decision to abort increased the risks associated with the
procedure. According to the court, the prison policy not to transport female prisoners out of the
institution for abortions that were not medically necessary was claimed to be reasonably related to
the penological interests of security and cost, but the court found those interests were not
legitimate penological interests. (Women's Diagnostic and Correctional Center, Missouri)

U.S. District Court
PERSONAL LIABILITY

Tardiffv. Knox County, 397 F.Supp.2d 115 (D.Me. 2005). A class action suit was brought against a
county, its sheriff, and jail officers claiming that the Fourth Amendment rights of some detainees
were violated when they were subjected to strip searches without reasonable suspicion that they
were harboring contraband on or within their bodies. The district court held that the county
violated the Fourth Amendment by adopting a policy that allowed for strip searches of all
detainees alleged to have committed felony offenses, although the sheriff was granted qualified
immunity because the law on this matter was not clearly established at the time the policy was
implemented. The policy provided for the strip-searching of all detainees alleged to have
committed non-violent, non·weapon, non-drug felonies. The court found that the county and the
sheriff were liable for a policy that called for the strip searches of detainees alleged to have
committed misdemeanors, without reasonable suspicion. According to the court, the sheriff was
responsible, in his individual capacity, for Fourth Amendment violations arising from strip
searches of all detainees alleged to have committed misdemeanors without a showing of reasonable
suspicion that they were harboring contraband on or within their bodies. The court found that the

XIX
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sheriff was aware of the custom of these universal strip searches and did not take effective action
to halt the practice. The court noted that specific standards that described which strip searches
may be undertaken in jails and prisons had been issued by the state attorney general. The state
corrections department had conducted a review of the jail's policy and procedure manual and
informed the sheriff that the policy pertaining to body searches needed to be revised to comply
with the attorney general's rules for searches. (Knox County Jail, Maine)
U.S. District Court
DAMAGES
HECK RULE

Thomas v. Barker, 371 F.Supp.2d 636 (M.D.Pa. 2005). A jail inmate brought a prose civil rights
suit seeking to challenge the propriety of charges of escape and other crimes. The district court
dismissed the case, finding that the inmate could not seek release from custody in a§ 1983 action.
The court noted that to the extent that the jail inmate was challenging the fact or duration of his
confinement by attacking a sheriffs filing of charges against him, the claims had to be brought in a
habeas corpus petition, rather than a civil rights action. The court also held that any claim for
monetary damages based on a civil rights claim for allegedly unconstitutional imprisonment based
on vindictive prosecution would not accrue in the inmate's favor under the Heck rule until such
time as the charges were dismissed or convictions were reversed on direct appeal, expunged by a
state tribunal, or called into question by the issuance of a federal writ of habeas corpus. The court
found that the claims were legally frivolous and subject to dismissal under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (PLRA). (State Correctional Institution-Retreat, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
TORT LIABILITY

Thomas ex rel. Smith v. Cook County Sheriff, 401 F.Supp.2d 867 (N.D.Ill. 2005). The administrator
of a detainee's estate brought an action arising from the death of the detainee at the jail, allegedly
due to inadequate medical attention. The district court granted the defendants' motions to dismiss
in part, and denied in part. The court held that the administrator had standing to sue on behalf of
the surviving spouse and next of kin, and that the allegations were sufficient to state most of the §
1983 claims. The court found that allegations of conspiracy were insufficient to state a claim. The
court held that the allegations were sufficient to remove the shield of immunity under a state tort
immunity act by pleading "willing and wanton conduct." According to the court, allegations that an
institutional policy, whether an express policy or a widespread practice, led to the death of the
detainee due to deliberate indifference to the detainee's medical needs, were sufficient to state a §
1983 claim. The detainee was suffering flu-like conditions at the time of arrest and he complained
of these symptoms to medical personnel during his initial screening at the jail. Three days later his
condition worsened and he requested medical attention from several officers, who refused and told
him he was just "dopesick." The next three days the detainee, and fellow detainees on his behalf,
requested medical attention and their requests were denied by officers and medical technicians,
and even made written requests. The detainee was found unconscious on the floor of his cell on the
seventh day after his admission and he died of meningitis later that day. (Cook County
Department of Corrections, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
PRIVATE OPERATOR
NEGLIGENCE
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Torres v. Corrections Corp. ofAmerica, 372 F.Supp.2d 1258 (N.D.Okla. 2005). A state prison
inmate who was assaulted and battered by a prison officer brought a § 1983 action in state court
against the corporate administrator of the prison, and also asserted a negligence claim. The
district court dismissed the case in part and denied dismissal in part. The court held that the
inmate's § 1983 claims were subject to the exhaustion requirements of the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (PLRA). The court held that the inmate's state law claim of negligence against the
corporate administrator of the prison did not fall within the ambit of PLRA's exhaustion of
administrative remedies provision. (David L. Moss Criminal Justice Center, Oklahoma, operated
by Corrections Corporation of America)

U.S. District Court
SUPERVISORY
LIABILITY

Valdes v. Crosby, 390 F.Supp.2d 1084 (M.D.Fla. 2005). The estate of an inmate who died in prison
after an alleged beating by correctional officers brought a § 1983 action against prison officials and
prison nurses. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants in part,
and denied it in part. The court found that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of
material fact on a supervisory liability claim against a warden. The court also held that there were
genuine issues of material fact as to whether inmate abuse at the hands of prison officers occurred
with sufficient regularity to demonstrate a history of widespread abuse at the prison, and as to
whether the prison warden established customs and practices that resulted in deliberate
indifference to violations of inmates' constitutional rights. According to the court, it was clearly
established at the time of the inmate's death that the warden could face liability under § 1983
predicated on his failure to take reasonable steps in the face of a history of widespread abuse that
created a known substantial risk of serious harm to inmates. The court found that a prison
inspector was not liable on a § 1983 supervisory liability claim, since the inspector was neither
responsible for, nor had authority to prevent or correct problems relating to abusive officers. The
court concluded that nurses were not liable under§ 1983 where a nurse's physical examination of
the inmate following alleged abuse by officers during the extraction of the inmate from his cell
revealed that the inmate suffered only minor injuries consistent with those seen by medical
personnel in prisons following cell extractions. The court held that any delay in the nurse's
response to a call for immediate medical help for the inmate did not create or exacerbate injuries
the inmate received from an alleged beating by prison officers, since the nurse arrived within

XIX

27.124

minutes of receiving the call and officers were attending to the inmate’s medical needs by
administering cardiopulmonary resuscitation. (Florida State Prison)
U.S. Appeals Court
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2005). A Native American inmate sued state

U.S. District Court
NOMINAL DAMAGES
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

White v. Kautsky, 386 F.Supp.2d 1042 (N.D.Iowa, 2005). A state prison inmate sued a state
corrections director and a warden, claiming that a policy that did not allow attorneys to do legal
research for inmates in appropriate cases violated his right to have access to the courts. The
district court held that the inmate was injured by the policy for the purposes of a constitutional
claim, where he did not pursue his non-frivolous claim that noncompliance with extradition
procedures invalidated his conviction. The court concluded that the corrections department did not
provide the inmate with a reasonably adequate opportunity to present claimed violations, where
there was no legal library and the attorney who was provided to consult with the inmate was only
allowed to confer and consult about the lack of merit of any proposed litigation, without being
allowed to conduct any legal research. The court noted that the inmate’s question that required
research carried a great deal of significance for the inmate. The court awarded only nominal
damages in the amount of $1 and held that the inmate was not entitled to the compensatory
damages he had requested, equal to the estimated amount of legal fees that would have been
incurred with his lawsuit. The court declined to award punitive damages where there was no
showing that the department acted maliciously when it provided attorneys to inmates for the
limited purpose of advising and conferring, but did not allow the attorneys to conduct any legal
research. (Anamosa State Penitentiary, Iowa)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN
SUPERVISORY
LIABILITY

Ziemba v. Armstrong, 430 F.3d 623 (2nd Cir. 2005). A state prison inmate brought a civil rights
action alleging that prison officials failed to provide constitutionally-adequate health care, failed to
protect him from the use of excessive force, and used excessive force. The district court granted
summary judgment for the officials, in part, and they appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part,
reversed in part and remanded. The court held that evidence was sufficient to establish that a
state corrections commissioner exhibited deliberate indifference to the inmate’s constitutional
rights or was grossly negligent in training subordinates, and that evidence was sufficient to impose
supervisory liability on a prison warden. The inmate was allegedly placed in four-point restraints
for 22 hours, beaten, and denied medical care. The court found that summary judgment was
precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a prison nurse and medic were
deliberately indifference to the inmate’s serious medical needs. (Connecticut State Prison)

corrections officials challenging a prison hair grooming policy that required male inmates to
maintain hair no longer than three inches, alleging it violated his rights under the Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The district court denied the inmate’s request for
a preliminary injunction and the inmate appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded,
finding that the policy imposed a substantial burden on the inmate’s religious practice and that
the policy was not the least restrictive alternative to achieve the state’s interest in prison security.
The court noted that the inmate was not physically forced to cut his hair, but that he was
subjected to punishments including confinement to his cell, imposition of additional duty hours,
and reclassification into a less desirable work group. The court also noted that the state failed to
explain why its women’s prisons did not adhere to an equally strict grooming policy. The court
concluded that the inmate faced the possibility of irreparable injury absent the issuance of an
injunction and the balance of hardships favored the inmate. (Adelanto Community Correctional
Facility, California)

2006
U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY

Abdullah v. Washington, 437 F.Supp.2d 137 (D.D.C. 2006). An inmate brought a pro se civil rights

U.S. Appeals Court
NEGLIGENCE
FTCA- Federal Tort
Claims Act

Acosta v. U.S. Marshals Service, 445 F.3d 509 (1st Cir. 2006). A detainee brought an action against

action under § 1983 against the District of Columbia and certain jail officials, in their individual
and official capacities, seeking damages related to his alleged exposure to second-hand tobacco
smoke while confined at a jail. The district court granted the officials’ motion to dismiss in part,
and denied in part. The court held that the inmate's allegations that he was subjected to an
intolerable level of second-hand tobacco smoke while confined at the jail, and that jail officials were
deliberately indifferent to his condition because they did not resolve the numerous grievances he
filed on the issue, were sufficient to support an Eighth Amendment claim based on exposure to
environmental tobacco smoke (ETS). The court found that the inmate's Eighth Amendment right
to be free from levels of second-hand smoke that posed an unreasonable risk of serious damage to
the inmate's future health was clearly established, and thus, the officials were not entitled to
qualified immunity. (District of Columbia Department of Corrections, Central Detention Facility)
the United States Marshals Service, various county jails where he was detained, doctors in a
federal prison, a private medical center, a private doctor, and others, alleging claims under § 1983
and the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), and alleging negligence under state law. The district
court dismissed the action and the detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held
that filing of an administrative claim with the United States Marshals Service was insufficient to

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satisfy the administrative exhaustion requirement of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), for
the purpose of § 1983 claims against county jails and a federal prison doctor. The court noted that
administrative claims against the county jails had to be directed to those facilities, and claims
alleging wrongdoing by a doctor at a federal prison had to be filed with the federal Bureau of
Prisons. The court ruled that FTCA claims against county facilities were barred by the
independent contractor exemption of the FTCA. According to the court, allegations did not state
deliberate indifference claims against a private medical center or a private doctor with allegations
that someone at a private medical center overmedicated him, and that a private doctor failed to
properly diagnose the severity of his foot injury. The detainee had been arrested on federal drug
and firearm charges and he was held without bail. During his pretrial detention, the United States
Marshals Service lodged him in several county jail facilities with which it contracts, and he also
spent time in two federal facilities. (Hillsborough County Department of Corrections, NH;
Cumberland County Jail, Maine; Merrimack County House of Corrections, NH; FMC Rochester,
MN; Strafford County House of Corrections, NH; FCI Raybrook, NY)
U.S. District Court
SANCTIONS
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Americans United For Separation of Church and State v. Prison Fellowship Ministries, 432

U.S. Appeals Court
CONTEMPT

Armstrong v. Guccione, 470 F.3d 89 (2nd Cir. 2006). A prisoner incarcerated for civil contempt for

F.Supp.2d 862 (S.D.Iowa 2006). A separation of church and state advocacy group, and affected
state prison inmates, sued the State of Iowa, claiming that funding of a contract under which an
organization providing pre-release rehabilitation services to inmates through a program based on
Evangelical Christianity violated the Establishment Clause. The plaintiffs moved for declarative
and injunctive relief. The district court held that: (1) the service provider was operating under
color of state law, for purposes of a suit under § 1983; (2) the program was pervasively sectarian;
(3) the program did not involve payments made at the direction of inmates, which would not
violate Establishment Clause; (4) the program fostered excessive entanglement of government
with religion; (5) the contract violated the Establishment Clause. The service provider was
enjoined from further contract performance, would not be paid amounts due under its contract,
and would be forced to return all payments received. The court noted that the plaintiffs had
standing to sue the State of Iowa and corrections officials and the prison ministries organization,
even though they were not Iowa taxpayers, because the inmate plaintiffs had made contributions
to the telephone fund, designed to finance telephone use by inmates, from which withdrawals had
been allegedly made to pay for the prison ministry in question. The court noted that if secular
activities of a pervasively sectarian organization may be separated from sectarian activities, the
secular activities may be funded by the government without violating the Establishment Clause.
The court found that all instruction, regardless of subject, with exception of computer science, was
presented as an aspect of Evangelical Christianity, and participants were required to participate
in single and group devotional activities. According to the court, state prison inmates were not
given true freedom of choice, there was no secular alternative to participation in the program,
which offered superior living quarters and some relaxation of prison rules. The program provider
was required to return the $1,529,182 paid by the state. (Iowa Department of Corrections and
InnerChange Freedom Initiative, Newton Correctional Facility)

refusing to comply with an order, sought habeas corpus relief. The district court denied the
prisoner’s motion for bail and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed, remanded, and
ordered the case to be reassigned. The court held that the Non-Detention Act did not eliminate the
lower courts' inherent power to order coercive civil confinement, and implicitly authorized coercive
confinement in the face of civil contempt. The court found that civil confinement only becomes
punitive, for the purposes of a due process analysis, when it loses the ability to secure compliance.
The court held that a seven-year length of imprisonment for refusing to produce corporate records
and property, so as to comply with an order issued in a civil securities fraud action, did not violate
the prisoner’s due process rights, where the property in question had a “life-altering” value of $15
million, such that his refusal to comply indicated that he was willing to suffer jail time in hopes of
ending up in possession of the property. The court opened it’s opinion with the following statement:

“It has been said that a civil contemnor who is incarcerated to compel compliance with a court
order holds the key to his prison cell: Where defiance leads to the contemnor's incarceration,
compliance is his salvation.” (Metropolitan Correctional Center, Federal Bureau of Prisons, New

York)
U.S. Appeals Court
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
COMPENSATORY
DAMAGES
FAILURE TO PROTECT

Britt v. Garcia, 457 F.3d 264 (2d Cir. 2006). A prisoner brought a suit against correctional officials

and others, alleging failure to protect him in violation of Eighth Amendment, civil rights
conspiracy, and state law violations. Following a jury verdict in favor of the prisoner on the civil
rights conspiracy claim, the district court denied a post-trial motion for judgment as matter of law
on qualified immunity grounds, and ordered a new trial on the issue of punitive damages. The
officials appealed. The appeals court held that the officials were not entitled to qualified immunity
as a matter of law based on special verdict on which the jury answered “no” to the question asking
if the officials had failed to protect the inmate in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights, but
“yes” to question asking if they had conspired to violate his constitutional rights. The prisoner was
serving a state sentence for a felony conviction when he was assaulted by another inmate who
slashed his head, neck, and back. He was rushed to a hospital where he received multiple stitches

27.126
XX

to close his wounds. Upon his return to prison, he was placed in protective custody but was
allegedly attacked at least once more by another inmate, and his cell was allegedly set on fire. He
brought suit seeking compensation for his injuries. The jury assessed compensatory damages
against two officials in the amounts of $100,000 and $50,000, and punitive damages in the
amounts of $5 million and $2.5 million, respectively. The court concluded that punitive damages
“should not exceed $200,000” in the case of one defendant and $100,000 in the case of the other
defendant, and ordered a new trial on the issue of punitive damages when the prisoner refused to
agree to forego all punitive damages in excess of those amounts. (Sing Sing Correctional Facility,
New York)
U.S. District Court
OFFICIAL CAPACITY

Burkett v. Wicker, 435 F.Supp.2d 875 (N.D.Ind. 2006). A prisoner, proceeding pro se, brought a
civil rights action under § 1983 against a jail nurse and others, alleging that he was denied
medical treatment while he was a pretrial detainee. The inmate alleged that a jail nurse made a
false entry into the prisoner's medical record, denied him doses of his prescribed medication,
prevented him from seeing a doctor, and delayed filling his prescription, that the nurse knew that
his hand was injured and that it would get worse without treatment, and that because of her
deliberate indifference to his serious medical need, he developed an infection, his hand did not heal
properly, he had permanent disfigurement, and he was in prolonged, unnecessary pain. The
district court held that the allegations supported a claim for violation of Eighth Amendment's
prescription against cruel and unusual punishment. But the court found that no liability existed
against the nurse in her official capacity, for allegedly denying the prisoner medical treatment
while he was a pretrial detainee, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, absent any allegation that
the nurse was acting pursuant to a policy or custom. (Cass County Jail, Indiana)

U.S. District Court
CLASS ACTION
SETTLEMENT

Bynum v. District of Columbia, 412 F.Supp.2d 73 (D.D.C. 2006). Persons who had been, were, or

U.S. District Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Clifton v. Eubank, 418 F.Supp.2d 1243 (D.Colo. 2006). An inmate brought a § 1983 action alleging

U.S. District Court
CLASS ACTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

would be incarcerated by the District of Columbia Department of Corrections brought a § 1983
class action challenging the Department's policy of conducting suspicionless strip searches of
inmates who were declared releasable after their court appearances, and challenging alleged overdetentions. The district court preliminarily approved a proposed settlement. Following a final
approval hearing, the district court held that final approval was warranted and that the allocation
of a sum for distribution to all class members who submitted claims was a fair method of
distribution. The court held that the distribution fund of $12 million was very favorable, especially
in view of the low number of opt-outs and objectors. The court found that there was no collusion
between the parties or their counsel and that the settlement comported with the rule governing
class actions and with due process requirements. The court found that the attorney fee award of
33% of the settlement fund, or $4 million, was reasonable, noting that counsel had engaged in
protracted efforts over four years to obtain the outstanding settlement in both monetary and
injunctive terms, the case was complex and involved novel issues, the case carried a serious risk of
lack of success, and the settlement met with a high level of class satisfaction. The court defined the
“Over-Detention Injunctive Relief Class” as: (a) Each person who has been, is or will be
incarcerated in any District of Columbia Department of Corrections facility beginning in the three
years preceding the filing of the action on or about May 16, 2002 up to and until the date this case
is terminated; and (b) who was not released, or, in the future will not be released by midnight on
the date on which the person is entitled to be released by court order or the date on which the basis
for his or her detention has otherwise expired. (District of Columbia Department of Corrections)

violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment against a prison nurse and corrections
officers, arising out of the stillbirth of her fetus. The court denied the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment. The court held that the inmate's delayed labor, resulting in the stillbirth of an
otherwise viable fetus, constituted a physical injury to the mother sufficient to satisfy the Prison
Litigation Reform Act’s (PLRA) physical injury requirement, and that PLRA did not bar her
constitutional claims under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The inmate had told an
officer that she was in labor and needed medical assistance but the officer sent her back to her
housing unit. Later she told another officer that she was in labor and needed help but the officer
declined to provide her with medical assistance and told her to return to her unit. Upon her third
request for medical assistance, another officer sent her to the facility's medical unit where the
nurse examined the inmate and found no evidence that her water had broken. During the
examination the nurse did not use a fetal heart monitor to evaluate the status of the fetus,
apparently because she did not know how to use the monitor. The inmate was sent back to her
housing unit without treatment, even though she told the nurse that she had difficulties with prior
deliveries. The next day, another officer noticed Clifton's distress and sent her to the medical unit.
She was sent from the prison to a hospital, where it was determined that her fetus was dead.
(Women's Correctional Facility, Canon City, Colorado)

Ginest v. Board of County Com'rs of Carbon County, 423 F.Supp.2d 1237 (W.D.Wyo. 2006).

County jail inmates filed a motion for an award of attorney fees and expenses after obtaining a
consent decree in a § 1983 class action against a county and sheriff in his official capacity, for
deliberate indifference to their medical needs, and a contempt order against the defendants. The

27.127
XX

district court held that: (1) the class counsel for the inmates was entitled to attorney fees for time
and effort spent in monitoring compliance by the county and its sheriff with the remedial plan; (2)
the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) did not preclude an award of attorney fees to the class
counsel; (3) the counsel would be awarded a 25% fee multiplier or enhancement; and (4) the
counsel was entitled to the award of expenses for his travel to Wyoming to review medical records
and perform other activities on behalf of the inmates. (Carbon County, Wyoming)
U.S. Appeals Court
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
SPECIAL MASTER

Handberry v. Thompson, 436 F.3d 52 (2nd Cir. 2006). City prison inmates, between the ages of 16
and 21, brought a class action against city officials under § 1983, alleging failure to provide
adequate educational services. The district court entered declaratory judgment in favor of the
inmates and entered an injunction ordering the city to comply with the terms of an educational
plan and to provide additional required services to eligible inmates. The city appealed. The appeals
court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court held that the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (PLRA) prohibited prospective relief for violations of state law only. The court found
that the requirement that the city develop temporary education plans (TEP) for students who did
not have current individualized education plans (IEP) within thirty days of enrollment was
appropriately narrowly drawn. According to the court, a special monitor appointed to oversee the
implementation of the order was not a “special master” for the purposes of PLRA and therefore the
district court’s requirement that the city and state pay for the special monitor did not violate
PLRA, which required expenses of special masters to be borne by the judiciary. The court noted
that the special monitor was not given a mandate to exercise quasi-judicial powers, such as finding
facts that would be binding on the court. (New York City Department of Corrections, New York
City Department of Education)

U.S. Appeals Court
SPECIAL MASTER
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Handberry v. Thompson, 446 F.3d 335 (2nd Cir. 2006). City prison inmates, between the ages of 16

U.S. Appeals Court
CLASS ACTION

In re Nassau County Strip Search Cases, 461 F.3d 219 (2d Cir. 2006). Arrestees brought an action
against a county and others, challenging the county correctional center's blanket strip search
policy for newly-admitted, misdemeanor detainees. The district court denied the plaintiffs' class
certification motions, and the plaintiffs appealed. The appeals court reversed in part and
remanded in part. The court held that common issues predominated over individual issues as to
liability in this case, and the class action device was a superior litigation mechanism as to the
issue of liability. (Nassau County Correctional Center, New York)

U.S. District Court
SUPERVISORY
LIABILITY
VICARIOUS LIABILITY

Locicero v. O’Connell, 419 F.Supp.2d 521 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). An inmate brought a pro se § 1983

U.S. District Court
INSURANCE

North River Ins. Co. v. Broward County Sheriff's Office, 428 F.Supp.2d 1284 (S.D.Fla. 2006). An
insurer sued a county sheriff's office and a number of its officers, seeking a determination of its
coverage obligations regarding lawsuits involving former inmates who had been incarcerated over
20 years earlier, but who were recently exonerated. The insurer moved for summary judgment.
The district court held that “bodily injury” and “personal injury” covered by the policy did not cover
allegations of malicious prosecution and false imprisonment that occurred 20 years earlier. One of

and 21, brought a class action against city officials under § 1983 and the New York education code,
alleging failure to provide adequate educational services. After the entry of a declaratory judgment
in favor of the inmates, the district court entered an injunction ordering the city to comply with the
terms of an educational plan and to provide additional required services to eligible inmates. The
city appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part and remanded. The appeals
court held that the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) prohibited prospective relief for violations
of state law only. The court held that the injunction was a necessary and narrowly drawn means of
effectuating prospective relief, as required by Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), even though
the court described the plaintiff class as consisting of inmates housed in one specific facility, where
that was the only facility that provided educational services, and inmates at city's other jails had
to transfer there to receive such services. According to the court, the special monitor appointed by
the district court to oversee implementation of the order was not a “special master,” and thus the
requirement that the city and state pay for the special monitor did not violate the provision of
Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requiring expenses for special masters to be borne by the
judiciary. (New York City Department of Education, New York City Department of Corrections,
Rikers Island)

action against a correction facility's superintendent and a correction officer, alleging deprivations
of his Eighth Amendment right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment. The district court held
that the inmate's allegations were sufficient to plead that the superintendent was personally
involved in an alleged deprivation of the inmate's constitutional rights. The court found that the
inmate stated a claim against a prison superintendent for deliberate indifference under § 1983 by
alleging that the risk a corrections officer posed to inmates was obvious prior to the deprivation the
inmate allegedly suffered, and by alleging that a corrections officer reportedly was officially
reprimanded for misconduct towards inmates and that the severity of his misconduct rose to a
level requiring his temporary removal from duty or from a particular program. The inmate alleged
that the officer threatened him and hit him on more than one occasion. (Downstate Correctional
Facility, New York)

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XX

the complaints was filed by the estate of an inmate who died in prison in 2000 and was
posthumously exonerated later that year. The second complaint was filed by a person who was
arrested in 1979 and convicted in 1980 and spent 22 years in prison before he was exonerated and
released from prison in June 2001. (Broward County Sheriff’s Office, Florida)
U.S. District Court
PRIVATE OPERATOR
MEDICAL CARE
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Olivas v. Corrections Corp. of America, 408 F.Supp.2d 251 (N.D.Tex. 2006). An inmate brought a §

U.S. Appeals Court
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
COMPENSATORY
DAMAGES

Patterson v. Balsamico, 440 F.3d 104 (2nd Cir. 2006). An African-American former employee of a
county sheriff's department brought an action against another corrections officer, alleging the
existence of a racially discriminatory hostile work environment and the intentional infliction of
emotional distress. After a jury trial, the district court awarded the former employee nominal
damages on the hostile work environment claim, $100,000 on the emotional distress claim, and
$20,000 in punitive damages. The court denied the corrections officer's motion for a new trial and
awarded the former employee attorney fees. The parties appealed. The court of appeals affirmed in
part, and vacated and remanded in part. The appeals court held that the district court did not
abuse its discretion when, pursuant to New York law, it declined to reduce compensatory damages
of $100,000 awarded to the plaintiff on his claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress,
arising from an assault in which the officer and others sprayed the plaintiff with mace, covered
him with shaving cream, and taunted him with racial slurs. The court noted that the plaintiff had
testified as to his humiliation, embarrassment, and loss of self-confidence, as well as to his
sleeplessness, headaches, stomach pains, and burning in his eyes from the use of mace. The
appeals court found that the punitive damages award of $20,000 did not exceed the maximum
permissible amount considering that this was a thoroughly reprehensible incident, particularly in
light of its racial motivation, and that the punitive damages award represented a relatively small
fraction of $100,000 compensatory damages awarded on the emotional distress claim. The court
noted that the officer against whom the award was made should have appreciated the gravity of
the racially motivated assault on a fellow officer and should have understood that such conduct
could have adverse economic consequences. But the appeals court concluded that the $20,000
damage award was excessive in light of the personal finances of the defendant corrections officer,
who earned an annual salary of approximately $37,632, was married and had two children. The
court found that an award of no more than $10,000 would provide sufficient punishment and deter
future conduct. The court remanded the case for a new trial on punitive damages, unless the
plaintiff agreed to remit the portion of the punitive damages award that exceeded $10,000. The
plaintiff alleged that he had been subjected to a racially discriminatory hostile work environment
and that his employment had been terminated because of his race. He alleged that he heard fellow
employees use racial slurs and make disparaging remarks about African-Americans on
approximately 12 occasions during his first three months of employment. (Oneida County
Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
NOMINAL DAMAGES

Pearson v. Welborn, 471 F.3d 732 (7th Cir. 2006). An inmate brought an action against prison

1983 action against a private company that managed a prison, alleging violations of his
constitutional rights and a claim of negligence under state law. The corporation moved for
summary judgment and the district court granted the motion. The court held that: the company
was not liable for alleged deliberate indifference to the inmate's serious medical needs; even if the
corporation failed to properly prioritize the inmate's dental injury, the failure did not amount to
deliberate indifference to the inmate's serious medical needs; and the inmate did not suffer a
“physical injury” under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The court noted that a private
corporation that manages a prison can be sued by an inmate under § 1983 for an alleged
constitutional injury, since the operation of a prison is a fundamental government function and the
standards applicable to determining liability under § 1983 against a municipal corporation are
applicable to determining the liability of a private corporation performing a government function.
The court held that the inmate's injury, in which he broke two front teeth, was not a dental injury
that required emergency care, and therefore the private prison-management company was not
liable to the inmate under § 1983 for alleged deliberate indifference to inmate's serious medical
needs. The inmate did not initially seek emergency care, and in the days immediately following the
injury he did not suffer pain requiring more than over-the-counter medicine. According to the
court, even if the private prison-management corporation failed to properly prioritize the inmate's
dental injury, such failure did not amount to deliberate indifference to the inmate's serious
medical needs under the Eighth Amendment, for the purposes of the inmate's § 1983 claim against
the company. The inmate's allegation in the § 1983 action that he suffered some pain, and later
suffered depression and emotional injury resulting from the loss of his teeth, was insufficient to
establish a “physical injury” under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). (Corrections
Corporation of America, Mineral Wells Pre-Parole Transfer Facility, Texas)

personnel, alleging retaliation in violation of the First Amendment. The district court entered
judgment upon jury verdict in favor of the inmate. Inmate appealed the court’s refusal to award
attorney fees and declaratory relief, and a prison warden and social worker cross-appealed. The
appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the inmate's oral complaints to prison
personnel about prison conditions, including the use of shackles in group therapy and denial of
yard time to prisoners in a pre-transfer unit, related to matters of public concern and were

27.129
XX

designed to effect a change in prison policy, and thus, they were protected by the First
Amendment. The court held that the inmate, who was awarded only nominal damages under the
Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) in his action against prison personnel, was not entitled to an
attorney fee award greater than 150% of the nominal damages based on his claim for declaratory
judgment, that his punishment by personnel was illegal. The court noted that the only relief the
inmate secured was nominal damages, and since the inmate had already been transferred to
another facility, a declaratory judgment would have been largely duplicative of the jury's verdict
concluding that personnel had retaliated against inmate. (Tamms Correctional Center, Illinois)
U.S. District Court
OFFICIAL CAPACITY
RLUIPA - Religious
Land Use and
Institutionalized
Persons Act

Price v. Caruso, 451 F.Supp.2d 889 (E.D.Mich. 2006). A state prison inmate brought a pro se suit

U.S. District Court
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

R.G. v. Koller, 415 F.Supp.2d 1129 (D.Hawai’i 2006). Three juveniles who either identified

U.S. Appeals Court
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Rodriguez-Marin v Rivera-Gonzalez, 438 F.3d 72 (1st Cir. 2006). Employees of Puerto Rico's

against the director of the state corrections department, claiming that failure to provide
transportation to another facility in order to permit his minimum attendance requirement for
Jewish services to be satisfied, was a violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA). The court found material issues of fact, as to whether there were sufficient
Jewish inmates in the prison to conduct services, precluded summary judgment. The court found
that the inmate's claim for damages, arising from the refusal of authorities to transport him to
another facility, was not rendered moot when he was transferred to another facility where need for
transportation no longer existed. According to the court, the inmate could pursue his damages
claim against the director in her official capacity, claiming that his rights under the RLUIPA were
violated because it was not clear whether, in accepting federal funding, the state had waived
sovereign immunity, and with it the director's official capacity immunity. (Southern Michigan
Correctional Facility)
themselves as, or were perceived to be, lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender and who had been
confined at a state juvenile correctional facility brought claims against the facility alleging due
process, equal protection, Establishment Clause, and access to counsel violations. The district
court granted the juveniles’ motion for a preliminary injunction in part, and denied in part. The
court held that the juveniles had standing to seek a preliminary injunction preventing the facility
officials from engaging in unconstitutional conduct and requiring them to implement policies and
procedures to ensure their safety at the facility. Although none of the juveniles were incarcerated
at the time the complaint was filed, the court found that enjoining certain unconstitutional conduct
and requiring officials to implement policies and procedures to remedy those conditions would
remedy the juveniles' injury, and, the juveniles showed a likelihood of repetition of the injury given
that each of the juveniles had been incarcerated at the facility two to three times over a relatively
short period of time, each had been released only to return to the facility a short time later, and
the juveniles' experiences indicated that, at the time the complaint was filed, each juvenile was
likely to return to the facility. The court found that the facility's adoption of a youth rights policy
providing that youth should not be discriminated against on the basis of sexual orientation did not
render moot the juveniles' claims for injunctive relief from sexual orientation harassment, absent
evidence, aside from the policies themselves, that the facility had altered its treatment of its
lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender wards. According to the court, the facility's use of isolation to
“protect” its lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender wards was not within the range of acceptable
professional practices and constituted punishment in violation of their due process rights. The
court found that such practices were, at best, an excessive and therefore unconstitutional, response
to the legitimate safety needs of the institution. The court held that officials at the facility acted
with deliberate indifference in violation of due process in allowing pervasive verbal, physical, and
sexual abuse to persist against lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender juveniles. The juveniles
complained of a relentless campaign of harassment based on their sexual orientation that included
threats of violence, physical and sexual assault, imposed social isolation, and near constant use of
homophobic slurs. (Hawai‘i Youth Correctional Facility)
corrections administration filed suit under § 1983 against the administration alleging political
discrimination, claiming that they were demoted in violation of their First Amendment and due
process rights. The district court entered a verdict for the employees, awarding compensatory and
punitive damages, and the defendants appealed. The court of appeals affirmed, finding that
evidence was sufficient to support the jury finding that the employees were demoted based on their
political affiliation. The court noted that the employees were long-standing, competent employees
and that both were demoted without being given any notice or opportunity to defend their
demotions, and that important documents were missing from their personnel files. According to
the court, punitive damages of $120,000 to $195,000 assessed against the chief legal advisor of the
new political administration were not excessive because the demotions jeopardized the employees'
livelihood. As a result of their demotions, one employee's salary was reduced by 60 percent and the
other's was reduced by 43 percent. Both employees suffered harm to their professional careers,
were unable to meet their financial obligations because of their reduced salaries, and suffered
emotional distress for which they sought medical attention. The court noted that “discrimination
based on political-party affiliation is rampant in government employment in Puerto Rico.”
(Administration of Corrections, Puerto Rico)

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U.S. Appeals Court
PRIVATE OPERATOR

Roles v. Maddox, 439 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2006). A prisoner brought a pro se § 1983 claim asserting

U.S. Appeals Court
SUPERVISORY
LIABILITY

Serna v. Colorado Dept. of Corrections, 455 F.3d 1146 (10th Cir. 2006). A prisoner brought
excessive force and inadequate medical care claims against various officers and officials. A state
prison director moved for summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity. The district
court denied summary judgment and director appealed. The court of appeals reversed and
remanded. The court held that: (1) the director’s authorizing the use of a special team was not
personal involvement that could form the basis for supervisory liability; (2) the director’s receipt of
periodic reports about the team’s progress was not direct participation that could give rise to
liability; (3) the director’s conduct did not constitute failure to supervise; and (4) the director was
not deliberately indifferent to the rights of inmates. The director had, at a warden’s request,
authorized a special team to conduct cell invasions to find a loaded gun. (Colorado Territorial
Corrections Facility)

U.S. District Court
DEFENSES
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
MUNICIPAL
LIABILITY

Shaw v. Coosa County Com'n., 434 F.Supp.2d 1199 (M.D.Ala. 2006). The estate of deceased inmate

U.S. District Court
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
CRIPA- Civil Rights of
Institutionalized
Persons Act

violations of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights in connection with the confiscation of
magazines by prison officials. The district court dismissed the action and the prisoner appealed.
The appeals court affirmed, finding that the exhaustion requirement of the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (PLRA) applied to prisoners who were held in private prisons, and the prisoner's claim
that his constitutional rights were violated by the confiscation of his magazines was subject to the
PLRA exhaustion requirement. (Idaho Correctional Center, operated by Corrections Corporation of
America, Inc.)

brought an action against county commission and sheriff, stemming from the inmate's death while
incarcerated at the county jail. The district court granted the county’s motion for summary
judgment. The court found that, in matters related to supervision of inmates and otherwise
operating county jails, Alabama's sheriffs are state, not county officers, and the sheriff's authority
is totally independent of the county commission. According to the court, the county commission did
not owe a duty of care under Alabama law to the inmate, where policies of the commission with
respect to funding jails or providing medical treatment to persons held in jails were not the moving
force behind the alleged injury. The court noted that, under Alabama law, sheriffs have full
responsibility for daily management of jails, including inmate supervision, and they are not subject
to county oversight in their performance of this responsibility. (Coosa County Jail, Alabama)

Siggers-El v. Barlow, 433 F.Supp.2d 811(E.D.Mich. 2006). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action
alleging that a prison official transferred him in retaliation for his exercising his First Amendment
rights. After a jury verdict in the inmate's favor, the official filed a motion for a new trial, and the
inmate moved for costs and attorney fees. The district court held that the Civil Rights of
Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA) that prohibited inmates from recovering mental or
emotional damages in the absence of a the physical injury, did not bar the inmate's claim for
emotional damages and that evidence supported the award of punitive damages. The court applied
only $1 of the inmate's damages award to his attorney fee award. The court noted that a jury may
be permitted to assess punitive damages in a § 1983 action when the defendant's conduct is shown
to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless disregard or callous
indifference to the federally protected rights of others. According to the court, the jury's award of
punitive damages against the prison official was supported by evidence that the official transferred
the inmate in retaliation for the inmate's exercise of his First Amendment free speech rights in
complaining to the official's superiors about the official's misconduct, even though the official was
aware that the transfer would prevent the inmate from seeing his attorney, from paying his
attorney, and from seeing his emotionally-disabled daughter.
The court found that the jury did not improperly use punitive damages to compensate the
inmate for the prison official's misconduct because the amount of economic damages, $4,000, was
too low. The court held that the prison official's conduct in transferring the inmate was sufficiently
reprehensible to warrant a punitive damages award of $200,000, even though prisoner transfers
were routine, and the inmate suffered only $4,000 in economic damages. According to the court, a
lesser award would have encouraged bad behavior by prison officials. The court ruled that the
inmate was entitled to reimbursement for the work of law students in calculating his attorney fee
award, even though the law students were supervised by an attorney and obtained course credit
for their work. The inmate had been represented by the law school's clinical law program, and the
law students participated as competent and professional attorneys throughout discovery,
dispositive motions, interlocutory appeal, and trial. According to the court, in calculating the
attorney fee award, the rate of $85/hour, rather than the $25/hour proposed by the defendant, was
the appropriate billing rate for time spent by law students on the case, where affidavits from local
attorneys stated that prevailing billing rates for the work of summer associates and interns was
between $100 and $130 per hour. The court applied only $1 of the inmate's $219,000 damages
award to the $90,875 in attorney's fees awarded to the plaintiff, even though the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (PLRA) prescribed application of up to 25% of such damages awards. (Michigan
Department of Corrections)

27.131
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U.S. District Court
CONSENT DECREETERMINATION
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Skinner v. Lampert, 457 F.Supp.2d 1269 (D.Wyo. 2006). An inmate, on behalf of himself and
current and future inmates at a state prison, brought a § 1983 action against state prison officials,
alleging that policies, practices, and customs of officials placed inmates at risk of unprovoked
assault, bodily injury, and death at hands of other inmates. The court found that conditions at the
prison violated inmates' Eighth Amendment right to be reasonably protected from physical
violence in the form of assaults by other inmates, and established a remedial plan to eliminate
those violations. The prison brought a motion to terminate the final decree and all related
prospective relief, under the two-year provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), and
the inmates brought a motion for contempt. The court held that its supervision over the prison's
inmate conflict documentation system could not be terminated and that the prison's interpretation
of “institutional deficiency” in the remedial plan constituted deliberate indifference. The court held
that the initial investigation requirement, reporting requirement, general incident tracking log
requirement, and educational requirement were narrowly tailored, as required by PLRA, and the
requirement for incorporation of various prison policies and state procedures were all narrowly
tailored and the least intrusive means as required by PLRA. (Wyoming State Penitentiary)

U.S. District Court
CONSENT DECREETERMINATION
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Skinner v. Uphoff, 410 F.Supp.2d 1104 (D.Wyo. 2006). A state prison inmate brought a § 1983

class action against prison officials, alleging failure to safeguard inmates against assaults by other
inmates, and seeking individual compensatory as well as class injunctive relief. The district court
granted injunctive relief and declaratory relief, finding that the defendants failed to adequately
train and supervise employees, failed to properly review policy violations, and failed to properly
discipline employees, all of which led to risks to inmate safety. In an effort to alleviate the
problems at the prison, a remedial plan was adopted and approved by the court. The parties filed
various motions to modify the remedial plan and the state moved for termination of the final
decree. The district court granted the motions in part, and denied in part. The court held that state
inmates and prison officials were entitled, under the remedial plan, to the opportunity to ask an
outside investigator about reports of his investigation of suspected premeditated inmate-on-inmate
assaults. The investigator was an independent contractor, and his reports bore directly upon
whether officials were complying with plan. The court held that the inmates had the right under
the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) to pursue discovery as to existence of the alleged ongoing
and continuing constitutional violations before the court could terminate the remedial plan entered
in the inmates' action challenging officials' responses to inmate-on-inmate violence. The court
concluded that the inmates demonstrated good cause for a 60-day postponement of an automatic
stay of the remedial plan after the officials filed a motion for termination, where the inmates made
allegations of ongoing inmate-on-inmate violence and delays in the officials' remedial actions, and
a joint expert raised various concerns. (Wyoming State Penitentiary)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
OFFICIAL CAPACITY

Smith v. Brevard County, 461 F.Supp.2d 1243 (M.D.Fla. 2006). The personal representative of the

U.S. District Court
PRIVATE OPERATOR
SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY

Stephens v. Correctional Services Corp., 428 F.Supp.2d 580 (E.D.Tex. 2006). A pretrial detainee

estate of pretrial detainee who hung himself in his cell, brought a § 1983 action on behalf of the
survivors of the estate, against a county sheriff, officers, and a non-profit corporation which was
under contract to provide mental health services to the prisoners at detention center. The sheriff,
officers and corporation moved to dismiss and the district court granted the motion in part, and
denied in part. The court held that allegations by the estate that, prior to the detainee’s hanging
himself in his cell, his family members and friends called and went to the detention center in
person to inform the non-profit corporation that the detainee was suicidal, were sufficient to
satisfy the deliberate indifference test in the suit. After receiving knowledge of the detainee’s
suicidal tendency, the corporation failed to provide adequate mental health care to the detainee.
According to the court, knowledge that the detainee was actually threatening to commit suicide
was certainly enough to show knowledge of a substantial risk of suicide, rather than just a mere
possibility. The court held that the estate stated a cause of action under § 1983 against the county
sheriff, in his official capacity, for violating the detainee’s Fourteenth Amendment rights.
According to the court, violation of the detainee’s constitutional rights was the result of the
sheriff’s failure to provide adequate staffing and safe housing for suicidal inmates, and in light of
the sheriff’s knowledge that inmate suicide was a problem, his failure to address any policies that
were causing suicides constituted deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of inmates.
(Brevard County Detention Center, Florida)

brought an action against a private jail corporation, alleging civil rights violations and common
law negligence stemming from an attack while he was incarcerated. The corporation moved for
dismissal. The district court held that the corporation was not entitled to state sovereign immunity
and that the corporation was potentially liable under § 1983. The court found that the detainee
properly stated a negligence claim, and also a viable claim for failure to train and/or supervise. The
court noted that although the establishment and maintenance of jails were “governmental
functions” under state law, jail services provided by a private entity were not. The detainee
alleged that the corporation had a duty to protect his well-being and to ensure his reasonable
safety while incarcerated, and that the corporation breached such duty by not properly segregating
him from violent inmates who threatened his life. He alleged that he informed officials of the death
threats and they took no action, and that he was severely beaten by three prisoners and suffered

27.132
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life-threatening injuries. (Jefferson County Corrections Facility, Texas)
U.S. District Court
PRIVATE PROVIDER

Sykes v. McPhillips, 412 F.Supp.2d 197 (N.D.N.Y. 2006). The personal representatives for a mother and son's
estates brought a civil rights action under § 1983 against various employees of a substance abuse correctional
facility where the son had been confined, a private hospital which provided emergency medical services to the
son, and a physician. The representatives alleged constitutional violations arising from the delivery of emergency
medical services during the son's incarceration, as well as a state law malpractice/negligence claim. The hospital
and physician moved for summary judgment on the issue of their “state actor” status. The district court granted
the motion, holding that neither the hospital nor the physician were a “state actor” for the purposes of § 1983.
According to the court, hospitals and physicians that provide care outside of the prison facility may be held to be
state actors for purposes of § 1983 when they work pursuant to a contract, but the private hospital did not
voluntarily assume the function of the state by accepting the correctional facility's delegation of its duty to provide
emergency medical care to the prisoner. The court noted that the hospital did not have an implied contract with
the correctional facility to provide emergency medical services when it treated the prisoner, given that it was
federally mandated to do so by the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA). The
prisoner suffered from diabetes while confined at the facility and the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants were
deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. The defendants maintained that the prisoner received the same
medical care as any other patient, regardless of his prisoner status. The plaintiff disputed this by pointing out that
corrections officers exercised continual custody over the prisoner in a manner that interfered with the
confidentiality normally accorded the health information of free patients, the hospital accommodated the officers'
constant attendance upon the prisoner, and the state paid for his medical care. (Hale Creek Alcohol and Substance
Abuse Correctional Treatment Center, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
FTCA- Federal Tort Claims
Act

Triestman v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471 (2nd Cir. 2006). A pro se federal prisoner, who was injured
when he was attacked by his roommate in a locked cell, brought an action against the federal Bureau of Prisons
(BOP) and the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The district court partially dismissed the
complaint and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. The court held that the suit was
not barred by the discretionary function exception to the FTCA, as the complaint's allegations could be read to
refer to negligence of the officer on duty by failing to patrol or respond diligently. The court noted that the BOP
had in place a program statement which provided that “[s]ignaling devices will be available for inmate use in all
locked housing units that do not have continuous staff coverage,” and that “[i]nmates will not be left unattended in
locked areas unless a signaling device is available to them for emergencies.” According to the court, the language
of this program statement makes it clear that prison officials must provide “continuous staff coverage” to, and
may not leave “unattended,” any inmate in a locked housing unit who does not have access to an emergency
“signaling device.” The prisoner, a first-time, non-violent inmate, had originally been “designated a low security
inmate and initially housed [in a] low security facility.” But due to overcrowding, he was transferred to a
“medium/high security prison” and was assigned to share a cell with an inmate who, the prisoner argued, “was
known to the [BOP] to be a violent criminal and sexual predator.” He was assaulted by his cellmate, dislocating
his shoulder and having his hand burned with lit cigarettes. Despite his shouts for help, no officer responded, and
during that time the prisoner was at the mercy of his cellmate, and in excruciating pain and fear. (Federal Correct’l
Institution, Ray Brook, New York)

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
COMPENSATORY
DAMAGES

Ziemba v. Armstrong, 433 F.Supp.2d 248 (D.Conn. 2006). A prison inmate sued a correctional officer under §
1983, seeking actual damages of $100,000 and punitive damages of $150,000, for injuries incurred when
excessive force was used to place the inmate in a four-point restraint. A jury returned a verdict against one officer,
who moved for judgment as matter of law and a new trial. The district court denied the motions, finding that the
officer was not entitled to qualified immunity and that the jury could find that the officer had the requisite state of
mind when he attacked the inmate. The court found that compensatory damages did not shock the conscience and
that punitive damages of $150,000 were warranted. The jury found that the officer hit the inmate in the face, knelt
on him and otherwise inflicted pain in the course of securing the inmate in a four-point restraint, where he
remained for 22 hours. The court noted that the officer engaged in reprehensible conduct by hitting the inmate
after the inmate was secured, and that punitive damages were only 50% higher than compensatory damages.
(Connecticut Department of Corrections)
2007

U.S. Appeals Court
NEGLIGENCE
FTCA- Federal Tort Claims
Act

Ashford v. U.S., 511 F.3d 501 (5th Cir. 2007). An inmate sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims
Act (FTCA) alleging that the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) was negligent in placing him in a prison
population with a gang member who had attacked him in the past. The district court entered summary judgment
for the BOP and the inmate appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that the
discretionary-function exception to FTCA did not apply if the inmate raised a concern at a prison intake interview
that he would be endangered if he were placed in the prison population with the gang member. According to the
court, genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the inmate raised a concern at the prison intake
interview, precluding summary judgment. (Federal Bureau of Prisons)

U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY
RESPONDEAT
SUPERIOR

Banks v. York, 515 F.Supp.2d 89 (D.D.C. 2007). A detainee in a jail operated by the District of Columbia
Department of Corrections (DOC), and in a correctional treatment facility operated by the District's private
contractor, brought a § 1983 action against District employees and contractor's employees alleging negligent
supervision under District of Columbia law, over-detention, deliberate indifference to serious medical needs,
harsh living conditions in jail, and extradition to Virginia without a hearing. The district court granted the
defendants’ motion to dismiss in part and denied in part. According to the court, the private corporation which
operated a prison as contractor for the District of Columbia, was performing functions normally performed by a

27.133
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municipality, and thus, the corporation could be liable to the prisoner under § 1983 if the prisoner alleged and
ultimately proved that his injuries were the result of an unconstitutional custom or policy of corporation. The
court held that the detainee sufficiently alleged that the Director of District of Columbia Department of
Corrections (DOC) was directly involved in violations of the detainee's constitutional rights, as required to state a
claim under § 1983 against a government official in his individual capacity. The detainee alleged that the Director
refused to transfer the detainee from the jail to a correctional treatment facility and failed to train DOC employees
under his supervision in such a way as to prevent the detainee's over-detention (detention beyond proper release
date). The court found that the Director of District of Columbia Department of Corrections (DOC) could not be
liable in his individual capacity, under the theory of respondeat superior, to the jail detainee for allegedly
unconstitutional actions or omissions of his subordinates. The court found that the detainee's allegations that a
DOC captain placed him in solitary confinement in retaliation for his oral complaint to the captain that his newlyassigned cellmate was HIV positive, stated a claim under § 1983 for retaliation for exercising First Amendment
free speech rights. The court found that whether the detainee had a protected right under the First Amendment, to
complain to the captain was not clearly established at the time, and thus, the captain had qualified immunity from
the detainee's§ 1983 claim. The court found that the detainee's allegations that the Director of the Department of
Corrections (DOC), despite his actual and constructive knowledge that DOC employees were engaged in conduct
that posed a pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury through over-detention, failed to train,
monitor, and discipline DOC employees with regard to timely release of inmates from DOC custody, and that the
Director's deliberate failure to do so caused detainee's over-detention, were sufficient when construed liberally to
state a claim under § 1983 for violation of due process and violation of protection against cruel and unusual
punishment. The court noted that the detainee had a clearly established constitutional protection against overdetention and thus, the Director was not entitled to qualified immunity. (Central Detention Facility. D.C. and
Correctional Treatment Facility operated by the Corrections Corporation of America)
U.S. District Court
BIVENS CLAIM
FTCA- Federal Tort Claims
Act

Barbaro v. U.S. ex rel. Federal Bureau of Prisons FCI Otisville, 521 F.Supp.2d 276, (S.D.N.Y. 2007). A federal
prison inmate brought a pro se Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) suit against the Bureau of Prisons (BOP),
alleging failure to treat his preexisting injuries, and asserted Eighth Amendment Bivens claims against individual
prison officials, alleging deliberate indifference to his medical needs. The district court granted the defendants'
motion to dismiss in part, on statutes of limitations grounds. Following the appointment of counsel for the inmate,
the inmate renewed his opposition to the motion to dismiss. The district court rejected the inmate’s opposition.
The prisoner alleged that officials failed to treat his preexisting back and neck injuries, allegedly leading to the
deterioration of his condition. (Federal Correctional Institution in Otisville, New York)

U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
STATE LIABILITY

Bush v. Butler, 521 F.Supp.2d 63 (D.D.C. 2007). An inmate sued two attorneys, an investigative reporter, a civil
liberties organization, and unknown defendants, alleging that the defendants engaged in a conspiracy to deprive
him of his civil rights and failed to prevent a conspiracy in violation of his civil rights. The inmate also asserted
state-law claims for legal malpractice, negligent misrepresentation, constructive fraud, breach of contract, breach
of implied warranty, civil conspiracy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and breach of fiduciary duty.
The defendants filed motions to dismiss. The district court dismissed the case. The court held that the inmate
failed to sufficiently allege the existence of a conspiracy to deprive him of his civil rights when he asserted that
the defendants agreed to punish him by interfering with his access to the courts, breaching their contract with him,
and making fraudulent misrepresentations. The court noted that the inmate failed to describe the persons involved
in the alleged agreement, the nature of the agreement, the particular acts taken to form a conspiracy, and overt acts
taken in furtherance of the conspiracy. The court held that it did not have diversity jurisdiction over state-law
claims. (Eastern Correctional Institution, Maryland)

U.S. District Court
INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY

Cobb v. Marshall, 481 F.Supp.2d 1248 (M.D.Ala. 2007). An older black female correctional officer sued a sheriff
under Title VII, Fourteenth Amendment equal protection as enforced by § 1983, and state law for hostile work
environment sexual harassment, retaliation, and race discrimination. The sheriff moved to dismiss for failure to
state a claim. The district court granted the motion in part and denied the motion in part. The court held that the
Title VII claims would not be dismissed on the basis of failure to name the sheriff in the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) charge, but that the officer could not bring Title VII claims against the sheriff
in his individual capacity. The court found that the officer stated Title VII claims for retaliation and race
discrimination, where she alleged that she filed an EEOC charge and provided favorable testimony in support of a
coworker's claim “against the department,” that as a result of those activities she was subjected to various forms of
retaliation, including denial of her request for leave, all in violation of Title VII, and pleaded that she was
disciplined more harshly than other similarly-situated Caucasian employees and was denied certain benefits which
other similarly-situated Caucasian employees received. (Montgomery County Sheriff's Department, Alabama)

U.S. District Court
SUPERVISORY
LIABILITY

Danley v. Allyn, 485 F.Supp.2d 1260 (N.D.Ala. 2007). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against jail
officers, alleging that he was subjected to excessive force and then denied medical treatment when they sprayed
him with pepper spray. The district court denied the defendants' motions to dismiss and they appealed. The court
of appeals vacated and remanded. On the remand, the district court again denied the defendants’ motion to
dismiss. The court held that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity from the detainee's claim that the
officers subjected him to excessive force, in violation of Fourteenth Amendment, by pepper spraying him in
response to a dispute over toilet paper. The court noted that the officers had fair warning that to employ pepper
spray as punishment, or for the sadistic pleasure of the sprayers, as distinguished from what was reasonably
necessary to maintain prisoner control, was constitutionally prohibited. The court found that the detainee'
allegations that a jail administrator and sheriff created an atmosphere or practice under which the defendant
officers operated in allegedly subjecting the detainee to excessive force and then denying him medical treatment
when they sprayed him with pepper spray, were sufficient, if proven, to create supervisory liability under § 1983.
The court held that the detainee's claim of deliberate indifference on behalf of defendant officers, wherein they
failed to provide medical attention to the detainee after using pepper spray against him, was no more than a

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continuation of the detainee's excessive force claim, and thus was not a separate cause of action under § 1983.
(Lauderdale Detention Center, Alabama)
U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
FTCA- Federal Tort Claims
Act

Davis v. U.S., 474 F.Supp.2d 829 (N.D.Tex. 2007). An inmate who was raped by a prison officer in a federal
medical center brought a Federal Tort Claims Act action against the United States, alleging negligence on the part
of other prison officers. The district court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court found
that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the prison officers were
working within the scope of their employment when they led the inmate to another officer who raped her, whether
the officers violated a duty to protect the inmate from harm, and whether their violations proximately caused the
inmate’s injury. (Federal Medical Center-Carswell, Texas)

U.S. District Court
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Hadix v. Caruso, 492 F.Supp.2d 743 (W.D.Mich. 2007). Prisoners brought a suit to correct unconstitutional
prison conditions necessary for prisoner health and safety, and requested injunctive relief as to a heat-related
injury. The district court entered an injunction. The court held that prison officials may not, consistent with Eighth
Amendment values, cause the expected deaths of prisoners subject to heat-illness by exposing them to high heat
and humidity conditions. According to the court, the requirements for safe Eighth Amendment custody are
violated by housing high-risk inmates in facilities which are routinely at heat index levels above 90 during
summer months, when it is known that such heat conditions will reliably cause heat injury and death. The court
ruled that the prisoners were entitled to an injunction requiring that all prisoners classified at high-risk for heatrelated injury be housed in areas in which the heat index was reliably maintained below a heat index of 90. The
court noted that the injunction was necessary to prevent irreparable harm, including bodily injury and death, and
that the scope of the injunction was narrowly tailored and was the least intrusive means of correction of the Eighth
Amendment violation. (Southern Michigan Correctional Facility, Charles E. Egeler Correctional Facility)

U.S. District Court
NEGLIGENT HIRING
NEGLIGENT RETENTION

Heckenlaible v. Virginia Peninsula Regional Jail Authority, 491 F.Supp.2d 544 (E.D.Va. 2007). An inmate
brought an action against a correctional officer and regional jail authority, seeking to recover monetary relief for
injuries suffered as a result of an allegedly nonconsensual sexual encounter between her and the officer. The jail
authority moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part, and denied in part. The
court found that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
correctional officer, whose duties required him to observe inmates in the shower, was acting within the scope of
his employment when he allegedly sexually assaulted the inmate after he observed her showering and during a
“cell search” thereafter. The court held that the inmate’s deposition testimony that she was the victim of a sexual
assault by the correctional officer was sufficient to preclude summary judgment in favor of the jail authority on
her intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. The court found that absent evidence indicating that the
correctional officer was known by anyone to have a propensity to commit sexual assault at the time he was hired,
or evidence indicating that some testing would have revealed that the officer would pose a danger to inmates, the
jail authority was not liable under Virginia law on the inmate's negligent hiring claim. The court also found that
since the jail authority never received any complaints from inmates about the officer, and swiftly investigated the
matter and took appropriate action upon learning that a sexual encounter had occurred, it was not liable for
negligent retention. (Virginia Peninsula Regional Jail)

U.S. District Court
NEGLIGENCE

Heredia v. Doe, 473 F.Supp.2d 462 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). An inmate filed a § 1983 action against county jail officials
alleging that he slipped and fell at a jail, and was denied proper medical treatment. The officials moved to dismiss
the complaint and the district court granted the motion. The court held that the inmate’s claim that he injured his
back when he slipped and fell at the county jail was nothing more than a claim for negligence, for which there was
no cause of action under § 1983. The inmate alleged he slipped and fell while walking to his cell and in the
process injured his back “to the point it swelled up and was in a lot of pain.” The court also found that officials
were not deliberately indifferent to the inmate’s medical needs, despite a one-day delay in providing treatment,
where the jail medical department took X-rays and provided pain medication. (Sullivan Corr’l. Facil., New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Hutchins v. McDaniels, 512 F.3d 193 (5th Cir. 2007). A prison inmate who was subjected to strip and cavity
searches by a prison officer brought suit under § 1983 to recover for alleged violation of his Fourth Amendment
rights. The district court entered an order dismissing the complaint and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court
reversed and remanded. The court held that the inmate’s allegations regarding strip and cavity searches to which
he was subjected by a prison officer who never accused him of possessing contraband during the search, and who
was allegedly wearing a “lewd smile” during the procedure, were sufficient to state a claim for violation of the
inmate's Fourth Amendment rights. The court noted that the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) prohibits a
prisoner from recovering compensatory damages in any federal civil action absent a showing of physical injury.
According to the court, the inmate's failure to allege that he had sustained any physical injury as a result of a strip
and cavity search, prevented him from asserting a claim for recovery of compensatory damages for emotional or
mental injuries that he allegedly suffered. The court noted that the inmate did not have to allege any physical
injury in order to state a claim for recovery of nominal or punitive damages for the officer's alleged violation of
his Fourth Amendment rights. (California Men’s Colony East)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
FAILURE TO TRAIN
POLICIES/PROCEDURES
SUPERVISORY
LIABILITY

Jenkins v. DeKalb County, Ga., 528 F.Supp.2d 1329 (N.D.Ga. 2007). Survivors of a county jail detainee who had
died as the result of an apparent beating by a fellow inmate brought a § 1983, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment
action against a county sheriff in his individual capacity, and against corrections officers. The defendants moved
for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The district court granted the motion. The 71 year old
pretrial detainee suffered from multiple mental illnesses including schizophrenia and dementia, which reportedly
manifested themselves in theform of delusions, paranoia, bizarre thoughts and behavior, physical violence, and
verbal outbursts that included racial epithets. The court held that county corrections officers' putting the inmate
into a cell different from the one to which he had been assigned, allegedly leading to the beating death of a pretrial
detainee who shared the same cell, did not violate the detainee's right against cruel and unusual punishment. The

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court noted that even though the action violated a jail policy, the policy was created primarily to keep track of
inmates' placement, not to maintain inmate safety, and there was no evidence of widespread inmate-on-inmate
violence due to the misplacement of inmates. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to show that the sheriff's
alleged poor training and supervision of corrections officers led to the officers' allegedly inadequate reaction to
the incident between the jail inmates, which ended with the beating death of one inmate. The court also found that
the sheriff's failure to comply with a court order to transfer the pretrial detainee to a mental health facility did not
show supervisory liability because the purpose of the transfer order was likely to get the detainee treatment for
mental illness, not to protect him. The court held that the county corrections officers were acting within the scope
of their duties when they mistakenly placed a fellow inmate in the same cell with a pretrial detainee, and thus the
officers were eligible for qualified immunity in the detainee’s survivors' § 1983 Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendment action. The court noted that the fact that the mistake violated jail policies or procedures did not mean
that the officers were not exercising discretionary authority. (DeKalb County Jail, Georgia)
U.S. District Court
NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION
DAMAGES

Limone v. U.S., 497 F.Supp.2d 143 (D.Mass. 2007). Two former prisoners whose convictions arising out of a
murder were overturned, and representatives of two co-defendants who died in prison, sued the United States and
individual federal and state law enforcement officers under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), Bivens, § 1983,
and state law, alleging their complicity in framing the prisoners. Following a bench trial, the district court entered
judgment for the plaintiffs. The court held that:(1) FBI agents engaged in malicious prosecution; (2) agents
engaged in a coercive conspiracy; (3) agents intentionally inflicted emotional distress on the prisoners; (4) agents
were negligent in their treatment of prisoners; (5) FBI was liable for negligent supervision of the agents activities;
(6) damages for wrongful imprisonment would be set at the rate of $1 million per year, adjusted for unrelated
concurrent sentences; (7) loss of consortium damages would be awarded to wives and children of prisoners; and
(8) damages would be awarded for intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
SUPERVISORY
LIABILITY

Murphy v. Franklin, 510 F.Supp.2d 558 (M.D.Ala. 2007). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against a
sheriff and jail administrator, alleging that he was subjected to punitive, degrading and inhumane treatment when,
without explanation, he was shackled hands-to-feet to the toilet in an isolation cell, and, on another occasion,
shackled to his cot. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss in part and denied in part. The
court held that although the detainee's complaint against the sheriff and jail administrator did not allege that he
was subjected to mistreatment pursuant to any specific official policy, the detainee's allegations that the sheriff
promulgated all policies and procedures in the county jail, that the detainee was placed in an isolation cell and
shackled hands-to-feet to the toilet, which was nothing more than a hole in the ground covered by a grate, and that
the sheriff ordered the detainee removed from this cell for an interview and then reshackled to the toilet grate,
were sufficiently specific to state a § 1983 claim against the sheriff under the theory of supervisory liability. The
detainee alleged that without explanation, he was moved into a ‘lockdown’ cell for one day, in which his right
hand was cuffed to the frame of his cot and his right leg was shackled to the other end of the cot's frame. Again
without explanation, he was allegedly then moved to an isolation cell, where he was shackled hands-to-feet to the
toilet, which is actually nothing more than a hole in the ground. He alleged that he was held in this configuration
for almost 12 days and was not released to allow urination or defecation, which caused him to soil himself, and
that he was also not given any personal necessities such as clean, dry clothing, personal hygiene items, or
bedding. (Elmore County Jail, Alabama)

U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
NEGLIGENCE

Norris v. Corrections Corp. of America, 521 F.Supp.2d 586 (W.D.Ky. 2007). The victim of an assault, rape, and
robbery filed suit against a private corrections company operating a prison under contract for a state, claiming the
company's negligence in allowing a prisoner to escape led to her injuries. The prisoner had crawled out of a
window of the facility and walked away. The corrections company moved for summary judgment. The district
court sustained the motion. The court ruled that the prisoner's harm to the victim was unforeseeable, and the
prisoner's acts were the intervening and superseding cause. The court noted that the company did not have a
special relationship by being in charge of a person with dangerous propensities that created a duty of care to
control the prisoner's conduct and to protect a third-party victim. (Marion Adjustment Center, Kentucky, Operated
by Corrections Corporation of America)

U.S. District Court
NEGLIGENT RETENTION

Orange v. Fielding, 517 F.Supp.2d 776 (D.S.C. 2007). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against two
detention center administrators to recover for a beating by officers. The court granted summary judgment in favor
of one administrator, and denied the other administrator's motion. The court held that the detainee's conclusory
statements in an affidavit, that the administrator was aware of an officer's aggressiveness toward inmates and
failed to protect the detainee, were insufficient to preclude summary judgment. The court found that the detainee's
affidavit stating that he spoke with the administrator several times about danger from officers, but that the
administrator failed to take action, raised genuine issues of material fact, precluding summary judgment in favor
of the other administrator. (Georgetown County Detention Center, South Carolina)

U.S. District Court
CLASS ACTION
CONSENT DECREE

Palmigiano v. Sundlun, 482 F.Supp.2d 207 (D.R.I. 2007). Inmates moved to join or intervene in a class action
lawsuit challenging prison conditions, settled by agreement 13 years previously. The district court denied the
motions. The court held that the agreement that settled a class action suit by inmates and called for complete
dissolution and dismissal of court orders, terminated the class action insofar as it concerned complaints regarding
prison conditions, precluding joinder of current inmates who alleged deficient medical, mental health and dental
care, environmental health and safety, management, security and inmate inactivity. (Adult Correctional
Institutions, Rhode Island)

U.S. Appeals Court
DAMAGES
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Phillips v. Hust, 477 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2007). A state prisoner brought a pro se § 1983 action against a prison
librarian in her personal and official capacities, alleging violation of his right to free speech and right of access to
court under the First Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the prisoner, and
subsequently awarded compensatory damages of $1,500. The librarian appealed. The appeals court affirmed in

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part, and remanded. The court held that the librarian’s refusal to allow the prisoner to comb-bind his petition for a
writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court violated the state prisoner’s First Amendment right of access
to the courts, where the prisoner raised a nonfrivolous claim in his certiorari petition, a state court applied an
incorrect legal standard in determining the prisoner’s ineffective assistance to counsel claim in his postconviction
petition, and the denial of the use of comb-binding machine frustrated his attempt to press his claim in the
Supreme Court. The court noted that even if Supreme Court rules did not require comb-binding, it was the binding
method the prison routinely made available to the prisoner and others, it was foreseeable that the librarian’s
refusal would obstruct the prisoner’s ability to file a petition in a timely manner, and the prisoner had no
independent tort cause of action against the librarian for violation of his rights. The court found that the librarian
was not entitled to qualified immunity for her conduct in refusing to allow the prisoner to use a comb-binding
machine, where her conduct violated the prisoner’s clearly established right to prepare, serve, and file court
documents in a timely manner, and not to be subjected to arbitrary enforcement of prison rules. The prisoner’s
petition missed the Supreme Court filing deadline and was denied as untimely. The appeals court held that the
librarian’s refusal was blatantly contrary to past practice and state prison regulations, and under existing
precedent, the librarian should have known that refusal of the prisoner’s request could result in missing the filing
deadline. According to the court, the damages award could be based on costs that the prisoner expended in
prosecuting his postconviction relief petition over the course of many years and any mental or emotional injury
the prisoner suffered, but the district court was required to make specific findings concerning the amount of the
costs expended as well as specific findings concerning mental or emotional injury. The court concluded that
where the district court’s findings are insufficient to indicate the factual basis for its ultimate conclusion
concerning damages in a § 1983 claim, its finding as to the amount of damages is clearly erroneous. On appeal to
the United States Supreme Court (555 U.S. 1150) the decision was vacated. (Snake River Correctional Institution,
Oregon)
U.S. Appeals Court
COMPENSATORY
DAMAGES

Phillips v. Hust, 507 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2007). A state prisoner brought a pro se § 1983 action against a prison
librarian in her personal and official capacities, alleging violations of his right to free speech and right to access
courts under the First Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of prisoner, and
subsequently awarded compensatory damages of $1,500. The librarian appealed. The appeals court affirmed in
part, reversed in part and remanded. The court held that the librarian's refusal to allow the prisoner to comb-bind
his petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court violated the prisoner's First Amendment
right of access to the courts, the librarian was not entitled to qualified immunity, and the district court was
required to make specific findings to support the damages award. The appeals court denied the librarian’s petition
for rehearing. In a dissent, Circuit Judge Kozinski expressed his “utter astonishment that we're leaving an opinion
on the books that not only denies the prison librarian qualified immunity but actually holds her liable. Her
transgression? Failing to help a prisoner bind a brief in a way that's not even permitted, and certainly not required,
by the Supreme Court's rules….How the prison librarian violated any of his rights, let alone his clearly established
rights, is a mystery that repeated readings of the majority opinion do not dispel.” (Snake River Correctional
Institution, Oregon)

U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Primus v. Lee, 517 F.Supp.2d 755 (D.S.C. 2007.) A prisoner brought a pro se medical malpractice action against a
prison surgeon, prison physician, and the director of the state Department of Corrections. The defendants moved
to dismiss, and the prisoner moved for leave to amend. The district court dismissed the action without prejudice
and granted the plaintiff’s motion to amend. The court held that the allegations did not state an Eighth
Amendment claim for deliberate indifference, and that the prisoner's proposed amendment would not be futile.
According to the court, the allegations that a prison surgeon negligently performed surgery, which resulted in the
unwanted removal of the prisoner's testicle, did not state a § 1983 claim for deliberate indifference to the
prisoner's serious medical needs under the Eighth Amendment. The prisoner's proposed amendment, alleging that
the surgeon contracted with the state corrections department to provide surgical treatment, and that the surgeon
unnecessarily and maliciously removed the prisoner's testicle in retaliation for the prisoner's lack of cooperation,
could state a § 1983 claim for deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment. The court noted that when a
physician cooperates with the state and assumes the state's constitutional obligation to provide medical care to its
prisoners, he or she acts “under color of state law,” for purpose of a § 1983 action. (Lee Correctional Institution,
South Carolina)

U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1983

Probst v. Central Ohio Youth Center, 511 F.Supp.2d 862 (S.D. Ohio 2007). A plaintiff, on behalf of the estate of
her son who committed suicide while incarcerated at juvenile detention facility, brought a wrongful-death action
against the facility, its superintendent, a non-profit provider that performed suicide evaluations at the facility and a
social worker employed by the provider. The plaintiff asserted claims under § 1983 and state law. The facility and
non-profit moved for summary judgment. The district court denied the motion. The court held that under the state
compulsion test, the private provider that performed suicide evaluations at the juvenile detention facility was not a
“state actor” for § 1983 purposes. The court noted that the facility did not exert any control over suicide
evaluations and the provider performed evaluations on an as-needed basis using its own standards and procedures.
According to the court, the facility had discretion to implement the provider's recommendations resulting from the
evaluations. But the court held that the private provider was a state actor for § 1983 purposes because it was
performing a “public function.” (Central Ohio Youth Center)

U.S. District Court
SPECIAL MASTER

Roberts v. County of Mahoning, Ohio, 495 F.Supp.2d 784 (N.D.Ohio 2007). Pretrial detainees and convicted
prisoners being held in the custody of an Ohio sheriff at two correctional facilities that were allegedly
understaffed and overcrowded brought a § 1983 class action against the county, sheriff, and county
commissioners, alleging that conditions of confinement at those facilities were unconstitutional. The district court
appointed a special master for the remedial phase of the litigation. A three-judge panel of the district court

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approved the proposed stipulated order. The district court held that the appointment of a special master had
accomplished the court's original objective and the appointment would be terminated. The court noted that the
special master's reports and other actions had fulfilled the requirement that he “assist the parties, specifically the
Defendants, in attempting to find a solution to the problems which created the unconstitutional conditions in the
Jail,” and his fourth report had established a mechanism for the litigation's actual resolution. The first two reports
addressed a narrowly avoided crisis that would have resulted from massive layoffs of security staff as a result of a
budget shortfall in the county. The third report, filed after passage of a successful ballot issue increasing revenues
available for the funding of the MCJC, described the parties' continued cooperation in attempting to resolve the
problems facing the jail, in particular, the need for accelerated collection of the proceeds from the successful bond
issue. The court concluded “These reports, to which no party filed any objection, were instrumental in establishing
an informational foundation for discussions of possible remedies to the phenomenon of chronic and serious
crowding in the jail.” (Mahoning County Justice Center, Ohio)
U.S. District Court
SPECIAL MASTER

Roberts v. Mahoning County, 495 F.Supp.2d 719 (N.D.Ohio 2007). Pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners
being held in the custody of an Ohio sheriff at one of two correctional facilities that were allegedly understaffed
and overcrowded brought a § 1983 class action against the county, sheriff, and county commissioners alleging
that conditions of confinement at those facilities were unconstitutional. The district court held that there was clear
and convincing evidence that crowding was the primary cause of the violation of a federal right, and that no other
relief besides a prisoner release order would remedy that violation. The release order provided for incarceration of
all violent felons and for reopening of all jail facilities under the control of the county to maximum occupancy,
while at the same time protecting the constitutional rights of inmates in the county jail facilities. (Mahoning
County Justice Center, Ohio)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONSENT DECREEMODIFICATION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Rowe v. Jones, 483 F.3d 791 (11th Cir. 2007). Following settlement of county prisoners’ § 1983 class action
lawsuit against county officials, an inmate welfare fund was created. The district court dismissed the officials’
motion to terminate a permanent plan for a charitable trust providing for donations from the fund. The officials
appealed and the appeals court reversed and remanded with instructions. The court held that an order establishing
a charitable trust funded by an inmate welfare fund, and a later order continuing the charitable trust were “consent
decrees,” rather than “private settlement agreements,” under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The court
noted that PLRA’s termination provisions, limiting prospective relief, are applicable to consent decrees but not to
private settlement agreements. The court noted that county officials did not sign either the order or otherwise
indicate their consent to the charitable trust, the orders bore the district judge’s signature and the district court’s
official stamp, and the district court retained jurisdiction over the enforcement of the charitable trust in both
orders. (Glynn County Detention Center, Georgia)

U.S. District Court
RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act

Schnitzler v. Reisch, 518 F.Supp.2d 1098 (D.S.D. 2007). An inmate who was a practicing Jehovah’s Witness
brought a § 1983 action against a secretary of corrections, warden, and prison officials, alleging that a prison's sex
offender treatment program violated his religious beliefs by requiring his participation in explicit group
discussions of a sexual nature as well as viewing certain images. The defendants moved for summary judgment
and the district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the prisoner's First
Amendment rights were not violated by participation in the program, but the prisoner stated a claim for violation
of his statutory free exercise of religion under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA). The court held that the § 1983 claims against the secretary and warden were not based upon the theory
of respondeat superior. The court found that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact
as to the level of personal involvement of the warden and the Secretary of the South Dakota Department of
Corrections in the determination that no alternative form of sex offender treatment program should be provided to
the prisoner. (Mike Durfee State Penitentiary, Springfield, South Dakota)

U.S. District Court
FTCA- Federal Tort Claims
Act

Smith v. U.S., 518 F.Supp.2d 139 (D.D.C. 2007). The mother of a child who was murdered by a parolee brought
an action under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) against the United States. The district court granted the
defendants’ motion for dismissal. The court held that an FTCA claim did not accrue until the mother knew or
should have known that the parolee was the person who killed her daughter, and that his presence in the
community was connected to the government in some way. The court found that the mother failed to make a
necessary showing to delay the accrual of her claim, the mother was not entitled to deviation from the objective
standard for determining whether she established that she could not have discovered her injury and its cause with
the exercise of due diligence. According to the court, even if extreme circumstances could justify a deviation from
the objective standard for whether an FTCA plaintiff established that she could not have discovered her injury and
its cause with the exercise of due diligence, the mother’s affidavit and declaration of her psychiatrist demonstrated
that she had suffered tremendously since the death of her daughter, but it did not establish sufficiently extreme
mental disability. (District of Columbia)

U.S. District Court
SUPERVISORY
LIABILITY

Streeter v. Goord, 519 F.Supp.2d 289 (N.D.N.Y. 2007). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action, alleging prison
officials and medical personnel acted with deliberate indifference in treating his sickle cell anemia in violation of
the Eighth Amendment. The court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court held that the
inmate’s condition during the sickle cell crisis was a “serious medical condition,” for the purposes of an Eighth
Amendment § 1983 claim. The court found that there was no evidence that a prison doctor knowingly disregarded
an excessive risk to the prisoner's health or safety, and that a delay in flushing the prisoner's catheter was not a
serious medical need. According to the court, the prisoner's conclusory allegations about prison nurses were
insufficient to establish that they knowingly disregarded a serious risk to his health. The court concluded that
there was no evidence that the prison commissioner was aware of the alleged constitutional violations that
occurred, nor was there any evidence that he implemented or sanctioned policies or customs amounting to a
constitutional violation, as was required to impose supervisory liability in § 1983 action. The court also found that

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the prison superintendent had no personal involvement in alleged violations as was required to impose supervisory
liability under § 1983. The court noted that the superintendent was not serving at the prison at the time of the
events relevant to the prisoner’s claims. (Coxsackie Correctional Facility, New York)
U.S. District Court
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

Strope v. Collins, 492 F.Supp.2d 1289 (D.Kan. 2007). Inmates brought a civil rights action against prison
officials, stemming from censorship of magazines containing alleged nudity. The parties moved for summary
judgment. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The district court held that summary
judgment on the inmates’ claims alleging First Amendment violations was precluded by genuine issues of
material fact, regarding whether prison officials' withholding of publications containing alleged nudity was
reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. The court found that an inmate who sued prison officials
was afforded adequate procedural due process in the denial of access to magazines containing alleged nudity,
where the inmate was given written notice of withholding of the magazine by way of an “Appeal of Censored
Material,” was told verbally about the refusal to process a Special Purpose Order (SPO) for a supplemental issue,
and had the opportunity to grieve the censorship and appeal decisions to prison officials who were not involved in
original process. According to the court, the prison officials were not entitled to sovereign immunity to the extent
that the inmates were seeking prospective injunctive relief from the officials in their official capacities, where the
inmates adequately indicated that they were challenging the nudity regulation itself and the manner in which it
could be applied prospectively. The court held that officials were not entitled to qualified immunity to the extent
that they were being sued in their individual capacities, where the claim that the censorship was not related to
legitimate penological interests implicated clearly-established First Amendment rights. The court held that
genuine issues of material fact, regarding the extent to which the prison warden personally participated in the
alleged deprivation of the inmates' First Amendment right to receive information by censoring magazines
containing alleged nudity, precluded summary judgment on claims alleging the warden's vicarious liability under
a federal civil rights statute. (Lansing Correctional Facility, Kansas)

U.S. District Court
INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY

Wakat v. Montgomery County, 471 F.Supp.2d 759 (S.D.Tex 2007). The estate of inmate who died in a county jail
brought a § 1983 action against the county, jail physician, and other county personnel. The defendants moved for
summary judgment. The district court held that the county was not liable based on a county policy, the county was
not liable for failure to train or supervise county jail personnel, and a physician did not act with deliberate
indifference to the inmate's serious medical needs. The court held that the county sheriff was not liable in his
individual capacity under § 1983 to the estate of the inmate absent a showing that he participated in any of the
alleged activities in any individual capacity. According to the court, the county was not liable to the estate under §
1983 for deliberate indifference to the inmate's serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment, since
the county policy did not directly cause county personnel to fail to seek physician approval to reinitiate the
inmate's prescription medication. The court noted that although the jail had a written policy of abruptly
discontinuing any narcotic medications when inmates were initially processed for booking, regardless of whether
the inmate had a valid prescription for the narcotic, the jail also had a policy allowing the narcotic medications to
be reinstated with the permission of a doctor. (Montgomery County Jail, Texas)

U.S. Appeals Court
FTCA- Federal Tort Claims
Act

Watson v. U.S., 485 F.3d 1100 (10th Cir. 2007). A guardian brought an action on behalf of an incapacitated
former federal prisoner under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), alleging that the government responded
negligently to the prisoner's medical condition, resulting in a brain hemorrhage that left him severely and
permanently disabled. The district court entered a jury verdict in favor of the defendants and the guardian
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that there was sufficient evidence that the government
lacked notice of the need to closely observe the prisoner for post-surgical complications upon his return to the
correctional facility after brain surgery. Evidence indicated that the prisoner did not require observation upon his
return to the facility, that he was neurologically normal except for mild speech problems, and that he was
discharged with the instruction only that he continue speech and occupational therapy, with no need for further
observation. The court upheld the district court’s finding that the government did not breach any applicable
standard of care by failing to summon an air ambulance after the prisoner was found unconscious in his cell,
where expert physicians testified that the use of an air ambulance was dependent upon distance, necessity, and the
patient's best interest, but did not suggest that such factors applied to the prisoner's case. (Federal Correctional
Institute in El Reno, Oklahoma)
2008

U.S. Appeals Court
STATE REMEDIES

Alba v. Montford, 517 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2008). A federal prisoner incarcerated in a privately operated
correctional facility brought a pro se § 1983 action against prison employees for allegedly acting with deliberate
indifference to his medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court interpreted the
complaint as asserting a claim under Bivens and dismissed it for failure to state a claim because the prisoner had
adequate state remedies available. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that even
assuming that the private prison was a government actor for the purposes of Bivens liability, alternative remedies
existed by which the prisoner could recover from its employees. (McRae Correctional Facility, Corrections
Corporation of America, Georgia)

U.S. District Court
COMPENSATORY
DAMAGES
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Antoine v. County of Sacramento, 566 F.Supp.2d 1045 (E.D.Cal. 2008). A pretrial detainee brought a civil rights
action against corrections officers based upon the officers' use of a “grating” restraint practice. After a jury verdict
in favor of the detainees, the officers moved for a new trial. The district court granted the motion in part and
denied in part. The court held that it was proper to permit an expert witness to express his opinions regarding the
propriety of the “grating” practice in the context of whether the officers' decision to employ that practice rather
than the “prostraint” restraining chair was appropriate. The court found that the compensatory damages instruction
given in the detainee's civil rights action was in error since it permitted the jury to believe that it could award an

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unlimited amount of non-compensatory damages to compensate the plaintiff for the abstract “value” of his
constitutional rights. According to the court, the use of the term “constitutional injuries”--combined with the
instruction allowing the jury to award nominal damages, and the omission of the $1.00 limit--invited the jury to
award an unlimited amount of damages based on the importance of the plaintiff's constitutional rights in lieu of
awarding compensatory damages. The jury awarded the detainee $20,000 in compensatory damages as well as
$25,000 in punitive damages against each of four defendants, and $50,000 against one defendant. (Sacramento
County, California)
U.S. Appeals Court
SUPERVISORY
LIABILITY
CONTRACT SERVICES

Brown v. District of Columbia, 514 F.3d 1279 (D.C. Cir. 2008). A District of Columbia prisoner brought Eighth
Amendment civil rights claims against the District, mayor, operator of a private prison and various correctional
officials and employees, among others. The district court dismissed certain claims for failure to effect service and
others for failure to state a claim. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded. The court held that the prisoner stated a claim for violation of his Eighth Amendment rights through
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The court also found that the allegations were sufficient to
state a claim for Monell liability against the District for Eighth Amendment violations by alleging that prison
officers failed to transfer him for treatment for 60 days following a physician's notification that the prisoner was in
need of immediate hospitalization for gallstones. The court found that the allegations were insufficient to state a
supervisory liability claim against a correctional official who supervised the care of prisoners “housed in contract
facilities” for alleged wrongdoing at a correctional facility that did not qualify as a “contract facility”. (District of
Columbia, Corrections Corporation of America, Occoquan Correctional Facility in Lorton, Virginia)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
NEGLIGENCE
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
SUPERVISORY
LIABILITY

Buckley v. Barbour County, Ala., 624 F.Supp.2d 1335 (M.D.Ala. 2008). An inmate brought § 1983, Eighth
Amendment and due process claims, as well as state law claims, against a county and a work-crew supervisor,
alleging that his back was injured as the result of a failure to train him in equipment safety before he cleared trees
as part of a prison work crew. The county and supervisor filed separate motions to dismiss. The district court
granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that the inmate's allegations that the county failed to
train him and another inmate in equipment operations safety, that they were ordered while part of a community
work squad to use chainsaws to cut a large oak tree to clear it from a roadway, and that the tree rolled onto the
inmate, breaking his back, were sufficient to plead a causal connection between the county's practice or custom of
failing to train and the inmate's injury. The court noted that the inmate was not required to allege a specific
practice or custom of failing to train inmates to avoid falling trees. The court held that the inmate's allegations
were also sufficient to show the county's awareness of facts from which an inference of a substantial risk of harm
could be drawn, as required to plead a deliberate indifference § 1983 Eighth Amendment claim. According to the
court, the inmate's allegations that a prison work-crew supervisor was aware that the inmate was not trained in
equipment safety and felt unqualified to use a chainsaw, yet still ordered the inmate to use a chainsaw to cut a
fallen tree hanging over a ditch, were sufficient to plead a § 1983 Eighth Amendment claim against the
supervisor. The court also denied qualified immunity from the inmate’s allegations. According to the court, under
Alabama law, the inmate's allegations that the work-crew supervisor ordered him and another inmate to cut a tree
hanging over a ditch with chainsaws, with the knowledge they were not trained in equipment safety, and that the
tree rolled onto the inmate breaking his back, were sufficient to plead willful negligence by the supervisor.
(Barbour County Community Work Squad, Alabama)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
COMPENSATORY
DAMAGES

Cameron v. Myers, 569 F.Supp.2d 762 (N.D.Ind. 2008). A prisoner moved for a default judgment on a § 1983
claim against a prison doctor for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the prison doctor was deliberately
indifferent to the prisoner's serious medical needs, and an award of $250,350 in compensatory damages, and
denial of punitive damages was warranted. According to the court, the doctor was deliberately indifferent to the
prisoner's serious medical needs in failing to provide the prisoner with the necessary and urgent medical care and
treatment required for his Crohn's disease, which also led to the prisoner's development of a flesh eating disease.
The court found that the doctor was plainly subjectively aware of the prisoner's objectively serious medical
condition because of the diagnosis established in his previous doctor's medical records as well as by what the
prisoner told him, and the doctor's inaction forced the prisoner to endure tremendous pain and suffering stemming
from his untreated Crohn's disease as well as the newly formed flesh eating disease, which ceased only when the
prisoner moved to a new facility and began treatment under another physician. (Indiana State Prison)

U.S. District Court
CLASS ACTION
CONSENT DECREE
DAMAGES
SETTLEMENT

Craft v. County of San Bernardino, 624 F.Supp.2d 1113 (C.D.Cal. 2008). County jail inmates brought a class
action alleging that a county's practice of routinely strip-searching inmates without probable cause or reasonable
suspicion that the inmates were in possession of weapons or drugs violated the Fourth Amendment. After the
court granted the inmates’ motion for partial summary judgment, the parties entered into private mediation and
reached a settlement agreement providing for, among other things, a class fund award of $25,648,204. The
inmates moved for the award of attorney's fees and costs. The district court held that class counsel were entitled to
an attorney's fees award in the amount of 25% of the settlement fund plus costs. The court noted that counsel
obtained excellent pecuniary and nonpecuniary results in a complex and risky case involving 150,000 class
members, 20,000 claims, and five certified classes, each of which presented unsettled legal issues. According to
the court, tens or hundreds of thousands of future inmates benefited from policy changes brought about by the
suit, and the attorneys were highly experienced and highly regarded civil rights lawyers with extensive class
action experience. (San Bernardino County Jail, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
BIVENS CLAIM
FAILURE TO PROTECT

Dale v. Poston, 548 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 2008). A federal prison inmate brought a Bivens action against several
corrections officers, alleging deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment based on the officers'
failure to prevent an assault by a fellow inmate. Following a jury verdict for the inmate on the issue of
administrative exhaustion, the district court granted summary judgment for the officers. The inmate appealed. The

27.140
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appeals court affirmed. The court found that the subjective prong of the inmate's claim was unsatisfied, since the
inmate had given the officers inadequate details of the danger involved. The prisoner told officers that other
inmates were “pressuring” him and “asking questions,” but never gave more details despite the officers' requests,
preventing them from determining whether a true threat was at play. The inmate declined offers to remain in
protective custody. (Federal Penitentiary, Terre Haute, Indiana)
U.S. District Court
CLASS ACTION
CONSENT DECREETERMINATION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Emerson-West v. Redman, 574 F.Supp.2d 433 (D.Del. 2008). A state inmate filed a motion for relief from the
district court's order terminating a consent order entered in a class action that challenged prison conditions and
disciplinary procedures. The inmate moved for a preliminary injunction and for summary judgment. The district
court denied the motions. The court held that the inmate received adequate notice of prison officials' motion for
relief from the consent order, and that termination of the consent order was warranted. The court noted that the
inmate was not a named class member, the inmate's name never appeared in the case, officials mailed copies of
their motion for relief to pro se plaintiffs who had appeared in the case and to the former attorney who represented
the class, and the court reopened the case when an inmate filed a motion to vacate the judgment. According to the
court, termination of the consent order was warranted under the provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(PLRA), where the consent order encompassed the state's entire penal system of discipline and sanctions and there
was no mention that it was entered to correct constitutional violations, particularly with respect to due process
issues. The court noted that a subsequent United States Supreme Court decision provided clear guidance regarding
prisoners' due process rights, and the consent order was not the least intrusive means to correct any alleged
constitutional violation. (James T. Vaughn Correctional Center, Delaware)

U.S. District Court
DAMAGES
FTCA-Federal Tort Claims
Act

Estate of Trentadue v. U.S., 560 F.Supp.2d 1124 (W.D.Okla. 2008). In a suit arising from the death of a special
housing unit (SHU) inmate at a Federal Transfer Center in Oklahoma, the district court ruled in favor of the
plaintiff’s family members on their claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under the Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA), and awarded a total amount of $1.1 million in damages to the individual family members. On
appeal, the court remanded for additional findings. On remand, the district court held that evidence supported a
$250,000 award to the inmate’s wife for the extreme and outrageous actions of the federal government in the
aftermath of the inmate's death and prior to her viewing the body, including the failure to inform her in advance of
the numerous extensive injuries on his body and the fact that an autopsy had been performed. The court found that
the siblings who were present when the numerous, extensive, and unexpected injuries to inmate's body were first
discovered were entitled to awards ranging from $150,000-$200,000, and brothers who never personally viewed
the injuries were entitled to between $50,000 and $100,000. The district court held that the plaintiffs'
understandable emotional reaction to the inmate’s death was needlessly and recklessly intensified by the United
States' failure to inform the family in advance as to the existence of the extensive injuries and that an autopsy had
been performed, and throughout the trial, the court heard no explanation for the defendant's silence in this regard.
The inmate had been returned to prison as a parole violator and was placed in a segregation single cell at his
request. The inmate was found hanging in his cell approximately 20 minutes after the previous routine cell check
by correctional officers. Other cuts and abrasions found on his body indicated persistent attempts to cause himself
serious injury or death. Permissible items found in the cell supported presumptions that cuts on the body were
self-inflicted. (Federal Transfer Center in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma)

U.S. Appeals Court
NOMINAL DAMAGES
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Fegans v. Norris, 537 F.3d 897 (8th Cir. 2008). A state inmate sued prison officials, alleging that they violated the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), as well as his free exercise and equal protection
rights, by enforcing a grooming policy and denying him Kosher meals. The district court entered judgment for the
inmate with respect to the Kosher meals, but entered judgment for the prison officials with respect to the
grooming policy. The inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the prison policy
prohibiting male inmates from wearing hair below their collar, which prevented the inmate, who followed the
Assemblies of Yahweh, from leaving his hair untrimmed, did not violate RLUIPA. Prison officials gave examples
of inmates using hair to conceal contraband and to change their appearance after escaping, and, although the
officials allowed shoulder-length hair in the women's barracks, the women were housed in a single unit and thus
had less opportunity to obtain and transport contraband. The court also found that the policy did not violate the
inmate’s free exercise rights. According to the court, the policy did not violate the inmate's equal protection rights,
inasmuch as differences in security risks between male and female inmates was a valid reason for differing hairlength rules for men and women, and the policy was reasonably related to the state's legitimate, penological
interests of safety and security. The appeals court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
awarding nominal damages, as limited by PLRA, of $1,500 for the prison officials' constitutional violation of
failing to provide Kosher meals, which amounted to $1.44 for each constitutional violation. The court also held
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to award punitive damages for the prison officials'
constitutional violation of failing to provide Kosher meals. The district court accurately stated the legal standard
for the award of punitive damages, but found that prison officials did not act with malice, and that punitive
damages were not warranted to deter future unlawful conduct, because the officials already had instituted a policy
for providing Kosher meals. (East Arkansas Regional Unit of the Arkansas Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
DAMAGES
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Ford v. County of Grand Traverse, 535 F.3d 483 (6th Cir. 2008). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action against
jail officials and the county claiming, among other things, that the county's policy or custom regarding the
provision of medical care at the jail on weekends reflected deliberate indifference to her medical needs and caused
injuries resulting from a fall from the top bunk in her cell when she had a seizure. After a jury found against the
county, the district court denied the county's motions for judgment as a matter of law. The county appealed. The
appeals court affirmed, finding that sufficient evidence existed for reasonable minds to find a direct causal link
between county's policy of permitting jail officials to “contact” medical staff simply by leaving a medical form in
the nurse's inbox, even though a nurse might not see the notice for 48 hours, and the alleged denial of the inmate's
right to adequate medical care, allegedly leading to the inmate suffering a seizure and falling from a top bunk.

27.141
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According to the court, the deposition testimony of a doctor provided a basis for finding that the inmate would not
have suffered a seizure had she been given medication within a few hours of her arrival at the jail. The inmate, a
self-described recovering alcoholic who also suffers from epilepsy, was arrested on a probation violation and
taken to the jail. That afternoon, she had a seizure, fell from the top bunk of a bed in her cell, and sustained
significant injuries to her right hip and right clavicle. Her case proceeded to trial and the jury found that none of
the jail officials were deliberately indifferent to her serious medical needs, but determined that the county's policy
regarding weekend medical care exhibited deliberate indifference to, and was the proximate cause of, her injuries.
The jury awarded her $214,000 in damages. (Grand Traverse County Jail, Michigan)
U.S. Appeals Court
COMPENSATORY
DAMAGES
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Gibson v. Moskowitz, 523 F.3d 657 (6th Cir. 2008). The representative of the estate of a mentally disabled inmate
who died of dehydration in a state prison brought a § 1983 action against a prison psychiatrist and others, alleging
deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, and asserting medical malpractice claims. The district court
denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment, and subsequently entered judgment, upon a jury verdict, in
favor of the representative. The court awarded $1.5 million in compensatory damages and $3 million in punitive
damages. The psychiatrist appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held that
evidence was sufficient to support a determination that the inmate had an objectively serious medical condition
and that the psychiatrist subjectively ignored the inmate's serious medical needs. The court found that the
compensatory damages award was not excessive and that the representative was entitled to recover punitive
damages. The court found that the punitive damages award was not excessive. The case was remanded to the
district court to provide justification for its allocation of $1.5 million in compensatory damages awarded by the
jury between the § 1983 Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim and the medical malpractice claim. The
court had allocated $683,500, representing Michigan's high-tier non-economic damages cap to the medical
malpractice claim, and the rest to the deliberate indifference claim, but it failed to provide any explanation for the
allocation. The appeals court held that the allocation did not follow intuitively from the evidence, since a higher
standard of culpability was required for the deliberate indifference claim. (Riverside Corr’l Facility, Michigan)

U.S. Appeals Court
MUNICIPAL LIABILITY
OFFICIAL CAPACITY
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Hampton Co. Nat. Sur., LLC v. Tunica County, Miss., 543 F.3d 221 (5th Cir. 2008). A surety company and its
agents, who were white, brought a § 1983 action against an African-American county sheriff in his individual
capacity and against the county, alleging that the sheriff's removal of the agents from the roster of approved bail
bond agents in the county constituted First Amendment retaliation and violated the Fourteenth Amendment's due
process and equal protection clauses. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants and the
plaintiffs appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part. The court held that the
sheriff was entitled to qualified immunity on the due process claim since there was no clearly established law in
the state as to whether the agents had a property right to issue bonds in a particular county, and thus no clearly
established law that would render the sheriff's actions objectively unreasonable. The court found that the county
was potentially liable since, under the governing state's law, sheriffs were final policymakers with respect to all
law enforcement decisions made within their counties, and the sheriff's decision was the type of single decision by
a relevant policymaker that could form the basis of § 1983 “municipal” liability. According to the court,
summary judgment was precluded by a fact issue as to whether the African-American sheriff failed to place the
agents back on the approved roster after they satisfied the arrearages that had given rise to their removal, while
simultaneously reinstating black bail bond agents who had been removed for the same reason. The court also
found that there were fact issue as to the credibility of the sheriff's stated reason for not reinstating the bail bond
agents, namely that the agents had failed to satisfy arrearages that had given rise to removal. (Tunica County,
Mississippi)

U.S. District Court
SUPERVISORY
LIABILITY

Harnett v. Barr, 538 F.Supp.2d 511 (N.D.N.Y. 2008). A prisoner brought a civil rights action against corrections
defendants, alleging they interfered with the practice of his religion in violation of the First Amendment and the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The district court denied the defendants’ motion
to dismiss. The court held that, without more, it could not be stated that the prisoner could prove no set of facts
that would entitle him to relief under the First Amendment or RLUIPA. The prisoner alleged that the corrections
defendants confiscated his religious meal, denied a sweet breakfast at the end of Ramadan, denied the ability to
retain food in his cell on Mondays and Thursdays, and denied permission to hem his pants. The court found that
failure of a supervisory official to investigate a letter of protest written by the inmate is not sufficient to show
personal involvement for the purposes of establishing § 1983 liability. According to the court, the same is true if
the only involvement of the supervisory official is to refer the inmate's complaint to the appropriate staff for
investigation. (Upstate Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONSENT DECREETERMINATION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Hines v. Anderson, 547 F.3d 915 (8th Cir. 2008). Inmates appealed an order of the district court that had
terminated a consent decree that regulated prison medical care. Inmates had filed a class action against the state in
1973, resulting in a 1977 consent decree that set medical standards for the prison. The appeals court affirmed the
district court ‘s ruling. The court held that the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) did not require an
investigation and/or evidentiary hearing before termination of a consent decree. The court noted that the consent
decree that regulated prison medical care did not constitute a final judgment, and therefore inmates had no
property right that would entitle them under the due process clause to further discovery and a pre-termination
evidentiary hearing. The court found that although the record presented a picture of what, at times, may have
constituted less than optimum care of inmates, it failed to show current and ongoing deliberate disregard of the
inmates' serious medical needs, which was required to maintain the consent decree. According to the court, the
type of day-to-day oversight on all aspects of medical care encompassed in the consent decree was broader than
necessary to assure protection of the right to reasonable medical care in the face of a known substantial risk of
harm to the inmate. Because the consent decree was not narrowly tailored nor was it the least intrusive means to
protect the inmates' Eighth Amendment rights, it violated the provisions of PLRA . (Minnesota Correctional
Facility at Oak Park Heights)

27.142
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U.S. District Court
COMPENSATORY
DAMAGES
NEGLIGENCE
RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR

Jackson v. Correctional Corporation of America, 564 F.Supp.2d 22 (D.D.C 2008). An inmate brought an action
against a prison's medical provider, alleging medical negligence and violations of the Eighth Amendment. The
court held that the inmate stated a medical negligence claim and the provider was liable under the theory of
respondeat superior. The inmate alleged that he was deprived of medication prescribed for his stomach ailments
for 19 days. The court held that an award of $9,500 in compensatory damages for medical negligence was
warranted, where the inmate experienced a burning pain in his stomach and esophagus that increased over time
without his medication and at times prevented him from sleeping or eating. (Center for Correctional Health Policy
and Studies, Inc., Correctional Corporation of America, District of Columbia Correctional Treatment Facility)

U.S. Appeals Court
BIVENS CLAIN
FTCA-Federal Tort Claims
Act

Jackson v. Kotter, 541 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 2008). A prisoner brought an action against federal prison employees and
the federal government, alleging negligence under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and constitutional claims
pursuant to Bivens. The district court dismissed the action and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed
in part and reversed and remanded in part. The court held that a Physician's Assistant (PA) in the prison did not
act with deliberate indifference toward the prisoner in response to an alleged back injury suffered by the prisoner
after being escorted out of his cell for a strip search. According to the court, the PA saw the prisoner shortly after
his alleged injuries and ordered an x-ray, personally observed the prisoner's condition and took into consideration
prior x-rays of his spine, and afforded some of the pain treatment that the prisoner demanded. (United States
Penitentiary, Terre Haute, Indiana)

U.S. District Court
NEGLIGENT
SUPERVISION

Jean-Laurent v. Wilkinson, 540 F.Supp.2d 501 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). A prisoner in a state correctional facility brought
a civil rights action against officers and supervisors claiming violation of his rights under the First, Fourth, Eighth,
and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants in part and denied
in part. The court held that striking the prisoner in the face several times while he was standing naked in a
stairwell surrounded by several officers, absent any indication that the prisoner posed a threat, was not within the
corrections officer's asserted good-faith effort to maintain order, discipline, and security due to a stabbing that
recently had occurred within the prison. The court found that the objective condition for a Fourteenth Amendment
excessive force civil rights claim was satisfied where the corrections officer, without reason or provocation, struck
the prisoner several times across his face, causing swelling on the left side of his face, a cut to the inside of his
mouth, his ear to bleed, and a hearing impairment. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a fact
issue as to whether the prisoner was under constant supervision by corrections officers and to what proximity he
was to other inmates so as to determine whether he could have acquired contraband. The court also found
summary judgment was precluded by a fact issue as to whether senior corrections officers were grossly negligent
in supervising a junior officer who allegedly violated the prisoner's Fourth Amendment rights through a strip
search, and as to whether the Fourth Amendment rights of the prisoner were violated during a second strip search
and alleged use of excessive force. (George Motchan Detention Center, New York City Dept. of Correction)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN
SUPERVISORY
LIABILITY

Jones v. Taylor, 534 F.Supp.2d 475 (D.Del. 2008). A state prisoner brought a civil rights action alleging that a
corrections officer used excessive force against him, another officer did not protect him, and a former
commissioner and a former warden did not properly train and supervise officers in dealing with prisoners. The
district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court held that the supervisors were not
the driving force behind the alleged use of excessive force by the corrections officer and were not deliberately
indifferent to the plight of the state prisoner. The court denied the prisoner’s claim for improper training, noting
that the officer received training prior to his employment and that he attened annual refresher courses. The court
noted that the officer had never been disciplined. The court held that the officer did not use excessive force
against the prisoner, where the officer, alone in a small space with the prisoner who was not handcuffed,
perceived a threat from the prisoner, and used minimal force, which included an A-frame chokehold. The court
noted that the prisoner was handcuffed once he was under control, received only minimal injury and never sought
follow-up medical treatment after his initial visit with a nurse. The use of force was investigated and approved by
the officer's supervisor, and the prisoner was found guilty of disorderly and threatening behavior with regard to
the incident. (Sussex Correctional Institute, Delaware)

U.S. District Court
DAMAGES

May v. Rich, 531 F.Supp.2d 998 (C.D.Ill. 2008). A state prisoner brought suit against a prison employee, alleging
civil rights claims for denial of access to the courts and retaliation for filing grievances and litigation. Following a
jury trial, the jury returned a general verdict in favor of the prisoner, awarding $2,388. The prison employee
moved for judgment as matter of law or, in the alternative, for a new trial. The district court granted the motion,
entering a judgment for the defendant as a matter of law. The court held that the prisoner did not suffer an actual
injury, as required for a denial of access claim. The court found that the employee did not retaliate against the
prisoner by filing a disciplinary report based on his possession of prison contraband. The court noted that the
employee had an absolute duty to file a disciplinary report against the prisoner for possession of carbon paper,
which was contraband in the prison system, such that reporting the prisoner could not be deemed retaliation for
the prisoner's exercise of First Amendment rights in filing civil rights suits. (Pontiac Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
DAMAGES

McCabe v. Mais, 602 F.Supp.2d 1025 (N.D.Iowa 2008). County jail detainees brought a § 1983 action against a
county jail officer, alleging that the officer conducted illegal strip searches and visual body cavity searches.
Following a jury trial, the district court granted the officer's motion reduce the jury’s damages award, and after the
detainees refused to accept the reduced damages award, ordered a new trial on the issue of damages. After a jury
returned a verdict in favor of the detainees in the amount of $55,804, the detainees moved for new trial. The court
held that a new trial on damages was not warranted and that the damages award was not so inadequate as to shock
the conscience. The court noted that there was no evidence that the detainees were subjected to repeated violations
of their Fourth Amendment rights, or that the illegal searches were conducted in a violent or mocking way, and
detainees' own descriptions of their emotional distress was not compelling. (Linn County Jail, Iowa)

27.143
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U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
OFFICIAL CAPACITY

Moonblatt v. District of Columbia, 572 F.Supp.2d 15 (D.D.C. 2008). A former inmate filed a § 1983 action
against the District of Columbia, alleging that correctional officers employed by a contractor hired to operate a
detention center violated his civil rights on account of his race, religion, and sexual orientation. The district court
denied summary judgment for the defendants. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by fact issues
as to whether the District had constructive or actual notice of the inmate's mistreatment, and whether the
contractor acted pursuant to a state custom or policy. The court found that an employee of a contractor hired by
the District of Columbia to operate a detention center, sued in his official capacity, was subject to liability under §
1983 for alleged deprivations of the inmate's constitutional rights by correctional officers. (Correctional Treatment
Facility, District of Columbia, operated by Corrections Corp. of America)

U.S. District Court
SUPERVISORY
LIABILITY

Munyiri v. Haduch, 585 F.Supp.2d 670 (D.Md. 2008). A motorist who was arrested for driving around a police
roadblock and subsequently failing to stop when signaled by a pursuing squad car brought a civil rights action
against an arresting officer, police commissioner and warden at central booking facility to which she was
transported. She alleged she was subjected to unlawful strip and visual body cavity searches. The defendants
moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that allegations
in the motorist's complaint were sufficient to state a supervisory liability claim against the Secretary of the
Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services (DPSCS) and the warden at a central booking
facility, for intrusive searches to which she was subjected.
The court found that the allegations in the
offender's complaint-- that she was improperly subjected to a strip search and to a visual body cavity search as the
result of a policy implemented by the Secretary of the Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional
Services (DPSCS) and by a warden at the central booking facility-- adequately pleaded the minimum facts
necessary to state a supervisory liability claim against the Secretary and the warden under § 1983. The policy
allegedly authorized strip searches and visual body cavity searches of all persons admitted to the facility,
regardless of the charges filed against them or circumstances surrounding their arrest. (Baltimore Central Booking
and Intake Facility, Maryland)

U.S. District Court
DAMAGES
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Murphy v. Gilman, 551 F.Supp.2d 677 (W.D.Mich. 2008). A civil rights action was brought against state prison
officials, raising claims arising from the death of a prisoner, who died from dehydration after a four-day period
during which he received no medical care and little water and food. A jury found that certain defendants were
deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's serious medical needs, the defendants were grossly negligent, and one
defendant was liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The jury awarded $250,000 in actual
damages, and $2,500,000 in punitive damages. The defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law, and to stay
enforcement of the judgment. The plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial. The district court denied the motions,
finding that evidence supported the finding that an official knew of the obvious risks to the prisoner. The court
held that punitive damages of $1,250,000 per prison official defendant was not constitutionally excessive for the
dehydration death of a physically vulnerable prisoner, who was trapped without physical necessities or medical
care for five days during a heat wave and who was awarded $250,000 in actual damages. The court noted that
evidence established that prison officials kept the prisoner's water turned off, knew that the prisoner was not
drinking, and knew the prison was on a heat alert. (Bellamy Creek Correctional Facility, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
CONSENT DECREETERMINATION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Osterback v. McDonough, 549 F.Supp.2d 1337 (M.D.Fla. 2008). Inmates sued corrections officials, alleging that
conditions of close management (CM) status amounted to cruel and unusual punishment. Following the grant of
the inmates' motion to certify the class, and issuance of an order entering the officials' revised offer of judgment
(ROJ), the officials moved to terminate the ROJ pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The
district court granted the motion. The court held that corrections officers were deliberately indifferent in violation
of the 8th Amendment when inmates on close management (CM) status who truly were suicidal or otherwise
suffered from severe psychological distress declared psychological emergencies. According to the court, the
officers failed to summon mental health staff, and inmates thereafter attempted to commit suicide or otherwise
harmed themselves, or, in one case, actually committed suicide. The court held that accreditation reports for
correctional institutions were inadmissible hearsay in the inmates' action. The court held that termination of the
revised offer of judgment (ROJ), which was previously adopted by the district court as a final order and judgment,
was appropriate under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) in that isolated instances of prison staff's failure
to appropriately respond to a bona fide psychological emergency of inmates in close management status did not
create a current and ongoing violation of the class members' Eighth Amendment rights. (Everglades Correctional
Institution, Florida)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
FTCA-Federal Tort Claims
Act
NEGLIGENCE

Parrott v. U.S., 536 F.3d 629 (7th Cir. 2008). A federal inmate brought an action against the Bureau of Prisons
(BOP) and several of its employees under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), alleging the employees
negligently handled his personal property and failed to protect him from being attacked by another inmate. The
inmate had been stabbed 22 times in the head and arm by another inmate and he was hospitalized for two weeks.
The district court granted summary judgment for the government and the inmate appealed. The appeals court
affirmed in part, vacated and remanded in part. The court held that the confiscation of the inmate's property,
followed by sending such property to the inmate's sister, was a “detention” for the purposes of the exception to
liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) for claims arising from detention of goods by a law
enforcement officer. The court found that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as
to whether a former separation order was in effect between the inmate and another inmate who attacked him. The
court noted that if a valid separation order is in effect between inmates, prison staff have no discretion in
enforcing such an order, and violation of the order will not be sheltered from liability under the Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA). (U.S. Penitentiary, Terre Haute, Indiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Pierce v. County of Orange, 519 F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 2008). Pretrial detainees in a county's jail facilities brought a §
1983 class action suit against the county and its sheriff seeking relief for violations of their constitutional and
statutory rights. After consolidating the case with a prior case challenging jail conditions, the district court

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rejected the detainees' claims and the detainees appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part and
remanded. The court held that the injunctive orders relating to the jail's reading materials, mattresses and beds,
law books, population caps, sleep, blankets, dayroom access (not less than two hours each day), telephone access
and communication with jailhouse lawyers were not necessary to correct current ongoing violations of the pretrial
detainees' constitutional rights. Inmates had alleged that they were denied the opportunity for eight hours of
uninterrupted sleep on the night before and the night after each court appearance. The court found that an
injunction relating to restrictions of the detainees' religious rights based on security concerns was narrowly drawn
and extended no further than necessary to correct the violation of the federal right of pretrial detainees in
administrative segregation. According to the court, providing pretrial detainees housed in administrative
segregation only ninety minutes of exercise per week, less than thirteen minutes per day, constituted punishment
in violation of due process standards. The court also found that the county failed to reasonably accommodate
mobility-impaired and dexterity-impaired pretrial detainees in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA). The court affirmed termination of 12 of the injunctive orders, but found that the district court erred in its
finding that two orders were unnecessary. (Orange County, California)
U.S. Appeals Court
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Pierce v. County of Orange, 526 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 2008). Pretrial detainees in a county's jail facilities brought a
§ 1983 class action suit against the county and its sheriff, seeking relief for violations of their constitutional and
statutory rights. After consolidating the case with a prior case challenging jail conditions, the district court
rejected the detainees' claims, and the detainees appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded. The court held that injunctive orders relating to the county jail’s reading materials, mattresses and
beds, law books, population caps, sleep, blankets, telephone access, and communication with jailhouse lawyers
were not necessary to current the current and ongoing violations of pretrial detainees' constitutional rights. The
court found that an injunction relating to restrictions of detainees' religious rights based on security concerns was
narrowly drawn and extended no further than necessary to correct the violation of the federal right of pretrial
detainees in administrative segregation. The injunctive order, with its provision for the curtailment or elimination
of pretrial detainees' religious rights based on security concerns, provided for no more than a minimum level of
ongoing participation in religious activities. The court held that providing pretrial detainees housed in
administrative segregation only 90 minutes of exercise per week, less than 13 minutes per day, constituted
punishment in violation of due process standards. The court found that an order requiring that inmates in
administrative segregation be permitted exercise at least twice each week for a total of not less than 2 hours per
week was necessary to correct the current and ongoing violation.
The court found that the county failed to reasonably accommodate mobility-impaired and dexterity-impaired
pretrial detainees in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The county did not offer any
legitimate rationale for maintaining inaccessible bathrooms, sinks, showers, and other fixtures in the housing areas
and common spaces assigned to mobility and dexterity impaired detainees, and the county offered no explanation
or justification for the significant differences between the vocational and recreational activities available to nondisabled and disabled detainees. Termination of injunctive orders requiring that inmates be provided with seating
while detained in holding cells, or elsewhere, awaiting transport to or from court and requiring that inmates be
given at least fifteen minutes within which to complete each meal did not constitute an abuse of discretion since
the treatment of detainees in the county's holding cells and the time allowed for meals did not violate the
detainees' constitutional rights. The court held that restrictions placed on use of the day room, limiting
administrative segregation detainees' use of the room to one or two inmates at a time, were reasonably related to
institutional security concerns. (Orange County Jail System, California)

U.S. District Court
SETTLEMENT

Platcher v. Health Professionals, Ltd., 549 F.Supp.2d 1040 (C.D.Ill. 2008). The estate of an inmate brought a
civil rights suit against a state department of corrections and private health professionals who worked at an
institution's health care center, alleging the inmate died from hypothermia as the result of being stripped, beaten,
and placed in a cold cell. The estate moved to enforce a settlement agreement reached with the state defendants.
The district court granted the motion to enforce the settlement. The court held that the estate was not required to
accept a confidentiality clause that was not discussed in an oral agreement simply because his counsel may have
had constructive notice of an alleged state policy to include confidentiality clauses. According to the court, there
was no evidence that counsel contemplated inclusion of a confidentiality clause during negotiations. (Menard
Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
FTCA-Federal Tort Claims
Act

Potter v. Ledesma, 541 F.Supp.2d 463 (D.Puerto Rico 2008). A federal inmate filed an action to recover damages
he suffered when prison officials failed to provide medical treatment after a cell door closed on his finger. The
district court granted the officials’ motion to dismiss in part and denied in part. The court held that the Federal
Tort Claims Act's (FTCA) exclusivity provision did not bar the inmate's Eighth Amendment claim. According to
the court, the inmate's allegation that he was entitled to money damages due to prison officials' deliberate
indifference to his serious medical needs after a cell door closed on his finger raised a cognizable claim for
violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. (Puerto Rico)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
NEGLIGENCE

Presley v. City of Blackshear, 650 F.Supp.2d 1307 (S.D.Ga. 2008). A mother brought an action against a city
police officer and a county paramedic, arising out of her son's death while detained in a county jail after his arrest.
The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court held that the arresting officer
was not deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of the detainee who died of an apparent drug
overdose after being arrested on drug charges and placed into custody at a county jail, absent evidence that the
arresting officer actually saw the detainee swallow any drugs that allegedly led to his death. The court held that
the county paramedic who responded to the jail was not deliberately indifferent despite any alleged negligence in
the paramedic's original diagnosis. The court noted that the paramedic promptly responded to both calls from
county jail concerning the detainee, and, each time, examined the detainee to determine whether further medical
treatment was needed. According to the court, the paramedic's alleged bad judgment and negligence in caring for

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the pretrial detainee who died of an apparent drug overdose, was insufficient to show a lack of good faith for the
purposes of statutory immunity from negligence or malpractice liability under Georgia law. (City of Blackshear
and Pierce County Jail, Georgia)
U.S. Appeals Court
BIVENS CLAIM
ALIEN

Rasul v. Myers, 512 F.3d 644 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Former detainees at a military facility in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
sued the Secretary of Defense and commanding officers alleging they were tortured. The detainees asserted claims
under the Alien Torture Statute, under the Geneva Conventions, under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA) and also asserted Fifth and Eighth Amendment claims on a Bivens cause of action. The defendants
moved to dismiss and the district court granted the motion in part and denied the motion as to the RFRA claim.
Both sides appealed. The district court affirmed in part and reversed as to the RFRA claim. The court held that the
acts of torture allegedly committed against aliens detained at the military base in Cuba were “within the scope of
employment” of military personnel who were allegedly committing such acts, for the purpose of deciding whether
the United states should be substituted as defendant. The court found that the aliens were without property or
presence in the United States and therefore lacked any constitutional rights and could not assert a Bivens claim
against military personnel for alleged due process violations and cruel and unusual punishment inflicted upon
them. The court held that the term “persons” as used in the RFRA to generally prohibit the government from
substantially burdening a “person's exercise of religion” did not extend to non-resident aliens. (United States
Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT

Sandage v. Board of Com'rs of Vanderburgh County, 548 F.3d 595 (7th Cir. 2008). The family of murder victims
brought a civil rights action under § 1983 against county officials, alleging that a county sheriff's department's
failure to act on the victims' complaint deprived the victims of their lives without due process of law, in violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The victims had complained that they were being harassed by a murderer who was
a county jail inmate and they asked county officials to revoke the inmate’s work-release privilege and re-imprison
him. The inmate ultimately murdered the victims while he was on work release. The inmate had been serving a
four-year sentence for robbery. The district court dismissed the complaint, and the plaintiffs appealed. The
appeals court affirmed, finding that the sheriff's department's failure to act on the victims' complaint did not
deprive the victims of due process. The court noted that the county officials had no duty to protect the victims
against private violence, and the officials' failure to revoke the inmate's work release did not create the danger that
the inmate posed to the victims. (Vanderburgh County Jail, Indiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
CLASS ACTION
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
REMEDIES

Shook v. Board of County Commissioners of County of El Paso, 543 F.3d 597 (10th Cir. 2008). County jail
inmates brought a class action suit alleging that jail conditions for prisoners with mental health needs violated the
Eighth Amendment's ban against cruel and unusual treatment. The district court denied the prisoners' motion for
class certification and dismissed the suit. The appeals court reversed and remanded. On remand, the district court
again denied certification, and the inmates appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that class certification
could be denied due to unmanageability, namely the difficulty of crafting specific injunctive relief applicable to
the class as a whole. The court noted that the plaintiff inmates variously complained that they were denied
medications, inadequately supervised, or subjected to excessive force or excessive restraint, and the propriety of
the jail's actions depended on circumstances that varied from class member to class member. (El Paso County Jail,
Colorado)

U.S. District Court
DAMAGES

Smith v. City of Oakland, 538 F.Supp.2d 1217 (N.D.Cal. 2008). After a jury rendered a verdict in favor of a
parolee and his girlfriend based on a finding that officers planted a semi-automatic rifle in his residence in order to
frame him, the officers filed post-trial motions seeking to overturn the jury's verdict on both liability and damages.
The district court held that substantial evidence supported the jury's verdict in favor of the parolee but that the $5
million dollar emotional distress award to the parolee was grossly excessive. According to the court, the
emotional distress award to the parolee for malicious prosecution that resulted in 4 1/2 months imprisonment, the
indignity of having to defend himself against trumped-up criminal charges and parole revocation proceedings, the
uncertainty and apprehension about his fate and future caused by the false arrest, and loss of his house and
relationship with his girlfriend was grossly excessive. The court granted a new trial on damages unless the parolee
accepted a reduction from $5 million to $3 million. The court found that the parolee was not precluded from
recovering damages that accrued after the indictment on his malicious prosecution claim against the police
officers. The court noted that the parolee's testimony was corroborated by another witness, the lack of any
fingerprints on the gun, expert's testimony about standard police procedures, the testimony of a parole agent that
an inspection of the parolee's home was scheduled for that same day, the lack of any other guns or ammunition
found in the search of the house, and inconsistencies in the officers' testimony. The court also found that the
award of $750,000 to the parolee's girlfriend for emotional distress suffered when officers' conducted a
suspicionless search of the parolee’s residence while she was present was grossly excessive, and was subject to
reduction to $300,000. (City of Oakland, California)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO SUPERVISE

Stutes v. Tipto, 540 F.Supp.2d 516 (D.Vt. 2008). A Vermont inmate incarcerated in Oklahoma in a privatelyowned facility brought an action against Vermont prison officials and facility employees claiming cruel and
unusual punishment. The inmate alleged that his time spent outdoors in cold weather exposed him to “the
potential of hypothermia, frostbite, and cold-related infections such as influenza, ear infections, upper respiratory
infections, bronchitis and more.” Shortly after his exposure to the cold, he began suffering from flu-like
symptoms. The district court dismissed the action. The court held that a state corrections commissioner was not
subject to liability under § 1983 for alleged mistreatment of the inmate, even though the inmate sent a letter to the
commissioner asking for protection from retaliation, and submitted a formal grievance form to the commissioner
after the alleged mistreatment, where there was no indication that the commissioner was responsible for a policy
or custom that led to the wrongdoing, or that he failed to properly supervise employees who committed the
allegedly wrongful acts. (North Fork Correctional Facility, Oklahoma, Corrections Corporation of America)

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U.S. District Court
CLASS ACTION
SETTLEMENT

Tardiff v. Knox County, 567 F.Supp.2d 201 (D.Me. 2008). An arrestee who was subjected to a strip and visual
body cavity search brought a § 1983 action against a county for alleged violations of her Fourth Amendment
rights. She brought the action after opting out of a class action against the county in which her claim had initially
moved forward and in which she was named as class representative. The county asserted counterclaims for breach
of contract and equitable estoppel and the parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The district court held that
the settlement agreement in a prior class action did not contain an implied term that the arrestee, as named class
representative, would not opt out of the agreement. (Knox County Jail, Maine)

U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
FAILURE TO PROTECT

Tatsch-Corbin v. Feathers, 561 F.Supp.2d 538 (W.D.Pa. 2008). Survivors of an inmate who committed suicide
sued a jail's forensic specialist under § 1983, claiming violations of the Fourteenth Amendment's prohibition
against deprivations of life without due process. The district court denied the forensic specialist’s motion to
dismiss. The court found that the fact that the jail's forensic specialist lacked a contractual relationship with either
the jail or a health care contractor retained by the county did not preclude her from being considered a “state
actor,” as required for imposition of liability under § 1983 in connection with the inmate's suicide. According to
the court, her role was to provide mental health care to inmates, regardless of her other job responsibilities or the
contractual nuances through which she came to work at the jail, and she could not have done so without the
authorization of the state. The court found that the inmate's survivors alleged sufficient facts to establish that the
forensic specialist should have known, or did know, that the inmate presented a suicide risk and failed to take
necessary or available precautions to protect him. According to the court, alleged facts suggested that the inmate
had made various threats to kill himself, which had been taken seriously enough by jail officials to warrant the
request of an evaluation by a mental health professional, and he had a documented history of attempted suicide
and psychiatric hospitalization, of which the specialist was allegedly aware. (Blair County Prison, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
DAMANGE
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

Williams v. Beltran, 569 F.Supp.2d 1057 (C.D.Cal. 2008). A state inmate brought an action against a prison,
alleging violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) by forcing him to shave
his beard, which he had worn for religious reasons. The district court dismissed the case. The court held that
RLUIPA unambiguously conditions receipt of federal prison funds on the waiver of Eleventh Amendment
sovereign immunity, and the remedial clause in RLUIPA providing for “appropriate relief” was not sufficiently
broad to waive state sovereign immunity from money damages. The court noted that there are three main
exceptions to the broad grant of sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment: first, Congress may
authorize such a suit in the exercise of its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment; second, a state may waive
its sovereign immunity by consenting to suit; and third, suit may be brought to enjoin a state official rather than
against the state itself. The court concluded that California had not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity
from money damages under RLUIPA and absent the availability of monetary relief, the plaintiff lacked any
remedy for his alleged RLUIPA claim. (California State Prison Lancaster)

U.S. District Court
FTCA-Federal Tort Claims
Act

Zabala-Calderon v. U.S., 616 F.Supp.2d 195 (D.Puerto Rico 2008). A female detainee filed suit, under the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), seeking injunctive relief and damages from the United States for injuries she
allegedly suffered from falling to the ground when exiting the bus managed by the United States Marshal Service
(USMS) during her transport from a detention center to a federal courthouse while she was fully restrained with
handcuffs, a belly chain, and shackles. The district court denied the government’s motion for summary judgment,
finding that fact issues precluded summary judgment as to whether the detainee's injuries were caused by the
government's negligence. The court found genuine issues of material fact remained as to whether the government
failed to follow a standard of care and skill in transporting the female detainee by placing shackles on her that
were allegedly too short for her to step down from a bus managed by the United States Marshal Service (USMS)
and by allegedly failing to assist her as she stepped down from bus, resulting in the detainee's falling to the ground
and sustaining injuries. (Metropolitan Detention Center, Puerto Rico)
2009

U.S. District Court
FTCA-Federal Tort Claims
Act
NEGLIGENCE

Abuhouran v. U.S., 595 F.Supp.2d 588 (E.D.Pa. 2009). A prisoner brought a negligence action against the United
States under the Federal Tort Claims Act alleging prison officials exposed him to excessive amounts of
environmental tobacco smoke (ETS). The defendants moved for summary judgment and the district court granted
the motion. The court held that the prisoner was precluded, under the discretionary function exception of the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), from challenging the warden's designation of smoking areas, as federal
regulations explicitly assigned the exercise of choice or judgment to the warden to designate areas subject to ETS.
The court noted that the stated policy considerations for implementing the “no smoking areas” in prisons was to
provide a clean air environment and to protect the health and safety of staff and inmates, suggesting the
designation of smoking areas was the kind of discretionary function the FTCA exception was meant to shield. The
court held that under Pennsylvania law, the prisoner failed to present any medical evidence or expert witnesses to
establish a causal connection between his exposure to environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) and his alleged injury,
as required to prevail on his negligence claim. The court also held that the prisoner failed to present any evidence
of an actual injury. (Federal Detention Center, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania)

U.S. Appeals Court
DAMAGES
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
MUNICIPAL LIABILITY

Askew v. Sheriff of Cook County, Ill., 568 F.3d 632 (7th Cir. 2009). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action
against a prison guard and a sheriff, asserting excessive force and deliberate indifference claims against the guard
and a municipal liability claim against the sheriff. The district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss.
The detainee appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. The appeals court held that upon determining
that a county was a required party in the pretrial detainee's § 1983 suit against a prison guard and the sheriff, the
district court was required to order that the county be made a party, rather than dismissing the suit. The court
noted that a county in Illinois is a necessary party in any suit seeking damages from an independently elected
county officer, and, because state law requires the county to pay, federal law deems it an indispensable party to
the litigation. But the court found that the Illinois county was not a party that was required to be joined if feasible

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in § 1983 suit brought against a prison guard in his individual capacity. (Cook County Jail, Illinois)
U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
POLICIES/PROCEDURES
RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR
VICARIOUS LIABILITY

Austin v. Taylor, 604 F.Supp.2d 685 (D.Del. 2009). A state prisoner brought an action alleging a § 1983 claim for
inadequate medical care in violation of the Eighth Amendment and a state law medical negligence claim against a
medical service corporation under contract with the state to provide healthcare services at a prison. The district
court dismissed the case in part. The court held that the corporation that provided prison healthcare was not a
state actor entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity on the state prisoner's § 1983 claim. The court noted that
despite having been named in hundreds of § 1983 actions, the corporation had never been held to be an arm of the
state for Eleventh Amendment purposes. The court noted that the corporation was an autonomous actor and was
not immune from state taxation, and any judgment against the corporation would not be paid from the state
treasury. According to the court, although the corporation could not be held liable for allegedly medically
negligent acts of an employee under the theories of respondeat superior or vicarious liability, the corporation
could be directly liable for acts of the employee if the employee's acts were deemed the result of the corporation's
policy or custom that was so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights that the corporation could
reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's serious medical need in violation of the
Eighth Amendment. The court noted that a “policy” of the corporation is made when a decision-maker possessing
final authority to establish a policy with respect to an allegedly violative action issues an official proclamation,
policy or edict. According to the court, the “custom” of the corporation can be proven by showing that a given
course of conduct, although not specifically endorsed or authorized by law, is so well-settled and permanent as to
virtually constitute law. (Howard R. Young Correctional Institution, Wilmington, Delaware)

U.S. District Court
NOMINAL DAMAGES
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Baker v. Wilkinson, 635 F.Supp.2d 514 (W.D.La. 2009). A Louisiana state prisoner brought a § 1983 action, in
forma pauperis, against a warden, assistant warden, prison operator, and two nurses, alleging that he was denied
adequate medical care related to hemorrhoids. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court
denied the motion. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to
whether the prisoner suffered an injury as a result of the delay in appropriate medical care, whether he was
entitled to damages for emotional distress, and whether he was entitled to nominal or punitive damages. (Winn
Correctional Center, Louisiana, Corrections Corporation of America)

U.S. Appeals Court
BIVENS CLAIM
FAILURE TO PROTECT

Boyd v. Driver, 579 F.3d 513 ((5th Cir. 2009). Following his acquittal on charges of assaulting prison employees,
a federal inmate filed a pro se Bivens action against numerous prison employees, alleging a “malicious
prosecution conspiracy.” The inmate alleged that prison employees committed perjury and tampered with
evidence in his prosecution for assaulting employees. The district court dismissed the action and the inmate
appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part. The appeals court held that the
inmate was not required to exhaust his administrative remedies with regard to his claim in his Bivens action,
where the claim was not “about prison life” within the meaning of the exhaustion provision of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). According to the court, the allegation by the inmate, that prison employees
committed perjury and tampered with evidence in conspiring to maliciously prosecute him for assault, did not,
without more, state any constitutional claim, as required to support a Bivens action. But the court held that
allegations that prison employees gave perjured testimony at the inmate's criminal trial and destroyed and
tampered with video evidence of the alleged assaults stated a claim for a due process violation, sufficient to
support his Bivens action. (Federal Correctional Institution Three Rivers, Texas)

U.S. District Court
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
SUPERVISORY
LIABILITY

Boyd v. Nichols, 616 F.Supp.2d 1331 (M.D.Ga. 2009). A female, who had been housed in a jail for violation of
her probation, brought an action against a former jailer, county, and former sheriff, under § 1983 and state law,
relating to the sexual assault of the inmate by the jailer. The county and sheriff moved for summary judgment and
the district court granted the motions. The court held that the sheriff was not “deliberately indifferent” to a
substantial risk of serious harm to the inmate under the Eighth Amendment or the Georgia constitution in failing
to protect the inmate from sexual assaults by a jailer, absent evidence that the sheriff had knowledge or indication
that the jailer was a threat or danger to inmates, or that male guards, if left alone with female inmates, posed a risk
to the inmates' health and safety. The court noted that the sheriff's actions in calling for an investigation and
terminating the jailer's employment upon learning of the jailer's actions was not an “indifferent and objectively
unreasonable response” to the inmate's claims, and thus, there was no violation of the inmate's rights. The court
held that the jail's staffing did not pose a “substantial risk of serious harm” to the inmate who was sexually
assaulted by a jailer, as required to show violation of the Eighth Amendment and Georgia constitution, absent
evidence that the jail was inadequately staffed. According to the court, the county did not have a policy or custom
of underfunding and understaffing the jail, as would constitute deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of
serious harm to the inmate, and thus the county could not be liable under § 1983 to the inmate who was sexually
assaulted by a jailer. The court found that the sheriff's failure to train deputies and jailers in proper procedures for
escorting and handling female inmates did not support supervisory liability on the § 1983 claim of the inmate,
where the sheriff had no knowledge of any prior sexual assaults at the jail or any problems with jailers improperly
escorting and handling female inmates, and the jailer who committed the assault had been trained previously on
how to interact with inmates and knew it was improper to have intimate contact with inmates. During the time
period in question, the county did not have a policy prohibiting a male jailer from escorting a female inmate
within the Jail. The court held that the county and sheriff had sovereign immunity from the state law claims of the
inmate, absent evidence that such immunity had been waived by an act of the General Assembly. (Berrien County
Jail, Georgia)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN
SUPERVISORY
LIABILITY

Brickell v. Clinton County Prison Bd., 658 F.Supp.2d 621(M.D.Pa. 2009). A former inmate filed a § 1983 action
against a county, county prison board, and various county officials to recover for injuries she sustained while
working in a jail kitchen. The district court dismissed the case in part, and denied dismissal in part. The court held
that the sheriff was not subject to supervisory liability under § 1983 for alleged failure to obtain adequate medical
treatment for the inmate after she suffered burns while working in a jail kitchen, where the sheriff did not

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participate in or have knowledge of any violations of the inmate's rights, did not direct jail employees to commit
the violations, and did not acquiesce in the employees' violations. The court found that the inmate's allegation that
a county prison board failed to adopt, and the jail's warden and deputy wardens failed to implement, policies
regarding treatment of severe burns and general medical treatment was sufficient to state a claim against the board
and officials under § 1983 for violation of her Eighth Amendment right to adequate medical care, where the
inmate claimed that there was a total absence of policy concerning medical treatment for severe burns or general
medical care when prison facilities were inadequate. According to the court, the county's alleged negligence in the
training of kitchen staff at the county jail was not sufficiently shocking to support the inmate's § 1983 due process
claim pursuant to a state-created danger theory based on the inmate's allegation that she suffered severe burns
while transferring a hot container from a stove to a top shelf of upright warmers, even if the county officials knew
or should have known that the inmate was physically unable to place the container on the top shelf in a safe
fashion. (Clinton County Prison Board, Clinton County Correctional Facility, Pennsylvania)
U.S. Appeals Court
DAMAGES

Cabral v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 587 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2009). A nurse practitioner working as a contractor in a
county house of correction brought an action against a county sheriff claiming that she was barred from entering
the house of correction, in violation of her free speech rights, for informing the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) of alleged prisoner abuse. The county sheriff brought an Administrative Procedure Act (APA) proceeding
against the United States Department of Justice, seeking discovery of relevant documents. The district court
denied the requested discovery and the sheriff appealed. A jury found in favor of the contractor in the underlying
free speech case and the district court denied the defendants' motions for a new trial. The appeals from the two
judgments were consolidated. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the sheriff's request for information
concerning a meeting between the nurse and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) would directly and
adversely impact the FBI investigations into prisoner abuse in the house of correction and violate the Privacy Act,
so as to warrant denial of such requests. The court held that evidence was sufficient to support the jury's
determination that the county sheriff barred the nurse practitioner from a county house of correction with a
conscious indifference to her free speech rights, as was necessary to support an award of punitive damages in the
nurse’s § 1983 action. The court found that the award of $250,000 in punitive damages to the nurse was not
excessive, where the sheriff's conduct was reprehensible and the award could have been greater. (Suffolk County
House of Correction, Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Chao v. Ballista, 630 F.Supp.2d 170 (D.Mass. 2009). A former state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against
officials at the Massachusetts Department of Correction (DOC), alleging that the officials failed to properly
investigate and protect her from sexual abuse by a prison guard. The officials moved to dismiss the complaint on a
number of grounds. The district court held that the former prisoner was not subject to the Prison Litigation
Reform Act's (PLRA) exhaustion requirement. The court found that the former prisoner's allegations in her
amended complaint that, over the course of a year, she and the prison guard engaged in 50 to 100 sexual
encounters in a prison facility without detection, that the guard had a sexual relationship with at least one other
female inmate, that sexual encounters continued even after the guard was reassigned to different duties, and that a
prison nurse placed the prisoner on oral contraceptive pills during the relevant time period, sufficiently stated a §
1983 claim against prison officials. The district court held that DOC officials were not entitled to qualified
immunity, given the extent of the abuse, the numerous warning signs alleged, and the available sources of
information. (South Middlesex Correctional Center, Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
FTCA-Federal Tort Claims
Act
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Chehade Refai v. Lazaro, 614 F.Supp.2d 1103 (D.Nev. 2009). A German citizen, who was detained by
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) officials at a Nevada airport, and later transferred to a local jail, after
his name had been erroneously placed on a watch list, brought an action against the United States, DHS officials,
a police department, a city, and a police chief, alleging various constitutional violations. The district court granted
the DHS and United States motions to dismiss in part, and denied in part. The court held that DHS officials could
not bypass constitutional requirements for strip searches and body-cavity searches of non-admitted aliens at a
border by sending the German citizen to a detention facility where they allegedly knew strip searches occurred in
the absence of reasonable suspicion under circumstances in which the DHS officials could not perform the strip
search themselves. According to the court, regardless of any reasonable suspicion that detention center officials
had for a strip search, federal officials at the border needed reasonable suspicion for a strip search.
The court found that the Fourth Amendment right of a non-admitted alien to be free from a non-invasive, nonabusive strip search absent suspicion to conduct such a search was clearly established in 2006, when the German
citizen was detained at an airport, and thus, a DHS officer was not entitled to qualified immunity. The court held
that the German citizen who was detained after arriving at a United States airport and was asked to spy for the
United States government in order to obtain an entry visa was not subjected to “involuntary servitude” in violation
of the Thirteenth Amendment, where the German citizen never actually spied for the United States.
The court found that the German citizen adequately alleged that the defendant's actions constituted extreme
and outrageous conduct, as required to state claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under Nevada
law, where he alleged that DHS officials told him that if he did not spy for the United States government, he
would never be able to return to the United States where his daughter and grandchild lived.
According to the court, the detained German citizen's negligence claim, alleging that the United States owed
him a duty of care not to cause him to be detained in a local jail when he had not been and was never charged with
any criminal offense, was not barred by the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA). The court noted that although the government claimed that immigration officials had discretion in
choosing where to house aliens, under an Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) memorandum, the alien
should never have been booked into local jail. (North Las Vegas Detention Center, Nevada)

U.S. District Court
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Chester v. Beard, 657 F.Supp.2d 534 (M.D.Pa. 2009). Pennsylvania death-row inmates brought a class action
under § 1983 against Pennsylvania Department of Corrections officials, seeking a permanent injunctive relief
against alleged violations of their right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment and their right to due

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process, arising from Pennsylvania's use of lethal injection as an execution method. The district court denied the
defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court held that the inmates had Article III standing to bring a § 1983 challenge
to the state's use of lethal injection as an execution method, seeking permanent injunctive relief, even if the
inmates were not under active death warrants. The court noted that the fact that the inmates were subject to the
death sentence conferred a sufficient personal stake in the action to satisfy the standing requirements. The court
held that the death-row inmates stated a § 1983 claim against the DOC by alleging that the state's use of lethal
injection as an execution method, in the absence of adequate training for those conducting the executions, exposed
the inmates to the risk of extreme pain and suffering. (Pennsylvania Department of Corrections)
U.S. Appeals Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
FAILURE TO ACT
FAILURE TO PROTECT

Clem v. Lomeli, 566 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2009). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action against a prison officer,
alleging his Eighth Amendment rights were violated when the officer failed to alleviate a substantial risk posed by
his drunk, threatening cellmate. The district court entered judgment following a jury verdict in favor of the officer
and the inmate appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The appeals court held that the inmate was
entitled to a “failure to act” jury instruction, where evidence showed that the officer heard the inmate's call for
help immediately prior to his beating by his cellmate and that the officer took no steps to abate any risk to the
inmate. The court also found that the district court's jury instruction error in the inmate's § 1983 action was not
harmless, where the instruction added an extra element to the inmate's burden of proof by requiring the jury to
find that some act of the officer was the moving force that directly caused the ultimate injury. The court noted that
the entire verdict consisted of a response of “no” to the question of whether the officer was deliberately indifferent
to a serious risk of harm by failing to remove the inmate from his cell, and the court never explained to the jury
what “deliberately indifferent” meant. (Mule Creek State Prison, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Prison Litigation
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act

Crawford v. Clarke, 578 F.3d 39 (1st Cir. 2009). Muslim inmates confined in a special management unit (SMU)
sued the Commissioner of the Massachusetts Department of Correction (DOC) under the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), alleging that he violated their right to freely exercise their religion by
preventing them from participating in Jum'ah Friday group prayer. The district court entered an injunction
requiring closed-circuit broadcasting of Jum'ah in any SMU in which the plaintiff inmates were housed or might
be housed in the future, and subsequently denied the commissioner's motion for reconsideration. The
commissioner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in issuing the injunction requiring corrections officials to provide closed circuit television broadcasts of
services in any SMU in which the plaintiff inmates were housed or might be housed in the future, as opposed to
the SMU in which they were currently housed, without making findings as to whether other SMUs were suitable
for closed circuit broadcasts. The court found that the injunction did not violate the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(PLRA), where the prospective relief was narrowly drawn and providing closed-circuit broadcasting was the least
intrusive means to alleviate the burden on the inmates’ rights. The court noted that the commissioner put nothing
in the record to differentiate other SMUs on the issues of a compelling governmental interest or least restrictive
means. (Massachusetts Department of Correction, MCI-Cedar Junction)

U.S. District Court
DAMAGES
QUASI-JUDICIAL
IMMUNITY

Delaney v. District of Columbia, 659 F.Supp.2d 185 (D.D.C. 2009). A former inmate and his wife brought a §
1983 action, on behalf of themselves and their child, against the District of Columbia and several D.C. officials
and employees, alleging various constitutional violations related to the inmate's incarceration for criminal
contempt due to his admitted failure to pay child support. They also alleged the wife encountered difficulties
when she and her child attempted to visit the husband at the D.C. jail. The defendants moved to dismiss. The
district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that District of Columbia judges and
court clerks were entitled to quasi-judicial immunity against the § 1983 claims for monetary damages for alleged
infringement of Fifth Amendment due process rights. According to the court, the defendants’ acts of issuing court
orders regarding the plaintiff's child support obligations, calculating the plaintiff's probation period, issuing
hearing notices, filing court documents, and posting the plaintiff's child support payments, were performed
pursuant to judicial functions. The court held that the inmate's wife did not allege that any District of Columbia
custom or policy caused the alleged violation of her Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizure,
precluding her § 1983 claim against a D.C. corrections official, even if the corrections officer's request that the
inmate's wife wait to speak to a corrections official prior to exiting the visiting area constituted a seizure.
The court held that an attorney, who was an African-American woman, stated a § 1983 claim against the
District of Columbia and D.C. jail official for violations of her Fifth Amendment due process rights by alleging
that an official refused to allow her to visit her clients at the jail based on her gender and race. (Lorton and Rivers
Correctional Centers, and District of Columbia Jail)

U.S. District Court
FTCA-Federal Tort Claims
Act
NEGLIGENCE

Edwards v. District of Columbia, 616 F.Supp.2d 112 (D.D.C. 2009). The representative of the estate of a woman
who committed suicide while being held in a District of Columbia jail brought an action against the District and
the jail's medical services contractor in the Superior Court for the District of Columbia, alleging negligence in the
provision of mental health care in ensuring that the woman was not a danger to herself. The representative also
alleged that the District and contractor failed to adequately provide a medical response upon discovering the
woman in the immediate moments after her suicide. The contractor removed the case to federal district court and
moved to dismiss. The district court held that the representative was required to exhaust administrative remedies
under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) on claims against the contractor before bringing an action under FTCA
and that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the FTCA claims and claims against the District.
(District of Columbia Jail)

U.S. Appeals Court
NOMINAL DAMAGES
SETTLEMENT

Estate of Enoch ex rel. Enoch v. Tienor, 570 F.3d 821 (7th Cir. 2009). The estate and minor sisters of an 18-yearold female prisoner who committed suicide while on suicide watch at a correctional institution brought an action
against correctional officers and staff, alleging violations of the prisoner's civil rights and seeking $5 million for
the estate plus $5 million for the sisters. After accepting the defendants' offer of a judgment for $635,000, the

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plaintiffs filed a motion requesting $328,740 in attorney fees. The district court awarded $100,000 to the
plaintiffs, with $1,500 to be taxed as fees for the guardian ad litem. The plaintiffs appealed. The appeals court
reversed and remanded, holding that the fact that the case was settled for $635,000 did not warrant a reduction in
the requested attorney fees. The court noted that $635,000 was not a nominal award, and the Farrar analysis for
determining attorney fees, which considered the extent of relief compared to the relief sought, was not relevant in
cases in which the recovery was not merely nominal. The court found that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in awarding $1,500 in fees to the guardian ad litem. (Taycheedah Correctional Institution, Wisconsin)
U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO
SUPERVISE
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Estate of Henson v. Wichita County, Tex., 652 F.Supp.2d 730 (N.D.Tex. 2009). Daughters of a pre-trial detainee,
who died from chronic obstructive pulmonary disease while being held in a county jail, brought a § 1983 action
against the county and jail physician for violation of the detainee's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The
court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the jail
physician was a supervisor, whether a policy of intimidation of jail nurses was a moving force behind the alleged
violation of the rights of the detainee, whether the physician failed to supervise nurses, and, if so, whether his
failure to supervise amounted to deliberate indifference. The court held that the jail physician was entitled to
assert a defense of qualified immunity, even though he was a contract physician. (Wichita County Jail, Texas)

U.S. District Court
FLSA-Fair Labor Standards
Act

Fraternal Order of Police Barkley Lod. v. Fletcher, 618 F.Supp.2d 712, (W.D.Ky. 2008). A police union, union
local, and current and past corrections officers at the Kentucky State Penitentiary filed a complaint alleging
violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), the Portal to Portal Act (PPA) and mandatory career retention
programs provisions under state statutes. The action was brought against a former Kentucky Governor, the
Department of Corrections Commissioner, and three wardens, all in their individual and official capacities. The
district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss in part and denied in part. The court held that state
officials and public employees can be liable as “employers” under FLSA. The plaintiffs alleged that the
defendants exempted and continued to deny overtime compensation to them in violation of FLSA. (Kentucky
State Penitentiary)

U.S. District Court
FHA-Fair Housing Act

Fross v. County of Allegheny, 612 F.Supp.2d 651 (W.D.Pa. 2009). A group of convicted sex offenders brought a
civil rights action against a county, alleging that a county ordinance that restricted the residency of sex offenders
violated their constitutional rights, the Fair Housing Act (FHA), and state law. The district court granted summary
judgment for the plaintiffs, finding that the ordinance was preempted by state law. The ordinance barred offenders
from residing within 2,500 feet of any child care facility, community center, public park or recreation facility, or
school. According to the court, the ordinance was contradictory to and inconsistent with various provisions of
state law, and interfered with the state's express objectives of rehabilitating and reintegrating offenders, diverting
appropriate offenders from prison, and establishing a uniform, statewide system the for supervision of offenders.
(Allegheny County, Pennsylvania)

U.S. Appeals Court
SETTLEMENT

Gevas v. Ghosh, 566 F.3d 717 (7th Cir. 2009). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action alleging prison staff members
and administrators were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. After a telephonic conference among
all of the parties was held, an agreement was supposedly reached, but there was no court reporter or recording of
the conference. The district court granted the defendants' motion to enforce the settlement agreement and ordered
the prisoner to sign the release and settlement agreement within 30 days or have his case dismissed. The prisoner
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. According to the court, the magistrate judge's failure to record the
settlement agreement did not invalidate the settlement, and the magistrate judge did not coerce the prisoner into
settling. The court noted that both parties assumed the risk that the judge would recall the discussion differently
than they did, when neither asked that any part of the discussion be placed on the record. According to the court,
having made no such request to have the discussion placed on the record, the prisoner had to live with the
consequences. (Stateville Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
COMPENSATORY
DAMAGES
INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY

Gilmore v. Bostic, 636 F.Supp.2d 496 (S.D.W.Va. 2009). A state prison inmate brought an action against a
probation officer, the state parole board, and state correctional facility employees, asserting that his constitutional
rights were violated by allegedly false information in his presentence report for a burglary conviction and in the
prison file which resulted in the inmate's classification in the state penal system at a higher level than was
appropriate and in a sex offender designation. The district court held that: (1) the board was entitled to absolute
immunity; (2) employees were not liable in their official capacities on claims for compensatory relief but the
employees sued in their individual capacities were liable; (3) the inmate stated a violation of a protected liberty
interest in parole release under the state constitution; (4) the inmate stated a claim under the state constitution for
violation of a protected liberty interest in not being required to undergo sex offender treatment; and (5) the inmate
adequately alleged a physical injury required to recover for mental or emotional injury. (Kanawha County Adult
Probation Department, West Virginia Board of Prob. and Parole, Huttonsville Correctional Center, West Virginia)

U.S. District Court
CLASS ACTION
CONSENT DECREETERMINATION

Graves v. Arpaio, 633 F.Supp.2d 834 (D.Ariz. 2009). Pretrial detainees in a county jail system brought a class
action against a county sheriff and a county board of supervisors, alleging violation of the detainees' civil rights.
The parties entered into a consent decree which was superseded by an amended judgment entered by stipulation of
the parties. The defendants moved to terminate the amended judgment. The district court entered a second
amended judgment which ordered prospective relief for the pretrial detainees. The amended judgment provided
relief regarding the following: population/housing limitations, dayroom access, natural light and windows,
artificial lighting, temperature, noise, access to reading materials, access to religious services, mail, telephone
privileges, clothes and towels, sanitation, safety, hygiene, toilet facilities, access to law library, medical care,
dental care, psychiatric care, intake areas, mechanical restraints, segregation, outdoor recreation, inmate
classification, visitation, food, visual observation by detention officers, training and screening of staff members,
facilities for the handicapped, disciplinary policy and procedures, inmate grievance policy and procedures, reports

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and record keeping, security override, and dispute resolution. The detainees moved for attorney's fees and
nontaxable costs. The district court held that: (1) the class of detainees was the prevailing party entitled to
attorney's fees; (2) the initial lodestar figure of $1,239,491.63 for attorney's fees was reasonable; (3) Kerr factors
provided no basis for downward adjustment of the initial lodestar; (4) the attorney's fees award would not be
reduced for limited success; (5) the amount requested as reimbursement for attorney's fees was fully compensable
under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA); (6) PLRA did not require appointment of class counsel for the
award of attorney's fees and non-taxable costs; and (7) the class was entitled to interest on the award of attorney'
fees from the date of the court's order ruling in favor of the detainees on the motion to terminate. The court noted
that defending and enforcing the judgment for more than five years and obtaining prospective relief required
substantial time and labor, the issues presented were not novel but many were difficult and complex, conducting
discovery, marshaling evidence, and presenting that evidence during a 13-day evidentiary hearing required
considerable skill, commitment of attorneys' time and advancement of costs limited attorneys' ability to take on
new cases, and the attorneys would not receive any compensation for their work representing the detainees except
as awarded by the court. (Maricopa County Sheriff and Maricopa County Board of Supervisors, Arizona)
U.S. Appeals Court
CLASS ACTION
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Hagan v. Rogers, 570 F.3d 146 (3rd Cir. 2009). Fourteen state prisoners jointly filed a single § 1983 complaint, on
behalf of themselves and a purported class, claiming violation of their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights
by prison officials' purported deliberate indifference to the exposure of prisoners to an outbreak of a serious and
contagious skin condition, allegedly scabies. The prisoners sought class certification, requested to proceed in
forma pauperis (IFP) under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), and sought appointment of counsel. The
district court denied joinder (combining actions), dismissed with leave to amend for all except one prisoner, and
denied class certification. The prisoners appealed. The appeals court reversed in part, vacated in part, and
remanded. The appeals court held that: (1) IFP prisoners were not barred from joinder by PLRA; (2) each joined
prisoner was required to pay the full individual filing fee; and (3) the typicality and commonality requirements
were satisfied for class certification. The court noted that prisoners proceeding in forma pauperis (IFP) remained
within the definition of “persons” under the permissive joinder rule, and thus, the prisoners were not categorically
barred from joinder in their civil rights action, despite concerns that joinder would undermine PLRA by
permitting split fees or avoiding the three-strike rule that limited IFP status. (Adult Diagnostic and Treatment
Center, New Jersey)

U.S. District Court
COMPENSATORY
DAMAGES
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Hall v. Terrell, 648 F.Supp.2d 1229 (D.Colo. 2009). A female detainee brought a § 1983 action against a
correctional officer, alleging that he raped her while she was in custody. Following entry of default judgment
against the officer, a bench trial to determine damages, and the entry of a judgment awarding compensatory and
punitive damages, the detainee moved for prejudgment interest and attorney fees. The district court granted the
motion for attorney fees in part. The court held that the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) applied to the
detainee's request for attorney fees where the detainee was, at every stage of the lawsuit, a prisoner confined to a
correctional facility, she was the prevailing party in her suit, and the suit was an action in which attorney fees
were authorized under § 1988. The court held that the reasonable hourly rate for the lodestar amount, in
determining the award of attorney fees under PLRA, was the hourly rate for Criminal Justice Act (CJA)
appointments in Tenth Circuit and District of Colorado. According to the court, under PLRA, the appropriate
hourly rate for the award of paralegal fees was 64% of the average rate that she had requested for non-senior
attorneys, and for an assistant was 50% of such rate. The court held that under PLRA, 10 percent was the
appropriate percentage of the judgment obtained by the detainee against the corrections officer, where the factor
of the opposing party's culpability or bad faith favored the detainee, the factor of ability to satisfy the award of
attorney fees suggested that the detainee should bear some portion of attorney fees, and the factor of the
possibility that the award might deter other persons favored the detainee. The district court had awarded
$1,354,070 in damages, comprised of $354,070.41 in compensatory damages and $1 million in punitive damages.
(Denver Women's Correctional Facility, Colorado)

U.S. District Court
DAMAGES
FAILURE TO DIRECT
FAILURE TO
SUPERVISE
SUPERVISORY
LIABILITY

Hamilton v. Lajoie, 660 F.Supp.2d 261 (D.Conn. 2009). An inmate filed a pro se § 1983 action against the State
of Connecticut, a warden, and correctional officers, seeking compensatory and punitive damages for head trauma,
abrasions to his ear and shoulder, and post-traumatic stress due to an officers' alleged use of unconstitutionally
excessive force during a prison altercation. The inmate also alleged inadequate supervision, negligence, and
willful misconduct. The court held that the inmate's factual allegations against correctional officers, in their
individual capacities, were sufficient for a claim of excessive force in violation of the inmate's Eighth Amendment
rights. The officers allegedly pinned the inmate to the ground near his cell, following an inspection for
contraband, and purportedly sprayed the inmate in the face with a chemical agent despite his complaints that he
had asthma. The court found that the inmate's allegations against the warden in his individual capacity were
sufficient for a claim of supervisory liability, under § 1983, based on the warden's specific conduct before and
after the altercation between the inmate and correctional officers. The inmate alleged that the warden was
responsible for policies that led to his injuries and for procedures followed by medical staff following the incident,
and the warden failed to properly train officers, to adequately supervise medical staff, to review video evidence of
the incident, and to order outside medical treatment of the inmate's injuries even though a correctional officer
received prompt medical care at an outside hospital for his head injury sustained in the altercation. (CorriganRadgowski Correctional Center, Connecticut)

U.S. Appeals Court
CLASS ACTION

Harper v. Sheriff of Cook County, 581 F.3d 511 (7th Cir. 2009). A former detainee filed a class action against a
sheriff, claiming that new detainees remanded to the sheriff's custody after a probable cause hearing were
unconstitutionally required to undergo intake procedures at the county jail before release on bond. The district
court certified the class and the sheriff appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. The court held that the
former detainee's class action lacked a predominance of common issues, precluding certification of the class,
where the detainee had not challenged any particular intake procedure. The court noted that the reasonableness of

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the delay between posting bond and release and the reasonableness of the time and manner of assigning
identification numbers prior to release required individual determinations based on the length of delay for each
detainee and the conditions and exigencies of the jail existing on that particular day. According to the court,
resolution of an equal protection claim could be satisfied in an individual suit. The court noted that the detainee
was not interested in a large damage award, and his constitutional claims required individualized liability and
damages determinations that could be better litigated in an individual suit. (Cook County Jail, Illinois)
U.S. Appeals Court
COMPENSATORY
DAMAGES
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Haynes v. Stephenson, 588 F.3d 1152 (8th Cir. 2009). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action for retaliatory
discipline against a corrections officer who had filed a disciplinary report against the inmate after the inmate had
filed a grievance report against an officer for directing “profane or abusive language” toward him. After a bench
trial, the district court awarded the inmate $1.00 in compensatory damages and $2,500.00 in punitive damages.
The officer appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the district court did not err in
concluding that the inmate established a prima facie case of retaliatory discipline and in determining that the
officer's retaliation against the inmate was reprehensible. According the appeals court, evidence supported the
district court's findings that the officer was knowingly untruthful in claiming that the inmate lied in the grievance,
the officer's retaliatory conduct was willful, reckless, and malicious, and the officer knew that Arkansas
Department of Corrections (ADC) regulations prohibited him from filing the disciplinary report. The court held
that the district court did not err in concluding that the high, 2,500:1 ratio of punitive to economic damages
awarded to the inmate in his § 1983 action did not offend due process, where the officer’s action was sufficiently
egregious to sustain the punitive damages. (Arkansas Dept. of Corr., Tucker Max. Security Unit)

U.S. Supreme Court
CIVIL LIABILITY

Haywood v. Drown, 129 S.Ct. 2108 (2009). A state prisoner brought civil rights actions in the New York Supreme
Court against several correction employees for allegedly violating his civil rights in connection with prisoner
disciplinary proceedings. The action was dismissed as barred by a state “jurisdictional” statute requiring that such
causes of action for damages arising out of the conduct of state corrections officers within the scope of their
employment be filed against the state in the New York Court of Claims. The prisoner appealed. The New York
Supreme Court Appellate Division affirmed, and the prisoner appealed. The New York Court of Appeals
affirmed. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The
court held that, having made the decision to create courts of general jurisdiction which regularly sat to entertain
analogous civil rights actions against state officials other than corrections officers, New York was not at liberty to
shut the doors of these courts to civil rights actions to recover damages from its corrections officers for acts within
the scope of their employment, and to instead require that such damages claims be pursued against the state in
another court of only limited jurisdiction. (New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
COMPENSATORY
DAMAGES
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Hendrickson v. Cooper, 589 F.3d 887 (7th Cir. 2009). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a prison officer
alleging excessive force. The district court entered judgment following a jury verdict in favor of the prisoner and
denied the officer's motion for judgment as matter of law or a new trial. The officer appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The court held that the issue of whether the officer attacked the prisoner for the malicious purpose of
causing harm was for the jury, as was the issue of whether the attack caused the prisoner to feel pain. According
to the court, the jury's award of compensatory damages of $75,000 for the prisoner's pain and suffering was not
excessive, noting that objective medical evidence was not required to support a compensatory damages award.
The court also found that the jury's punitive damages award of $125,000 against the officer was not excessive, in
light of the prisoner’s description of how much pain the officer inflicted by throwing him to the ground and
kneeing him in the back. The court noted that the officer acted with a malicious desire to cause the prisoner harm,
the officer's use of force was completely unjustified, the officer goaded the prisoner into leveling an assault which
the officer then used as an excuse to attack, the officer laid in wait for the prisoner to enter a housing unit, the
prisoner was disabled, and when the prisoner appeared the officer grabbed, shoved, floored, and kneed him. The
appeals court opinion began with the following statement: “Prison is rough. Violent prisoners can pose a serious
threat, requiring prison officers to use force to maintain order. Sometimes, though, the only real threat comes from
a rogue officer who attacks a prisoner for no good reason.” (Wabash Valley Correctional Facility, Indiana)

U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
PRIVATE OPERATOR

Hinton v. Corrections Corp. of America, 624 F.Supp.2d 45 (D.D.C. 2009). An inmate, acting pro se and in forma
pauperis, brought a § 1983 action against a private corporation that operated the treatment facility where the
inmate was held in custody, alleging the facility failed to provide prescription eyeglasses in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. The district court dismissed the case. The court held that the inmate's allegations were insufficient to
state a § 1983 claim for an Eighth Amendment violation. According to the court, the corporation had no duty to
provide eye glasses, eye care, or eye treatment, as the corporation's contract with the government did not stipulate
that the corporation was to provide eye care, and a separate entity, other than the corporation, was under contract
to provide eye care to inmates at the facility. (Central Treatment Facility, District of Columbia, operated by
Corrections Corporation of America)

U.S. Appeals Court
DAMAGES

Kahle v. Leonard, 563 F.3d 736 (8th Cir. 2009). An individual who was raped by a trainee corrections officer
while she was a pretrial detainee, brought a § 1983 action against the trainee corrections officer and other public
officials and entities. After a jury found the trainee corrections officer liable and awarded damages, the district
court granted the plaintiff's motion for attorneys' fees. The trainee corrections officer appealed. The appeals court
affirmed in part and remanded in part. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by
admitting the plaintiff's psychologist's report as a supplemental report, and the district court's jury instructions did
not constitute an abuse of discretion. The district court applied one percent of the detainee’s $1.1 million
judgment ($11,000) to attorneys' fees. With the detainee’s legal expenses totaling $186,208.88, the defendant was
responsible for $175,208.88 in attorneys' fees, in addition to the $1.1 million judgment. The appeals court did not
affirm the award of only one percent and remanded the case for further proceedings. (Pennington County Jail,
South Dakota)

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U.S. Appeals Court
SETTLEMENT

King v. Rivas, 555 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2009). A pretrial detainee brought an action against corrections officers and
others, alleging constitutional violations relating to a false accusation of threatening a guard. Prior to trial, the
defendants made a package settlement offer, which was rejected by the detainee. Following the trial of one officer,
a jury awarded the detainee damages in an amount less than the settlement offer. The parties moved for attorney's
fees and costs. The district court granted the detainee's motion and denied the defendant's motion. The officer
appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. The court held that the package settlement offer is to be taken
on its own terms and compared with the total recovery package in determining whether a defendant is entitled to
costs following the detainee’s success at trial. The court held that the officer was entitled to costs, excluding
attorney's fees, and that the detainee was entitled only to attorney's fees and costs accrued prior to the rejected
offer. (Hillsborough House of Corrections, New Hampshire).

U.S. Appeals Court
DAMAGES
FTCA- Federal Tort
Claims Act

Limone v. U.S., 579 F.3d 79 (1st Cir. 2009). Former prisoners whose murder convictions were overturned, and
representatives of codefendants who died in prison, brought an action against the United States Government,
asserting claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) arising from the Government's involvement in
framing the prisoners. Following a bench trial, the district court entered judgment for the plaintiffs, and the
Government appealed. The appeals court held that evidence supported the district court's conclusion that the FBI's
conduct in cultivating witness's testimony inculpating wrongly accused defendants in a state murder prosecution,
while possessing information undercutting the testimony's veracity, was extreme and outrageous, as required to
state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under Massachusetts law and the Federal Tort Claims
Act (FTCA). According to the court, the FBI agents knowingly participated in events leading to wrongful
indictment, prosecution, conviction and continued incarceration of the defendants, they aided a witness in framing
the plaintiffs and they bolstered the credibility of the witness's testimony. The appeals court held that the FBI's
conduct did not fall within the Federal Tort Claims Act's (FTCA) discretionary function exception, and thus the
Government was not immune from the defendants' claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under
Massachusetts law and FTCA. According to the court, the FBI's conduct violated due process. The appeals court
ruled that non-economic damages awards of $1 million per year of wrongful incarceration in the plaintiffs' action
were not excessive and the damages awards were not grossly disproportionate to the injuries sustained and did not
shock the conscience. (Federal Bureau of Investigation, Suffolk County, Massachusetts)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
DAMAGES

Medical Development Intern. v. California Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 585 F.3d 1211 (9th Cir.
2009). A medical services provider for two California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR)
prisons brought an action in state court against CDCR and the receiver appointed by the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California to oversee the delivery of medical care to prisoners incarcerated by
the CDCR. The provider sought damages for the receiver's refusal to pay for services it provided under contract
with CDCR. After the case was removed to the district court, the court granted the receiver's motion to dismiss.
The provider appealed, but the appeal was stayed to allow the provider to seek leave from the Northern District to
sue the receiver. Subsequently, the Northern District denied the provider's request, and then denied the provider's
motion for clarification. The provider appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded
to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California. The appeals court held that the receiver
was not immune in his official capacity from the claim of a medical services provider seeking damages for the
receiver's refusal to pay for services it provided under contract with CDCR. The court noted that the receiver held
“all powers vested by law in the Secretary of the CDCR as they relate[d] to the administration, control,
management, operation, and financing of the California prison medical health care system,” which necessarily
included the power to control CDCR with regard to paying the provider. (California Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation)

U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Merriweather v. Zamora, 569 F.3d 307 (6th Cir. 2009). A former federal prisoner filed a Bivens complaint
claiming deprivation of his First, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment rights by prison mailroom employees' routinely
opening and reading prisoner's mail outside of his presence, although the mail was marked as “legal mail” or
“special mail” pursuant to Bureau of Prison's (BOP) regulations. The district court denied the employees summary
judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity. The employees appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part,
reversed in part, and remanded. The appeals court held that: (1) a fact issue precluded summary judgment as to
whether two envelopes from the prisoner's attorney were opened outside the presence of the prisoner; (2) an
envelope from federal community defenders was properly labeled legal mail; (3) nine envelopes containing the
word “attorney/client” were properly labeled legal mail; (4) prison employees' opening of the prisoner's legal mail
outside his presence violated his clearly established First and Sixth Amendment rights; (5) prison mailroom
supervisors were not protected by qualified immunity; but (6) prison mailroom employees were protected by
qualified immunity. According to the court, the former prisoner's allegations that prison mailroom employees
opened his legal mail outside his presence despite his repeated complaints to mailroom supervisors were sufficient
to find that mailroom supervisors acted unreasonably in response to the prisoner's complaints, precluding the
supervisors' protection by qualified immunity from the prisoner's claims. The prisoner alleged that the supervisors'
conduct encouraged an atmosphere of disregard for proper mail-handling procedures, where one supervisor stated
that the prison did not have to follow case law but only the Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) policy, and that other
supervisors knew of the prisoner's complaints but did nothing to correct the admitted errors. (Michigan Federal
Detention Center. Federal Bureau of Prisons)

U.S. District Court
CLASS ACTION

Miller v. Washington County, 650 F.Supp.2d 1113 (D.Or. 2009). Inmates brought a class action against county
and sheriff, alleging that the county's policy of strip searching inmates was unconstitutional. The parties crossmoved for summary judgment, and the inmates additionally moved for class certification. The district court held
that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the county's
blanket policy of strip searching all individuals transported from another correctional or detention facility was
justified by the need for institutional security. The court denied class certification, finding that the county's strip

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search policy regarding arrestees did not present common questions of law or fact. The court stayed the action,
noting that the appellate court was reviewing a strip search policy at the time. (Washington Co. Jail, Oregon)
U.S. District Court
DAMAGES

Nails v. Laplante, 596 F.Supp.2d 475 (D.Conn. 2009). A state prisoner filed a civil rights action alleging that
physicians had been deliberately indifferent to his medical needs and violated his rights under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court held
that the prisoner's disagreement over the treatment provided by the defendant physicians was insufficient to show
that the physicians actually were aware of a substantial risk that the prisoner would suffer serious harm as the
result of their actions or inactions, as required for a claim of deliberate indifference under Eighth Amendment, or
a claim under Title II of ADA. The court noted that a private suit for money damages under Title II of ADA could
have been maintained against the physicians in their official capacities only if the prisoner, as plaintiff, could have
established that the Title II violation had been motivated by either discriminatory animus or ill will due to the
prisoner’s disability. (Osborn Correctional Institution, Connecticut)

U.S. Appeals Court
INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY
RLUIPA-Religious Land
Use & Inst. Persons Act

Nelson v. Miller, 570 F.3d 868 (7th Cir. 2009). A Roman Catholic prisoner sued a prison chaplain in his official
and individual capacities for alleged violations of his rights under the free exercise and establishment clauses of
the First Amendment, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), and the Illinois
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (IRFRA). The district court entered partial summary judgment in favor of the
chaplain, and, after a bench trial on the remaining issues, found against the prisoner on all counts. The prisoner
appealed. The appeals court held that the Roman Catholic prisoner's practice of his religion, which compelled him
to abstain from all meat on all Fridays and during Lent and to avoid the meat of four-legged animals, was
substantially burdened under the First Amendment, RLUIPA, and IRFRA by the requirement that he document
that his preferred diet was compelled by his religion. The court found that denial of the prisoner's request that he
not be given the meat of four-legged animals did not constitute a substantial burden on his religious exercise for
the purposes of the First Amendment, RLUIPA, and IRFRA since a regular diet would still be nutritionally
adequate if all meat of four-legged animals were skipped, and thus the prisoner was not put to a choice between
his religious beliefs and adequate nutrition. But the denial of a non-meat diet on Fridays and during Lent
substantially burdened the prisoner's practice of his religion. According to the court, since the prisoner currently
received a non-meat diet and there was no evidence that the prison intended to revoke the prisoner's religious diet,
the prisoner's claim for injunctive relief was moot. The court noted that RLUIPA, which was enacted pursuant to
the Spending Clause, could not subject state officials to suit in their individual capacities. (Tamms Correctional
Center, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
CONSENT DECREETERMINATION
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act

North Emerson-West v. Redman, 630 F.Supp.2d 373 (D.Del. 2009). A state inmate filed a motion for relief from
the district court's order terminating a consent order entered in a class action challenging prison conditions and
disciplinary procedures. The court denied the motion. The district court held that the inmate did not have standing
to challenge the order, which was brought 30 years earlier, under Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The court
held that termination of the consent order was warranted, where the consent order encompassed the state's entire
penal system of discipline and sanctions, that there was no mention that it was entered to correct constitutional
violations, particularly with respect to due process issues and subsequently a United States Supreme Court
decision provided clear guidance regarding prisoners' due process rights, and finally that the consent order was not
the least intrusive means to correct any alleged constitutional violation. (James T. Vaughn Correctional Center,
Smyrna, Delaware)

U.S. District Court
ALIEN
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
MUNICIPAL LIABILITY

Ortega Melendres v. Arpaio, 598 F.Supp.2d 1025 (D.Ariz. 2009). Detainees of Hispanic descent brought an
action against a county sheriff for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that deputies from the sheriff's office
profiled, targeted, and ultimately stopped and detained persons based on their race in violation of the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments. The district court ruled against the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court held that:
(1) allegations were sufficient to state Fourth Amendment claims; (2) allegations were sufficient to state equal
protection claims; (3) the county was subject to municipal liability; and (4) the court would not dismiss the county
sheriff's office as a non-jural entity. The plaintiff was detained for four hours in a police holding cell without
being apprised of any charges against him, and was then handed over to Immigration and Customs Enforcement
officials.
The court held that an allegation that deputies placed the Hispanic passenger of a speeding vehicle in full
custodial arrest for violating United States immigration laws, even after the passenger provided them with
sufficient immigration documents, including a United States Visa containing a fingerprint and picture, a
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) permit, and a Mexican Federal Voter Registration Card with a picture
and fingerprint, was sufficient to state a claim for a Fourth Amendment violation for being placed into full
custodial arrest without probable cause. The court noted that an allegation that the deputies' request for an
Hispanic driver's Social Security card was not “standard procedure” for all routine traffic stops conducted by the
county. According to the court, allegations that the county sheriff made a public statement that physical
appearance alone was sufficient to question an individual about their immigration status, that the county's crime
suppression sweeps had been allegedly targeted at areas having a high concentration of Hispanics, and that the
county had used volunteers with known animosity towards Hispanics and immigrants to assist in crime sweeps,
were sufficient to allege a discriminatory purpose, as required to state a § 1983 equal protection claim. (Maricopa
County Sheriff's Office, Cave Creek Holding Cell, Arizona)

U.S. District Court
BIVENS CLAIM
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F.Supp.2d 1005 (N.D.Cal. 2009). A detainee, a United States citizen who was designated an
“enemy combatant” and detained in a military brig in South Carolina, brought an action against a senior
government official, alleging denial of access to counsel, denial of access to court, unconstitutional conditions of
confinement, unconstitutional interrogations, denial of freedom of religion, denial of right of information, denial
of right to association, unconstitutional military detention, denial of right to be free from unreasonable seizures,

27.155
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and denial of due process. The defendant moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and
denied in part. The court held that the detainee, who was a United States citizen, had no other means of redress for
alleged injuries he sustained as a result of his detention, as required for Bivens claim against the senior
government official, alleging the official's actions violated constitutional rights. The court noted that the Military
Commissions Act was only applicable to alien, or non-citizen, unlawful enemy combatants, and the Detainee
Treatment Act did not “affect the rights under the United States Constitution of any person in the custody of the
United States.” The court found that national security was not a special factor counseling hesitation and
precluding judicial review in the Bivens action brought by the detainee. Documents drafted by the official were
public record, and litigation may be necessary to ensure compliance with the law.
The court held that the detainee sufficiently alleged that the official's acts caused a constitutional deprivation,
as required for the detainee's constitutional claims against the official. The detainee alleged that the senior
government official intended or was deliberately indifferent to the fact that the detainee would be subjected to
illegal policies that the official set in motion, and to a substantial risk that the detainee would suffer harm as a
result, that the official personally recommended the detainee's unlawful military detention and then wrote opinions
to justify the use of unlawful interrogation methods against persons suspected of being enemy combatants.
According to the court, it was foreseeable that illegal interrogation policies would be applied to the detainee, who
was under the effective control of a military authority and was one of only two suspected enemy combatants held
in South Carolina.
The court found that the detainee's allegations that he was detained incommunicado for nearly two years with
no access to counsel and thereafter with very restricted and closely-monitored access, and that he was hindered
from bringing his claims as a result of the conditions of his detention, were sufficient to state a claim for violation
of his right to access to courts against a senior government official.
According to the court, the detainee's allegations that a senior government official bore responsibility for his
conditions of confinement due to his drafting opinions that purported to create legal legitimacy for such treatment,
were sufficient to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment, and thus stated a due process claim under the
Fourteenth Amendment. The detainee alleged that while detained, he suffered prolonged shackling in painful
positions and relentless periods of illumination and intentional interference with sleep by means of loud noises at
all hours, that he was subjected to extreme psychological stress and impermissibly denied medical care, that these
restrictions and conditions were not justified by a legitimate penological interest, but rather were intended to
intensify the coerciveness of interrogations.
The court held that federal officials were cognizant of basic fundamental civil rights afforded to detainees
under the United States Constitution, and thus a senior government official was not entitled to qualified immunity
from claims brought by the detainee. The court also held that the official was not qualifiedly immune from claims
brought by the detainee under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). (Military Brig, South Carolina)
U.S. Appeals Court
COMPENSATORY
DAMAGES

Phillips v. Hust, 588 F.3d 652 (9th Cir. 2009). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against a prison librarian,
claiming that her failure to allow him access to a comb-binding machine violated his First Amendment right of
access to the courts. The district court granted summary judgment to the inmate, and after a bench trial, awarded
the inmate $1,500 in compensatory damages. A panel of the court of appeals affirmed, and the librarian's petition
for a rehearing en banc was denied. The United States Supreme Court granted the librarian's petition for a writ of
certiorari, vacated the panel opinion, and remanded. On remand, the appeals court reversed and remanded, finding
that the librarian was entitled to qualified immunity. According to the court, it was objectively legally reasonable
for the prison librarian to conclude that her denial of access to the comb-binding machine would not hinder the
inmate's capability to file his petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States, and thus
the librarian was entitled to qualified immunity from the inmate's § 1983 suit in light of the Supreme Court's
flexible rules for pro se filings, which did not require and perhaps did not even permit comb-binding. (Snake
River Correctional Institution, Oregon)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONTEMPT

Plata v. Schwarzenegger, 560 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2009). In a class action brought on behalf of state prisoners,
alleging that state officials were providing inadequate health care in violation of the Eighth Amendment and the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the receiver appointed to oversee the provision of health care at state
prisons moved for an order of contempt based on the state's failure to fund the receiver's capital projects. The
district court ordered the state to fund the projects and to show cause why it should not be held in contempt. The
state appealed, and alternatively filed a petition for a writ of mandamus. The appeals court dismissed the appeal
and denied the writ of mandamus. According to the court, the state failed to prove that it would be damaged or
prejudiced in a way not correctable on appeal, weighing against granting the state's petition for a writ of
mandamus to prevent the district court from holding it in contempt based on its failure to fund the receiver's
capital projects. (California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation)

U.S. Appeals Court
INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY
RLUIPA-Religious Land
Use & Inst. Persons Act

Rendelman v. Rouse, 569 F.3d 182 (4th Cir. 2009). A state prisoner brought an action against state prison officials
in their official and individual capacities, seeking injunctive relief and damages under the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and § 1983 based on the officials' refusal to make any accommodation
for his kosher dietary restrictions. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the officials and the
prisoner appealed. The appeals court dismissed in part and affirmed in part. The appeals court held that RLUIPA
did not authorize a claim for money damages against an official sued in her individual capacity when invoked as a
spending clause statute. The court held that the prisoner's claim for injunctive relief under RLUIPA based on the
state prison officials' refusal to make accommodations for his kosher dietary restrictions was rendered moot by his
transfer to a federal prison. The court noted that even if the prisoner's claim was capable of repetition because
there was a possibility that he could return to state prison if his appeal of a federal conviction was successful, the
claim would not likely persist in evading judicial review, as the prisoner would have sufficient opportunity to reinitiate an action seeking injunctive relief if he returned to state prison. (Maryland Correctional InstitutionHagerstown)

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U.S. District Court
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
RLUIPA-Religious Land
Use & Inst. Persons Act

Rouser v. White, 630 F.Supp.2d 1165 (E.D.Cal. 2009). A California state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against
current and former directors of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) and wardens
at two prisons at which the prisoner was housed, alleging violations of federal and state constitutions, and the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), related to his practice of the Wiccan religion.
The defendants moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the motion in part and denied in part.
The court held that the officials significantly burdened the prisoner's exercise of the Wiccan religion under
RLUIPA by inhibiting the prisoner's timely receipt of religious articles, restricting Wiccans' use of chapel space,
failing to announce Wiccan group worship to the general population, prohibiting use of certain items that are part
of group worship, blocking access to religious items, and failing to retain a paid chaplain to provide services to the
prisoner and other Wiccans. According to the court, the officials made no deliberate change in policies to prevent
the recurrence of the events that caused understaffing that resulted in the prisoner being barred from attending
group services. The court held that the failure of the officials to hire a paid chaplain to attend to the religious
needs of the prisoner and other Wiccans constituted a substantial burden on the prisoner's religious exercise under
RLUIPA, where paid chaplains had certain rights and authority within institutions, which volunteer chaplains and
inmates themselves were denied, thus hindering the prisoner's religious exercise. The court found that neither
limited resources, nor lack of necessary accommodations to facilitate the religious needs in prisons, constituted a
compelling interest under RLUIPA, and thus the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation could
not avoid liability under RLUIPA in the prisoner's action.
The court held that a prison warden, but not the director of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, was liable for violation of the prisoner's free exercise of the Wiccan religion arising from denial of
the prisoner’s request for a “Witches Bible” while the prisoner was in administrative segregation. According to
the court, even if the warden did not personally sign the form denying the request, it was reasonable to assume
that the person who signed the form did so with the warden's authority. But the court found that the proffered
reasons were rationally related to the denial of the prisoner's request for incense and candles, and thus did not
violate the prisoner's right of free exercise of religion. The director and warden denied the request based on fire
safety concerns. The court held that California prison officials instituted a policy of denominational preference by
harassing the prisoner on the basis of his Wiccan faith, and denying him access to religious articles, group worship, and a spiritual leader, thus weighing against the officials under the test to determine whether they violated
the prisoner's rights under the Establishment Clause. The court noted that the officials' policy to announce to the
general population times for certain religious services, but not to announce Wiccan services, had the primary
effect of advancing or inhibiting religion.
The court denied qualified immunity to the director and the warden because the law was well-settled at the
time. The court concluded that the prisoner was entitled to injunctive relief on his claims, even though officials
had changed some policies to facilitate the prisoner's access to religious items and group worship. The court found
that these changes had not improved the process for approving orders for religious items nor altered the way in
which religious groups gained access to items in lockers, and a pattern of constitutional violations existed sufficient to call into question the permanence of any changes the defendants had made. (Pleasant Valley State Prison,
California)

U.S. District Court
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Scott v. DiGuglielmo, 615 F.Supp.2d 368 (E.D.Pa. 2009). A state inmate filed an action seeking a declaration that
he had serious and continuing mental health condition and had not been receiving adequate treatment, and an
injunction ordering prison officials to make corrections to his prison charts. The district court granted the officials’ motion to dismiss in part and denied in part. The court held that the inmate had standing to seek declaratory
and injunctive relief against prison officials based on his claim that he had a serious and continuing mental health
condition and had not been receiving adequate treatment, where the alleged denial of proper medical and psychiatric care was continuing, and there was a substantial likelihood that his injury would be addressed by the requested
relief. (State Correctional Institution at Graterford, Pennsylvania)

U.S. Appeals Court
BIVENS CLAIM
FTCA-Federal Tort Claims
Act

Smith v. U.S., 561 F.3d 1090 (10th Cir. 2009). An inmate brought an action against prison employees, the U.S.
Attorney General, and the director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, alleging that he was exposed to asbestos
while assigned to work at a prison. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, and the inmate
appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that the Inmate Accident Compensation Act was the exclusive remedy against the government for a prisoner with alleged work-related
injuries, and thus dismissal of the prisoner's claims under Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) was warranted. The
court held that the federal workers' compensation scheme for participants in a prison work program lacked the
requisite procedural safeguards of the inmate's constitutional rights to foreclose a Bivens action by the inmate.
According to the court, the inmate's allegations that prison employees had known that asbestos was present in a
closet in which the inmate was working when he was exposed to asbestos were sufficient to state an Eighth
Amendment Bivens claim against those employees. (United States Penitentiary at Leavenworth, Kansas)

U.S. District Court
DAMAGES

Tardiff v. Knox County, 598 F.Supp.2d 115 (D.Me. 2009). After granting a detainee's motion for summary judgment on liability under § 1983 for a strip search she underwent at a county jail, the county moved to exclude the
detainee's evidence of lost income or profits allegedly caused by her mental distress growing out of the strip
search. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the detainee's tardy
pretrial disclosure of economic loss information did not prejudice the county's ability to investigate so as to warrant the exclusion of evidence of the detainee's evidence of lost income or profits. The court found that damages
for economic loss based upon a lost future contract were not recoverable in the civil rights suit seeking damages
allegedly caused by the detainee's mental distress, since the jury would have to speculate in order to determine
whether the detainee suffered an economic loss on a future contract and, if so, how much. (Knox County Jail,
Maine)

XXIII

27.157

U.S. Appeals Court
CLASS ACTION

Vallario v. Vandehey, 554 F.3d 1259 (10th Cir. 2009). County jail inmates sued a county sheriff and a county's
administrator of jail operations in their official capacities, alleging disregard of risks to inmates from restraint
chairs and other devices, and the denial of access to psychiatric care for indigent inmates. The district court granted the inmates' motion for class certification and the defendants petitioned for interlocutory appeal. The appeals
court granted the petition and remanded the case. The court held that the district court abused its discretion by
misconstruing the complaint as alleging that denial of adequate mental health treatment affected all inmates, and
abused its discretion by refraining from any consideration whatsoever of the action's merits. (Garfield Co. Jail,
Colo.)

U.S. District Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES
SANCTIONS
SETTLEMENT

Walker v. Gomez, 609 F.Supp.2d 1149 (S.D.Cal. 2009). A prisoner brought an action against the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, alleging violations of their settlement agreement with the prisoner that
resulted from a prior complaint, discrimination based on race as a policy, and retaliation. The prisoner moved to
enforce the settlement agreement and for monetary sanctions. The court held that the prison officials' conduct of
placing the prisoner under lockdown for a period of 10 days following incidents of riots and attempted murder
was not a severe restriction on the prisoner's activities amounting to a breach of the terms of the prior settlement
agreement. The court found that prison officials did not violate the settlement agreement's requirement that they
implemented policies and procedures within the prison system which held inmates accountable for their own individual conduct rather than institute prison-wide lockdowns based on race. The court held that a prison counselor's
conduct of asking the prisoner if he wished to transfer to another prison that would cater to his “sensitive needs”
was not in retaliation in violation of the settlement agreement. The court noted that the act of asking the prisoner if
he would like to volunteer for a transfer was simply because a new facility was in place and inmates were needed
to successfully operate it, and, moreover, the counselor testified that she asked the same question of other inmates
and she posted a sign on her office window conveying the same inquiry she posed to prisoner, and, further, the
prisoner was never transferred. According to the court, a prison counselor's conduct of staying in the same room
as the prisoner while he completed confidential calls did not amount to retaliation in violation of the settlement
agreement. (Calipatria State Prison, California)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
FAILURE TO TRAIN
NEGLIGENCE

Wilson v. Taylor, 597 F.Supp.2d 451 (D.Del. 2009). The mother of a deceased prisoner, who died in his solitary
cell as a result of asphyxia due to hanging after an apparent attempt to feign suicide, brought a § 1983 action
against Delaware Corrections officials. The district court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
The court held that fact issues precluded summary judgment on the mother’s § 1983 claim, custom or policies
claim, deliberate indifference claim, qualified immunity grounds, wrongful death claim, and claim for punitive
damages. The court found genuine issues of material fact as to: (1) whether the prisoner's detention was valid at
the time of his death; (2) whether Delaware Corrections officials failed to train and or maintain customs, policies,
practices, or procedures, relating to the prisoner's repeated release inquiry; (3) whether Delaware Corrections
officials' ignored the prisoner's risk of hurting himself to get the attention of guards as to his repeated release inquiries; (4) whether a correctional officer acted in good faith and without gross or wanton negligence in throwing
the prisoner against a bench in his cell while holding his throat and threatening him verbally; and (5) whether
Delaware Corrections officials' conduct in ignoring the prisoner's repeated release inquiries was a proximate cause
of the prisoner's ultimate death. The court also found that fact issues existed as to whether Delaware Corrections
officials acted outrageously and with reckless indifference to the rights of others, precluding summary judgment
on the mother's § 1983 claim for punitive damages. (Delaware Correctional Center)

U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
PRIVATE OPERATOR

Wormley v. U.S., 601 F.Supp.2d 27 (D.D.C. 2009). A detainee brought an action against private correctional entities, the District of Columbia, the federal government and officials, stemming from an alleged five-month jail
over-detention. The court held that the conduct of federal officials in allegedly causing the five-month jail overdetention did not violate a clearly established federal right of which a reasonable officer would have known, for
the purposes of the officials' qualified immunity defense to the detainee's Fifth Amendment claim, since the officials did not participate in the actual over-detention. The court found that the private correctional vendor sued by
the detainee, stemming from an alleged five-month jail over-detention, was acting “under color of state law,” for
purposes of the detainee's § 1983 claims, since the vendor was performing a traditional government function by
administering the District of Columbia Correctional Treatment Facility. (Washington Halfway Homes, Fairview
Halfway House, Correctional Treatment Facility, Corrections Corporation of America, District of Columbia)
2010

U.S. District Court
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

Advocacy Center for Elderly and Disabled v. Louisiana Dept. of Health and Hospitals,
731 F.Supp.2d 583 (E.D.La., 2010). A disability advocacy organization and incompetent detainee's next friend
brought an action against the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals and Department officials, challenging
the Department's practice of subjecting incompetent criminal defendants to extended delays in parish jails before
their transfer to a mental health facility. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court denied the motion.
The court held that the action fell within the Ex Parte Young exception to sovereign immunity, where the organization alleged an ongoing violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and sought prospective relief in the form of a
permanent injunction requiring officials to accept custody of incompetent defendants and provide them with proper restorative treatment. The court noted that the Ex Parte Young exception to sovereign immunity holds that a
suit is not barred when it is brought against state officials to enjoin the enforcement of an allegedly unconstitutional law. The court found that the disability advocacy organization had associational standing to bring the due
process challenge where the organization was allied with and representative of its constituents, who had standing
to sue in their own right. The federal laws under which the Advocacy Center was established include the Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act of 1986 (“PAIMI”). (Louisiana Department of Health
and Hospitals, Feliciana Forensic Facility)

XXIII

27.158

U.S. District Court
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Advocacy Center for Elderly and Disabled v. Louisiana Dept. of Health and Hospitals, 731 F.Supp.2d 603
(E.D.La. 2010). A disability advocacy organization brought an action challenging the Louisiana Department of
Health and Hospitals' practice of subjecting incompetent criminal defendants to extended delays in parish jails
before their transfer to a mental health facility. The organization moved for a preliminary injunction. The district
court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the organization demonstrated a substantial
likelihood of success on the merits of its due process claim, and demonstrated a substantial threat of irreparable
injury if the injunction did not issue. The court found that the organization demonstrated that the threatened injury
outweighed the damage the injunction might cause, and the organization demonstrated that the public interest
would not be disserved if an injunction was issued. The organization claimed that the Louisiana Department of
Health and Hospitals' practice of subjecting criminal defendants found to be incompetent to stand trial to extended
delays in parish jails before their transfer to a mental health facility was not rationally related to the restoration of
the defendants' competency, in violation of their due process rights, where incompetent defendants remained in
parish jails because mental health facility was full, not because remaining in jail might restore their competency.
The court noted that the organization presented evidence that continued incarceration in parish jails could exacerbate the incompetent defendants' mental conditions. The court held that inadequate funding could not excuse the
Department's perpetuation of unconstitutional conditions of confinement. (Louisiana Department of Health and
Hospitals, Feliciana Forensic Facility)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Armstrong v. Schwarzenegger, 622 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2010). A class of disabled state prison inmates and parolees moved for an order requiring state prison officials to track and accommodate the needs of disabled parolees
housed in county jails, and to provide access to a workable grievance procedure pursuant to the officials' obligations under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Rehabilitation Act, and prior court orders. The district
court granted the motion and the state appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and vacated in part. The appeals court held that: (1) contractual arrangements between the state and a county for incarceration of state prison
inmates and parolees in county jails were subject to ADA; (2) the district court's order was not invalid for violating federalism principles; (3) the state failed to show that the order was not the narrowest, least intrusive relief
possible, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA); but (4) there was insufficient evidence to justify the system-wide injunctive relief in the district court's order. The court noted the state's recent proposal to alter
its sentencing practices to place in county jails approximately 14,000 persons who would otherwise be incarcerated in state prisons. The court also noted that the state's contracts with counties were not simply for incarceration,
but to provide inmates and parolees in county jails with various positive opportunities, from educational and
treatment programs, to opportunities to contest their incarceration, to the fundamentals of life, such as sustenance,
and elementary mobility and communication, and the restrictions imposed by incarceration meant that the state
was required to provide these opportunities to individuals incarcerated in county jails pursuant to state contracts to
the same extent that they were provided to all state inmates. The district court’s order did not require the state to
shift parolees to state facilities if county jails exhibited patterns of ADA non-compliance; rather, the order required that, if the state became aware of a class member housed in a county jail who was not being accommodated, the state either ensure that the jail accommodated the class member, or move the class member to a state or
county facility which could accommodate his needs. In finding that statewide injunctive relief was not needed, the
court held that evidence of ADA violations was composed largely of single incidents that could be isolated, and
the district court's order identified no past determinations that showed class members in county jails were not
being accommodated. (California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation)

U.S. Appeals Court
OFFICIAL CAPACITY
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Avalos v. Baca, 596 F.3d 583 (9th Cir. 2010). A detainee brought an action against officers of a county sheriff's
department in their official and individual capacities for alleged violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights based on his over-detention and the officers' alleged efforts to procure an involuntary waiver of his
civil rights claim. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the officers. The detainee appealed.
The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the officers were not liable under § 1983 in their official capacities
on the over-detention claim, absent evidence that they had a policy, practice, or custom of over-detaining inmates.
According to the court, the detainee had no freestanding constitutional right to be free of a coercive waiver, and
even if the detainee had a right to be free from a coercive waiver, the officers were entitled to qualified immunity
on the involuntary waiver claim. The detainee had been arrested on a warrant from another county for domestic
abuse and was transported to the arresting county jail. The arresting county had the responsibility to notify the
other county, under state law, but failed to do so. Over two months later the arresting county realized that the
detainee had been over-detained and released him. On the day of his release, a deputy in street clothing asked the
detainee, who did not speak English, to sign papers that were an offer to settle his claim for over-detention for
$500. The detainee asserted that he did not know what was in the papers. (Los Angeles Sheriff's Department,
California)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO SUPERVISE
FAILURE TO TRAIN
MUNICIPAL LIABILITY

Beatty v. Davidson, 713 F.Supp.2d 167 (W.D.N.Y. 2010). A former pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action
against a county, jail officials, and a nurse, alleging that the defendants denied him adequate medical care while
he was a pretrial detainee, in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights. The defendants moved for summary
judgment. The district court denied the motion. The court held that the detainee's diabetic condition was a serious
medical condition and that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the nurse was deliberately indifferent to the detainee's diabetic condition, precluding summary judgment for the nurse. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether jail officials were grossly negligent in supervising subordinates who allegedly violated the former pretrial detainee's constitutional rights. According to the court, a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the county lacked a system at its jail for
managing chronically ill inmates and failed to train and properly supervise its staff, precluding summary judgment
for the county on the former pretrial detainee's municipal liability claim under § 1983. (Erie County Holding Center, Pennsylvania)

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U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Brown v. North Carolina Dept. of Corrections, 612 F.3d 720 (4th Cir. 2010). An inmate brought a § 1983 suit
against correctional officers and the North Carolina Department of Corrections, claiming that they violated his
Eighth Amendment rights by being deliberately indifferent to the serious harm he suffered at the hands of a fellow
inmate. The district court dismissed the action and the inmate appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded.
The court held that the prisoner, who suffered significant physical injuries as the result of another inmate's attack,
sufficiently alleged a § 1983 claim of deliberate indifference to his Eighth Amendment rights against an officer
who allegedly observed the altercation and failed to respond, and another officer who allegedly was aware of the
other inmate's grudge but still sent the prisoner into a housing block to pick up supplies. The court found that the
inmate stated a § 1983 claim against a corrections officer of deliberate indifference by alleging that an officer was
in “the Block” when the assault occurred, and a reasonable person could infer from that statement that the officer
was aware of the attack, and that his failure to intervene represented deliberate indifference to a serious risk of
harm. (Alexander Correctional Institute, North Carolina)

U.S. District Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
SETTLEMENT
CONSENT AGREEMENTTERMINATION

Clark v. California, 739 F.Supp.2d 1168 (N.D.Cal. 2010). The state of California, Governor and various state
prison officials filed a motion pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) to terminate the prospective
relief in a 2001 settlement agreement and an order that required them to comply with a remedial plan designed to
ensure that California prisoners with developmental disabilities were protected from serious injury and discrimination on the basis of their disability. Developmentally disabled prisoners moved for enforcement of, and further
relief under, the settlement agreement and order. The court held that for the purposes of a motion pursuant to the
Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), testimony from a few prison staff members at individual prisons did not
prove systemic compliance with the remedial plan. The court held that termination of the settlement agreement
and order entered pursuant to Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) was unwarranted since the state defendants
failed to carry their burden to show the absence of current and ongoing rights violations under ADA and Rehabilitation Act, and the prospective relief contained in the settlement agreement and order remained necessary, was
sufficiently narrow, and was minimally intrusive. According to the court, the defendants failed to fulfill their obligation to provide developmentally disabled California prisoners with the accommodations and program modifications that would enable them to gain access to prison programs, services, and activities afforded non-disabled
prisoners. The court found that the state defendants were not deliberately indifferent, so as to violate the Eighth
Amendment, even though the state defendants had not adequately implemented the remedial plan, where the correction department's policies provided for constitutionally acceptable treatment. The court ruled that further relief
was necessary under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) to secure the rights of class of developmentally
disabled prisoners, where the defendants demonstrated an ignorance of conditions for developmentally disabled
prisoners and an inability to recognize the gravity of and to remedy the problems that had been identified by the
court expert and others. According to the court, the defendants demonstrated an inability to take remedial steps
absent court intervention, evidence reflected that the defendants had failed to comply with the remedial plan even
nine years later, and the remedial plan in its current form did not go far enough to ensure compliance with the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Rehabilitation Act. (California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation)

U.S. District Court
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Couch v. Jabe, 737 F.Supp.2d 561 (W.D.Va. 2010). An inmate, proceeding pro se, brought a § 1983 action claiming that prison officials violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights when they applied a Virginia Department of Corrections (VDOC) regulation to exclude the books Ulysses and Lady Chatterley's Lover from the
prison library and prevented him from ordering those books from a private, approved vendor. The parties crossmoved for summary judgment. The district granted the inmate’s motion, finding that the regulation violated the
First Amendment, and that injunctive relief was warranted. The court held that the regulation was not reasonably
related to legitimate penological interests, and thus, was overbroad, in violation of the First Amendment. The
court noted that legitimate government interests in security, discipline, good order and offender rehabilitation
were not rationally related to the regulation, which forbid all “explicit ... descriptions of sexual acts” including
“sexual acts in violation of state or federal law,” and encompassed much of the world's finest literature, but did
not extend to “soft core” pornography. According to the court, while the inmate had no right to a general purpose
reading library under the First Amendment, where the Virginia Department of Corrections (VDOC) decided to
provide a general literary library to offenders, VDOC officials were constrained by the First Amendment in how
they regulated the library. The court concluded that the appropriate remedy following a determination that the
First Amendment was violated by a prison regulation, which excluded the books Ulysses and Lady Chatterley's
Lover from a prison library, was injunctive relief against the enforcement and application of the regulation. (Augusta Correctional Center, Virginia)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
FAILURE TO TRAIN
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Davis v. Oregon County, Missouri, 607 F.3d 543 (8th Cir. 2010). A pretrial detainee brought an action under §
1983 and various state law authority against a county, county sheriff's department, and a sheriff, alleging the defendants violated his rights in failing to ensure his safety after a fire broke out at the county jail. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The
court held that the county jail's smoking policy did not demonstrate that the sheriff acted with deliberate indifference in violation of the due process rights of the detainee caught in his cell during a jail fire, even if a jailer supplied cigarettes to inmates, since the jail had an anti-smoking policy in effect at all relevant times. The court noted
that the jailer who allegedly supplied the cigarettes to the inmates had retired nine months before the fire occurred,
and jail officials made sweeps for contraband as recently as five days before the fire. According to the court, the
county jail's inoperable sprinklers and lack of extra fire safety equipment such as oxygen tanks did not amount to
deliberate indifference in violation of the due process rights of the detainee caught in his cell during a fire, where
jail officials took action to deal with fire hazards by prohibiting smoking and searching for contraband, and fire
extinguishers and smoke detectors were present at the time of the fire. The court held that any failure of the sheriff
to engage his officers in more exhaustive emergency training did not amount to deliberate indifference in violation of the due process rights of the detainee caught in his cell during a fire, even if the officers' lack of training

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presented a substantial safety risk. The court noted that the officers' actions in removing inmates from their cells
after they discovered the fire demonstrated that they did not disregard the risk. (Oregon County Jail, Missouri)
U.S. District Court
TORT LIABILITY

Dean v. Walker, 743 F.Supp.2d 605 (S.D.Miss. 2010). Motorists injured when a squad car commandeered by an
escapee collided with their vehicle brought a § 1983 action in state court against a county sheriff and deputy sheriffs, in their individual and official capacities, the county, and others, asserting various claims under federal and
state law. The case was removed to federal court where the court granted in part and denied in part the defendants'
motion for summary judgment. The defendants moved to alter or amend. The court denied the motion. The court
held that the “public duty” doctrine did not relieve the county of tort liability to the motorists under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA). The court found that the county sheriff and deputy sheriffs who were in vehicular
pursuit of the escaped jail inmate when the escapee's vehicle crashed into the motorists' vehicle owed a duty to the
motorists as fellow drivers, separate and apart from their general duties to the public as police officers, and thus
the “public duty” doctrine did not relieve the county of tort liability in the motorists' claims under the Mississippi
Tort Claims Act (MTCA). (Jefferson–Franklin Correctional Facility, Mississippi)

U.S. District Court
COMPENSATORY
DAMAGES
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Durrenberger v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, 757 F.Supp.2d 640 (S.D.Tex. 2010). A hearing impaired prison
visitor brought an action against the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ), alleging failure to accommodate his disability during visits in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Rehabilitation Act.
The district court denied summary judgment for the defendants and granted summary judgment, in part, for the
visitor. The court held that acceptance by the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) of federal financial
assistance waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity from the prison visitor's action alleging disability discrimination in violation of the Rehabilitation Act, where the Act expressly stated that acceptance of federal funds
waived immunity. The court held that summary judgment as to compensatory damages was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to the amount of damages suffered by the visitor by the prison's failure to accommodate his disability. The court found that a permanent injunction enjoining future violations of the Rehabilitation
Act by the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) was warranted in the hearing impaired prison visitor's
action alleging failure to accommodate, where TDCJ had not accommodated the visitor in the past, continued to
not provide accommodations and gave no indication that it intended to provide any in the future. (Hughes Unit,
Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division)

U.S. District Court
NEGLIGENCE
STATE LIABILITY
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Estate of Crouch v. Madison County, 682 F.Supp.2d 862 (S.D.Ind. 2010). An inmate's estate brought a § 1983 suit
against a county and corrections officers, claiming that the officers were deliberately indifferent to the inmate's
serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and that the county was liable for failure to train its
officers or establish policies regarding the medical care of inmates. The defendants moved for summary judgment.
The district court granted the motion. The court held that the inmate did not show signs of an objectively serious
need for medical attention prior to 3:00 a.m. on the day of his death from a drug overdose, at which time he was
found unresponsive. According to the court, the Indiana Tort Claims Act entitled the corrections officers and
county to immunity on state law negligence claims arising from the inmate's death, which occurred while he was
assigned to a community corrections program maintained under the supervision of a governmental entity. (Madison County Community Justice Center, Indiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
CLASS ACTION
POLICIES/PROCEDURES
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of County of Burlington, 621 F.3d 296 (3rd Cir. 2010). Affirmed 132
S.Ct. 1510 (2012). A non-indictable arrestee brought a class action pursuant to § 1983 against two jails, alleging a
strip search violated the Fourth Amendment. After granting the motion for class certification, the district court
granted the arrestee's motion for summary judgment, denied his motion for a preliminary injunction and denied
the jails' motions for qualified and Eleventh Amendment immunity. The jails appealed. The appeals court reversed
and remanded. The appeals court held that as a matter of first impression in the circuit, the jails' policy of conducting strip searches of all arrestees upon their admission into the general prison population was reasonable. The
court found that jails were not required to provide evidence of attempted smuggling or discovered contraband as
justification for the strip search policy. According to the court, the decision to conduct strip searches, rather than
use a body scanning chair, was reasonable. The court noted that the chair would not detect non-metallic contraband like drugs, and there was no evidence regarding the efficacy of the chair in detecting metallic objects. The
appeals court decision was affirmed by the United States Supreme Court in 2012 (132 S.Ct. 1510). (Burlington
County Jail, Essex County Correctional Facility, New Jersey)

U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

George v. Sonoma County Sheriff's Dept., 732 F.Supp.2d 922 (N.D.Cal. 2010). A county inmate's estate and survivors filed a § 1983 action alleging that the inmate received inadequate medical care from medical staff at a
county detention facility and at a medical center. The court held that the medical center, that was contractually
obliged to undertake medical treatment of inmates from the county detention center, and its physicians, were state
actors, and thus were subject to liability under § 1983 in action alleging that county inmate's death was result of
inadequate treatment he received at the center, even though the center was a privately owned facility that cared for
patients other than inmates, and inmates could be sent to other facilities. The court held that summary judgment
for the defendants was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether physicians at the medical center
with which the county had contracted to provide care for its inmates had an ulterior financial motive to discharge
the inmate before his condition had stabilized, had a predetermined length of inmate's hospital stay, and had no
intention of fully treating the inmate. (Sonoma Co. Main Adult Det.Facility, and Sutter Medical Center, Calif.)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONSENT DECREEMODIFICATION

Graves v. Arpaio, 623 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir, 2010). Pretrial detainees in a county jail system brought a class action
against a county sheriff and the county supervisors board, alleging violation of the detainees' civil rights. The
parties entered into a consent decree which was superseded by an amended judgment entered by stipulation of the
parties. The defendants moved to terminate the amended judgment. The district court entered a second amended
judgment which ordered prospective relief for the pretrial detainees. The district court awarded attorney fees to

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the detainees. The sheriff appealed the second amended judgment. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that
the district court did not abuse its discretion by ordering prospective relief requiring the sheriff to house all detainees taking psychotropic medications in temperatures not exceeding 85 degrees and requiring the sheriff to
provide food to pretrial detainees that met or exceeded the United States Department of Agriculture's Dietary
Guidelines for Americans. The district court had held that air temperatures above 85 degrees greatly increased the
risk of heat-related illnesses for individuals taking psychotropic medications, and thus that the Eighth Amendment
prohibited housing such detainees in areas where the temperature exceeded 85 degrees. (Maricopa County Sheriff,
Jail, Maricopa County Supervisors, Arizona)
U.S. District Court
FTCA- Federal Tort Claims
Act

Hanson v. U.S., 712 F.Supp.2d 321 (D.N.J. 2010). An inmate brought a Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) action,
alleging that a Bureau of Prisons (BOP) officer slammed his head on the floor and choked him in an attempt to
force the inmate to spit out contraband that the inmate was attempting to swallow. The government filed a motion
for summary judgment and the district court denied the motion. The court held, for the purposes of the inmate's
FTCA claim, under New Jersey law the BOP officers employed unreasonable force while attempting to search the
inmate for contraband. According to the court, summary judgment was precluded by material issues of fact regarding whether the BOP officers used reasonable force in holding and searching the inmate. (Federal Correctional Facility in Fort Dix, New Jersey)

U.S. Appeals Court
SUPERVISORY LIABILITY
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Harper v. Lawrence County, Ala., 592 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2010). Following a pretrial detainee's death from alcohol withdrawal while in a county jail, the detainee's estate brought an action against the county, sheriff, police
officers, and others under § 1983 and state law, alleging deliberate indifference to the detainee's serious medical
needs. The district court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss and the defendants appealed. The appeals court
affirmed and reversed in part. The court held that allegations supported a claim that jailers were deliberately indifferent to the detainee's serious medical needs, but that the sheriff and others did not have actual knowledge of the
detainee's erratic and strange behavior while in jail. The court found that allegations supported a claim that the
sheriff and jail administrators were deliberately indifferent. The court held that allegations that jailers were told by
other inmates and other jail staff that the pretrial detainee was displaying erratic and strange behavior, and that
jailers took no steps to secure immediate medical attention for the detainee, supported a § 1983 claim that jailers
were deliberately indifferent to the detainee's serious medical needs under the due process clause. The court held
that the detainee’s estate failed to allege how the sheriff and jail administrators could possibly have had actual
knowledge of the detainee's erratic and strange behavior while in jail, as required to support a § 1983 claim alleging deliberate indifference to the detainee’s serious medical needs. According to the court, for the purposes of a
jailer's claim of qualified immunity from the § 1983 claim that he was deliberately indifferent to the pretrial detainee's serious medical needs under the due process clause, it was clearly established at the time of the detainee’s
confinement that a jail official who was aware of, but ignored, dangers of acute alcohol withdrawal and waited for
an emergency before obtaining medical care was deliberately indifferent to the inmate's constitutional rights. The
court found that the complaint's specific allegations that the sheriff and jail administrators who were responsible
for management and administration of the jail had customs or policies of improperly screening inmates for alcohol
withdrawal and improperly handling inmates addicted to alcohol or drugs, together with its factual detail concerning prior a similar incident, satisfied the pleading standards for stating a § 1983 claim of deliberate indifference to
the pretrial detainee's serious medical needs under the due process clause based on supervisor liability. (Lawrence
County Jail, Alabama)

U.S. District Court
SUPERVISORY LIABIITY

Hawkins v. Brooks, 694 F.Supp.2d 434 (W.D.Pa. 2010.) A state prisoner brought a pro se § 1983 action against
various prison officials and corrections officers, alleging retaliation, harassment, due process violations, defamation of character, and mental anguish. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in
part and denied in part. The court held that the prisoner's conduct of pressing charges against a corrections officer
who the prisoner claimed raped and impregnated her and complaining about other officers' alleged harassment
amounted to a “constitutionally protected activity,” as required for the prisoner to state a § 1983 retaliation claim.
The court found that corrections officers' alleged conduct of withholding the prisoner's incoming and outgoing
mail in retaliation for the prisoner's pressing rape charges against an officer at another prison amounted to an
“adverse action,” as required to establish a prima facie pro se § 1983 retaliation claim against the officers. But the
court found that a prison official's alleged conduct of reassigning the prisoner to a different unit in the same prison
did not rise to the level of an “adverse action,” as required to establish a prima facie pro se § 1983 retaliation
claim. The court found that the prisoner had no liberty interest in her place of confinement, transfer, or classification, and thus, prison officials' alleged refusal to have the prisoner transferred to an out-of-state institution did not
violate her due process rights. The court found that the prisoner's assertions that she made supervisory prison
officials aware of the harassment and retaliation she allegedly suffered at the hands of correctional officers as a
result of her pressing rape charges against a correctional officer at another facility, and that none of the supervisory officials offered assistance or took any corrective action, were sufficient to state a claim for supervisory liability, in her § 1983 retaliation action. (State Correctional Institution at Cambridge Springs, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
DAMAGES

In re Nassau County Strip Search Cases, 742 F.Supp.2d 304 (E.D.N.Y. 2010). Arrestees brought a class action
against a county, among others, challenging the county correctional center's blanket strip search policy for newly
admitted, misdemeanor detainees. The defendants conceded liability, and following a non-jury trial on the issue of
general damages, the district court held that each arrestee was entitled to the same dollar amount per new admit
strip search by way of the general damages award, that it would exclude any information concerning the effect
that the searches had upon arrestees in awarding general damages, and an award of $500 in general damages to
each arrestee was appropriate. (Nassau County, New York)

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U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
FAILURE TO PROTECT

Jackson v. Stevens, 694 F.Supp.2d 1334 (M.D.Ga. 2010.) An inmate brought a § 1983 suit against a prison official asserting an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim. The official moved for summary judgment and
the district court denied the motion. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of
material fact as to whether the prison official had subjective knowledge of a serious risk of harm to the inmate
from a second inmate, whom the official heard say that he would try to kill or harm the first inmate if they were
put in a cell together, and whether the official disregarded the risk when she admonished the second inmate before
placing him in a cell with the first inmate. Immediately after the official closed the cell door, the second inmate
immediately hit the inmate. (Washington State Prison)

U.S. Appeals Court
COMPENSATORY
DAMAGES
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

King v. McMillan, 594 F.3d 301 (4th Cir. 2010). A female former deputy sued her employer sheriff in his official
capacity, under Title VII, for sexual harassment and in his individual capacity, under state law, for battery. The
sheriff left office and the incoming sheriff was substituted in the action. A jury returned verdicts for the deputy on
both claims, and the district court entered judgment for the deputy, awarded compensatory and punitive damages,
and granted the sheriff's post-trial motion to reduce the compensatory damages award. Both sheriffs appealed. The
appeals court affirmed. The court held that substitution was appropriate for the claim under Title VII. The court
held that, under Virginia law, the punitive damages award of $100,000 imposed for the sheriff's battery of the
female deputy by unwanted touching was not excessive. The court also found that the compensatory damages
award of $50,000, which the district court had reduced from $175,000, was not excessive. (City of Roanoke, Virginia)

U.S. District Court
ALIEN
FTCA- Federal Tort Claims
Act

Lin Li Qu v. Central Falls Detention Facility Corp., 717 F.Supp.2d 233 (D.R.I. 2010). A federal immigration
detainee's widow sued the Government under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), asserting claims arising out of
the detainee's care while he was detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). The government
moved to dismiss. The district court denied the motion. The court held that the widow met the FTCA's notice
requirement and that her FTCA claims were not barred by the independent contractor defense. The court held that
the widow stated negligence claims actionable under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), when she alleged that
after the Government was aware, or should have been aware, of the detainee's deteriorating medical condition, it
acted negligently when it ordered the transfers of the detainee to different facilities and when it improperly reviewed the basis for his custody and detention. (Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Wyatt Detention Center,
Rhode Island, Franklin County House of Corrections, Greenfield, Massachusetts, Franklin County Jail, Vermont)

U.S. Appeals Court
CLASS ACTION

McDaniel v. County of Schenectady, 595 F.3d 411 (2nd Cir. 2010). Pretrial detainees appealed an order of the
district court which approved the settlement of a class action arising from jail defendants' alleged violations of
their constitutional rights during strip-searches, but awarding less than the requested fee to their attorneys. The
appeals court affirmed, finding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to award attorney
fees using a percentage-of-fund approach, in the extent of its reliance on the modified lodestar approach, or in its
application of the reasonableness factors. The court noted: “The parties vigorously litigated this action for a period
of more than three years, with various attorneys for the plaintiff class spending more than 1,000 hours working on
the case.” The parties eventually agreed to injunctive relief which included the creation of a settlement fund totaling $2.5 million. The detainees' suggested a fee award of 26% represented a multiplier of 1.98-2.24 beyond what
counsel would have earned based on their hourly rates, and the court's award was the equivalent to 13% of the
common fund, which the court found was squarely within the range of typical awards in similar cases. (Schenectady County Jail, New York)

U.S. District Court
SUPERVISORY LIABILITY
NEGLIGENT RETENTION

Mitchell v. Rappahannock Regional Jail Authority, 703 F.Supp.2d 549 (E.D.Va. 2010). A female inmate brought
an action against a regional jail authority and correctional officers who held the ranks of colonel, lieutenant, captain, sergeant, and corporal, alleging under § 1983 that the defendants violated the Eighth Amendment, and asserting state-law claims for assault and battery, gross negligence, and negligent retention. The district court denied the
defendants' motion to dismiss. The court held that the inmate's allegations in her complaint: (1) of over ten instances of sexual assaults by a correctional officer, under circumstances where his superiors were in a position to
have knowledge of what was happening at various times; (2) that each named superior witnessed or participated in
several of those actions; (3) that all superiors had direct knowledge of the officer's personal remarks to the inmate;
(4) and that the officer's obsession with the inmate was a matter of commentary among all correctional staff, were
sufficient to state a § 1983 Eighth Amendment claim for supervisory liability against the superiors. The inmate
also alleged that each superior witnessed several incidents where the officer followed the inmate into a storage
room and assaulted her. The inmate also alleged that a corporal, who was in charge of inmate workers, witnessed
the correctional officer, in violation of jail regulations, approach her several times while working in the kitchen,
and that the corporal told the inmate not to be rude to the officer or she would be fired from her job after the inmate asked the corporal to prevent the officer from moving behind the counter. (Rappahannock Jail Authority,
Rappahannock Regional Jail, Virginia)

U.S. Appeals Court
CLASS ACTION
POLICIES/PROCEDURES
SETTLEMENT

Olson v. Brown, 594 F.3d 577 (7th Cir. 2010). An inmate at a county jail which served as a temporary detention
center filed a class action in state court against a sheriff, alleging that procedures at the jail violated Indiana law
and the inmates' First Amendment rights. The inmate challenged jail staff's alleged practices of opening inmates'
legal mail, denying inmates access to the law library, and failing to respond to inmates' grievances. The case was
removed to federal court. The inmate moved for class certification but he was transferred out of jail before the
court's ruling. The district court granted the sheriff's motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissed action as
moot. The inmate appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that the inherently transitory exception to the mootness doctrine prevented dismissal of the case. The court noted that even though the inmate was
transferred out of the jail prior to certification of his class action, there would likely be a constant class of persons
suffering the deprivation complained of in the inmate’s complaint. (Tippecanoe County Jail, Indiana)

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U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN
OFFICIAL CAPACITY
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Parrish v. Ball, 594 F.3d 993 (8th Cir. 2010). A female detainee filed a § 1983 suit against a sheriff and a deputy,
individually and in their official capacities, alleging failure to train the deputy, who had sexually assaulted the
detainee. After bench trial the district court granted in part and denied in part the sheriff’s motion for summary
judgment. The sheriff and the detainee cross-appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded. The court held that the sheriff in his official capacity was not liable for the deputy's inadequate training, and that the sheriff in his individual capacity was entitled to qualified immunity from the failure to train
claim. The court noted that although the deputy received minimal training at best for his law enforcement position, the inadequacy of his training was not so likely to result in violation of the constitutional rights of the detainee, so that the county could reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need for training, especially when the county had no notice at all that a sexual assault was likely. According to the court, there was no
patently obvious need to train the deputy not to sexually assault women, and the sexual assault was a consequence
too remote to conclude that failure to train the deputy caused him to sexually assault the detainee. (Hot Spring
County Sheriff's Department and Jail, Arkansas)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONSENT DECREE
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act
SPECIAL MASTER
TERMINATION OF
ORDER

Plata v. Schwarzenegger, 603 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2010). After the State of California was unable to comply with
consent orders in a prisoners' class action, which provided remedies to address deficiencies in prison medical care,
the district court imposed a receivership on the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR)
to administer and improve prisoner health care. The state moved to terminate the receivership and challenged the
receiver's construction plan for additional prison facilities. The district court denied the state's motion and refused
to terminate the receiver's construction plan. The state appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, and dismissed
the appeal in part. The court held that the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) did not bar appointment of a
receiver for CDCR after the State of California was unable to comply with consent orders that provided remedies
for and addressed deficiencies in prison medical care. Although PLRA provided for appointment of a special
master to hold hearings and make recommended findings, and it did not expressly authorize appointment of receivers, nothing in PLRA expressly prohibited appointment of a receiver, the role of special master was distinct
from that of a receiver, and receiverships were a recognized equitable tool to address problems in prisons prior to
enactment of PLRA. According to the court, imposition of a receivership on CDCR to administer and improve
prisoner health care was the least intrusive means of remedying the State prison system's constitutionally inadequate medical care, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), where the State admitted that it was
unable to comply with consent orders that provided stipulated remedial plans to address the constitutional violations, and the State failed to show that it could remedy the ongoing violations in the absence of the receivership.
The appeals court held that it lacked jurisdiction on appeal to consider the State of California's challenge to the
District Court's denial of its motion to terminate a construction plan for additional prison facilities. The court
noted that the district court's ruling was not a final judgment, the plan itself was in flux, so that any challenge to it
was premature, and the ruling did not involve a refusal to terminate or to wind up the receivership itself, so that it
was not an appealable interlocutory order. (California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation)

U.S. Appeals Court
FTCA- Federal Tort
Claims Act
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Qureshi v. U.S., 600 F.3d 523 (5th Cir. 2010). A detainee filed a complaint against the United States seeking damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act based on his allegedly unlawful detention by the Department of Homeland
Security. The district court issued an order requiring him to obtain the court's permission before filing suit in any
federal court in the state of Texas, and the detainee appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. The appeals court held that the pre-filing injunction was invalid where the district court entered the injunction without
affording the detainee prior notice or the opportunity to oppose the injunction or be heard on its merits.

U.S. District Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES
OFFICIAL CAPACITY
RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Riley v. County of Cook, 682 F.Supp.2d 856 (N.D.Ill. 2010). The special administrator of the estate of a prisoner
who committed suicide while incarcerated at a county jail brought a civil rights action under § 1981 and § 1983
against county defendants. Approximately three weeks after he was admitted to the jail the prisoner was found in
his cell hanging by his neck from a bed sheet. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the
motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the county could not have been directly liable, under Illinois
law, for failure to establish and implement the policies and procedures raised in the civil rights complaint, where it
was within the purview of the sheriff's office, not the county, to implement policies and procedures within the
county jail. The court noted that Illinois sheriffs were independently elected officials not subject to the control of
the county. The county also could not have been vicariously liable for the acts of the sheriff and his employees
under a respondeat superior theory under Illinois law, as the sheriff was an independently-elected official, answering directly to the electorate, and not having a master/servant relationship with the county board.
The court found that the special administrator stated a claim against the county department of correction’s
superintendent and the county sheriff, in their official capacities, for § 1983 violations, by alleging that the defendants were responsible for the care and management of the prisoners at the county jail, and had policymaking
authority to implement appropriate procedures to do so, but acted with deliberate indifference by failing to institute suicide prevention practices. The administrator alleged that the prisoner's suicide was the result of this direct
indifference. (Cook County Sheriff, Cook County Department of Corrections, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
SUPERVISORY
LIABILITY

Rupe v. Cate, 688 F.Supp.2d 1035 (E.D.Cal. 2010). A state prisoner brought an action against prison officials for
violation of his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), alleging that the officials failed to accommodate his Druid religious practices and
retaliated against him for protected activities. The officials moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the prisoner pled sufficient facts to state a claim against prison
officials on a theory of supervisor liability under § 1983 by alleging that he wrote to the officials about violations
of his rights, that the officials were “made completely aware of the inappropriate actions of their subordinates,”
and that they “actively chose to be deliberately indifferent to these actions.”

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The court found that the prisoner's claims for injunctive relief based on the California Department of Corrections' (DOC) alleged systemic discrimination against those practicing the Pagan religion were not moot, even
though he had been transferred from the prison where many of the alleged violations of his rights occurred, where
he was still incarcerated in a prison run by the DOC. The court held that the prisoner's claims for damages under
RLUIPA against state prison officials in their official capacity were barred by Eleventh Amendment sovereign
immunity, since RLUIPA did not provide a clear statement requiring states to waive immunity from liability for
money damages. According to the court, the issue of whether prison officials violated the prisoner's rights under
the Free Exercise Clause by failing to reasonably accommodate his Druid religious faith could not be resolved at
the motion to dismiss phase because of factual disputes as to what interest justified the officials' alleged failure,
the existing and potential alternatives for Druid religious exercise, and the impact of requested accommodations
on prison officials and other inmates.
The court found that the prisoner stated claim for retaliation by prison officials for conduct protected by the
Free Exercise Clause by alleging that he was strip-searched as harassment for writing letters to prison and government officials in which he complained about the lack of accommodations for his religion. The prisoner also
alleged that officials conspired to place him in administrative segregation and ultimately to transfer him to requite
his complaints about their previous adverse actions against him, and that the actions taken against him were motivated solely by the officials' desire to inhibit his religious worship. The court found that the prisoner stated a claim
against prison officials for violation of his right to equal protection by alleging that he and other Pagans were
denied opportunities to practice their religion that were available to mainstream religions and that the officials
engaged in a pattern of discrimination against Pagan practitioners. (Mule Creek State Prison, California Department of Corrections)
U.S. District Court
NEGLIGENT RETENTION
FAILURE TO PROTECT

Sexton v. Kenton County Detention Center, 702 F.Supp.2d 784 (E.D.Ky. 2010). Two female detainees brought a §
1983 action against a county detention center and officials, alleging deliberate indifference with respect to hiring
and supervision of a deputy who sexually assaulted them while they awaited arraignment. The defendants moved
for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the detainees failed to establish
deliberate indifference with respect to the center's hiring of the deputy. The court noted that none of the deputy's
prior misdemeanor offenses, including his driving infractions and domestic assault, demonstrated a propensity to
commit rape. The court found that the detainees failed to demonstrate a causal link between the center's alleged
policy of not terminating employees with excessive absenteeism and the deputy's conduct. The court noted that
"...Absent evidence of prior complaints of sexual assault, the mere fact that a male guard supervises a female
inmate does not lead to the conclusion that the inmate is at a great risk of being sexually assaulted by the guard."
According to the court, the detainees failed to establish that the county detention center was deliberately indifferent to their constitutional rights by not effectively monitoring surveillance equipment, and thus they could not
recover in their § 1983 action against the center, where there was no evidence that the center had a policy or custom of ineffective surveillance. The detainees argued that only one person monitored the 89 cameras that were
used throughout the Detention Center and that they were mainly monitored only for ingress and egress of secured
doors. They asserted that the county should have had cameras in the video arraignment room for the inmates'
protection. The court noted that state jail regulations do not require constant monitoring of video surveillance
cameras or dictate where the cameras are to be placed inside a detention facility. (Kenton County Detention Center, Kentucky)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO SUPERVISE
GOVERNMENTAL
IMMUNITY
NEGLIGENT
SUPERVISION

Smith v. County of Lenawee, 600 F.3d 686 (6th Cir. 2010). A female detainee's estate brought an action against a
county, sheriff, on-call physician, police officers, and parole agent, under § 1983 and state law, arising out of the
detainee's death while in the county's custody. The district court denied the parole agent's motion for summary
judgment on a gross negligence claim. The agent filed interlocutory appeal. The appeals court reversed. The court
held that the parole agent's failure to intercede on behalf of the detainee in county custody, upon arriving at the jail
to serve the detainee a notice of parole violation charges and determining that the detainee was unable to be transported or served, was not the “proximate cause” of the detainee's death, so as to entitle the agent to governmental
immunity from gross negligence liability under Michigan law. The court noted that the detainee was in the custody of county jail officials in the hours leading up to her death, the parole agent worked for the state Department of
Corrections, not the county, the detainee had been experiencing delirium tremens (DT) symptoms for close to 48
hours prior to arrival at the jail, a physician had been notified of the detainee's condition and told jail officials to
monitor the detainee, the agent was present at the jail for a matter of minutes only, and county jail officials failed
to check the detainee until 40 minutes after the agent left the jail. (Lenawee County Sheriff’s Department, and
Michigan Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
FTCA- Federal Tort Claims
Act

Spotts v. U.S., 613 F.3d 559 (5th Cir. 2010). High-security inmates at a federal prison, who were not evacuated in
the aftermath of damage to the prison and the surrounding area caused by a hurricane, brought an action against
the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The district court dismissed on jurisdictional
grounds as barred by the “discretionary function” exception to the FTCA. The inmates appealed. The appeals
court affirmed. The court held that the decision on the part of a regional director of the Bureau of Prisons (BOP),
not to evacuate high-security inmates from the prison when damage caused by the hurricane deprived the facility
of electricity and potable water for an extended period of time, was the type of policy decision protected by the
“discretionary function” exception to the FTCA. (Federal Correctional Complex, United States Penitentiary,
Beaumont, Texas)

U.S. District Court
COMPENSATORY
DAMAGES
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Tate v. Troutman, 683 F.Supp.2d 897 (E.D.Wis. 2010). A county jail inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that
officials failed to provide constitutionally sufficient medical care. The inmate moved for the entry of a default
judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that a county jail officer
and medical officials were not personally involved in the allegedly inadequate medical treatment provided to the
inmate after a fall in his cell, and thus were not liable under § 1983 for any compensatory or nominal damages for
an Eighth Amendment violation. The court noted that even though the inmate suffered pain after the fall and had

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blood in his bowel movements, the inmate had a history of severe low back and bilateral neck pain, headaches,
and rectal bleeding before the fall. The court held that county jail officials failed to provide adequate medical care
for the inmate's dislocated shoulder, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and thus the inmate was entitled to an
award of compensatory damages for past pain and suffering. The court noted that the jail physician refused to see
the inmate or speak to him, jail officials rejected the inmate's grievances regarding his inadequate medical treatment, and the inmate experienced physical pain and emotional distress for three or four weeks due to his lack of
adequate diagnosis and treatment of his shoulder injury by immobilization.
The court concluded that an award of $27,000 was the appropriate amount to compensate the inmate for his
past pain and suffering, where the inmate experienced pain and suffering for about one month. The court found
that county jail officials showed callous indifference towards the inmate's medical needs, and thus a punitive damages award of $9,000 was warranted to deter or punish the Eighth Amendment violation. The court also found that
the inmate was entitled to prejudgment interest on the compensatory damage award at an average monthly prime
rate compounded annually from the period beginning on the date of his injury through the date of the entry of
judgment. (Milwaukee Country Jail, Wisconsin)
U.S. Appeals Court
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Thomas v. Bryant, 614 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2010). Inmates incarcerated at the Florida State Prison (FSP) brought
a § 1983 action against various officers and employees of the Florida Department of Corrections (DOC), alleging
that the use of chemical agents on inmates with mental illness and other vulnerabilities violated the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. The claims against individual correctional officers
responsible for administering the agents were settled. After a five-day bench trial on the remaining claims against
the DOC Secretary and the FSP warden for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, the district court entered
findings of fact and conclusions of law. The court ended final judgment and a final permanent injunction in the
inmates' favor. The Secretary and warden appealed. The appeals court affirmed.
The court held that, notwithstanding his untimely death, the inmate who obtained declaratory and injunctive
relief could still be the “prevailing party” entitled to attorney fees for the cost of district court litigation under the
Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act (42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1983, 1988.) The court found that in reaching its conclusion the district court did not clearly err in finding that an inmate was sprayed with chemical agents at times
when he had no capacity to comply with officers' orders because of his mental illness, or in finding that those
sprayings caused the inmate lasting psychological injuries.
According to the court, the repeated non-spontaneous use of chemical agents on an inmate with a serious mental illness constituted an extreme deprivation sufficient to satisfy the objective prong of the test for an Eighth
Amendment violation. The court noted that the inmate's well-documented history of mental illness and psychotic
episodes rendered him unable to comply at the times he was sprayed, such that the policy was unnecessary and
without penological justification in his specific case. The court found that the DOC’s policy and practice of spraying inmates with chemical agents, as applied to an inmate who was fully secured in his seven-by-nine-foot steel
cell, was not presenting a threat of immediate harm to himself or others, and was unable to understand and comply
with officers' orders due to his mental illness, were extreme deprivations violating the broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity and decency embodied in the Eighth Amendment.
The court held that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the record demonstrated that DOC officials acted with deliberate indifference to the severe risk of harm an inmate faced when officers repeatedly
sprayed him with chemical agents for behaviors caused by his mental illness. The appeals court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that injunctive relief was warranted and necessary, despite
contentions that an inmate was currently incarcerated at a facility where he was not subject to DOC's chemical
agents policy. The court noted that the permanent injunction against violations of the mentally ill inmate's Eighth
Amendment rights from sprayings with chemical agents did not extend further than necessary to correct a constitutional violation and was not overly intrusive. According to the court, in addition to being closely tethered to the
identified harm, the district court's permanent injunctive relief was narrowly drawn and plainly adhered to the
requirements of Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). (Florida State Prison)

U.S. Appeals Court
COMPENSATORY
DAMAGES
FAILURE TO PROTECT
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Thomas v. Cook County Sheriff's Dept., 604 F.3d 293 (7th Cir. 2010). A mother brought a § 1983 and state wrongful death action against a county, sheriff, and various officers and medical technicians at a county jail after her son
died from pneumococcal meningitis while being held as a pretrial detainee. The mother asserted a claim of deliberate indifference to medical needs as well as a common-law claim for wrongful death. Following a jury verdict
for the mother, the district court, ordered the reduction of the total damage award from $4,450,000 to $4,150,000.
The defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part. The court held
that the issue of whether county corrections officers were subjectively aware of the pretrial detainee's serious
medical condition that culminated in death from pneumococcal meningitis, as required to support the detainee’s
survivor's § 1983 deliberate indifference action against a county and officers, was for the jury, given the cellmates'
and other witnesses' accounts of the detainee's vomiting and exhibiting other signs of serious illness within plain
view of officers without any response from them, and given testimony as to the inmates' various complaints to
officers regarding his condition. According to the court, issues of whether the county had a custom or practice of
failing to timely review jail inmates' medical requests, and a causal link between such failure and the death of the
pretrial detainee from pneumococcal meningitis were for the jury. The court noted that the supervisor and individual medical technicians for the contractor that handled medical services for inmates testified to the practice of not
retrieving inmate medical requests on a daily basis, and the detainee's fellow inmates testified to having filed
numerous medical requests on the detainee's behalf.
The court found that a causal link was not shown between the county sheriff's department's alleged policy of
understaffing the county jail and the pretrial detainee's death from pneumococcal meningitis. Although individual
deputies employed as corrections officers were shown to have known of and ignored the detainee's medical needs,
there was no evidence that such inaction was due to understaffing rather than other causes. The court found that a
compensatory damages award of $4 million was not excessive. The award was not out of line when measured
against those in other similar cases, and the award had rational connection with evidence that the detainee was 32

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years old, had three children whom he supported, and had died of a treatable illness after numerous fellow inmates
had alerted corrections officers about his condition. (Cook County Jail, Illinois)
U.S. Appeals Court
CLASS ACTION
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Valdivia v. Schwarzenegger, 599 F.3d 984 (9th Cir. 2010). Parolees brought a class action alleging a state's parole
revocation procedures violated their due process rights. After entering a permanent injunction for the parolees, the
district court entered an order granting the parolees' motion to enforce a paragraph of the injunction concerning
the use of hearsay evidence, and subsequently entered an order granting their motion to enforce the injunction
notwithstanding passage of an allegedly conflicting voter proposition. An appeal was taken. The appeals court
held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the use of hearsay evidence was subject
to balancing, but the district court abused its discretion in denying the state's motion to modify the injunction to
conform with the voter proposition. (California)
2011

U.S. Appeals Court
COMPENSATORY
DAMAGES
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Al-Amin v. Smith, 637 F.3d 1192 (11th Cir. 2011). A state prison inmate brought a § 1983 action against state
corrections officials, alleging that the officials had repeatedly opened his privileged attorney mail outside of his
presence, in violation of his rights of access to the courts and free speech. The district court denied the officials'
motion for summary judgment. The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed in part, and denied rehearing en
banc. The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. On remand, the district court granted the officials' motion, precluding the inmate from offering evidence of either compensatory or punitive damages. The inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the prisoner could not seek punitive damages relief absent a physical injury, under the provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act. (Georgia State Prison)

U.S. District Court
CLASS ACTION
DAMAGES

Augustin v. Jablonsky, 819 F.Supp.2d 153 (E.D.N.Y. 2011). Arrestees brought a class action against a county
challenging the county correctional center's blanket strip search policy for newly admitted, misdemeanor detainees. After the county admitted liability, the plaintiffs' class action involving more than 17,000 members was certified for the issue of general damages and the district court awarded general damages of $500 per strip search. The
county moved to decertify the class for purposes of determining the issue of arrestees' special damages. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the resolution of special damages could not proceed on a classwide basis, since questions of law or fact common to the class no longer predominated over questions affecting
individuals. (Nassau County Correctional Center, New York)

U.S. District Court
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

Barrington v. New York, 806 F.Supp.2d 730 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against correctional officers and a state, alleging violation of his constitutional rights as the result of an assault from officers in
retaliation for filing grievances about disciplinary actions taken against him. The defendants moved for summary
judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the state was entitled to sovereign immunity. The court found that the prisoner's § 1983 excessive force suit against correctional
officers in their individual capacities did not implicate a rule against double recovery, under New York law, despite the officers' contention that the prisoner had already won an excessive force suit in state court against the
officers in their official capacities and now wanted "a second bite at the apple." The court noted that there was no
court in which the prisoner could have brought both an excessive force claim under state law against the state and
the officers in their official capacities and a § 1983 claim against the officers in individual capacities for which
punitive damages were available. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether the prisoner's filing of a grievance was the motivating factor for the alleged assault by
the correctional officers. (Green Haven Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
MUNICIPAL LIABILITY

Cash v. County of Erie, 654 F.3d 324 (2nd Cir. 2011). A pretrial detainee filed a § 1983 action against a county,
sheriff, and deputy sheriff alleging that the deputy sexually assaulted her. After entry of a jury verdict in the detainee's favor, the district court granted the defendants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The
parties filed cross-appeals. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The appeals court held that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that the sheriff was deliberately indifferent to the risk of sexual misconduct, and the jury's determination that the county was subject to municipal liability was not irreconcilably
inconsistent with its finding that the sheriff was not negligent. According to the court, trial evidence revealed that
the detainee was housed in a female housing unit at the facility, that the deputy, acting alone, escorted some female detainees to the recreation center but ordered the plaintiff to remain behind. When the deputy returned, he
grabbed the plaintiff, put his hands over her nose and mouth, forced her into the deputies' bathroom, and raped
her. The plaintiff reported the assault the next morning, prompting an investigation that led to the deputy’s arrest
for first-degree rape. (Erie County Holding Center, New York)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
FAILURE TO SUPERVISE
FAILURE TO TRAIN
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
SUPERVISORY
LIABILITY

Chao v. Ballista, 806 F.Supp.2d 358 (D.Mass. 2011). A female former inmate brought an action under § 1983 and
the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act (MCRA) against a prison guard and superintendent, alleging that the guard
violated her constitutional rights by sexually exploiting her while she was incarcerated, and that the superintendent failed to protect her from the guard's repeated sexual battery. Following a jury trial, the district court entered
judgment in the inmate's favor. The defendants subsequently moved for judgment as matter of law or for a new
trial. The district court denied the motions. The court held that the question of whether the prison guard's misconduct in sexually exploiting the inmate while she was incarcerated rose to the level of “sufficiently serious harm”
necessary to establish an Eighth Amendment violation, was for the jury. The court also found that the issue of
whether the prison guard and superintendent were deliberately indifferent to the rights, health, or safety of the
inmate was for the jury. The court found that the jury verdict finding that the prison superintendent was not liable
for punitive damages because the superintendent's conduct was not “willful, wonton, or malicious,” was not inconsistent with the verdict finding that the superintendent was “sufficiently culpable” as to have been deliberately

27.167

indifferent to the inmate's needs, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The court noted that malicious conduct is
not required to sustain an Eighth Amendment claim for supervisory liability for deliberate indifference.
According to the court, issues of whether the prison guard knew, or should have known, that emotional distress
would result from his sexually exploiting the inmate while she was incarcerated, and as to whether the guard's
conduct, including demanding fellatio in 23 separate places with the inmate, was extreme and outrageous, were
for the jury. The court found that the superintendent was not entitled to qualified immunity from the former inmate's § 1983 claim alleging that the superintendent failed to protect her from the prison guard's repeated sexual
exploitation, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, where the law was clearly established that prison officials had
a duty to protect their inmates by training and supervising guards, creating and sustaining a safe prison environment, and investigating allegations of sexual misconduct or abuse when they arose. (South Middlesex Correctional Center, Massachusetts)
U.S. District Court
FTCA- Federal Tort Claims
Act
NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

Chess v. U.S., 836 F.Supp.2d 742 (N.D.Ill. 2011). An inmate who suffered personal injuries in an assault by a
fellow inmate brought an action against the federal government under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), alleging it failed to properly screen the fellow inmate upon intake and also failed to monitor him. The inmate had suffered second-degree burns when the other inmate threw a cup of scalding water onto his face and then physically
assaulted him by hitting him with the cup and punching him. The parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The
district court denied the plaintiff's motion, and granted the defendants’ motion in part and denied in part. The
court held that the government failed to comply with certain directives aimed at monitoring federal prisoners
suffering from mental illness, for the purposes of its attempt to avoid liability to the federal inmate who suffered
personal injuries in an assault by a fellow inmate under the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA) waiver of sovereign immunity. The court found that the inmate’s claims relating to a corrections officer's alleged failure to monitor inmates during lockup were not barred by the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA) discretionary function exception.
According to the court, while there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Bureau of Prisons (BOP)
officials complied with requirements to review the inmate's central file upon intake and to review the assaulting
inmate's mental health on a monthly basis, the assaulted inmate failed to raise the issue for trial as to whether the
Bureau’s failure to review the assailing inmate's central file proximately caused his injury. The court found that
summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact, as to whether, after his second placement,
BOP officials knew or reasonably should have known that the inmate should have been segregated from the administrative population. The court also found genuine issues of material fact as to whether a correctional officer's
alleged failure to monitor the unit at the time of the attack constituted negligence and proximately caused the
attacked inmate's injuries. (Federal Bureau of Prisons, Metropolitan Correctional Center Chicago, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
DAMAGES
FAILURE TO PROTECT

Cobige v. City of Chicago, Ill., 651 F.3d 780 (7th Cir. 2011). The estate of a deceased female arrestee brought a §
1983 action against a city and police officers, alleging failure to provide medical care in violation of the Fourth
Amendment and the Illinois wrongful death law. After a jury verdict in favor of the estate, the city and officers
filed motions for judgment as a matter of law and/or for a new trial. The district court denied the motions. The city
and officers appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part and remanded. The appeals court held
that evidence presented at trial in the estate's § 1983 action was sufficient to establish causation of the arrestee's
death, where evidence from one of the arrestee's cellmates, two deputy sheriffs and a civilian aide at the lockup,
permitted a jury to find that she experienced severe abdominal pain throughout her confinement. A professor and
head of coronary care at university hospitals testified that the pain led the arrestee to produce more epinephrine,
which combined with a pre-existing heart condition caused her death, and uterine tumors found during a postmortem examination led to his conclusion that the arrestee had suffered serious abdominal pain. The court held
that the probative value of evidence of the deceased arrestee's police record, time in prison, and drug addiction
outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice, where the evidence bore directly on the appropriate amount of damages and that a new trial on the issue of damages was warranted. (Chicago Police Department lockup, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Coscia v. Town of Pembroke, Mass., 659 F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 2011). The estate of a detainee who committed suicide
after being released from custody brought a § 1983 action against police officers, their supervisors, and a town,
alleging that the officers and supervisors were deliberately indifferent to the arrestee's medical needs and that the
town failed to train the officers to prevent detainee suicides. The district court denied the individual defendants'
motion for judgment on the pleadings and they appealed. The appeals court reversed. The appeals court held that
the estate failed to state a claim for deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to health under the
Fourteenth Amendment. According to the court, the estate failed to allege facts sufficient to demonstrate a causal
relationship between the police officers' failure to furnish medical care to the detainee during a seven-hour period
of custody and the detainee's act of committing suicide by walking in front of a train 14 hours after his release
from custody. The court noted that the detainee had been thinking about suicide at the time he was arrested, the
detainee was thinking about suicide at the time he was released from custody, and when the police released the
detainee from custody they placed him in no worse position than that in which he would have been had they not
acted at all. The court found that in the absence of a risk of harm created or intensified by a state action, there is
no due process liability for harm suffered by a prior detainee after release from custody in circumstances that do
not effectively extend any state impediment to exercising self-help or to receiving whatever aid by others may
normally be available. The twenty-one-year-old detainee had been involved in a one-car accident, he was arrested
about eleven o'clock in the morning and brought to the police station. On the way there he said he intended to
throw himself in front of a train, and he continued to utter suicide threats at the station house accompanied by selfdestructive behavior, to the point of licking an electrical outlet. As a consequence, the police did not lock him in a
cell, but placed him in leg restraints and followed an evaluation protocol that showed a high suicide risk. He was
not examined by a doctor, but was released on his own recognizance about six o'clock that evening. (Town of
Pembroke, Massachusetts)

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U.S. District Court
CONCENT DECREETERMINATION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
SETTLEMENT

Davis v. Gunter, 771 F.Supp.2d 1068 (D.Neb. 2011). State prisoners sued prison officials for allegedly violating
the First and Fourteenth Amendments by restricting the prisoners' receipt of postage stamps through the mail.
Following a settlement agreement that resulted in dismissal of the case pursuant to a joint motion of the parties,
the prisoner moved 20 years later for a temporary restraining order and for discovery, and the officials moved to
terminate the consent decree and dismiss the case. The district court denied all motions. The court held that the
settlement agreement was not a consent decree within the meaning of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA),
providing mutually exclusive definitions for a consent decree, which is relief entered by the court and enforceable
by contempt power, and a “private settlement agreement,” which is not subject to judicial enforcement by contempt power, but rather, only by a prisoner's new action for breach of contract. (Nebraska State Penitentiary)

U.S. District Court
MUNICIPAL LIABILITY

Dean v. Walker, 764 F.Supp.2d 824 (S.D.Miss. 2011). Vehicular accident victims brought an action against a
county, sheriff and deputies, stemming from a head-on collision with an escaped inmate whom the defendants
were chasing. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court held that the
accident victims failed to establish a pattern of unconstitutional conduct by county, as required to maintain a claim
for municipal liability under § 1983. The court noted that the victims introduced no evidence at all with respect to
other police pursuits in the county or other instances where inmates were not made to wear handcuffs. According
to the court, the victims failed to establish that the sheriff acted with an intent to harm, unrelated to his pursuit of
the inmate, as required to maintain a substantive due process claim. The court noted that the sheriff's pulling in
front of the inmate in an attempt to stop him, even if reckless, was consistent with the sheriff's legitimate interest
in apprehending the inmate. (Jefferson–Franklin Correctional Facility, Mississippi)

U.S. District Court
DAMAGES
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Drumgold v. Callahan, 806 F.Supp.2d 405 (D.Mass. 2011). A former prisoner brought an action against former
homicide detectives, a police commissioner, and a city for damages arising from his wrongful conviction and
unlawful imprisonment for the murder of a twelve-year-old girl. Following a verdict against the detective in a
second trial, the detective filed motions for judgment as a matter of law, for a new trial, and to reduce the jury
award. The district court denied the motions. The court held that the detective was not entitled to qualified immunity for failing to turn over impeachment evidence to a prosecutor. The court held that an award of approximately $1 million per year of the plaintiff's wrongful fourteen-year incarceration was not excessive in the suit
against the detective who withheld impeachment evidence, and therefore a reduction in the award was not warranted. The court noted that the jury determined the value of non-economic damages. (City of Boston, Mass.)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONTRACT SERVICES

Florer v. Congregation Pidyon Shevuyim, N.A., 639 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2011). A state prisoner brought an action
under § 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) against a Jewish organization that contracted with the prison to provide Jewish religious services to prisoners, a rabbi who was president of
the organization, and an outreach program of the organization. The prisoner alleged that the defendants refused to
provide basic religious reading materials, other basic materials, and spiritual leadership. The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of the organization and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court
held that the prisoner, whose requests for a Torah, Jewish calendar, and rabbi visit were denied by the private
Jewish organization could not establish that such denial was the result of a governmental policy, as required to
hold the organization liable for any deprivation of the prisoner's free exercise rights under § 1983 or his rights
under the RLUIPA. According to the court, there was no evidence that the organization was enforcing a department of corrections (DOC) or governmental policy, or that the organization's internal policy was adopted by the
DOC. The court also held that the prisoner could not establish that the organization helped DOC staff determine
whether other prisoners should be classified by the DOC as Jewish, as required to hold the organization liable.
The court noted that the private Jewish organization and its rabbi were not “state actors” under the public function
analysis, as would allow the defendants to be held liable on the prisoner's claims. (Washington State Penitentiary)

U.S. District Court
ALIEN
CLASS ACTION
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Franco-Gonzales v. Holder, 828 F.Supp.2d 1133 (C.D.Cal. 2011). Immigrant detainees brought a putative class
action on behalf of mentally disabled detainees being held in custody without counsel during removal proceedings, asserting claims under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), Rehabilitation Act, and Due Process
Clause. A detainee who was a native and citizen of Belarus, and who had been deemed mentally incompetent to
represent himself in removal proceedings, moved for a preliminary injunction. The district court granted the motion in part. The court held that: (1) the detainee was entitled to a custody hearing at which the government had to
justify his continued detention on the basis that he was a flight risk or would be a danger to the community; (2) a
qualified representative for a mentally incompetent immigrant detainee may be an attorney, law student or law
graduate directly supervised by a retained attorney, or an accredited representative; (3) the detainee’s father could
not serve as a qualified representative for detainee at a custody hearing; (4) appointment of a qualified representative to represent the detainee at a custody hearing was a reasonable accommodation under the Rehabilitation Act;
(5) the likelihood of irreparable harm and the balance of hardships favored the detainee; and (6) a mandatory
injunction was warranted. (Sacramento County Jail, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Gilman v. Schwarzenegger, 638 F.3d 1101(9th Cir. 2011). California state prisoners serving life imprisonment
sentences with the possibility of parole filed a class action under § 1983, alleging that a provision of California's
Victims' Bill of Rights Act of 2008, which reduced the availability and frequency of parole hearings for prisoners
initially found not suitable for parole, violated the Ex Post Facto Clause and prisoners' substantive due process
rights. The prisoners moved for a preliminary injunction to bar enforcement of the Act, and the state moved to
dismiss. The district court granted preliminary injunctive relief in part, and the State appealed. The appeals court
reversed. The appeals court held that, even assuming that the Act threatened to create the risk of prolonged incarceration for those convicted prior to its enactment, the prisoners' ability to apply for expedited hearings remedied
any possible Ex Post Facto violation and warranted denial of the inmates' request for a preliminary injunction.
(California)

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U.S. District Court
GOVERNMENTAL
IMMUNITY
NEGLIGENCE
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
QUASI-JUDICIAL
IMMUNITY
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

Harbeck v. Smith, 814 F.Supp.2d 608 (E.D.Va. 2011). A former pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against
a public defender, clerk of court, and deputy clerk of court, alleging that she was unlawfully imprisoned for 87
days after criminal charges against her were dismissed, in violation of her rights under Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments, and false imprisonment under Virginia law. The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state
claim. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that the detainee failed to
state § 1983 and false imprisonment claims against public defender and that the public defender was entitled to
governmental immunity against a legal malpractice claim. The court found that the detainee's allegations were
sufficient to state a § 1983 claim against the clerk and that the clerk was not entitled to quasi–judicial immunity
against the § 1983 claim and was not entitled to sovereign immunity against the negligence claim. The court also
found that the detainee alleged necessary conduct by the clerk and deputy clerk to state a claim for punitive damages. According to the court, the allegations that the clerk of court received at least two letters notifying her that
the pretrial detainee should be released, and that she still failed to take action to effectuate that release after criminal charges against the detainee were dismissed, were sufficient to allege the clerk's personal involvement in the
detainee's continued detention. The court noted that the clerk's alleged inaction in procuring the detainee's release
after criminal charges were dismissed was not a choice within the clerk's discretion and was not taken pursuant to
the state court's direction. The court also held that the clerk of court failed in her execution of a ministerial duty,
precluding her entitlement to sovereign immunity against the pretrial detainee's negligence claim, where the clerk
received orders for detainee to be released, which the clerk's office was then required to notify the jail of the detainee's change in status so as to effectuate her release. (Hampton Roads Regional Jail, Virginia, and Circuit Court
of the City of Hampton, Virginia)

U.S. District Court
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Hughbanks v. Dooley, 788 F.Supp.2d 988 (D.S.D. 2011). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action alleging that the
state Department of Corrections' correspondence policy prohibiting the delivery of bulk-rate mail was unconstitutional. The prisoner moved for preliminary injunctive relief and asked the court to invalidate portions of the policy. The district court denied the motion. The court found that the prisoner's mere allegation that his First Amendment rights were violated by the prison's denial of bulk-rate mail established the threat of irreparable harm, in
determining whether to grant the prisoner a preliminary injunction seeking to invalidate the prison's bulk-rate mail
policy, but the balance of hardships favored the prison in determining whether to grant the prisoner's request. The
court noted that the bulk-rate mail policy was a state policy, and suspension of the policy for all inmates in the
state would compromise the safety and security of every institution in the state. The court found that the policy
was rationally-related to the prison's penological purpose of maintaining security and order, that prisoners could
review catalogs in a prison property office and could pre-pay postage on any catalog to have it mailed first or
second class, that the challenged policy was statewide and any accommodation would have a significant effect on
state inmates and prison staff, and the policy was not an exaggerated response to security and other concerns.
Similarly, the court found that the prisoner's allegation that his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights were
being violated by the prison's failure to notify him when prohibited bulk-rate mail was not delivered established
the threat of irreparable harm, in determining whether to grant the prisoner a preliminary injunction requiring the
prison to notify the intended recipient and sender when bulk-rate correspondence was confiscated. The court again
found that the balance of hardships favored the prison, where the prison would have to expend substantial prison
resources to implement the requested policy, and the current policy was implemented to preserve a prison resource. (Mike Durfee State Prison, South Dakota)

U.S. District Court
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Link v. Luebbers, 830 F.Supp.2d 729 (E.D.Mo. 2011). After federal habeas proceedings were terminated, federally-appointed counsel filed vouchers seeking payment under the Criminal Justice Act (CJA), for work performed
on a prisoner's executive clemency proceedings and civil cases challenging Missouri's execution protocol. The
district court held that counsel were entitled to compensation for pursuing the prisoner's § 1983 action for declaratory and injunctive relief alleging denial of due process in his clemency proceedings, but that counsel were not
entitled to compensation for work performed in the § 1983 action challenging Missouri's execution protocol. The
court noted that the prisoner's § 1983 action challenging Missouri's execution protocol was not integral to the
prisoner's executive clemency proceedings. (Missouri)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
NEGLIGENCE
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

Maraj v. Massachusetts, 836 F.Supp.2d 17 (D.Mass. 2011). The mother of a deceased inmate brought an action,
as administratrix of the inmate's estate, against the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, a county sheriff's department, a county sheriff, and corrections officers, alleging that the defendants violated the inmate's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. She also brought common law claims of wrongful death, negligence, and assault and
battery. The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state claim. The district court granted the motion in part
and denied in part. The court held that the Commonwealth, in enacting legislation effectuating the assumption of
county sheriff's department by the Commonwealth, did not waive sovereign immunity as to § 1983 claims filed
against the Commonwealth, the department, and corrections officers in their official capacities after the transfer
took effect. The court found that the correction officers who were no longer participating in the transfer of the
inmate at the time inmate first resisted and the officers who took the first responsive measure by “double locking”
the inmate's handcuffs were not subject to liability in their individual capacities as to the § 1983 substantive due
process claim brought by inmate's mother arising from the inmate's death following the transfer.
According to the court, corrections officers who applied physical force to the resisting inmate during the transfer of the inmate, or were present when the inmate was unresponsive and requiring medical attention, were subject
to liability, in their individual capacities, as to the § 1983 substantive due process claim brought by the inmate's
mother. The court held that the county sheriff and corrections officers who participated in the transfer of the inmate, who died following the transfer, were immune from negligence and wrongful death claims brought by the
inmate's mother under the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act (MTCA) provision which categorically protected public
employees acting within the scope of their employment from liability for “personal injury or death” caused by
their individual negligence. But the court found that the mother properly alleged that county corrections officers'
contact with the inmate amounted to excessive force, and that a supervisor instructed the use of excessive force, as

27.170

required to state a claim for assault and battery, under Massachusetts law, against the officers. (South Bay House
of Correction, Suffolk County, Massachusetts)
U.S. District Court
HECK RULE
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
QUASI-JUDICIAL
IMMUNITY

McBride v. Cahoone, 820 F.Supp.2d 623 (E.D.Pa. 2011). A state prisoner filed § 1983 action against his probation officer, and others, alleging violation of his constitutional rights after he was sent to prison for 83 days without a hearing for violation of his electronic monitoring program. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district
court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that: (1) the state prisoner had a due process
liberty interest in serving his sentence in home confinement; (2) his claim was not barred by Heck v. Humphrey;
(3) the prisoner had standing to seek injunctive and declaratory relief; (4) the claim against the director of the state
probation and parole department was not barred by the Eleventh Amendment; (5) the probation officer was not
entitled to qualified immunity; (6) the probation officer was not entitled to quasi-judicial immunity; and (7) the
director of the state probation and parole department was not entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. The court noted
that the prisoner pled guilty after a judge advised him repeatedly that if he accepted the government's plea offer,
he would not serve any time in prison, but would carry out his sentence in electronically-monitored home confinement. (Delaware County Office of Adult Probation and Parole Services, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO SUPERVISE
FAILURE TO TRAIN
POLICIES/PROCEDURES
NEGLIGENT HIRING

Morse v. Regents of University of California, Berkeley, 821 F.Supp.2d 1112 (N.D.Cal. 2011). A journalist arrested while covering a demonstration at a university sued the university's board of regents, its police department and
various officers on the department, asserting § 1983 claims for violation of the First Amendment, the Fourth
Amendment, and the Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth Amendment, as well as a claim for violation of the Privacy Protection Act. The defendants filed a partial motion to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part
and denied in part. The court held that the journalist stated a § 1983 claim for violation of the Excessive Bail
Clause of the Eighth Amendment on the theory that the defendants added unsupported charges for the sole purpose of increasing his bail. The court found that the theory was viable under the Excessive Bail Clause, despite the
indirect means the defendants allegedly used to obtain the higher bail, and the intervening actions of the judicial
officer who actually set bail. The court found that the journalist stated a § 1983 claim against the police chief in
his individual capacity where the journalist asserted that the chief failed to train or supervise those individuals
who directly deprived the journalist of his constitutional rights and that, by his policy decisions, he set in motion
the acts that deprived the journalist of his constitutional rights. The court held that the journalist’s claims that he
was wrongfully arrested by university police and that his property was subject to searches and seizures without
proper cause and without the proper warrants, stated a claim under the Privacy Protection Act (PPA) against the
university police chief for failure to screen, train, and supervise. The court noted that the journalist's claim related
specifically to the statutory provisions of the PPA, that he alleged sufficient facts to support his claim of a causal
connection between the police chief's conduct and the statutory violation, and liability was not limited to those
personally involved in the statutory violation. (University of California, Berkeley)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO ACT
FAILURE TO PROTECT
FAILURE TO SUPERVISE
FAILURE TO TRAIN

Plair v. City of New York, 789 F.Supp.2d 459 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). A pre-trial detainee at an adolescent jail brought
an action against a city, city officials, and corrections officers, asserting claims under § 1983 and state law arising
from an incident in which an officer allegedly punched him in the face. The defendants moved to dismiss. The
district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the detainee failed to state excessive force claims against supervisory officials and a § 1983 claim against the city. The court found that correctional officers and supervisors did not have immunity under New York law from state law claims and the city did
not have immunity under New York law from state law claims brought on the respondeat superior basis. The court
held that the determination of whether the pretrial detainee's claim against the city for its negligent hiring, training, and retention of officers and supervisors allegedly involved in the detainee's beating could not be resolved at
the motion to dismiss phase because of factual issues as to whether the actions of these officers and supervisors
were undertaken in the scope of their employment. (Davoren Center, Rikers Island, New York City)

U.S. District Court
NOMINAL DAMAGES
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Rattray v. Woodbury County, Iowa, 788 F.Supp.2d 839 (N.D.Iowa 2011). A detainee sued a county, claiming that
her civil rights were violated by a strip search conducted by jail employees. Following a jury verdict awarding
substantial damages, the county moved for a new trial or for a reduction of the jury’s award. The court granted the
motion. The court held that a new trial was warranted because it was impossible to determine why the jury, in its
first verdict, awarded $5,000 for past emotional distress, and a few minutes later awarded her $250,000 for past
emotional distress in a second verdict. The court noted that, after the jury learned it could not award $250,000 in
nominal damages, it drastically increased its initial award of $5,000 for past emotional distress to $250,000 in the
second verdict, and while the jury may have intended the $250,000 award as punitive damages, such damages
were not pled, and the jury had been instructed that such damages could not be awarded. (Woodbury Co. Jail,
Iowa)

U.S. District Court
INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY

Reed v. Baca, 800 F.Supp.2d 1102 (C.D.Cal. 2011). A detainee brought a § 1983 action against a sheriff, county,
and the sheriff's department, alleging wrongful arrest and detention. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the county and the sheriff's department did not
infringe on the pretrial detainee's Fourteenth Amendment rights by detaining him pursuant to a valid warrant but
in the face of repeated protests of innocence, despite the detainee's argument that the county and the department
knew or should have known that he was entitled to release prior to dismissal of the case against him. According to
the court, even assuming a violation, the detainee failed to present evidence to show that his continued detention,
beyond the point at which the county and the department allegedly knew or should have known he was entitled to
release, was pursuant to a policy or custom evincing deliberate indifference to his constitutional rights, as would
support liability. The court found that the county sheriff was not liable in his individual capacity under § 1983 for
the pretrial detainee's over-detention, absent evidence that the sheriff had any direct contact with the detainee or
actual knowledge of claimed constitutional violations, or condoned, ratified, or encouraged the alleged constitutional violations in any way. (Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, California)

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U.S. District Court
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Rodriguez-Sanchez v. Acevedo-Vila, 763 F.Supp.2d 294 (D.Puerto Rico 2011). An inmate brought a § 1983 action
against a prison warden and a director of corrections for alleged violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be
free from cruel and unusual punishment. The district court held that the prison warden was liable for an Eighth
Amendment violation but the inmate was not entitled to a judgment against the director of corrections. The court
found that the inmate was entitled to $1,000 per day for pain and suffering and to a punitive damages award of
$10,000 from the warden. According to the court, the warden was liable to the inmate for violating the inmate’s
Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment because the inhumane conditions to which
the inmate was subjected in his cell included the lack of an adequate place to sit, no working toilet, shower runoff
water channeled through the cell, and foul odors. The court held that these conditions were the result of design
and not of accident or happenstance, and were known to the prison officials in charge and in control, including the
warden. (Correctional Institution Annex 296, Guayama, Puerto Rico)

U.S. Appeals Court
DAMAGES
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Schaub v. VonWald, 638 F.3d 905 (8th Cir. 2011). A paraplegic state prisoner brought an action against the director of a county adult detention center (ADC), the county, and others, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious
medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Following a bench trial, the district court held that the director violated the prisoner's Eighth Amendment rights, and awarded the prisoner $114,000 in lost wages, $100,000
in pain and suffering, and $750,000 in punitive damages. The director appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The
appeals court held that: (1) the district court did not clearly err in finding that the prisoner's condition constituted a
serious medical need; (2) the director was subjectively aware of the prisoner's serious medical needs; (3) the director knowingly and deliberately disregarded the prisoner's serious medical needs; (4) the prisoner's need for medical attention would have been obvious to a layperson, and thus submission of verifying medical evidence was
unnecessary; (5) expert testimony on the causation of the prisoner's serious medical condition was unnecessary;
(6) the director's conduct involved callous indifference to the prisoner's serious medical needs, and thus the award
of punitive damages was warranted; and (7) the director had the burden to introduce evidence of his net worth to
minimize a potential punitive damages award. The court noted that the prisoner's oozing sores and smell of infection due to pressure sores, made his serious medical needs obvious to a layperson, and a letter from the prisoner's
doctor, summarizing the prisoner's medical condition and needs, and the prison medical staff's observations, documenting new areas of skin breakdown due to pressure sores, provided sufficient medical evidence verifying the
escalating seriousness of the prisoner's condition. (Olmsted County Adult Detention Center, Minnesota)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
FAILURE TO SUPERVISE
SUPERVISORY
LIABILITY

Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 2011). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action for damages resulting from a
violent attack he allegedly suffered while he was an inmate in a county jail. The district court dismissed the prisoner's supervisory liability claim for deliberate indifference against the sheriff in his individual capacity, and the
prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that the inmate sufficiently alleged a
supervisory liability claim of deliberate indifference against the sheriff in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments based on allegations that the sheriff failed to act to protect inmates under his care despite his
knowledge that they were in danger because of the culpable acts of his subordinates and despite his ability to take
actions that would have protected them. The court noted that the complaint specifically alleged numerous incidents in which inmates in county jails had been killed or injured because of the culpable actions of the subordinates of the sheriff, that the sheriff was given notice of all of those incidents, was given notice, in several reports,
of systematic problems in the county jails under his supervision that had resulted in deaths and injuries, and that
the sheriff did not take action to protect inmates under his care despite the dangers created by the actions of his
subordinates of which he had been made aware. (Los Angeles County Jails, California)

U.S. District Court
FTCA- Federal Tort Claims
Act
DAMAGES
FAILURE TO TRAIN
FAILURE TO SUPERVISE
STATUTES

Tookes v. U.S., 811 F.Supp.2d 322 (D.D.C. 2011). An arrestee brought an action under the Federal Tort Claims
Act (FTCA) against the United States, alleging assault and battery, false imprisonment, and negligent training and
supervision. The United States filed a motion for partial summary judgment. The district court granted the motion
in part, and denied in part. The court held that the training and supervision of Deputy United States Marshals was
a discretionary function, and therefore, the discretionary function exception to FTCA precluded subject matter
jurisdiction of the arrestee's negligent training and supervision claims, following an alleged attack by marshals.
The court noted that there were no statutes, regulations, or policies that specifically prescribed how to train or
oversee marshals, and decisions involved social, economic, and political policy in that decisions had to balance
budgetary constraints, public perception, economic conditions, individual backgrounds, office diversity, experience, public safety, and employee privacy rights, as well as other considerations. According to the court, there
was no evidence that the arrestee should have known she could be diagnosed as suffering from post-traumatic
stress disorder following an alleged false imprisonment by United States marshals, and therefore, the arrestee was
not limited from seeking greater damages for her emotional injuries than the amount claimed in her administrative
form, in her FTCA claim. The court found that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether the United States marshals falsely imprisoned the arrestee by bringing her back into a courthouse. (United States Marshals Services, District of Columbia)

U.S. District Court
CONCENT DECREEMODIFICATION

U.S. v. Cook County, Illinois, 761 F.Supp.2d 794 (N.D.Ill. 2011). The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) brought
an action against a county, alleging conditions in a county jail violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment.
Following entry of a consent decree, the county moved for entry of a prisoner release order. The district court
denied the motion. The court held that while overcrowding was a primary cause of the unconstitutional conditions
at the jail and a prisoner release order was the least intrusive form of relief for overcrowding in the jail, the proposed prisoner release order was not narrowly drawn or sufficiently specific, and thus the grant of the order was
not warranted. The court noted that conditions of overcrowding caused guards to resort to excessive force, incidents involving guards' use of excessive force were more frequent on days the jail was overcrowded, overcrowding caused grossly unsanitary and unhealthy conditions, and chronic overcrowding of the jail's medical facilities
resulted in inadequate medical and mental-health care. According to the court, the proposed order did not explain
or justify the number of inmates who would be affected by the order or the number of inmates that would be re-

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leased annually, did not specify which class or classes of prisoners would be eligible for release or what grounds
were to be used in deciding whether an inmate should be released on their own recognizance or released on electronic monitoring, or provide assurance that adequate funding would be available for electronic monitoring
equipment or that prisoners released to electronic monitoring would be effectively monitored. (Cook County Jail,
Illinois)
U.S. Appeals Court
DAMAGES
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use & Institutionalized
Persons Act

Vinning-El v. Evans, 657 F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 2011). A state inmate brought an action against correctional facility
officials, alleging violations of § 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA)
based on their denial of his request for a vegan diet, which he claimed was required by his religious practices. The
district court entered an order granting in part and denying in part the officials' motion for summary judgment, and
they appealed. The appeals court held that the inmate could not recover monetary damages against officials under
RLUIPA. According to the court, the inmate's action against the officials was treated as an action against the state,
and monetary damages were not available against a state under RLUIPA. (Pinckneyville Correctional Center, Ill.)

U.S. District Court
DAMAGES

Webb v. Jessamine County Fiscal Court, 802 F.Supp.2d 870 (E.D.Ky. 2011). An inmate brought a § 1983 action
against a county fiscal court, a judge, detention center, and jailers, alleging that the defendants were deliberately
indifferent to his serious medical needs, resulting in her being forced to endure labor unassisted by medical personnel and to give birth to her child in a holdover cell. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district
court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the pregnant inmate had a “serious medical need” during the overnight
hours in which she, at the end of her pregnancy term, experienced readily recognizable symptoms of labor, and as
to whether the county jailer who communicated with the inmate on the night in question, and who was purportedly a certified nursing assistant (CNA), perceived the facts necessary to draw the inference that a serious medical
condition existed and then disregarded that condition. According to the court, the fact that the inmate gave birth to
a healthy baby in a holdover cell following a normal and, by all appearances, unremarkable course of labor and
delivery, went to the amount of damages to be awarded in the inmate's § 1983 action against the county defendants, but did not change the fact that the type of injury the inmate allegedly suffered was cognizable under the
Eighth Amendment. (Jessamine County Detention Center, Kentucky)

U.S. Appeals Court
NOMINAL DAMAGES
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Williams v. Hobbs, 662 F.3d 994 (8th Cir. 2011). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action against deputy director of
a department of correction and various wardens alleging that his approximately 14-year continuous detention in
administrative segregation violated his procedural due process rights. Following a bench trial, the district court
found that four of the five defendants had denied the inmate due process, awarded $4,846 in nominal damages,
and denied punitive damages. Both parties appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded. The court held that the inmate's administrative segregation reviews were not meaningful under the due
process clause. The court noted that one warden testified that the inmate's seven-years' worth of clean history was
irrelevant to him, another warden confirmed that even if the inmate proved to be a model prisoner his vote would
always be that the inmate remain in administrative segregation in light of his past transgressions, and the wardens
failed to explain to the inmate with any specificity why he constituted a continuing threat to the security and good
order of prison. The court found that the director conducted his review in a meaningful fashion. The court ruled
that the inmate was not entitled to a per-day nominal damages award for each day spent in administrative segregation, and that the district court did not abuse its discretion by not awarding punitive damages. (Tucker Maximum
Security Unit, Arkansas)
2012

U.S. District Court
FTCA- Federal Tort Claims
Act
ATCA- Alien Tort Claims
Act

Al-Zahrani v. Rodriguez, 669 F.3d 315 (D.C.Cir. 2012). Survivors of detainees who died at the Guantanamo Bay
Naval Base sued the United States and a host of government officials under the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA),
the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), and the Fifth and Eighth Amendments. The survivors asserted that the detainees had been subjected to physical and psychological torture and abuse, inadequate medical treatment and
withholding of necessary medication, and religious abuse. The district court granted the government's motion to
be substituted as the defendant on the ATCA claims and its motion to dismiss both the ATCA and the FTCA
claims. The appeals court later denied the survivors' motion for reconsideration. The survivors appealed. The
appeals court affirmed on other grounds. The appeals court held that habeas corpus statute amendments barred
federal court jurisdiction over the action. (Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba)

U.S. District Court
SUPERVISORY
LIABILITY
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Alexander v. Weiner, 841 F.Supp.2d 486 (D.Mass. 2012). An inmate, who was a male-to-female transsexual diagnosed with Gender Identity Disorder (GID), brought an action against prison medical staff, alleging violations of
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments for failing to provide adequate medical treatment for her GID. The district court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court held that allegations by the inmate that she was a
male-to-female transsexual diagnosed with Gender Identity Disorder (GID), that laser hair removal or electrolysis
was part of her treatment prescribed by doctors under contract with the prison, and that she was denied this medical care were sufficient to plead that her serious medical need was not adequately treated in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. The court also held that allegations that she was denied this care on at least three separate occasions,
despite a long history of administrative appeals and requests for doctors' orders to be followed, were sufficient to
plead deliberate indifference by prison officials in violation of the Eighth Amendment. According to the court,
allegations that the associate medical director at the prison had direct responsibility for administrating medical
care ordered by physicians, and that the director failed to permit the inmate to receive her prescribed treatment,
were sufficient to plead personal involvement by the director in deliberate indifference to serious medical needs,
as required for the inmate's § 1983 claim alleging violations of the Eighth Amendment. The court also found that
the assistant deputy commissioner for clinical services at the prison was aware of the inmate's prescribed course of
treatment, that the inmate was denied treatments, and that the commissioner responded to filed grievances by

27.173

claiming the grievances were resolved and then telling the inmate to address her concerns with primary care providers, were sufficient to plead the commissioner's personal involvement in deliberate indifference to her serious
medical needs. (Massachusetts Department of Correction)
U.S. District Court
NEGLIGENCE
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Allen v. Ford, 880 F.Supp.2d 407 (W.D.N.Y. 2012). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action against correction
officers, alleging negligence in failing to provide adequate safety equipment while he was working in a cafeteria
and in failing to provide treatment when he burned himself, as well as asserting deliberate indifference in instruction and supervision. The officers moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court
held that: (1) the negligence claims were precluded by sovereign immunity; (2) one officer did not know of and
disregard the severity of the prisoner's injuries; and (3) the officer advising the prisoner to sign up for sick call for
the following morning, rather than providing emergency sick call at that time, was not deliberately indifferent.
The court noted that the prisoner reported the incident to the officer, who asked if he was badly burned, the prisoner responded that he did not know, the prisoner's skin did not blister until after he returned to his cell at the end
of his shift, and the prisoner visited the medical department the next morning and was transferred to a county
medical center. (New York State Department of Corrections, Wende Correctional Facility)

U.S. Appeals Court
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
DAMAGES

Alvarez v. Hill, 667 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2012). A former inmate in the Oregon Department of Corrections (ODOC)
sued prison officials, alleging that ODOC employees substantially burdened the practice of his religion in violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The district court granted summary
judgment for the defendants and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that Oregon's
sovereign immunity barred the former inmate's Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA)
claims for money damages against corrections officials sued in their official capacity, where, for sovereignimmunity purposes, the official capacity claims were treated as claims against the state. The court found that the
former inmate lacked a legally cognizable interest in the outcome of his claims for declaratory and injunctive
relief, despite his contentions that his claims were capable of repetition, yet would continue to evade review, and
that his claims challenged ongoing prison policies to which other inmates would remain subject. According to the
court, there was no indication that the inmate, who had completed his sentence and his post-incarceration supervision, would again be subjected to the challenged prison policies, and current inmates could bring their own
RLUIPA claims challenging the policies at issue. The court noted that an Inmate's release from prison while his
claims are pending generally will moot any claims for injunctive relief relating to the prison's policies unless the
suit has been certified as a class action. (Oregon Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
CLASS ACTION
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Armstrong v. Brown, 857 F.Supp.2d 919 (N.D.Cal. 2012). Disabled state prisoners and parolees brought a class
action against state prison officials, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the
Rehabilitation Act. Seventeen years later, plaintiffs moved for an order requiring officials to track and accommodate the needs of class members housed in county jails and to provide a workable grievance procedure. Following
remand to allow the development of additional evidence, the prisoners and parolees filed a renewed motion. The
district court granted the motion and entered an enforce order. The court held that: (1) officials' efforts to comply
with ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and prior orders were inadequate and ineffective on a system-wide level; (2)
system-wide injunctive relief was appropriate; (3) district court would not abstain from exercising its jurisdiction
over matters pertaining to county jails; (4) a stay of the prior order was not warranted; and (5) the district court
would exercise its retained jurisdiction to enforce the injunction. The court held that state officials were obliged to
ensure ADA-compliant conditions for prisoners and parolees that they housed under their own authority in county
jails. (California Youth and Adult Corrections Authority, Board of Prison Terms, California Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
FTCA- Federal Tort Claims
Act

Baker v. U.S., 670 F.3d 448 (3rd Cir. 2012). A prisoner, proceeding pro se, brought an action against the government and others under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), alleging personal injuries caused by his exposure to
second–hand smoke while incarcerated. The district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss and the government's motion to dismiss. The appeals court affirmed on other grounds. (McKean Federal Correctional Institution, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
FAILURE TO PROTECT
LIABILITY

Bektic-Marrero v. Goldberg, 850 F.Supp.2d 418 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). The wife of an inmate who died of cancerrelated causes while in the custody of a county department of correction (DOC) brought an action against the
county, DOC officials, and entities that contracted with the county to provide medical care and treatment to DOC
inmates and employees of those entitles. The wife alleged under § 1983 that the inmate received inadequate medical care, and asserted related state-law claims for wrongful death and medical malpractice. The defendants moved
to dismiss for failure to state a claim and/or for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment
for the defendants in part, and denied in part. The court held that the physicians who were under contract with the
county to provide medical services to inmates at the county jail on a part-time basis acted under the color of state
law, within the meaning of § 1983, when they treated the inmate, and thus the physicians were subject to liability
under § 1983. The court held that the allegations that the health care coordinator for the DOC denied or delayed
responding to the wife's request for the inmate's medical records, which she hoped to use to have the inmate's
parole restored and to seek a second medical opinion, and that the coordinator expressly denied the wife's request
to provide the inmate with a liquid dietary supplement which wife would supply at her own cost, sufficiently pled
the coordinator's personal involvement in the alleged deprivation of necessary medical care to the inmate, so as to
subject the coordinator to liability under § 1983. The court found that the United States Department of Justice
(DOJ) report which concluded that the provision of medical care to inmates by the county department of correction (DOC) was constitutionally deficient in several respects sufficiently alleged that the county's “custom” of
providing inadequate care to inmates was the cause of Eighth Amendment violations sustained by the inmate.
(Westchester County Department of Correction, New York)

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U.S. District Court
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
POLICIES/PROCEDURES
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use & Institutionalized
Persons Act

Benning v. Georgia, 845 F.Supp.2d 1372 (M.D.Ga. 2012). An inmate, who was a Torah-Observant Jew, proceeding pro se, brought an action against a state, a board of corrections, a department of corrections (DOC) and its
commissioner, seeking injunctive relief on allegations that grooming policies violated the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The district court held that: (1) the inmate's beliefs were sincerely held;
(2) the policy requiring the inmate to remove his earlocks substantially burdened a tenet of his religion; (3) requiring the inmate to purchase or obtain from a charity a depilatory to comply with the policy did not substantially
burden a tenet of the inmate's religion; and (4) summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether the prison policy of refusing to allow the inmate to grow earlocks was the least restrictive
means of protecting the prison's compelling interests. The court noted that the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) affords to prison inmates a heightened protection from government-imposed burdens by requiring that the government demonstrate that the substantial burden on the prisoner's religious exercise
is justified by a compelling, rather than merely a legitimate, governmental interest. The court noted that the inmate had changed his religion of record with the department of corrections (DOC) to Judaism 10 years previously,
he had not changed his religion since, and inmate had spent much of his time grieving and litigating issues related
to his Jewish faith. (Autry State Prison, Georgia)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352 (3rd Cir. 2012). A federal inmate brought a civil rights action against prison officials
and employees, alleging, among other things, that the defendants failed to protect him from inmate violence, and
that the defendants placed him in a special housing unit (SHU) in retaliation for exercising his First Amendment
rights. The inmate alleged that prison investigators used him to intercept notes being passed among other inmates,
and then failed to protect him after they fouled up the operation and the inmates discovered his involvement.
When the target inmates threatened to retaliate, the inmate contended he repeatedly begged the officials responsible for help, but no one took any preventive measures. Later, one of the inmates against whom inmate had cooperated, along with two others, beat him while they were together in a locked recreation pen. A few months later,
an inmate wielding a razor-blade type weapon also attacked the inmate in the recreation pen. The district court
denied the defendants' motion to dismiss. The defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in
part, and remanded. The appeals court held that: (1) the officials' decision to keep the inmate, who had acted as an
informant, in SHU after his cooperation with the officials was not unreasonable; (2) the officials were deliberately
indifferent to the inmate's safety when they placed him in a recreation yard with prisoners who were aware of his
complicity with officials by informing on them; (3) the officials were not deliberately indifferent to a risk of harm
when they placed the inmate in the yard with a prisoner who had a history of violent assaults against other inmates; (4) the inmate stated a failure-to-protect claim with respect to the officer's failure to intervene in the assault, where he intervened in another prisoner's assault on the inmate in the special housing unit's (SHU) recreation yard “only after several minutes of continued pummeling;” and (6) the inmate stated a substantive due process claim. The court noted that the federal inmate, who was either not yet convicted, or convicted but not yet
sentenced, when he was attacked by other inmates in the prison's recreation yard, had a clearly established due
process right to have prison officials protect him from inmate violence. (Federal Detention Center, Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Brooks v. Roy, 881 F.Supp.2d 1034 (D.Minn. 2012). A Native American state prisoner filed a § 1983 action,
claiming that his required participation in a prison's substance abuse treatment program violated the Free Exercise
Clause, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), the American Indian Religious
Freedom Act (AIRFA), and the Minnesota Constitution. The prisoner sought an injunction assigning him at his
own expense to a privately-run, Native American inpatient treatment program 200 miles from the prison, or readmitting him to the prison's program so that he would be eligible for prison benefits. The prisoner moved for a
temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction. The district court denied the motion. The court held that:
(1) the Free Exercise Clause and RLUIPA claims were not actionable; (2) the First Amendment retaliation claim
was not actionable; (3) the prisoner would not likely suffer irreparable harm absent a preliminary injunction; (4)
the balance of hardships did not favor a preliminary injunction; (5) the public interest did not support a preliminary injunction; and (6) AIRFA lacked a private cause of action. The court noted that the prisoner failed to delineate any sincerely-held religious belief that was in any way infringed on by his participation in the prison substance
abuse treatment program, as required to support his claim for infringement of his right to free exercise of religion.
(Minnesota Correctional Facility, Faribault)

U.S. District Court
SUPERVISORY
LIABILITY
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Bruner-McMahon v. Hinshaw, 846 F.Supp.2d 1177 (D.Kan. 2012). The administrator of the estate and the children of a deceased inmate brought a § 1983 action against a prison medical contractor, its employees, county
officials, and prison employees, alleging violations of the Eighth Amendment. The court held that summary
judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a deputy knew that the inmate faced a
risk of a serious medical condition and chose to ignore it. The court also found that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a deputy who found the inmate lying on the floor in his
cell but did not contact the clinic was deliberately indifferent to the risk of serious medical need. The court found
that a deputy who helped escort the inmate back to his cell was not deliberately indifferent to the inmate's serious
medical need, as would violate the Eighth Amendment after the inmate died a couple days later, even though the
deputy saw the inmate acting strangely and moving slowly, where the deputy believed the inmate had a mental
health condition and did not need emergency care from a medical provider, and the deputy believed the deputy in
charge at that time would address the matter, and the deputy had no other contact with the inmate. According to
the court, a county custom, practice, or policy did not cause alleged constitutional violations by jail deputies in not
getting medical care for inmate, as required for supervisory liability for the sheriff in his official capacity. The
court noted that policy required that inmates receive necessary medical care without delay, deputies were expected
to use common sense when responding to an inmate request or a known need, if an inmate appeared ill or a deputy
otherwise recognized the need for medical attention the deputy was supposed to advise the inmate to place his
name on sick call, contact a supervisor, or call the medical facility, and, in the event of a medical emergency, the

27.175

deputy could call an emergency radio code alerting a medical facility to respond immediately. (Sedgwick County
Adult Detention Facility, Kansas)
U.S. Appeals Court
DAMAGES
HECK RULE

Burd v. Sessler, 702 F.3d 429 (7th Cir. 2012). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against prison officials,
alleging that they deprived him of access to the courts by preventing him from using library resources to prepare a
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The district court dismissed the action and the prisoner appealed. The appeals
court affirmed, finding that the claim was barred by Heck v. Humphrey. The court noted that such a claim for
damages would require the prisoner to show that the deprivation of access hindered his efforts to successfully
withdraw his guilty plea, which would necessarily implicate the validity of the prisoner's conviction that he incurred on account of that guilty plea. The court noted that even if the prisoner was no longer in custody at the time
of his § 1983 suit, he could have pursued federal habeas relief while in custody, but failed to do so. Under Illinois
practice, the prisoner had thirty days to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, but for the first twenty-nine days
of this period, he was held at prison facilities that lacked library resources of any kind. (Sheridan Correctional
Center, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
CLASS ACTION
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Choquette v. City of New York, 839 F.Supp.2d 692 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). Female detainees filed § 1983 actions
against a city and city officials alleging that the policy, practice, and custom of the city department of correction
(DOC) of subjecting female detainees to a forced gynecological examination upon admission to DOC custody
violated their constitutional rights. The detainees alleged that they were not informed of what the exam entailed
and were subjected to, or threatened with, punishment if they questioned or refused the exam. The defendants
moved to dismiss. The district court denied the motion. The court held that the statute of limitations for the detainees' claims was tolled until the gynecological exam class claims were dismissed from the class action challenging the DOC's alleged practice of conducting strip searches, where the potential gynecological exam class was
pleaded in both the original complaint and the first amended intervenor complaint, and the settlement agreement
did not provide unequivocal notice that the gynecological exam class claims were not being pursued. (New York
City Dept. of Correction, Rose M. Singer Center, Rikers Island)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
FTCA- Federal Tort Claims
Act
NEGLIGENCE

Coffey v. U.S., 870 F.Supp.2d 1202 (D.N.M. 2012). The mother of a deceased inmate brought an action against
the government under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), alleging, among other things, that Bureau of Indian
Affairs (BIA) was negligent in failing to medically screen the inmate prior to his transfer to a different facility.
The government moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state claim or, in the
alternative, for summary judgment. The district court denied the motion for summary judgment. The court held
that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact: (1) as to whether the Bureau of Indian
affairs (BIA), which transferred custody of the inmate with a heart condition to a county jail, where he died, engaged in conduct that breached its duty to conduct some screening of the inmate's condition; (2) as to whether
BIA's conduct caused the inmate's death; (3) as to whether BIA engaged in conduct that breached its duty to take
some steps to ensure that the jail would learn of his condition; (4) as to whether BIA's conduct caused the inmate's
death; (5) as to whether BIA engaged in conduct that breached its duty to take some steps to ensure that the inmate's medical needs were addressed when it chose to transfer him; and (6) as to whether BIA engaged in conduct
that breached its duty to act reasonably in terms of sending the inmate to the jail. (Reno Sparks Indian Colony,
Nevada, and Washoe County Jail, Nevada)

U.S. District Court
FTCA- Federal Tort Claims
Act
NEGLIGENCE

Coffey v. U.S., 906 F.Supp.2d 1114 (D.N.M. 2012). The mother of a decedent, a Native American who died in a
county correctional institution, brought actions on behalf of her son and his children against the government, alleging wrongful death and negligence claims arising from his treatment while in the institution. After a two-day
bench trial, the district court found that: (1) the notice provided to the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) in the mother's administrative claim was sufficient, thereby providing jurisdiction over the mother's wrongful death and negligence claims; (2) the BIA's decision whether to screen and transfer the inmate were not choices susceptible to
policy analysis, and thus, the discretionary-function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) did not
preclude jurisdiction; (3) the mother's negligent screening claims were precluded; (4) the mother's negligent transfer claims were precluded; and (5) the mother's wrongful death claims, arising under FTCA, were precluded. The
mother had filed a standard two-page form and submitted it to Indian Health Services and the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS), claiming that her son was denied medication, and that he was transferred by
BIA to another correctional facility. The district court concluded that the United States Government was not liable
for the detainee’s death. (U.S. Department of the Interior-Bureau of Indian Affairs, McKinley County Detention
Center, Nevada)

U.S. District Court
NOMINAL DAMAGES
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
QUALIFIED IMMUN ITY
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use & Institutionalized
Persons Act

Colvin v. Caruso, 852 F.Supp.2d 862 (W.D.Mich. 2012). A state prisoner filed a § 1983 action against prison officials, asserting that the prison's 16-day denial of kosher meals, mistakes in administering the kosher-meal program, and lack of Jewish services and literature at the prison violated his constitutional rights and Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The district court denied the prisoner's motion for a preliminary
injunction, and subsequently granted summary judgment in favor of the officials, and denied prisoner's motion to
amend and second motion for preliminary injunction. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part,
vacated in part, and remanded. On remand, the district court held that the prison's “zero tolerance” policy for possession of even one non-kosher food item violated the Free Exercise Clause and RLUIPA. But the court determined that the officials were entitled to qualified immunity where there had not been any determination that the
regulation was in any way deficient at the time of the officials' actions. The court held that the prison's use of
questionnaire about the inmate's knowledge of his designated religion was proper. According to the court, the
officials' failure to reinstate the inmate to his kosher diet regimen violated the inmate's rights but punitive damages
were not warranted. The court awarded $1 in nominal damages where the inmate did not look like he missed
many meals as a result of the officials' actions, and there was no evidence of physical injury. The court noted that
even though the prison had economic interest in restricting kosher diet to prisoners who had a sincere belief that

27.176

the diet was necessary to practice their religion, where the inmate had no other means of eating, there was no
evidence that providing a modicum of flexibility would have a ripple effect on prison staff or inmates or would
escalate the cost of providing kosher meals. (Michigan Department of Corrections, Alger Correctional Facility)
U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
SUPERVISORY
LIABILITY

Covarrubias v. Wallace, 907 F.Supp.2d 808 (E.D.Tex. 2012). A state prisoner brought a pro se § 1983 action
against prison guards and officials complaining of alleged violations of his constitutional rights, in connection
with an alleged assault by guards and a subsequent disciplinary hearing. The district court held that: (1) picket
officers could not be held liable under a supervisory liability theory for failing to intervene when the prisoner was
subjected to pepper spray, where even if they had authority to intervene, they did not have a realistic opportunity
to intervene; (2) the punishments imposed on the prisoner for assaulting a guard did not violate any due process
liberty interest; (3) denial of the prisoner's grievance did not violate any due process liberty interest; and (4) the
prisoner failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim for disregarding an excessive risk to his health or safety. But
the court found that the prisoner's allegations, that corrections officers used excessive force against him in retaliation for requesting a supervisor and for attempts to informally resolve a complaint, stated § 1983 claims against
the officers. The prisoner alleged that as he was being restrained, one officer fired a two- to three-second burst of
pepper spray into his right eye, and the officers subsequently tackled him, using their elbows, knees, arms, and
hands on his back, legs, arms, and face as they piled on him and pressed his face into the concrete. (Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Beto Unit)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Currie v. Cundiff, 870 F.Supp.2d 581 (S.D.Ill. 2012). The administrator of the estate of a deceased detainee
brought an action against a county, jail officials, and health care providers, alleging various claims, including
claims pursuant to § 1983 and the Illinois Wrongful Death Act, as well as for punitive damages. The court held
that allegations by the administrator of the estate of the deceased arrestee, that jail officials and health care providers acted with deliberate indifference in dealing with his diabetes while he was in custody, were sufficient to
plead that they acted with reckless or callous disregard to federally protected rights, as required to seek punitive
damages in the § 1983 proceedings alleging violations of the Fourth Amendment. The detainee died as a result of
diabetic ketoacidosis while confined in the county jail. (Williamson County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
COMPENSATORY
DAMAGES
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
FAILURE TO PROTECT
NEGLIGENCE
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Curtis v. TransCor America, LLC, 877 F.Supp.2d 578 (N.D.Ill. 2012). A prisoner's son brought a wrongful death
action against a prisoner transport company, alleging that the company was liable for damages resulting from the
death of the prisoner while in the company's custody. The district court held that it was necessary and proper for
the court to resolve a narrow question of fact prior to trial for choice of law purposes, that Illinois law, rather than
the law of Indiana, governed the issue of compensatory damages, and that the prisoner's son would be allowed to
pursue punitive damages. The prisoner suffered a stroke that was allegedly caused, at least in part, by excessive
temperatures in the prisoner compartment of the transport vehicle. According to the court, even though the complaint for wrongful death of the prisoner during a ride in a bus with a broken air conditioning unit had not requested punitive damages, the plaintiff could seek such damages against the prisoner transport company at trial. The
court noted that although the company faced increased liability exposure, allegations suggesting that the employees ignored indications that the prisoner was in distress went beyond mere negligence. (TransCor America, LLC,
Transport from Leavenworth, Kansas to the Federal Correctional Complex in Terre Haute, Indiana)

U.S. District Court
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
RLUIPA- Religious
Land Use and
Institutionalized
Persons Act

Davis v. Abercrombie, 903 F.Supp.2d 975 (D.Hawai’i 2012). Inmates brought a state court action against the
governor of Hawai'i, the Director of the Hawai'i Department of Public Safety (DPS), and the private manager of a
correctional facility in Arizona at which they were housed, seeking declaratory relief that the defendants violated
their rights to free exercise of their religion by depriving them of their prayer objects. The action was removed to
federal court. The inmates moved for a preliminary injunction preventing the defendants from exercising the policies that infringed on their right to exercise their religion. The district court denied the motion. The court held that
one inmate failed to exhaust his prison administrative remedies, as required under the Prison Litigation Reform
Act (PLRA), prior to bringing the action. After submitting an informal resolution form, the inmate did not obtain
the final recommendation from the warden or the administrative duty officer on his damaged property claim before initiating the grievance process under a prison policy, and the inmate did not appeal denial of his formal
grievance. The court held that lack of an irreparable harm to the inmate as a result of damage to his prayer object,
a turtle pendant, precluded the issuance of a preliminary injunction, where there was no imminent danger the his
sacred items would be desecrated absent injunctive relief. The court noted that the inmate's possession and use of
his prayer object, a kukui nut, was a “religious exercise” for purposes of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA): the object was used in daily prayers and chants, in dances, and other individual religious protocol and communal religious activities, it provided the inmate with spiritual comfort, and it symbolized
enlightenment, growth and accomplishment. The court found that the correctional facility's policy, prohibiting the
inmate from possessing his prayer object, a kukui nut, and requiring him to donate it to charity, destroy it, or send
it out of the institution, substantially burdened his religious exercise under RLUIPA. (Hawaii Department of
Public Safety, Corrections Corporation of America, Saguaro Correctional Center, Arizona, and Red Rock Correctional Center, Arizona)

U.S. District Court
CLASS ACTION
FINES

De Luna v. Hidalgo County, Tex., 853 F.Supp.2d 623(S.D.Tex. 2012). Two students, on behalf of themselves and a
purported class, brought a § 1983 action against state magistrates and a county, alleging violation of federal due
process and equal protection rights based on their placement in jail for unpaid fines or costs related to violations
of the Texas Education Code. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment and the students also moved
for class certification. The district court held that: (1) the students lacked standing to seek equitable and declaratory relief from magistrates' practice of incarcerating individuals without an indigency determination; (2) the county's policy of jailing individuals charged with fine-only misdemeanor offenses who had failed to directly inform
the arraigning magistrate of their indigency violated due process; and (3) the students did not waive their right to
an affirmative indigency determination by waiving their right to counsel at arraignment. The court held that sum-

27.177

mary judgment was precluded on the § 1983 claim by a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether one of
the students placed in jail for unpaid fines or costs related to violations of Texas Education Code knew that she
could tell a state magistrate that she could not pay the fines on her outstanding charges and obtain either a payment plan or community service. (Hidalgo County Jail, Texas)
U.S. District Court
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act
SETTLEMENT
CONSENT DECREE

Disability Law Center v. Massachusetts Dept. of Correction, 960 F.Supp.2d 271 (D.Mass. 2012). A nonprofit
organization, which represented mentally ill prisoners, brought an action against a state's Department of Correction, alleging that the Department and its officials violated the federal constitutional rights of prisoners by subjecting them to disciplinary and other forms of segregation for prolonged periods of time. After extensive negotiations, the parties jointly moved for approval of a settlement agreement. The district court granted the motion,
finding the agreement to be fair, reasonable, and adequate. The court noted that the agreement addressed the fundamental issue of prison suicides by providing a process for minimizing the possibility that inmates with serious
mental illnesses would be confined in segregation, and for reviewing their mental health while in segregation. The
court held that the agreement did not order any “prospective relief,” or in fact any “relief” at all, thereby precluding the applicability of the requirement of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), that prospective relief not
extend further than necessary to remedy violation of a federal right. (Massachusetts Department of Correction)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Donahoe v. Arpaio, 869 F.Supp.2d 1020 (D.Ariz. 2012). In consolidated cases, members of a county board of
supervisors, county staff, and judges of county courts, brought actions against members of county sheriff's office
and county attorney's office, alleging various torts and constitutional violations. The defendants moved to dismiss.
The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that members of the county sheriff's office and county attorney's office were not entitled to absolute immunity in their filing of a federal Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) lawsuit against members of county board of supervisors, county staff, and judges of county's courts, where the RICO suit was far removed from the judicial phase of the criminal process, and there was no basis for governmental enforcement under RICO itself. According fo the court, the
county sheriff's and county attorney's voluntary dismissal of their RICO suit constituted termination in favor of
the members of the county board of supervisors, county staff, and judges of county's courts, as required to support
Arizona law claims against the sheriff and attorney for wrongful institution of civil proceedings.
The court held that an abuse of process claim was stated against the sheriff and attorney when a judge in the
county's criminal court alleged that county sheriff and county attorney hired a process server to serve the judge
with the federal RICO suit, when the sheriff and the attorney knew or should have known that the server previously had been prosecuted for threatening to kill the judge. The court held that neither the county sheriff nor the
deputy county attorney were entitled to qualified immunity at the motion to dismiss stage of the § 1983 action,
where the plaintiffs' claims overlapped to some extent, there was asymmetry of the information between plaintiffs
and the defendants regarding which defendants actually took, ordered, supervised, or approved certain actions,
and the defendants would not be prejudiced by allowing these claims to proceed because they would already be
subject to discovery in the plaintiffs' suit. According to the court, numerous constitutional violations allegedly
undertaken by the county attorney, the county sheriff, and their subordinates, were sufficiently egregious and
voluminous to raise a fair inference of failure to train in relation to the § 1983 claims asserted by the plaintiffs.
(Maricopa County Sheriff's Office and County Attorney's Office, Phoenix, Arizona)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
FAILURE TO DIRECT
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
POLICIES/
PROCEDURES

Gabriel v. County of Herkimer. 889 F.Supp.2d 374 (N.D.N.Y. 2012). The administrator of a pretrial detainee's
estate brought a § 1983 action against a county, jail officials, and jail medical personnel, alleging deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, due process violations, and a state claim for wrongful death. The county
brought a third-party complaint against a hospital demanding indemnity. The defendants moved for summary
judgment and the hospital moved to dismiss the third-party complaint. The district court held that severance of the
third party complaint involving the hospital was warranted, where a separate trial regarding indemnity, following
a verdict on liability, would be both economical and convenient. The court found that summary judgment was
precluded by material fact issues as to: (1) whether a nurse practitioner was aware of the detainee’s history of
depression, anxiety, tachycardia, angina, mitral valve prolapsed, degenerative back disease, and sciatic nerve, but
consciously disregarded the risk of harm to him; (2) whether the detainee had a serious medical condition; and (3)
whether a policy or custom of the county led to the denial of medical treatment for the detainee. According to the
court, there was no evidence that a corrections officer disregarded an excessive risk to the safety of the pretrial
detainee, noting that when the officer witnessed the detainee fall, he assisted him and promptly contacted the
medical unit. According to the court, a lieutenant was not a policymaker, as required to support a § 1983 claim by
the estate, where the lieutenant was responsible for jail security and had no involvement in the jail's medical policies and procedures. (Herkimer County Jail, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
COMPENSATORY
DAMAGES
NEGLIGENCE

Gonzalez v. U.S., 681 F.3d 949 (8th Cir. 2012). A former federal inmate filed suit under the Federal Tort Claims
Act (FTCA), alleging that employees of the United States negligently caused a significant delay in the proper
treatment of leg injuries that he suffered while playing softball in federal custody. Following a bench trial, the
district court found the government liable and awarded compensatory damages of $813,000. The government
appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the damages award of $813,000 was not excessive. According
to the court, the award was not excessive for the former federal inmate's pain and suffering and mental anguish
suffered from the morning he sought medical treatment for an injury to his left leg and ankle sustained in a prisonsanctioned softball game until the date x-rays were taken approximately one month later, and the pain and suffering and mental anguish reasonably certain to be experienced for the remainder of the former inmate's expected
life, which the district court determined to be 22 years, where the government breached a duty of care by failing to
treat the ankle in four weeks prior to the taking of x-rays, and the inmate suffered a continuing injury following
his surgery. (Federal Correctional Institution, Forrest City, Arkansas)

27.178

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN
OFFICIAL CAPACITY
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Gooding v. Ketcher, 838 F.Supp.2d 1231(N.D.Okla. 2012). A musician brought an action against a marshal of the
Cherokee Nation and a deputy county sheriff, sheriff, casino employees, county police officer, jail employees, and
a nurse, alleging false imprisonment, assault and battery, and violation of his First, Fourth, and Fourteenth
Amendment rights, and seeking declaratory judgment that Oklahoma law governing flag burning and desecration
was unconstitutional. The musician had been arrested and detained at a local county jail. The defendants moved to
dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the musician's allegations that his use of an American flag during his performance at a casino was a constitutionally protected activity,
that the county sheriff failed to train his deputies as to the constitutional nature of the activity, and that the sheriff
adopted an unconstitutional policy and/or custom which led to the musician's arrest and imprisonment, stated a §
1983 claim against the sheriff in his individual capacity as a supervisor. (Rogers County Jail, Oklahoma)

U.S. District Court
CLASS ACTION
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Henderson v. Thomas, 891 F.Supp.2d 1296 (M.D.Ala. 2012). State prisoners, on behalf of themselves and a class
of all current and future HIV-positive (HIV+) prisoners, filed a class action against prison officials, seeking declaratory judgment that the Alabama Department of Corrections' (ADOC) policy of segregating HIV+ prisoners
from the general prison population violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation
Act, and seeking an injunction against further enforcement of the policy. The district court denied the officials’
motion to dismiss. The court held that the prisoners' class action complaint plausibly alleged that HIV-positive
prisoners suffered from an impairment that substantially limited a major life activity, as required to state claims
that the ADOC HIV-segregation policy discriminated against prisoners on the basis of a disability in violation of
ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. According to the court, the complaint provided information on the contemporary
medical consensus regarding HIV treatment and alleged that each named plaintiff was diagnosed with HIV, that
HIV was an impairment of the immune system, that HIV substantially limited the named plaintiffs in one or more
major life activities, and that HIV qualified as a disability. The court found that the prisoners' class action complaint plausibly alleged that they were otherwise qualified individuals with a disability due to their HIV-positive
status on the grounds that reasonable accommodations could be made to eliminate the significant risk of HIV+
prisoners transmitting HIV while integrated with other prisoners. The complaint alleged details of the programs
and accommodations for which HIV+ prisoners were ineligible, alleged that all but two state penal systems had
integrated HIV+ prisoners into the general prison population, and alleged that the National Commission on Correctional Health Care counseled against segregation. (Alabama Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
CLASS ACTION
CONSENT DECREE
DAMAGES
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Hilton v. Wright, 673 F.3d 120 (2nd Cir. 2012). A state prison inmate infected with the Hepatitis C virus brought a
class action against the New York State Department of Correctional Services and the Department's Chief Medical
Officer, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment, as
well as violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act. Following class certification, the parties entered into a settlement agreement resolving the injunctive and equitable claims. Defendants
moved for summary judgment on the remaining damages claims. The inmate's attorneys moved for attorney's fees
and out-of-pocket expenses incurred monitoring the settlement agreement. The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, awarded fees to the inmate's attorneys, but denied expenses. The inmate
appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. The appeals court vacated the district court's decision granting
summary judgment to the Chief Medical Officer on the Eighth Amendment claim, due to the extreme brevity of
the district court's opinion. The appeals court also vacated the district court's decision granting summary judgment
on the ADA claim on the ground that the Eleventh Amendment precluded damages. (New York Department of
Correctional Services)

U.S. District Court
SUPERVISORY
LIABILITY

Jackson v. Gandy, 877 F.Supp.2d 159 (D.N.J. 2012). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a department of corrections, corrections officers, and prison officials, alleging violations of his Eighth Amendment right
against cruel and unusual punishment. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted
the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that there was no evidence that prison officials were personally involved in a corrections officers' alleged assault on the state prisoner, as required to establish supervisory
liability against the officials under § 1983, despite defense counsel's bare assertions of deliberate indifference and
notice of assaultive history. The court ruled that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material
fact as to whether the force used by corrections officers to subdue the prisoner was excessive and in violation of
Eighth Amendment, and whether a corrections officer participated in the alleged assault on the prisoner. The court
held that the corrections officers were not entitled to qualified immunity where the prisoner's complaint alleged a
violation of the constitutional right to be free from unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, and such right was
clearly established at the time of the officers' alleged misconduct. The court also held that summary judgment was
precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the prisoner exhausted his administrative remedies
regarding the excessive force claim against corrections officials in accordance with the requirements of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). (N.J. Department of Corrections, Bayside State Prison)

U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
NEGLIGENCE
POLICIES/PROCEDURES
SUPERVISORY
LIABILITY
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Jones v. Correctional Medical Services, Inc., 845 F.Supp.2d 824 (W.D.Mich. 2012). The personal representative
of the estate of an inmate, who died of viral meningoencephalitis while under the control of the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC), brought an action against prison officials and personnel, as well as the company which contracted to provide medical services to the inmate and the company's employees, alleging that the
defendants violated the inmate's Eighth Amendment right to adequate medical care. The representative also asserted state law claims for gross negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court held that the
company that provided medical services to inmates under a contract with the Michigan Department of Corrections
(MDOC) could not be held liable under § 1983 on a supervisory liability theory in the action brought by the personal representative, but the company was subject to suit under § 1983. The court found that the personal representative failed to establish that policies or customs of the company which provided medical services to inmates
under contract with the MDOC were involved in the inmate's treatment, as required to sustain a § 1983 Eighth
Amendment claim against the company based on the inmate's alleged inadequate medical treatment. The court

27.179

held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the doctor employed
by company was aware of the serious medical needs of the inmate, as to whether the doctor's treatment of the
inmate displayed deliberate indifference, and as to whether the doctor's inaction or delay proximately caused the
inmate's death. (Ernest Brooks Facility, Michigan, and Correctional Medical Services)
U.S. District Court
COMPENSATORY
DAMAGES
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Kneen v. Zavaras, 885 F.Supp.2d 1055 (D.Colo. 2012). A state prisoner brought an action against prison officials
in a state facility operated by a private corporation, for violations of his Eighth Amendment rights, seeking injunctive relief, as well as nominal damages, actual damages, and $1 million in compensatory damages against each
defendant. The defendants moved to dismiss and the prisoner moved to amend. The district court granted the
defendants' motion, and granted in part and denied in part the plaintiff’s motion. The court held that the prisoner
failed to allege a factual basis demonstrating that a prison official's position as a warden impacted the prisoner's
health or the decisions made with regard to his treatment, or lack thereof, as required to support the prisoner's §
1983 deliberate indifference claim against warden as an individual in his supervisory capacity based on the denial
of treatment for Hepatitis. The court found that the prisoner stated a claim against the prison's health administrator
as an individual in her supervisory capacity under § 1983 for deliberate indifference, based on the denial of his
request for Hepatitis treatment, by alleging: (1) the health administrator was responsible for reviewing prisoner
complaints regarding the denial and delay of medical care; (2) the health administrator reviewed the prisoner's
complaints regarding the denial and delay of medical care; and (3) the health administrator knew that the prisoner
had been diagnosed with chronic Hepatitis C, had lab results which indicated that treatment was immediately
warranted, and had also suffered from Esophageal Varicies, a serious and life threatening complication of cirrhosis. (Colorado Department of Corrections, Crowley County Correctional Facility, operated by the Corrections
Corporation of America)

U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use & Institutionalized
Persons Act

Knows His Gun v. Montana, 866 F.Supp.2d 1235 (D.Mont. 2012). Native American state prisoners brought an
action against a state, the state department of corrections (DOC), a private prison facility, and wardens, alleging
violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). Defendants filed motion to
dismiss. The district court held that: (1) the allegations were sufficient to plead the searches were a substantial
burden on their religious exercise; (2) the allegations were sufficient plead the confiscations and prohibitions were
a substantial burden on their religious exercise; (3) the allegations about relieving a prisoner from the pipe carrier
position were sufficient to plead it was a substantial burden on his religious exercise; (4) transferred prisoners did
not have standing for claims for injunctive and declaratory relief; (5) the private facility was a state actor; and (6)
the private facility was an instrumentality of the state. The Native American prisoners' alleged that the prison
subjected them to en masse strip searches before and after sweat lodge ceremonies, that the searches sometimes
occurred in a hallway where other inmates could see them and at least one occurred in a gym with video cameras
monitored by a female guard, and that some inmates declined to participate in the ceremony due to the degrading
nature of the searches. According to the court, the prisoners' allegations that sacred items were confiscated or
prohibited by the prison for their sweat lodge ceremonies, including smudge tobacco and antlers, and that the
items were essential for the ceremony to be meaningful and proper were sufficient to plead confiscations and
prohibitions were a substantial burden on their religious exercise, as required for their claims under RLUIPA. The
prisoner also alleged that they were subject to pat down searches before and after entering the ceremonial sweat
lodge grounds, that they were provided insufficient water and toilet facilities, that the size of the sweat lodge and
the frequency of the ceremonies was inadequate, and that they were not provided a Native American spiritual
advisor. (Montana Dept. of Corrections; Corrections Corporation of America; Crossroads Correctional Center)

U.S. District Court
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Kosilek v. Spencer, 889 F.Supp.2d 190 (D.Mass. 2012). A Massachusetts prisoner suffering from gender identity
disorder (GID) brought an action, alleging his rights were being violated by the Massachusetts Department of
Corrections' (DOC) refusal to provide him with male-to-female sex reassignment surgery for his GID, and seeking
an injunction requiring the DOC to provide him with the surgery. The district court entered summary judgment
for the prisoner, finding that: (1) the prisoner's gender identity disorder (GID) constituted a serious medical need
that triggered Eighth Amendment protection; (2) DOC officials had actual knowledge of the prisoner's serious
medical need; (3) the DOC Commissioner's refusal to provide the surgery in order to avoid public and political
criticism was not a legitimate penological purpose; and (4) the DOC Commissioner's deliberate indifference
would continue in the absence of injunction. (Massachusetts Department of Correction, MCI Norfolk)

U.S. Appeals Court
CLASS ACTION
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
PRIVATE OPERATOR

Kress v. CCA of Tennessee, LLC, 694 F.3d 890 (7th Cir. 2012). Inmates at a county jail filed a § 1983 action
against a sheriff, warden, jail doctor, and the private contractor which operated the facility, alleging that inadequate medical care and unsafe conditions at the jail violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The inmates
sought injunctive and monetary relief. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the contractor and
the inmates appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that: (1) the district court did not abuse
its discretion in determining that the inmates failed to satisfy the typicality requirement for class certification; and
(2) there was no evidence of a continuing violation, as would warrant injunctive relief. The inmates claimed that
the change in the number of daily rounds of medicine given, from three per day to two per day, with exceptions
for inmates with unique medical needs, amounted to inadequate medical care in violation of the inmates' rights
under the Eighth Amendment. (Corrections Corporation of America, Marion County Correctional Center, Indianapolis, Indiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
PRIVATE PROVIDER

McCullum v. Tepe, 693 F.3d 696 (6th Cir. 2012). A deceased inmate's mother sued a prison psychiatrist under §
1983, claiming that he was deliberately indifferent to the serious medical need of the inmate, who hung himself
from his bed. The district court denied the psychiatrist's motion for summary judgment and he appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the psychiatrist could not invoke qualified immunity. According to the court, a
physician employed by an independent non-profit organization, but working part-time for a county as a prison
psychiatrist, could not invoke qualified immunity in a § 1983 suit arising out of his activities at the prison. The

27.180

court found that there was no common-law tradition of immunity for a private doctor working for a public institution at the time that Congress enacted § 1983. (Butler County Prison, Community Behavioral Health, Ohio)
U.S. Supreme Court
PRIVATE OPERATOR
PRIVATE PROVIDER

Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S.Ct. 617 (2012). A prisoner at a federal facility operated by a private company filed a
pro se complaint against several employees of the facility, alleging the employees deprived him of adequate medical care, in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, and caused
him injury. The district court dismissed the complaint and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and
remanded, and, subsequently, amended its opinion. The U.S. Supreme court reversed, finding that the prisoner
could not assert an Eighth Amendment Bivens claim for damages against private prison employees. (Wackenhut
Correctional Corporation- Federal Correctional Institution at Taft, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
ALIEN
DAMAGES
FTCA- Federal Tort Claims
Act
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

Mirmehdi v. U.S., 689 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2012). Aliens who were not lawfully in the United States filed an action
against the United States seeking monetary damages on a claim of constitutionally invalid detention, inhumane
detention conditions, witness intimidation, and the intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court
dismissed some claims and the parties settled the remaining claims. The plaintiffs appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The appeals court held that: (1) Bivens did not provide a remedy for aliens not lawfully in United States
to sue federal agents for monetary damages for wrongful detention pending deportation; (2) the aliens had not
been prejudiced by witness intimidation; and (3) the decision to detain an alien pending resolution of immigration
proceedings fell within the discretionary function exception to a waiver of sovereign immunity under the Federal
Tort Claims Act (FTCA). (U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Calif.)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
NEGLIGENCE
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Moulton v. DeSue, 966 F.Supp.2d 1298 (M.D.Fla. 2012). The personal representative of a jail inmate's estate
brought a § 1983 action against correctional officers, a nurse, and a sheriff, alleging deliberate indifference to the
inmate's right to adequate medical care while in pretrial confinement, which resulted in her death. The defendants
filed motions for summary judgment. The district court denied the motions in part and granted the motions in part.
The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the correctional officers' failure to call emergency rescue when the pregnant jail inmate complained of stomach cramps
constituted more than grossly negligent disregard of a substantial risk of a serious harm, precluding summary
judgment for the officers on the deliberate indifference to the inmate's serious medical need claim. According to
the court, correctional officers were on notice that their alleged actions or inactions violated the jail inmate's clearly established Fourteenth Amendment right to adequate medical care, and, thus, the officers were not entitled to
qualified immunity in § 1983 action. The court also held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether the correctional officers acted with ill will or malice toward the jail inmate, or
exhibited reckless indifference. (Bradford County Jail, Florida)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONTRACT SERVICES

Northfield Ins. Co. v. City of Waukegan, 701 F.3d 1124 (7th Cir. 2012). Insurers that, pursuant to commercial
general liability policies, provided law enforcement liability coverage to a city and its employees acting within the
scope of their employment, brought a declaratory judgment action, seeking declarations that they had no duty to
defend or indemnify the city or its employees in a third-party action in which a civil rights plaintiff alleged that
the city and its police officers played a role in his wrongful conviction. The district court granted summary judgment for the insurers and the defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that coverage did not exist
for a claim alleging false arrest and imprisonment. (Waukegan, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Paine v. Cason, 678 F.3d 500 (7th Cir. 2012). The guardian of the estate of an arrestee, who allegedly suffered
from bipolar disorder, brought a § 1983 action against a municipality and police officers, alleging civil rights
violations in connection with the arrest and subsequent release from custody without being provided access to
mental health treatment. The arrestee was raped at knifepoint after her release and either jumped or was pushed
from a window, causing permanent brain damage. The district court denied summary judgment in part for the
defendants. The defendants sought relief through interlocutory appeal. The appeals court affirmed in part, denied
in part, and remanded. The appeals held that: (1) the arrestee, as a person in custody, had clearly a established
right for police to provide care for her serious medical condition; (2) whether the police should have understood
that the arrestee had a serious medical condition, and thus should have provided care, was a factual issue that
could not be decided on interlocutory appeal; (3) causation was a factual issue not suited to resolution on interlocutory appeal of denial of qualified immunity; (4) the arrestee did not have a clearly established constitutional right
for her release to be delayed pending mental-health treatment; (5) the arrestee had a clearly established due process right for the police to not create danger, without justification, by arresting her in a safe place and releasing
her in a hazardous one while unable to protect herself; (6) the arresting officer was entitled to qualified immunity;
(7) the watch officer was not entitled to qualified immunity; and (8) a detention aide was not entitled to qualified
immunity. According to the court, a police officer who was responsible for preparing the arrestee's individualrecognizance bond and collecting possessions that were to be returned on her release, and who received a telephone call from the mother of the arrestee regarding the arrestee's bi-polar condition and did nothing in response
and who did not even note the call in a log, was not entitled to qualified immunity to the civil rights claims that
the police had created a danger, without justification. The court found that the detention aide who was responsible
for evaluating inmates, observed the arrestee behaving in a mentally unstable way, such as smearing menstrual
blood on her cell walls, and transferred another person out of the arrestee's cell because of her inappropriate behavior, and yet did nothing to alert other personnel at the stationhouse, was not entitled to qualified immunity to
the civil rights claims that the police did not arrange for medical treatment of serious conditions while the arrestee's custody continued. (Eighth District Station, Second District Station, Chicago Police Department)

27.181

U.S. District Court
BIVENS CLAIM
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR

Patel v. Moron, 897 F.Supp.2d 389 (E.D.N.C. 2012). A federal prisoner brought a Bivens action against prison
officials, alleging, among other things, deliberate indifference to his medical needs in violation of the Eighth
Amendment, violation of due process, retaliation in violation of the First Amendment, and denial of access to
courts. The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim and for a protective order and stay, and the
prisoner moved for a temporary restraining order, for a continuance to permit discovery, and to strike portions of
the defendants' motion to dismiss. The district court held that: (1) the prisoner was not responsible for failure to
exhaust his administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA); (2) the prisoner’s allegations
were sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim; (3) the prisoner’s allegations were
sufficient to state a due process claim that he was placed in solitary confinement in violation of the Bureau of
Prison's regulations and without having a legitimate investigation or a pending disciplinary charge; and (4) the
allegations were sufficient to state a claim of retaliation in violation of the First Amendment. The court dismissed
claims that were based on the theory of respondeat superior. According to the court, prison officials' refusal to
provide grievance forms and interference with the prisoner’s efforts to exhaust administrative remedies did not
violate the prisoner's First Amendment right of access to courts. (Federal Correctional Center in Butner-N.C., and
Rivers Correctional Institution, operated by the GEO Group, Inc)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
NEGLIGENCE

Reilly v. Vadlamudi, 680 F.3d 617 (6th Cir. 2012). An inmate brought a suit against a doctor and nurses who treated him in prison, claiming Eighth Amendment violations under § 1983 as well as medical malpractice under
Michigan law. The district court denied immunity claims asserted by the doctor and one of the nurses, and they
appealed. The appeals court reversed. The court held that the physician was not deliberately indifferent to the
medical needs of the inmate who was found to have a serious form of bone cancer, thus precluding imposition of
§ 1983 liability on the inmate's Eighth Amendment claim, where the physician had made a single contact with the
inmate who had no history of any symptoms suggesting cancer. The court held that the physician was not grossly
negligent regarding an the inmate, thus precluding imposition of liability under Michigan law, where the physician examined the inmate ten months before his complaints of severe “headaches that cause[d] him to vomit,” and
during the physician's single contact with the inmate, the inmate had a headache and left eye swelling and no other
symptoms. The court held that the nurse was not deliberately indifferent to the medical needs of an inmate found
to have a serious form of bone cancer, thus precluding imposition of § 1983 liability on the inmate's Eighth
Amendment claim. The court noted that the nurse examined the inmate only twice, his initial diagnosis, that a
“small raised area over the left eye” appeared to be a calcium deposit, warranted no treatment, and following the
second visit, the nurse made a referral to an optometrist. (Mound Correctional Facility, Michigan)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Rice ex rel. Rice v. Correctional Medical Services, 675 F.3d 650 (7th Cir. 2012). Following a pretrial detainee's
death while incarcerated, his parents, representing his estate filed suit pursuant to § 1983, alleging among other
things that jail officials and medical personnel had deprived the pretrial detainee of due process by exhibiting
deliberate indifference to his declining mental and physical condition. The district court entered summary judgment against the estate. The estate filed a second suit reasserting the state wrongful death claims that the judge in
the first suit had dismissed without prejudice after disposing of the federal claims. The district court dismissed
that case on the basis of collateral estoppel, and the estate appealed both judgments. The appeals court affirmed in
part, reversed in part, and remanded. The appeals court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine
issues of material fact as to whether jail officials were deliberately indifferent to the pretrial detainee's conditions
of confinement, and whether his conditions of confinement were sufficiently serious to support his Fourteenth
Amendment due process claim. The court noted that whether the detainee himself created the unsanitary conditions was a fact relevant to the claim, but given detainee's mental condition, it did not foreclose the claim.
The court found that the estate failed to show that the detainee's assignment to an administrative segregation
unit of the jail for approximately seven months violated the detainee's due process rights, where the estate failed to
identify feasible alternatives and to tender evidence supporting the contention that the detainee likely would have
fared better in one of those alternative placements.
The court held that jail officials did not employ excessive force, in violation of due process, to the pretrial
detainee who had been fighting with his cellmate and failed to comply with a directive that he step out of his cell
which he refused to leave for 18 hours, by spraying his face with pepper foam, and placing him in a restraint
chair. The court held that jail officials did not have notice of a substantial risk that the mentally ill pretrial detainee
might be assaulted by other inmates, as required to support the pretrial detainee's claim of deliberate indifference
in violation of due process. The court noted that while jail personnel were aware that the detainee had a hygiene
problem, they had no notice that he was at risk of assault because of that problem, particularly within the more
secure confines of the administrative segregation unit.
The court found that neither jail guards or supervisors were deliberately indifferent to the risk that the mentally
ill pretrial detainee might engage in a behavior such as compulsive water drinking that would cause him to die
within a matter of hours and did not consciously disregarded that risk, and therefore they were not liable for his
death under § 1983. According to the court, while a factfinder might conclude that the guards exhibited a generalized recklessness with respect to the safety of the inmates housed in the administrative segregation unit by failing
to conduct hourly checks of the unit, there was no evidence that the guards or supervisors were subjectively aware
of the possibility that the detainee might injure himself to the point of death before anyone could intervene.
(Elkhart County Jail, Indiana)

U.S. District Court
MUNICIPAL LIABILITY
POLICIES/PROCEDURES
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1983

Rigg v. City of Lakewood, 896 F.Supp.2d 978 (D.Colo. 2012). The wife of a detainee who died while in the custody of police officers filed suit, on her own behalf and as the personal representative of her decedent's estate, asserting due process claims pursuant to § 1983 and common law wrongful death claims against two cities and two
police departments. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motions. The court held that
the representative failed to sufficiently allege a § 1983 claim for municipal liability against the two cities for deprivation of due process by their purported indifference to the detainee's medical needs, since the complaint did not
allege the existence of a municipal custom or policy that was causally linked to the due process violation. (Lakewood Police Station, Colorado)

27.182

U.S. District Court
SUPERVISORY
LIABILITY

Santos v. Bush, 874 F.Supp.2d 408 (D.N.J. 2012). A mentally ill inmate brought an action under § 1983 against a
doctor and a warden at the prison where he was formerly housed, alleging that the defendants forcibly medicated
him without due process. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion.
The court held that the prison warden was not involved in any of the mental health evaluations the inmate received or the development of his treatment plans, nor did the warden have any direct involvement, or even actual
knowledge, of the specific circumstances surrounding the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication
to the inmate, as would subject her to liability under § 1983 on the inmate's due process claims. According to the
court, the warden's letter to the inmate's grandmother related to issues of the inmate's unwillingness to take psychotropic medication voluntarily was insufficient to demonstrate personal involvement, or knowledge and acquiescence, by the warden in approving or otherwise deciding whether the inmate should have been involuntarily
medicated, as would subject the warden to liability under § 1983. The court found that the prison's administration
of psychotropic drugs to the mentally ill inmate under its involuntary medication administration (IMA) procedure
did not violate the inmate's procedural due process rights, where: (1) the inmate was diagnosed with a serious
mental illness, based on a series of well-documented delusions, paranoid beliefs, and behaviors exhibited by the
inmate; (2) at least four psychiatrists evaluated the inmate at various points during his treatment; (3) four separate
treatment review committees (TRC) were convened during the inmate's treatment; (4) the inmate received notice
of each TRC hearing; and (5) the inmate's involuntary medication was periodically reviewed in accordance with
the IMA procedure. (South Woods State Prison, New Jersey)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
FAILURE TO TRAIN
MUNICIPAL LIABILITY
SUPERVISORY
LIABILITY

Schwartz v. Lassen County ex rel. Lassen County Jail (Detention Facility), 838 F.Supp.2d 1045 (E.D.Cal. 2012).
The mother of a deceased pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action on behalf of herself and as successor in interest against a county, sheriff, city, police department, and several officers, alleging violations of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in
part. The court held that allegations that: (1) the undersheriff knew the pretrial detainee from various encounters
with the county, including his diverticulitis and congenital heart condition that required a restricted diet; (2) the
undersheriff gave testimony to set bail for the detainee at $150,000 on a misdemeanor offense; (3) the detainee's
doctor sent a letter explaining the detainee should be put on house arrest as opposed to detention because of his
medical condition; (4) the detainee had to be admitted to a hospital for emergency surgery during a previous confinement; (5) the detainee's mother requested he be released for medical attention; (6) the detainee lost over 40
pounds during two weeks of detention; (7) the detainee requested to see a doctor but was told to “quit complaining;” and (8) the undersheriff personally knew the detainee was critically ill, were sufficient to plead that the undersheriff knew of and failed to respond to the detainee's serious medical condition, as would be deliberate indifference required to state a § 1983 claim alleging violations of Fourteenth Amendment due process after the detainee died. According to the court, allegations that the pretrial detainee's health was visibly deteriorating, that he
had requested medical care on numerous occasions, and that the undersheriff knew of his health issues but failed
to ensure that the prison provided him medical care, were sufficient to plead a causal connection between the
undersheriff's conduct and denial of medical care for the detainee's serious medical need, as required to state a §
1983 supervisory liability claim against the undersheriff alleging violations of Fourteenth Amendment due process after the detainee died. The court also found that allegations were sufficient to plead that training was obviously deficient, as required to state a § 1983 claim for municipal liability against the city, alleging violations of
the Fourteenth Amendment due process after the detainee died. The court found that allegations that the undersheriff owed the pretrial detainee an affirmative duty to keep the jail and prisoners in it, and that he was answerable for their safekeeping, were sufficient to plead a duty, as required to state a claim of negligent infliction of
emotional distress (NIED) under California law against the undersheriff after the detainee died. (Lassen County
Adult Detention Facility, California)

U.S. District Court
SUPERVISORY
LIABILITY
42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1983

Segura v. Colombe, 895 F.Supp.2d 1141 (D.N.M. 2012). An arrestee brought an action against a board of county
commissioners, alleging claims pursuant to § 1983 and the New Mexico Tort Claims Act (NMTCA) following his
arrest by a tribal police officer who was appointed and commissioned as a county deputy sheriff. The board
moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that
the tribal police officer, who was appointed and commissioned as a county deputy sheriff, was not a salaried public employee of a governmental entity, as required to be a law enforcement officer under the New Mexico Tort
Claims Act (NMTCA). Therefore, the court found that the officer's conduct could not be attributable to the board
of county commissioners. The court noted that the commissioners did not have immediate supervisory responsibilities over the officer, and the officer was not subject to sheriff’s department rules. (Santa Fe Board of County
Comm’rs., New Mexico, and Santa Fe County Adult Detention Facility)

U.S. District Court
DAMAGES

Singletary v. District of Columbia, 876 F.Supp.2d 106 (D.D.C. 2012). A parolee brought a § 1983 action against
the District of Columbia, seeking money damages for unlawful revocation of his parole by the Parole Board. The
district court granted summary judgment in the parolee's favor as to the issue of liability. After a trial on damages,
the jury returned a verdict of $2.3 million for the parolee. The District of Columbia moved for a new trial. The
district court denied the motion. The court held that the damages award was not excessive, that the parolee was
properly allowed to testify as to what he experienced for the ten years that he was wrongly incarcerated, and that
evidence concerning an alleged prior traffic offense was properly excluded. The court found that the jury's damage award to the parolee whose parole was unlawfully revoked, resulting in his serving an additional ten years in
prison, of $230,000 per year—or about forty-four cents per minute—for each year that he was stripped of the
privileges of individual choice and physical freedom and subjected to the indignity of incarceration, was not excessive. (District of Columbia Parole Board)

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U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
FTCA- Federal Tort Claims
Act

Sledge v. U.S., 883 F.Supp.2d 71 (D.D.C. 2012). A federal inmate's relatives brought an action under the Federal
Tort Claims Act (FTCA) against the United States, alleging claims for personal injury and wrongful death based
on the failure of Bureau of Prisons (BOP) employees to prevent or stop an attack on the inmate. The attack resulted in the inmate’s hospitalization and death. The relatives also sought to recover for emotional distress that the
inmate and his mother allegedly suffered when BOP employees denied bedside visitation between the mother and
the inmate. Following dismissal of some of the claims, the United States moved to dismiss the remaining claims
based on FTCA's discretionary function exception. The district court granted the motion. The court found that a
correction officer's decision to position himself outside the housing unit, rather than in the sally port, to smoke a
cigarette during a controlled move was discretionary, and thus the United States was immune from liability under
the Federal Tort Claims Act's (FTCA) discretionary function exception. The court noted that the prison lacked
mandatory guidelines that required correctional staff to follow a particular course of action regarding supervision
of inmates during controlled moves, and the officer's decision implicated policy concerns, in that it required consideration of the risks posed by inmates moving throughout prison, and required safety and security calculations.
The court held that the mother of the deceased federal inmate failed to state a claim for negligent infliction of
emotional distress, under Missouri law, arising from the Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) denial of bedside visitation
between the mother and inmate, absent allegations that the BOP should have realized that its failure to complete a
visitation memorandum involved an unreasonable risk of causing distress, or facts necessary to demonstrate that
the mother's emotional distress was “medically diagnosable” and was of sufficient severity as to be “medically
significant.” The court found that the Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) alleged decision not to allow the mother of federal
inmate, who was in coma after being severely beaten by a fellow inmate, to visit her son after the BOP allegedly
failed to complete a visitation memorandum, was not so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to
go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in civilized
community, thus precluding the mother's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim under Missouri law.
(Federal Correctional Institution, Allenwood, Pennsylvania)

U.S. Appeals Court
CLASS ACTION

Smentek v. Dart, 683 F.3d 373 (7th Cir. 2012). Pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners brought a § 1983 class
action against a county and county jail officials, alleging that the failure to make more than a single dentist available to 10,000 inmates violated their federal constitutional rights. The district court certified the class, and the defendants petitioned for leave to appeal from the grant of class certification. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the district court's earlier denial of class certification of the inmates' § 1983 suit did not bar,
pursuant to the rule of comity, the subsequent certification by a different district judge of the same or a similar
class in a § 1983 suit brought by an inmate who was a member of the class in the previous suit. (Cook County Jail,
Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2012). A state death-row inmate brought a § 1983 action for declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief against prison officials and medical personnel, alleging, among other things,
deliberate indifference to his medical needs in violation of his rights under the Eighth Amendment. The district
court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part,
reversed in part and remanded. The court held that: (1) factual issues precluded summary judgment for the defendants on the issue of whether denial of a recommended treatment violated the inmate's Eighth Amendment
rights; (2) factual issues precluded summary judgment for the defendants on the ground that the decision to treat
the inmate pharmacologically, rather than surgically, was a mere difference of opinion over the course of treatment that did not establish deliberate indifference; (3) factual issues precluded summary judgment for the warden
and the assistant warden on the claim for deliberate indifference to the inmate's serious medical needs; (4) factual
issues precluded summary judgment for the head of the prison's utilization review panel on the claim for deliberate indifference to the inmate's serious medical needs; (5) the Eleventh Amendment applied to bar the claim
against the state and the state corrections department for monetary damages based on the alleged custom or policy
of refusing to provide certain types of medical care to inmates; and (6) factual issues precluded summary judgment for the defendants on the inmate's Eighth Amendment claim for injunctive relief. (Ely State Prison, Nevada
Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Soneeya v. Spencer, 851 F.Supp.2d 228 (D.Mass. 2012). A state prisoner, a male-to-female transsexual, brought an
action against the Commissioner of the Massachusetts Department of Correction (DOC), alleging violations of her
Eighth Amendment rights. Following a bench trial, the district court held that the prisoner's gender identity disorder (GID) was a serious medical need and the treatment received by the prisoner was not adequate. The court
found that the Commissioner was deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's serious medical need and the DOC's
pattern of obstruction and delay was likely to continue, as required for the prisoner to obtain injunctive relief on
her Eighth Amendment claim, where the DOC's policy for treating GID imposed a blanket prohibition on cosmetic and sex reassignment surgery without exception. The court noted that the transsexual prisoner's gender identity
disorder was a “serious medical need” within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment, the prisoner's GID was
diagnosed by a physician as needing treatment, and she had a history of suicide attempts and self castration while
in custody. The court found that the treatment received by the transsexual prisoner was not adequate, although the
DOC provided the prisoner with psychotherapy and hormone treatment, it failed to perform an individual medical
evaluation aimed solely at determining appropriate treatment for her GID as a result of its blanket prohibition on
cosmetic and sex reassignment surgery. (MCI–Shirley, Massachusetts)

U.S. Appeals Court
NOMINAL DAMAGES

Taylor v. Dormire, 690 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2012). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against prison officials,
alleging that the officials refused to feed the prisoner for several days while he was restrained in connection with
his removal from his cell, based on his declaration of his cellmate as an enemy. The district court entered judgment on the jury's verdict for the officials. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The
appeals court held that the district court’s error was not harmless as to its failure to give the prisoner's requested
instruction on nominal damages. The court noted that the jury had been instructed that damages constituted a

27.184

required element of a verdict in favor of the prisoner and that if any element was not proven then the verdict had
to be in favor of prison officials. According to the court, the jury must have considered the damages issue, since it
wrote a symbol for “zero” in the space on the verdict form for damages. (Jefferson City Correctional Center, Missouri)
U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
NEGLIGENCE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Todd v. Montoya, 877 F.Supp.2d 1048 (D.N.M. 2012). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against a corrections officer and prison officials, alleging cruel and unusual punishment, and state claims for negligence, gross
negligence, and recklessness. The corrections officer moved for summary judgment and the detainee moved for
additional discovery. The district court granted the officer’s motion and denied the detainee’s motion. The court
found that there was evidence that the detainee suffered an injury that was more than de minimis, as required to
meet the objective element of a § 1983 claim against corrections official for deliberate indifference to a substantial
risk of serious harm, in violation of the Due Process Clause. According to the court, there was evidence showing
that the detainee received a beating from two other prisoners, including having them hit him in the face and attacking him for two to three minutes. But the court held that there was no evidence that a corrections officer acted
with deliberate indifference when the detainee was physically assaulted by the other prisoners. The court noted
that the officer called other officers to come stop the fight almost immediately after the physical altercation involving the detainee began. The court held that there was no evidence that the corrections officer permitted two
prisoners to discover the detainee's criminal history as a sex offender in such a way that caused the detainee's
beating, as required to support the detainee's negligence claim against the officer under New Mexico law. (Bernalillo County Metropolitan Detention Center, Albuquerque, New Mexico)

U.S. Appeals Court
NOMINAL DAMAGES
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Washington v. Hively, 695 F.3d 641 (7th Cir. 2012). A federal pretrial detainee filed a § 1983 action alleging that a
county jail guard improperly touched him during a pat down and strip search. The detainee alleged that while
patting him down, the guard spent five to seven seconds gratuitously fondling the plaintiff's testicles and penis
through the plaintiff's clothing and then while strip searching him fondled his nude testicles for two or three seconds, contrary to a jail policy which forbids touching the inmate in the course of a strip search, and again without
any justification. The district court entered summary judgment in the guard's favor, and the detainee appealed. The
appeals court reversed and remanded. The appeals court held that: (1) the detainee's allegation that the guard
touched his private parts to humiliate him or to gratify the guard's sexual desires was sufficient to state a claim,
whether or not the force exerted by the guard was significant; (2) fact issues remained as to the guard's subjective
intent in conducting the pat down and strip search; and (3) a statute barring federal civil actions by prisoners for
mental or emotional injuries absent a showing of physical injury did not bar the pretrial detainee from seeking
both nominal and punitive damages in his § 1983 action, even though the detainee did not claim to have suffered
any physical injury. (Waukesha County Jail, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
COMPENSATORY
DAMAGES
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Wells v. City of Chicago, 896 F.Supp.2d 725 (N.D.Ill. 2012). The representative of the estate of a detainee who
died on the night he was to be released from custody brought an action against a city and city police officers,
alleging under § 1983 that the defendants unlawfully detained the detainee and denied him medical care. Following a trial, the jury returned a verdict for the representative and against four defendants on the unlawful detention
claim, and for the defendants on claims relating to denial of medical care. The defendants moved for judgment as
a matter of law or, in the alternative, a new trial or remittitur on the issue of damages. The district court granted
the motions in part and denied in part. The district court held that: (1) the issue of whether the defendants held the
detainee for more than 48 hours before being taken before a judge or being released, or for less than 48 hours for
an improper purpose, was for the the jury; (2) the officers had probable cause to arrest the detainee for a crime
with an intent element; (3) the issue of whether individual officers participated in the unlawful detention was for
the jury; (4) the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity from the unlawful detention claim; (5) the award
of $1 million in compensatory damages was excessive; and (6) the award of $150,500 in punitive damages was
not warranted where there was little to indicate that the defendants acted with evil intent or callous indifference to
the detainee's rights.. The court noted that, although the detainee suffered significant physical pain during the time
he was detained, as well as intense humiliation and severe mental and emotional distress, he was in custody for, at
most, 53 hours, and only the final five hours of his detention were unlawful. The detainee had driven a semitrailer truck through a bus stop and into a Chicago Transit Authority “L” Station, killing two women and injuring
20 people. After brief treatment in a hospital, the police transported him to a police station, where he was interviewed and then placed in a holding cell. He ultimately only received a traffic citation, though police kept investigating the collision until the time of his death. Officers were making arrangements to take the detainee to a hospital for evaluation after finding that he had difficulty walking once removed from his cell. He died in the hospital 6
weeks later. (City of Chicago Police Department, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
INJUNCTIVBE RELIEF
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Westefer v. Neal, 682 F.3d 679 (7th Cir. 2012). Past and present inmates in the custody of the Illinois Department
of Corrections (IDOC), who had been incarcerated in a supermax prison, brought a § 1983 action against IDOC
officials and employees, alleging that defendants violated their right to procedural due process by employing
unconstitutionally inadequate procedures when assigning inmates to the supermax prison, and seeking injunctive
and declaratory relief. The district court granted injunctive relief, and the defendants appealed. The appeals court
vacated and remanded with instructions. The appeals court held that the scope and specificity of the district court's
injunction exceeded what was required to remedy a due-process violation, contrary to the terms of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) and cautionary language from the Supreme Court about remedial flexibility and
deference to prison administrators. The court held that the IDOC's ten–point plan should be used as a constitutional baseline, revising the challenged procedures and including a detailed transfer-review process. According to the
court, this would eliminate the operational discretion and flexibility of prison administrators, far exceeding what
due process required and violating the mandate of the PLRA. The court found that, under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (PLRA), injunctive relief to remedy unconstitutional prison conditions must be narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to remedy the constitutional violation, and use the least intrusive means to correct

27.185

the violation of the federal right. The court noted that informal due process, which is mandatory for inmates transferred to a supermax prison, requires some notice of the reasons for the inmate's placement and enough time to
prepare adequately for the administrative review. The court found that, to satisfy due process regarding inmates
transferred to a supermax prison, only a single prison official is needed as a neutral reviewer, not necessarily a
committee, noting that informal due process requires only that the inmate be given an opportunity to present his
views, not necessarily a full-blown hearing. Similarly, the informal due process does not necessarily require a
written decision describing the reasons for an inmate's placement, or mandate an appeal procedure. (Closed Maximum Security Unit, Tamms Correctional Center, Illinois)
U.S. Appeals Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
FAILURE TO ACT
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Wheeler v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680 (7th Cir. 2012). A state prison inmate brought a § 1983
action alleging prison officials and the prison's medical provider refused to provide effective care for the inmate's
golf-ball-size hemorrhoids, leaving him in excruciating pain, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. After receiving no ruling on his first two motions for preliminary injunctive relief, the inmate moved for preliminary injunctive relief for a third time, seeking to compel the defendants to arrange for an operation to address his condition.
The district court denied the motion and the inmate appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. The appeals court held that the district court failed to comply with a statutory command to screen “as soon as practicable” the inmate's complaint. The district court still had not screened the complaint after ten months, and the appeals court required the district court to swiftly screen the complaint, to authorize service of process on all defendants involved in the inmate's medical treatment, to give the defendants a short time to respond to the inmate's
motion for preliminary injunctive relief, and to promptly conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the
inmate was entitled to such relief. (Wexford Health Sources, Pinckneyville Correctional Center, Illinois)
2013

U.S. District Court
FTCA- Federal Tort Claims
Act
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Alvarado-David v. U.S., 972 F.Supp.2d 210 (D.Puerto Rico 2013). A prisoner brought an action against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), alleging he fell out of his bunk and hit a toilet bowl, breaking his frontal teeth and upper lip because the United States' failed to provide prisoners with ladders to climb to
their bunks. The United States moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under the FTCA's discretionary function exception. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the decision by Bureau of
Prisons (BOP) personnel not to provide ladders or other equipment for the prisoners to climb to their bunks fit
within the discretionary function exception to the FTCA. The court noted that no rules or regulations governed the
use of ladders or bunk beds in correctional facilities, and the decision not to provide ladders in correctional facilities for safety reasons, as ladders could be broken off and used as weapons or escape devices, was grounded in
considerations of public policy. (Metropolitan Detention Center, Guaynabo, Puerto Rico)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
OFFICIAL CAPACITY
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Ames v. Randle, 933 F.Supp.2d 1028 (N.D.Ill. 2013). An inmate brought § 1983 Eighth Amendment claims
against various employees of the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) who allegedly were responsible for
the conditions of the inmate's confinement. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss. The court denied the motion,
finding that the inmate adequately pled that Illinois prison officials were deliberately indifferent, as required to
state a § 1983 Eighth Amendment claim. According to the court, the inmate alleged that he repeatedly advised the
official about the prison's detrimental living conditions and that the official did not make an effort to remedy the
conditions, that he informed another official about the intolerable living conditions and that this official did not
make an effort to remedy the conditions, and that he discussed the intolerable living conditions with other officials, each of whom also failed to make any efforts to remedy the living conditions. The inmate claimed that he
was subjected to unsanitary conditions, a lack of ventilation, and continuous lighting that interfered with his sleep.
He also alleged that his housing area had dried bodily fluids on the wall of his cell and a strong odor of ammonia
from his uncleaned toilet, that there was pest infestation accompanied by filth and feces, and that there was a
complete lack of basic cleaning supplies or even garbage bags. He also cited filthy soiled bedding, missing or
dilapidated, and sometimes dangerously damaged cell furniture and fixtures, and badly peeling toxic paint. The
inmate suffered from endocarditis, an infection of the lining of the heart, which he claimed was due to the conditions of his confinement, and from which his “numerous, almost constant, fungal infections” stemmed.
The court held that the inmate's official-capacity suit against Illinois prison officials seeking prospective relief
was not barred by the Eleventh Amendment, as it fell within the Ex parte Young exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity. The court noted that the inmate named individual state officials as defendants in this action, and
he alleged that those state officials failed to provide him with the minimal civilized measures of life's necessities,
in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and the inmate sought a permanent injunction enjoining the officials from
continuing to engage in the allegedly unlawful conduct. (Stateville Correctional Center, Illinois Department of
Corrections)

U.S. District Court
INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
OFFICIAL CAPACITY
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Aref v. Holder, 953 F.Supp.2d 133 (D.D.C. 2013). Current and former prisoners brought an action against the
Bureau of Prisons (BOP), BOP officials, and the Attorney General, claiming that their First and Fifth Amendment
rights were violated when they were placed in Communications Management Units (CMUs), in which their ability
to communicate with the outside world was seriously restricted. Following dismissal of all but the procedural due
process and First Amendment retaliation claims, the defendants moved to dismiss the First Amendment claims.
The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that: (1) the prisoner's release from
BOP custody rendered moot his official-capacity claims for equitable relief; (2) a second prisoner sufficiently
alleged a First Amendment retaliation claim; but (3) the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) barred the prisoners' individual-capacity claims against a BOP official for mental or emotional injury. (Federal Correctional Institutions in Terre Haute, Indiana, and Marion, Illinois)

27.186

U.S. District Court
COMPENSATORY
DAMAGES
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Benton v. Rousseau, 940 F.Supp.2d 1370 (M.D.Fla. 2013). A pretrial detainee, who alleged that he was beaten by
drivers while being transported to prison, brought a § 1983 action against drivers of a private company which was
in the business of transporting prisoners throughout the State of Florida. The district court held that the inmate
established a § 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim and a § 1983 Fourteenth Amendment excessive force
claim. According to the court: (1) the prisoner engaged in constitutionally protected speech because he complained about conditions of his confinement in the transport vehicle; (2) the driver of transport vehicle engaged in
adverse or retaliatory conduct by pulling the inmate out of the van and onto the ground and beating and kicking
the inmate; and (3) there was a causal connection between the driver's retaliatory action and inmate's protected
speech, in that the incident would not have occurred but for the inmate's complaints regarding conditions of his
confinement. The court noted that the inmate's injuries included headaches and facial scars, and his injuries, although perhaps not serious, amounted to more than de minimis injuries. The court ruled that the inmate was entitled to $45,012 in compensatory damages because the inmate had scarring on his face and suffered from headaches and numbness in his side, he suffered the loss of a $12 shirt, and he suffered mental and emotional anguish
as a result of actions of drivers of transport van, who kicked and beat him. The court held that the inmate was
entitled to punitive damages in the amount of $15,000 based on the violation of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by the drivers. The court noted that although the drivers were no longer employed by their private
employer, the employer did not investigate after the incident nor did it punish the drivers for their actions, and
imposition of punitive damages would deter the drivers from taking similar actions in the future. (United States
Prisoner Transport, Hernando County Jail, Florida)

U.S. District Court
SUPERVISORY
LIABILITY

Canales v. Gatzunis, 979 F.Supp.2d 164 (D.Mass. 2013). A former county jail inmate brought an action in state
court against a county sheriff's department, the sheriff, the jail superintendent, a state public safety commissioner,
and others, alleging the defendants subjected him to reckless, negligent, and cruel medical treatment. Some defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in
part. The court found that because the county sheriff's department and other county defendants voluntary removed
to inmate's action to federal court, the defendants did not enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity against any Massachusetts Tort Claims Act (MTCA) claims they would be subject to in state court as a result of waiver. The court
held that the former jail inmate's allegations that the county defendants had a “disorganized medical program” at
the jail and failed to maintain a “quality assurance program,” and that the jail failed “to maintain adequate and
accurate medical records,” insufficiently pled that the jail superintendent was personally involved in misinforming
the inmate that he had HIV and mistakenly administering another prisoner's HIV medication to the inmate, as
would subject the superintendent to supervisory liability for his subordinates' alleged Eighth Amendment violations under § 1983. (Suffolk County House of Correction, Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
CONSENT DECREE

Coleman v. Brown, 922 F.Supp.2d 1004 (E.D.Cal. 2013). State prison inmates brought Eighth Amendment challenges to the adequacy of mental health care and medical health care provided to mentally ill inmates and the
general prison population, respectively. The inmates moved to convene a three-judge panel of the district court to
enter a population reduction order that was necessary to provide effective relief. The motions were granted and
the cases were assigned to same panel, which ordered the state to reduce the prison population to 137.5% of its
design capacity. The state moved to vacate or modify the population reduction order. The district court denied the
motion. The three-judge panel of the district court held that: (1) the state's contention that prison crowding was
reduced and no longer a barrier to providing inmates with care required by the Eighth Amendment did not provide
the basis for a motion to vacate the order on the ground that changed circumstances made it inequitable to continue applying the order; (2) the state failed to establish that prison crowding was no longer a barrier to providing
inmates with care required by the Eighth Amendment; and (3) the state failed to establish it had achieved a durable remedy to prison crowding. (California Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections)

U.S. District Court
CLASS ACTION
CONSENT DECREE
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Coleman v. Brown, 960 F.Supp.2d 1057 (E.D.Cal. 2013). California prisoners with serious mental disorders
brought a class action against a Governor, alleging that due to prison overcrowding, they received inadequate
mental health care, in violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. Separately, California prisoners with serious medical conditions brought a class action asserting constitutional claims similar to those in the other action. In the case concerning mental health care, the district court found Eighth Amendment violations and appointed a special master to oversee the development and implementation of a remedial
plan. In the case concerning medical care, the State stipulated to a remedial injunction, and, after the State failed
to comply with that injunction, the district court appointed a receiver to oversee remedial efforts. A three judge
district court panel consolidated the two cases and the panel entered a remedial order requiring the State to reduce
its prison population to 137.5 percent of design capacity within two years. The Governor appealed. The United
States Supreme Court affirmed the population reduction order. The district court subsequently denied the defendants' motion to vacate or modify the population reduction order, and directed the defendants to comply with the
population reduction order. The defendants' moved to stay the order directing compliance pending appeal to the
United States Supreme Court. The district court denied the motion, finding that: (1) the State was not likely to
succeed on the merits of the prisoners' lawsuit challenging prison conditions; (2) the State would not be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) issuance of a stay would substantially injure the prisoners; and (4) the public interest
favored denying the stay. (California)

U.S. District Court
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use & Institutionalized
Persons Act

Conway v. Purves, 963 F.Supp.2d 708 (E.D.Mich. 2013). State prisoners brought an action against a state department of corrections (DOC) and its officials challenging the nutritional adequacy of the meals provided to the prisoners during the Islamic month of Ramadan, and asserting claims for violation of the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and constitutional violations. The plaintiffs moved for a preliminary
injunction or a temporary restraining order (TRO) to require the department of corrections and its officials to
provide nutritionally balanced meals containing between 2600 and 2900 calories on any given day during Ramadan. The district court denied the motion, finding that the prisoners failed to show certain and immediate irrepara-

27.187

ble harm, as required for a preliminary injunction. The court noted that Ramadan had recently concluded, that any
harm that the prisoners could suffer approximately one year in the future was speculative, and the action would
likely be resolved prior to the next Ramadan observance. (Michigan Department of Corrections)
U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
OFFICIAL CAPACITY

Duran v. Merline, 923 F.Supp.2d 702 (D.N.J. 2013). A former pretrial detainee at a county detention facility
brought a pro se § 1983 action against various facility officials and employees, the company which provided food
and sanitation services to the facility, and the medical services provider, alleging various constitutional torts related to his pretrial detention. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motions
in part and denied in part. The district court held that fact issues precluded summary judgment on: (1) the conditions of confinement claim against a former warden in his official capacity; (2) an interference with legal mail
claim against a correctional officer that alleged that the facility deliberately withheld the detainee's legal mail
during a two-week period; (3) a First Amendment retaliation claim based on interference with legal mail; and (4)
a claim for inadequate medical care as to whether the detainee's Hepatitis C condition was a serious medical condition that required treatment and whether the provider denied such treatment because it was too costly. The detainee asserted that overcrowding at the county detention facility, which allegedly led to the detainee being forced
to sleep and eat his meals next to open toilet, and led to inmate-on-inmate violence, contributed to his assault by
another inmate. According to the court, the long-standing conditions of confinement whereby the county detention
facility was overcrowded for at least 24 years and facility officials “triple-celled” inmates, allegedly leading to
unsanitary conditions, amounted to a “custom” for the purposes of the former detainee's § 1983 Fourteenth
Amendment conditions of confinement claim against a former warden in his official capacity.
The court held that the food service provider's serving the detainee cold meals for a 45-day period while the
kitchen in the county detention facility was being renovated, was not “punishment,” as would support the inmate's
§ 1983 Fourteenth Amendment conditions of confinement claim against the provider, absent evidence that the
food served to the detainee was spoiled or contaminated, that a significant portion of the detainee's diet consisted
of such food, or that the food service caused more than a temporary discomfort. The court also held that the alleged actions of the food service provider in serving the detainee one food item when another ran out, failing to
serve bread with the inmate's meal, serving the inmate leftovers from days before, serving juice in a dirty container on one occasion, serving milk after its expiration date, and serving meals on cracked trays that caused the detainee to contract food poisoning, did not amount to a substantial deprivation of food sufficient to amount to
unconstitutional conditions of confinement, as would violate the inmate's due process rights. (Atlantic County
Justice Facility, New Jersey)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
FAILURE TO PROTECT
FAILURE TO
SUPERVISE
FAILURE TO TRAIN

E.A.F.F. v. U.S., 955 F.Supp.2d 707 (W.D.Tex. 2013). Unaccompanied alien minors brought an action against
Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) officials, alleging they were physically and sexually abused while they
were in detention awaiting final adjudication of their immigration status. The officials moved for partial summary
judgment. The district court granted the motions. The court noted that a person detained for deportation is equivalent to a pretrial detainee, and a pretrial detainee's constitutional claims are considered under the Due Process
Clause. The court held that the officials could not be held liable for due process violations that occurred when the
unaccompanied alien minors were physically and sexually abused as a result of alleged overcrowding at a detention facility, where they were being held while awaiting final adjudication of their immigration status, and where
there was no evidence that the officials were responsible for decisions regarding the facility's capacity.
According to the court, isolated incidents of physical and sexual abuse by staff members at the detention facility were insufficient to put the officials on notice of a substantial risk of future abuse, as required to hold the officials liable for deliberate indifference in failing to protect the minors' safety in violation of their due process
rights. The court noted that other incidents of alleged abuse were investigated by the Texas Department of Family
and Protective Services and did not result in any abuse findings. The court found that officials' failure to systematically interview minors concerning their abuse allegations did not amount to deliberate indifference to their safety
in violation of their due process rights, where officials spoke to some of the minors during their monitoring visits,
and clinicians were on-site and available to speak with the minors on a regular basis.
The court held that the officials could not be held liable in their supervisory capacities on a theory of failure to
train or supervise, for due process violations arising from alleged physical and sexual abuse by staff members at
the detention facility, where staff members received training in behavior management and de-escalation techniques, officials responded to reports of abuse by recommending or providing further training, officials adopted
safety policies designed to prevent abuse, and officials recommended that staff members work in pairs and they
were unaware that staff members were working individually. (Nixon facility Operated by Away From Home, Inc.,
Texas)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO
SUPERVISE
FAILURE TO TRAIN
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Eason v. Frye, 972 F.Supp.2d 935 (S.D.Miss. 2013). A pretrial detainee brought a pro se § 1983 action against an
officer and a sheriff, alleging that the officer used excessive force by releasing his canine while responding to a
fight between the detainee and another inmate, and that he did not receive immediate medical attention after the
incident. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The district court
held that: (1) the detainee failed to allege that the sheriff was personally involved in the dog bite incident, as required for § 1983 liability; (2) the officer did not use excessive force; (3) prison officials were not deliberately
indifferent to the detainee's serious medical needs where there was no evidence that the officials refused to treat
the detainee, ignored his complaints, or intentionally treated him incorrectly; (4) the detainee failed to state a §
1983 failure to train or supervise claim; (5) the sheriff was entitled to qualified immunity from the failure to train
claim, where the detainee made no specific allegations about how the sheriff was unreasonable in his training and
supervising methods; and (6) the detainee could not maintain a claim for mental or emotional suffering. The court
noted that the detainee refused to stop fighting when the officer ordered him to stop, thus causing an obvious
threat to security. In response, the officer applied the amount of force necessary to restore order on the tier, and as
soon as the detainee went to the ground and stopped fighting, the officer ordered the dog to release its grip. The
detainee suffered a minor injury when he was bitten by the dog. According to the court, the detainee made no

27.188

specific allegations regarding how the training and supervision program at the detention facility was inadequate or
defective, he contended that his numerous complaints and grievances went unanswered but provided no evidence
of inadequate training or supervision, and he made no allegation of an official policy that caused the allegedly
inadequate training and supervision. (Harrison County Adult Detention Center, Mississippi)
U.S. District Court
SUPERVISORY
LIABILITY

Estate of Henson v. Wichita County, 988 F.Supp.2d 726 (N.D.Tex. 2013). Family members of a pretrial detainee
who died from chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) while being held in a county jail brought a § 1983
action against a county and a jail physician, among others, for violation of the detainee's Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights, and asserted claims under state law for negligence and breach of contract. The defendants
moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The district court granted the motions in part, and
denied in part. The physician and the county moved for reconsideration. The district court granted the motion,
finding that the physician was not subject to supervisory liability under § 1983, absent any finding that the nurse
refused to treat the detainee, ignored his complaints, intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any similar conduct that would clearly evince a wanton disregard for any serious medical need. The court held that the
county was not liable in the § 1983 claim brought by family members, absent a showing of an underlying constitutional violation by a county employee or a county policy that permitted or caused some constitutional violation.
(Wichita County Jail, Texas)

U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
SUPERVISORY
LIABILITY

Estate of Prasad ex rel. Prasad v. County of Sutter, 958 F.Supp.2d 1101 (E.D.Cal. 2013). The estate of a deceased
pretrial detainee brought an action against jail employees and officials, as well as medical staff, alleging violations
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and
denied in part. The court held that: (1) although the detainee died at a hospital, liability for the jail employees and
officials was not precluded, where the jail employees and officials could have contributed to detainee's death despite the transfer to the hospital; (2) allegations were sufficient plead deliberate indifference to serious medical
needs by the deputies and medical staff; (3) allegations were sufficient to state a claim for supervisory liability;
(4) allegations were sufficient to state a claim for supervisory liability against the corrections officers in charge;
(5) allegations were sufficient to state a claim against the county; (6) allegations were sufficient to state a claim
for wrongful death under California law; and (7) the health care provider was a state actor. The court found that a
statement by health care providers, in an attachment to the complaint, that even if the detainee had been transferred to the hospital sooner, it “probably” would not have changed his death, was possibly self serving, and did
not contradict the complaint's allegations that the detainee's death was unnecessary and unavoidable.
According to the court, allegations that the county maintained customs or practices whereby no medical staff
whatsoever were at the jail for one-sixth of every day, that the staff lacked authority to respond to emergency and
critical inmate needs, and that the jail records system withheld information from affiliated health care providers,
were sufficient to state a § 1983 claim against the county, alleging violations of the Fourteenth Amendment after
the pretrial detainee died. The court held that allegations that deficiencies in medical care at the jail, including lack
of 24-hour emergency care, were longstanding, repeatedly documented, and expressly noted by officials in the
past., and that the doctor who was employed by the health care provider that contracted with the prison was aware
of the deficiencies, and that the doctor discharged the pretrial detainee to the jail were sufficient to plead deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, as required to state a § 1983 action against the doctor for violations of
the Fourteenth Amendment after the detainee died. (Sutter County Jail, California)

U.S. District Court
DAMAGES
FTCA- Federal Tort Claims
Act

Ford-Sholebo v. U.S., 980 F.Supp.2d 917 (N.D.Ill. 2013). The wife of a deceased pretrial detainee who suffered
from a seizure disorder, individually and as administrator of the detainee's estate, brought a wrongful death action
against the United States pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The district court held that: (1) evidence supported a finding that the detainee had a seizure disorder; (2) correctional facility employees breached the
standard of care for treating the detainee's seizure disorder; (3) the employees' failures and breaches of the standard of care proximately caused the detainee's death; and (4) an award of damages to the wife in the amount of
$40,000 for the loss of consortium was appropriate. The court noted that the testimony of the administrator's expert physician and a pathologist who was subpoenaed to testify at trial, that the detainee suffered from a seizure
disorder, was overwhelmingly credible, while testimony of the government's two experts, that the detainee did not
have seizure disorder, was incredible and unreliable. According to the court, the standard of care for treating the
detainee's seizure disorder required correctional facility personnel, including physicians and physician assistants,
to examine the detainee on a monthly basis, review the detainee's medical records, draw the detainee's blood for
the purpose of monitoring the level of anti-seizure medication in his blood and obtain corresponding lab reports,
and inform the detainee about the risks and benefits of taking or not taking medication, and to counsel him about
his medication. The court found that the facility breached the appropriate standard of care, where required monthly evaluations were not conducted, facility personnel failed to make any efforts to retrieve the detainee's medical
records while they were treating the detainee, facility physicians were derelict in their duty to review medical
records they actually possessed and then to meet with the detainee in light of information they derived from those
records, and physicians failed to talk to the detainee about his medication, to ask him why he was not taking his
medication, and to counsel him about his noncompliance. (Metropolitan Correctional Center, Chicago, and
Kankakee County Detention Center, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Foster v. Ghosh, 4 F.Supp.3d 974 (N.D.Ill. 2013). A state inmate brought an action against Illinois Department of
Corrections officials and an optometrist who treated him in prison, alleging under § 1983 that the defendants were
deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The inmate moved for
a preliminary injunction requiring the defendants to grant him access to an ophthalmologist to evaluate his cataracts. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the optometrist and medical director were deliberately indifferent to the inmate's serious medical needs and that the inmate would suffer irreparable harm absent the
issuance of an injunction. According to the court, the only treatment the inmate received in prison was a prescription for eyeglasses, which was not effective, and the inmate's request for a consultation was not expensive, uncon-

27.189

ventional, or esoteric. The court noted that the cost the defendants would bear providing adequate care to the inmate did not outweigh the irreparable harm the inmate would endure if his cataracts remained unevaluated.
(Stateville Correctional Center, Illinois)
U.S. Appeals Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
FAILURE TO PROTECT
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Glaze v. Byrd, 721 F.3d 528 (8th Cir. 2013). A pretrial detainee who had been beaten by three fellow inmates
brought an action against a correctional officer, a lieutenant, and jail officials, alleging deliberate indifference to a
substantial risk of serious harm, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The officer and the lieutenant appealed. The
appeals court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held that summary judgment for the correctional
officer was precluded by a fact question as to whether the correctional officer was aware of a substantial risk of
harm to the detainee and was deliberately indifferent to his safety. (Faulkner County Detention Center, Arkansas)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
FAILURE TO PROTECT
POLICIES/PROCEDURES
SUPERVISORY
LIABILITY

Goodman v. Kimbrough, 718 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 2013). The wife of a pretrial detainee who suffered from dementia and who was severely beaten by his cellmate filed a § 1983 action against jail officials in their individual
capacities for alleged violation of the Due Process Clause by deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of harm
to the detainee. The wife also asserted a supervisory liability claim against the sheriff in his official capacity and a
state law claim for loss of support and consortium. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The wife appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that there was no evidence that jail officials
were subjectively aware of a risk of serious harm to which the pretrial detainee was exposed from his severe beating by a cellmate, and that the officials deliberately disregarded that risk, as required to support the detainee's §
1983 claim of deliberate indifference in violation of the Due Process Clause. According to the court, the officers'
failure to conduct cell checks and head counts and their deactivation of emergency call buttons constituted negligence but did not justify constitutional liability under § 1983. According to the court, jail officials' policy violations by failing to enter every cell in conducting head counts and in deactivating emergency call buttons did not
constitute a custom so settled and permanent as to have the force of law. (Clayton County Jail, Georgia)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
FAILURE TO PROTECT
SUPERVISION

Grimes v. District of Columbia, 923 F.Supp.2d 196 (D.D.C. 2013). A juvenile detainee's mother filed a § 1983
action against the District of Columbia for violation of the Eighth Amendment and negligent hiring, training, and
supervision, after the detainee was attacked and killed by other detainees. After the district court ruled in the District's favor, the appeals court vacated and remanded. On remand, the District moved for summary judgment. The
district court granted the motion. The court held that officials at the juvenile detention facility were not deliberately indifferent to a known safety risk, and thus their failure to protect the detainee from an attack by another detainee did not violate the Eighth Amendment. According to the court, there was no evidence of a history of assaults on youth at the facility, such that any facility employee knew or should have known that a fight between the
detainee and another youth was going to take place, or that the youth who fought with the detainee had a history
of assaultive behavior while at the facility. The court also found no evidence that a municipal custom, policy, or
practice caused any such violation. The court also held that the mother’s failure to designate an expert witness
barred her claim. (Oak Hill Detention Facility, District of Columbia)

U.S. District Court
CLASS ACTION
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Haas v. Burlington County, 955 F.Supp.2d 334 (D.N.J. 2013). Arrestees filed a proposed class action under §
1983 alleging that their constitutional rights were violated when they were strip searched at a county jail. The
district court granted the arrestees' motion for leave to file an amended complaint, and the county appealed. The
district court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held that the arrestees' proposed amendment to their
complaint, in which they alleged that they were arrested for minor offenses, that they either were held, or could
have been held, outside of the general jail population, and that they were subjected to strip searches pursuant to
the county's blanket policy before their detentions had been reviewed by a judicial officer, stated plausible claims
for violation of their rights under Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Burlington County Jail, New Jersey)

U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
NEGLIGENCE
VICARIOUS LIABILITY

Harrelson v. Dupnik, 970 F.Supp.2d 953 (D.Ariz. 2013). The mother of 17-year-old inmate who died while
housed at a county jail brought an action in state court against the county, the county sheriff, the healthcare provider which contracted with the county to provide medical and mental health care at the jail, and employees of the
provider, individually and on behalf of the inmate's estate, alleging under § 1983 that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to the inmate's serious medical needs. The defendants removed the action to federal court and
moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The district court
held that: (1) the county defendants' duty to provide medical and mental health services to an inmate was nondelegable; (2) intervening acts of the medical defendants did not absolve the county defendants of liability for
alleged negligence; (3) the mother failed to state a claim for wrongful death; (4) the county was not deliberately
indifferent to the inmate's rights; (5) the provider was not subject to liability; but (6) a fact issue precluded summary judgment as to an Eighth Amendment medical claim against the employees.
According to the court, the duty of the county and the county sheriff to provide medical and mental health
services to the 17-year-old county jail inmate, who suffered from bipolar disorder and depression, was nondelegable, and thus the county and sheriff were subject to vicarious liability, under Arizona law, for the alleged
medical malpractice of the healthcare provider which contracted with the county to provide medical and mental
health services at the jail. The court noted that there was no evidence that the legislature intended to permit the
county or sheriff to delegate their duties and obligations they owned to the inmate. The court found that the intervening acts of the contract medical provider, in allegedly failing to properly diagnose and treat the inmate's medical and mental health needs, both before and after the inmate received an injection of a psychotropic medication,
were not so extraordinary as to absolve the county and the county sheriff of liability for their failure to protect the
inmate.
The court found that there was no evidence that the county jail's policy or custom of placing inmates in protective custody for their own protection amounted to deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of the inmate,
who died while on protective custody status. According to the court, there was no evidence that the county had

27.190

actual notice of a pattern of risk of harm or injury as a result of the county jail officials' use of isolation, or an
administrative segregation policy in the juvenile detention housing unit at the county jail, or that any omissions in
the county's policies necessarily gave rise to the situation in which the inmate, died from a purported cardiac
event. The court found that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the
inmate's prescribing physician knew of the inmate's serious medical need for a full psychiatric assessment, and
failed to timely provide that assessment, and as to whether jail medical personnel were aware that the inmate was
suffering from a reaction to a psychotropic medication or unknown serious medical illness, and, if so, whether
they were deliberately indifferent. (Pima County Adult Detention Complex, and Conmed Healthcare Management, Inc., Arizona)
U.S. Appeals Court
DAMAGES

Harrison v. Michigan, 722 F.3d 768 (6th Cir. 2013). A prisoner filed an action against a state and state officers
seeking damages and injunctive relief stemming from his unlawful confinement in a prison system. The district
court dismissed the action. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The appeals court
found that the statute of limitations applicable to the prisoner's § 1983 complaint had not been triggered until the
state court of appeals issued its holding that the prisoner had been improperly sentenced to consecutive terms for
his convictions and remanded the case for entry of a corrected judgment. The court noted that although the prisoner apparently had learned that he was being held unlawfully while still in prison, he did not have knowledge of his
injury until the state court of appeals established that he had suffered such an injury. (Michigan Department of
Corrections, Michigan Parole Board)

U.S. Appeals Court
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
OFFICIAL CAPACITY
RLUIPA- Religious
Land Use and
Institutionalized
Persons Act

Hartmann v. California Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 707 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2013). California state
prisoners brought a § 1983 action against, among others, the California Department of Corrections (CDCR), alleging that the defendants violated their state and federal constitutional rights to exercise their religious beliefs by
refusing to hire a paid, full–time, Wiccan chaplain and by failing to apply neutral criteria in determining whether
paid chaplaincy positions were necessary to meet the religious exercise needs of inmates adhering to certain religions. The district court dismissed claims against the California State Personnel Board and its individual members, and, dismissed claims against the state, its governor, and various other agencies and individuals. The prisoners appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held that: (1) the First Amendment
did not require CDCR to provide inmates with chaplain of their choice, regardless of whether the number of Wiccan inmates was greater than the number of inmates practicing faiths for which CDCR did provide staff chaplain,
because the prisoners had a reasonable opportunity to exercise their faith via the services of staff chaplains and a
volunteer Wiccan chaplain that they already received; (2) the prison policy did not violate prisoners' rights under
the Equal Protection Clause where the prison provided the plaintiffs with a volunteer Wiccan chaplain when
available, made staff chaplains available to all prisoners to assist in their religious exercise, and the prison administration considered the prisoners' requests at three different levels of review before determining that services were
sufficient without hiring a full–time Wiccan chaplain; (3) the prisoners did not plead that their religious exercise
was so burdened as to pressure them to abandon their beliefs, precluding their claim that the prison administration
violated their rights under Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA); (4) two prison officials were proper official–capacity defendants on the prisoners' claim for injunctive relief where the prisoners
sought an affirmative injunction requiring the prison administration to adopt and apply neutral criteria in determining chaplain hiring needs and they alleged that each official was responsible for the policies and practices of
the California Department of Corrections (CDCR), as well as the day–to–day operation of the prison; and, (5)
permitting prisoners to amend complaint was unwarranted on futility grounds.
But the court found that the prisoners did state a claim for violation of the First Amendment's Establishment
Clause by alleging that the prison administration created staff chaplain positions for five conventional faiths, refused to hire a paid, full–time, Wiccan chaplain, and failed to apply neutral criteria in evaluating whether the
growing membership in minority religions warranted reallocation of resources used in accommodating inmates'
religious exercise needs. (California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation)

U.S. Appeals Court
COMPENSATORY
DAMAGES
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Hazle v. Crofoot, 727 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2013). A parolee, who was an atheist, brought an action against various
state officials and a state contractor, seeking damages and injunctive relief for the deprivation of his First
Amendment rights, after his parole was revoked following his refusal to participate in a residential drug treatment
program that required him to acknowledge a higher power, as a condition of his parole. The contractor, Westcare,
was a private regional substance abuse coordination agency, and made the arrangements for the parolee’s placement in the program. After the parolee was granted partial summary judgment by the district court, a jury awarded
the parolee zero damages. The district court denied the parolee’s motion for a new trial, and the parolee appealed.
The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that the parolee was entitled to an award of compensatory damages for each day that he spent in prison as a result of the violation of his First Amendment rights by
various state officials. The appeals court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the contractor's conduct was the proximate cause of the parolee's unconstitutional imprisonment, when it contracted only with drug treatment facilities offering solely religious based programs or services, and counseled and arranged for the parolee to attend a religion-based facility as part of his state-imposed
parole program, despite having been informed that the parolee was an atheist and that he objected to such religious programming. The court held that the parolee's claim under California law for an injunction preventing both
a state contractor and various state officials from expending state funds in an unconstitutional manner that required parolees to participate in religious treatment programs in order to be eligible for parole, failed to provide
parolees with secular or non-religious treatment alternatives, and revoked the parole of those who protested or
resisted participation in religion-based treatment programs, was not rendered moot after the state issued a directive stating that parole agents could not require a parolee to attend any religious based program if the parolee
refused to participate for religious reasons, where the state directive had not been implemented in any meaningful
fashion. (California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitations, Board of Parole Hearings, Westcare, and
Empire Recovery Center, California)

27.191

U.S. District Court
POLICY/PROCEDURE
SUPERVISORY
LIABILITY

Hernandez v. Cate, 918 F.Supp.2d 987 (C.D.Cal. 2013). An Hispanic state inmate, whose ethnicity was classified
as “other,” brought an in forma pauperis civil rights action against California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) officials, alleging, among other things, that the officials discriminated against him on basis of
his race, in violation of his equal protection and due process rights, and that the officials violated his Eighth
Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. The officials moved to dismiss the complaint for
failure to state claim. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that state
prison officials applied a suspect racial classification to Hispanic inmates, who were ethnically classified as “other,” when the officials placed those inmates on modified program status in lockstep with the lockdown of Mexican inmates, while non-Hispanic inmates who associated with the Mexican inmates or disruptive inmates of other
ethnic groups were not subjected to same lockstep treatment. According to the court, prison policies were not
narrowly tailored to control prison disturbances, as required to survive strict scrutiny of the § 1983 equal protection claim brought by Hispanic inmate. The court held that the state prison warden's authority and discretion to
justify modified programs imposed on the Hispanic inmate and to deny the inmate relief at the administrative
level were sufficient to show the warden's personal involvement in the alleged deprivations of the inmate's equal
protection and Eighth Amendment rights so as to subject the warden to supervisory liability under § 1983. The
court found that state prison officials were not entitled to qualified immunity from the § 1983 equal protection
claim brought by the Hispanic inmate where it would have been clear to a reasonable official that it was unlawful
to place the inmate on a modified program on the basis of his race, ethnicity, or national origin. (Ironwood State
Prison, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
FTCA- Federal Tort
Claims Act

Hill v. U.S., 922 F.Supp.2d 174 (D.Mass. 2013). A federal prisoner brought an action against the United States
under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) alleging that he was assaulted by another inmate while in custody and
that a correctional officer on duty failed to respond to a “help” button and his calls for help. The United States
moved to dismiss. The district court denied the motion, finding that dismissal pursuant to the FTCA's discretionary function exception was not warranted. The court found that the issue of whether BOP had any mandatory
directive for immediate response to either a “help” button or inmate calls for help involved fact issues that could
not be resolved on a motion to dismiss. (Federal Medical Center in Ayer, Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
CLASS ACTION
DAMAGES
OFFICIAL CAPACITY

Hilton v. Wright, 928 F.Supp.2d 530 (N.D.N.Y. 2013). A state prison inmate infected with the Hepatitis C virus
(HCV) brought a class action against the New York State Department of Correctional Services and Community
Supervision (DOCCS) and its chief medical officer, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs
in violation of the Eighth Amendment, as well as violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the
Rehabilitation Act. Following class certification, the parties entered into a settlement agreement resolving injunctive and equitable claims. The defendants moved for summary judgment on the remaining damages claims. The
inmate's attorneys moved for attorney's fees and out-of-pocket expenses incurred monitoring the settlement
agreement. The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, awarded fees to the inmate's
attorneys, but denied expenses. The inmate appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. On remand, the
district court held that: (1) the Eleventh Amendment barred an Eighth Amendment claim against an officer in his
official capacity; (2) the inmate waived the Eighth Amendment claim based on initial denial of treatment due to
his short prison term; (3) a fact issue precluded summary judgment on the Eighth Amendment claim based on
denial of treatment due to the inmate's failure to complete a substance abuse program;(4) a fact issue precluded
summary judgment on the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims; and (5) enlargement of the cap set forth in the
agreement was appropriate. (New York State Department of Correctional Services and Community Supervision)

U.S. District Court
CONSENT DECREE
CONTEMPT
CONTRACT SERVICES
SETTLEMENT

Kelly v. Wengler, 979 F.Supp.2d 1104 (D.Idaho 2013). Prisoners brought a civil contempt action against a private
prison contractor, alleging the contractor violated a settlement agreement that required it to comply with the staffing pattern specified in its contract with the Idaho Department of Correction. The district court found that the
contractor was in civil contempt for violating the settlement agreement, that the contractor's non-compliance with
staffing requirements were significant, and the contractor did not promptly take all reasonable steps to comply
with settlement agreement. The court held that a two-year extension of the consent decree was a proper sanction
for the contractor's civil contempt in willfully violating the settlement agreement, where the contractor's failure to
comply with a key provision of the settlement agreement had lasted nearly as long as the duration of the agreement. According to the court, the use of an independent monitor to ensure the private prison contractor's compliance with the settlement agreement was an appropriate resolution, where such duty was most fairly handled by a
monitor with a direct obligation to the district court and to the terms of the settlement agreement. The court noted
that “…it is clear that there was a persistent failure to fill required mandatory positions, along with a pattern of
CCA staff falsifying rosters to make it appear that all posts were filled.” The state assumed operation of the facility in July 2014, changing the name to the Idaho State Correctional Center. (Corrections Corporation of America,
Idaho Dept. of Correction, Idaho Corr'l.)

U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
FAILURE TO ACT
SETTLEMENT

Kelly v. Wengler, 979 F.Supp.2d 1237 (D.Idaho 2013). Prisoners moved for discovery and a hearing on the issue
of whether a private prison contractor should be held in civil contempt for violating the parties' settlement agreement. The district court held that it had the power to enforce the settlement agreement, and that the prisoners were
entitled to a hearing and to discovery on the issue of whether the private prison contractor should be held in civil
contempt. The prisoners alleged that the contractor had been falsifying staffing records, and the district court
ordered discovery, noting that prisoners had offered affidavits from current and former employees of the contractor, all alleging more unfilled posts than contractor had admitted to. (Corrections Corporation of America, Idaho
Department of Correction, Idaho Correctional Center)

U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
SETTLEMENT

Kelly v. Wengler, 979 F.Supp.2d 1243 (D.Idaho 2013). Prisoners seeking to have a private prison contractor held
in civil contempt for violating the parties' settlement agreement moved to unseal related documents. The district
court held that the filings in the civil contempt proceedings would not be kept under seal. The court noted that the

27.192

settlement agreement did not state that disputes would be private. And the court found: “It is hardly private spite,
promotion of public scandal, or libelous, to contend that CCA is wrong, and to submit sworn affidavits from past
and current employees in support of that argument. Idaho taxpayers pay CCA to operate one of their prisons. With
public money comes a public concern about how that money is spent. Such a public interest cannot be swatted
away by calling it a desire for ‘public spectacle,’ or a form of ‘private spite,’ or any of the other labels that CCA
offers.” In July 2014 the Department of Corrections assumed control of the facility. (Corrections Corporation of
America, Idaho Department of Correction, Idaho Correctional Center)
U.S. District Court
FTCA- Federal Tort
Claims Act
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Lineberry v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 923 F.Supp.2d 284 (D.D.C. 2013). A federal prisoner brought an action
against the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) and prison official under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and Bivens,
alleging he was denied access to the postal service in violation of his First Amendment rights. The district court
granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court held that the prisoner's admitted failure to submit a claim to
the Bureau of Prisons prior to filing his lawsuit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) alleging BOP's mail
regulations violated his First Amendment rights, deprived the district court of subject matter jurisdiction. The
court found that neither the requirement of a mailing label generated by the Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) mail system,
nor the return of mail lacking such a label, violated the prisoner's First Amendment rights, and the prisoner provided no factual allegations to support his conclusory claims that the system denied him access to the press, the
establishment or exercise of religion, and peaceable assembly. (Federal Correctional Institution in Texarkana,
Texas)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN
MUNICIPAL LIABILITY
NEGLIGENCE
SUPERVISORY
LIABILITY

Lucia v. City of Peabody, 971 F.Supp.2d 153 (D.Mass. 2013). The administrator of the estate of an individual who
died from acute and chronic substance abuse while in protective custody brought an action against a city and its
mayor, as well as the police department, its chief, and four other individual officers, alleging claims under § 1983
for various constitutional violations and claims of negligence and false imprisonment under state law. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The district court held that: (1) the
officers were entitled to qualified immunity on the claim that they violated the individual's constitutional rights by
failing to call a treatment center; (2) the officers were entitled to qualified immunity on the claim that they violated the individual's constitutional rights by failing to monitor him and provide proper care; (3) the administrator
failed to establish municipal liability based on failure to train; (4) the administrator failed to establish supervisory
liability against the supervising officer; (5) police were immune from negligence liability under statutory exception to Massachusetts Tort Claims Act; and (6) the officers were not liable for false imprisonment. The court noted that at the time of the relevant events, a reasonable officer would not have known that determining that a suitable treatment facility was not available was a Fourth Amendment prerequisite to his ability to constitutionally
detain an intoxicated individual who was not charged with any crime, as required for the right to be clearly established, and therefore the individual officers who detained the individual were entitled to qualified immunity under
§ 1983. (Peabody Police Department, Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
FTCA- Federal Tort Claims
Act
POLICIES/PROCEDURES
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

McKinney v. U.S., 950 F.Supp.2d 923 (N.D.Tex. 2013). A 79-year-old federal prisoner, who allegedly had been
injured while being transported to a medical center, filed suit against the United States pursuant to the Federal
Torts Claim Act (FTCA). The district court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss, holding that the prisoner's
tort claim was not barred under the discretionary function exception to FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity.
The court noted that a prisoner has the right to bring a cause of action under FTCA for a breach of the duty prescribed by federal statute requiring the Bureau of Prisons to provide for the safekeeping, care, and subsistence of
all federal prisoners. The prisoner alleged that he was injured when officials failed to assist him on stairs when he
was exiting an airplane, while he was fully restrained in handcuffs, shackles, and a belly chain. According to the
court, there were no legitimate policy considerations at play in the officials' choice not to assist a fully restrained,
elderly, ill, and outnumbered prisoner on the stairs of an airplane. The prisoner alleged that, due to his fall, he
suffered intense pain, has reoccurring medical issues, must now use a walker to get around, continues to need
medication for pain, and requires counseling to address the mental and emotional stress he has suffered. (FCI–
Fort Worth, Texas, and Federal Medical Center, Butner, North Carolina)

U.S. District Court
SUPERVISORY LIABILITY
CONTRACT SERVICES

M.H. v. County of Alameda, 90 F.Supp.3d 889 (E.D. Cal. 2013). Children of a deceased inmate brought a § 1983
action against a doctor, a nurse, prison health services, a county, a sheriff, ten deputies, and a county social worker. The inmate died from anoxic encephalopathy due to cardiac arrest following excessive physical exertion, multiple blunt injuries, and tasering, which occurred while he was incarcerated, and while he was experiencing severe
alcohol withdrawal. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in
part. The court held that the children sufficiently stated a claim under California law that the nurse was deliberately indifferent to the inmate’s medical needs, by alleging that the nurse knew that the inmate was at risk of severe
alcohol withdrawal, violated prison and county procedure in failing to attend to his medical needs, and failed to
satisfy the medical standard of care, which resulted in substantial harm to the inmate. According to the court, the
children also stated valid Monell claims by alleging that the doctor’s and the prison health services corporation’s
customs, practices, or lack thereof, constituted deliberate indifference to the prisoners’ medical needs, and also
stated a claim for supervisory liability. The inmate had broken a food tray in his cell, blocked his toilet, and made
a mess of his cell. A deputy allegedly entered his cell alone with a taser in one hand and handcuffs in the other.
The deputy tased the inmate for two cycles, or ten seconds, causing the inmate to run for the door, slip on the wet
floor, and fall. The children alleged that the deputy and at least nine other deputies then severely beat, punched,
kicked, stomped, tased, and brutalized the inmate. The inmate was taken to a hospital where he was found to suffer anoxic brain damage, severe acidosis, several cardiac arrests, and respiratory failure. The inmate died two days
later. An autopsy determined that the inmate died from anoxic encephalopathy due to cardiac arrest following
excessive physical exertion, multiple blunt injuries, and tasering. (Corizon Health Inc, and Santa Rita Jail, Alameda County Sheriffs’ Department, California)

27.193

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE
FAILURE TO PROTECT
INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY
OFFICIAL CAPACITY

Newell v. Kankakee County Sheriff's Department, 968 F.Supp.2d 973 (C.D.Ill. 2013). A disabled federal detainee
who was housed at a county jail for two months brought an action against the county sheriff's department and
county officials under § 1983 and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The defendants moved to dismiss.
The district court denied the motion. The court held that the detainee's allegations that the county officials developed, supervised, and enforced policies and practices of the jail, ensured that grievances were received in the
proper manner and were properly responded to, and were aware of his serious medical needs and his grievances,
yet turned a blind eye to the situation, were sufficient to state a claim against the officials in their individual capacities in his civil rights action alleging he was denied medical care and kept in unsafe and unhealthy conditions
while he was housed at the county jail. The detainee allegedly had multiple disabilities that he sustained in an auto
accident, including weakness and numbness in his left side and he partially dragged his left leg. He also had incontinence with urine and bowel movements and required the use of adult diapers. He was unable to stand still
without assistance, which made showering and using the toilet difficult. The detainee alleged that despite his obvious disabilities and medical issues, he was assigned to a regular dorm on the top floor of the jail, and a to a top
bunk. He had to hop on one leg to go up or down the stairs and needed assistance from other inmates to get into
and out of his bunk. He was allegedly not given adult diapers until his third day at the jail, and even then, he was
not given an adequate supply of diapers and would sometimes sit in a soiled diaper for days, and in clothes with
urine and feces on them. He alleged that he was not given enough biohazard bags, and the soiled diapers and bags
piled up in his cell. One day, when there was no one to assist the detainee, he fell while attempting to get out of
his bunk and he sat for two hours until someone came to help him. As a result, his left leg worsened and his right
leg was numb, he could not walk at all and was forced to crawl down stairs on his buttocks, and scoot along the
floor and walk on his hands.
The court found that the detainee's allegations that he was denied medical care and kept in unsafe and unhealthy conditions while he was housed at the county jail, and that the jail was not an exceptionally large facility,
were sufficient to state claim against the corrections officer working at the jail in his individual capacity. According to the court, the situation described by the inmate, if true, would have been obvious to any correctional officer
working in the area in which the inmate was housed.
The court held that the detainee's allegations that correctional staff at the county jail acted pursuant to an official policy or custom not to perform a medical intake, investigate inmates' medical issues or complaints about
problems with walking if they were ambulatory, nor provide sufficient medically-necessary hygiene items such as
adult diapers to inmates, among other things, were sufficient to allege that an official policy or custom was a
“moving force” in the alleged violation of his rights, as required to state official capacity claims under Monell.
The court held that the detainee's allegation that he was barred from basic facilities on the basis of his disabilities
while he was housed at the county jail was sufficient to allege discriminatory intent, as required to state an ADA
claim against the county sheriff's department. (Jerome Combs Detention Center, Kankakee, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
MUNICIPAL LIABILITY

Page v. Mancuso, 999 F.Supp.2d 269 (D.D.C. 2013). A pretrial detainee brought an action in the Superior Court
for the District of Columbia, against the District of Columbia and a police officer, alleging unlawful arrest in
violation of the Fourth Amendment, and deliberate indifference to the arrestee's over-detention and strip search.
The detainee also alleged that the District maintained a custom and practice of strip searches in violation of the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments. The defendants removed the action to federal court and filed a partial motion to
dismiss. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the detainee's complaint failed to allege that the
District of Columbia was deliberately indifferent to Fourth and Fifth Amendment violations jail officials inflicted
upon the detainee when they subjected him to “over-detention” and strip searches, as required to state a claim
against District for Fourth and Fifth Amendment violations under the theory of municipal liability. (D.C. Jail)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE
GOVERNMENTAL
LIABILITY
FAILURE TO TRAIN

Poche v. Gautreaux, 973 F.Supp.2d 658 (M.D.La. 2013). A pretrial detainee brought an action against a district
attorney and prison officials, among others, alleging various constitutional violations pursuant to § 1983, statutory
violations under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act (RA), as well as state law
claims, all related to her alleged unlawful detention for seven months. The district attorney and prison officials
moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that the detainee sufficiently alleged an official policy or custom, as required to establish local government liability for constitutional torts, by alleging that failures of the district attorney and the prison officials to implement policies designed
to prevent the constitutional deprivations alleged, and to adequately train their employees in such tasks as processing paperwork related to detention, created such obvious dangers of constitutional violations that the district
attorney and the prison officials could all be reasonably said to have acted with conscious indifference. The court
found that the pretrial detainee stated a procedural due process claim against the district attorney and the prison
officials under § 1983 related to her alleged unlawful detention for seven months, by alleging that it was official
policy and custom of the officials to skirt constitutional requirements related to procedures for: (1) establishing
probable cause to detain; (2) arraignment; (3) bail; and (4) appointment of counsel, and that the officials' policy
and custom resulted in a deprivation of her liberty without due process. The court also found a procedural due
process claim against the district attorney under § 1983 by the detainee’s allegation that it was the district attorney's policy and custom to sign charging papers such as bills of information without reading them, without checking their correctness, and without even knowing what he was signing, and that the attorney's policy and custom
resulted in a deprivation of her liberty without due process. The court found a substantive due process claim
against the district attorney in the detainee’s allegation that after obtaining clear direct knowledge that the detainee was being wrongfully and illegally held, the district attorney still failed to correct the mistakes that caused the
detention, and to cover up his failures in connection with the case, the district attorney made a conscious decision
to bring belated charges against the detainee. The court held that the detainee stated an equal protection claim
against the prison officials under § 1983, by alleging that the officials acted with a discriminatory animus toward
her because she was mentally disabled, and that she was repeatedly and deliberately punished for, and discriminated against, on that basis. (East Baton Rouge Prison, Louisiana)

27.194

U.S. District Court
INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY

Potts v. Moreci, 12 F.Supp.3d 1065 (N.D.Ill. 2013). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against a county,
employees of the county jail in their individual capacities, and a sheriff, in his individual and official capacities,
alleging retaliation in violation of his First Amendment rights, deprivation of his procedural due process and equal
protection rights, denial of access to the courts, municipal liability, and statutory indemnification. The sheriff
moved to dismiss the claims asserted against him. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part.
The court found that the detainee who allegedly was placed in a segregation unit at the county jail without adequate grounds and without an opportunity to contest such placement stated a claim for a procedural due process
violation against the sheriff, in his individual capacity, under § 1983. The court noted that the sheriff's personal
responsibility for the detainee's placement in segregation could be assumed in determining whether the detainee
adequately pleaded the claim, and the detainee also sufficiently alleged the sheriff's knowledge of the detainee's
allegedly unconstitutional confinement in segregation by asserting that the sheriff attended periodic meetings at
which the detainee's confinement was discussed, which permitted the inference that sheriff knew about the challenged conduct and facilitated, approved, condoned, or turned a blind eye to it. The court held that the detainee
sufficiently pleaded the sheriff's personal involvement in the alleged misconduct of jail employees in singling out
the detainee for arbitrary treatment during his confinement in a segregation unit, subjecting him to living conditions that were inconsistent even with conditions of other detainees in a segregation unit, and thus stated a § 1983
claim for class-of-one equal protection violation against the sheriff. (Cook County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
CLASS ACTION
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE

Pride v. Correa, 719 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2013). A prisoner brought § a 1983 action against two members of a
prison's committee that reviewed medical notes, claiming that the members violated his Eighth Amendment rights
by acting with deliberate indifference towards his serious medical needs in denying his prescribed knee brace and
egg crate mattress. The district court granted summary judgment to the committee members. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded with directions. The appeals court held that the prisoner's § 1983
action seeking an injunction was not duplicative of an earlier class action, Plata v. Brown, and was not conclusively in the Plata stipulation, where the prisoner's action did not refer to systemic relief for inmates generally. The
court noted that the Plata stipulation stated that it only had preclusive effect on other actions seeking class or systemic relief, and the procedural provisions of the stipulation only applied to systemic reform goals and not individual claims. (Calipatria Prison, California)

U.S. District Court
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Prison Legal News v. Babeu, 933 F.Supp.2d 1188 (D.Ariz. 2013). A non-profit organization that produced and
distributed a monthly journal and books to inmates brought an action against county jail officers and mailroom
employees, alleging that the defendants violated its First Amendment and due process rights by failing to deliver
its materials to its subscribers at the jail. The parties cross-moved for partial summary judgment. The court granted the motions in part, denied in part, and deferred in part. The court held that the jail's policy limiting incoming
inmate correspondence to one-page and postcards did not violate the First Amendment, where there was an apparent common-sense connection between the jail's goal of reducing contraband and limiting the number of pages a
particular piece of correspondence contained, and sufficient alternative avenues of communication remained open
for publishers who wished to communicate with inmates at the jail. But the court held that the jail’s failure to give
the non-profit organization notice and the opportunity to appeal the jail's refusal to deliver its materials to inmates
violated the organization's procedural due process rights. The court held that there was no evidence that mailroom
employees, their supervisors, or command staff at the county jail were motivated by evil motive or intent when
they violated the non-profit publisher's First Amendment and due process rights by discarding publisher's materials without providing the publisher opportunity to contest or appeal the non-deliverability decision, or that those
individuals' unconstitutional actions involved reckless or callous indifference to the publisher's federally protected
rights, as would support an award of punitive damages against the individuals in the publisher's § 1983 action.
(Pinal County Jail, Arizona)

U.S. District Court
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Prison Legal News v. Columbia County, 942 F.Supp.2d 1068 (D.Or. 2013). A publisher filed a § 1983 action
alleging that a county and its officials violated the First Amendment by rejecting dozens of its publications and
letters mailed to inmates incarcerated in its jail and violated the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to provide it or
the inmates with the notice of, and opportunity to, appeal the jail's rejection of its publications and letters. A bench
trial was held, resulting in a judgment for the publisher. The court held that: (1) the policy prohibiting inmates
from receiving mail that was not on a postcard violated the First Amendment; (2) the county had a policy of prohibiting inmates from receiving magazines; (3) the county failed to provide adequate notice of withholding of
incoming mail by jail authorities; (4) entry of a permanent injunction prohibiting officials from enforcing the
postcard-only policy was warranted; and (5) a permanent injunction prohibiting officials from enforcing the prohibition against magazines was not warranted. (Columbia County Jail, Oregon)

U.S. Appeals Court
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2013). Aliens subject to detention pursuant to federal immigration
statutes brought a class action against Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and others, challenging prolonged detention without individualized bond hearings and determinations to justify their continued detention.
The district court entered a preliminary injunction requiring the holding of bond hearings before an immigration
judge (IJ). The government appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that: (1) the statute authorizing
the Attorney General to take into custody any alien who is inadmissible or deportable by reason of having committed certain offenses for as long as removal proceedings are “pending” cannot be read to authorize mandatory
detention of criminal aliens with no limit on the duration of imprisonment; (2) aliens subject to prolonged detention were entitled to bond hearings before IJs; (3) irreparable harm was likely to result from the government's
reading of the immigration detention statutes as not requiring a bond hearing for aliens subject to prolonged detention; and, (4) the public interest would benefit from a preliminary injunction. The court ruled that the class was
comprised of all non-citizens within the Central District of California who: (1) are or were detained for longer
than six months pursuant to one of the general immigration detention statutes pending completion of removal
proceedings, including judicial review, (2) are not and have not been detained pursuant to a national security de-

27.195

tention statute, and (3) have not been afforded a hearing to determine whether their detention is justified. (Los
Angeles Field Office of ICE, California)
U.S. District Court
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
OFFICIAL CAPACITY

Rother v. NYS Dept. of Corrections and Community Supervision, 970 F.Supp.2d 78 (N.D.N.Y. 2013). A female
corrections officer brought an action against a state department of corrections, correctional facility, supervisors
and coworkers, alleging sex discrimination and retaliation under Title VII, denial of equal protection pursuant to §
1983, denial of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, First Amendment retaliation, conspiracy under §
1985, and various state claims. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and
denied in part. The officer alleged that a coworker told the officer, in front of inmates, coworkers, and the officer's
subordinates, that she had received an administrative-sergeant position by performing sexual favors and that she
was a “bitch and a backstabber,” “a stupid cunt,” and a “whining bitch” who “sucked.” She alleged that she was
subjected to discriminatory coworker shunning and tire-slashing threats, assignment denials, performance criticisms, discipline, vigilant monitoring, and denial of overtime and leave pay denials. The appeals court held that,
through the description of the emotional and psychological toll of her treatment, the officer subjectively perceived
her work environment to be abusive.
The court found that the officer’s complaint alleged the “materially adverse action” element of a Title VII
retaliation claim against a correctional facility and the state department of corrections by alleging that she endured
unmerited criticism and discipline, failure to remedy a coworker's mistreatment, repeated coworker shunning and
threats of tire slashing, video-camera monitoring, denial of vacation pay, and delay in filling out workers' compensation paperwork. The court also held that the officer's complaint stated a § 1983 claim against the state department of corrections and the correctional facility for violation of the Equal Protection Clause, where her complaint alleged that no male employee was subjected to the treatment of which she complained, and that the officer
was criticized and disciplined repeatedly for proper and innocuous conduct while a male coworker received no
criticism or discipline for his patently improper and inappropriate verbal tirade, which included explicitly sexist
language. According to the court, the state's commissioner of corrections, by virtue of his supervisory position,
had both a direct connection to the alleged gender discrimination against the female corrections officer, and the
authority to reinstate and transfer the officer, supporting her § 1983 equal protection claim against the commissioner in his official capacity seeking injunctive or declaratory relief. (Coxsackie Correctional Facility, N.Y. State
Department of Corrections and Community Supervision)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE
INDIVIDUAL
CAPACITY
OFFICIAL CAPACITY

Santiago v. Blair, 707 F.3d 984 (8th Cir. 2013). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against correctional officers, alleging excessive force and deliberate indifference to his medical needs in violation of the Eighth
Amendment and retaliation in violation of the First Amendment. The district court granted the officers' motion for
summary judgment with respect to official capacity claims, but denied summary judgment with respect to individual capacity claims. The officers appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
The appeals court held that the district court improperly applied the Fourth Amendment excessive force legal
standard to the prisoner's § 1983 claim for excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment, warranting
remand to the district court to inquire whether the force was applied to the prisoner in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm. The appeals court held that summary
judgment in prisoner's First Amendment retaliation action was precluded by a genuine dispute of material fact as
to whether a correctional officer's threats of death would chill a prisoner of ordinary firmness from engaging in
the prison grievance process. The court also found a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the correctional
officer issued death threats to the prisoner because the prisoner had filed and pursued an excessive force grievance. According to the court, summary judgment in the First Amendment retaliation action was precluded by a
genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the correctional officer's placement of the prisoner in a cell without
his personal property, proper facilities, bedding, or clothing, and the officer's threat that things would get worse,
issued after hearing the prisoner complain that he was being retaliated against, were adverse actions sufficient to
chill a prisoner of ordinary firmness from engaging in the prison grievance process. (Potosi Correctional Center,
Missouri)

U.S. District Court
COMPENSATORY
DAMAGES
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Slevin v. Board of Com'rs for County of Dona Ana, 934 F.Supp.2d 1270 (D.N.M. 2013). A detainee brought an
action against a county board of commissioners, detention center director, and medical director, alleging violations of his rights with regard to his medical care. The detainee alleged that, because of his mental illness, officials
at the Detention Center kept him in administrative segregation for virtually the entire 22 months of his incarceration, without humane conditions of confinement or adequate medical care, and without periodic review of his
confinement, causing his physical and mental deterioration, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act.
The jury awarded the detainee $3 million in punitive damages against the Detention Center Director, and $3.5
million in punitive damages against the facility medical director. The jury fixed the amount of compensatory
damages at $15.5 million, which included $500,000 for each month that detainee was incarcerated, plus an additional $1 million for each year since the detainee’s release from custody. The defendants moved for a new trial or
for reduction of the damages awards. The district court denied the motion, finding that the compensatory damages
award was supported by substantial evidence and it would not be set aside on the ground that it was the product of
passion or prejudices. The court also declined to set aside the punitive damages awards as excessive. (Doña Ana
County Detention Center, New Mexico)

U.S. District Court
COMPENSATORY
DAMAGES
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Slevin v. Board of Com'rs for County of Dona Ana, 934 F.Supp.2d 1282 (D.N.M. 2013). A detainee brought an
action against a county board of commissioners, detention center director, and medical director, alleging violations of his rights with regard to his medical care. After a verdict in favor of the detainee, the defendants moved
for a new trial based on nondisclosure of the existence of attorney-client relationship between the detainee's counsel and a witness, who was a lead plaintiff in other proceedings. The district court denied the motion, finding that
failure to volunteer information about their representation of the witness was not fraud, misrepresentation, or
misconduct, and did not substantially interfere with the defense. The detainee alleged that, because of his mental

27.196

illness, officials at the Detention Center kept him in administrative segregation for virtually the entire 22 months
of his incarceration, without humane conditions of confinement or adequate medical care, and without periodic
review of his confinement, causing his physical and mental deterioration, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The jury awarded the detainee $3 million in punitive damages against the Detention Center Director,
and $3.5 million in punitive damages against the facility medical director. The jury fixed the amount of compensatory damages at $15.5 million, which included $500,000 for each month that detainee was incarcerated, plus an
additional $1 million for each year since the detainee’s release from custody. (Doña Ana County Detention Center, New Mexico)
U.S. Appeals Court
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Thompson v. King, 730 F.3d 742 (8th Cir. 2013). The estate of a detainee, who died in police custody from multiple drug intoxication, brought a § 1983 action against the arresting and detaining officers, alleging that the officers
had shown deliberate indifference to the detainee's serious medical needs. The district court denied the officers’
motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. The officers appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The appeals court held that the arresting officer's discovery of an
empty bottle of a recently refilled anti-anxiety medication, and the detainee's statement that he had taken “a little”
of the medication, did not amount to subjective knowledge that the detainee required medical attention, and thus
the officer was entitled to qualified immunity in the § 1983 action arising from the subsequent death of the detainee in police custody. The court noted that the detainee presented no external injuries, and the detainee was conscious during the initial encounter, answering officers’ questions and following instructions. The court found that
summary judgment for the police officer in charge of the jail was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as
to whether the police officer had subjective knowledge of the serious medical need of the detainee and whether
the officer deliberately disregarded that need. According to the court, a reasonable officer in charge of a jail would
have known that a constitutional violation occurs by deliberately disregarding a detainee's serious medical needs,
and thus the right was clearly established, and in turn the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity from the §
1983 claim arising from detainee's death while in police custody. (Saline County Detention Center, Arkansas)

U.S. District Court
BIVENS CLAIM
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use & Institutionalized
Persons Act

Uduko v. Cozzens, 975 F.Supp.2d 750 (E.D.Mich. 2013). A prisoner bought claims under Bivens, the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000
(RLUIPA), and conspiracy, against corrections officers, alleging that the officers had retaliated and discriminated
against him for lodging complaints and filing various grievances, by restricting his participation as a religious
inmate representative and in religious activities. The officers moved to dismiss. The district court granted the
motions in part and denied in part. The court held that the prisoner alleged a substantial burden on his ability to
perform religious acts of significance to his faith. The court found that claims that a corrections officer failed to
give the prisoner an administrative detention order that explained why the prisoner was placed in administrative
detention and why the prisoner was cleared of all allegations against him after he was removed, along with claims
that the officers recruited inmates to supply false allegations against the prisoner, plausibly alleged a conspiracy
sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss the prisoner's Bivens conspiracy claim against the officers. The court held
that claims that corrections officers restricted the prisoner's active participation in religious services, banned him
from attending and participating in any and all religious services and programs held in the chapel area, and prohibited him from prophesying and laying hands on and praying for anyone, alleged a substantial burden on prisoner's ability to perform religious acts of significance to his faith, as required to support prisoner's First Amendment retaliation claims, and claimed violations of RFRA and RLUIPA. (Federal Correctional Institution in Milan,
Michigan)

U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Vollette v. Watson, 937 F.Supp.2d 706 (E.D.Va. 2013). Former food service and medical care contractors who
worked at a city jail brought an action against a sheriff, who oversaw the jail, and sheriff's deputies, alleging under
§ 1983 that their being required to undergo strip searches at the jail violated their Fourth Amendment rights, and
that they were retaliated against, in violation of the First Amendment. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was
precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to what triggered the strip searches of contractors who worked at
city jail, the nature of such searches, and the factual predicate for revocation of the contractors' security clearances. According to the court, at the time the contractors were strip searched, it was clearly established, for qualified
immunity purposes in the contractors' § 1983 Fourth Amendment unlawful search action against the sheriff and
sheriff's deputies, that prison employees did not forfeit all privacy rights when they accepted employment, and
thus, that prison authorities were required to have reasonable and individualized suspicion that employees were
hiding contraband on their person before performing a “visual body cavity search.” The court also found that
summary judgment as to the contractors’ claims for false imprisonment and battery was precluded by genuine
issues of material fact as to what triggered the strip searches. (Aramark and Correct Care Solutions, Contractors,
Portsmouth City Jail, Virginia)

U.S. District Court
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Vollette v. Watson, 978 F.Supp.2d 572 (E.D.Va. 2013). Employees of private contractors providing services to
inmates housed at a jail brought a § 1983 action against a sheriff and deputy sheriffs, alleging that they were subjected to unlawful strip and visual body cavity searches at the jail. The next business day after the suit was filed,
the sheriff issued a blanket order revoking the security clearances of the contractor's employees who were still
working at the jail. The district court denied the employees' motion for a preliminary injunction ordering the sheriff to reinstate their security clearances at the jail pending the outcome of the litigation. The district court also
partially granted and partially denied the defendants' summary judgment motion. A jury decided the constitutionality of the strip searches. This left the First Amendment retaliation claim by six of the nine plaintiffs. The district
court entered summary judgment for the plaintiffs on the retaliation claim. The court held that: (1) the contractor's
employees suffered irreparable injury from the sheriff's revocation of their security clearances for which there was
no adequate remedy at law; (2) the balance of hardships plainly weighed in favor of a permanent injunction; (3)
the public interest would be enhanced by the entry of a permanent injunction; and (4) the plaintiffs demonstrated

27.197

violation of their First Amendment rights, and the sheriff had to reinstate their security clearances and update any
relevant internal jail records to reflect the same. The court noted that the sheriff's candid statements that he felt
betrayed by the federal lawsuits filed by the employees who were subjected to strip searches for contraband, and
that the suits “pushed [him] over the edge” were an admission that the adverse employment action of revoking the
employees' security clearances was taken against them in response to their exercise of their First Amendment
constitutional rights to free speech and to petition the government for redress of grievances. (Portsmouth City Jail,
Virginia)
U.S. District Court
DAMAGES
CIVIL LIABILITY
LIBEL

Von Kahl v. Bureau of Nat. Affairs, Inc., 934 F.Supp.2d 204 (D.D.C. 2013). A prisoner brought an action against
a legal publisher, alleging libel in summary of his mandamus petition published more than 20 years after his criminal convictions. The court held that: (1) the publisher's statement that the prisoner “showed no hint of contrition”
with respect to the murders of deputy United States Marshals was actionable; (2) the prisoner was not “libel
proof”; (3) the prisoner was a limited purpose public figure, but the complaint alleged sufficient facts supporting a
claim of actual malice; (4) the summary did not falsely impute that the prisoner had been accused of a crime and
thus was not libelous per se; and (5) the prisoner pled sufficient facts showing special harm to support a claim for
special damages. (Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., Criminal Law Reporter, District of Columbia)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE

Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119 (2nd Cir. 2013). An inmate, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brought a §
1983 action against a warden and various other prison officials and employees, alleging violations of the Eighth
Amendment. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The inmate appealed. The appeals court
affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court held that the prisoner's allegations were sufficient to
plead that he was deprived of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities and was subjected to unreasonable health and safety risks, as required to state a § 1983 claims against prison officials for violations of the Eighth
Amendment. The prisoner alleged that: (1) for approximately 28 months he was confined in a cell with five other
men with inadequate space and ventilation; (2) the heat was stifling in the summer and it was freezing in the winter; (3) urine and feces splattered the floor; (4) there were insufficient cleaning supplies; (5) the mattress was too
narrow for him to lie on flat; and (6) noisy and crowded conditions made sleep difficult and created a constant risk
of violence. The court also found that the prisoner's allegations were sufficient to plead that prison officials knew
of and disregarded excessive risks to his health and safety, as required to find that the officials were deliberately
indifferent. The prisoner alleged that officials knew of overcrowding in his cell, that he spoke with some officials
about the conditions, that officials were aware noise was loud and constant, that they were aware of temperature
issues, that the prisoner informed officials that his bed was too narrow, that one official failed to issue cleaning
supplies, and that conditions did not change despite his complaints. (Federal Correctional Institution, Ray Brook,
New York)

U.S. District Court
COMPENSATORY
DAMAGES
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Wells v. City of Chicago, 925 F.Supp.2d 1036 (N.D.Ill. 2013). A representative of an arrestee's estate filed a §
1983 action against a city and its police officers and employees for claims arising from his arrest, confinement,
and death. After the entry of a jury verdict in the plaintiff's favor, the plaintiff moved for the award of attorney
fees and expenses. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that: (1) reduction of the attorney fee award was not warranted due to the fact that the plaintiff prevailed against only four of six
individual defendants whom she sued; (2) a three-fourths reduction of the plaintiff's attorney fee award was warranted due to the plaintiff's failure to prevail on her medical care claim; (3) reduction was not warranted due to the
fact that the pain and suffering award was less than requested; (4) a reduction was warranted based on the plaintiff's limited success on punitive damages; (5) a two-thirds reduction of the plaintiff's expense award was warranted; (6) housing expenses incurred during the trial by out-of-town counsel were recoverable; and (7) neither party
was entitled to recover its costs. The jury had been asked to award punitive damages totaling $1,750,000 against
eleven defendants, but the jury awarded a total of $150,500 against four officers, and the court later vacated the
award completely. The jury awarded the plaintiff $1 million in compensatory damages against all of the defendants found to have been liable.(City of Chicago, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
DAMAGES

Wilkins v. Gaddy, 734 F.3d 344 (4th Cir. 2013). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action alleging an officer maliciously and sadistically assaulted him with excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The prisoner
alleged that the officer “lifted and then slammed him to the concrete floor where, once pinned, punched, kicked,
kneed, and choked” him until the officer was removed by another member of the corrections staff. After a jury
returned a verdict for the prisoner, the district court granted the prisoner's motion for attorneys' fees, but only in
the amount of $1. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the provision of the
Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), capping attorneys' fee award at 150% of the value of the prisoner’s monetary judgment, satisfied a rational basis review. The court held that the PLRA provision did not violate the Fifth
Amendment's equal protection component by treating the prisoner and non-prisoner litigants differently, where
the provision rationally forestalled collateral fee litigation while ensuring that the incentive provided by an attorneys' fee award still attached to the most injurious civil rights violations. (Lanesboro Correctional Institute, North
Carolina Department of Public Safety)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO
SUPERVISE
FAILURE TO TRAIN
POLICIES/PROCEDURES
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Wilson v. Montano, 715 F.3d 847 (10th Cir. 2013). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action against a county sheriff,
several deputies, and the warden of the county's detention center, alleging that he was unlawfully detained, and
that his right to a prompt probable cause determination was violated. The district court denied the defendants'
motion to dismiss. The defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded in
part. The detainee had been held for 11 days without a hearing and without charges being filed. The appeals court
held that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity from the claim that they violated the arrestee's
right to a prompt post-arrest probable cause determination, where the Fourth Amendment right to a prompt probable cause determination was clearly established at the time. The court held that the arrestee sufficiently alleged
that the arresting sheriff's deputy was personally involved in the deprivation of his Fourth Amendment right to a

27.198

prompt probable cause hearing, as required to support his § 1983 claim against the deputy. The arrestee alleged
that he was arrested without a warrant, and that the deputy wrote out a criminal complaint but failed to file it in
any court with jurisdiction to hear a misdemeanor charge until after he was released from the county's detention
facility, despite having a clear duty under New Mexico law to ensure that the arrestee received a prompt probable
cause determination. According to the court, under New Mexico law, the warden of the county's detention facility
and the county sheriff were responsible for policies or customs that operated and were enforced by their subordinates, and for any failure to adequately train their subordinates. The court noted that statutes charged both the
warden and the sheriff with responsibility to supervise subordinates in diligently filing a criminal complaint or
information and ensuring that arrestees received a prompt probable cause hearing. The court found that the arrestee sufficiently alleged that the warden promulgated policies that caused the arrestee's prolonged detention
without a probable cause hearing, and that the warden acted with the requisite mental state, as required to support
his § 1983 claim against the warden, regardless of whether the arrestee ever had direct contact with the warden.
The arrestee alleged that the warden did not require filing of written criminal complaints, resulting in the detainees' being held without receiving a probable cause hearing, and that the warden acted with deliberate indifference
to routine constitutional violations at the facility.
The court held that the arrestee sufficiently alleged that the county sheriff established a policy or custom that
led to the arrestee's prolonged detention without a probable cause hearing, and that the sheriff acted with the requisite mental state, as required to support his § 1983 claim against the sheriff, by alleging that: (1) the sheriff allowed deputies to arrest people and wait before filing charges, thus resulting in the arrest and detention of citizens
with charges never being filed; (2) the sheriff was deliberately indifferent to ongoing constitutional violations
occurring under his supervision and due to his failure to adequately train his employees; (3) routine warrantless
arrest and incarceration of citizens without charges being filed amounted to a policy or custom; and (4) such
policy was the significant moving force behind the arrestee's illegal detention. (Valencia County Sheriff's Office,
Valencia County Detention Center, New Mexico)
2014
U.S. District Court
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

American Civil Liberties Union Fund of Michigan v. Livingston County, 23 F.Supp.3d 834 (E.D.Mich. 2014). A
civil rights organization brought a § 1983 action against a county and county officials alleging that the jail's postcard-only mail policy violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Following the grant of a temporary restraining order (TRO), the organization moved for preliminary injunction. The district court granted the motion. The
organization had sought a preliminary injunction enjoining the jail policy of refusing to promptly deliver properly
marked legal mail sent by an organization attorney and individually addressed to an inmate. The court held that
there was a likelihood of success on the merits of its claim that the policy violated the First Amendment protection
accorded inmates' legal mail. The court noted that the organization sent letters in envelopes that were individually
addressed to individual inmates, were labeled “legal mail,” clearly delineated that the mail came from an organization attorney, the letters asked if the inmate was interested in meeting with an organization attorney to obtain
legal advice regarding the jail policy of limiting all incoming and outgoing mail to one side of a four by six–inch
postcard, but the letters were not delivered. The jail opened the letters and read them, and the jail failed to notify
the inmates or the organization that the letters were not delivered. (Livingston County Jail, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Arpaio v. Obama, 27 F.Supp.3d 185 (D.D.C. 2014). The Sheriff of Maricopa County, Arizona, brought an action
against the President of the United States, alleging that executive actions deferring action with respect to certain
programs affecting undocumented immigrants were unconstitutional and otherwise illegal. The sheriff moved for
a preliminary injunction to enjoin the programs, and the President moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. The district court dismissed the action. The district court held that the sheriff did not suffer an injury
in fact, and therefore lacked standing in his personal and official capacities to bring an action. The court noted that
the sheriff sought to vindicate only a general interest in the proper application of the Constitution and laws, and,
although the sheriff alleged that undocumented immigrants had targeted him for assassination as a result of his
“widely known stance on illegal immigration,” the programs in question did not cause threats to the sheriff's life,
and the sheriff's stance pre-existed the instant action and the challenged programs. (Maricopa County Sheriff,
Arizona)

U.S. District Court
PRIVATE PROVIDER

Awalt v. Marketti, 74 F.Supp.3d 909 (N.D.Ill. 2014). The estate and the widow of a pretrial detainee who died in a
county jail brought civil rights and wrongful death actions against jail personnel and medical care providers who
serviced the jail. The county defendants and the medical defendants moved for summary judgment. The district
court held that: (1) the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable juror to find that the correctional officers and a jail
superintendent were deliberately indifferent to the detainee’s medical needs; (2) summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the officers knew that the detainee was suffering seizures while
in jail and failed to take appropriate action; (3) a reasonable juror could have found that neither a physician nor a
nurse made a reasoned medical judgment not to prescribe a particular anti-seizure drug for the detainee; and, (4)
in the Seventh Circuit, private health care workers providing medical services to inmates are not entitled to assert
qualified immunity. The court also found that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material
fact: (1) concerning whether failure of the sheriff’s office and the jail’s medical services provider to provide adequate medical training to correctional officers caused the detainee’s death; (2) as to whether the sheriff’s office
and the jail’s medical services provider had an implicit policy of deliberate indifference to medical care provided
to detainees; (3) regarding whether correctional officers knew that the detainee was suffering seizures and ignored
his suffering; (5) as to whether the decision of the sheriff’s office and the jail’s medical services provider not to
implement a standardized grievance mechanism led to a widespread practice at the jail of ignoring or delaying
response to grievances and medical requests made by detainees, and as to whether this failure was the moving
force behind the pretrial detainee’s seizure-related death; and (6) as to whether the sheriff’s office and the jail’s
medical services provider had an express policy that prevented a nurse from restocking a particular medication

27.199

until there were only eight pills left in stock and whether that policy was the moving force behind the pretrial
detainee’s seizure-related death. The court denied qualified immunity from liability to the correctional officers
and the sheriff’s office. (Grundy County Jail, Illinois)
U.S. District Court
INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY

Blossom v. Dart, 64 F.Supp.3d 1158 (N.D.Ill. 2014). A disabled detainee in a county jail brought an action against
a county and a county sheriff, asserting a § 1983 claim for deprivation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights and
alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act. The sheriff filed a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court denied the motion. The court held that the disabled
detainee, who suffered injuries due to the lack of accommodation for his disability, sufficiently alleged that the
sheriff had personal knowledge of, or involvement in, the alleged deprivation of his Fourteenth Amendment
rights, so as to state a § 1983 claim against the sheriff in his individual capacity. The detainee alleged that the
sheriff acquired personal knowledge of the fact that disabled prisoners assigned to a certain jail division had sustained injuries because shower and toilet facilities were not equipped with appropriate grab bars, toilet seats, and
shower seats, and the detainee alleged that despite revising the jail’s housing assignment policy for detainees who
used wheelchairs, the sheriff refused to revise the policy for other disabled detainees. The court also found that the
detainee sufficiently alleged that there was an official policy allowing disabled detainees to be housed in nonaccessible housing units that continued to exist despite the knowledge that the policy had caused serious injuries
to disabled detainees. (Cook County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
CONSENT DECREETERMINATION

Brown v. Livingston, 17 F.Supp.3d 616 (S.D.Tex. 2014). A prisoner brought an action, individually and on behalf
of others similarly situated, alleging that various policies of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ)
violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and the First Amendment. TDCJ
moved to terminate a consent decree that prohibited it from discriminating against Muslims in the pursuit of their
right to profess their religious beliefs and to exercise their religious practices. The district court denied the motion.
The court held that TDCJ's volunteer policy violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, and RLUIPA. The policy required that all religious activities not supervised by a prison chaplain or guard have an outside volunteer in attendance. According to the court, the policy
meant that Muslim inmates who were in prisons near populations centers from which Muslim volunteers could
not be recruited in greater numbers being able to participate in religious activities only one hour per week, while
Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish inmates who could procure more outside volunteers had access to six hours or
more of religious activities per week. (Texas Department of Criminal Justice)

U.S. District Court
SUPERVISORY
LIABILITY
FAILURE TO ACT
FAILURE TO
INTERVENE

Cash v. Wetzel, 8 F.Supp.3d 644 (E.D. Pa. 2014). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against prison officials,
alleging, among other things, violations of his civil rights in connection with destruction of his legal materials.
The officials moved to dismiss, and the prisoner moved for leave to file a supplemental complaint alleging retaliation, and for entry of default. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that
the claims against officials in their official capacities were barred by the Eleventh Amendment The court held that
the allegation that two prison officials separated the prisoner from his legal materials, causing him to be unable to
adequately litigate his direct appeal, stated a claim for denial of his right of access to courts. But the court found
that because the prisoner did not lose a legal claim as the result of the officials' alleged withholding of the prisoner's legal material during a meeting with his attorney, the officials could not be held liable for denying the prisoner's access to courts. The court found that the prisoner stated a claim under § 1983 for failure to intervene against
two prison officials by alleging that the officials were present as another prison official destroyed prisoner's legal
materials, and that two officials were aware of a conspiracy to deprive the prisoner of his right of access to courts,
and that they did not investigate and stop the conspiracy. According to the court, a claim was also stated by allegations that two officials decided to withhold mitigation evidence from the prisoner in retaliation for bringing a
lawsuit, in presence of the other official, and that each official failed to intervene in the other's withholding. The
court held that the prisoner stated a claim under § 1983 for supervisory liability against a prison official by alleging that the official acquiesced in his subordinates' removal of the prisoner's legal documents. (State Correctional
Institution- Graterford, SCI-Albion, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
CONSENT DECREE

Coleman v. Brown, 28 F.Supp.3d 1068 (E.D.Cal. 2014). Nearly 20 years after mentally ill inmates prevailed on
class action challenges to conditions of their confinement and a special master was appointed to implement a
remedial plan, the inmates moved to enforce court orders and for affirmative relief related to the use of force,
disciplinary measures, and housing and treatment in administrative segregation units (ASUs) and segregated housing units (SHUs). The district court granted the motions in part. The court held that prison officials' excessive use
of force on seriously mentally ill inmates by means of pepper spray and expandable batons, pursuant to prison
policies and without regard to the impact on inmates' psychiatric condition, was not yet remedied, as required by
the prior judgment in favor of inmates. The court found that prison officials' changes in policies and practices of
housing mentally ill inmates in administrative segregation units (ASUs) and segregated housing units (SHUs)
were inadequate to remedy the systemic Eighth Amendment violations identified in the prior judgment in favor of
inmates. According to the court, the placement of seriously mentally ill inmates in the harsh, restrictive, and nontherapeutic conditions of administrative segregation units (ASUs) for non-disciplinary reasons for more than the
minimal period necessary to transfer the inmates to protective housing or a housing assignment violated the
Eighth Amendment. The court noted that nearly half of the suicides in ASUs were by inmates placed there for
non-disciplinary reasons, and such placement subjected inmates to significant restrictions including no contact
visits, significant limits on access to both exercise yards and dayroom, eating all meals in their cells, being placed
in handcuffs and restraints when moved outside their cells, and receiving mental health treatment in confined
spaces described as “cages,” with strip searches before and after treatment. (California Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation)

27.200

U.S. District Court
OFFICIAL CAPACITY
RECKLESS
INDIFFERENCE

Endl v. New Jersey, 5 F.Supp.3d 689 (D.N.J. 2014). The parents of an inmate who died in a state prison brought a
§ 1983 action, individually and the mother as administrator of the inmate's estate, against the state, the department
of corrections (DOC), a prison, corrections officers, a medical care provider, and physicians and nurses, alleging
the inmate had been deprived of necessary medical care. The defendants filed motions to dismiss. The district
court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that corrections officers, who were sued in
their official capacities, were not immune from liability under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act (TCA) where there
were not just errors in medical judgment, but claims of deliberate or reckless indifference, and the survivors' clearly alleged conduct that may have been outside the scope of the officers' employment or that may have constituted
willful misconduct. The court found that allegations that individual medical providers responsible for the inmate
misdiagnosed the inmate's congestive heart failure as bronchitis, failed to provide a medical workup following the
inmate's complaint of chest cavity pain, and failed to properly medicate him, were sufficient to support an Eighth
Amendment claim for cruel and unusual punishment in the § 1983 action against the providers. (Northern State
Prison, New Jersey)

U.S. District Court
CONSENT DECREE

Graves v. Arpaio, 48 F.Supp.3d 1318 (D.Ariz. 2014). Pretrial detainees in the Maricopa County, Arizona, jail
system brought a class action against the county and the county board of supervisors, seeking injunctive relief for
alleged violations of their civil rights. The parties entered into consent decree which was superseded by amended
judgments entered by stipulation of the parties. The defendants sought to terminate the remaining court-ordered
injunctive relief regarding medical, dental, and mental health care for detainees. The district court denied the motion. The court held that: (1) termination of injunctive relief requiring the timely identification, assessment, and
placement of detainees suffering from serious health conditions was not warranted; (2) termination of injunctive
relief requiring the timely identification, assessment, and placement of detainees suffering from mental illness was
not warranted; (3) termination of injunctive relief requiring the timely identification, segregation, and treatment of
detainees with communicable diseases was not warranted; (4) termination of injunctive relief requiring that the
detainees have ready access to care to meet their serious medical and mental health needs was not warranted; and
(5) the detainees were the prevailing party for the purpose of awarding attorney's fees. (Maricopa Co. Jail, Ariz.)

U.S. District Court
CLASS ACTION
FAILURE TO TRAIN

Hernandez v. County of Monterey, 70 F.Supp.3d 963 (N.D.Cal. 2014). Current and recently released inmates from
a county jail brought an action against the county, the sheriff’s office, and the private company that administered
all jail health care facilities and services, alleging, on behalf of a class of inmates, that substandard conditions at
the jail violated the federal and state constitutions, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation
Act, and a California statute prohibiting discrimination in state-funded programs. The inmates sought declaratory
and injunctive relief. The defendants filed motions to dismiss. The district court denied the motions. The court
held that both current and recently released inmates had standing to pursue their claims against the county and
others for allegedly substandard conditions at the jail, even though the recently released inmates were no longer
subject to the conditions they challenged. The court noted that the short average length of stay of inmates in the
proposed class, which was largely made up of pretrial detainees, was approximately 34 days, and that short period, coupled with the plodding speed of legal action and the fact that other persons similarly situated would continue to be subject to the challenged conduct, qualified the plaintiffs for the “inherently transitory” exception to
the mootness doctrine.
The court found that the inmates sufficiently alleged that the private company that administered all jail health
care facilities and services operated a place of public accommodation, as required to state a claim for violation of
ADA Title III. The court noted that: “The complaint alleges a litany of substandard conditions at the jail, including: violence due to understaffing, overcrowding, inadequate training, policies, procedures, facilities, and prisoner
classification; inadequate medical and mental health care screening, attention, distribution, and resources; and
lack of policies and practices for identifying, tracking, responding, communicating, and providing accessibility for
accommodations for prisoners with disabilities.” (Monterey County Jail, California)

U.S. District Court
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY

Imhoff v. Temas, 67 F.Supp.3d 700 (W.D.Pa. 2014). A pretrial detainee brought an action against employees of a
county correctional facility, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical need, violation of his rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment with regard to conditions of his confinement, and excessive force in violation of
the Eighth Amendment. The employees moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied
in part. The court held that the detainee stated a claim against the employees for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need under the Fourteenth Amendment, where the detainee alleged that he informed facility personnel of his extensive drug use, that he had repeatedly requested medical assistance when he began experiencing
seizures and hallucinations in conjunction with his drug withdrawal in the presence of facility personnel, and that
he was provided no medical treatment for at least eight days despite his requests for medical attention. The court
held that the employees were not entitled to qualified immunity from liability because a county correctional facility’s constitutional obligation to provide care to inmates suffering unnecessary pain from a serious medical need
was clearly established at the time the pretrial detainee allegedly began experiencing seizures in conjunction with
drug withdrawal and was not provided medical treatment.
The court found that the detainee’s allegations against the employees in their individual capacities regarding
the intentional denial of medical treatment, excessive use of force, and violation of his rights under Fourteenth
Amendment with regard to conditions of his confinement were sufficient to set forth a plausible claim for punitive
damages. The detainee alleged that he was denied basic human needs such as drinking water, access to a toilet and
toilet paper, and toiletries such as soap and a toothbrush. (Washington County Correctional Facility, Penn.)

U.S. District Court
DAMAGES
CLASS ACTION

In re Nassau County Strip Search Cases, 12 F.Supp.3d 485 (E.D.N.Y. 2014). Arrestees brought a class action
against county officials and others, challenging the county correctional center's blanket strip search policy for
newly admitted, misdemeanor detainees. Following a bench trial, the district court awarded general damages of
$500 per strip search for the 17,000 persons who comprised the class. Subsequently, the arrestees moved for attorney fees in the amount of $5,754,000 plus costs and expenses of $182,030. The court held that it would apply

27.201

the current, unadjusted hourly rates charged by the various attorneys in determining counsel fees using the lodestar method as a cross-check against the percentage method. The court found that the lodestar rates were $300 for
all associates, with two exceptions for requested rates below $300, and $450 for all partners. The court awarded
$3,836,000 in counsel fees, which was equivalent to 33 1/3 % of the total amount recovered on behalf of the class,
and $182,030.25 in costs and expenses. (Nassau County Correctional Center, New York)
U.S. Appeals Court
PERSONAL LIABILITY

Jackson v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537 (8th Cir. 2014). A state prisoner brought an action against various state prison
officials, challenging the prison's drug treatment program as in violation of his free exercise rights under the First
Amendment. The district court dismissed the action. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that the prisoner stated a § 1983 claim against prison officials for violation of his First
Amendment free exercise rights with allegations that he was an atheist, that he was required to attend and complete a substance abuse treatment program that had religious components and invoked religious tenets in order to
be eligible for early parole, that due to the religious components of the program and the prison's failure to transfer
the prisoner to a secular treatment program, his choices were to withdraw from the program or remain exposed to
those religious elements. He chose to withdraw from the program, and was denied early release as a result. The
court found that the director of the state department of corrections (DOC) could be held personally liable under §
1983 for the alleged violation of the atheist state prisoner's First Amendment free exercise rights, where under
Missouri law, the director was responsible for administering the treatment program, and establishing rules and
policies determining how, when, and where offenders could be admitted into or removed from the treatment program. According to the court, the director of the prison's substance abuse treatment program could be held personally liable under § 1983 for the alleged violation of the prisoner's First Amendment free exercise rights, where the
program director allegedly could have allowed the prisoner to avoid the religious portions of the program, but still
remain enrolled in the program. (Western Reception, Diagnostic, and Correctional Center, Missouri)

U.S. Appeals Court
FTCA- Federal Tort Claims
Act

Keller v. U.S., 771 F.3d 1021 (7th Cir. 2014). A federal inmate brought an action under the Federal Tort Claims
Act (FTCA), alleging that federal prison employees negligently failed to protect him from being attacked by another inmate. The government moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion and the inmate
appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by
genuine issues of material fact as to whether the prison intake psychologist failed to comply with mandatory regulations by not examining all of the inmate's medical records before releasing the inmate into the general prison
population, and whether prison guards violated post orders by failing to attentively monitor their assigned areas of
the prison yard. (United States Penitentiary, Terre Haute, Indiana)

U.S. District Court
SETTLEMENT
CONSENT DECREE
CONTEMPT
COURT MONITOR
CONTRACT SERVICES
PRIVATE OPERATOR

Kelly v. Wengler, 7 F.Supp.3d 1069 (D.Idaho 2014). State inmates filed a class action against a warden and the
contractor that operated a state correctional center, alleging that the level of violence at the center violated their
constitutional rights. After the parties entered into a settlement agreement the court found the operator to be in
contempt and ordered relief. The inmates moved for attorney fees and costs. The district court granted the motions. The court held that the settlement offer made in the contempt proceeding, by the contractor that operated the
state correctional facility, which provided an extension of the settlement agreement, required a specific independent monitor to review staffing for the remainder of the settlement agreement term, and offered to pay reasonable
attorney fees, did not give the inmates the same relief that they achieved in the contempt proceeding, and thus the
inmates' rejection of the offer did not preclude them from recovering attorney fees and costs they incurred in the
contempt proceeding. The court noted that the inmates were already entitled to reasonable attorney fees in the
event of a breach, and the inmates achieved greater relief in the contempt proceeding with regard to the extension
and the addition of an independent monitor. After considering the totality of the record and the arguments by
counsel, the court awarded the plaintiffs' counsel $349,018.52 in fees and costs. (Idaho Correctional Center, Corrections Corporation of America)

U.S. District Court
INSURANCE

LCS Corrections Services, Inc. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 19 F.Supp.3d 712 (S.D.Tex. 2014). An insured prison operator brought an action seeking declaratory judgment that an insurer had a duty under a commercial umbrella liability policy to defend it in an underlying civil rights action. The underlying case was brought by the representative
of a deceased inmate who allegedly died because of the operator’s policy of not giving inmates their scheduled
medications. The insurer moved for partial summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court
held that the underlying claim for refusing to provide prescribed medications fell within the scope of the policy's
professional liability exclusion, despite the operator's contention that the claim addressed administrative rather
than professional conduct because it was a global administrative decision to deprive inmates of that particular
medical care, where the exclusion extended to “failure to provide professional services.” (Lexington Insurance
Company, LCS Corrections Services, Inc., Texas)

U.S. District Court
MUNICIPAL LIABILITY

Little v. Municipal Corp., 51 F.Supp3d 473 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). State inmates brought a § 1983 action against a city
and city department of correction officials, alleging Eighth Amendment and due process violations related to
conditions of their confinement and incidents that occurred while they were confined. The defendants moved to
dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court granted the motion, finding that: (1) the inmates failed to
state a municipal liability claim; (2) locking the inmates in cells that were flooding with sewage was not a sufficiently serious deprivation so as to violate the Eighth Amendment; (3) the inmates failed to state an Eighth
Amendment claim based on the deprivation of laundry services; (4) the inmates failed to state that officials were
deliberately indifferent to their conditions of confinement; (5) the inmates’ administrative classification did not
implicate their liberty interests protected by due process; and (6) cell searches did not rise to the level of an Eighth
Amendment violation. The court noted that the cells flooded with sewage for up to eight-and-a-half hours, during
which they periodically lacked outdoor recreation and food, was undeniably unpleasant, but it was not a significantly serious deprivation so as to violate the inmates’ Eighth Amendment rights. According to the court, there
was no constitutional right to outdoor recreation, and the inmates were not denied food entirely, but rather, were
not allowed to eat during periods of lock-down. (N.Y. City Department of Corrections)

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U.S. District Court
FCTA- Federal Tort Claims
Act
DAMAGES

Morales v. U.S., 72 F.Supp.3d 826 (W.D.Tenn. 2014). A federal prisoner brought an action against the United
States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), alleging the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) breached its duty of care,
resulting in his assault and injury by another prisoner. The district court held that: (1) the prisoner’s administrative
claim satisfied FTCA’s notice requirements; (2) the BOP breached its duty of care to the prisoner by placing him
in a recreation cage with a prisoner with whom he was in “keep-away” status; and (3) the prisoner was entitled to
damages under FTCA in the amount of $105,000. The court noted that officers were not monitoring the recreation
cage at the time of attack, and, as a result of such failures, the prisoner suffered 14 stab wounds, nerve damage,
and psychological harm. (Federal Bureau of Prisons, FCI- Memphis, Tennessee)

U.S. District Court
INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY

Mori v. Allegheny County, 51 F.Supp.3d 558 (W.D.Pa. 2014). An inmate who was seven and one-half months into
a “high risk” pregnancy brought an action under § 1983 against a county for deliberate indifference to her health
in violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, and survival and wrongful
death claims for violations of the Fourteenth Amendment, after the loss of the child following a placental abruption. The county moved to dismiss. The district court denied the motion. The court held that the prisoner: (1) stated an Eighth Amendment claim based on failure to monitor the unborn child after the prisoner complained of
vaginal bleeding; (2) stated a claim against the county based on custom and practice; (3) sufficiently alleged a
causal link between the policies and the loss of the child; (4) stated a claim against county officials for individual
liability; and (5) stated wrongful death and survivor claims for the death of the child. The inmate alleged that
individual policy makers, including the chief operating officer of the county jail’s health services, and the jail’s
nursing supervisor, were responsible for the policies that led to failure to provide adequate medical treatment. The
prisoner also alleged that she was made to wait over 24 hours before being sent to a hospital after her vaginal
bleeding started, that she was transported by a police cruiser rather than ambulance, that it was well known that
bleeding late in pregnancy often indicated serious medical issues, that the child was alive during birth, and that the
delay in medical treatment contributed to the injuries during birth and the death of the child shortly after birth.
(Allegheny County Jail, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
VICARIOUS LIABILITY

Nagle v. Gusman, 61 F.Supp.3d 609 (E.D.La. 2014). Siblings of a mentally ill pretrial detainee who committed
suicide brought an action against numerous employees of a parish sheriff’s office, alleging a due process violation
under § 1983, and asserting claims for wrongful death and negligence under state law. The siblings moved for
partial summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that: (1) a deputy had a duty to
take reasonable measures to protect the detainee from self-inflicted harm; (2) the deputy breached his duty by
failing to observe the detainee for long periods of time; (3) the deputy’s abandonment of his post was the cause of
the detainee’s suicide; (4) the sheriff was vicariously liable; and (5) the deputy’s repeated decision to abandon his
post violated the detainee’s due process right to adequate protection from his known suicidal impulses. According
to the court, the detainee was suffering from psychosis and was suicidal while in custody, the detainee was placed
on a suicide watch, suicide watch policies and training materials of the sheriff’s office explicitly required officers
to continuously monitor detainees on a suicide watch and to document that they had done so, and it was during
one of the deputy’s extended absences that the detainee succeeded in killing himself. The officer left his post at
least three times during his suicide watch shift, to help another employee distribute meals to other inmates, to take
a restroom break, and to visit the nurses’ station. During these absences, the detainee went unobserved for an hour
and a half, fifteen minutes, and two hours respectively. No other staff took the officer’s place observing the detainee during the times when the officer abandoned his post. During the officer’s final absence, an inmate notified
an on-duty officer that the detainee was lying on the floor of his cell, unresponsive. It was later determined that
the detainee had asphyxiated after his airway became blocked by a wad of toilet paper. (Orleans Parish Sheriff’s
Office, House of Detention at Orleans Parish Prison, Louisiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
FINES
SANCTIONS

Neal v. LaRiva, 765 F.3d 788 (7th Cir. 2014). A federal prisoner filed a habeas corpus petition alleging prison
officials sanctioned him without due process for violating a prison rule forbidding the forging of any document,
article of identification, money, security, or official paper. The district court denied the petitioner's motion to stay
and to compel arbitration, and denied the petition on the merits. The petitioner appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the Bureau of Prisons was not required to arbitrate the prisoner's habeas claim, and the petitioner's repeated flouting of his duty to be honest with the court warranted a fine and referral to the United States
Attorney for possible prosecution for perjury. The appeals court opened its decision by asserting that the detainee
“…seems unable to resist dishonesty.” (Federal Correctional Institution, Terre Haute, Indiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
CLASS ACTION

Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657 (9th Cir. 2014). State prisoners, and the state's authorized protection and advocacy
agency, filed a class action for declaratory and injunctive relief against senior officials from the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC), asserting Eighth Amendment claims, based on allegedly serious systemic deficiencies
in conditions of confinement in isolation cells, and in the provision of privatized medical, dental, and mental
health care services. The district court granted class certification and prison officials appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The court found that the prisoners were not merely aggregating many claims of individual mistreatment,
and instead were alleging that ADC policies and practices of statewide and systemic application exposed all inmates in ADC custody to substantial risk of serious harm, to which the senior officials allegedly were deliberately
indifferent, even if the risk might ultimately result in different future harm for different inmates. (Arizona Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
PRIVATE PROVIDER

Pierce v. Pemiscot Memorial Health Systems, 25 F.Supp.3d 1198 (E.D.Mo. 2014). A mental health detainee
brought a § 1983 action against a medical director and a program director employed by the company that contracted to provide psychiatric services to a county hospital, alleging violations of her due process rights and Missouri law. The parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The district court denied the motion, granted the defendants’ motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment on the issue of punitive damages was precluded by genuine issue of material fact as to whether the conduct of the medical director and the

27.203

program director in continuing to detain the mental health detainee was motivated by an evil motive or involved
reckless indifference to the detainee's rights. The detainee brought the action to challenge her detention in an inpatient psychiatric unit following the expiration of a 96–hour detention order. She alleged that her continued detention violated her due process rights under the United States and Missouri Constitutions, governing involuntary
commitment procedures. (Pemiscot Memorial Hospital, Missouri)
U.S. District Court
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Reid v. Donelan, 2 F.Supp.3d 38 (D.Mass. 2014). Following the grant of a detainee's individual petition for habeas corpus, and the grant of the detainee's motion for class certification, the detainee brought a class action against,
among others, officials of Immigration & Customs Enforcement (ICE), challenging the detention of individuals
who were held in immigration detention within the Commonwealth of Massachusetts for over six months and
were not provided with an individualized bond hearing. The detainee also moved, on his own behalf, for a permanent injunction prohibiting the defendants from shackling him during immigration proceedings absent an individualized determination that such restraint was necessary. The defendants cross-moved for summary judgment. The
district court granted the defendants’ motion. The court held that an individual assessment is required before a
detainee may be shackled during immigration proceedings, but that the individual assessment performed by ICE
satisfied the detainee's procedural due process rights, such that an assessment by an independent Immigration
Judge was unnecessary in the detainee's case. The court denied the motion for an injunction, finding that the detainee would not suffer irreparable harm absent a permanent injunction. The court noted that the detainee had an
interest in preservation of his dignity, but ICE had safety concerns about his immigration proceedings, including
the logistical issues of escorting the detainee through multiple floors and public hallways, and an Immigration
Judge would be unlikely to overturn a decision by ICE to shackle the detainee, given the detainee's extensive
criminal history. (Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
SUPERVISORY
LIABILITY
INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY

Revilla v. Glanz, 7 F.Supp.3d 1207 (N.D.Okla. 2014). Four pretrial detainees or representatives of their estates
brought an action against a county sheriff, asserting claims under § 1983 and the Oklahoma Constitution, relating
to allegedly deficient medical care. The sheriff filed a motion to dismiss. The district court denied the motion,
finding that the plaintiffs stated a § 1983 claim against the sheriff for supervisory liability in his individual capacity, and a § 1983 claim against the sheriff for liability in his individual capacity. The court noted that the Due Process Clause of the Oklahoma Constitution protects pretrial detainees against the denial of medical attention. The
plaintiffs alleged: (1) that the sheriff was responsible for ensuring that pretrial detainees received appropriate
medical care; (2) that he was responsible for creating, adopting, approving, ratifying, nd enforcing the policies
that his subordinates allegedly violated; (3) that he failed to provide prompt and adequate care in the face of
known and substantial risks to each detainee's health-;, and (4) that he had long known of systemic deficiencies in
the jail's medical care. The plaintiffs cited numerous incidents and reports, as well as inmate deaths, which they
alleged provided clear notice to the sheriff of seriously deficient medical and mental health care which placed
inmates at a serious risk of injury or death. One such notice included a report by the United States Department of
Homeland Security's Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties which “found a prevailing attitude among clinic
staff [at the Jail] of indifference.” (Tulsa County Jail, Oklahoma)

U.S. District Court
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
MUNICIPAL LIABILITY
CONTRACT SERVICES

Revilla v. Glanz, 8 F.Supp.3d 1336 (N.D.Okla. 2014). Pretrial detainees or representatives of their estates brought
an action against healthcare providers, doctors, and nurse, asserting claims under § 1983 and the Oklahoma Constitution, relating to allegedly deficient medical care. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court denied
the motion, finding that: (1) allegations were sufficient to plead the provider, doctors, and nurse were acting under
the color of state law; (2) allegations were sufficient to state a § 1983 claim against the provider under the theory
of municipal liability; and (3) the provider was not entitled to immunity from punitive damages afforded to municipalities. The court noted that the healthcare provider was endowed by the county with powers or functions that
were governmental in nature, that provider was responsible for providing medical services at the jail, including
creating and implementing policies and practices governing provision of care, as well as training and supervision,
that doctors and nurse were employees of the provider, that they had responsibility for overseeing and treating
detainees, and that doctors served as the medical director. The pretrial detainees and representatives of their estates also alleged that the provider refused to send detainees to a hospital for financial reasons, understaffed the
medical unit, failed to properly train and supervise employees, and the provider was on notice of these deficiencies from reports by the National Commission on Correctional Health Care, the Oklahoma Department of Health,
the United States Department of Homeland Security's Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL), and the
Jail's own medical auditor. (Correctional Healthcare Companies, Inc.)

U.S. District Court
DAMAGES

Rodriguez v. County of Los Angeles, 96 F.Supp.3d 1012 (C.D. Cal. 2014). State detainees brought an action
against numerous defendants, including a county, a sheriff’s department, and individual jail guards and supervisors, alleging excessive force under § 1983. Following a jury verdict in their favor, the detainees moved for attorney fees. The district court granted the motion, holding that: (1) the detainees were entitled to recover fully compensatory attorney fees, notwithstanding the fact that some individual defendants were dismissed or prevailed at
trial and that the detainees did not succeed on all motions, where the detainees succeeded on all of their claims;
(2) the detainees were entitled to a lodestar multiplier of 2.0; and, (3) the district court would apply only a 1%
contribution of the detainees’ $950,000 damages award to their attorney fee award, where the defendants’ conduct
involved malicious violence leaving some detainees permanently injured. The court awarded over $5.3 million for
attorney fees. (Men’s Central Jail, Los Angeles, California)

U.S. District Court
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
COMPENSATORY
DAMAGES

Rodriguez v. County of Los Angeles, 96 F.Supp.3d 990 (C.D. Cal. 2014). Former and current inmates brought an
action against a county, a county sheriff’s department, and individual deputies, claiming that the deputies used
excessive force to remove the inmates from their cells, in violation of the right to be free from excessive force
under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. After a jury verdict in favor of the inmates, the defendants moved
for judgment as a matter of law, to vacate the judgment, and for a new trial. The district court denied the motion.

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The court held that evidence that supervising law enforcement officials in the county sheriff’s department saw or
heard inmates being beaten and knowingly and intentionally permitted the use of unconstitutional force, and that
deputies engaged in malicious conduct with the intent to harm in removing the inmates from their cells, was sufficient to demonstrate that the officials and deputies used threats, intimidation, or coercion to violate the inmates’
constitutional rights, as required to hold the officials and deputies liable. According to the court, the conduct of
enforcement officials in supervising the extraction of inmates from their cells was not discretionary, and thus the
supervising officials were not immune from liability resulting from the exercise of discretion, where the supervising officials saw or heard inmates being beaten and saw the injuries caused by these beatings.
The court found that evidence that the deputies engaged in malicious conduct with intent to harm, by using
stun guns on sensitive body parts and on unconscious inmates, was sufficient to demonstrate that the deputies
acted without a legitimate purpose in using the force, as required to hold the deputies liable.
According to the court, evidence that officials directed the deployment of riot-control rounds and grenades, and
the use of stun guns, to forcibly extract inmates from their cells, and that the force surpassed what was necessary
to gain control of the situation, was sufficient to show that the officials directed the use of excessive force and
encouraged their subordinates’ use of force with the intent to harm, warranting denial of qualified immunity to the
officials. The court noted that the force was used on inmates who were not resisting and after the inmates had
been incapacitated,
The court found that the jury’s award of $210,000 in punitive damages to current and former inmates was not
so grossly excessively as would violate the Due Process Clause, despite the contention that the award of punitive
damages exceeded the officials’ ability to pay, where the jury found that the officials acted maliciously, causing
serious physical harm to the inmates. The court noted that there was no major disparity between the award of
punitive damages and the $740,000 awarded as compensatory damages. (Los Angeles County Men’s Central Jail,
California)
U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO INTERVENE
FAILURE TO TRAIN

Rowlery v. Genesee County, 54 F.Supp.3d 763 (E.D.Mich. 2014). A detainee brought an action against a county
and officers and deputies in the county sheriff’s department, alleging that he was assaulted by deputies on two
occasions when he was lodged at the county jail. The defendants moved for partial summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The district court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to: (1) whether the county adequately trained officers and deputies
regarding the use of force; (2) whether certain officers and deputies came into physical contact with the detainee;
(3) whether certain officers and deputies failed to act reasonably when they did not act to prevent or limit other
deputies’ use of force on the detainee; and (4) whether the alleged failure of certain officers and deputies to put a
stop to other deputies’ use of force on the detainee was the proximate cause of the detainee’s injuries. (Genesee
County Jail, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
INJUNCTION

Sassman v. Brown, 73 F.Supp.3d 1241 (E.D.Cal. 2014). A male prisoner filed a civil rights action against the
Governor of California and the Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR),
claiming violation of the Equal Protection Clause by exclusion of men from California’s Alternative Custody
Program (ACP). The California Penal Code allows only female inmates to participate in the voluntary ACP in lieu
of confinement in a state prison. The prisoner moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent continued exclusion
of male prisoners from ACP based on their gender. The district court denied the motion for an injunction. The
district court held that the prisoner had a likelihood of success on the merits of the claim, but that it was unlikely
that the prisoner could show irreparable harm absent an injunction. The prisoner had unsuccessfully applied to
participate in the ACP and was similarly situated to female state prisoners who applied and were approved. According to the court, where the male prisoner met all gender-neutral eligibility criteria required by regulations
implementing the ACP, and assuming that female prisoners and their children would benefit more from ACP than
male prisoners and their children, perpetuated the stereotype that women were more fit to parent and more important to their families than men. The court found that restricting applicants to only women state prisoners was
not substantially related to the important government interests of family reunification and community reintegration, and thus, the male prisoner had a likelihood of success on the merits of his claim. (Alternative Custody Program, California)

U.S. District Court
CLASS ACTION
CONTRACT SERVICES

Scott v. Clarke, 61 F.Supp.3d 569 (W.D.Va. 2014). Female inmates brought a § 1983 action alleging that a correctional facility failed to provide adequate medical care and that Commonwealth of Virginia Department of Corrections (VDOC) officials were deliberately indifferent to that failure, in violation of the inmates’ Eighth
Amendment rights. The inmates moved for class certification. The district court held that class certification was
warranted under the subsection of the class action rule pertaining to cases where predominantly injunctive or
declaratory relief was appropriate. The court found that the proposed class of approximately 1,200 female inmates
housed at the state correctional facility who were subject to its medical care system was sufficiently large, on its
face, to satisfy the size requirement for class certification, and that the “commonality” requirement for class certification was met. The court noted that one of the questions of fact was whether the VDOC medical contract system permitted improper cost considerations to interfere with the treatment of serious medical conditions. (Fluvanna Correctional Center for Women, Commonwealth of Virginia Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO
INTERVENE

Smith v. Conway County, Ark., 759 F.3d 853 (8th Cir. 2014). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against
two jailers, a county jail administrator, the county, and the sheriff, alleging claims for excessive force and failure
to supervise under the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court denied qualified immunity to the administrator
and jailers and denied summary judgment to the county and individual defendants. The defendants appealed. The
appeals court affirmed in part and dismissed in part. The court held that a nonviolent pretrial detainee's right to be
free from being shot with a stun gun for non-compliance was clearly established at the time a jailer used a stun
gun on the detainee for the purpose of achieving compliance, and thus, the jailer was not entitled to qualified immunity from the detainee's § 1983 claim of excessive force in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court

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found that at the time a jailer failed to intervene when another jailer warned the pretrial detainee and then shot him
with a stun gun, that a jail official violated a pretrial detainee's due process rights if the official knew that another
official was using excessive force against the detainee but failed to intervene, and thus the jailer was not entitled
to qualified immunity from the detainee's § 1983 claim of excessive force in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Conway County Jail, Arkansas)
U.S. Appeals Court
INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY
OFFICIAL CAPACITY

Stauffer v. Gearhart, 741 F.3d 574 (5th Cir. 2014). A state prisoner brought a civil rights action against prison
employees in their individual and official capacities, claiming that they violated his First Amendment rights by
confiscating his magazines under a Sex Offender Treatment Program (SOTP) rule, violated his due process rights
by failing to provide any meaningful review of a mailroom employee's decisions, and violated his equal protection
rights by applying the policy solely to inmates participating in the SOTP. The district court granted summary
judgment for the prison employees. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the
state prison's rule providing for confiscation of the magazines of prisoners in the Sex Offender Treatment Program
(SOTP) was neutral, as required to not violate the prisoner's free speech rights, despite not banning newspapers
and religious materials, since the purpose of the rule was to facilitate treatment and the prison did not have any
ulterior motive in promulgating the rule. According to the court, the rule was rationally related to the prison's
legitimate interest in sex-offender rehabilitation, as required to not violate the prisoner's free speech rights, since
the rule placed restrictions on reading material in order to facilitate treatment by preventing distractions. The court
noted that the magazines that the prisoner requested undermined the goals of the SOTP in the professional judgments by prison officials tasked with overseeing program. According to the court, confiscation of the magazines
of the prisoner in the SOTP, pursuant to the rule, did not deprive the prisoner of due process, since the prisoner
could, and did, use the prison's grievance system to claim that he had been wrongly denied those magazines, and
prison administrators responded by investigating his claims and giving written justification that explained why he
was not entitled to relief. (Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Goree Unit)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO ACT

Taylor v. Swift, 21 F.Supp.3d 237 (E.D.N.Y. 2014). A pro se prisoner brought a § 1983 action against city jail
officials, alleging that officials failed to protect him from an assault from other inmates, and that officials used
excessive force in uncuffing the prisoner after escorting him from showers to his cell. The officials moved to
dismiss based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and the motion was converted to a motion for summary judgment. The district court denied the motion. The prisoner claimed indifferent supervision of jail officers,
when members of the Crips gang served him and other non-gang members “tiny food portions while serving gang
members large food portions.” The prisoner complained to officials and this resulted in the Crips gang members
being admonished and chided. The day after this chiding, the prisoner alleged that he and two other non-Cripsaffiliated inmates “were victims of gang assault where [plaintiff] & [another inmate] got cut & stabbed.” According to the inmate, while the attack was occurring, a corrections officer allowed the Crips to act with impunity and
waited 20 to 30 minutes to press an alarm, and another officer failed to open a door that would lead the prisoner to
safety, and failed to use mace to break up the alleged gang assault. (New York City Department of Correction,
Riker’s Island)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO TRAIN
FAILURE TO
INTERVENE

Thomas v. Cumberland County, 749 F.3d 217 (3rd Cir. 2014). Following an attack by other inmates at a county
correctional facility, an inmate brought an action against the county and corrections officers at the facility pursuant to § 1983 and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, alleging failure to train, failure to protect, failure to intervene,
and incitement. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the county and an officer. The inmate's
claims against the other officer proceeded to trial, and a jury found in favor of the officer. The inmate appealed the
district court’s grant of summary judgment in the county's favor on the § 1983 failure to train claim. The appeals
court vacated. The court held that a triable issue remained as to whether the county exhibited deliberate indifference to the need for pre-service training for officers in conflict de-escalation and intervention and whether the lack
of such training caused the inmate's injuries. (Cumberland County Correctional Facility, New Jersey)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONSENT AGREEMENT
CRIPA- Civil Rights of
Institutionalized Persons
Act

U.S. v. Erie County, N.Y., 763 F.3d 235 (2nd Cir. 2014). The United States Department of Justice (DOJ) brought
an action against a county pursuant to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA) alleging that the
county's correctional facility deprived inmates of their constitutional right to provide safe and sanitary conditions
of confinement. After the parties entered into a settlement agreement the district court granted a civil rights organization's motion to intervene, but denied its motion to unseal the compliance reports prepared pursuant to the settlement agreement. The organization appealed. The appeals court reversed, finding that the reports were “judicial
documents,” and that the public had a First Amendment right of access to the reports. The court noted that every
aspect of the litigation was public, such reports were made available to the public in similar cases, the issues involved were manifestly ones of public concern, and access would enable the public to decide whether the court
and the parties were doing their jobs in fulfilling the terms of the settlement agreement. (Erie County, Pennsylvania)
2015

U.S. District Court
CONTEMPT
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Armstrong v. Brown, 103 F.Supp.3d 1070 (N.D. Ca. 2015). Disabled state prisoners filed a motion for further
enforcement of an injunction applicable to all California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR)
prisons, alleging that corrections officials were continuing to place class members in administrative segregation
due to a lack of accessible housing, in violation of the district court’s orders and the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA). The district court granted the motion, holding that further enforcement would not be limited to the
least compliant correctional institutions. The court noted that while the majority of the violations took place at one
institution, the violations occurred at other institutions as well, and that transfers of disabled prisoners into noncomplying institutions occurred with the involvement of CDCR officials. (California Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation)

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U.S. Appeals Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Ball v. LeBlanc, 792 F.3d 584 (5th Cir. 2015). Death row inmates brought a § 1983 action against a state department of corrections and state officials, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief based on allegations that heat in
the prison violated the Eighth Amendment, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Rehabilitation
Act (RA). Following a bench trial, the district court sustained the Eighth Amendment claims, rejected the disability claims, and issued a permanent injunction requiring the state to install air conditioning throughout death
row. The department and officials appealed and the inmates cross-appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part,
vacated and remanded in part. The court held that: (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting
evidence of, or relying on heat index measurements of death-row facilities; (2) the district court did not clearly
err in finding that heat in death-row cells posed a substantial risk of serious harm to inmates and that prison
officials were deliberately indifferent to the risk posed to death-row inmates by the heat in prison cells; (3) housing of death-row inmates in very hot prison cells without sufficient access to heat-relief measures violated the
Eighth Amendment; (4) inmates were not disabled under ADA or RA; and (5) permanent injunctive relief requiring the state to install air conditioning throughout death-row housing violated the Prison Litigation Reform
Act (PLRA), where acceptable remedies short of facility-wide air conditioning were available. (Department of
Public Safety and Corrections, Louisiana State Penitentiary)

U.S. District Court
SPECIAL MASTER
CONTEMPT
SANCTIONS

Balla v. Idaho State Bd. of Correction, 119 F.Supp.3d 1271 (D. Idaho 2015). State inmates filed a class action
against the state board of correction and prison officials challenging conditions of their confinement. After the
court found in the inmates’ favor, a special master was appointed. Inmates filed a motion for sanctions or contempt after the officials destroyed and altered documents and otherwise presented misleading information to the
special master when he visited a state correctional institution. The district court granted the motion. The court held
that the institution’s pattern of allowing its employees to manipulate inmate medical files warranted imposition of
sanctions for spoliation of evidence, and an appropriate sanction was to restart the two-year monitoring period in
the institution’s compliance plan. (Idaho State Board of Correction, Idaho State Correctional Institution)

U.S. District Court
DECLARATORY
RELIEF
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
SUPERVISORY
LIABILITY

Barrett v. Premo, 101 F.Supp.3d 980 (D. Or. 2015). An inmate brought a claim under § 1983 against several
corrections officials for violation of his First Amendment rights arising out of rejection of a piece of mail he sent
to another inmate because it had artwork on the front of the envelope. The district court ordered declaratory and
injunctive relief. The court found that: (1) the Department of Corrections did not have a consistently enforced
policy or practice prohibiting artwork on the front of incoming envelopes, and thus the rejection of the inmate’s
envelope violated his First Amendment rights; (2) monetary damages were inadequate to address the inmate’s loss
of First Amendment freedoms; (3) the constitutional hardship to prison inmates was far greater than the insignificant potential impact on the prison’s time and resources from having to look more closely at envelopes to read a
recipient’s address if artwork was present; (4) a permanent injunction enjoining the Department from enforcing
the policy would permit inmates and nonparty members of the public to more easily and effectively communicate,
and thus the public interest weighed in favor of an injunction; (5) a permanent injunction did not extend any further than necessary to correct the First Amendment violations and was the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violations; and (6) supervisory prison officials were sufficiently involved in alleged violation of the inmate’s First Amendment rights to be liable under § 1983. (Oregon State Penitentiary)

U.S. Appeals Court
FACILITY DESIGN
MUNICIPAL LIABILITY

Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 797 F.3d 654 (9th Cir. 2015). An arrestee brought an action against a county, its
sheriff’s department, and two officers under § 1983 for violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be protected
from harm by other inmates, arising out of an attack against the arrestee by another arrestee with whom he was
jailed. A jury returned a verdict for the arrestee, and the district court denied the defendants’ motion for judgment
as a matter of law. The defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court
held that: (1) the right of inmates to be protected from attacks by other inmates was established with sufficient
clarity to guide a reasonable officer; (2) substantial evidence supported the jury’s determination that the officer
was deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm to the arrestee; (3) sufficient evidence supported
the jury’s determination that the officer’s deliberate indifference was the actual and proximate cause of harm to
the arrestee; (4) sufficient evidence supported the jury’s determination that the supervising officer was aware of,
but disregarded, the risk to the arrestee posed by the other inmate; (5) the design of a jail by a municipality is the
result of a series of deliberate choices that render the design a formal municipal policy for the purposes of municipal liability under § 1983; (6) arrestee failed to establish that the county had actual knowledge of a risk of harm
from the design of the jail, as required to establish liability under § 1983; and (7) the award of future damages to
the arrestee was supported by the record. The jury returned a verdict for the arrestee on all counts and awarded
him $2,605,632 in damages. The parties later stipulated to $840,000 in attorney fees, $18,000 in punitive damages. The arrestee had been placed in a “sobering cell” after his arrest for public drunkenness and was seriously
injured by another drunken inmate in the sobering cell. When the other inmate was admitted, staff determined that
he posed a threat to officers, requiring supervision by two officers at all times. The other arrestee was placed in
the same cell as the plaintiff, even though the jail policy was to place combative inmates in a separate cell, and
separate cells were available but left unused on the night of the incident.
The court noted that the arrestee submitted billing records from his cognitive assistant and his treating psychologist and a chart detailing the charges for medical expenses he already had incurred, and proffered several
medical experts who testified to his need for ongoing medical care.
The jail was purportedly in violation of a state regulation requiring monitoring equipment in sobering cells, as
required to establish that the county was deliberately indifferent to the Fourth Amendment right of pretrial detainees to be protected from harm by other inmates and was liable under § 1983 for injuries sustained by the arrestee.
According to the court ”One would assume that for any given construction project, including jails, the municipality’s governing body—or a committee that it appoints to act in its stead—reviews bids, considers designs, and
ultimately approves a plan for the facility and allocates funds for its construction. These choices are sufficient, in
our opinion, to meet the definition of a formal municipal policy…” (Los Angeles Sheriff’s West Hollywood Station, California)

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U.S. Appeals Court
PERSONAL LIABILITY
FAILURE TO TRAIN
OFFICIAL CAPACITY
MEDICAL CARE

Coley v. Lucas County, Ohio, 799 F.3d 530 (6th Cir. 2015). The administrator of a pretrial detainee’s estate
brought a state court action against a county, county sheriff, police officer and police sergeant, alleging § 1983
violations of the detainee’s constitutional rights and various state law claims. The district court denied the defendants’ motions to dismiss and denied individual defendants’ requests for qualified immunity. The defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that a police officer’s act of shoving a fully restrained pretrial
detainee in a jail booking area, causing the detainee to strike his head on the wall as he fell to the cement floor
without any way to break his fall, constituted “gratuitous force” in violation of the detainee’s Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from excessive force. The court noted that the detainee’s state of being handcuffed, in a belly
chain and leg irons, led to a reasonable inference that the officer’s actions were a result of his frustration with the
detainee’s prior restraint behavior, since the detainee was not in any condition to cause a disruption that would
have provoked the officer to use such force. The court held that the police officer was on notice that his actions
were unconstitutional, and therefore he was not entitled to qualified immunity from liability under § 1983. According to the court, the officer’s attempts to cover up the assault by filing false reports and lying to federal investigators following the death of the detainee led to a reasonable conclusion that the officer understood that his actions violated the detainees’ clearly established right not to be gratuitously assaulted while fully restrained and
subdued.
The court held that a police sergeant’s continued use of a chokehold on the unresisting, fully-shackled pre-trial
detainee, after hearing the detainee choke and gurgle, and when a fellow officer was urging him release his
chokehold, was objectively unreasonable, in violation of the detainee’s Fourteenth Amendment right to be free
from excessive force. The court noted that the sergeant’s subsequent acts of telling other officers to leave the
medical cell after the detainee was rendered unconscious, failing to seek medical help, and refusing to mention the
use of a chokehold in incident reports, led to the inference the that sergeant was aware he violated the law and
sought to avoid liability. According to the court, the police sergeant was on notice that his actions were unconstitutional, and therefore, he was not entitled to qualified immunity under § 1983.
The court found that the county sheriff could be held personally liable under § 1983, based on his failure to
train and supervise employees in the use of excessive force, the use of a chokehold and injuries derived therefrom,
and to ensure that the medical needs of persons in the sheriff’s custody were met. According to the court, evidence
that the sheriff helped his employees cover up their unconstitutional actions by making false statements to federal
officials about his knowledge of his employees’ assault, chokehold, and deliberate failure to provide medical
attention to the detainee demonstrated that the sheriff at least implicitly authorized, approved or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending employees. The court noted that under Ohio law, allegations by the estate of the pretrial detainee that the county sheriff had full knowledge of the assault but intentionally
and deliberately made false statements to federal officials were sufficient to state a claim that the sheriff ratified
the conduct of his officers and, thus, was potentially personally liable for his officers’ actions.
The court concluded that the officers’ use of excessive force, failure to provide medical care, assault and battery, and wrongful death could be imputed to the sheriff in his official capacity since the sheriff’s false statements
to federal investigators were a position that was inconsistent to non-affirmance of the officers’ actions. (Lucas
County Jail, Ohio)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO INTERVENE
NEGLIGENCE

Cortez v. Skol, 776 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 2015). The mother of a state inmate who suffered severe brain damage,
after he was attacked by two fellow prisoners while being escorted through an isolated prison passage by a corrections officer, brought an action alleging a § 1983 Eighth Amendment claim against the officer and a gross negligence claim against the state. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the
mother appealed. The appeals court reversed, finding that summary judgment was precluded by issues of material
fact as to whether the corrections officer exposed the high-security inmate to a substantial risk of serious injury
when he: (1) escorted the inmate and two fellow high-security prisoners through the isolated prison passage by
himself; (2) did not require the prisoners to wear leg restraints; and (3) failed to physically intervene once the
prisoners attacked the inmate. The court also found fact issues as to whether the officer was subjectively aware of
the risk involved in the escort and acted with deliberate indifference to the inmate’s safety. The court held that the
mother was not the prevailing party for purposes of awarding attorney’s fees. (Morey Unit, Lewis Prison Complex, Arizona)

U.S. Appeals Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Doe v. Cook County, Illinois, 798 F.3d 558 (7th Cir. 2015). Detainees at a county juvenile detention center brought
a class action against the center and the county, alleging that some employees at the center violated their constitutional rights by abusing their charges. The facility administrator, who was appointed to run the detention center as
part of a settlement between the parties, proposed to terminate the employment of 225 direct-care employees and
require them to apply to fill the new positions. The union for the employees intervened to oppose the administrator’s plan, arguing that the proposal violated Illinois employment law by overriding the collective bargaining and
arbitration statutes. The district court authorized the administrator to implement the plan. The union appealed. The
appeals court reversed and remanded. The appeals court held that the district court’s approval of the administrator’s plan was not a simple enforcement of the order appointing the administrator, and thus the district court was
required pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) to make findings that the relief requested by the
administrator was narrowly drawn, extended no further than necessary to correct the violation of a federal right,
and was the least intrusive means. (Cook County Juvenile Temporary Detention Center, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
PERSONAL LIABILITY

Doe v. New York, 97 F.Supp.3d 5 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). A former inmate brought a § 1983 action against a former
governor, prison doctors, and various other officials, alleging medical indifference to his Hepatitis infection in
violation of the Eighth Amendment. The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district
court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the inmate’s allegations were sufficient to
plead the governor’s personal involvement in the creation of an alleged prison policy of not disclosing infections
to inmates and only treating those with obvious symptoms. The inmate alleged that testing during routine physical
and medical examinations revealed that he was infected and that he was not informed or treated, and that he was

27.208

subjected to a variety of tests and that results should have put doctors on notice that he was infected, but he was
never advised of an infection. The inmate alleged that a prison policy was implemented “in or about 1994” to not
disclose to inmates Hepatitis infections and to only treat those with obvious symptoms, that the former governor
took office in 1995, and that the governor was part of meetings discussing infection treatment and prevention.
(New York State Department of Correctional Services)
U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO INTERVENE

Ewing v. Cumberland County, 152 F.Supp.3d 269 (D. N.J. 2015). A former arrestee brought a § 1983 action,
bringing claims against county correctional officers, police officers, and a number of municipal entities for use of
excessive force and other constitutional violations. The defendants filed nine motions for summary judgment. The
district court held that (1) issues of fact existed as to whether the force used on detainee was imposed maliciously
and sadistically to cause harm; (2) issues of fact existed as to whether two officers who were not in the room when
excessive force was allegedly used on the pre-trial detainee knew of and failed to intervene in the assault; (3)
issues of fact existed as to whether five correctional officers conspired to cover up their actions; (4) issues of fact
existed as to whether the police officer who had taken the detainee back to the jail after a trip to the hospital had
reason to believe that the detainee's safety was in jeopardy when the officer left the jail, and (5) genuine issues of
material fact existed as to whether the county trained its correctional officers on the use of force, whether the other
trainings that took place were inadequate and untimely, whether that failure to train amounted to deliberate indifference, and whether there was a causal link between that lack of training and the injuries the detainee sustained at
the hands of correction officers, precluding summary judgment for the defendants in the failure to train claim.
According to the court, the detainee, while unarmed, suffered life-threatening injuries while in an isolated room
with five officers, and that none of the officers were injured, indicated that the officers used force beyond what
was necessary to take down the detainee, in a manner intended to inflict pain. The court noted that it was clearly
established, at the time of the incident, that prisoners were protected from excessive force and wanton beatings
that exceed good-faith efforts to maintain discipline and order, and a reasonable officer would have known that
the force used was excessive. (Cumberland Co. Correctional Facility and Vineland Police Dept., New Jersey)

U.S. District Court
FINES

Fant v. City of Ferguson, 107 F.Supp.3d 1016 (E.D. Mo. 2015). City residents brought a class action lawsuit
against a city, asserting claims under § 1983 for violations of Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments based on
allegations that they were repeatedly jailed by the city for being unable to pay fines owed from traffic tickets and
other minor offenses. The residents alleged that pre-appearance detentions lasting days, weeks, and in one case,
nearly two months, in allegedly poor conditions, based on alleged violations of a municipal code that did not warrant incarceration in the first instance, and which were alleged to have continued until an arbitrarily determined
payment was made, violated their Due Process rights. The residents alleged that they were forced to sleep on the
floor in dirty cells with blood, mucus, and feces, were denied basic hygiene and feminine hygiene products, were
denied access to a shower, laundry, and clean undergarments for several days at a time, were denied medications,
and were provided little or inadequate food and water. The plaintiffs sought a declaration that the city’s policies
and practices violated their constitutional rights, and sought a permanent injunction preventing the city from enforcing the policies and practices. The city moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and
denied in part. The court held that: (1) allegations that residents were jailed for failure to pay fines without inquiry
into their ability to pay and without any consideration of alternative measures of punishment were sufficient to
state a claim that the city violated the residents’ Due Process and Equal Protection rights; (2) the residents plausibly stated a claim that the city’s failure to appoint counsel violated their Due Process rights; (3) allegations of preappearance detentions plausibly stated a pattern and practice of Due Process violations; (4) allegations of conditions of confinement were sufficient to state a plausible claim for Due Process violations; and (5) the residents
could not state an Equal Protection claim for being treated differently, with respect to fines, than civil judgment
debtors. The court noted that the residents alleged they were not afforded counsel at initial hearings on traffic and
other offenses, nor were they afforded counsel prior to their incarceration for failing to pay court-ordered fines for
those offenses. (City of Ferguson, Missouri)

U.S. District Court
FCTA- Federal Tort Claims
Act

Garcia-Feliciano v. U.S., 101 F.Supp.3d 142 (D.P.R. 2015). A detainee who was injured while walking restrained
down a flight of stairs at a courthouse brought an action against the federal government under the Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA), alleging that the U.S. Marshals Service was negligent in not providing him with assistance
while walking down the steps while restrained. After a bench trial, the district court held that: (1) the leg irons
attached to the detainee’s legs were the cause of his fall; (2) a policy directive that required the marshals to not
leave detainees unattended did not require a deputy to physically assist the detainee down stairs; and (3) the deputy’s actions were a discretionary function, not subject to FTCA. The court dismissed the case. (U.S. Marshals
Service, Puerto Rico)

U.S. District Court
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Hernandez v. County of Monterey, 110 F.Supp.3d 929 (N.D. Cal. 2015). The plaintiffs, current and recently released jail inmates seeking relief on behalf of a class, brought an action against the county, the sheriff’s office,
and the private company that administered jail health care facilities and services, alleging that substandard conditions constituted deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and failure to
accommodate in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The plaintiffs moved for a preliminary
injunction. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the
merits in their action, alleging that county jail conditions constituted deliberate indifference in violation of Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments and failure to accommodate in violation of ADA. According to the court, there was
significant evidence that the jail’s policies and practices with regard to tuberculosis (TB) screening, suicide and
self-harm prevention, alcohol and drug withdrawal, and continuing medical prescriptions, were noncompliant with
contemporary standards and guidelines, placing inmates at risk and constituting deliberate indifference to their
serious medical needs. The court also found that the preliminary injunction, targeting discrete county jail conditions, would be in the public interest where the public had an interest in preventing the spread of communicable
diseases, enforcing the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and eliminating discrimination on the basis of

27.209

U.S. District Court
ACTA- Alien Tort Claim
Act
FTCA- Federal Tort
Claims Act

disability. (Monterey County Jail, California)
Jawad v. Gates, 113 F.Supp.3d 251 (D.D.C. 2015). A plaintiff, a citizen of Afghanistan and a former detainee at
the United States Naval Facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and at other U.S. military bases, brought an action
against the U.S. Government and four individual defendants under the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA), and the Fifth and Eighth Amendments.
The plaintiff alleged that he was detained without adequate due process, tortured, and otherwise subjected to inhumane treatment. Government moved to dismiss the ATCA and FTCA claims, and the individual defendants
moved to dismiss the TVPA and constitutional claims. The district court granted the motions, finding that the
United States was properly substituted as the defendant, the complaint failed to state claim for violation of TVPA,
and the Military Commissions Act (MCA) divested the district court of jurisdiction to hear claims regarding a
former detainee’s detention, transfer, treatment, and conditions of confinement. (Forward Operating Base 195,
Afghanistan, and United States Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba)

U.S. Appeals Court
COMPENSATORY
DAMAGES
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

King v. Zamiara, 788 F.3d 207 (6th Cir. 2015). A prisoner brought an action against prison officials under § 1983,
alleging First Amendment retaliation arising from his transfer to a higher security prison due to his participation in
a state-court class action against the prison officials. After a bench trial, the district court found in favor of the
prison officials. The appeals court reversed with respect to three officials. On remand, the district court entered
judgment in favor of the prisoner and ordered compensatory damages and attorney fees, but denied the prisoner’s
request for punitive damages and injunctive relief. Both parties appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. The court held that: (1) the district court properly awarded prisoner compensatory damages; (2) the district
court’s award of compensatory damages to equal $5 a day for each day he was kept in a higher security prison
was not a reversible error; (3) the district court relied on an incorrect legal standard in concluding that the prisoner
was not entitled to punitive damages; (4) the prisoner was not entitled to injunctive relief requiring the department
of corrections to remove certain documents from his file that allegedly violated his due process rights; and (5) the
district court abused its discretion in failing to charge up to 25% of the attorney fees awarded to the prisoner
against his compensatory damages award. (Conklin Unit at Brooks Correctional Facility, Chippewa Correctional
Facility, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY
FAILURE TO PROTECT

Kruger v. Nebraska, 90 F.Supp.3d 874 (D. Neb. 2015). A murder victim’s husband and the administrator of her
estate brought an action in state court against the state of Nebraska, the Department of Correctional Services, and
several corrections officers, asserting § 1983 claims, due process violations, and various negligence claims arising
out of the release of a prisoner who murdered the victim shortly after his release from prison. The defendants
removed the case to federal court and moved for dismissal. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for
dismissal, finding that the officers did not have a special relationship with the victim that created an affirmative
duty, under the due process clause, to protect her, the officers were acting solely within the scope of their employment when they released the prisoner, and thus the husband could not assert claims under state law against the
officers in their individual capacities. The court noted that the officers were engaged in discretionary functions
when they released the prisoner, and thus were shielded from liability. (Nebraska Department of Correctional
Services)

U.S. District Court
MUNICIPAL LIABILITY

Kucharczyk v. Westchester County, 95 F.Supp.3d 529 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). An inmate who was allegedly denied
surgery to repair a hernia brought a pro se action against a county and county jail officials under § 1983, alleging
deliberate indifference to his health in violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court denied the motion, finding that the inmate had sufficiently alleged an objective deprivation of medical care and failure to act in spite of a known risk to his health.
The court found that the inmate stated a claim for municipal liability, and was not required to exhaust administrative remedies. The inmate claimed that he had a hernia that required surgery, and was repeatedly denied a date for
surgery to correct the hernia, and that county jail officials engaged in a widespread practice of denying necessary
medical care. The court noted that a Department of Justice report had found significant medical care deficiencies
at the jail. (Westchester County, N.Y., and Correct Care Solutions LLC)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT

Makdessi v. Fields, 789 F.3d 126 (4th Cir. 2015). A prisoner brought an action against prison officials, claiming
that the officials failed to protect the prisoner from repeated physical and sexual abuse by other prisoners, even
after the prisoner lodged numerous complaints, in violation of the prisoner’s Eighth Amendment right to be free
from cruel and unusual punishment. The district court entered judgment for the prison officials and the prisoner
appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. The court noted that “…the Supreme Court has stated, however, that the subjective ‘actual knowledge’ standard required to find prison officials deliberately indifferent to a
substantial risk of serious injury may be proven by circumstantial evidence. Prison officials may not simply bury
their heads in the sand and thereby skirt liability. Rather, they may be held accountable when a risk is so obvious
that it had to have been known. Because we do not believe that the court below appreciated this nuance, we vacate
the dismissal of Makdessi’s claims…” (Wallens Ridge State Prison, Virginia)

U.S. District Court
FTCA- Federal Tort Claims
Act
BIVENS CLAIMS

McGowan v. U.S., 94 F.Supp.3d 382 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). A federal prisoner, who was serving the remainder of his
sentence at a halfway house, brought an action against a U. S. Bureau of Prisons (BOP) employee who managed
the halfway house, alleging violations of his right to free speech, and asserting claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and negligence under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The defendants moved to dismiss. The
district court granted the motion and dismissed the action. The court held that the prisoner could not bring a
Bivens claim alleging his free speech right was violated when he was transferred from the halfway house to a
prison for violating a BOP regulation against publishing under a byline, where the prisoner could have challenged
his transfer through a habeas petition after exhausting BOP’s administrative remediation process. The court noted
that the prisoner’s reassignment to prison was rescinded when his lawyers notified the BOP that the byline regulation had been repealed. The court held that the prisoner’s confinement was uncategorically privileged, and thus,

27.210

under state law, he could not assert a claim for false imprisonment against the United States pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) based on his brief transfer from the halfway house. (Community First Services, Inc.,
and Metropolitan Detention Center, New York)
U.S. District Court
INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY

McNeill v. Allen, 106 F.Supp.3d 711 (W.D. N.C. 2015). A pre-trial detainee in a county detention facility brought
an action against county sheriff’s office captain under § 1983, alleging deliberate indifference to his medical
needs in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court dismissed the case, finding that the detainee
failed to plead personal involvement as required to maintain claim against sheriff’s captain in his individual capacity under § 1983. The detainee alleged that jail staff did not adequately treat him for injuries he suffered after
slipping on water in his jail cell. (Buncombe County Sheriff’s Office and Jail, N. Carolina)

U.S. District Court
TVPA- Trafficking Victims
Protection Act

Menocal v. GEO Group, Inc., 113 F.Supp.3d 1125 (D. Colo. 2015). Current and former detainees at a private, forprofit immigration detention facility brought an action against the facility’s owner-operator, alleging that a work
program violated the Colorado Minimum Wage Order (CMWO) because detainees were paid $1 per day instead
of the state minimum wage, that forcing detainees to clean living areas under the threat of solitary confinement
violated the Trafficking Victims Protection Act’s (TVPA) prohibition on forced labor, and that the owner-operator
was unjustly enriched through the work program. The detainees participate in a “Voluntary Work Program” at the
facility where they perform tasks such as maintaining the on-site medical facility that is owned and operated by
the same company, doing laundry, preparing meals, and cleaning various parts of the facility for compensation of
$1 per day. They also alleged that each day, six randomly selected detainees (whether they participate in the Voluntary Work Program or not) are required to clean the facility’s “pods” without compensation under the threat of
solitary confinement. The owner-operator moved to dismiss. The court found that the detainees adequately alleged
that the owner-operator obtained the detainees’ labor by threats of physical restraint, as required to state a claim
for violation of TVPA.
The court held that the detainees were not the facility owner-operator’s “employees” who could bring claim
alleging that a work program violated CMWO. The court noted that the detainees apparently fell within CMWO’s
broad definition of employee, but so did prisoners to whom the state labor department found CMWO’s definition
of employee should not apply, and detainees, like prisoners, did not use the wages to provide for themselves, and
thus the purposes of CMWO were not served by including them in the definition of employee. (Aurora Detention
Facility, Owned and Operated by the GEO Group, Colorado)

U.S. District Court
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Norsworthy v. Beard, 87 F.Supp.3d 1104 (N.D.Cal. 2015). A transsexual female prison inmate brought a § 1983
action against prison officials and medical staff for denying necessary medical treatment for the inmate’s gender
dysphoria in violation of Eighth Amendment. The inmate also alleged that the officials were deliberately indifferent to her medical needs and deprived her of her right to equal protection under the law when they denied her sex
reassignment surgery. The officials moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court granted the
motion in part and denied the motion in part. The court held that: (1) the inmate stated a claim for prospective
injunctive relief; (2) the inmate stated an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim based on denial of the
request for sex reassignment surgery; (3) the inmate stated an equal protection claim; but (4) the inmate failed to
state an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim based on denial of a request for a legal name change.
(Mule Creek State Prison, California)

U.S. District Court
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Norsworthy v. Beard, 87 F.Supp.3d 1164 (N.D.Cal. 2015). A transsexual female prison inmate brought a § 1983
action against prison officials and medical staff for denying necessary medical treatment for the inmate’s gender
dysphoria in violation of Eighth Amendment. The inmate moved to strike expert testimony and for a preliminary
injunction requiring the defendants to provide her with sex reassignment surgery (SRS). The defendants moved
for judicial notice. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The district court found that
the expert report of a psychiatrist retained by the officials and medical staff would not be stricken for failure to
comply with the requirements for disclosure of expert qualifications, and that the expert was qualified to testify
regarding prison culture and the treatment that incarcerated persons with gender dysphoria should receive. The
court noted that notwithstanding years of treatment in the form of hormone therapy and counseling, the inmate
continued to experience severe psychological pain, and that the treating and examining psychologists agreed the
inmate met the eligibility criteria for SRS under the standards of care for treating transsexual patients.
The court held that: (1) the inmate was likely to succeed on the merits of the Eighth Amendment claim; (2) the
inmate was suffering irreparable harm that would likely continue absent a preliminary injunction; (3) the balance
of equities weighed in favor of granting an injunction; (4) it was in the public interest to grant an injunction; and
(5) an injunction would meet the requirements of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). (Mule Creek State
Prison, California)

U.S. District Court
PRIVATE OPERATOR

Pena v. Greffet, 108 F.Supp.3d 1030 (D.N.M. 2015). A former inmate at a privately operated correctional facility
brought a civil rights action against a correctional officer, among others, asserting a claim under § 1983 for violation of her Eighth Amendment rights and asserting a claim for battery under state law. The officer moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the inmate failed to state
a claim for excessive force under the Eighth Amendment, but sufficiently stated a claim for battery under New
Mexico law. According to the court, the inmate’s allegations that a privately employed correctional officer pursued the inmate down a hallway after she refused to answer a question, grabbed her from behind, and slammed
her against a wall, were insufficient to allege that the officer acted maliciously and sadistically to cause harm, as
required to state a claim for excessive force under the Eighth Amendment, since the allegations were just as much
in line with the officer’s legitimate pursuit of penological goals as they were with his desire to harm or humiliate
the inmate. (New Mexico Women’s Correctional Facility, operated by Corrections Corporation of America)

27.211

U.S. District Court
PRIVATE OPERATOR

Pena v. Greffet, 110 F.Supp.3d 1103 (D.N.M. 2015). A female prison inmate brought an action under § 1983 for
numerous violations of her constitutional rights, including under the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments
against employees of the contractor that operated the correctional facility, and against the contractor under the
theory of vicarious liability, for alleged physical and sexual assault by employees while she was incarcerated. The
defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings. The district court denied the motion. The court held that the
“aided-in-agency” theory of vicarious liability applied to the female prison inmate’s claims under § 1983 against
the contractor after the contractor’s employee repeatedly sexually assaulted the inmate. According to the court, the
employee’s relationship with the inmate by virtue of his employment conferred “extraordinary power” upon him,
the employee’s authority to do as he wished appeared to be delegated to him, and the inmate was unlikely to be
able to successfully complain about the employee’s actions. The court noted that the issue of whether the employer was vicariously liable for the employee’s repeated rape and sexual assault of the inmate was for a jury to
decide in the inmate’s claim under § 1983 for violations of numerous constitutional rights, including the right to
bodily integrity under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court found that while state-employee prison guards are
entitled to qualified immunity against federal suits under § 1983, private prison guards receive no such benefit.
(New Mexico Women’s Correctional Facility, operated by Corrections Corporation of America)

U.S. District Court
COMPENSATORY
DAMAGES

Pierce v. District of Columbia, 128 F.Supp.3d 250 (D.D.C. 2015). A deaf inmate who communicated with American Sign Language (ASL), but who had been forced to communicate with staff and other inmates only through
lip-reading and written notes due to the lack of an interpreter to assist him, filed suit against the District of Columbia alleging discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the
Rehabilitation Act. Both sides moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the inmate’s motion in
part and denied the defendant’s motion. The court held that: (1) the prison had affirmative duty to evaluate the
newly incarcerated deaf inmate's accommodation requirements, and its failure to do so denied the inmate benefits
under the Rehabilitation Act and ADA; (2) the prison was deliberately indifferent to the deaf inmate's need
for accommodation, as would support an award of compensatory damages; and (3) summary judgment was
precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the prison had placed the inmate in protective custody,
and kept him there, because of the inmate's constant requests for accommodation. The court noted that the inmate's need for accommodation was obvious, in that the inmate did not speak and communicated only through
American Sign Language (ASL), and the prison was required to identify precise limitations resulting from the
disability and potential reasonable accommodations by way of an interactive assessment of the inmate. According
to the court, the inmate's request for an American Sign Language (ASL) interpreter to assist him during anger
management and substance abuse classes was sufficient to put the prison on notice that deaf inmate might need a
similar accommodation to communicate effectively in other prison situations, such as in inmate programs, hall
meetings, the orientation process, protective custody proceedings, graphic arts class, and medical consultations.
(Correctional Treatment Facility, District of Columbia)

U.S. Appeals Court
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2015). A petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus, on behalf of
himself and a class of aliens detained during immigration proceedings for more than six months without a bond
hearing, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief providing individualized bond hearings with the burden on the
government, certification of the class, and appointment of class counsel. The district court denied the petition. The
petitioner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. On remand, the district court entered a preliminary
injunction and the government appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The district court then granted summary
judgment to the class and entered a permanent injunction, and the parties appealed. The appeals court affirmed in
part and reversed in part. The court held that the aliens were entitled to automatic individualized bond hearings
and determinations to justify their continued detention. The court ruled that the government had to prove by clear
and convincing evidence that an alien was a flight risk or a danger to the community to justify denial of a bond at
the hearing. (Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Los Angeles, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
NEGLIGENCE
FAILURE TO TRAIN
PRIVATE PROVIDER

Shadrick v. Hopkins County, Ky., 805 F.3d 724 (6th Cir. 2015). The mother of deceased inmate brought a § 1983
action against a county and a medical provider, which contracted with county to provide medical services to county inmates, alleging that the medical provider’s failure to train and supervise its nurses violated the inmate’s constitutional right to adequate medical care and that the medical provider was negligent under state law. The twentyfive year old inmate had entered the jail to serve a short sentence for a misdemeanor offense. He died three days
later from complications of an untreated methicillin-resistant staphylococcus aureas (MRSA) infection. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the medical provider. The mother appealed. The appeals court
reversed and remanded. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact
as to whether the medical provider’s training program was inadequate, whether the inadequacy resulted from its
deliberate indifference to inmate’s right to adequate medical care, and whether the inadequacy caused, or was
closely related to, the inmate’s death. The court noted that the nurses were required to make professional judgments outside their area of medical expertise, and unless training was provided, the nurses lacked knowledge
about the constitutional consequences of their actions or inactions in providing medical care to inmates.
The court found that the medical provider did not derive its existence and status from the county, and thus was
not entitled to share the county’s governmental immunity on a Kentucky negligence claim. The court noted that
nearly all of the inmate’s medical conditions-- high blood pressure, rheumatoid arthritis, gout, osteoporosis, and
staph infection-- had been diagnosed by a private physician as mandating treatment, and deputy jailers could tell
that the inmate needed prompt medical treatment even though they did not have the same medical training as the
nurses who were employed at the county jail. (Hopkins County Detention Center, Southern Health Partners, Inc.,
Kentucky)

27.212

U.S. District Court
SUPERVISORY LIABILITY
FAILURE TO TRAIN
FAILURE TO PROTECT
FAILURE TO SUPERVISE

Shaidnagle v. Adams County, Miss., 88 F.Supp.3d 705 (S.D.Miss. 2015). After a detainee committed suicide
while being held in a county jail, his mother, individually, on behalf of the detainee’s wrongful death beneficiaries, and as administratrix of the detainee’s estate, brought an action against the county, sheriff, jail staff, and others, asserting claims for deprivation of civil rights, equitable relief, and declaratory judgment. The defendants
brought a § 1988 cross-claim for attorney fees and costs against the plaintiff, and subsequently moved for summary judgment. The court held that neither the sheriff nor another alleged policymaker could be held liable on a
theory of supervisory liability for failure to train or supervise, where the mother did not show that the training jail
staff received was inadequate, and the policy in place to determine whether the detainee was a suicide risk was not
the “moving force” behind a constitutional violation. The court held that the correct legal standard was not whether jail officers “knew or should have known,” but whether they had gained actual knowledge of the substantial
risk of suicide and responded with deliberate indifference. The court held that neither party was entitled to attorney fees as the “prevailing party.” (Adams County Jail, Mississippi)

U.S. District Court
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
NEGLIGENCE
PRIVATE PROVIDER

Simmons v. Corizon Health, Inc., 122 F.Supp.3d 255 (M.D.N.C. 2015).The guardians and conservators of a county jail inmate, who suffered a catastrophic hypoxic brain injury after going into cardiac arrest caused by excessive
internal bleeding from a perforated ulcer, brought an action against the jail medical provider, the county, the sheriff, and the local government excess liability fund, asserting claims for deliberate indifference, negligence, and
loss of consortium. The provider moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and the remaining defendants
moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim and for lack of personal jurisdiction. The district court granted the
motions in part and denied in part. The court held that the medical provider’s alleged violation of its contract with
the county, which required it to comply with standards set by the National Commission on Correctional Health
Care, with respect to its treatment of the county jail inmate could not serve as a basis for the inmate’s negligence
claim under North Carolina law.
The court found that the inmate and his guardians and conservators stated a deliberate indifference claim
against the medical provider by alleging that the inmate made the provider’s staff aware that he was experiencing
severe stomach pain and was vomiting blood, that medical records documented the vomiting of blood, decreased
urine output, and no bowel movements for two weeks, that despite his repeated complaints of severe stomach pain
and vomiting blood, he received no further medical care and was not provided a physician consultation, and that
shortly thereafter, he went into cardiac arrest caused by excessive internal bleeding from a perforated ulcer. The
court also found that the allegations were sufficient to support a claim for punitive damages under § 1983. According to the court, the fact that the county allegedly contracted out to the private medical provider did not preclude its obligation to provide inmates with medical care and the county could be held liable under § 1983 for the
provider’s allegedly constitutionally inadequate medical care of the inmate. The court noted that the provider was
allegedly delegated some final policymaking authority and the county allegedly failed to review the provider’s
policies, such that some of the provider’s policies became those of the county. (Corizon Health, Inc., and Guilford
County Jail, North Carolina)

U.S. District Court
NEGLIGENCE
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Simmons v. Corizon Health, Inc., 136 F.Supp.3d 719 (M.D.N.C. 2015). A county jail inmate, who suffered a catastrophic hypoxic brain injury after going into cardiac arrest caused by excessive internal bleeding from a perforated ulcer, brought a § 1983 action against the jail medical provider, the county, the sheriff, and the local government excess liability fund, asserting claims for deliberate indifference, negligence, and loss of consortium on the
part of the inmate’s guardian and conservator. After the district court denied the sheriff’s motion to dismiss, the
sheriff moved for reconsideration. The district court granted the motion, finding that a single, isolated prior alleged incident was insufficient to establish the sheriff's office policy or custom of deliberate indifference to the
medical needs of prisoners, and the inmate failed to state a claim for deliberate indifference to the inmate's serious
medical needs based on failure to train sheriff’s deputies. (Corizon Health Inc. and Guilford County Sheriff, North
Carolina)

U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Stojcevski v. County of Macomb, 143 F.Supp.3d 675 (E.D. Mich. 2015). A former county jail inmate, individually
and as the administrator of the estate of his brother, who died after being incarcerated at the same jail, brought an
action against a county, county officials and employees, the jail's private medical provider, and the provider's
employees, alleging deliberate indifference to medical needs and municipal liability under § 1983 and gross negligence under state law. The defendants moved to dismiss. The court held that the employees' delegation of medical care of the inmate to an outside contractor did not entitle them to qualified immunity on Eighth Amendment
deliberate indifference claims arising from the inmate's death. According to the court, regardless of the county's
reliance on the contractor, if the employees were aware of a risk to the inmate's health, drew the inference that a
substantial risk of harm to the inmate existed, and consciously disregarded that risk, they too would be liable for
the inmate's injuries under § 1983.
The court found that allegations by the administrator of the estate were sufficient to state a Monell claim
against the county and the jail's private medical provider for municipal liability under § 1983. The court noted that
although many of the policies and procedures set forth by the administrator in support of his claim, such as failure
to adhere to national standards, did not state a constitutional violation, the examples of where such standards were
not followed were factual allegations supporting his assertion that inmates at the jail were not afforded adequate
medical treatment. (Macomb County Jail, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Trueblood v. Washington State Dept. of Social and Health, 101 F.Supp.3d 1010 (W.D. Wash. 2015). Members of
a class of pretrial detainees suspected of being mentally incompetent, the next friends of such pretrial detainees,
and a disability rights organization brought an action seeking a permanent injunction and a declaratory judgment
establishing a time frame within which due process required that the Department of Social and Health Services
provide a competency evaluation and restoration of services to such detainees. After a bench trial, the district
court held that: (1) the disability rights organization had standing to bring the action; (2) the next friends of the

27.213

pretrial detainees had standing to bring an action; and (3) due process balancing favored the interests of the pretrial detainees, and thus seven days was the maximum justifiable period of incarceration while awaiting a competency evaluation and restoration of services. A permanent injunction was ordered. The court noted that jails could not
provide an environment or type of care required for such detainees, especially as they were often held in solitary
confinement without access to medication, and that confinement in jails actively damaged detainees’ mental condition and each additional day of incarceration caused further deterioration of the detainees’ mental health, increased the risk of suicide and victimization by other inmates. (State of Washington, Department of Social and
Health Services)
U.S. Appeals Court
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

U.S. v. Secretary, Florida Dept. of Corrections, 778 F.3d 1223 (11th Cir. 2015). The federal government brought
an action against the Florida Department of Corrections (DOC), alleging that the DOC’s failure to provide a kosher diet to all of its prisoners with sincere religious grounds for keeping kosher violated the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The district court granted the DOC’s motion for a preliminary injunction and the federal government appealed. The appeals court vacated the district court decision and dismissed
the appeal. The court held that the preliminary injunction did not comply with the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(PLRA), and thus, expired after 90 days. The court noted that injunctive relief was not narrowly drawn, extended
further than necessary to correct the violation of the federal right, and was not the least intrusive means necessary
to correct the violation, in violation of PLRA. (Florida Department of Corrections)
2016

U.S. Appeals Court
INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY

Heard v. Tilden, 809 F.3d 974 (7th Cir. 2016). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against the medical director of a corrections department, the health care provider that contracted with the department to provide medical
care for inmates, and a provider’s employee, alleging that they violated the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and
unusual treatment by delaying surgery for his recurrent hernia. The district court entered summary judgment in the
director’s, provider’s, and employee’s favor. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated
and remanded in part. The court held that the prisoner’s allegation that the medical director was involved directly
in the choice to stall necessary surgery for the prisoner’s recurrent hernia was sufficient to state a claim against the
director, in his individual capacity, for deliberate indifference to the prisoner’s medical need in violation of the
Eighth Amendment. (Illinois Department of Corrections, Wexford Health Sources)

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XIX

XIX

XIX

XIX

XIX

homophobic fellow inmates. The court found that the rule was not void for vagueness under the
First Amendment. (Westville Correctional Facility, Indiana)
2006
U.S. District Court
OUTGOING MAIL
PRIVILEGED CORRESPONDENCE

Barber v. U.S. Attorney General, 458 F.Supp.2d 1378 (S.D.Ga. 2006). An inmate filed a pro se

U.S. District Court
LEGAL MAIL
OUTGOING MAIL
INTERFERENCE

Felton v. Lincoln, 429 F.Supp.2d 226 (D.Mass. 2006). Federal prisoner brought civil rights action

U.S. District Court
PUBLICATIONS
REJECTING MAIL

George v. Smith, 467 F.Supp.2d 906 (W.D.Wis. 2006). A state prisoner sued prison officials under §

U.S. District Court
RELIGIOUS LITERATURE
RESTRICTIONS

Jesus Christ Prison Ministry v. California Department of Corrections, 456 F.Supp.2d 1188
(E.D.Cal. 2006). A prison ministry program and state prisoners brought an action against the
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), alleging that a correctional
facility's policy prohibiting the sending of free softbound Christian literature, compact discs, and
tapes to prisoners who have requested those materials violated the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and their First Amendment rights. The court held that the
policy violated prisoners' free exercise and free speech rights under First Amendment. According to
the court, the asserted penological goals of preventing the receipt of contraband, reducing fire
hazards, increasing the efficiency of random cell inspections or enhancing prison security did not

action against the United States Attorney General. The district court held that the inmate's
repeated filing of frivolous pro se actions in district courts warranted imposition of a sanction
permitting the warden to open and inspect each outgoing envelope from the inmate addressed to a
court, to withhold postage from any document that was not a notice of appeal (NOA) from the
sanction order, and to block all of the inmate's mail to court if he used his own resources to pay
postage. The court opened its opinion by stating “inmate-plaintiff Edward Barber's recreationallitigation days have come to an end.” (Georgia)
under § 1983 against jail officials, in their individual and official capacities, asserting claims for
violations of his constitutional rights. The prisoner alleged that jail personnel wrongfully reviewed
and confiscated material which was part of the discovery in his underlying criminal case and
which had been sent to him by counsel, that he was wrongfully disciplined for possessing such
material, and that there was wrongful interference with other incoming and outgoing mail, in
violation of various regulations. The district court held that: (1) the temporary confiscation of the
prisoner’s legal materials did not violate his rights to due process and to meaningful access to
courts, where the prisoner's counsel engaged in extensive discussions with prison personnel to
make sure that the material was available for the prisoner's review in preparation for his trial,
and the prisoner's defense was in no way impaired as a result of having the material temporarily
confiscated; (2) the alleged wrongful disciplinary isolation imposed against the prisoner for
possessing the legal material did not violate prisoner's right to due process; (3) officials' alleged
failure to allow prisoner to be represented at disciplinary hearing did not amount to a violation of
the prisoner's constitutional rights; (4) any wrongful interference with the prisoner's incoming and
outgoing mail, in violation of various regulations, was de minimis, and did not rise to level of a
constitutional violation; (5) the sheriff had qualified immunity where the prisoner failed to show
that the sheriff actually participated in acts that allegedly deprived prisoner of his constitutional
rights, formulated a policy of tolerating such violations, or was deliberately indifferent; but (6) a
genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether a prison director, captain, and deputy
superintendent were personally involved in acts that allegedly deprived the prisoner of his
constitutional rights, precluding summary judgment for those officials on basis of qualified
immunity. (Plymouth County Correctional Facility, Massachusetts)

1983, alleging deprivation of his free speech rights and deliberate indifference to his serious
medical needs. The officials moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the
motion in part and stayed in part. The court held that: (1) the officials’ ban on the prisoner’s
receipt of a newsletter on the ground that the newsletter solicited gifts did not violate the
prisoner’s free speech rights; (2) a prohibition against the prisoner possessing an atlas did not
violate his free speech rights; (3) the officials did not violate the prisoner’s speech rights in
concluding that a magazine advocated behavior consistent with a gang and thus was prohibited by
regulation; and (4) the prisoner was not exposed to unreasonably high levels of environmental
tobacco smoke. The court found that the prison officials’ ban on the prisoner’s receipt of a
newsletter that advocated for healthcare improvements in the prison and encouraged readers to
“(s)end donations” and to urge their families to “join in the fight,” did not violate the prisoner’s free
speech rights, in that it was a reasonable application of the prison policy prohibiting delivery of
correspondence soliciting gifts. Similarly, the court held that the prohibition against the prisoner
possessing an atlas had a reasonable relationship to a legitimate penological interest, and thus did
not violate his free speech rights, in that the possession of an atlas might allow the prisoner to plot
escape routes. The court held that prison officials did not violate the prisoner’s speech rights in
concluding that a magazine advocated behavior consistent with a gang, and thus was prohibited by
a prison regulation, in as much as it was neither arbitrary nor irrational for the prison officials to
conclude that a picture in the magazine portrayed gang-related hand signs. (Oshkosh Correctional
Institution, Wisconsin)

28.45
XX

justify the policy, and the distinction between approved vendors and unapproved vendors was
arbitrary and not reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. The court also found that
the policy violated prisoners' rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act (RLUIPA) where the approved vendor policy placed a “substantial burden” on the exercise of
the prisoners' religious beliefs because prisoners were unable to engage in conduct that is
motivated by their sincere religious beliefs without access to the materials provided by the
unapproved vendor at no cost, and the unique study and worship materials provided by the
unapproved vendor were unavailable through any of the approved vendors. (California State
Substance Abuse Treatment Facility)
U.S. Appeals Court
POSTAGE

Johnson v. Goord, 445 F.3d 532 (2nd Cir. 2006). An inmate brought a civil rights action against

U.S. Appeals Court
LEGAL MAIL

Jones v. Brown, 461 F.3d 353 (3d Cir. 2006). State prisoners brought an action against prison

U.S. Appeals Court
OUTGOING MAIL
WITHHOLDING
CORRESPONDENCE
REGULATIONS

Koutnik v. Brown, 456 F.3d 777 (7th Cir. 2006). A state prisoner brought a pro se § 1983 action,

U.S. District Court
LEGAL MAIL

Strong v. Woodford, 428 F.Supp.2d 1082 (C.D.Cal. 2006). A prisoner filed a § 1983 action, alleging
prison officials mishandled or destroyed his outgoing legal mail. The defendants filed a motion to
dismiss. The district court held that the prisoner failed to state a First Amendment violation with
respect to access to the courts and that the prisoner's allegations that prison officials negligently
destroyed or mishandled his legal mail did not support an actionable claim under § 1983. The court
held that the prisoner's allegations of supervisor liability did not state a claim under § 1983 and
that the officials were immune from liability for money damages or other retroactive relief.
According to the court, a delay in filing a legal document without any attendant adverse

prison officials, challenging a regulation governing possession of stamps. The district court entered
judgment in favor of the officials and inmate appealed. The appeals court held that the inmate did
not have a constitutional right to unlimited free postage for non-legal mail, and the regulation was
reasonably related to legitimate penological interests, and thus did not violate the inmate's First
Amendment right to send outgoing non-legal mail. The prison regulation prevented certain
inmates in keeplock from receiving stamps through the mail and permitted them to receive only
one free stamp per month for personal use. The court noted that stamps could be used by inmates
as a form of currency, and the regulation furthered the legitimate goals of reducing thefts,
disputes, and unregulated prisoner transactions. (New York State Department of Correctional
Services)
officials, claiming that a policy of opening and inspecting their legal mail outside of their presence
violated their First Amendment rights. The district court granted judgment for the prisoners and
the officials appealed. Another district court on similar claims granted judgment for the officials
and the prisoners in that case also appealed. The cases were consolidated on appeal. The court
entered judgment for the prisoner, finding that the policy of opening legal mail outside the
presence of the addressee prisoner impinged upon the prisoner's right to freedom of speech under
the First Amendment, and that the legal mail policy was not reasonably related to the prison's
legitimate penological interest in protecting the health and safety of prisoners and staff. The court
held that reasonable prison administrators would not have realized that they were violating the
prisoners' First Amendment free speech rights by opening prisoners' legal mail outside of the
prisoners' presence, entitling them to qualified immunity. The court noted that although the
administrators maintained the policy after three relatively uneventful years had passed after the
September 11 terrorist attacks and subsequent anthrax concerns, the policy was reasonable when
it was established. (New Jersey Department of Corrections)

challenging the confiscation of his outgoing letter, which contained a swastika and a reference to
the Ku Klux Klan. The prisoner alleged violations of his First Amendment free speech rights, and
his due process rights. The district court dismissed the due process claim, and granted summary
judgment in favor of defendants on remaining claim. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The court held that the prison regulation, prohibiting prisoners from possessing
symbolism that could be associated with any inmate group not approved by the warden, was not
impermissibly vague, for the purpose of determining whether the regulation was facially violative
of the prisoner's First Amendment free speech rights. According to the court, although the
regulation gave some discretion and flexibility to prison officials, the prison setting required it to
ensure order and safety. The appeals court deferred to state prison officials' assessment of
whether a swastika and a reference to the Ku Klux Klan in the prisoner's outgoing letter were
gang-related symbols, for the purpose of the prisoner's claim that seizure of the letter by prison
officials violated his First Amendment right to free speech, where knowledge of gang symbolism
was acquired primarily through interaction with and observation of prisoners, and the symbolism
was constantly changing. According to the court, the confiscation of the prisoner's outgoing letter
furthered the substantial governmental interest in prisoner rehabilitation, and thus, it did not
violate the prisoner's First Amendment free speech rights. The court noted that the letter was an
attempt to express the prisoner's affiliation with racially intolerant groups, which thwarted the
state's goals of encouraging the prisoner to live crime-free when released from custody, and
fostering the prisoner's ability to resolve conflicts without violence. (Wisconsin Secure Program
Facility)

28.46
XX

consequences does not constitute actual harm, as required for an inmate to assert claims based on a denial of his First
Amendment rights in legal correspondence. (California)
2007
U.S. District Court
LEGAL MAIL
OPENING MAIL

Banks v. York, 515 F.Supp.2d 89 (D.D.C. 2007). A detainee in a jail operated by the District of Columbia Department
of Corrections (DOC), and in a correctional treatment facility operated by the District's private contractor, brought a §
1983 action against District employees and contractor's employees alleging negligent supervision under District of
Columbia law, over-detention, deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, harsh living conditions in jail, and
extradition to Virginia without a hearing. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss in part and
denied in part. The court held that the detainee's allegations that his legal mail was opened by officials at the jail
outside of his presence on numerous occasions during a four-month period, and that such actions were intentional and
pursuant to a policy or systemic practice, stated a claim under § 1983 for violation of First Amendment free speech
rights. (Central Detention Facility. D.C. and Corr’l Treatment Facil. operated by Corrections Corporation of America)

U.S. District Court
LEGAL MAIL
OPENING MAIL

Fontroy v. Beard, 485 F.Supp.2d 592 (E.D.Pa. 2007). Inmates sued state prison officials, claiming that a policy of
opening legal and court mail outside their presence violated the First Amendment. The district court granted summary
judgment for the inmates, in part. The court held that the policy of opening inmate legal and court mail outside of
their presence, inspecting for contraband, and resealing the mail without reading it, violated the First Amendment
right of inmates to have mail opened in their presence. The court noted that the policy did not further the prison's
objective of blocking contraband entering prison through the mails, over an alternate procedure of opening mail in
inmate's presence. On appeal (559 F.3d 173) the appeals court reversed. (SCI-Graterford, Pennsylvania)

U.S. Appeals Court
PROHIBITIONSPUBLICATIONS

Jones v. Salt Lake County, 503 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2007). County jail prisoners and a legal publication for prisoners
filed § 1983 suits against county jails, county officials, and a state Department of Corrections (DOC), challenging the
constitutionality of mail regulations in the jails and state prisons. The district court dismissed the actions and the
plaintiffs appealed. The two actions were consolidated for appeal. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part,
and remanded. The court held that: (1) a jail regulation banning prisoners' receipt of technical and sexually explicit
publications did not violate the First Amendment; (2) the jail regulation barring prisoners from ordering books from
the outside did not violate the First Amendment; and (3) the prison's refusal to accept legal publications did not
amount to a violation of prisoners' First Amendment or due process rights where the refusal to accept the magazines
was not based on any prison policy, but was due to a prison mailroom personnel's negligence. The court remanded the
case to the district court to conduct a four-part Turner analysis of the validity of the county jail's ban on prisoners'
receipt of all catalogs. The court held that the regulation banning ordering books from outside was reasonably related
to the jail's legitimate penological goal of security, as it prevented contraband from being smuggled into the jail, and
that prisoners had access to thousands of paperbacks through the jail library, prisoners could request permission to
order books directly from a publisher, prisoners could also obtain paperback books donated to them through a
program at local bookstore, prisoners had access to other reading materials such as newspapers and certain magazines.
The court noted that allowing prisoners to have unrestricted access to books from all outside sources would
significantly impact jail resources. (Utah State Prison, Salt Lake County Jail and San Juan County Jail, Utah)

U.S. District Court
CORRESPONDENCE
REGULATIONS

Jordan v. Pugh, 504 F.Supp.2d 1109 (D.Colo. 2007). A federal inmate brought an action alleging that a prison
regulation prohibiting inmates from acting as reporters or publishing under bylines violated the First Amendment.
After a bench trial was held, the district court entered judgment for the inmate. The court found that the inmate had
constitutional standing to raise the First Amendment challenge against the regulation, where the inmate had been
punished twice for publishing under a byline. The court held that the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) regulation
violated the First Amendment, despite the BOP's concerns of creating “big wheel” inmates who presented a security
risk, a chilling effect on the performance or speech of prison staff, or permitting inmates to conduct business. The
court noted that a myriad of similar publishing opportunities were available to inmates, there was no particular
security risk associated with an inmate publishing under a byline in the news media that was not present with other
inmate publications, the BOP had adequate authority to screen and exclude dangerous content coming into the prison,
and there was no evidence linking inmates' outgoing news media correspondence to inmates conducting business.
(Federal Bureau of Prisons, Administrative Maximum Unit [“ADX”], Florence, Colorado)

U.S. District Court
PROHIBITIONPUBLICATIONS
RELIGIOUS
LITERATURE

Kaufman v. Schneiter, 524 F.Supp.2d 1101 (W.D.Wis. 2007). A former state inmate sued prison officials for
declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, alleging that he was subjected to retaliatory transfer and that his rights
under the First and Eighth Amendments and Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) were
violated. The court granted the officials’ motion for summary judgment. According to the court, there were no facts in
evidence that the former state inmate was prevented from ordering publications about his religion of atheism while
incarcerated at a maximum security facility, was in the facility's step program, or was in any other way injured by the
step program's no-publications policy, and therefore the former inmate lacked standing to litigate his claim that the
policy violated his free exercise rights and rights under Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA). (Wisconsin Secure Program Facility)

U.S. District Court
OUTGOING MAIL
INSPECTION OF MAIL

Maddox v. Berge, 473 F.Supp.2d 888 (W.D.Wis. 2007). A state prisoner brought a civil rights action under § 1983
against prison officials and employees, alleging that his administrative confinement for participating in a riot violated
his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The court found that allegations that the prisoner was confined to his
cell 23 hours a day and that he was denied “outside recreation” while he was in administrative confinement
demonstrated injuries from an objectively serious deprivation, for the purposes of his conditions or confinement
claim. The court ruled that a prison requirement that the prisoner leave all of his outgoing nonlegal mail open to be
inspected by prison officials did not violate the prisoner’s First Amendment rights, where his outgoing mail was not
censored or delayed. (Green Bay Correctional Institution, Wisconsin)

28.47
XXII

U.S. District Court
CENSORSHIP
PROHIBITIONSPUBLICATIONS

Strope v. Collins, 492 F.Supp.2d 1289 (D.Kan. 2007). Inmates brought a civil rights action against prison officials,
stemming from censorship of magazines containing alleged nudity. The parties moved for summary judgment. The
district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The district court held that summary judgment on the
inmates’ claims alleging First Amendment violations was precluded by genuine issues of material fact, regarding
whether prison officials' withholding of publications containing alleged nudity was reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests. The court found that an inmate who sued prison officials was afforded adequate procedural due
process in the denial of access to magazines containing alleged nudity, where the inmate was given written notice of
withholding of the magazine by way of an “Appeal of Censored Material,” was told verbally about the refusal to
process a Special Purpose Order (SPO) for a supplemental issue, and had the opportunity to grieve the censorship and
appeal decisions to prison officials who were not involved in original process. The court held that officials were not
entitled to qualified immunity to the extent that they were being sued in their individual capacities, where the claim
that the censorship was not related to legitimate penological interests implicated clearly-established First Amendment
rights. The court held that genuine issues of material fact, regarding the extent to which the prison warden personally
participated in the alleged deprivation of the inmates' First Amendment right to receive information by censoring
magazines containing alleged nudity, precluded summary judgment on claims alleging the warden's vicarious liability
under a federal civil rights statute. (Lansing Correctional Facility, Kansas)

U.S. District Court
LEGAL MAIL
OPENING MAIL
DELIVERY

Vasquez v. Raemisch, 480 F.Supp.2d 1120 (W.D.Wis. 2007). A prisoner sought leave to proceed under the in forma
pauperis statute in a proposed civil rights action for declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief brought against prison
officials and corrections officers. The court held that the prisoner failed by state a First Amendment claim by alleging
that his legal mail was opened by prison officials three times outside his presence, and that his legal mail was given to
another prisoner with the same last name on one occasion, where the prisoner did not suggest that any of the four
instances he described prevented him from litigating a case, and none of the mail at issue involved correspondence
from his criminal defense lawyer. (Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
PROHIBITIONSPUBLICATIONS

West v. Frank, 492 F.Supp.2d 1040 (W.D.Wis. 2007). A prisoner sued prison officials under § 1983, alleging that
they violated his speech and equal protection rights by enforcing a policy prohibiting prisoners from receiving
publications in the mail. The prisoner wanted to stay abreast of the nation's current events while he was incarcerated
and had subscribed to USA Today using his own funds. Authorities at the Wisconsin Secure Program Facility where
the prisoner was incarcerated refused to deliver the newspaper. The officials moved for summary judgment. The
court granted the motion. The court held that the officials who had no involvement in the adoption or implementation
of the policy could not be liable under § 1983 for any violation of the prisoner's speech rights that occurred when the
policy was applied to him. The court held that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the prison violated
the prisoner's free speech rights by enforcing its policy against him, instituted as part of a behavior modification
program, precluding summary judgment. But the court found that the action was moot, where the state had abandoned
the policy, and the prisoner had been transferred from the only prison in the state that imposed such a policy.
(Wisconsin Secure Program Facility)
2008

U.S. Appeals Court
LEGAL MAIL
OPENING MAIL

Al-Amin v. Smith, 511 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2008). A state prison inmate brought a § 1983 action against state
corrections officials, alleging that the officials repeatedly opened his privileged attorney mail outside of his presence
in violation of his rights to access to the courts and free speech. The district court denied the officials’ motion for
summary judgment and the officials appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The appeals
court held that the prisoner’s constitutional right of access to the courts requires that incoming legal mail may be
opened only in the inmate's presence and only to inspect for contraband. According to the court, the inmate’s right to
have properly marked incoming attorney mail opened only in his presence was clearly established. The court found
that the lack of showing of actual injury precluded recovery on the right-of-access claim. The court held that the
inmate had a free speech right to communicate with his attorneys separate from his right of access to the courts and
that the pattern and practice of opening the prisoner's attorney mail outside his presence impinges on his freedom of
speech. The court noted that actual injury is not required for the prisoner to state a free speech claim arising from the
opening of attorney mail and that the First Amendment prohibition against opening the inmate's attorney mail outside
his presence was clearly established. (Georgia State Prison)

U.S. Appeals Court
CENSORSHIP
LANGUAGE
OUTGOING MAIL

Barrett v. Belleque, 544 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2008). A prisoner brought a pro se § 1983 action alleging that prison
officials violated his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments by punishing him for writing letters using
vulgar and offensive racist language to describe prison officials. The district court dismissed the complaint and the
prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that the prisoner's allegations that the
prison censored his outgoing mail and punished him for its contents stated a § 1983 claim that his First Amendment
rights were violated. The prisoner had attempted to mail a series of letters to his grandmother and mother. The letters
used vulgar and offensive racist language to describe prison officials. After reviewing the letters, prison officials cited
the prisoner for violation of various prison disciplinary rules, resulting in a loss of good time, revocation of certain
privileges, and other punitive measures. The appeals court found that the district court's dismissal relied on an
incorrect legal standard. (Oregon State Penitentiary)

U.S. District Court
DELAY
LEGAL MAIL

Dolberry v. Levine, 567 F.Supp.2d 413 (W.D.N.Y. 2008). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against prison officials
asserting his constitutional rights were violated in a number of ways. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The
court granted summary judgment for the defendants in part and denied in part. The court found that an isolated
incident of mail tampering is usually insufficient to establish a constitutional violation for violating a prisoner's right
to the free flow of incoming and outgoing mail under the First Amendment; rather, the inmate must show that prison
officials regularly and unjustifiably interfered with the incoming legal mail. (Wyoming Corr’l Facility, New York)

28.48
XXII

U.S. District Court
INTERFERENCE
SEIZURE

Frazier v. Diguglielmo, 640 F.Supp.2d 593 (E.D.Pa. 2008). A prisoner brought an action against several prison
officers and supervisors, alleging that the defendants violated his rights by interfering with his mail and seizing legal
materials from his cell. The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court granted the
motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the prisoner's bare allegation, that prison officials' seizure of a
writ of coram nobis “obstructed” his right to “petition the government for redress of grievances,” was insufficient to
allege the infringement of an exercise of a First Amendment right of access to the courts to secure judicial relief, as
required to state a claim for violation of the right of access. The court noted that the prisoner did not describe the
contents of the writ or the judgment he sought to challenge, nor did the prisoner allege or even allude to any prejudice
in any legal action caused by the writ's confiscation. The court found that the prisoner's allegation that prison officials
seized legal documents relating to his criminal and habeas cases was insufficient to state a claim for violation of First
Amendment right of access to the courts, absent an allegation that the alleged seizure caused him prejudice in a legal
challenge to his conviction or to his conditions of confinement. (State Correctional Institution at Graterford,
Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
CENSORSHIP
PROHIBITIONPUBLICATIONS

Johnson v. Raemisch, 557 F.Supp.2d 964 (W.D.Wis. 2008). An inmate sued prison officials under § 1983, contending
that their censorship of a newsletter violated his First Amendment right to free speech. The district court held that the
challenged censorship was not logically connected to a legitimate penological interest and therefore violated the
inmate's First Amendment rights. The court found that many of the proffered reasons for the censorship suggested that
it was the critical nature of the newsletter that prompted the decision, rather than any true interest in security or
rehabilitation. According to the court, to the extent that there was a true concern for security or rehabilitation,
censorship of the newsletter, which did not advocate violence or any other unlawful activity, was an exaggerated
response to those concerns. The court held that the appropriate injunctive relief for a violation of the inmate's First
Amendment rights in the officials' blocking the inmate's subscription to a newsletter addressing prisoner rights issues
was to provide the inmate with a copy of the newsletter. (Waupun Correctional Institution, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
PROHIBITIONPUBLICATIONS

Jordan v. Sosa, 577 F.Supp.2d 1162 (D.Colo. 2008). A federal prisoner brought an action against a prison and
officials, alleging a prison regulation prohibiting the prisoner from receiving sexually explicit material in the mail was
unconstitutional. The district court held that the regulation did not violate the prisoner's First Amendment rights nor
did it violate the inmate's or publishers' due process rights. But the court found that the portion of the regulation that
allowed the prison to fail to retain the rejected publication violated due process. (United States PenitentiaryAdministrative Maximum, Florence, Colorado)

U.S. District Court
CENSORSHIP
PUBLICATIONS

Prison Legal News v. Schwarzenegger, 561 F.Supp.2d 1095 (N.D.Cal. 2008). In an action arising from a publisher's
allegations that a state corrections department illegally censored its publications, the parties' settlement agreement
provided that the publisher was the prevailing party for the purposes of a reasonable attorney fee award and costs. The
publisher, Prison Legal News, had alleged that the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR)
illegally censored its publications. The publisher moved for a fee award for work performed by its counsel after the
settlement agreement was executed, and for the establishment of a semi-annual fees process. The defendants opposed
the motion. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that: (1) the allegedly
minimal nature of work performed after the agreement was executed did not preclude the publisher from being the
prevailing party entitled to the fee award; (2) the publisher could recover fees for time spent by its counsel on such
activities as drafting press releases and responding to media inquiries; (3) clerical tasks could not be billed at the
paralegal or attorney rate; (4) a reduction in the fee award was not warranted on grounds that the publisher had
multiple attorneys in attendance at two telephone conferences; (5) a fee reduction was not warranted on grounds that
the requested fees included hours spent on duplicative and excessive tasks; and (6) the establishment of a semi-annual
fees process was not warranted. (California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation)

U.S. District Court
ATTORNEY MAIL
OPENING MAIL

Shine v. Hofman, 548 F.Supp.2d 112 (D.Vt. 2008). A federal pretrial detainee in the custody of the Vermont
Department of Corrections brought a pro se action, alleging violation of his constitutional rights. The detainee alleged
that his mail was opened and returned to him, thereby impeding his ability to communicate with his attorney, that his
placement in close custody limited his ability to access legal materials, and that his placement in segregation barred
him from contacting his attorney and potential witnesses. The district court dismissed in part. The court held that the
inmate did not state a First Amendment claim for deprivation of access to courts, absent an allegation of actual injury
in connection with his challenge to his conviction or sentence. (Vermont Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
DELAY
PACKAGE

Williamson v. Black, 537 F.Supp.2d 792 (M.D.N.C. 2008). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a
corrections officer, alleging that the officer received the prisoner’s legal mail and withheld it from the prisoner. The
district court granted summary judgment for the officer. The court held that the prisoner's constitutional rights were
not violated by the corrections officer's alleged withholding of his incoming mail, since the alleged withholding
involved only one package that did not contain legal mail, the package was incoming mail, and the prisoner
subsequently received copies of the documents contained in the package. (North Carolina)
2009

U.S. Appeals Court
LEGAL MAIL
PACKAGES
REJECTING MAIL

Bonner v. Outlaw, 552 F.3d 673 (8th Cir. 2009). An inmate filed a Bivens action against prison officials, alleging their
handling of his incoming legal mail violated his constitutional rights. The district court granted the defendants' motion
to dismiss. The appeals court affirmed in part and remanded in part. On remand, the district court denied the warden's
motion to dismiss and his motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The warden appealed. The
appeals court held that the inmate's allegations were sufficient to state a procedural due process claim against the
warden, and that the due process right to receive notice was clearly established. The court held that the Federal Bureau
of Prison's (BOP) regulation governing an inmate's notification of rejected correspondence, which distinguished
between letters and other correspondence by requiring notification for rejections of the former but not for the latter,

XXIII

28.49

was unreasonable under procedural due process principles. The court found that there was no governmental interest
advanced by the regulation, that inmates did not have an alternative means of receiving notice, and that there was no
additional burden placed on prison officials by having to give notice. According to the court, the inmate's allegations
that the warden had responsibility for lack of notice as to the prison's rejection of packages containing legal mail were
sufficient to state a procedural due process claim against the warden. The inmate had alleged that the warden was
personally involved in creating, applying, or interpreting a policy that failed to adhere to notice requirements, and that
even if the warden had no role in deciding what notice procedures to follow, the inmate alleged that the warden failed
to train or supervise mail room employees to follow notice requirements. (Federal Corr’l Inst., Waseca, Minnesota)
U.S. District Court
LEGAL MAIL
LIMITATION
SECURITY PRACTICES

Covell v. Arpaio, 662 F.Supp.2d 1146 (D.Ariz. 2009). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a county sheriff,
alleging that the sheriff violated his First Amendment rights by instituting a policy that banned incoming letters and
restricted incoming mail to metered postcards. The prisoner alleged that the mail policy prevented him from receiving
legal mail from witnesses in his criminal case. The sheriff moved for summary judgment and the district court granted
the motion. The court held that the jail’s non-privileged mail policy which banned incoming letters and restricted
incoming mail to metered postcards was reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest in reducing contraband
smuggling. The court noted that alternative means, including postcards, telephones, and jail visits, existed. According
to the court, allowing stamped mails would increase the likelihood of smuggling contraband into the jail, which would
in turn lead to conflicts and violence, and there was no evidence that the prisoner's suggested alternative, by having
staff inspect each piece of mail and remove the stamps, would accommodate the right at a de minimis cost to the jail.
The court held that even if correspondence from a witness on the prisoner's witness list was improperly excluded by
the county jail, in violation of the prisoner's right of access to the courts, the prisoner failed to allege any violation of
the policy that was at the direction of the county sheriff, as required to render him liable under § 1983. (Maricopa
County Lower Buckeye Jail, Arizona)

U.S. District Court
LIMITING
CORRESPONDENTS

Doss v. Gilkey, 649 F.Supp.2d 905 (S.D.Ill. 2009). Federal prisoners brought an action against prison officials,
alleging that the officials' failure to acknowledge the validity of their marriage and to grant them a spousal exemption
to the rule that inmates could not correspond with each other violated their equal protection and due process rights.
The officials moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. According to the court, the prison
officials' failure to acknowledge the validity of the marriage of two prisoners and to grant them a spousal exemption
to the rule that inmates could not correspond with each other did not violate the prisoners' equal protection rights
where there was no showing that officials singled out the prisoners based on their Islamic religion or any other
improper consideration. The court found that the prison had a legitimate security interest in generally preventing
unrelated prisoners from corresponding, the face of the prisoners' marriage certificate did not strictly comport with the
statutory requirements, the marriage certificate was not registered, as required by state law, and there was some
evidence that the marriage was not valid due to one prisoner's failure to terminate a prior marriage. (Federal
Correctional Institution, Greenville, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
CORRESPONDENCECOURT
INSPECTION OF MAIL
LEGAL MAIL
OPENING MAIL

Fontroy v. Beard, 559 F.3d 173 (3rd Cir. 2009). Inmates sued state prison officials, claiming that a policy of opening
legal and court mail outside their presence violated the First Amendment. The district court declared the policy
unconstitutional in violation of the First Amendment. The prison officials appealed. The appeals court reversed,
finding that the policy did not violate the First Amendment right of inmates to have mail opened in their presence.
According to the court, the policy of requiring a control number on legal and court mail sent to inmates, opening mail
without control numbers outside of inmates' presence, and inspecting for contraband before delivering mail to
inmates, did not violate the First Amendment right of inmates to have mail opened in their presence. The court noted
that the new legal mail policy was implemented to avoid abuse of the legal mail privilege, that the new policy was less
burdensome on prison employees than the prior policy, that the inmates' proposed alternative could not be achieved at
de minimis cost, and while inmates could not control whether courts or attorneys actually obtained control numbers,
that alternatives were provided by new policy. (Pennsylvania Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
DELAY

Johnson v. Boyd, 676 F.Supp.2d 800 (E.D. Ark. 2009). A state prisoner filed a civil rights action against a detention
center and its personnel alleging several violations. The defendants moved for summary judgment and the district
court granted the motion in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether detention center personnel failed to protect the prisoner from an attack by another prisoner.
According to the court, the prisoner's First Amendment freedom of association and speech rights had not been
violated by denial of his visitation, phone, and mailing privileges for two days as the direct result of the prisoner
committing a disciplinary infraction while he was in protective custody. (Crittenden County Detention Center,
Arkansas)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONFISCATION
OUTGOING MAIL
PROHIBITION
REGULATIONS

Jones v. Caruso, 569 F.3d 258 (6th Cir. 2009). State prison officials filed a motion to reconsider an order enjoining
them from enforcing a rule preventing prisoners from possessing books, pamphlets, forms or other material regarding
actions that could be taken under Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). The district court denied the motion, and the
prison officials appealed. The appeals court affirmed and remanded. The appeals court held that the letter which the
prisoner attempted to mail to the Michigan Secretary of State's office, requesting information about copyrighting and
trademark registration in Michigan, was not “legal mail,” and thus its confiscation pursuant to the prison regulation
was not subject to heightened review under the First Amendment. But the court found that the prisoner was likely to
succeed on the merits of his First Amendment claim and the balancing of the relevant factors favored issuance of a
preliminary injunction. The court noted that the harms that prisoners would face from the enforcement of the rule
outweighed those which the prison defendants would face if the court upheld the injunction, and public interest in
preventing prisoners' abusive filings would not be harmed by the preliminary injunction. (Saginaw Correctional
Facility, Michigan)

XXIII

28.50

U.S. Appeals Court
CENSORSHIP

Mays v. Springborn, 575 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2009). A prisoner brought an action against prison officials, asserting
claims based on strip searches at prisons and alleged retaliation for his complaints about the searches, denial of his
request for dietary supplements which he considered to be religious necessities, alleged inadequacy of his diet, failure
to issue certain winter clothing items, and censorship of pages in a magazine mailed to him. The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of the officials on the claims about prison food and clothing and granted the officials
judgment as a matter of law on the claims about strip searches, retaliation, and censorship. The prisoner appealed. The
appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court held that the prison's censorship of a
magazine mailed to the prisoner, by removing an article that described a prison riot and pictures of people believed to
have been making gang signs, was reasonable, even if the prisoner had access to other writings and to television
shows about prison riots. (Stateville Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
LEGAL MAIL
OPENING MAIL
REGULATIONS

Merriweather v. Zamora, 569 F.3d 307 (6th Cir. 2009). A former federal prisoner filed a Bivens complaint claiming
deprivation of his First, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment rights by prison mailroom employees' routinely opening and
reading prisoner's mail outside of his presence, although the mail was marked as “legal mail” or “special mail”
pursuant to Bureau of Prison's (BOP) regulations. The district court denied the employees summary judgment on the
grounds of qualified immunity. The employees appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded. The appeals court held that: (1) a fact issue precluded summary judgment as to whether two envelopes
from the prisoner's attorney were opened outside the presence of the prisoner; (2) an envelope from federal
community defenders was properly labeled legal mail; (3) nine envelopes containing the word “attorney/client” were
properly labeled legal mail; (4) prison employees' opening of the prisoner's legal mail outside his presence violated his
clearly established First and Sixth Amendment rights; (5) prison mailroom supervisors were not protected by qualified
immunity; but (6) prison mailroom employees were protected by qualified immunity. According to the court, the
former prisoner's allegations that prison mailroom employees opened his legal mail outside his presence despite his
repeated complaints to mailroom supervisors were sufficient to find that mailroom supervisors acted unreasonably in
response to the prisoner's complaints, precluding the supervisors' protection by qualified immunity from the prisoner's
claims. The prisoner alleged that the supervisors' conduct encouraged an atmosphere of disregard for proper mailhandling procedures, where one supervisor stated that the prison did not have to follow case law but only the Bureau
of Prisons' (BOP) policy, and that other supervisors knew of the prisoner's complaints but did nothing to correct the
admitted errors. (Michigan Federal Detention Center. Federal Bureau of Prisons)

U.S. District Court
LEGAL MAIL
OUTGOING MAIL
REJECTING MAIL

Proctor v. Applegate, 661 F.Supp.2d 743 (E.D.Mich. 2009). State prisoners brought a § 1983 action against Michigan
Department of Corrections (MDOC) employees and multiple prison facilities, alleging violations of their
constitutional rights. The defendants moved to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds and for failure to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held
that state prison regulations which permitted the confiscation of certain types of mail and prohibited “copyrighting” of
names served a legitimate and neutral government purpose, and thus did not violate the prisoners' constitutional rights.
According to the court, an employee's rejection of the prisoner's letters to nine state senators and representatives
because the prisoner did not pay for postage and because the letters did not qualify as legal mail, as they were not
addressed to a court, attorney, or a party to a lawsuit, did not implicate the prisoner's constitutional rights. (Michigan
Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
LIMITATION

Samford v. Dretke, 562 F.3d 674 (5th Cir. 2009). A state prison inmate brought an in forma pauperis § 1983 action
against a corrections official, alleging that a prohibition against any communication between the inmate and his sons
constituted a violation of his First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and association. The district court
dismissed the petition and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the enforcement of a
“negative mail list” that included the inmate's sons did not unduly infringe upon the inmate's First Amendment rights,
and the officials' removal of the inmate's sons from the approved visitors list was reasonable. The court found that the
restriction was rationally related to the prison's legitimate interest in protecting crime victims and their families from
unwanted communications, given the inmate's wife's request that the sons be placed on the list and the fact that the
inmate had been imprisoned after violating a probation condition of no contact with the sons. The court noted that an
alternate means of communication remained open via the inmate's mother. (Texas Department of Criminal Justice)

U.S. District Court
CENSORSHIP
REFUSAL
REJECTING MAIL

Sikorski v. Whorton, 631 F.Supp.2d 1327 (D.Nev. 2009). A state prisoner and his mother and sister brought a § 1983
action against prison officials and correctional officers, alleging violation of their First and Fourteenth Amendment
rights by censoring, refusing to deliver, and returning various pieces of mail addressed to the prisoner and failing to
provide them with notice and the opportunity to appeal their decisions. The prisoner also alleged that officials
retaliated against him for his use of the prison grievance system. The court held that the prison's policy of not
allowing inmates names and addresses of private citizens without express, informed consent of the citizens did not
violate the First Amendment rights of the prisoner who was issued an “unauthorized mail notification” relating to a
citizens' petition for recommendations regarding parole and sentencing procedures, which was forwarded to the
prisoner by a third-party. According to the court, there was a valid, rational connection between the policy and a
legitimate governmental interest of protecting citizens, there were alternative means of exercising rights that remained
open to the prisoner, accommodation of the asserted rights would have had a significant impact on guards and other
inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally, and that there were no alternatives to the policy. The
court found that the prison's practice of returning mail to the sender unopened when such mail contained tape or
stickers did not violate the First Amendment where the policy was rationally related to a legitimate governmental
interest in preventing illegal chemical drugs from coming into the prison. The court held that the prison's policy of not
giving notice and the opportunity to appeal to inmates regarding mail that was returned to the sender because of
noticeable violations on the outside of the envelope did not violate the First Amendment or due process. The court
noted that providing the accommodation of giving notice and opportunity to appeal for every piece of mail with a
noticeable violation would have placed a significant burden on prison resources. The court found that the prisoner
failed to establish that a correctional officer retaliated against him, in violation of § 1983, for exercising the prison

XXIII

28.51

grievance system by issuing notices of charges against the prisoner, returning unopened letters addressed to the
prisoner, and issuing an unauthorized mail notification. The court held that the officer acted for legitimate correctional
reasons, and the prisoner's exercise of his First Amendment rights was not chilled. (Nevada State Prison)
U.S. District Court
DELAY
INDIGENT INMATES
LEGAL MAIL
OUTGOING MAIL

Wesolowski v. Washburn, 615 F.Supp.2d 126 (W.D.N.Y. 2009). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against
corrections employees, alleging that the employees violated his rights by interfering with his ability to send outgoing
mail. The employees moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the motion. The court held that the
employees did not violate the prisoner's right of access to the courts protected under the First Amendment when they
correctly determined that certain mail did not qualify as “legal mail” under applicable corrections department
regulations, and rejected certain letters and other items that the prisoner sought to mail because of his noncompliance
with the regulations. The court noted that, at most, the prisoner was inconvenienced and had some delays in his
outgoing mail. The court held that the employees did not violate the prisoner's right to the free flow of mail as
protected under the First Amendment when they correctly determined that certain mail did not qualify as “legal mail”
and rejected certain letters and other items. According to the court, all the employees did was to require the prisoner's
compliance with regulations concerning outgoing mail. The court found that even if the employees had incorrectly
determined that some of the prisoner's outgoing mail was not legal mail, and thus did not qualify for free postage,
employees were entitled to qualified immunity from the prisoner's § 1983 action because the employees did not
violate any of the prisoner's clearly established rights of which a reasonable person in the employees' position would
have known. (Southport Correctional Facility, New York)
2010

U.S. District Court
INTERFERENCE
OUTGOING MAIL

Akers v. Watts, 740 F.Supp.2d 83 (D.D.C. 2010). A federal inmate brought a civil rights action against various
officials, employees, and agents of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),
United States Attorney's Office for the District of Kansas, and the United States Marshals Service (USMS) in their
individual capacities, alleging, among other things, that the defendants conspired to violate his constitutional rights by
restricting his communications with persons outside the prison. The district court granted the federal defendants
motion to dismiss. The court held that it did not have personal jurisdiction in the federal inmate's civil rights action
against the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) officials, employees, and agents, a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agent, a
Kansas Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA), or the United States marshals, where the complaint made no
allegations that such defendants had any personal connection with District of Columbia other than their federal
employment, and the mere fact that the defendants were federal government employees, affiliated with agencies that
were headquartered or maintained offices in the District of Columbia, was insufficient to render them subject to suit in
their individual capacities. The court held that restrictions imposed upon, and the Bureau of Prisons (BOP)
interferences with, the correspondence of federal inmate, who had initiated fraudulent schemes from prison on more
than one occasion and used the mail in furtherance of his efforts, served a legitimate penological interest by limiting
the inmate's ability to manipulate or swindle others, and thus did not violate the inmate's First Amendment rights. The
court noted that the inmate had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his non-legal mail, and therefore restrictions
placed upon the inmate’s correspondence following his repeated efforts to initiate new fraudulent schemes while
incarcerated did not violate the Fourth Amendment. (Administrative Maximum, Florence, Colorado, Federal Bureau
of Prisons)

U.S. District Court
DELIVERY
DELAY

Antonetti v. Skolnik, 748 F.Supp.2d 1201 (D.Nev. 2010). A prisoner, proceeding pro se, brought a § 1983 action
against various prison officials, alleging various constitutional claims, including violations of the First, Fifth, Sixth,
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court dismissed in part. The court held that the prisoner's allegations
were factually sufficient to state a colorable § 1983 claim that prison officials violated the Eighth Amendment by
depriving him of needed medical care. The prisoner alleged that he was housed in segregation/isolation, leading to a
mental health breakdown, and: (1) that he was seen by mental health professionals eight times over a five year period
instead of every 90 days as required by administrative regulations; (2) that mental health professionals recommended
he pursue art and music for his mental health but that prison officials denied him the materials; (3) and that the
officials' actions resulted in the need to take anti-psychotic and anti-depression medications due to suffering from
bouts of aggression, extreme depression, voices, paranoia, hallucinations, emotional breakdowns and distress,
unreasonable fear, and systematic dehumanization. According to the court, the prisoner's allegations that officials
deprived him of incoming mail without notice and without a post-deprivation remedy were factually sufficient to state
a § 1983 claim under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. (High Desert State Prison, Nevada)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONFISCATION
OUTGOING MAIL

Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178 (10th Cir. 2010). A state prisoner, proceeding pro se, brought a § 1983 action against
prison officials, alleging violations of the First, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court dismissed the
complaint with prejudice. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
The court held that the prisoner's allegations that a prison official intentionally confiscated and destroyed letters sent
to him by persons outside the prison “under the guise” of sticker and perfume violations, for the purpose of harassing
him, were sufficient to plead violations of his First Amendment speech rights. The court also found that the prisoner's
allegations that a prison official returned to him outgoing letters that had “appropriate postage affixed without reason”
for failure to mail them, were sufficient to plead a violation of the prisoner's First Amendment speech rights. The
court found an alleged First Amendment speech rights violation with the prisoner's allegations that he was given a
letter from his sister and that it was confiscated from him due to his incommunicado status, but that it was never
returned to him. The court held that the prisoner's allegations that prison officials confiscated canteen items, deprived
him of hygiene items for 25 hours and incarcerated him for four weeks in an isolation cell with limited outdoor
recreation and lack of access to hygiene items, were insufficient to state a § 1983 claim for violations of the Eighth
Amendment. (Wyoming State Penitentiary)

XXIII

28.52

U.S. District Court
WITHHOLDING
CORRESPONDENCE

Hawkins v. Brooks, 694 F.Supp.2d 434 (W.D.Pa. 2010). A state prisoner brought a pro se § 1983 action against
various prison officials and corrections officers, alleging retaliation, harassment, due process violations, defamation of
character, and mental anguish. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and
denied in part. The court held that the prisoner's conduct of pressing charges against a corrections officer who the
prisoner claimed raped and impregnated her and complaining about other officers' alleged harassment amounted to a
“constitutionally protected activity,” as required for the prisoner to state a § 1983 retaliation claim.
The court found that corrections officers' alleged conduct of withholding the prisoner's incoming and outgoing
mail in retaliation for the prisoner's pressing rape charges against an officer at another prison amounted to an “adverse
action,” as required to establish a prima facie pro se § 1983 retaliation claim against the officers. But the court found
that a prison official's alleged conduct of reassigning the prisoner to a different unit in the same prison did not rise to
the level of an “adverse action,” as required to establish a prima facie pro se § 1983 retaliation claim. The court found
that the prisoner had no liberty interest in her place of confinement, transfer, or classification, and thus, prison
officials' alleged refusal to have the prisoner transferred to an out-of-state institution did not violate her due process
rights. The court found that the prisoner's assertions that she made supervisory prison officials aware of the
harassment and retaliation she allegedly suffered at the hands of correctional officers as a result of her pressing rape
charges against a correctional officer at another facility, and that none of the supervisory officials offered assistance or
took any corrective action, were sufficient to state a claim for supervisory liability, in her § 1983 retaliation action.
(State Correctional Institution at Cambridge Springs, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
CONFISCATION

Kendrick v. Faust, 682 F.Supp.2d 932 (E.D. Ark. 2010). A female state prison inmate brought a § 1983 action against
employees of the Arkansas Department of Correction (ADC), alleging various violations of her constitutional rights.
The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The
court held that the inmate failed to allege that she sustained an actual injury or that an Arkansas Department of
Correction (ADC) official denied her the opportunity to review her mail prior to its being confiscated, as required to
support a claim that the official violated the inmate's constitutional right of access to the courts and her First
Amendment right to send and receive mail. The court found that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues
of material fact as to whether there was a legitimate penological interest for the alleged destruction of the prison
inmate's bible, precluding summary judgment as to whether ADC employees violated the inmate's right to freedom of
religion by destroying her bible. (Arkansas Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
LIMITATION
LIMITING
CORRESPONDENTS

Keup v. Hopkins, 596 F.3d 899 (8th Cir. 2010). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against prison officials, alleging
that they violated his First Amendment rights by preventing him from mailing drawings. The prisoner had tried to
send drawings of a marijuana leaf and a bare-breasted woman to his mother and the Maoist Internationalist Movement
(Maoists). The district court entered a directed verdict in the prisoner's favor at the close of a jury trial, and granted
the prisoner's motion for attorney fees. The officials appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded. The court held that the correctional services department's decision to amend an operational memorandum
to ban only drawings that advocated or were likely to incite violent or illegal activity did not render moot the
prisoner's claim for monetary damages for any violations of his constitutional rights that had occurred prior to such an
amendment. According to the court, the prisoner was the “prevailing party,” entitled to attorney fees. The court found
that the prisoner's award of $1.00 in nominal damages was subject to the 150% cap sent by the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (PLRA) and he thus was entitled to only $1.50 in fees, rather than the $25,000 awarded by the district
court. (Lincoln Correctional Center, Nebraska).

U.S. Appeals Court
CORRESPONDENCE
DELIVERY

Prison Legal News v. Schwarzenegger, 608 F.3d 446 (9th Cir. 2010). A nonprofit charitable organization that
published a monthly magazine containing news and analysis relating to the legal rights of prisoners brought an action
against state officials, in their individual and official capacities, seeking monetary, injunctive, and declaratory relief
under § 1983 for violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The organization challenged state institutions'
refusal to deliver the organization's magazine to certain prisoners. After a settlement agreement was reached, the
district court granted the organization's first motion for attorneys' fees and costs, and granted in part the organization's
second motion for attorneys' fees and costs. State officials appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in
part, and remanded with instructions. The court held that the civil rights attorneys' fee statute authorized the
organization, that prevailed in its § 1983 action against state officials by obtaining a legally enforceable settlement
agreement relating to the delivery of its magazine to prisoners, to recover attorneys' fees for monitoring the state
officials' compliance with the parties' settlement agreement. The appeals court held that the district court did not abuse
its discretion by awarding fees for 31.5 hours of “correspondence with inmates” where without such correspondence it
would have been difficult for the organization to discover or to document violations of the terms of the settlement.
(California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation)

U.S. Appeals Court
LEGAL MAIL
READING OF MAIL

Stanley v. Vining, 602 F.3d 767 (6th Cir. 2010). A prisoner filed a § 1983 action against prison officials, claiming
deprivation of his constitutional rights by a prison guard who was allegedly reading the prisoner's legal mail in the
prisoner's presence in his cell in violation of a prison regulation, and by issuing a prison misconduct charge against the
prisoner after an exchange of angry words. The district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that although the prisoner had a
liberty interest in receiving his mail, under the First Amendment, the prisoner was not deprived of his procedural due
process rights based on the prison guard allegedly violating a prison regulation by reading the prisoner's mail in the
prisoner's presence in his cell. The court noted that the prisoner received a post-deprivation hearing, as part of the
prison grievance procedure, which determined that the guard had not read mail in violation of regulation. The court
found that the prisoner's allegation that the guard issued a misconduct charge against him over their dispute that the
guard allegedly read the prisoner's legal mail did not rise to the level of a valid § 1983 claim, where the prisoner failed
to allege that the charge interfered in any way with his rights to counsel, access to courts, equal protection, or
procedural due process. The court noted that the complaint stated no facts or theories from which the court could

28.53

devise a plausible constitutional claim, and did not even divulge what the disposition of the charge was. According to
the court, no constitutional provision flatly prohibits, as unlawful censorship, a prison from opening and reading a
prisoner's mail, unless it can be shown that the conduct interferes with the prisoner's right to counsel or access to the
courts, or violates his rights of equal protection or procedural due process. “We find no per se constitutional rule that
such conduct automatically violates a broad, general rule prohibiting censorship, as our dissenting colleague seems to
imagine. (Alger Maximum Correctional Facility, Michigan Department of Corrections)
U.S. District Court
INTERFERENCE
LEGAL MAIL

Tafari v. McCarthy, 714 F.Supp.2d 317 (N.D.N.Y. 2010). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against employees
of the New York State Department of Correctional Services (DOCS), alleging, among other things, that the
employees violated his constitutional rights by subjecting him to excessive force, destroying his personal property,
denying him medical care, and subjecting him to inhumane conditions of confinement. The employees moved for
summary judgment, and the prisoner moved to file a second amended complaint and to appoint counsel. According to
the court, one incident in which state correctional officers allegedly interfered with the prisoner's outgoing legal mail
did not create a cognizable claim under § 1983 for violation of the prisoner's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights,
absent a showing that the prisoner suffered any actual injury, that his access to courts was chilled, or that his ability to
legally represent himself was impaired. The court found that, even if a state prisoner's right to file prison grievances
was protected by the First Amendment, a restriction limiting the prisoner's filing of grievances to two per week did
not violate the prisoner's constitutional rights, since the prisoner was abusing the grievance program. The court noted
that the prisoner filed an exorbitant amount of grievances, including 115 in a two-month period, most of which were
deemed frivolous. The court held that state prison officials' alleged retaliatory act of leaving the lights on in the
prisoner's cell in a special housing unit (SHU) 24 hours per day did not amount to cruel and unusual treatment, in
violation of the Eighth Amendment. According to the court, the prisoner failed to demonstrate a causal connection
between his conduct and the adverse action of leaving the lights on 24 hours per day, since the illumination policy
applied to all inmates in SHU, not just the prisoner, and constant illumination was related to a legitimate penological
interest in protecting both guards and inmates in SHU. (New York State Department of Correctional Services, Eastern
New York Correctional Facility)

U.S. Appeals Court
PROHIBITIONPUBLICATIONS

Torres v. O'Quinn, 612 F.3d 237 (4th Cir. 2010). An inmate brought an action against state prison officials,
complaining that the officials failed to repair a malfunctioning night-light in his prison cell, resulting in a disturbing
strobe effect. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
The inmate appealed and the appeals court affirmed. The inmate then brought a separate action against prison
officials, alleging a constitutional violation due to the prison's prohibition of his subscription to commercially
available pictures of nude women. The district court dismissed the action for failure to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted, the inmate appealed, and the appeals court dismissed the appeal. The inmate then moved for a
partial refund of filing fees that had been collected from his prison trust account, challenging the prison's practice of
withholding 40 percent of his account to satisfy the filing fee requirement for his two appeals. The appeals court
found that PLRA required that no more than 20 percent of an inmate's monthly income be deducted to pay filing fees,
irrespective of the total number of cases or appeals the inmate had pending at any one time. The court held that
granting the inmate a partial refund of fees was not warranted since the amounts withheld from the inmate's account
were actually owed and were properly, if excessively, collected. (Red Onion State Prison, Virginia)

U.S. District Court
INTERFERENCE

Webster v. Fischer, 694 F.Supp.2d 163 (N.D.N.Y. 2010). An inmate brought a civil rights action against prison
officials, alleging discrimination, retaliation, harassment, and violations of his constitutional rights, federal statutes,
state law, and regulations. The inmate sough declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, as well as money damages in
the amount of $500,000. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court held that
misbehavior reports and disciplinary actions were not in retaliation for the inmate's participation in an inmate liaison
committee, where the inmate was found guilty of the charges in the misbehavior reports based on admissions at a
disciplinary hearing. The court held that there was no evidence that the inmate was placed on a mail watch or that any
of his mail was illegally opened or intentionally misdirected. (Cayuga Correctional Facility, New York State
Department of Correctional Services)
2011

U.S. Appeals Court
ATTORNEY MAIL
PRIVILEGED
CORRESPONDENCE

Al-Amin v. Smith, 637 F.3d 1192 (11th Cir. 2011). A state prison inmate brought a § 1983 action against state
corrections officials, alleging that the officials had repeatedly opened his privileged attorney mail outside of his
presence, in violation of his rights of access to the courts and free speech. The district court denied the officials'
motion for summary judgment. The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed in part, and denied rehearing en banc.
The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. On remand, the district court granted the officials' motion,
precluding the inmate from offering evidence of either compensatory or punitive damages. The inmate appealed. The
appeals court affirmed, finding that the prisoner could not seek punitive damages relief absent a physical injury, under
the provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act. (Georgia State Prison)

U.S. District Court
OUTGOING MAIL
REGULATIONS

Hamilton v. Hall, 790 F.Supp.2d 1368 (N.D.Fla. 2011). A female county jail inmate brought a class action under §
1983 against a county sheriff, challenging a jail policy requiring all outgoing mail, except legal and other privileged
correspondence, to be in postcard form. The sheriff moved to dismiss. The district court denied the motion. The court
held that the inmate stated a claim against the county sheriff under § 1983 for violation of her First Amendment right
to freedom of speech, by alleging that the jail's policy of requiring all outgoing mail, other than legal and otherwise
privileged correspondence, to be in postcard form inhibited her ability to communicate with those outside the jail.
(Santa Rosa County Jail, Florida)

28.54

U.S. Appeals Court
DELIVERY
LEGAL MAIL

Haury v. Lemmon, 656 F.3d 521 (7th Cir. 2011). A prisoner, proceeding pro se, brought a § 1983 action against prison
personnel, alleging they interfered with delivery of his legal mail and failed to provide a sufficient law library. The
district court denied the prisoner's motion to proceed in forma pauperis and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court
reversed and remanded. The appeals court held that dismissal of the prisoner's prior lawsuit for lack of jurisdiction did
not warrant imposing a strike for filing frivolous actions in determining whether the prisoner could proceed in forma
pauperis under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) in his current § 1983 action. (Indiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
PROHIBITIONPUBLICATIONS
REFUSAL

Hrdlicka v. Reniff, 631 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2011). A publisher and his criminal justice publication brought two suits
claiming that their First Amendment rights were being violated by the mail policies at two county jails in California
that refused to distribute unsolicited copies of the publication to inmates. The district court granted summary
judgment to the defendants, and the plaintiffs appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that
summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the jails were justified in refusing
to distribute unsolicited copies of the publication to inmates. According to the court, the facts to be considered
included the degree to which allowing distribution of the publication would produce additional clutter in cells or
otherwise adversely affect jail security, the extent to which the jails would be forced to expend additional resources to
deliver the publication, and whether the publisher could effectively reach inmates by delivery only upon request.
(Sacramento County, Butte County, California)

U.S. District Court
BULK MAIL
NOTICE
DELIVERY

Hughbanks v. Dooley, 788 F.Supp.2d 988 (D.S.D. 2011). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action alleging that the state
Department of Corrections' correspondence policy prohibiting the delivery of bulk-rate mail was unconstitutional. The
prisoner moved for preliminary injunctive relief and asked the court to invalidate portions of the policy. The district
court denied the motion. The court found that the prisoner's mere allegation that his First Amendment rights were
violated by the prison's denial of bulk-rate mail established the threat of irreparable harm, in determining whether to
grant the prisoner a preliminary injunction seeking to invalidate the prison's bulk-rate mail policy, but the balance of
hardships favored the prison in determining whether to grant the prisoner's request. The court noted that the bulk-rate
mail policy was a state policy, and suspension of the policy for all inmates in the state would compromise the safety
and security of every institution in the state. The court found that the policy was rationally-related to the prison's
penological purpose of maintaining security and order, that prisoners could review catalogs in a prison property office
and could pre-pay postage on any catalog to have it mailed first or second class, that the challenged policy was
statewide and any accommodation would have a significant effect on state inmates and prison staff, and the policy
was not an exaggerated response to security and other concerns.
Similarly, the court found that the prisoner's allegation that his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights were
being violated by the prison's failure to notify him when prohibited bulk-rate mail was not delivered established the
threat of irreparable harm, in determining whether to grant the prisoner a preliminary injunction requiring the prison
to notify the intended recipient and sender when bulk-rate correspondence was confiscated. The court again found that
the balance of hardships favored the prison, where the prison would have to expend substantial prison resources to
implement the requested policy, and the current policy was implemented to preserve a prison resource. (Mike Durfee
State Prison, South Dakota)

U.S. District Court
CENSORSHIP
RELIGIOUS LITERATURE

Murphy v. Lockhart, 826 F.Supp.2d 1016 (E.D.Mich. 2011). An inmate at a maximum correctional facility in
Michigan brought a § 1983 action against various Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) employees alleging
that his placement in long-term and/or indefinite segregation was unconstitutional, that he was prohibited from
communicating with his friends and family, and that his ability to practice his Christian religion was being hampered
in violation of his First Amendment rights. The inmate also alleged that the MDOC's mail policy was
unconstitutional. The defendants moved for summary judgment and for a protective order. The court held that the
prisoner's statements in a published magazine article discussing an escape attempt were protected speech, and that a
fact issue precluded summary judgment on the retaliation claims against the other facility's warden, resident unit
manager, and assistant resident unit supervisor stemming from the prisoner's participation in that article. The Esquire
Magazine article discussed security flaws at the correctional facility, detailing the prisoners' escape plan and revealing
which prison staff he manipulated and how he obtained and built necessary tools to dig a tunnel. The court noted that
the prisoner's statements were not directed to fellow inmates, and rather he spoke on issues relating to prison security
and was critical of the conduct of Michigan Department of Corrections personnel, which resulted in his nearsuccessful prison break. The court found that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact, as
to whether the defendants' proffered legitimate grounds for removing the prisoner from his coveted administrative
segregation work assignment as a porter/painter/laundry worker--discovery that he possessed contraband--were a
pretext to retaliate for his protected speech in the published magazine article. The court found that the alleged
violation of the prisoner's right to free exercise of his religion from the rejection of a claimed religious publication,
Codex Magica, was justified by the prison's legitimate penological interest in limiting prisoners' access to books that
included instructions on how to write in code. According to the court, because the prison had a valid penological
interest in restricting access to the publication, which contained instructions on how to write in code, the prisoner mail
regulation used to censor that book could not be unconstitutional as applied on the ground that it prevented the
prisoner's access to that publication. (Ionia Maximum Correctional Facility, Kinross Correctional Facility, Standish
Correctional Facility, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
LEGAL MAIL
INTERFERENCE

Neff v. Bryant, 772 F.Supp.2d 1318 (D.Nev. 2011). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a warden, caseworker
and correctional officers, alleging violations of the First, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. After dismissal of the
prisoner's claims, the prisoner filed an amended complaint. The court held that the prisoner's allegations that he was
denied parole due to his security classification were insufficient to state a § 1983 claim for denial of Fourteenth
Amendment due process. The court found that the prisoner's allegations that legal materials mailed to him were
intercepted and withheld, and that as a result he lost a motion related to a civil claim, were insufficient to state a §
1983 claim for denial of access to the courts in violation of the First Amendment, absent allegations as to the nature of
the motion, or that the result of the failed motion was the loss of a non-frivolous direct criminal appeal, habeas corpus
petition, or § 1983 claim. (Ely State Prison, Nevada)

28.55

U.S. Appeals Court
LIMITATION
PROHIBITION

Perry v. Secretary, Florida Dept. of Corrections, 664 F.3d 1359 (11th Cir. 2011). An individual who operated two pen
pal services that solicited pen pals for prisoners, as well as another pen pal service, brought a civil rights action
challenging the constitutionality of a Florida Department of Corrections (FDOC) rule prohibiting inmates from
soliciting pen pals. The district court granted the FDOC's motion for summary judgment and the plaintiffs appealed.
The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the plaintiffs, whose interests as publishers in accessing
prisoners had been harmed, had standing to bring their claims, but that the FDOC rule at issue was rationally related
to a legitimate penological interest. The court found that the plaintiffs had a liberty interest in accessing inmates and
they were afforded constitutionally required due process. The court noted that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
Procunier v. Martinez set forth a three-part test to decide whether there are proper procedural safeguards for inmate
correspondence of a personal nature: (1) the inmate must receive notice of the rejection of a letter written by or
addressed to him, (2) the author of the letter must be given reasonable opportunity to protest that decision, and (3)
complaints must be referred to a prison official other than the person who originally disapproved the correspondence.
(Florida Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELIVERY
PROHIBITIONPUBLICATION

Van den Bosch v. Raemisch, 658 F.3d 778 (7th Cir. 2011). The publisher of a newsletter about the Wisconsin state
prison system and a pro se state prisoner who wrote an article for that newsletter brought separate actions challenging
a regulation imposed by the Wisconsin Department of Corrections (DOC) on distribution of incoming prisoner mail.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the DOC officials. The plaintiffs appealed and the actions
were consolidated for appeal. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the officials' decision to bar distribution
of the newsletter to prisoners did not violate the First Amendment and the officials' refusal to deliver copies of the
article that the state prisoner had written to the newsletter did not violate the prisoner's First Amendment rights. The
court noted that one newsletter article described the Wisconsin parole commission as totalitarian and abusers of
prisoners, and another urged its readers to employ any and all tactics to bring about change in prison life, so that it
was reasonable for the officials to perceive the newsletter articles as posing a potential threat to rehabilitation and
security. (Green Bay Correctional Institution, Wisconsin)

U.S. Appeals Court
REGULATIONS
PROHIBITION

Woods v. Commissioner of the Ind. Dept. of Corrections, 652 F.3d 745 (7TH Cir. 2011). State inmates brought a class
action against the Indiana Department of Corrections (IDOC), alleging violations of the First Amendment related to a
regulation prohibiting advertising for pen-pals and receiving materials from websites and publications that allowed
advertisements for pen-pals. The district court granted the IDOC's motion for summary judgment and the inmates
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the regulation related fairly directly to the IDOC's stated
goal of preventing fraud by limiting inmates' access to potential victims, thus weighing in favor of a finding that the
regulation was reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest in the inmates' class action. The court noted that
ample alternative means of communication existed regardless of the regulation, where inmates were free to obtain
pen–pals through various groups that visited the prison or to cultivate contacts through other inmates, their attorneys,
and by their own initiative. (Indiana Department of Corrections)
2012

U.S. Appeals Court
CORRESPONDENCEFRIENDS
RELATIVES
PROHIBITIONPUBLICATIONS
SECURITY PRACTICES

Al-Owhali v. Holder, 687 F.3d 1236 (10th Cir. 2012). A federal inmate brought a suit against the Attorney General,
the Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), a prison warden, and the FBI, alleging that several special
administrative measures imposed upon him violated his First and Fifth Amendment rights. The inmate had been
convicted of several terrorism-related offenses stemming from the 1998 bombing of the United States embassy in
Nairobi, Kenya. The district court dismissed the complaint and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The
appeals court held that: (1) the inmate failed to address whether the ban on his communications with his nieces and
nephews was supported by a rational penal interest; (2) the measure preventing the inmate's subscription to two
Arabic–language newspapers fell within the warden's broad discretion to limit incoming information, and was
rationally related to a penal interest to prevent the inmate from acting upon contemporary information or receiving
coded messages; and (3) the inmate offered only a vague allegation regarding the measure that purportedly barred him
from obtaining a book authored by former President Jimmy Carter, where the inmate offered no factual context to
show that the measure was unrelated to any legitimate penal interest, and instead merely implied the existence of a
secret list of banned publications. (United States Penitentiary, Administrative Maximum, Florence, Colorado)

U.S. District Court
LEGAL MAIL

Blalock v. Eaker, 845 F.Supp.2d 678 (W.D.N.C. 2012). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against prison
officials, alleging they lost his legal mail. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
The court held that when prison staff ignored the detainee's subpoenas it did not violate his right of access to the
courts. The court noted that the detainee was represented by counsel, the subpoenas were invalid as the detainee was a
criminal defendant who had no right under North Carolina common law to pretrial discovery, North Carolina statutes
did not authorize the use of subpoenas “duces tecum” as a criminal discovery tool, and North Carolina law did not
allow criminal defendants to depose witnesses. (Lincoln County Detention Center, North Carolina)

U.S. District Court
RELIGIOUS
LITERATURE
SECURITY PRACTICES

Forter v. Geer, 868 F.Supp.2d 1091 (D.Or. 2012). A state inmate, who was a member of the Christian Identity Faith
and proceeding pro se, brought a § 1983 action against department of corrections (DOC) employees, alleging
violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act (RLUIPA). The defendants filed a motion to dismiss and for summary judgment. The district court granted the
motions. The court held that the inmate did not file grievances for most claims, even though such procedures were
available to him, and he did not appeal those grievances that he did file, and therefore failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies under the provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995.
The court held that withholding of a religious poster did not substantially burden the religious exercise of the
inmate, who was a member of the Christian Identity Faith, as would violate the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The court also held that size restrictions which prevented the inmate from
possessing the religious poster did not violate his First Amendment free exercise rights, where the regulations

28.56

prevented any items, except subscription newspapers, over a certain size. According to the court, prison officials
withholding of certain religious pamphlets from the mail of the inmate, was validly and rationally connected to a
legitimate interest in ensuring order and safety, for the purposes of the inmate's § 1983 claim alleging that the
withholding violated his First Amendment free exercise and Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights. The court
noted that the pamphlets contained racially inflammatory material and that the prison population was racially mixed.
(Oregon Department of Corrections)
U.S. District Court
DELIVERY
INTERFERENCE
LEGAL MAIL

Galeas v. Inpold, 845 F.Supp.2d 685 (W.D.N.C. 2012). An inmate, proceeding pro se, brought a § 1983 action against
a mailroom officer, alleging mishandling of his legal mail. The district court granted the officer’s motion to dismiss.
The court held that the inmate's allegations that his mother sent him two packages by certified mail containing his
legal papers, that the mailroom officer signed the receipt, and that the inmate never received the packages were
insufficient to plead intentional interference by the officer, as required to state a § 1983 claim for denial of access to
the courts in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court also held that the allegations were insufficient to
plead an actual injury, as required to state a § 1983 claim against the mailroom officer for denial of access to the
courts, absent allegations as to the contents of those papers or of the legal to issue to which they were vital.
(Lanesboro Correctional Institution, North Carolina)

U.S. District Court
INDIGENT INMATES
POSTAGE
MAIL

Gaskins v. Dickhaut, 881 F.Supp.2d 223 (D.Mass. 2012). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a prison's
superintendent and treasurer, alleging the defendants violated his constitutional right of access to courts under the
Fourteenth Amendment. The prisoner challenged a Massachusetts Department of Corrections' (DOC) regulation that
determined that an inmate was not indigent, and thus ineligible for free postage, if he had more than $10 in his prison
account during 60-day period. The defendants moved to dismiss and the district court allowed the motion. The court
held that the inmate failed to allege that the policy prevented him from pursuing a legal claim or caused him to suffer
an actual injury, as required to state a § 1983 claim against prison officials for denial of access to courts under
Fourteenth Amendment, where his complaint lacked such allegations. (Massachusetts Department of Corrections,
Souza Baranowski Correctional Center)

U.S. District Court
CENSORSHIP
LEGAL MAIL
LIMITING
CORRESPONDENTS
REGULATIONS

Hill v. Terrell, 846 F.Supp.2d 488 (W.D.N.C. 2012). A state prisoner, proceeding pro se, brought an action against a
department of correction (DOC) and prison officials, alleging denial of access to the courts. The district court granted
the defendants motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court held that the prison's censorship of the prisoner's
outgoing mail did not violate his First Amendment rights, where two individuals contacted the prison with notice that
they did not wish to be contacted by the prisoner, the prison policy permitted withdrawal of the prisoner's privilege to
write to a particular person upon request by that person, and the prisoner was informed that letters would be censored
to those people. According to the court, the prisoner's allegations that prison staff censored his legal mail, preventing
him from communicating adequately or confidentially with his attorneys, were insufficient to state a § 1983 claim for
denial of access to the courts in violation of the First Amendment, absent allegations of any specific instances where
his legal mail was censored or of an actual injury from the censorship. (Marion Correctional Institution, North
Carolina)

U.S. Appeals Court
LIMITING
CORRESPONDENCE
REGULATIONS

Lane v. Williams, 689 F.3d 879 (7th Cir. 2012). Convicted sex offenders who, after completing their sentences,
remained in state custody as civil detainees pursuant to the Illinois Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act,
brought a § 1983 action, alleging constitutional problems with the conditions of their confinement at a treatment
facility. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants and the detainees appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The appeals court held that security restrictions on face-to-face interactions between the civil detainees held
in different units within the state's treatment facility for sexually violent persons (SVP) did not constitute treatment
decisions which, as a matter of due process, had to be made by health professionals, merely because the security
restrictions affected treatment options. The court found that requiring the civil detainees to use United States Mail,
rather than the facility's internal mail system, to send letters to detainees in the facility's other units did not violate the
detainees' First Amendment associational rights, even if the facility's internal mail system was a superior means of
sending letters. The court noted that commitment under the Illinois Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act is civil
and may be for purposes such as incapacitation and treatment, but not for punishment. As a general matter, persons
who have been involuntarily civilly committed are entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of
confinement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are designed to punish. (Rushville Treatment and
Detention Center, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
LIMITING
CORRESPONDENTS
RELIGION

Moorehead v. Keller, 845 F.Supp.2d 689 (W.D.N.C. 2012). A state inmate, a Messianic Jew, brought a pro se § 1983
action against North Carolina Department of Corrections (DOC) officials, alleging that the officials prevented him
from writing to his “spiritual advisor” and discontinued Messianic Jewish services at the prison, in violation of his
constitutional rights. The defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings. The district court granted the motion. The
court held that the state prison regulation prohibiting prison volunteers from corresponding with inmates was
reasonably related to the prison's legitimate penological interest in preventing volunteers from becoming unduly
familiar with inmates, and thus the actions of North Carolina Department of Corrections (DOC) officials in preventing
the Messianic Jewish inmate from corresponding with his “spiritual advisor,” who was a volunteer at the prison,
pursuant to regulation did not violate the inmate's constitutional rights. (Mountain View Correctional Institution,
North Carolina)

U.S. Appeals Court
PROHIBITIONPUBLICATIONS

Prison Legal News v. Livingston, 683 F.3d 201 (5th Cir. 2012). A non-profit publisher of a magazine about prisoners'
rights filed a § 1983 suit claiming violation of the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause by the Texas
Department of Criminal Justice's (TDCJ) book censorship policy and procedures, as applied to the publisher that was
prohibited from distributing five books to prisoners. The district court granted the TDCJ summary judgment. The
publisher appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the TDCJ book censorship policy that prohibited

28.57

the publisher's distribution of two books graphically depicting prison rape was rationally related to a legitimate
penological goal of protecting prisoners from a threat to safety and security by use of descriptions as templates to
commit similar rapes, and thus, the policy as applied to the publisher's distribution of the two books to prisoners did
not contravene the publisher's First Amendment right to free speech. According to the court, the TDCJ book
censorship policy that prohibited the publisher's distribution of a book containing racial slurs and advocating
overthrow of prisons by riot and revolt was rationally related to the legitimate penological goal of protecting the
prison's safety and security from race riots, and thus, the policy as applied to the publisher's distribution of book to
prisoners did not contravene the publisher's First Amendment right to free speech. The court also noted that the prison
had a legitimate penological goal of protecting prisoners from the threat of violence due to the existence of race-based
prison gangs and the prevalence of racial discord. The court found that the TDCJ book censorship policy that formerly
prohibited the publisher's distribution of a book recounting sexual molestation of a young child was rationally related
to the legitimate penological goal of protecting the prison from impairment of the rehabilitation of sex offenders and
from disruptive outbursts by prisoners who were similarly victimized, and thus, the policy as applied to the publisher's
distribution of the book to prisoners did not contravene the publisher's First Amendment right to free speech. The
court noted that the TDCJ policy left prisoners and the publisher with ample alternatives for exercising their free
speech rights by permitting prisoners to read the publisher's newsletter and the majority of books that the publisher
distributed. (Prison Legal News, Texas Department of Criminal Justice)
U.S. Appeals Court
DELIVERY

Swann v. Secretary, Georgia, 668 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 2012). A former inmate at a county jail brought a civil rights
action against a state and county officials, alleging that the officials failed to mail him a presidential absentee ballot at
the jail. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The former inmate appealed. The
appeals court vacated and remanded with instructions. The appeals court held that the former inmate lacked standing
to bring an action against county officials for their failure to mail him an absentee ballot for the presidential election at
the county jail, where the inmate's non-receipt of a ballot was not fairly traceable to any action of the officials, but
only to inmate's own conduct, since the inmate failed to provide the address of the jail on his absentee ballot
application. (DeKalb County Jail, Georgia)

U.S. District Court
INSPECTION OF MAIL
OUTGOING MAIL

U.S. v. Ligambi, 886 F.Supp.2d 492 (E.D.Pa. 2012). A detainee who was charged with various crimes, including
racketeering, moved to suppress an outgoing prison letter seized by prison officials. The district court denied the
motion. The court held that the defendant, who was in prison while charged with various crimes, including
racketeering, did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his outgoing non-privileged mail. The court noted
that prison regulations permitted officials to seize correspondence when it might contain information concerning
criminal activities, it was established practice to inspect non-privileged mailings to promote discipline in the
institution, and the defendant had a reputation for involvement with organized crime. (South Woods State Prison,
Southern State Correctional Facility, New Jersey)
2013

U.S. District Court
DELAY
INTERFERENCE
LEGAL MAIL

Duran v. Merline, 923 F.Supp.2d 702 (D.N.J. 2013). A former pretrial detainee at a county detention facility brought
a pro se § 1983 action against various facility officials and employees, the company which provided food and
sanitation services to the facility, and the medical services provider, alleging various constitutional torts related to his
pretrial detention. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motions in part and
denied in part. The district court held that fact issues precluded summary judgment on: (1) the conditions of
confinement claim against a former warden in his official capacity; (2) an interference with legal mail claim against a
correctional officer that alleged that the facility deliberately withheld the detainee's legal mail during a two-week
period; (3) a First Amendment retaliation claim based on interference with legal mail; and (4) a claim for inadequate
medical care as to whether the detainee's Hepatitis C condition was a serious medical condition that required
treatment and whether the provider denied such treatment because it was too costly. (Atlantic County Justice Facility,
New Jersey)

U.S. District Court
PROHIBITIONPUBLICATIONS
SECURITY PRACTICES

Gray v. Cannon, 974 F.Supp.2d 1150 (N.D.Ill. 2013). State inmates brought an action against prison officials,
alleging that the officials' refusal to let them receive mail that included photographs depicting nudity and sexual
activity violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment, and that grievance procedures for challenging the
refusals violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court granted the officials’
motion for summary judgment. The court held that a state prison regulation preventing inmates from obtaining nude
or sexually explicit photographs was reasonably related to legitimate penological interests, and thus did not violate the
inmates' First Amendment rights. The court noted that: (1) the regulation was expressly aimed at protecting prison
security; (2) the regulation permitted withholding reading materials only if it furthered interests in security, good
order, or discipline, and there existed a valid and rational connection between the regulation and prison security; (3)
the prison left open alternative means of exercising the restricted right by permitting inmates to receive a wide range
of publications; (4) the restrictions fell within the broad limits of deference to prison officials regarding what was
detrimental to security; and (5) the inmates did not point to an alternative that fully accommodated inmates' rights at a
de minimus cost to valid penological interests. The court found that there was no evidence regarding how the state
prison's grievance and appeal procedures operated, as required to support the inmates’ claim that they were provided
with insufficient opportunities to challenge prison's rejections of sexually explicit photographs and publications sent
to them, in violation of due process. (Stateville Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
PACKAGES
RELIGIOUS
LITERATURE

Kramer v. Conway, 962 F.Supp.2d 1333 (N.D.Ga. 2013). A pretrial detainee at a county jail brought an action against
the jail, the jail administrator, and a county sheriff, alleging that conditions of his confinement violated his right to
practice his Orthodox Jewish faith, that the defendants violated his right to possess legal reference books, and that the
defendants failed to accommodate his physical disabilities. The detainee moved for a preliminary and a permanent
injunction and moved for leave to file a second amendment to his verified complaint. The defendants moved for

28.58

summary judgment. The district court denied the motions in part and granted the motion in part. The court held that
the pretrial detainee’s allegation that the county jail denied him books needed to practice his Orthodox Jewish
religious faith failed to establish a violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA),
absent evidence that the county jail received federal funds in connection with its policies limiting the number and type
of books allowed in cells. The court held that the county jail's policy of limiting the number of religious books that the
pretrial detainee, an Orthodox Jew, could keep in his cell, but providing him access to others that were not in his cell,
was based on legitimate penological interests, and thus, did not violate the detainee's rights under the Free Exercise
Clause. According to the court, a uniformly applied books-in-cell limitation was reasonable in a facility that housed
2,200 inmates, the limitation was applied in a neutral way and the expressive content of books was not considered,
books in sufficient quantities could be used as weapons and presented fire and obstacle hazards, access to other books
was made by exchanging out titles and by allowing the copying of parts or all of a text, and the detainee was not
denied access to nine religious books he claimed were required in practicing his faith, but rather, argued only that
access was required to be more convenient.
The court found that the jail's policy of prohibiting hard cover books in cells, including limiting religious texts to
those that did not have hard covers, was based on legitimate penological interests, and thus, did not violate rights of
the pretrial detainee, an Orthodox Jew, under the Free Exercise Clause. The court noted that evidence at hearing on
the detainee's motion for injunctive relief showed that hardcover books posed safety and security risks because hard
covers could be used to conceal contraband and because of their potential use as weapons, the policy was applied in a
neutral way, and the expressive content of books was not considered.
The court found that the jail's policy of limiting package mail to four pounds was based on legitimate penological
interests, and thus, did not violate rights as applied to the pretrial detainee, an Orthodox Jew, under the Free Exercise
Clause when the jail rejected one of detainee's packages that contained more than four pounds of books. The court
noted that the jail received a large volume of mail and other items each day, all of which had to be searched for
contraband and threats their contents could pose to the safety and security of inmates and jail officials, the policy was
applied in a neutral way, and the expressive content of books was not considered. The court held that the jail's policy
that limited the number and type of books allowed in a cell did not violate the pretrial detainee's Due Process rights,
where there was no evidence that the policy was intended to punish the detainee, the jail's policies prohibiting hard
cover books and limiting the number of books allowed in a cell were reasonably related to legitimate penological
interests, and the jail gave the detainee substantial access to legal materials by increasing the time he was allowed in
the library and liberally allowing him to copy legal materials to keep in his cell. (Gwinnett County Jail, Georgia)
U.S. District Court
CORRESPONDENCE
INTERFERENCE

Lineberry v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 923 F.Supp.2d 284 (D.D.C. 2013). A federal prisoner brought an action
against the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) and prison official under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and Bivens,
alleging he was denied access to the postal service in violation of his First Amendment rights. The district court
granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court held that the prisoner's admitted failure to submit a claim to the
Bureau of Prisons prior to filing his lawsuit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) alleging BOP's mail
regulations violated his First Amendment rights, deprived the district court of subject matter jurisdiction. According
to the court, the prisoner's allegations that neither his counselor nor his unit manager provided him the appropriate
form for submitting a formal inmate grievance, and that without access to the first step of the process, he could not
have been expected to complete the process, were sufficient to allege that circumstances rendered administrative
remedies effectively unavailable, such as would excuse the prisoner from exhausting his administrative remedies, as
required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The court found that neither the requirement of a mailing label
generated by the Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) mail system, nor the return of mail lacking such a label, violated the
prisoner's First Amendment rights, and the prisoner provided no factual allegations to support his conclusory claims
that the system denied him access to the press, the establishment or exercise of religion, and peaceable assembly.
(Federal Correctional Institution in Texarkana, Texas)

U.S. Appeals Court
BULK MAIL
CENSORSHIP

Mays v. Springborn, 719 F.3d 631 (7th Cir. 2013). A former state prisoner brought an action against prison officials,
asserting claims based on strip searches at prisons and alleging retaliation for his complaints about the searches, denial
of his request for a dietary supplements which he considered to be religious necessities, inadequacy of his diet, failure
to issue certain winter clothing items, and censorship of pages in a magazine mailed to him. The district granted
summary judgment in favor of the officials on the claims about prison food and clothing and granted the officials
judgment as a matter of law on the claims about strip searches, retaliation, and censorship. The prisoner appealed. The
appeals court affirmed in part, vacated the judgment with respect to the strip searches, and remanded. On remand, the
district court entered judgment, upon a jury verdict, in favor of the officials as to the strip search claims, and the
prisoner again appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The appeals court held that: (1) even if there was a
valid penological reason for the strip searches conducted on a prisoner, the manner in which the searches were
conducted was itself required to pass constitutional muster, and (2) a jury instruction requiring the prisoner to negate
the possibility that strip searches would have occurred even if there had been no retaliatory motive was plain error.
(Stateville Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
BULK MAIL
DELIVERY
PROHIBITIONPUBLICATIONS
REFUSAL
REJECTING MAIL

Prison Legal News v. Babeu, 933 F.Supp.2d 1188 (D.Ariz. 2013). A non-profit organization that produced and
distributed a monthly journal and books to inmates brought an action against county jail officers and mailroom
employees, alleging that the defendants violated its First Amendment and due process rights by failing to deliver its
materials to its subscribers at the jail. The parties cross-moved for partial summary judgment. The court granted the
motions in part, denied in part, and deferred in part. The court held that the jail's policy limiting incoming inmate
correspondence to one-page and postcards did not violate the First Amendment, where there was an apparent
common-sense connection between the jail's goal of reducing contraband and limiting the number of pages a
particular piece of correspondence contained, and sufficient alternative avenues of communication remained open for
publishers who wished to communicate with inmates at the jail. But the court held that the jail’s failure to give the
non-profit organization notice and the opportunity to appeal the jail's refusal to deliver its materials to inmates
violated the organization's procedural due process rights.

28.59

The court ruled that the blanket ban on newspapers and magazines violated clearly established law, and therefore
neither the county jail mailroom employees nor their supervisors were entitled to qualified immunity from the § 1983
First Amendment claim arising from employees' failure to deliver the organization's materials to inmates. According
to the court, the law was clear that blanket bans on newspapers and magazines in prisons violated the First
Amendment, and it was objectively unreasonable for the employees to throw away mail, or refuse to deliver it, based
upon a perceived blanket ban on newspapers and magazines. Because the county jail mailroom uniformly enforced the
unconstitutional county policy and allowed books from only four publishers, the county was subject to liability for
First Amendment violations in § 1983 action.
The court held that there was no evidence that mailroom employees, their supervisors, or command staff at the
county jail were motivated by evil motive or intent when they violated the non-profit publisher's First Amendment
and due process rights by discarding publisher's materials without providing the publisher opportunity to contest or
appeal the non-deliverability decision, or that those individuals' unconstitutional actions involved reckless or callous
indifference to the publisher's federally protected rights, as would support an award of punitive damages against the
individuals in the publisher's § 1983 action. (Pinal County Jail, Arizona)
U.S. District Court
BULK MAIL
DELIVERY
LIMITATION
NOTICE
PROHIBITIONPUBLICATIONS
REGULATIONS

Prison Legal News v. Columbia County, 942 F.Supp.2d 1068 (D.Or. 2013). A publisher filed a § 1983 action alleging
that a county and its officials violated the First Amendment by rejecting dozens of its publications and letters mailed
to inmates incarcerated in its jail and violated the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to provide it or the inmates with
the notice of, and opportunity to, appeal the jail's rejection of its publications and letters. A bench trial was held,
resulting in a judgment for the publisher. The court held that: (1) the policy prohibiting inmates from receiving mail
that was not on a postcard violated the First Amendment; (2) the county had a policy of prohibiting inmates from
receiving magazines; (3) the county failed to provide adequate notice of withholding of incoming mail by jail
authorities; (4) entry of a permanent injunction prohibiting officials from enforcing the postcard-only policy was
warranted; and (5) a permanent injunction prohibiting officials from enforcing the prohibition against magazines was
not warranted. (Columbia County Jail, Oregon)
2014

U.S. District Court
LEGAL MAIL
WITHHOLDING
CORRESPONDENCE
NOTICE
LIMITATION

American Civil Liberties Union Fund of Michigan v. Livingston County, 23 F.Supp.3d 834 (E.D.Mich. 2014). A civil
rights organization brought a § 1983 action against a county and county officials alleging that the jail's postcard-only
mail policy violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Following the grant of a temporary restraining order
(TRO), the organization moved for preliminary injunction. The district court granted the motion. The organization had
sought a preliminary injunction enjoining the jail policy of refusing to promptly deliver properly marked legal mail
sent by an organization attorney and individually addressed to an inmate. The court held that there was a likelihood of
success on the merits of its claim that the policy violated the First Amendment protection accorded inmates' legal
mail. The court noted that the organization sent letters in envelopes that were individually addressed to individual
inmates, were labeled “legal mail,” clearly delineated that the mail came from an organization attorney, the letters
asked if the inmate was interested in meeting with an organization attorney to obtain legal advice regarding the jail
policy of limiting all incoming and outgoing mail to one side of a four by six–inch postcard, but the letters were not
delivered. The jail opened the letters and read them, and the jail failed to notify the inmates or the organization that
the letters were not delivered. (Livingston County Jail, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
LANGUAGE
READING OF MAIL
PROHIBITION
EMAIL

Grenning v. Klemme, 34 F.Supp.3d 1144 (E.D.Wash. 2014). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action alleging that
prison officials and employees retaliated against him, in violation of the First Amendment, for the content of letters
and manuscript he authored, as well as his filing of grievances and a lawsuit. The district court granted the inmate’s
motion for a protective order. The officials moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in
part and denied in part. The court held that the inmate's incoming mail from his creative writing instructor and his
outgoing mail to his mother were restricted by prison officials due to the legitimate penological interest of prohibiting
inmates from receiving or sending sexually explicit mail, and thus the restriction of the mail did not violate the
inmate's First Amendment rights. The court found that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of
material fact as to whether prison mailroom staff members selectively applied the foreign language mail policy as a
pretext to prevent the inmate, who filed grievances, from receiving mail from his overseas parents written in
Norwegian, as to whether the staff members made an effort to seek translations, and as to whether the policy as
applied amounted to a de facto ban on all of the inmate's incoming non-English mail. The court also found that
summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether a correctional officer who screened
the inmate's outgoing e-mail to his family and a correctional sergeant with whom the screening officer shared the email colluded to penalize the inmate for opinions expressed in the e-mail, and as to whether the actions of the
screening officer and the sergeant chilled the inmate's exercise of protected rights. The court held that the correctional
sergeant was not entitled to qualified immunity from the inmate's § 1983 claim that the sergeant retaliated against
him, in violation of the First Amendment, when he disciplined the inmate based on disparaging remarks contained in
the inmate's outgoing e-mail to his mother, where a reasonable official would have understood that punishing the
inmate for the unflattering content of personal correspondence directed to another was unlawful. (Airway Heights
Corrections Center, Washington)

U.S. District Court
CENSORSHIP
PUBLICATIONS
LIMITATIONS

Karsjens v. Jesson, 6 F.Supp.3d 916 (D.Minn. 2014). Patients who were civilly committed to the Minnesota Sex
Offender Program (MSOP) brought a § 1983 class action against officials, alleging various claims, including failure to
provide treatment, denial of the right to be free from inhumane treatment, and denial of the right to religious freedom.
The patients moved for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, and the officials moved to dismiss. The district
court granted the defendants’ motion in part and denied in part, and denied the plaintiffs’ motions. According to the
court, the patients stated a § 1983 First Amendment free exercise claim against state officials with allegations that
MSOP's policies, procedures, and practices caused the patients to be monitored during religious services and during
private meetings with clergy, did not permit patients to wear religious apparel or to possess certain religious property,

28.60

and did not allow patients to “communally celebrate their religious beliefs by having feasts,” and that such policies
and practices were not related to legitimate institutional or therapeutic interests. The court also found that the patients’
allegations that state officials limited their phone use, limited their access to certain newspapers and magazines, and
removed or censored articles from newspapers and magazines, stated a § 1983 First Amendment claim that officials
unreasonably restricted their right to free speech. (Minnesota Sex Offender Program)
U.S. Appeals Court
LEGAL MAIL
READING OF MAIL

Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 2014). A state death-row inmate brought a § 1983 action for declaratory
and injunctive relief against Arizona Department of Corrections (ADOC) officials and a prison guard who allegedly
read the inmate's legal mail. A district court dismissed for failure to state a claim. The inmate appealed. The appeals
court reversed and remanded, finding that the inmate stated claims for a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel. According to the court, the inmate, by alleging that the prison guard read, rather than merely inspected or
scanned for contraband the inmate's outgoing legal mail related to the appeal of his murder conviction and death
sentence, and that prison officials had asserted their entitlement to read a prisoner's legal mail while in the prisoner's
presence, stated a claim for violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. (Arizona State Prison)

U.S. District Court
PUBLICATIONS
NOTICE
LIMITATIONS

Prison Legal News v. Chapman, 44 F.Supp.3d 1289 (M.D.Ga. 2014). The publisher of a periodical that addressed
prisoners' rights brought a civil rights action against a county sheriff and a county jail commander, alleging that mail
policies at the jail restricting the distribution of the periodical violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. A bench
trial was held. The district court entered judgment in favor of the publisher in part and in favor of the defendants in
part. The court held that: (1) the jail's postcard-only policy did not violate the publisher's First Amendment right of
free speech; (2) the jail policy totally banning individual inmates' receipt of publications through the mail violated the
First Amendment; and, (3) the postcard-only policy violated due process. According to the court, the jail's postcardonly policy, which restricted a jail inmate's receipt of mail to postcards only, was reasonably related to the jail's
legitimate penological interests in security and efficiency, and thus, did not violate the periodical publisher's First
Amendment right to communicate with inmates. The court noted that by limiting the space in which correspondents
could communicate with inmates, the policy impeded the ability to conceal illegal schemes in lengthy correspondence,
reduced the likelihood of inmates' receipt of contraband, saved jail employees' four to six hours per day screening
inmate mail, and the publisher could still communicate via postcards or by phone, and no easy, low-cost alternative
existed. But the court found that the postcard-only policy did not provide appropriate notice and appeal procedures for
non-postcard mail, and thus, violated the publisher's procedural due process rights, where no jail policy required the
sender to be notified each time the jail decided not to deliver to an inmate a book, a magazine, or a multi-page letter.
(Walton County Jail, Georgia)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONFISCATION
LIMITATION
REGULATIONS

Stauffer v. Gearhart, 741 F.3d 574 (5th Cir. 2014). A state prisoner brought a civil rights action against prison
employees in their individual and official capacities, claiming that they violated his First Amendment rights by
confiscating his magazines under a Sex Offender Treatment Program (SOTP) rule, violated his due process rights by
failing to provide any meaningful review of a mailroom employee's decisions, and violated his equal protection rights
by applying the policy solely to inmates participating in the SOTP. The district court granted summary judgment for
the prison employees. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the state prison's rule
providing for confiscation of the magazines of prisoners in the Sex Offender Treatment Program (SOTP) was neutral,
as required to not violate the prisoner's free speech rights, despite not banning newspapers and religious materials,
since the purpose of the rule was to facilitate treatment and the prison did not have any ulterior motive in
promulgating the rule. According to the court, the rule was rationally related to the prison's legitimate interest in sexoffender rehabilitation, as required to not violate the prisoner's free speech rights, since the rule placed restrictions on
reading material in order to facilitate treatment by preventing distractions. The court noted that the magazines that the
prisoner requested undermined the goals of the SOTP in the professional judgments by prison officials tasked with
overseeing program. According to the court, confiscation of the magazines of the prisoner in the SOTP, pursuant to
the rule, did not deprive the prisoner of due process, since the prisoner could, and did, use the prison's grievance
system to claim that he had been wrongly denied those magazines, and prison administrators responded by
investigating his claims and giving written justification that explained why he was not entitled to relief. (Texas
Department of Criminal Justice, Goree Unit)
2015

U.S. Appeals Court
POSTCARDS
INCOMING MAIL
PRIVILEGED
CORRESPONDENCE
REGULATIONS
NOTICE
REFUSAL

American Civil Liberties Union Fund of Michigan v. Livingston County, 796 F.3d 636 (6th Cir. 2015). A civil rights
organization brought a § 1983 action against a county and county officials alleging that the jail’s mail policy, pursuant
to which all incoming and outgoing mail except “bona-fide legal mail” had to be on standard four-by-six-inch
postcards, violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Following the grant of a temporary restraining order
(TRO), the organization moved for a preliminary injunction. The district court granted the motion and the county
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the organization had a likelihood of success on the merits of
its claim that the policy violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process protections. The court noted that the
organization alleged that the jail blocked delivery of letters sent by the organization’s attorney without providing the
organization or the intended inmate recipients notice and opportunity to contest the decision. (Livingston County Jail,
Michigan)

U.S. District Court
LEGAL MAIL

Angulo v. Nassau County, 89 F.Supp.3d 541 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). An inmate brought a pro se action against a county and
its correctional facility personnel, alleging the defendants violated his constitutional rights through the destruction of
various legal documents and his legal mail. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted
the motion. The court held that: (1) the inmate’s letter of complaint did not comply with the correctional facility’s
grievance procedure, and thus the inmate failed to properly exhaust his administrative remedies; (2) administrative
remedies were “available” to the inmate, and thus the inmate was not excused from filing a grievance; (3) the inmate’s
allegations that personnel acted willfully and maliciously were insufficient to support the claim that personnel

28.61

interfered with his ability to access the courts; and (4) personnel did not conspire to destroy the inmate’s legal mail.
(Nassau County Correctional Center, and Downstate Correctional Facility, New York)
U.S. District Court
REGULATIONS
POSTCARDS

Barnes v. Wilson, 110 F.Supp.3d 624 (D. Md. 2015). An inmate brought an action against certain county jail officials,
alleging that a deputy used excessive force when she slammed a door slot on the inmate’s hand. The deputy and a
supervisor moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court
held that summary judgment was precluded by an issue of material fact as to whether the deputy closed the door on
the inmate’s hand maliciously or in response to a breach of security by the inmate. The court found that the jail’s
policy of restricting the inmate’s mail to postcards did not violate his First Amendment right to send and receive mail,
where the policy did not foreclose all avenues of communication, the inmate’s stay at the jail was transitional and
temporary, and the policy did not impact the inmate’s ability to communicate with legal counsel regarding his
criminal case. (Washington County Detention Center, Maryland)

U.S. District Court
REFUSAL
INSPECTION OF MAIL
SECURITY PRACTICES

Barrett v. Premo, 101 F.Supp.3d 980 (D. Or. 2015). An inmate brought a claim under § 1983 against several
corrections officials for violation of his First Amendment rights arising out of rejection of a piece of mail he sent to
another inmate because it had artwork on the front of the envelope. The district court ordered declaratory and
injunctive relief. The court found that: (1) the Department of Corrections did not have a consistently enforced policy
or practice prohibiting artwork on the front of incoming envelopes, and thus the rejection of the inmate’s envelope
violated his First Amendment rights; (2) monetary damages were inadequate to address the inmate’s loss of First
Amendment freedoms; (3) the constitutional hardship to prison inmates was far greater than the insignificant potential
impact on the prison’s time and resources from having to look more closely at envelopes to read a recipient’s address
if artwork was present; (4) a permanent injunction enjoining the Department from enforcing the policy would permit
inmates and nonparty members of the public to more easily and effectively communicate, and thus the public interest
weighed in favor of an injunction; (5) a permanent injunction did not extend any further than necessary to correct the
First Amendment violations and was the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violations; and (6) supervisory
prison officials were sufficiently involved in alleged violation of the inmate’s First Amendment rights to be liable
under § 1983. (Oregon State Penitentiary)

U.S. Appeals Court
CENSORSHIP

Murchison v. Rogers, 779 F.3d 882 (8th Cir. 2015). A former state prisoner filed a § 1983 action, alleging that prison
officials violated his First Amendment rights by censoring his weekly news magazine (Newsweek). The district court
dismissed claims against certain officials, and granted summary judgment in favor of the remaining officials. The
prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that censorship of the prisoner’s weekly news magazine was
rationally connected to the officials’ legitimate penological interest in prohibiting materials that promoted violence,
disorder, or violation of the law. The court noted that the prisoner had alternative means of exercising his First
Amendment right. (South Central Correctional Center, Missouri)

U.S. Appeals Court
PROHIBITION

Payton v. Cannon, 806 F.3d 1109 (7th Cir. 2015). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action challenging a prison policy
banning all sexually explicit material as violative of the First Amendment. The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the defendants. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the policy did not
violate the prisoner’s First Amendment right of free expression. The court held that the policy was reasonably related
to the prison’s legitimate penological interests in preventing prison violence and black-market trading among
prisoners. (Stateville Prison, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
NOTICE
PROHIBITIONPUBLICATIONS

Prison Legal News v. Jones, 126 F.Supp.3d 1233 (N.D. Fla. 2015). The publisher of a monthly legal magazine
brought a § 1983 action against the Secretary of the Florida Department of Corrections (FDOC), alleging violations of
its First Amendment and procedural due process rights arising out of impoundment and rejection of magazine
publications. Following a bench trial, the district court held that the regulation prohibiting prisoner access to
publications with a specific type of advertisements did not violate the First Amendment. The court noted that
advertisements for three-way calling and call-forwarding services in the magazine presented a security threat,
warranting the FDOC's decision to impound and reject the magazine under a Florida administrative rule. The court
held that FDOC's repeated failure to provide an impoundment notice to the publisher violated the publisher`s
substantive due process rights. (Florida Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
INTERFERENCE

Quiroz v. Short, 85 F.Supp.3d 1092 (N.D.Cal. 2015). A state prisoner brought an action against prison officials,
alleging that the officials retaliated against him for filing a prior federal civil rights complaint and for participating in
another inmate’s civil rights suit. One official moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in
part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to:
(1) whether the official acted with a retaliatory motive when he sent to the prisoner’s fiance a letter intended for
another woman; (2) whether the prison official acted with a retaliatory motive when he issued a rules violation report
(RVR) against the prisoner; and (3) whether officials had an agreement to retaliate against the prisoner by issuing the
RVR against him. The court found that: (1) the official did not have a retaliatory motive in investigating an
administrative grievance; (2) the prisoner’s assertion that one of the official’s duties was to monitor incoming and
outgoing mail was insufficient to show that the official destroyed two specific pieces of the prisoner’s mail; (3) the
official was entitled to qualified immunity on the prisoner’s right to intimate association claim; and (4) the official’s
act of sending a letter to the prisoner’s fiancé that was intended for another woman did not prevent the prisoner from
continuing to associate with his fiancé and did not prevent the prisoner from marrying his fiancé. (Pelican Bay State
Prison, Secure Housing Unit, California)

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The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court held that a
one and one-half day delay between the prisoner’s first complaints of flu-like symptoms and his
treatment and diagnosis of pneumonia by a physician did not constitute deliberate indifference by
prison officials. (Albemarle Correctional Institution, North Carolina)
U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE

Ziemba v. Armstrong, 430 F.3d 623 (2nd Cir. 2005). A state prison inmate brought a civil rights
action alleging that prison officials failed to provide constitutionally-adequate health care, failed
to protect him from the use of excessive force, and used excessive force. The district court granted
summary judgment for the officials, in part, and they appealed. The appeals court affirmed in
part, reversed in part and remanded. The court held that evidence was sufficient to establish that
a state corrections commissioner exhibited deliberate indifference to the inmate’s constitutional
rights or was grossly negligent in training subordinates, and that evidence was sufficient to
impose supervisory liability on a prison warden. The inmate was allegedly placed in four-point
restraints for 22 hours, beaten, and denied medical care. The court found that summary judgment
was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a prison nurse and medic were
deliberately indifference to the inmate’s serious medical needs. (Connecticut State Prison)
2006

U.S. District Court
SMOKE-FREE
ENVIRONMENT

Abdullah v. Washington, 437 F.Supp.2d 137 (D.D.C. 2006). An inmate brought a pro se civil

rights action under § 1983 against the District of Columbia and certain jail officials, in their
individual and official capacities, seeking damages related to his alleged exposure to second-hand
tobacco smoke while confined at a jail. The district court granted the officials’ motion to dismiss in
part, and denied in part. The court held that the inmate's allegations that he was subjected to an
intolerable level of second-hand tobacco smoke while confined at the jail, and that jail officials
were deliberately indifferent to his condition because they did not resolve the numerous
grievances he filed on the issue, were sufficient to support an Eighth Amendment claim based on
exposure to environmental tobacco smoke (ETS). The court found that the inmate's Eighth
Amendment right to be free from levels of second-hand smoke that posed an unreasonable risk of
serious damage to the inmate's future health was clearly established, and thus, the officials were
not entitled to qualified immunity. (District of Columbia Department of Corrections, Central
Detention Facility)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE

Alberson v. Norris, 458 F.3d 762 (8th Cir. 2006). A state prisoner's mother, on the prisoner's behalf
and as the special administrator of his estate, brought a § 1983 action against prison officials,
alleging deliberate indifference with respect to the medical treatment of the prisoner, who died
from complications arising from Goodpasture Syndrome. The district court granted summary
judgment to the defendants and the mother appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that
Goodpasture Syndrome was a sophisticated medical condition, and thus, the estate, which was
alleging inadequate medical treatment, was required to present expert testimony proving
causation. The court noted that after the prisoner complained of earaches and other afflictions, he
received extensive medical treatment, including treatment from a physician on six separate dates
in a period of about two months, followed shortly thereafter by admission to the infirmary ward.
(Wrightsville Unit, Arkansas Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE

Ammons v. Lemke, 426 F.Supp.2d 866 (W.D.Wis. 2006). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action
alleging that a prison's medical officials were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical
conditions. The district court held that the inmate's wrist injury constituted a “serious medical
condition,” for the purposes of his Eighth Amendment claim against prison medical officials for
deliberate indifference, where the injury was diagnosed as a fracture of his ulnar styloid process,
the injury caused his bone structure to split, the wrist sustained permanent injury and bone
disfigurement, and the injury continued to cause him pain. The court found that a physician's
failure to immediately prescribe pain medication for the inmate or to make an appointment for
the inmate to see an orthopedic specialist after examining the inmate's fractured wrist did not
demonstrate deliberate indifference to inmate's serious medical condition necessary to establish
claim under Eighth Amendment, where the physician examined the inmate twice in one month's
time, reviewed an x-ray of his wrist, determined initially that no treatment was possible because
the injury was the result of old fracture, but later prescribed pain medication and arranged for
the inmate to see an orthopedic specialist. (Stanley Correctional Institution, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
TRANSPORTATION
TRANSFER

Anderson-Bey v. District of Columbia, 466 F.Supp.2d 51 (D.D.C. 2006). Prisoners transported

between out-of-state correctional facilities brought a civil rights action against the District of
Columbia and corrections officers, alleging common law torts and violation of their constitutional
rights under First and Eighth Amendments. The prisoners had been transported in two groups,
with trips lasting between 10 and 15 hours. The defendants brought motions to dismiss or for
summary judgment which the court denied with regard to the District of Columbia. The court
held that: (1) a fact issue existed as to whether the restraints used on prisoners during the
prolonged transport caused greater pain than was necessary to ensure they were securely
restrained; (2) a fact issue existed as to whether the officers acted with deliberate indifference to

29.165
XX

the prisoners’ health or safety in the transport of the prisoners; (3) a causal nexus existed
between the protected speech of the prisoners in bringing the civil lawsuit against the corrections
officers and subsequent alleged retaliation by the officers during the transport of prisoners; (4) a
fact issue existed as to whether the officers attempted to chill the prisoners’ participation in the
pending civil lawsuit against the officers; and (5) a fact issue existed as to whether conditions
imposed on the prisoners during the transport were justified by valid penological needs. The court
found that the denial of food during a bus ride that lasted between 10 and 15 hours was
insufficiently serious to state a stand-alone cruel and unusual punishment civil rights claim
under the Eighth Amendment. The court also found that the denial of bathroom breaks during
the 10 to 15 hour bus trip, did not, without more, constitute cruel and unusual punishment under
the Eighth Amendment. The court stated that the extremely uncomfortable and painful shackles
applied for the numerous hours during transports, exacerbated by taunting, threats, and denial of
food, water, medicine, and toilets, was outrageous conduct under District of Columbia law,
precluding summary judgment on the prisoners’ intentional infliction of emotional distress claim
against the corrections officers. (District of Columbia)
U.S. District Court
HEARING IMPAIRED
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act

Arce v. O'Connell, 427 F.Supp.2d 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). A purportedly hearing-impaired inmate

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE

Burgos v. Alves, 418 F.Supp.2d 263 (W.D.N.Y. 2006). A prisoner brought an action against
physicians employed by the New York State Department of Correctional Services (DOCS),
alleging that they violated his constitutional rights in connection with their treatment of a knee
injury. The physicians moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the motion.
The court held that the prisoner's dissatisfaction with the care that he received for his knee injury
did not give rise to an Eighth Amendment claim, where there was no evidence of any kind that
the physicians were deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's medical condition, nor any proof that
they acted with a culpable state of mind or intended in some way to inflict pain on the prisoner.
The court concluded that “there is no evidence that defendants simply ignored his complaints, or
that they deliberately allowed plaintiff to suffer…with the benefit of hindsight, plaintiff simply
contends that they should have done more sooner.” (New York State Department of Correctional
Services)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
MEDICATION
RECORDS
DELAY IN CARE

Burkett v. Wicker, 435 F.Supp.2d 875 (N.D.Ind. 2006). A prisoner, proceeding pro se, brought a
civil rights action under § 1983 against a jail nurse and others, alleging that he was denied
medical treatment while he was a pretrial detainee. The inmate alleged that a jail nurse made a
false entry into the prisoner's medical record, denied him doses of his prescribed medication,
prevented him from seeing a doctor, and delayed filling his prescription, that the nurse knew that
his hand was injured and that it would get worse without treatment, and that because of her
deliberate indifference to his serious medical need, he developed an infection, his hand did not
heal properly, he had permanent disfigurement, and he was in prolonged, unnecessary pain. The
district court held that the allegations supported a claim for violation of Eighth Amendment's
prescription against cruel and unusual punishment. But the court found that no liability existed
against the nurse in her official capacity, for allegedly denying the prisoner medical treatment
while he was a pretrial detainee, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, absent any allegation
that the nurse was acting pursuant to a policy or custom. (Cass County Jail, Indiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONTAGIOUS
DISEASES

Butler v. Fletcher, 465 F.3d 340 (8th Cir. 2006). A prisoner who was transferred from a county

brought a pro se suit against employees of a corrections department, alleging that they violated
his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), as well as the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments, by failing to provide reasonable accommodations for his hearing impairment and
retaliating against him after he filed grievances regarding the lack of such accommodations. The
defendants moved for summary judgment and the court dismissed the case. The district court
held that the inmate was not a member of the class protected by a consent decree addressing the
treatment of deaf or hard-of-hearing inmates and thus, he lacked standing to move for contempt
alleging violations of the decree. The court found that to the extent the inmate suffered from a
hearing loss, it was not such as would prevent him from participating fully in “activities,
privileges, or programs” as required for him to come within the protections of the consent decree.
(New York State Department of Correctional Services)

jail to a prison after his conviction, where he tested positive for tuberculosis (TB), filed a § 1983
action against a county sheriff, alleging the sheriff violated his substantive due process rights by
failing to adopt and implement adequate safeguards protecting county jail inmates from TB
infection. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the sheriff and the prisoner
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the sheriff did not act with deliberate
indifference to a serious health risk that TB posed to detainees in the county jail. The prisoner
alleged that he spent most of his time at the jail in two-person cells and in larger holding cells,
where as many as twenty-six short-term detainees were held under deplorable sanitary
conditions. He asserted that the sheriff’s policy of placing short-term detainees in multi-person
cells without an initial TB screening inadequately protects detainees from the serious health risk
of TB. (Ramsey County Adult Detention Center, Minnesota)

29.166
XX

U.S. Appeals Court
WHEELCHAIR
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Callahan v. Poppell, 471 F.3d 1155 (10th Cir. 2006). A state prisoner filed an action under § 1983,

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE

Carter v. Newland, 441 F.Supp.2d 208 (D.Mass. 2006). A federal inmate brought a pro se civil

alleging that corrections' officials' failure to provide him with a wheelchair following an injury
violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment. The district court granted the defendants'
motion for summary judgment, and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court
held that medical personnel's alleged conduct of denying the prisoner a wheelchair following an
injury did not amount to deliberate indifference, as required for the prisoner's Eighth
Amendment deliberate indifference claim. The court noted that medical staff denied his use of a
wheelchair because they feared his leg muscles would atrophy, and, although an orthopedist
initially recommended a wheelchair for the prisoner, the orthopedist altered that assessment
upon learning that the prisoner would not need to walk far while he was housed in the medical
department. (Lawton Correctional Facility, Oklahoma)

rights claim against various prison medical personnel alleging deliberate indifference to his
serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court held that
allegations that the government thwarted the inmate's attempt to exhaust administrative
remedies that were required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), precluded dismissal for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court found that the inmate’s allegations were sufficient to
state a claim for deliberate indifference to inmate's medical needs when they failed to operate on
his diseased toe, failed to address his complaints of pain, and transferred him to a non-medical
facility. (Federal Medical Center, Devens, Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE

Cirilla v. Kankakee County Jail, 438 F.Supp.2d 937 (C.D.Ill. 2006). A pretrial detainee brought a

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Clark-Murphy v. Foreback, 439 F.3d 280 (6th Cir. 2006). The estate of a state inmate who died of
dehydration while in an observation cell brought two civil rights suits against prison employees,
alleging deliberate indifference to the prisoner's medical needs in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. The district court denied qualified immunity to 15 corrections officers and they
appealed. The appeals court held that a captain and sergeant who assisted the inmate after he
collapsed outside the mess hall were not subjectively indifferent to his serious medical needs in
violation of his Eighth Amendment rights, and thus were entitled to qualified immunity. The
court noted that each perceived that the inmate faced risks to his psychological health and took
reasonable steps to ensure that officers in charge of the inmate's care secured psychological
services for him, and that neither officer had any further contact with the inmate or any reason to
believe that the inmate's medical needs were not being met. The court found that prison officers
and a psychologist who were in the position to perceive that the inmate, who was acting strangely
and had been locked in an observation cell and had not received the psychological assistance he
needed, were not entitled to qualified immunity on the Eighth Amendment claim alleging
deliberate indifference given their interactions with the inmate and their apparent failure to go
up the chain of command when a referral did not secure assistance for the inmate. The court also
found that the officers and psychologist were not entitled to qualified immunity on the claim that
they were deliberately indifferent to the hydration needs of the inmate who died of dehydration
after six days in an observation cell, as they could have perceived a serious risk to the inmate
based on a heat wave, the fact that water was repeatedly cut off to inmate's cell during their
shifts, and the reports of other inmates that the inmate had called out for water. The court found
that a correctional nurse who worked just one shift shortly after the inmate's placement in an
observation cell was entitled to qualified immunity from liability given her limited exposure to
the inmate and the resulting absence of evidence that there was reason to believe that the nurse
perceived that psychological help had not been obtained for the inmate or that his condition was
deteriorating. (Bellamy Creek Correctional Facility, Ionia, Michigan)

§ 1983 action against a county jail and jail personnel, alleging violations of his due process rights.
The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court held that the
county jail and jail personnel were not aware of, and deliberately indifferent to, a specific,
impending, and substantial threat to the pretrial detainee's safety, as required for liability under
§ 1983 for failure to protect detainee from other inmates in violation of detainee's right to due
process. According to the court, even if the detainee was involved in several altercations with
other inmates, he never filed grievances or complaints about those incidents, he claimed only
some bruising and a bloody nose as result of the altercations, and although the detainee
requested medical attention for a sore finger after the altercations, he did not complain at that
time about injuries from fights. The court found that the county jail and jail personnel did not act
with deliberate indifference after he was injured in a fight with another inmate in a holding cell,
and that he received appropriate medical care after the fight. Jail personnel drove the detainee to
a hospital where he received three stitches in his head, a splint for his wrist, and x-rays, which
found no fractures. Upon his return from the hospital, the detainee was placed in the jail's
medical dormitory, where he remained until his transfer out of the jail. While in the medical
dormitory, the detainee received medical attention and was never beaten by anyone. The
detainee subsequently saw medical or nursing personnel on six occasions without complaining of
any serious medical condition or medical crisis. (Kankakee County Jail, Illinois)

29.167
XX

U.S. District Court
FEMALE PRISONERS
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Clifton v. Eubank, 418 F.Supp.2d 1243 (D.Colo. 2006). An inmate brought a § 1983 action alleging

U.S. District Court
MEDICATION
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE

Cook v. Pueppke, 421 F.Supp.2d 1201 (E.D.Mo. 2006). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
DELAY IN CARE
MEDICATION

Davis v. Carter, 452 F.3d 686 (7th Cir. 2006). A plaintiff filed an action on behalf of an inmate’s
estate, alleging that county jail officials failed to provide adequate medical assistance to the
inmate. The inmate’s death in the county jail was due to sudden withdrawal from his prescribed
methadone medication. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the officials and
the plaintiff appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The
court held that fact issues remained as to whether the county had a widespread practice or
custom of inordinate delay in providing methadone treatment to inmates. The court found that a
county jail officer was not deliberately indifferent to the inmate’s methadone withdrawal
symptoms, and thus was not subject to liability under § 1983 for an Eighth Amendment violation
following the inmate’s death, even though the officer received a call from the inmate’s wife
informing her that the inmate had not yet received methadone treatment and was in excruciating
pain. The officer responded that the county “don’t work that fast,” but appropriately transferred
the call to a person responsible for the inmate’s medical care. There was no evidence that the
officer’s job duties included anything more than answering the telephones. (Cook County Jail,
Illinois)

U.S. District Court
PRETRIAL DETAINEE
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Davis v. Township of Paulsboro, 421 F.Supp.2d 835 (D.N.J. 2006). The parents of an arrestee

violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment against a prison nurse and corrections
officers, arising out of the stillbirth of her fetus. The court denied the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment. The court held that the inmate's delayed labor, resulting in the stillbirth of
an otherwise viable fetus, constituted a physical injury to the mother sufficient to satisfy the
Prison Litigation Reform Act’s (PLRA) physical injury requirement, and that PLRA did not bar
her constitutional claims under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The inmate had told an
officer that she was in labor and needed medical assistance but the officer sent her back to her
housing unit. Later she told another officer that she was in labor and needed help but the officer
declined to provide her with medical assistance and told her to return to her unit. Upon her third
request for medical assistance, another officer sent her to the facility's medical unit where the
nurse examined the inmate and found no evidence that her water had broken. During the
examination the nurse did not use a fetal heart monitor to evaluate the status of the fetus,
apparently because she did not know how to use the monitor. The inmate was sent back to her
housing unit without treatment, even though she told the nurse that she had difficulties with
prior deliveries. The next day, another officer noticed Clifton's distress and sent her to the
medical unit. She was sent from the prison to a hospital, where it was determined that her fetus
was dead. (Women's Correctional Facility, Canon City, Colorado)

a prison nurse supervisor, alleging she prevented him from receiving needed medication following
a tooth extraction, in violation of his federal constitutional rights. The nurse supervisor filed
motion for summary judgment which was granted by the district court in part, and denied in part.
The court held that a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the nurse supervisor directed
other nurses not to provide the inmate with his prescribed pain medication because of his
attempted escape, precluded summary judgment in favor of the supervisor. The court granted
summary judgment for the defendant on the alleged deprivation of antibiotic medication. The
court found that the deprivation of an antibiotic prescribed for eight days could not support an
Eighth Amendment violation in a § 1983 action where there was no medical evidence that the
inmate developed an infection or that failure to administer the antibiotic resulted in any infection
or other negative medical condition, and the inmate's only complaint was of the pain resulting
from the alleged failure to administer pain medication. (Southeast Correctional Center, Missouri)

brought a federal civil rights claim against a county, a township, and various law enforcement
officers, arising from arrestee's death which occurred after he had been struck in the head by a
bottle during a fight and then taken into police custody. The defendants moved for summary
judgment and the district court granted the motion. The court held that the officers did not use
excessive force in spraying the suspect with pepper spray, where he was visibly agitated, was
acting aggressively, was yelling profanities, banged walls in his house, and shoved an officer
three times, and no lasting injury occurred. According to the court, the officers did not use
excessive force in waiting to wash the pepper spray from the suspect's eyes until after he had
been transported from the site of the spraying to a police station because the suspect continued to
physically resist officers and persisted in yelling and cursing after being sprayed. The court found
that an officer did not use excessive force in removing the arrestee from his cell, where the officer
nudged the arrestee several times on his lower leg in an attempt to rouse him, stepped into the
cell and grabbed the arrestee by the arm, smoothly pulled the suspect by the arm off the bench
and onto his hands and knees, pulled him a few feet across the floor, and placed handcuffs on
him. The court held that Township officers were not deliberately indifferent to the serious
medical needs of the arrestee who had been hit on the head with a bottle in a fight prior to arrest,
and thus due process principles were not violated, where an ambulance arrived to transport the
arrestee to a hospital within minutes of the arrestee's arrival at police headquarters, a doctor
examined the arrestee and determined he was fit for incarceration, and the arrestee was

29.168
XX

periodically checked once back at the police station. According to the court, the fact that the
arrestee vomited and was still bleeding upon his return to the police station did not establish
deliberate indifference. (Gloucester Co. Sheriff's Dept., Township of Paulsboro, New Jersey)
U.S. District Court
HEARING IMPAIRED
REHABILITATION ACT
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act

Degrafinreid v. Ricks, 417 F.Supp.2d 403 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). A deaf inmate sued the superintendent
of a state correctional facility and other officials, claiming violation of his constitutional and
statutory rights when his hearing aid was confiscated during a search of his cell and then
destroyed. The district court held that the inmate stated a claim for monetary damages against
the state under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), through allegations that constituted a
showing of deliberate indifference to the inmate's medical condition in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. The inmate claimed that officials destroyed his hearing aid during a search of his
cell, knowing he was deaf, and delayed replacement for many weeks. According to the court,
because the Rehabilitation Act (RA) was enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause of Article I,
Congress can require states to waive their sovereign immunity as a condition of accepting federal
funds. New York State's continued acceptance of funding, under the Rehabilitation Act, resulted
in a waiver of sovereign immunity as to claims of the deaf prison inmate. (Upstate Correctional
Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
REHABILITATION ACT
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
AIDS- Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome
TRANSPORTATION

Dukes v. Georgia, 428 F.Supp.2d 1298 (N.D.Ga. 2006). A pretrial detainee brought an action
against state and county defendants as well as jail personnel, alleging deliberate indifference to a
serious medical need, violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the
Rehabilitation Act, and medical malpractice. The defendants filed motions for summary
judgment. The court held that jail personnel did not violate the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) or the Rehabilitation Act when an officer and others allegedly told other inmates of the
detainee's status as an HIV infected person, where the detainee did not show that such disclosure
denied him the benefits of any program or service or that it discriminated against him. The court
also found no ADA or Rehabilitation Act violation when an officer did not place a mask on the
detainee when he was being transported to the hospital, where the failure to place a mask on the
detainee did not deny him the benefits of any program or service or discriminate against him.
The court noted that transportation can be construed as a “program or service provided by the
public entity” for the purposes of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). According
to the court, even if a physician's failure to diagnose the pretrial detainee's cryptococcus was
negligent or even severely negligent, her actions and treatment of the detainee did not constitute
deliberate indifference to the detainee's serious medical needs in violation of due process where
the detainee was receiving treatment for his symptoms and his underlying illness, HIV, and while
in hindsight it appeared that a lesion shown by the x-rays was in fact cryptococcus, there was no
showing that indicated that the physician was ever aware of that severe risk. The court held that
a jail nurse was not deliberately indifferent to the detainee's serious medical needs in violation of
the due process clause, where she responded to all requests for medical service and conveyed the
requests and relevant information to a physician, and did not have substantial knowledge of a
serious medical risk when she observed that the detainee was not moving about, was urinating on
his mat, and was cursing at the staff. (Coweta County Jail, Georgia)

U.S. District Court
HEARING IMPAIRED
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act

Duquin v. Dean, 423 F.Supp.2d 411 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). A deaf inmate filed an action alleging that

prison officials violated his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),
Rehabilitation Act, and a consent decree by failing to provide qualified sign language interpreters,
effective visual fire alarms, use of closed-captioned television sets, and access to text telephones
(TTY). Officials moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted in their favor. The
court held that the officials at the high-security facility complied with the provision of a consent
decree requiring them to provide visual fire alarms for hearing-impaired inmates, even if the
facility was not always equipped with visual alarms, where corrections officers were responsible
for unlocking each cell door and ensuring that inmates evacuate in emergency situations. The
court held that the deputy supervisor for programs at the facility was not subject to civil contempt
for her failure to fully comply with the provision of consent decree requiring the facility to provide
access to text telephones (TTY) for hearing-impaired inmates in a manner equivalent to hearing
inmates' access to telephone service, even though certain areas within the facility provided only
limited access to TTY, and other areas lacked TTY altogether. The court noted that the deputy
warden made diligent efforts to comply with the decree, prison staff responded to the inmate's
complaints with temporary accommodations and permanent improvements, and repairs to broken
equipment were made promptly. The court found that the denial of the inmate's request to
purchase a thirteen-inch color television for his cell did not subject the deputy supervisor for
programs to civil contempt for failing to fully comply with the provision of a consent decree
requiring the facility to provide closed-captioned television for hearing-impaired inmates, despite
the inmate's contention that a closed-caption decoder would not work on commissary televisions.
The court noted that the facility policy barred color televisions in cells and that suppliers
confirmed that there was no technological barrier to installing decoders in televisions that were
available from the commissary. (Wende Correctional Facility, New York)

29.169
XX

U.S. Appeals Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
DELAY IN CARE

Feeney v. Correctional Medical Services, Inc., 464 F.3d 158 (1st Cir. 2006). A former inmate

U.S. District Court
HEARING IMPAIRED
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act

Figueroa v. Dean, 425 F.Supp.2d 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). A state prisoner who was born deaf
brought an action against a superintendent of programs at a prison, alleging failure to provide
interpreters, visual fire alarms, access to text telephone, and a television with closed-captioned
device in contempt of a consent order in class action in which the court entered a decree awarding
declaratory relief to prohibit disability discrimination against hearing impaired prisoners by state
prison officials. The superintendent moved for summary judgment and the district court granted
the motion. The court held that the exhaustion requirement of Prison Litigation Reform Act
(PLRA) did not apply to an action seeking exclusively to enforce a consent order. The court found
that the superintendent was not in contempt of the consent order, noting that sign language
interpreters were provided at educational and vocational programs and at medical and counseling
appointments for hearing-impaired inmates as required by consent decree, the prison was
equipped with visual fire alarms that met the requirements of the decree, and diligent efforts
were being made to comply with the consent decree regarding access to text telephones. (Wende
Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE

Flanyak v. Hopta, 410 F.Supp.2d 394 (M.D.Penn. 2006). A state prison inmate filed a § 1983

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE

Fleming v. LeFevere, 423 F.Supp.2d 1064 (C.D.Cal. 2006). An inmate who was denied treatment

brought a § 1983 action against state correctional health care professionals, alleging they acted
with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the professionals and the former inmate appealed. The appeals court
affirmed, finding that the health care professionals were not deliberately indifferent to the former
inmate's serious medical needs. The former inmate suffered from plantar faciitis, and alleged that
there was a lengthy delay in providing him with orthopedic footwear after it was first prescribed.
The court noted that the inmate was examined many times after he first reported his symptoms,
numerous diagnostic tests were performed on the inmate, outside specialists-- including a
podiatrist, neurologist, neurosurgeon, and physical therapist-- were consulted, the inmate was
given other treatments for his symptoms, and that uncertainty existed about the source of his
pain prompting causes other than plantar faciitis to be investigated. (Correctional Medical
Services, Inc., Old County Correctional Center, Massachusetts)

Eighth Amendment action against the supervisor of the unit overseeing prison jobs and against
the prison's health care administrator, alleging that he had been subjected to unsafe conditions
while working as a welder. The inmate also alleged that the administrator had been deliberately
indifferent to his medical needs arising from those conditions. The defendants moved for
summary judgment and the district court granted the motion. According to the court, the
supervisor of the state prison unit overseeing prison jobs was not shown to have known of and
disregarded a risk to the inmate who had chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, from dust and
smoke accompanying his work as a welder, precluding recovery in the inmate's § 1983 Eighth
Amendment action against the supervisor alleging unsafe working conditions. The inmate did not
complain directly to the supervisor about his working conditions or file a grievance relating to
those conditions and declined to wear a dust mask he was given. The court noted that the prison's
accreditation required compliance with safe-working-area standards. The court held that the
prison's health care administrator could not be liable in the inmate's § 1983 Eighth Amendment
action alleging deliberate indifference to serious medical needs because the administrator was
neither a prison doctor nor on the medical staff. The inmate was diagnosed and treated by others
without ever seeing the administrator, and the inmate never filed any grievances that would have
alerted the administrator to any alleged mistreatment. (State Correctional Institution at
Mahanoy, Pennsylvania)

for Hepatitis C sued a prison's staff psychiatrist who reported that the prisoner was a fairly poor
candidate for treatment of Hepatitis C with Interferon, alleging state and federal constitutional
violations. The psychiatrist filed a motion for summary judgment which the court granted. The
district court held that the inmate failed to establish that the psychiatrist was deliberately
indifferent to the inmate's serious medical need in violation of his rights under the Eighth
Amendment, because the prisoner's claim was based solely on his disagreement with the
psychiatrist's medical evaluation, and he failed to provide any competent evidence to satisfy his
burden of showing that the psychiatrist chose a medically unacceptable course of treatment in
conscious disregard of any risk to the inmate's health. The court held that the inmate failed to
state a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, and that even assuming the psychiatrist
violated the inmate's constitutional rights, the psychiatrist was entitled to qualified immunity.
According to the court, the inmate could not state a claim for personal injury damages against the
psychiatrist based on the equal protection clause of the California Constitution, and the inmate
could not state a claim against the psychiatrist based on a clause of California Constitution
providing that state constitutional rights were not dependent on those guaranteed by the United
States Constitution. (California Men's Colony)

29.170
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U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE

Forton v. County of Ogemaw, 435 F.Supp.2d 640 (E.D.Mich. 2006). The estate of a deceased jail

U.S. District Court
SMOKE-FREE
ENVIRONMENT

George v. Smith, 467 F.Supp.2d 906 (W.D.Wis. 2006). A state prisoner sued prison officials under

U.S. District Court
INADEQUATE CARE
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Glass v. Rodriguez, 417 F.Supp.2d 943 (N.D.Ill. 2006). A state inmate brought an action against a

U.S. Appeals Court
INADEQUATE CARE
NEGLIGENCE
WORK ASSIGNMENT

Gobert v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d 339 (5th Cir. 2006). A former inmate whose leg was injured while he
was on work release brought a § 1983 action against a state prison physician, alleging
constitutionally inadequate medical care. The physician moved for summary judgment. The
district court denied qualified immunity, and the physician appealed. The appeals court reversed,
finding that the physician was aware of a substantial risk of serious harm to the inmate from the
nature of the wound itself, but the inmate failed to demonstrate that the physician disregarded
the substantial health risk about which he knew, as required to establish deliberate indifference
to a serious medical need. The inmate's leg was crushed while he was on work release when the
garbage collection truck on which he worked as a “hopper” collided with another vehicle. The
inmate's injury consisted of an open wound. According to medical records, the inmate was given
extensive medical treatment for the injury throughout his imprisonment term, and the court held
that, at most, there might have been negligence in the one-week lapse in antibiotic treatment.
(Elayn Hunt Correctional Center, Gabriel, Louisiana).

inmate brought suit against a county and various employees, claiming deprivation of the inmate's
Eighth Amendment right to medical care. The female inmate had been serving a sentence in the
jail and died from a cancerous tumor that encircled her esophagus. The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court held that the inmate had an objectively
serious medical condition, as required for an Eighth Amendment claim. The court found that the
jail nurse supervising medical care of the inmate did not display deliberate indifference to the
inmate's medical condition, in violation of Eighth Amendment, where the nurse twice had the
inmate sent to a clinic for a physician's evaluation, provided the inmate with an inhaler and
instructed the inmate in its use, had the inmate moved to an observation cell, and left orders that
the inmate be transported to a medical facility if her condition worsened. The court found that a
jail officer who was observing the inmate was not deliberately indifferent to the inmate's medical
condition, where the officer had no knowledge of the inmate's condition, administered the
inhalator dose, checked on the inmate frequently, and declined the inmate's request that she be
taken to hospital, supported by another inmate, only because of the non-hospitalization order left
by nurse. According to the court, the alleged failure of the jail administrator, who was not on duty
on the day in question, to relay a friend's concern regarding the physical condition of inmate, left
as telephone message, did not establish that the administrator was deliberately indifferent to the
medical situation of inmate. The court also found that correctional officers did not show deliberate
indifference to the inmate, although the inmate was screaming while in an observation cell,
wanting to return to her own cell, and not eating, because the officers observed her frequently
and took her back to her cell at her request, where she instantly fell to the floor unconscious.
(Ogemaw County Jail, Michigan)

§ 1983, alleging deprivation of his free speech rights and deliberate indifference to his serious
medical needs. The officials moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the
motion in part and stayed in part. The court held that: (1) the officials’ ban on the prisoner’s
receipt of a newsletter on the ground that the newsletter solicited gifts did not violate the
prisoner’s free speech rights; (2) a prohibition against the prisoner possessing an atlas did not
violate his free speech rights; (3) the officials did not violate the prisoner’s speech rights in
concluding that a magazine advocated behavior consistent with a gang and thus was prohibited
by regulation; and (4) the prisoner was not exposed to unreasonably high levels of environmental
tobacco smoke. The court found that the prisoner was not exposed to unreasonable levels of
environmental tobacco smoke, where the only smoking allowed in the prison was outdoors, and he
was not required to stand or sit next to staff or inmates while they were smoking outdoors. The
court noted that medical records revealed that the prisoner was seen for complaints relating to
asthma only four times in three years, and that he did not claim second-hand smoke was a
potential cause of the first three flare-ups. (Oshkosh Correctional Institution, Wisconsin)
doctor at a county jail, alleging deliberate indifference to his back problems while he was a
pretrial detainee. The doctor moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the
motion. The court held that the doctor was not deliberately indifferent to the serious medical
condition of the detainee with back pain, as would violate the Due Process Clause, even though
the detainee never underwent an MRI and he was not able to see a physician every week as he
would have wished. The court found that doctors, orthopedic specialists, and physical therapists
used x-rays and CAT scans to diagnose the detainee's condition and to develop a treatment plan,
and the detainee was provided with pain medication, physical therapy, and visits to an outside
clinic. The court noted that neither simple medical malpractice nor mere dissatisfaction with a
doctor's prescribed course of treatment is actionable as Eighth Amendment deliberate
indifference under § 1983. (Cook County Correctional Center, Illinois)

29.171
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U.S. Appeals Court
DELAY IN CARE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE

Gordon ex rel. Gordon v. Frank, 454 F.3d 858 (8th Cir. 2006). The widowed spouse of an inmate

U.S. Appeals Court
INTAKE SCREENING
SUICIDE

Grayson v. Ross, 454 F.3d 802 (8th Cir. 2006). The personal representative of the estate of a

who died in a county jail brought an action against the county and jail personnel under § 1983
and Minnesota tort law. The district court denied the defendants’ summary judgment motion, and
the defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that: (1) the corrections
officer was not entitled to qualified immunity on a § 1983 claim; (2) the supervisor was not
entitled to qualified immunity; (3) the officers were not entitled to official immunity on the tort
claim under Minnesota law; and (4) the supervisor was not entitled to official immunity on the
tort claim under Minnesota law. The court held that a corrections officers acted with deliberate
indifference to the inmate’s serious medical need in her response to his intercom call for medical
help, and thus, the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity on the spouse’s § 1983 claim.
According to the court, at roll call before her shift, the officer learned the inmate had medical
issues that placed him on high observation, she knew the inmate had been released from the jail
a year before due to heart problems, and she was present when the inmate asked for help
climbing the stairs to his cell and saw him struggling up the stairs. When the inmate called and
told her he could not breathe and was in pain, she delayed medical treatment and threatened to
discipline him. The court held that a corrections officer acted with deliberate indifference to the
inmate’s serious medical needs by failing to initiate medical treatment, and thus, the officer was
not entitled to qualified immunity on the spouse’s § 1983 claim. The officer knew the inmate had
medical issues that placed him on high observation, he was present when the inmate asked for
help climbing the stairs to his cell and saw him struggling up the stairs, he received the intercom
call from the inmate requesting a blood pressure test and overheard a call in which the inmate
told another officer he could not breathe and was in pain, and the inmate told him he had trouble
breathing during the officer’s subsequent wellness check.
According to the court, a supervisor was not entitled to qualified immunity on the
spouse’s § 1983 claim. An officer told the supervisor that the inmate had complained over the
intercom of breathing trouble and chest in, and the supervisor noted the incident but waited for
officers to ask him to initiate medical treatment.The court found that under the Minnesota law,
officers violated a ministerial duty when they failed to immediately notify their supervisor of the
medical situation of the inmate, and thus, the officers were not entitled to official immunity on
the tort claim brought by the inmate’s widowed spouse. The county sheriff’s medical emergency
policies narrowed the standard of the officers’ conduct in response to a medical situation to a
simple and definite task of notifying the supervisor.
The inmate had been sentenced to 10 days in jail for driving without a license. He was
released to a hospital to treat his heart problems. After treatment, he did not return to the jail.
The county issued a warrant for him to serve his five remaining days. A year later, he returned to
a hospital complaining of pain. After waiting in the emergency room, he left without receiving
treatment but called the police for a ride home. Finding a warrant for his arrest, the police turned
him over to a county deputy. He told the deputy he had congestive heart failure and pneumonia.
At 5:23 p.m. he arrived at the jail. He immediately complained of pain and informed the jail staff
that he had pneumonia, congestive heart failure, high blood pressure and diabetes. After 11:00
p.m., he was taken to his cell. He requested help climbing the stairs from two officers on duty. He
did not receive help and climbed the stairs on his own. Between 11:55 p.m. and 12:00 a.m., he
rang the officers’ intercom three times. The officers conducted wellness checks on inmates every
30 minutes throughout the night. During two checks early in the morning, an officer spoke with
the inmate, who said something about medication and trouble breathing. Officers observed him
resting on his bunk throughout the night. He changed positions restlessly. At 5:15 a.m., an officer
noticed that he lay partially propped against the wall, blood flowing from his mouth, eyes open,
and no sign of breathing. He died of hypertensive and artherosclerotic heart disease. (Washington
County Jail, Minnesota)

pretrial detainee who died following self-mutilation while incarcerated in a jail, brought a civil
rights action against the county sheriff, the arresting police officer, and jailers in their individual
and official capacities alleging violation of the pretrial detainee’s right to medical treatment and
to due process. The district court granted judgment for the defendants and the estate appealed.
The appeals court affirmed in part. The court held that: (1) the detainee did not have an
objectively serious medical need on intake from the perspective of the arresting police officer, as a
layperson; (2) the arresting police officer did not subjectively know that the detainee required
medical attention; (3) a reasonable police officer would not have known on intake that the pretrial
detainee had an objectively serious medical need; (4) the detainee did not have an objectively
serious medical need on intake from the perspective of the jailer, as a layperson; (5) the jailer did
not subjectively know that the detainee required medical attention; (6) a reasonable jailer would
not have known on intake that the pretrial detainee had an objectively serious medical need; (7)
the county did not have an official practice of booking inmates who were hallucinating without
providing medical care; and (8) the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the
Arkansas State Jail Standards from evidence in the trial, as the jail standards did not represent
minimum constitutional standards. (Crawford County Detention Center, Arkansas)

29.172
XX

U.S. District Court
MENTAL HEALTH

Hadix v. Caruso, 461 F.Supp.2d 574 (W.D.Mich. 2006). State prisoners filed a class action under §

U.S. District Court
RELEASE
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE

Hubbard v. Taylor, 452 F.Supp.2d 533 (D.Del. 2006). Pretrial detainees filed suit under § 1983,

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2006). A state prisoner who had fractured his thumb

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE

Johnson v. Doughty, 433 F.3d 1001 (7th Cir. 2006). A former inmate brought an action under §

1983 in 1980, alleging that conditions of their confinement violated their constitutional rights.
Following settlement of claims by consent decree, and termination of the enforcement of mental
health provisions of the consent decree, a prisoner moved to reopen the judgment regarding
mental health care and for the issuance of preliminary injunction. The district court granted the
motion. The court held that reopening the mental health provisions of the consent decree was
warranted where many recurrent problems noted by physicians concerned “cracks” between
medical and mental health care. The court noted that forcing separate enforcement actions on
related topics would do a disservice to prisoners and administrators by forcing them to function
under multiple enforcement regimes. According to the court, the prison’s failure to provide daily
psychologist rounds to mentally ill prisoners in a segregation unit violated their Eighth
Amendment rights, inasmuch as such prisoners often had psychiatric needs which could not be
accommodated without rounds due to their lack of movement and the prisoners’ inability to
request care, and that segregation often placed prisoners with mental illness at a heightened risk
of mental decompensation and in conflict with correctional officers. The court held that the
pattern and practice of non-treatment of prisoners with mental illness, and the uncoordinated
treatment of prisoners presenting complicated cases with interdisciplinary problems, violated the
Eighth Amendment, in that it deprived prisoners of necessary services for serious medical and
mental health needs. The court found that the prison’s use of mechanical in-cell restraints,
including “top of the bed” restraints consisting of chaining a prisoner’s hands and feet to a
concrete slab, as disciplinary method and/or control mechanism constituted torture and violated
the Eighth Amendment, notwithstanding a six-hour limit on bed restraints but which did not
prohibit the use of other dangerous restraint devices at end of the six-hour period. (Southern
Michigan State Prison, Jackson)

challenging conditions of their confinement on Fourteenth Amendment due process grounds, and
a prisoner imprisoned at the same facility asserted a claim under the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA). The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and
plaintiffs appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. On remand, the district court
granted summary judgment for the defendants. The court held that requiring the pretrial
detainees to sleep on a mattress on the floor of their cells for a period of three to seven months did
not violate the detainees' Fourteenth Amendment due process rights, because providing sleeping
accommodations on the floor was in response to overcrowding at the facility and was not intended
to punish. The court noted that even if the pretrial detainees' constitutional rights were violated
by requiring them to sleep on mattresses on the floor, the law was not sufficiently clear so that a
reasonable official would understand that what he was doing violated a constitutional right,
entitling the officials to qualified immunity. The court held that a former inmate's allegations
that he was released from prison due to his end stage renal disease, rather than be provided with
medical care, failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), where the inmate was not denied adequate medical services because of his
end stage renal disease and he received regular dialysis treatment while he was incarcerated.
(Multi-Purpose Criminal Justice Facility, Delaware)
brought a pro se civil rights action against prison doctors, a warden, and others, alleging
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the prisoner appealed.
The court of appeals held that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment in
favor of two doctors and a warden, reversing and remanding. The court found that there were
issues of material fact as to when a prison doctor became aware of the prisoner's fractured thumb,
whether a prison doctor was deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's serious medical need to have
his thumb set and cast, and whether the delay in treatment was harmful to the prisoner. The
prisoner claimed that he had sent letters and grievances about his failure to receive treatment.
(California State Prison-Sacramento)
1983 against prison doctors and officials, alleging deliberate indifference to his medical needs.
The court granted summary judgment to some of the officials, and final judgment for the
remaining defendants after a bench trial. The court held that the inmate failed to establish that
the officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind in allegedly exhibiting deliberate
indifference to his medical needs. According to the court, the necessity for surgery for the inmate’s
hernia was not obvious to the non-medical grievance counselor and warden, and to the reviewing
administrators who determined that the inmate’s situation had been addressed appropriately.
The court found that the examining doctor formed a professional opinion that surgery was not
necessary and did not subsequently observe any worsening of the inmate’s condition. The court
noted that other doctors concurred with the initial diagnosis and the health care administrator
reasonably relied upon the doctors’ opinions. (Graham Correctional Center, Illinois)

29.173
XX

U.S. Appeals Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
DELAY IN CARE

Johnson v. Hamilton, 452 F.3d 967 (8th Cir. 2006). A state prisoner who was involved in a

physical altercation with corrections officers brought a § 1983 action, alleging violation of his
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court granted summary judgment in
favor of the defendants. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court found that
the officers’ use of force against the prisoner was reasonable. The prisoner pushed and punched
one officer in response to an attempt to restrain him and examine his earring to determine
whether the earring violated the prison rules. The prisoner continued to assault the officers even
after he was restrained. The court noted that the injuries suffered by the officers were much more
serious than any suffered by the prisoner, and the prisoner was criminally prosecuted and
convicted as a result of his conduct during the altercation. The court held that the prisoner failed
to demonstrate that prison medical personnel deliberately disregarded his serious medical needs,
as would violate his Eighth Amendment rights. According to the court, although there was a
delay of one month between the date that a prison nurse tentatively diagnosed the prisoner with
a fractured finger and the x-ray and treatment of the fracture, there was no showing that the
delay was the result of anything other than negligence. (Jefferson City Correctional Center,
Missouri)

U.S. Appeals Court
HANDICAP
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE

Johnson v. Snyder, 444 F.3d 579 (7th Cir. 2006). A state prisoner, who was an amputee, brought a

U.S. District Court
INADEQUATE CARE

Jones v. Marshall, 459 F.Supp.2d 1002 (E.D.Cal. 2006). An inmate who was attacked by other
prisoners brought suit against prison employees alleging failure to protect his safety and
deliberate difference to his medical needs. The defendants moved for summary judgment and the
district court granted the motion. The court held that the prison officers were not deliberately
indifferent to any risk that the inmate might be attacked by other prisoners by releasing him into
an exercise yard, absent any evidence that the officers either knew or could have inferred that the
new inmate, who had no known enemies, faced a substantial risk of attack from other inmates if
released into the exercise yard. According to the court, the officers were not deliberately
indifferent to a specific risk, as required to violate the inmate’s Eighth Amendment rights by
failing to protect him from attack, notwithstanding the inmate’s generalized, subjective fear for
his safety at the time. The court found that a medical technician was not deliberately indifferent
to the serious medical needs of the inmate, who had been attacked by other prisoners in an
exercise yard, when she visually examined him through holding cell bars immediately after the
incident, but failed to touch him or treat him. The inmate suffered no further injury as a result of
the technician’s conduct, and the technician did not know of any serious medical condition and
fail to treat it. (Solano State Prison, California State Prison at Corcoran)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONTAGIOUS
DISEASES

Kaucher v. County of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418 (3rd Cir. 2006). A corrections officer filed suit under §
1983 against a county and several county employees responsible for the operation of a
correctional facility, alleging violation of his substantive due process rights, contending he
contracted a Methicilin Resistant Stapylococcus Aureus (MRSA) infection as a result of the
defendants’ conscience-shocking behavior in creating unsanitary and dangerous conditions at the
facility. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and the officer
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that: (1) the alleged inadequate remedial
and preventative measures to stop the spread of MRSA within the correctional facility did not rise
to a level of deliberate indifference that could be characterized as conscience shocking, and (2) the
facility’s alleged failure to act affirmatively to improve conditions at the jail and alleged failure to
act affirmatively to educate and warn inmates and corrections officers about MRSA infections and
to train them in infection prevention were not the cause of the corrections officer’s infection. The
court noted that the state corrections department found the jail to be substantially in compliance
with state standards, giving the defendants reason to believe their measures were adequate, only

civil rights action against various prison officials, alleging violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the officials and the
prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the director of the state
Department of Corrections was not liable absent evidence that the director was actually aware of
the prisoner's situation or his complaints. The court concluded that the health care administrator
was not deliberately indifferent to the medical needs of the prisoner where the administrator
responded in a timely manner to the prisoner's grievance, noted that the prisoner did not need a
crutch because of his prosthesis, and recommended that a concrete bench be placed in the shower.
The court also found that the disability coordinator was not deliberately indifferent because the
coordinator investigated the prisoner's complaint, acknowledged a problem with the shower and
then understood that a stronger chair would be provided, and there was no evidence that the
coordinator was aware that a stronger chair was not provided or that he had an affirmative duty
to investigate further. The court held that the warden was not deliberately indifferent where the
warden was aware of the prisoner's request, he concurred with other officials' recommendation for
a different chair, and evidence showed that he believed that his subordinates were attending to
the issue. According to the court, the superintendent was not deliberately indifferent, where the
superintendent contacted a subordinate prison official who supervised the shower personnel and
discussed the problem, he suggested reinforcing the chair, and since he did not hear further about
the problem he assumed it had been resolved. (Menard Correctional Center, Illinois)

29.174
XX

two of 170 corrections officers tested positive for colonization of the infection, and the facility had
in place policies and procedures to ensure sanitary conditions in the jail, including requirements
that cells be regularly cleaned with an all-purpose detergent and that showers be disinfected with
a bleach and water solution. The court also noted that the officer chose to remain employed at the
jail, in a position that obliged him to work amidst MRSA infections and from the outset of his
employment, he was aware of the safety risks associated with working in a prison, and he was on
notice of the jail’s standard operating procedures, which described proper methods of handling
inmates with communicable diseases. (Bucks County Correctional Facility, Pennsylvania)
U.S. Appeals Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
DELAY IN CARE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Kiman v. New Hampshire Dept. of Corrections, 451 F.3d 274 (1st Cir. 2006). A former state
inmate filed an action alleging that prison officials violated Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) and state law by failing to properly treat his amyotrophic lateral sclerosis
(ALS). The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the officials and the inmate
appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. The court held that the officials’ actions
regarding the inmate’s diagnosis, medical consultations, physical therapy, and medical dosages
were not unreasonable. The prison medical staff sought the inmate’s medical records, arranged
for consultation with an outside specialist, and made reasoned medical judgments about the types
of treatment and the physical therapy that they thought were appropriate in his case. According
to the court, the delay in permitting the inmate to use his cane while they verified his need for it
did not violate Title II of ADA, where the inmate had not used a cane when he was previously in
the prison, the inmate was still able to walk without it, the inmate was confined to his cell at all
times except for short daily walks to and from his shower, correction officers were available to
help the inmate walk to a shower, and the inmate’s doctor issued a day pass to permit the inmate
to use a dayroom for recreation. The court found that summary judgment on ADA claims was
precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to: (1) whether the officials failed to deliver
medications to the inmate in a timely and regular basis; (2) the using of a shower chair or
accessible shower facilities despite his repeated requests; (3) the refusal to honor the inmate’s
front cuff pass and requests for front cuffing; and (4) the refusal to accommodate the inmate’s
request to be placed on the bottom tier of the facility and in a bottom bunk. The court noted that
in the Eighth Amendment context, the lack of an inmate’s formal compliance with a grievance
procedure is not a defense to liability for those prison officials who were aware of the prisoner’s
serious medical needs and refused to help. (New Hampshire State Prison)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELAY IN CARE
TRAINING
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE

Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir. 2006). The widow of an inmate in a county

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE

MacLeod v. Kern, 424 F.Supp.2d 260 (D.Mass. 2006). A prisoner brought an action against

U.S. District Court
MEDICATION
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE

Martin v. Donaghue, 407 F.Supp.2d 984 (N.D.Ind. 2006). A state prison inmate brought § 1983
action against medical personnel and corrections officials, alleging deliberate indifference to his
medical needs. The district court dismissed the case holding that: the “minimal” skin irritation
from the inmate's elastic allergy did not constitute a serious medical need, and even assuming
that the allergy constituted a serious medical need, there was no deliberate indifference since the
inmate had been seen and treated. According to the court, because the allergy was not a serious

jail brought a § 1983 action in state court against the county and others, alleging failure to
adequately train jail medical staff, leading to the denial of adequate medical care which resulted
in the inmate's death. Following removal to federal court, the district court granted the county's
motion for summary judgment and the widow appealed. The court of appeals reversed and
remanded, finding that a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding whether the county's
policy of relying on medical professionals, without offering training on how to implement
procedures for documenting, monitoring, and assessing inmates in the medical unit of the jail,
amounted to deliberate indifference to the inmates’ serious medical needs. The court also found
that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the
county's failure to implement specific policies regarding the treatment of inmates in the medical
unit of the jail amounted to a failure to train the jail's medical staff on how to treat inmates, and
whether the policies were the moving force behind the inmate's death. The 71-year-old inmate
was serving a 120-day jail sentence, and he suffered from congestive heart failure and other
ailments. Over a period of eighteen days his medical condition deteriorated, and although nurses
saw him several times during that period, there is no record of a doctor's examination until the
morning of the 18th day, hours before he died of cardiac arrest. (Los Angeles Co. Jail, California)

correctional and health care defendants, alleging that they violated his civil rights by displaying
deliberate indifference to his medical needs relating to his Hepatitis C, a stomach mass and a
testicular cyst. The defendants moved for summary judgment, and the district court granted the
motion. The court held that the course of treatment provided for the prisoner's serious medical
needs, even if inadequate, was not so inadequate as to shock the conscience, and thereby
constitute deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment. According to the court,
although the defendants denied medication for the prisoner's Hepatitis C, denial of the
medication was due to the reason that the prisoner's treatment would have been adversely
affected by the prisoner's prior drug use. (University of Massachusetts Correctional Health, Old
Colony Correctional Center in Bridgewater, Massachusetts)

29.175
XX

medical need, corrections officials’ failure to supply him with medication and non-elastic
underwear did not constitute deliberate indifference to the inmate’s medical needs. The court
noted that the inmate, who tucked his undershirt inside his underwear to avoid irritation in the
absence of medication and elastic-free underwear, had been seen and treated, even though the
inmate disagreed with that treatment. (Indiana)
U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICATION

Moots v. Lombardi, 453 F.3d 1020 (8th Cir. 2006). A state prisoner sued various prison officials,
alleging that they were deliberately indifferent to his serious mental health needs and that they
retaliated against him for filing a grievance. The district court entered summary judgment for the
officials and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed and held that: (1) the failure to
house the prisoner with cellmates of his choosing did not constitute deliberate indifference to his
serious medical needs, where the officials had ample reasons for their action, including safety
concerns, and the officials had no reason to know that their housing choices would have a serious
negative impact on the prisoner’s mental health; (2) any failure to ensure that the prisoner’s
medications were promptly transferred to solitary confinement did not constitute deliberate
indifference to his serious medical needs, absent a showing by the prisoner that he suffered harm
as a result; (3) a conduct violation for fighting did not constitute retaliatory discipline, where the
prisoner was bruised around his eye, and the fact that a conduct violation was later expunged did
not mean that there was not some evidence for its imposition; and (4) transfer to another prison
did not constitute disciplinary retaliation, where he disputed neither the computation of his
classification score nor the conclusion that his score made him ineligible to remain at the prison
from which he was transferred. (Missouri Eastern Correctional Center)

U.S. District Court
PRIVACY
INFORMED CONSENT

Niemic v. Maloney, 448 F.Supp.2d 270 (D.Mass. 2006). An inmate in state correctional facility
brought action against corrections officials and health care providers alleging that the health care
providers improperly shared his medical records. The district court held that health care
providers who provided medical services at the correctional facility did not violate inmate's
Fourth Amendment rights when they exchanged medical information with corrections officers
without the inmate's informed consent. The court found that the corrections officers had a
reasonable need to know that the inmate's drug test showed use of heroin and cocaine. (MCICedar Junction, Massachusetts)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICATION
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE

Norfleet v. Webster, 439 F.3d 392 (7th Cir. 2006). A federal prisoner with arthritis brought an
action against prison officials, alleging they were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical
needs. The district court granted summary judgment for the officials, in part, and the prison's
clinical director and physician assistant appealed. The court of appeals held that neither the
clinical director nor the physician assistant were deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's serious
medical needs. The clinical director had determined that the prisoner no longer needed soft-soled
shoes or certain medications for his arthritis, after receiving two differing medical opinions made
within four months of each other. The physician assistant had required the prisoner to wait at
least ten days before getting a refill of his pain reliever, in adherence to prison's policy regarding
pain relievers. (United States Penitentiary, Terre Haute, Indiana)

U.S. District Court
DENTAL CARE
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
PRIVATE PROVIDER
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE

Olivas v. Corrections Corp. of America, 408 F.Supp.2d 251 (N.D.Tex. 2006). An inmate brought a

§ 1983 action against a private company that managed a prison, alleging violations of his
constitutional rights and a claim of negligence under state law. The corporation moved for
summary judgment and the district court granted the motion. The court held that: the company
was not liable for alleged deliberate indifference to the inmate's serious medical needs; even if the
corporation failed to properly prioritize the inmate's dental injury, the failure did not amount to
deliberate indifference to the inmate's serious medical needs; and the inmate did not suffer a
“physical injury” under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The court noted that a private
corporation that manages a prison can be sued by an inmate under § 1983 for an alleged
constitutional injury, since the operation of a prison is a fundamental government function and
the standards applicable to determining liability under § 1983 against a municipal corporation
are applicable to determining the liability of a private corporation performing a government
function. The court held that the inmate's injury, in which he broke two front teeth, was not a
dental injury that required emergency care, and therefore the private prison-management
company was not liable to the inmate under § 1983 for alleged deliberate indifference to inmate's
serious medical needs. The inmate did not initially seek emergency care, and in the days
immediately following the injury he did not suffer pain requiring more than over-the-counter
medicine. According to the court, even if the private prison-management corporation failed to
properly prioritize the inmate's dental injury, such failure did not amount to deliberate
indifference to the inmate's serious medical needs under the Eighth Amendment, for the purposes
of the inmate's § 1983 claim against the company. The inmate's allegation in the § 1983 action
that he suffered some pain, and later suffered depression and emotional injury resulting from the
loss of his teeth, was insufficient to establish a “physical injury” under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (PLRA). (Corr. Corp. of America, Mineral Wells Pre-Parole Transfer Facility, Texas)

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U.S. Appeals Court
RIGHT TO REFUSE
INFORMED CONSENT
INVOLUNTARY
TREATMENT

Pabon v. Wright, 459 F.3d 241 (2nd Cir. 2006). A pro se state prisoner sued prison physicians and
private consulting physicians under § 1983, alleging that they violated Eighth Amendment by
providing inadequate treatment for his Hepatitis C. The district court entered summary
judgment in favor of the physicians and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The
court held that the prisoner's due process right to refuse medical treatment carries with it a
concomitant right to such information as a reasonable patient would deem necessary to make an
informed decision, and that the prison officials' action of requiring the prisoner to undergo a liver
biopsy before considering him eligible for Hepatitis C treatment was not a violation of his due
process rights. The court also found that the prisoner's right to receive medical information was
not clearly established when he had a liver biopsy. The court noted that prison officials may
administer treatment to a prisoner despite that prisoner's desire to refuse treatment, without
violating the prisoner's due process rights, if, in the exercise of their professional judgment, the
officials reasonably determine that providing such treatment furthers a legitimate penological
interest. (Green Haven Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
REHABILITATION ACT
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act

Partelow v. Massachusetts, 442 F.Supp.2d 41 (D.Mass. 2006). A state prisoner whose leg had

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICATION

Phillips v. Jasper County Jail, 437 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2006). An inmate at a county jail brought a
§ 1983 action against various jail employees and the jail's doctor, alleging violation of his
constitutional rights. The district court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment
and the inmate appealed. The court of appeals held that the inmate was not entitled to appointed
counsel where discovery had just begun at the time the inmate requested counsel and there was
no conflicting testimony, there was no indication that the inmate was unable to investigate or
present his case, the inmate correctly identified the applicable legal standard governing his
claims and successfully amended his complaint to include essential information, his claims
involved information readily available to him, the inmate was able to avoid procedural default,
the complaint was sufficient to survive the first motion for summary judgment, and the inmate
had been able to file more than thirty documents with the court. The court held that the jail's
doctor who prescribed anti-seizure medicine to the inmate was not deliberately indifferent to the
inmate's serious medical needs, even though the medication prescribed was different from the
medication the inmate had taken in the past. According to the court, the doctor did not know that
the medication prescribed would present a danger to the inmate or that he was prescribing less
medication than was required. The court found that summary judgment was precluded by a
genuine issue of material fact regarding whether jail employees assigned the inmate to a top
bunk, despite the fact that he suffered from a seizure disorder. (Jasper County Jail, Missouri)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICATION
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Pietrafeso v. Lawrence County, S. D., 452 F.3d 978 (8th Cir. 2006). A widow, as personal

been amputated brought an action against numerous defendants, including a county correctional
center and sheriff, alleging that failure to provide him with handicapped-accessible shower
facilities during the renovation of his housing unit violated his federal and state civil rights. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court held that the
officials provided alternative accessible facilities, precluding claims under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act. The court noted that officials provided the
prisoner with a chair for use in the standard shower, assigned him to a housing unit with
handicapped-accessible showers, promptly transferred him back to his original unit at his
request, and ultimately made arrangements for him to shower in the medical unit. The court held
that the prisoner could not establish an Eighth Amendment claim, where officials allowed the
prisoner to shower in medical unit and made other such accommodations imposing only minor
impediments and delays. The court found that the transfer of the prisoner to a maximum security
housing unit in order to place him near a handicapped accessible shower was not in retaliation for
the prisoner's exercise of constitutional rights, as would violate § 1983. (Hampden County
Correctional Center, Massachusetts)

representative of a pretrial detainee who died of an acute asthma attack while detained in a
county jail, brought a civil rights action against the county and jailers alleging deliberate
indifference to the detainee’s serious medical needs. The detainee had arrived at the jail at 7:10
p.m. with an envelope marked with the detainee’s name, inmate number, and the following
notation in bold red letters: “URGENT Colo. Inter-Correctional Medical Summary Transfer
Report DELIVER TO MEDICAL DEPARTMENT AT ONCE.” In an intake interview, the
detainee told the jailer that he suffered from a severe asthma condition. The detainee said he
was taking a “bunch” of medications, though he brought with him to the jail only an Albuterol
inhaler. After a jury trial, the district court entered judgment in favor of the defendants as a
matter of law. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the head jailer was not
deliberately indifferent to the detainee’s medical needs in failing to take the detainee to a
physician shortly after the detainee’s arrival, absent any evidence that the jailer actually knew of
and recklessly disregarded the risk of serious harm to the detainee posed by the lack of access to
his prescribed medications over the weekend. According to the court, the head jailer’s failure to
take the detainee and his medical records to the physician was at most negligence. The court held
that the jail administrator and the chief deputy were not deliberately indifferent,
notwithstanding the chief deputy’s instructions to another jailer to attempt to get the inmate’s

29.177
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prescriptions filled without taking the detainee to an emergency room. Although the jail
administrator failed to ensure that the detainee visited a physician to secure a refill of his
prescriptions, the day before the detainee died the administrator had been advised by a
physicians assistant that an emergency room visit was not necessary unless the detainee made
frequent use of the inhaler. The administrator was following that advice. The court noted that a
jailer repeatedly asked others to obtain the detainee’s medications and, on his day off, took
medical notes transferred with the detainee to the physicians assistant and then visited the
detainee in the jail to tell him of the physicians assistant’s advice. (Lawrence Co. Jail, S.D.)
U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE

Pinkston v. Madry, 440 F.3d 879 (7th Cir. 2006). A state inmate brought § 1983 action against
two correctional officers, alleging that they violated his Eighth Amendment rights in allowing
another prisoner to assault him and thereafter refusing to assist him in receiving adequate
medical care. The district court granted the officers' motion for judgment on partial findings and
the inmate appealed. The court of appeals held that the inmate did not show that the two
correctional officers failed to protect him by allowing a fight between the inmate and another
prisoner, given the testimony of three witnesses that a correctional officer, acting alone, could not
have operated a locking mechanism so as to open the inmate's cell door, thereby allowing the fight
to occur. The court noted an absence of evidence that bolstered the inmate's contention that an
officer could have opened the cell door by himself, and an absence of evidence that another officer
was present who could have assisted the first officer in opening the cell door. The court found that
the officers were not deliberately indifferent to any serious medical needs of the inmate following
the alleged altercation with another prisoner, and thus were not liable under the Eighth
Amendment and § 1983. The inmate testified that one officer obtained medical supplies,
bandaged the inmate's split lip, and subsequently changed the dressing. The court noted that the
inmate waited four days to formally request medical attention, and that the inmate refused to
cooperate with medical staff and accept medical assistance when it was offered to him. (Indiana
Department of Corrections Maximum Control Complex, Westville, Indiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELAY IN CARE
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE

Plemmons v. Roberts, 439 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2006). A county jail inmate who had been arrested
for failing to pay child support brought a § 1983 action against a county, county sheriff, and
corrections officers, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The district
court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment and they appealed. The court of
appeals held that genuine issues of material fact as to whether the county jail inmate suffered
from a serious heart condition, whether jail officials were notified of the inmate's history of heart
problems, whether officials failed to recognize that the inmate was suffering from the symptoms
of a heart attack that would be obvious to a lay person, whether the officials acted promptly to
obtain necessary medical help, and whether the officials were properly trained to deal with such a
medical emergency, precluded summary judgment in favor of the defendants. According to the
court, the corrections officers’ alleged delay in providing medical care to the inmate who was
having a heart attack constituted conduct that violated clearly established law, and therefore the
officers were not entitled to qualified immunity in the inmate's § 1983 Eighth Amendment
deliberate indifference claim. The inmate alleged that two officers inexcusably delayed in
summoning an ambulance even though he had told them that he had a history of heart trouble.
The court noted that the medical intake form completed by one of the officers did not contain any
mention of heart problems. (Pulaski County Jail, Missouri)

U.S. District Court
INADEQUATE CARE

Poole v. Taylor, 466 F.Supp.2d 578 (D.Del. 2006). A former pretrial detainee filed a § 1983 action
alleging unconstitutional conditions of confinement, and that he was denied adequate medical
care. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court held
that the detainee’s due process rights were not violated when he was required to sleep on a
mattress on the floor for over six months in an overcrowded facility that experienced sporadic hot
and cold temperatures and insect and rodent infestations. The court noted that the officials had
issued numerous work orders for temperature repairs and pest control, the detainee was not
denied access to toilet facilities, the officials determined that triple-celling pretrial detainees was
a method to deal with their overcrowded facilities, and there was no evidence of intention on the
officials’ part to punish the detainee. The court found that officials were not deliberately
indifferent to the detainee’s serious medical needs, in violation of the Due Process Clause, even
though he was not hospitalized or sent to a plastic surgeon after he sustained a large cut over his
right eye. The court noted that the detainee’s treatment included sutures, bandaging of his
wound, and administration of medication, as well as a follow-up visit. The detainee was given
instructions to contact the medical department for any perceived problems with the wound, and
the detainee did not seek additional treatment. (Multi-Purpose Crim. Justice Facility, Delaware)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
PRETRIAL DETAINEE
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE

Pryor v. Dearborn Police Dept., 452 F.Supp.2d 714 (E.D.Mich. 2006). The estate of an arrestee
brought a § 1983 action against police officers and a police department, alleging failure to provide
the arrestee with adequate medical care. The district court held that summary judgment was
precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the arrestee's condition-- a crack
cocaine overdose-- constituted a serious medical need, and whether the police officers acted with
deliberate indifference to the arrestee's serious medical need. The detainee was arrested, and
29.178

XX

while he was in custody in a police vehicle he consumed an unknown quantity of cocaine. He
again ingested cocaine when he was detained at the police station and subsequently collapsed on
the floor of his cell and began convulsing. Paramedics were eventually called, and they
transported the arrestee to a hospital, where he died three days later. (Dearborn Police Station,
Michigan)
U.S. District Court
DELAY IN CARE
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE

Rand v. Simonds, 422 F.Supp.2d 318 (D.N.H. 2006). A pretrial detainee brought a pro se action
against a superintendent, assistant superintendent, and physician's assistant for a county
correctional facility, alleging that they were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs.
The defendants moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the motion. The
court held that the detainee administratively exhausted his claim that the superintendent and
assistant superintendent were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs, even though
he did not file a formal grievance, given that “rules” on grievance procedures in the inmate
handbook did not require that the grievance take a particular form. The court noted that the
detainee submitted a request form asking for referral to a specialist, as specified in the medical
procedures section of handbook, and that inquiries made by an investigator for the detainee's
criminal defense attorney into the facility's refusal to refer the detainee to an outside medical
care provider for his shoulder pain gave the superintendent and assistant superintendent the
requisite opportunity to address the detainee's complaints, which they took advantage of by
explaining the decision made. The court held that the detainee failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), on his claim
that a physician's assistant at the county correctional facility was deliberately indifferent to his
serious medical needs by failing to refer him to specialist outside the facility for his shoulder
injury. According to the court, the complaints made on the detainee's behalf by an investigator for
the detainee's criminal defense attorney did not allege any misfeasance on the part of the
physician's assistant or even mention him, and therefore did not give the facility's officials
sufficient notice of the detainee's concerns about treatment received from the physician's
assistant to allow those concerns to be dealt with administratively. The court found that material
issues of fact existed as to whether the superintendent and assistant superintendent denied
outside care to the detainee on prohibited bases, such as the detainee's ability or willingness to
pay for such medical services, precluding summary judgment for the officials on the detainee's
claims alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. But the court concluded that
a delay in having the detainee examined by an orthopedic surgeon did not cause him any
additional pain or permanent injury, given that the specialists who eventually saw the detainee
did not believe that surgery was an appropriate treatment for his shoulder pain and the measures
recommended did not appreciably reduce the detainee's pain and discomfort, such that
implementing them earlier would not have measurably improved his condition. The court found
that the detainee's injury did not amount to a “serious medical need” for alleged deliberate
indifference to his serious medical needs. (Merrimack Co. House of Corrections, New Hampshire)

U.S. Appeals Court
INADEQUATE CARE

Renkel v. U.S., 456 F.3d 640 (6th Cir. 2006). A detainee in a United Stated disciplinary barracks

U.S. District Court
ABORTION
TRANSPORTATION

Roe v. Crawford, 439 F.Supp.2d 942 (W.D. Mo. 2006). An inmate brought a class action against

U.S. District Court
DENTAL CARE
DELAY IN CARE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
RESTRAINTS

Samuel v. First Correctional Medical, 463 F.Supp.2d 488 (D.Del. 2006). A state inmate filed a §

brought an action against the United States alleging her receipt of sub-standard medical care
while incarcerated violated her rights under the United Nations Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. The district court granted the
government’s motion to dismiss. The detainee appealed and the appeals court affirmed. The court
of appeals held that there was no implied private right of action for violations of the Convention
Against Torture. According to the court, the treaty was not self-executing and statutes
criminalizing torture outside the United States did not provide civil regress for torture within the
United States. (United States Disciplinary Barracks in Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas)
corrections officials, challenging a policy prohibiting transportation of pregnant inmates off-site to
provide abortion care for non-therapeutic abortions. The district court held that the policy
violated inmates' Due Process rights and the policy violated the Eighth Amendment. The court
noted that inmates who chose to terminate a pregnancy and had to be transported outside of the
prison for that purpose posed no greater security risk than any other inmate requiring outside
medical attention. The court held that a Missouri law prohibiting the use of State funds to assist
with an abortion did not encompass transport to the location where the procedure was to take
place, there was no alternative way for an inmate to obtain a non-therapeutic abortion, and
abortion out counts had no measurable impact on the ongoing prison need to schedule and
reschedule medical appointments. (Women's Eastern Reception, Diagnostic and Correctional
Center, Missouri)

1983 action alleging that prison officials violated his constitutional rights. The district court
granted the prison officials’ motion to dismiss. The court held that prison officials did not violate
the inmate’s Eighth Amendment rights by forcing him to remain handcuffed while receiving
dental treatment, where the use of shackles and handcuffs during dental treatment was a routine
security measure in the prison. The court took notice of the close proximity of the medical care

29.179
XX

provider and his or her dental instruments to the inmate during dental examinations and
treatments. The court found that prison officials were not deliberately indifferent to the inmate’s
serious medical needs, in violation of Eighth Amendment, as a result of the contract medical
provider’s failure to provide the inmate with dental treatment for over nine months, where the
state agreed that the delay was unacceptable and awarded a contract to another provider, which
provided treatment in a timely manner. (Delaware Correctional Center)
U.S. Appeals Court
INADEQUATE CARE
MEDICATION

Self v. Crum, 439 F.3d 1227 (10th Cir. 2006). A detainee brought an action against a jail's
physician alleging deliberate indifference to his medical needs in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the physician and the
detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the physician who provided
medication for a respiratory infection and to reduce fever and coughing did not consciously
disregard the substantial risk of serious harm arising from the detainee's symptoms. According to
the court, the detainee's allegation that the physician diagnosed his heart problem but ignored it,
was based on speculation and conjecture. The court noted that, at most, the physician's actions
amounted to a misdiagnosis or failure to conduct further testing. (Denver County Jail, Colorado)

U.S. Appeals Court
INADEQUATE CARE

Senty-Haugen v. Goodno, 462 F.3d 876 (8th Cir. 2006). A civilly-committed sex offender brought
an action against the Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Human Services, other
Department officials, and sex offender program employees, alleging violations of federal and state
law for being placed in isolation, receiving inadequate medical attention, and being retaliated
against. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the offender
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the offender did not receive inadequate
medical treatment in violation of his due process rights, in that the alleged delays in treatment
did not worsen his conditions, he provided no expert evidence that the treatment he received was
inadequate, and staff was not unreasonable in requiring him to move away from the door of his
room before he could be treated for an injured leg, since they were unable to ascertain the extent
of his injury until they could see that it was safe for them to enter. (Minnesota Sex Offender
Program, Minnesota Department of Human Services)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE
TRAINING

Shaw v. Coosa County Com'n., 434 F.Supp.2d 1179 (M.D.Ala. 2006). A daughter, individually and

U.S. Appeals Court
DELAY IN CARE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
NEGLIGENCE

Smith v. Clarke, 458 F.3d 720 (8th Cir. 2006). An inmate brought § 1983 and negligence actions
against a physician and the Director of Nebraska Department of Correctional Services alleging
failure to treat in a timely manner a pituitary gland tumor pinching his optic nerve. The district
court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The inmate appealed. The appeals
court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that: (1) the physician did
not violate the Eighth Amendment; and (2) the physician was not a state employee within the
meaning of the Nebraska State Tort Claims Act provision requiring plaintiffs with tort claims
against state employees to file a claim with the State Tort Claims Board before filing an action in
court. The court noted that the physician examined the inmate three times and noticed a problem
with his pupils during the third examination, and nothing had indicated the tumor prior to the
third examination. (Nebraska Department of Correctional Services)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
INVOLUNTARY
MEDICATION

Spann v. Roper, 453 F.3d 1007 (8th Cir. 2006). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a

as administrator of the estate of her deceased father, brought state and federal law claims against
a sheriff and county commission arising from her father's death while he was an inmate in a
county jail. The county commission and sheriff filed separate motions for summary judgment,
which the district court granted. The court held that the county sheriff did not have the requisite
knowledge to be found deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of the inmate who
failed to disclose his medical condition or to request treatment. According to the court, the sheriff
did not violate the Eighth Amendment rights of the jail inmate who died of cardiovascular disease
on his second day of incarceration, absent a showing that the inmate disclosed his condition upon
admission, that the sheriff otherwise knew that the inmate had a serious condition that required
immediate medical treatment, or that the sheriff failed to provide the inmate with treatment with
knowledge that failure to do so posed a substantial risk of serious harm. The inmate apparently
was not taking his medications and did not request medical treatment. The court found that
facially constitutional policies governing booking, supervision, staffing, and training of jail
personnel did not, as applied, result in deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of the
inmate, where the policies provided for health screening of inmates upon their admission and
medical treatment when requested by inmates, and there was no evidence that the policies were
ignored nor any history of widespread problems to place the sheriff on notice of the need to correct
the policies, as required to hold the sheriff individually liable. (Coosa County Jail, Alabama)

prison nurse alleging deliberate indifference and violation of the due process clause. The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of the nurse. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court
affirmed in part and remanded in part. The court held that the nurse did not act with deliberate
indifference in forcing the prisoner to take another inmate’s medication. According to the court,
summary judgment was precluded by fact questions as to: (1) whether the state prison nurse’s
mistaken conduct in forcing the prisoner to take psychiatric medication created a serious medical

29.180
XX

condition that the nurse knew of but ignored; and (2) whether immediate medical attention, such
as pumping the prisoner’s stomach, could have removed the medication before it was totally
absorbed in the prisoner’s system. The court found that the prisoner’s due process rights were not
implicated by the nurse’s inadvertent administration of another inmate’s psychiatric medication
because the nurse’s decision did not involve the treatment of an unwilling patient with
psychiatric medication. A few minutes after taking the medication, the prisoner felt his legs
collapse and the room spin. He awoke in pain in another room with a sore throat and dried blood.
(Transitional Care Unit, Missouri)
U.S. District Court
EMERGENCY CARE
HOSPITAL
PRIVATE PROVIDER
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE

Sykes v. McPhillips, 412 F.Supp.2d 197 (N.D.N.Y. 2006). The personal representatives for a

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE

Taylor v. Wausau Underwriters Ins. Co., 423 F.Supp.2d 882 (E.D.Wis. 2006). The estate of a
pretrial detainee who had committed suicide in jail brought § 1983 claims against a county
corrections officer, alleging deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, a claim against the
county alleging that the county maintained an unconstitutional informal policy of allowing
inmates on suicide watch to turn out their lights, and a state law wrongful death claim against
the officer and county. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the officer and
county. The court held that the county was not liable for a due process violation under § 1983 for
deliberate indifference to the detainee’s serious medical needs absent evidence that the officer's
delay in turning on the detainee's light after the detainee had turned it off, during which time the
detainee hanged himself, was a standard practice or an aberration. According to the court, even if
the jail's unofficial policy of allowing inmates on suicide watch access to light switches was the
cause of the detainee's suicide, in that it compromised corrections officers' ability to supervise the
detainee, the county was not deliberately indifferent to the detainee's serious medical needs in
violation of his due process rights. The court found that the jail's classification of the detainee as a
suicide risk did not indicate he was actually a suicide risk, the fact that the detainee was a former
corrections officer charged with heinous crimes did not indicate a substantial suicide risk, and,
even if suicide risk was indicated by facts that the detainee stole a razor, that there were
scratches on his wrists, and that he removed elastic from his underwear, the county placed him
on suicide watch and thus was not indifferent. The court noted that the absence of mental illness
in an inmate who commits suicide is not fatal to a claim for deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs. The detainee was a former correctional officer charged with attempted murder,
kidnapping, and sexual assault of a minor. He was admitted to jail where he was placed on a
suicide watch in a cell with constant camera surveillance. (Fond du Lac County Jail, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
SMOKE-FREE
ENVIRONMENT

Thiel v. Nelson, 422 F.Supp.2d 1024 (W.D.Wis. 2006). Patients who were involuntarily committed
to a mental health facility pursuant to a state's sexually violent persons statute filed state court
actions challenging a smoking ban enacted at the facility. After removal to federal court, the
patients moved to remand, and the officials moved to dismiss the complaint. The district court
dismissed the complaint. The court held that the decision to completely ban smoking at the
facility was rationally related to legitimate state interests of improving patients' health and
safety, reducing fire hazards, maintaining clean and sanitary conditions, and reducing complaints
and the threat of litigation from patients who did not smoke. The court found that the smoking
ban did not violate the patients' equal protection rights, even if another state detention facility
continued to permit its patients to smoke. The court noted that, unlike criminally confined
offenders who may be subject to punishment as long as it is not cruel and unusual under the
Eighth Amendment, persons who are civilly confined may not be punished. According to the

mother and son's estates brought a civil rights action under § 1983 against various employees of a
substance abuse correctional facility where the son had been confined, a private hospital which
provided emergency medical services to the son, and a physician. The representatives alleged
constitutional violations arising from the delivery of emergency medical services during the son's
incarceration, as well as a state law malpractice/negligence claim. The hospital and physician
moved for summary judgment on the issue of their “state actor” status. The district court granted
the motion, holding that neither the hospital nor the physician were a “state actor” for the
purposes of § 1983. According to the court, hospitals and physicians that provide care outside of
the prison facility may be held to be state actors for purposes of § 1983 when they work pursuant
to a contract, but the private hospital did not voluntarily assume the function of the state by
accepting the correctional facility's delegation of its duty to provide emergency medical care to the
prisoner. The court noted that the hospital did not have an implied contract with the correctional
facility to provide emergency medical services when it treated the prisoner, given that it was
federally mandated to do so by the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act
(EMTALA). The prisoner suffered from diabetes while confined at the facility and the plaintiffs
alleged that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. The defendants
maintained that the prisoner received the same medical care as any other patient, regardless of
his prisoner status. The plaintiff disputed this by pointing out that corrections officers exercised
continual custody over the prisoner in a manner that interfered with the confidentiality normally
accorded the health information of free patients, the hospital accommodated the officers' constant
attendance upon the prisoner, and the state paid for his medical care. (Hale Creek Alcohol and
Substance Abuse Correctional Treatment Center, New York)

29.181
XX

court, involuntarily committed patients may be subjected to conditions that advance goals such as
preventing escape and assuring the safety of others. The court also found that the patients were
not deprived of their due process right to adequate treatment as result of state's decision to
completely ban smoking at facility. (Sand Ridge Secure Treatment Center, Wisconsin)
U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICATION
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Thomas v. Ashcroft, 470 F.3d 491 (2nd Cir. 2006). A detainee brought a Bivens action against
named and unnamed federal Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents and prison officials,
alleging that his blindness was caused by the defendants' deliberate indifference to his serious
medical needs while in federal custody. The district court dismissed the case and the detainee
appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that
allegations by the detainee, that federal prison officials were on notice of his glaucoma and
resulting medical needs, that they were aware of the improper administration of his medications
and that they still failed to address the situation, that he was transferred to one correctional
facility where he received no medication despite the requests of his family, his lawyer, and
outside physicians, and that the officials were personally ordered by a magistrate judge to see to
the detainee's medical needs, stated a Bivens claim against prison officials, for deliberate
indifference to the detainee's serious medical needs. (New York Metropolitan Correctional Center,
Federal Bureau of Prisons)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE

Thomas v. Bruce, 428 F.Supp.2d 1161(D.Kan. 2006). A state prisoner brought a civil rights action

U.S. District Court
DELAY IN CARE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Thomas v. Walton, 461 F.Supp.2d 786 (S.D.Ill. 2006). A state prisoner brought civil rights claims

U.S. District Court
INTAKE SCREENING

Thompson v. County of Cook, 428 F.Supp.2d 807 (N.D.Ill. 2006). A detainee held for civil

under § 1983 against prison officials, asserting an Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate
indifference to his serious medical needs. The district court granted the officials' motion for
summary judgment, but the court of appeals reversed and remanded. On remand, the district
court held that the officials did not violate the prisoner's Eighth Amendment right to be free from
cruel and unusual punishment by allegedly failing to treat his Hepatitis C, where the officials
recognized the prisoner's condition and provided ongoing monitoring. The court noted that, when
the prisoner's high enzyme levels warranted further testing and a liver biopsy, officials undertook
steps to ensure treatment through the established administrative process. (Hutchinson
Correctional Facility, Kansas)

against correctional officials, alleging use of excessive force, deliberate indifference to medical
needs, and retaliation in violation of his First Amendment rights. The defendants’ motion for
partial summary judgment was granted in part and denied in part. The district court held that a
one-day delay in providing access to a mental health professional following the prisoner’s suicide
attempt did not involve deliberate indifference and that a 10-day delay in providing medical
attention was not deliberate indifference. The court found that the prisoner’s repeated refusal to
comply with an order to submit to a strip search during a cell inspection justified spraying him
with the chemical agent. The court found that the spraying did not involve the use of excessive
force, where the chemical was not used in a quantity greater than necessary to subdue the
prisoner, secure his compliance with the order, and assure the safety of the officers. The court
noted that the prisoner was being held in segregation in a maximum security prison and had a
history of assaults on correctional officers. (Tamms Correctional Center, Illinois)

contempt brought an action against a county and a sheriff, alleging civil rights violations due to
invasive search procedures. Following a jury verdict for the defendants, the detainee moved for a
new trial. The district court held that a jury's verdict as to an unreasonable body cavity search
was against the manifest weight of evidence. The court noted that, notwithstanding the detainee's
purported intermingling with others who were incarcerated, he was not charged with any crime,
and there was no evidence that deputies noticed anything suspicious about detainee which would
have otherwise justified a search. The detainee was subjected to an invasive urethral swabbing
procedure without his consent. The detainee had been held in civil contempt and ordered held in
custody after he refused to sign certain documents related to his pending divorce proceedings.
Upon arrival at the jail, the detainee was processed along with approximately 250 other new
inmates. After spending some time in a holding pen, the detainee and others were photographed
and given identification cards. An employee from Cermak Health Services, the agency responsible
for administering medical treatment to detainees at the jail, then asked Thompson a number of
medical screening questions. During the interview, the detainee responded to the questions on a
standard form concerning his medical history and signed the following “consent for treatment”
portion of the form: I consent to a medical and mental health history and physical including

screening for tuberculosis and sexually transmitted diseases as part of the intake process of the
Cook County Jail. I also consent to ongoing medical treatment by Cermak Health Services staff
for problems identified during this process. I understand I may be asked to sign forms allowing
other medical treatments. I understand that every effort will be made by CHS staff to keep my
medical problems confidential. I understand the policy of CHS regarding access to health care at
Cook County Jail. The defendants presented evidence at trial that during the interview, an
employee informed the detainee of his right to refuse the medical screening, but the detainee
denied that anyone informed him of his right to refuse to consent. Following the medical

29.182
XX

screening interview, his personal property was inventoried and then he and other inmates then
underwent a urethral swabbing procedure. He claimed that he felt pain both during and after the
procedure. (Cook County Jail, Illinois)
U.S. District Court
MEDICATION
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE

Torres v. Trombly, 421 F.Supp.2d 527 (D.Conn. 2006). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against
a correction officer, prison nurse, and other prison officials, alleging that the nurse and the officer
were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The
district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss in part, and denied in part. The nurse
and officer subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment. The district court held that the
nurse's failure to administer the prisoner's hypertension medication on one day did not cause the
prisoner to suffer a serious medical condition, and thus the nurse and the correction officer who
escorted the nurse on the day in question, were not deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's
serious medical needs. The court noted that the prisoner was taking a relatively low dose of
medication for mild hypertension, the prisoner took his medication on every other day that
month, his blood pressure was normal when checked three weeks later, and there was no
indication that the missed dose of medication interfered with the prisoner's activities or caused
him medical complications. The court noted that § 1983 was not meant to redress medical
malpractice claims that can be adequately resolved under state tort law, and therefore a
prisoner's claim of misdiagnosis, faulty judgment, or malpractice, without more to indicate prison
officials' deliberate indifference to the prisoner's medical needs, is not a cognizable Eighth
Amendment claim under § 1983. (Northern Correctional Institution, Connecticut)

U.S. District Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
HEARING IMPAIRED

Tucker v. Hardin County, 448 F.Supp.2d 901 (W.D.Tenn. 2006). Deaf detainees and their deaf
mother sued a county and a city, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court held that a
county court did not violate the ADA's Title II, which prohibits discrimination in public services,
by asking the deaf mother to serve as interpreter for her deaf sons at their plea hearing, despite
her contention that the request deprived her of her right to participate as a spectator. The court
noted that the mother expressed no reservations to the court about serving as an interpreter, that
she could have refused the request, and, even if the court were somehow responsible for her
service as an interpreter, its request was based on her skill in lip-reading and sign language, not
on her disability. According to the court, assuming that overnight incarceration was covered by
the ADA's Title II which prohibits discrimination in public services, and assuming that placing a
phone call was an “aid, benefit, or service” within the meaning of an ADA regulation prohibiting
public entities from providing a disabled person aid, benefit, or service that was not as effective as
that provided to others, the county did not violate ADA in using relay operators and notes to
allow the deaf detainees to communicate with their mother, rather than providing them with a
teletypewriter (TTY) telephone. The court noted that information was transmitted and received,
which was the same benefit non-disabled person would have received. While in custody, the two
brothers communicated with officers through written notes. The jail was not equipped with a
teletypewriter (TTY) telephone. Instead, the officers acted as relay operators, using paper and
pencil, as they spoke with an operator acting on their behalf to complete the call, which lasted 45
minutes. (Hardin County Jail, and the City of Savannah Police Department, Tennessee)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE

U.S. v. Gonzales, 436 F.3d 560 (5th Cir. 2006). Following a jury trial, deportation officers were

convicted of deprivation of civil rights and one defendant appealed. The appeals court held that
evidence was sufficient to support a finding that the defendant willfully sprayed a detainee, who
had a broken neck, with pepper spray and that the use of pepper spray resulted in bodily injury.
The court noted that a detention officer testified that while the defendant was carrying the
detainee to the bus, he said “Let's Mace the fucker and see if he budges” and two other detention
officers remembered a similar statement, and when the defendant exited the bus, he was
coughing, smirking sarcastically, and claiming that there had been an “accidental discharge.”
After the pepper spray was used, the detainee's mouth was foaming, he complained of stinging
pain, and his eyes were swollen shut for at least three hours. The court found that the force that
caused this pain and that the pepper spray was applied when the detainee was paralyzed,
handcuffed, and lying on the floor of the bus. The detainee made his injury known to the
defendant, screaming “they broke me...” and in response to his pleas the officers taunted him and
invited people to wipe their feet on him. Two of the defendants dragged his limp body from a
house to the van, dragged him off the van onto a bus, and witnessed his reaction to being pepper
sprayed. According to the court, by moving the detainee without stabilizing him, the officers
exposed him to a risk of harm. The detainee was left alone on the bus floor, handcuffed, eyes
swollen shut, and foaming at the mouth, despite the officers’ training that, due to the risk of
potentially fatal asphyxiation, those who had been pepper sprayed should be continually
monitored and placed upright, never in a prone position. (San Antonio Division of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service [INS] and Brazos County Jail, Texas)

29.183
XX

U.S. District Court
PRETRIAL DETAINEE
CRIPA- Civil Rights of
Institutionalized
Persons Act

U.S. v. Terrell County, Ga., 457 F.Supp.2d 1359 (M.D.Ga. 2006). The federal government brought

U.S. District Court
MEDICATION

Upthegrove v. Kuka, 408 F.Supp.2d 708 (W.D.Wisc. 2006). An inmate brought a § 1983 action

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICATION
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE

Vaughn v. Greene County, Arkansas, 438 F.3d 845 (8th Cir. 2006). The sister of a pretrial
detainee brought a civil rights action against a sheriff and others to recover damages related to
the in-custody death of her brother. The district court denied the sheriff's motion for summary
judgment and the sheriff appealed. The court of appeals dismissed in part, reversed and
remanded in part. The court held that the county sheriff had no knowledge of the pretrial
detainee's serious medical needs, and thus was entitled to qualified immunity. The court noted
that the sheriff had no personal interaction with the pretrial detainee during his incarceration,
and there was no indication that the sheriff knew the pretrial detainee had been vomiting for
several hours, was not provided with his anti-depressant medication for two to three days
preceding his death, or had heart problems that put him at risk for a heart attack. According to
the court, the sheriff's practice of delegating to others such duties as reading mail and responding
to communications regarding jail inmates did not amount to deliberate indifference to the pretrial
detainee's serious medical needs, as required to be held individually liable for the detainee's
death in a § 1983 action. The 46-year-old detainee had completed a medical intake form
indicating he had a history of mental illness, headaches, epilepsy/seizures, ulcers, and
kidney/bladder problems, but indicating that he did not have a history of heart problems or high
or low blood pressure. Although he had no medications with him upon his arrival at the jail, his
mother later brought his medications, including an anti-depressant. The jail ran out of his antidepressant medication for two days and the detainee began to act odd. He was moved to an
isolation cell to be monitored. He was later found dead in the cell. An autopsy led to the
determination that the detainee died of natural causes--arteriosclerotic cardiovascular disease-causing a heart attack that resulted in his death. Detectable amounts of his anti-depressant
medication were found in the detainee’s system during the autopsy. (Greene County Jail,
Arkansas)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE
MEDICATION

White v. Crow Ghost, 456 F.Supp.2d 1096 (D.N.D. 2006). An arrestee brought a Bivens action
against personnel of a jail operated by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), alleging failure to
provide adequate medical care, unsanitary conditions, and delayed or prevented bond hearings.
The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The court held that jail officials
were not deliberately indifferent to the arrestee's medical needs, in violation of his Eighth
Amendment rights, where officials provided the arrestee with medical care promptly after
learning of his suicide gestures or attempts, and again upon learning he might have an infection.
The court noted that when the arrestee's need for medication was established, officials ensured
that the medications were administered. The court found that the officials were not deliberately
indifferent to any risk of harm to arrestee from his placement in two different, allegedly cold and
unsanitary jail cells for a total of four days, and thus such placement did not rise to the level of an
Eighth Amendment violation. The court noted that the arrestee was placed in those cells after his
suicide gestures or attempts so that he could be monitored, his clothing and bedding was removed
for his protection after he tried to hang himself, and cleaning supplies were withheld to protect
him. (Standing Rock Agency, Fort Yates Detention Center, North Dakota)

a Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA) action against a county, county sheriff,
and various other county officials, seeking a determination that county jail conditions were
grossly deficient in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court granted the
government’s motion for summary judgment. The court held that the sheriff and other officials
were deliberately indifferent to the jail's gross deficiencies in the areas of medical and mental
health care for inmates, protection of inmates from harm, environmental health and safety of
inmates, and fire safety, in violation of the due process clause. The court noted that the lack of
funds is not a defense to, nor legal justification for, unconstitutional conditions of a jail, for the
purpose of analyzing a deliberate indifference claim under the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Even if a defendant argues that it is planning or working towards
construction of a new jail to remedy the unconstitutional conditions at the current facility, the
failure to implement interim measures to alleviate those conditions demonstrates deliberate
indifference, according to the court. (Terrell County, Georgia)

arising from an alleged failure to provide him with pain medication. The defendant officers moved
for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion, finding that the inmate failed to
file an inmate complaint so as to exhaust administrative remedies with respect to one correctional
officer. The court found that a correctional sergeant who, prior to dispensing the inmate's pain
medication, was called away to a prison emergency, did not act with deliberate indifference to the
inmate's serious medical need because another officer replaced the sergeant and continued to
dispense medications. The court noted that the inmate inexplicably did not remain in line to
receive his medication and therefore any pain he suffered as the result of missing his medication
was the result of his own choice, not of any Eighth Amendment violation. (Jackson Correctional
Institution, Wisconsin)

29.184
XX

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
EMERGENCY CARE
INTAKE SCREENING

Williams v. Bradshaw, 459 F.3d 846 (8th Cir. 2006). The mother of a detainee who died while in jail brought a §
1983 action, claiming that police officers violated the detainee’s rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments. The district court granted judgment on the pleadings in favor of the officers. The mother appealed.
The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the mother lacked standing. The detainee, the daughter of the
plaintiff, had been brought to a jail and was being interrogated when she began talking unintelligibly and
experiencing seizures. An officer said that she was “faking a seizure” to avoid jail time. She lost consciousness
but officers did not request an ambulance for nearly an hour. She had ingested cocaine at the time of her arrest
and died from cocaine intoxication. (Howard County Jail and City of Nashville, Arkansas)

U.S. District Court
SMOKE

Williams v. District of Columbia, 439 F.Supp.2d 34 (D.D.C. 2006). A former inmate filed a pro se § 1983 action
seeking damages for alleged exposure to second-hand tobacco smoke while he was confined in jail. The district
court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court held that the former inmate's allegations
that while he was in jail he was subjected to an intolerable level of environmental tobacco smoke (ETS), that
such exposure caused health problems at the time he was confined and posed a risk to his future health, and that
the individual defendants were deliberately indifferent to his condition, if true, were sufficient to establish an
Eighth Amendment violation. The court found that genuine issues of fact existed, precluding summary judgment.
The inmate alleged that inmates and staff in his housing unit smoked tobacco, the unit did not have adequate
ventilation or windows or doors that could be opened to remove the tobacco smoke, and his cellmate smoked
five packs of cigarettes a day and kept a homemade toilet paper wick burning at all times for the purpose of
lighting cigarettes. The inmate said that he experienced nausea and nosebleeds, and he filed a number of
grievances. (District of Columbia Department of Corrections, Central Detention Facility)

U.S. District Court
REHABILITATION ACT
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act

Winters ex rel. Estate of Winters v. Arkansas Department of Health and Human Services, 437 F.Supp.2d 851
(E.D.Ark. 2006). The administrator of the estate of mentally ill pre-trial detainee/civil committee who had died
of peritonitis while in custody of a sheriff sued the sheriff and the Arkansas Department of Human Services
(DHS) under § 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Rehabilitation Act. Following bench
trial, the district court held that neither DHS nor the sheriff caused or contributed to the death of the
detainee/committee, and they were not liable under the Due Process Clause, Eighth Amendment, Rehabilitation
Act, or ADA. The court found that the sheriff had no policy or custom to apprehend and incarcerate acutely
mentally ill persons, as indicated by the fact that the detainee may have been only person under civil
commitment ever housed in the sheriff's detention facility. (Benton Co. Jail, Arkansas)
2007

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
DELAY IN CARE

Adams v. Cook County Dept. of Corrections, 485 F.Supp.2d 940 (N.D.Ill. 2007). An inmate brought a § 1983
claim against physicians, alleging they acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The
district court dismissed the claim in part, and denied the defendants’ motion for dismissal in part. The court held
that the prisoner alleged sufficiently serious medical needs to support his claim that jail officials acted with
deliberate indifference to such needs, in violation of due process, by alleging that he had “shortness of breath,”
“severe pain in [his] right side” and a high fever. The court found that the inmate stated a § 1983 claim for
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs under the Fourteenth Amendment by alleging that he had a
serious medical need and that he was inadequately treated by two physicians. (Cook County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
PSYCHOTROPIC DRUGS

Anderson ex rel. Cain v. Perkins, 532 F.Supp.2d 837 (S.D.Miss. 2007). A daughter, as next friend of a jail
detainee who suffered second-degree burns on her ankles, thighs, and buttocks while awaiting mental health
commitment, brought a civil rights suit against a sheriff and a county. The sheriff moved for summary judgment
on claims brought against him in his individual capacity. The district court granted the motion. The court held
that the sheriff did not violate the detainee's right to be protected from harm, absent evidence showing that
restraints were likely used to subdue her. The court found that the sheriff was not deliberately indifferent to the
detainee's medical needs in failing to administer her anti-psychotic medications, where the detainee's refusal to
take her medications prior to being taken into custody, coupled with her violent and psychotic behavior as the
result of the refusal, was the basis for her commitment. The court found that the sheriff was not deliberately
indifferent in failing to discover second-degree burns of an unknown origin on the detainee's ankles, thighs, and
buttocks because jailers regularly observed the detainee through a viewing window in her cell door, but did not
actually enter the cell to visually inspect the detainee for signs of injury. (Amite County Jail, Mississippi)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONTAGIOUS
DISEASES

Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2007). A prisoner filed a pro se action against prison officials,
alleging that the threat he faced from contagious diseases violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment. The prisoner sought leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) but the district court
denied the motion. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The appeals court held that
the prisoner's qualification for an imminent danger exception to the Prison Litigation Reform Act's (PLRA)
three-strikes rule was determined at the time of filing of the complaint and that under the imminent danger
exception the prisoner could file an entire complaint IFP. The prisoner alleged that he was at risk of contracting
HIV and that he had already contracted hepatitis C, because of his exposure to other prisoners who had those
contagious diseases due to prison officials' policy of not screening prisoners for such diseases. (California State
Prison, Solano)

29.185
XXII

U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
DENTAL CARE
SPECIAL DIET
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Banks v. York, 515 F.Supp.2d 89 (D.D.C. 2007). A detainee in a jail operated by the District of Columbia
Department of Corrections (DOC), and in a correctional treatment facility operated by the District's private
contractor, brought a § 1983 action against District employees and contractor's employees alleging negligent
supervision under District of Columbia law, over-detention, deliberate indifference to serious medical needs,
harsh living conditions in jail, and extradition to Virginia without a hearing. The district court granted the
defendants’ motion to dismiss in part and denied in part. The court held that the detainee’s allegations that his
teeth became chipped and his gums became infected, leading to damage to his gums, disfigurement of his face,
infection, pain, anxiety, and extraction of four teeth, were sufficient allegations of a serious medical need.
Officials had confiscated his dental crown. The court found that the detainee stated a claim under § 1983 for
cruel and unusual punishment through deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. The court held that the
detainee stated a claim with his allegation that the prison's dental unit should have replaced his dental crown or
permitted him to have his private dentist do so. The prison's dental unit had treated him with antibiotics and
offered to extract the seven affected teeth. The court held that this involved a mere disagreement over proper
treatment and did not support a § 1983 claim of violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishment through deliberate indifference to the prisoner's serious medical needs. (Central Detention
Facility. D.C. and Correctional Treatment Facility operated by the Corrections Corporation of America)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE

Barbaro v. U.S. ex rel. Federal Bureau of Prisons FCI Otisville, 521 F.Supp.2d 276, (S.D.N.Y. 2007). A federal
prison inmate brought a pro se Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) suit against the Bureau of Prisons (BOP),
alleging failure to treat his preexisting injuries, and asserted Eighth Amendment Bivens claims against individual
prison officials, alleging deliberate indifference to his medical needs. The district court granted the defendants'
motion to dismiss in part, on statutes of limitations grounds. Following the appointment of counsel for the
inmate, the inmate renewed his opposition to the motion to dismiss. The district court rejected the inmate’s
opposition. The prisoner alleged that officials failed to treat his preexisting back and neck injuries, allegedly
leading to the deterioration of his condition. (Federal Correctional Institution in Otisville, New York)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
DENTAL CARE
MEDICATION

Baylis v. Taylor, 475 F.Supp.2d 484 (D.Del. 2007). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against various
defendants, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The defendants moved for dismissal.
The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the inmate’s administrative
remedies with respect to his claim that prison personnel were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical
needs were presumed to have been exhausted, for the purposes of the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s
requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted before a § 1983 action could be brought, since no further
remedies were available to the inmate. The court held that the inmate failed to state a § 1983 claim for deliberate
indifference to his serious medical needs against a prison doctor. The inmate alleged in his complaint that the
doctor stopped prescribing a particular medication that the inmate deemed appropriate for treatment of his
attention deficit disorder, but the court held that this indicated merely a difference of opinion as to treatment that
did not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. According to the court, the inmate stated a § 1983
claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs against a prison psychologist by alleging that, despite
his promises, the psychologist failed to provide the inmate with therapy for his attention deficit disorder, and
failed to have the inmate revisit a psychiatrist. The court also found that the inmate stated a § 1983 claim for
deliberate indifference to serious medical needs against a prison employee, with his complaint that alleged that
the inmate had no teeth, that he presented himself for dental care, and that the employee refused to let the dental
work go forward. (Delaware Correctional Center)

U.S. District Court
DENTAL CARE
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE

Blackston v. Correctional Medical Services, Inc., 499 F.Supp.2d 601 (D.Del. 2007). An inmate brought an
action against a correctional medical services company, alleging Eighth Amendment violations due to
inadequate dental care. The company moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The
court held that the inmate failed to establish that the company exhibited deliberate indifference to his serious
medical needs following tooth extractions. The inmate's medical records established that he had received dental
examinations and treatments to resolve routine problems as well as emergency concerns. (Howard Young
Correctional Institution, Delaware)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE

Branton v. City of Moss Point, 503 F.Supp.2d 809 (S.D.Miss. 2007). The son of a pre-trial detainee who had
committed suicide while in custody, filed suit against the city and jail officers asserting claims pursuant to the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments for failure to train, failure to adopt a policy for safe custodial care of
suicidal detainees, and failure to adopt a policy of furnishing medical care to suicidal detainees. The detainee
was detained on suspicion of drunk driving and was resistant during the booking process. During the booking
process the detainee answered a series of questions. When he was asked, “Have you ever attempted suicide or
are you thinking about it now?” he responded, “No.” He was taken to a cell that was designated for intoxicated
or combative prisoners, given a sheet and a blanket, and was locked in the cell at 3:30 a.m. While conducting a
jail check at approximately 5:30 a.m., an officer discovered the detainee kneeling in a corner of the cell with the
sheet around his neck. He was unable to be revived. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district
court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether jail officers had actual knowledge of a substantial risk of suicide by
the detainee, and that fact issues precluded summary judgment in the claim against the city and officers in their
official capacities. On appeal (261 Fed.Appx. 659), the appeals court reversed and remanded. (City of Moss
Point, Mississippi)

U.S. District Court
INADEQUATE CARE

Brown v. Beard, 492 F.Supp.2d 474 (E.D.Pa. 2007). A prisoner brought a civil rights suit alleging that medical
personal were intentionally not providing adequate medical care to combat his risk factors for heart disease.
Prison officials moved to vacate an order allowing the prisoner to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). The district
court granted the motion. The court held that the prisoner was not in imminent danger of serious physical injury,
as required to proceed IFP under the Prison Litigation Reform Act after having three or more prior IFP actions

29.186
XXII

dismissed as frivolous. The court noted that the prisoner did not dispute that he was receiving medical attention
for high blood pressure, low blood sugar, and high cholesterol, but merely disputed the findings and quality of
treatment he was receiving. (SCI Graterford, Pennsylvania)
U.S. District Court
DELAY OF CARE
MEDICATION
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE

Bumpus v. Canfield, 495 F.Supp.2d 316 (W.D.N.Y. 2007). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that state
prison officials and employees violated his Eighth Amendment rights in connection with his medical care and
treatment. The defendants moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the motion. The court
held that the prison physician's delay of several days in dispensing the inmate's hypertension medication did not
demonstrate deliberate indifference to the inmate's serious medical needs, where there was no evidence that the
inmate experienced any complications during the time that he was waiting for his prescription to be refilled. The
court found that the prison's nurse administrator was not deliberately indifferent to the inmate's serious medical
needs, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, even if she did not respond to the inmate's letters complaining
about his perceived lack of medical attention, where the administrator was not personally involved in the
inmate's medical treatment, and the inmate did not believe that the administrator was deliberately trying to hurt
him. (Elmira Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE

Calhoun v. Volusia County, 499 F.Supp.2d 1299 (M.D.Fla. 2007). An inmate at a county detention center
brought a § 1983 action against the government entity serving as the center's medical care contractor and the
physician who was the supervisor for the center's infirmary, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious
medical needs. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The court held that the detention
center's medical care contractor and supervising physician did not act with deliberate indifference to the serious
medical needs of the inmate with gall bladder disease in the context of the inmate's pre-operative care. The court
noted that the inmate was provided with medical attention as soon as he began complaining of symptoms, the
inmate was examined by a registered nurse who then sought the advice of a physician's assistant, the inmate was
kept under observation in an infirmary and offered a liquid diet that he initially refused, and the physician was
contacted and had the inmate taken to an emergency room upon the worsening of his symptoms. (Volusia
County Detention Center, Florida)

U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
INADEQUATE CARE

Cameron v. Allen, 525 F.Supp.2d 1302 (M.D.Ala. 2007). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action against the
commissioner of a state department of corrections, a contract medical care provider, and a prison physician
challenging the constitutionality of medical treatment provided to him. The defendants moved for summary
judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the commissioner was not subject to liability
under § 1983 for the prison medical staff's alleged deliberate indifference to the inmate's serious medical needs,
where the commissioner did not personally participate in, or have any direct involvement with, the inmate's
medical treatment, that medical personnel made all decisions relative to the course of treatment provided to the
inmate, and such treatment did not result from a policy instituted by the commissioner. The court found that the
inmate's failure to properly exhaust the prison's grievance procedure barred his § 1983 action. According to the
court, even though the inmate filed grievance forms addressing his medical treatment, the treatment that was the
subject of the forms was wholly unrelated to the medical treatment about which he complained in his § 1983
action. (Bullock County Correctional Facility, Alabama)

U.S. District Court
DELAY IN TREATMENT
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
DENTAL CARE
STAFF

Chambers v. NH Prison, 562 F.Supp.2d 197 (D.N.H. 2007). A state prisoner brought a civil rights suit alleging
that prison officials had denied him necessary dental care in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. The
district court granted the prisoner’s motion for a preliminary injunction. The court found that the prisoner
demonstrated the likelihood of success on merits where his allegations were sufficient to state a claim for
supervisory liability against some defendants. The prisoner alleged that officials were deliberately indifferent to
his serious medical needs in refusing to provide care for a cavity for approximately one year due to a staffing
shortage. According to the court, the prisoner’s allegations that prison supervisors and a prison dentist knew of
the prisoner's pain as the result of an unfilled cavity, but nevertheless failed to take steps to ensure that care was
provided to him within a reasonable time period, provided the minimal facts necessary to state a claim for
supervisory liability under § 1983 for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs under the Eighth
Amendment. (New Hampshire State Prison)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
MEDICATION

Clarke v. Blais, 473 F.Supp.2d 124 (D.Me. 2007). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against jail
officers, alleging they subjected him to excessive force, and against a physician’s assistant for allegedly failing
to give him proper treatment for his physical and mental health issues. The defendants moved for summary
judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that questions as to
whether jail officers used excessive force in restraining the detainee and whether qualified immunity was
available as a defense precluded summary judgment in the detainee’s § 1983 action. The court found that the
physician’s assistant was not deliberately indifferent to the detainee’s serious medical needs, by not embarking
upon anti-viral therapy for the detainee’s hepatitis C because, as a pretrial detainee, he was subject to further
movement among facilities, and in not prescribing Seroquel, an anti-psychotic drug, as recommended by a
counselor/social worker at an outside clinic. The court noted that the physician’s assistant consulted an outside
gastroenterologist, the detainee’s liver function was monitored, and the counselor did not renew the Seroquel
recommendation at a subsequent clinic evaluation. (Knox County Jail, Maine)

U.S. District Court
MEDICATION
TREATMENT
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Coleman-Bey v. U.S., 512 F.Supp.2d 44 (D.D.C. 2007). A prisoner who suffered from Chronic Hepatitis C
brought a petition for a writ of mandamus in Superior Court of the District of Columbia, seeking to order the
United States to provide him with necessary Hepatitis C medication. The action was removed to federal court
and the defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment, finding that
failure to prescribe antiviral medication for the prisoner or to arrange for a liver biopsy did not amount to
deliberate indifference to the prisoner's serious medical needs. The court noted that the prisoner was not a
candidate for a liver biopsy due to his history of mental illness, and that he was not a candidate for antiviral

29.187
XXII

therapy because he did not have abnormal alanine aminotransferase (ALT) levels. The court noted that the
prisoner had visited an infectious disease clinic at least twice within the past year and the BOP had taken other
steps to monitor the prisoner's condition. (United States Penitentiary in Terre Haute, Indiana)
U.S. District Court
DELAY IN CARE
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE

Collins v. Kearney, 495 F.Supp.2d 466 (D.Del. 2007). A state prisoner brought a civil rights action under § 1983
against a prison warden, sergeant, corrections officers, nurse, and a physician, alleging claims for excessive
force, assault and battery, and deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. The district court granted
summary judgment for the defendants in part, and denied in part. The court held that prison officials were not
deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's serious medical needs, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, where the
prisoner was examined by a nurse while in a holding cell immediately following an incident in which he was
allegedly attacked by a corrections officer, and, two days later, he was seen by a physician. The court noted that
x-rays were ordered, and the prisoner continued to receive medical treatment for his fractured ribs and
complaints of pain. (Sussex Correctional Institute, Delaware)

U.S. District Court
DELAY OF CARE
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE

Cox v. Hartshorn, 503 F.Supp.2d 1078 (C.D.Ill. 2007). A former pretrial detainee in a county jail brought a §
1983 action against a county sheriff and county jail nurse, alleging that he was denied proper medical care within
the county jail in violation of his constitutional rights. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment. According to the court, the detainee's medical complaint of a foot rash did not rise to the
level of an objectively serious medical need, so as to afford the detainee due process protections against the
county sheriff and county jail nurse's alleged deliberate indifference to his request for medical attention. The
court noted that the detainee's fungal foot rash was not so serious that it was life threatening or posed a risk of
needless pain or lingering disability, and after being treated by a nurse, the detainee did not submit any further
medical requests for treatment of the rash, nor did he receive any treatment of the rash after leaving the county
jail. (Vermilion County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Danley v. Allyn, 485 F.Supp.2d 1260 (N.D.Ala. 2007). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against jail
officers, alleging that he was subjected to excessive force and then denied medical treatment when they sprayed
him with pepper spray. The district court denied the defendants' motions to dismiss and they appealed. The court
of appeals vacated and remanded. On the remand, the district court again denied the defendants’ motion to
dismiss. The court held that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity from the detainee's claim that the
officers subjected him to excessive force, in violation of Fourteenth Amendment, by pepper spraying him in
response to a dispute over toilet paper. The court noted that the officers had fair warning that to employ pepper
spray as punishment, or for the sadistic pleasure of the sprayers, as distinguished from what was reasonably
necessary to maintain prisoner control, was constitutionally prohibited. The court found that the detainee'
allegations that a jail administrator and sheriff created an atmosphere or practice under which the defendant
officers operated in allegedly subjecting the detainee to excessive force and then denying him medical treatment
when they sprayed him with pepper spray, were sufficient, if proven, to create supervisory liability under § 1983.
The court held that the detainee's claim of deliberate indifference on behalf of defendant officers, wherein they
failed to provide medical attention to the detainee after using pepper spray against him, was no more than a
continuation of the detainee's excessive force claim, and thus was not a separate cause of action under § 1983.
(Lauderdale Detention Center, Alabama)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE

Desroche v. Strain, 507 F.Supp.2d 571 (E.D.La. 2007). A pre-trial detainee brought a pro se, in forma pauperis
action against prison officials, alleging improper conditions of confinement, negligent medical treatment,
invasion of privacy, and excessive force. The district court dismissed the action. The court held that the alleged
conditions of the detainee's confinement, including being required to sleep on the floor of an overcrowded
holding tank, being deprived of a mattress, and being provided with water only in a dirty sink, if proven, did not
violate his Eighth Amendment or due process rights, given that he experienced such conditions for only ten days,
and that use of sink did not cause him to suffer disease or other serious harm.
The court found that the detainee's attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) was not a serious
condition, and therefore any denial of medical care for the condition did not violate his Eighth Amendment
rights. The court noted that even if ADHD was a serious condition, prison officials were not deliberately
indifferent in treating it, and any denial of medical care did not violate the detainee's Eighth Amendment rights,
in that the detainee merely disagreed with the treatment offered by two doctors at the jail. (River Parish
Correction Center, Louisiana)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
MENTAL HEALTH
SUICIDE

Estate of Hill v. Richards, 525 F.Supp.2d 1076 (W.D.Wis. 2007. The estate of a county jail inmate who
committed suicide sued the social worker who interviewed the inmate shortly before her suicide, claiming
deliberate indifference to the inmate's suicidal mental condition, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The
social worker moved for summary judgment. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by fact
issues as to whether the worker was aware of a suicide risk, as the result of a statement by the inmate that she
had poked herself with a thumbtack, and as to the adequacy of the worker’s response to the inmate's statement.
The court noted that expert testimony was not required to establish that the social worker violated the Eighth
Amendment by being deliberately indifferent to the health and safety of the jail inmate; under those
circumstances a jury of laypersons could conclude that there was a duty to protect the inmate. The social worker
knew, from her experiences with the inmate, that the inmate had a history of depression, that she had been
prescribed multiple medications for depression and that she previously had expressed a desire to die. The social
worker also knew that the inmate had not been taking her medication for several weeks and that she was being
housed in segregation at the jail, where neither other prisoners nor staff could easily monitor her. (Dane County
Jail, Wisconsin)

29.188
XXII

U.S. District Court
INTAKE SCREENING
SUICIDE

Estate of Puza v. Carbon County, 586 F.Supp.2d 271 (M.D.Pa. 2007). The estate of a pretrial detainee who
committed suicide brought an action alleging civil rights violations against a county and its corrections officers,
and negligence claims against the architect of a county prison. The defendants moved for summary judgment and
the district court granted the motion. The court held that correctional and intake officers were not deliberately
indifferent to the pretrial detainee's vulnerability to suicide, as was required for the officers' liability under the
due process clause for the detainee's suicide. The court noted that the suicide was a “complete surprise” to the
police chief who spent one and a half hours with the detainee, the detainee told an officer “he had much to look
forward to, and [did] not believe in suicide,” the detainee was placed in a cell next to an inmate who was on
suicide watch and could be regularly observed, and the officer intervened when he noticed the detainee was still
kneeling during a second observation of the detainee. The court found that county employees, through the jail's
suicide policy, were not deliberately indifferent as to whether the pretrial detainee successfully committed
suicide, as required to support a due process claim. According to the court, the policy was annually reviewed by
the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections and was never found deficient, the detainee's screening form did not
trigger a suicide watch, and the employees acted without deliberate indifference in allowing the detainee to retain
his shoelaces while in his jail cell. (Crabtree, Rohrbaugh & Associates, Carbon County Prison, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
INADEQUATE CARE
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE

Estrada v. Reed, 508 F.Supp.2d 699 (W.D.Wis. 2007). An allegedly indigent federal prisoner brought a
proposed Bivens action against a warden, prison doctor, two prison health services administrators, and a captain
on the prison's medical staff, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The district court
granted the prisoner’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis, in part, finding that the prisoner alleged potentially
serious medical needs and allowed an inference of deliberate indifference on the part of several of the
defendants. The prisoner alleged that prison medical staff failed to monitor his blood pressure consistently after
doctors recommended such monitoring, and that a serious stroke left him with limited ability to use much of his
left side and with difficulty speaking, so that he required consistent therapy to regain his motor skills. (Federal
Correctional Institution, Oxford, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
DELAY IN TREATMENT
TRANSFER
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE

Farmer v. Kavanagh, 494 F.Supp.2d 345 (D.Md. 2007). A state prison inmate sued officials, claiming her
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights and her Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment were violated when she was transferred from a medium to a maximum security facility. The
defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court entered judgment for the officials on the federal
claims and dismissed the state law claim. The court held that the inmate had a liberty interest in not being sent to
a maximum security prison, as required in order to bring a claim that transfer to maximum security facility
without prior notice and an opportunity to be heard, was a violation of her Fourteenth Amendment rights. The
court noted that the maximum security prison's strict control over every aspect of an inmate's life, and almost
virtual isolation from any human contact, imposed conditions of confinement far worse than her previous
situation in the general population of a medium security prison. But the court found that the officials had
qualified immunity from the inmate's due process claim because, at the time of the transfer, it was not clearly
established that an inmate could have a liberty interest in not being transferred to a maximum security prison.
The court held that the officials’ alleged difference in access to health care providers, between the medium
security prison and the maximum security prison to which the inmate was transferred, was insufficient to support
a determination that prison officials showed deliberate indifference to her medical needs by transferring her. The
court noted that the inmate’s delivery of drugs required for AIDS treatment was delayed and intermittently
interrupted, but the patient's file did not reflect the seriousness of her condition, and when one maximum security
prison employee was found derelict in making deliveries of medications, the employee was fired. (Maryland
Correctional Adjustment Center [“Supermax”])

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Felix-Torres v. Graham, 521 F.Supp.2d 157, (N.D.N.Y. 2007). A prisoner filed a pro se § 1983 suit against the
New York Department of Correctional Services (DOCS), alleging that named DOCS employees and four “John
Doe” defendants violated his constitutional rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, related to
injuries suffered from a fall from his assigned upper bunk during a diabetic low blood sugar reaction and seizure.
The named employees moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court granted the motion in part
and denied in part. The court held that the prisoner sufficiently alleged that prison officials were personally
involved in the deprivation of his Eighth Amendment rights and that they were not protected by qualified
immunity. The court found that the prisoner sufficiently alleged that a nurse administrator was deliberately
indifferent to a risk for the prisoner and that the prisoner’s allegations were sufficient for a § 1983 claim of
deprivation of rights. According to the court, the prisoner sufficiently alleged the “personal involvement” of a
superintendent and deputy superintendents of the prison based on the officials' creation and administration of
prison procedures for assignment of inmates to upper bunks, and by supervision of subordinates who assigned
the prisoner to an upper bunk despite his known medical condition. (Auburn Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE

Foster v. Elyea, 496 F.Supp.2d 951 (N.D.Ill. 2007). A special administrator, on behalf of a deceased inmate,
brought a § 1983 action against prison officials, alleging their failure to provide the inmate with prescribed
medication, treatment, diet, or exercise opportunities hastened his death or caused him great emotional distress.
The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held
that the allegations of the special administrator stated an Eighth Amendment claim that employees were
deliberately indifferent to the inmate’s serious medical needs. The administrator alleged that the employees knew
that the inmate faced a risk of death if he did not receive his prescribed medication, treatment, diet, and exercise
for his type two diabetes, high blood pressure, and congestive heart failure, but that department of corrections
employees personally involved in delivering medical services to the inmate failed to provide those things to him.
(Statesville Correctional Center, Illinois)

29.189
XXII

U.S. District Court
DELAY IN CARE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Giddings v. Joseph Coleman Center, 473 F.Supp.2d 617 (E.D.Pa. 2007). A parolee brought a civil rights action
against a parole officer and warrant officers who transported him back to prison from a halfway house, alleging
that they were deliberately indifferent to his serious physical and mental health needs in violation of the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments. The defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground of qualified
immunity. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the parole officer was entitled to qualified
immunity from the Eighth Amendment claim that she was deliberately indifferent to the parolee’s need for
medical treatment for a self-inflicted cut on his arm, noting that the cut was not serious because the parolee did
not experience significant blood loss or infection, and the officer was not indifferent to the cut as evidenced by
her offer to take the parolee to the hospital the next day. The court ruled that the officer was entitled to qualified
immunity from the claim that she was deliberately indifferent to parolee’s mental health needs, where evidence
did not show that the parolee’s mental health needs were serious on the day he cut himself, as there was no
indication of a genuine suicide attempt, and the officer was not indifferent to those needs as she sent the parolee
to the mental health unit of the halfway house. (Joseph Coleman Center, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Giles v. Kearney, 516 F.Supp.2d 362 (D.Del.2007). An inmate sued prison officials under § 1983, alleging
constitutional violations arising from an alleged use of excessive force at a correctional institution. The district
court entered judgment for the defendants. The court held that the incidents in which pepper spray was used
against the inmate did not constitute excessive force. According to the court, a corrections officer's use of pepper
spray against the inmate was justified in response to the inmate's defiant and argumentative behavior, as well as
his repeated refusals to obey orders. Noting that the officer was alone in a shower facility as the inmate
continued to yell and defy orders, the court concluded that the officer's use of pepper spray to calm the
increasingly volatile situation and prevent injury was a measured and reasonable response. The court also found
that there was no deliberate indifference to the inmate's medical needs following incidents in which he was
sprayed with pepper spray. The court noted that the inmate received medical care and assessment following each
of the events at issue and there was no evidence that defendants obstructed, neglected or prevented him from
receiving care or ignored his requests for medication or medical treatment. (Sussex Correctional Inst., Delaware)

U.S. Appeals Court
NEGLIGENCE
FEMALE PRISONERS
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE

Goebert v. Lee County, 510 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2007). A pretrial detainee in a county jail, who had been
pregnant during her detention and whose child had been stillborn, brought a § 1983 action against county and jail
officials, a physician, and the jail's medical services provider, alleging deliberate indifference to her serious
medical needs. The district court granted summary judgment for all defendants based on failure to satisfy the
administrative exhaustion requirement of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The detainee appealed. The
appeals court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part. The court held that the jail's administrative
appeal procedure for inmates was not “available” within the meaning of PLRA, where the detainee had no way
of knowing about it. According to the court, the detainee adequately exhausted her available remedies under
PLRA by filing a document titled “request form.” The court noted that the handbook given to inmates did not
mention a grievance form, but only spoke of a “written request,” and the inmate checked the “complaint” box on
the request form rather than the “request” box and cogently described her grievance. The court found that the
detainee's amniotic fluid leak constituted a serious medical need and the facility commander exceeded gross
negligence in answering the detainee's complaint about lack of treatment, supporting a deliberate indifference
claim. The commander apparently held a general disbelief of inmates' medical complaints, and responded only
with a statement that the detainee could visit an outside physician if she could pay for it. (Lee Co. Jail, Florida)

U.S. District Court
INADEQUATE CARE

Green v. McGinnis, 515 F.Supp.2d 379 (W.D.N.Y. 2007). A state prisoner brought an action against prison
employees alleging that he was denied adequate medical treatment in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights.
The prison employees moved for summary judgment, which was granted by the district court. The court held that
the notice of motion and scheduling order provided adequate notice to the prisoner of an action and the
consequences of failure to respond. The court found that the prisoner received adequate medical treatment. The
court noted that the prisoner had x-rays and other tests on his back, including an MRI, and received physical
therapy. (Southport Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
ALCOHOL/DRUGS
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE

Hall v. County of Nemaha, Neb., 509 F.Supp.2d 821 (D.Nev. 2007). A pretrial detainee's survivors sued a city,
county, and various city and county officers and officials, asserting various claims under § 1983 in connection
with the death of the detainee from an overdose after swallowing his methamphetamine during a roadside stop of
a vehicle in which he was riding. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants in part and
denied in part. The district court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as
to whether a deputy sheriff and a jailer knew that the detainee had swallowed the methamphetamine during a
roadside stop and whether they ignored the detainee's panting and gasping, his claims that he could not see or
breathe, and his crying and screaming that he needed to go to the hospital. The court found that law enforcement
officers and other jail officers, who were unaware that the detainee had swallowed his methamphetamine during
a roadside stop, were not deliberately indifferent to the detainee's serious medical needs, so as to violate his
Eighth Amendment rights, even though he was complaining, uncooperative and acted like an intoxicated person.
The court noted that from their perspective, the detainee was behaving like many other “besotted” pretrial
detainees who were “plucked from the highway in the wee hours of the night and who suffered nothing more
than a drug-induced stupor while cooling their heels in a cell awaiting their turn to see the local magistrate.”
(Nemaha County, Nebraska)

U.S. Appeals Court
DENTAL CARE

Hartsfield v. Colburn, 491 F.3d 394 (8th Cir. 2007). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against a nurse,
physician, and captain, alleging that they were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. The inmate
alleged that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs when they delayed referring
him to an oral surgeon to have three teeth extracted. On remand the district court entered judgment for the
defendants and the detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the district court

29.190
XXII

did not clearly err in finding that the nurse and physician acted reasonably in requiring a second sick call request
from the detainee before referring him to a dentist, and that most of the delay in the detainee seeing the dentist
resulted when the detainee unreasonably failed or refused to submit a second request. The court found that the
captain in charge of transporting inmates to medical appointments did not deny or delay the detainee's dental
treatment by interfering with or overriding any medical staff decisions to schedule an earlier appointment. (Scott
County Jail, Iowa)
U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
INVOLUNTARY
TREATMENT
PSYCHOTROPIC DRUGS

Hendon v. Ramsey, 528 F.Supp.2d 1058 (S.D.Cal. 2007). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that
prison medical officials involuntarily administered anti-psychotic medications without following proper
procedures and in deliberate indifference to his medical needs. The officials moved to dismiss. The district court
granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the involuntary administration of anti-psychotic
medications to the inmate did not demonstrate deliberate indifference to the inmate's serious medical needs, as
required to establish an Eighth Amendment violation, where the officials administered the drugs in an attempt to
treat the inmate's mental health crisis. But the court held that the post-deprivation remedies available to the
California inmate after the officials forcibly administered anti-psychotic drugs were insufficient to protect the
inmate's due process liberty interest in being free from involuntary medication. According to the court, although
state law established procedural safeguards before inmates could be involuntarily medicated, the prison officials
allegedly disregarded their duty to comply with those established pre-deprivation procedures. The court found
that the inmate's right to be free from arbitrary administration of anti-psychotic medication was clearly
established by existing case law in 2002, the time of this incident, and therefore state prison officials were not
entitled to qualified immunity from liability. (California State Prison-Sacramento)

U.S. District Court
DELAY IN CARE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
NEGLIGENCE

Heredia v. Doe, 473 F.Supp.2d 462 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). An inmate filed a § 1983 action against county jail
officials alleging that he slipped and fell at a jail, and was denied proper medical treatment. The officials moved
to dismiss the complaint and the district court granted the motion. The court held that the inmate’s claim that he
injured his back when he slipped and fell at the county jail was nothing more than a claim for negligence, for
which there was no cause of action under § 1983. The inmate alleged he slipped and fell while walking to his
cell and in the process injured his back “to the point it swelled up and was in a lot of pain.” The court also found
that officials were not deliberately indifferent to the inmate’s medical needs, despite a one-day delay in
providing treatment, where the jail medical department took X-rays and provided pain medication. (Sullivan
Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act

Herman v. County of York, 482 F.Supp.2d 554 (M.D.Pa. 2007). The estate of a prisoner who had committed
suicide in a county prison sued the county, a warden, the prison health service, and nurses, asserting Eighth
Amendment claims under § 1983, claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and state medical
malpractice claims. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motions in part
and denied in part. The court found that, notwithstanding a Pennsylvania statute stating that the safekeeping,
discipline, and employment of prisoners was exclusively vested in a prison board, the county could be held liable
to the prisoner under § 1983 for the actions of the warden if he was acting as an agent of the county. The court
held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the warden was
acting as an agent for the county in allegedly failing to prevent the prisoner's suicide, and as to the warden's role
in ratifying county prison policies. The court found that the county, warden, nurses, and prison health service
were not deliberately indifferent to the medical needs of prisoner who committed suicide, where alleged failures
to check on the prisoner in his cell was by officers other than the defendants, nurses could not have been
deliberately indifferent if they were unqualified as the prisoner's estate said, and the nurses' failure to place the
prisoner on a suicide watch did not fall outside their professional judgment, given the prisoner's denials of
suicidal ideation and his family's testimony. The court found that the prisoner was not denied access to county
prison's programs or services because of disability, and any failure by the county and warden to prevent his
suicide thus was not discrimination in services, programs, or activities of a public entity in violation of ADA.
The prisoner denied thoughts of suicide, he told a nurse that he did not wish to take anti-depressant medications
that had been prescribed for him, and a nurse told him to return to mental health services if necessary. (York
County Prison, Pennsylvania)

U.S. Appeals Court
INVOLUNTARY
MEDICATION

Hydrick v. Hunter, 500 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2007). Sexual offenders who were civilly confined in a state
psychiatric hospital under California's Sexually Violent Predators Act (SVP) filed a class action against various
state officials under § 1983, challenging the conditions of their confinement. The district court denied the
defendants' motion to dismiss, and the defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed in
part. The court held that the First Amendment claims brought against state hospital officials were based on
clearly established law for qualified immunity purposes insofar as they challenged retaliation for filing lawsuits,
however, officials had qualified immunity to the extent that the plaintiffs' claim relied on a First Amendment
right not to participate in treatment sessions. The court found that the plaintiffs stated a § 1983 claim for
violations of their Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The court
concluded that hospital officials were entitled to qualified immunity with regard to procedural due process
claims, but not substantive due process claims. The offenders alleged that they were subjected to public strip
searches, to retaliatory searches of their possessions and to arbitrary seizure of their personal belongings, that
they were placed in shackles during transport to the hospital and during visits from family and friends, that they
were subjected to restraint even if they did not pose any physical risk, and that they were force-medicated. On
appeal to the United States Supreme Court (129 S.Ct. 2431) the court vacated the decision. (Atascadero State
Hospital, California)

29.191
XXII

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE

Johnson v. Tedford, 616 F.Supp.2d 321 (N.D.N.Y. 2007). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that
prison officials violated his constitutional rights by verbally and physically assaulting him, and then denying him
adequate medical care for the injuries he sustained in that assault. The officials moved for summary judgment.
The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was
precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the inmate filed a medical care grievance that was not
responded to, recorded, or assigned a grievance number. The court also held that summary judgment was
precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the sergeant who supervised the state corrections
officers who allegedly assaulted the inmate also had supervisory authority over the nurse who treated the inmate.
The inmate alleged that the sergeant was grossly negligent in supervising the nurse when she engaged in the
examination of the inmate. (Clinton Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
MENTAL HEALTH
SUICIDE

Justus v. County of Buchanan, 517 F.Supp.2d 810 (W.D.Va. 2007). The administrator of a pretrial detainee's
estate filed a § 1983 action against a sheriff and county jail employees arising out of the detainee's jail suicide.
The detainee had a history of schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, anxiety, paranoia, and delusions and had been
hospitalized for these conditions several times in the three years prior to his suicide. His treatment records show
that he was hospitalized because family members reported suicidal ideation and bizarre, violent, and sexually
inappropriate behavior. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The
court held that the sheriff's deputies' failure to provide the pretrial detainee with prompt medical care after they
discovered him hanging in his cell did not amount to deliberate indifference to the detainee's serious bodily
injuries, in violation of the detainee's due process rights. The court noted that, even though the detainee was still
alive when they took him down approximately 13 minutes after discovering him, there was no showing of an
affirmative causal link between their inaction and the detainee's death from hypoxic brain injury.
The court found that the sheriff was not deliberately indifferent to the pretrial detainee's suicidal nature, and
thus was not subject to liability under § 1983 for failing to take steps to prevent his suicide, even though a
notation on an incident report two months before the detainee's suicide indicated that another prisoner reported
that the detainee “was threatening suicide”. The court found no proof that the report did not simply inadvertently
escape the sheriff's knowledge.
The court held that a reasonable sheriff would not have understood from existing law that the absence of an
operating video surveillance system in the county jail would violate a suicidal pretrial detainee's constitutional
rights, and thus the sheriff was entitled to qualified immunity from liability under § 1983, even though the jail
policy and procedure manual required immediate repair of any defective security equipment, and the sheriff was
aware that the equipment had not been operating for some time.
According to the court, under Virginia law, the deputies' failure to provide the pretrial detainee with prompt
medical care after they discovered him hanging in his cell did not amount to gross negligence as required to
overcome their immunity from tort liability. (Buchanan County, Virginia)

U.S. District Court
DENTAL CARE

Kaufman v. Schneiter, 474 F.Supp.2d 1014 (W.D.Wis. 2007). An inmate at a supermaximum security prison
filed a § 1983 action alleging that prison officials violated his constitutional rights. The inmate filed a motion
seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The
court held that the inmate’s claim that he was transferred to a maximum security facility in retaliation for his
decision to name a warden as a defendant in a civil rights action was not frivolous, and thus the inmate was
entitled to proceed in forma pauperis in his § 1983 action, where fact issues remained as to whether the lawsuit
motivated the warden’s decision to transfer the inmate. The court found that the inmate’s allegations that he was
in pain from a tooth that was cutting into his tongue, and that the waiting list for dental care was approximately
12 months long, were sufficient to state a claim against prison officials under the Eighth Amendment for
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. (Wisconsin Secure Program Facility)

U.S. District Court
CONTAGIOUS DISEASES
DELAY IN CARE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
ISOLATION

Lee v. Frederick, 519 F.Supp.2d 320 (W.D.N.Y. 2007). A state prison inmate brought a § 1983 suit against
corrections staff, claiming deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, in violation of his Eighth
Amendment rights. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The
court held that placing the inmate on “TB hold” status unless he consented to take TB medication did not
constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The court noted that the inmate's
TB test was negative and that he shared a cell with an inmate who was not on TB hold, but other test results
indicated that the inmate's immune system was not functioning properly, and conditions at the facility made it
impracticable to completely isolate the inmate from the rest of the population.
The court found that a delay of six or seven hours in obtaining treatment for the inmate's eye condition after
he reported the condition to a nurse did not constitute deliberate indifference to the inmate's serious medical
needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. According to the
court, the inmate received treatment at a hospital and made a full recovery, and even assuming that the inmate
was in pain during the delay, there was no indication that a nurse or a physician assistant who responded to the
report deliberately delayed taking action for the purpose of causing the inmate pain or to prolonging his
suffering. (Five Points Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
DENTAL CARE
MEDICATION
RECORDS
POLICIES

Meuir v. Greene County Jail Employees, 487 F.3D 1115 (8th Cir. 2007). A prisoner who suffered from chronic
dental problems brought a § 1983 action against a county and county jail medical staff, alleging deliberate
indifference to his serious medical needs. The prisoner suffered from chronic dental problems. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed.
The court held that the prisoner failed to establish that jail medical staff acted with deliberate indifference to his
serious medical needs, where jail nurses provided the prisoner with over-the-counter pain medication and
encouraged him to brush and gargle with salt water in response to his complaints of bleeding gums and
toothaches. The court noted that staff referred him to a county dentist, but the prisoner refused to go. According
to the court, in the face of medical records indicating that medical treatment was provided and physician

29.192
XXII

affidavits indicating that the care provided was adequate, an inmate cannot create a question of fact, to avoid
summary judgment, in a claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs by merely stating that he did
not feel he received adequate treatment. According to the court, the prisoner lacked standing to seek injunctive
relief to end the county jail's unwritten “pull-teeth-only” policy for treatment of chronic dental problems, where
the prisoner filed suit against the county four months after he was transferred to another correctional facility, his
dental ailments were treated without complaint at the transferee facility, and there was no reason to believe that
detainee would be returned to the county jail. (Greene County Jail, Missouri)
U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
SUICIDE

Mombourquette ex rel. Mombourquette v. Amundson, 469 F.Supp.2d 624 (W.D.Wis. 2007). A pretrial detainee
in a county jail who was left seriously brain damaged after she attempted suicide by hanging in her cell, brought
a civil rights suit against a county sheriff, correctional officers, and jail nurses, alleging that they violated her
constitutional rights by failing to protect her from harming herself. The defendants filed motions for summary
judgment. The district court denied the motions. The court held that evidence that the pretrial detainee reported
to county jail personnel that a jail lieutenant was taking another female inmate out of her cell at night to engage
in sexual activity was admissible, because such evidence showed that the lieutenant had a strong motive to
withhold protection from the detainee, and thus was relevant to show he intentionally disregarded a risk to the
detainee’s safety. The court also found that evidence that county sheriff refused to investigate allegations that the
county jail lieutenant was engaging in sexual misconduct with another inmate was relevant and admissible,
where the sheriff’s dismissive attitude of the complaint exhibited deliberate indifference, both toward the
detainee’s health and safety in particular and generally toward the health and safety of all inmates. The court
denied summary judgment because it found a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a nurse and
correctional officers at the county jail were deliberately indifferent to pretrial detainee’s health and safety. The
court also found a genuine issue of material fact as to whether there was an affirmative link between the county
sheriff’s failure to properly train and supervise county jail personnel and the failure to prevent the detainee’s
suicide. (Monroe County Jail, Wisconsin)

U.S. Appeals Court
MENTAL HEALTH
SUICIDE
RESTRAINTS

Norris v. Engles, 494 F.3d 634 (8th Cir. 2007). A county jail detainee, who had been diagnosed with manic
bipolar depression, sued a jail official under § 1983, alleging due process violations arising from his physical
restraint. The district court denied the official's motion for summary judgment based upon qualified immunity.
The official appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that the official's alleged conduct of
cuffing the detainee to a floor-grate toilet in an uncomfortable manner for approximately three hours, if proven,
did not violate the detainee's substantive due process rights. According to the court, the official’s alleged actions
did not shock the conscience and thus did not violate the detainee's substantive due process rights, inasmuch as
official took such action after the detainee, who had been diagnosed with manic bipolar depression, had
threatened to pull out her own peripherally inserted central catheter (PICC) so that she would bleed to death, and
after the detainee had shown that having her hands handcuffed behind her back was alone not an adequate form
of restraint. (Independence County Jail, Arkansas)

U.S. Appeals Court
MENTAL HEALTH
REHABILITATION ACT
ADA- Americans With
Disabilities Act

O'Guinn v. Lovelock Correctional Center, 502 F.3d 1056 (9th Cir. 2007). A prisoner filed a pro se suit claiming
prison officials denied him accommodation and treatment for mental illness, under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act. The district court dismissed the suit pursuant to the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the
prisoner's suit did not arise under § 1983 and that exhaustion is required under PLRA. The court found that the
prisoner failed to exhaust administrative remedies. According to the court, the prisoner's filing of grievances
requesting a lower bunk due to poor balance resulting from a brain injury were not equivalent to claims of denial
of mental health treatment, and the prisoner’s complaint to the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) did
not exhaust the prison's internal grievance process. The court found that the DOJ's investigation of the prisoner’s
claims did not satisfy the exhaustion requirement as the investigation did not terminate the prisoner's rights to
pursue ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims internally. (Lovelock Correctional Center, Nevada)

U.S. District Court
INADEQUATE CARE

Pettus v. Wright, 514 F.Supp.2d 436 (W.D.N.Y 2007). A state prisoner brought a civil rights action under § 1983
against physicians who examined or treated him, alleging that he was denied adequate medical treatment for a
number of conditions affecting his health, in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. The physicians moved
for summary judgment and the district court granted the motion. The court held that the treatment the prisoner
received was adequate. The court noted that although the prisoner disagreed with the course of treatment that he
received, he was examined by a number of physicians, including specialists, various tests were performed on
him, and he was administered various medications for his complaints, consistent with the test results. (Elmira
Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
TRANSFER
DELAY IN CARE
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE

Price v. Correctional Medical Services, 493 F.Supp.2d 740 (D.Del. 2007). An inmate brought a § 1983 action
against a prison's medical services provider and prison officials, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious
medical needs. The provider moved to dismiss, and the inmate moved for appointment of counsel. The district
court denied the motions. The court held that the prisoner stated a claim under § 1983 against the prison's
medical services provider for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. The prisoner alleged that the refusal of prompt medical care to his recently surgically repaired
wrists, upon his transfer from another facility, by employees of the prison's medical services provider, was, or
could have been, partially responsible for the permanent damage to his wrists that was independently verified by
an outside doctor. The court noted that the seriousness of the prisoner’s medical need was so obvious, from the
condition he arrived in, his description of the events to nurses, and from the obvious pain he was under for a
period of weeks, that any lay person would have recognized the need for a doctor.
The court held that the prisoner's allegations that the employees of the prison's medical services provider were
following the provider's inmate housing code when they initially denied the prisoner care, causing deliberate

29.193
XXII

indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment and two weeks of intense
suffering, were sufficient, at the early stage of proceedings, to allege that there was a relevant provider policy or
custom, and that the policy caused the constitutional violation, as required for provider to be held liable for its
employees' acts under § 1983. The court declined to appoint counsel for inmate, noting that the prisoner had
been capably representing himself, and there were no special circumstances requiring the appointment of
counsel. (Delaware Correctional Center)
U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Primus v. Lee, 517 F.Supp.2d 755 (D.S.C. 2007.) A prisoner brought a pro se medical malpractice action against
a prison surgeon, prison physician, and the director of the state Department of Corrections. The defendants
moved to dismiss, and the prisoner moved for leave to amend. The district court dismissed the action without
prejudice and granted the plaintiff’s motion to amend. The court held that the allegations did not state an Eighth
Amendment claim for deliberate indifference, and that the prisoner's proposed amendment would not be futile.
According to the court, the allegations that a prison surgeon negligently performed surgery, which resulted in the
unwanted removal of the prisoner's testicle, did not state a § 1983 claim for deliberate indifference to the
prisoner's serious medical needs under the Eighth Amendment. The prisoner's proposed amendment, alleging
that the surgeon contracted with the state corrections department to provide surgical treatment, and that the
surgeon unnecessarily and maliciously removed the prisoner's testicle in retaliation for the prisoner's lack of
cooperation, could state a § 1983 claim for deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment. The court noted
that when a physician cooperates with the state and assumes the state's constitutional obligation to provide
medical care to its prisoners, he or she acts “under color of state law,” for purpose of a § 1983 action. (Lee
Correctional Institution, South Carolina)

U.S. Appeals Court
HEARING IMPAIRED
ADA- Americans With
Disabilities Act

Robertson v. Las Animas County Sheriff's Dept., 500 F.3d 1185 (10th Cir. 2007). A deaf pretrial detainee
brought suit under § 1983 and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) against deputies and a sheriff,
claiming wrongful arrest and failure to accommodate his disability. The district court dismissed all claims
against the defendants on their motion for summary judgment and the detainee appealed. The appeals court
reversed and remanded. The court held that a fact issue as to whether the totally deaf detainee with a surgically
implanted cochlear implant was substantially limited in his ability to hear, precluded summary judgment as to
whether he was a qualified individual under ADA. The court also found that summary judgment was precluded
by fact issues as to whether the jail knew, or should have been aware of, the deaf inmate's limitations. The court
found that the detainee was qualified to receive benefits and services of the county jail, within the meaning of
ADA, with respect to phone services and televised closed-circuit viewing of his probable cause hearing, as such
services were available to all inmates. (Las Animas County Jail, Colorado)

U.S. District Court
EQUAL PROTECTION
EXPERIMENTATION
INADEQUATE CARE
MEDICATION

Roman v. Donelli, 616 F.Supp.2d 299 (N.D.N.Y. 2007). A state prisoner, who suffered from Hepatitis C,
brought a § 1983 action against the New York State Department of Correctional Services' (DOCS) chief medical
officer, among others, alleging that the officer violated his constitutional rights under the First, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments. The officer moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the motion.
The court held that the officer was not deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's medical needs and that the
prisoner was not similarly situated to another prisoner who was allegedly treated for the same condition.
According to the court, the officer's allegedly differentiated treatment of prisoners was not motivated by
discriminatory animus, as would support an equal protection claim. The chief medical officer refused to
implement a course of treatment that was not approved by Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for 22 months
after the prisoner was treated ineffectively with a different drug combination. The court noted that the officer
made decisions regarding the prisoner's treatment based on information before him at the time, and when the
officer became aware of the circumstances that would warrant an exception to the prison policy prohibiting
treatment with drugs that were not FDA approved, the officer approved treatment.
The court found that the prisoner did not suffer any adverse action as a result of his filing of grievances, as
would support a First Amendment retaliation claim. (New York State Department of Correctional Services)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
TRANSPLANT
DELAY OF CARE

Rosado v. Alameida, 497 F.Supp.2d 1179 (S.D.Cal. 2007). The family of a state prisoner who died of liver
disease brought a civil rights action under § 1983 against prison physicians and officials, alleging violation of his
Eighth Amendment rights by failing to take necessary steps to qualify him for a liver transplant and to provide
other necessary care for his liver condition. The physicians moved for summary judgment. The district court
granted the motion in part, and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine
issues of material fact regarding whether the deputy director of prison health care services chose to delay or
refused an evaluation for a liver transplant for the prisoner, who later died of liver cirrhosis, whether the failure
to take steps towards a liver transplant was medically unacceptable, and whether the deputy's decision was
chosen in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to the prisoner's health. The court found that the deputy
director of prison health care was not entitled to qualified immunity for his alleged intentional denial or delay in
getting the prisoner with end-stage liver cirrhosis evaluated for a liver transplant, as it was clearly established
that prison officials could not intentionally deny or delay prisoner's access to necessary medical care. (Centinela
State Prison, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
INADEQUATE CARE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Ruiz-Rosa v. Rullán, 485 F.3d 150 (1st Cir. 2007). The mother of a pretrial detainee brought suit against officials
of the Puerto Rico prison system and prison medical personnel after her 18-year-old son died of septicemia while
incarcerated. The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and the mother appealed.
The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the district court's dismissal with prejudice of the
mother's complaint for failure to comply with a court order requiring her to file a clearly stated amended
complaint was an abuse of discretion, but that there was no evidence of deliberate indifference on the part of
prison personnel to the serious medical needs of pretrial detainee, as required for the mother's claim under the
Fourteenth Amendment. The court noted that the detainee received medical care in the form of draining of his
abscess, blood cultures, and two different antibiotics. (Bayamón Correctional Complex, Puerto Rico)

29.194
XXII

U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
DENTAL CARE
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE

Samuel v. Carroll, 505 F.Supp.2d 256 (D.Del. 2007). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that prison
officials violated his constitutional rights. The officials moved to dismiss and the district court granted the
motions. The inmate filed a motion for partial reconsideration. The prison's contract medical provider filed a
motion for summary judgment, and a second provider filed a motion for an entry of judgment. The district court
denied the motions for reconsideration, summary judgment and entry of final judgment. The district court held
that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the contract medical
provider had a policy or custom, in the form of a standard eight to nine month delay for tooth repair, that
amounted to deliberate indifference to the inmate's serious medical needs. The motions to compel discovery
were granted in part and denied in part. (Delaware Correctional Center)

U.S. District Court
HEARING IMPAIRED
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act

Sanders v. Ryan, 484 F.Supp.2d 1028 (D.Ariz. 2007). A hearing-impaired inmate brought a civil rights action
against a prison official and the State of Arizona, claiming his rights were violated under the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), the First Amendment, Arizona civil rights laws, and the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court
held that the state's failure to rebut the hearing-impaired inmate's evidence in opposition to a summary judgment
motion that the prison denied him access to his bi-aural headphones, allowed the inference of discriminatory
animus, as required to establish a claim under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The inmate
had arranged to have four items, including the headphones, shipped to the prison before the effective date of the
rule limiting prisoners' possessions, and the prison issued a television and a calculator but not headphones. The
court held that the state's refusal to issue the hearing-impaired inmate bi-aural headphones so that he could watch
television did not violate his First Amendment rights, where the inmate did not have a right to watch television,
he was still able to receive information, ideas, and messages through books, magazines and newspapers, and the
inmate acknowledged in his complaint that he was able to hear his television without his hearing aids. (Arizona
Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
DELAY IN CARE
INADEQUATE CARE

Shuler v. Edwards, 485 F.Supp.2d 294 (W.D.N.Y. 2007). A state prisoner who fell in his cell and sustained a
broken ankle filed a pro se § 1983 claim against a nurse and a physician's assistant who treated him at a prison
hospital, alleging inadequate medical treatment. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants.
The court held that the prisoner failed to establish that he received inadequate treatment from the physician's
assistant and nurse, although x-rays were not taken until a day after injury, 17 days passed between the x-rays
and surgery, and the prisoner alleged that such delay resulted in severe pain and caused him to walk with a limp.
The court noted that the physician's assistant and nurse treated the prisoner by immobilizing his ankle, giving
him crutches and pain relievers, and providing for further evaluation and treatment, and there was no proof that
they acted with a culpable state of mind or intended to inflict pain on prisoner. (Attica Correctional Facility, New
York)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE

Streeter v. Goord, 519 F.Supp.2d 289 (N.D.N.Y. 2007). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action, alleging prison
officials and medical personnel acted with deliberate indifference in treating his sickle cell anemia in violation of
the Eighth Amendment. The court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court held that
the inmate’s condition during the sickle cell crisis was a “serious medical condition,” for the purposes of an
Eighth Amendment § 1983 claim. The court found that there was no evidence that a prison doctor knowingly
disregarded an excessive risk to the prisoner's health or safety, and that a delay in flushing the prisoner's catheter
was not a serious medical need. According to the court, the prisoner's conclusory allegations about prison nurses
were insufficient to establish that they knowingly disregarded a serious risk to his health. The court concluded
that there was no evidence that the prison commissioner was aware of the alleged constitutional violations that
occurred, nor was there any evidence that he implemented or sanctioned policies or customs amounting to a
constitutional violation, as was required to impose supervisory liability in § 1983 action. The court also found
that the prison superintendent had no personal involvement in alleged violations as was required to impose
supervisory liability under § 1983. The court noted that the superintendent was not serving at the prison at the
time of the events relevant to the prisoner’sclaims. (Coxsackie Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
PRETRIAL DETAINEE
CONTAGIOUS
DISEASES
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE

Thomas v. Sheahan, 499 F.Supp.2d 1062 (N.D.Ill. 2007). A special administrator filed a § 1983 suit against a
county, sheriff, county board, correctional officers, supervisors, and a correctional medical technician, on behalf
of a pretrial detainee who died at a county jail from meningitis and pneumonia. The administrator alleged
violations of the detainee’s constitutional rights and state law claims for wrongful death, survival action, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress. The defendants moved for summary judgment and to strike
documents. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court did not strike all of the
plaintiff's summary judgment submissions, for allegedly failing to disclose witnesses or individuals with relevant
information who submitted affidavits, given that the plaintiff had disclosed witnesses prior to discovery deadline.
The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
detainee's illness was an objectively serious medical need, and whether correctional officials and a correctional
medical technician were aware of the detainee's serious medical symptoms. The court found that the supervisors
of the correctional officers were not deliberately indifferent to the detainee's serious medical condition, where
the officers did not contact their supervisors about the detainee until the morning that he died, the supervisors
obtained medical care for the detainee, and the supervisors were not responsible for security checks or rounds of
jail. The court also found that summary judgment was precluded on the issue of causation due to a genuine issue
of material fact as to whether the county was deliberately indifferent to its widespread practice of failing to train
its employees on how to handle inmate medical requests at the county jail. Summary judgment was also
precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the county was deliberately indifferent to: (1) its
widespread practice of understaffing correctional officers at the county jail; (2) its widespread practice of failing
to repair broken video monitoring systems for inmate surveillance at the jail; and, (3) its widespread policy or
practice of falsifying daily logs to cover up missed security checks on inmates. (Cook County Jail, Illinois).

29.195
XXII

U.S. District Court
INADEQUATE CARE

Thomas v. Sheahan, 514 F.Supp.2d 1083 (N.D.Ill. 2007). A special administrator filed a § 1983 suit against a
county, sheriff, county board, correctional officers, supervisors and correctional medical technician on behalf of
a pretrial detainee who died at a county jail from meningitis and pneumonia, alleging violations of constitutional
rights and state law claims for wrongful death, survival action, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The court held that the administrator's failure to produce documentary evidence of lost wages or child support
payments did not preclude her from introducing evidence at trial. The court found that the physician was not
qualified to testify as to the manifestations of meningitis absent evidence that the physician was an expert on
meningitis or infectious diseases. According to the court, a jail operations expert's proposed testimony that the
county did not meet minimum standards of the conduct for training of correctional staff was inadmissible. The
court also found that evidence of jail conditions was relevant and thus admissible, where the administrator of the
detainee's estate argued that county officials should have known the detainee was sick because he was throwing
up in his cell and in a day room. (Cook County, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
TRAINING
INADEQUATE CARE

Turner v. Correctional Medical Services, 494 F.Supp.2d 281 (D.Del. 2007). A former prisoner brought a § 1983
action against a state, prison officials, and a medical service company, alleging inadequate medical care for
hepatitis while he was incarcerated. After the district court entered partial summary judgment in the prisoner's
favor, the company moved to alter or amend the judgment. The district court denied the motion. The court held
that expert testimony regarding the need to train the inmate suffering from hepatitis C to rotate the injection site
for his interferon shots was not required to establish the medical service company's deliberate indifference to the
inmate's serious medical needs, where the medical record was replete with references to the inmate self-injecting
at the same site and an infection occurring at the injection site. (Delaware Correctional Center)

U.S. District Court
INVOLUNTARY
MEDICATION

U.S. v. Jaramillo-Ayala, 526 F.Supp.2d 1094 (S.D.Cal. 2007). The U. S. government moved for an order
allowing involuntary medication of a defendant in order to render him fit to stand trial on charges of reentry after
deportation. The district court issued a medication order. The court held that while medication could not be
sustained on grounds that the defendant was a danger to himself or others, medication was medically necessary
and appropriate to render the defendant fit for trial on serious crimes. (Alvarado Parkway Institute, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
RECORDS

U.S. v. Miller, 477 F.3d 644 (8th Cir. 2007). A supervisor at a county detention center was convicted in the
district court of depriving two prisoners of their Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment. The supervisor appealed and the appeals court affirmed. The court held that there was sufficient
evidence that the supervisor acted maliciously and sadistically toward the prisoner, in violation of the Eighth
Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, even though the supervisor could have inflicted
even greater injuries upon the prisoner. Evidence indicated that the supervisor punched the prisoner when there
was no legitimate reason to do so, kicked the prisoner, and stomped on the prisoner while he was lying on the
ground. The court noted that the assailing officer's ability to inflict greater injuries upon a prisoner does not make
an attack any less malicious or sadistic, for the purposes of the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment. The court held that the prisoner's medical records, which did not identify the supervisor as
the individual responsible for the prisoner's injuries, were admissible under the medical treatment or diagnosis
exception to the hearsay records. (Craighead County Detention Facility, Arkansas)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
MEDICATION

Wakat v. Montgomery County, 471 F.Supp.2d 759 (S.D.Tex 2007). The estate of inmate who died in a county
jail brought a § 1983 action against the county, jail physician, and other county personnel. The defendants
moved for summary judgment. The district court held that the county was not liable based on a county policy,
the county was not liable for failure to train or supervise county jail personnel, and a physician did not act with
deliberate indifference to the inmate's serious medical needs. The court held that the county sheriff was not liable
in his individual capacity under § 1983 to the estate of the inmate absent a showing that he participated in any of
the alleged activities in any individual capacity. According to the court, the county was not liable to the estate
under § 1983 for deliberate indifference to the inmate's serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth
Amendment, since the county policy did not directly cause county personnel to fail to seek physician approval to
reinitiate the inmate's prescription medication. The court noted that although the jail had a written policy of
abruptly discontinuing any narcotic medications when inmates were initially processed for booking, regardless
of whether the inmate had a valid prescription for the narcotic, the jail also had a policy allowing the narcotic
medications to be reinstated with the permission of a doctor. The court held that the county jail physician did not
act with deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of the inmate, where the physician did not refuse to
treat the inmate nor ignore his complaints, prescribed medication when he was first called about the inmate's
disorientation and hallucinations, and saw the inmate and diagnosed him with undifferentiated schizophrenia.
According to the court, although the physician failed to see signs of withdrawals from benzodiazepine, there was
no indication that he intentionally treated the inmate for schizophrenia while knowing that, in fact, he was
suffering dangerous withdrawals from a prescription drug to which he was addicted. (Montgomery Co. Jail,
Texas)

U.S. Appeals Court
EMERGENCY CARE
INADEQUATE CARE

Watson v. U.S., 485 F.3d 1100 (10th Cir. 2007). A guardian brought an action on behalf of an incapacitated
former federal prisoner under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), alleging that the government responded
negligently to the prisoner's medical condition, resulting in a brain hemorrhage that left him severely and
permanently disabled. The district court entered a jury verdict in favor of the defendants and the guardian
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that there was sufficient evidence that the government
lacked notice of the need to closely observe the prisoner for post-surgical complications upon his return to the
correctional facility after brain surgery. Evidence indicated that the prisoner did not require observation upon his
return to the facility, that he was neurologically normal except for mild speech problems, and that he was
discharged with the instruction only that he continue speech and occupational therapy, with no need for further
observation. The court upheld the district court’s finding that the government did not breach any applicable

29.196
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standard of care by failing to summon an air ambulance after the prisoner was found unconscious in his cell,
where expert physicians testified that the use of an air ambulance was dependent upon distance, necessity, and
the patient's best interest, but did not suggest that such factors applied to the prisoner's case. (Federal
Correctional Institute in El Reno, Oklahoma)
U.S. Appeals Court
DENTAL CARE

Whitington v. Ortiz, 472 F.3d 804 (10th Cir. 2007). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action alleging his rights
were violated by the denial of access to free hygiene items. The district court dismissed the action and the
prisoner appealed. The appeals court held that the prison’s failure to timely respond to the prisoner’s Step Three
grievance regarding access to hygiene products established that the prisoner exhausted his available
administrative remedies, as required by PLRA. A Step 3 grievance requires the prison to respond within 45 days.
196 days after he filed his Step 3 grievance he still had not received a response and then filed suit. The court held
that the prisoner’s elaboration on the way the prison’s policies caused him to suffer dental problems satisfied his
obligation to state an injury to support his Eighth Amendment claim but did not equate to a delay in dental
treatment claim. The prisoner contended that he was unable to pay for hygiene items out of his prison income
after the prison debits his prison account to pay for restitution, medical care, legal photocopies, and legal
postage. (Colorado Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELAY IN TREATMENT
MEDICATION
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE

Williams v. Liefer, 491 F.3d 710 (7th Cir. 2007). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against prison officers,
alleging deliberate indifference to his medical needs. Following the entry of a jury verdict in favor of the
prisoner, the district court denied the officers' motion for judgment as a matter of law. The officers appealed. The
appeals court affirmed. The court held that the issue of whether a delay in medical care unnecessarily prolonged
and exacerbated the prisoner's pain and unnecessarily prolonged his high blood pressure was for a jury, and the
officers were not qualifiedly immune. The court noted that medical records indicated that the nitroglycerin the
prisoner eventually received almost immediately relieved his pain and lowered his blood pressure, such that a
jury could find that the delay caused the prisoner six extra hours of pain and dangerously elevated blood pressure
for no good reason. (Menard Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
DELAY IN CARE
MEDICATION

Williamson v. Correctional Medical Services, 494 F.Supp.2d 285 (D.Del. 2007). An inmate brought a § 1983
action against prison's health care providers, alleging violations of his rights under the First, Fifth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments. The inmate alleged that he experienced a pervasive and continuous pattern of
unnecessary and harmful medication interruptions during a four year period. He alleged he required thyroid
medication. The inmate also alleged that he suffered an acute knee injury involving muscle, tendon and ligament
damage as a result of an injury, and that the defendants were deliberately indifferent by disregarding his
symptoms and denying or obstructing medical treatment for the condition. The district court dismissed the
action. The court found that the action was brought against a wrongly named provider, requiring dismissal as to
that entity. The court noted that the provider named in the suit did not contract with the Department of
Corrections (DOC) to provide medical services, as alleged in the complaint. (Delaware Correctional Center)

U.S. Appeals Court
REHABILITATION ACT
MENTAL HEALTH
ADA- Americans With
Disabilities Act

Winters v. Arkansas Dept. of Health and Human Services, 491 F.3d 933 (8th Cir. 2007). The administrator of the
estate of a mentally ill pretrial detainee/civil committee who had died of peritonitis in a county jail sued a sheriff
and the Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) under § 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA), and the Rehabilitation Act. The district court entered judgment for the defendants. The administrator
appealed and the appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the pretrial detainee was not discriminated
against on the basis of his mental illness, as required to a establish violation of the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA) or the Rehabilitation Act. The court noted that the detainee was arrested for criminal trespass, and
although he was not treated for his peritonitis due to his inability to communicate because of his mental illness,
the sheriff and other jail officials sought immediate treatment for the detainee's mental illness, and attempted to
transport him to a state hospital, but he was denied admittance due to lack of available space. The court found
that neither the Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) nor the county sheriff were deliberately
indifferent to the serious medical needs of the detainee, nor was there a policy or custom to deprive mentally ill
detainees of treatment. According to the court, the detainee died from a condition that neither defendant knew of
or suspected, the sheriff and other jail officers attempted to get the detainee into a mental health treatment
facility, but no facility would accept custody of him. (Benton County Jail, Arkansas)

U.S. Appeals Court
INTAKE SCREENING
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE

Williams v. Rodriguez, 509 F.3d 392 (7th Cir. 2008). An arrestee sued a city and others under § 1983, asserting
claims for false arrest and deliberate indifference to his medical needs. The district court entered summary
judgment for the defendants and the arrestee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the
arrestee's asthma was not objectively serious during the time he was being processed, and therefore an officer
was not deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. According to the court, the arrestee's statements to the
officer that he had asthma, needed his medication, and could not breathe, made in the context of a request that
the arrestee take a breathalyzer test, were insufficient by themselves to show that he was suffering from a serious
attack. (City of Chicago Police Department, Illinois)
2008

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
SMOKE-FREE
ENVIRONMENT

Abdullah v. Washington, 530 F.Supp.2d 112 (D.D.C. 2008.) An inmate filed a § 1983 action seeking damages
for violation of his Eighth Amendment rights stemming from his alleged exposure to second-hand tobacco
smoke while confined at a District of Columbia detention facility. The district court granted summary judgment
in favor of the defendants. The court held that the plaintiff’s expert's testimony failed to demonstrate a causal
relationship between environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) and the increased risk of harm to the inmate. The
court noted that the expert was a biophysicist, not a medical doctor, never went to the jail, and never examined
the inmate or his medical records. The court held that the officials were not deliberately indifferent to the health

29.197
XXII

risks caused by environmental tobacco smoke (ETS), even if the officials inadequately enforced no-smoking
rules, where a non-smoking policy was in existence during the inmate's incarceration, and the jail was
undergoing extensive renovation to improve air quality, including the ventilation system. (District of Columbia
Department of Corrections, Central Detention Facility)
U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
EMERGENCY CARE
RELIGION

Abdur-Raqiyb v. Erie County Medical Center, 536 F.Supp.2d 299 (W.D.N.Y. 2008). A jail prisoner brought a
federal civil rights suit against public hospitals and a physician, alleging violation of his First and Eighth
Amendment rights during emergency treatment for a suspected heart attack. The district court granted the
defendants’ motions for summary judgment. The court held that the hospitals' failure to communicate, that
allegedly resulted in an overdose of morphine upon the prisoner's arrival at a second hospital, did not involve the
requisite deliberate indifference for an Eighth Amendment claim. The court noted that the failure to
communicate did not establish the intent to cause the prisoner pain or physical harm or a conscious disregard of a
substantial risk of harm. The court held that the Muslim prisoner's First Amendment right to free exercise of
religion was not violated when hospital personnel administered drugs that were pork-derived and gave him a CT
scan in which shellfish-derived dye was used to rule out a possible heart attack, in response to his complaints of
chest pain, without informing him in advance of the nature of the substances involved. The court noted that the
prisoner acknowledged that his religion permitted the administration of otherwise forbidden substances in
emergencies, and hospital staff would have exposed themselves to liability had they not administered the
medications and CT test. (Groveland Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
INVOLUNTARY
MEDICATION

Anglin v. City of Aspen, Colo., 552 F.Supp.2d 1205 (D.Colo. 2008). A pretrial detainee brought a civil rights
action, alleging that a county sheriff, county jailers, and others violated her rights to due process and free speech,
as well as her right to be free from unreasonable seizure, by forcibly injecting her with antipsychotic medication
while in custody at a county jail. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants in part. The
court held that a county sheriff's deputy personally participated in the decision to sedate the detainee and
therefore the deputy could be liable in his individual capacity under § 1983. The deputy had called paramedics
and admittedly lobbied the medics to sedate the detainee, he allegedly falsely reported to the paramedics that the
detainee had been banging her head and throwing herself against her steel cell door, and he participated in
physically restraining the detainee during the injection, at the request of the paramedics. The court found that
summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the deputy falsely reported to
the paramedics. The court found that the deputy was not entitled to qualified immunity from liability. The court
found that the training of county jail personnel by the county sheriff and other officials with respect to forcible
sedation of pretrial detainees in the county jail, was not deliberately indifferent to the due process rights of the
detainees, and therefore the sheriff and county officials were not liable under § 1983 for failure to properly train.
The training required personnel to call the paramedics and let the paramedics, with the advice of a physician,
make the decision as to whether or not to sedate. (Pitkin County Jail, Colorado)

U.S. District Court
INVOLUNTARY
MEDICATION
PRIVATE PHYSICIAN
PSYCHOTROPIC DRUGS

Anglin v. City of Aspen, Colo., 552 F.Supp.2d 1229 (D.Colo. 2008). A jail inmate brought a civil rights action,
alleging that an emergency room physician violated her constitutional rights by forcibly injecting her with
antipsychotic medication while she was in custody. The physician filed a motion for summary judgment, which
was granted by the district court. The court held that the physician “acted under color of state law” within the
meaning of § 1983 when he ordered the inmate to be involuntarily sedated, and that the physician exercised
reasonable medical judgment in deciding to forcibly sedate the inmate. The court noted that although the private
physician did not contract directly with the state to treat the inmate, the physician however undertook a public
function because the provision of medical services to inmates was traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the
state. The inmate appeared highly intoxicated and out of control, was pounding and throwing her body against
her cell door, was violently pulling against her restraints and thrashing about, and was unable to gain control in
the presence of the paramedics or to allow her vital signs to be taken. (Pitkin County Jail, Colorado)

U.S. District Court
INVOLUNTARY
MEDICATION

Anglin v. City of Aspen, 562 F.Supp.2d 1304 (D.Colo. 2008). A jail inmate brought a civil rights action under §
1983 against a city, former and current police officers, and a police chief, alleging that the defendants violated
her rights to due process and free speech, as well as her right to be free from unreasonable seizure, by forcibly
injecting her with antipsychotic medication while she was in custody at a county jail. The district court granted
summary judgment for the defendants. The court held that officers did not deprive the inmate of due process by
restraining her while paramedics forcibly sedated her and that the officers' act of restraining the inmate while she
was sedated did not amount to excessive use of force. The court found that the police chief was not liable for
failure to train and/or supervise officers, where the training reflected the sound conclusion that medical
professionals, rather than law enforcement personnel, were the individuals most qualified to determine whether
sedation was appropriate. According to the court, absent a policy of sedating detainees, the city was not
municipally liable under § 1983. The court held that the officers’ act of restraining the inmate while paramedics
forcibly administered antipsychotic medication to her was not substantially motivated as a response to her
exercise of allegedly constitutionally protected conduct, as would support the inmate's First Amendment free
speech retaliation claim against the officers, where the physician, not the officers, had legal authorization to
decide whether an emergency existed that justified the inmate's forced sedation, and the officers did not
participate in making the decision to forcibly sedate the inmate. (City of Aspen, Colorado)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
DELAY IN TREATMENT
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Brown v. District of Columbia, 514 F.3d 1279 (D.C. Cir. 2008). A District of Columbia prisoner brought Eighth
Amendment civil rights claims against the District, mayor, operator of a private prison and various correctional
officials and employees, among others. The district court dismissed certain claims for failure to effect service
and others for failure to state a claim. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part,
and remanded. The court held that the prisoner stated a claim for violation of his Eighth Amendment rights
through deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The court also found that the allegations were

29.198
XXII

sufficient to state a claim for Monell liability against the District for Eighth Amendment violations by alleging
that prison officers failed to transfer him for treatment for 60 days following a physician's notification that the
prisoner was in need of immediate hospitalization for gallstones. The court found that the allegations were
insufficient to state a supervisory liability claim against a correctional official who supervised the care of
prisoners “housed in contract facilities” for alleged wrongdoing at a correctional facility that did not qualify as a
“contract facility”. (District of Columbia, Corrections Corporation of America, Occoquan Correctional Facility
in Lorton, Virginia)
U.S. Appeals Court
DELAY IN CARE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
NEGLIGENCE
SUICIDE

Brumfield v. Hollins, 551 F.3d 322 (5th Cir. 2008). The daughter of a detainee who hung himself while confined
in a “drunk tank” of a county jail brought a § 1983 action against the county, and a sheriff and deputies in their
individual and official capacities. The district court awarded summary judgment to each defendant sued in his
individual capacity on the basis of qualified immunity, but denied summary judgment to individual defendants in
their official capacities and to the county. After a trial, the district court directed a verdict in favor of all officers
and the county. The daughter appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the sheriff was protected
by qualified immunity and that the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding expert testimony
indicating that the detainee was alive when paramedics arrived at the jail. The court found that the county was
not liable under § 1983. According to the court, the sheriff was entitled to qualified immunity from the claim that
he failed to adopt any written policy pertaining to inmate supervision or medical care, where verbal policies
existed concerning inmate supervision and medical care. The court found that the sheriff's efforts in training and
supervising deputies were not deliberately indifferent, as required for the sheriff to be liable under § 1983 for the
suicide of a drunk driving detainee. The court noted that the deputies did receive training, and that there was no
evidence of a pattern of similar violations or evidence that it should have been apparent that a constitutional
violation was the highly predictable consequence of an alleged failure to train. The court found that while the
deputies' conclusion that the detainee who had hung himself was already dead, and their resulting failure to make
any attempt to save his life, were arguably negligent, this conduct alone did not amount to deliberate
indifference, nor was any county custom or policy the moving force behind the deputies' conduct, as required for
the county to be liable under § 1983 for denial of reasonable medical care. (Marion County Jail, Mississippi)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
INTAKE SCREENING
PRETRIAL DETAINEE

Burnette v. Taylor, 533 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 2008). The father of a detainee who died while in custody in a
county jail brought a § 1983 claim against county sheriff's deputies and jailers, alleging deliberate indifference to
the detainee's serious medical needs. The district court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment on
qualified immunity grounds. The defendants appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held
that the arresting officers were not deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of the detainee who died
after ingesting a lethal combination of drugs while in custody in the county jail. Although the officers had been
warned by the detainee's stepfather that the detainee was strung out on drugs, and one officer observed that the
detainee had glassy eyes and appeared to be under the influence of something, the officers saw only that the
detainee possessed a bottle of prescription pills. The court noted that neither the detainee nor any family member
requested that the detainee be given medical treatment, and the symptoms exhibited by the detainee were not
necessarily indicative that medical attention was required.
The court found that a jailer was not deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of the
detainee. The jailer was in charge of dressing out the detainee before he was placed in his cell, and although the
jailer found a bottle of prescription pills and observed that the detainee was wasted, the detainee advised that he
had just woken up, and no one told the jailer that the detainee needed medical help or needed to be looked after.
The court also held that a jailer was not deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of the detainee
even though the jailer was aware that the detainee was in possession of a bottle of pills when he was arrested,
that his speech was slurred, that he needed assistance when he was moved from one cell to another and that his
eyes were rolling back in his head at that time, and that the detainee was making a snoring sound at the time of
one bed check. According to the court, the jailer was never aware that the detainee could have ingested a lethal
amount of drugs, no one ever recommended to the jailer that the detainee be placed in a holding cell or otherwise
be observed, and the jailer observed the detainee laughing and talking with his cellmates at one point. (Bacon
County Jail, Georgia)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE

Burns v. Trombly, 624 F.Supp.2d 185 (N.D.N.Y. 2008). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against prison
employees, alleging that his constitutional rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments were violated
when the employees used excessive force during an attempt to move him to a different prison cell, and when
they were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs arising from that use of excessive force. The
employees moved for partial summary judgment and the district court granted the motion. The court held that the
assertion in the prisoner's complaint was insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact with regard to an
employee's personal involvement in the alleged use of excessive force. According to the court, the prison
employee who videotaped the alleged use of excessive force was not deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's
serious medical needs arising from that incident, where the prisoner did not explain to the employee why he
needed to go to the medical clinic, the employee did not hear the prisoner's request, and the employee did not
witness any alleged loss of consciousness or facial swelling while standing outside the prisoner's cell door. The
court held that the state prisoner's letter complaining to a superintendent was too brief to place prison employees
on notice that any constitutional violation had actually occurred, and thus was insufficient to create a genuine
issue of material fact with regard to the employees' personal involvement in the alleged use of excessive force
and deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs arising from that use of excessive force. (Upstate
Correctional Facility, New York)

29.199
XXII

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE

Cameron v. Myers, 569 F.Supp.2d 762 (N.D.Ind. 2008). A prisoner moved for a default judgment on a § 1983
claim against a prison doctor for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the prison doctor was deliberately
indifferent to the prisoner's serious medical needs, and an award of $250,350 in compensatory damages, and
denial of punitive damages was warranted. According to the court, the doctor was deliberately indifferent to the
prisoner's serious medical needs in failing to provide the prisoner with the necessary and urgent medical care and
treatment required for his Crohn's disease, which also led to the prisoner's development of a flesh eating disease.
The court found that the doctor was plainly subjectively aware of the prisoner's objectively serious medical
condition because of the diagnosis established in his previous doctor's medical records as well as by what the
prisoner told him, and the doctor's inaction forced the prisoner to endure tremendous pain and suffering
stemming from his untreated Crohn's disease as well as the newly formed flesh eating disease, which ceased only
when the prisoner moved to a new facility and began treatment under another physician. (Indiana State Prison)

U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
INADEQUATE CARE
MISDIAGNOSIS
WORK ASSIGNMENT

Cason v. District of Columbia, 580 F.Supp.2d 76 (D.D.C. 2008). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a
correctional services company, alleging violations of the Eighth Amendment related to an injury to the prisoner's
eye, alleged misdiagnosis, and alleged inadequate treatment. The district court granted summary judgment for
the company. The court found that the company was not responsible for dishwashing at the prison or for the
prisoner's medical care, and thus the company was not liable under § 1983 for the prisoner's alleged eye injury
while working in the kitchen as a dishwasher, alleged misdiagnosis by prison medical staff, or alleged
inadequate treatment. (ARAMARK Correctional Service, District of Columbia Central Detention Facility,
Operated by Corrections Corporation of America)

U.S. District Court
DELAY IN TREATMENT
INADEQUATE CARE
MEDICATION

Collins v. Williams, 575 F.Supp.2d 610 (D.Del. 2008). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against a warden, a
prison's medical provider, medical director, and corrections officers, alleging lack or delay of medical treatment
and/or improper medical treatment. Following dismissal of the claims against the medical director and
corrections officers, and dismissal of the claims against the warden and provider, the inmate filed an amended
complaint against the warden and provider and moved for the appointment of counsel, which was denied. The
defendants moved for summary judgment, and the inmate moved for reconsideration of the order denying his
motion for appointment of counsel. The district held that the warden and provider were entitled to summary
judgment. The court held that dismissal was warranted for the inmate’s refusal to cooperate in the discovery
process. The court noted that the warden had no personal involvement in the alleged denial of the inmate's access
to medical treatment or the alleged interference with the inmate's medical care, and the warden responded to the
inmate's grievances and letters by directing him to the individuals who could be of assistance. The court found
that the provider was not deliberately indifferent to the inmate's serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. According to the court, rather than ignoring the inmate's medical complaints, he provided care and
treatment. The court noted that although not to inmate’s liking and perhaps not as quickly as the inmate wished,
all delays in his receiving medication, save one, were for pain medication and were for a relatively short period.
The court declined to second guess the medical decision to discontinue the inmate's use of trazodone, a drug
primarily used for the treatment of depression. (Howard R. Young Correctional Institution, Delaware)

U.S. District Court
CONTAGIOUS DISEASE
MALPRACTICE

Costa v. County of Burlington, 566 F.Supp.2d 360 (D.N.J. 2008). A plaintiff brought a wrongful death action
against a doctor, arising from alleged malpractice in the treatment of an inmate who was at a corrections center.
The district court denied the doctor’s motion to dismiss the action based on the plaintiff’s alleged failure to
comply with filing deadlines. The plaintiff claimed that the inmate contracted a MRSA infection while she was
confined and died because the doctor failed to both “respond to her obvious need for medical care” and
hospitalize her at the appropriate time. The plaintiff also alleged that the doctor failed to report the MRSA
outbreak to the appropriate authorities. (Burlington County Corrections and Work Release Center, N.J.)

U.S. District Court
CONTAGIOUS DISEASES
RECORDS-ACCESS

Costa v. County of Burlington, 584 F.Supp.2d 681 (D.N.J. 2008). An administrator, individually and as the
representative of a deceased pretrial detainee‘s estate, brought civil rights and state law claims against a county
and the warden of a county jail, alleging that the inmate contracted Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus
(MRSA) during her incarceration and ultimately died as result of MRSA-related pneumonia. The administrator
appealed the pretrial rulings of a United States Magistrate. The district court denied the appeal in part and
dismissed in part. The court held that broadening the scope of discovery of documents concerning other inmates'
medical treatment beyond grievances related to Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) would have
been too intrusive and minimally probative. (Burlington County Corrections and Work Release Center, New
Jersey)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELAY IN CARE

Danley v. Allen, 540 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2008). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against jailers,
alleging that he was subjected to excessive force and then denied medical treatment when they sprayed him with
pepper spray. The district court entered orders denying the defendants' motions to dismiss on qualified immunity
grounds, and the defendants appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. On remand, the district court
again denied the motion to dismiss, and defendants again appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court found
that allegations in the detainee's complaint, regarding his subsequent confinement without being allowed to
properly clean himself and remove pepper spray from his clothing, in a small, poorly-ventilated cell, were
sufficient to state an excessive force claim. According to the court, the entire incident, consisting of both the
initial pepper-spraying and the detainee’s subsequent confinement in a small, poorly-ventilated cell, could be
treated as a single alleged incident of use of excessive force. The court noted that the detainee’s eyes nearly
swelled shut, he had difficulty breathing, and he nearly passed out, while jail officials allegedly failed to take
any, and then only inadequate, steps to alleviate his suffering but instead mocked and ridiculed him. The court
found that the alleged mocking of the detainee while he suffered, by jailers who parodied his choking, was
circumstantial evidence of their malicious intent. The court found that the allegations were sufficient to state a

29.200
XXII

claim for officials' deliberate indifference to the detainee’s serious medical needs. The court determined that the
jailers were not entitled to qualified immunity on the detainee's deliberate indifference claim and that the
detainee stated a claim against the sheriff and the jail administrator to hold them personally liable under § 1983
for alleged excessive force and deliberate indifference by the jailers. The detainee was allegedly diagnosed with
chemical conjunctivitis and bronchospasms as the result of the delay in treatment. The court noted that this,
along with the fact that another prisoner allegedly recognized the detainee's distress and was ultimately
successful in obtaining a brief shower for him, was sufficient to show the seriousness of his medical need.
(Lauderdale County Detention Center, Alabama)
U.S. District Court
DELAY IN TREATMENT
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
NEGLIGENCE

Dantone v. Bhaddi, 570 F.Supp.2d 167 (D.Mass. 2008). A prisoner brought an action against the United States
under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and against a prison doctor under Bivens, seeking to recover for
injuries allegedly sustained when the seat of a van in which he was being transported collapsed. The district
court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss. The court held that the prisoner's allegations that prison staff
breached its duty of care in their transportation of him by failing to properly install, maintain, and inspect the
seating in a transport van, and that this breach resulted in the collapse of the seat, which resulted in the injuries to
his head and neck, and ongoing pain, were sufficient facts to state a negligence claim against the United States
under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The court found that the prisoner's allegations that he received no meaningful
medical care following the accident, that the magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) which he eventually received
six months after the accident was untimely, and that, to date, he had been unable to obtain any medical
information about the results of his tests, all despite repeated complaints to the prison doctor, were sufficient to
state a claim against the doctor of deliberate indifference to his medical needs in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. (Federal Medical Center, Devens, Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Davis v. First Correctional Medical, 530 F.Supp.2d 657 (D.Del. 2008). A state prisoner filed a § 1983 action
alleging that a contractor that operated a prison medical center and its employees were deliberately indifferent to
his ventral hernia. The contractor renewed its motion to dismiss and the prisoner moved for appointment of
counsel. The district court dismissed the action. The prisoner had complained of pain following his diagnosis,
and had alleged that the contractor was not responsive to his need. (Delaware Correctional Center)

U.S. District Court
DELAY IN CARE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Davis v. First Correctional Medical, 589 F.Supp.2d 464 (D.Del. 2008). An inmate brought a § 1983 action
against a prison medical center and others, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in
violation of the Eighth Amendment. The parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The district court granted
summary judgment for the defendants. The court held that a delay in surgery to treat and relieve a hernia and to
resect the inmate's small bowel due to an obstruction did not constitute deliberate indifference to the inmate's
serious medical need. The court noted that the inmate had been treated repeatedly for his medical conditions, that
any delay in surgery was caused by diagnostic testing and scheduling, and that there was no evidence that the
delay was intentional. (Howard R. Young Correctional Institution, Delaware).

U.S. District Court
DELAY IN CARE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Davis v. Williams, 572 F.Supp.2d 498 (D.Del. 2008).A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a prison
warden, several correctional officers, and prison medical staff, alleging that the defendants failed to protect him
from a fellow prisoner even though he complained of the prisoner's conduct. The prisoner moved for summary
judgment, to amend, and to appoint counsel. The court held that the prison warden's participation in an after-thefact review of the prisoner's grievance was not enough to establish the warden's personal involvement in the
prisoner's alleged constitutional deprivations, as would subject the warden to personal liability in the prisoner's §
1983 action. According to the court, prison medical employees were not deliberately indifferent to the serious
medical needs of the prisoner, whose jaw was broken in an altercation with a fellow inmate, in violation of the
Eighth Amendment. The court noted that the prisoner's condition was monitored almost immediately after he
was injured, his jaw was x-rayed one day following the injury, and two days after the injury, the prisoner was
placed in an infirmary and placed on a liquid diet. The court also found no Eighth Amendment violation on the
delay of approximately one week from the time the prisoner was examined by a physician for his jaw injury until
the time he was surgically treated. (Delaware Correctional Center)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
PRETRIAL DETAINEE

Dean v. City of Fresno, 546 F.Supp.2d 798 (E.D.Cal. 2008). The widow and children of a detainee who died
from complications of cocaine ingestion while incarcerated in a county jail, brought an action in state court
against a city and two police officers. After removal to federal court, the defendants moved for summary
judgment on all claims. The district court granted the motion in part and remanded. The court found that the
officers violated the detainee's Fourteenth Amendment right to medical care when they did not obtain medical
aid for the detainee after he vomited in the patrol car and rock cocaine was found in the vomit. According to the
court, a rational jury could conclude that the officers knew that the detainee had swallowed rock cocaine and had
a serious medical condition, and that the officers did not render care themselves, did not call for paramedics, did
not take the detainee to the hospital, and did not report the discovery of rock cocaine in the vomit to the jail
nurse. The court found that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity where the detainee, who did not
exhibit signs of being high as his detention progressed and who was previously communicative of his symptoms,
gave an inaccurate reason to explain his condition and never requested medical treatment.
The court held that the plaintiffs failed to show that the city failed to adequately train the officers. According
to the court, the undisputed evidence showed that Fresno police officers receive police academy training, field
training programs, on the job training, advanced officer courses, and various classes and seminars. The court
noted that Fresno police officers are particularly trained: (1) to conduct evaluations to determine if a person is
under the influence of a controlled substance, including rock cocaine (for those officers involved in narcotics
investigations); (2) to request aid for persons in need of medical care; (3) to recognize an arrestee's need for
medical care and provide such care; (4) to be aware of efforts that suspects may make to hide controlled
substances, including putting such substances in their mouths; (5) to render medical aid, contact emergency

29.201
XXII

medical services or transport the suspect to the hospital if they have a reasonable belief that a suspect has
swallowed a controlled substance, such as rock cocaine; (6) to know that ingestion of cocaine can cause death;
(7) to know that arrested persons may have evidence in their mouth; (8) to know that persons arrested on drug
charges may attempt to conceal the illegal drugs on their person; and (9) to be suspicious of those arrested and
what the arrestees say. (City of Fresno and Fresno County Jail, California)
U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Decker v. Dunbar, 633 F.Supp.2d 317 (E.D.Tex. 2008). Affirmed 358 Fed.Appx. 509. An inmate filed a pro se §
1983 action against prison officials, asserting Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment violations, among other
constitutional claims. The officials moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the motion. The
court held that the officials' conduct in delaying the inmate's use of a restroom for 30 minutes did not amount to
deliberate indifference to his medical needs in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. According to the court,
the delay in taking the inmate to a restroom was caused by the need to conduct a prisoner count, and the inmate
failed to demonstrate that he suffered any injury as a direct result of the delay. The court found that placement
of the inmate in a holding cell for 90 minutes on a day that the outside temperature reached 95 degrees did not
amount to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The court noted that even
assuming the holding cell was extremely hot, 90 minutes was not an excessive period of time rising to the level
of a constitutional violation. The court held that the inmate failed to demonstrate that his alleged lack of access
to the prison's law library resulted in dismissal of his multiple previously filed criminal appeals and civil cases,
and thus the inmate failed to establish an actual injury, as required to prevail on the claim that he was denied
access to court. (Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division)

U.S. District Court
ADA-Americans with
Disabilities Act
EQUAL PROTECTION
HEARING IMPAIRED

Douglas v. Gusman, 567 F.Supp.2d 877 (E.D.La. 2008). A deaf prisoner brought a civil rights suit alleging
violation of his equal protection rights, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Eighth Amendment
as the result of his limited access to a telephone typewriter (TTY) device for phone calls, lack of access to closed
captioning for television, and verbal abuse from officers. The district court dismissed the action. The court held
that the prisoner’s civil rights claims arising from denial of full access to a telephone typewriter (TTY) and
denial of closed captioning on a television in a parish prison accrued each time he was denied access to a TTY or
captioning or was threatened or assaulted for requesting access. The court found that the differential treatment
permitting other inmates unlimited telephone access, while permitting the deaf inmate only limited access, did
not violate the deaf inmate's equal protection rights where the deaf inmate, who required the use of telephone
typewriter (TTY) device for the deaf in a separate office, failed to show that limited access burdened a
fundamental right. Legitimate security interests of the prison, where a deputy was required to escort the prisoner
outside his housing area each time the prisoner used the phone, precluding the claim that he was denied equal
protection based on the greater phone privileges afforded to hearing inmates who had access to phones in the
housing tier. The court held that failure to provide a telephone typewriter (TTY) device on the deaf prisoner's
housing tier, while providing unlimited access to phones to other prisoners, did not discriminate against the
disabled inmate in violation of Title II of the ADA. According to the court, allowing the prisoner twice daily use
of a TTY device on a prison facility phone outside the housing tier was meaningful access, and lack of a TTY in
the housing tier affected disabled persons in general, precluding a finding of specific discrimination against the
inmate in particular. The court held that alleged verbal abuse from correctional officers when the deaf prisoner
complained about the lack of a telephone typewriter (TTY) was too trivial to rise to the level of a violation of the
Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. (Orleans Parish Prison, Louisiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELAY IN CARE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
PRIVATE PHYSICIAN

Duckworth v. Ahmad, 532 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 2008). A state prisoner diagnosed with bladder cancer brought a §
1983 action against prison doctors, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of
the Eighth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the doctors and the prisoner
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that a prison doctor's failure to order a cystoscopy when the
prisoner reported, and testing showed, that he was passing blood in his urine, which delayed the proper diagnosis
of bladder cancer, did not constitute deliberate indifference to the prisoner's serious medical needs in violation of
the Eighth Amendment. The court noted that although it would have been a better route to conduct the
cystoscopy, the doctor referred the prisoner to an outside urology clinic and believed incorrectly that the prisoner
was seeing an urologist. According to the court, there was no showing that the doctor suspected cancer or knew
that blood in the urine involved an excessive risk of cancer, and after the doctor learned that the prisoner was, in
fact, not seeing the urologist, he conducted additional testing, which did not reveal blood in the urine. (Centralia
Correctional Facility, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Duffield v. Jackson, 545 F.3d 1234 (10th Cir. 2008). An inmate in a state correctional facility brought a § 1983
action against several members of the medical staff claiming they violated his Eighth Amendment right to be
free from cruel and unusual punishment by showing deliberate indifference to his medical condition. The district
court dismissed the claims against some defendants and granted summary judgment in favor of others. The
inmate appealed. The appeals court held that the district court did not commit a plain error in determining that
the prisoner's medical treatment did not violate his Eighth Amendment rights. The court noted that the prisoner
received repeated examinations and underwent lab-work and x-rays, was prescribed several different medicines,
and saw an outside specialist for an ear infection. The court held that the nurse who facilitated the prisoner's
various requests for medical services lacked an affirmative link with the prisoner's diagnosis and treatment, as
required for liability under § 1983 on the prisoner's Eighth Amendment medical mistreatment claim. (James
Crabtree Correctional Center, Helena, Oklahoma)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE

Ellis v. Vadlamudi, 568 F.Supp.2d 778 (E.D.Mich. 2008). A state prisoner brought a civil rights suit against
prison medical personnel alleging due process and Eighth Amendment violations as the result of failure to treat
his chronic pain from several diagnosed medical conditions. The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). A magistrate filed a
report and recommendation that the motion be denied and the defendants filed objections. The district court held

29.202
XXII

that the continuing violations doctrine should be applied to repeated failure to treat chronic pain, such that
instances predating and postdating a prison grievance were exhausted, even if discrete grievances were not filed
for each denial of treatment within the time limits of the state prison's grievance system. (Mound Correctional
Facility, Michigan Department of Corrections)
U.S. District Court
AIDS-Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Estate of Chance v. First Correctional Medical Inc., 579 F.Supp.2d 583 (D.Del. 2008). The administrators of an
inmate's estate brought a § 1983 action against Delaware Department of Corrections (DOC) officials for claims
arising out of the inmate's death. The district court granted summary judgment for the officials. The court held
that there was no evidence that the DOC Commissioner and the DOC Bureau Chief for the Bureau of
Management Services were involved in the medical care provided to the HIV-positive inmate who died by
cryptococcal meningitis, and therefore, those DOC officials were not deliberately indifferent to the inmate's
medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Howard R. Young Correctional Institution, Webb
Correctional Facility, Delaware)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Estate of Harvey ex rel. Dent v. Roanoke City Sheriff's Office, 585 F.Supp.2d 844 (W.D.Va. 2008). The
administrator of a pretrial detainee's estate brought a civil rights action under §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986 and
Virginia law, against a city sheriff's department, sheriff, deputies, and prison health providers, alleging excessive
use of force, failure to train, assault, battery, conspiracy, breach of a non-delegable fiduciary duty, intentional
infliction of emotional distress and wrongful death. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district
court granted the motions. The court held that the estate of the pretrial detainee who died following cardiac arrest
after transfer from a jail to a hospital could not sustain a deliberate indifference claim under the Fourteenth
Amendment against the employees of a prison health provider, absent evidence that they actually knew of and
disregarded a serious risk of harm to the detainee, or that they actually knew of and ignored a serious need for
medical care. The court noted that the city sheriff and sheriff's deputies did not knowingly disregard a substantial
risk of harm to the pretrial detainee in violation of Fourteenth Amendment when they relied on medical
personnel's decisions as to the appropriate course of treatment for the detainee's medical needs. The court found
that the city sheriff's deputies did not act with deliberate indifference when, in an attempt to transfer the detainee
to a hospital for treatment, they forcibly removed the detainee from his cell, placed him face down on a stretcher,
and covered him with a blanket to stop him from spitting and throwing feces at the deputies. According to the
court, there was no evidence that the deputies knew that the detainee suffered from an excited delirium or serious
heart condition. The court noted that the detainee was naked, slick with feces and urine, spitting, yelling, being
combative, threatening to throw more bodily fluids, trying to bite, and was HIV and Hepatitis C positive.
(Roanoke City Jail, Virginia)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
INADEQUATE CARE

Fear v. Diboll Correctional Center, 582 F.Supp.2d 841 (E.D.Tex. 2008). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action
against a prison system, medical center, and prison physician, alleging deliberate indifference to a serious
medical need. The district court dismissed the action. The court found that the prisoner's allegations that a prison
physician was deliberately indifferent to his nail fungus condition failed to state a claim under § 1983, where the
nail fungus condition did not amount to a serious medical need, the physician was responsive to the prisoner's
health problem, and the physician followed protocol in treating the prisoner. (Diboll Correctional Center, Texas)

U.S. Appeals Court
ADEQUACY OF CARE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Ford v. County of Grand Traverse, 535 F.3d 483 (6th Cir. 2008). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action against
jail officials and the county claiming, among other things, that the county's policy or custom regarding the
provision of medical care at the jail on weekends reflected deliberate indifference to her medical needs and
caused injuries resulting from a fall from the top bunk in her cell when she had a seizure. After a jury found
against the county, the district court denied the county's motions for judgment as a matter of law. The county
appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that sufficient evidence existed for reasonable minds to find a
direct causal link between county's policy of permitting jail officials to “contact” medical staff simply by leaving
a medical form in the nurse's inbox, even though a nurse might not see the notice for 48 hours, and the alleged
denial of the inmate's right to adequate medical care, allegedly leading to the inmate suffering a seizure and
falling from a top bunk. According to the court, the deposition testimony of a doctor provided a basis for finding
that the inmate would not have suffered a seizure had she been given medication within a few hours of her
arrival at the jail. The inmate, a self-described recovering alcoholic who also suffers from epilepsy, was arrested
on a probation violation and taken to the jail. That afternoon, she had a seizure, fell from the top bunk of a bed in
her cell, and sustained significant injuries to her right hip and right clavicle. Her case proceeded to trial and the
jury found that none of the jail officials were deliberately indifferent to her serious medical needs, but
determined that the county's policy regarding weekend medical care exhibited deliberate indifference to, and was
the proximate cause of, her injuries. The jury awarded her $214,000 in damages. (Grand Traverse County Jail,
Michigan)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
INADEQUATE CARE
NEGLIGENCE

Francisco v. Correctional Medical System, 548 F.Supp.2d 128 (D.Del. 2008). A state prisoner brought an action
against a correctional medical services provider, alleging claims for deliberate indifference to his need for
medical treatment and medical negligence under state law. The district court granted summary judgment for the
defendant. The court held that the correctional medical services provider's decision not to provide normal
treatment for the prisoner's Hepatitis C did not amount to deliberate indifference to the prisoner's need for
medical treatment, in violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.
The court noted that normal treatment was contraindicated by the prisoner's psychiatric illness, and that the
prisoner received full treatment that was necessary and appropriate based on documented literature and national
databases. According to the court, the prisoner failed to present expert medical testimony, as required to prevail
under the Delaware Medical Malpractice Act, on medical negligence claims against the correctional medical
services provider. (Delaware Correctional Center)

29.203
XXII

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
WORK ASSIGNMENT
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Gabriel v. Hamlin, 514 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 2008). A state prisoner who was seriously burned while working in a
prison kitchen filed a § 1983 action against prison officials alleging that they were recklessly indifferent to his
serious medical needs. The district court dismissed the action for want of prosecution, and subsequently denied a
motion for reconsideration. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that
dismissal of the prisoner's claim was not warranted as a sanction. According to the court, the prisoner's failure to
secure a trial deposition of his expert as a contingency did not justify the harsh sanction of dismissal for want of
prosecution. (Big Muddy River Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
MALPRACTICE

Gibson v. Moskowitz, 523 F.3d 657 (6th Cir. 2008). The representative of the estate of a mentally disabled inmate
who died of dehydration in a state prison brought a § 1983 action against a prison psychiatrist and others,
alleging deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, and asserting medical malpractice claims. The district
court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment, and subsequently entered judgment, upon a jury
verdict, in favor of the representative. The court awarded $1.5 million in compensatory damages and $3 million
in punitive damages. The psychiatrist appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The
court held that evidence was sufficient to support a determination that the inmate had an objectively serious
medical condition and that the psychiatrist subjectively ignored the inmate's serious medical needs. The court
found that the compensatory damages award was not excessive and that the representative was entitled to
recover punitive damages. The court found that the punitive damages award was not excessive.
According to the court, the psychiatrist was in charge of the inmate's treatment team, he admittedly was aware
that the temperature in the observation room where the inmate was held exceeded 90 degrees, and that the
combination of the inmate's medication and the room temperature was potentially deadly. A psychiatric expert
testified that the inmate's medication affected the part of the brain that regulated body temperature and dissipated
heat, and another medical expert testified that the inmate's dehydration occurred over a period of several days.
Evidence was presented that during that period, the inmate lost 42 pounds. The psychiatrist never asked for the
inmate's temperature to be monitored, even when he had learned from a nurse and other prison employees that
the inmate had vomited. The nurse had advised the psychiatrist that the inmate was suffering from dehydration
and severe weight loss, and that his condition was deteriorating. The psychiatrist did not examine the inmate,
change his medication, or move the inmate to a cooler room.
The case was remanded to the district court to provide justification for its allocation of $1.5 million in
compensatory damages awarded by the jury between the § 1983 Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference
claim and the medical malpractice claim. The court had allocated $683,500, representing Michigan's high-tier
non-economic damages cap to the medical malpractice claim, and the rest to the deliberate indifference claim,
but it failed to provide any explanation for the allocation. The appeals court held that the allocation did not
follow intuitively from the evidence, since a higher standard of culpability was required for the deliberate
indifference claim. (Riverside Correctional Facility, Michigan)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
MALPRACTICE
MEDICATION
NEGLIGENCE

Gil v. Reed, 535 F.3d 551 (7th Cir. 2008). A federal prisoner brought a Bivens action against a prison doctor,
physician's assistant, and the United States alleging negligence, malpractice, and deliberate indifference to his
serious medical needs in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of defendants. On appeal, the appeals court vacated and remanded. On remand, the district
court again granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court
again vacated and remanded. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether the refusal of the physician's assistant to fill the prisoner's prescription for antibiotics
harmed the prisoner, and whether the prison physician acted with deliberate indifference to the prisoner's serious
medical needs when he prescribed medication which a specialist had warned against while simultaneously
canceling other prescribed products. (Federal Correctional Institution, Oxford, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
DENTAL CARE

Gonzales v. Brevard, 531 F.Supp.2d 1019 (W.D.Wis. 2008). A state prisoner filed a § 1983 action claiming that
a dentist and nurses employed by the Department of Corrections violated his Eighth Amendment rights due to
the prisoner's pain and bleeding following a tooth extraction. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court held that the dentist and nurses
were not deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's serious dental health needs following a tooth extraction that
was not closed with sutures. The court noted that the dentist and nurses provided reasonable medical treatment
that did not substantially depart from accepted professional judgment by packing the surgical opening, as a
common alternative to sutures. (Columbia Correctional Institution, Wisconsin.)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
MENTAL HEALTH
PSYCHOTROPIC DRUGS
SUICIDE

Graham v. Van Dycke, 564 F.Supp.2d 1305 (D.Kan. 2008). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against medical
providers working at a state correctional facility, alleging violations of her Eighth Amendment due process rights
arising from a strip search conducted by a male officer. She also challenged her mental health confinement. The
district court granted summary judgment for the medical providers. The court held that the prison doctor's
decision to remove the inmate from her cell after she became agitated and demanded two psychotropic drugs and
to place her in mental health segregation was not deliberate indifference. The court noted that the doctor's
decision was based on the inmate's previous history of mental illness and the doctor's knowledge that the inmate
previously had a bad experience using one of the drugs she requested. The inmate threatened to harm other
inmates, and the doctor feared for the inmate's safety because she had access to scissors. The court found that
removal of the female inmate from her cell into administrative segregation and removal of her clothing, after she
became agitated and demanded psychotropic drugs, did not violate her privacy or Eighth Amendment due
process rights, even though officers who performed such tasks were all male. According to the court, the inmate
was on suicide watch, which required removal of clothing to avoid self-injury, removal was done pursuant to
established procedure and was videotaped, and a staffing shortage rendered it impractical to include a female
officer on the removal team. (Topeka Correctional Facility, Kansas)

29.204
XXII

U.S. Appeals Court
DELAY IN CARE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
MEDICATION

Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763 (7th Cir. 2008). A federal pretrial detainee who was a Canadian citizen and
who was held in a county jail brought actions against a city and against a sheriff, jail commander, sergeant, jail
officers, and the United States marshal. The detainee sued the defendants in their official and individual
capacities, asserting state-law negligence and constitutional claims, § 1983 claims, and claims under the Alien
Tort Claims Act. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants and the detainee appealed. The
appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court found that the detainee did not show
that the alleged practice at the county jail of dispensing an inmate or detainee's entire drug prescription at one
time was a widespread practice, reflective of a policy choice made by the county sheriff, as required to establish
a § 1983 claim against the sheriff in his official capacity. According to the court, the detainee did not establish
the frequency of the claimed practice or indicate how many such disbursements to others he witnessed. The court
held that summary judgment was precluded by verifiying medical evidence of a genuine issue of material fact as
to whether a delay in securing medical care for the detainee’s broken nose was deliberate indifference to his
serious medical needs. According to the court, evidence that the detainee suffered a nasal fracture, could
experience further bleeding, and possibly would need to see a specialist, and that the detainee later underwent
painful nose surgery, would help a jury determine whether the one and one-half day delay by jail officers in
getting the detainee medical attention unnecessarily prolonged and exacerbated the detainee's pain. (Marion
County Jail, Indiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
RESTRAINTS

Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567 (6th Cir. 2008). A state prisoner, proceeding pro se, brought §§ 1981 and 1983
actions against prison officials, alleging violations of his right to due process, right to equal protection, and
Eighth Amendment rights. The district court dismissed the action and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court
affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held that the prisoner had no due process liberty interest in
freedom from use of four-point restraints or in having a prison nurse arrive before corrections officers placed the
prisoner in the restraints. According to the court, such restraints were expected adverse consequences of
confinement, the prisoner had been accused of hitting a corrections officer, and officers entered the prisoner's
cell to conduct an investigation. (Kentucky State Penitentiary)

U.S. Appeals Court
INADEQUATE CARE

Hannah v. U.S., 523 F.3d 597 (5th Cir. 2008). A federal prisoner filed a pro se complaint under the Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA) against the United States and others involved in the medical treatment that he received while
suffering from Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus Aureas (MRSA), a sinus infection. After the prisoner's
untimely motion for appointment of an expert witness was denied, the United States moved for summary
judgment. The district court granted the motion and dismissed the lawsuit. The prisoner appealed. The appeals
court affirmed. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to appoint an expert
witness, and that under Texas law, the prisoner was required to present expert testimony to establish the
applicable standard of care with respect to the treatment of MRSA and to show how the care he received
breached that standard. According to the court, his failure to designate or hire an expert to testify on his behalf
entitled the United States to judgment as a matter of law. (Federal Medical Center, Fort Worth, Texas)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELAY IN CARE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
EMERGENCY CARE
PRIVATE PROVIDER

Harrison v. Ash, 539 F.3d 510 (6th Cir. 2008). The personal representative of the estate of an inmate who died
after suffering a severe asthma attack at a jail brought a § 1983 action against jail nurses and officers, alleging
deliberate indifference to the inmate's serious medical needs. The inmate died while serving a 35-day sentence
for failing to pay child support. The district court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment and the
defendants appealed. The court held that the appeals court had jurisdiction over the officers' appeal and that the
officers were entitled to qualified immunity, and that the court did not have jurisdiction to consider the nurse’s
appeals. The court found that an officer working in the jail's medical unit reasonably responded to the substantial
risk to the inmate's health from asthma and, thus, was not deliberately indifferent to the inmate's serious medical
needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. According to the court, the officer, after being contacted by the
inmate from his cell to report that he was having difficulty breathing, notified the nursing staff of the inmate's
complaints, who in turn arranged for emergency medical transport to the hospital, where the inmate was
subsequently pronounced dead. After being contacted by the nurse to request that an ambulance be called, one
officer contacted an ambulance and later drove the ambulance to the hospital after being told to do so by the
other officer so that emergency medical staff could treat the inmate while in route to the hospital. The court held
that the jail nurses, as employees of a for-profit private medical provider, rather than the county, could not assert
a qualified immunity defense to the § 1983 action. Although the nurses were acting under the color of state law,
because of the contractual relationship between the county and the provider, there was no firmly rooted common
law practice of extending immunity to private actors, and policy rationales undergirding qualified immunity did
not support extending immunity to the nurses. (Macomb County Jail, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
INADEQUATE CARE

Hart v. Bertsch, 529 F.Supp.2d 1032 (D.N.D. 2008). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action against prison
officials for violations of his constitutional right to receive necessary medical care. The inmate alleged that the
officials failed to provide adequate medical care for his serious medical needs because he had been housed in a
cell that utilized “steam heat,” and that officials had not provided him with a medical alert button necessary due
to his sleep apnea. The officials moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court
held that the officials did not act with deliberate indifference toward the inmate's central sleep apnea condition or
alleged sensitivity toward “steam heat,” as would have violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment. The court noted that the inmate had been subjected to a multitude of physical
examinations and diagnostic tests in an effort to diagnose the cause of his breathing complaints, and that the
treating physician found no medical or factual basis to support another physician's recommendation that the
inmate needed to avoid steam heat. According to the court, the inmate failed to follow through with
recommended treatments, and the physician had never received a recommendation that the inmate be provided
with a medical alert button, nor would such a procedure have been consistent with the inmate's condition. (North
Dakota State Penitentiary)

29.205
XXII

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE

Hart v. Celaya, 548 F.Supp.2d 789 (N.D.Cal. 2008). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against corrections
officers, alleging excessive force and deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The district court
granted summary judgment for the defendants. The court held that the officers did not use excessive force in
releasing pepper-spray into the prisoner's holding cell after he refused to submit to an unclothed body search.
The court noted that the officer released pepper-spray into the cell only after the prisoner refused to comply with
the direct orders of three different officers of increasingly higher rank to submit to the search, after the officer
explained to the prisoner that all inmates entering administrative segregation were required to submit to an
unclothed body search, after the prisoner began yelling and pushing up against his cell door causing it to shake
and rattle, and after the officers were concerned that the prisoner would either harm himself or break out of his
cell and endanger others. The court found that the prisoner did not suffer from a “serious medical need” within
the meaning of the Eighth Amendment when he was pepper-sprayed in his cell, allegedly roughly handled by
corrections officers as they took him to an outside area for decontamination and required him to kneel on a
concrete surface for approximately 45 minutes during decontamination. After decontamination the prisoner was
examined by a medical technician who listed no evidence of injury and documented the prisoner's
decontamination from pepper-spray. A physician's subsequent examination found no long-term or lasting skin,
knee, shoulder or pepper-spray related injuries. (Salinas Valley State Prison, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
INADEQUATE CARE

Hayes v. Snyder, 546 F.3d 516 (7th Cir. 2008). A former prisoner brought an action against prison officials,
alleging the officials were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion and the
prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that the
prisoner's testicular growths and cysts, painful urination and excruciating pain constituted a serious medical
condition and a reasonable jury could infer that the prison physician was deliberately indifferent to these needs.
The court held that the physician was not entitled to qualified immunity. The court noted that the prison
physician never prescribed prescription-strength pain killers, stopped providing even minimal pain treatment to
the prisoner, and rejected the prisoner's request to see a specialist. The court found that non-medical prison
officials were not deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's serious medical need in violation of the Eighth
Amendment, where the officials responded readily and promptly to each of the prisoner's letters and grievances
and were entitled to defer to the professional judgment of medical officials on questions of the prisoner's medical
care. (Hill Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
TREATMENT
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Hernandez v. Velasquez, 522 F.3d 556 (5th Cir. 2008). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action alleging
violations of his Eighth Amendment and due process rights. The district court granted summary judgment to all
defendants and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the prisoner failed to
show that he was placed at a substantial risk of serious harm when he was placed on lockdown status for 13
months, and therefore he could not show deliberate indifference on the part of prison personnel to his health or
safety, as required for prison personnel to be liable under § 1983 for imposing conditions of confinement that
constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. The court noted that even if the prisoner
suffered from muscle atrophy, stiffness, loss of range of motion and depression, there was no indication that
those conditions posed a substantial risk of serious harm. The court held that the prisoner failed to show that
prison personnel failed reasonably to address his medical needs, as required for prison personnel to be liable
under § 1983 for deliberate indifference to the prisoner's serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. The court noted that sick call requests that the prisoner submitted while he was in lockdown,
complaining of muscle soreness, stiffness and loss of range of motion, bore notations from medical staff showing
that they responded to the prisoner in a timely manner, treating his back pain with heat packs, conducting an xray, advising him to take medication for soreness and recommending exercises for soreness and stiffness. (Texas
Department of Criminal Justice, Polunsky Unit)

U.S. Appeals Court
EQUAL PROTECTION
INADEQUATE CARE

Hines v. Anderson, 547 F.3d 915 (8th Cir. 2008). Inmates appealed an order of the district court that had
terminated a consent decree that regulated prison medical care. Inmates had filed a class action against the state
in 1973, resulting in a 1977 consent decree that set medical standards for the prison. The appeals court affirmed
the district court ‘s ruling. The court held that the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) did not require an
investigation and/or evidentiary hearing before termination of a consent decree. The court noted that the consent
decree that regulated prison medical care did not constitute a final judgment, and therefore inmates had no
property right that would entitle them under the due process clause to further discovery and a pre-termination
evidentiary hearing. The court found that although the record presented a picture of what, at times, may have
constituted less than optimum care of inmates, it failed to show current and ongoing deliberate disregard of the
inmates' serious medical needs, which was required to maintain the consent decree. According to the court, the
type of day-to-day oversight on all aspects of medical care encompassed in the consent decree was broader than
necessary to assure protection of the right to reasonable medical care in the face of a known substantial risk of
harm to the inmate. Because the consent decree was not narrowly tailored nor was it the least intrusive means to
protect the inmates' Eighth Amendment rights, it violated the provisions of PLRA . (Minnesota Correctional
Facility at Oak Park Heights)

U.S. District Court
MEDICATION

Hubbs v. County of San Bernardino, CA, 538 F.Supp.2d 1254 (C.D.Cal. 2008). A civilly committed sexually
violent predator (SVP) brought a civil rights action against a sheriff and county claiming numerous violations of
his constitutional and statutory rights. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss in part and
denied in part. The court held that the SVP stated a civil rights due process claim against the county and a civil
rights due process claim against the sheriff and county regarding conditions of his confinement at the jail. The
SVP alleged that policies regarding conditions of confinement and denial of medical care injured him, and that
the sheriff did not properly train his subordinate employees to prevent those injuries. The SVP alleged that the
defendants did not provide prescribed medications and that a holding cell was cold and did not have a mattress,

29.206
XXII

hygiene supplies, or bed roll. The court found that the SVP stated a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim
against the sheriff and county, on allegations that, pursuant to the sheriff's policies, he was neither provided with
prescribed medications in a manner directed by his treating physicians, nor allowed to have medications that
were sent with him, and those deprivations caused him severe pain and suffering, made him sick and listless, and
caused him to suffer from a migraine headache that lasted for four days. The SVP also alleged that he suffered
from severe urinary problems, which included great difficulty in emptying his bladder, as a result of the
deprivation. (West Valley Detention Center, San Bernardino County, California)
U.S. District Court
DENIAL OF CARE

Hurt v. Birkett, 566 F.Supp.2d 620 (E.D.Mich. 2008). A state inmate brought an action against prison employees
under § 1983, alleging conspiracy, racial discrimination, retaliation, deliberate indifference, excessive force, and
failure to report in connection with an incident in which the inmate's arm was broken. The district court
dismissed the action. The court held that the inmate’s allegations, that state prison employees engaged in a
campaign of harassment based on race, failed to state an equal protection claim. The court noted that a single
allegation was insufficient to raise the inmate's right to relief above the speculative level. The court found that
the inmate's allegations that prison employees conspired to deny him medical care after his arm was broken, in
violation of the Eighth Amendment, failed to state a claim of conspiracy against the employees, absent details
and allegations of specific acts made in furtherance of such conspiracy. The court held that prison employees
were not liable for excessive force for breaking the inmate's arm, where a video of the incident in which the
inmate's arm was broken showed the inmate starting an altercation and needing to be subdued, and it was clear
that the force applied by the employees was applied in a good-faith effort to restore discipline. (Marquette
Branch Prison, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
RECORDS

Husayn v. Gates, 588 F.Supp.2d 7 (D.D.C. 2008). A detainee at the United States Naval Base in Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his detention as an enemy combatant. After
denial of the detainee's motion for disclosure of his medical records, the detainee moved for reconsideration. The
district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that counsel was entitled to review the
detainee's medical records and staff records regarding his seizure-related episodes, despite the government's
contention that the records were inherently related to detention, treatment, or conditions of confinement, and thus
were exempted from judicial review. The court found that the records were necessary to permit counsel to assess
whether and to what extent the detainee's medical condition affected his right to habeas relief, and to determine
whether to challenge the legitimacy of his Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) hearing. The detainee
alleged that he suffered over 120 seizures since he was first detained in 2006, and that they are currently frequent
and severe. He alleged that they consist of excruciating pain in his head near the site of an old mortar injury that
left him unable to think clearly or speak for an extended period. (United States Naval Base in Guantánamo Bay,
Cuba)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE

Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225 (4th Cir. 2008). The estate and family of a deceased inmate brought a § 1983 survival
and wrongful death action against correctional officers, alleging violations of the inmate's Eighth Amendment
rights. The district court granted, in part, the officers' motion for summary judgment. The officers appealed. The
appeals court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held that an officer violated the deceased inmate's
Eighth Amendment right to be free from excessive force, arising from the inmate's death after his extraction
from his cell involving the use of pepper spray, and thus the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity on §
1983 claims. The court held that correction officers were deliberately indifferent to the medical needs of the
deceased inmate in violation of the inmate's Eighth Amendment right to adequate medical care, and thus were
not entitled to qualified immunity on § 1983 claim brought by the inmate's estate and family. According to the
court, the officers' training required decontamination after the use of pepper spray, the state's medical examiner
credited pepper spray as contributing to the inmate's death, a lay person would have inferred from the inmate's
collapse that he was in need of medical attention, the officers witnessed the inmate's collapse, caught him, and
directed him into a wheelchair, and yet the inmate received no medical treatment. The officers argued that the
inmate did not appear fazed by the pepper spray and that the inmate's opportunity to breathe fresh air while he
was wheeled from the medical room was an adequate alternative to receiving actual medical care. (Western
Correctional Institution, Maryland)

U.S. District Court
INADEQUATE CARE

Ilina v. Zickefoose, 591 F.Supp.2d 145 (D.Conn. 2008). A federal prisoner filed a § 2241 petition for a writ of
habeas corpus, alleging that she was denied necessary medical care in violation of her Eighth Amendment rights.
The district court held that the claim was cognizable as a habeas petition. According to the court, the claim
asserted by the prisoner who had been diagnosed with cervical cancer, that she was denied necessary medical
care in federal prison in violation of her Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment,
and seeking restoration of certain medical treatment, specifically hormone medication, was cognizable as a
habeas petition challenging her conditions of confinement pursuant. (Federal Correctional Institution, Danbury,
Connecticut)

U.S. District Court
DELAY IN TREATMENT
MEDICATION
NEGLIGENCE

Jackson v. Correctional Corporation of America, 564 F.Supp.2d 22 (D.D.C 2008). An inmate brought an action
against a prison's medical provider, alleging medical negligence and violations of the Eighth Amendment. The
court held that the inmate stated a medical negligence claim and the provider was liable under the theory of
respondeat superior. The inmate alleged that he was deprived of medication prescribed for his stomach ailments
for 19 days. The court held that an award of $9,500 in compensatory damages for medical negligence was
warranted, where the inmate experienced a burning pain in his stomach and esophagus that increased over time
without his medication and at times prevented him from sleeping or eating. (Center for Correctional Health
Policy and Studies, Inc., Correctional Corporation of America, District of Columbia Correctional Treatment
Facility)

29.207
XXII

U.S. Appeals Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
INADEQUATE CARE

Jackson v. Kotter, 541 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 2008). A prisoner brought an action against federal prison employees
and the federal government, alleging negligence under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and constitutional
claims pursuant to Bivens. The district court dismissed the action and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court
affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part. The court held that a Physician's Assistant (PA) in the prison
did not act with deliberate indifference toward the prisoner in response to an alleged back injury suffered by the
prisoner after being escorted out of his cell for a strip search. According to the court, the PA saw the prisoner
shortly after his alleged injuries and ordered an x-ray, personally observed the prisoner's condition and took into
consideration prior x-rays of his spine, and afforded some of the pain treatment that the prisoner demanded.
(United States Penitentiary, Terre Haute, Indiana)

U.S. District Court
MEDICATION
MENTAL HEALTH
TRANSFER

Jarecke v. Hensley, 552 F.Supp.2d 261 (D.Conn. 2008). A prisoner who suffered from antisocial personality and
borderline personality disorders challenged his mental health treatment and an attempt to transfer him to a
correctional facility with dormitory housing, alleging violation of the Eighth Amendment. The prisoner moved
for a preliminary injunction to prevent his transfer and to be prescribed lithium and assigned to a single cell. The
district court denied the motion. The court found that the prisoner did not have a likelihood of success on the
merits of his claim, and that the prisoner would not suffer irreparable harm without an injunction. The court
noted that the prisoner's medical treatment was adequate, as lithium was generally not used to treat such
disorders, and that no medical diagnosis precluded his transfer to a dormitory setting or required confinement in
single cell. (Connecticut)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
DENTAL CARE

Johnston v. Maha, 584 F.Supp.2d 612 (W.D.N.Y. 2008). A pretrial detainee brought an action against
employees of a county jail, alleging violations of his constitutional rights under § 1983 and violations of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The defendants moved for summary judgment and the district court
granted the motion. The court held that the inmate failed to exhaust administrative remedies for the purposes of
the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) as to some of his § 1983 and Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
claims against employees of the county jail, where the inmate either did not pursue appeals at all, or did not
pursue appeals to the final step. The court held that evidence was insufficient to show that medical staff at the
county jail acted with deliberate indifferent to the inmate's medical needs as to requested dental care, as required
to support his § 1983 claim for violation of the Eighth Amendment. The court noted that although the inmate had
to wait two months to see a dentist, the dentist filled the inmate's cavities and took x-rays related to that
treatment. (Genesee County Jail, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Jones v. Minnesota Dept. of Corrections, 512 F.3d 478 (8th Cir. 2008). The trustee for the heirs of an inmate
brought an action against a state Department of Corrections, corrections officers and prison nurse alleging
deliberate indifference to the inmate's serious medical need in violation of Eighth Amendment. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and trustee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The
court held that the inmate did not have a medical need so obvious that a layperson would easily recognize the
need for a doctor's immediate attention, as required to establish an objectively serious medical need without a
physician's diagnosis. The court found that the corrections officers and a prison nurse did not violate the Eighth
Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment by deliberate indifference to the inmate's serious
medical need. The court noted that although the inmate appeared to be unable to stand or walk under her own
power, did not respond to officers' directions, rolled on the ground grunting and groaning and had dried blood
and cuts on her lips, prison personnel had no background knowledge that made it obvious that those symptoms
required medical attention and the inmate never expressed a need for medical attention. (Blue Earth County Jail
and Minnesota Correctional Facility- Shakopee)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
INTAKE SCREENING
NEGLIGENCE

Jones v. Oakland County, 585 F.Supp.2d 914 (E.D.Mich. 2008). The personal representative of an arrestee's
estate brought an action against a county and two employees of the jail where the arrestee died of heart failure.
The arrestee had been brought to the jail on a bench warrant for failing to appear at a court proceeding. Two days
after her admission she was found unresponsive in her cell and could not be revived. It was subsequently
determined that she died of heart failure (ischemic cardiomyopathy). The defendants moved for summary
judgment and the district court granted the motion. The court held that neither a jail interviewer, whose only
contact with the arrestee was a classification interview lasting between five and fifteen minutes, nor a jail nurse,
who first came into contact with the arrestee when she was summoned to assist in CPR and other efforts to
revive the arrestee after she was found unresponsive in her jail cell, were deliberately indifferent to the arrestee's
serious medical needs. According to the court, neither employee perceived a substantial risk to the arrestee's
health and well-being and yet disregarded that risk, and any purported negligence in the interviewer's assessment
of the arrestee's medical needs did not rise to the level of deliberate indifference. The court held that the conduct
of the interviewer, whose only contact with the arrestee was a classification interview lasting between five and
fifteen minutes, did not amount to “gross negligence” within the meaning of Michigan's governmental immunity
statute, and therefore she was not liable for failing to secure immediate medical treatment for a condition that
shortly would result in the arrestee's death. (Oakland County Jail, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
COSTS
DELAY IN CARE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Jones v. Westchester County Department of Corrections Medical Dept., 557 F.Supp.2d 408 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). A
county prisoner brought pro se action against a county corrections department, warden, and administrative
liaison, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The district court held that the prisoner's
complaint, stating that he was scheduled for necessary surgery to alleviate chronic and extreme pain, and stating
facts tending to show that prison officials denied him surgery in order to shift the cost to another agency,
sufficiently alleged that he was denied adequate care, as required to state a claim for deliberate indifference to
his serious medical needs. According to the court, the prisoner's complaint, stating that his hips caused him
chronic and extreme pain, and that his pain would have been alleviated if he had been given hip replacement
surgery, sufficiently alleged that his medical needs were serious, as required to state a deliberate indifference

29.208
XXII

claim. The court found that the prisoner's complaint, stating that an administrative liaison made the final decision
not to let him have hip replacement surgery, and that she personally, and with deliberate indifference to his
suffering, put the county's financial concerns ahead of his medical needs, alleged with requisite specificity the
personal involvement of the administrative liaison, as required to state a cause of action against her for deliberate
indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Westchester County
Department of Corrections, New York)
U.S. District Court
CONTAGIOUS DISEASES

Joy v. Healthcare C.M.S., 534 F.Supp.2d 482 (D.Del. 2008). An inmate filed an action under § 1983, raising
constitutional claims against a Governor, mayor, and corrections officials. The district court held that the
prisoner stated an Eighth Amendment claim against the warden based on his exposure to tuberculosis, where he
alleged that the warden was aware that inmates were not thoroughly screened for disease before going into the
general population and that correctional medical services did not have a policy in place to examine inmates
before placing them into the general population. (Howard R. Young Correctional Institution, Delaware)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
TRANSFER

Kinslow v. Pullara, 538 F.3d 687 (7th Cir. 2008). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action against prison officials at
the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) and the New Mexico Department of Corrections (NMDOC), and
against a private transportation company and its employees. The inmate alleged violation of his constitutional
right to adequate medical treatment during his transfer between institutions, resulting in the failure of
chemotherapy for his advanced liver disease from hepatitis C. The district court dismissed the claims against the
NMDOC, and dismissed the claimsagainst the remaining parties after settlement. The inmate appealed. The
appeals court affirmed. The court held that NMDOC officials lacked sufficient contacts with Illinois for the
exercise of personal jurisdiction. The court noted that New Mexico officials had only arranged and planned the
inmate's transfer by a handful of phone calls, but did not purposefully avail themselves of the privileges of
conducting activities in Illinois, and had not deliberately engaged in significant activities or created continuing
obligations in Illinois. The inmate’s transfer took place in October 2004. The court noted that although the
inmate’s bus trip to New Mexico could have been completed in less than 24 hours, the route that the private
transport company (TransCor) chose lasted six days. Moreover, while the Illinois and New Mexico prison
officials were all well aware of the inmate’s prescribed treatment and of how strictly it had to be followed, they
failed to establish procedures that would ensure proper medical care for the inmate during the trip. According to
the court, “During his transfer, everything that could go wrong with [the inmate’s] treatment, did.” (Illinois
Department of Corrections, New Mexico Department of Corrections, TransCor America, LLC)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
SMOKE-FREE
ENVIRONMENT

Lee v. Young, 533 F.3d 505 (7th Cir. 2008). A former state prisoner brought a pro se § 1983 action against prison
officials, alleging that the officials exhibited deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, in connection
with the prisoner's exposure to secondhand smoke that allegedly triggered his asthma. The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of the officials, and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that
the officials were not deliberately indifferent. According to the court, although the prisoner complained to
medical staff, the officials did not ignore the medical staff's advice, since no doctor ever recommended that the
prisoner be transferred to avoid exposure to the secondhand smoke. The court noted that medical professionals
concluded that the prisoner's asthma was controlled. When the prisoner requested a non-smoking cell he was
given one, his cellmate was issued a disciplinary ticket when he smoked in their non-smoking cell, and the
ventilation system was repaired when the prisoner complained. (Shawnee Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
INVOLUNTARY
TREATMENT

Levine v. Roebuck, 550 F.3d 684 (8th Cir. 2008). A state inmate brought § 1983 claims against a correctional
officer and nurses alleging that they violated his Fourth and Eighth Amendment rights by forcing him to undergo
catheterization to avoid prison discipline when he could not provide a urine sample for a random drug test. The
district court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment and the inmate appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The court held that the prison nurses' actions in attempting catheterization of the inmate were
objectively reasonable and did not violate the inmate's Eighth Amendment rights against brutality. The court
noted that the nurses were following a request from a correctional officer, and the inmate had undergone
voluntary catheterization in the past when he was unable to urinate. (Western Missouri Correctional Center)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Lindell v. Schneiter, 531 F.Supp.2d 1005 (W..D.Wis. 2008). A prison inmate brought a § 1983 action against
state prison employees, claiming violations of his Eighth and First Amendment rights. The defendants moved for
summary judgment. The court granted the motion in part and denied the motion in part. The court held that the
employees did not exhibit deliberate indifference to the medical condition of the inmate, in violation of the
Eighth Amendment, by limiting him to 2.5 hours of exposure to sunlight per week. The court found that the
inmate failed to show a health risk associated with his being forced to use unwashed outerwear when exercising.
The court ruled that summary judgment was precluded by fact issues as to whether a corrections officer directly
told the inmate that he was being denied access to a desired program because he filed complaints, whether
another officer failed to intervene when the inmate was told he was being retaliated against, and as to the
existence of direct evidence of retaliation. The court noted that there was evidence that two prison security
officers directly stated that the inmate was being placed in restricted housing and denied participation in a
desired program because he brought administrative complaints. (Wisconsin Secure Program Facility)

U.S. District Court
DELAY IN CARE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Lloyd v. Lee, 570 F.Supp.2d 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). A prisoner brought a pro se § 1983 action against prison
doctors and a mayor, alleging that the defendants denied him adequate medical care while he was incarcerated in
violation of his constitutional rights. The district court dismissed the action in part and denied the defendants’
motion for dismissal in part. The court held that the prisoner’s amended complaint sufficiently alleged a serious
deprivation, as required to state an Eighth Amendment claim, and the complaint sufficiently alleged that doctors
acted with deliberate indifference to the prisoner's serious medical needs. The court found that the doctors
alleged to have been involved only in the first few weeks of the prisoner's medical treatment could not be

29.209
XXII

charged with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The court found that a qualified immunity
defense did not shield the doctors from liability. The prisoner alleged he was denied magnetic resonance imaging
(MRI) scan for months and that, as a consequence, his shoulder injury was not properly diagnosed and his
surgery was unreasonably delayed, and that inadequate medical treatment caused a condition of urgency,
degeneration, and extreme pain, and the delayed surgery that was necessary to his recovery. The court noted that
an unconvicted detainee's rights are at least as great as those of a convicted prisoner, and district courts apply the
same “deliberate indifference” test developed under the Eighth Amendment to Fourteenth Amendment claims.
(Manhattan House of Detention and Riker's Island Corrections Building, New York)
U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE

Lockett v. Suardini, 526 F.3d 866 (6th Cir. 2008). A state prisoner sued two prison officers and two prison nurses,
alleging violations of his free speech and Eighth Amendment rights. The district court entered summary
judgment for the officers and nurses. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the
prisoner's act of calling a hearing officer a “foul and corrupted bitch” was not protected conduct. The court found
that the prison officers did not use excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment in restraining the
prisoner after he insulted a hearing officer, where the prisoner did not dispute that he was angered, bit an
officer’s hand, and verbally threatened the officers. The prisoner stated that the officers merely attempted to
shove him down stairs and “almost” broke his glasses, and the prisoner by his own account suffered at most
“minor lacerations and cuts.” According to the court, the prisoner's injuries from the altercation with the officers,
consisting of minor cuts and lacerations, did not create an objectively serious medical need, and any denial of
medical treatment thus did not violate his Eighth Amendment rights. (Alger Maximum Correctional Facility,
Michigan)

U.S. District Court
HANDICAP
RA- Rehabilitation Act
RESTRAINTS
TRANSPORTATION
WHEELCHAIR

Miller v. Johnson, 541 F.Supp.2d 799 (E.D.Va. 2008). A state prisoner brought an action against a state department of corrections and warden, seeking damages under the Rehabilitation Act. The inmate suffered from
Guillain-Barre syndrome, a paralyzing neurological disorder that caused nerve damage in his feet and ankles. As
a consequence of his disease, the inmate was unable to bend his left foot at the ankle and was able to walk only
with great difficulty. He was able to climb stairs only while holding handrails in order to steady himself.
According to the court, the inmate was a qualified person with a disability within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act. The inmate alleged that officials refused to provide needed accommodations, including the use of
a cane and a wheelchair, use of elevators, and transport without cuffing his hands to a waist chain. The district
court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The district court held that by accepting federal funding, the
department waived sovereign immunity as a bar to the prisoner's action. (Greensville Correctional Center,
Virginia)

U.S. Appeals Court
DENIAL
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE

Moore ex rel. Estate of Grady v. Tuelja, 546 F.3d 423 (7th Cir. 2008). Administrators of an arrestee's estate filed
a § 1983 action alleging that police officers and jail personnel deprived the arrestee of his rights under the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments by using excessive force and denying him medical care. The district court entered
judgment on a jury verdict in the defendants' favor and denied the administrators' motions for judgment as a
matter of law and for a new trial. The administrators appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that
there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's findings. A physician had testified that the nature of the
arrestee's injuries indicated that he had most likely been beaten with a baton by jail personnel. But all medical
experts agreed that the arrestee suffered from advanced heart disease and died of a heart attack, the arrestee had
been in two automobile accidents on the date of his death and had suffered a hand laceration immediately after
the second accident, and there was evidence that the arrestee's wrist injuries occurred in an accident or while he
was being transported to jail, and that his head injuries occurred when he fell to the floor after a heart attack.
(Chicago Police Department, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Murphy v. Gilman, 551 F.Supp.2d 677 (W.D.Mich. 2008). A civil rights action was brought against state prison
officials, raising claims arising from the death of a prisoner, who died from dehydration after a four-day period
during which he received no medical care and little water and food. A jury found that certain defendants were
deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's serious medical needs, the defendants were grossly negligent, and one
defendant was liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The jury awarded $250,000 in actual
damages, and $2,500,000 in punitive damages. The defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law, and to
stay enforcement of the judgment. The plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial. The district court denied the
motions, finding that evidence supported the finding that an official knew of the obvious risks to the prisoner.
The court held that punitive damages of $1,250,000 per prison official defendant was not constitutionally
excessive for the dehydration death of a physically vulnerable prisoner, who was trapped without physical
necessities or medical care for five days during a heat wave and who was awarded $250,000 in actual damages.
The court noted that evidence established that prison officials kept the prisoner's water turned off, knew that the
prisoner was not drinking, and knew the prison was on a heat alert. (Bellamy Creek Corr’l Facility, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
DELAY IN CARE

Myrie v. Calvo/Calvoba, 591 F.Supp.2d 620 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). A pretrial detainee brought a pro se § 1983 action
alleging jail medical personnel violated his Eighth Amendment right to adequate medical care. The medical
personnel filed a pre-answer motion to dismiss the complaint. The district court granted the motion. The court
held that the detainee's claim that deprivation of his eyeglasses caused significant eye deterioration constituted a
serious deprivation of medical needs, but the allegation that a jail physician neglected to take care of his vision
problem in a sufficiently prompt manner did not sufficiently allege the physician was deliberately indifferent to
the detainee's serious medical needs. According to the court, allegations that jail medical personnel's delay in
locating his medical file, and the resulting cancellation of his appointment with a physician, delayed or denied
his access to medical treatment in violation of Due Process failed to state a claim. (Otis Bantum Correctional
Center, New York)

29.210
XXII

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
INADEQUATE CARE

Petrig v. Folz, 581 F.Supp.2d 1013 (S.D.Ind. 2008). An inmate filed a § 1983 action in state court alleging that
county jail officials failed to protect him from an assault by his cellmate and were deliberately indifferent to his
serious medical needs. The case was removed to federal court and the district court granted summary judgment
for the sheriff, in part. The court held that the sheriff was not liable under § 1983 in his individual capacity for
failing to provide proper medical care after the inmate was assaulted by his cellmate, where the sheriff was not
personally involved in any wrongful conduct, and was not personally responsible for the inmate's care after the
attack. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether
reasonable jail officials should have realized that the inmate, who was suffering from a lacerated spleen, had an
objectively serious medical need, and whether a 21-hour delay in having a physician evaluate and treat the
inmate was reasonable. The court found that the county jail's failure to maintain medical staff on-site and
available to examine the injured inmate for more than an entire day, and its failure to immediately transport the
inmate, who was in obvious distress, to a hospital, were sufficiently indicative of a possible custom, policy, or
practice that contributed to the inmate's injury, precluding summary judgment. (Posey County Jail, Indiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
EMERGENCY CARE
MALPRACTICE

Phillips v. Roane County, Tenn., 534 F.3d 531 (6th Cir. 2008). A representative of the estate of a pretrial detainee
who died in a county jail of untreated diabetes brought an action against correctional officers, a jail doctor, and
paramedics, alleging deliberate indifference to the detainee's serious medical condition under § 1983 and
asserting state law medical malpractice claims. The district court denied the defendants' motion for summary
judgment and the defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The
court found that the detainee had a sufficiently serious medical condition, as required to prevail in a § 1983
deliberate indifference claim against jail officers and others, under the Due Process Clause. The court noted that
at one point the detainee was found unconscious in her cell without a pulse, and for approximately two weeks
after that incident, the detainee complained to officers and a doctor about chest pains, numbness, dizziness,
vomiting, nausea, constipation, and a possible kidney infection. The court held that the alleged conduct of the
correctional officers in observing and being aware of the detainee's serious medical condition, which included
signs of nausea, vomiting blood, swelling, lethargy, and chest pains, and in allegedly disregarding jail protocols,
which required the officers to transport the detainee to a hospital emergency room for evaluation upon
complaints of chest pain, amounted to deliberate indifference to the detainee's serious medical condition, in
violation of the detainee’s due process rights. The court found that the paramedic's conduct in allegedly
disregarding a jail protocol which required the paramedic to transport detainees to a hospital emergency room
when they complained of chest pains, by failing to transport the detainee upon responding to an incident in
which the detainee allegedly lost consciousness, had no pulse, and complained of chest pain and nausea after she
regained consciousness, amounted to deliberate indifference to the detainee's serious medical condition, in
violation of her due process rights. The court found that county officials were not liable under § 1983 for their
alleged failure to properly train jail officers as to the proper protocols for obtaining medical treatment for the
detainee, absent a showing that any individual official encouraged, authorized, or knowingly acquiesced to the
officers' alleged deliberate indifference. The court found that the alleged conduct of a county jail doctor in being
aware of the detainee's serious medical condition, which included signs of nausea, vomiting blood, swelling,
lethargy, and chest pains, but failing to conduct more than a cursory examination, and in allegedly disregarding
jail protocols, amounted to deliberate indifference to the detainee's serious medical condition, in violation of the
detainee's due process rights. Because the detainee had a clearly established right under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to receive medical treatment to address serious medical needs, the court found that
jail officials were not entitled to qualified immunity for their alleged conduct in failing to provide the diabetic
detainee with medical treatment. (Roane County Jail, Tennessee)

U.S. Appeals Court
INADEQUATE CARE
RECORDS
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Popoalii v. Correctional Medical Services, 512 F.3d 488 (8th Cir. 2008). A state prisoner brought a § 1983
action against multiple staff members of the state department of corrections (DOC) alleging deliberate
indifference to her serious medical conditions. The district court struck the prisoner's expert affidavit and granted
summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held
that DOC staff members were not deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's serious medical condition of
cryptococcal meningitis, which resulted in her eventual blindness, as required to prevail in a § 1983 Eighth
Amendment claim. According to the court, the prisoner had none of the normal signs or risk factors of
cryptococcal meningitis. The court noted that although the staff probably should have been more vigilant in
obtaining the prisoner's medical records, which would have disclosed her condition, there was no showing that
they knew of the prisoner's condition. (Women's Eastern Reception Diagnostic and Corr’l Center, Missouri)

U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
INADEQUATE CARE

Porterfield v. Durst, 589 F.Supp.2d 523 (D.Del. 2008). An inmate brought an action against prison physicians
and a correctional medical service, alleging Eighth Amendment violations following the amputation of his
finger. The finger had been injured when the tray slot door to his cell was slammed shut by a correctional officer.
The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment in part and denied
in part. The court held that the inmate failed to establish that the physicians' conduct contributed to his injury
because the physicians' administration of a particular antibiotic and prescription of post-surgery physical therapy
fell within the ambit of their discretionary medical judgment. The court held that summary judgment was
precluded by genuine issues of material fact regarding whether a correctional medical service was deliberately
indifferent to the inmate's serious medical needs. (Corr’l Medical Services, Inc., Delaware Dept. of Correction)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE

Potter v. Ledesma, 541 F.Supp.2d 463 (D.Puerto Rico 2008). A federal inmate filed an action to recover
damages he suffered when prison officials failed to provide medical treatment after a cell door closed on his
finger. The district court granted the officials’ motion to dismiss in part and denied in part. The court held that
the Federal Tort Claims Act's (FTCA) exclusivity provision did not bar the inmate's Eighth Amendment claim.
According to the court, the inmate's allegation that he was entitled to money damages due to prison officials'
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs after a cell door closed on his finger raised a cognizable
claim for violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. (Puerto Rico)

29.211
XXII

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
NEGLIGENCE

Presley v. City of Blackshear, 650 F.Supp.2d 1307 (S.D.Ga. 2008). A mother brought an action against a city
police officer and a county paramedic, arising out of her son's death while detained in a county jail after his
arrest. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court held that the arresting
officer was not deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of the detainee who died of an apparent drug
overdose after being arrested on drug charges and placed into custody at a county jail, absent evidence that the
arresting officer actually saw the detainee swallow any drugs that allegedly led to his death. The court held that
the county paramedic who responded to the jail was not deliberately indifferent despite any alleged negligence in
the paramedic's original diagnosis. The court noted that the paramedic promptly responded to both calls from
county jail concerning the detainee, and, each time, examined the detainee to determine whether further medical
treatment was needed. According to the court, the paramedic's alleged bad judgment and negligence in caring for
the pretrial detainee who died of an apparent drug overdose, was insufficient to show a lack of good faith for the
purposes of statutory immunity from negligence or malpractice liability under Georgia law. (City of Blackshear
and Pierce County Jail, Georgia)

U.S. District Court
PRIVACY

Ringgold v. Lamby, 565 F.Supp.2d 549 (D.Del. 2008). An inmate filed a § 1983 action against a correctional
officer, alleging deliberate indifference amounting to cruel and unusual punishment based on the officer's alleged
refusal to let him leave his cell early to serve food and the officer's alleged discussion of his hygiene and HIV
status with another prisoner. The district court granted the officer‘s motion for summary judgment. The court
held that the officer's alleged discussion of the prisoner's hygiene and HIV status with another prisoner was only
verbal harassment and therefore could not be cruel and unusual punishment. The court noted that the inmate's
right to privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited the officer from making any statements to another
prisoner about the inmate's hygiene and HIV status, and the statements did not involve correctional goals or
institutional security. The court found that the officer's refusal to allow the inmate to leave his cell to serve a
meal as a prison food worker was a good faith error and not cruel and unusual punishment, where the officer
thought that the inmate worked on a different crew. (Howard R. Young Correctional Institution, Rhode Island)

U.S. Appeals Court
ABORTION

Roe v. Crawford, 514 F.3d 789 (8th Cir. 2008). An inmate brought a class action against corrections officials
challenging the Missouri Department of Corrections (MDC) policy prohibiting transportation of pregnant
inmates off-site for elective, non-therapeutic abortions. The district court determined that the MDC policy was
unconstitutional and entered judgment for the inmate. Corrections officials appealed. The appeals court affirmed.
The court held that the MDC policy could not withstand scrutiny under Turner. The court noted that even if the
MDC policy rationally advanced the prison's legitimate security interests, the policy acted as a complete bar to
elective abortions. The prison policy allowed transportation “outcounts” to outside facilities only for medically
necessary therapeutic abortions due to a threat to the mother's life or health. According to the court, obtaining an
abortion prior to incarceration was not a valid alternative means of exercising the right. According to the court,
the MDC policy did not reduce the overall number of outcounts and so did not reduce any strain on financial or
staff resources, and ready alternatives to the MDC policy existed including reverting to the previous policy of
allowing outcounts for elective abortions. (Missouri Department of Corrections, Women's Eastern Reception,
Diagnostic and Correctional Center)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
INADEQUATE CARE
MEDICATION

Sanderson v. Buchanon, 568 F.Supp.2d 217 (D.Conn. 2008). An inmate brought a § 1983 suit against
corrections officials, alleging that he was provided constitutionally inadequate medical care. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court held that there was no deliberate indifference to
the serious medical needs of the inmate regarding his stomach pain, thus defeating his § 1983 claim asserting an
Eighth Amendment violation. According to the court, even assuming that the inmate did have an ulcer, all that
could be drawn from the facts was that prison staff unadvisedly gave him an over-the-counter drug used to treat
minor digestive system upset and that his symptoms continued for several more days. (Carl Robinson
Correctional Institution, Connecticut)

U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
DELAY IN TREATMENT
MEDICATION

Sauve v. Lamberti, 597 F.Supp.2d 1312 (S.D.Fla. 2008). A former prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a
sheriff and correctional health services corporation, alleging that the defendants denied the prisoner access to
medications while he was incarcerated. The district court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to the extent that a
doctor employed by the corporation with which the county contracted for correctional health care services was
aware of the prisoner's history of drug problems, mental health issues, and prior noncompliance with treatment at
the time of his decision not to place the prisoner on medication. The court also found genuine issues of material
fact as to whether the decision not to place the prisoner on medication for the first 49 days of his incarceration
was based on the medical judgment of the doctor. The court held that summary judgment was also precluded by
genuine issues of material fact as to whether the corporation had a practice or policy that resulted in the prisoner
being denied medication for 49 days during his incarceration. The court ruled that the sheriff failed to establish
an entitlement to summary judgment, even though the former prisoner presented evidence only as to the private
corporation with which the county contracted for correctional health care services because the county remained
liable for constitutional deprivations caused by policies or customs of the corporation. (Broward County Jail,
Florida, and Armor Correctional Health Services)

U.S. District Court
ADA-Americans with
Disabilities Act
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE

Shaw v. TDCJ-CID, 540 F.Supp.2d 834 (S.D.Tex. 2008). A legally blind state inmate brought an action alleging
that prison officials failed to remedy unsafe conditions in handicapped showers, in violation of his constitutional
rights, Title II of Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act (RA), and the Texas Tort
Claims Act (TTCA). The inmate also alleged that prison medical officials were deliberately indifferent to his
serious medical needs. The district court granted summary judgment for the officials. The court held that prison
officials did not discriminate against the legally blind inmate as the result of their alleged failure to remedy
unsafe conditions in the prison's handicapped showers, and thus the officials were not liable under Title II of
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) for injuries the inmate sustained in a slip and fall accident. The court

29.212
XXII

found that prison officials were not deliberately indifferent to the inmate's serious medical needs, in violation of
the Eighth Amendment, as a result of their failure to remedy unsafe slippery conditions in the prison's
handicapped showers, absent a showing that the officials were aware of and deliberately ignored an excessive
risk. According to the court, prison medical officials were not deliberately indifferent to the inmate's broken
hand, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, despite the inmate's contention that their failure to operate resulted
in excessive pain and disfigurement. The court noted that a physician saw the inmate the morning after he
reported the accident, X-rays indicated that the fracture would heal properly without surgery, the physician
properly diagnosed the injury and prescribed pain medication, a brace, and a bandage, and the inmate received
physical therapy to help restore motion and strength. (Estelle Unit, Texas Department of Criminal JusticeCorrectional Institutions Division)
U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
DENIAL
MEDICATION

Smith v. County of Los Angeles, 535 F.Supp.2d 1033 (C.D.Cal. 2008). The estate of a deceased county jail
inmate brought a § 1983 action against a county and officials, claiming violation of the inmate's Fourth, Fifth,
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, arising out of denial of the inmate's request for an asthma inhalator.
The district court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court held that the Eleventh Amendment
immunity of state officials did not apply to the county sheriff. The court found that the estate stated a claim that
the county was liable when the inmate died allegedly because he was denied an asthma inhalator. The court held
that the allegation that the county “promulgated, created, maintained, ratified, condoned, and enforced a series of
policies, procedures, customs and practices which authorized the arbitrary punishment and infliction of pain,
torture, and physical abuse of certain inmates and detainees” was sufficient to state a claim. The court found that
the estate stated a claim that officials violated the Eighth Amendment by showing deliberate indifference to his
medical condition, through allegations that they ignored the inmate's plea to be furnished with his asthma
inhalator. (Los Angeles County Men's Central Jail, California)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
MEDICATION
MENTAL HEALTH

Swift v. Tweddell, 582 F.Supp.2d 437 (W.D.N.Y. 2008). An inmate brought a pro se § 1983 action against a
sheriff, deputies, and jail employees. The district court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
The court found that the jail employees were not deliberately indifferent to the inmate's serious medical needs, in
violation of the Eighth Amendment, in connection with a delay in prescribing the inmate's “mental health”
medications. The court noted that on the day that the inmate submitted a request for mental health clinic services,
the jail nurse referred the request to the county Mental Health Department (MHD) pursuant to standard practice
at the jail, but because the inmate did not appear to be an emergency case and because he made no further
requests for mental health services, he was not seen by a psychiatrist from MHD for more than two months. He
was prescribed Prozac but did not, according to the court, suffer serious adverse effects as a result of the
temporary gap between his request for mental health care and his psychiatric examination. (Steuben County Jail,
New York)

U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
MENTAL HEALTH
SUICIDE

Tatsch-Corbin v. Feathers, 561 F.Supp.2d 538 (W.D.Pa. 2008). Survivors of an inmate who committed suicide
sued a jail's forensic specialist under § 1983, claiming violations of the Fourteenth Amendment's prohibition
against deprivations of life without due process. The district court denied the forensic specialist’s motion to
dismiss. The court found that the fact that the jail's forensic specialist lacked a contractual relationship with
either the jail or a health care contractor retained by the county did not preclude her from being considered a
“state actor,” as required for imposition of liability under § 1983 in connection with the inmate's suicide.
According to the court, her role was to provide mental health care to inmates, regardless of her other job
responsibilities or the contractual nuances through which she came to work at the jail, and she could not have
done so without the authorization of the state. The court found that the inmate's survivors alleged sufficient facts
to establish that the forensic specialist should have known, or did know, that the inmate presented a suicide risk
and failed to take necessary or available precautions to protect him. According to the court, alleged facts
suggested that the inmate had made various threats to kill himself, which had been taken seriously enough by jail
officials to warrant the request of an evaluation by a mental health professional, and he had a documented history
of attempted suicide and psychiatric hospitalization, of which the specialist was allegedly aware. (Blair County
Prison, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
DENIAL

Tindal v. Goord, 530 F.Supp.2d 465 (W.D.N.Y. 2008). A state prisoner brought a pro se § 1983 action against
state department of corrections employees, alleging denial of proper medical care in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs. The court held that the prisoner
received adequate medical treatment. The court noted that the prisoner received extensive treatment, including a
test for syphilis, and was diagnosed as suffering from certain ailments other than a sexually transmitted disease,
such as folliculitis and a possible bacterial infection, for which he was prescribed antibacterial and pain
medications. (New York State Department of Correctional Services)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

U.S. v. Conatser, 514 F.3d 508 (6th Cir. 2008). Jail officers were convicted in district court on charges arising
from their participation as corrections officers in a conspiracy to violate the rights of detainees and prisoners in a
county jail. The officers appealed and the appeals court affirmed. The court held that evidence was sufficient to
support the determination that one officer joined a conspiracy. Three conspirators testified that the officer was
among those second-shift officers who would accompany a second-shift supervisor into a cell or stand outside
the cell while the supervisor committed unjustified assaults on loud, obnoxious or uncooperative inmates.
According to the court, evidence indicated that the officer, on a specific occasion involving the death of an
inmate, followed the supervisor and a coconspirator as they took the inmate to a detox cell, and the officer stood
outside while the inmate was assaulted. The court found that a sentence of life imposed upon a supervising
corrections officer was reasonable, even though another officer had inflicted the injuries that ultimately killed an
inmate, given that the supervising officer’s actions in denying the inmate necessary and appropriate medical care
resulted in his death. (Wilson County Jail, Tennessee)

29.213
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U.S. Appeals Court
INVOLUNTARY
MEDICATION
PSYCHOTROPIC DRUGS

U.S. v. Green, 532 F.3d 538 (6th Cir. 2008). A pretrial detainee who had been determined to be mentally
incompetent to stand trial on narcotics trafficking indictments, appealed the order of the district court for
involuntary administration of psychotropic medications. The appeals court affirmed, finding that an important
governmental interest was at stake in the prosecution, as required to support an order for involuntary medication.
(Federal Medical Center, Rochester, New York)

U.S. District Court
INVOLUNTARY
MEDICATION
PSYCHOTROPIC DRUGS

U.S. v. Moruzin, 583 F.Supp.2d 535 (D.N.J. 2008). A defendant was indicted on charges of bank robbery and
jury tampering. The government moved for the involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication to the
defendant to render him competent to stand trial. The district court denied the motion. The court held that the
administration of medication would not significantly further the state's interests, that alternatives existed to
involuntary administration of the drug Haldol, and that involuntary administration of Haldol was not in the
defendant's best medical interest. (Federal Medical Center, Butner, North Carolina)

U.S. Appeals Court
DENIAL OF CARE

Vondrak v. City of Las Cruces, 535 F.3d 1198 (10th Cir. 2008). An arrestee filed a § 1983 action against a city
and its police officers alleging illegal arrest, excessive force, inadequate medical attention, and failure to train.
The district court granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The parties
filed cross-appeals. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, dismissed in part, and remanded. The
appeals court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the
police officers ignored the arrestee's complaints that his handcuffs were too tight, and whether the arrestee
suffered permanent nerve injury because of the handcuffing. The court noted that for purposes of determining the
police officers' qualified immunity from liability under § 1983 for use of excessive force, the arrestee's right to
be free from unduly tight handcuffing, and the contours of that right, were clearly established in 2003. The court
also found that it was clearly established that all law enforcement officials had an affirmative duty to intervene to
protect the constitutional rights of citizens from infringement by other law enforcement officers in their
presence, and thus one of the officers was not entitled to qualified immunity from liability, where the officer was
in close proximity to the initial handcuffing, and was present thereafter. The arrestee had been taken into custody
and transported to the police station, where two blood alcohol tests were administered. Both tests showed no
alcohol. He was held for another 90 minutes, during which time he made several requests for someone to loosen
his handcuffs because his wrists were hurting. All requests were ignored. Eventually, the officers charged the
arrestee with Driving While Under the Influence to the Slightest Degree, and they released him on his own
recognizance. The charge was later dropped. Following his release, the arrestee went to an emergency room. A
toxicology screening report showed no drugs or alcohol. A doctor who treated the arrestee observed “multiple
superficial abrasions and ecchymosis” on both wrists. He diagnosed the arrestee with neurapraxia in both wrists,
and a soft tissue sprain of the right wrist. The pain and discomfort in the arrestee’s wrists did not subside, and it
interfered with his ability to practice as an orthodontist and to play golf. He was diagnosed with a permanent
radial nerve injury in his wrists that was caused by the handcuffing. (Las Cruces Police Department, New
Mexico)

U.S. District Court
SMOKE

Williams v. District of Columbia, 530 F.Supp.2d 119 (D.D.C. 2008). A former inmate brought a § 1983 action
against District of Columbia and corrections officials seeking damages related to his alleged exposure to secondhand smoke while he was in jail. Defendants moved for summary judgment. The court granted summary
judgment for the defendants. The court held that a potential future injury to the former inmate arising from his
alleged exposure to environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) while he was in jail was too remote and speculative to
support standing in the inmate's § 1983 action. The court noted that the expert report submitted by the inmate
indicating a increased risk of heart disease and lung cancer for the jail population exposed to ETS during the
inmate's period of incarceration did not indicate a probability of harm to the inmate. (District of Columbia
Department of Corrections Central Detention Facility)

U.S. District Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
HEARING IMPAIRED

Williams v. Hayman, 657 F.Supp.2d 488 (D.N.J. 2008). A state prisoner brought an action for violation of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), alleging denial of various social and educational programs and services
at a prison because he was deaf, and naming as a defendant the Commissioner of the New Jersey Department of
Corrections (NJDOC), the Executive Director of the New Jersey Parole Board, the prison's chief administrator,
the prison's assistant administrator, the prison's parole administrator, a corrections officer, two social workers at
prison, and the prison's psychiatrist. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants in part and
denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the prisoner's deafness inhibited his capacity to express his grievances comprehensibly in writing in
accordance with prison grievance program's requirements. The court also found a genuine issue of material fact
as to the prison social worker's ability to interpret effectively, accurately, and impartially, both receptively and
expressively, using any necessary specialized vocabulary. (South Woods State Prison, New Jersey)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE

Zuhair v. Bush, 592 F.Supp.2d 16 (D.D.C. 2008). An alien, who had petitioned for habeas relief from his
detention in the Guantanamo Bay military facility, brought an emergency motion to compel immediate medical
relief. The district court held that the court would appoint its own medical/mental health expert to examine the
detainee and provide the court with a report and any recommendations. The court noted that evidence suggested
that the health of the petitioner was continuing to deteriorate. (United States Naval Base in Guantánamo Bay,
Cuba)

29.214
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2009
U.S. District Court
SMOKE-FREE
ENVIRONMENT

Abuhouran v. U.S., 595 F.Supp.2d 588 (E.D.Pa. 2009). A prisoner brought a negligence action against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act alleging prison officials exposed him to excessive amounts of environmental tobacco smoke (ETS). The defendants moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the
motion. The court held that the prisoner was precluded, under the discretionary function exception of the Federal
Tort Claims Act (FTCA), from challenging the warden's designation of smoking areas, as federal regulations
explicitly assigned the exercise of choice or judgment to the warden to designate areas subject to ETS. The court
noted that the stated policy considerations for implementing the “no smoking areas” in prisons was to provide a
clean air environment and to protect the health and safety of staff and inmates, suggesting the designation of
smoking areas was the kind of discretionary function the FTCA exception was meant to shield. The court held
that under Pennsylvania law, the prisoner failed to present any medical evidence or expert witnesses to establish
a causal connection between his exposure to environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) and his alleged injury, as required to prevail on his negligence claim. The court also held that the prisoner failed to present any evidence of
an actual injury. (Federal Detention Center, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
ADEQUACY OF CARE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
SMOKE-FREE
ENVIRONMENT

Adams v. Banks, 663 F.Supp.2d 485 (S.D.Miss. 2009). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against a warden and
other prison officials for exposure to unreasonable levels of secondhand smoke, or environmental tobacco smoke
(ETS), and for denial of adequate medical care. The defendants moved for summary judgment, and the inmate
moved for summary judgment on his claim against a prison nurse. The district court held that summary judgment
was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the inmate was exposed to unreasonably high
levels of environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) from cellmates who smoked in his cell and from other inmates in
the area outside his cell. The court also found fact issues as to whether the complaints made by the inmate were
sufficient for the warden and assistant supervisor to infer that ETS posed a substantial risk of serious harm to
him, such that they acted with deliberate indifference to the inmate's situation. The court found that summary
judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to the seriousness of the inmate's medical condition
as a result of exposure to environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) in his cell, as well as to the nature of a prison
nurse's responses to the inmate's three sick call request forms complaining of coughing, chest pains, nausea,
dizziness, difficulty breathing and vomiting as a result of exposure to ETS. The court held that neither the warden nor the assistant supervisor were involved in a decision to deny the inmate medical care as a result of exposure to secondhand smoke, and thus they were not deliberately indifferent to the inmate's serious medical needs
in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Wilkinson Co. Correctional Facility, Mississippi)

U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
INADEQUATE CARE

Austin v. Taylor, 604 F.Supp.2d 685 (D.Del. 2009). A state prisoner brought an action alleging a § 1983 claim
for inadequate medical care in violation of the Eighth Amendment and a state law medical negligence claim
against a medical service corporation under contract with the state to provide healthcare services at a prison. The
district court dismissed the case in part. The court held that the corporation that provided prison healthcare was
not a state actor entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity on the state prisoner's § 1983 claim. The court noted
that despite having been named in hundreds of § 1983 actions, the corporation had never been held to be an arm
of the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes. The court noted that the corporation was an autonomous actor
and was not immune from state taxation, and any judgment against the corporation would not be paid from the
state treasury. According to the court, although the corporation could not be held liable for allegedly medically
negligent acts of an employee under the theories of respondeat superior or vicarious liability, the corporation
could be directly liable for acts of the employee if the employee's acts were deemed the result of the corporation's policy or custom that was so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights that the corporation
could reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's serious medical need in violation
of the Eighth Amendment. The court noted that a “policy” of the corporation is made when a decision-maker
possessing final authority to establish a policy with respect to an allegedly violative action issues an official
proclamation, policy or edict. According to the court, the “custom” of the corporation can be proven by showing
that a given course of conduct, although not specifically endorsed or authorized by law, is so well-settled and
permanent as to virtually constitute law. (Howard R. Young Correctional Institution, Wilmington, Delaware)

U.S. District Court
DELAY OF CARE

Baker v. Wilkinson, 635 F.Supp.2d 514 (W.D.La. 2009). A Louisiana state prisoner brought a § 1983 action, in
forma pauperis, against a warden, assistant warden, prison operator, and two nurses, alleging that he was denied
adequate medical care related to hemorrhoids. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court
denied the motion. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to
whether the prisoner suffered an injury as a result of the delay in appropriate medical care, whether he was entitled to damages for emotional distress, and whether he was entitled to nominal or punitive damages. (Winn Correctional Center, Louisiana, Corrections Corporation of America)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
DENIAL
MEDICATION

Blackstock v. Corrections Corp. of America, 660 F.Supp.2d 764 (W.D.La. 2009). A state inmate brought an
action against a prison medical provider, seeking preliminary injunctions requiring that the prison provide him
prescribed medications. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the prison physician's refusal,
for no valid reason, to provide Neurontin, prescribed by an outside neurologist, constituted deliberate indifference. The court noted that the prison had specifically referred the inmate to the neurologist because the prison
physician, who was not a neurologist, needed the specialist's expertise in a serious and complicated medical case.
Neurontin was available in a generic form and was less expensive than what the prison was giving the inmate,
and Neurontin was a drug that had helped the inmate and was a successful treatment for him both before and
after his arrival at prison. According to the court, the inmate would likely suffer irreparable injury in the absence
of a preliminary injunction requiring that the prison provide him medications prescribed by the outside neurologist. (Winn Correctional Center, Louisiana)

XXIII

29.215

U.S. District Court
MALPRACTICE
NEGLIGENCE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Brace v. Massachusetts, 673 F.Supp.2d 36 (D.Mass. 2009). The administrator of a female detainee’s estate sued
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and a number of individuals having some role in providing medical services to inmates at a county correctional facility, including a clinician, asserting claims for negligence and medical malpractice, and alleging that the detainee was deprived of her constitutional rights by deliberate indifference
to her medical needs. A clinician moved to dismiss certain counts. The district court allowed the motion in part
and denied in part. The court held that dismissal of a medical malpractice claim after a medical tribunal found
that there was insufficient evidence to raise a legitimate question of liability did not preclude the deceased detainee's estate from stating a § 1983 claim against a prison clinician for deliberate indifference to the inmate's
medical needs. The court held that the deceased detainee's estate stated a § 1983 wrongful death claim against
the jail clinician for deliberate indifference to the inmate's medical needs, in violation of her Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The estate alleged that the clinician observed the detainee while she was in obvious
medical distress and took the minimal step of making a phone call to a medical unit about the detainee's condition. (Hampden County House of Correction, Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
DENTAL CARE

Brathwaite v. Correctional Medical Services, 630 F.Supp.2d 413 (D.Del. 2009). A state prison inmate brought a
§ 1983 action against a corporation that provided medical services to correctional facilities, and individual defendants including a dentist affiliated with the corporation, alleging deliberate indifference to his dental needs in
violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
The court held that denials of the inmate's requests for a root canal procedure were not deliberate indifference,
given the dentist's repeated recommendation of extraction and the inmate's refusal to consent to the extraction.
The court noted that, under the Eighth Amendment, prisoners are entitled to medical treatment, but prisoners
have no right to choose the specific form of medical treatment when the treatment provided is reasonable. (Correction Medical Services, Delaware Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
INADEQUATE CARE
POLICIES
TRAINING

Brickell v. Clinton County Prison Bd., 658 F.Supp.2d 621(M.D.Pa. 2009). A former inmate filed a § 1983 action
against a county, county prison board, and various county officials to recover for injuries she sustained while
working in a jail kitchen. The district court dismissed the case in part, and denied dismissal in part. The court
held that the sheriff was not subject to supervisory liability under § 1983 for alleged failure to obtain adequate
medical treatment for the inmate after she suffered burns while working in a jail kitchen, where the sheriff did
not participate in or have knowledge of any violations of the inmate's rights, did not direct jail employees to
commit the violations, and did not acquiesce in the employees' violations. The court found that the inmate's allegation that a county prison board failed to adopt, and the jail's warden and deputy wardens failed to implement,
policies regarding treatment of severe burns and general medical treatment was sufficient to state a claim against
the board and officials under § 1983 for violation of her Eighth Amendment right to adequate medical care,
where the inmate claimed that there was a total absence of policy concerning medical treatment for severe burns
or general medical care when prison facilities were inadequate. (Clinton County Prison Board, Clinton County
Correctional Facility, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE

Browne v. San Francisco Sheriff's Dept., 616 F.Supp.2d 975 (N.D.Cal. 2009). A former state pretrial detainee
filed a § 1983 action against nearly 50 defendants, seeking redress for alleged injuries caused by deputies and
medical staff of a sheriff's department. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. The court
held that a deputy's alleged placing of a “white tip poisonous spider” in a safety cell before moving the pretrial
detainee back into the cell, grabbing the detainee and bending his arm while he threw him out of the cell, and
putting his knee into the center of the detainee's back did not rise to the level of malicious and sadistic use of
force, as required for a Fourteenth Amendment excessive force claim. The court noted that there was no evidence that the detainee was injured or that he sought medical treatment for any injuries. (San Francisco County
Sheriff's Department, San Francisco County Jail, California)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
INADEQUATE CARE

Browning v. Pennerton, 633 F.Supp.2d 415 (E.D.Ky. 2009). A pro se federal prisoner brought an action against
prison officials, alleging that the officials violated the Eighth Amendment by deliberately failing to heed his
warning that another inmate was going to harm him and for providing inadequate medical treatment after the
inmate attacked him. The court held that the prisoner failed to allege that he personally warned prison supervisors of threats made by another inmate and his resulting fear for his safety, as required to state an Eighth
Amendment failure to protect claim against the supervisors. The court found that prison supervisors were not
physicians qualified to render medical treatment and lacked involvement in treating the prisoner's injuries, and
thus the supervisors could not be held liable for failing to provide adequate medical treatment to the prisoner
following an assault by another inmate. The court found that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether the prisoner, who had warned prison officers that he faced imminent danger
from another inmate, was incarcerated under conditions that posed a substantial risk of serious harm, and whether the officers were deliberately indifferent to that substantial risk. (U.S. Penitentiary-Big Sandy, Kentucky)

U.S. District Court
ADA-Americans with
Disabilities Act
WORK ASSIGNMENT

Burke v. North Dakota Dept. of Correction and Rehabilitation, 620 F.Supp.2d 1035 (D.N.D. 2009). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action against prison officials alleging statutory and constitutional violations, including interference with his free exercise of religion, lack of adequate medical care, retaliation for exercising his constitutional rights, failure to protect, refusal to accommodate his disability, and cruel and unusual punishment. The
district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The court held that: (1) failure to provide Hindu
worship services on Thursdays did not violate the inmate's equal protection rights; (2) the decision to reduce
Hindu worship services at the facility did not violate the Free Exercise Clause; (3) restriction of the Hindu inmate's use of camphor, kumkum, incense, and a butter lamp during worship services did not violate the Free
Exercise Clause; and (4) failure to find a qualified Hindu representative to assist the inmate in the study of his
religion did not violate the Free Exercise Clause. According to the court, the officials' requirement that the inmate work did not violate the Eighth Amendment, even though the inmate suffered from mental illness and

XXIII

29.216

hepatitis C, and the Social Security Administration had determined that he was disabled. The inmate had not
requested accommodations in his working conditions on account of his disabilities, and there was no evidence
that the inmate was being forced to work beyond his physical strength or that the jobs were endangering his life
or health. The court noted that the prison policies and procedures manual established that all inmates were expected to work, regardless of their disability status.
The court found that the inmate's purported schizoid/sociopathic personality did not substantially limit any
major life activity, and thus did not constitute a “disability” under ADA, where the inmate did not describe the
nature and severity, duration, the anticipated duration, or the long-term impact of his mental impairment. The
court held that the inmate failed to demonstrate that his mental impairment substantially limited his ability to
care for himself. Similarly, the inmate's hepatitis C did not substantially limit any major life activity, and thus
did not constitute a “disability” under ADA. (North Dakota State Penitentiary)
U.S. Appeals Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592 (7th Cir. 2009). A prisoner who allegedly suffered permanent vision impairment due to a prison's failure to treat his eye condition while he was incarcerated brought a civil rights action
against prison officials for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. The district court dismissed the
prisoner's complaint, and he appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and remanded. The court held that the
prisoner's allegations regarding a prison official's role as head of the prison's medical unit in treatment of the
prisoner's eye condition were sufficient to support his § 1983 claim against the official for deliberate indifference
to a serious medical need. Although the prisoner's complaint did not say that he ever spoke with the official or
explain how she came to know of his eye condition, it may have been possible to show through discovery that
the physicians and nurses to whom the prisoner spoke reported to the official on his condition, and that the official rather than the other members of the health unit made the decision to leave the condition untreated. The
court found that a prison complaint examiner was not deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's serious medical
need when she rejected as untimely the prisoner's grievance regarding the alleged failure of the prison's medical
staff to treat his eye condition. The court noted that the examiner was fulfilling her duty to dismiss untimely
grievances, and was not required to go beyond the duties of her job and try to help the prisoner. (Milwaukee
Secure Detention Facility, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
MEDICATION

Burton v. Lynch, 664 F.Supp.2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a prison
superintendent, corrections officers, prison nurses and a physician alleging violations of his federal constitutional
rights. A nurse, the superintendent, and the physician moved to dismiss and the district court granted the motion
in part and denied in part. The court held that the prisoner's grievance relating to his alleged beating by corrections officers, for which the prisoner sought an investigation into the beating and to be seen by a doctor, presented no ongoing situation that the prison's superintendent could remedy, such that the superintendent was not personally involved in the alleged violation of the prisoner's constitutional right. According to the court, although
the request to see a doctor referred to an ongoing situation, by the time superintendent received it the prisoner
had been seen by a doctor, and by the time superintendent answered the prisoner's appeal the prisoner had been
transferred to another prison. The court found that the prisoner's allegations that when he saw a prison doctor he
could not straighten his left arm without receiving a lot of pain from his elbow, and that the doctor refused to
examine his elbow, saying only that was “there was nothing wrong with it without touching it or x-rays,” were
sufficient to allege facts which plausibly could support a finding that the prisoner's elbow condition was sufficiently serious, as required to state a claim for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs under the
Eighth Amendment. The court found that the prisoner's allegations: (1) that a prison doctor retaliated against
him for a previous grievance he had filed against the doctor by denying medical evaluation, treatment, and adequate pain medication; (2) that all levels of the inmate grievance process determined that the doctor had, by his
own admission, prescribed the prisoner a medication to which he was allergic; (3) that the doctor failed to detect
a condition which was later determined to require surgery on the prisoner's elbow; (4) and that the doctor told the
prisoner his elbow looked fine and that his allergy to the medication was the prisoner's “problem,”' were sufficient to state a case of retaliation under the First Amendment. (Fishkill Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
MENTAL HEALTH
SUICIDE

Cabral v. County of Glenn, 624 F.Supp.2d 1184 (E.D.Cal. 2009). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action
against a city and a police officer alleging violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and claims under
California law. The city and officer filed a motion to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and
denied in part. The court held that the detainee, a psychotic and suicidal individual who collided with the wall of
a safety cell and broke his neck, failed to plead that a police officer, who extracted the detainee from his holding
cell and used a stun gun and pepper spray on him following an incident in which the detainee rubbed water from
his toilet on his body, was deliberately indifferent to the detainee's need for medical attention, as required to state
due process claim under § 1983. According to the court, the detainee failed to allege that the officer knew he was
suicidal and was not receiving medical care, or that the officer attempted to interfere with the detainee's receipt
of such medical attention. The court found that the detainee's allegations that the officer used a stun gun, a stuntype shield and pepper spray in an attempted cell extraction while the detainee was naked, unarmed and hiding
behind his toilet were sufficient to state an excessive force claim under § 1983. The court denied qualified immunity for the officer, even though the detainee had not responded to the officers' commands to come out of his
cell. The court noted that the law clearly established that police officers could not use a stun gun on a detainee
who did not pose a threat and who merely failed to comply with commands. (City of Willows Police Department, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
MISDIAGNOSIS
PRETRIAL DETAINEE

Caiozzo v. Koreman, 581 F.3d 63 (2nd Cir. 2009). The estate of a pretrial detainee who died in custody at a county jail, brought a § 1983 action against county corrections officials and medical staff, alleging deliberate indifference to the detainee's serious medical condition in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The estate appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The
appeals court held: (1) the subjective standard for analyzing a claim of deliberate indifference to medical needs
of a convicted prisoner held in state custody also applied to the pretrial detainee, overruling Liscio v. Warren and

XXIII

29.217

Benjamin v. Fraser; (2) the estate was required to prove that the defendants disregarded a risk of harm to the
detainee of which the defendants were aware; and (3) a nurse was not deliberately indifferent to the detainee's
serious medical condition of alcohol withdrawal. The court noted that the nurse incorrectly believed that the
detainee was intoxicated, and there was no evidence that the nurse actually believed that the detainee was in
danger of imminent severe alcohol withdrawal. The detainee had previously been incarcerated at the facility on
at least 27 separate occasions, and had been treated for chronic alcoholism by the facility's medical staff. (Albany
County Correctional Facility, New York)
U.S. District Court
COSTS

Campbell v. Credit Bureau Systems, Inc., 655 F.Supp.2d 732 (E.D.Ky. 2009). An inmate brought an action under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) against collection agencies, stemming from purported
charges for medical care while incarcerated. The district court granted the defendants’ motions for summary
judgment. The court held that the inmate's certified letters to collection agencies, notifying them that he disputed
the debt and requesting validation, did not entitle the inmate to protection under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) provision requiring agencies to temporarily cease collection efforts and assist debtors in understanding the source and nature of the debt, where the letters were not timely delivered. But the court held that the
collection agencies failed to establish that the inmate initiated the action in bad faith or with nefarious motive,
for the purposes of a fee request. (Federal Medical Center in Lexington, Kentucky)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
SPECIAL DIETS

Cardinal v. Metrish, 564 F.3d 794 (6th Cir. 2009). A prisoner brought an action against a warden seeking monetary damages, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief. The prisoner asserted violations of the Eighth
Amendment and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) based on the failure to
provide him with kosher food which resulted in his not eating for eight days. The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the warden. The prisoner appealed. The court held that the warden was entitled to Eleventh
Amendment immunity on the prisoner's claim seeking monetary damages for the alleged violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) for not providing him with kosher meals. According to the court, even though the state accepted federal funds for its prisons, RLUIPA did not contain a clear
indication that receipt of federal prison funds was unambiguously conditioned on a state's consent to be sued for
monetary damages. The court held that there was no evidence that the warden knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to the prisoner's health or safety, as required to support the prisoner's claim against the warden for deliberate indifference to his medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment based on failure to provide him
with kosher food. (Hiawatha Correctional Facility, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
PRETRIAL DETAINEE

Christian v. Wagner, 611 F.Supp.2d 958 (S.D.Iowa 2009). A pretrial detainee brought an action against county
jail officials and employees, seeking to recover damages for injuries he allegedly sustained as a result of his
exposure to a cleaning solvent used to clean cells. Following a jury verdict in favor of the defendants, the detainee filed a combined motion for a new trial and for judgment as a matter of law. The district court denied the
motion. The court held that the detainee's claim was properly construed as a deliberate indifference to a serious
medical need claim, not a general conditions of confinement claim. According to the court, whether the detainee
had a serious medical need to be removed from the cleaning solvent was an issue for the jury. (Johnson County
Jail, Iowa)

U.S. District Court
AIDS-Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome
CONTAGIOUS
DISEASES
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Clark v. Williams, 619 F.Supp.2d 95 (D.Del. 2009). An inmate sued state corrections officials, claiming that they
violated his Eighth Amendment rights when he was incarcerated in a cell with an inmate infected with human
immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and Hepatitis B, and by failing to provide him with medical treatment when he
contracted Hepatitis B. The district court held that the inmate had no administrative remedy, and thus, the exhaustion requirement of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) did not have to be met. The court ruled that
the issue of whether prison officials were aware that the inmate was living under conditions that exposed him to
a communicable disease that posed an unreasonable risk of serious harm to his future health was a triable fact
issue. According to the court, the medical services administrator and a physician were not deliberately indifferent
to the inmate's medical needs. (Howard R. Young Correctional Institution, Delaware)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
INADEQUATE CARE
MISDIAGNOSIS

Conseillant v. Alves, 599 F.Supp.2d 367 (W.D.N.Y. 2009). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a physician employed by the New York State Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) alleging improper or inadequate treatment, in violation of his rights under the Eighth Amendment. The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the physician. The court held that the prisoner's allegations that a nurse practitioner misdiagnosed him as suffering from hepatitis, and that the defendant physician knew of this misdiagnosis but allowed
the prisoner to think he had a deadly disease, were insufficient to demonstrate deliberate indifference. The court
noted that the prisoner’s medical treatment was not so inadequate as to amount to “cruel or unusual punishment”
prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. According to the court, the prisoner did not establish that he had a “serious medical need,” or that the physician ignored any serious medical need. The court noted that the physician
was not personally involved in any misdiagnosis, as the evidence only showed that the physician ordered followup testing, not that he told the prisoner that he had an active hepatitis infection. (New York State Department of
Correctional Services)

U.S. District Court
NEGLIGENCE

Creed v. Virginia, 596 F.Supp.2d 930 (E.D.Va. 2009). The father of a prisoner who died while in custody
brought an action in state court against the state of Virginia, a county sheriff, a prison supervisor, a prison director, and various prison employees. The father alleged that the prisoner died when he was placed in a choke hold
and stopped breathing during a medical examination before his planned transfer to a hospital for involuntary
commitment, asserting civil rights and supervisory liability claims under § 1983, as well as state law claims for
negligence, gross negligence, and willful and wanton negligence. After the case was removed to federal court the
prisoner's father and state moved to remand. The district court granted the motion. (Prince William-Manassas
Regional Adult Detention Center, Virginia)

XXIII

29.218

U.S. Appeals Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
INADEQUATE CARE
NEGLIGENCE

Dominguez v. Correctional Medical Services, 555 F.3d 543 (6th Cir. 2009). A prisoner brought an action against
a registered nurse and other defendants, asserting a state law claim of gross negligence and § 1983 claims for
alleged subjection to excessive force and inadequate medical care in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The
nurse moved for summary judgment. The district court denied summary judgment as to the § 1983 claim of inadequate medical care and the state law claim of gross negligence. The nurse appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that summary judgment was precluded due to a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the nurse acted with deliberate indifference to the prisoner's serious medical needs. The court also found
summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the nurse's conduct in
providing care for the prisoner was the proximate cause of the prisoner's injury. (Carson City Correctional Facility, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
NEGLIGENCE
SUICIDE

Edwards v. District of Columbia, 616 F.Supp.2d 112 (D.D.C. 2009). The representative of the estate of a woman
who committed suicide while being held in a District of Columbia jail brought an action against the District and
the jail's medical services contractor in the Superior Court for the District of Columbia, alleging negligence in
the provision of mental health care in ensuring that the woman was not a danger to herself. The representative
also alleged that the District and contractor failed to adequately provide a medical response upon discovering the
woman in the immediate moments after her suicide. The contractor removed the case to federal district court and
moved to dismiss. The district court held that the representative was required to exhaust administrative remedies
under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) on claims against the contractor before bringing an action under
FTCA and that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the FTCA claims and claims against the District.
(District of Columbia Jail)

U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE

Estate of Henson v. Wichita County, Tex., 652 F.Supp.2d 730 (N.D.Tex. 2009). Daughters of a pre-trial detainee,
who died from chronic obstructive pulmonary disease while being held in a county jail, brought a § 1983 action
against the county and jail physician, among others, for violation of the detainee's Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to
whether the jail physician was a supervisor, whether a policy of intimidation of jail nurses was a moving force
behind the alleged violation of the rights of the detainee, whether the physician failed to supervise nurses, and, if
so, whether his failure to supervise amounted to deliberate indifference. The court held that the jail physician
was entitled to assert a defense of qualified immunity, even though he was a contract physician. (Wichita County
Jail, Texas)

U.S. District Court
ADEQUACY OF CARE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
MENTAL HEALTH
PRIVATE PHYSICIAN
PRIVATE PROVIDER
RIGHT TO REFUSE

Estate of Rice ex rel. Rice v. Correctional Medical Services, 596 F.Supp.2d 1208 (N.D.Ind. 2009). The estate of
a prisoner who died while detained at a county jail, where he suffered from schizophrenia and various complications as the result of his refusal to take his medication and his self-imposed starvation, brought an action against
a private hospital and a physician at the hospital. The estate alleged that the physician deprived the prisoner of
his constitutional rights in violation of § 1983, and that the hospital and physician negligently failed, under state
law, to provide adequate medical care and treatment to the prisoner. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants in part. The court held that an expert's summary judgment report, in which he stated,
among other things, that the treating physician was fully aware that the deceased prisoner had been refusing
food, drink, and medications, and that she had no reason to believe that the same pattern would not subsequently
continue back in jail, was admissible. The court also found that the expert's summary judgment report that the
physician who treated the schizophrenic prisoner prior to his death showed indifference to the prisoner's serious
medical condition “by turning a blind eye to the likely outcome of a return to jail” was admissible. The court
noted that the expert was not offering a legal conclusion as to the treating physician's subjective knowledge.
The court found that the prisoner had a serious medical need, as an element of his alleged Eighth Amendment
violation. The court noted that the prisoner went to a hospital because he was not taking his medications, was not
eating, had lost 50 pounds in 13 months, and was uncommunicative. Medical records indicated that the prisoner
had severe mental problems, including schizophrenia, which posed a risk of serious damage to his future health.
The physician who treated the prisoner acknowledged the seriousness of his condition in her medical recommendation, and ten weeks after his hospital stay, the prisoner died from malnutrition. (Elkhart County Jail, Indiana)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE

Farnam v. Walker, 593 F.Supp.2d 1000 (C.D.Ill. 2009). A state prisoner who suffered from cystic fibrosis filed a
civil rights action against a prison under the Eighth Amendment alleging deliberate indifference to his serious
medical needs. The prisoner filed a motion for preliminary injunction which the district court granted. The court
noted that the risk of irreparable harm had not abated and an inference existed that at least some prison personnel
participated in, and acquiesced to, deliberate indifference to the prisoner's cystic fibrosis. According to the court,
personnel with medical training and the ability to intervene subjectively knew of the prisoner's needs and yet
disregarded them in such a way that a nominally competent professional would not have, and the prison denied
the prisoner's appointment at a cystic fibrosis center via a “corporate utilization review” for no stated reason or
explanation. (Graham Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
MEDICATION

Fleming v. Sharma, 605 F.Supp.2d 399 (N.D.N.Y. 2009). The wife of a deceased prisoner, individually and as
administratrix of the prisoner's estate, brought an action under § 1983 against a prison physician and a medical
director, alleging that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's serious medical needs in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights, and seeking loss of consortium as a result of the prisoner's death. The
district court granted summary judgment for the defendants in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the prison physician and medical
director were deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of the prisoner, who suffered from congestive
heart failure, and who died while under the defendants' care. The defendants allegedly failed to provide the prisoner with medication to stabilize his heart condition, despite the recommendations of four different physicians
that the prisoner be treated with the medication. According to the court, the prison physician and the medical

XXIII

29.219

director were not entitled to qualified immunity from the § 1983 claim brought by the wife where the very nature
of the action called into question the reasonableness of the defendants' decision not to administer medication.
(Mohawk Correctional Facility, New York)
U.S. District Court
ADA-Americans with
Disabilities Act
MEDICATIONS

Flynn v. Doyle, 630 F.Supp.2d 987 (E.D.Wis. 2009). Prisoners at a state correctional institution brought a class
action against a governor and other defendants, alleging that medical and mental health care provided to them at
the institution violated the Eighth Amendment and Title II of Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The prisoners moved for a preliminary injunction and the district court granted the motion. The court found that the class
of prisoners was reasonably likely to succeed at trial on the merits of its Eighth Amendment claims against a
governor, institution and other defendants alleging that continued use of correctional officers to distribute medications at the institution posed a substantial risk of serious harm to members of the class. According to the court,
the defendants knew of the risk but failed to take reasonable steps to abate it. (Taycheedah Correctional Institution, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
EQUAL PROTECTION
INADEQUATE CARE
RA- Rehabilitation Act
STAFF

Flynn v. Doyle, 672 F.Supp.2d 858 (E.D.Wis. 2009). Female inmates filed a class action alleging that medical,
dental, and mental health care provided to prisoners at a state facility violated the Eighth Amendment, Equal
Protection Clause, Title II of Americans with Disabilities Act, and Rehabilitation Act. The officials moved for
partial summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that
summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether there were systemic and
gross deficiencies in staffing, facilities, and procedures at the state correctional facility that resulted in provision
of inadequate medical care for female inmates. The court also found that summary judgment was precluded on
the inmates' claim that the state violated Title II of ADA by failing to provide access to programs to inmates with
mobility, visual, and hearing disabilities. The court found a genuine issue of material fact as to the effectiveness
of accommodations offered to disabled inmates at a state correctional facility. The court found that the female
inmates' allegation that the state provided inpatient mental health services for male inmates, but not for female
inmates, was sufficient to state claim against the state under the Equal Protection Clause, despite the state's contention that the disparity was natural outgrowth of the historically small number of female inmates in the state.
(Taycheedah Correctional Institution, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
INTAKE SCREENING
MENTAL HEALTH
PRETRIAL DETAINEE
PRIVATE PHYSICIAN
RECORDS
SUICIDE

Francis ex rel. Estate of Francis v. Northumberland County, 636 F.Supp.2d 368 (M.D.Pa. 2009). The administrator of the estate of a detainee who committed suicide while in a county prison brought an action against the
county and prison officials, asserting claims for Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment reckless indifference and
Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment under § 1983. The administrator also alleged wrongful death
under state law. The county defendants brought third-party claims against a psychiatrist who evaluated the detainee, and the psychiatrist counter-claimed. The county defendants and psychiatrist moved separately for summary judgment. The court held that the County, which paid $360,000 in exchange for a release of claims brought
by the estate of the detainee, would be entitled to indemnity on third-party claims against the psychiatrist who
evaluated the detainee if a jury determined that the psychiatrist was at fault in the detainee's suicide. The court
held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to: (1) whether the evaluating
psychiatrist knew the pretrial detainee was a suicide risk and failed to take necessary and available precautions to
prevent the detainee's suicide as would show deliberate indifference to the detainee's medical needs; (2) whether
the evaluating psychiatrist was an employee of the county prison entitled to immunity under the Pennsylvania
Political Subdivision Tort Claim Act (PSTCA) or was an independent contractor excluded from such immunity;
(3) whether the evaluating psychiatrist's failure to appropriately document the pretrial detainee's medical records
led to the detainee's removal from a suicide watch; (4) whether the recordation of the pretrial detainee's suicide
watch level was customary, precluding summary judgment as to whether the evaluating psychiatrist had a duty to
record this information; (5) whether the evaluating psychiatrist's failure to communicate the appropriate suicide
watch level to county prison officials resulted in the pretrial detainee's suicide; and (6) whether the evaluating
psychiatrist communicated the appropriate suicide watch level for the pretrial detainee to county prison officials
and whether the psychiatrist was required to record the watch level in the detainee's medical records.
The court found that the county prison had an effective suicide policy in place and thus the psychiatrist who
evaluated the pretrial detainee had no viable Fourteenth Amendment inadequate medical care and failure to train
counterclaims under § 1983 against the county. According to the court, while at least one individual at the prison
may have failed to carry out protocols for the diagnosis and care of suicidal detainees, the policy would have
been effective if properly followed as was customary at the prison.
The court held that the county prison warden adequately trained subordinates with regard to protocols for
the care and supervision of suicidal inmates and adequately supervised execution of these protocols, and thus the
psychiatrist who evaluated the pretrial detainee had no viable counterclaim under § 1983 against the warden for
failure to adequately train or supervise under the Fourteenth Amendment. (Northumberland County Prison,
Pennsylvania)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELAY IN TREATMENT
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
MEDICATION

Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318 (3rd Cir. 2009). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action against correctional officers
and others, alleging excessive force and deliberate indifference to his medical needs. The district court entered
summary judgment in favor of some officers, and entered judgment in favor of the remaining defendants. The
inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded. The appeals court held that
summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the inmate had ceased resisting before correctional officers kicked or “kneed” him in the side. According to the court, an administrative
assault determination and a state court no contest plea for the inmate's hitting of a correctional officer, before he
was wrestled to the ground, did not provide a blank check justification for the correctional officers' excessive use
of force thereafter. The court held that the district court's determination that correctional officers did not act with
deliberate indifference to the inmate's serious needs when they denied his request for pain medication and administered pepper spray to subdue the inmate after he became agitated was not a clear error. The court noted that

XXIII

29.220

the inmate was in an infirmary, had suffered a broken rib and a punctured lung, and was at risk of death as the
result of a delay in diagnosis and transfer to a hospital. The officer checked with the nurse on duty and found that
no medication was prescribed, the inmate ignored repeated requests to calm down and continued shouting and
hitting and shaking a door late at night, and the officers administered a single spray of pepper spray. (Sussex
Correctional Institution, Delaware)
U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
EQUAL PROTECTION

Goodson v. Willard Drug Treatment Campus, 615 F.Supp.2d 100 (W.D.N.Y. 2009). A state prisoner filed a pro
se § 1983 action against prison officials and a prison's drug treatment facility, claiming violation of his rights
under the Eighth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause. The district court granted summary judgment for
the defendants. The court held that the prison's assignment of the prisoner to a top bunk from which he fell and
was injured while confined in the prison's drug treatment facility, where he was sent for medical reasons relating
to a herniated disc in his lower back, did not deprive the prisoner of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from
cruel and unusual punishment. The court noted that the prisoner did not have a serious medical need for a lower
bunk, and the prison did not make the top bunk assignment in deliberate indifference to the prisoner's medical
needs. (Willard Drug Treatment Campus, New York State Department of Correctional Services)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Griffin v. Arpaio, 557 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2009). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action against a county sheriff
and others, alleging cruel and unusual punishment and unsafe living conditions based on their failure to assign
him a lower bunk for medical reasons. The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The district court granted the motion and the inmate
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. Although the court found that a prison grievance need only alert the prison
to the nature of the wrong for which redress is sought and the inmate's failure to grieve deliberate indifference to
his serious medical needs did not invalidate his exhaustion attempt, the inmate did not properly exhaust administrative remedies under PLRA. The court held that the inmate's grievance regarding his need for a lower bunk
assignment did not provide sufficient notice of the staff's alleged disregard of his lower bunk assignments to
allow officials to take appropriate responsive measures, as required to properly exhaust administrative remedies
under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) before he brought a § 1983 action. The officials responding to
the inmate's grievance reasonably concluded that a nurse's order for a lower bunk assignment solved the inmate's
problem. (Maricopa County Sheriff, Arizona)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONTAGIOUS DISEASE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Hagan v. Rogers, 570 F.3d 146 (3rd Cir. 2009). Fourteen state prisoners jointly filed a single § 1983 complaint,
on behalf of themselves and a purported class, claiming violation of their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights by prison officials' purported deliberate indifference to the exposure of prisoners to an outbreak of a serious and contagious skin condition, allegedly scabies. The prisoners sought class certification, requested to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), and sought appointment of counsel. The district court denied joinder (combining actions), dismissed with leave to amend for all except one prisoner, and denied class certification. The prisoners appealed. The appeals court reversed in part, vacated in part,
and remanded. The appeals court held that: (1) IFP prisoners were not barred from joinder by PLRA; (2) each
joined prisoner was required to pay the full individual filing fee; and (3) the typicality and commonality requirements were satisfied for class certification. The court noted that prisoners proceeding in forma pauperis
(IFP) remained within the definition of “persons” under the permissive joinder rule, and thus, the prisoners were
not categorically barred from joinder in their civil rights action, despite concerns that joinder would undermine
PLRA by permitting split fees or avoiding the three-strike rule that limited IFP status. (Adult Diagnostic and
Treatment Center, New Jersey)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE

Hamilton v. Lajoie, 660 F.Supp.2d 261 (D.Conn. 2009). An inmate filed a pro se § 1983 action against the State
of Connecticut, a warden, and correctional officers, seeking compensatory and punitive damages for head trauma, abrasions to his ear and shoulder, and post-traumatic stress due to an officers' alleged use of unconstitutionally excessive force during a prison altercation. The inmate also alleged inadequate supervision, negligence, and
willful misconduct. The court held that the inmate's factual allegations against correctional officers, in their individual capacities, were sufficient for a claim of excessive force in violation of the inmate's Eighth Amendment
rights. The officers allegedly pinned the inmate to the ground near his cell, following an inspection for contraband, and purportedly sprayed the inmate in the face with a chemical agent despite his complaints that he had
asthma. The court found that the inmate's allegations against the warden in his individual capacity were sufficient for a claim of supervisory liability, under § 1983, based on the warden's specific conduct before and after
the altercation between the inmate and correctional officers. The inmate alleged that the warden was responsible
for policies that led to his injuries and for procedures followed by medical staff following the incident, and the
warden failed to properly train officers, to adequately supervise medical staff, to review video evidence of the
incident, and to order outside medical treatment of the inmate's injuries even though a correctional officer received prompt medical care at an outside hospital for his head injury sustained in the altercation. (CorriganRadgowski Correctional Center, Connecticut)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
EQUAL PROTECTION
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE

Harris v. City of Circleville, 583 F.3d 356 (6th Cir. 2009). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against a
city and police officers, alleging that he was subjected to excessive force and inadequate medical care, and discriminated against on account of his race, while being booked at a jail. The district court denied the defendants'
motion for summary judgment and the defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held
that summary judgment was precluded by fact issues on the excessive force claim, the deliberate indifference
claim, and the equal protection claim. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of
material fact as to whether police officers' use of force against the detainee, in yanking at the detainee's necklace
and kicking his leg out from under him causing the detainee to fall and hit his head, in using a takedown maneuver to get the detainee down on the floor in a booking area, and in kicking the detainee in the ribs, was objectively reasonable or shocked the conscience. According to the court, summary judgment was precluded by a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether the detainee had a serious need for medical care that was so obvious that even

XXIII

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a layperson would easily recognize the need for a doctor's attention, following the police officers' exercise of
force against him. The court also held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact
as to whether police officers used excessive force and delayed medical treatment of the detainee on account of
his African-American race. (Circleville City Jail, Ohio)
U.S. District Court
CHILDREN
DELAY IN CARE
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
FEMALE PRISONERS

Havard v. Puntuer, 600 F.Supp.2d 845 (E.D.Mich.,2009). The guardian of a minor child, who was born in a
county jail while her mother was incarcerated there, brought a § 1983 action against jail employees for injuries
sustained during and immediately after the birthing process. The district court denied the employees’ motion to
dismiss. The court held that the minor child was a “person” within the Fourteenth Amendment at the time of her
§ 1983 claims against jail employees, for injuries allegedly sustained as a result of alleged unconstitutional conduct during and immediately after the birthing process. The child was allegedly injured by the employees' failure
to provide medical attention to the mother in violation of the child's due process rights, such that the child was
not in a hospital at the time of her birth, the physicians and the facilities of the hospital were not available to
resuscitate her when she was born, and she was not resuscitated until she arrived at the hospital following
transport from the jail, at which time she had no respiration or heartbeat. The court found that deputies and a
nurse at the county jail were not entitled to qualified immunity from the § 1983 action brought on behalf of the
minor child, where the constitutional duty to care for helpless infants who have newly come into the world, including the duty to care for them by anticipation, during the birthing process, was clearly established at the time
of the birth. The court noted that the defendants allegedly left the mother in her cell for two hours even though
they were aware that she was in active labor, crying out for help, and that, once called, paramedics did not arrive
until the child was being delivered and did not have the equipment to resuscitate the child when she was delivered. (Wayne County Jail, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
EYE CARE
PRIVATE PROVIDER

Hinton v. Corrections Corp. of America, 624 F.Supp.2d 45 (D.D.C. 2009). An inmate, acting pro se and in forma
pauperis, brought a § 1983 action against a private corporation that operated the treatment facility where the
inmate was held in custody, alleging the facility failed to provide prescription eyeglasses in violation of the
Eighth Amendment. The district court dismissed the case. The court held that the inmate's allegations were insufficient to state a § 1983 claim for an Eighth Amendment violation. According to the court, the corporation had
no duty to provide eye glasses, eye care, or eye treatment, as the corporation's contract with the government did
not stipulate that the corporation was to provide eye care, and a separate entity, other than the corporation, was
under contract to provide eye care to inmates at the facility. (Central Treatment Facility, District of Columbia,
operated by Corrections Corporation of America)

U.S. Appeals Court
MALPRACTICE
MEDICATION
MENTAL HEALTH
PRIVACY
SUICIDE

Hunter v. Amin, 583 F.3d 486 (7th Cir. 2009). The sister of a pretrial detainee who committed suicide in a county
jail brought an action on her own behalf, and as the personal representative of the estate of her deceased brother,
against a jail psychiatrist, county sheriff, and the county, asserting claims under § 1983, as well as claims of
medical malpractice. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the sister appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The appeals court held that the county jail's policy that prevented the pretrial detainee from speaking to the jail psychiatrist without a jail officer
being present did not violate the detainee's constitutional rights, so as to serve as the basis for holding the county
liable for the detainee's death under § 1983. According to the court, the pretrial detainee had a constitutional
right to adequate mental health treatment, but there was no evidence suggesting that the detainee could not have
received adequate mental health treatment in the presence of a corrections officer. The appeals court held that
summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the jail psychiatrist committed medical malpractice by discontinuing the medication of the detainee who later committed suicide. (St. Clair
County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELAY IN CARE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
X-RAY

Jenkins v. County of Hennepin, Minn., 557 F.3d 628 (8th Cir. 2009). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against a
county, the supervisor of a jail's nursing staff, and others alleging he received constitutionally inadequate medical care while incarcerated. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the
inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court found that the supervisor of the jail's nursing staff did
not act with deliberate indifference to the inmate's serious medical condition when she determined that the inmate should be sent for an x-ray in a day or two. The inmate was unable to open his jaw completely, blow his
nose, or chew. According to the court, the decision reflected a medical judgment that the inmate's injury, though
possibly serious, was not urgent and nothing indicated that a one-day delay was detrimental to the inmate's recovery. The court held that the inmate failed to establish that any of the jail's official policies reflected deliberate
indifference to his serious medical needs, as required to support his § 1983 claim. (Hennepin County Adult Detention Center, Minnesota)

U.S. District Court
DELAY OF CARE
DENIAL

Jennings v. Hart, 602 F.Supp.2d 754 (W.D.Va. 2009). The administrator of an inmate's estate brought an action
against a sheriff and several other current or former officers in a county sheriff's department, alleging claims
under § 1983 and a state wrongful death act for one officer’s alleged wrongful denial of medical care to an inmate in the county jail. The district court denied the officers’ motion to dismiss on the grounds of sovereign
immunity. The district court held that the officers lacked the discretion to keep the inmate at the jail and deny her
the opportunity to be seen by a neurologist or other medical professional for ten days following referral by a
nurse practitioner. The officers allegedly ignored the inmate's repeated requests for help and worsening physical
condition, including severe headaches, dizziness, pressure in her head, loss of appetite, and fluid drainage in her
ears. By the time the officers contacted outside medical professionals, the inmate was suffering from brain abscesses and a stroke which lead to her death. (Culpeper County Jail, Virginia)

XXIII

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U.S. District Court
POLICIES
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Jones v. Pramstaller, 678 F.Supp.2d 609 (W.D. Mich. 2009). The personal representative for a prisoner's estate
brought a § 1983 action against prison employees and others, alleging that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's known serious medical need in violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be free of
cruel and unusual punishment. The representative also brought state law claims for gross negligence and recklessness. Several employees moved for judgment on the pleadings, or, in the alternative, for summary judgment.
The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that the personal representative
stated a claim against a prison physician by alleging that the physician should have realized the likely gravity
and urgency of the prisoner's condition when he read a report that the prisoner had lost control of his muscles,
could not walk, and had his eyes rolling back in his head involuntarily, but failed to order an immediate examination of the prisoner. The court also held that a claim was stated against the prison's coordinator of healthcare
services by alleging that the coordinator failed to investigate whether the prisoner was under a physician's care
after his symptoms and complaints indicating a grave and urgent medical condition were reported to her, and to
act promptly once she learned that he was not. According to the court, the prison's warden and deputy director
were entitled to rely on the judgment of the healthcare risk management coordinator, indicating that she had
checked on the prisoner's well-being and assuring them that his medical needs were being addressed, and, thus,
they were not liable under § 1983 for deliberate indifference to the prisoner's known serious medical need. The
court ordered further discovery to determine whether the director and coordinator failed to put in place policies
and procedures requiring that prisoner complaints, symptoms, or diagnoses of a certain type or severity be communicated to officials within a certain time period after the information became available. (Ernest Brooks Correctional Facility, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
ADA-Americans with
Disabilities Act
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
EYE CARE
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE

Kemppainen v. Aransas County Detention Center, 626 F.Supp.2d 672 (S.D.Tex. 2009). An inmate brought an
action against a county, alleging that jail personnel were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs
because they failed to provide him prescription eyeglasses in violation of the Eighth Amendment and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The county moved for summary judgment, and the inmate moved to amend
his complaint. The district court denied both motions. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by
genuine issues of material fact as to whether the county had a policy or practice of denying eye examinations and
prescription eyeglasses to indigent inmates due to funding issues, and whether that policy amounted to deliberate
indifference to the inmate's serious medical needs, in violation of Eighth Amendment. According to the court,
the inmate was not substantially limited in the major life activity of seeing, and thus was not disabled within the
meaning of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), since the inmate's sight was correctable through prescription eyeglasses. (Aransas County Detention Center, Texas)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELAY IN CARE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
WORK ASSIGNMENT

Knight v. Wiseman, 590 F.3d 458 (7th Cir. 2009). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against correctional
officers, alleging that they violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by requiring him to work despite a prior shoulder injury and delaying medical treatment following a subsequent re-injury. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of officers and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court
held that state correctional officers' conduct, in making the prisoner with a previous shoulder injury engage in
work gang duty along a highway upon arrival to the work camp, did not constitute an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to any serious medical condition involving the prisoner's shoulder injury, absent evidence
showing that the officers knew of his prior shoulder injury before he reinjured it. According to the court, even if
the correctional officers knew of the prisoner's previous shoulder injury when they made him engage in work
gang duties along the highway, such conduct did not constitute Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to the
prisoner's serious medical needs since the prisoner did not have any medical work restrictions on his record. The
court noted that as soon as the prisoner informed the officers that he was so hurt that he could not do any work at
all, the officers took the necessary steps to secure him the medical treatment to which he was entitled, which a
doctor determined to be ibuprofen and bed rest. The court held that the period of time between when the prisoner
re-injured his shoulder during work gang duty and when he received medical treatment did not constitute Eighth
Amendment deliberate indifference on the part of the correctional officers supervising the work, notwithstanding
an independent decision of a van driver to take a brief, mile-long detour on the trip back to the work camp. The
court noted that the officers could not abandon the remainder of the work gang and the severity of the injury did
not appear to call for the cancellation of the detail altogether, so they placed the prisoner on the next available
transport back to the work camp, and two and a half hours, at most, passed between the injury and the treatment.
(Vandalia Correctional Center. Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE

Krout v. Goemmer, 583 F.3d 557 (8th Cir. 2009). The administratrix of a pretrial detainee's estate brought a §
1983 action against police officers and correctional officers alleging excessive force and deprivation of medical
care. The district court denied the defendants' motions for summary judgment and the defendants appealed. The
appeals court dismissed in part, affirmed in part, and reversed in part. The appeals court held that the correctional
officers' response to the pretrial detainee's inability to walk or feel his legs and difficulty breathing was not deliberately indifferent to his medical needs under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
court noted that the detainee was closely monitored and checked by an officer every 15 minutes, the detainee did
not want medical attention, the detainee stated he was doing fine, emergency medical services (EMS) technicians
examined the detainee's neck and neuromuscular function and determined there was nothing unusual, the detainee declined to go to a hospital at least three times, and officers repositioned the detainee's neck to ease his breathing. (Pope County Detention Center, Russellville Police Department, Arkansas)

U.S. District Court
ADEQUACY OF CARE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Lewis v. Naku, 650 F.Supp.2d 1090 (E.D.Cal. 2009). An inmate brought a § 1983 suit claiming that a prison
physician was deliberately indifferent to his medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment. The physician moved for summary judgment. The district court granted
the motion. The court held that the physician was not deliberately indifferent to the inmate's medical needs when
he failed to properly diagnose the inmate's back injury. According to the court, the physician was at most, negli-

XXIII

29.223

gent in his diagnosis. The court noted that at one visit, the inmate did not inform the physician that he had back
pain, and at a subsequent visit at which the inmate's back pain was at issue, the physician examined the inmate
and determined that he was not in distress and that his lumbar spine was remarkable only for point tenderness at
the mid back, and then diagnosed the inmate with osteoarthritis and wrote him a prescription for a pain killer and
a muscle relaxant. (Salinas Valley State Prison, CSP–Solano, California)
U.S. District Court
CONTAGIOUS
DISEASES
CONTRACT SERVICES
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
QUARANTINE

Malles v. Lehigh County, 639 F.Supp.2d 566 (E.D.Pa. 2009). A prisoner, who allegedly contracted Methicillin
Resistant Staphylococcus Aureus (MRSA) while incarcerated at a county prison, brought an action under § 1983
against the county prison and the prison medical provider, alleging that the defendants unconstitutionally failed
to provide him timely, adequate medical care and to protect him from getting infected, and that the provider was
negligent under state law. The district court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The court
held that neither prison nurses' perfunctory examinations of the prisoner nor their failure to recognize the prisoner's MRSA for five days constituted deliberate indifference to the prisoner's serious medical needs. The court
found that the failure of the county prison and/or the company which contracted with the county to provide medical services to inmates at the prison to fully execute their own plans to more aggressively prevent the spread of
MRSA did not provide the basis for the prisoner's Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim in his § 1983
action. The court noted that the county and/or the company certainly could provide inmates with conditions that
exceeded the relatively low bar of the Eighth Amendment, but they were not required to do that simply because
they made plans to do so. The court held that the alleged failure of the county prison and the company which
contracted with the county to provide medical services to inmates at the prison to quarantine inmates infected
with MRSA, to properly clean and maintain shower facilities, to warn inmates about MRSA and educate them
about prevention, and generally to take more precautions against the spread of MRSA did not deprive the prisoner who allegedly contracted MRSA at the prison of life's necessities according to contemporary standard of decency, as would constitute cruel and unusual punishment under Eighth Amendment. According to the court, the
county prison and company which contracted with the county to provide medical services to inmates were not
deliberately indifferent to the risk that the prisoner would contract MRSA in prison, as would violate the Eighth
Amendment, where the prison and company engaged in some efforts to stop the spread of MRSA, even if they
did not do everything they could or planned to do. (Lehigh County, Pennsylvania, and PrimeCare Medical, Inc.)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
PRETRIAL DETAINEE

Mann v. Taser Intern., Inc., 588 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2009). The administrators of an estate, the husband, and
guardians of the children of an arrestee who died following her arrest by sheriff's deputies and her admission to a
county jail, brought an action under § 1983 and state law against the deputies and the manufacturer and distributor of the stun gun used by deputies during the arrest. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants and the plaintiffs appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the use of the stun
gun constituted reasonable force where the arrestee's behavior was violent, aggressive and prolonged, demonstrating that she was clearly a danger to herself and others, and the deputy warned the arrestee to stop her behavior and discharged his stun gun only after she refused to comply with the his orders. According to the court, the
plaintiffs failed to establish that the arrestee's death was caused by the use of a stun gun. The court noted that the
plaintiffs' own medical expert testified that, while it would have been naive of him to say that the use of the stun
gun did not contribute in some degree to the arrestee's death, he was unable to declare to a reasonable degree of
medical certainty that the arrestee would have survived but for its use.
The court held that the sheriff's deputies were not deliberately indifferent to the arrestee's serious medical
condition of “excited delirium” when they opted to take her to jail instead of to a hospital. Although one deputy
had knowledge of the arrestee's past methamphetamine use, and the arrestee's mother and another person told a
different deputy that the arrestee was sick and needed to go to the hospital, the deputies had no prior knowledge
of the medical condition called “excited delirium” or its accompanying risk of death. The court noted that the
arrestee's physical resistance and verbal communication suggested to the deputies that, although agitated, the
arrestee was not in immediate medical danger, which was an opinion shared by emergency medical personnel
called to the scene by the deputies. (Whitfield County Sheriff's Office, Georgia)

U.S. District Court
DELAY IN CARE
DENTAL CARE
SPECIAL DIETS

Marquez v. Quarterman, 652 F.Supp.2d 785 (E.D.Tex. 2009). A prisoner, proceeding pro se and in forma
pauperis, brought a § 1983 action complaining about the prison system's refusal to provide him with dentures.
The district held that the prisoner's allegations were sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment “deliberate indifference to medical needs” claim under § 1983, where the prisoner complained about an inability to chew food,
stomach cramps, gas, and spastic colon, which resulted in a loss of weight of 13 pounds since his arrival at the
prison system. According to the court, the prisoner did not state an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference
claim under § 1983 against the dental clinic, where the hygienist was not involved in the denial of dentures, but
instead referred the prisoner to dentists for screening to see if he should receive dentures. The court noted that
the hygienist was receptive to the prisoner's request and forwarded his name for consideration, as opposed to
being deliberately indifferent by automatically denying his request for dentures. The court allowed the prisoner
to proceed with his deliberate indifference claims against a food services officer, who purportedly denied him a
soft food diet, despite the prescription for it. (Polunsky Unit, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional
Division)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
INTAKE SCREENING

Martinez v. Beggs, 563 F.3d 1082 (10th Cir. 2009). A pretrial detainee's estate brought a § 1983 action against a
sheriff, deputies, and board of county commissioners alleging violations of the Fourteenth Amendment for deliberate indifference to the detainee's serious medical needs after the detainee died while in police custody. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on qualified immunity grounds. The plaintiff
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the arresting officers and custodial officers had no
reason to suspect that the detainee, who was intoxicated, posed a risk of heart attack and death, as required to
support a claim that the officers violated the Fourteenth Amendment by being deliberately indifferent to the
detainee's serious medical needs. (Cleveland County Detention Center, Oklahoma)

XXIII

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U.S. Appeals Court
ADA-Americans with
Disabilities Act
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
INADEQUATE CARE

Mason v. Correctional Medical Services, Inc., 559 F.3d 880 (8th Cir. 2009). A state prisoner brought an action
against the manager of his prison housing unit and the director of prison medical services, alleging that they
violated his Eighth Amendment rights by failing to facilitate or render adequate medical treatment. The prisoner
also brought an action against the Missouri Department of Corrections (MDOC), alleging violations of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the director
and the MDOC. Following a jury verdict in favor of the manager, the district court denied the prisoner's posttrial motion for judgment as a matter of law. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held
that there was no admissible evidence that the director of prison medical services was informed of the prisoner's
serious medical need arising from a blood clot in his left eye, and thus there was no basis for an Eighth Amendment claim against the director alleging deliberate indifference to this serious medical need. The court held that
even if the defendant knew of the prisoner's serious medical need, he is not liable under the Eighth Amendment
if he believed, albeit unsoundly, that the risk to which the facts gave rise was insubstantial or nonexistent. The
court found that recreational activities, medical services, and educational and vocational programs at state prisons are “benefits” within the meaning of the ADA, and qualified individuals with a disability are entitled to
meaningful access to such benefits. The court held that the blind prisoner was provided with meaningful access
to prison benefits, including library benefits, which required him to read and write, as required by the ADA.
According to the court, given the sufficiency of the accommodations provided, the prison was not required to
provide alternative accommodations such as Braille materials or computer software that would read written materials aloud. The prisoner was provided with an inmate reader, who was available to read to the prisoner in person and to create audio tapes of written material at the prisoner's request. The prisoner was also granted access to
audio materials by mail and to a tape recorder.
The court held that the prison did not deny the blind prisoner meaningful access to prison facility benefits, in
violation of the ADA, when it did not provide the prisoner with a trained outside assistant capable of assisting
him in his day-to-day activities. The prisoner was provided with an inmate assistant, and the court found that it
would be unduly burdensome to require the prison to furnish the prisoner with a trained handler from outside the
prison, given that such a person would not be trained in safety and security matters, and would require the escort
of a prison guard at all times. The court found that the prison did not deprive the blind prisoner of meaningful
access to the prison's exercise and recreation facilities, in violation of the ADA, where the prison provided the
inmate an assistant who walked with the prisoner, and the prisoner chose not to engage in other activities, such
as weightlifting. According to the court, the prisoner was not denied meaningful access to his prison housing
unit's ADA compliance officer, in violation of the ADA. The prisoner knew the identity of the ADA compliance
officer, the officer had answered requests that the prisoner submitted and had not refused the prisoner's requests
for assistance, and the prisoner was not entitled to a general disability assessment. (Northeast Correctional Center, Missouri)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
INADEQUATE CARE
MEDICATION
SPECIAL DIET
TREATMENT

Mastroianni v. Reilly, 602 F.Supp.2d 425 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against a sheriff
and medical personnel at a county correctional center, alleging a violation of his Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendment rights. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants in part, and denied in
part. The court held that the inmate's treatment by the jail's director of psychiatry and its mental health group did
not pose any particular risk of harm or result in actual adverse consequences to the inmate, as would constitute
deliberate indifference to serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The inmate was seen by
someone in the mental health department, including the director, on a regular basis, and when he saw the director, he examined the inmate and discussed his problems. The inmate's medications were changed during the
course of his treatment as a result of meeting with practitioners in the mental health department, and on one
occasion the inmate complained to the director about his medication being discontinued and the director reacted
appropriately and had it reinstated. The court found that jail medical staff were not deliberately indifferent to the
inmate's medical needs for the treatment of kidney stones in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Although the
inmate disagreed with the course of treatment he received, he received regular medical attention for the condition
and underwent the necessary diagnostic tests. At the onset of symptoms, the inmate filled out a sick call form
and was brought to the the medical department where he was given a urine test and instructed to drink water. He
returned to medical approximately every three days during this episode and was prescribed pain medication. He
was then given a sonogram test and passed the stone naturally without surgical intervention.
The court held that jail medical staff were not deliberately indifferent to the inmate's medical needs for treatment of a back injury sustained as a result of a fall down the dormitory stairs. Immediately following the accident, the inmate was taken to a hospital and sometime thereafter he was given a magnetic resonance imaging
(MRI) as a result of continuing back pain. The inmate was diagnosed with herniated disks following the fall.
After leaving jail, the treatment recommended by a specialist was stretching and exercise, which the inmate
indicated was helpful to the condition. According to the court, jail staff was not, in violation of the Eighth
Amendment, deliberately indifferent to a known or obvious risk that the inmate would develop diabetes from an
allegedly high starch diet, and staff was not deliberately indifferent to the inmate's medical needs when he developed diabetes while incarcerated. Prior to his incarceration, the inmate's physicians had advised him to observe a
low-salt, low-fat diet. The inmate did not recall his physicians advising him that starches and sugars could increase his blood sugar. Upon discovery of the inmate's elevated blood sugar levels, he was placed on a diabetic
diet, received daily blood glucose tests, and was prescribed diabetic medications.
The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the
jail's medical staff disregarded a serious risk of harm to the inmate in response to his repeated complaints of
worsening heart symptoms, and as to whether the jail staff's alleged failure to provide the inmate with prescribed
doses of medication for his high blood pressure, heart condition, and diabetes up to 150 times during a two-year
period caused the deterioration of the inmate's health or posed an unreasonable future risk of harm. (Nassau
County Correctional Center, New York)

XXIII

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U.S. Appeals Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
MISDIAGNOSIS

McRaven v. Sanders, 577 F.3d 974 (8th Cir. 2009). The guardian of an incapacitated detainee brought a § 1983
action on behalf of the detainee against a supervising detention facility officer, a practical nurse, and other detention facility officers, alleging deliberate indifference to the detainee's medical needs. The district court denied
qualified immunity to the defendants and they appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the
supervising officer could not have reasonably relied on the practical nurse's opinion that the detainee did not
require hospitalization and, thus, was not entitled to qualified immunity. The court noted that the officer was
aware of the cocktail of potent drugs the detainee had consumed and that circumstances strongly suggested he
did not consume the drugs in prescribed dosages, the officer was aware the detainee exhibited symptoms of extreme intoxication, and the officer knew or reasonably should have known that the practical nurse based his
assessment on the faulty assumption that the detainee was under the influence of alcohol, not drugs. The court
held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to the deputies' and sergeant's
subjective knowledge of the detainee's medical need, and the care that the nurse provided to the detainee. The
court also found that a sergeant who was trained in cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) and who made no attempt to resuscitate the detainee was not entitled to qualified immunity, since the sergeant was aware of the detainee's medical need and was capable of providing assistance, but failed to do so. (Garland County Adult Detention Center, Arkansas)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONTRACT SERVICES

Medical Development Intern. v. California Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 585 F.3d 1211 (9th Cir.
2009). A medical services provider for two California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR)
prisons brought an action in state court against CDCR and the receiver appointed by the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California to oversee the delivery of medical care to prisoners incarcerated by
the CDCR. The provider sought damages for the receiver's refusal to pay for services it provided under contract
with CDCR. After the case was removed to the district court, the court granted the receiver's motion to dismiss.
The provider appealed, but the appeal was stayed to allow the provider to seek leave from the Northern District
to sue the receiver. Subsequently, the Northern District denied the provider's request, and then denied the provider's motion for clarification. The provider appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California. The appeals court held that the
receiver was not immune in his official capacity from the claim of a medical services provider seeking damages
for the receiver's refusal to pay for services it provided under contract with CDCR. The court noted that the receiver held “all powers vested by law in the Secretary of the CDCR as they relate[d] to the administration, control, management, operation, and financing of the California prison medical health care system,” which necessarily included the power to control CDCR with regard to paying the provider. (California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation)

U.S. District Court
DELAY IN CARE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
NEGLIGENCE

Moore v. Thomas, 653 F.Supp.2d 984 (N.D.Cal. 2009). A state prisoner filed a civil rights action in California
state court against prison defendants, alleging various claims stemming from his incarceration. After removal to
federal court, the defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and
denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to
whether the alleged force was applied by a correctional officer maliciously and sadistically to cause harm to the
prisoner, or whether the officer was using the force necessary to subdue the prisoner, who was engaged in a
mutual combat with a fellow inmate and refused to follow orders that he stop fighting. The court also found a
fact issue as to whether the force used was excessive. The court held that a one month delay in the treatment of
the prisoner's fractured jaw did not constitute deliberate indifference to the prisoner's serious medical needs in
violation of the Eighth Amendment because the defendant physicians were not responsible for the delay in
providing medical treatment. According to the court, even if the physicians had the opportunity to do so and
knew that there was a substantial risk that the prisoner's condition would worsen without receiving treatment, the
delay may have amounted to negligence, but was not enough to establish deliberate indifference and also did not
cause substantial harm because the type of jaw fracture the prisoner had sustained was one that would heal normally over a relatively short period of time. (Pelican Bay State Prison, California Medical Facility)

U.S. District Court
ADA-Americans with
Disabilities Act
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Nails v. Laplante, 596 F.Supp.2d 475 (D.Conn. 2009). A state prisoner filed a civil rights action alleging that
physicians had been deliberately indifferent to his medical needs and violated his rights under the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court
held that the prisoner's disagreement over the treatment provided by the defendant physicians was insufficient to
show that the physicians actually were aware of a substantial risk that the prisoner would suffer serious harm as
the result of their actions or inactions, as required for a claim of deliberate indifference under Eighth Amendment, or a claim under Title II of ADA. The court noted that a private suit for money damages under Title II of
ADA could have been maintained against the physicians in their official capacities only if the prisoner, as plaintiff, could have established that the Title II violation had been motivated by either discriminatory animus or ill
will due to the prisoner’s disability. (Osborn Correctional Institution, Connecticut)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
RESTRAINTS

Nelson v. Correctional Medical Services, 583 F.3d 522 (8th Cir. 2009). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action
against the director of the Arkansas Department of Correction (ADC), and a corrections officer, alleging that
while giving birth to her child she was forced to go through the final stages of labor with both legs shackled to
her hospital bed in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court denied the defendants' motion for
summary judgment. On rehearing en banc, the Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.
The appeals court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether
the corrections officer’s conduct in forcing the inmate to go through the final stages of labor with both legs
shackled to her hospital bed constituted “deliberate indifference” in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The
appeals court held that the inmate, in the final stages of labor, had a “clearly established” right not to be shackled
absent clear and convincing evidence that she was a security or flight risk, and thus a government official would
not be protected from § 1983 liability for violating that right based on qualified immunity. (Arkansas Department
of Correction, McPherson Unit)

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U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
FEMALE PRISONERS
NEGLIGENCE

Parlin v. Cumberland County, 659 F.Supp.2d 201 (D.Me. 2009). A female former county jail inmate brought an
action against jail officers, a county, and a sheriff, under § 1983 and Maine law, alleging deliberate indifference
to her serious medical needs, negligence, and excessive force. The district court granted summary judgment for
the defendants in part and denied in part. The court held that: (1) the officers were not deliberately indifferent to
a serious medical need; (2) an officer who fell on the inmate did not use excessive force; (3) the county was not
liable for deprivation of medical care; and (4) the county was not liable for failure to train. The court held that
the officers were not entitled to absolute immunity from excessive force claims where a genuine issue of material
fact existed as to whether the officers used excessive force in transferring the jail inmate between cells. According to the court, there was no evidence that jail officers were subjectively aware of the jail inmate's serious medical condition, where the inmate made no mention of her shoulder injury to the officers other than crying out “my
shoulder” after she had fallen. (Cumberland County Jail, Maine)

U.S. District Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
HANDICAP
FACILITIES
PRETRIAL DETAINEE
RA- Rehabilitation Act
WHEELCHAIR

Phipps v. Sheriff of Cook County, 681 F.Supp.2d 899 (N.D.Ill. 2009). Paraplegic and partially-paralyzed pretrial
detainees currently and formerly housed at a county prison brought a class action against the county and county
sheriff, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act. The parties
cross-moved for summary judgment. The district court denied the motions for summary judgment. The court
held that the sheriff waived the affirmative defense that the plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), where the sheriff raised that defense for the first
time in his motion for summary judgment. The court held that paraplegic and partially-paralyzed pretrial detainees who were formerly housed at the county prison were not “prisoners confined in jail” for the purposes of the
Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), and thus their civil rights claims were not subject to, or barred by, PLRA.
The court held that the pretrial detainees adequately alleged discrimination based on the prison's failure to
provide wheelchair-accessible bathroom facilities. According to the court, the detainees met the PLRA physical
injury required. In addition to alleging mental and emotional harm, the detainees complained of bed sores, infections, and injuries resulting from falling to the ground from their wheelchairs and toilets, which were undeniably
physical injuries. According to the court, the county and county sheriff failed to establish that they were not
recipients of federal funds, as would render them beyond the reach of the Rehabilitation Act's requirements.
The court held that county prison facilities to which the paraplegic and partially-paralyzed pretrial detainees
claimed to have been denied access--showers, toilets, and sinks--were “services” and “programs” within the
meaning of Title II of ADA, which forbade discrimination against persons with disabilities in the area of public
services, programs, and activities. The court found that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of
material fact as to whether the paraplegic and partially-paralyzed pretrial detainees were intentionally discriminated against, and as to whether modifications to county prison facilities requested by the detainees were reasonable. The court found no evidence that the detainees were excluded from electronic monitoring or drug rehabilitation programs by the county department of corrections, as would support their Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) claim. (Cook County Department of Corrections, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
ADA-Americans with
Disabilities Act
INADEQUATE CARE

Plata v. Schwarzenegger, 560 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2009). In a class action brought on behalf of state prisoners,
alleging that state officials were providing inadequate health care in violation of the Eighth Amendment and the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the receiver appointed to oversee the provision of health care at state
prisons moved for an order of contempt based on the state's failure to fund the receiver's capital projects. The
district court ordered the state to fund the projects and to show cause why it should not be held in contempt. The
state appealed, and alternatively filed a petition for a writ of mandamus. The appeals court dismissed the appeal
and denied the writ of mandamus. According to the court, the state failed to prove that it would be damaged or
prejudiced in a way not correctable on appeal, weighing against granting the state's petition for a writ of mandamus to prevent the district court from holding it in contempt based on its failure to fund the receiver's capital
projects. (California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
SUICIDE

Powers-Bunce v. District of Columbia, 594 F.Supp.2d 54 (D.D.C. 2009). The mother of a detainee who hung
himself in a holding cell at a police precinct headquarters brought an action against the District of Columbia and
individual police and Secret Service officers alleging constitutional violations and tort claims for her son's suicide. The detainee hung himself shortly after he was arrested by the Secret Service for cocaine possession and
driving with a suspended license. The detainee had been placed in a jail cell away from other detainees around
2:00 a.m. No one checked on the detainee while he was alone in his cell between 2:30 a.m. and 4:16 a.m. He
was found hanging from the bars of the jail cell by his tube socks tied in a knot around 4:16 a.m. The district
court dismissed claims against the police officers and the Secret Service officers in their entirety. The court held
that the arresting Secret Service officers were not the custodians of the detainee and therefore had no “special
relationship” with the detainee giving rise to an affirmative duty to resuscitate the detainee, as would support the
due process claims of the detainee's mother against the officers for deliberate indifference in their failure to resuscitate. According to the court, although the officers had taken temporary custody of the detainee and might
have obtained a key to the cell, the District, not the officers, was the custodian which owed an affirmative duty
of protection to the detainee. (Metro Police Dept., Third District Precinct Headquarters, District Columbia)

U.S. District Court
DELAY IN CARE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
INTAKE SCREENING
PRETRIAL DETAINEE
SUICIDE

Powers-Bunce v. District of Columbia, 659 F.Supp.2d 173 (D.D.C. 2009). A mother, for herself and as the personal representative of an arrestee who hanged himself in a holding cell at a police precinct shortly after he was
arrested by the United States Secret Service, brought an action against the District of Columbia and several police and Secret Service officers. The District of Columbia moved for judgment on the pleadings, or in the alternative, for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that: (1) the District of Columbia did not violate the Fifth Amendment right of the arrestee to be free from deliberate indifference to his
substantial risk of committing suicide; (2) the District of Columbia could not be held liable for a police officers'
failure to attempt to revive the arrestee; and (3) the District of Columbia could not be held liable for officers'
inadequate training and supervision. The court noted that although a Secret Service officer suspected the arrestee
was under the influence of cocaine after he had observed his jittery behavior and discovered a half-used bag of

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cocaine on the arrestee during a search at the precinct, there was no evidence that cocaine-users were a greater
suicide risk or that jittery behavior was a warning sign of impending suicide. According to the court, there was
no evidence that police officers who accepted custody of the arrestee had subjective knowledge of his suicidal
tendencies or actually drew the inference that the arrestee was a suicide risk, and there was no evidence that a
Secret Service officer communicated either his suspicion of the arrestee's cocaine use or his observation of jittery
behavior to either police officer. The court held that inadequate training and supervision of District of Columbia
police officers, who failed to follow police department procedures when they did not attempt to revive the arrestee who had hanged himself in his cell, failed to expeditiously obtain assistance from Emergency Medical
Services, and failed to maintain and operate the video surveillance system, did not reflect a deliberate or conscious choice by the District of Columbia, as required to hold the District of Columbia liable under § 1983 for
the detainee's death. (District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department, Third District Precinct)
U.S. Appeals Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
DENIAL

Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Service, 577 F.3d 816 (7th Cir. 2009). A prisoner, proceeding in forma
pauperis, brought a § 1983 action against medical providers alleging that, while acting under the color of state
law, they violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment by exhibiting deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The district court dismissed the case and the prisoner appealed.
The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated and remanded in part. The court held that the prisoner's allegation
that after an emergency medical technician-paramedic (EMT) inserted an intravenous line (IV) in his right arm,
EMTs ignored his complaints of pain, would be sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate
indifference against the EMTs under § 1983, if the prisoner could establish that the EMTs were state actors. The
court found that the ambulance service company was not liable to the prisoner under § 1983 for the alleged actions of its employees in being deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's serious medical needs, absent allegations
of wrongdoing on the part of the company. According to the court, the hospital that affirmatively declined to
assume the state's responsibility to provide medical care to the prisoner did not operate under the color of state
law in providing care to the prisoner, and thus the hospital could not be liable under § 1983 for exhibiting deliberate indifference to prisoner's serious medical needs. The court held that the prisoner sufficiently alleged a state
action against the hospital, as required to state a claim for deliberate indifference against the hospital under §
1983, by alleging he was placed in a prison ward of the hospital, an allegation suggesting the hospital had an
ongoing relationship with the prison authorities for the care of prisoner-patients in need of hospitalization, and
that his stay at the facility was not simply for emergency medical treatment, but rather involved a stay of several
days. (St. Agnes Hospital, Waupun Memorial Hospital, Kettle Moraine Correctional Institution, Wisconsin)

U.S. Appeals Court
INFORMED CONSENT
MALPRACTICE
PRIVACY

Sanchez v. Pereira-Castillo, 590 F.3d 31 (1st Cir. 2009). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 claims against correctional officials, a prison warden, a prison's correctional officer, and a physician, and medical battery and medical
malpractice claims against the physician, relating to strip searches, x-rays, rectal examinations, and exploratory
surgery to detect and recover suspected contraband. The district court dismissed the suit and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part and remanded. The appeals court held that the digital
rectal examinations were not unreasonable where the procedures were the direct culmination of a series of
searches that began when a metal detector used to scan the prisoner's person gave a positive reading, the prisoner
had two normal bowel movements before the searches were conducted, a physician examined him upon arrival at
the hospital and found him to be asymptomatic, and several lab tests were found to be “within normal limits.”
The court noted that the searches were carried out by medical professionals in the relatively private, sanitary
environment of a hospital, upon suspicion that the prisoner had contraband, namely a cell phone, in his rectum,
and with no abusive or humiliating conduct on the part of the law enforcement officers or the doctors.
But the court found that the exploratory surgery of the abdomen of the prisoner was unreasonable where the
surgery required total anesthesia, surgical invasion of the abdominal cavity, and two days of recovery in the
hospital. The court noted that the surgery was conducted despite several indications of the absence of contraband, including the results of two monitored bowel movements and two rectal examinations. According to the
court, an x-ray, as a much less invasive procedure, could have confirmed the results. The court held that the
prisoner's signed consent form for the exploratory surgery of his abdomen did not preclude the prisoner's claim
that he was deprived of his Fourth Amendment rights, where the prisoner was pressured and intimidated into
signing the consent, had been under constant surveillance for more than a day prior to the surgery, had been
forced to submit to searches, x-rays, and invasive rectal examinations prior to his signing the consent form, and
had twice been forced to excrete on a floor in the presence of prison personnel. The court held that the prisoner's
allegations against correctional officers were sufficient to allege that the officers caused the hospital's forced
exploratory surgery on the prisoner, as required to state a § 1983 claim against the officers. The prisoner alleged
that the officers were directly involved in all phases of the search for contraband and in the ultimate decision to
transport the prisoner to the hospital for a rectal examination or a medical procedure to remove the foreign object
purportedly lodged in the prisoner's rectum. According to the court, the prisoner's allegation that correctional
officers exerted pressure on hospital physicians that examined the prisoner was sufficient to allege the state
compulsion necessary to state a claim of § 1983 liability against a surgeon.
The court found that correctional officers' conduct, in forcing the prisoner to undergo an invasive abdominal
surgery, was a violation of a clearly established constitutional right, such that the officers were not entitled to
qualified immunity from § 1983 liability. (Bayamón 501 Unit of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico Administration of Corrections, and Río Piedras Medical Center)

U.S. District Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Schaub v. County of Olmsted, 656 F.Supp.2d 990 (D.Minn. 2009). An inmate at a county detention center
brought an action against a county, detention center, center director, probation officer, and several unnamed
defendants, alleging that he was injured as result of failure to accommodate his medical condition of paraplegia.
The district court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court held that summary judgment
was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to: (1) whether members of county detention center staff
were deliberately indifferent to the inmate's serious medical needs arising from paraplegia; (2) whether failure to
oversee nursing staff at the detention center was the “moving force” behind the delay in treating the inmate's

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wounds and pressure sores on his return to the county detention center; (3) whether the county detention center's
unwritten policy barring medical care to work-release inmates was the “moving force” behind the inmate's injuries during his first two months in the center; and (4) whether the county detention center's modifications in
permitting the inmate to attend to his hygiene at home, or rely on nursing staff to bathe him, were reasonable,
and whether the inmate was excluded from appropriate medical care because of his disability. (Olmsted County
Adult Detention Center, Minnesota)
U.S. Appeals Court
INADEQUATE CARE
MEDICATION

Shepherd v. Dallas County, 591 F.3d 445 (5th Cir. 2009). A pretrial detainee sued a county under § 1983, alleging that conditions of confinement, specifically the jail's failure to administer pills he needed to ameliorate
chronic hypertension, violated his due process right to medical care while in custody. The district court, entered
judgment on jury verdict for the detainee. The county appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the
action was an attack on conditions of confinement rather than on episodic acts or omissions of particular jail
officials. The court noted that the jail medical director testified that the jail's medical services were inadequate,
and a clinical pharmacist testified that the administration of medication at the jail was so inadequate that half or
more of the inmates did not receive their prescription medications. The court held that a Department of Justice
(DOJ) report concerning jail conditions was not excludable as being more prejudicial than probative, inasmuch
as the report was relevant in that it provided strong support for the claim that medical care at the jail was constitutionally inadequate, and, although findings in the report were prejudicial to the county's cause, they were probative as well. (Dallas County Jail, Texas)

U.S. Appeals Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
RA- Rehabilitation Act

Shomo v. City of New York, 579 F.3d 176 (2nd Cir. 2009). A pro se prisoner brought a § 1983 action, alleging
deliberate indifference to a serious medical condition in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and violation of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act. The district court dismissed the ADA and
Rehabilitation Act claims, and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the Eighth Amendment
claims. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The appeals
court held that the prisoner’s allegations that he was disabled based on the physical limitations in the use of his
arms, and that the defendants denied him access to infirmary-style housing and other prison services on the basis
of his disability, were sufficient to suggest that the prisoner could have viable claims against prison officials
under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, and thus, the pro se prisoner was entitled leave to re-plead his dismissed complaint. (New York City Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
INADEQUATE CARE
PROSTHESES

Silva v. Clarke, 603 F.Supp.2d 248 (D.Mass. 2009). An inmate brought a civil rights suit against the Commissioner of the Massachusetts Department of Correction (DOC), a subcontracted medical provider and an employee of the provider, claiming that his Eighth Amendment rights were being violated due to inadequate medical
care. The inmate moved for a preliminary injunction and a defendant moved to dismiss. The district court dismissed the action, finding that the inmate's assertion that he was not being provided with medically-required
footwear failed to state a claim. The court noted that the inmate did not allege a complete denial of medical
treatment, but rather that prison officials refused to follow the recommendation of one of the physicians who
examined him, and he was examined by several doctors and given custom made orthotics. (Souza-Baranowski
Correctional Facility, Massachusetts)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Sledge v. Kooi, 564 F.3d 105 (2nd Cir. 2009). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action alleging violation of his
Eighth Amendment rights, against a physician at a state correctional facility. The inmate alleged deliberate indifference in refusing to provide him with proper medical treatment for his alleged eczema, back pain, stomach
disorders, allergies, and asthma. The district court granted summary judgment for the physician and the inmate
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the inmate's alleged medical conditions did not constitute a serious medical need. (Auburn Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
INADEQUATE CARE
POLICIES

Smith v. District of Columbia, 674 F.Supp.2d 209 (D.D.C. 2009). The parent of a deceased inmate brought an
action against the District of Columbia, stemming from the inmate's death following incarceration. Prior to being
incarcerated, the inmate was partially paralyzed and confined to a wheelchair as a result of gunshot wounds. The
parent alleged that while confined, these injuries prompted the inmate to make repeated “requests for medical
care treatment, and attention including, but not limited to, providing medication when ordered by his physicians,
providing prompt and adequate dressing changes to prevent the formation and growth of decubitus sores, [and]
providing sanitary cell conditions.” The parent alleged that the District failed to “provide a healthcare system
that included prompt, proper, adequate, and reasonable medical care and treatment to all persons incarcerated
under their care, custody, and supervision.” The inmate died eight months after his release from the facility. The
district court granted the District’s motion for dismissal. The court held that the parent failed to assert a direct
causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation. (Correctional
Treatment Facility, District of Columbia)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE

Smith v. Smith, 589 F.3d 736 (4th Cir. 2009). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against a prison nurse alleging
she exhibited deliberate indifference to his serious medical need in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The
district court dismissed the complaint. The inmate appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded, finding
that the inmate stated a claim for deliberate indifference by alleging that he was prescribed treatment by a doctor
and that when he sought to receive that treatment, he was unable to do so because the prison nurse ripped up the
order to report slip (OTR), which authorized his treatment. (Evans Correctional Institute, South Carolina)

U.S. Appeals Court
INTAKE SCREENING
PRETRIAL DETAINEE

Spears v. Ruth, 589 F.3d 249 (6th Cir. 2009). The estate of a deceased detainee brought a § 1983 action against a
police officer and a city, alleging deliberate indifference to the detainee's serious illness or injury while in the
officer's care. The district court denied summary judgment and the officer and city brought an appeal. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that the pretrial detainee's condition and need for medical

XXIII

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attention was not so obvious to the police officer as to establish the existence of a serious medical need, for the
purposes of a claim of deliberate indifference in violation of due process. The officer allegedly failed to inform
emergency medical technicians (EMT) on the scene and at the jail that the detainee, who later died from respiratory and cardiac failure resulting from cocaine use, had admitted that he smoked crack cocaine. According to the
court, the EMTs and jail nurse, who presumably had a greater facility than the average layperson to recognize an
individual's medical need, observed the detainee's behavior and administered tests based on those observations,
and both the EMTs and the jail officers concluded that the detainee did not need to be transported to the hospital.
After admission to the jail, the detainee continued to hallucinate and officers placed him in a restraint chair “for
his own safety,” tasing him to “relax his muscles.” The detainee remained restrained for approximately three and
a half hours, during which time he was calm but continued to hallucinate. Shortly after the officers released him
from the chair, the detainee began to shake and spit up blood and then became unconscious. He was taken to a
hospital where he was diagnosed with respiratory and cardiac failure and multi-organ failure resulting from cocaine use. He lapsed into a coma and died eleven months later. (City of Cleveland, Bradley County Justice Center, Tennessee)
U.S. Appeals Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
INTAKE SCREENING
PRETRIAL DETAINEE

Tamez v. Manthey, 589 F.3d 764 (5th Cir. 2009). Survivors of a pretrial detainee, who died while in custody from
acute cocaine intoxication when the bag of cocaine that he swallowed before his arrest burst in his intestines,
brought a § 1983 action, alleging that police officers and prison officials were deliberately indifferent to the
detainee's need for medical care. The district court granted the summary judgment in favor of the defendants.
The plaintiffs appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that police detectives were not deliberately
indifferent to the medical needs of the detainee. The court noted that the detectives' knowledge that the detainee
had pupils that were maximally dilated and that he needed medical clearance did not show that the detectives
were aware of an unjustifiably high risk to the detainee's health, or that the risk to the detainee's health was so
obvious that they should have inferred such a risk. According to the court, jailers were not deliberately indifferent to the medical needs of the detainee. According to the court, the fact that the jailers were told the detainee
needed medical clearance and that he had dilated pupils did not show that the jailers knew or should have known
of a substantial risk to the detainee's health. (Harlingen City Jail, Cameron County Carrizales-Rucker Detention
Center, Texas)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Teague v. Mayo, 553 F.3d 1068 (7th Cir. 2009). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against corrections officers.
The district court granted summary judgment for the officers on the claim of deliberate indifference to the prisoner’s serious medical needs, and, following a jury trial, entered judgment for the officers on an excessive force
claim. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that while the prisoner was in segregation, two corrections officers could not have been deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs relating to
his degenerative joint disease and other back problems, in violation of Eighth Amendment, where the officers
were not assigned to the segregation unit at the time. (Menard Correctional Institution, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
ADA-Americans with
Disabilities Act
DELAY IN CARE
HANDICAP
PROSTHESES
RA-Rehabilitation Act

Thomas v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Corr., 615 F.Supp.2d 411 (W.D.Pa. 2009). A state prison inmate who was an
above-the-knee amputee brought a § 1983 action against the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections and individual corrections officials and medical personnel, alleging that denial of his request for a handicap cell, and the
delay in replacing and inadequate replacement of his prosthesis, violated the Eighth Amendment, Rehabilitation
Act, Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and state law. The district court granted summary judgment for the
defendants. The court found that there was no evidence that state corrections officials were aware that the amputee prisoner was at risk of assault at the hands of fellow inmates due to the denial of his request for a handicap
cell, as required to support the prisoner's Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim against officials. Except for
a single reference to an altercation with a fellow prisoner, the prisoner's requests for a handicap cell included no
indication that the prisoner was concerned about being attacked, only that he was having difficulty moving about
in a standard cell. The court held that the officials' and medical personnel's delay in replacing the amputee prisoner's prosthesis did not amount to deliberate indifference to the prisoner's medical needs in violation of the
Eighth Amendment, even if the replacement process took longer than it should have. The court noted that the
prisoner had been without the use of his former prosthesis for approximately two years before coming under the
protection of the state corrections system, during which time he ambulated well on crutches, and once in the
system, efforts were made to repair his old prosthesis, and failing that, to provide him with a new prosthesis.
According to the court, the state medical personnel's denial of the amputee prisoner's requests for a handicap
cell did not amount to deliberate indifference to the prisoner's medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Each request for a handicap cell was reviewed, but a determination was made that since the prisoner ambulated well with crutches and subsequently was fitted with a prosthesis, a handicap cell was medically unnecessary. The court found that the prisoner's disagreement with that determination did not render it deliberate indifference. The court held that state corrections officials and medical personnel provided the prisoner with reasonable accommodation for his disability, in the form of a non-hydraulic replacement prosthetic following the loss of
his hydraulic prosthetic, precluding recovery in the prisoner's ADA Title II failure-to-accommodate claim. (State
Correctional Institution at Camp Hill, State Correctional Institution at Houtzdale, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
DELAY IN CARE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
INTERFERENCE

Tommassello v. Stine, 642 F.Supp.2d 910 (D.Minn. 2009). A federal prisoner, who suffered from recurrent skin
cancers, brought an action against prison officials, alleging a violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be free
from cruel and unusual punishment by delaying needed surgeries and by interfering with post-surgical wound
care. The defendants moved for dismissal or for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. The
district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded
by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether prison officers, one of whom told federal prisoner “I told you I'd
teach you a lesson” and the other who said “I don't care” in response to the prisoner's complaint about his serious
infection and request for medical care for the serious infection, were deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's
infection. The court also found a fact issue as to whether a prison doctor acted with deliberate indifference toward the prisoner's serious infection when he visited the prisoner twice in segregation and saw that his back was

XXIII

29.230

seeping pus and blood yet ignored his condition and did nothing to help him. According to the court, summary
judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the federal prison camp's clinical director acted with deliberate indifference as to his role in the prisoner's delay in having cancer lesions, caused by his
Gorlin syndrome, treated by a micrographic surgeon. (Federal Prison Camp in Duluth, Minnesota, Federal Medical Center, in Rochester, Minnesota)
U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
INADEQUATE CARE

Vann v. Vandenbrook, 596 F.Supp.2d 1238 (.D.Wis. 2009). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a crisis
intervention worker, registered nurse, and several corrections officers, alleging deliberate indifference to a serious medical need in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The prisoner moved to proceed in forma pauperis and
for the appointment of counsel. The district court granted the motion to proceed in part and denied in part, and
denied the motion for appointment of counsel. The court held that the prisoner stated a § 1983 claim against the
intervention worker and the unknown officer where they were aware of the prisoner's suicide risk when the
worker refused to place the prisoner in an observation program and the officer provided the prisoner with a razor
and a nail clipper and left the prisoner unattended. The court found that the registered nurse's failure to provide
treatment to the prisoner constituted deliberate indifference to the prisoner's serious medical needs, as required
for the prisoner to state a § 1983 claim for violation of the Eighth Amendment, where the prisoner had sustained
133 self-inflicted wounds that were bleeding and the nurse merely inspected his wounds. According to the court,
the corrections officers who performed an emergency cell extraction of the prisoner following his suicide attempt, transported him to a day room where the prison's registered nurse performed an inspection of the prisoner's wounds, thus precluding the prisoner's § 1983 claim against the officer for deliberate indifference to his
serious medical needs in violation of Eighth Amendment. The court held that the prisoner's proffered reasons for
appointment of counsel—that the case was legally and factually complex, that the claim required the testimony
of medical experts, and that he lacked legal training to present the case, especially in front of a jury, were universal among pro se litigants and thus constituted insufficient grounds for the appointment of counsel. (Columbia
Correctional Institution, Wisconsin)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
DENIAL
MEDICATION

Vaughn v. Gray, 557 F.3d 904 (8th Cir. 2009). A detainee’s sister brought a § 1983 action against several officers and county employees alleging they were deliberately indifferent to the detainee’s serious medical needs
which resulted in his death. The district court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment based on
qualified immunity and the defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that a genuine issue
of material fact existed as to whether jail officials deliberately disregarded the medical needs and condition of
the detainee. The detainee was charged with first-degree sexual assault. During the jail's intake procedure, he
completed a medical intake form, indicating that he had a history of mental illness, headaches, epilepsy/seizures,
ulcers, and kidney/bladder problems, but indicating that he did not have a history of heart problems or high or
low blood pressure. Although the detainee had no medications with him upon his arrival at the jail, his mother
later brought his medications, including an anti-depressant. He received his medication for several days until the
prescription ran out. He missed several doses before a new prescription arrived. During the time he was without
medication, his cellmate told jail employees that the detainee had been ingesting shampoo and engaging in other
odd behavior. The detainee was moved to an isolation cell to be monitored on an hourly basis. He was observed
vomiting and asked to see a nurse but he was not provided access. He was later found dead in his cell. An autopsy determined that he died of natural causes: arteriosclerotic cardiovascular disease, causing a heart attack that
resulted in his death. (Greene County Jail, Arkansas)

U.S. District Court
COSTS
WORK ASSIGNMENT

Vuncannon v. U.S., 650 F.Supp.2d 577 (N.D.Miss. 2009). A parolee brought an action against a county and
others, alleging claims under § 1983 arising out of injuries he sustained in an accident while operating a forklift
as part of a work release project. The court held that summary judgment for the county on the hospital’s claim
was precluded by a genuine issues of material fact as to (1) whether the parolee was a county prisoner, indigent,
and unable to pay; (2) whether the parolee was in need of hospitalization for the entire length of time; and (3)
whether the hospital's charges were reasonable and customary. (Shelby County Health Care Corporation, Tennessee, and Tippah County, Mississippi)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
MALPRACTICE
MEDICATION
MENTAL HEALTH
NEGLIGENCE

Wade v. Castillo, 658 F.Supp.2d 906 (W.D.Wis. 2009). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against prison
psychiatrists, alleging that the psychiatrists committed medical malpractice and exhibited deliberate indifference
to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The psychiatrists moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part, and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment
was precluded by genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the prisoner, who was diagnosed with a
psychotic disorder, had a serious medical need at the time the prison psychiatrist discontinued the prisoner's
medications, and whether the psychiatrist was aware that he was exposing the prisoner to a substantial risk of
serious harm by taking him off the medications. The court held that the refusal of the prisoner's treating psychiatrist to prescribe psychotropic medication did not amount to deliberate indifference to the prisoner's serious medical need, as would violate the Eighth Amendment, where the psychiatrist did not prescribe medication because
he was uncertain whether the prisoner had a psychotic disorder. The court found that summary judgment was
precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the prisoner's treating psychiatrist met the requisite
standard of care for psychiatrists when he refused to prescribe psychiatric medication to the prisoner and in
providing psychiatric care to the prisoner, and as to whether the psychiatrist's alleged negligence was a substantial factor in causing the prisoner's harm. (Green Bay Correctional Institution, Dodge Correctional Institution and
Racine Correctional Institution, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
DELAY IN CARE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Williams v. Correctional Medical Services, 629 F.Supp.2d 360 (D.Del. 2009). An inmate brought a pro se §
1983 action against a corporation that provided medical services to correctional facilities and the correctional
facility's medical authority, commissioner and warden, among others, alleging deliberate indifference to his
serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court held that the correctional facility’s medical authority's mistaken belief that the inmate suffering from a suspected hernia was transferred to a

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different facility, allegedly resulting in a delay in his medical care, was not deliberate indifference to his serious
medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment, absent evidence that the authority ignored the inmate's
condition. But the court found that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the corporation that provided medical services to correctional facilities was deliberately indifferent to
the inmate's serious medical needs when the provider delayed treatment of the inmate's suspected hernia for
approximately two years after a physician first recommended treatment. (James T. Vaughn Correctional Center,
Delaware)
2010
U.S. District Court
MENTAL HEALTH

Antonetti v. Skolnik, 748 F.Supp.2d 1201 (D.Nev. 2010). A prisoner, proceeding pro se, brought a § 1983 action
against various prison officials, alleging various constitutional claims, including violations of the First, Fifth,
Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court dismissed in part. The court held that the prisoner's
allegations were factually sufficient to state a colorable § 1983 claim that prison officials violated the Eighth
Amendment by depriving him of needed medical care. The prisoner alleged that he was housed in segregation/isolation, leading to a mental health breakdown, and: (1) that he was seen by mental health professionals
eight times over a five year period instead of every 90 days as required by administrative regulations; (2) that
mental health professionals recommended he pursue art and music for his mental health but that prison officials
denied him the materials; (3) and that the officials' actions resulted in the need to take anti-psychotic and antidepression medications due to suffering from bouts of aggression, extreme depression, voices, paranoia, hallucinations, emotional breakdowns and distress, unreasonable fear, and systematic dehumanization. The court found
that the prisoner's allegations that he was subjected to a policy of a minimum of five hours of outside exercise
per week but that administrative regulations provided for a minimum of seven hours and controlling consent
decrees required eight hours, were sufficient to state a colorable § 1983 claim under the Eighth Amendment.
The court held that the prisoner's allegations were factually sufficient to state a colorable § 1983 claim for violations of his Fourth Amendment right to be free of unlawful searches and Eighth Amendment right to be free of
cruel and unusual punishment. The prisoner alleged that whenever he was moved from his cell to any other location he was made to stand in a brightly lit shower in full view of female employees, made to strip naked, place
his bare feet on a filthy floor covered in insects and scum, spread his buttocks, lift his penis, then put his fingers
in his mouth without any opportunity to wash his hands, and that the process was unnecessary because inmates
were in full restraints, escorted and solitary at all times. The court found that the prisoner's allegations were sufficient to state a colorable § 1983 Eighth Amendment claim for violation of his right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment where the prisoner alleged the exercise provided to him was to stand in a completely enclosed
cage alone, in extreme heat or cold without water, shade, exercise equipment or urinals, and that as a result he
suffered sunburns, cracked and bleeding lips and a lack of desire to exercise, resulting in a loss of physical and
mental health. (High Desert State Prison, Nevada)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
POLICIES
TRAINING

Beatty v. Davidson, 713 F.Supp.2d 167 (W.D.N.Y. 2010). A former pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action
against a county, jail officials, and a nurse, alleging that the defendants denied him adequate medical care while
he was a pretrial detainee, in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights. The defendants moved for summary
judgment. The district court denied the motion. The court held that the detainee's diabetic condition was a serious
medical condition and that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the nurse was deliberately indifferent to the detainee's diabetic condition, precluding summary judgment for the nurse. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether jail officials were grossly negligent in supervising subordinates who allegedly violated the former pretrial detainee's constitutional rights. According to the court, a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the county lacked a system at its jail
for managing chronically ill inmates and failed to train and properly supervise its staff, precluding summary
judgment for the county on the former pretrial detainee's municipal liability claim under § 1983. (Erie County
Holding Center, Pennsylvania)

U.S. Appeals Court
DENTAL CARE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Berry v. Peterman, 604 F.3d 435 (7th Cir. 2010). A state prisoner brought a pro se § 1983 action against a prison
nurse, doctor, and jail administrator, alleging deliberate indifference to his tooth pain and decay, which ultimately required a root canal. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The prisoner
appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that the prisoner
who suffered from tooth decay and serious pain, which ultimately required a root canal, had an objectively serious medical condition, as required to support the prisoner's § 1983 Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference
action, based on the alleged failure of a prison nurse and doctor to refer him to a dentist. The court found that the
jail administrator did not act with deliberate indifference to the state prisoner's serious medical condition of tooth
pain and decay, by failing to refer the prisoner to a dentist for treatment, and thus, the administrator was not
liable, where the administrator consulted with the prison medical staff, forwarded the prisoner's concerns to the
state Department of Corrections (DOC), and responded timely to the prisoner's complaints. The court held that
summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the prison doctor acted with
deliberate indifference to the state prisoner's serious medical condition of tooth decay and severe pain, by failing
to refer the prisoner to a dentist for treatment, despite the prisoner's persistent complaints.
The court found that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a
prison nurse acted with deliberate indifference to the state prisoner's serious medical condition by failing to recommend a dental visit or deferring to the prison doctor's determination that the prisoner could wait to see the
dentist, despite prisoner's persistent complaints. (Waushara County Jail, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
FEMALE PRISONERS
RESTRAINTS

Brawley v. Washington, 712 F.Supp.2d 1208 (W.D.Wash. 2010). A female former inmate brought a § 1983
action against the Washington State Department of Corrections and various officials, seeking relief from violations of her constitutional rights that she alleged occurred during the birth of her first child. The Department filed
a motion for summary judgment, which the district court granted in part and denied in part. The court held that

XXIII

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the female inmate, who was shackled to a hospital bed while giving birth, showed, from an objective standpoint,
that she had a serious medical need and was exposed to an unnecessary risk of harm for the purposes of her §
1983 Eighth Amendment claim. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by material issues of fact
as to whether officers were deliberately indifferent to the risks of harm to the inmate and her serious medical
needs when they shackled her to a hospital bed. According to the court, the inmate showed that shackling inmates while they were in labor was clearly established as a violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment, thereby barring the Department of Corrections' qualified immunity defense. (Washington State Corrections Center for Women)
U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
POLICIES
STAFF

Brown v. Callahan, 623 F.3d 249 (5th Cir. 2010). The estate of a pretrial detainee, who died of a gastrointestinal
hemorrhage while in pretrial custody, brought a § 1983 action against a county sheriff in his individual and official capacity for failure to train and supervise the jail's medical employees and for maintaining an unconstitutional policy of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. The district court denied the sheriff's motion for
summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The sheriff appealed. The appeals court reversed. The court
held that the county sheriff was not deliberately indifferent to a known or obvious risk of inadequate medical
care toward pretrial detainees arising from the supervising jail physician's unpleasant attitude or practice of intimidation toward jail nurses, which allegedly discouraged nurses from calling the physician or sending patients
to the emergency room. The court noted that the detainee’s gastrointestinal hemorrhage was neither referred for
treatment by a hospital emergency room nor treated by the jail's supervising physician. According to the court,
despite the physician's bad temper, despite one nurse's expressed fear of an “ass-chewing” from the physician
had she sent the detainee to the emergency room, and even though the nurses and physician had disagreed in two
instances on whether inmates should be sent to an emergency room, the two nurses had previously decided to
send inmates to the emergency room over the physician's objections. The sheriff had reportedly counseled the
physician and ordered the nurses to act appropriately notwithstanding the physician’s distemper, and there was
no prior instance in which the sheriff's instruction to the nurses was not followed. (Wichita County Jail, Texas)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
FEMALE PRISONERS
NEGLIGENCE

Castro v. Melchor, 760 F.Supp.2d 970(D.Hawai‘I 2010). A female pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action
against correctional facility officials and medical staff, alleging the defendants were deliberately indifferent to
his serious medical needs resulting in the delivery of a stillborn child. The defendants moved for summary
judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment
was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the correctional facility's medical staff subjectively knew the pretrial detainee's complaints of vaginal bleeding presented a serious medical need. The court
held that the staff’s failure to ensure the detainee received an ultrasound and consultation was no more than gross
negligence, and the medical staff did not deny, delay, or intentionally interfere with the pretrial detainee's medical treatment. According to the court, summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to
whether the correctional facility officials' actions and inactions in training the facility's medical staff resulted in
the alleged deprivation of the pretrial detainee's right to medical treatment and whether the officials consciously
disregarded serious health risks by failing to apply the women's lock-down policies. Following a verbal exchange with a guard, two officers physically forced the detainee to the ground from a standing position. While
she was lying on the ground on her stomach, the officers restrained her by holding their body weights against her
back and legs and placing her in handcuffs. The detainee was approximately seven months pregnant at the time.
(Oahu Community Correctional Center, Hawai’i)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE

Choate v. Merrill, 685 F.Supp.2d 146 (D.Me. 2010). The estate of a prison inmate who committed suicide
brought an action against individual prison officers, administrators of the correctional facility, and the facility's
health care provider, claiming that their violations of the inmate's civil and constitutional rights caused his death.
All defendants moved to dismiss and/or for summary judgment. The district court granted the motions in part
and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the inmate was in fact dead when a prison officer first discovered him hanging in his cell. (Special Management Unit, Maine State Prison)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
PRETRIAL DETAINEE

Christian v. Wagner, 623 F.3d 608 (8th Cir. 2010). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against jail officials and employees, alleging a due process violation arising out of his exposure to a cleaning solvent. After a
jury found in favor of the defendants, the district court denied the detainee's motion for a new trial or judgment
as a matter of law. The detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the jury could
reasonably find that the detainee failed to show that a physician or other medical personnel had diagnosed him
with a serious medical need while incarcerated, as would support a finding that such need was objectively serious. The court noted that medical personnel who examined the detainee found no objective evidence supporting
a diagnosis, and the record did not contain a medical order to jail employees. The court also held that evidence
supported the finding that the detainee's need for medical attention was not so obvious that a layperson must
have recognized it, as would support a finding that such need was objectively serious. According to the court, the
detainee's testimony that he informed jail employees that he coughed up blood and experienced difficulty breathing was corroborated only by his mother, whereas several jail employees testified they did not observe the detainee suffering adverse reactions to cleaning solutions and had no recollection of his complaining of a medical
problem. (Johnson County Jail, Iowa)

U.S. Appeals Court
INTERFERENCE WITH
TREATMENT
MENTAL HEALTH
SUICIDE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Clouthier v. County of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232 (9th Cir. 2010). The estate of a pretrial detainee brought a §
1983 action against a county, mental health specialist, and two sheriff's deputies alleging they violated the detainee’s due process rights by failing to prevent his suicide while he was confined. The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the estate appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that the estate had to show that the detainee was confined under
conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm and that correction officers were deliberately indifferent to
that risk. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether

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the mental health specialist at the jail, who was on notice of the pretrial detainee's suicidal condition, was deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of harm to the detainee when she removed the detainee from an observation log and told deputies that the detainee could be given regular clothes and bedding. According to the court, it
was clearly established at the time of detention that a reasonable mental health professional would not have removed key suicide prevention measures put in place by a prior mental health staff member, and therefore the
specialist was not entitled to qualified immunity. The court found that the estate failed to establish that a sheriff's
deputy at the jail knew that moving the detainee to the general population in the jail posed a substantial risk of
serious harm to the detainee, where the deputy only knew that the detainee had missed meals and free time, and
that the detainee had been taken off an observation log. The court noted that the deputy spoke to the detainee all
weekend and noted he had a positive outlook on wanting to get out of the room, and earlier that day the mental
health specialist found that the detainee was not actively suicidal at the time. The court held that the estate failed
to establish that another sheriff’s deputy knew that the detainee was suicidal and deliberately ignored that risk,
where the deputy knew only that the detainee was suicidal and needed to be on 15-minute checks and the mental
health specialist told the deputy to give the detainee his regular clothes and bedding. The court noted that nothing
indicated that the deputy saw the detainee's knotted sheet. According to the court, the county did not have a
longstanding custom or practice of moving pretrial detainees from an observation cell into the general population
without consultation with mental health staff, or a longstanding practice of miscommunication between mental
health staff and custodial staff. The court found no pattern of repeated wrongful conduct by county staff, and
nothing that indicated another suicide resulted from the improper transfer of a detainee.
The court found that the affidavit of the estate's expert, who opined that custodial staff and mental health staff
did not work together as a team, was speculative and conclusory, and thus was insufficient to avoid summary
judgment. The court noted that the factual basis for the expert's declaration was limited to a sequence of events
and statements of participants surrounding the detainee's transfer to the general population in the jail, and the
report did not address the key question of whether the alleged disconnect was so obvious as to have been deliberate indifference. (Contra Costa County Martinez Detention Facility, California)
U.S. Appeals Court
CONTAGIOUS DISEASES

Duvall v. Dallas County, Tex., 631 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2010). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against a
county for personal injuries stemming from a staph infection that he contracted while incarcerated in the county's
jail. At the conclusion of a jury trial in the district court the detainee prevailed. The county appealed. The appeals
court affirmed. The court held that: (1) sufficient evidence supported the finding that the county's actions in
allowing the infection were more than de minimis; (2) sufficient evidence existed to support the finding that the
county had an unconstitutional custom or policy in allowing the infection to be present; and (3) sufficient evidence supported the finding that the detainee contracted the infection while in jail. The court noted that physicians testified that there was a “bizarrely high incidence” of the infection and that they were not aware of a jail
with a higher percentage of the infection than the county's jail. According to the court, there was evidence that
jail officials had long known of the extensive infection problem yet continued to house inmates in the face of the
inadequately controlled staph contamination, and that the county was not willing to take the necessary steps to
spend the money to take appropriate actions. The court noted that there was evidence that the jail had refused to
install necessary hand washing and disinfecting stations and had failed to use alcohol-based sanitizers, which
were the recommended means of hand disinfection. (Dallas County, Texas)

U.S. District Court
ALCOHOL/DRUGS
POLICIES
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Estate of Crouch v. Madison County, 682 F.Supp.2d 862 (S.D.Ind. 2010). An inmate's estate brought a § 1983
suit against a county and corrections officers, claiming that the officers were deliberately indifferent to the inmate's serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and that the county was liable for failure to
train its officers or establish policies regarding the medical care of inmates. The defendants moved for summary
judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the inmate did not show signs of an objectively serious need for medical attention prior to 3:00 a.m. on the day of his death from a drug overdose, at
which time he was found unresponsive. According to the court, the Indiana Tort Claims Act entitled the corrections officers and county to immunity on state law negligence claims arising from the inmate's death, which
occurred while he was assigned to a community corrections program maintained under the supervision of a governmental entity. (Madison County Community Justice Center, Indiana)

U.S. District Court
GID- Gender Identity
Disorder
TRANSSEXUAL

Fields v. Smith, 712 F.Supp.2d 830 (E.D.Wis. 2010). Wisconsin Department of Corrections (DOC) inmates, who
were diagnosed with Gender Identity Disorder (GID), brought a § 1983 action against DOC officials, alleging,
among other things, that the officials violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by enforcing a statutory
provision preventing DOC medical personnel from providing hormone therapy or sexual reassignment surgery to
inmates with GID, and from evaluating inmates with GID for possible hormone therapy. The inmates sought a
permanent injunction barring enforcement of the statute against them and other inmates. The court held that: (1)
GID or transsexualism was a “serious medical need” for the purposes of the Eighth Amendment; (2) as matter of
first impression, enforcement of the statute against the inmates violated the Eighth Amendment; (3) as matter of
first impression, the statute was facially unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment; (4) the possibility that
certain inmates seeking treatment for gender issues might have had conditions not requiring hormone therapy did
not repel a facial challenge to the statute; and (5) as matter of first impression, the statute violated the Equal
Protection Clause both as applied to the inmates and on its face. The district court granted the motion, issuing a
“…permanent injunction that restrains the defendants from enforcing or attempting to enforce the provisions of
Wis. Stat. § 302.386(5m), by direct, indirect or other means, against any prisoner to whom the statute would
otherwise apply and specifically against the plaintiffs.” (Wisconsin Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
DENTAL CARE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Flanory v. Bonn, 604 F.3d 249 (6th Cir. 2010). A prisoner, proceeding pro se, brought a § 1983 action against
prison officials, alleging violations of the Eighth Amendment. The district court granted the defendants' motions
to dismiss. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that the prisoner's
deprivation of dental care was not temporary, as required for his Eighth Amendment claim, where the inmate
was denied toothpaste for 337 days. According to the court, the prisoner's deprivation of toothpaste by the prison

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caused him physical injury, as required for his Eighth Amendment claim, where the inmate was diagnosed with
periodontal disease of the gums and one tooth was extracted. The court held that the prisoner's allegations that he
was denied toothpaste for 337 days, that he filed various grievances about the deprivation, and that he was diagnosed with periodontal disease of the gums and one tooth was extracted as a result of the deprivation, were sufficient to plead that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his hygiene needs, as required for his Eighth
Amendment claims. (Newberry Correctional Facility, Michigan Department of Corrections)
U.S. Appeals Court
INTAKE SCREENING
MEDICATION
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Gayton v. McCoy, 593 F.3d 610 (7th Cir. 2010). The administrator of a female detainee‘s estate brought a § 1983
action against correctional facility officials and nurses, alleging they violated her due process rights by failing to
provide adequate medical care. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants, and the administrator appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The appeals court held that
the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding a physician unqualified to offer expert testimony that the
detainee's death from non-specific heart failure would have been prevented had she been given her congestive
heart failure medication, where the physician lacked specific knowledge in cardiology and pharmacology, and he
provided no basis for his testimony except that the detainee's medication treated heart disease. But the appeals
court held that the district court abused its discretion in finding the physician unqualified to offer expert testimony that the detainee's vomiting combined with her diuretic medication may have contributed to her tachycardia
and subsequent death from non-specific heart failure. The court held that a correctional facility nurse who examined the detainee during intake was not deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs posed by her heart
condition, as required to establish violation of the detainee's due process right to adequate medical care in the §
1983 action. The court noted that, even though the nurse failed to follow the facility's protocol requiring her to
contact a doctor when an inmate complained of chest pains, the nurse placed the detainee on a list to have her
vital signs checked each morning, and the nurse arranged for the detainee to get her congestive heart failure
medication. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the nurse who examined the detainee following her complaints of nausea was deliberately indifferent to
his serious medical needs posed by her heart condition and vomiting. In its decision, the court noted that “On the
other hand, Nurse Pam Hibbert was presented with ample evidence that Taylor needed medical treatment.”
(Peoria County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
INADEQUATE CARE
PRIVATE PROVIDER

George v. Sonoma County Sheriff's Dept., 732 F.Supp.2d 922 (N.D.Cal. 2010). A county inmate's estate and
survivors filed a § 1983 action alleging that the inmate received inadequate medical care from medical staff at a
county detention facility and at a medical center. The court held that the medical center, that was contractually
obliged to undertake medical treatment of inmates from the county detention center, and its physicians, were
state actors, and thus were subject to liability under § 1983 in action alleging that county inmate's death was
result of inadequate treatment he received at the center, even though the center was a privately owned facility
that cared for patients other than inmates, and inmates could be sent to other facilities. The court held that summary judgment for the defendants was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether physicians at
the medical center with which the county had contracted to provide care for its inmates had an ulterior financial
motive to discharge the inmate before his condition had stabilized, had a predetermined length of inmate's hospital stay, and had no intention of fully treating the inmate. (Sonoma County Main Adult Detention Facility, and
Sutter Medical Center, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
PSYCHOTROPIC DRUGS
SPECIAL HOUSING

Graves v. Arpaio, 623 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir, 2010). Pretrial detainees in a county jail system brought a class action
against a county sheriff and the county supervisors board, alleging violation of the detainees' civil rights. The
parties entered into a consent decree which was superseded by an amended judgment entered by stipulation of
the parties. The defendants moved to terminate the amended judgment. The district court entered a second
amended judgment which ordered prospective relief for the pretrial detainees. The district court awarded attorney fees to the detainees. The sheriff appealed the second amended judgment. The appeals court affirmed. The
court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by ordering prospective relief requiring the sheriff to
house all detainees taking psychotropic medications in temperatures not exceeding 85 degrees and requiring the
sheriff to provide food to pretrial detainees that met or exceeded the United States Department of Agriculture's
Dietary Guidelines for Americans. The district court had held that air temperatures above 85 degrees greatly
increased the risk of heat-related illnesses for individuals taking psychotropic medications, and thus that the
Eighth Amendment prohibited housing such detainees in areas where the temperature exceeded 85 degrees.
(Maricopa County Sheriff, Jail, Maricopa County Supervisors, Arizona)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
INADEQUATE CARE
WORK ASSIGNMENT

Hardy v. 3 Unknown Agents, 690 F.Supp.2d 1074 (C.D.Cal. 2010). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action
against prison physicians, alleging that the physicians failed to provide adequate medical care, in violation of the
Eighth Amendment, and that one physician retaliated against him for filing grievances, in violation of the First
Amendment. The physicians moved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment in part
and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the prisoner had an ear infection, constituting a serious medical need, while under the prison physician's
care, and, if so, whether the physician was deliberately indifferent to that need. The court found that a state prison physician was not entitled to qualified immunity from the prisoner's § 1983 claim alleging that the physician
provided inadequate medical care for his ear infection, where a reasonable physician would have understood that
failure to examine and treat the prisoner's ear in response to his complaints about ear pain and difficulty hearing
would violate the Eighth Amendment. According to the court, the state prison physician's prescribing of medication for the prisoner's psoriasis without actually examining the prisoner's back did not amount to deliberate indifference to the prisoner's serious medical needs, as would violate the Eighth Amendment. The court noted that
whether or not the physician's prescribing of medication without a back examination was sound medical practice,
it was hardly a failing of constitutional magnitude.
The court held that the prison physician was not deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's serious medical

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needs, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, in refusing to approve a “lay-in” or reduction of duties based on
the prisoner's back problems. The court found that the reasons given for the physician's decision, including lack
of documentation as to whether the prisoner underwent back surgery and his observations of the prisoner, were
reasonable. (California State Prison-Los Angeles County)
U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
INTAKE SCREENING
PRIVATE PHYSICIAN

Hardy v. City of New York, 732 F.Supp.2d 112 (E.D.N.Y. 2010). An inmate brought an action against a city
correctional department and correctional officers, among others, alleging deliberate indifference, false arrest, and
malicious prosecution. The defendants moved to dismiss and for summary judgment. The district court granted
the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that the inmate failed to demonstrate that correctional center officers were deliberately indifferent to his serious ear condition in violation of the Eighth Amendment, notwithstanding the contention that he was unreasonably forced to wait 10 days after his referral to see a specialist.
The court noted that the inmate met with medical staff during intake and on at least four other occasions during
his five-week incarceration, he was immediately and continually treated with oral antibiotics and other medications, and his symptoms were not so alarming as to indicate the need for immediate access to a specialist. The
court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether it was objectively reasonable for correctional transit facility officers and correctional facility medical staff to believe that
their conduct in dealing with the inmate's serious ear condition did not violate clearly established law. (City of
New York Department of Correction, Otis Bantum Correctional Center)

U.S. Appeals Court
ALCOHOL/DRUGS
INTAKE SCREENING
PRETRIAL DETAINEE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Harper v. Lawrence County, Ala., 592 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2010). Following a pretrial detainee's death from
alcohol withdrawal while in a county jail, the detainee's estate brought an action against the county, sheriff, police officers, and others under § 1983 and state law, alleging deliberate indifference to the detainee's serious
medical needs. The district court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss and the defendants appealed. The
appeals court affirmed and reversed in part. The court held that allegations supported a claim that jailers were
deliberately indifferent to the detainee's serious medical needs, but that the sheriff and others did not have actual
knowledge of the detainee's erratic and strange behavior while in jail. The court found that allegations supported
a claim that the sheriff and jail administrators were deliberately indifferent. The court held that allegations that
jailers were told by other inmates and other jail staff that the pretrial detainee was displaying erratic and strange
behavior, and that jailers took no steps to secure immediate medical attention for the detainee, supported a §
1983 claim that jailers were deliberately indifferent to the detainee's serious medical needs under the due process
clause. The court held that the detainee’s estate failed to allege how the sheriff and jail administrators could
possibly have had actual knowledge of the detainee's erratic and strange behavior while in jail, as required to
support a § 1983 claim alleging deliberate indifference to the detainee’s serious medical needs.
According to the court, for the purposes of a jailer's claim of qualified immunity from the § 1983 claim that
he was deliberately indifferent to the pretrial detainee's serious medical needs under the due process clause, it
was clearly established at the time of the detainee’s confinement that a jail official who was aware of, but ignored, dangers of acute alcohol withdrawal and waited for an emergency before obtaining medical care was
deliberately indifferent to the inmate's constitutional rights. The court found that the complaint's specific allegations that the sheriff and jail administrators who were responsible for management and administration of the jail
had customs or policies of improperly screening inmates for alcohol withdrawal and improperly handling inmates addicted to alcohol or drugs, together with its factual detail concerning a prior similar incident, satisfied
the pleading standards for stating a § 1983 claim of deliberate indifference to the pretrial detainee's serious medical needs under the due process clause based on supervisor liability. (Lawrence County Jail, Alabama)

U.S. Appeals Court
NEGLIGENCE
PRETRIAL DETAINEE

Harriman v. Hancock County, 627 F.3d 22 (1st Cir. 2010). An arrestee brought an action against a county, sheriff, and corrections officers alleging excessive force, false arrest, conspiracy, deprivation of due process, negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and the arrestee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that in the detainee's excessive force claim the detainee's assertion that officers' accounts of his fall in his jail cell were inconsistent and
inherently unbelievable was insufficient to defeat the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The court noted
that the detainee conceded he had no recollection of an alleged beating, the officers were consistent in reporting
that they saw the detainee fall and heard sounds in his cell that resembled a fall, all officers reported that they did
not the strike the detainee and did not see anyone strike the detainee, and a neurologist did not opine on the cause
of the detainee's injuries. (Hancock County Jail, Maine)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
TRANSFER
TRANSPORTATION

Hartmann v. Carroll, 719 F.Supp.2d 366 (D.Del. 2010). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that prison
officials failed to provide professional prevention, diagnosis, and treatment for his thyroid disease and failed to
provide medical transportation. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The
court held that the officials were not liable for failing to provide a medical transfer, where the officials had no
personal involvement in the transfer decision, and were not aware of the risk of serious injury that could have
occurred to the inmate and purposefully failed to take appropriate steps. The court found that a state prison medical official was not deliberately indifferent to the inmate's thyroid disease, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, where the inmate received medical care for his throat complaints and his thyroid condition. (James T.
Vaughn Correctional Center, Delaware)

U.S. District Court
EQUIPMENT
MALPRACTICE
NEGLIGENCE
CONTRACT SERVICES

Jaundoo v. Clarke, 690 F.Supp.2d 20 (D.Mass. 2010). A state prisoner brought an action against various Massachusetts Department of Correction (DOC) and UMass Correctional Health Service (UMCH) officials and employees, alleging that the defendants unlawfully deprived him of necessary medical care by confiscating his
crutches while he was incarcerated in a maximum security prison. The prisoner moved for leave to file an
amended complaint. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that UMCH
had sovereign immunity from the prisoner's proposed negligence and medical malpractice claims and that a
UMCH employee had immunity from liability for her alleged negligence and medical malpractice, under the

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Massachusetts Tort Claims Act (MTCA). The court held that the prisoner stated a deliberate indifference claim
under § 1983 against a Massachusetts Department of Correction (DOC) employee, a correctional officer, by
alleging that the officer intentionally created and submitted an incident report in which he falsely claimed that he
had seen prisoner running, for the purpose of depriving the prisoner of his crutches. The court found that supervisory and failure to train claims were precluded, where officials and employees did not directly participate in
the decision to deprive the prisoner of his crutches. (Massachusetts Department of Correction, UMass Correctional Health Service, MCI-Cedar Junction)
U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
FEMALE PRISONERS
PRETRIAL DETAINEE
SUICIDE ATTEMPT

Jessup v. Miami-Dade County, 697 F.Supp.2d 1312 (S.D.Fla. 2010). A pre-trial detainee who had been placed
on suicide precaution status at a county detention center for women, filed a state action against a corrections
officer and the county, asserting negligence and claims under § 1983 for the officer's deliberate indifference to
his serious medical needs, and against the county for failure to train or discipline staff. The defendants removed
the case to federal court and moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held
that the detainee's actions of drinking from a toilet, smearing menstrual blood on a window, and stepping on and
off a ledge in her cell, did not indicate a “strong likelihood” that she was about to inflict self-harm, as required
for jail officials to be liable for deliberately disregarding the detainee's serious medical needs in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment, when they failed to place her in four-point restraints. The detainee subsequently injured
her head. The court noted that the detainee's activities were bizarre but not violent, aggressive or out of control as
would require restraints. According to the court, a jail official did not act in a fashion “beyond gross negligence,”
as required to hold her liable for deliberate disregard of the pre-trial detainee's serious medical needs, in violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment, when the official failed to act to stop the detainee from self-inflicting head and
nose injuries by banging her head against a cell wall during her confinement after being placed on a suicide
watch. The officials immediately ordered the detainee to stop head banging activity and tried to open her cell.
(Miami-Dade Women's Detention Center, Florida)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
HANDICAP
WORK ASSIGNMENT

Jones v. Michigan, 698 F.Supp.2d 905 (E.D.Mich. 2010). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action against a state
correctional facility's classification director and a correction officer. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the inmate's grievance against the classification
director and correction officer gave fair notice of his claim that he was harassed and forced to perform work as a
sports equipment handler, despite fact that he was wearing a neck brace and walking with a cane due to injuries
arising from an automobile accident. But the court found that the correction officer was not deliberately indifferent to the inmate's injuries, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, where the officer was never told by the inmate
that he could not perform work duties as a sports equipment handler. Similarly, the classification director was
not deliberately indifferent to the inmate's injuries, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, where the director was
never advised of an accommodation notice or of the physician's diagnoses that the inmate could not perform
work duties. (Saginaw Correctional Facility, Michigan)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
EMERGENCY CARE
NEGLIGENCE

Jones v. Muskegon County, 625 F.3d 935 (6th Cir. 2010). A father, as the personal representative of the estate of
a deceased pretrial detainee, brought an action against a county and various corrections officers and medical
staff, alleging constitutional claims pursuant to § 1983, gross negligence and intentional infliction of emotional
distress. The district court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment. The father appealed. The
appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded. The court held that assignment charts listing corrections officers assigned to the pretrial detainee's area during the period in which his health deteriorated, and
affidavits from other detainees who witnessed his deterioration and the officers' alleged failure to assist the detainee, were insufficient to create a fact issue as to whether the officers were deliberately indifferent towards the
detainee's serious medical needs in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court noted that the affidavits
referred to “guards” in a general sense without specifying wrongdoing attributable to any particular officer, and
did not specify which officers observed the detainee's deterioration or ignored his requests for medical care.
The court found that a correctional officer's failure to immediately call an ambulance upon observing the
pretrial detainee's deteriorating health condition was not deliberate indifference towards his serious medical
needs as would violate the Fourteenth Amendment, where the officer believed the decision to call an ambulance
was not hers to make but was command's, and the officer attended to the detainee's medical needs and made
efforts to make him more comfortable. But the court found that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether prison nurses were aware of the risk to the pretrial detainee's health and chose
to disregard the risk, and whether the prison nurses were grossly negligent under Michigan law as to the pretrial
detainee's medical care. (Muskegon County Jail, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
INADEQUATE CARE

Kasiem v. Switz, 756 F.Supp.2d 570 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). A state prisoner, proceeding pro se, brought a § 1983
action against the New York Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) and prison employees, alleging violations of his rights involving the defendants' purported failure to adequately treat his claimed hearing problems
and related ear pain. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The court held that the
prisoner failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, as required under the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(PLRA), prior to bringing a § 1983 action, where any grievances possibly covering his claims were never fully
exhausted or became exhausted only months after the suit was filed. (Sullivan Correction Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
DENIAL
GID- Gender Identity
Disorder

Konitzer v. Frank, 711 F.Supp.2d 874 (E.D.Wis. 2010). A prisoner, a biological male suffering from Gender
Identity Disorder (GID), brought an action against prison officials alleging violation of Eighth Amendment's
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment by denying him certain medical services related to his disorder.
The district court granted summary judgment for the prison officials in part and denied in part. The court held
that the prisoner's Gender Identity Disorder (GID) was a “serious medical need,” as required to establish the
prisoner's § 1983 claim alleging that denial of his request for the opportunity to live as a female, as part of his
treatment for GID, violated his Eighth Amendment rights. According to the court, although the prisoner had

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received some hormonal therapy to provide relief from GID symptoms, denial of the opportunity to live as a
female allegedly caused the prisoner to be depressed, resulting in self-mutilation of his genitals and suicide attempts. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
triadic therapy for Gender Identity Disorder (GID), which consisted of hormone therapy, real-life experience
living as the preferred gender, and sex reassignment surgery, was the appropriate treatment for the prisoner. The
court also found that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact regarding whether
prison officials' denial of a request by the male prisoner to live as a female by, for example, wearing makeup and
female undergarments and removing facial hair, constituted deliberate indifference to the prisoner's serious medical needs, and whether security concerns justified such denial. (Wisconsin Department of Corrections)
U.S. District Court
NEGLIGENCE
TRANSFER

Lin Li Qu v. Central Falls Detention Facility Corp., 717 F.Supp.2d 233 (D.R.I. 2010). A federal immigration
detainee's widow sued the Government under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), asserting claims arising out
of the detainee's care while he was detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). The government
moved to dismiss. The district court denied the motion. The court held that the widow met the FTCA's notice
requirement and that her FTCA claims were not barred by the independent contractor defense. The court held
that the widow stated negligence claims actionable under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), when she alleged
that after the Government was aware, or should have been aware, of the detainee's deteriorating medical condition, it acted negligently when it ordered the transfers of the detainee to different facilities and when it improperly reviewed the basis for his custody and detention. (Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Wyatt Detention
Center, Rhode Island, Franklin Co. House of Corrections, Greenfield, Mass., Franklin County Jail, Vermont)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
PRETRIAL DETAINEE

Lum v. County of San Joaquin, 756 F.Supp.2d 1243 (E.D.Cal. 2010). An arrestee's survivors brought an action
against a county, city, and several city and county employees, alleging § 1983 claims for various civil rights
violations and a state law claim for wrongful death arising from the arrestee's accidental drowning after his release from the county jail. The defendants moved to dismiss portions of the complaint and the survivors moved
for leave to amend. The district court granted the defendants' motion in part and denied in part, and granted the
plaintiffs' motion. The survivors alleged that the city's police sergeants made a decision to arrest the individual
for being under the influence in public, despite lack of evidence of alcohol use and knowledge that the individual
was being medicated for bipolar disorder, and to book him on a “kickout” charge so that he would be released
from jail six hours later. The court found that the arresting officers, by taking the arrestee into custody, created a
special relationship with the arrestee, similar to the special relationship between a jailer and a prisoner, so as to
create a duty of care for the purposes of wrongful death claim under California law, arising from the arrestee's
accidental drowning following his release from the county jail. The court noted that it was foreseeable that the
arrestee needed medical attention and that there was a risk posed by releasing him without providing such attention. The court held that the county, city, and arresting officers were entitled to immunity, under a California
Tort Claims Act section related to liability of public entities and employees for the release of prisoners, for the
wrongful death of the arrestee, only as to the basic decision to release the arrestee from the county jail, but not as
to the defendants' ministerial acts after the initial decision to release the arrestee. The court noted that the arrestee
had a lacerated foot, was covered with vomit and had trouble walking, and had a seizure while he was in a holding cell. The arrestee’s body was found floating in the San Joaquin River, approximately two miles west of the
county jail, shortly after he was released. (San Joaquin County Jail, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
DENTAL CARE
DELAY OF TREATMENT
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

McGowan v. Hulick, 612 F.3d 636 (7th Cir. 2010). A prisoner who suffered complications from an upper molar
extraction brought a pro se action, under § 1983 and Illinois law, against a dentist, a prison's dental director, the
regular prison physician, and the prison warden, alleging that they were all negligent and deliberately indifferent
to his plight. The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice and denied the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration. The appeals court vacated and remanded. The court held that the prisoner's allegations were sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against the dental director for delay in obtaining treatment. According to the court, the prisoner was forced to wait three months to see a dentist after he first
complained of dental pain, the prison dental director knew that the prisoner needed to see an oral surgeon after a
botched extraction yet required him to wait in pain for two months until a contract oral surgeon was scheduled to
come to the prison, and the director stalled in authorizing a referral to an outside surgeon after the contract surgeon cancelled his planned visit. The court held that the prisoner's allegation that the prison dentist decided to
extract his tooth rather than to fill it, was insufficient to state an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference
claim, where there was no allegation that the dentist chose extraction without exercising professional judgment.
(Menard Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
MEDICATION
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
DENIAL

Miller v. Beard, 699 F.Supp.2d 697 (E.D.Pa. 2010). An inmate brought a § 1983 suit against prison officials, a
health care provider and medical personnel, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs under
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The court held that a
prison nurse was not deliberately indifferent to the inmate's mental health issues, thus defeating his § 1983 claim
of an Eighth Amendment violation, despite the claim that she engineered the discontinuance of his psychotropic
medications by falsely accusing him of hoarding his medication. According to the court, the nurse had a reasonable subjective fear that the inmate was hoarding his medication. The court held that summary judgment was
precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether a physician failed to provide adequate treatment for
the inmate after taking the inmate off powerful psychotropic medications, and whether the abrupt discontinuance
of the medications had a negative impact on the inmate's mood and behavior.
The court found that the injuries the inmate suffered as a consequence of the physician's refusal to provide
him with asthma, allergy, and migraine medication were not “serious,” thus defeating the inmate's § 1983 claim
of an Eighth Amendment violation in deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. (State Correctional
Institution at Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania)

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U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
NEGLIGENCE
PRETRIAL DETAINEE

Molina v. New York, 697 F.Supp.2d 276 (N.D.N.Y. 2010). A juvenile detainee brought an action against a state,
its Office of Children and Family Services (OCFS) that operated a youth correctional facility, state and facility
officials, and detention aides, asserting § 1983 claims and claims of negligence and assault and battery. The
defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The
court held that the juvenile detainee's allegations that detention aides at the youth correctional facility broke his
arm while restraining him were sufficient to support a plausible Eighth Amendment claim that the aides used
excessive force. The court held that the detainee's allegations that he had to wait approximately 15 hours before
being diagnosed and scheduled for surgery despite the obviousness of his injuries and his own pleading for assistance, were sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference to his serious medical
needs. (Louis Gossett Jr. Residential Center, New York)

U.S. District Court
DENTAL CARE
EMERGENCY CARE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Mosby v. Cavey, 686 F.Supp.2d 868 (W.D.Wis. 2010). A pretrial detainee sued medical personnel at a county
jail, asserting a Fourteenth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference to his serious medical need. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court denied the motion. The court held that summary judgment
was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to when the inmate's impacted wisdom tooth presented an
emergency condition requiring surgery, and whether dentists refused to refer him to an outside oral surgeon
because they were not permitted to make such referrals. The court also found genuine issues of material fact as
to whether a failure of prison nurses to schedule the inmate to see the dentists or consult with the dentists was
intentional mistreatment likely to seriously aggravate the inmate's serious dental condition. (Dane County Jail,
Wisconsin)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
PSYCHOTROPIC DRUGS

Orr v. Larkins, 610 F.3d 1032 (8th Cir. 2010). An inmate brought a § 1983 claim against prison officials alleging
his rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Eighth Amendment were violated
when he was kept in administrative segregation for nine months. The district court dismissed the complaint as
frivolous and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the inmate's nine-month stay
in administrative segregation did not constitute an atypical and significant hardship when compared to the burdens of ordinary prison life, as required to support the inmate's claim that his liberty interests under the Fourteenth Amendment were violated. The court found that prison officials who provided the inmate with antidepressants, and later with anti-psychotic medication, during his nine-month stay in administrative segregation,
were not deliberately indifferent to the inmate's worsening mental illness, as required to support the inmate's
Eighth Amendment claim. (Eastern Reception, Diagnostic and Correctional Center, Missouri)

U.S. District Court
ADA-Americans with
Disabilities Act
DENIAL
EQUIPMENT
HANDICAP
HEARING IMPAIRED
RA-Rehabilitation Act

Paulone v. City of Frederick, 718 F.Supp.2d 626 (D.Md. 2010). An arrestee, a deaf woman, brought an action
against a state, a county board, and a sheriff alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),
the Rehabilitation Act, and related torts. The state and sheriff moved to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that the arrestee
failed to allege that any program or activity she was required to complete following her arrest for driving under
the influence (DUI) and during her subsequent probation, received federal funds, as required to state Rehabilitation Act claims against the state for discriminating against her and denying her benefits because of her deafness.
The court found that the arrestee stated an ADA claim with her allegations that, after her arrest and during her
detention, police officers denied her the use of a working machine that would have allowed her to make a telephone call, help in reading and understanding forms, and access to a sign language interpreter. (Frederick County
Board of County Commissioners, Frederick County Adult Detention Center, Maryland)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELAY IN TREATMENT
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
FEMALE PRISONERS

Pourmoghani-Esfahani v. Gee, 625 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2010). A female pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against a deputy sheriff, alleging excessive force and deliberate indifference to her serious medical needs.
The district court denied the deputy's motion for summary judgment and the deputy appealed. The appeals court
affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that the deputy sheriff was not qualifiedly immune from the pretrial detainee's § 1983 excessive force claim, since the deputy's alleged actions, including
slamming the detainee's head to the floor seven to eight times while she was restrained, if proven, were obviously beyond what the Constitution would allow under the circumstances. The court held the deputy sheriff's alleged
actions or inactions following her altercation with the pretrial detainee, if proven, did not constitute deliberate
indifference to the detainee's serious medical needs, where: the detainee alleged that the deputy dispatched her to
her cell directly after the altercation; the nurse saw her within approximately two minutes of her arrival in the
cell; the nurse informed the deputy that the detainee had a possible nose injury but that her nose was not broken;
the nurse and an officer then attended to the detainee within approximately five minutes of the detainee's cellmate's first signals for help; and, the detainee then received continuous medical care until she was taken to hospital. The court noted that no preexisting law clearly established that an approximately two-to-five-minute delay of
medical care, either while the detainee moved from a waiting room to her cell following an altercation or while
her cellmate waited for the guard to respond to her signaling, was a constitutional violation.
The appeals court accepted the depiction of events from recordings from closed-circuit video cameras placed
throughout jail, rather than crediting the detainee's account of the altercation, where the video obviously contradicted the detainee's version of the facts. But the court noted that video failed to convey spoken words or tone
and sometimes failed to provide unobstructed views of the events, and the court credited the detainee's version
where no obviously contradictory video evidence was available. (Hillsborough County Jail, Florida)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
DENIAL

Reed-Bey v. Pramstaller, 603 F.3d 322 (6th Cir. 2010). A state prison inmate brought a § 1983 action against the
Michigan Department of Corrections, the health-management company that provided medical services for a
prison, and several prison and company officials. The inmate alleged that the defendants violated his Eighth
Amendment rights by denying him adequate medical care for a separated shoulder he suffered during a prison
basketball game. The district court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment and dismissal for the
inmate's failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The inmate appealed. The appeals court reversed. The court

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held that the inmate properly exhausted administrative remedies as required under the Prison Litigation Reform
Act (PLRA) with respect to his § 1983 claim that prison officials violated his Eighth Amendment rights, even
though the inmate failed to identify the “names of all those involved” in the grievance as required by the prison's
internal grievance policies. The court noted that the inmate invoked one complete round of the prison's three-step
grievance procedure and the prison addressed the merits of the inmate's claim at each step of the process rather
than defaulting the inmate's claim as procedurally barred. (Mound Correctional Facility, Michigan Department of
Corrections, and Corrections Medical Services, Inc.)
U.S. District Court
ADA-Americans with
Disabilities Act
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
EQUIPMENT
RA- Rehabilitation Act

Robinson v. Catlett, 725 F.Supp.2d 1203 (S.D.Cal. 2010). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action against prison
officials alleging constitutional violations and violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the
Rehabilitation Act. The officials moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court
held that the decision to assign the inmate to an upper bunk did not demonstrate deliberate indifference to his
serious medical needs. The court noted that the inmate requested a vacant cell, rather than a lower bunk assignment, and officials assigned the inmate to a lower bunk once they understood problem. The court held the confiscation of the inmate's cane did not demonstrate deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs and did not
violate the Rehabilitation Act. The cane was confiscated after the inmate attempted to strike another prisoner
with it. The court found that prison officials' denial of the disabled inmate's request for his own cell did not
amount to intentional discrimination on the basis of a disability, required to warrant the award of monetary damages under ADA or the Rehabilitation Act, even though officials had initially placed the inmate in an upper
bunk. (Calipatria State Prison, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
MENTAL HEALTH
SUICIDE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Simmons v. Navajo County, Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2010). Parents of a pretrial detainee who committed
suicide while in custody brought a state-court action against various jail personnel, their supervisors, and their
county employer, asserting claims under state tort law, § 1983, and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the parents appealed. The appeals
court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court held that there was no evidence that a prison
nurse knew the pretrial detainee who subsequently committed suicide was in substantial danger of killing himself, as required to demonstrate the prison nurse was deliberately indifferent to such risk in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. According to the court, although the nurse was aware that the detainee had previously attempted to take his own life, suffered from depression, and was at some risk of making another attempt, at the
time detainee killed himself, over a month had elapsed since his suicide attempt, during which time the detainee
received counseling, took antidepressants, and by all accounts, was doing better. The court found that prison
nurses were not deliberately indifferent, under the Fourteenth Amendment, to the detainee who committed suicide, because they failed to ensure that the detainee had daily evaluations pursuant to the suicide prevention
policy, absent evidence that they knew detainee was in a suicidal crisis. According to the court, the prison nurses'
failure to retrieve the used gauze the pretrial detainee used to hang himself did not constitute deliberate indifference in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, absent evidence that the prison nurses were aware the pretrial
detainee had accumulated the gauze. The court found that the teenage pretrial detainee waved the prison nurse
away on the morning of the day he committed suicide, when the nurse tried to speak with him, because he was
absorbed in watching television, did not show that the prison nurse was subjectively aware of the detainee's risk
of suicide, so as to support a deliberate indifference claim against the prison nurse under the Fourteenth
Amendment. (Navajo County Jail, Arizona)

U.S. Appeals Court
ALCOHOL/DRUGS
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
FEMALE PRISONER
PRETRIAL DETAINEE

Smith v. County of Lenawee, 600 F.3d 686 (6th Cir. 2010). A female detainee's estate brought an action against a
county, sheriff, on-call physician, police officers, and parole agent, under § 1983 and state law, arising out of the
detainee's death while in the county's custody. The district court denied the parole agent's motion for summary
judgment on a gross negligence claim. The agent filed interlocutory appeal. The appeals court reversed. The
court held that the parole agent's failure to intercede on behalf of the detainee in county custody, upon arriving at
the jail to serve the detainee a notice of parole violation charges and determining that the detainee was unable to
be transported or served, was not the “proximate cause” of the detainee's death, so as to entitle the agent to governmental immunity from gross negligence liability under Michigan law. The court noted that the detainee was
in the custody of county jail officials in the hours leading up to her death, the parole agent worked for the state
Department of Corrections, not the county, the detainee had been experiencing delirium tremens (DT) symptoms
for close to 48 hours prior to arrival at the jail, a physician had been notified of the detainee's condition and told
jail officials to monitor the detainee, the agent was present at the jail for a matter of minutes only, and county jail
officials failed to check the detainee until 40 minutes after the agent left the jail. (Lenawee County Sheriff’s
Department, and Michigan Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
DENIAL

Stack v. Karnes, 750 F.Supp.2d 892 (S.D.Ohio 2010). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against a county and
the county Board of Commissioners, alleging violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that
the county was not entitled to immunity afforded under Ohio law to counties. The court found that the inmate's
allegations that the county historically had a policy, custom, and practice of failing to implement adequate training programs for jail personnel, and that he was denied medical treatment for his diabetes, were sufficient to
state a Monell claim against the county for violation of the Eighth Amendment . According to the court, the
county Board of Commissioners had no duty to keep a safe jail, and therefore, could not be liable in the inmate's
§ 1983 action alleging he was denied adequate medical care in violation of the Eighth Amendment, where the
sheriff was the entity in charge of the jail, rather than the Board. (Franklin County Corrections Center, Ohio)

U.S. District Court
DENTAL CARE
INADEQUATE CARE

Swan v. U.S., 698 F.Supp.2d 227 (D.Mass. 2010). A prisoner brought a pro se action against the United States
under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), asserting negligence after federal medical center officials allegedly
failed to provide him with adequate dental care. The government moved for summary judgment. The district
court held that a fact issue as to whether the prisoner was afforded the right to preventative dental care precluded

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summary judgment. Despite his periodontal disease, the prisoner did not receive a dental cleaning for almost one
year following his arrival. (Federal Medical Center Devens, Massachusetts)
U.S. District Court
DENIAL
TRANSFER

Tafari v. McCarthy, 714 F.Supp.2d 317 (N.D.N.Y. 2010). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against employees of the New York State Department of Correctional Services (DOCS), alleging, among other things, that
the employees violated his constitutional rights by subjecting him to excessive force, destroying his personal
property, denying him medical care, and subjecting him to inhumane conditions of confinement. The employees
moved for summary judgment, and the prisoner moved to file a second amended complaint and to appoint counsel. The court held that a state prison correctional officer's alleged throwing of urine and feces on the prisoner to
wake him up, while certainly repulsive, was de minimis use of force, and was not sufficiently severe to be considered repugnant to the conscience of mankind, and thus the officer's conduct did not violate the Eighth
Amendment. The court found that officers who were present in the prisoner's cell when another officer allegedly
threw urine and feces on the prisoner lacked a reasonable opportunity to stop the alleged violation, given the
brief and unexpected nature of the incident, and thus the officers present in the cell could not be held liable for
failing to intervene. The court found that even if a correctional officers' captain failed to thoroughly investigate
the alleged incident in which one officer threw urine and feces on the prisoner to wake him up, such failure to
investigate did not violate the prisoner's due process rights, since the prisoner did not have due process right to a
thorough investigation of his grievances.
According to the court, one incident in which state correctional officers allegedly interfered with the prisoner's outgoing legal mail did not create a cognizable claim under § 1983 for violation of the prisoner's First and
Fourteenth Amendment rights, absent a showing that the prisoner suffered any actual injury, that his access to
courts was chilled, or that his ability to legally represent himself was impaired. The court held that there was no
evidence that the state prisoner suffered any physical injury as result of an alleged incident in which a correctional officer spit chewing tobacco in his face, as required to maintain an Eighth Amendment claim based on
denial of medical care. The court found that, even if a state prisoner's right to file prison grievances was protected by the First Amendment, a restriction limiting the prisoner's filing of grievances to two per week did not violate the prisoner's constitutional rights, since the prisoner was abusing the grievance program. The court noted
that the prisoner filed an exorbitant amount of grievances, including 115 in a two-month period, most of which
were deemed frivolous. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact
as to whether state correctional officers used excessive force against the prisoner in the course of his transport to
a different facility. The court held that state correctional officers were not entitled to qualified immunity from the
prisoner's § 1983 excessive force claim arising from his alleged beating by officers during his transfer to a different facility, where a reasonable juror could have concluded that the officers knew or should have known that
their conduct violated the prisoner's Eighth Amendment rights, and it was clearly established that prison official's
use of force against an inmate for reasons that did not serve penological purpose violated the inmate's constitutional rights. The inmate allegedly suffered injuries, including bruises and superficial lacerations on his body,
which the court found did not constitute a serious medical condition.
The court held that state prison officials' alleged retaliatory act of leaving the lights on in the prisoner's cell in
a special housing unit (SHU) 24 hours per day did not amount to cruel and unusual treatment, in violation of the
Eighth Amendment. According to the court, the prisoner failed to demonstrate a causal connection between his
conduct and the adverse action of leaving the lights on 24 hours per day, since the illumination policy applied to
all inmates in SHU, not just the prisoner, and constant illumination was related to a legitimate penological interest in protecting both guards and inmates in SHU. (New York State Department of Correctional Services, Eastern New York Correctional Facility)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Tate v. Troutman, 683 F.Supp.2d 897 (E.D.Wis. 2010). A county jail inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that
officials failed to provide constitutionally sufficient medical care. The inmate moved for the entry of a default
judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that a county jail officer and medical officials were not personally involved in the allegedly inadequate medical treatment provided
to the inmate after a fall in his cell, and thus were not liable under § 1983 for any compensatory or nominal damages for an Eighth Amendment violation. The court noted that even though the inmate suffered pain after the fall
and had blood in his bowel movements, the inmate had a history of severe low back and bilateral neck pain,
headaches, and rectal bleeding before the fall. The court held that county jail officials failed to provide adequate
medical care for the inmate's dislocated shoulder, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and thus the inmate was
entitled to an award of compensatory damages for past pain and suffering. The court noted that the jail physician
refused to see the inmate or speak to him, jail officials rejected the inmate's grievances regarding his inadequate
medical treatment, and the inmate experienced physical pain and emotional distress for three or four weeks due
to his lack of adequate diagnosis and treatment of his shoulder injury by immobilization.
The court concluded that an award of $27,000 was the appropriate amount to compensate the inmate for his
past pain and suffering, where the inmate experienced pain and suffering for about one month. The court found
that county jail officials showed callous indifference towards the inmate's medical needs, and thus a punitive
damages award of $9,000 was warranted to deter or punish the Eighth Amendment violation. The court also
found that the inmate was entitled to prejudgment interest on the compensatory damage award at an average
monthly prime rate compounded annually from the period beginning on the date of his injury through the date of
the entry of judgment. (Milwaukee Country Jail, Wisconsin)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
POLICIES
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Thomas v. Cook County Sheriff's Dept., 604 F.3d 293 (7th Cir. 2010). A mother brought a § 1983 and state
wrongful death action against a county, sheriff, and various officers and medical technicians at a county jail after
her son died from pneumococcal meningitis while being held as a pretrial detainee. The mother asserted a claim
of deliberate indifference to medical needs as well as a common-law claim for wrongful death. Following a jury
verdict for the mother, the district court, ordered the reduction of the total damage award from $4,450,000 to
$4,150,000. The defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part. The

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court held that the issue of whether county corrections officers were subjectively aware of the pretrial detainee's
serious medical condition that culminated in death from pneumococcal meningitis, as required to support the
detainee’s survivor's § 1983 deliberate indifference action against a county and officers, was for the jury, given
the cellmates' and other witnesses' accounts of the detainee's vomiting and exhibiting other signs of serious illness within plain view of officers without any response from them, and given testimony as to the inmates' various complaints to officers regarding his condition. According to the court, issues of whether the county had a
custom or practice of failing to timely review jail inmates' medical requests, and a causal link between such
failure and the death of the pretrial detainee from pneumococcal meningitis were for the jury. The court noted
that the supervisor and individual medical technicians for the contractor that handled medical services for inmates testified to the practice of not retrieving inmate medical requests on a daily basis, and the detainee's fellow
inmates testified to having filed numerous medical requests on the detainee's behalf.
The court found that a causal link was not shown between the county sheriff's department's alleged policy of
understaffing the county jail and the pretrial detainee's death from pneumococcal meningitis. Although individual deputies employed as corrections officers were shown to have known of and ignored the detainee's medical
needs, there was no evidence that such inaction was due to understaffing rather than other causes. The court
found that a compensatory damages award of $4 million was not excessive. The award was not out of line when
measured against those in other similar cases, and the award had rational connection with evidence that the detainee was 32 years old, had three children whom he supported, and had died of a treatable illness after numerous
fellow inmates had alerted corrections officers about his condition. (Cook County Jail, Illinois)
U.S. Appeals Court
MISDIAGNOSIS
DUE PROCESS
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Townsend v. Jefferson County, 601 F.3d 1152 (11th Cir. 2010). A detainee who suffered a miscarriage at a county jail brought a civil rights action against the county, county sheriff, two deputies, and the nurse who had examined her. The district court denied the deputies' motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds,
and they appealed. The appeals court reversed and rendered. The court held that the injury suffered by the pregnant detainee who used crack cocaine daily and had a miscarriage at the county jail was not caused by any deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs by the deputies, in violation of due process. According to the
court, the deputies knew that the detainee had spoken with a nurse at the jail who determined that the detainee's
condition was not an emergency, and there was no evidence that the detainee's situation was so obviously dire
that the deputies must have known that the nurse had grossly misjudged her condition. (Birmingham Jail, Jefferson County, Alabama)

U.S. District Court
INVOLUNTARY
MEDICATION
MENTAL HEALTH

U.S. v. Burhoe, 692 F.Supp.2d 137 (D.Me. 2010). The government moved for order permitting involuntary administration of medication to render a defendant competent to stand trial on charge of possession of firearms
after having been previously committed to a mental institution. The district court held that the government established an important governmental interest in the prosecution of the defendant, granting the motion. The court
noted that the defendant was charged with the offense of possession of firearms after having been previously
committed to a mental institution, arising out of an incident in which he allegedly fired a rifle at a state trooper
and ultimately was shot by the police, and there were also state charges pending against the defendant for aggravated attempted murder and reckless conduct with a firearm, arising out of the same incident that brought about
the federal charge. (Maine)

U.S. District Court
ADA-Americans with
Disabilities Act
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
HEARING IMPAIRED

Ulibarri v. City & County of Denver, 742 F.Supp.2d 1192 (D.Colo. 2010). Deaf detainees, and the estate of one
detainee who committed suicide, brought a civil rights action challenging their arrests and detentions by the
members of city and county's police and sheriff departments. The district court granted the defendants’ motions
for summary judgment in part and denied in part. The court held that failure to provide a deaf detainee with a
sign language interpreter during the intake process did not constitute disability discrimination. The court found
that jail deputies were not deliberately indifferent to a deaf detainee's needs. But the court held that summary
judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the deaf detainee had access to the jail's
services after he was booked and placed in his housing assignment to the same extent as inmates who could
communicate verbally, and whether the detainee could access the jail's services without assistance.
The court held that jail deputies were not deliberately indifferent to needs of a deaf detainee who committed
suicide, and because there was no underlying Eighth Amendment violation, supervisor defendants were not liable in either their official or individual capacities for the detainee's suicide, and the municipality was not liable
for failure to adequately train and supervise the deputies. The court noted that no evidence indicated that the
detainee had been suicidal prior to his incarceration or at the time of his medical screening, but rather, evidence
established that the detainee could communicate through writing and otherwise sufficiently to at least alert medical staff that he needed assistance. The court noted that medical staff made regular and frequent visits to the jail.
But the court also held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact existed as to
whether the sheriff's department breached a duty to the detainee to take reasonable care to prevent the detainee
from committing suicide, and whether any such breach proximately caused the detainee's suicide.
The court held that jail officials' late night release of the deaf detainee and the potential harm from being
unable to communicate or get herself home did not demonstrate the level of outrageousness required to establish
a substantive due process violation under a state-created danger theory. According to the court, the detainee
failed to show that officers would have been aware of the risk that, instead of waiting in the facility for public
transportation to begin, the detainee would leave and accept a ride from a stranger. The detainee was released at
2:00 a.m. and she was given bus tokens by a deputy sheriff. Her husband had called the facility to say that he
was on his way to pick her up, but the message was not relayed to the detainee. There was a waiting area in the
lobby of the facility but she did not notice it and attempted to get herself home on her own. (City and County of
Denver Police and Sheriff Departments, Pre-arraignment Detention Facility, Denver County Jail, Colorado)

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U.S. District Court
EQUIPMENT
TREATMENT

Webster v. Fischer, 694 F.Supp.2d 163 (N.D.N.Y. 2010). An inmate brought a civil rights action against prison
officials, alleging discrimination, retaliation, harassment, and violations of his constitutional rights, federal statutes, state law, and regulations. The inmate sough declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, as well as money
damages in the amount of $500,000. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
The court held that misbehavior reports and disciplinary actions were not in retaliation for the inmate's participation in an inmate liaison committee, where the inmate was found guilty of the charges in the misbehavior reports
based on admissions at a disciplinary hearing. The court found that the inmate did not suffer from the infliction
of any physical injury or pain as a result of a corrections officers' allegedly harassing conduct.
According to the court, the inmate did not suffer deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty interest by
confinement in a special housing unit for 90 days. The court held that the inmate's sleep apnea was not sufficiently serious to warrant Eighth Amendment protection, where the inmate admitted that he did not use a breathing machine for a 90-day period that he was confined to a special housing unit, and there was no evidence that
the inmate experienced any physical deterioration or other consequences as a result of the lapse in treatment.
The court held that there was no evidence that the inmate was placed on a mail watch or that any of his mail
was illegally opened or intentionally misdirected. (Cayuga Correctional Facility, New York State Department of
Correctional Services)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE

Wells v. Bureau County, 723 F.Supp.2d 1061 (C.D.Ill. 2010). The estate of a 17-year-old pretrial detainee who
committed suicide while in custody at a county jail brought an action against the county, county sheriff, and
corrections officers, alleging claims pursuant to § 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the
Rehabilitation Act. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part
and denied in part. The court held that the fact that the pretrial detainee, who committed suicide while in custody
at a county jail, did not need a mental health professional when he was booked at the jail after being arrested on
charges of illegal consumption of alcohol by a minor and possession of drug paraphernalia, was not dispositive
of whether the detainee presented a serious need when he was booked at the jail approximately two weeks later
after being arrested on charges of contributing to the delinquency of a minor.
The court held that information received by booking officers after pretrial detainee's suicide, including information that the detainee had been kicked out of his father's house, that the detainee was living in a tent, that the
detainee and his girlfriend had a suicide pact, and that the detainee had commented to other inmates that if he
was going to prison he would “shoot himself,” was irrelevant to establishing what was in the officers' minds at
time they were alleged to have been deliberately indifferent to the risk that the detainee would commit suicide.
According to the court, the corrections officers lacked actual knowledge of a significant likelihood that the detainee would imminently seek to take his own life, or even of facts that would promote the inference of a subjective awareness of such a substantial risk, and thus the officers did not act with deliberate indifference to that risk
in violation of due process, despite any alleged negligence in assessing and observing the detainee prior to his
suicide. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
the county sheriff's policy that correctional officers not personally observe prisoners during the overnight shift
was constitutionally inadequate. From 10 PM to 6:30 AM, detainees are locked in their cells. During the overnight period from 11 PM on June 8, 2007, to 5 AM on June 9, 2007, Officer Keefer did eleven cell checks on
Cellblock 2. While standing in the guard walkway, officers are able to look into two of the four cells and observe
detainees in those cells, but officers are unable to see the detainees in the other two cells in the cellblock. During
her checks, Officer Keefer personally observed the detainees in two of the cells in Cellblock 2 because she could
see them from the guard walkway, but did not observe Wells in his cell because she was unable to see into his
cell from the guard walkway. At 6:45 AM, when another officer let the detainees in Cellblock 2 out of their cells
for breakfast, he discovered Wells hanging in his cell. (Bureau County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
DELAY OF CARE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
PRETRIAL DETAINEE
TRAINING

Wereb v. Maui County, 727 F.Supp.2d 898 (D.Hawai‘i 2010). Parents of a pretrial detainee, a diabetic who died
in custody, brought an action against a county and county police department employees, alleging under § 1983
that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to the detainee's medical needs, and asserting a claim for wrongful death under state law. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in
part and denied in part. The detainee died in a 2-cell police lockup. The court held that county police officers and
public safety aids who did not interact with or observe the pretrial detainee not moving in his cell were not subjectively aware of the serious medical need of the detainee, and thus those officers and aids were not deliberately
indifferent to that need, in violation of the detainee's due process rights. The court held that summary judgment
as to the § 1983 Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference claim was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether county police officers who interacted with the pretrial detainee and/or a county public
safety aid who did not see the detainee move around in his cell while she monitored him over video had subjective knowledge of the serious medical need of detainee, precluding summary judgment.
The court found that neither county police officers who interacted with the pretrial detainee, nor a county
public safety aid who did not see the detainee move around in his cell while she monitored him over video, were
entitled to qualified immunity from the § 1983 Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference claim brought by
the detainee's parents, where at the time of the detainee's death, it was clearly established that officers could not
intentionally deny or delay access to medical care. The court held that summary judgment was precluded on the
§ 1983 municipal liability claim by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the county adequately trained its
employees to monitor the medical needs of the pretrial detainees, and, if so, as to whether the county's inadequate training of its employees was deliberately different, and as to whether inadequate training “actually
caused” the death of the pretrial detainee. (Lahaina Police Station, Maui County, Hawaii)

U.S. Appeals Court
NEGLIGENCE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Williams v. Jackson, 600 F.3d 1007 (8th Cir. 2010). A former inmate brought Eighth Amendment claims against
a prison maintenance supervisor and three correction officers alleging that they willfully and maliciously exposed him to ultraviolet radiation resulting in physical injury. The district court denied the defendants' motion for
summary judgment, and they appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The
court held that correction officers were not entitled to qualified immunity from the inmate's claims alleging that

XXIII

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officers used excessive force and acted with deliberate indifference, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, in
removing the shield used to protect cell occupants from exposure to ultraviolet radiation from a germicidal ultraviolet radiation lamp used for the treatment of tuberculosis. The court found that officers acted in retaliation for a
comment made by another inmate during a “shake down” of the cell, and that officers ignored demands to replace the shield or deactivate the light, since reasonable officers were on sufficient notice that they may not purposefully expose inmates to potentially harmful radiation in the complete absence of a penological purpose. The
court found that the inmate's allegation that the prison's maintenance supervisor received notice that correction
officers had removed the protective shield but failed to take timely action to replace the shield alleged was nothing more than simple negligence, and thus was insufficient to state an Eighth Amendment violation. (East Arkansas Regional Unit, Arkansas Department of Corrections)
U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
PRIVATE PHYSICIAN
WORK ASSIGNMENT

Wright v. Genovese, 694 F.Supp.2d 137 (N.D.N.Y. 2010). A state prisoner, who underwent open-heart surgery,
brought a § 1983 action against a private physician and three physicians who were employed by, or contractors
for, the Department of Correctional Services (DOCS). The prisoner alleged that the physicians denied him constitutionally adequate medical care and equal protection of law. The district court granted the physicians’ motions for summary judgment. The court held that, to the extent the physicians were being sued in their official
capacities, they were immune from suit. The court found that the private physician was not deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's medical needs and that the primary treating physician and a consulting cardiologist did not
act with deliberate indifference in how they addressed the prisoner's work restrictions following his surgery.
According to the court, the primary treating physician was not deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's serious
medical needs with respect to prescribing post-operative cardiac and pain medication. (Shawagunk Correctional
Facility, New York).

U.S. District Court
GID- Gender Identity
Disorder
POLICIES
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
TRANSSEXUAL

Young v. Adams, 693 F.Supp.2d 635 (W.D.Tex. 2010). An inmate suffering from a gender identity disorder
brought a pro se, in forma pauperis § 1983 suit against prison officials, claiming that they collectively denied
him hormone treatment, in violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The district court dismissed the action for failing to comply with time limitations. The court noted that,
even if the case had met the time limitations, medical staff at the correctional facility were not deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of an inmate, where the inmate did not meet the requirements to receive hormone treatment under the correctional facility's policy for treatment of gender disorder, which included a confirmed parole or discharge date of 180 days. The court noted the inmate was referred to a mental health unit for
evaluation, and he was an intact male who was still manufacturing testosterone. (Alfred D. Hughes Unit, Texas
Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division)
2011

U.S. District Court
DELAY IN CARE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
MEDICATION

Alexander v. City of Muscle Shoals, Ala., 766 F.Supp.2d 1214 (N.D.Ala. 2011). A pretrial detainee sued a city,
city police officers, jailers, a mayor, and city council members, asserting § 1983 claims alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs and his health and safety. The court found that qualified immunity applied
to bar the § 1983 liability of jailers for deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of the pretrial detainee, because the detainee failed to argue against the qualified immunity defense. According to the court, once a
defendant raises a defense of qualified immunity, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing both that the defendant committed the constitutional violation and that the law governing the circumstances was already clearly
established at the time of the violation, and the detainee failed to adequately respond to the qualified immunity
defense. The court noted that the jailers did not contact medical professionals at the detainee's request for four
days at most, and that the detainee, who complained that he was in pain, at that point had been without prescription pain medication to which he was addicted for at least three days. The court also noted that the detainee had
already faked a suicide attempt to garner jailers' attention and had also been both combative and difficult. (City
of Muscle Shoals Municipal Jail, Alabama)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
RECORDS-ACCESS

Alspaugh v. McConnell, 643 F.3d 162 (6th Cir. 2011). A state prisoner filed a civil rights action alleging excessive force and deliberate indifference against numerous state and private defendants. The district court granted
summary judgment against the prisoner. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed
in part. The appeals court held that the prisoner's request for a videotape of a fight was of the nature that it would
have changed legal and factual deficiencies of his civil rights action alleging excessive force, and thus the prisoner was entitled to production of it, since the videotape would have shown how much force had been used in
subduing the prisoner. But the court held that the prisoner who was alleging excessive force and deliberate indifference was not entitled to the production of his medical records before considering the state's motion for summary judgment, where the state and private defendants produced enough evidence to demonstrate that medical
personnel were not deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. (Ionia Max. Security Corre’l Facility, Michigan)

U.S. Appeals Court
GID- Gender Identity
Disorder
TRANSSEXUAL

Battista v. Clarke, 645 F.3d 449 (1st Cir. 2011). A Massachusetts civil detainee, who was anatomically male but
suffered from gender identity disorder (GID), brought an action against Massachusetts officials alleging “deliberate indifference” to her medical needs, and seeking an injunction requiring that hormone therapy and female
garb and accessories be provided to her. The district court granted preliminary injunctive relief, and the state
officials appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the record supported the district
court's conclusion that Massachusetts officials were deliberately indifferent to the medical needs of the civil
detainee or exercised an unreasonable professional judgment by denying her female hormone therapy. The court
noted that it had been fifteen years since the detainee first asked for treatment, and for ten years, health professionals had been recommending hormone therapy as a necessary part of the treatment. According to the court,
when, during the delay, the detainee sought to castrate herself with a razor blade, state officials could be said to
have known that the detainee was at a “substantial risk of serious harm.” (Massachusetts Treatment Center for
Sexually Dangerous Persons)

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U.S. District Court
DELAY IN TREATMENT
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
POLICIES

Burgos v. Philadelphia Prison System, 760 F.Supp.2d 502 (E.D.Pa. 2011). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983
action against a city prison system, health service and officials, alleging wrongful delay in receiving medical
treatment for his broken arm. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment in part
and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact,
regarding whether the prison health service's actions in failing to timely refer the detainee to an orthopedic surgeon for treatment of a broken arm constituted an official “policy” of deliberate indifference to the detainee's
serious medical needs, for the purposes of municipal liability under § 1983, and whether the prison health administrator significantly delayed the detainee's medical treatment for non-medical reasons. (Philadelphia Prisons
Systems, Prison Health Services, Inc.)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
FEMALE PRISONERS

Cobige v. City of Chicago, Ill., 651 F.3d 780 (7th Cir. 2011). The estate of a deceased female arrestee brought a §
1983 action against a city and police officers, alleging failure to provide medical care in violation of the Fourth
Amendment and the Illinois wrongful death law. After a jury verdict in favor of the estate, the city and officers
filed motions for judgment as a matter of law and/or for a new trial. The district court denied the motions. The
city and officers appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part and remanded. The appeals court
held that evidence presented at trial in the estate's § 1983 action was sufficient to establish causation of the arrestee's death, where evidence from one of the arrestee's cellmates, two deputy sheriffs and a civilian aide at the
lockup, permitted a jury to find that she experienced severe abdominal pain throughout her confinement. A professor and head of coronary care at university hospitals testified that the pain led the arrestee to produce more
epinephrine, which combined with a pre-existing heart condition caused her death, and uterine tumors found
during a post-mortem examination led to his conclusion that the arrestee had suffered serious abdominal pain.
The court held that the probative value of evidence of the deceased arrestee's police record, time in prison, and
drug addiction outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice, where the evidence bore directly on the appropriate
amount of damages and that a new trial on the issue of damages was warranted. (Chicago Police Department
lockup, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
SUICIDE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Coscia v. Town of Pembroke, Mass., 659 F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 2011). The estate of a detainee who committed suicide
after being released from custody brought a § 1983 action against police officers, their supervisors, and a town,
alleging that the officers and supervisors were deliberately indifferent to the arrestee's medical needs and that the
town failed to train the officers to prevent detainee suicides. The district court denied the individual defendants'
motion for judgment on the pleadings and they appealed. The appeals court reversed. The appeals court held that
the estate failed to state a claim for deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to health under
the Fourteenth Amendment. According to the court, the estate failed to allege facts sufficient to demonstrate a
causal relationship between the police officers' failure to furnish medical care to the detainee during a seven-hour
period of custody and the detainee's act of committing suicide by walking in front of a train 14 hours after his
release from custody. The court noted that the detainee had been thinking about suicide at the time he was arrested, the detainee was thinking about suicide at the time he was released from custody, and when the police released the detainee from custody they placed him in no worse position than that in which he would have been
had they not acted at all. The court found that in the absence of a risk of harm created or intensified by a state
action, there is no due process liability for harm suffered by a prior detainee after release from custody in circumstances that do not effectively extend any state impediment to exercising self-help or to receiving whatever
aid by others may normally be available. The twenty-one-year-old detainee had been involved in a one-car accident, he was arrested about eleven o'clock in the morning and brought to the police station. On the way there he
said he intended to throw himself in front of a train, and he continued to utter suicide threats at the station house
accompanied by self-destructive behavior, to the point of licking an electrical outlet. As a consequence, the police did not lock him in a cell, but placed him in leg restraints and followed an evaluation protocol that showed a
high suicide risk. He was not examined by a doctor, but was released on his own recognizance about six o'clock
that evening. (Town of Pembroke, Massachusetts)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELAY IN
TREATMENT
POLICIES
PRETRIAL DETAINEE

Craig v. Floyd County, Ga., 643 F.3d 1306 (11th Cir. 2011). A pretrial detainee who was admitted to a county
jail after being cleared for admittance by a medical center to which he was transported following his arrest,
brought a civil rights action against the county based on its nine-day delay in eventually providing him with
surgical treatment for multiple fractures to his head. The district court granted the county's motion for summary
judgment. The detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the pretrial detainee
failed to show that a nine-day delay by medical personnel at the county jail in providing him with appropriate
surgical treatment for multiple fractures to his skull was the result of any unconstitutional custom or policy of
allegedly not referring detainees to physicians, of relying on hospital clearance forms instead of performing their
own diagnostic tests on detainees transported to jail from a hospital, or of using the least costly means to treat
detainees. The court noted that the detainee's only proof of any such policy or custom was that nine medical
providers had evaluated him sixteen times at the county jail, before he was finally transported to a medical center
when a tomography scan of his head revealed these fractures. According to the court, while nine different medical providers were involved in the detainee's treatment before a tomography was eventually ordered, this was
insufficient to show that the county had a policy or custom of constitutional violations against detainees that was
either persistent or so widespread as to have the force of law, as required to subject the county to liability under §
1983. (Floyd County Jail, Georgia)

29.245

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
PRIVACY
TREATMENT
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
DELAY IN CARE
EYE CARE
SMOKE

Davidson v. Desai, 817 F.Supp.2d 166 (W.D.N.Y. 2011). An inmate at a state prison filed a pro se § 1983 action
against prison officials and medical staff alleging that they had been deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs, and had interfered with his attempts to file grievances regarding his medical care, in violation of the
First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The defendants moved alternatively for judgment on the pleadings
and for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that
summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the state inmate's shoulder
surgery, related to his degenerative disc disease, was delayed because of the inmate's refusal to submit to a preoperative chest x-ray, or whether it was delayed due to the prison's deliberate indifference to his serious medical
needs. According to the court, the inmate's allergies were not a “sufficiently serious condition” under the Eighth
Amendment, and thus prison officials' failure to provide the inmate with allergy treatment did not constitute
deliberate indifference, where the inmate had undergone allergy testing, allergy sensitivity injections were recommended, but when the inmate arrived for allergy injections he objected to the fact that the injection serum had
not been drawn into a syringe within his view and refused the injections.
The court also found that the inmate's breathing difficulties and possible asthma did not constitute “sufficiently serious conditions” under the Eighth Amendment, and thus prison officials' failure to house the inmate in a
prison infirmary where levels of allergens were allegedly lower than levels in other parts of prison was not deliberate indifference. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to
whether the inmate suffered serious health problems caused by exposure to environmental tobacco smoke (ETS),
and whether officials knew of, yet disregarded an excessive risk to the inmate's health. According to the court,
there was no evidence that prison officials' delays in providing the inmate with an updated prescription to his
corrective eyeglass lenses had resulted in symptoms which impaired his daily activities, as required to support
the inmate's claim against the prison for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The court noted that
the inmate was able to order glasses from an outside source, he made no claims that the lack of a proper prescription had resulted in eye strain or headaches, and during the delay, the inmate was able to continue to research
and write in support of his legal actions. The court held that the state prison's sick call procedures, which required that, prior to seeing a physician or nurse practitioner, the inmate discuss his medical issues with a nurse
while in close proximity to other inmates at sick call such that others were able to overhear medical concerns,
did not violate the inmate's right to privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court noted that the inmate's
medical conditions were not so unusual so as to provoke an intense desire to preserve confidentiality, nor would
result in hostility and intolerance from others if disclosed. (Elmira Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
INADEQUATE CARE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
MENTAL HEALTH

Davis v. Correctional Medical Services, 760 F.Supp.2d 469 (D.Del. 2011). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action
alleging that prison medical officials failed to provide mental health treatment, failed to follow policies and procedures to prevent officers and other inmates from harassing him, and failed to provide adequate medical treatment for his broken nose. The district court granted the officials’ motions to dismiss and for summary judgment.
The court held that the failure of the prison's mental health administrator to speak to the inmate or to investigate
his complaint regarding his treatment and his living conditions did not violate any recognizable constitutional
right, as required to sustain the inmate's § 1983 claim against the administrator. According to the court, prison
medical officials were not deliberately indifferent to the inmate's fractured nose, in violation of the Eighth
Amendment, where the officials took an x-ray two months after the incident, the inmate did not complain about
his nasal condition for seven months, once he did, the condition was consistently monitored and evaluated on
several occasions, and the inmate was approved for surgery, but he refused to undergo the procedure. (James T.
Vaughn Correctional Center, Delaware)

U.S. Appeals Court
GID- Gender Identity
Disorder
TRANSSEXUAL
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE

Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 550 (7th Cir. 2011). Wisconsin Department of Corrections (DOC) inmates, who were
diagnosed with Gender Identity Disorder (GID), brought a § 1983 action against DOC officials, alleging, among
other things, that the officials violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by enforcing a statutory provision
preventing DOC medical personnel from providing hormone therapy or sexual reassignment surgery to inmates
with GID, and from evaluating inmates with GID for possible hormone therapy. The inmates sought a permanent
injunction barring enforcement of the statute against them and other inmates. The district court granted judgment
on behalf of the plaintiffs and the defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that:
(1) enforcement of the statute constituted deliberate indifference to the inmates' serious medical needs; (2) the
statute facially violated the Eighth Amendment; (3) deference to prison administrators in implementing the ban
was not warranted; and (4) the district court did not abuse its discretion in enjoining the entirety of the Wisconsin
Inmate Sex Change Prevention Act. (Wisconsin Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
DENTAL CARE

Francis v. Carroll, 773 F.Supp.2d 483 (D.Del. 2011). A former inmate, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis,
brought a § 1983 action against a former warden and other Department of Correction administrators, alleging
violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment and
the district court granted the motion. The court held that denial of dental floss by the prison's medical provider to
the inmate was not deliberate indifference to his dental needs by prison administrators, as would violate the
Eighth Amendment, where the administrators were entitled to rely upon the provider to care for the inmate's
dental needs, and the prison permitted dental loops that provided the same hygiene function as floss. According
to the court, denial of dental floss to the inmate did not violate Fourteenth Amendment equal protection, where
the inmate was treated no differently than other inmates, and the denial was based upon security concerns.
(James T. Vaughn Correctional Center, Delaware)

U.S. Appeals Court
INADEQUATE CARE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
DELAY IN CARE

Gonzalez v. Feinerman, 663 F.3d 311 (7th Cir. 2011). A state prisoner filed a civil rights action claiming that two
prison physicians and a warden did not provide adequate care for his hernia. The district court dismissed the
action and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The appeals
court held that the prisoner stated a claim that prison physicians were deliberately indifferent to his inguinal
hernia and chronic pain from that hernia, as serious medical conditions, by pursuing a standard of care that they
knew to be ineffective. The physicians only recommended minimal or no pain medications and refused to au-

29.246

thorize surgical repair, and the prisoner's ongoing pain was so debilitating that he could not carry on his daily
activities or sleep comfortably. The court noted that the physicians never altered their response to his hernia over
a period of more than two years as the condition and associated pain worsened over time.
According to the court, the warden was a proper defendant in the civil rights action claiming that two prison
physicians did not provide adequate care for his hernia, since the prisoner sought injunctive relief and the warden
would be responsible for ensuring that any injunctive relief would be carried out. The court noted that if the
prisoner was seeking only damages, the warden's lack of personal involvement would have been conclusive, but
since the prisoner also sought injunctive relief, it was irrelevant whether the warden participated in the alleged
violations. (Menard Correctional Center, Illinois)
U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
INADEQUATE CARE

Hale v. Rao, 768 F.Supp.2d 367 (N.D.N.Y. 2011). An inmate brought an action against prison officials alleging
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, and alleging that the conditions of his confinement violated
the Eighth Amendment. Prison officials moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in
part and denied in part. The court excused the state inmate's failure to exhaust administrative remedies prior to
bringing the claim in federal court because prison staff had thrown out a grievance filled out by another inmate
on the inmate's behalf, refused to provide the inmate with the materials needed to file another grievance, and
threatened to physically assault him if he attempted to utilize the grievance procedure. The court noted that the
inmate was illiterate and had a poor understanding of the grievance procedure. The court held that the inmate
was adequately treated following an alleged assault by a corrections officer, precluding the inmate's claim under
the Eighth Amendment alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The inmate received medical treatment including at least ten stitches to close the open wounds on his left shin, and an x-ray of his leg to
determine if the bone was fractured. Medical staff later re-evaluated his leg injury, cleaned the wound, and provided pain killers. The court found that allegations by the inmate that prison conditions were unsanitary due to
the presence of insects in an infirmary room, and that medical staff pulled a staple out of his abdomen by hand,
failed to establish the inmate's claim under the Eighth Amendment that his conditions of confinement constituted
cruel and unusual punishment, absent evidence that the conditions at the prison prevented the inmate from receiving appropriate medical care. (Downstate Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
NEGLIGENCE

Hawkins v. County of Lincoln, 785 F.Supp.2d 781 (D.Neb. 2011). The personal representative of a hospital patient brought a § 1983 action against the hospital, a county, a city, and related defendants for claims arising when
the patient was brought to the hospital at the time of his arrest, was released by the hospital to a county jail, and
subsequently hanged himself at the jail. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted
the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of
material fact as to whether prison officials were objectively aware that the prisoner posed a risk of harm to himself that included a risk of suicide. According to the court, although the prisoner had serious medical needs in
connection with his risk of suicide, no prison correctional officers, jailers, and/or law enforcement officers were
deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's needs, even though it might have been negligent for individual defendants to take the prisoner off a suicide watch without having him evaluated by a physician or other professional.
According to the court, the defendants' conduct was not more blameworthy than mere negligence. The court also
held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the county acted
with deliberate indifference by failing to have a specific policy for determining when an inmate could be removed from a suicide watch and placed in a situation that could increase the likelihood of a successful suicide
attempt. (Lincoln County Jail, Nebraska)

U.S. District Court
MEDICATION

Hodge v. Murphy, 808 F.Supp.2d 405 (D.R.I. 2011). A pretrial detainee brought a pro se action against a state
prison warden and others, alleging the defendants failed to properly dispense his daily medication for migraines
and pain resulting from a fractured lower back. The district court dismissed the action. The court held that the
allegation that the pretrial detainee suffered undue pain as the result of prison officials' failure to properly dispense daily medication was insufficient to establish a serious medical need involving a substantial risk of serious
harm, as required to state a due process claim against the prison officials under the Fourteenth Amendment.
(Donald W. Wyatt Detention Facility, Central Falls, Rhode Island)

U.S. Appeals Court
DENTAL CARE

Holden v. Hirner, 663 F.3d 336 (8th Cir. 2011). A pretrial detainee filed a § 1983 action against officials of a
county jail for allegedly violating his Fourteenth Amendment rights under the Due Process Clause by allegedly
failing to protect him from an assault by three other inmates, and failing to provide adequate medical treatment
for his tooth pain. The district court granted prison officials summary judgment and the detainee appealed. The
appeals court affirmed. The court held that there was no evidence that the pretrial detainee was incarcerated
under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm in the protective custody pod in which the detainee
was imprisoned as a sex offender, even though one of the assaulting inmates was involved in another fight four
days before the altercation with the detainee. The court noted that the pod was designed to provide greater supervision and security for vulnerable inmates who were more likely to be assaulted, and nothing in the record established that the prior fight involved a sex offender. According to the court, even if the pretrial detainee faced a
substantial risk of serious harm from other inmates in the protective custody pod, there was no evidence that
officials at the county jail were deliberately indifferent to his safety, where the detainee did not tell officials that
he felt threatened by other inmates, and the officials had no knowledge of any specific danger to the detainee in
the pod. he court held that the pretrial detainee's tooth pain did not constitute a serious medical need, as required
to support the detainee's Fourteenth Amendment claim of deprivation of his due process rights by officials of the
county jail. The court noted that a nurse employed by the jail evaluated the detainee's teeth and gums on multiple
occasions and never noted bleeding, swelling, infection, or other visible symptoms of tooth pain. The nurse never determined that the detainee's tooth pain required treatment, and the detainee was observed eating without
difficulty and later refused to have his tooth extracted. The court found that the detainee's prognosis was not
negatively impacted by any delay in treatment. (Marion County Jail, Missouri)

29.247

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
DENTAL CARE
INVOLUNTARY
TREATMENT

Holmes v. Fischer, 764 F.Supp.2d 523 (W.D.N.Y. 2011). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that prison officials violated his constitutional rights by subjecting him to non-random urinalysis drug testing, confining
him in a special housing unit (SHU), and denying medical care. The defendants moved for a more definite
statement, to strike the complaint, and to dismiss. The district court denied the motion. The inmate alleged that,
while incarcerated in a special housing unit (SHU): (1) he was routinely cuffed from behind, aggravating left
shoulder and leg conditions resulting from previous injuries, (2) he was subjected to continuous illumination in
his cell, rendering it impossible to sleep; (3) officials interfered with the inmate grievance he attempted to file
regarding constant SHU cell illumination; (4) he was denied dental floss; (5) he was denied, during winter
months, proper boots, gloves, hat, and thermos; (6) he was exposed to feces thrown by mentally-ill inmates confined to SHU; (7) he was denied proper medical treatment and tests; and (8) he was subjected to urinalysis testing which so traumatized him as to cause physical harm. The court held that these allegations were sufficient to
state claims under the Eighth Amendment for cruel and unusual punishment and deliberate indifference to necessary medical care. According to the court, the inmate's allegations that he was subjected to urinalysis based on
reports from confidential informants whose credibility and reliability had not been confirmed, despite the complete absence of any history of drug use, and that two random urinalysis tests to which he was subjected were
done to retaliate against him for filing inmate grievances regarding non-random urinalysis testing, were sufficient to state an unreasonable search claim under the Fourth Amendment, The court found that the inmate’s
allegation that, as a result of repeated non-random urinalysis drug testing to which he was subjected, he suffered
physical harm, including insomnia, nausea, headaches, burning eyes, aggravation of an old gunshot wound, inability to exercise, and appetite loss, was sufficient to state a cruel and unusual punishment claim under the Eighth
Amendment. (Elmira Correctional Facility, and Southport Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
EQUIPMENT
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Jaundoo v. Clarke, 783 F.Supp.2d 190 (D.Mass. 2011). A state prisoner brought an action under § 1983 against
various prison officials and employees, alleging that the defendants unlawfully deprived him of necessary medical care by confiscating his crutches while he was incarcerated in a maximum security prison. The district court
held that summary judgment for a corrections officer was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the prisoner's knee had healed sufficiently that he no longer needed crutches. According to the court,
summary judgment for a nurse was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the nurse knew or
had a reason to know of the prisoner's serious medical condition and whether it was reckless for the nurse to rely
on a corrections officer's report that the prisoner had been moving around without his crutches. The court also
found genuine issues of material fact as to whether another corrections officer falsely reported that the prisoner
was running on both feet without his crutches, and whether that officer conveyed such information to induce
prison medical staff to take away the prisoner's crutches. The court found that the conduct of a health services
administrator, in failing to immediately investigate the confiscation of the prisoner's crutches, did not rise to the
level of deliberate indifference to the prisoner's serious medical needs. (Massachusetts Correctional Institution at
Cedar Junction)

U.S. District Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
HEARING IMPAIRED

Johnson v. Florida Dept. of Corrections, 826 F.Supp.2d 1319 (N.D.Fla. 2011). A hard-of-hearing inmate at a
state prison, who had allegedly been denied the benefit of television and radio services provided to other inmates, filed suit against the state department of corrections seeking accommodation in the form of volumeboosting listening devices, and alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The defendant moved to dismiss. The
district court denied the motion. The court held that even though the inmate was transferred to a different prison
after filing grievances and prior to filing suit, he sufficiently exhausted his administrative remedies under PLRA,
since officials had been alerted to his problem and had the opportunity to resolve it before being sued. The court
noted that even though the prison to which the inmate had been transferred would require him to have different
adaptive technology than the type which he had originally sought, his claim arose from the same continuing
failure of the prison to provide him with access to television and radio audio. (Polk Correctional Inst., Florida)

U.S. Appeals Court
AIDS- Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome
CONTRACT SERVICES
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
INADEQUATE CARE

Leavitt v. Correctional Medical Services, Inc., 645 F.3d 484 (1st Cir. 2011). A state inmate brought a § 1983
action against a private contractor that provided medical care at a prison and the contractor's employees, among
others, alleging that the defendants provided inadequate medical care for his human immunodeficiency virus
(HIV) at a jail and a prison. The district court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment and the
inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The appeals court held that
summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the physician assistant at the
jail was deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of the inmate, in failing to refer him to an infectious
disease specialist or to otherwise treat his HIV in a timely manner, and as to whether the assistant's alleged deprivation of care subjected the inmate to serious harm, both short-term and long-term. The court held that the
regional medical director employed by the private contractor that provided medical care did not act with deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of the HIV positive inmate in failing to sign off on necessary referrals to specialists and in failing to follow up on the inmate after committing to intervene more personally in his
care. The court noted that, after examining the inmate, the director not only ordered updated blood work, but also
took the unusual step of ordering that the inmate's follow-up appointment specifically be with him, and when the
director finally saw the inmate's lab results three months after the labs were drawn, the director approved the
inmate's referral to specialists. (Maine State Prison, and York County Jail, Maine)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
DENIAL
POLICIES
PRETRIAL DETENTION

Newbrough v. Piedmont Regional Jail Authority, 822 F.Supp.2d 558 (E.D.Va. 2011). The administrator of an
immigration detainee's estate brought an action against the federal government, a regional jail authority and
various of its employees, and several agents of the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE),
alleging § 1983 claims in relation to medical treatment received by detainee while in jail, and a claim for wrongful death. The defendants moved to dismiss and the plaintiff moved for a stay. The court held that the stricter
deliberate indifference standard, rather than the professional judgment standard, applied to the § 1983 denial–of–
medical–care claims brought by the administrator, where immigration detention was more similar to pretrial
detention rather than the involuntary commitment of psychiatric patients, in that immigration detention served to

29.248

secure the detainee's appearance at future proceedings and to protect the community, and pre–removal detention
was generally limited in duration. The court held that the allegations of the administrator were sufficient to allege that a prison nurse deliberately denied, delayed, or interfered with the detainee's medical care with
knowledge of his serious condition, as required to state a § 1983 denial–of–medical–care claim under Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause. The administrator alleged that the nurse visited the detainee while he was
held in isolation in a medical segregation unit with an apparent inability to walk or stand, and yet withheld medication because the detainee was unwilling to stand up and walk to the door to receive that medication. The court
noted that the nurse acknowledged that not giving the detainee his medication could cause severe problems. The
court found that the nurse did not deny, delay, or intentionally interfere with the immigration detainee's medical
treatment, where the nurse documented her observations regarding the detainee's acute back pain, sleeplessness,
and unresponsiveness, and then related those observations to superior prison officials, including a prison doctor.
According to the court, allegations of the administrator were sufficient to allege that a prison doctor deliberately
denied, delayed, or interfered with the detainee's medical care with knowledge of his serious condition, where
the administrator alleged that the doctor received multiple reports from his subordinates regarding the detainee's
back pain, his inability to stand, and elevated vital signs and yet failed to act or personally assess the detainee's
condition, to provide more than perfunctory treatment, or to follow up on prescribed courses of treatment. The
court found that the administrator sufficiently alleged that the regional jail authority and its superintendent failed
to adequately train jail staff, as required to state a § 1983 policy–or–custom claim in relation to the detainee's
medical care under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The administrator alleged that prison officers regularly refused to refer requests for medical attention unless a request was in writing, regardless of the
urgency of a detainee's need, that prison staff either failed to recognize symptoms of grave illness or ignored
them, and that, even in the face of the detainee's potentially fatal infection, staff provided no more than an over–
the–counter pain reliever. The court found that the administrator’s allegations were sufficient to allege that the
jail's superintendent, even if newly hired, was aware of the shortcomings in his facility's medical care, as required to state a § 1983 supervisory liability claim, where the administrator alleged that numerous public investigations and media coverage reported the poor quality of the jail's health services and the superintendent failed to
act to improve those services. (Piedmont Regional Jail Authority, Virginia, and U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement Agency)
U.S. District Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
CONTRACT SERVICES
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
RA- Rehabilitation Act
WORK ASSIGNMENT

O'Neil v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, 804 F.Supp.2d 532 (N.D.Tex. 2011). The next friend to a deceased
prisoner's minor daughter who died of an asthma attack while confined brought a § 1983 action against the Texas
Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ), a prison doctor, the company that provided health care services at the
prison, and others, alleging violations of the Eighth Amendment, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),
and the Rehabilitation Act (RA). The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the
motions in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether a picket officer, in failing to respond to the emergency call button of the prisoner who
was suffering from an asthma attack and in refusing to respond to the cellmate's verbal calls to help the prisoner
during an asthma attack, knew of a substantial risk of serious harm to the prisoner and failed to act with deliberate indifference to that harm. The court found that the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity.
The court held that summary judgment on claims alleging violations of Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) and Rehabilitation Act (RA). Rehabilitation Act of 1973, was precluded by a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ), in failing to put the prisoner who suffered
from asthma on job restriction from temperature or humidity extremes, failing to allow the prisoner access to his
medication on the day he died as the result of an asthma attack, and failing to provide the prisoner with periodic
physician follow-up appointments, failed to accommodate the prisoner's disability. The court held that summary
judgment on alleged violations of Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Rehabilitation Act (RA) was
precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the company that provided health care services at the
prison, in failing to respond to emergency calls for help for the prisoner who suffered from asthma and failing to
provide the prisoner with prompt medical attention on the day he died as the result of an asthma attack, failed to
accommodate the prisoner's disability. (Jordan Unit, Texas Department of Criminal Justice)

U.S. District Court
MENTAL HEALTH

Ocasio v. Konesky, 821 F.Supp.2d 571 (W.D.N.Y. 2011). An inmate, proceeding pro se, brought a § 1983 claim
against a social worker employed by a Department of Correctional Services (DOCS), alleging he was wrongfully
removed from a mental health program. The social worker filed a motion for summary judgment, which the
district court granted. The court held that the social worker's removal of a designation permitting the inmate to
participate in an intensive mental health program administered by Department of Correctional Services (DOCS)
was not retaliation for the inmate's complaints, where the designation was based upon the worker's observations
of the inmate's symptoms, and the conclusions were seconded by the inmate's treating physicians and other
DOCS staff. (Wende Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE

Ortiz v. City of Chicago, 656 F.3d 523 (7th Cir. 2011). A female arrestee's estate brought a civil rights action
against a city and a number of its police officers, alleging claims arising out of the arrestee's denial of medical
care and death during detention. The district court barred the proposed testimony of the estate's medical expert,
and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The estate appealed. The appeals court affirmed in
part and reversed in part. The appeals court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of
material fact as to whether it was objectively unreasonable for police officers to take no action to seek medical
care for the arrestee, and as to whether the arrestee would not have died or experienced pain and suffering prior
to her death had the police officers taken her to a hospital. The court held that remand was required for the district court to determine whether the medical expert's testimony that, assuming the arrestee died of a heroin overdose, she would have suffered less if she had been taken to the hospital, would help a jury understand whether
the police officers' failure to take the arrestee to the hospital exacerbated her injury. According to the court, the
police officers were not entitled to qualified immunity where it was clearly established at the time of arrestee's

29.249

death that the Fourth Amendment protected a person's rights until she had had a probable cause hearing, and that
providing no medical care in the face of a serious health risk was deliberate indifference. (Chicago Police Department 23rd District Lockup, Illinois)
U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
TRAINING

Palmer v. Board of Com'rs for Payne County Oklahoma, 765 F.Supp.2d 1289 (W.D.Okla. 2011). A former pretrial detainee in a county detention center filed a § 1983 action against a sheriff, deputy sheriff, and county jail
administrator for alleged deliberate indifference to the detainee's serious medical needs in violation of the Due
Process Clause. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and
denied in part. The court held that a deputy sheriff was not deliberately indifferent to the pretrial detainee's serious medical needs, in violation of the Due Process Clause, due to a bacterial infection that required surgical
excision of three gangrenous areas of the detainee's body, but rather, he took active and reasonable steps to abate
any harm to the detainee. According to the court, there was no evidence of inadequate training of jailers as to the
passing on of doctor's instructions for inmates, as required to establish the deliberate indifference of the county
sheriff to the serious medical needs of the pretrial detainee who contracted a bacterial infection, in violation of
due process,. (Payne County Jail, Oklahoma)

U.S. Appeals Court
RESTRAINTS
TRANSPORTATION

Reynolds v. Dormire, 636 F.3d 976 (8th Cir. 2011). A state prisoner filed a pro se § 1983 action against a prison
warden and correctional officers (COs), asserting Eighth Amendment claims arising from refusal to remove the
prisoner's restraints on a day-long journey to a medical appointment, and from his alleged injuries from falling
five feet into a sally port pit designed to facilitate visual inspections of vehicle undercarriages at an entryway
into the prison. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The prisoner appealed. The
appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The appeals court held that the prisoner's complaint was devoid of any allegation suggesting that correctional officers acted with deliberate indifference to the
prisoner's safety in restraining him throughout the day, as required to support an Eighth Amendment claim in his
§ 1983 action, since the complaint merely alleged that the officers refused to remove the prisoner's restraints.
But the court held that the prisoner's complaint sufficiently alleged claims of deliberate indifference to his safety
in violation of the Eighth Amendment by two correctional officers, but not the other three officers who were
simply on duty in the vicinity of the prisoner's accident in which he fell five feet into a sally port pit. According
to the court, the complaint sufficiently pleaded that the two officers were aware of a substantial risk to the prisoner's safety but recklessly disregarded that risk. The prisoner alleged that one officer parked the prison van
about three feet from edge of the pit, that the prisoner was obliged to back out of the van, using a stool to descend from the vehicle, with his legs shackled and his arms secured by a black box restraint, that the second
officer supervising the prisoner's exit started backing away rather than assisting the prisoner, and that officers
knew about the hazard because another prisoner had fallen into the same pit on the same day. (Northeast Correctional Center, Missouri)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
DELAY IN CARE

Schaub v. VonWald, 638 F.3d 905 (8th Cir. 2011). A paraplegic state prisoner brought an action against the director of a county adult detention center (ADC), the county, and others, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Following a bench trial, the district court held that the
director violated the prisoner's Eighth Amendment rights, and awarded the prisoner $114,000 in lost wages,
$100,000 in pain and suffering, and $750,000 in punitive damages. The director appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The appeals court held that: (1) the district court did not clearly err in finding that the prisoner's condition constituted a serious medical need; (2) the director was subjectively aware of the prisoner's serious medical
needs; (3) the director knowingly and deliberately disregarded the prisoner's serious medical needs; (4) the prisoner's need for medical attention would have been obvious to a layperson, and thus submission of verifying medical evidence was unnecessary; (5) expert testimony on the causation of the prisoner's serious medical condition
was unnecessary; (6) the director's conduct involved callous indifference to the prisoner's serious medical needs,
and thus the award of punitive damages was warranted; and (7) the director had the burden to introduce evidence
of his net worth to minimize a potential punitive damages award. The court noted that the prisoner's oozing sores
and smell of infection due to pressure sores, made his serious medical needs obvious to a layperson, and a letter
from the prisoner's doctor, summarizing the prisoner's medical condition and needs, and the prison medical
staff's observations, documenting new areas of skin breakdown due to pressure sores, provided sufficient medical evidence verifying the escalating seriousness of the prisoner's condition. (Olmsted County Adult Detention
Center, Minnesota)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
DENIAL

Scott v. Antonini, 764 F.Supp.2d 904 (E.D.Mich. 2011). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against doctors,
alleging denial of his right to medical treatment. After the appeals court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint
in part, reversed in part and remanded, the remaining doctor defendant filed a motion for summary judgment.
The district court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to: (1) whether the prisoner's multiple complaints of severe and constant pain were a sufficiently serious medical need requiring treatment; (2) whether the doctor knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to the prisoner's health and safety; and (3) whether the prisoner had an obvious need for medical care. The prisoner alleged that the doctor was
deliberately indifferent to his medical needs that arose after he had undergone radiation treatment for prostate
cancer. (G. Robert Cotton Correctional Facility, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
FEMALE PRISONERS
POLICIES

Shultz v. Allegheny County, 835 F.Supp.2d 14 (W.D.Pa. 2011). The administratrix of the estate of an inmate who
died after developing bacterial pneumonia while pregnant brought a § 1983 action against a county, jail health
services, and various officials and employees of county jail, alleging they ignored her serious medical problems.
The county and official filed a motion to dismiss. The district court denied the motion. The court held that allegations that the inmate had complained of symptoms involving her breathing and lungs to jail personnel but was
told to “stick it out,” that she feared impending death and communicated that to officials and her mother, that her
condition progressed to the point where she had difficulty breathing and had discharge from her lungs, that she

29.250

was taken to the infirmary with additional symptoms including nausea and vomiting, which had been present for
several days, that she was treated for influenza without taking cultures or other testing, that there was no outbreak of the flu within the jail, that her condition did not improve, that she continued to complain of difficulty
breathing and lung discharge, that she was taken to a medical facility intensive care unit, and that tests were
performed there but her condition had already progressed to the point where it was fatal were sufficient to plead
deliberate indifference to her serious medical need. The court found that allegations that her condition could
have been easily controlled and cured with testing were sufficient to plead a cost-cutting/saving custom or policy
existed and was the moving force in the inmate's death, as required for the § 1983 action. (Allegheny Correctional Health Services Inc., Allegheny County Jail, Pennsylvania)
U.S. District Court
MENTAL HEALTH
SUICIDE
INADEQUATE CARE

Smith v. Atkins, 777 F.Supp.2d 955 (E.D.N.C. 2011). The mother of a schizophrenic inmate who committed
suicide at a jail and the mother of the inmate's children brought a § 1983 action in state court against a county
deputy sheriff, jail officials, a medical contractor, and a nurse employed by the contractor, alleging that the defendants violated the inmate's Eighth Amendment rights in failing to provide adequate medical care. The defendants removed the action to federal court and moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motions. The court held that the deputy sheriff who happened to be at the jail delivering a prisoner when the inmate,
who had been diagnosed with schizophrenia, committed suicide, did not know that the inmate was at a substantial risk of committing suicide or intentionally disregarded such risk. The court found that the deputy was not
liable under § 1983 where the deputy did not know the inmate or anything about him, or have any responsibilities associated with the inmate's custody. The court also found that jail officials were not deliberately indifferent
towards the schizophrenic inmate who was awaiting transfer to a state prison, as would violate the inmate's
Eighth Amendment rights, because there was no indication that the officials subjectively knew that the inmate
was at a substantial risk of committing suicide and intentionally disregarded that risk. According to the court,
simply because the jail inmate, who was diagnosed with schizophrenia, had previously been on a suicide watch
at the jail did not put jail officials on notice that he was suicidal during his subsequent incarceration two years
later. The court held that jail officials' mere failure to comply with a state standard and a jail policy requiring a
four-time per hour check on any prisoner who had ever been on a suicide watch did not violate the Eighth
Amendment rights of the inmate. The court found that the mother of the inmate failed to show a direct causal
link between a specific deficiency in training and an alleged Eighth Amendment violation, as required to sustain
the mother's § 1983 Eighth Amendment claim against jail officials based on their alleged failure to train jail
employees. (Bertie–Martin Regional Jail, North Carolina)

U.S. District Court
DENIAL
INADEQUATE CARE

Thomas v. U.S., 779 F.Supp.2d 154 (D.C.C. 2011). A federal prisoner brought an action against the United
States, the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), and the BOP's Administrator of National Inmate Appeals, alleging
he was deprived of adequate medical treatment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The defendants moved to
dismiss. The court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the prisoner stated a claim
for injunctive relief under the Eighth Amendment, seeking an order compelling prison officials to provide adequate medical treatment for his chronic ailments, “severe cramps all over his body” that were “debilitating,” by
alleging that he had not received proper treatment for his ailments. (Fed. Corr’l Complex, Terre Haute, Indiana)

U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
MENTAL HEALTH

Troy D. v. Mickens, 806 F.Supp.2d 758 (D.N.J. 2011). Two juvenile delinquents brought a § 1983 action against
mental health providers and the New Jersey Juvenile Justice Commission (JJC), alleging that the actions of the
defendants while the delinquents were in custody violated the Fourteenth Amendment and New Jersey law. One
of the plaintiffs was 15 years old when he was adjudicated as delinquent and remained in custody for a total of
225 days. For approximately 178 of those days, the delinquent was held in isolation under a special observation
status requiring close or constant watch, purportedly for his own safety. Although the delinquents were placed in
isolation for different reasons, the conditions they experienced were similar. Each was confined to a seven-footby-seven-foot room and allowed out only for hygiene purposes. The rooms contained only a concrete bed slab, a
toilet, a sink, and a mattress pad. One delinquent was allegedly held in extreme cold, and the other was allegedly
isolated for four days in extreme heat. Both were denied any educational materials or programming, and were
prevented from interacting with their peers. One delinquent’s mattress pad was often removed, a light remained
on for 24 hours a day, and he was often required to wear a bulky, sleeveless smock. Both delinquents were allegedly denied mental health treatment during their periods in isolation. The court held that summary judgment was
precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to: (1) whether the New Jersey Juvenile Justice Commission
(JJC) and mental health providers were deliberately indifferent towards conditions of confinement, in protecting
and in providing medical care for the juvenile delinquent housed in JJC facilities; (2) whether placing the juvenile delinquent housed in temporary close custody and special observation status implicated a liberty interest; (3)
whether a juvenile delinquent housed in New Jersey Juvenile Justice Commission (JJC) facilities had procedural
due process protections available to him upon a change of status; (4) whether the juvenile delinquent had a liberty interest implicated in his transfer to a more restrictive placement; (5) whether the juvenile delinquent had
sufficient procedural due process protections available to him upon transfer to a more restrictive placement; and
(6) whether the New Jersey Juvenile Justice Commission (JJC) and mental health providers acted with malice or
reckless indifference. (New Jersey Juvenile Justice Commission, Juvenile Medium Security Facility, New Jersey
Training School, Juvenile Reception and Assessment Center)

U.S. District Court
FEMALE PRISONERS
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE

Webb v. Jessamine County Fiscal Court, 802 F.Supp.2d 870 (E.D.Ky. 2011). An inmate brought a § 1983 action
against a county fiscal court, a judge, detention center, and jailers, alleging that the defendants were deliberately
indifferent to his serious medical needs, resulting in her being forced to endure labor unassisted by medical personnel and to give birth to her child in a holdover cell. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by
genuine issues of material fact as to whether the pregnant inmate had a “serious medical need” during the overnight hours in which she, at the end of her pregnancy term, experienced readily recognizable symptoms of labor,
and as to whether the county jailer who communicated with the inmate on the night in question, and who was

29.251

purportedly a certified nursing assistant (CNA), perceived the facts necessary to draw the inference that a serious
medical condition existed and then disregarded that condition. According to the court, the fact that the inmate
gave birth to a healthy baby in a holdover cell following a normal and, by all appearances, unremarkable course
of labor and delivery, went to the amount of damages to be awarded in the inmate's § 1983 action against the
county defendants, but did not change the fact that the type of injury the inmate allegedly suffered was cognizable under the Eighth Amendment. (Jessamine County Detention Center, Kentucky)
U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
TRAINING
ALCOHOL/DRUGS

Wereb v. Maui County, 830 F.Supp.2d 1026 (D.Hawai‘i 2011). The parents of a diabetic pretrial detainee who
died in custody brought an action against a county and county police department employees, alleging under §
1983 that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to the detainee's medical needs, and asserting a claim for
wrongful death under state law. The district granted summary judgment, in part, in favor of the defendants. The
county moved for reconsideration. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held
that summary judgment was precluded by fact issues on the claim that the county failed to train jail employees to
monitor detainees' serious medical needs. The court found that the county and its police department were not
liable for their alleged failure to train employees on the risks and symptoms of alcohol withdrawal. According to
the court, assuming that the detainee died from alcohol withdrawal, no other prisoner in the county jail had suffered injury from alcohol withdrawal for more than 17 years before the detainee's death, so that such a failure to
train did not constitute deliberate indifference. (Lahaina, Maui, Police Station, Hawai’i)

U.S. District Court
DENTAL CARE
INADEQUATE CARE

Wesolowski v. Harvey, 784 F.Supp.2d 231 (W.D.N.Y. 2011). A former prisoner brought a pro se civil rights
action against the Superintendent of, and a dentist at, a correctional facility, alleging that he was subjected to
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights, due to a lack of dental care. The
defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion and dismissed the case. The
court held that the allegation that the prisoner was subjected to a delay of seven months between his first request
for dental treatment and his first examination by a dentist failed to state a claim for deliberate indifference to his
serious medical needs. The court found that the allegation that the prisoner was only offered painkillers, with the
option of immediate extraction of the three affected teeth, or fillings, was insufficient to state a claim for inadequate medical care. According to the court, the allegation that the prisoner was deprived of adequate dental care
was insufficient to state a claim against the facility superintendent where no underlying constitutional deprivation occurred that the superintendent ignored, was informed of, created, permitted, or toward which he could
have been deliberately indifferent. The court noted that the prisoner's prior requests for treatment were made at a
different institution, to different persons, who were not parties to his lawsuit. (Southport Corr'l. Facility, N. Y.)
2012

U.S. Appeals Court
HANDICAP
HEARING IMPAIRED
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 2012). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against correctional
officers, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in connection with the officers' alleged
failure to comply with the prisoner’s medical orders, which required the prisoner to be housed in a ground floor
cell. The district court dismissed the action and denied the prisoner's motion to alter or amend the judgment. The
prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed and remanded. The court held that the district court abused its
discretion by failing to consider arguments that directed the court to crucial facts showing he might have exhausted his administrative remedies, and in addition to being pro se, the prisoner was illiterate, disabled, and had
limited English skills. The court found that the prisoner satisfied the administrative exhaustion requirement of
the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) prior to filing his § 1983 action against the correctional officers, where
the prisoner filed grievances addressing the officers' alleged failure to comply with medical orders several
months before filing the complaint. The court held that the prisoner stated a § 1983 Eighth Amendment claim
against correctional officers for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs .The prisoner alleged that he
suffered from numerous medical conditions and was hearing and mobility impaired, that his medical orders stated that the prisoner was mobility impaired and had housing restrictions requiring a lower bunk, no stairs, and no
triple bunk, and that the correctional officers knew of those medical orders, but failed to comply with them.
(Mule Creek State Prison, California)

U.S. District Court
GID- Gender Identity
Disorder
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Alexander v. Weiner, 841 F.Supp.2d 486 (D.Mass. 2012). An inmate, who was a male-to-female transsexual
diagnosed with Gender Identity Disorder (GID), brought an action against prison medical staff, alleging violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments for failing to provide adequate medical treatment for her GID.
The district court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court held that allegations by the inmate that she
was a male-to-female transsexual diagnosed with Gender Identity Disorder (GID), that laser hair removal or
electrolysis was part of her treatment prescribed by doctors under contract with the prison, and that she was denied this medical care were sufficient to plead that her serious medical need was not adequately treated in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The court also held that allegations that she was denied this care on at least three
separate occasions, despite a long history of administrative appeals and requests for doctors' orders to be followed, were sufficient to plead deliberate indifference by prison officials in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
According to the court, allegations that the associate medical director at the prison had direct responsibility for
administrating medical care ordered by physicians, and that the director failed to permit the inmate to receive her
prescribed treatment, were sufficient to plead personal involvement by the director in deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs, as required for the inmate's § 1983 claim alleging violations of the Eighth Amendment.
The court also found that the assistant deputy commissioner for clinical services at the prison was aware of the
inmate's prescribed course of treatment, that the inmate was denied treatments, and that the commissioner responded to filed grievances by claiming the grievances were resolved and then telling the inmate to address her
concerns with primary care providers, were sufficient to plead the commissioner's personal involvement in deliberate indifference to her serious medical needs. (Massachusetts Department of Correction)

29.252

U.S. District Court
EMERGENCY CARE
NEGLIGENCE
WORK ASSIGNMENT
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Allen v. Ford, 880 F.Supp.2d 407 (W.D.N.Y. 2012). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action against correction
officers, alleging negligence in failing to provide adequate safety equipment while he was working in a cafeteria
and in failing to provide treatment when he burned himself, as well as asserting deliberate indifference in instruction and supervision. The officers moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The
court held that: (1) the negligence claims were precluded by sovereign immunity; (2) one officer did not know of
and disregard the severity of the prisoner's injuries; and (3) the officer advising the prisoner to sign up for sick
call for the following morning, rather than providing emergency sick call at that time, was not deliberately indifferent. The court noted that the prisoner reported the incident to the officer, who asked if he was badly burned,
the prisoner responded that he did not know, the prisoner's skin did not blister until after he returned to his cell at
the end of his shift, and the prisoner visited the medical department the next morning and was transferred to a
county medical center. (New York State Department of Corrections, Wende Correctional Facility)

U.S. District Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
MEDICATION
MENTAL HEALTH
RA- Rehabilitation Act

Anderson v. Colorado, 887 F.Supp.2d 1133 (D.Colo. 2012). A mentally ill inmate sued a state, its Department of
Corrections (DOC), the DOC's director, and a warden, asserting claims for alleged violations of due process, the
Eighth Amendment bar against cruel and unusual punishment, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and
the Rehabilitation Act. Following a bench trial, the district court held that: (1) denying the inmate in administrative segregation any opportunity to be outdoors and to engage in some form of outdoor exercise for period of 12
years was a serious deprivation of a human need; (2) the defendants were deliberately indifferent to the inmate's
mental and physical health; (3) the inmate failed to establish that he was denied a necessary and appropriate
medication in violation of ADA and the Rehabilitation Act; (4) the defendants had to assign a department psychiatrist to reevaluate the inmate's current mental health treatment needs and take steps concluded to be appropriate in the psychiatrist's medical judgment; (5) the inmate failed to establish a violation of his rights under the
Eighth Amendment, ADA, and the Rehabilitation Act due to the alleged denial of treatment provided by a multidisciplinary treatment team; (6) the inmate had a due process-protected liberty interest in progressing out of
administrative segregation; and (7) the new stratified incentive system that was being implemented with respect
to inmates in administrative segregation, if used fairly, was consistent with due process. (Colorado Department
of Corrections, Colorado State Penitentiary)

U.S. District Court
ADA-Americans with
Disabilities Act
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
MEDICATION
MENTAL HEALTH
RA- Rehabilitation Act

Anderson v. Colorado, Dept. of Corrections, 848 F.Supp.2d 1291 (D.Colo. 2012). An inmate brought an action
against a state, the Department of Corrections (DOC), the DOC's director, and a warden asserting violations of
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments as well as violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and
Rehabilitation Act. The inmate moved for partial summary judgment and to reopen discovery, and the defendants moved for summary judgment. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of
material fact as to whether the maximum security prison's denial of outdoor exercise to the inmate for the more
than 11 years of his incarceration was sufficiently serious and whether prison officials acted intentionally or with
deliberate indifference. The court also found genuine issues of material fact as to whether the inmate's lack of
outdoor exercise during his 11 years of incarceration caused his muscles to grow weaker, on the grounds that the
inmate could demonstrate a physical injury. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine
issues of material fact as to whether prison officials arbitrarily administered a demerit program that would allow
the inmate to progress to higher levels and ultimately out of administrative segregation and into the general population, depriving him of a liberty interest without the due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
The court held that summary judgment was also precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether a
primary reason that the inmate had not progressed out of administrative segregation and into the general population was that he was denied a prescribed non-formulary medication, such that his mental illness was improperly
and inadequately treated, and whether prison officials were deliberately indifferent to the inmate's serious mental
health condition when he did not receive certain medications prescribed by physicians for the treatment of his
mental illness. The court also held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to
whether the inmate received adequate treatment for his mental illness, with regard to his Rehabilitation Act and
ADA claims against the state and prison officials. (Colorado State Penitentiary)

U.S. District Court
DENIAL
INADEQUATE CARE
POLICIES
PRIVATE PROVIDER

Bektic-Marrero v. Goldberg, 850 F.Supp.2d 418 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). The wife of an inmate who died of cancerrelated causes while in the custody of a county department of correction (DOC) brought an action against the
county, DOC officials, and entities that contracted with the county to provide medical care and treatment to DOC
inmates and employees of those entitles. The wife alleged under § 1983 that the inmate received inadequate
medical care, and asserted related state-law claims for wrongful death and medical malpractice. The defendants
moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim and/or for summary judgment. The district court granted summary
judgment for the defendants in part, and denied in part. The court held that the physicians who were under contract with the county to provide medical services to inmates at the county jail on a part-time basis acted under the
color of state law, within the meaning of § 1983, when they treated the inmate, and thus the physicians were
subject to liability under § 1983. The court held that the allegations that the health care coordinator for the DOC
denied or delayed responding to the wife's request for the inmate's medical records, which she hoped to use to
have the inmate's parole restored and to seek a second medical opinion, and that the coordinator expressly denied
the wife's request to provide the inmate with a liquid dietary supplement which wife would supply at her own
cost, sufficiently pled the coordinator's personal involvement in the alleged deprivation of necessary medical
care to the inmate, so as to subject the coordinator to liability under § 1983. The court found that the United
States Department of Justice (DOJ) report which concluded that the provision of medical care to inmates by the
county department of correction (DOC) was constitutionally deficient in several respects sufficiently alleged that
the county's “custom” of providing inadequate care to inmates was the cause of Eighth Amendment violations
sustained by the inmate. (Westchester County Department of Correction, New York)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Bell v. Luna, 856 F.Supp.2d 388 (D.Conn. 2012). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action against prison officials
and a prison doctor, alleging that the defendants subjected him to unconstitutional conditions of confinement and
showed deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The defend-

29.253

ants moved to dismiss for failure to state claim. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part.
The court held that the state prison doctor was not deliberately indifferent to the inmate's health in failing to take
sufficient measures to treat the inmate’s joint and back pain, or in failing to prescribe the inmate with an analgesic cream, as would violate the inmate's Eighth Amendment rights. The court found that forcing the inmate to go
nearly seven months with a torn, partially unstuffed, unhygienic mattress was a condition of confinement sufficiently serious to implicate the Eighth Amendment. According to the court, the inmate's allegations that a unit
manager “willfully, wantonly, and maliciously disregarded” the inmate's repeated requests for an adequate and
hygienic mattress stated a claim under § 1983 against the manager for cruel and unusual punishment in violation
of his Eighth Amendment rights. The court held that the unit manager was not entitled to qualified immunity
from the inmate's § 1983 claim where the law of the Second Circuit would have put the manager on notice at the
time of the alleged violation that failing to provide the inmate with an hygienic, working mattress for over half a
year ran afoul of the Eighth Amendment. (MacDougall–Walker Correctional Inst., Connecticut)
U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
POLICIES
STAFF

Bruner-McMahon v. Hinshaw, 846 F.Supp.2d 1177 (D.Kan. 2012). The administrator of the estate and the children of a deceased inmate brought a § 1983 action against a prison medical contractor, its employees, county
officials, and prison employees, alleging violations of the Eighth Amendment. The court held that summary
judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a deputy knew that the inmate faced a
risk of a serious medical condition and chose to ignore it. The court also found that summary judgment was
precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a deputy who found the inmate lying on the floor in
his cell but did not contact the clinic was deliberately indifferent to the risk of serious medical need. The court
found that a deputy who helped escort the inmate back to his cell was not deliberately indifferent to the inmate's
serious medical need, as would violate the Eighth Amendment after the inmate died a couple days later, even
though the deputy saw the inmate acting strangely and moving slowly, where the deputy believed the inmate had
a mental health condition and did not need emergency care from a medical provider, and the deputy believed the
deputy in charge at that time would address the matter, and the deputy had no other contact with the inmate.
According to the court, a county custom, practice, or policy did not cause alleged constitutional violations by jail
deputies in not getting medical care for inmate, as required for supervisory liability for the sheriff in his official
capacity. The court noted that policy required that inmates receive necessary medical care without delay, deputies were expected to use common sense when responding to an inmate request or a known need, if an inmate
appeared ill or a deputy otherwise recognized the need for medical attention the deputy was supposed to advise
the inmate to place his name on sick call, contact a supervisor, or call the medical facility, and, in the event of a
medical emergency, the deputy could call an emergency radio code alerting a medical facility to respond immediately. (Sedgwick County Adult Detention Facility, Kansas)

U.S. District Court
EXAMINATIONS
FEMALE PRISONERS

Choquette v. City of New York, 839 F.Supp.2d 692 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). Female detainees filed § 1983 actions
against a city and city officials alleging that the policy, practice, and custom of the city department of correction
(DOC) of subjecting female detainees to a forced gynecological examination upon admission to DOC custody
violated their constitutional rights. The detainees alleged that they were not informed of what the exam entailed
and were subjected to, or threatened with, punishment if they questioned or refused the exam. The defendants
moved to dismiss. The district court denied the motion. The court held that the statute of limitations for the detainees' claims was tolled until the gynecological exam class claims were dismissed from the class action challenging the DOC's alleged practice of conducting strip searches, where the potential gynecological exam class
was pleaded in both the original complaint and the first amended intervener complaint, and the settlement
agreement did not provide unequivocal notice that the gynecological exam class claims were not being pursued.
(New York City Department of Correction, Rose M. Singer Center, Rikers Island)

U.S. District Court
EXAMINATIONS
NEGLIGENCE
RECORDS
TRANSFER

Coffey v. U.S., 870 F.Supp.2d 1202 (D.N.M. 2012). The mother of a deceased inmate brought an action against
the government under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), alleging, among other things, that Bureau of Indian
Affairs (BIA) was negligent in failing to medically screen the inmate prior to his transfer to a different facility.
The government moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state claim or, in the
alternative, for summary judgment. The district court denied the motion for summary judgment. The court held
that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact: (1) as to whether the Bureau of Indian
affairs (BIA), which transferred custody of the inmate with a heart condition to a county jail, where he died,
engaged in conduct that breached its duty to conduct some screening of the inmate's condition; (2) as to whether
BIA's conduct caused the inmate's death; (3) as to whether BIA engaged in conduct that breached its duty to take
some steps to ensure that the jail would learn of his condition; (4) as to whether BIA's conduct caused the inmate's death; (5) as to whether BIA engaged in conduct that breached its duty to take some steps to ensure that
the inmate's medical needs were addressed when it chose to transfer him; and (6) as to whether BIA engaged in
conduct that breached its duty to act reasonably in terms of sending the inmate to the jail. (Reno Sparks Indian
Colony, Nevada, and Washoe County Jail, Nevada)

U.S. District Court
DENIAL
MEDICATION
NEGLIGENCE
TRANSFER

Coffey v. U.S., 906 F.Supp.2d 1114 (D.N.M. 2012). The mother of a decedent, a Native American who died in a
county correctional institution, brought actions on behalf of her son and his children against the government,
alleging wrongful death and negligence claims arising from his treatment while in the institution. After a twoday bench trial, the district court found that: (1) the notice provided to the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) in the
mother's administrative claim was sufficient, thereby providing jurisdiction over the mother's wrongful death and
negligence claims; (2) the BIA's decision whether to screen and transfer the inmate were not choices susceptible
to policy analysis, and thus, the discretionary-function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) did not
preclude jurisdiction; (3) the mother's negligent screening claims were precluded; (4) the mother's negligent
transfer claims were precluded; and (5) the mother's wrongful death claims, arising under FTCA, were precluded. The mother had filed a standard two-page form and submitted it to Indian Health Services and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), claiming that her son was denied medication, and that he was transferred by BIA to another correctional facility. The district court concluded that the United States Government

29.254

was not liable for the detainee’s death. (U.S. Department of the Interior-Bureau of Indian Affairs, McKinley
County Detention Center, Nevada)
U.S. District Court
EMERGENCY CARE
MEDICATION
RECORDS
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Cordell v. Howard, 879 F.Supp.2d 145 (D.Mass. 2012). A federal inmate, who allegedly suffered from a blood
disorder, brought a pro se Bivens action against four prison medical providers, alleging that the defendants overdosed him with medication, falsified his medical records, refused to provide him with emergency medical care,
and failed to intervene to correct improper medical treatment, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court denied the motion. The former inmate alleged that: (1) he suffered
from a blood disorder that was controlled by blood thinning medication; (2) during his incarceration the prison
medical providers violated his Eighth Amendment rights by giving him overdoses of that medication; (3) the
providers falsified his medical records in an attempt to cover up their improper treatment; (4) the overdoses were
life threatening and caused him severe pain and bleeding; and (5) the providers refused to give him emergency
medical care. The court held that these allegations stated an Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference
against the providers. (Federal Medical Center- FMC Devens, Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Currie v. Cundiff, 870 F.Supp.2d 581 (S.D.Ill. 2012). The administrator of the estate of a deceased detainee
brought an action against a county, jail officials, and health care providers, alleging various claims, including
claims pursuant to § 1983 and the Illinois Wrongful Death Act, as well as for punitive damages. The court held
that allegations by the administrator of the estate of the deceased arrestee, that jail officials and health care providers acted with deliberate indifference in dealing with his diabetes while he was in custody, were sufficient to
plead that they acted with reckless or callous disregard to federally protected rights, as required to seek punitive
damages in the § 1983 proceedings alleging violations of the Fourth Amendment. The detainee died as a result of
diabetic ketoacidosis while confined in the county jail. (Williamson County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
EQUAL PROTECTION
WORK ASSIGNMENT

Davis v. Prison Health Services, 679 F.3d 433 (6th Cir. 2012). A homosexual state inmate, proceeding pro se and
in forma pauperis, brought an action against prison health services, the health unit manager, the public works
supervisor, and a corrections officer, alleging that he was improperly removed from his employment in a prison
public-works program because of his sexual orientation. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to
state a claim and the inmate appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that the inmate
stated an equal protection claim against prison personnel by alleging that: (1) public-works officers supervising
his work crew treated him differently than other inmates, ridiculed and belittled him, and “made a spectacle” of
him when they brought him back to the correctional facility after a public-works assignment because of his sexual orientation; (2) the officers did not want to strip search him because he was homosexual and would make
“under the breath” remarks when selected to do so; and there were similarly situated, non-homosexual, insulindependent diabetic inmates who participated in the public-works program and who were allowed to continue
working in the program after an episode in which the inmate believed he was experiencing low blood sugar,
which turned out to be a false alarm, while the inmate was removed from the program. (Florence Crane Correctional Facility, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
DENIAL
MEDICATION
SPECIAL HOUSING
WHEELCHAIR

Dilworth v. Goldberg, 914 F.Supp.2d 433 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). A released pretrial detainee and his wife brought an
action against a county, its health care corporation, and 47 related individuals, for federal and state claims arising
from his confinement at a county jail. The district court partially dismissed the claims and the plaintiffs moved to
amend. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court found that New York's threeyear limitations period began to run on the date in which the pretrial detainee was directed by an officer to sign
fraudulent papers indicating he caused his own injuries and that would waive his legal claims against the county
and jail officials. According to the court, it was appropriate for the now-released pretrial detainee to amend his
complaint to assert his section 1983 unconstitutional conditions of confinement claim, under the Eighth Amendment, against the officer, since there were sufficient allegations in the proposed pleading to support the claim.
The court noted that loss of consortium claims are not cognizable under § 1983 because they do not involve an
injury based on a deprivation of the plaintiff's rights, privileges, and immunities. The detainee, an AfricanAmerican, was detained in the jail when he slipped and fell on wet wax that had been left on a corridor floor by a
trustee inmate. He “suffered severe injuries to his head, back, and right arm, and lost consciousness due to the
fall.”He was taken the jail infirmary and given a "cursory" examination, which allegedly resulted in the understatement of his actual medical condition. Rather than allowing him to return to his cell to rest, he was ordered to
go to a visit and he was threatened with a charge of disobeying a direct order if he did not comply. He suffered
several subsequent health problems but was not taken to an outside source of medical care. He was given a
wheelchair and assigned to a dormitory with inmates who had medical problems. While confined in the dorm he
was allegedly denied meals on several occasions, was not able to take a shower, and was refused pain medication. He alleged further complaints about his treatment and conditions. (Westchester County Department of Corrections, New York Medical College, Westchester County Health Care Corporation, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
SUICIDE

Estate of Miller, ex rel. Bertram v. Tobiasz, 680 F.3d 984 (7th Cir. 2012). The minor siblings of an inmate who
committed suicide brought a § 1983 action against correctional facility staff members, alleging deliberate indifference to the inmate's serious medical condition involving a long history of suicide attempts, self-harm, and
mental illness. The district court granted qualified immunity to the management-level defendants and others, but
denied qualified immunity to an intake nurse, psychology associate, and prison guards. The defendants who were
denied qualified immunity appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the inmate's siblings adequately alleged that the intake nurse and a psychology associate were subjectively aware that the inmate
was a suicide risk, as required to state a claim alleging deliberate indifference to the inmate's serious medical
condition. The court found that the inmate's siblings adequately alleged that prison guards were subjectively
aware that the inmate was a suicide risk. According to the court, the siblings adequately alleged that the intake
nurse and psychology associate failed to take reasonable steps to prevent the harm from the inmate's suicidal
tendencies, and that prison guards failed to take reasonable steps to prevent the harm from the inmate's suicidal

29.255

tendencies. The court held that the intake nurse, psychology associate, and prison guards were not entitled to
qualified immunity. The court noted that the guards allegedly knew or should have known of the inmate's mental
illness and suicide attempts because he was adjudicated mentally ill, he had court-ordered medications he refused to take the night he died, and he had a well-documented history of suicidal behavior. The inmate was
housed in a unit where inmates in need of greater supervision were placed. The guards allegedly failed to call for
medical attention despite finding the inmate with no pulse and not breathing on the floor of his cell with a white
cloth wrapped around his neck, and waited to assemble an entry team and then applied restraints to the inmate
before removing the ligature from around his neck. (Columbia Correctional Institute, Wisconsin)
U.S. District Court
CONTRACT
SERVICES
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
POLICIES
PRETRIAL DETAINEE
SUICIDE
SUICIDE ATTEMPT

Ferencz v. Medlock, 905 F.Supp.2d 656 (W.D.Pa. 2012). A mother, as administrator for her son’s estate, brought
deliberate indifference claims under a wrongful death statute against prison employees, and the prison's medical
services provider, following the death of her son when he was a pretrial detainee in a county prison. The employees and provider moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The
district court held that under Pennsylvania law, the mother lacked standing to bring wrongful death and survival
actions in her individual capacity against several prison employees for her son's death while he was in prison,
where the wrongful death and survival statutes only permitted recovery by a personal representative, such as a
mother in her action as administratrix of her son's estate, or as a person entitled to recover damages as a trustee
ad litem. The court found that the mother's claims that a prison's medical services provider had a policy, practice,
or custom that resulted in her son's death were sufficient to overcome the provider's motion to dismiss the mother's § 1983 action for the death of her son while he was in prison.
Upon admission to the facility, the detainee had been evaluated and scored a 12 on a scale, which was to have
triggered classification as suicidal (a score of 8 or more). The Classification Committee subsequently did not
classify the detainee as suicidal as they were required to do under the jail classification policy, and no member of
the Committee communicated to medical contractor staff or correctional officers responsible for monitoring the
detainee that he was suicidal and going through drug withdrawal. At the time, the jail was equipped with an
operational and working video surveillance system and there was a video camera in the detainee’s cell. The video surveillance of the cell was broadcast on four different television monitors throughout the jail, all of which
were working and manned by officers. Additionally, the work station thhhattt was located around the corner
from the cell, approximately 20 feet away, was equipped with one of the four television monitors. The monitor
was situated on the wall above the desk at the work station, such that it would be directly in front of the officer
manning the station if he was sitting facing his desk. The detainee attempted suicide by trying to hang himself
with his bed sheet from the top of the cell bars, which took several minutes and was unsuccessful. After the attempt, however, the detainee left the bed sheet hanging from the top of his cell bars and started to pace in his cell
in visible mental distress. This suicide attempt, as well as the hanging bedsheet were viewable from the nearby
work station video surveillance monitor as well as the other three monitors throughout the jail. A few minutes
later the detainee attempted to commit suicide a second time by hanging himself with his bed sheet from the top
of his cell bars. This suicide attempt took several minutes, was unsuccessful, and was viewable from the work
station video surveillance monitor as well as the other three monitors throughout the jail. A few minutes later,
the detainee attempted to commit suicide a third time by hanging himself with his bed sheet. This time, he hung
himself from his bed sheet for over twenty minutes, without being noticed by any of the four officers who were
manning the four video surveillance monitors. In fact, one officer admitted he was asleep at his work station at
the time. By the time another officer noticed the hanging, nearly 30 minutes had passed. The detainee was cut
down and transported to a local hospital where he was subsequently pronounced dead due to asphyxiation by
hanging. (Fayette County Prison, Pennsylvania, and PrimeCare Medical, Inc.)

U.S. District Court
EYE CARE
MEDICATION
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Flournoy v. Ghosh, 881 F.Supp.2d 980 (N.D.Ill. 2012). An inmate with ocular hypertension brought a § 1983
action against a state prison physician and warden, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical need,
in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court denied
the motions. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by material fact issues regarding: (1) whether
the physician was deliberately indifferent to the inmate's ocular hypertension; and (2) whether the warden was
alerted to the medical staff's failure to promptly provide the inmate prescriptions. (Stateville Corr'l., Illinois)

U.S. District Court
PRETRIAL DETAINEE
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Frank v. County of Ontario, 884 F.Supp.2d 11 (W.D.N.Y. 2012). A pretrial detainee brought a state action
against a county, a jail physician, and a nurse practitioner, alleging medical malpractice and deliberate indifference to his serious medical need under §§ 1983 and 1985. The defendants removed the action to federal court
and moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that there was no evidence that the pretrial detainee who had a history of colitis had a serious medical need, as required to support a
claim for deliberate indifference to his serious medical need in violation of Fourteenth Amendment. The court
noted that the detainee was repeatedly examined during his relatively brief stay at the jail, and the defendants
ordered tests on more than one occasion, which generally yielded normal results that did not indicate a need for
surgery or more aggressive treatment. The court also found no evidence that the jail physician and or nurse practitioner unreasonably delayed treatment of the detainee's colitis. According to the court, the fact that the detainee
did not undergo surgery for his condition until some weeks after he was discharged from jail suggested that the
detainee did not need emergency surgery as a result of treatment that he had received at the jail. (Ontario County
Jail, New York)

U.S. District Court
DENIAL
POLICIES
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Gabriel v. County of Herkimer. 889 F.Supp.2d 374 (N.D.N.Y. 2012). The administrator of a pretrial detainee's
estate brought a § 1983 action against a county, jail officials, and jail medical personnel, alleging deliberate
indifference to a serious medical need, due process violations, and a state claim for wrongful death. The county
brought a third-party complaint against a hospital demanding indemnity. The defendants moved for summary
judgment and the hospital moved to dismiss the third-party complaint. The district court held that severance of
the third party complaint involving the hospital was warranted, where a separate trial regarding indemnity, following a verdict on liability, would be both economical and convenient. The court found that summary judgment

29.256

was precluded by material fact issues as to: (1) whether a nurse practitioner was aware of the detainee’s history
of depression, anxiety, tachycardia, angina, mitral valve prolapsed, degenerative back disease, and sciatic nerve,
but consciously disregarded the risk of harm to him; (2) whether the detainee had a serious medical condition;
and (3) whether a policy or custom of the county led to the denial of medical treatment for the detainee. According to the court, there was no evidence that a corrections officer disregarded an excessive risk to the safety of the
pretrial detainee, noting that when the officer witnessed the detainee fall, he assisted him and promptly contacted
the medical unit. According to the court, a lieutenant was not a policymaker, as required to support a § 1983
claim by the estate, where the lieutenant was responsible for jail security and had no involvement in the jail's
medical policies and procedures. (Herkimer County Jail, New York)
U.S. District Court
SUICIDE
EMERGENCY CARE
PRETRIAL DETAINEE

Glover v. Gartman, 899 F.Supp.2d 1115 (D.N.M. 2012). The personal representative of the estate of a pretrial
detainee who committed suicide while in custody brought an action against a warden of a county detention center and corrections officers, alleging under § 1983 that the defendants violated his substantive due process rights
when they provided him with razor blades and failed to respond in a timely manner to his emergency calls for
help. The officers moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court granted the motion. The court
held that a county corrections officer's act of providing the pretrial detainee with two razor blades and then leaving the detainee alone for over an hour so that detainee could shave before trial, during which time the detainee
committed suicide, did not violate the detainee's substantive due process rights under the United States Constitution or the New Mexico Constitution, where the officer did not know that the detainee posed any suicide risk.
The court also held that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity from the § 1983 claim that the officer
violated the pretrial detainee's substantive due process rights, where there was no due process violation, as the
officer did not know that the detainee posed any suicide risk, and a detainee's substantive due process right not to
be left alone with razor blades was not clearly established at the time of the incident. The court also found that a
corrections officer was entitled to qualified immunity from the § 1983 claim that the officer violated the substantive due process rights of the detainee by failing to respond to the detainee's calls for help. According to the
court, the officer's conduct did not rise to the level of a due process violation, and the substantive due process
right of the detainee to have an officer respond to a call was not clearly established absent evidence that the officer heard the call or knew of a suicide risk. (Lea County Detention Center, New Mexico)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
TRANSFER

Gomez v. Randle, 680 F.3d 859 (7th Cir. 2012). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging excessive force,
deliberate indifference to his serious medical condition, and retaliation for filing a grievance. After appointing
counsel for the inmate and allowing him to proceed in forma pauperis, the district court granted an attorney's
motion to withdraw and dismissed the case. The inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in
part, and remanded. The court held that the statutory period for the inmate to file a § 1983 action alleging that an
unidentified corrections officer who fired two rounds from shotgun into the inmate population violated an Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against excessive force was tolled while the inmate completed the administrative
grievance process. The court held that the issue of when the inmate completed the prison's grievance process
with regard to his claim involved fact issues that could not be resolved on a motion to dismiss. According to the
court, the inmate's allegation that an unidentified corrections officer fired two rounds from a shotgun into inmates who were not involved in an ongoing altercation was sufficient to state an excessive force claim under the
Eighth Amendment. The court found that the inmate's allegations that he suffered a shotgun wound that caused
excessive bruising and bleeding, that prison officials waited four days before treating his wound, and that he
experienced prolonged, unnecessary pain as result of a readily treatable condition, were sufficient to state a claim
for deliberate indifference to his serious medical condition, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The court
found that the inmate's allegations that he used the prison's grievance system to address his injury and lack of
treatment he received following his injury, that he was transferred to a correctional center where he had known
enemies when he refused to drop his grievance, and that there was no other explanation for his transfer, were
sufficient to state a claim of retaliation in violation of his First Amendment right to use a prison grievance system. (Illinois Department of Corrections, Stateville Correctional Center)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELAY OF CARE
NEGLIGENCE
X-RAY

Gonzalez v. U.S., 681 F.3d 949 (8th Cir. 2012). A former federal inmate filed suit under the Federal Tort Claims
Act (FTCA), alleging that employees of the United States negligently caused a significant delay in the proper
treatment of leg injuries that he suffered while playing softball in federal custody. Following a bench trial, the
district court found the government liable and awarded compensatory damages of $813,000. The government
appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the damages award of $813,000 was not excessive. According
to the court, the award was not excessive for the former federal inmate's pain and suffering and mental anguish
suffered from the morning he sought medical treatment for an injury to his left leg and ankle sustained in a prison-sanctioned softball game until the date x-rays were taken approximately one month later, and the pain and
suffering and mental anguish reasonably certain to be experienced for the remainder of the former inmate's expected life, which the district court determined to be 22 years, where the government breached a duty of care by
failing to treat the ankle in four weeks prior to the taking of x-rays, and the inmate suffered a continuing injury
following his surgery. (Federal Correctional Institution, Forrest City, Arkansas)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
INADEQUATE CARE

Gulley v. Ghosh, 864 F.Supp.2d 725 (N.D.Ill. 2012). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against a prison doctor,
alleging that inadequate treatment of his sciatic nerve pain amounted to deliberate indifference to his medical
needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The doctor moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court denied the motion. The court held that the inmate stated a cause of action against the prison doctor
under § 1983 for deliberate indifference to the inmate's serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The inmate alleged that the doctor persisted in a course of treatment he knew was ineffective to treat the
inmate's sciatica, the inmate alleged he experienced six months of untreated pain before the doctor prescribed
him a small dose of medication that did not alleviate the pain, and the inmate alleged the doctor told him he
prescribed a minimal amount of medication because it would be cheaper than sending the inmate to an outside
neurologist. (Stateville Correctional Center, Illinois)

29.257

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Hartmann v. Carroll, 882 F.Supp.2d 742 (D.Del. 2012). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action, proceeding
pro se and in forma pauperis, against a warden, deputy warden, and an employee of the medical healthcare contractor for the Delaware Department of Correction (DOC). The prisoner alleged deliberate indifference to his
medical needs. The prisoner requested counsel, and the employee moved to dismiss. The district court denied the
request for counsel and denied the motion to dismiss. The court held that evidence did not support the conclusion
that the prisoner was incompetent, where the prisoner had actively participated in the litigation, and he had been
able to represent himself in court. (Sussex Correctional Institution, Delaware)

U.S. District Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
AIDS- Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome
RA- Rehabilitation Act
SPECIAL HOUSING

Henderson v. Thomas, 891 F.Supp.2d 1296 (M.D.Ala. 2012). State prisoners, on behalf of themselves and a
class of all current and future HIV-positive (HIV+) prisoners, filed a class action against prison officials, seeking
declaratory judgment that the Alabama Department of Corrections' (ADOC) policy of segregating HIV+ prisoners from the general prison population violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act, and seeking an injunction against further enforcement of the policy. The district court denied the officials’ motion to dismiss. The court held that the prisoners' class action complaint plausibly alleged that HIVpositive prisoners suffered from an impairment that substantially limited a major life activity, as required to state
claims that the ADOC HIV-segregation policy discriminated against prisoners on the basis of a disability in
violation of ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. According to the court, the complaint provided information on the
contemporary medical consensus regarding HIV treatment and alleged that each named plaintiff was diagnosed
with HIV, that HIV was an impairment of the immune system, that HIV substantially limited the named plaintiffs in one or more major life activities, and that HIV qualified as a disability. The court found that the prisoners'
class action complaint plausibly alleged that they were otherwise qualified individuals with a disability due to
their HIV-positive status on the grounds that reasonable accommodations could be made to eliminate the significant risk of HIV+ prisoners transmitting HIV while integrated with other prisoners. The complaint alleged details of the programs and accommodations for which HIV+ prisoners were ineligible, alleged that all but two
state penal systems had integrated HIV+ prisoners into the general prison population, and alleged that the National Commission on Correctional Health Care counseled against segregation. (Ala. Dept. of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
AIDS- Acquired
Immune Deficiency
Syndrome
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
FEMALE PRISONERS
RA- Rehabilitation Act
SPECIAL HOUSING
TRANSFER

Henderson v. Thomas, 913 F.Supp.2d 1267 (M.D.Ala. 2012). Seven HIV-positive inmates brought an action on
behalf of themselves and class of all current and future HIV-positive inmates incarcerated in Alabama Department of Corrections (ADOC) facilities, alleging that ADOC's HIV segregation policy discriminated against them
on the basis of their disability, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Rehabilitation Act.
After a non-jury trial, the district court held that: (1) the class representatives had standing to sue; (2) the claims
were not moot even though one inmate had been transferred, where it was reasonable to believe that the challenged practices would continue; (3) inmates housed in a special housing unit were “otherwise qualified,” or
reasonable accommodation would render them “otherwise qualified;” (4) the blanket policy of categorically
segregating all HIV-positive inmates in a special housing unit violated ADA and the Rehabilitation Act; (5)
housing HIV-positive inmates at other facilities would not impose an undue burden on the state; and (6) foodservice policies that excluded HIV-positive inmates from kitchen jobs within prisons and prohibited HIVpositive inmates from holding food-service jobs in the work-release program irrationally excluded HIV-positive
inmates from programs for which they were unquestionably qualified and therefore violated ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. The court also found that female HIV-positive class representative had standing to challenge
ADOC policies that HIV-positive women were segregated within the prison from general-population prisoners
and that women were allowed work-release housing at one facility, but not at ADOC's other work-release facility
for women. The court held that modification of the ADOC medical classification system to afford HIV-positive
inmates individualized determinations, instead of treating HIV status as a dispositive criterion regardless of viral
load, history of high-risk behavior, physical and mental health, and any other individual aspects of inmates, was
a reasonable accommodation to ensure that HIV-positive inmates housed in the prison's special housing unit
were “otherwise qualified,” under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act, for
integration into the general prison population. According to the court, requiring ADOC to dismantle its policy of
segregating HIV-positive female inmates in a particular dormitory at a prison would neither impose undue financial and administrative burdens nor require fundamental alteration in the nature of ADOC's operations. The court
suggested that it was almost certain that ADOC was wasting valuable resources by maintaining its segregation
policy, in that a large space at a prison filled with empty beds was being used to house only a few women. (Alabama Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
INADEQUATE CARE
POLICIES
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Jones v. Correctional Medical Services, Inc., 845 F.Supp.2d 824 (W.D.Mich. 2012). The personal representative
of the estate of an inmate, who died of viral meningoencephalitis while under the control of the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC), brought an action against prison officials and personnel, as well as the company which contracted to provide medical services to the inmate and the company's employees, alleging that the
defendants violated the inmate's Eighth Amendment right to adequate medical care. The representative also
asserted state law claims for gross negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court held that
the company that provided medical services to inmates under a contract with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) could not be held liable under § 1983 on a supervisory liability theory in the action brought by
the personal representative, but the company was subject to suit under § 1983. The court found that the personal
representative failed to establish that policies or customs of the company which provided medical services to
inmates under contract with the MDOC were involved in the inmate's treatment, as required to sustain a § 1983
Eighth Amendment claim against the company based on the inmate's alleged inadequate medical treatment. The
court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the doctor
employed by company was aware of the serious medical needs of the inmate, as to whether the doctor's treatment
of the inmate displayed deliberate indifference, and as to whether the doctor's inaction or delay proximately
caused the inmate's death. (Ernest Brooks Facility, Mich. , and Correctional Medical Services)

29.258

U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
DELAY IN CARE

Jones v. Pramstaller, 874 F.Supp.2d 713 (W.D.Mich. 2012). The estate of a prisoner who died of viral
meningoencephalitis brought an action under § 1983 against a doctor who provided the prisoner with medical
care under contract with the contractor that provided health care to state prisoners. The doctor moved for disqualification of the estate's expert witness. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the estate
failed to show that the expert witness' testimony was based on common sense rather than expertise and experience, and the estate failed to show that the expert witness's opinion was based on reliable principles and methods. The proposed expert witness, a physician, believed that the doctor's unreasonable delay in having the prisoner hospitalized was probably a cause of the prisoner's death. (Ernest Brooks Facility, Michigan Department of
Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
POLICIES

King v. Kramer, 680 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir. 2012). The widow of a deceased pre-trial detainee brought a § 1983
action against a county, officers, and nurses, alleging violations of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The widow appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part
and reversed in part. The court held that the county jail officers were not deliberately indifferent to the pre-trial
detainee's serious medical needs, as would violate the Fourteenth Amendment, even though severe seizures led
to his death. The court noted that the officers were not responsible for administering medical care and they immediately notified nursing staff when the seizures began, and the officers monitored the detainee while waiting
for a nurse to arrive. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as
to whether a prison nurse's actions regarding treatment of the pre-trial detainee were so far afield from an appropriate medical response to the detainee's seizures that they fell outside the bounds of her professional judgment.
The court found that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
county had a policy or custom resulting in violations of the pre-trial detainee's constitutional rights, precluding
summary judgment in a § 1983 action alleging violations of the Fourteenth Amendment following the detainee's
death. (La Crosse County Jail, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
DELAY IN CARE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
DENIAL

Kneen v. Zavaras, 885 F.Supp.2d 1055 (D.Colo. 2012). A state prisoner brought an action against prison officials in a state facility operated by a private corporation, for violations of his Eighth Amendment rights, seeking
injunctive relief, as well as nominal damages, actual damages, and $1 million in compensatory damages against
each defendant. The defendants moved to dismiss and the prisoner moved to amend. The district court granted
the defendants' motion, and granted in part and denied in part the plaintiff’s motion. The court held that the prisoner failed to allege a factual basis demonstrating that a prison official's position as a warden impacted the prisoner's health or the decisions made with regard to his treatment, or lack thereof, as required to support the prisoner's § 1983 deliberate indifference claim against warden as an individual in his supervisory capacity based on
the denial of treatment for Hepatitis. The court found that the prisoner stated a claim against the prison's health
administrator as an individual in her supervisory capacity under § 1983 for deliberate indifference, based on the
denial of his request for Hepatitis treatment, by alleging: (1) the health administrator was responsible for reviewing prisoner complaints regarding the denial and delay of medical care; (2) the health administrator reviewed the
prisoner's complaints regarding the denial and delay of medical care; and (3) the health administrator knew that
the prisoner had been diagnosed with chronic Hepatitis C, had lab results which indicated that treatment was
immediately warranted, and had also suffered from Esophageal Varicies, a serious and life threatening complication of cirrhosis. (Colorado Department of Corrections, Crowley County Correctional Facility, operated by the
Corrections Corporation of America)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
GID- Gender Identity
Disorder
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Kosilek v. Spencer, 889 F.Supp.2d 190 (D.Mass. 2012). A Massachusetts prisoner suffering from gender identity
disorder (GID) brought an action, alleging his rights were being violated by the Massachusetts Department of
Corrections' (DOC) refusal to provide him with male-to-female sex reassignment surgery for his GID, and seeking an injunction requiring the DOC to provide him with the surgery. The district court entered summary judgment for the prisoner, finding that: (1) the prisoner's gender identity disorder (GID) constituted a serious medical
need that triggered Eighth Amendment protection; (2) DOC officials had actual knowledge of the prisoner's
serious medical need; (3) the DOC Commissioner's refusal to provide the surgery in order to avoid public and
political criticism was not a legitimate penological purpose; and (4) the DOC Commissioner's deliberate indifference would continue in the absence of injunction. (Massachusetts Department of Correction, MCI Norfolk)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICATION
CONTRACT SERVICES

Kress v. CCA of Tennessee, LLC, 694 F.3d 890 (7th Cir. 2012). Inmates at a county jail filed a § 1983 action
against a sheriff, warden, jail doctor, and the private contractor which operated the facility, alleging that inadequate medical care and unsafe conditions at the jail violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The inmates sought injunctive and monetary relief. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the contractor and the inmates appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that: (1) the district court
did not abuse its discretion in determining that the inmates failed to satisfy the typicality requirement for class
certification; and (2) there was no evidence of a continuing violation, as would warrant injunctive relief. The
inmates claimed that the change in the number of daily rounds of medicine given, from three per day to two per
day, with exceptions for inmates with unique medical needs, amounted to inadequate medical care in violation of
the inmates' rights under the Eighth Amendment. (Corrections Corporation of America, Marion County Correctional Center, Indianapolis, Indiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
POLICIES
PRETRIAL DETAINEE

Luckert v. Dodge County, 684 F.3d 808 (8th Cir. 2012). The personal representative of the estate of her deceased
son, who committed suicide while detained in a county jail, filed a § 1983 action against the county and jail
officials for allegedly violating due process by deliberate indifference to the detainee's medical needs. Following
a jury trial, the district court entered judgment for the personal representative, awarding actual and punitive damages as well as attorney fees and costs. The jury awarded $750,000 in compensatory damages and $100,000 in
punitive damages. The district court denied the defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law and the defendants appealed. The appeals court reversed the denial of the defendants’ motion and vacated the awards. The
appeals court held that while the detainee had a constitutional right to protection from a known risk of suicide,
the jail nurse and the jail director were protected by qualified immunity, and the county was not liable. Accord-

29.259

ing to the court, the county jail nurse's affirmative but unsuccessful measures to prevent the pretrial detainee's
suicide did not constitute deliberate indifference to his risk of suicide, where the nurse assessed the detainee
twice after learning from his mother that he had recently attempted suicide, the nurse arranged for the detainee to
have two appointments with the jail's psychiatrist, including an appointment on the morning of the detainee's
suicide, the nurse contacted the detainee's own psychiatrist to gather information about the detainee's condition,
she reviewed the detainee's medical records, and she responded in writing to each of the detainee's requests for
medical care. The court held that the county jail director's actions and omissions in managing jail's suicide intervention practices did not rise to the level of deliberate indifference to the pretrial detainee's risk of suicide, even
though the director delegated to the jail nurse significant responsibility for suicide intervention before formally
training her on suicide policies and procedures, and the jail's actual suicide intervention practices did not comport with the jail's written policy. The court noted that the jail had a practice under the director's management of
identifying detainees at risk of committing suicide, placing them on a suicide watch, and providing on-site medical attention, and the detainee remained on suicide watch and received medical attention including on the day of
his suicide. The court held that the county lacked a custom, policy, or practice that violated the pretrial detainee's
due process rights and caused his suicide, precluding recovery in the § 1983 action. The court found that, even
though the county had flaws in its suicide intervention practices, the county did not have a continuing, widespread, and persistent pattern of constitutional misconduct regarding prevention of suicide in the county jail.
(Dodge County Jail, Fremont, Nebraska)
U.S. District Court
FEMALE PRISONER
MEDICATION
RIGHT TO REFUSE

Manning v. Sweitzer, 891 F.Supp.2d 961 (N.D.Ill. 2012). An arrestee brought an action against various village
police officers and a village alleging unreasonable search and seizure of her vehicle, denial of the right to counsel, cruel and unusual punishment, conspiracy under § 1985, failure to train, unlawful detention, and several state
law claims. The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court granted the motion in
part and denied in part. The court held that the detainee's allegation that she was offered medication for her unnamed mental ailment while incarcerated, but that she declined to accept the medication “for fear of overmedication or a harmful interaction,” failed to establish that she was subjected to inhumane conditions or that the police
were deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need, as required to support her claim that she was subjected to
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause. According to
the court, the arrestee's failure to allege any other incidents of wrongdoing by the village, combined with her
failure to show that the unconstitutional consequences of the village's alleged failure to train its police officers
were patently obvious, precluded her claim against the village. (Village of Park Forest Police Dept., Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONTAGIOUS DISEASE
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

McCaster v. Clausen, 684 F.3d 740 (8th Cir. 2012). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against a jail superintendent, the jail nursing supervisor, five nurses he encountered while incarcerated, and a county, asserting that
they had been deliberately indifferent to his serious medical need for treatment due to tuberculosis. The district
court granted summary judgment on immunity grounds to the administrators and the county, but denied summary judgment to the nurses. The nurses appealed. The appeals court held that two nurses were entitled to qualified immunity from the inmate's action, but summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact
for three of the nurses on the inmate's Eighth Amendment claim. The court held that although one nurse might
have been negligent in failing to perceive of, or further investigate, the inmate's signs of illness in connection
with tuberculosis, she did not deliberately disregard the inmate's need for medical treatment, and thus, she was
entitled to qualified immunity from the inmate's § 1983 Eighth Amendment claims. The court noted that the
nurse only met the inmate during his intake exam, she noted his elevated pulse, his weight loss and coughing, he
did not complain of medical issues directly to her or on the screening form, and he played basketball within
several days of his intake exam. The court found that a second nurse did not deliberately disregard the inmate's
need for medical treatment arising from tuberculosis, and thus, she was entitled to qualified immunity. According to the court, the nurse's interaction with the inmate lasted two minutes and was confined to reading the result
of his Mantoux test, and although the result was not read correctly, the error did not show indifference to the
inmate's medical needs. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact
as to whether three nurses who knew from other inmates and correctional staff, of the inmate's medical needs due
to tuberculosis, were deliberately indifferent to the inmate's medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The court noted that the inmate’s condition worsened during his 56 day sentence for fifth degree assault,
and he was transferred to a hospital emergency room two days before he was scheduled for release. (Ramsey
County Correctional Facility, Minnesota)

U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE
MENTAL HEALTH
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
PRIVATE PROVIDER

McCullum v. Tepe, 693 F.3d 696 (6th Cir. 2012). A deceased inmate's mother sued a prison psychiatrist under §
1983, claiming that he was deliberately indifferent to the serious medical need of the inmate, who hung himself
from his bed. The district court denied the psychiatrist's motion for summary judgment and he appealed. The
appeals court affirmed, finding that the psychiatrist could not invoke qualified immunity. According to the court,
a physician employed by an independent non-profit organization, but working part-time for a county as a prison
psychiatrist, could not invoke qualified immunity in a § 1983 suit arising out of his activities at the prison. The
court found that there was no common-law tradition of immunity for a private doctor working for a public institution at the time that Congress enacted § 1983. (Butler County Prison, Community Behavioral Health, Ohio)

U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE
JUVENILE
MENTAL HEALTH
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Miller v. Harbaugh, 698 F.3d 956 (7th Cir. 2012). The mother of a minor who hanged himself while incarcerated
at a state youth detention facility, on her own behalf and as the minor's representative, brought a § 1983 action
against state officials, alleging deliberate indifference to the minor's serious mental illness. The 16-year-old
youth had a history of mental illness and was known to have attempted suicide at least three times. The district
court granted summary judgment for the officials. The mother appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals
court held that, even assuming that state supervisory officials' decision to use metal bunk beds in rooms of a
youth detention facility that were occupied by residents who were mentally disturbed but did not appear to be
imminently suicidal, amounted to deliberate indifference to the residents' serious medical needs, the law was not
then so clearly established as to defeat the officials' defense of qualified immunity to the due process claim. The

29.260

court found that a psychologist at the state youth detention facility, who had authorized the minor's transfer after
learning of minor's unsuccessful participation in the facility's drug abuse program, was not deliberately indifferent to the minor's serious medical needs, in violation of due process. According to the court, even if he knew that
the minor, who had mental health issues, presented a suicide risk and that the transferee facility was using metal
bunk beds like that which the minor thereafter used to hang himself. The court found that the psychologist's
involvement with the minor was minimal, the decision to make the transfer was made after the psychologist met
with the facility's entire treatment staff, and the psychologist did not know which room at the transferee facility
the minor would be given or that the facility's other suicide prevention measures would prove to be inadequate.
(Illinois Youth Center, Kewanee, Illinois)
U.S. Supreme Court
INADEQUATE CARE
PRIVATE PROVIDER

Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S.Ct. 617 (2012). A prisoner at a federal facility operated by a private company filed a
pro se complaint against several employees of the facility, alleging the employees deprived him of adequate
medical care, in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, and
caused him injury. The district court dismissed the complaint and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded, and, subsequently, amended its opinion. The U.S. Supreme court reversed, finding that the
prisoner could not assert an Eighth Amendment Bivens claim for damages against private prison employees.
(Wackenhut Correctional Corporation- Federal Correctional Institution at Taft, California)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
EMERGENCY CARE
FEMALE PRISONERS
NEGLIGENCE

Moulton v. DeSue, 966 F.Supp.2d 1298 (M.D.Fla. 2012). The personal representative of a jail inmate's estate
brought a § 1983 action against correctional officers, a nurse, and a sheriff, alleging deliberate indifference to the
inmate's right to adequate medical care while in pretrial confinement, which resulted in her death. The defendants filed motions for summary judgment. The district court denied the motions in part and granted the motions
in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
the correctional officers' failure to call emergency rescue when the pregnant jail inmate complained of stomach
cramps constituted more than grossly negligent disregard of a substantial risk of a serious harm, precluding
summary judgment for the officers on the deliberate indifference to the inmate's serious medical need claim.
According to the court, correctional officers were on notice that their alleged actions or inactions violated the jail
inmate's clearly established Fourteenth Amendment right to adequate medical care, and, thus, the officers were
not entitled to qualified immunity in § 1983 action. The court also held that summary judgment was precluded
by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the correctional officers acted with ill will or malice toward the
jail inmate, or exhibited reckless indifference. (Bradford County Jail, Florida)

U.S. District Court
INVOLUNTARY
MEDICATION
MENTAL HEALTH
TRAINING
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Olaniyi v. District of Columbia, 876 F.Supp.2d 39 (D.D.C. 2012). A pretrial detainee brought an action against
the District of Columbia and the United States, asserting claims under § 1983 and the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA), arising from his detention and a separate incident involving a traffic stop. The defendants moved for
summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that past alleged deficiencies in medical services at the District of Columbia jail that were unrelated to unconstitutional forced medication of inmates
could not have put the District on notice of the need for training to avoid an alleged due process violation arising
from the detainee's being forcibly injected with a psychoactive drug while residing in the jail's mental health
unit, and thus could not sustain a finding of deliberate indifference necessary to hold the District liable under §
1983 for an alleged due process violation. The court also held that the detainee failed to establish a pattern of
similar due process violations by untrained or inadequately trained jail employees that could have put the District
on notice of a need for more training with respect to forced medication of inmates, thus precluding the detainee's
§ 1983 due process claim against the District based on a failure to train theory. (Mental Health Unit of the District of Columbia Jail)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
INTAKE SCREENING
MENTAL HEALTH
RELEASE

Paine v. Cason, 678 F.3d 500 (7th Cir. 2012). The guardian of the estate of an arrestee, who allegedly suffered
from bipolar disorder, brought a § 1983 action against a municipality and police officers, alleging civil rights
violations in connection with the arrest and subsequent release from custody without being provided access to
mental health treatment. The arrestee was raped at knifepoint after her release and either jumped or was pushed
from a window, causing permanent brain damage. The district court denied summary judgment in part for the
defendants. The defendants sought relief through interlocutory appeal. The appeals court affirmed in part, denied
in part, and remanded. The appeals held that: (1) the arrestee, as a person in custody, had clearly a established
right for police to provide care for her serious medical condition; (2) whether the police should have understood
that the arrestee had a serious medical condition, and thus should have provided care, was a factual issue that
could not be decided on interlocutory appeal; (3) causation was a factual issue not suited to resolution on interlocutory appeal of denial of qualified immunity; (4) the arrestee did not have a clearly established constitutional
right for her release to be delayed pending mental-health treatment; (5) the arrestee had a clearly established due
process right for the police to not create danger, without justification, by arresting her in a safe place and releasing her in a hazardous one while unable to protect herself; (6) the arresting officer was entitled to qualified immunity; (7) the watch officer was not entitled to qualified immunity; and (8) a detention aide was not entitled to
qualified immunity. According to the court, a police officer who was responsible for preparing the arrestee's
individual-recognizance bond and collecting possessions that were to be returned on her release, and who received a telephone call from the mother of the arrestee regarding the arrestee's bi-polar condition and did nothing
in response and who did not even note the call in a log, was not entitled to qualified immunity to the civil rights
claims that the police had created a danger, without justification. The court found that the detention aide who
was responsible for evaluating inmates, observed the arrestee behaving in a mentally unstable way, such as
smearing menstrual blood on her cell walls, and transferred another person out of the arrestee's cell because of
her inappropriate behavior, and yet did nothing to alert other personnel at the stationhouse, was not entitled to
qualified immunity to the civil rights claims that the police did not arrange for medical treatment of serious conditions while the arrestee's custody continued. (8th District Station, 2nd District Station, Chicago Police Dept.)

29.261

U.S. District Court
CONTAGIOUS DISEASE
CONTRACT SERVICES
POLICIES
DELAY IN CARE

Parkell v. Danberg, 871 F.Supp.2d 341 (D.Del. 2012). A state inmate who developed a staphylococcus infection
brought an action against the corporation that contracted with the prison to provide medical services to inmates
and the corporation's employees, alleging under § 1983 that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his
serious medical needs, in violation of Eighth Amendment. The inmate also alleged that the corporation violated
his substantive due process rights by refusing to treat him while he was housed in isolation. The defendants
moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The
district court held that the inmate stated a § 1983 Eighth Amendment medical needs claim against the employee
with his allegations in his complaint that: (1) an employee of the corporation refused to examine the inmate; (2)
the employee ignored the inmate's complaints of an infected arm, and refused to administer a pain reliever; (3)
over the next few days his condition worsened and correctional officers notified the on-duty physician regarding
the inmate's condition; and (4) the physician performed a medical procedure on the inmate's elbow approximately one week following his visit with the employee. The court found that the inmate stated a § 1983 Eighth
Amendment medical needs claim against the corporation with his allegations that the corporation had policies,
customs, or practices of refusing to treat the inmate, who developed a staphylococcus infection, particularly
when he was housed in isolation. According to the court, the inmate stated a § 1983 substantive due process
claim against the corporation with his allegations that he was subjected to conditions significantly worse than
other inmates under similar circumstances, and that because of his security classification, the corporation refused
to treat him while housed in isolation, and refused to enter his cell to provide treatment while he was housed in
the infirmary. (Howard R. Young Correctional Institution, Delaware)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE
CONTRACT SERVICES
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
MEDICATION
MENTAL HEALTH
PRETRIAL DETAINEE

Ponzini v. Monroe County, 897 F.Supp.2d 282 (M.D.Pa. 2012). Survivors of a pretrial detainee sued prison officials, medical care providers and a corrections officer under § 1983 and state tort law, claiming that they were
deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of the detainee, who committed suicide. The detainee allegedly did not receive his medication during his confinement. The survivors noted that one of the medications,
Paxil, has “a short half-life and leaves a user's system very quickly,” and that its withdrawal symptoms include
“worsening of underlying anxiety or depression, headache, tremor or ‘shakes', gastrointestinal distress and fatigue-, all of which were allegedly present in detainee during his incarceration.” The detainee had also been taking Trazadone. The survivors alleged that during the period in which the detainee was incarcerated at the facility,
officers were aware that the detainee should have been monitored closely and placed on a suicide watch. The
survivors asserted that, although the detainee was not on a suicide watch, the inmate housed in an adjacent cell
was on such a watch. An officer was expected to pass the neighboring cell, and by virtue of its location, the detainee’s cell, every fifteen minutes. The survivors alleged that the officer falsified documents demonstrating that
he properly made his rounds every fifteen minutes, and that officer failure to properly maintain a suicide watch
on the detainee’s neighbor facilitated the detainee’s own suicide. The detainee killed himself by swallowing
shreds of his own t-shirt. The court held that the survivors stated a § 1983 claim under the Fourteenth Amendment against prison officials for deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of the detainee, who committed suicide allegedly as a result of a lack of daily medication necessary to treat depression and other psychological issues. According to the court, the complaint raised the possibility that prison officials knew that the
detainee suffered from a severe medical condition and did not attempt to provide appropriate, necessary care in a
timely manner. The court held that the survivors also stated a § 1983 claim under the Fourteenth Amendment
against the corporate medical provider for deliberate indifference. (PrimeCare Medical, Inc., and Monroe County
Correctional Facility, Pennsylvania)

U.S. Appeals Court
COSTS
DENTAL CARE

Poole v. Isaacs, 703 F.3d 1024 (7th Cir. 2012). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action against prison officials,
alleging that a required $2.00 copayment for dental care furnished at a correctional center violated his Eighth
Amendment rights. The district court allowed the action to proceed against the center's healthcare administrator
after screening the complaint, but then granted summary judgment for the administrator. The inmate appealed.
The appeals court held that the imposition of a modest fee for medical services provided to inmates with adequate resources to pay the fee, standing alone, does not violate the United States Constitution. According to the
court, the issue of whether the inmate should have been given the benefit of an exemption from the required
copayment was state-law question that could not be pursued under § 1983. (Big Muddy River Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
EQUAL PROTECTION

Powell v. Symons, 680 F.3d 301 (3rd Cir. 2012). A state prisoner filed a § 1983 action asserting Eighth Amendment claim that a physician was deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. The district court granted summary
judgment for the defendant and the prisoner appealed. Another prisoner filed a similar claim and the district
court granted summary judgment for defendants and that prisoner appealed. The appeals were consolidated. The
appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that the district court abused its discretion as to one prisoner in not
entering an order appointing an appropriate representative under the guardian ad litem rule, and that a letter from
a physician as to the other prisoner sufficed to put the district court on notice that the prisoner possibly was incompetent. The court noted that the letter from the physician stated that the prisoner “is under my care for Major
Depression and Attention Deficit Disorder. I do not feel he is competent at this time to represent himself in court.
I would recommend that he be given a public defender, if at all possible.” (SCI–Rockview, Pennsylvania)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
SPECIAL DIETS

Prude v. Clarke, 675 F.3d 732 (7th Cir. 2012). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against a sheriff and jail personnel, alleging that he was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment as
a result of his exclusive diet of nutriloaf, a bad-tasting food given to prisoners as a form of punishment. The
parties moved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants and the
inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The appeals court held that summary
judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether jail officials were aware that the inmate was being sickened by his exclusive diet of nutriloaf, yet did nothing about it. According to the court, deliberate withholding of nutritious food from a prison inmate, or substitution of a tainted or otherwise sickening

29.262

food, with the effect of causing substantial weight loss, vomiting, stomach pains, and maybe an anal fissure, or
other severe hardship, violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. (Milwaukee County Jail, Wisconsin)
U.S. Appeals Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
NEGLIGENCE

Reilly v. Vadlamudi, 680 F.3d 617 (6th Cir. 2012). An inmate brought a suit against a doctor and nurses who
treated him in prison, claiming Eighth Amendment violations under § 1983 as well as medical malpractice under
Michigan law. The district court denied immunity claims asserted by the doctor and one of the nurses, and they
appealed. The appeals court reversed. The court held that the physician was not deliberately indifferent to the
medical needs of the inmate who was found to have a serious form of bone cancer, thus precluding imposition of
§ 1983 liability on the inmate's Eighth Amendment claim, where the physician had made a single contact with
the inmate who had no history of any symptoms suggesting cancer. The court held that the physician was not
grossly negligent regarding an the inmate, thus precluding imposition of liability under Michigan law, where the
physician examined the inmate ten months before his complaints of severe “headaches that cause[d] him to vomit,” and during the physician's single contact with the inmate, the inmate had a headache and left eye swelling
and no other symptoms. The court held that the nurse was not deliberately indifferent to the medical needs of an
inmate found to have a serious form of bone cancer, thus precluding imposition of § 1983 liability on the inmate's Eighth Amendment claim. The court noted that the nurse examined the inmate only twice, his initial diagnosis, that a “small raised area over the left eye” appeared to be a calcium deposit, warranted no treatment, and
following the second visit, the nurse made a referral to an optometrist. (Mound Correctional Facility, Michigan)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
MENTAL HEALTH
PRETRIAL DETAINEE
SUICIDE

Rice ex rel. Rice v. Correctional Medical Services, 675 F.3d 650 (7th Cir. 2012). Following a pretrial detainee's
death while incarcerated, his parents, representing his estate filed suit pursuant to § 1983, alleging among other
things that jail officials and medical personnel had deprived the pretrial detainee of due process by exhibiting
deliberate indifference to his declining mental and physical condition. The district court entered summary judgment against the estate. The estate filed a second suit reasserting the state wrongful death claims that the judge in
the first suit had dismissed without prejudice after disposing of the federal claims. The district court dismissed
that case on the basis of collateral estoppel, and the estate appealed both judgments. The appeals court affirmed
in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The appeals court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether jail officials were deliberately indifferent to the pretrial detainee's conditions of confinement, and whether his conditions of confinement were sufficiently serious to support his Fourteenth Amendment due process claim. The court noted that whether the detainee himself created the unsanitary
conditions was a fact relevant to the claim, but given detainee's mental condition, it did not foreclose the claim.
The court found that the estate failed to show that the detainee's assignment to an administrative segregation
unit of the jail for approximately seven months violated the detainee's due process rights, where the estate failed
to identify feasible alternatives and to tender evidence supporting the contention that the detainee likely would
have fared better in one of those alternative placements. The court held that jail officials did not employ excessive force, in violation of due process, to the pretrial detainee who had been fighting with his cellmate and failed
to comply with a directive that he step out of his cell which he refused to leave for 18 hours, by spraying his face
with pepper foam, and placing him in a restraint chair. The court held that jail officials did not have notice of a
substantial risk that the mentally ill pretrial detainee might be assaulted by other inmates, as required to support
the pretrial detainee's claim of deliberate indifference in violation of due process. The court noted that while jail
personnel were aware that the detainee had a hygiene problem, they had no notice that he was at risk of assault
because of that problem, particularly within the more secure confines of the administrative segregation unit.
The court found that neither jail guards or supervisors were deliberately indifferent to the risk that the mentally ill pretrial detainee might engage in a behavior such as compulsive water drinking that would cause him to die
within a matter of hours and did not consciously disregarded that risk, and therefore they were not liable for his
death under § 1983. According to the court, while a factfinder might conclude that the guards exhibited a generalized recklessness with respect to the safety of the inmates housed in the administrative segregation unit by
failing to conduct hourly checks of the unit, there was no evidence that the guards or supervisors were subjectively aware of the possibility that the detainee might injure himself to the point of death before anyone could
intervene. (Elkhart County Jail, Indiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELAY IN TREATMENT

Richards v. Mitcheff, 696 F.3d 635 (7th Cir. 2012). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a prison
doctor, alleging that a delay in treatment violated the Eighth Amendment. The district court granted the doctor's
motion to dismiss and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that the allegations were sufficient to plead incapacitation. According to the court, the prisoner's allegations that he had several
surgeries that disabled him, that he was in constant pain and unable to walk when out of a hospital, and that he
filed suit as soon as he could muster concentration and energy to do so, were sufficient to plead incapacitation, as
required to toll the limitations period under Indiana law for the prisoner's § 1983 claim against the prison doctor
for violations of the Eighth Amendment. (Pendleton Correctional Facility, Indiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Rosario v. Brawn, 670 F.3d 816 (7th Cir. 2012). The father of a detainee who committed suicide while in police
custody brought a § 1983 action against police officers, alleging deliberate indifference to the detainee's risk of
suicide in violation of the detainee's right to due process under Fourteenth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment to the police officers, and the father appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held
that the police officers did not intentionally disregard a substantial risk that the detainee would commit suicide,
as required for liability on a due-process claim alleging deliberately indifferent treatment of the detainee. The
detainee committed suicide while being transported to a mental health facility after exhibiting self-destructive
behavior. The officers failed to discover the detainee's razor blade, which he used to commit suicide. According
to the court, their overall actions toward the detainee showed protection and compassion by searching the detainee, arranging for assessment of his mental condition, ensuring his comfort during transportation, and personally
administering first aid despite his resistance. (Washington County Sheriff, Wisconsin)

29.263

U.S. District Court
INVOLUNTARY
MEDICATION
MENTAL HEALTH
POLICIES

Santos v. Bush, 874 F.Supp.2d 408 (D.N.J. 2012). A mentally ill inmate brought an action under § 1983 against a
doctor and a warden at the prison where he was formerly housed, alleging that the defendants forcibly medicated
him without due process. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion.
The court held that the prison warden was not involved in any of the mental health evaluations the inmate received or the development of his treatment plans, nor did the warden have any direct involvement, or even actual
knowledge, of the specific circumstances surrounding the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication
to the inmate, as would subject her to liability under § 1983 on the inmate's due process claims. According to the
court, the warden's letter to the inmate's grandmother related to issues of the inmate's unwillingness to take psychotropic medication voluntarily was insufficient to demonstrate personal involvement, or knowledge and acquiescence, by the warden in approving or otherwise deciding whether the inmate should have been involuntarily
medicated, as would subject the warden to liability under § 1983. The court found that the involuntary medication administration (IMA) procedure utilized by the New Jersey Department of Corrections (DOC), and the prison's involuntary administration of psychotropic medication to the mentally ill inmate, complied with substantive
due process. According to the court, the procedure was reasonably related to the state's legitimate interests in
responding to the dangers posed by the mentally ill inmate, providing inmates with treatment in their medical
interest, and ensuring the safety of prison staff, administrative personnel, and inmates. The court found that the
prison's administration of psychotropic drugs to the mentally ill inmate under its involuntary medication administration (IMA) procedure did not violate the inmate's procedural due process rights, where: (1) the inmate was
diagnosed with a serious mental illness, based on a series of well-documented delusions, paranoid beliefs, and
behaviors exhibited by the inmate; (2) at least four psychiatrists evaluated the inmate at various points during his
treatment; (3) four separate treatment review committees (TRC) were convened during the inmate's treatment;
(4) the inmate received notice of each TRC hearing; and (5) the inmate's involuntary medication was periodically
reviewed in accordance with the IMA procedure. (South Woods State Prison, New Jersey)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
SPECIAL DIET

Schwartz v. Lassen County ex rel. Lassen County Jail (Detention Facility), 838 F.Supp.2d 1045 (E.D.Cal. 2012).
The mother of a deceased pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action on behalf of herself and as successor in interest against a county, sheriff, city, police department, and several officers, alleging violations of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied
in part. The court held that allegations that: (1) the undersheriff knew the pretrial detainee from various encounters with the county, including his diverticulitis and congenital heart condition that required a restricted diet; (2)
the undersheriff gave testimony to set bail for the detainee at $150,000 on a misdemeanor offense; (3) the detainee's doctor sent a letter explaining the detainee should be put on house arrest as opposed to detention because of
his medical condition; (4) the detainee had to be admitted to a hospital for emergency surgery during a previous
confinement; (5) the detainee's mother requested he be released for medical attention; (6) the detainee lost over
40 pounds during two weeks of detention; (7) the detainee requested to see a doctor but was told to “quit complaining;” and (8) the undersheriff personally knew the detainee was critically ill, were sufficient to plead that
the undersheriff knew of and failed to respond to the detainee's serious medical condition, as would be deliberate
indifference required to state a § 1983 claim alleging violations of Fourteenth Amendment due process after the
detainee died. According to the court, allegations that the pretrial detainee's health was visibly deteriorating, that
he had requested medical care on numerous occasions, and that the undersheriff knew of his health issues but
failed to ensure that the prison provided him medical care, were sufficient to plead a causal connection between
the undersheriff's conduct and denial of medical care for the detainee's serious medical need, as required to state
a § 1983 supervisory liability claim against the undersheriff alleging violations of Fourteenth Amendment due
process after the detainee died. The court found that allegations that the undersheriff owed the pretrial detainee
an affirmative duty to keep the jail and prisoners in it, and that he was answerable for their safekeeping, were
sufficient to plead a duty, as required to state a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) under
California law against the undersheriff after the detainee died. (Lassen Co. Adult Detention Facility, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
FEMALE PRISONERS
NEGLIGENCE

Shelton v. Arkansas Dept. of Human Services, 677 F.3d 837 (8th Cir. 2012). The administratrix of the estate of a
mental health patient brought an action against various public officials and health professionals, alleging shortcomings in the way the medical professionals responded after the patient hanged herself while a patient at the
facility. The district court dismissed the action. The administratrix appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The
court held that the state actors' discovery of an unconscious voluntary mental health patient hanged in her room
did not trigger duties related to involuntary commitment nor did it give rise to a constitutional-level duty of care.
According to the court, after the state actors discovered the patient, she was no different than any unconscious
patient in an emergency room, operating room, or ambulance controlled by the state actors, and, in such circumstances, the state actors owed patients state-law duties of care based upon standards for simple or professional
negligence. The court found that the physician's decision to remove the mental health patient from a suicide
watch was a medical-treatment decision, and therefore a claim based on that decision could not be brought pursuant to either the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) or the Rehabilitation Act, absent any allegation that
the removal from suicide watch was influenced by anything other than the physician's judgment. (Arkansas State
Hospital)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELAY IN CARE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Smith v. Knox County Jail, 666 F.3d 1037 (7th Cir. 2012). A pretrial detainee brought a pro se action against a
county jail under § 1983, alleging that jail officials violated the Eighth Amendment because they were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs after a fellow inmate attacked him. The district court dismissed the
case and the detainee appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. The court held that the detainee stated
a claim for deliberate indifference under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment with his allegations that while he was asleep in his cell a guard opened the door and allowed another inmate to attack him, that
he requested medical attention after the attack but received none for five days, and that the guard knew of his
“obvious blood,” dizziness, throwing up, blind spots, severe pain, and loss of eye color. (Knox Co. Jail, Illinois)

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U.S. Appeals Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
DENIAL
INTERFERENCE WITH
TREATMENT
POLICIES

Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2012). A state death-row inmate brought a § 1983 action for declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief against prison officials and medical personnel, alleging, among other things,
deliberate indifference to his medical needs in violation of his rights under the Eighth Amendment. The district
court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part,
reversed in part and remanded. The court held that: (1) factual issues precluded summary judgment for the defendants on the issue of whether denial of a recommended treatment violated the inmate's Eighth Amendment
rights; (2) factual issues precluded summary judgment for the defendants on the ground that the decision to treat
the inmate pharmacologically, rather than surgically, was a mere difference of opinion over the course of treatment that did not establish deliberate indifference; (3) factual issues precluded summary judgment for the warden and the assistant warden on the claim for deliberate indifference to the inmate's serious medical needs; (4)
factual issues precluded summary judgment for the head of the prison's utilization review panel on the claim for
deliberate indifference to the inmate's serious medical needs; (5) the Eleventh Amendment applied to bar the
claim against the state and the state corrections department for monetary damages based on the alleged custom or
policy of refusing to provide certain types of medical care to inmates; and (6) factual issues precluded summary
judgment for the defendants on the inmate's Eighth Amendment claim for injunctive relief. (Ely State Prison,
Nevada Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
GID- Gender Identity
Disorder
POLICIES
TRANSSEXUAL

Soneeya v. Spencer, 851 F.Supp.2d 228 (D.Mass. 2012). A state prisoner, a male-to-female transsexual, brought
an action against the Commissioner of the Massachusetts Department of Correction (DOC), alleging violations
of her Eighth Amendment rights. Following a bench trial, the district court held that the prisoner's gender identity disorder (GID) was a serious medical need and the treatment received by the prisoner was not adequate. The
court found that the Commissioner was deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's serious medical need and the
DOC's pattern of obstruction and delay was likely to continue, as required for the prisoner to obtain injunctive
relief on her Eighth Amendment claim, where the DOC's policy for treating GID imposed a blanket prohibition
on cosmetic and sex reassignment surgery without exception. The court noted that the transsexual prisoner's
gender identity disorder was a “serious medical need” within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment, the prisoner's GID was diagnosed by a physician as needing treatment, and she had a history of suicide attempts and self
castration while in custody. The court found that the treatment received by the transsexual prisoner was not adequate, although the DOC provided the prisoner with psychotherapy and hormone treatment, it failed to perform
an individual medical evaluation aimed solely at determining appropriate treatment for her GID as a result of its
blanket prohibition on cosmetic and sex reassignment surgery. (MCI–Shirley, Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
PRETRIAL DETAINEE
RESTRAINTS
SUICIDE ATTEMPT

Stanfill v. Talton, 851 F.Supp.2d 1346 (M.D.Ga. 2012). The father of a pretrial detainee who died while in custody at a county jail brought a § 1983 action individually, and as administrator of the detainee's estate, against a
county sheriff and others, alleging that the defendants violated the detainee's rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth amendments. The county defendants moved for summary judgment, and the father cross-moved for partial
summary judgment and for sanctions. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
The court held that the father failed to establish that the county defendants had a duty to preserve any video of
the detainee in his cells, as would support sanctions against the defendants in the father's civil rights action. The
court noted that the defendants did not anticipate litigation resulting from the detainee's death, the father did not
file suit until almost two years after the detainee's death, and there was no indication that the father requested
that the defendants impose a litigation hold or provided the defendants any form of notice that litigation was
imminent or even contemplated until the lawsuit was actually filed.
The court found that county correctional officers' use of force in placing the detainee in a restraint chair was
not excessive, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, where less than one hour before the detainee was
placed in the chair he had tied tourniquet around his arm, somehow removed metal button from his prison
jumpsuit, cut his wrist or arm, and sprayed blood across his cell. The court noted that the officers were familiar
with the inmate's history of self-mutilation, and the extent of injury inflicted by the officers' use of the chair was
minimal, and the officers made some effort to temper the severity of their use of force. After the detainee was
placed back in the restraint chair, he was given water, and a jail nurse, at one officer's request, took the inmate's
blood pressure, pulse, and breathing rate, and determined that the detainee appeared in normal health and needed
no further medical care. The court also held that the officers' continued restraint of the detainee in the restraint
chair was not excessive, as would violate the Fourteenth Amendment where the officers were aware of detainee's
history of self-mutilation, the detainee posed a serious risk of harm to himself, and the particular circumstances
confronting the officers justified the continued use of restraints until the officers were reasonably assured that the
situation had abated. According to the court, even if the history of the detainee as a “cutter” constituted a serious
medical need, there was no evidence that the county correctional officers were deliberately indifferent to that
need, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, where the only risk of harm the officers were subjectively
aware of was the detainee's potential to injure himself. Despite the detainee's refusal to speak with medical staff
upon arrival at jail, he was immediately classified as a suicide risk due to his self-destructive history and was
placed on a suicide watch, and for two days, the detainee remained on suicide watch in jail custody, whereby he
was observed at least every 15 minutes, without incident. The court concluded that there was no causal connection between the county correctional officers' alleged indifference to the detainee's medical needs and detainee's
death while in custody at the county jail, as would support a Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference
claim brought by the detainee's father. The court noted that the father's medical expert opined that the detainee's
death was not causally related to his restraint in the chair, and although the expert listed dehydration as a contributing cause of the detainee's sudden cardiac dysrhythmia that led to the detainee's death, the expert did not
testify that the detainee would have survived had he not been dehydrated. The court held that the father failed to
show, by way of medical evidence, that an alleged six-minute delay of a correctional officer in performing resuscitation efforts once the detainee was found unresponsive, was the cause of the detainee's death, as would support the father's Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against the county defendants. The court
ruled that “All parties can agree that Stanfill's death was unfortunate, and that in hindsight, perhaps more could

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have been done. Hindsight, however, is not an appropriate lens through which to view the Defendants' actions.
The Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of proving that the Defendants violated Stanfill's constitutional rights.
The Defendants are therefore entitled to qualified immunity.” (Houston County Detention Center, Georgia)
U.S. Appeals Court
INVOLUNTARY
MEDICATION
INVOLUNTARY
TREATMENT

U.S. v. Loughner, 672 F.3d 731 (9th Cir. 2012). In a prosecution for attempted assassination of a Congresswoman, murder of federal judge, murder and attempted murder of other federal employees, injuring and causing death
to participants at a federally provided activity, and related weapons offenses, the district court denied the defendant's emergency motion to enjoin an involuntary medication decision, and he appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that: (1) procedures used to determine whether the defendant ought to be involuntarily medicated complied with due process; (2) the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) medical facility did not act arbitrarily in finding that the defendant was a danger to himself and that antipsychotic medication was in his best interest; and, (3) due process did not require the BOP to specify a medication regimen before it could involuntarily
medicate the defendant. (U.S. Medical Center for Federal Prisoners in Springfield, Missouri)

U.S. District Court
DENTAL CARE
COSTS

Weeks v. Hodges, 871 F.Supp.2d 811 (N.D.Ind. 2012). An inmate brought an action against a county sheriff and
a jail commander, in their individual and official capacities, alleging under § 1983 that the defendants violated
his Eighth Amendment rights in connection with his dental treatment. The defendants moved for summary
judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment
was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the county sheriff and/or the jail administrator acted with deliberate indifference to the inmate's serious dental needs when they took no action to follow
through on the jail dentist's diagnosis that the inmate needed to have his wisdom tooth removed, when it became
clear that neither the inmate nor his mother were going to pay for the procedure. According to the court, there
was no evidence that the county jail had a widespread practice of refusing inmates medical or dental care unless
the inmates could pay for it themselves, as would support the inmate's § 1983 Eighth Amendment claim against
the municipality arising from his allegedly deficient dental care. (Whitley County Jail, Indiana)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
PRETRIAL DETAINEE
RELEASE

Wells v. City of Chicago, 896 F.Supp.2d 725 (N.D.Ill. 2012). The representative of the estate of a detainee who
died on the night he was to be released from custody brought an action against a city and city police officers,
alleging under § 1983 that the defendants unlawfully detained the detainee and denied him medical care. Following a trial, the jury returned a verdict for the representative and against four defendants on the unlawful detention
claim, and for the defendants on claims relating to denial of medical care. The defendants moved for judgment as
a matter of law or, in the alternative, a new trial or remittitur on the issue of damages. The district court granted
the motions in part and denied in part. The district court held that: (1) the issue of whether the defendants held
the detainee for more than 48 hours before being taken before a judge or being released, or for less than 48 hours
for an improper purpose, was for the the jury; (2) the officers had probable cause to arrest the detainee for a
crime with an intent element; (3) the issue of whether individual officers participated in the unlawful detention
was for the jury; (4) the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity from the unlawful detention claim; (5)
the award of $1 million in compensatory damages was excessive; and (6) the award of $150,500 in punitive
damages was not warranted where there was little to indicate that the defendants acted with evil intent or callous
indifference to the detainee's rights.. The court noted that, although the detainee suffered significant physical
pain during the time he was detained, as well as intense humiliation and severe mental and emotional distress, he
was in custody for, at most, 53 hours, and only the final five hours of his detention were unlawful. The detainee
had driven a semi-trailer truck through a bus stop and into a Chicago Transit Authority “L” Station, killing two
women and injuring 20 people. After brief treatment in a hospital, the police transported him to a police station,
where he was interviewed and then placed in a holding cell. He ultimately only received a traffic citation, though
police kept investigating the collision until the time of his death. Officers were making arrangements to take the
detainee to a hospital for evaluation after finding that he had difficulty walking once removed from his cell. He
died in the hospital 6 weeks later. (City of Chicago Police Department, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
DELAY IN TREATMENT
INADEQUATE CARE

Wheeler v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680 (7th Cir. 2012). A state prison inmate brought a § 1983
action alleging prison officials and the prison's medical provider refused to provide effective care for the inmate's
golf-ball-size hemorrhoids, leaving him in excruciating pain, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. After receiving no ruling on his first two motions for preliminary injunctive relief, the inmate moved for preliminary
injunctive relief for a third time, seeking to compel the defendants to arrange for an operation to address his
condition. The district court denied the motion and the inmate appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. The appeals court held that the district court failed to comply with a statutory command to screen “as soon as
practicable” the inmate's complaint. The district court still had not screened the complaint after ten months, and
the appeals court required the district court to swiftly screen the complaint, to authorize service of process on all
defendants involved in the inmate's medical treatment, to give the defendants a short time to respond to the inmate's motion for preliminary injunctive relief, and to promptly conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine
whether the inmate was entitled to such relief. (Wexford Health Sources, Pinckneyville Correctional Center,
Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELAY IN TREATMENT
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2012). A state inmate brought a pro se § 1983 action, alleging that a
delay by prison medical providers in treating his hernia amounted to deliberate indifference to his medical needs
in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim
pursuant to the prisoner complaint screening statute. The inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and
reversed and remanded in part. The court held that the inmate's hernia was a “serious medical need” under the
test for an Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to the inmate's serious medical needs. The court
found that the inmate adequately pleaded an Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to his serious
medical needs against the prison physician by alleging that the physician repeatedly diagnosed the inmate as
suffering from a hernia and repeatedly concluded that referral for surgery was necessary, that the inmate failed to

29.266

receive the prescribed treatment for more than one year, and that the delay in treatment was attributable to the
physician's failure to request a referral properly and his inexplicable cancellation of a second referral request.
(California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility, Corcoran)
U.S. District Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
CONTRACT SERVICES
EQUAL PROTECTION

Wilkins-Jones v. County of Alameda, 859 F.Supp.2d 1039 (N.D.Cal. 2012). A detainee at a county jail who had
limited mobility and deformed hands as a result of systemic lupus and rheumatoid arthritis brought an action
against the contractor that provided medical care assessment services for detainees, and its employees, alleging
violations of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the California Disabled Persons Act (CDPA),
and the California Unruh Civil Rights Act. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that: (1) the private contractor was not liable as a public entity or
instrumentality under the ADA; (2) the contractor qualified as a “business establishment,” under the California
Unruh Civil Rights Act; (3) the complaint properly asserted a deprivation of full and equal accommodations, as
required to state a claim under the California Unruh Civil Rights Act; (4) the allegations were insufficient to
assert intentional discrimination, as required to state a claim against the contractor for violation of the California
Unruh Civil Rights Act; (5) the CDPA applied to county jails and the accommodations and services provided
therein; and (6) the allegations stated a claim against contractor under the CDPA. The jail inmate who had limited mobility and deformed hands alleged that she was unable to use the toilet in the jail as needed, causing her
injuries, and that she was deprived of access to jail's facilities, beds, showers, walkways, and benches. According
to the court, this properly asserted a deprivation of full and equal accommodations, as required to state a claim
against the private contractor that contracted with county to provide medical care assessment services for the
county jail. (County of Alameda, California)

U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
DELAY IN TREATMENT
MEDICATION
POLICIES
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Williamson v. Correct Care Solutions LLC, 890 F.Supp.2d 487 (D.Del. 2012). A state prisoner, proceeding pro
se and in forma pauperis, brought a § 1983 action against the contractor that provided medical services at a prison, and several of the contractor's employees, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The
district court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court held that the prisoner stated a claim against the
contractor by alleging that he suffered from serious medical conditions requiring daily medication, that the contractor failed to provide him medication for 14 days, that the lack of medication resulted in necessary medical
attention, and the delay in ordering and dispensing medication was the result of the contractor's cost containment
policies and customs. The court found that the prisoner also stated a § 1983 claim against the investigator for the
contractor that provided medical services at the prison, for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs,
by alleging that the investigator was aware of the prisoner's serious medical conditions requiring daily medication and a specific type of knee brace, but failed to determine that lack of medication for a 14 day period was an
emergency, and failed to approve the prisoner's emergency grievances for a knee brace. According to the court, a
§ 1983 claim was also stated against the physician employed by the contractor, for deliberate indifference to his
serious medical needs, by alleging that the physician was aware of the prisoner's serious medical conditions but
refused to follow-up on an order for the prisoner's specialty knee brace, and instead provided a neoprene knee
sleeve. (James T. Vaughn Correctional Center, Delaware)

U.S. District Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
EQUAL PROTECTION
MEDICATION
PRETRIAL DETAINEE
RA- Rehabilitation Act
TRAINING
TRANSPORTATION

Woods v. City of Utica, 902 F.Supp.2d 273 (N.D.N.Y. 2012). A wheelchair-using, paraplegic arrestee sued a
city, police officer, a county, a former sheriff, and county corrections officers, bringing federal causes of action
for violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act, and Fourteenth Amendment
equal protection and due process. The arrestee alleged that he was lifted out of his wheelchair and placed on the
floor of a sheriff's van, forcing him to maneuver himself onto a bench seat which caused his pants and underwear
to fall, exposing his genitals, that he was not secured to the bench with a seatbelt, causing him to be thrown
about the passenger compartment and suffer leg spasms during his ride to the jail, that he was forced to urinate
into an empty soda bottle and handle his sterile catheter with his hands that were dirty from moving himself
around the floor of the van, and that the county corrections officers stood by as he struggled to maneuver himself
out of the van and into his wheelchair while other inmates watched. The city and county defendants moved for
summary judgment. The district court held that: (1) the city did not fail to accommodate the arrestee's disability,
for purposes of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims; (2) summary judgment was precluded by fact issues as
to whether the arrestee was denied the benefit of safe and appropriate transportation by the county on the day of
his arrest when he was moved from a police station to a county jail; (3) the county was entitled to summary
judgment to the extent the arrestee's claims involved his transportation from the jail to court proceedings on two
other dates; (4) fact issues existed as to whether the county defendants were deliberately indifferent to the paraplegic inmate's known medical need for suppositories every other day, in violation of due process, but they were
not deliberately indifferent to his need for catheters and prescription pain medication; and (5) the county defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity. The court noted that while the county defendants disputed the arrestee's version of the facts, corrections officers all denied receiving any training regarding how to transport
disabled inmates. (Utica Police Department, Oneida County Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
DELAY IN CACRE
EMERGENCY CARE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
PRETRIAL DETAINEE

Wright v. County of Franklin, Ohio, 881 F.Supp.2d 887 (S.D.Ohio 2012). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983
action against a county, sheriff, deputy, medical staff, and physician, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and state common law claims. The defendants
moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held
that the pretrial detainee who had abdominal pain had a serious medical need, as required to support a § 1983
claim against the county, sheriff, deputy, medical staff, and physician for deliberate indifference to his serious
medical need in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. According to the court, as a result of the delay in diagnosis and treatment, the detainee was later rushed to a hospital, diagnosed with a small bowel obstruction and a
mass in his colon, and subjected to emergency surgery. The court found that summary judgment was precluded
by a genuine issues of material fact as to: (1) whether a nurse failed to exercise judgment and instead chose to
ignore serious symptoms that ultimately led to the pretrial detainee with abdominal pain having to undergo multiple major surgeries; (2) whether nurses did basically nothing in the face of the pretrial detainee's alarming

29.267

symptoms, including vomiting blood and severe abdominal pain, which later proved to be precursor to a serious
gastrointestinal issue. The court found that there was no evidence that the county or sheriff had a policy or custom of recklessly training medical staff who were contracted to work at the prison, as required to support the
pretrial detainee's § 1983 claim for failure to train. The court noted that the detainee's claim was based on little
more than the argument that the Sheriff's Office and the county did not do enough to ensure that nurses were
familiar with policies applicable to inmates who need medical care. (Franklin County Correctional Center, Correctional Care Plus, Ohio)
2013
U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
INADEQUATE CARE

Alsobrook v. Alvarado, 986 F.Supp.2d 1312 (S.D.Fla. 2013). A state prisoner who was seriously injured in a
fight with his cellmate brought a § 1983 action against a warden, corrections officers, prison nurse, the prison's
healthcare provider, and the Secretary of the Florida Department of Corrections. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that the prisoner sufficiently alleged that a corrections officer was deliberately indifferent to a risk of serious harm posed by the cellmate,
in violation of the Eighth Amendment, where: (1) the prisoner alleged that his cellmate told the officer that he
would become violent if the prisoner was not removed from the cell; (2) the prisoner requested to be separated
from his cellmate; (3) the officer did nothing in response to this information; and (4) that a fight ensued, which
resulted in serious injuries to the prisoner. The court held that the prisoner sufficiently alleged that the treatment
he received from a prison nurse after he was brought to the infirmary following a fight with his cellmate was so
grossly inadequate that it amounted to no treatment at all, and thus he stated a § 1983 claim that the nurse was
deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The prisoner alleged
that he was brought to the infirmary with open wounds, swelling on his head and face, and covered with blood,
that he vomited while awaiting treatment and, after being “treated,” he left the infirmary with open wounds,
swelling on his head and face, covered with blood, and with four ibuprofen in his pocket. (South Florida Reception Center, Florida)

U.S. Appeals Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
EQUAL PROTECTION
RA- Rehabilitation Act
RECORDS

Armstrong v. Brown, 732 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2013). Disabled state prisoners and parolees brought a class action
against state prison officials, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act. Seventeen years later, the plaintiffs moved for an order requiring officials to track and accommodate
the needs of the class members housed in county jails and to provide a workable grievance procedure. The prisoners and parolees filed a renewed motion, which the district court granted. The defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and dismissed in part. The court held that: (1) Amendments to the California Penal
Code relating to the legal custody of parolees did not relieve officials of responsibility for the discrimination
suffered by disabled parolees housed in county jails, past and present, or of their obligation to assist in preventing further Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) violations; and (2) orders requiring officials to track and
accommodate the needs of disabled prisoners and parolees housed in county jails and to provide a workable
grievance procedure were consistent with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act
and did not infringe on California's prerogative to structure its internal affairs. (California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation)

U.S. District Court
HEARING IMPAIRED
POLICIES
TRANSLATOR

Armstrong v. Brown, 939 F.Supp.2d 1012 (N.D.Cal. 2013). Prisoners brought a class action against the Governor
of California, the state Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and a number of related directors and executive officers, seeking to enforce prior orders requiring the defendants to provide sign language interpreters
(SLI), and to hold the defendants in contempt for violations. The district court granted the motion to enforce the
prior orders. The court held that setting a policy which failed to provide SLIs for hearing-impaired inmates during rounds by psychiatric technicians warranted enforcement of the order against the defendants, and the defendants' failure to provide SLIs for hearing-impaired inmates at classes attended by deaf inmates also warranted an
enforcement order. But the court decided that civil contempt sanctions were not appropriate because officials
were making substantial efforts to reach compliance with the orders by voluntarily increasing both contract and
civil services positions for qualified SLIs. (Substance Abuse Treatment Facility, California Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections)

U.S. District Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Ball v. LeBlanc, 988 F.Supp.2d 639 (M.D.La. 2013). State death row inmates brought a § 1983 action against a
state department of corrections and state officials, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief based on allegations
of violations of the Eighth Amendment, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Rehabilitation Act.
The district court granted declaratory and injunctive relief in part and denied in part. The court held that the
temperature and humidity of cells presented a substantial risk of harm to death row inmates, as required for their
claims against the prison and officials, alleging the conditions of confinement violated the Eighth Amendment.
The court noted that: (1) the inmates were regularly subjected to temperatures above 90.5 degrees and heat indices above 100 degrees; (2) the heat index inside death row tiers was often higher than that outside the facility;
(3) inmates were subjected to consecutive days with heat indices above 100 degrees; (4) inmates were at risk of
heat-related illnesses including heat stroke and worsening of their underlying conditions, which included diabetes, hypertension, and uncontrolled blood pressure; and (5) two inmates were over age 55, increasing the risk for
them. The court found that prison officials had knowledge that the heat and humidity in death row tiers placed
inmates at a substantial risk of harm, as required to find the officials were deliberately indifferent to the serious
medical needs for the purpose of the inmates' Eighth Amendment claims. The inmates had submitted multiple
administrative complaints regarding the heat, and officials responded that they knew it was “extremely hot.”
According to the court, prison officials disregarded the substantial risk of serious harm to death row inmates
regarding heat and humidity in cells, as required to find that the officials were deliberately indifferent to the
serious medical needs for the purpose of the inmates' Eighth Amendment claims, where the officials did not take
any actions to reduce the heat conditions despite knowledge of the conditions. The court found that there was no
evidence that death row inmates were limited in any major life activities due to their medical conditions, including hypertension, obesity, and depression, as required for their claims against the prison and officials, alleging

29.268

violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act. (Louisiana State Penitentiary)
U.S. District Court
MENTAL HEALTH

Barnes v. Ross, 926 F.Supp.2d 499 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). A mentally ill inmate brought a § 1983 action against the
Commissioner of the New York Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS) and employees of the New York Office of Mental Health asserting Eighth Amendment and equal protection claims. The
mentally ill African-American inmate alleged that he and other minorities were subject to discriminatory treatment because of their race, in that white inmates were sent to the hospital for proper treatment, while AfricanAmericans and Latino inmates were placed in observation for long periods and then were sent back to their cells,
where they would harm themselves or try to commit suicide. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court
granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that: (1) requirements of class certification were not
satisfied; and (2) the inmate failed to plausibly allege an Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference to
his serious medical needs (Sullivan Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
MENTAL HEALTH
PRETRIAL DETAINEE
SUICIDE

Belbachir v. County of McHenry, 726 F.3d 975 (7th Cir. 2013). The administrator of the estate of a female federal detainee who committed suicide in a county jail filed suit against the county, county jail officials, and employees of the medical provider that had a contract with the county to provide medical services at the jail, alleging
violation of the detainee's due process rights and Illinois tort claims. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of all county defendants. The administrator appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed
in part, and remanded. The appeals court found that the jail inmate who was detained by federal immigration
authorities pending her removal hearing was in the same position as a lawfully arrested pretrial detainee. The
court noted that a pretrial detainee was entitled, pursuant to the due process clause, to at least as much protection
during her detention as convicted criminals were entitled to under the Eighth Amendment-- namely protection
from harm caused by a defendant's deliberate indifference to the inmate's safety or health. The court asserted that
persons who have been involuntarily committed are entitled, under the due process clause, to more considerate
treatment during detention than criminals whose conditions of confinement are designed to punish.
The court found that the alleged conduct of a clinical social worker at the county jail who interviewed the
detainee, in noting that the detainee suffered from a major depressive disorder, hallucinations, acute anxiety, and
feelings of hopelessness, but allegedly failing to report those findings to the jail guards or any other jail staff or
to recommend that the detainee be placed on a suicide watch or receive mental health treatment, amounted to
deliberate indifference to the detainee's risk of suicide, in violation of the detainee's due process rights. The court
held that a nurse manager employed by the medical provider was not deliberately indifferent to the detainee's
risk of suicide, as would violate the detainee's due process rights, where the nurse manager treated the detainee
for panic attacks and anxiety, and recommended that she be given a cellmate and transferred to a medical treatment area at the jail, both of which were done, and there was no showing that the nurse manager knew that the
detainee was suicidal.
According to the court, the county sheriff's and county jail director's failure to provide annual training to jail
staff on how to recognize the risk of suicide in detainees, and their failure to implement a suicide prevention
policy, did not render the county liable under § 1983 for the detainee's suicide during her detention at the jail,
absent a showing that such failures caused the detainee's suicide. (McHenry County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
PRETRIAL DETAINEE
TRANSFER
TRANSPORTATION

Benton v. Rousseau, 940 F.Supp.2d 1370 (M.D.Fla. 2013). A pretrial detainee, who alleged that he was beaten
by drivers while being transported to prison, brought a § 1983 action against drivers of a private company which
was in the business of transporting prisoners throughout the State of Florida. The district court held that the inmate established a § 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim and a § 1983 Fourteenth Amendment excessive
force claim. According to the court: (1) the prisoner engaged in constitutionally protected speech because he
complained about conditions of his confinement in the transport vehicle; (2) the driver of transport vehicle engaged in adverse or retaliatory conduct by pulling the inmate out of the van and onto the ground and beating and
kicking the inmate; and (3) there was a causal connection between the driver's retaliatory action and inmate's
protected speech, in that the incident would not have occurred but for the inmate's complaints regarding conditions of his confinement. The court noted that the inmate's injuries included headaches and facial scars, and his
injuries, although perhaps not serious, amounted to more than de minimis injuries. The court ruled that the inmate was entitled to $45,012 in compensatory damages because the inmate had scarring on his face and suffered
from headaches and numbness in his side, he suffered the loss of a $12 shirt, and he suffered mental and emotional anguish as a result of actions of drivers of transport van, who kicked and beat him. The court held that the
inmate was entitled to punitive damages in the amount of $15,000 based on the violation of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by the drivers. The court noted that although the drivers were no longer employed by
their private employer, the employer did not investigate after the incident nor did it punish the drivers for their
actions, and imposition of punitive damages would deter the drivers from taking similar actions in the future.
(United States Prisoner Transport, Hernando County Jail, Florida)

U.S. Appeals Court
JUVENILE
MENTAL HEALTH
DELAY IN CARE

Blackmon v. Sutton, 734 F.3d 1237 (10th Cir. 2013). A former juvenile pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action
against various members of a juvenile detention center's staff, alleging they violated the Fourteenth Amendment
rights guaranteed to him as a pretrial detainee. The district court denied the defendants' motion for summary
judgment based on qualified immunity. The defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, and reversed in part. The court held that the eleven-year-old pretrial detainee's right to be free from punishment altogether was clearly established at the time the staff allegedly used a chair bearing wrist, waist, chest, and ankle
restraints to punish detainee, for the purposes of the juvenile detention center's staff's qualified immunity defense. According to the court, the senior correctional officer approved a decision by one of his subordinates, a
fully grown man, to sit on the chest of the eleven-year-old without any penological purpose. The court found that
the detainee’s Fourteenth Amendment due process rights were violated when employees allegedly failed to provide the eleven-year-old detainee with any meaningful mental health care despite his obvious need for it. The

29.269

court noted that prison officials who assumed a “gate keeping” authority over the prisoner’s access to medical
professionals were deliberately indifferent to the detainee's medical needs when they denied or delayed access to
medical care. But the court also held that the detainee's alleged right to be placed in a particular facility of his
choice while awaiting trial was not clearly established at the time the director failed to transfer detainee to a
nearby shelter, for purposes of the juvenile detention center director's qualified immunity defense.. The court
stated: “Weeks before eleven-year-old, 4'11," 96–pound Brandon Blackmon arrived at the juvenile detention
center in Sedgwick, Kansas, officials there made a new purchase: the Pro–Straint Restraining Chair, Violent
Prisoner Chair Model RC–1200LX. The chair bore wrist, waist, chest, and ankle restraints. In the months that
followed, the staff made liberal use of their new acquisition on the center's youngest and smallest charge. Sometimes in a legitimate effort to thwart his attempts at suicide and self-harm. But sometimes, it seems, only to punish him. And that's the nub of this lawsuit.” (Juvenile Residential Facility, Sedgwick County, Kansas)
U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
DELAY IN CARE
POLICIES

Bredbenner v. Malloy, 925 F.Supp.2d 649 (D.Del. 2013). A former inmate brought a pro se § 1983 action
against a corrections officer, the corporation which contracted to provide medical services to inmates, the health
services administrator, and a nurse practitioner, alleging violations of his constitutional rights by virtue of the
defendants' alleged deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The court held that summary judgment
for the defendants was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the treatment the inmate received for his injured wrist from the date of the injury until he saw a physician was adequate, and as to whether
the prison health services administrator was personally involved in the inmate's treatment. The court also found
that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether policymakers at the
corporation which contracted to provide medical services to inmates knew of the inmate's injured wrist but did
nothing to address it. (James T. Vaughn Correctional Center, Delaware)

U.S. Appeals Court
INADEQUATE CARE

Budd v. Motley, 711 F.3d 840 (7th Cir. 2013). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that, as a pretrial
detainee, he was subjected to unconstitutional conditions of confinement at a county jail and that the sheriff was
deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. The district court dismissed the complaint, and the inmate appealed.
The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The appeals court held that the detainee's
allegations were sufficient to state a plausible claim under the Due Process Clause for subjecting him to unconstitutional conditions of confinement. The prisoner alleged that: (1) on one occasion he was confined with eight
inmates in a portion of the county jail intended for three; (2) he had to sleep on the floor alongside broken windows and cracked toilets; (3) on another occasion he and other inmates had to sleep on the floor even though
shower water leaked there; (4) cells had broken windows, exposed wiring, extensive rust, sinks without running
water, toilets covered in mold and spider webs, and a broken heating and cooling system; (5) inmates were denied any recreation; and (6) the jail furnished inmates with no supplies to clean for themselves.
The appeals court found that county jail officials were not deliberately indifferent to the pretrial detainee's
serious medical needs, in violation of the Due Process Clause even if he was dissatisfied with the treatment he
received from a jail nurse. The court noted that the detainee was taken to see a nurse as soon as he informed the
officer on duty about his leg wound, he was taken to a hospital promptly after writing a letter to the sheriff asking to see a doctor, and the detainee received medical attention, medication, testing, and ongoing observation at
the hospital. (Edgar County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
MEDICATION
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462 (6th Cir. 2013). An arrestee brought an action under § 1983 against a county
board of commissioners, sheriff, deputies, and jail nurse, alleging violations of his constitutional rights during his
arrest. The defendants moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the motion. The arrestee appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The appeals court
held that: (1) a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the force used against the arrestee was reasonable; (2) a corrections officer and the jail nurse were not liable for failure to prevent deputy sheriffs from
using excessive force, absent a showing that the nurse and officer had both the opportunity and the means to
prevent the harm from occurring; (3) the nurse was not liable for deliberate indifference to the arrestee's medical
needs, where the arrestee's latent cranial injury was not so obvious that a lay person would easily have recognized the necessity for a doctor's attention; (4) the county board of commissioners was not liable under § 1983
for any alleged conduct of deputy sheriffs in violating the arrestee's federal constitutional rights, absent a showing that any county policy or custom was the moving force behind the alleged violations; (5) a genuine issue of
material fact existed as to whether a deputy sheriffs' use of force against the arrestee was reckless under Ohio
law; (6) a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether a deputy sheriff assaulted the arrestee in response
to an off-color jibe; and (7) genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the county board of commissioners, sheriff, and deputies knew that litigation was probable and whether their destruction of videotape evidence of deputies' use of force against the arrestee was willful. The court also found that the jail nurse did not
act with malice and in a wanton and willful manner in allowing the arrestee to sit in a county jail cell for 12
hours with serious injuries, where the nurse attended to the arrestee, assessed what she perceived to be minor
injuries, provided him with ibuprofen for his pain, and advised him he could contact someone for further medical
assistance if necessary. (Greene County Jail, Ohio)

U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
MAPLRACTICE
MEDICATION
POLICIES

Bustetter v. Armor Correctional Health Services, Inc., 919 F.Supp.2d 1282 (M.D.Fla. 2013). A former inmate
brought an action against a sheriff's department, the sheriff, a medical services contractor, a doctor, a nurse, and
a pharmacy, alleging medical malpractice, negligence, and violations of § 1983. The inmate alleged that the
medical services contractor had a policy of not telling an inmate what medications he was being given, that the
contractor had another policy of providing no medications if an inmate refused to take any of his medications,
that measurement of his blood sugar levels and administration of his insulin to treat his diabetes was limited to
twice a day, that he was given excess levels of statins, and that he was not informed, upon his release, of what
medication he was given or of its side-effects. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the
motions in part and denied in part. The court held that the inmate’s allegations were sufficient to state Eighth

29.270

Amendment claims against the contractor, nurse, and doctor. When he was taken into custody at the jail for a
non-violent traffic offense, the inmate informed the medical staff of his medical conditions and current medications. The inmate’s medical conditions included Type I diabetes, for which he was insulin dependent and taking
two types of insulin three to five times per day, a prior heart attack, and blindness in one eye. (Sarasota County
Jail, Florida)
U.S. District Court
AIDS- Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome
MEDICATION
RECORDS

Canales v. Gatzunis, 979 F.Supp.2d 164 (D.Mass. 2013). A former county jail inmate brought an action in state
court against a county sheriff's department, the sheriff, the jail superintendent, a state public safety commissioner, and others, alleging the defendants subjected him to reckless, negligent, and cruel medical treatment. Some
defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court granted the motion in part and denied
in part. The court found that because the county sheriff's department and other county defendants voluntary removed to inmate's action to federal court, the defendants did not enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity against
any Massachusetts Tort Claims Act (MTCA) claims they would be subject to in state court as a result of waiver.
The court held that the former jail inmate's allegations that the county defendants had a “disorganized medical
program” at the jail and failed to maintain a “quality assurance program,” and that the jail failed “to maintain
adequate and accurate medical records,” insufficiently pled that the jail superintendent was personally involved
in misinforming the inmate that he had HIV and mistakenly administering another prisoner's HIV medication to
the inmate, as would subject the superintendent to supervisory liability for his subordinates' alleged Eighth
Amendment violations under § 1983. According to the court, the inmate's allegations that the “defendants” told
the inmate that he had HIV and administered HIV medication to him, even though he did not have HIV, did not
sufficiently state that the county jail superintendent was personally involved with the inmate's medical treatment
or otherwise took any action with respect to the inmate, as would support the inmate's intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim against the superintendent, in his individual capacity, under Massachusetts law. (Suffolk County House of Correction, Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
FEMALE PRISONERS
PRETRIAL DETAINEE
SUICIDE ATTEMPT
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Chennault v. Mitchell, 923 F.Supp.2d 765 (E.D.Va. 2013). The guardian for an incapacitated former pretrial
detainee filed § 1983 action against a former sheriff and former officers of the sheriff's department for alleged
violation of the detainee's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process, by deliberate indifference to her medical
needs that resulted in her permanent brain damage from an attempted suicide. The defendants moved to dismiss.
The district court granted the motion. The court held that sheriff's department officers were not deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of the detainee, as required to support the detainee's § 1983 claim for violation of her Fourteenth Amendment due process rights, where the officers had no knowledge or even any reason
to suspect that the detainee presented a risk of suicide, rather than merely a risk of violent behavior towards
officers. According to the court, the sheriff's department officers' pepper spraying of the detainee due to her
violent behavior toward the officers, and then failing to decontaminate her, did not establish that the officers
knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of harm to the detainee, where the officers did not know or have reason to believe that the detainee was suicidal at the time that she was sprayed, the detainee did not allege that the
use of spray was unnecessary or excessive in amount, and the detainee did not exhibit any adverse reactions to
the spray or to the lack of decontamination. The court found that the sheriff's department officers' failure to support the detainee's body and/or neck when they cut her shirt on which she hung herself on cell bars in an attempted suicide did not constitute deliberate indifference to her serious medical needs in violation of her Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The court noted that, even though the detainee's injuries were increased
from sliding down cell bars and forcibly striking her head on the cell door, the officers faced an emergency and
needed to act quickly and decisively to save the detainee's life. According to the court, their actions “…were not
only reasonable in this situation, but laudable.” The court held that the detainee's § 1983 claim that the sheriff
failed to train jail personnel, to ensure they could adequately respond to the medical needs of combative and/or
intoxicated detainees, was foreclosed by the lack of a Fourteenth Amendment violation by jail personnel and a
lack of a causal link between the sheriff's policies and the detainee's attempted suicide, where jail personnel were
not deliberately indifferent to the detainee's medical needs in violation of the detainee's due process rights, and
there was no pattern of unconstitutional violations resulting in suicides or attempted suicides. (Richmond City
Jail Annex, Virginia)

U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
EXAMINATIONS
POLICIES
PRETRIAL DETAINEE
STAFF

Christie ex rel. estate of Christie v. Scott, 923 F.Supp.2d 1308 (M.D.Fla. 2013). An estate brought a § 1983
action against a private prison health services provider and corrections officers following the death of a detainee
after he was pepper-sprayed over 12 times in 36 hours. The provider moved for summary judgment. The district
court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by
genuine issues of material fact as to: (1) whether failure of the nurses to inspect the detainee after each time he
was pepper-sprayed constituted deliberate indifference; (2) whether the sheriff knew that corrections officers
were using pepper spray nearly indiscriminately; (3) whether corrections officers were deliberately indifferent to
the detainee's physical and medical needs; and (4) whether corrections officers' repeated pepper-spraying of the
detainee while he was restrained naked in a chair was malicious and sadistic to the point of shocking the conscience. The estate alleged that the nurses' failed to evaluate the detainee after each time he was pepper-sprayed,
failed to follow their employer’s policy by not monitoring the detainee every 15 minutes for the periods he was
restrained, and failed to offer the detainee fluids or a bedpan while he was restrained. The nurses allegedly
checked the inmate only two times during the five hours he was restrained. The court found that the health services provider did not have a policy of understaffing that constituted deliberate indifference to the detainee’s
health, as required to support a § 1983 claim against the private provider. (Lee County Jail, Florida)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
MENTAL HEALTH

Coleman v. Brown, 922 F.Supp.2d 1004 (E.D.Cal. 2013). State prison inmates brought Eighth Amendment challenges to the adequacy of mental health care and medical health care provided to mentally ill inmates and the
general prison population, respectively. The inmates moved to convene a three-judge panel of the district court
to enter a population reduction order that was necessary to provide effective relief. The motions were granted
and the cases were assigned to same panel, which ordered the state to reduce the prison population to 137.5% of

29.271

its design capacity. The state moved to vacate or modify the population reduction order. The district court denied
the motion. The three-judge panel of the district court held that: (1) the state's contention that prison crowding
was reduced and no longer a barrier to providing inmates with care required by the Eighth Amendment did not
provide the basis for a motion to vacate the order on the ground that changed circumstances made it inequitable
to continue applying the order; (2) the state failed to establish that prison crowding was no longer a barrier to
providing inmates with care required by the Eighth Amendment; and (3) the state failed to establish it had
achieved a durable remedy to prison crowding. (California Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections)
U.S. District Court
INADEQUATE CARE
MENTAL HEALTH

Coleman v. Brown, 960 F.Supp.2d 1057 (E.D.Cal. 2013). California prisoners with serious mental disorders
brought a class action against a Governor, alleging that due to prison overcrowding, they received inadequate
mental health care, in violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. Separately, California prisoners with serious medical conditions brought a class action asserting constitutional claims
similar to those in the other action. In the case concerning mental health care, the district court found Eighth
Amendment violations and appointed a special master to oversee the development and implementation of a remedial plan. In the case concerning medical care, the State stipulated to a remedial injunction, and, after the
State failed to comply with that injunction, the district court appointed a receiver to oversee remedial efforts. A
three judge district court panel consolidated the two cases and the panel entered a remedial order requiring the
State to reduce its prison population to 137.5 percent of design capacity within two years. The Governor appealed. The United States Supreme Court affirmed the population reduction order. The district court subsequently denied the defendants' motion to vacate or modify the population reduction order, and directed the defendants
to comply with the population reduction order. The defendants' moved to stay the order directing compliance
pending appeal to the United States Supreme Court. The district court denied the motion, finding that: (1) the
State was not likely to succeed on the merits of the prisoners' lawsuit challenging prison conditions; (2) the State
would not be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) issuance of a stay would substantially injure the prisoners; and
(4) the public interest favored denying the stay. (California)

U.S. District Court
EXAMINATION
FACILITIES
HANDICAP
RA- Rehabilitation Act
WHEELCHAIR

Cooke v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 926 F.Supp.2d 720 (E.D.N.C. 2013). Detainees who used wheelchairs and who
were civilly committed at a federal corrections facility as sexually dangerous persons filed suit, seeking injunctive relief against the United States Bureau of Prisons for its alleged failure to accommodate their disabilities in
violation of the Architectural Barriers Act (ABA), the Rehabilitation Act, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA), and the First and Fifth Amendments. The government moved to dismiss and for summary judgment,
and the detainees moved for discovery and to deny the government's motions. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court found that although the detainees failed to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing suit under the ABA, the detainees were not “prisoners” as defined by the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (PLRA) and thus did not have to exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit.
The court found that the detainees, by alleging that, unlike detainees without disabilities, they could not access the prison's religious library or an outdoor pagan worship area, stated claims under the Free Exercise Clause
of the First Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) in their action seeking injunctive
relief against the Bureau of Prisons for failing to accommodate their disabilities. The court held that the detainees failed to state a claim for a violation of the constitutional right to privacy. According to the court, even assuming that the detainees had a limited constitutional right to privacy in medical treatment, the inmates alleged
that the prison medical facility had no private, wheelchair-accessible examination room, but did not allege harm
from the use or disclosure of their medical information. (Butner Federal Correctional Complex, North Carolina)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
FEMALE PRISONERS

Cooper v. Rogers, 968 F.Supp.2d 1121 (M.D.Ala. 2013). A female state prisoner filed a § 1983 action against
jail officials in Alabama court, alleging deliberate indifference to her serious medical needs in violation of the
Eighth Amendment. After the action was removed to federal court, officials moved for summary judgment. The
district court granted the motion. The court held: (1) officials were acting within scope of their discretionary
authority when they denied the pregnant prisoner medical care, as required to invoke qualified immunity; (2) the
prisoner’s prolonged vaginal bleeding accompanied by pain was a serious medical need; (3) officials acted with
deliberate indifference to the prisoner's serious medical needs; but (4) evidence was insufficient to establish that
deliberate indifference to prisoner's serious medical needs caused her miscarriage. The court noted that officials
were aware that the prisoner was pregnant and that she was experiencing vaginal bleeding and pain, the prisoner
testified that she made almost daily verbal requests for medical attention, officials ignored her requests or responded by threatening to send her to a women's prison, and told her to keep the baby inside of her. (Bullock
County Jail, Alabama)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
MEDICATION
PRETRIAL DETAINEE

Currie v. Chhabra, 728 F.3d 626 (7th Cir. 2013). The administrator of the estate of a deceased arrestee brought
an action against a county, jail officials, and health care providers, alleging various claims, including claims
pursuant to § 1983 and the Illinois Wrongful Death Act, and for punitive damages. The district court denied the
providers' motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity. The providers appealed prior to disposition by the
district court. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the health care providers were not entitled
to qualified immunity to the arrestee's estate's civil rights claim under the Fourth Amendment alleging that the
providers' failure to monitor the arrestee's blood sugar level, provide insulin shots, and deliver other necessary
medical care while the arrestee was detained in the county jail. According to the court, the officials’ conduct
was objectively unreasonable and caused the detainee’s death, which resulted from diabetic ketoacidosis, a lifethreatening condition associated with untreated Type I diabetes. The court noted that although prior Fourth
Amendment medical care cases spoke only of “officers,” those opinions did not hint at any special Fourth
Amendment exemption for health care professionals. (Williamson County Jail, Illinois)

29.272

U.S. Appeals Court
GID- Gender Identity
Disorder

De'lonta v. Johnson, 708 F.3d 520 (4th Cir. 2013). A pre-operative transsexual inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that state prison officials' continued denial of consideration for sex reassignment surgery as treatment for her
gender identity disorder (GID) constituted deliberate indifference to her serious medical need in violation of the
Eighth Amendment. The district court dismissed the complaint, and the inmate appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that the inmate's allegation was sufficient to state a plausible Eighth
Amendment claim against the officials, even though the officials had provided the inmate with hormone treatment and mental health consultations, and had allowed her to live and dress as a woman, where the standard
protocol for treatment of GID indicated that sex reassignment surgery might be necessary for individuals who
continued to present with severe GID after one year of hormone therapy and dressing as woman. The court noted
that the officials failed to evaluate the inmate concerning her suitability for surgery, despite her repeated complaints as to the persistence of her symptoms and the inefficacy of her existing treatment. (Powhatan Correctional Center, and Buckingham Correctional Center, Virginia Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
INVOLUNTARY
MEDICATION
INVOLUNTARY
NOURISHMENT

Dhiab v. Obama, 952 F.Supp.2d 154 (D.D.C. 2013). An alien who was engaged in a voluntary hunger strike
while detained at the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, moved for a preliminary injunction against
force-feeding him and the administration of medications related to the force-feeding without his consent. The
district court denied the motion, finding that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the motion. (U.S. Naval Base at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba)

U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
COSTS
INADEQUATE CARE

Duran v. Merline, 923 F.Supp.2d 702 (D.N.J. 2013). A former pretrial detainee at a county detention facility
brought a pro se § 1983 action against various facility officials and employees, the company which provided
food and sanitation services to the facility, and the medical services provider, alleging various constitutional torts
related to his pretrial detention. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the
motions in part and denied in part. The district court held that fact issues precluded summary judgment on: (1)
the conditions of confinement claim against a former warden in his official capacity; (2) an interference with
legal mail claim against a correctional officer that alleged that the facility deliberately withheld the detainee's
legal mail during a two-week period; (3) a First Amendment retaliation claim based on interference with legal
mail; and (4) a claim for inadequate medical care as to whether the detainee's Hepatitis C condition was a serious
medical condition that required treatment and whether the provider denied such treatment because it was too
costly. The detainee asserted that overcrowding at the county detention facility, which allegedly led to the detainee being forced to sleep and eat his meals next to open toilet, and led to inmate-on-inmate violence, contributed to his assault by another inmate. According to the court, the long-standing conditions of confinement
whereby the county detention facility was overcrowded for at least 24 years and facility officials “triple-celled”
inmates, allegedly leading to unsanitary conditions, amounted to a “custom” for the purposes of the former detainee's § 1983 Fourteenth Amendment conditions of confinement claim against a former warden in his official
capacity. The court held that the food service provider's serving the detainee cold meals for a 45-day period
while the kitchen in the county detention facility was being renovated, was not “punishment,” as would support
the inmate's § 1983 Fourteenth Amendment conditions of confinement claim against the provider, absent evidence that the food served to the detainee was spoiled or contaminated, that a significant portion of the detainee's
diet consisted of such food, or that the food service caused more than a temporary discomfort. The court also
held that the alleged actions of the food service provider in serving the detainee one food item when another ran
out, failing to serve bread with the inmate's meal, serving the inmate leftovers from days before, serving juice in
a dirty container on one occasion, serving milk after its expiration date, and serving meals on cracked trays that
caused the detainee to contract food poisoning, did not amount to a substantial deprivation of food sufficient to
amount to unconstitutional conditions of confinement, as would violate the inmate's due process rights. (Atlantic
County Justice Facility, New Jersey)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICATION
SUICIDE

Earl v. Racine County Jail, 718 F.3d 689 (7th Cir. 2013). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against a county jail
and various jail officers, asserting claims for denial of due process and deliberate indifference to his serious
medical condition. The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the inmate's five days on suicide watch were
neither long enough nor harsh enough to deprive him of a due-process-protected liberty interest, where: (1) the
only changes to the inmate's meals were that trays upon which food was served were disposable foam rather than
plastic; (2) eating utensils were quickly removed after each meal; (3) the inmate was not denied bedding but was
given a mattress and a blanket; (4) the inmate was denied writing materials for only the first 48 hours; and (5)
rather than being prohibited human contact, deputies were assigned to closely and personally monitor the inmate
to ensure his safety. The court found that jail officers were not deliberately indifferent to the inmate's allergic
reaction to suicide garments in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The court noted that after the inmate told an
officer about his allergic reaction to a suicide gown, the officer called a nurse who immediately examined the
inmate and gave him cream and medication, and the officers appropriately deferred to the nurse's medical decision that the inmate did not need different garments because there was no sign of rash or bumps on the inmate.
(Racine County Jail, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE

Eason v. Frye, 972 F.Supp.2d 935 (S.D.Miss. 2013). A pretrial detainee brought a pro se § 1983 action against
an officer and a sheriff, alleging that the officer used excessive force by releasing his canine while responding to
a fight between the detainee and another inmate, and that he did not receive immediate medical attention after
the incident. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The district
court held that: (1) the detainee failed to allege that the sheriff was personally involved in the dog bite incident,
as required for § 1983 liability; (2) the officer did not use excessive force; (3) prison officials were not deliberately indifferent to the detainee's serious medical needs where there was no evidence that the officials refused to
treat the detainee, ignored his complaints, or intentionally treated him incorrectly; (4) the detainee failed to state
a § 1983 failure to train or supervise claim; (5) the sheriff was entitled to qualified immunity from the failure to

29.273

train claim, where the detainee made no specific allegations about how the sheriff was unreasonable in his training and supervising methods; and (6) the detainee could not maintain a claim for mental or emotional suffering.
The court noted that the detainee refused to stop fighting when the officer ordered him to stop, thus causing an
obvious threat to security. In response, the officer applied the amount of force necessary to restore order on the
tier, and as soon as the detainee went to the ground and stopped fighting, the officer ordered the dog to release its
grip. The detainee suffered a minor injury when he was bitten by the dog. According to the court, the detainee
made no specific allegations regarding how the training and supervision program at the detention facility was
inadequate or defective, he contended that his numerous complaints and grievances went unanswered but provided no evidence of inadequate training or supervision, and he made no allegation of an official policy that
caused the allegedly inadequate training and supervision. (Harrison County Adult Detention Center, Mississippi)
U.S. District Court
NEGLIGENCE
INADEQUATE CARE
CONTRACT SERVICES

Estate of Henson v. Wichita County, 988 F.Supp.2d 726 (N.D.Tex. 2013). Family members of a pretrial detainee
who died from chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) while being held in a county jail brought a § 1983
action against a county and a jail physician, among others, for violation of the detainee's Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights, and asserted claims under state law for negligence and breach of contract. The defendants
moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The district court granted the motions in part, and
denied in part. The physician and the county moved for reconsideration. The district court granted the motion,
finding that the physician was not subject to supervisory liability under § 1983, absent any finding that the nurse
refused to treat the detainee, ignored his complaints, intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any
similar conduct that would clearly evince a wanton disregard for any serious medical need. The court held that
the county was not liable in the § 1983 claim brought by family members, absent a showing of an underlying
constitutional violation by a county employee or a county policy that permitted or caused some constitutional
violation. (Wichita County Jail, Texas)

U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
EMERGENCY CARE
POLICIES
PRETRIAL DETAINEE
PRIVATE PHYSICIAN
TRANSPORTATION

Estate of Prasad ex rel. Prasad v. County of Sutter, 958 F.Supp.2d 1101 (E.D.Cal. 2013). The estate of a deceased pretrial detainee brought an action against jail employees and officials, as well as medical staff, alleging
violations of the Fourteenth Amendment. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion
in part and denied in part. The court held that: (1) although the detainee died at a hospital, liability for the jail
employees and officials was not precluded, where the jail employees and officials could have contributed to
detainee's death despite the transfer to the hospital; (2) allegations were sufficient plead deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs by the deputies and medical staff; (3) allegations were sufficient to state a claim for supervisory liability; (4) allegations were sufficient to state a claim for supervisory liability against the corrections
officers in charge; (5) allegations were sufficient to state a claim against the county; (6) allegations were sufficient to state a claim for wrongful death under California law; and (7) the health care provider was a state actor.
The court found that a statement by health care providers, in an attachment to the complaint, that even if the
detainee had been transferred to the hospital sooner, it “probably” would not have changed his death, was possibly self serving, and did not contradict the complaint's allegations that the detainee's death was unnecessary and
unavoidable. According to the court, allegations that the county maintained customs or practices whereby no
medical staff whatsoever were at the jail for one-sixth of every day, that the staff lacked authority to respond to
emergency and critical inmate needs, and that the jail records system withheld information from affiliated health
care providers, were sufficient to state a § 1983 claim against the county, alleging violations of the Fourteenth
Amendment after the pretrial detainee died.
The court held that allegations that deficiencies in medical care at the jail, including lack of 24-hour emergency care, were longstanding, repeatedly documented, and expressly noted by officials in the past., and that the
doctor who was employed by the health care provider that contracted with the prison was aware of the deficiencies, and that the doctor discharged the pretrial detainee to the jail were sufficient to plead deliberate indifference
to serious medical needs, as required to state a § 1983 action against the doctor for violations of the Fourteenth
Amendment after the detainee died. (Sutter County Jail, California)

U.S. District Court
DELAY IN TREATMENT
EMERGENCY CARE
TRANSPORTATION

Fluker v. County of Kankakee, 945 F.Supp.2d 972 (C.D.Ill. 2013). An inmate and his wife filed a § 1983 action
in state court against a county and the county sheriff's office to recover for injuries the inmate suffered when a
correctional officer who was driving his prison transport vehicle was required to brake suddenly, causing the
inmate to hurtle forward and hit his head on a metal divider. The case was removed to federal court. The district
court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court held that: (1) the officials' failure to
fasten the inmate’s seatbelt did not violate the Eighth Amendment; the official's alleged driving above the posted
speed limit did not violate the Eighth Amendment; and the officials' failure to immediately call for an ambulance
did not violate the Eighth Amendment. The court noted that the officials, who were not medically trained, called
a supervisor for guidance within one minute of the accident, and were told to continue to the jail where a trained
first responder immediately assessed the inmate and cleaned and bandaged a laceration on his head when the
transport van arrived 7 to 10 minutes later. The inmate was transported to a hospital within 10 to 15 minutes of
arriving at the jail. (Jerome Combs Det. Center, Kankakee County, Ill.)

U.S. District Court
EXAMINATIONS
INADEQUATE CARE
MEDICATION
PRETRIAL DETAINEE
RECORDS

Ford-Sholebo v. U.S., 980 F.Supp.2d 917 (N.D.Ill. 2013). The wife of a deceased pretrial detainee who suffered
from a seizure disorder, individually and as administrator of the detainee's estate, brought a wrongful death action against the United States pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The district court held that: (1)
evidence supported a finding that the detainee had a seizure disorder; (2) correctional facility employees
breached the standard of care for treating the detainee's seizure disorder; (3) the employees' failures and breaches
of the standard of care proximately caused the detainee's death; and (4) an award of damages to the wife in the
amount of $40,000 for the loss of consortium was appropriate. The court noted that the testimony of the administrator's expert physician and a pathologist who was subpoenaed to testify at trial, that the detainee suffered from
a seizure disorder, was overwhelmingly credible, while testimony of the government's two experts, that the detainee did not have seizure disorder, was incredible and unreliable.

29.274

According to the court, the standard of care for treating the detainee's seizure disorder required correctional
facility personnel, including physicians and physician assistants, to examine the detainee on a monthly basis,
review the detainee's medical records, draw the detainee's blood for the purpose of monitoring the level of antiseizure medication in his blood and obtain corresponding lab reports, and inform the detainee about the risks and
benefits of taking or not taking medication, and to counsel him about his medication. The court found that the
facility breached the appropriate standard of care, where required monthly evaluations were not conducted, facility personnel failed to make any efforts to retrieve the detainee's medical records while they were treating the
detainee, facility physicians were derelict in their duty to review medical records they actually possessed and
then to meet with the detainee in light of information they derived from those records, and physicians failed to
talk to the detainee about his medication, to ask him why he was not taking his medication, and to counsel him
about his noncompliance. (Metropolitan Correctional Center, Chicago, and Kankakee Co. Det. Center, Illinois)
U.S. District Court
EYE CARE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
INADEQUATE CARE

Foster v. Ghosh, 4 F.Supp.3d 974 (N.D.Ill. 2013). A state inmate brought an action against Illinois Department
of Corrections officials and an optometrist who treated him in prison, alleging under § 1983 that the defendants
were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The inmate
moved for a preliminary injunction requiring the defendants to grant him access to an ophthalmologist to evaluate his cataracts. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the optometrist and medical director
were deliberately indifferent to the inmate's serious medical needs and that the inmate would suffer irreparable
harm absent the issuance of an injunction. According to the court, the only treatment the inmate received in prison was a prescription for eyeglasses, which was not effective, and the inmate's request for a consultation was not
expensive, unconventional, or esoteric. The court noted that the cost the defendants would bear providing adequate care to the inmate did not outweigh the irreparable harm the inmate would endure if his cataracts remained
unevaluated. (Stateville Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
SPECIAL DIET
RELIGION

Garnica v. Washington Dept. of Corrections, 965 F.Supp.2d 1250 (W.D. Wash. 2013). A state prisoner brought
an action in state court against the Washington Department of Corrections (DOC) and DOC personnel, alleging
violations of First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The action was removed to federal court, and the defendants moved for summary judgment.
The district court granted the motion. The court held that even if the ailments that the Muslim prisoner experienced during a Ramadan fast were related to meals provided to him by prison personnel during the fast, those
ailments were not sufficiently serious to constitute a serious medical need, as required to establish prison personnel's deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The court found
that prison personnel did not act with deliberate indifference to the Muslim prisoner's health and safety with
respect to the meals provided to the prisoner during his Ramadan fast, and thus, there was no violation of the
prisoner's Eighth Amendment rights. The court noted that prison personnel acted with the intent to provide the
prisoner and other Ramadan participants with proper nutrition and calories during Ramadan, and when they
learned the caloric value of the prison's Ramadan meals had been miscalculated, they corrected the caloric values
and added supplements to the meals to ensure that the goal of 2,700 average calories was met. When the prisoner
complained of diarrhea, constipation, and headaches during Ramadan, he was seen by a DOC medical professional and was treated for his complaints.
The court held that the prisoner's right to practice his Muslim religion was not substantially burdened, within
the meaning of RLUIPA, by the nature or quantity of food provided to him by prison personnel during the Ramadan fast. According to the court, although the prisoner was not satisfied with the quality or quantity of the food
provided, he and other Ramadan participants were given a daily meal and supplements. The court found that
meals contained an average of 2700 calories and he and other vegetarian participants received additional snacks
to compensate for meat items they could not consume. The court noted that even though one meal that was provided contained only approximately 1900 calories due to a mistake in packaging the Ramadan meals, the mistake
was corrected the next day and thereafter the prisoner was given calorically and nutritionally adequate meals
throughout the Ramadan fast. (Clallam Bay Corrections Center, Washington Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
HEARING IMPAIRED
ADA-Americans with
Disabilities Act

Gilmore v. Hodges, 738 F.3d 266 (11th Cir. 2013). A pretrial detainee, proceeding pro se, brought a § 1983 action against prison officers, alleging violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), in failing to provide batteries for his hearing aids. The district court granted
summary judgment for the officers. The detainee appealed. The appealed court affirmed. The court found genuine issues of material fact as to whether the detainee's severe hearing loss that could be corrected by hearing aids
was an objectively serious medical need, and whether prison officials' response to the detainee's need for batteries for his hearing aids was objectively insufficient. But the court held that the detainee's right to a functioning
hearing aid was not clearly established at the time, and therefore the officers were entitled to summary judgment.
(Wakulla County Jail, Florida)

U.S. District Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
FEMALE PRISONERS
MEDICATION
MENTAL HEALTH
RA- Rehabilitation Act
RIGHT TO REFUSE
SPECIAL DIET

Hahn v. Walsh, 915 F.Supp.2d 925 (C.D.Ill. 2013). The estate of a diabetic pretrial detainee brought an action
against a city, police officers, a county, the county sheriff, and a jail medical provider, alleging under § 1983 that
the defendants were deliberately indifferent to the detainee's serious medical needs. The defendants moved for
summary judgment. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that a city
police officer at the scene of the arrest who had no involvement with the diabetic detainee could not be held
liable under § 1983 for being deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of detainee, who died from
diabetic ketoacidosis after she was taken to a county jail. The court also found that city police officers who
transported the detainee to the county jail, rather than a hospital, were not deliberately indifferent to the serious
medical needs of the detainee, where the officers were entitled to defer to the judgment of the paramedics on the
scene. According to the court, there was no evidence that the county sheriff knew of a serious risk to the health
of the diabetic pretrial detainee and consciously disregarded that risk, that any prior deaths at the jail involved
medical care provided to an inmate, much less that medical care involved an inmate with diabetes, or that the
sheriff's decisions about certification of the jail's medical contractor had any adverse effect on the detainee, as

29.275

would subject the sheriff to liability under § 1983, in his individual capacity, for his alleged deliberate indifference to the detainee's serious medical needs. The court found that the county's actions in shutting off water to the
mentally ill, diabetic pretrial detainee's cell when the inmate was stuffing clothing into the cell's toilet did not
violate the detainee's Fourteenth Amendment rights. According to the court, the estate's claim against the county
that the detainee, who died of diabetic ketoacidosis after allegedly refusing diabetic treatment and food while
incarcerated, was not properly treated for her mental illness and diabetes was not actionable under the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA) or the Rehabilitation Act. (Champaign County Jail, Illinois)
U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
JUVENILE
MENTAL HEALTH
PSYCHOTROPIC DRUGS

Harrelson v. Dupnik, 970 F.Supp.2d 953 (D.Ariz. 2013). The mother of 17-year-old inmate who died while
housed at a county jail brought an action in state court against the county, the county sheriff, the healthcare provider which contracted with the county to provide medical and mental health care at the jail, and employees of
the provider, individually and on behalf of the inmate's estate, alleging under § 1983 that the defendants were
deliberately indifferent to the inmate's serious medical needs. The defendants removed the action to federal court
and moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The district
court held that: (1) the county defendants' duty to provide medical and mental health services to an inmate was
non-delegable; (2) intervening acts of the medical defendants did not absolve the county defendants of liability
for alleged negligence; (3) the mother failed to state a claim for wrongful death; (4) the county was not deliberately indifferent to the inmate's rights; (5) the provider was not subject to liability; but (6) a fact issue precluded
summary judgment as to an Eighth Amendment medical claim against the employees.
According to the court, the duty of the county and the county sheriff to provide medical and mental health
services to the 17-year-old county jail inmate, who suffered from bipolar disorder and depression, was nondelegable, and thus the county and sheriff were subject to vicarious liability, under Arizona law, for the alleged
medical malpractice of the healthcare provider which contracted with the county to provide medical and mental
health services at the jail. The court noted that there was no evidence that the legislature intended to permit the
county or sheriff to delegate their duties and obligations they owned to the inmate.
The court found that the intervening acts of the contract medical provider, in allegedly failing to properly
diagnose and treat the inmate's medical and mental health needs, both before and after the inmate received an
injection of a psychotropic medication, were not so extraordinary as to absolve the county and the county sheriff
of liability for their failure to protect the inmate. The court found that there was no evidence that the county jail's
policy or custom of placing inmates in protective custody for their own protection amounted to deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of the inmate, who died while on protective custody status. According to the
court, there was no evidence that the county had actual notice of a pattern of risk of harm or injury as a result of
the county jail officials' use of isolation, or an administrative segregation policy in the juvenile detention housing
unit at the county jail, or that any omissions in the county's policies necessarily gave rise to the situation in
which the inmate, died from a purported cardiac event.
The court found that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the
inmate's prescribing physician knew of the inmate's serious medical need for a full psychiatric assessment, and
failed to timely provide that assessment, and as to whether jail medical personnel were aware that the inmate was
suffering from a reaction to a psychotropic medication or unknown serious medical illness, and, if so, whether
they were deliberately indifferent. (Pima County Adult Detention Complex, and Conmed Healthcare Management, Inc., Arizona)

U.S. District Court
ADA-Americans with
Disabilities Act
CONTAGIOUS
DISEASES
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
RA-Rehabilitation Act

Hilton v. Wright, 928 F.Supp.2d 530 (N.D.N.Y. 2013). A state prison inmate infected with the Hepatitis C virus
(HCV) brought a class action against the New York State Department of Correctional Services and Community
Supervision (DOCCS) and its chief medical officer, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs
in violation of the Eighth Amendment, as well as violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and
the Rehabilitation Act. Following class certification, the parties entered into a settlement agreement resolving
injunctive and equitable claims. The defendants moved for summary judgment on the remaining damages
claims. The inmate's attorneys moved for attorney's fees and out-of-pocket expenses incurred monitoring the
settlement agreement. The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, awarded fees to
the inmate's attorneys, but denied expenses. The inmate appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. On
remand, the district court held that: (1) the Eleventh Amendment barred an Eighth Amendment claim against an
officer in his official capacity; (2) the inmate waived the Eighth Amendment claim based on initial denial of
treatment due to his short prison term; (3) a fact issue precluded summary judgment on the Eighth Amendment
claim based on denial of treatment due to the inmate's failure to complete a substance abuse program;(4) a fact
issue precluded summary judgment on the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims; and (5) enlargement of the cap
set forth in the agreement was appropriate. (New York State Department of Correctional Services and Community Supervision)

U.S. District Court
POLICIES
SUICIDE
TRAINING

Holscher v. Mille Lacs County, 924 F.Supp.2d 1044 (D.Minn. 2013). Trustees for the next-of-kin of a pretrial
detainee who committed suicide while incarcerated at a county jail brought an action against the county, alleging
under § 1983 that the county provided inadequate medical care to the detainee, in violation of his due process
rights. The trustees also asserted related claims for negligence and wrongful death under state law. The county
moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held
that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the county had actual
knowledge of the pretrial detainee's risk of suicide, as to whether the county was deliberately indifferent to that
risk, and as to whether the detainee's death was the result of an unconstitutional custom. The court also held that
summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the county's training of its jail
employees on proper implementation of its suicide prevention policy was adequate, as to whether the county was
deliberately indifferent in failing to revise its training, and as to whether any inadequate training on the part of
the county caused the pretrial detainee's suicide. (Mille Lacs County Jail, Wisconsin)

29.276

U.S. Appeals Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
MEDICATION
RECORDS

Jackson v. Pollion, 733 F.3d 786 (7th Cir. 2013). A state inmate brought an action against a nurse practitioner
and a correctional counselor, alleging under § 1983 that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his hypertension, for which he was not receiving his prescribed medication. The district court granted the defendants'
motion for summary judgment. The inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the
defendants were not deliberately indifferent to the inmate's hypertension by failing to provide him with his prescribed medication for a three-week period. The court noted that the nurse practitioner did not know that the
inmate was not receiving his medication, and the counselor, who was not a member of the prison's medical staff,
though he knew about the inmate's problem, he assumed that medical staff would address it. (Menard Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICATION
POLICIES

Johnson v. Douglas County Medical Dept., 725 F.3d 825 (8th Cir. 2013). An inmate brought a § 1983 action
against a county, alleging failure to provide him with necessary medication. The district court granted the county's motion for summary judgment and the inmate appealed. The court held that jail employees' denial of the
inmate’s medication for one morning, which resulted in a seizure, did not establish a continuing, widespread,
persistent pattern of unconstitutional misconduct by the employees, as required to subject the county to liability
in the inmate's § 1983 action. According to the court, there was no evidence that county policymaking officials
received notice of denial of medication prior to the inmate's seizure and made a deliberate choice to ignore or
tacitly authorize the denial, and no other inmates were denied medication. (Douglas County Correctional Center,
Correct Care Solutions, Nebraska)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
FEMALE PRISONER
PRETRIAL DETAINEE

Keele v. Glynn County, Ga.. 938 F.Supp.2d 1270 (S.D.Ga. 2013). A pretrial detainee's estate brought an action
against a county, county sheriff, and officials at the county detention facility in their official and individual capacities, alleging that, while detained, the detainee's access to necessary medical care was delayed or deficient
and that the delay or deficiency led to the detainee's death. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The
district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the detainee's bruised or fractured
ribs and rash were objectively serious medical needs, as required for the estate's deliberate indifference claim
against officials at the county detention facility under Fourteenth Amendment. According to the court, a lay
person would be alerted to the necessity of medical attention after the detainee lost control of her bowels, began
to hallucinate, vomited repeatedly, became pale and developed blisters inside her mouth, and thus the detainee
had an objectively serious medical need when the symptoms manifested, as required for the estate's deliberate
indifference claim against the officials. The court found that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the nurse at the county detention facility was subjectively aware that the
pretrial detainee faced a substantial risk of serious harm, whether the nurse was more than grossly negligent in
disregarding that risk of harm, and whether the nurse's actions caused the detainee's injuries, including death.
The court noted that a reasonable nurse in the county detention facility nurse's position would have known that
delaying provision of medical care to a pretrial detainee with the detainee's symptoms, which included hallucinating, withdrawing from pain medication, pale, vomiting, hives, complaining of feeling bad, and not eating,
drinking, or getting up to do any activity, violated her constitutional rights, and thus the nurse failed to establish
an entitlement to qualified immunity from deliberate indifference claims under the Fourteenth Amendment.
According to the court, it was clearly established that knowledge of the need for medical care and intentional
refusal to provide that care constituted deliberate indifference, and the law was clearly established that nearly
half a day was too long to fail to properly respond to a medical need. (Glynn County Detention Center, Georgia)

U.S. District Court
DENTAL CARE
DELAY IN TREATMENT
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

King v. Chapman, 4 F.Supp.3d 1017 (N.D.Ill. 2013). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against prison medical
and dental providers, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and
denied in part. The district court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as
to: (1) whether the delay in providing a new dental “night guard” to the inmate by a dentist working for the state
was deliberate indifference; (2) whether a prison dentist was deliberately indifferent to the inmate's serious medical needs in delaying sending the inmate to a specialist and in prescribing medication to the inmate; and (3)
whether the medical director was deliberately indifferent to the inmate's serious medical needs in obtaining physical therapy for the inmate after surgery. (Wexford Health Sources, Inc., Menard Correctional Facility, Stateville
Correctional Facility, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
MENTAL HEALTH
SUICIDE

Lemire v. California Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 726 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2013). The estate, parents,
and daughter of a mentally ill inmate who died in custody brought a § 1983 action against the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), CDCR officials, and prison staff. The plaintiffs sought to
recover damages for alleged violations of the Eighth Amendment, based on the inmate's right to be free from
cruel and unusual punishment, and the Fourteenth Amendment, based on the family's substantive due process
right of familial association. The district court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs. The appeals court
affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether: (1) withdrawal of all floor staff from a prison building which housed
mentally ill inmates, for up to three and a half hours, created an objectively substantial risk of harm to the unsupervised inmates in the building; (2) the captain who called staff meetings, and a warden, who purportedly authorized the meetings, were aware of risks posed by withdrawing all floor officers from the building for over
three hours; (3) any risk of harm could have been prevented with adequate supervision; and (4) the actions of the
warden and the captain shocked the conscience.
The court also found genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether (1) floor officers who were the first
prison personnel to arrive in the cell of the mentally ill inmate who apparently committed suicide were deliberately indifferent to the inmate's serious medical needs when they failed to provide cardiopulmonary resuscitation
(CPR), despite being trained to administer it; (2) the officers' failure to provide medical care caused the inmate's
death; and (3) the officers' actions shocked the conscience, precluding summary judgment as to the § 1983

29.277

Eighth Amendment medical claim brought by the inmate's family against officers and family's substantive due
process claim against the officers. (California State Prison at Solano)
U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
DENIAL

Lewis v. Zon, 920 F.Supp.2d 379 (W.D.N.Y. 2013). A Jewish inmate brought an action against a state's department of corrections and approximately 50 of its officials and employees pursuant to § 1983 and the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), alleging denial of religious accommodations in violation
of the First Amendment and RLUIPA. The inmate moved for summary judgment and the defendants cross
moved to dismiss and/or for summary judgment. The district court denied the plaintiff’s motion, and granted in
part and denied in part the defendant’s motion. The court held that: (1) there was no evidence that the defendants
were deliberately indifferent to the inmate's medical needs during his hunger strike; (2) a material fact dispute
regarding whether the inmate was denied medical treatment when he began experiencing pain after the culmination of his hunger strike precluded summary judgment on the claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need; and (3) the inmate's having to forego fresh bedding for a few hours after soiling his bedding was not a
serious medical situation requiring treatment.(N. Y. State Department of Correctional Services, Upstate Correctional Facility, Downstate Correctional Facility, Wende Correctional Facility, Auburn Correctional Facility)

U.S. District Court
DELAY IN TREATMENT
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
RESTRAINTS

Maraj v. Massachusetts, 953 F.Supp.2d 325 (D.Mass. 2013). The estate of a deceased inmate brought a § 1983
excessive-force action against county corrections officers and others, alleging that they used excessive force and
were deliberately indifferent to the inmate’s medical needs, in violation of the Constitution. The district court
partially granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss and the defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The defendants allegedly caused the inmate's death by using an emergency restraint belt and delaying medical treatment, but a prison medical examiner determined that the inmate had a preexisting heart condition that ultimately led to the inmate's cardiac arrest, and the manner of death could not be
determined. (Suffolk County House of Correction, Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
TRANSPORTATION

McKinney v. U.S., 950 F.Supp.2d 923 (N.D.Tex. 2013). A 79-year-old federal prisoner, who allegedly had been
injured while being transported to a medical center, filed suit against the United States pursuant to the Federal
Torts Claim Act (FTCA). The district court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss, holding that the prisoner's
tort claim was not barred under the discretionary function exception to FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity.
The court noted that a prisoner has the right to bring a cause of action under FTCA for a breach of the duty prescribed by federal statute requiring the Bureau of Prisons to provide for the safekeeping, care, and subsistence of
all federal prisoners. The prisoner alleged that he was injured when officials failed to assist him on stairs when
he was exiting an airplane, while he was fully restrained in handcuffs, shackles, and a belly chain. According to
the court, there were no legitimate policy considerations at play in the officials' choice not to assist a fully restrained, elderly, ill, and outnumbered prisoner on the stairs of an airplane. The prisoner alleged that, due to his
fall, he suffered intense pain, has reoccurring medical issues, must now use a walker to get around, continues to
need medication for pain, and requires counseling to address the mental and emotional stress he has suffered.
(FCI–Fort Worth, Texas, and Federal Medical Center, Butner, North Carolina)

U.S. District Court
SMOKE-FREE
ENVIRONMENT

Mearin v. Swartz, 951 F.Supp.2d 776 (W.D.Pa. 2013). State inmates, proceeding pro se, brought an action
against prison officials and employees, alleging that exposure to environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) violated
the Eighth Amendment, as well as asserting First Amendment retaliation claims. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the prisoners' allegations were sufficient to plead they were exposed to unreasonably high levels of environmental tobacco smoke
(ETS), as required to state a § 1983 claim for violations of the Eighth Amendment against various prison officials and employees. One prisoner alleged that he was exposed to constant smoking by cellmates, inmates in
neighboring cells, and by corrections officers and staff, which resulted in his suffering from constant coughs,
headaches, chest pains, shortness of breath, vomiting, and fatigue. A second prisoner alleged that he was constantly exposed to second hand smoke by other inmates and employees while in certain housing, which resulted
in his suffering from constant headaches, coughs, dizziness, breathing difficulties, and burning sensations in his
chest. The prisoners alleged that officials and employees had actual knowledge of their exposure to ETS and of
the risks of harm to the prisoners' health, but failed to rectify conditions and to enforce the prison's zero tolerance
smoking policy. The court found that the prisoners' allegations that they had made requests to unit managers to
be housed with non-smoking cellmates, that the managers had knowledge of the prisoners' need to be housed
with non-smokers, that the managers denied the requests, that the prisoners suffered various health conditions
from exposure to smoke, and that the prisoners submitted grievances about smoke exposure, were sufficient to
state a § 1983 claim against case managers for violations of the Eighth Amendment. (State Correctional Institution at Greene, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
ADA-Americans with
Disabilities Act
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
EMERGENCY CARE
FACILITIES
POLICIES
TRAINING

Morris v. Dallas County, 960 F.Supp.2d 665 (N.D.Tex. 2013) The parents of a detainee who died while in custody at a county jail brought a § 1983 action in state court against the county, the county jail medical staff, and
officials, alleging violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and constitutional violations. The
action was removed to federal court. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted
the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment for the defendants was precluded
by fact issues with regard to: (1) the nurses who were defendants; (2) the claim that the county failed to monitor
the detainee’s health; and (3) failure to train officers on how to observe and assess the jail detainees' medical
needs and respond to those needs. The court noted that the way the jail infirmary was structured, including the
lack of direct access between the detainees and the nursing staff, and the absence of procedures for communication between the nurses and the correctional officers concerning emergent medical symptoms, were a county
custom. According to the court, whether that custom was adopted or continued, even though it was obvious that
its likely consequence would be a deprivation of medical care for the detainees, precluded summary judgment in
favor of the county in the § 1983 deliberate indifference claim brought against the county. (Dallas Co. Jail, Tex.)

29.278

U.S. District Court
INADEQUATE CARE
MENTAL HEALTH

Moses v. Westchester County Dept. of Corrections, 951 F.Supp.2d 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). The estate of a deceased prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a county, its department of corrections (DOC), and a corrections
officer, alleging state and federal claims after the prisoner was beaten by the officer. The defendants moved to
dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court found that the family exercised reasonable diligence in pursuing the action, as required to equitably toll the limitations period for the §
1983 action. The estate alleged that the corrections officer “kicked and stomped” on the prisoner’s head, causing
injuries that eventually led to his death. The officer was indicted in county court for assault and the Federal Bureau of Investigations opened an investigation into allegations that the officer had used excessive force against
the prisoner. The officer was eventually convicted of reckless assault. The prisoner’s death also prompted a federal investigation into conditions at the jail, and investigators found a number of instances of the use of excessive
force by jail staff, a failure to provide an adequate review system, and a failure to provide adequate mental and
medical health care. (Westchester Department of Corrections, New York)

U.S. District Court
FACILITIES
PRETRIAL DETAINEES
TREATMENT

Nelson v. District of Columbia, 928 F.Supp.2d 210 (D.D.C. 2013). A detainee brought a § 1983 claim against the
District of Columbia arising from his stay in jail. The defendant moved to dismiss and the district court granted
the motion. The court held that denial of one telephone call and access to stationery during the detainee's fiveday stay in a “Safe Cell,” which was located in the jail's infirmary, did not implicate his First Amendment right
of free speech or right of access to courts. The court found that the detainee's alleged exposure to “dried urine on
the toilet seat and floor” and garbage during his five-day stay, along with the denial of a shower, did not rise to
the level of a Fifth Amendment due process violation. According to the court, placement of detainee in a Safe
Cell was not motivated by a desire to punish the detainee, but rather by a nurse's desire to attend to the detainee's
ailments after his “legs and back gave out” twice. The court noted that denial of the detainee’s request to have
the cell cleaned was for the non-punitive reason that the detainee would not be in the cell that long. (D.C. Jail,
District of Columbia)

U.S. District Court
ADA- American with
Disabilities Act
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
HANDICAP
WHEELCHAIR

Newell v. Kankakee County Sheriff's Department, 968 F.Supp.2d 973 (C.D.Ill. 2013). A disabled federal detainee who was housed at a county jail for two months brought an action against the county sheriff's department and
county officials under § 1983 and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The defendants moved to dismiss.
The district court denied the motion. The court held that the detainee's allegations that the county officials developed, supervised, and enforced policies and practices of the jail, ensured that grievances were received in the
proper manner and were properly responded to, and were aware of his serious medical needs and his grievances,
yet turned a blind eye to the situation, were sufficient to state a claim against the officials in their individual
capacities in his civil rights action alleging he was denied medical care and kept in unsafe and unhealthy conditions while he was housed at the county jail. The detainee allegedly had multiple disabilities that he sustained in
an auto accident, including weakness and numbness in his left side and he partially dragged his left leg. He also
had incontinence with urine and bowel movements and required the use of adult diapers. He was unable to stand
still without assistance, which made showering and using the toilet difficult. The detainee alleged that despite his
obvious disabilities and medical issues, he was assigned to a regular dorm on the top floor of the jail, and a to a
top bunk. He had to hop on one leg to go up or down the stairs and needed assistance from other inmates to get
into and out of his bunk. He was allegedly not given adult diapers until his third day at the jail, and even then, he
was not given an adequate supply of diapers and would sometimes sit in a soiled diaper for days, and in clothes
with urine and feces on them. He alleged that he was not given enough biohazard bags, and the soiled diapers
and bags piled up in his cell. One day, when there was no one to assist the detainee, he fell while attempting to
get out of his bunk and he sat for two hours until someone came to help him. As a result, his left leg worsened
and his right leg was numb, he could not walk at all and was forced to crawl down stairs on his buttocks, and
scoot along the floor and walk on his hands.
The court found that the detainee's allegations that he was denied medical care and kept in unsafe and unhealthy conditions while he was housed at the county jail, and that the jail was not an exceptionally large facility,
were sufficient to state claim against the corrections officer working at the jail in his individual capacity. According to the court, the situation described by the inmate, if true, would have been obvious to any correctional
officer working in the area in which the inmate was housed.
The court held that the detainee's allegations that correctional staff at the county jail acted pursuant to an
official policy or custom not to perform a medical intake, investigate inmates' medical issues or complaints about
problems with walking if they were ambulatory, nor provide sufficient medically-necessary hygiene items such
as adult diapers to inmates, among other things, were sufficient to allege that an official policy or custom was a
“moving force” in the alleged violation of his rights, as required to state official capacity claims under Monell.
The court held that the detainee's allegation that he was barred from basic facilities on the basis of his disabilities
while he was housed at the county jail was sufficient to allege discriminatory intent, as required to state an ADA
claim against the county sheriff's department. (Jerome Combs Detention Center, Kankakee, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELAY IN TREATMENT
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
DENTAL CARE
STAFF

Peralta v. Dillard, 704 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2013). An inmate brought a civil rights action against a prison dentist,
alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The district court entered judgment in favor of the
dentist, and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the dentist could not be held
personally liable for deliberate indifference to the inmate's serious medical needs if he could not render or cause
to be rendered the needed dental services because of a lack of resources that he could not cure. The court noted
that the dentist and other doctors tried to address the shortage through various means, including requests for
more resources and changing staff schedules to allow staff to see more patients, but they had no control over the
staffing budget, which was set at the state level. (California State Prison, Los Angeles County)

29.279

U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
MEDICATION
POLICIES

Prosser v. Nagaldinne, 927 F.Supp.2d 708 (E.D.Mo. 2013). An inmate brought a § 1983 and tort action against
prison physicians, medical contract monitors, and the director of Missouri Department of Corrections (MDOC).
The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part.
The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issue of material fact as to whether the prison
physician's care of the inmate fell so far below the reasonable standard of care as to amount to deliberate indifference. The court found that the correctional services regional medical director's denial of referral requests from
the inmate's physical therapist for a nerve conduction study and a neurologist consultation following inmate's
back surgery did not constitute deliberate indifference to the inmate's serious medical needs in violation of the
Eighth Amendment. The court noted that the medical director promptly and appropriately responded to several
requests for specialized care, and she denied requests for a nerve conduction study and neurologist consultation
based upon the opinions of inmate's treating surgeon, who did not order a nerve conduction study and did not
believe that one was medically necessary. According to the court, even if a prison physician misdiagnosed the
inmate's foot drop as rheumatoid arthritis, the physician's treatment of the inmate did not constitute deliberate
indifference to the inmate's serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment, where the physician
reviewed the inmate's medical history, diagnosed him with rheumatoid arthritis, and provided treatment to him
by ordering a cane for him. The court held that the policy of the corporation providing medical services to prison
inmates, which required inmates to be admitted to the infirmary in order to receive narcotic pain medication, did
not constitute deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of the inmate who was recovering from back
surgery, where the policy served a legitimate purpose of promoting the safety and well-being of the inmates.
(Corizon, Inc. f/k/a Correctional Medical Services, Inc., Missouri Department of Corrections, Farmington Correctional Center)

U.S. Appeals Court
EQUIPMENT
INTERFERENCE WITH
TREATMENT

Pride v. Correa, 719 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2013). A prisoner brought § a 1983 action against two members of a
prison's committee that reviewed medical notes, claiming that the members violated his Eighth Amendment
rights by acting with deliberate indifference towards his serious medical needs in denying his prescribed knee
brace and egg crate mattress. The district court granted summary judgment to the committee members. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded with directions. The appeals court held that the prisoner's § 1983 action seeking an injunction was not duplicative of an earlier class action, Plata v. Brown, and was
not conclusively in the Plata stipulation, where the prisoner's action did not refer to systemic relief for inmates
generally. The court noted that the Plata stipulation stated that it only had preclusive effect on other actions seeking class or systemic relief, and the procedural provisions of the stipulation only applied to systemic reform
goals and not individual claims. (Calipatria Prison, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
MENTAL HEALTH
NEGLIGENCE

Quigley v. Tuong Vinh Thai, 707 F.3d 675 (6th Cir. 2013). The administrator of a deceased prisoner's estate
brought a § 1983 action against a prison psychiatrist, alleging violations of the Eighth Amendment, as well as
state claims for gross negligence. The district court denied the psychiatrist's motion for summary judgment and
the psychiatrist appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by
genuine issues of material fact as to: (1) whether the psychiatrist violated prisoner's Eighth Amendment right; (2)
whether the psychiatrist violated the prisoner's clearly established right; (3) whether the psychiatrist's treatment
of the prisoner's depression was so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether an injury
resulted; and (4) whether the psychiatrist's treatment of prisoner's depression was the proximate cause of prisoner's death. (Mich. Department of Corrections Guidance Center, and Correctional Medical Services, Inc.)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
EQUAL PROTECTION
MENTAL HEALTH
SUICIDE ATTEMPT

Randle v. Alexander, 960 F.Supp.2d 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). An African-American state inmate with a history of
serious mental illness brought an action against officials of the New York State Department of Corrections and
Community Supervision (DOCCS), correctional officers, and mental health personnel, alleging under § 1983
that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs and that he was retaliated against,
in violation of his First Amendment rights, among other claims. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district
court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the correctional officers' alleged actions
in forcing the inmate to fight a fellow inmate, and threatening to beat the inmate with a baton and engage in a
joint cover-up if the two inmates did not “finish” their fight within a specified area of the prison, which ultimately resulted in the fellow inmate sustaining fatal injuries in the fight, had no legitimate penological purpose, and
was far afield of the species of force employed to restore or maintain discipline. The court held that the alleged
actions reflected indifference to inmate safety, if not malice toward the inmate, as supported the inmate's § 1983
Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim. The court found that the inmate stated an Eighth Amendment inadequate medical care claim against mental health personnel. The inmate alleged that he had a history of serious
mental illness, that his symptoms increased following a forced fight with a fellow inmate, that the inmate attempted suicide on three occasions, two of which required his hospitalization, that prison mental health personnel evidenced deliberate indifference to his medical needs, as they recklessly disregarded the risk the inmate
faced as result of special housing unit (SHU) confinement, and that the inmate was confined to SHU despite a
recommendation that he be placed in a less-restrictive location. (Green Haven Correctional Facility, Protective
Custody Unit, New York State Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
WHEELCHAIR
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act

Randolph v. Wetzel, 987 F.Supp.2d 605 (E.D.Pa. 2013). A state inmate brought an action against public officials
employed by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and prison medical providers, alleging, among other things,
that the defendants violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and provided inadequate medical treatment. The defendants moved for summary judgment, and the inmate cross-moved for partial summary judgment.
The district court granted the defendants’ motions in part and denied in part, and denied the inmate’s motion.
The district court held that state prison officials were not deliberately indifferent to the inmate's allegedly serious
medical condition, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, in requiring the inmate to use a wheelchair to access
outdoors for “yard time” or to see visitors, rather than transporting the inmate on a gurney. The court noted that
the officials relied on the medical providers' judgment that the inmate was able to sit up and get into a wheel-

29.280

chair. The court found that the allegedly excessive bright lighting at prison facilities which was left on for 24
hours-a-day, was related to a legitimate penological concern of providing security for staff and inmates, and thus
the lighting did not violate the Eighth Amendment.
According to the court, the inmate's absence at his misconduct hearings, allegedly due to his injuries, and his
subsequent sentence of 540 days of disciplinary custody, did not violate his procedural due process rights, where
the inmate received both advanced written notice of the claimed violation and a written statement of the fact
finders as to the evidence relied upon in reaching their decision. The court found that the inmate's alleged restricted access to his personal effects and legal mail when he was moved between cells, and his alleged denial of
access to a law library, did not result in an actual injury to inmate, thus precluding his § 1983 access to courts
claim. The court noted that the inmate proceeded with all of his legal claims in addition to his complaint of denial of access to courts. (SCI Graterford, SCI Greene, Pennsylvania)
U.S. Appeals Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Ray v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 706 F.3d 864 (7th Cir. 2013). A state prison inmate brought a § 1983 action
against a prison physician and physician's employer, alleging violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment as a result of the physician's failure to treat the inmate's shoulder pain. The
district court granted summary judgment to the defendants and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed.
The court held that the prison physician did not display deliberate indifference to the inmate's serious medical
condition of shoulder pain, as required to support a § 1983 claim against the physician for cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The court noted that, although the inmate did not receive an
MRI (magnetic resonance imaging) scan that he wanted because the physician diagnosed the inmate with arthritis and did not believe an MRI scan would help in treatment, the inmate received medical treatment for his
shoulder pain, including frequent examinations, x-rays, and painkillers, and he was assigned to a lower bunk so
he could avoid arm motions that he found painful. (Western Illinois Correctional Center)

U.S. District Court
CELLS
DELAY OF CARE
DENIAL

Robinson v. Phelps, 946 F.Supp.2d 354 (D.Del. 2013). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against prison
officials alleging excessive force and failure to protect. The district court held that the prisoner stated cognizable
and non-frivolous claims for excessive force, failure to protect, and denial of medical care. The prisoner alleged
that on one occasion a sergeant assaulted him and that a lieutenant arrived during the assault and that he sustained injuries but was denied medical care by these officers and other prison personnel, that another sergeant
shoved and pushed him when he was taken to a medical grievance hearing, making his injuries worse, that this
sergeant shoved him to the ground while escorting him to the shower, and then dragged him when he could not
get up, requiring that he be taken away by stretcher, and that other officers later choked him until he lost consciousness. The court found that the prisoner also stated cognizable and non-frivolous Eighth Amendment claims
against a prison physician for denial or delay of medical treatment; the prisoner alleged that after he was assaulted by a corrections officer, he was seen by the physician, who would not prescribe pain medication and advised
the prisoner that he would be x-rayed within seven to ten days, but the x-rays were not taken for a month and a
half, and he alleged that some months later he was taken to an outside facility for a magnetic resonance imaging
(MRI) of the neck and back. According to the court, the prisoner's allegations were sufficient to state an Eighth
Amendment claim that the physicians denied his requests for medically necessary accommodations. The prisoner
alleged that medical officials did not authorize his housing on a lower bunk and, as a result, he slept on the floor,
that an officer later moved him to an upstairs cell even though he knew that the prisoner required lower housing
due to his neck and back injuries, and that the prisoner showed the officer a memo from a superior officer indicating the prisoner needed the housing, (James T. Vaughn Correctional Center, Delaware)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELAY IN TREATMENT
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
INADEQUATE CARE
RESTRAINTS
TRANSPORTATION

Rogers v. Boatright, 709 F.3d 403 (5th Cir. 2013). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against corrections
officers and their supervisor, alleging that he was seriously injured when the prison van in which he was riding
stopped abruptly, and that he was provided with inadequate and untimely medical care for his injuries. The district court dismissed the suit. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded. The appeals court held that the prisoner stated a non-frivolous claim that an officer acted with deliberate indifference to his safety in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The prisoner alleged that he sustained a
serious injury while being transported in a prison van because a corrections officer operated the van recklessly
and had to brake suddenly to avoid hitting another vehicle, that he was shackled in leg irons and handcuffs and
was not provided with a seatbelt and thus could not protect himself when the prison van stopped abruptly, and
that the officer had told another officer that other inmates similarly had been injured the prior week and during
other incidents. A dissenting appeals judge asserted that “…there is no constitutional requirement that inmates be
buckled with seatbelts during transportation. Nearly all courts have rejected such claims, because the use of
seatbelts on shackled prisoners presents inevitable, non-trivial security concerns for other passengers and the
guards.” The appeals court held that the corrections officers transporting the prisoner to a hospital in a prison
van did not show deliberate indifference to the prisoner's serious medical needs, in violation of the Eighth
Amendment, when, after the prisoner was injured, the officers proceeded to the hospital, had the prisoner
checked by a physician, but then failed to take the prisoner to the emergency room for treatment of his bleeding
wounds as that physician had directed, but instead brought the prisoner to the prison's medical facility, where he
was treated some five hours later. (Eastham Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional
Institutions Division)

U.S. District Court
INJURY
EQUIPMENT
WHEELCHAIR
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Sistrunk v. Khan, 931 F.Supp.2d 849 (N.D.Ill. 2013). A pretrial detainee with a leg injury brought a pro se §
1983 action against a county jail physician, alleging deliberate indifference to his medical needs in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court granted the physician’s motion for summary judgment. The court
found that there was no evidence that the detainee's perceived need for a wheelchair, rather than crutches, due to
his injured and infected leg, was an objectively serious medical need, as required to support the pro se § 1983
claim against the jail physician for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court noted that, although the detainee's physical therapist and hospi-

29.281

tal physicians recommended that he be placed in wheelchair “for now,” such accommodation was not medically
necessary in light of the fact that the detainee's left leg was uninjured and could support weight, and the wheelchair recommendation was preliminary to more active ambulation by detainee. According to the court, the physician's decision to issue the detainee crutches instead of a wheelchair when detainee had one good leg was not so
far afield as to demonstrate an absence of professional judgment. The court noted that there was no evidence that
the jail physician was aware that the detainee had fallen, let alone that he had a serious medical need for treatment of his injuries, as required to support a § 1983 claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical need
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Cook County Department of Corrections, Illinois)
U.S. District Court
INADEQUATE CARE
MENTAL HEALTH

Slevin v. Board of Com'rs for County of Dona Ana, 934 F.Supp.2d 1270 (D.N.M. 2013). A detainee brought an
action against a county board of commissioners, detention center director, and medical director, alleging violations of his rights with regard to his medical care. The detainee alleged that, because of his mental illness, officials at the Detention Center kept him in administrative segregation for virtually the entire 22 months of his
incarceration, without humane conditions of confinement or adequate medical care, and without periodic review
of his confinement, causing his physical and mental deterioration, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities
Act. The jury awarded the detainee $3 million in punitive damages against the Detention Center Director, and
$3.5 million in punitive damages against the facility medical director. The jury fixed the amount of compensatory damages at $15.5 million, which included $500,000 for each month that detainee was incarcerated, plus an
additional $1 million for each year since the detainee’s release from custody. The defendants moved for a new
trial or for reduction of the damages awards. The district court denied the motion, finding that the compensatory
damages award was supported by substantial evidence and it would not be set aside on the ground that it was the
product of passion or prejudices. The court also declined to set aside the punitive damages awards as excessive.
(Doña Ana County Detention Center, New Mexico)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELAY OF CARE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
DENTAL CARE
MEDICATION

Smego v. Mitchell, 723 F.3d 752 (7th Cir. 2013). A civilly committed sex offender brought a § 1983 claim
against a dentist, doctors, and a dental hygienist at a state detention facility, alleging that they acted with deliberate indifference to the offender's serious dental problems. The district court granted summary judgment in favor
of the defendants. The plaintiff appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The
appeals court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the
dentist acted with an unjustifiably high risk of harm that was either known or so obvious that it should be known
in delaying dental treatment for the offender for decay in multiple teeth, and failing to prescribe appropriate pain
medication, for a time period of about 30 months, during which the offender was suffering from pain. The court
also found fact issues as to whether the dental hygienist intentionally obstructed or delayed dental treatment for
the offender for decay in multiple teeth. (Rushville Treatment and Detention Center, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
MEDICATION
PRETRIAL DETAINEE
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Sours v. Big Sandy Regional Jail Authority, 946 F.Supp.2d 678 (E.D.Ky. 2013). The administrator of a detainee's estate filed a § 1983 action against jail officials alleging deliberate indifference to the detainee's serious
medical needs, negligence, and violation of state regulations. The officials moved for summary judgment. The
district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that: (1) the nurse, a deputy jailer, and
the center's administrator were not deliberately indifferent to the detainee's serious medical needs; (2) the nurse's
determination that the detainee did not need insulin “right away” was a discretionary decision for which she was
entitled to qualified official immunity; (3) the nurse was not entitled to qualified official immunity for her alleged failure to leave adequate instructions to deputy jailers for the care of the detainee; and (4) the jailers were
entitled to qualified official immunity, The court noted that, under Kentucky law, the detention center nurse's
duty to ensure that the diabetic pretrial detainee could be cared for in her absence was mandatory and ministerial,
and thus the nurse was not entitled to qualified official immunity in the wrongful death action brought by the
administrator, for her alleged failure to leave adequate instructions for deputy jailers for the care of the detainee.
According to the court, the nurse was aware that the jailers were unlikely to be able to identify the symptoms of
diabetic ketoacidosis and that there was no information in the detention center about diabetes. On appeal, the
court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The appeals court held that the nurse was not entitled to qualified
immunity. (Big Sandy Regional Detention Center, Kentucky)

U.S. District Court
INTERFERENCE WITH
TREATMENT

Staples v. U.S., 948 F.Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013). A federal prisoner brought a pro se action against the United
States and several employees of the Bureau of Prisons, alleging violations of the Eighth Amendment. The district
court held that the inmate stated Eighth Amendment violations with his allegations that: (1) two corrections
officers at the federal prison ignored the his medical restriction, which required him to sleep on a lower bunk
bed; (2) the officers told the prisoner t osleep on a top bed or to sleep on the floor; (3) he was forced to sleep on
the floor and suffered unnecessary physical pain in his back and left hip; and (4) his condition was ignored. The
prisoner alleged that the conditions continued for over two weeks in spite of his complaints. (Federal Correctional Institution Schuylkill, Minersville, Pennsylvania)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
INADEQUATE CARE
QUARANTINE

Stoudemire v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections, 705 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2013). A female former prisoner brought an
action against the Michigan Department of Corrections (DOC), a warden, and other DOC-associated officers,
doctors, and nurses, asserting violations of § 1983, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), and
state law. The prisoner alleged that she underwent three separate amputations as a result of inadequate health
care by the defendants and was subjected to a strip search that served no legitimate penological purpose. The
district court denied summary judgment to the warden and a corrections officer on their qualified immunity defenses to the § 1983 claims against them, and they appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part,
and remanded. The appeals court held that the district court did not properly evaluate the warden's qualified
immunity defense to the prisoner's Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference to her serious medical
needs, when it denied summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds to “defendants.,” The court held that
remand was warranted for the court to conduct a particularized analysis of whether the warden was deliberately
indifferent to the conditions of the prisoner's confinement while in quarantine. The court noted that the district

29.282

court did not mention any facts in the record that specifically pertained to the warden, nor did the court make any
findings regarding the warden's knowledge or mental state. (Huron Valley Women's Corr'l. Facility, Michigan)
U.S. District Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Terbush v. Massachusetts ex rel. Hampden County Sheriff's Office, 987 F.Supp.2d 109 (D.Mass. 2013). An inmate brought a state court action against the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, a medical doctor, a registered
nurse, and a physician assistant, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs and asserting claims
under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act. The inmate alleged that his inability to provide a urine sample while participating in a day reporting program, was due to an alleged “Shy Bladder
Syndrome” condition as well as subsequent medical issues following his return to a correctional facility. The day
reporting program provided home-based incarceration for selected inmates with the goal of transitioning them
back to the community. Inmates were still “incarcerated” but were allowed to live at home under strict reporting
conditions, including drug testing. When the inmate could not produce a urine sample upon his admission to the
program, he was returned to jail. The defendants removed the action to federal court, and moved for summary
judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court found that the inmate's alleged “Shy Bladder Syndrome” condition was not a “disability” under the ADA, and even if the condition was a disability, the inmate
did not meet the essential eligibility requirements for participation in the program and, therefore, was not a
“qualified individual with a disability” under the ADA. The court noted that inmate had often refused to cooperate with medical advice, he received extensive medical care on practically a daily basis, sometimes multiple
times a day, the inmate failed to inform anyone at the facility of his urinary retention until two or three days after
returning to the facility, the inmate was sent to a hospital when he complained about his urinary retention, and
while the inmate did not see an outside urologist until approximately one month later, at that point his medical
issues were resolved. (Hampden County Sheriff's Department Day Reporting Program, Hampden County Correctional Center, Massachusetts)

U.S. Appeals Court
ALCOHOL/DRUGS
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
INTAKE SCREENING

Thompson v. King, 730 F.3d 742 (8th Cir. 2013). The estate of a detainee, who died in police custody from multiple drug intoxication, brought a § 1983 action against the arresting and detaining officers, alleging that the
officers had shown deliberate indifference to the detainee's serious medical needs. The district court denied the
officers’ motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. The officers appealed. The appeals
court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The appeals court held that the arresting officer's discovery of an empty bottle of a recently refilled anti-anxiety medication, and the detainee's statement that he had
taken “a little” of the medication, did not amount to subjective knowledge that the detainee required medical
attention, and thus the officer was entitled to qualified immunity in the § 1983 action arising from the subsequent
death of the detainee in police custody. The court noted that the detainee presented no external injuries, and the
detainee was conscious during the initial encounter, answering officers’ questions and following instructions.
The court found that summary judgment for the police officer in charge of the jail was precluded by a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether the police officer had subjective knowledge of the serious medical need of
the detainee and whether the officer deliberately disregarded that need. According to the court, a reasonable
officer in charge of a jail would have known that a constitutional violation occurs by deliberately disregarding a
detainee's serious medical needs, and thus the right was clearly established, and in turn the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity from the § 1983 claim arising from detainee's death while in police custody. (Saline
County Detention Center, Arkansas)

U.S. Appeals Court
INVOLUNTARY
MEDICATION
MENTAL HEALTH
PRETRIAL DETAINEE
PSYCHOTROPIC DRUGS

U.S. v. Hardy, 724 F.3d 280 (2nd Cir. 2013). The district court granted the motion of the United States to authorize the Bureau of Prisons to medicate a mentally ill detainee without his consent, and the detainee appealed. The
appeals court affirmed, finding that there was no basis for disturbing the district court's order authorizing involuntary medication of the pretrial detainee to reduce the danger he posed to Bureau of Prisons staff. The court
noted that involuntary medication of the detainee to reduce the danger he posed to staff was warranted, where the
detainee suffered from schizophrenia, the consensus of the testifying psychiatrists and psychologists was that
antipsychotic medication was the treatment of choice for someone with the detainee's condition. The court noted
that the detainee's past conduct, which included threats of harm, attempts to bite or hit officers, repeated throwing of liquids in their faces, and attempted and actual stabbings, indicated that he posed a danger to others.
(United States Bureau of Prisons, Metropolitan Corrections Center, New York City, Metropolitan Detention
Center, Brooklyn, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
DENIAL
EQUIPMENT
MEDICATION
SPECIAL DIET

Vandiver v. Prison Health Services, Inc., 727 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 2013). A prisoner brought a pro se action alleging that the contract prison medical professionals were deliberately indifferent to his health care needs, and applied to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). The district court denied the IFP application under the “three strikes”
rule, and found that the prisoner failed to satisfy pleading requirements for an imminent danger exception. The
prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that the prisoner sufficiently alleged an
imminent danger of serious physical injury, to satisfy the pleading requirements of the imminent danger exception. The prisoner alleged that the defendants continued to deny approved specialty care referral visits for his
chronic illnesses of diabetes and Hepatitis C, that he faced a risk of coma or death resulting from the denial of
physician-prescribed special shoes, a transport vehicle, a special diet and medication, and he had already undergone a partial amputation of his feet. (Prison Health Services, Earnest C. Brooks Correctional Facility, Mich.)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
DENIAL

Verser v. Ghosh, 925 F.Supp.2d 1028 (N.D.Ill. 2013). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against prison medical
staff, including the medical director, alleging denial of adequate medical care in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The director moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that: (1)
the alleged delay in treatment of the inmate's abdominal pain by the director was not deliberate indifference; (2)
the director’s prescribing of antacids for the inmate’s abdominal pain was not deliberate indifference; (3) the
director’s refusal to prescribe pain medication recommended by a specialist for the inmate's abdominal pain was
not deliberate indifference; and (4) the director's discharge of the inmate from the infirmary after his colonoscopy was not deliberate indifference. (Stateville Correctional Center, Illinois)

29.283

U.S. Appeals Court
FEMALE PRISONERS
POLICIES
RESTRAINTS

Villegas v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville, 709 F.3d 563 (6th Cir. 2013). An Immigration detainee filed a
§ 1983 action against a metropolitan government alleging deliberate indifference to her serious medical needs
after she was shackled during the final stages of labor and post-partum recovery. The district court entered
judgment in the detainee's favor. A jury awarded the detainee $200,000 in damages. The defendants appealed.
The appeals court reversed and remanded. The appeals court held that summary judgment should not have been
granted by the district court, where there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether the pregnant immigration detainee presented a flight risk, whether the officers who accompanied her to the hospital when she went
into labor were aware of the hospital's no restraint order, and whether the detainee was at risk of physical or
psychological harm as a result of being shackled. The appeals court also found genuine issues of material fact as
to whether the hospital prescribed a breast pump to allow the detainee to express her breast milk postpartum, and
whether a layperson would recognize the need to provide the detainee with a breast pump. (Metropolitan Gov. of
Nashville and Davidson County, Davison County Sheriff's Office, Tennessee)

U.S. Appeals Court
COSTS
WORK ASSIGNMENT

Vuncannon v. U.S., 711 F.3d 536 (5th Cir. 2013). A county and the medical corporation that treated a county
inmate sought reimbursement of medical expenses from the provider of workers' compensation insurance under
the Mississippi Workers' Compensation Act (MWCA). The inmate was in a county work program under the
sheriff's supervision, for which services he earned $10 per day to be credited “toward any and all charges of
F.T.A/cash bonds owed to the county.” He was seriously injured in a forklift accident while helping law enforcement officials conduct a “drug bust” pursuant to that program. The inmate’s treatment cost more than
$640,000. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of provider. The county appealed. The appeals
court affirmed. The court held that the inmate did not qualify for reimbursement of medical expenses under
MWCA. The appeals court noted that the county inmate was not an employee working under contract of hire,
and therefore, did not qualify for reimbursement of medical expenses from the provider of workers' compensation insurance under the Mississippi Workers' Compensation Act (MWCA) after he was injured in a county work
program. According to the court, there was no express, written contract between the inmate and the county, the
inmate did not sign a document transmitted by the sheriff to a county justice court stating that the inmate was
placed on a work detail, the document was transmitted after he began working for the county, and inmates were
required to work under Mississippi law. (Tippah County Jail, Mississippi)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
DELAY IN CARE

Williams v. Erickson, 962 F.Supp.2d 1038 (N.D.Ill. 2013). A state inmate brought an action alleging that a prison nurse's refusal to open the seal on a new colostomy bag so that he could change the bag violated the Eighth
Amendment and Illinois law. The defendants moved to dismiss, and the district court denied the motion in part.
The court held that the inmate’s allegations were sufficient to: (1) state a claim for deliberate indifference to his
serious medical needs; (2) state a claim for deliberate indifference to conditions of confinement; and (3) state a
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) under Illinois law. The court noted that the inmate
was required to sit in fecal waste for four hours while medical personnel who had the means of remedying the
problem deliberately ignored him. (Stateville Correctional Center, Illinois Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
EQUIPMENT

Withers v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 710 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 2013). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action
against a variety of health professionals employed by or under contract to a state prison, alleging deliberate indifference to his medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court granted the defendants’
motion for summary judgment and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part,
and remanded. The appeals court held that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether a nurse who
allegedly let the prisoner who was suffering from back pain to climb a ladderless bunk bed, resulting in his fall
from the bunk bed, was deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's medical needs, precluding summary judgment.
(Danville Correctional Center, Illinois)
2014

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Al-Turki v. Robinson, 762 F.3d 1188 (10th Cir. 2014). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against several prison
officials and a prison nurse for alleged failure to provide him with a medical evaluation or treatment while he
suffered through several hours of severe abdominal pain from what turned out to be kidney stones. The district
court granted qualified immunity to the prison officials, but denied the nurse's motion for summary judgment on
qualified immunity grounds. The nurse appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the prisoner's
claim of pain satisfied the objective component of his deliberate indifference claim, and that it was clearly established at the time of the incident that repeatedly refusing to provide treatment to a prisoner who was complaining
of severe abdominal pain would be deliberate indifference. (Limon Correctional Facility, Colorado)

U.S. District Court
METHADONE
MEDICATION
INADEQUATE CARE

Alvarado v. Westchester County, 22 F.Supp.3d 208 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). Jail inmates, who were addicted to heroin
before being taken into custody, brought a pro se § 1983 action against a county, the provider of on-site medical
services at a jail, and county officials, alleging refusal to accept a grievance deprived them of First Amendment
right to petition the government for redress, deliberate indifference to serious medical needs in violation of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, and deliberate indifference to risk of inadequate medical care at the jail.
The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held
that: (1) the inmates had no First Amendment right to have grievances processed or investigated in any particular
manner; (2) the mere receipt of the inmates' grievance by an assistant warden and the county executive was insufficient to establish their personal involvement; (3) the inmate's allegations established a deputy commissioner's personal involvement; (4) the allegations supported the inmates' § 1983 claim that the provider was deliberately indifferent; and (5) the allegations satisfied Monell's policy or custom requirement to support a § 1983
claim against county. The court noted that the inmates alleged that the county had knowledge of and acquiesced
into a pattern of deliberate indifference to the risk that the provider of on-site medical services at jail was providing inadequate medical care where: the inmate sent a letter to county officials stating the provider was not issuing methadone to inmates who were using heroin; the inmates were experiencing withdrawal symptoms; the

29.284

letter came less than three years after Department of Justice issued a report identifying areas of medical care
provided at jail which fell below constitutionally required standards. (Correct Care Solutions Medical Services
P.C., and Westchester County Jail, New York)
U.S. District Court
PRIVATE PROVIDER
MEDICATION
TRAINING
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Awalt v. Marketti, 74 F.Supp.3d 909 (N.D.Ill. 2014). The estate and the widow of a pretrial detainee who died in
a county jail brought civil rights and wrongful death actions against jail personnel and medical care providers
who serviced the jail. The county defendants and the medical defendants moved for summary judgment. The
district court held that: (1) the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable juror to find that the correctional officers
and a jail superintendent were deliberately indifferent to the detainee’s medical needs; (2) summary judgment
was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the officers knew that the detainee was suffering
seizures while in jail and failed to take appropriate action; (3) a reasonable juror could have found that neither a
physician nor a nurse made a reasoned medical judgment not to prescribe a particular anti-seizure drug for the
detainee; and, (4) in the Seventh Circuit, private health care workers providing medical services to inmates are
not entitled to assert qualified immunity.
The court also found that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact: (1) concerning
whether failure of the sheriff’s office and the jail’s medical services provider to provide adequate medical training to correctional officers caused the detainee’s death; (2) as to whether the sheriff’s office and the jail’s medical services provider had an implicit policy of deliberate indifference to medical care provided to detainees; (3)
regarding whether correctional officers knew that the detainee was suffering seizures and ignored his suffering;
(5) as to whether the decision of the sheriff’s office and the jail’s medical services provider not to implement a
standardized grievance mechanism led to a widespread practice at the jail of ignoring or delaying response to
grievances and medical requests made by detainees, and as to whether this failure was the moving force behind
the pretrial detainee’s seizure-related death; and (6) as to whether the sheriff’s office and the jail’s medical services provider had an express policy that prevented a nurse from restocking a particular medication until there
were only eight pills left in stock and whether that policy was the moving force behind the pretrial detainee’s
seizure-related death. The court denied qualified immunity from liability to the correctional officers and the
sheriff’s office. (Grundy County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
COSTS

Baker County Medical Services, Inc. v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 763 F.3d 1274 (11th Cir. 2014). A hospital commenced
an action against various federal agencies and officials, seeking declaratory judgment that a statute imposing
Medicare rate as full compensation for medical services rendered to federal detainees was an unconstitutional
taking as applied to it. The district court dismissed the action. The hospital appealed. The appeals court affirmed.
The court held that requiring the hospital to treat federal detainees at a Medicare rate on the basis that it had
opted into the Medicare and Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA) was not a taking.
(Baker County Medical Services, d.b.a. Ed Fraser Memorial Hospital, Florida)

U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE
PRIVATE PROVIDER
POLICIES

Barkes v. First Correctional Medical, Inc., 766 F.3d 307 (3rd Cir. 2014). The widow and children of a deceased
inmate brought a § 1983 action against various administrators, including the commissioner of a state department
of corrections (DOC) and a warden, and the private company that contracted with the DOC to provide medical
services to prisons, alleging violations of the Eighth Amendment. The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, denied the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration, and denied the parties' motions for
summary judgment. The administrators appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that: (1) an inmate's right to proper implementation of adequate suicide prevention tools was clearly established; (2) summary
judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the policies of the company created an
unreasonable risk of constitutional deprivation that was exacerbated by the supervision of the warden and the
commissioner; and (3) a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the inmate's suicide was caused by
failure to supervise the private company that contracted with the DOC to provide medical services. (Howard R.
Young Correctional Institution, Delaware, and First Correctional Medical, Inc.)

U.S. District Court
CONTAGIOUS DISEASES
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Beagle v. Schwarzenegger, 107 F.Supp.3d 1056 (E.D. Cal. 2014). Former and current state prisoners who contracted “Valley Fever” during their terms of incarceration brought a § 1983 action against state officials, alleging
that they were recklessly exposed to dangerous conditions, and that the defendants were deliberately indifferent
to their serious medical needs, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The officials moved to dismiss. The court
granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that the alleged reckless exposure of immunocompetent Caucasian state prisoners to risk of contracting “Valley Fever” was sufficient to state Eighth Amendment
claim, and that the prisoners did not state a claim for deliberate indifference to their serious medical needs. According to the court, the alleged reckless exposure of immunocompetent Caucasian state prisoners to the risk of
contracting “Valley Fever” by placing those prisoners in a prison facility that was experiencing an epidemic of
“Valley Fever,” without implementing any remedial or preventative measures to lower the prisoners’ risk of
contracting the disease, stated an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against the prison officials.
(Pleasant Valley State Prison, Avenal State Prison, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE
CONTRACT SERVICES

Cady v. Walsh, 753 F.3d 348 (1st Cir. 2014). Following her son’s death from self-inflicted injuries in a county
jail, the mother of a pretrial detainee brought an action under § 1983 against employees of a private healthcare
services provider, alleging deliberate indifference to the detainee’s health in violation of the Due Process
Clause. The provider's employees moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The district court
denied the motion and the employees appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the employees failed to
raise a purely legal challenge, depriving the court of jurisdiction. (Cumberland County Jail, Corizon Inc., Maine)

29.285

U.S. Appeals Court
MENTAL HEALTH
SUICIDE ATTEMPT
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Cano v. Taylor, 739 F.3d 1214 (9th Cir. 2014). A former prisoner brought a § 1983 action against prison officials, alleging deliberate indifference to his mental health needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and violations of his right to freely exercise his religious beliefs and to have access to the courts, in violation of the First
and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court granted summary judgment to the officials on the deliberate
indifference claim and dismissed the remaining counts for failure to exhaust administrative remedies pursuant to
the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The former prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part,
vacated in part, and remanded. The court held that the inmate's claims for injunctive and declaratory relief arising out of alleged constitutional violations that occurred while in prison were mooted by his release from prison.
The court found that there was no evidence that prison mental health care providers were deliberately indifferent
to the prisoner's medical needs, as required to support an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim,
where the prisoner was seen by mental health care employees regularly for his complaints, and evidence showed
that the prisoner's suicide threats were manipulative in nature. (Arizona Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
EYE CARE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2014). An inmate, who was blind in one eye due to a cataract,
brought an action against Nevada Department of Corrections (NDOC) officials and supervisory medical personnel, alleging under § 1983 that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in denying his requests for cataract-removal surgery. The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary
judgment and the inmate appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that the inmate's monocular blindness was a serious medical need and the NDOC director was the proper defendant. The court noted that
although monocular blindness is not life-threatening, it is the loss of the function of an organ, the inmate's eye
had been blind for more than a decade, the inmate's condition affected his perception and rendered him unable to
see if he turned to the left. Several doctors, including an ophthalmologist, found the cataract and resulting vision
loss “important and worthy of treatment,” and the inmate's monocular blindness caused him a physical injury
when he ran his hand through a sewing machine on two occasions while working in the prison mattress factory.
According to the court, summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the
inmate, who was blind in his right eye due to a cataract, was harmed by prison officials' denial of his requests for
cataract-removal surgery, as to whether the officials were deliberately indifferent to the inmate's monocular
blindness, and as to whether a particular physician was personally involved in the inmate's medical care. (Nevada Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act

Cox v. Massachusetts Dept. of Correction, 18 F.Supp.3d 38 (D.Mass. 2014). A mentally disabled state prisoner
brought an action against a state department of correction (DOC) and various officials, alleging violations of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and Massachusetts Declaration of
Rights. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The
court found that the prisoner's grievance alleging he was improperly classified, resulting in a sexual assault,
provided the DOC with sufficient notice to investigate, and therefore, the prisoner's claims under the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA) were administratively exhausted. The prisoner alleged that the DOC did not keep
him safe and that he was mentally challenged. According to the court, the prisoner's allegations that he was sexually assaulted by other inmates, that he suffered other abuses, that prison officials knew of the risk of harm to
the prisoner, that his history of mental illness was well-documented, and that officials were responsible for policies, procedures, and training that led to his injury were sufficient to state a § 1983 claim against the officials for
violations of the Eighth Amendment, and a claim under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, absent allegations of
threats, intimidation, or coercion by officials.
The court held that the prisoner’s allegations that prison officials knew of his disability, that medical professionals encouraged staff to provide appropriate housing to prevent the prisoner from being targeted by other
inmates, and that he was sexually assaulted after failure to provide appropriate housing were sufficient to state a
failure to accommodate claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). (Massachusetts Department of
Correction, Old Colony Correctional Center)

U.S. District Court
RECORDS
PRIVACY
Acquired Immune DefiCiency Syndrome (AIDS)

Doe v. Beard, 63 F.Supp.3d 1159 (C.D.Cal. 2014). A state prisoner who was HIV-positive, brought an action
against a medical technician, the technician’s supervisor, corrections officers, and the California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), alleging violations of his right to privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause and the California constitution, based on the defendants’ failure to retrieve the prisoner’s medical file, which had been delivered to another prisoner. The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to
state a claim. The district court denied the motion. The court held that the prisoner stated a § 1983 claim against
corrections officers and a medical technician for violation of his right to privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause by alleging that they acted with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious
harm when they failed to retrieve his medical file, even after the prisoner explained that it had fallen into the
hands of another prisoner and that he was receiving threats based on his HIV-positive status. The court found
that prison officials were not entitled to qualified immunity from the prisoner’s § 1983 claim, where the prisoner’s right to medical privacy was clearly established and a reasonable prison official would have been on notice
that he or she could not violate the prisoner’s right to medical privacy without a legitimate penological objective.
(California Institute for Men)

U.S. District Court
MEDICATION
MISDIAGNOSIS
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Endl v. New Jersey, 5 F.Supp.3d 689 (D.N.J. 2014). The parents of an inmate who died in a state prison brought
a § 1983 action, individually and the mother as administrator of the inmate's estate, against the state, the department of corrections (DOC), a prison, corrections officers, a medical care provider, and physicians and nurses,
alleging the inmate had been deprived of necessary medical care. The defendants filed motions to dismiss. The
district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that corrections officers, who were
sued in their official capacities, were not immune from liability under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act (TCA)
where there were not just errors in medical judgment, but claims of deliberate or reckless indifference, and the
survivors' clearly alleged conduct that may have been outside the scope of the officers' employment or that may

29.286

have constituted willful misconduct. The court found that allegations that individual medical providers responsible for the inmate misdiagnosed the inmate's congestive heart failure as bronchitis, failed to provide a medical
workup following the inmate's complaint of chest cavity pain, and failed to properly medicate him, were sufficient to support an Eighth Amendment claim for cruel and unusual punishment in the § 1983 action against the
providers. (Northern State Prison, New Jersey)
U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Estate of Booker v. Gomez, 745 F.3d 405 (10th Cir. 2014). The estate of deceased pretrial detainee who died
while in custody after officers restrained him in his response to his alleged insubordination, brought a § 1983
action in state court against the deputies and a sergeant, alleging excessive force, deprivation of life without due
process, and failure to provide immediate medical care. Following removal to federal court, the district court
denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The defendants appealed.
The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the detainee's right to be free from excessive force, including use of a neck restraint, stun gun, and pressure on his back while he was on his stomach and not resisting,
was clearly established, for purposes of determining whether the deputies and sergeant were entitled to qualified
immunity. According to the court, a reasonable officer would know that failing to check a pretrial detainee's vital
signs or provide immediate medical attention after he was rendered unconscious by the use of force, which allegedly included at least a two-minute neck hold, 140 pounds of pressure on his back, and the use of stun gun for
eight seconds, was deliberate indifference. (Downtown Det. Center, Denver, Colorado)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
EMERGENCY CARE
TRAINING

Finn v. Warren County, Kentucky, 768 F.3d 441 (6th Cir. 2014). The administrator of an inmate's estate and the
guardian of the inmate's minor children brought a § 1983 action against a county, a jail's health care provider,
and various jail employees, alleging violation of the inmate's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to receive adequate medical care while incarcerated. The district court granted summary judgment to some parties,
and a jury returned verdicts for the remaining defendants on the remaining claims. The plaintiffs appealed. The
appeals court reversed and remanded in part and affirmed in part. The court held that a supervisory jailer was not
entitled to qualified immunity for his ministerial acts of training deputy jailers to follow a written emergency
medical services (EMS) policy and to enforce that policy as written. When the inmate’s condition worsened,
cellmates threw objects at a speaker in the top of the cell to activate the intercom to get the guards' attention. The
cellmates reported to the guards ten to fifteen times that something was wrong with the inmate and that he needed to be taken to the hospital. According to the inmates, the guards ignored their pleas for help and turned off the
television in their housing unit. A senior supervisor’s incident report alleged that he checked on the inmate several times, while the jail's observation log showed that he checked on the inmate only twice: at 5:27 a.m. and at
6:28 a.m. Later the inmate died in the cell, and although he was found dead in his cell, a deputy entered on the
observation log “appears to be okay.” (Warren County Regional Jail, Kentucky)

U.S. Appeals Court
INTAKE SCREENING
MEDICATION
MALPRACTICE
NEGLIGENCE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Fourte v. Faulkner County, Ark., 746 F.3d 384 (8th Cir. 2014). A pretrial detainee sued a county and jail officials
for alleged deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, after he became legally blind allegedly due to his
high blood pressure while incarcerated. The district court denied the defendants summary judgment based on
qualified immunity. The defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The appeals court held that the lack of medical screening at intake, failure to prescribe medication, and a
delay in administering medication were not deliberate indifference. The court held that the officials' failure to
conduct medical screening of the detainee at intake did not constitute deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, where the officials began logging the detainee's daily blood pressure in response to his complaints of
heart problems. The court found that the officials' failure to prescribe medication for the detainee after several
high blood pressure readings did not constitute deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The court
noted that although the officials at most should have known they were committing malpractice by not prescribing medication, medical malpractice was not deliberate indifference. According to the court, the officials' delay
in administering blood pressure medication to the detainee by failing to write a second prescription sooner, after
the medication did not arrive following first prescription, did not constitute deliberate indifference to his serious
medical needs, where the officials at most were negligent, and deliberate indifference required even more than
gross negligence. (Faulkner County Jail, Arkansas)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
TRAINING
MEDICATION

Graham v. Hodge, 69 F.Supp.3d 618 (S.D.Miss. 2014). The spouse of a pretrial detainee who died of cardiac
arrhythmia brought a wrongful death action against a sheriff and a county alleging deliberate indifference to the
detainee’s medical care under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as failure to train
under § 1983. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court
held that a nurse was not deliberately indifferent to the detainee’s medical needs, notwithstanding that the nurse
waited 13 days to fax a medical authorization to a care center, that she sent the detainee to a medical clinic that
had no cardiologist, that she was not aware for several months that the detainee was not taking necessary heart
medication, and that the detainee ultimately died of cardiac arrhythmia. According to the court, the nurse regularly treated the detainee, which included providing him with his medication once she was made aware of its
necessity, and the detainee’s death was not proximately caused by the months-long lack of medicine. The court
found that the detainee’s death was not a highly predictable consequence of failing to train the jail nurse. (Jones
County Adult Detention Facility, Mississippi)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
MENTAL HEALTH
CONTAGIOUS
DISEASES

Graves v. Arpaio, 48 F.Supp.3d 1318 (D.Ariz. 2014). Pretrial detainees in the Maricopa County, Arizona, jail
system brought a class action against the county and the county board of supervisors, seeking injunctive relief
for alleged violations of their civil rights. The parties entered into consent decree which was superseded by
amended judgments entered by stipulation of the parties. The defendants sought to terminate the remaining
court-ordered injunctive relief regarding medical, dental, and mental health care for detainees. The district court
denied the motion. The court held that: (1) termination of injunctive relief requiring the timely identification,
assessment, and placement of detainees suffering from serious health conditions was not warranted; (2) termina-

29.287

tion of injunctive relief requiring the timely identification, assessment, and placement of detainees suffering
from mental illness was not warranted; (3) termination of injunctive relief requiring the timely identification,
segregation, and treatment of detainees with communicable diseases was not warranted; (4) termination of injunctive relief requiring that the detainees have ready access to care to meet their serious medical and mental
health needs was not warranted; and (5) the detainees were the prevailing party for the purpose of awarding
attorney's fees. (Maricopa County Jail, Arizona)
U.S. Appeals Court
INADEQUATE CARE
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
POLICIES

Hahn v. Walsh, 762 F.3d 617 (7th Cir. 2014). A female pretrial detainee's estate brought an action against a county, sheriff, and medical services contractor, alleging the defendants failed to provide adequate medical treatment
for the detainee's diabetes in violation of her rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act, and Illinois law. After several of the estate's claims were dismissed,
the district court entered summary judgment for the defendants on the estate's remaining claims. The estate appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that the district court
abused its discretion in dismissing with prejudice the wrongful death claim brought by the detainee's estate for
failure to include an affidavit and written report confirming the claim's merit, where the court made no specific
finding that failure to include an affidavit and report was in bad faith or an attempt to delay litigation, and its
conclusion that the estate could not timely file an amended complaint because the statute of limitations had
lapsed failed to take into account the possibility that an amendment would relate back to the estate's initial, timely complaint.
The court found that the county sheriff's lack of a written policy or procedure for diabetic detainees whose
blood sugar was not being measured and who refused to eat did not amount to deliberate indifference to the pretrial detainee's serious medical needs in violation of her due process rights. According to the court, the deaths of
seven correctional facility inmates and a single incident of an inmate complaining about his diabetes treatment
were insufficient to put the sheriff on notice that his lack of a policy could cause the death of a detainee as a
result of diabetic ketoacidosis, as none of the deaths were caused by complications from diabetes. (Champaign
County Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELAY IN CARE

Henderson v. Ghosh, 755 F.3d 559 (7th Cir. 2014). An inmate brought an action against prisoner health care
providers and other corrections employees, alleging that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs by failing to inform him of his declining kidney health until he had “stage 5 kidney failure.”
The district court denied the inmate's motions for recruitment of counsel during the pleading and discovery phases of the litigation, and granted summary judgment to the defendants. The inmate appealed. The appeals court
reversed and remanded. The appeals court held that the district court abused its discretion in denying the inmate's
two requests for appointment of counsel, where the inmate had a low IQ, was functionally illiterate, and was
inexperienced with civil litigation, and the inmate's claim was factually and legally complex, requiring complex
medical evidence and retention of expert witnesses. The court held that the inmate was prejudiced by the failure
of the district court to appoint counsel, where the inmate was unable to obtain any medical evidence in opposition to summary judgment, the inmate was unable to timely file requests for discovery, and the inmate was unable to identify “John or Jane Doe” defendants who were dismissed for failure to prosecute. (Stateville Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
PRIVATE PROVIDER
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
REHABILITATION ACT
HANDICAP

Hernandez v. County of Monterey, 70 F.Supp.3d 963 (N.D.Cal. 2014). Current and recently released inmates
from a county jail brought an action against the county, the sheriff’s office, and the private company that administered all jail health care facilities and services, alleging, on behalf of a class of inmates, that substandard conditions at the jail violated the federal and state constitutions, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act, and a California statute prohibiting discrimination in state-funded programs. The inmates sought
declaratory and injunctive relief. The defendants filed motions to dismiss. The district court denied the motions.
The court held that both current and recently released inmates had standing to pursue their claims against the
county and others for allegedly substandard conditions at the jail, even though the recently released inmates were
no longer subject to the conditions they challenged. The court noted that the short average length of stay of inmates in the proposed class, which was largely made up of pretrial detainees, was approximately 34 days, and
that short period, coupled with the plodding speed of legal action and the fact that other persons similarly situated would continue to be subject to the challenged conduct, qualified the plaintiffs for the “inherently transitory”
exception to the mootness doctrine.
The court found that the inmates sufficiently alleged that the private company that administered all jail health
care facilities and services operated a place of public accommodation, as required to state a claim for violation of
ADA Title III. The court noted that: “The complaint alleges a litany of substandard conditions at the jail, including: violence due to understaffing, overcrowding, inadequate training, policies, procedures, facilities, and prisoner classification; inadequate medical and mental health care screening, attention, distribution, and resources; and
lack of policies and practices for identifying, tracking, responding, communicating, and providing accessibility
for accommodations for prisoners with disabilities.” (Monterey County Jail, California)

U.S. District Court
MEDICATIONS
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
INTAKE SCREENING

Hinojosa v. Livingston, 994 F.Supp.2d 840 (S.D.Tex. 2014). The mother of a former inmate who died of hyperthermia while incarcerated brought an action against the prison's health care provider, asserting claims under
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act, alleging the provider's failure to make
accommodations for the inmate's disabilities resulted in the inmate's death. The provider moved to dismiss. The
district court denied the motion. The court held that the mother alleged sufficient facts to state that the inmate
was discriminated against by the prison's health care provider, in support of her claims under the ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act, by alleging that the provider knew of the risks and dangers associated with certain medical
conditions and medications, that the provider knew the inmate suffered from those conditions and used those
medications, and that despite that knowledge, the provider failed to make reasonable accommodations, resulting
in the inmate suffering more pain and punishment than non-disabled prisoners, namely, his death. The court

29.288

noted that the mother alleged that the provider knew both that the inmate suffered from hypertension, diabetes,
schizophrenia, and/or depression, and was prescribed medications to treat his disabilities, and that extreme temperatures could be deadly, but still failed to protect the inmate from the extreme temperatures that ultimately
resulted in the inmate's death. The court found that the mother alleged sufficient facts concerning the accommodations that should have been provided by the prison's health care provider without a request, but were denied or
refused, as well as which facilities, programs, or services should have been modified by the provider, to state
claims under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. The mother complained that the provider's intake process was
flawed in that it could take up to 10 days for prisoners to receive an intake physical, and that the delay created a
loophole that left inmates with heat sensitive conditions and disabilities especially vulnerable to death because
they did not receive accommodations for their heat sensitive disabilities, and that the provider's failure to employ
24–hour medical staff at the prison resulted in a fatal delay and denial of vital medical care to the inmate. (Univ
of Texas Medical Branch, Texas Dept.of Criminal Justice Garza West Unit)
U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
DELAY IN CARE
ALCOHOL/DRUGS

Imhoff v. Temas, 67 F.Supp.3d 700 (W.D.Pa. 2014). A pretrial detainee brought an action against employees of a
county correctional facility, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical need, violation of his rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment with regard to conditions of his confinement, and excessive force in violation
of the Eighth Amendment. The employees moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and
denied in part. The court held that the detainee stated a claim against the employees for deliberate indifference to
a serious medical need under the Fourteenth Amendment, where the detainee alleged that he informed facility
personnel of his extensive drug use, that he had repeatedly requested medical assistance when he began experiencing seizures and hallucinations in conjunction with his drug withdrawal in the presence of facility personnel,
and that he was provided no medical treatment for at least eight days despite his requests for medical attention.
The court held that the employees were not entitled to qualified immunity from liability because a county correctional facility’s constitutional obligation to provide care to inmates suffering unnecessary pain from a serious
medical need was clearly established at the time the pretrial detainee allegedly began experiencing seizures in
conjunction with drug withdrawal and was not provided medical treatment.
The detainee had initially been refused admission to the jail because he displayed signs of a drug overdose
and he was admitted to a local hospital. After hospital personnel determined he was stable he was admitted to the
jail. At one point in his confinement, the detainee acted out and banged his cell door with a plastic stool. This
resulted in the retrieval of the stool by jail officers and, while he was held down by one officer, he was kicked in
the face by another officer. When he yelled for help, an officer responded by choking the detainee and then
spraying him with pepper spray, and he was not permitted to shower to remove the pepper spray for thirty
minutes.
The court found that the detainee’s allegations against the employees in their individual capacities regarding the intentional denial of medical treatment, excessive use of force, and violation of his rights under Fourteenth Amendment with regard to conditions of his confinement were sufficient to set forth a plausible claim for
punitive damages. The detainee alleged that he was denied basic human needs such as drinking water, access to a
toilet and toilet paper, and toiletries such as soap and a toothbrush. (Washington County Correctional Facility,
Pennsylvania)

U.S. Appeals Court
EMERGENCY CARE
INADEQUATE CARE

Jackson v. Buckman, 756 F.3d 1060 (8th Cir. 2014). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against corrections facility employees and corrections officials alleging he received constitutionally deficient medical care and
that medical officials used excessive force against him while responding to his medical emergency. The district
court granted summary judgment to the defendants, and the detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The
court held that: (1) a physician was not deliberately indifferent to the detainee's surgical wound on his abdomen;
(2) a nurse was not deliberately indifferent to the detainee's medical needs; (3) absent an underlying constitutional violation, the detainee could not maintain official-capacity and failure-to-supervise claims against a sheriff and
a chief of detention; (4) a nurse's act of hitting the pretrial detainee's nose while administering an ammonia inhalant was not excessive force; and (5) the force used by nurses to move the pretrial detainee to his bed after he
lost consciousness was not excessive. (Pulaski County Regional Detention Facility, Arkansas)

U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE
MEDICATION

Johnson v. Conner, 754 F.3d 918 (11th Cir. 2014). The mother and personal representative of a mentally ill inmate who committed suicide by hanging himself with bed sheet while in custody at a county jail filed suit
against corrections personnel working at the jail at the time of the suicide, as well as various county entities. The
mother alleged that jailers were responsible for administering her son’s medication daily, and failed to do so, that
her son had previously attempted to commit suicide with a bed sheet while incarcerated, and that the jailers
failed to take appropriate precautions with her son following that suicide attempt. The district court denied immunity to the jailers and the jailers appealed. The appeals court certified questions to the Alabama Supreme
Court, which the Supreme Court declined to answer. The appeals court held that the statute extending immunity
to county jailers did not apply retroactively to conduct which occurred prior to its enactment. (Barbour County
Jail, Alabama)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

King v. Kramer, 763 F.3d 635 (7th Cir. 2014). The estate of a pretrial detainee who died while awaiting trial in a
county jail brought a civil rights action against the county and the health care provider for the jail. Following
reversal in part of the grant of summary judgment in favor of the county and the provider, the court entered
judgment for the county and the provider on a jury verdict. The estate appealed. The appeals court reversed and
remanded, finding that: (1) the county was not liable for the death of the detainee who was found dead in his jail
cell after jail medical staff rapidly tapered off his psychotropic medication, absent evidence that the county had
an official custom or policy in place to deprive inmates of their prescribed medications; (2) the district court
could not take judicial notice of a contract between the county and the provider; and (3) the indemnification
agreement between the county and the provider was inadmissible to show liability. (La Crosse Jail, Wisconsin)

29.289

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
EMERGENCY CARE

Kitchen v. Dallas County, Tex., 759 F.3d 468 (5th Cir. 2014). The widow of a pretrial detainee who died of asphyxiation while he was being extracted from his jail cell brought a § 1983 action against the county, detention
officers, and others, alleging that the defendants used excessive force and acted with deliberate indifference to
the detainee's medical needs. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in its entirety, and the plaintiff appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded in part, and affirmed in
part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to both the timing and the degree of force used in extracting the detainee from his jail cell. The court noted that the law was
“clearly established” at the relevant time that use of force against an inmate was reserved for good-faith efforts
to maintain or restore discipline, rather than for the purpose of causing harm, such that the defendants had reasonable warning that kicking, stomping, and choking a subdued inmate would violate the inmate's constitutional
rights under certain circumstances. The court held that the widow failed to demonstrate that detention officers
acted with deliberate indifference to the detainee's medical needs, even though they failed to contact medical
staff prior to attempting to extract the detainee from his cell, where the need for participation of specialized staff
to perform the extraction of a mentally ill inmate from a jail cell was not so apparent that even laymen would
recognize this alleged medical need. (Dallas County Jail, Texas)

U.S. Appeals Court
GID- Gender Identity
Disorder
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE

Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63 (1st Cir. 2014). A state inmate brought an action against the Massachusetts Department of Corrections (DOC), alleging that the DOC's refusal to provide male-to-female sex reassignment
surgery (SRS) to treat the inmate's gender identity disorder (GID) constituted inadequate medical care and deliberate indifference to the inmate's serious medical needs, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court
granted an injunction requiring the DOC to provide SRS, and the DOC appealed. The appeals court reversed.
The court held that the DOC's decision not to provide SRS to treat the inmate's GID was not sufficiently harmful
to the inmate so as to violate the Eighth Amendment, and the DOC was not deliberately indifferent in refusing to
provide SRS. The court noted that the DOC continued to provide all ameliorative measures to the inmate, in
addition to antidepressants and psychotherapy. The DOC solicited the opinion of multiple medical professionals,
and the DOC's concerns about safety and security, including the provision of safe housing options for the inmate
after SRS, were reasonable, according to the court. (Massachusetts Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
EYE CARE
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
RIGHT TO REFUSE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Kuhne v. Florida Dept. of Corrections, 745 F.3d 1091 (11th Cir. 2014). A former state prisoner filed a § 1983
claim, alleging that state corrections officials acted with deliberate indifference by failing to provide him with
medical care for his retinopathy. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The
prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The appeals court held that summary judgment was
precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to: (1) whether the “refusal of medical care” form signed by the
prisoner was modified after he signed it to indicate that he was refusing medical treatment for his retinopathy:
(2) whether the prisoner voluntarily declined treatment for his retinopathy; and if so, (3) whether he changed his
mind and requested medical treatment for his retinopathy thereafter. (Jackson Correctional Institution, Florida)

U.S. Appeals Court
METHADONE

Laganiere v. County of Olmsted, 772 F.3d 1114 (8th Cir. 2014). The trustee for a state inmate's heirs and next of
kin filed a § 1983 action alleging that officials at a county adult detention center deliberately disregarded the
inmate's medical needs. The district court entered summary judgment in the defendants’ favor, and the trustee
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that a deputy at the county adult detention center did not
deliberately disregard the inmate's serious medical needs, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, even though
another inmate had told jail guards to check on him, and the deputy failed to prevent the inmate's death from a
methadone overdose. The court noted that there was no evidence that the deputy was aware of the other inmate's
statement, and the deputy checked on the inmate every half hour, observed the inmate asleep in his cell instead
of engaged in the morning routine at the center, and did not observe anything unusual. (Olmstead County Adult
Detention Center, Minnesota)

U.S. District Court
MEDICATION
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE

LCS Corrections Services, Inc. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 19 F.Supp.3d 712 (S.D.Tex. 2014). An insured prison
operator brought an action seeking declaratory judgment that an insurer had a duty under a commercial umbrella
liability policy to defend it in an underlying civil rights action. The underlying case was brought by the representative of a deceased inmate who allegedly died because of the operator’s policy of not giving inmates their
scheduled medications. The insurer moved for partial summary judgment. The district court granted the motion.
The court held that the underlying claim for refusing to provide prescribed medications fell within the scope of
the policy's professional liability exclusion, despite the operator's contention that the claim addressed administrative rather than professional conduct because it was a global administrative decision to deprive inmates of that
particular medical care, where the exclusion extended to “failure to provide professional services.” (Lexington
Insurance Company, LCS Corrections Services, Inc., Texas)

U.S. District Court
NEGLIGENCE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Martinson v. Leason, 22 F.Supp.3d 952 (D.Minn. 2014). A prisoner brought an action under § 1983 against three
county jail nurses in their individual capacities alleging deliberate indifference to the prisoner’s health in violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, as well as a negligence claim
against the county, following amputation of nine fingers after an infection progressed to sepsis. The defendants
moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that: (1) the nurse who responded to a medication request was not reckless; (2) the nurse who knew the prisoner to be ill was not reckless;
(3) failure to act reasonably in following a jail policy was not deliberate indifference; (4) a nurse was not aware
of serious medical need; and (5) the prisoner's diarrhea and bloody cough was not a serious medical need. (Dakota County Jail, Minnesota)

29.290

U.S. District Court
ALCOHOL/DRUGS
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
POLICIES

M.H. v. County of Alameda, 62 F.Supp.3d 1049 (N.D.Cal. 2014). A pretrial detainee’s estate brought a civil
rights action against a county, its sheriff, sheriff’s deputies, and a correctional healthcare provider, alleging violations of § 1983 as well as common law claims for negligence, assault, and battery after the detainee died from
alcohol withdrawal. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court held that summary judgment was precluded by fact issues: (1) with regard to the nurse who performed the detainee’s medical intake
assessment to determine, if she was subjectively aware of his risk of alcohol withdrawal but did nothing prior to
his death; (2) as to whether the county adequately implemented its training policies concerning recognition of
inmates with alcohol and other drug problems; (3) with regard to the healthcare provider for failure to supervise
the nurse who performed the detainee’s medical intake assessment and for failure to follow its own policies; and
(4) as to whether a deputy was justified in using a stun gun against the detainee while moving him to an isolation
cell and in delivering closed-fist strikes to the detainee’s back after a struggle ensued. The court also found a fact
issue with regard to whether a social worker was subjectively reckless when she chose to see other inmates despite knowing that the pretrial detainee was at risk for severe alcohol withdrawal. The detainee had been arrested
for jaywalking. (Alameda County, Glenn Dyer Detention Facility, California)

U.S. District Court
DELAY IN CARE
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE

Mori v. Allegheny County, 51 F.Supp.3d 558 (W.D.Pa. 2014). An inmate who was seven and one-half months
into a “high risk” pregnancy brought an action under § 1983 against a county for deliberate indifference to her
health in violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, and survival and
wrongful death claims for violations of the Fourteenth Amendment, after the loss of the child following a placental abruption. The county moved to dismiss. The district court denied the motion. The court held that the prisoner: (1) stated an Eighth Amendment claim based on failure to monitor the unborn child after the prisoner complained of vaginal bleeding; (2) stated a claim against the county based on custom and practice; (3) sufficiently
alleged a causal link between the policies and the loss of the child; (4) stated a claim against county officials for
individual liability; and (5) stated wrongful death and survivor claims for the death of the child. The inmate alleged that individual policy makers, including the chief operating officer of the county jail’s health services, and
the jail’s nursing supervisor, were responsible for the policies that led to failure to provide adequate medical
treatment. The prisoner also alleged that she was made to wait over 24 hours before being sent to a hospital after
her vaginal bleeding started, that she was transported by a police cruiser rather than ambulance, that it was well
known that bleeding late in pregnancy often indicated serious medical issues, that the child was alive during
birth, and that the delay in medical treatment contributed to the injuries during birth and the death of the child
shortly after birth. (Allegheny County Jail, Pennsylvania)

U.S. Appeals Court
COSTS
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Morris v. Livingston, 739 F.3d 740 (5th Cir. 2014). A state inmate, proceeding pro se, brought a § 1983 action
against a governor, challenging the constitutionality of a statute requiring inmates to pay a $100 annual health
care services fee when they receive medical treatment. The district court dismissed the action. The inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that: (1) the governor was entitled to Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity where the state department of criminal justice was the agency responsible for
administration and enforcement of the statute; (2) allegations were insufficient to plead deliberate indifference
where the inmate did not allege he was denied medical care or that he was forced to choose between medical
care or basic necessities; (3) the inmate received sufficient notice that he would be deprived of funds; and (4) it
was not unreasonable for the prison to take funds from the state inmate's trust fund account to pay for medical
care. The court noted that the prison posted notices about the statute, the notices informed inmates of the fee and
what it covered, and a regulation was promulgated that provided additional notice. (Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Stevenson Unit, Cuero, Texas)

U.S. District Court
INADEQUATE CARE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
TRAINING

Nam Dang v. Sheriff of Seminole County, Fla., 38 F.Supp.3d 1333 (M.D.Fla. 2014). A pretrial detainee brought
a § 1983 action against a county sheriff, county jail medical staff, and others, alleging that he was deprived of his
constitutional right to receive adequate medical care for his meningitis, resulting in multiple strokes and severe
brain damage. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court denied the motions, finding that the pretrial
detainee had serious medical needs, his allegations stated a claim against jail nurses for deliberate indifference to
his serious medical needs, and the detainee stated a § 1983 claim against the county sheriff. The detainee allegedly experienced severe and increasing neck and back pain, minimal neck rotation, fever, and bouts of unconsciousness and was eventually diagnosed with meningitis, and ended up suffering multiple strokes and brain
damage. The inmate alleged that the nurses who regularly attended to the detainee over a period of weeks were
well aware of his increasing symptoms and declining health, that the nurses allegedly put him on muscle relaxants and returned him repeatedly to the general population, that the nurses allegedly made no meaningful effort
to diagnose or treat his condition, until he passed out in a wheelchair, could not sit up, and became unresponsive.
The court held that the detainee’s allegations that the lack of meaningful health care training of county jail
personnel was the result of the county sheriff's deliberate cost-cutting efforts, and that the lack of such training
was reckless and created an obvious risk that the detainee's constitutional right to adequate medical care for his
serious medical need of meningitis would be violated, stated a § 1983 claim against county sheriff. (John E. Polk
Correctional Facility, Seminole County, Florida)

U.S. District Court
MEDICATION
SPECIAL DIET
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Noble v. Three Forks Regional Jail Authority, 995 F.Supp.2d 736 (E.D.Ky. 2014). A diabetic former inmate
brought an action against a regional county jail and a number of its employees, individually and in their official
capacities, alleging both constitutional claims under § 1983 and state claims stemming from his incarceration.
The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that there
was no evidence that the county jail maintained an official policy or custom to deprive inmates of medical care
to save money, thus precluding the former inmate's § 1983 Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim
against jail arising from his alleged receipt of daily diabetes medication that was contrary to his doctor's advice,
and food that exacerbated his diabetic condition. The court found that the diabetic inmate was not at an excessive
risk of serious harm, nor did county jail employees fail to take adequate precautions to protect the inmate from

29.291

harm, and thus the employees were not deliberately indifferent to the inmate's serious medical condition, in violation of Eighth Amendment. The court noted that the inmate received substantial medical attention while incarcerated, and he was allowed special accommodations based on his diabetic condition, including taking his medication and blood sugar test kit to his cell. He was granted a specialized menu from the cafeteria, and his daily
medication administration schedule was modified after consultation with a physician. (Three Forks Regional Jail
Authority, Kentucky)
U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICATION
AIDS- Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome
PRIVACY

Nunes v. Massachusetts Dept. of Correction, 766 F.3d 136 (1st Cir. 2014). Prisoners with HIV brought an action
against the Massachusetts Department of Correction, a prison healthcare provider, and various corrections officials, challenging the decision to dispense HIV medication only in single doses at the dispensing window, alleging violation of the Eighth Amendment, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).
The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. The prisoners appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that: (1) the prison's change in the method for dispensing HIV medication did not violate
the Eighth Amendment; (2) the requirement that prisoners obtain their HIV medication from the prison's dispensing window did not violate any right to privacy; (3) the change to dispensing HIV medication only at the prison's
dispensing window was not disparate treatment; and (4) the prison offered a reasonable accommodation to a
prisoner who claimed an inability to visit the dispensing window by offering to move the prisoner to the prison's
medical unit. The court noted that prison doctors had raised concerns about a lack of privacy and whether prisoners would maintain their drug regimen, and the prison delayed implementing the change to investigate those
concerns, and found no evidence that the provision of HIV medication from the dispensing window resulted in
inadequate medical care. (Massachusetts Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELAY IN CARE

Olson v. Morgan, 750 F.3d 708 (7th Cir. 2014). An inmate brought a pro se § 1983 action against prison officials
asserting violations of the Eighth Amendment, specifically, that a correctional officer failed to move him to a
new cell when he warned the officer that the cellmate was not taking medication and might become violent. The
inmate also alleged that the manager of the prison's health-services unit delayed treatment of a broken tooth he
suffered when the cellmate attacked him. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the officials.
The inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that there was no evidence that the correctional
officer was subjectively aware that the cellmate was dangerous, as required to support the inmate's Eighth
Amendment claim. The court held that there was no evidence that the manager of the prison's health-services
unit failed to act promptly once she learned of inmate's broken tooth suffered when the cellmate attacked him, as
required to support the inmate's Eighth Amendment. (Columbia Correctional Institution, Wisconsin)

U.S. Appeals Court
PRIVATE PROVIDER
INADEQUATE CARE
DENTAL CARE
MENTAL HEALTH

Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657 (9th Cir. 2014). State prisoners, and the state's authorized protection and advocacy
agency, filed a class action for declaratory and injunctive relief against senior officials from the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC), asserting Eighth Amendment claims, based on allegedly serious systemic deficiencies in conditions of confinement in isolation cells, and in the provision of privatized medical, dental, and
mental health care services. The district court granted class certification and prison officials appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court found that the prisoners were not merely aggregating many claims of individual
mistreatment, and instead were alleging that ADC policies and practices of statewide and systemic application
exposed all inmates in ADC custody to substantial risk of serious harm, to which the senior officials allegedly
were deliberately indifferent, even if the risk might ultimately result in different future harm for different inmates. (Arizona Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
DENTAL CARE
COSTS
DELAY IN TREATMENT
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
STAFF

Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2014). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action against a prison's chief
dental officer, its chief medical officer, and its staff dentist, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The district court granted judgment as a matter of law to the chief dental officer and the chief medical
officer at the close of inmate's case, and entered judgment on the jury's verdict in favor of the dentist. The inmate
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held: (1) it is appropriate to consider the resources
available to a prison official who lacks authority over budgeting decisions, overruling Jones v. Johnson, 781
F.2d 769, and Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978; (2) evidence warranted a jury instruction on the lack of resources available to the staff dentist; (3) evidence did not establish the chief medical officer's awareness of the
inmate's dental needs; and (4) evidence did not establish the chief dental officer's awareness of the inmate's dental needs. The court noted that there was evidence that budgetary constraints actually affected the state prisoner's
dental treatment: (1) where the staff dentist listed “staffing shortages beyond our control” as an explanation for
the waiting list for dental procedures; (2) evidence was presented that the prison had less than half the number of
dentists required by law; (3) there were no dental hygienists; and (4) that dentists frequently had to work without
dental assistants. The staff dentist testified that staff shortages limited the amount of time he could have spent
with the prisoner during any visit and that he focused on a prisoner's most pressing complaint because he did not
have enough time. (California State Prison, Los Angeles County)

U.S. Appeals Court
MENTAL HEALTH
PRETRIAL DETAINEE
SUICIDE ATTEMPT
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Pittman ex rel. Hamilton v. County of Madison, Ill., 746 F.3d 766 (7th Cir. 2014). By and through his guardian, a
pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against a county and various jail officials, alleging the defendants were
deliberately indifferent to his risk of suicide in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court granted
the defendants' motion for summary judgment and denied the detainee's motion for a new trial. The detainee
appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The appeals court held that a nurse
and doctor were not deliberately indifferent, that there was no evidence that the sheriff or a captain knew of a
substantial risk of harm for the detainee, and that the jail's suicide prevention policies and practices were not so
inadequate that they violated the detainee's rights. But the appeals court also held that summary judgment was
precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a deputy and a sergeant were aware of the detainee's
risk of suicide, where the detainee requested to see a crisis intervention person. According to the court, when an
inmate presents an officer with a request to see a crisis intervention person and the officer also is aware that the

29.292

reason for the request well may be a serious psychological condition that is beyond the officer's capacity to assess definitively, the officer has an obligation under the Eighth Amendment to refer that individual to the person
who, under existing prison procedures, is charged with making that definitive assessment. (Madison County Jail,
Illinois)
U.S. Appeals Court
INADEQUATE CARE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403 (7th Cir. 2014). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a warden, medical
contractor, and the contractor's physicians, alleging deliberate indifference to the risk of injury and to his medical
needs. After dismissing the warden at the screening of the complaint, the district court granted the remaining
defendants summary judgment. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that a wet
stairway, on which the prisoner allegedly slipped, was not a hazardous condition of confinement, in violation of
the Eighth Amendment. According to the court, the decision by a physician not to schedule an MRI for a state
prisoner who injured his back after slipping in a wet stairwell did not depart significantly from accepted professional norms; therefore, the physician was not deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's serious medical needs, in
violation of the Eighth Amendment. The court found that the physician's failure to refer the prisoner to a specialist after the prisoner complained of back pain following a fall in a wet stairway was not deliberate indifference to
the prisoner's serious medical needs, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, where the prisoner had a common
ailment, the physician prescribed medications, and, after those medications did not appear to help, the physician
tried new medications or dosages. (Menard Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
X-RAY
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE

Rahman v. Schriro, 22 F.Supp.3d 305 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against a
state prison commissioner, warden, deputy warden, deputy of security, and officers, alleging they violated the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause by forcing him to go through a radiation-emitting X-ray security
screening machine in order to get to and from his daily work assignment. The defendants moved to dismiss for
failure to state a claim. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the
detainee sufficiently alleged a serious present injury or future risk of serious injury, as required to state a deliberate indifference claim against prison officials under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, by alleging that he was subjected to at least two full-body X-ray scans each day, that each scan exposed him to a level of
radiation that was 10 to 50 times higher than that emitted by airport scanners, that radiation damages cells of the
body and that even low doses of radiation increase an individual's risk of cancer, and that federal regulations
prohibited prison officials from using even non-repetitive X-ray examinations for security purposes unless the
device was operated by licensed practitioner and there was reasonable suspicion that the inmate had recently
secreted contraband. According to the court, the detainee's allegations that a prison officer intentionally subjected him to a higher dose of radiation through a full-body X-ray screening machine while calling him a “fake Muslim, homosexual, faggot” were sufficient to allege that the force was not applied to maintain or restore discipline,
as required to state an excessive force claim under Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The court held
that the alleged force exerted by a prison officer on the detainee by setting the full-body X-ray screening machine to a higher radiation dose on one occasion was not excessive in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause. The court noted that the alleged force was de minimis, and the use of a higher setting of
radiation, which was designed to produce a better image, in a situation where detainee expressed resistance to the
scanning process and could have been conceivably hiding contraband was not the type of force repugnant to the
conscience of mankind.
The court found that the prison commissioner was not entitled to qualified immunity where the right to be
free from deliberate indifference to serious medical needs was clearly established, and given the known dangers
of radiation, a reasonable person would have understood that exposing the detainee to a cumulative level of radiation that posed a risk of damage to his future health could violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. (Anna M. Kross Center, Rikers Island, New York City Department of Correction)

U.S. District Court
INADEQUATE CARE
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
POLICIES
PRETRIAL DETAINEE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Revilla v. Glanz, 7 F.Supp.3d 1207 (N.D.Okla. 2014). Four pretrial detainees or representatives of their estates
brought an action against a county sheriff, asserting claims under § 1983 and the Oklahoma Constitution, relating to allegedly deficient medical care. The sheriff filed a motion to dismiss. The district court denied the motion, finding that the plaintiffs stated a § 1983 claim against the sheriff for supervisory liability in his individual
capacity, and a § 1983 claim against the sheriff for liability in his individual capacity. The court noted that the
Due Process Clause of the Oklahoma Constitution protects pretrial detainees against the denial of medical attention. The plaintiffs alleged: (1) that the sheriff was responsible for ensuring that pretrial detainees received appropriate medical care; (2) that he was responsible for creating, adopting, approving, ratifying, nd enforcing the
policies that his subordinates allegedly violated; (3) that he failed to provide prompt and adequate care in the
face of known and substantial risks to each detainee's health-;, and (4) that he had long known of systemic deficiencies in the jail's medical care. The plaintiffs cited numerous incidents and reports, as well as inmate deaths,
which they alleged provided clear notice to the sheriff of seriously deficient medical and mental health care
which placed inmates at a serious risk of injury or death. One such notice included a report by the United States
Department of Homeland Security's Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties which “found a prevailing attitude
among clinic staff [at the Jail] of indifference.” (Tulsa County Jail, Oklahoma)

U.S. District Court
INADEQUATE CARE
CONTRACT SERVICES
POLICIES
STAFFING
TRAINING

Revilla v. Glanz, 8 F.Supp.3d 1336 (N.D.Okla. 2014). Pretrial detainees or representatives of their estates
brought an action against healthcare providers, doctors, and nurse, asserting claims under § 1983 and the Oklahoma Constitution, relating to allegedly deficient medical care. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district
court denied the motion, finding that: (1) allegations were sufficient to plead the provider, doctors, and nurse
were acting under the color of state law; (2) allegations were sufficient to state a § 1983 claim against the provider under the theory of municipal liability; and (3) the provider was not entitled to immunity from punitive
damages afforded to municipalities. The court noted that the healthcare provider was endowed by the county
with powers or functions that were governmental in nature, that provider was responsible for providing medical
services at the jail, including creating and implementing policies and practices governing provision of care, as

29.293

well as training and supervision, that doctors and nurse were employees of the provider, that they had responsibility for overseeing and treating detainees, and that doctors served as the medical director.
The pretrial detainees and representatives of their estates also alleged that the provider refused to send detainees to a hospital for financial reasons, understaffed the medical unit, failed to properly train and supervise employees, and the provider was on notice of these deficiencies from reports by the National Commission on Correctional Health Care, the Oklahoma Department of Health, the United States Department of Homeland Security's Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL), and the Jail's own medical auditor. (Correctional
Healthcare Companies, Inc.)
U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Richards v. Jones, 31 F.Supp.3d 630 (D.Del. 2014). A state prison inmate, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brought an action against medical staff pursuant to § 1983 for violations of his constitutional rights. The
district court held that the inmate's claims against the prison medical director, a nurse practitioner, and director of
nurses were frivolous and would be dismissed. The court found that the inmate adequately alleged a nurse practitioner and medical bureau chief were deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need. The nurse practitioner
allegedly denied the inmate's grievance seeking treatment for his hernia and the medical bureau chief allegedly
denied the inmate's appeal from the nurse practitioner's decision. (Sussex Correctional Institution, Delaware)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
DIAGNOSIS

Rouster v. County of Saginaw, 749 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 2014). The representative of the estate of a detainee who
died while in custody at a county jail brought a § 1983 action against the county, the contractor that provided
medical services to the county jail, and the jail's nursing staff, who were employees of the contractor. The district
court granted in part the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The representative appealed. The appeals
court affirmed. The court held that the county jail's nursing staff did not have subjective knowledge of the detainee's perforated duodenal ulcers, which eventually resulted in sepsis and the detainee's death, and staff did not
consciously disregard the detainee's condition or otherwise refuse to provide appropriate treatment, as required
for staff to be liable in a § 1983 Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference claim. According to the court,
although staff was aware that the detainee had complained of stomach cramping, diarrhea, and vomiting, and that
he had been observed engaging in bizarre behavior, such as drinking from a toilet, they misdiagnosed him first
with gas and diarrhea, and later with alcohol withdrawal. The court noted that the detainee never told any staff
member about his previous treatment for his ulcer, staff did not ignore the detainee's symptoms, but attempted to
treat him with over-the-counter medication and moved him to an observation cell for monitoring. (Saginaw
County Jail, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
FEMALE PRISONERS
COSTS
CONTRACT SERVICES

Scott v. Clarke, 61 F.Supp.3d 569 (W.D.Va. 2014). Female inmates brought a § 1983 action alleging that a correctional facility failed to provide adequate medical care and that Commonwealth of Virginia Department of
Corrections (VDOC) officials were deliberately indifferent to that failure, in violation of the inmates’ Eighth
Amendment rights. The inmates moved for class certification. The district court held that class certification was
warranted under the subsection of the class action rule pertaining to cases where predominantly injunctive or
declaratory relief was appropriate. The court found that the proposed class of approximately 1,200 female inmates housed at the state correctional facility who were subject to its medical care system was sufficiently large,
on its face, to satisfy the size requirement for class certification, and that the “commonality” requirement for
class certification was met. The court noted that one of the questions of fact was whether the VDOC medical
contract system permitted improper cost considerations to interfere with the treatment of serious medical conditions. (Fluvanna Correctional Center for Women, Commonwealth of Virginia Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
COSTS
CONTRACT SERVICES
INADEQUATE CARE

Scott v. Clarke, 64 F.Supp.3d 813 (W.D.Va. 2014). Prisoners brought a § 1983 action against prison officials,
alleging failure to provide adequate medical care in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court granted the prisoners’ motion for summary judgment. The court held that: (1) the state department of corrections has a
non-delegable duty to provide prisoners with medical care that meets constitutional minimum standards; (2) the
prisoners had serious medical needs; and (3) a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the prison
officials were deliberately indifferent to the prisoners’ serious medical needs. The court noted that the prisoners
serious medical needs included: (1) one prisoner who had sarcoidosis, which was a potentially life-threatening
chronic inflammatory disease that could affect the body’s vital organs; (2) another prisoner had Hepatitis C; (3)
another prisoner had severely deformed ingrown toenail that made it difficult to walk when inflamed and infected, and she was profoundly hearing impaired; and (4) a final prisoner suffered from various medical problems,
including degenerative disc disease affecting her neck and spine, bi-lateral carpal tunnel syndrome in her wrists,
a bladder condition causing constant incontinence, and chronic kidney disease. The court held that summary
judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the decision by prison officials to favor
lower contract costs over the likely quality of resulting care was deliberate indifference to the prisoners’ serious
medical needs. (Fluvanna Correctional Center for Women, Commonwealth of Virginia Dept. of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
COSTS
DENIAL

Sherley v. Thompson, 69 F.Supp.3d 656 (W.D.Ky. 2014). A state prisoner filed a pro se § 1983 action against the
Commissioner of the Kentucky Department of Corrections (DOC), a prison warden, and other prison officials,
alleging that his conditions of confinement violated his Eighth Amendment rights, that he was deprived of medical treatment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and was subjected to race discrimination in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause. The district court dismissed the case, in part. The court held that the prisoner stated
claims against the warden and prison administrators for violation of his equal protection rights and his conditions
of confinement. According to the court, the prisoner stated an Eighth Amendment claim against one prison nurse
by alleging that the nurse failed to provide him with appropriate medical treatment for ant bites he sustained, due
to his inability to pay for treatment.
The prisoner alleged that the prison had a policy or custom of segregating blacks and non-blacks, and that
prison officials refused to place him in a non-black cell to get away from pests in his cell. The court held that the
administrators allowed ants to infest his cell for weeks and that as a result, he received ant bites that caused him

29.294

to scratch until his skin was broken due to severe itching, in violation of his conditions of confinement rights
under § 1983 and the Eighth Amendment. (Little Sandy Correctional Complex, Green River Correctional Complex, Kentucky)
U.S. District Court
INADEQUATE CARE

Stevens v. Gooch, 48 F.Supp.3d 992 (E.D.Ky. 2014). An inmate brought an action against a jailer and a county,
asserting section 1983 and state law claims related to the adequacy of the jail's medical treatment. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court found that the inmate sufficiently exhausted administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) prior to bringing the §
1983 action, where the inmate filed five grievances related to his ankle injury but never received a response from
jail officials. (Lincoln County Jail, Kentucky)

U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Stones v. McDonald, 7 F.Supp.3d 422 (D.Del. 2014). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a prison
warden, the Commissioner of the Delaware Department of Correction (DOC), the state's contractor for prison
medical services, and a physician employed by the contractor, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious
medical needs, relating to damage to the nerves in his left ankle and foot after the prisoner slipped off a curb and
rolled his ankle. The prisoner filed motions to compel discovery, for appointment of counsel, and for appointment of a medical expert witness, and the state officials filed motions for summary judgment. The district court
granted summary judgment to the defendants. The district court held that: (1) the physician's alleged negligence
in not sending the prisoner for physical therapy did not provide the basis for an Eighth Amendment claim; (2) the
prisoner's disagreement with a non-party physician's recommendation against surgery did not provide the basis
for an Eighth Amendment claim; (3) the prisoner did not show a policy of the contractor that violated the prisoner's constitutional rights; and (4) the prisoner did not show state officials' personal involvement in the alleged
constitutional violation. (Sussex Correctional Institute, Delaware)

U.S. District Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
INADEQUATE CARE
WHEELCHAIR

Stoudemire v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections, 22 F.Supp.3d 715 (E.D.Mich. 2014). A female former prisoner,
who was a double amputee, brought an action against the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) and
various MDOC-associated officers and healthcare professionals, asserting violations of § 1983, the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA), and state law. The prisoner alleged failure to provide adequate health care and
accommodations for disabled individuals. The district court denied summary judgment to the warden and a corrections officer on their qualified immunity defenses to the § 1983 claims. The defendants appealed. The appeals
court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. On remand the district court held that: (1) a fact question
as to whether the warden was aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
serious harm existed precluded summary judgment, and (2) it was clearly established that deliberate indifference
to serious medical needs of prisoners constituted the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain proscribed by
Eighth Amendment. The prisoner alleged that she acquired MRSA following the amputation of her left leg. As a
result of her condition, her housing assignment at the facility was changed from the infirmary to the segregation
unit. The prisoner alleged that there was an absence of handicap facilities within this unit, that she was unable to
safely transfer from her wheelchair to the bed or toilet, and that she was allowed only one shower during the two
weeks while housed in segregation. (Huron Valley Women's Correctional Facility, Michigan)

U.S. Appeals Court
MENTAL HEALTH
SUICIDE
SPECIAL NEEDS

Townsend v. Cooper, 759 F.3d 678 (7th Cir. 2014). An inmate suffering from a significant mental illness brought
a § 1983 action against prison officials, claiming that imposition of a behavior action plan in response to the
inmate's disruptive behavior and threats of suicide violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights, deprived him of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities and exhibited an indifference to his serious
medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment for the prison officials and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The
court held that the behavior action plan resulted in an atypical and significant hardship compared to ordinary
prison life, and thus, the inmate had a liberty interest in not being placed on the plan sufficient to support his
Fourteenth Amendment due process challenge against the prison officials, where the plan involved removal of
the inmate's personal property from his cell, provision of a bag lunch, provision of a paper gown, and limited
access to toiletries. The court found that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as
to whether prison officials acted in disregard of a substantial risk of serious harm to the inmate, and a fact issue
as to whether the behavior action plan was imposed for safety reasons or as a disciplinary measure. The court
found that prison psychologists were not deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of the inmate when
they placed the inmate on the behavior action plan, where the psychologists repeatedly visited the inmate, regularly adjusted the inmate's access to property that he could use to harm himself, and repeatedly placed the inmate
on observation status to ensure his safety when he was suicidal. (Green Bay Correctional Institution, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
MENTAL HEALTH
EXAMINATIONS
MEDICATION

Trueblood v. Washington State Dept. of Social and Health Services, 73 F.Supp.3d 1311 (W.D.Wash. 2014).
Pretrial detainees brought a class action against the Washington Department of Social and Health Services and
two state hospitals, alleging that in-jail waiting times for court-ordered competency evaluations and restoration
services violated their Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The detainees moved for summary judgment.
The district court granted the motion, finding that in-jail waiting times for court-ordered competency evaluations
and restoration services violated the Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights of mentally incapacitated pretrial detainees. The court noted that detainees were incarcerated for many weeks, not because they were
convicted, found to be dangerous, or posed a flight risk, but because Department of Social and Health Services
and state hospitals did not have sufficient bed space or available staff to provide the services they were required
to provide. Some detainees were held in solitary confinement due to space issues, exacerbating any mental illness, and the rate of medication compliance was lower in jail. (Washington State Dept. of Social and Health
Services, Western State Hospital and Eastern State Hospital)

29.295

U.S. District Court
TRANSPORTATION
WHEELCHAIR
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
RA- Rehabilitation Act

Turner v. Mull, 997 F.Supp.2d 985 (E.D.Mo. 2014). An inmate, who suffered from a demyelinating neurological
disorder of unknown etiology, brought an action against a correctional officer, a warden, a transportation officer,
and a health services administrator, alleging violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Rehabilitation Act. The defendants moved for summary judgment.
The district court granted the motion. The district court held that: (1) the prison's policy that inmates were not
permitted to be transported in a handicapped-accessible van unless they appeared at the pickup area in a wheelchair did not violate the inmate's rights; (2) the warden failing to take action in response to letters by the inmate
was not deliberate indifference; (3) a correctional officer and a transportation officer who did not transport the
inmate in a handicapped-accessible van were not deliberately indifferent; (4) a supervisor was not deliberately
indifferent; (5) the alleged exposure to urine and vomit during a van ride did not violate the Eighth Amendment;
(6) the prison did not discriminate against inmate based on his disability by not transporting the inmate in a
handicapped-accessible vehicle; and (7) the administrator did not discriminate against the inmate. (Eastern Reception Diagnostic Correctional Center, Missouri)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
PRETRIAL DETAINEE

Woodson v. City of Richmond, Va., 2 F.Supp.3d 804 (E.D.Va. 2014). A detainee in a city jail filed a § 1983 action against the city, the sheriff, and deputies, claiming constitutional and state law violations arising from the
detainee's heat stroke allegedly caused by deliberate indifference to his need for medical care. The detainee was
housed on the top floor of the jail during a time when outside temperatures exceeded 100 degrees, and when
interior temperatures were even higher. The inmate suffered a heat stroke and was found unresponsive in his cell,
and he had a body temperature of 106.1 degrees. The sheriff cross-claimed against the city for indemnification or
contribution. The city moved to dismiss the cross-claim. The court dismissed the cross-claim, finding that the
sheriff lacked the right to contribution and the right to indemnification for § 1983 claims or state law claims.
(Richmond City Jail, Virginia)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
MENTAL HEALTH
SUICIDE ATTEMPT
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Young v. Choinski, 15 F.Supp.3d 172 (D.Conn. 2014). A state prisoner brought an action against prison officials
and personnel under § 1983, alleging deliberate indifference to his medical and mental health needs in violation
of the Eighth Amendment. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion
in part and denied in part. The court held that the prisoner failed to establish that his medical need was objectively serious, as required to support a claim against prison officials and personnel for deliberate indifference to a
serious medical need in violation of Eighth Amendment. The court noted that, although the prisoner alleged he
cut his arms with a metal object causing severe bleeding, none of wounds appeared to be bleeding on a video
recording of the prisoner as he was escorted from his cell to a medical unit, the prisoner did not allege that the
abrasions significantly interfered with his daily activities or caused him substantial or chronic pain, and he offered no evidence that the wounds required any further treatment beyond cleaning and antibiotic ointment.
The court found that the prisoner suffered from a serious mental health need, as required to support claim
against prison personnel for deliberate indifference to his serious mental health needs in violation of the Eighth
Amendment, where the prisoner had been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder, borderline personality
disorder, and antisocial personality disorder, and the prisoner's health records reflected that he had made prior
attempts and threats to commit suicide. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether a corrections officer intentionally refused to take action to summon mental
health or medical personnel to evaluate and treat the prisoner after he became aware of the prisoner's suicidal
thoughts, and then the officer learned that the mental health unit had closed for the evening. (Northern Correctional Institution, Somers, Connecticut)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
MENTAL HEALTH
SUICIDE ATTEMPT
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Young v. Choinski, 15 F.Supp.3d 194 (D.Conn. 2014). A prisoner, proceeding pro se, brought a § 1983 action
against prison officials and personnel, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical and mental health
needs, constituting cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. After the district court
granted the defendants' summary judgment motion in part and denied it in part, the defendants moved for reconsideration. The district court denied the motion. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether a correctional officer was subjectively aware of the prisoner's serious
mental health needs. The court found that the prisoner’s complaint alleging deliberate indifference, failure to
prevent and protect from self-harm, denial of medical care, and that a correctional officer failed to assist the
prisoner with prompt medical attention was sufficient to state a claim against the officer for deliberate indifference to serious medical and mental health needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Northern Correctional
Institution, Somers, Connecticut)
2015

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
DELAY IN CARE

Baker v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 118 F.Supp.3d 985 (N.D. Ill. 2015). A state prisoner brought an action
against the provider of prison health services and physicians, alleging that failure to treat his fractured arm violated the Eighth Amendment. The provider and physicians moved for summary judgment. The district court
granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine
issue of material fact regarding whether the policies and practices of the health services provider caused unacceptable delays in the treatment of the prisoner’s fractured arm which both directly prolonged his pain and potentially precluded a physician from treating the prisoner on an acute and emergent basis. (Wexford Health Sources,
Inc., Dixon Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
INADEQUATE CARE
MEDICATION
TRAINING

Brauner v. Coody, 793 F.3d 493 (5th Cir. 2015). A state prisoner, who was a paraplegic, brought an action
against a prison medical director, assistant warden, and prison doctors, alleging deliberate indifference to his
serious medical condition. The district court denied the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. The defendants appealed. The appeals court reversed, finding that: (1) prison doctors were not deliberately indifferent
to the prisoner’s serious medical needs by failing to provide him with adequate pain management; (2) officials

29.296

were not deliberately indifferent by subjecting the prisoner to unsanitary showers; and (3) doctors did not fail to
provide adequate training and supervision regarding proper wound care, even if the prisoner’s wound care by
nurses and other subordinates was occasionally sporadic, where the doctors were active in managing it, and they
regularly changed the prescribed frequency of the bandage changes based on the changing condition of the prisoner’s wounds, and also prescribed antibiotic therapy regimens to assist with healing. The court noted that it was
undisputed that the showers were cleaned twice per day with bleach, that the prisoner was given a disinfectant
spray bottle for his personal use, and that the prisoner was permitted to enter the showers before the other prisoners so that he could clean himself without interference, and there was no showing that the prisoner was ever
prohibited from using the showers. (R.E. Barrow Treatment Center, Louisiana)
U.S. District Court
CONTAGIOUS
DISEASES

Brown v. Moore, 93 F.Supp.3d 1032 (W.D. Ark. 2015). An inmate, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis,
brought a § 1983 action against a sheriff and jail officials, alleging that his constitutional rights were violated.
The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in
part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by an issue of fact as to whether the inmate’s being
housed with a prisoner who had a staph infection constituted deliberate indifference. The court found that the
inmate’s assertion that his diet was not approved on a yearly basis by a dietician in compliance with Arkansas
Jail Standards did not equate to a constitutional violation under the Eighth Amendment. (Boone County Detention Center, Arkansas)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELAY IN CARE
MEDICATION
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Burton v. Downey, 805 F.3d 776 (7th Cir. 2015). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against a county,
county jail, county sheriff, non-medical correctional officials, physician’s assistants, and nurses, asserting due
process violations based on deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, relating to hip and elbow pain, a
rash, and rectal bleeding. The district court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity and the defendants appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that an
alleged two-day delay in providing non-narcotic pain medication to the detainee was not deliberate indifference,
failure to honor the detainee’s preference for narcotic pain medication was not deliberate indifference, the detainee did not offer objective evidence of a serious medical need for narcotic pain medication, and failure to
provide outside physical therapy was not deliberate indifference. The court noted that an orthopedic surgeon who
had treated the detainee before his detention recommended to staff that the detainee receive in-cell therapy using
a towel.
The court held that failure of county jail staff to provide the detainee, who suffered from hip pain, with a
second mattress, did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment with respect to conditions of confinement, in
the absence of evidence that a second mattress was essential medical care. (Jerome Combs Detention Center,
Kankakee County, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICATION

Chavarriaga v. New Jersey Dept. of Corrections, 806 F.3d 210 (3d Cir. 2015). A former prisoner brought a §
1983 action in state court against the New Jersey Department of Corrections (NJDOC), the former New Jersey
Attorney General, the New Jersey Commissioner of Corrections, a correctional sergeant, and various other correctional officers. The prisoner alleged that the defendants violated her constitutional rights when they transferred her from one place of confinement to another where they denied her potable water, clothing, sanitary napkins, and subjected her to an unlawful body cavity search. The district court granted summary judgment in favor
of the Attorney General, Commissioner of Corrections, and correctional sergeant, and dismissed the remaining
claims. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded. The appeals court held that: (1) NJDOC’s policies regarding custodial placements and the Due Process Clause did not
give the prisoner a liberty interest in being housed in a particular institution, as required to support a due process
claim based on the prisoner’s transfers among custodial facilities; (2) allegations that correctional officers deprived the prisoner of potable water were sufficiently serious so as to reach level of an Eighth Amendment violation; (3) allegations that correctional officers forced her to walk down a staircase and hallway naked in plain
view of male prison personnel and inmates to reach a shower were sufficiently serious so as to reach the level of
Eighth Amendment violation; (4) allegations that she was denied her sanitary napkins and medication for migraine headaches and menstrual cramps were sufficiently serious so as to reach the level of an Eighth Amendment violation; and (5) the prisoner plausibly alleged that a correctional officer maliciously searched her body
cavities, as required to state a claim against the officer for using excessive force in violation of the Eighth
Amendment, where the prisoner alleged facts demonstrating that a cavity search was not routine, that the cavity
search was conducted in a manner that violated New Jersey regulations, and alleged that the cavity search was so
painful that during the search prisoner cracked a molar while clenching her teeth. The court noted that a state has
broad authority to confine an inmate in any of its institutions, and thus, courts recognize that a state’s authority to
place inmates anywhere within the prison system is among a wide spectrum of discretionary actions that traditionally have been the business of prison administrators rather than of the federal courts. (Garrett House Residential Community Release Facility, Edna Mahan Correctional Facility, New Jersey)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE

Coley v. Lucas County, Ohio, 799 F.3d 530 (6th Cir. 2015). The administrator of a pretrial detainee’s estate
brought a state court action against a county, county sheriff, police officer and police sergeant, alleging § 1983
violations of the detainee’s constitutional rights and various state law claims. The district court denied the defendants’ motions to dismiss and denied individual defendants’ requests for qualified immunity. The defendants
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that a police officer’s act of shoving a fully restrained pretrial detainee in a jail booking area, causing the detainee to strike his head on the wall as he fell to the cement
floor without any way to break his fall, constituted “gratuitous force” in violation of the detainee’s Fourteenth
Amendment right to be free from excessive force. The court noted that the detainee’s state of being handcuffed,
in a belly chain and leg irons, led to a reasonable inference that the officer’s actions were a result of his frustration with the detainee’s prior restraint behavior, since the detainee was not in any condition to cause a disruption
that would have provoked the officer to use such force. The court held that the police officer was on notice that

29.297

his actions were unconstitutional, and therefore he was not entitled to qualified immunity from liability under §
1983. According to the court, the officer’s attempts to cover up the assault by filing false reports and lying to
federal investigators following the death of the detainee led to a reasonable conclusion that the officer understood that his actions violated the detainees’ clearly established right not to be gratuitously assaulted while fully
restrained and subdued.
The court held that a police sergeant’s continued use of a chokehold on the unresisting, fully-shackled pretrial detainee, after hearing the detainee choke and gurgle, and when a fellow officer was urging him release his
chokehold, was objectively unreasonable, in violation of the detainee’s Fourteenth Amendment right to be free
from excessive force. The court noted that the sergeant’s subsequent acts of telling other officers to leave the
medical cell after the detainee was rendered unconscious, failing to seek medical help, and refusing to mention
the use of a chokehold in incident reports, led to the inference the that sergeant was aware he violated the law
and sought to avoid liability. According to the court, the police sergeant was on notice that his actions were unconstitutional, and therefore, he was not entitled to qualified immunity under § 1983.
The court found that the county sheriff could be held personally liable under § 1983, based on his failure to
train and supervise employees in the use of excessive force, the use of a chokehold and injuries derived therefrom, and to ensure that the medical needs of persons in the sheriff’s custody were met. According to the court,
evidence that the sheriff helped his employees cover up their unconstitutional actions by making false statements
to federal officials about his knowledge of his employees’ assault, chokehold, and deliberate failure to provide
medical attention to the detainee demonstrated that the sheriff at least implicitly authorized, approved or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending employees. The court noted that under Ohio
law, allegations by the estate of the pretrial detainee that the county sheriff had full knowledge of the assault but
intentionally and deliberately made false statements to federal officials were sufficient to state a claim that the
sheriff ratified the conduct of his officers and, thus, was potentially personally liable for his officers’ actions.
The court concluded that the officers’ use of excessive force, failure to provide medical care, assault and
battery, and wrongful death could be imputed to the sheriff in his official capacity since the sheriff’s false statements to federal investigators were a position that was inconsistent to non-affirmance of the officers’ actions.
(Lucas County Jail, Ohio)
U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
INADEQUATE CARE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Conley v. Birch, 796 F.3d 742 (7th Cir. 2015). An inmate, who allegedly injured his hand in a physical altercation
with a fellow inmate, brought a § 1983 action against a prison physician for deliberate indifference in violation
of the Eighth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment in the physician’s favor, and the inmate
appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The appeals court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the prison physician strongly suspected that the inmate’s
hand was fractured, precluding summary judgment in the physician’s favor on the issue of whether the physician
was aware of the inmate’s condition on the inmate’s deliberate indifference claim under the Eighth Amendment.
The court also found a fact issue as to whether the prison physician acted with deliberate indifference to the
inmate’s serious medical needs by refusing either to promptly evaluate the inmate’s suspected hand fracture or to
provide appropriate precautionary treatment, such as a splint. (Vienna Correctional, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
INTERFERENCE WITH
TREATMENT

DeBrew v. Atwood, 792 F.3d 118 (D.C. Cir. 2015). A federal inmate brought an action alleging that the Bureau
of Prison’s (BOP) response to his request for documents violated the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), that
the BOP and its officials violated the Takings and Due Process Clauses by retaining interest earned on money in
inmates’ deposit accounts, and that officials violated the Eighth Amendment by charging excessively high prices
for items sold by the prison commissary and for telephone calls. The district court entered summary judgment in
the BOP’s favor and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The
court held that the BOP did not violate FOIA by failing to produce recordings of the inmate’s telephone conversations and that the inmate’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies precluded the court from reviewing
whether the BOP conducted an adequate search. The court found that the Bureau of Prisons’ (BOP) alleged practice of charging excessively high prices for items sold by prison commissary and for telephone calls did not
violate Eighth Amendment. (Federal Bureau of Prisons, Washington, D.C.)

U.S. Appeals Court
DENIAL OF CARE

Dimanche v. Brown, 783 F.3d 1204 (11th Cir. 2015). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against prison
officials, alleging he was subjected to harsh treatment in retaliation for filing grievances about prison conditions
and asserting claims for cruel and unusual punishment, due process violations, and First Amendment retaliation.
The district court dismissed the case for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and failure to state a claim
pursuant to the in forma pauperis statute. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The
court held that the grievance sent by the state prisoner directly to the Secretary of the Florida Department of
Corrections (FDOC) met the conditions for bypassing the informal and formal grievance steps at the institutional
level under Florida law, and thus the prisoner satisfied the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s (PLRA) exhaustion
requirement with respect to his § 1983 claims alleging cruel and unusual punishment, due process violations, and
First Amendment retaliation. The court noted that the prisoner clearly stated at the beginning of the grievance
form that he was filing a grievance of reprisal, indicating he feared for his life and that he was “gassed in confinement for grievances [he] wrote,” and clearly stated the reason for bypassing the informal and formal grievance steps, namely, his fear that he would be killed if he filed additional grievances at the institutional level, and
alleged participation by high-ranking prison officials. The court found that the prisoner stated claims against
prison officials for First Amendment retaliation and cruel and unusual punishment by alleging that prison guards
and officials sprayed him with tear gas without provocation, denied him prompt medical care, filed false disciplinary reports, and threatened further retaliation, all in retaliation for filing grievances. (Liberty Correctional
Institution, Florida)

29.298

U.S. Appeals Court
DENTAL CARE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
DELAY IN CARE

Dobbey v. Mitchell-Lawshea, 806 F.3d 938 (7th Cir. 2015). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a
correctional officer and a prison dentist, alleging that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his
abscessed tooth. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, and the prisoner appealed. The
appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue
of material fact as to whether the correctional officer and the prison dentist acted with deliberate indifference to
the prisoner’s serious medical need, in that the dentist did not examine the prisoner until two weeks after he
reported a tooth abscess and the officer did not report the prisoner’s complaints of pain to the dentist, or to
someone else on the prison’s medical staff, who could have alleviated the prisoner’s pain. (Stateville Prison,
Illinois)

U.S. District Court
CONTAGIOUS
DISEASES

Doe v. New York, 97 F.Supp.3d 5 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). A former inmate brought a § 1983 action against a former
governor, prison doctors, and various other officials, alleging medical indifference to his Hepatitis infection in
violation of the Eighth Amendment. The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district
court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the inmate’s allegations were sufficient to
plead the governor’s personal involvement in the creation of an alleged prison policy of not disclosing infections
to inmates and only treating those with obvious symptoms. The inmate alleged that testing during routine physical and medical examinations revealed that he was infected and that he was not informed or treated, and that he
was subjected to a variety of tests and that results should have put doctors on notice that he was infected, but he
was never advised of an infection. The inmate alleged that a prison policy was implemented “in or about 1994”
to not disclose to inmates Hepatitis infections and to only treat those with obvious symptoms, that the former
governor took office in 1995, and that the governor was part of meetings discussing infection treatment and
prevention. (New York State Department of Correctional Services)

U.S. District Court
MEDICATION
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE

Dollar v. Gutierrez, 111 F.Supp.3d 1114 (D. Nev. 2015). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against prison medical staff, asserting that they were deliberately indifferent to his alleged serious medical needs. The district court
dismissed the case. The court held that the prison medical staff’s alleged conduct of prescribing only ibuprofen
and acetaminophen for the prisoner’s knee pain over a long period of time did not constitute deliberate indifference to the prisoner’s serious medical needs and thus did not violate Eighth Amendment. (Nevada Department of
Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
WRONGFUL DEATH
MEDICAL CARE
INTIMIDATION

Estate of Henson v. Wichita County, Tex., 795 F.3d 456 (5th Cir. 2015). The estate of a pretrial detainee who died
from chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) while being held in a county jail brought a § 1983 action
against the county, jail physician, and others, alleging violation of the detainee’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and asserted claims under state law for negligence and breach of contract. The district court granted
in part, and denied in part, the defendants’ motions for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The
court of appeals reversed and remanded in part. The physician and county moved for reconsideration. The appeals court granted the motion and the estate appealed. The court held that there was no unstated policy of intimidation at the jail to prevent sending detainees to a hospital, and thus, the doctor could not be liable for alleged
enforcement of such a policy. According to the court, the county’s multi-tiered health services plan, which provided that the county jail would employ six licensed vocational nurses, rather than registered nurses, and one jail
physician, to provide medical care for pretrial detainees, and which did not require the nurses and physician to be
present at jail facility at all times, but required them to be available via telephone and regularly present for sick
call clinics, and provided that detainees facing emergency situations would be transported to a hospital, did not
violate the due process rights of the pretrial detainee who died of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD)
while held at the jail. According to the court, the county’s plan was reasonably related to its legitimate interest in
providing medical attention to detainees with varying levels of need, and there was no showing that serious injury and death were the inevitable results of the plan. (Wichita County Jail, Texas)

U.S. District Court
MEDICATIONS

Fant v. City of Ferguson, 107 F.Supp.3d 1016 (E.D. Mo. 2015). City residents brought a class action lawsuit
against a city, asserting claims under § 1983 for violations of Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments based
on allegations that they were repeatedly jailed by the city for being unable to pay fines owed from traffic tickets
and other minor offenses. The residents alleged that pre-appearance detentions lasting days, weeks, and in one
case, nearly two months, in allegedly poor conditions, based on alleged violations of a municipal code that did
not warrant incarceration in the first instance, and which were alleged to have continued until an arbitrarily determined payment was made, violated their Due Process rights. The residents alleged that they were forced to
sleep on the floor in dirty cells with blood, mucus, and feces, were denied basic hygiene and feminine hygiene
products, were denied access to a shower, laundry, and clean undergarments for several days at a time, were
denied medications, and were provided little or inadequate food and water. The plaintiffs sought a declaration
that the city’s policies and practices violated their constitutional rights, and sought a permanent injunction preventing the city from enforcing the policies and practices. The city moved to dismiss. The district court granted
the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that: (1) allegations that residents were jailed for failure to
pay fines without inquiry into their ability to pay and without any consideration of alternative measures of punishment were sufficient to state a claim that the city violated the residents’ Due Process and Equal Protection
rights; (2) the residents plausibly stated a claim that the city’s failure to appoint counsel violated their Due Process rights; (3) allegations of pre-appearance detentions plausibly stated a pattern and practice of Due Process
violations; (4) allegations of conditions of confinement were sufficient to state a plausible claim for Due Process
violations; and (5) the residents could not state an Equal Protection claim for being treated differently, with respect to fines, than civil judgment debtors. The court noted that the residents alleged they were not afforded
counsel at initial hearings on traffic and other offenses, nor were they afforded counsel prior to their incarceration for failing to pay court-ordered fines for those offenses. (City of Ferguson, Missouri)

29.299

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE
INADEQUATE CARE
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
POLICIES

Fisher v. Miami-Dade County, 114 F.Supp.3d 1247 (S.D. Fla. 2015). A former pre-trial detainee brought a §
1983 action against a county, alleging that during his detention in a county jail, county employees were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. The county moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court denied the motion. The court held that the detainee: (1) sufficiently alleged that the county had policy
that constituted deliberate indifference to jail detainees’ serious medical needs (2) sufficiently alleged that County policymakers had notice of a pattern or practice of deliberate indifference to detainees’ serious medical needs;
and (3) sufficiently alleged that county policymakers failed to take action after being put on notice of the pattern
of deliberate indifference to detainees’ serious medical needs. According to the court, detailed allegations of a
pattern of deliberate indifference to county jail detainees’ medical needs, including 117 inmate deaths in the
years preceding the plaintiff’s detention, and 20 specific instances in which county employees withheld necessary medical care from detainees, or provided insufficient medical care, resulting in severe injury or death to
those detainees, were sufficient to state a claim for municipal liability under § 1983. The court noted that direct
complaints by detainees had been made to county officials, there were widespread news accounts in local newspapers and on local news television programs regarding treatment of detainees, the Department of Justice (DOJ)
had conducted a three-year DOJ investigation into county employees’ violations of detainees’ constitutional
rights, including the right to medical care, and there were more than half a dozen judicial orders from federal,
state and county courts relating to detainees’ medical treatment. The court noted that the detainee sufficiently
alleged that county policymakers chose not to take action after being put on notice of county employees’ deliberate indifference to jail detainees’ serious medical needs, where the detainee alleged that systemic deficiencies
occurred, including two deaths, following the mayor’s promise to correct such deficiencies. (Miami-Dade Corrections and Rehabilitation Department, Florida)

U.S. District Court
PRETRIAL DETAINEE
INADEQUATE CARE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Frary v. County of Marin, 81 F.Supp.3d 811 (N.D.Cal. 2015). A deceased detainee’s wife, mother, daughter, and
estate brought an action against a county and certain county jail employees, alleging that the employees were
deliberately indifferent to the detainee’s serious medical needs while he was in custody. The defendants moved
for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The district court held
that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to: (1) whether a deputy was aware
of a substantial risk to the detainee’s serious medical needs and disregarded that risk by failing to monitor the
detainee more closely; (2) whether another deputy knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to the detainee’s
health when she failed to ascertain the circumstances of the detainee’s prolonged unconsciousness, and when she
falsely radioed another deputy falsely suggesting that the detainee had consciously refused breakfast; (3) whether
a nurse recognized a serious risk to the detainee’s health from ingesting street morphine pills and then failed to
take reasonable precautionary steps to protect the detainee from that risk; (4) whether the sheriff’s duties with
respect to the county jail were causally connected to the alleged violations of the detainee’s due process rights;
(5) whether the county’s policy and practice of indirect monitoring at the county jail was a moving force behind
the alleged violation of the detainee’s due process rights; and (6) whether the county’s failure to implement policies at the county jail about how to monitor detainees with medical needs was the moving force behind the alleged violation of the due process rights of the detainee. The plaintiffs alleged that the Jail’s regular practice and
operating procedure was only to observe inmates indirectly, using “tower checks” where deputies looked out the
tower window to observe the inmates from dozens of feet away, or listening to inmates through intercoms in
their cells. (Marin County Jail, California)

U.S. District Court
INADEQUATE CARE
MEDICATION
PRIVATE PROVIDER
COSTS

Gannaway v. Prime Care Medical, Inc., 150 F.Supp.3d 511 (E.D. Pa. 2015). A state inmate brought § 1983
action against Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC) employees, private companies and healthcare
professionals contracted to provide medical services to DOC institutions, alleging that he received inadequate
medical treatment throughout his incarceration, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and that he was retaliated
against, in violation of the First Amendment. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court
granted the motions. The court held that private physicians employed by the vendor which contracted to provide
medical services to state inmates were acting under the color of state law for the purposes of inmate's § 1983
claim that he received inadequate medical treatment in connection with an “internal stitch” from prior surgery, in
violation of the Eighth Amendment. The court noted that the physicians consistently provided the inmate with
medical care throughout his incarceration, and there was no indication that the physicians were aware of, or
acquiesced in, the inmate's alleged deprivation of food while in a restricted housing unit (RHU). The court found
that the medical providers were not deliberately indifferent to the inmate's serious medical needs, in violation of
the Eighth Amendment, where the inmate received extensive medical treatment while in DOC custody, including
regular medical visits, prescriptions for medication to treat pain, acid reflux, high blood pressure, and constipation, and various diagnostic testing.
The court found that there was no evidence that charges for medical co-payments and medications, which
were required by DOC policy, rendered the inmate unable to obtain treatment for his purported serious medical
needs, as would support his § 1983 Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim. (Pennsylvania State Correctional Institution (SCI) at Rockview, and Prime Care Medical).

U.S. District Court
MEDICATION
INADEQUATE CARE
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE

Hammond v. Rector, 123 F.Supp.3d 1076 (S.D. Ill. 2015). An inmate brought an action against employees of the
Illinois Department of Corrections and a private medical company, alleging that the defendants were deliberately
indifferent to his medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court granted the defendants` motion for summary judgment. The court held that non-medical prison staff did not show deliberate indifference to the inmate’s medical needs, where the officials investigated the inmate’s grievances, confirmed that he
was receiving treatment for the complained of issues, and were not required to second guess the inmate’s treating physicians regarding the appropriate level of care. The court found that decisions by a doctor who examined
the inmate only once to deny the inmate a “physically challenged” designation and not provide additional pain
medication, standing alone, were insufficient to amount to deliberate indifference to the inmate’s medical needs
in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Wexford Health Sources, Inc., Pinckneyville Corr. Center, Illinois)

29.300

U.S. District Court
CELLS
POLICIES
PRIVATE PROVIDER

Hendrick v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 141 F.Supp.3d 393 (D. Md. 2015). A state prisoner brought a § 1983
action against prison officials, medical staff, and the corporation that provided medical services to a prison, alleging that his reassignment from a single cell to a double cell in contravention of his medical needs violated his
Eighth Amendment rights. The medical staff and corporation moved to dismiss or for summary judgment. The
district court granted the motion. The court held that the prisoner's allegations were insufficient to state a § 1983
claim against the private corporation that provided medical services to the prison, where the prisoner alleged no
specific conduct by the corporation and did not allege a custom or policy of the corporation that resulted in a
deprivation of his constitutional rights.
The court found that medical providers did not act with deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of the
prisoner, who suffered from papilledema and pseudotumor cerebri, by returning him to a double cell instead of a
single cell as he requested, and thus did not violate the prisoner's Eighth Amendment rights. The court noted that
the medical director believed that having a cellmate would make the prisoner safer given his history of blacking
out, there was no indication that the prisoner's prior placement in a single cell was an absolute medical necessity,
there was no indication that the prisoner's cellmates threatened him or caused him any harm, and the prisoner's
subjective concerns for his safety were insufficient to show an excessive risk to his health and safety. (North
Branch Correctional Inst., and Wexford Health Sources, Inc., Maryland)

U.S. District Court
CONTAGIOUS DISEASES
ADA-American with
Disabilities Act
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE
PRIVATE PROVIDER
MEDICATIONS
SUICIDE
ALCOHOL/DRUGS
HEARING IMPAIRED

Hernandez v. County of Monterey, 110 F.Supp.3d 929 (N.D. Cal. 2015). The plaintiffs, current and recently
released jail inmates seeking relief on behalf of a class, brought an action against the county, the sheriff’s office,
and the private company that administered jail health care facilities and services, alleging that substandard conditions constituted deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and failure to
accommodate in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The plaintiffs moved for a preliminary
injunction. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the
merits in their action, alleging that county jail conditions constituted deliberate indifference in violation of
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and failure to accommodate in violation of ADA. According to the court,
there was significant evidence that the jail’s policies and practices with regard to tuberculosis (TB) screening,
suicide and self-harm prevention, alcohol and drug withdrawal, and continuing medical prescriptions, were noncompliant with contemporary standards and guidelines, placing inmates at risk and constituting deliberate indifference to their serious medical needs. The court noted that there was significant evidence that inmates with
disabilities were excluded from access to exercise, religious services, and other meetings that were conducted in
inaccessible locations, or from sign language interpreters, in violation of ADA. The court found that the plaintiffs were likely to suffer irreparable harm, absent preliminary injunctive relief, where the jail continued to fail to
provide proper tuberculosis (TB) identification, isolation, diagnosis and treatment, to eliminate potential suicide
hazards for unstable mentally ill patients, to continue community medications, and to properly treat inmates
withdrawing from drugs and alcohol, and inmates with disabilities would continue to suffer access exclusion and
lack of sign language interpreters.
The court also found that the preliminary injunction, targeting discrete county jail conditions, would be in the
public interest where the public had an interest in preventing the spread of communicable diseases, enforcing the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and eliminating discrimination on the basis of disability. (Monterey
County Jail, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICATION

Hinojosa v. Livingston, 807 F.3d 657 (5th Cir. 2015). The mother of an inmate who died of complications from
heatstroke while incarcerated brought an action against prison officials and employees, the Texas Department of
Criminal Justice (TDCJ), the University of Texas Medical Branch (UTMB), and an official of UTMB, alleging
that they were responsible for her son’s death. Prison officials moved to dismiss on the basis of qualified immunity. The district court deferred ruling and the officials appealed. The appeals court dismissed the action, finding
that it did not have jurisdiction over the appeal. The court held that the inmate’s factual allegations, if true,
would be sufficient to establish prison officials’ liability for an Eighth Amendment violation and to overcome a
qualified immunity defense, and that further clarification of the facts was necessary for the district court to rule
on the prison officials’ qualified immunity defense. The mother of the inmate alleged that officials subjected the
inmate to dangerous heat conditions in conscious disregard of the serious risk that the heat posed for prisoners
who, like the inmate, suffered from certain medical conditions, took certain medications, and had recently been
transferred from air-conditioned jails to non-climate-controlled facilities. The mother alleged that the officials
had promulgated and had power to change policies that allegedly caused the inmate’s death, and the Eighth
Amendment right not to be subjected to extremely dangerous temperatures without adequate ameliorative
measures had been clearly established at the time of inmate’s death. (Garza West Unit, Texas Department of
Criminal Justice)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
DENTAL CARE
MALPRACTICE

Hobbs v. Powell, 138 F.Supp.3d 1328 (N.D. Ala. 2015). The personal representative of a jail inmate's estate filed
suit against the county sheriff, the captain in charge of jail guards, guards, and the physician contracted to provide health care services for the jail population, asserting claims for wrongful death, deliberate indifference to
the inmate's serious medical needs, and a state law claim against the physician for medical malpractice. The jail
defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of immunity, and the physician filed a motion to dismiss for
failure to state claims. The district court denied the motions. The court held that: (1) the amended Alabama statute that extended qualified immunity of a sheriff and sheriff's deputies to corrections officers working in sheriffs'
jails was a constitutionally permissible exercise by Alabama Legislature of its broad police power; (2) immunity
under Alabama's Jailer Liability Protection Act required findings that jail personnel were acting within the scope
of their official duties and that they were acting in compliance with law; (3) the personal representative adequately alleged the inmate's serious medical need; (4) the personal representative adequately alleged that the
physician had subjective knowledge of, but failed to treat the inmate for an abscessed tooth; (5) the personal
representative adequately alleged that the physician's failure to examine or provide any treatment to the inmate
for an abscessed tooth was the cause of the inmate's death; and (6) the allegations stated a claim against the phy-

29.301

sician for medical malpractice under the Alabama Medical Liability Act. The personal representative alleged that
the inmate submitted medical request forms through jail personnel for treatment of an abscessed tooth, that the
physician ignored the requests, that a toothache caused noticeably severe swelling that required immediate medical attention, that inmate's pain and swelling was such that any reasonable person would know that he required
immediate medical attention, and that, at some time before the inmate's release from jail several days later, the
physician and/or agents of the entity that provided physician services to the jail observed the inmate through the
window of a locked door but did not examine him in any way or refer him for any care. The inmate died at a
hospital within hours after being released from the jail. (Winston County Jail, (Correctional Managed Care Consultants, LLC, and Winston County Jail, Alabama)
U.S. District Court
POLICIES
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE
JUVENILE
SUICIDE

Hughes v. Judd, 108 F.Supp.3d 1167 (M.D. Fla. 2015). Several juveniles, as representatives of other juveniles
similarly situated, brought a § 1983 action asserting that the sheriff of a Florida county and the health care provider retained by the sheriff violated the juveniles’ rights under the Fourteenth Amendment during the juveniles’
detention at the county jail. The district court held that the plaintiffs failed to prove that either the sheriff or the
health care provider was deliberately indifferent to any substantial risk of serious harm during the juveniles’
detention, or that their policies or customs effected any other constitutional violation. According to the court, at
most, the juveniles showed only that two persons, each of whom was qualified to testify as an expert, disfavored
some of the sheriff’s past or present managerial policies and practices and advocated the adoption of others they
felt were superior for one reason or another. (Polk County Central County Jail, Florida, and Corizon Health, Inc.)

U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE

Jackson v. West, 787 F.3d 1345 (11th Cir. 2015). The estate of a detainee who committed suicide while in the
custody of a county jail brought a § 1983 action against a county sheriff and against 10 corrections officers,
alleging violation of the detainee’s due process rights. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
three officers on qualified immunity grounds, but denied summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds with
respect to the remaining officers. The remaining officers filed an appeal. The appeals court reversed, finding that
the officers lacked a subjective knowledge of a strong risk that the detainee would attempt suicide, so that the
officers did not act with deliberate indifference in failing to prevent the suicide. The court noted that the detainee
had made explicit suicide threats and he was placed in the suicide prevention unit, as was proper protocol, and
the detainee was released from that unit when prison medical staff later determined that he no longer presented
such a risk. The court stated: “This case is troubling. The Marion County Jail tragically failed to keep Mr. James
safe while he was incarcerated.” (Marion County Jail, Florida)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
MEDICATION

Johnson v. Clafton, 136 F.Supp.3d 838 (E.D. Mich. 2015). A pretrial detainee brought an action against a jail's
medical director, alleging that, during his pretrial detention, the medical director was deliberately indifferent to
his severe pain and infected ulcers. The director filed a motion for summary judgment. The district court granted
the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded on the detainee’s
claim that the medical director knew that the detainee had an infection, but chose to not treat it with antibiotics.
According to the court, the medical director did not violate the due process clause by prescribing non-narcotic
pain relievers to the detainee since the director's decision was objectively reasonable and the director was not
deliberately indifferent to the detainee's pain. The court noted that the detainee has received 11 prescriptions for
pain in 16 months. (Wayne County Jail, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
INADEQUATE CARE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
PRIVATE PROVIDER

Kelly v. Ambroski, 97 F.Supp.3d 1320 (M.D. Ala. 2015). An African–American prisoner who had injured his
back brought a § 1983 action against state prison officials, medical personnel, and the company providing prison
medical services, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical need in violation of the Eighth Amendment, violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection, and various state claims. The defendants
moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the prisoner: (1) failed
to show that the company maintained a policy or custom which contributed in any way to the claimed constitutional violations, as required to support a § 1983 claim; (2) did not show that the physician and the prison’s
health services administrator were deliberately indifferent to his back pain; (3) failed to establish that a warden
and an assistant warden had any direct involvement in his medical treatment, as required to support a § 1983
claim against them for deliberate indifference to his serious medical need; and (4) the prisoner’s conclusory
allegations were insufficient to support an equal protection claim. According to the court, the African–American
prisoner had no personal knowledge of white prisoners’ medical and treatment history or their individual diagnoses to establish that they were similarly situated to him, and allegations did not establish that decisions by prison
officials and medical personnel regarding his medical care were motivated by his race. The court noted that medical evidence showed that medical staff regularly examined the prisoner for his complaints of back pain, prescribed him pain medication, scheduled multiple diagnostic procedures for him, and sent him to several specialists outside of the prison, and the fact that the prisoner disagreed with the efficacy of the treatment recommended
or simply preferred a different course of treatment did not amount to a constitutional claim. (Bibb Correctional
Facility, and Corizon Correctional Healthcare, Alabama)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE

Kitchen v. Ickes, 116 F.Supp.3d 613 (D. Md. 2015). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against a corrections
officer and a prison health care provider, alleging excessive force in the officer’s use of pepper spray and deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. The officer and the provider moved to dismiss, or, in the alternative,
for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the inmate exhausted his available administrative remedies as to his claim that the corrections officer used excessive force in spraying him with
pepper spray, as required to file suit against the officer, under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The
court noted that the inmate filed a request for an administrative remedy on the issue of alleged use of excessive
force, appealed the decision rendered concerning his claim of excessive force, and subsequently filed a grievance
with the inmate grievance office regarding the officer’s use of pepper spray. (North Branch Correctional Institution, Maryland)

29.302

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE

Kucharczyk v. Westchester County, 95 F.Supp.3d 529 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). An inmate who was allegedly denied
surgery to repair a hernia brought a pro se action against a county and county jail officials under § 1983, alleging
deliberate indifference to his health in violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court denied the motion, finding that the inmate had
sufficiently alleged an objective deprivation of medical care and failure to act in spite of a known risk to his
health. The court found that the inmate stated a claim for municipal liability, and was not required to exhaust
administrative remedies. The inmate claimed that he had a hernia that required surgery, and was repeatedly denied a date for surgery to correct the hernia, and that county jail officials engaged in a widespread practice of
denying necessary medical care. The court noted that a Department of Justice report had found significant medical care deficiencies at the jail. (Westchester County, N.Y. and Correct Care Solutions LLC)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
SUICIDE

Letterman v. Does, 789 F.3d 856 (8th Cir. 2015). Parents of a deceased prisoner, who died from injuries suffered
while in jail, brought a § 1983 action against a prison sergeant, lieutenant, and case manager, alleging that the
employees were indifferent to the prisoner’s medical needs. The prisoner had been arrested for possession of
marijuana and was given a 120 “shock sentence” in confinement. He became suicidal and was transferred to a
padded cell at the request of mental health personnel. He was to have been personally observed every 15 minutes
by staff and procedure required the prisoner to give a verbal response each time. After a shift chance, the oncoming officer decided to monitor the prisoner via closed circuit television rather than making the required in-person
rounds. During the shift, the prisoner injured himself in the cell and eventually died from his injuries. The district
court denied the employees’ motion for summary judgment, based on assertions of qualified immunity. The
employees appealed. The appeals court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material
fact as to whether a prison sergeant, who was in charge of the unit where prisoner was kept, and a lieutenant,
were deliberately indifferent to the risk of harm to the prisoner who died from injuries allegedly sustained in a
padded cell. (Missouri Western Reception, Diagnostic and Correction Center)

U.S. District Court
INADEQUATE CARE

McNeill v. Allen, 106 F.Supp.3d 711 (W.D. N.C. 2015). A pre-trial detainee in a county detention facility
brought an action against county sheriff’s office captain under § 1983, alleging deliberate indifference to his
medical needs in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court dismissed the case, finding that the
detainee failed to plead personal involvement as required to maintain claim against sheriff’s captain in his individual capacity under § 1983. The detainee alleged that jail staff did not adequately treat him for injuries he
suffered after slipping on water in his jail cell. (Buncombe County Sheriff’s Office and Jail, N. Carolina)

U.S. Appeals Court
DENTAL CARE

Mead v. Palmer, 794 F.3d 932 (8th Cir. 2015). A civilly committed sex offender brought a § 1983 action against
a nurse and the civil commitment unit’s director, alleging that they were deliberately indifferent to his serious
medical needs. The district court denied the defendants’ motion for qualified immunity from suit. The defendants
appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that the nurse and the civil commitment
unit’s director did not deny the offender essential dental care by refusing his request for dentures, and thus were
not deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court
noted that the offender was never prescribed dentures as a medical necessity, and despite his claims of inability
to chew and discomfort, he was still able to eat and consume adequate calories and nutrition, he actually gained
weight, and he never asked for a soft diet. (Iowa Department of Human Services, CCUSO Unit Cherokee Mental
Health Institute)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELAY IN CARE
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Miller v. Campanella, 794 F.3d 878 (7th Cir. 2015). An Illinois state inmate brought a § 1983 action against
prison medical and administrative personnel, alleging deliberate indifference to his gastroesophageal reflux disease. The district court granted the defendants’ summary judgment motion. The inmate appealed. The appeals
court reversed and remanded. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether prison medical and administrative personnel knew that the inmate had gastroesophogeal
reflux disease, which was a very unpleasant, potentially dangerous, yet readily treatable disease, and yet did
nothing for two months. (Lawrence Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL DIET

Montalvo v. Lamy, 139 F.Supp.3d 597 (W.D.N.Y. 2015). An inmate brought an action against a sheriff, prison
officials and a commissary, alleging that he was a diabetic and that, while incarcerated, he was not provided with
a medically appropriate diet, was not permitted to purchase food items from the prison commissary, and was the
subject of false misbehavior reports when he complained about his dietary issues. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the inmate failed to
allege that the prison commissary, operated by a private company, was acting under the color of state law, as
required to state constitutional claims against the commissary. The court noted that the inmate did not allege that
the commissary had a policy of denying commissary access to diabetic prisoners or had the authority to override
the prison's policy with respect to inmates with dietary restrictions, and instead, alleged that the prison maintained a policy of limiting commissary access for prisoners with dietary restrictions. (Erie County Holding Center, New York)

U.S. District Court
DELAY IN CARE
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE

Montoya v. Newman, 115 F.Supp.3d 1263 (D. Colo. 2015). A former county jail detainee brought a § 1983 action against a sheriff, jail detention officer, and jail medical staff member, and a physician, alleging deliberate
indifference to his serious medical needs. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court
granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the summary judgment was precluded by a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether a county jail detention officer was aware of the detainee’s serious
medical need and was deliberately indifferent to that need when he failed to arrange for the detainee to see a
doctor for at least two days, despite knowing that the detainee was coughing up bloody phlegm, had trouble
breathing, and was not eating. The officer was also allegedly told by two other detainees, as well as the detainee’s sister, and the detainee himself, the detainee needed to see a doctor. (Huerfano County Jail, Colorado)

29.303

U.S. Appeals Court
DELAY IN CARE
INADEQUATE CARE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Nally v. Ghosh, 799 F.3d 756 (7th Cir. 2015). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that a prison’s medical
staff was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical condition. The district court dismissed the complaint and
the inmate appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that dismissal on limitations grounds was
not warranted. According to the court, the issue of when the state inmate learned that he was diabetic or prediabetic presented a fact question that could not be resolved on a motion to dismiss on limitations grounds the
inmate’s § 1983 action alleging that the prison’s medical staff was deliberately indifferent to the results of blood
tests, administered over a period of more than five years, that indicated that he was either diabetic or prediabetic, or had progressed from pre-diabetic to diabetic during period. (Stateville Prison, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
MEDICATION
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
INADEQUATE CARE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Niemic v. UMass Correctional Health, 89 F.Supp.3d 193 (D.Mass. 2015). A state inmate brought an action
against employees of a former prison medical provider, alleging under § 1983 that the employees were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in connection with his ongoing treatment for a variety of ailments,
including severe back pain, migraine headaches, and hepatitis B and C, and that the employees violated the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act (MCRA). The employees moved for summary judgment. The district court granted
the motion. The court held that: (1) the physician who treated the inmate over the course of several years was not
deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs; (2) the physician was not liable with respect to a claim
based on discontinuance of a methadone prescription; (3) a nurse was not deliberately indifferent to the inmate’s
serious medical needs; (4) a nurse practitioner was not deliberately indifferent to the inmate’s serious medical
needs; (5) the medical director was not subject to supervisory liability; and (6) the inmate’s failure to receive a
preferred pain medication or treatment program did not rise to a due process violation. (UMass Correctional
Health, Souza–Baranowski Correctional Center, Massachusetts)

U.S. Appeals Court
TRANSSEXUAL

Norsworthy v. Beard, 802 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2015). A transsexual female prison inmate filed a § 1983 action
against prison officials and medical staff for denying necessary medical treatment for the inmate’s gender dysphoria, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court issued a preliminary injunction ordering the
officials to provide the inmate with sex reassignment surgery, and the officials appealed. The injunction was
stayed. The appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that the inmate’s release from prison rendered the
action moot, and remand was warranted for determination of whether her release while her appeal was pending
was the result of the officials’ actions. (California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation)

U.S. District Court
TRANSSEXUAL
GID- Gender Identify
Disorder
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Norsworthy v. Beard, 87 F.Supp.3d 1104 (N.D.Cal. 2015). A transsexual female prison inmate brought a § 1983
action against prison officials and medical staff for denying necessary medical treatment for the inmate’s gender
dysphoria in violation of Eighth Amendment. The inmate also alleged that the officials were deliberately indifferent to her medical needs and deprived her of her right to equal protection under the law when they denied her
sex reassignment surgery. The officials moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court granted
the motion in part and denied the motion in part. The court held that: (1) the inmate stated a claim for prospective injunctive relief; (2) the inmate stated an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim based on denial
of the request for sex reassignment surgery; (3) the inmate stated an equal protection claim; but (4) the inmate
failed to state an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim based on denial of a request for a legal name
change. (Mule Creek State Prison, California)

U.S. District Court
TRANSSEXUAL
GID- Gender Identify
Disorder
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Norsworthy v. Beard, 87 F.Supp.3d 1164 (N.D.Cal. 2015). A transsexual female prison inmate brought a § 1983
action against prison officials and medical staff for denying necessary medical treatment for the inmate’s gender
dysphoria in violation of Eighth Amendment. The inmate moved to strike expert testimony and for a preliminary
injunction requiring the defendants to provide her with sex reassignment surgery (SRS). The defendants moved
for judicial notice. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The district court found that
the expert report of a psychiatrist retained by the officials and medical staff would not be stricken for failure to
comply with the requirements for disclosure of expert qualifications, and that the expert was qualified to testify
regarding prison culture and the treatment that incarcerated persons with gender dysphoria should receive. The
court noted that notwithstanding years of treatment in the form of hormone therapy and counseling, the inmate
continued to experience severe psychological pain, and that the treating and examining psychologists agreed the
inmate met the eligibility criteria for SRS under the standards of care for treating transsexual patients.
The court held that: (1) the inmate was likely to succeed on the merits of the Eighth Amendment claim; (2)
the inmate was suffering irreparable harm that would likely continue absent a preliminary injunction; (3) the
balance of equities weighed in favor of granting an injunction; (4) it was in the public interest to grant an injunction; and (5) an injunction would meet the requirements of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). (Mule
Creek State Prison, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELAY IN CARE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
PRIVATE PROVIDER

Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768 (7th Cir. 2015). An inmate brought a pro se § 1983 action against prison officials
alleging cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, in particular, that the officials
were deliberately indifferent to his severe hand injury, delaying his receipt of medically necessary surgery for ten
months. After twice denying the inmate’s request for pro bono counsel, the district court dismissed the action
with prejudice, for failure to state a claim. The inmate appealed and appellate counsel was appointed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that: (1) the inmate stated a claim against a prison physician
for such serious delays in the provision of adequate treatment that the Eighth Amendment may have been violated; (2) the inmate stated a claim against a prison nurse for deliberate indifference; (3) the inmate sufficiently
identified an unconstitutional policy or practice to state a claim under § 1983 against the private corporation that
served as the prison’s health care provider; (4) the inmate stated a claim for deliberate indifference against the
prison’s health care administrator; (5) the inmate stated a claim for deliberate indifference against prison grievance officials; (6) the inmate stated a valid First Amendment retaliation claim; and (7) the district court’s denial
of the inmate’s request for pro bono counsel was not unreasonable. (Lawrence Correctional Center, Illinois)

29.304

U.S. Appeals Court
INADEQUATE CARE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Petties v. Carter, 795 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 2015). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against two prison doctors, alleging that they were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs by failing to provide adequate
medical care for his torn Achilles tendon. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the doctors.
The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that a doctor’s failure to order immediate immobilization of the prisoner’s ankle with a splint or boot did not amount to deliberate indifference under the Eighth
Amendment, and a doctor’s failure to order physical therapy for the prisoner did not amount to deliberate indifference. According to the court, the doctor exempted the prisoner from walking to meals, prescribed pain medication, an anti-inflammatory, and crutches, and the doctor ordered an immediate magnetic resonance imaging
(MRI) scan and referred him to an orthopedist, all of which amounted to meaningful and ongoing treatment for
the prisoner’s injury. (Stateville Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
HEARING IMPAIRED
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
RA- Rehabilitation Act

Pierce v. District of Columbia, 128 F.Supp.3d 250 (D.D.C. 2015). A deaf inmate who communicated with
American Sign Language (ASL), but who had been forced to communicate with staff and other inmates only
through lip-reading and written notes due to the lack of an interpreter to assist him, filed suit against the District
of Columbia alleging discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
and the Rehabilitation Act. Both sides moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the inmate’s
motion in part and denied the defendant’s motion. The court held that: (1) the prison had affirmative duty to
evaluate the newly incarcerated deaf inmate's accommodation requirements, and its failure to do so denied the
inmate benefits under the Rehabilitation Act and ADA; (2) the prison was deliberately indifferent to the deaf
inmate's need for accommodation, as would support an award of compensatory damages; and (3) summary
judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the prison had placed the inmate in
protective custody, and kept him there, because of the inmate's constant requests for accommodation. The court
noted that the inmate's need for accommodation was obvious, in that the inmate did not speak and communicated
only through American Sign Language (ASL), and the prison was required to identify precise limitations resulting from the disability and potential reasonable accommodations by way of an interactive assessment of the
inmate. According to the court, the inmate's request for an American Sign Language (ASL) interpreter to assist
him during anger management and substance abuse classes was sufficient to put the prison on notice that deaf
inmate might need a similar accommodation to communicate effectively in other prison situations, such as in
inmate programs, hall meetings, the orientation process, protective custody proceedings, graphic arts class, and
medical consultations. (Correctional Treatment Facility, District of Columbia)

U.S. District Court
DENTAL CARE
DELAY IN CARE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Proctor v. Horn, 95 F.Supp.3d 1242 (D. Nev. 2015). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against the state’s
department of corrections, a dentist, a dental assistant, a dental technician, and the prison’s nursing director,
alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The parties
moved for summary judgment. The district court denied the prisoner’s motion, and granted the defendants’ motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the dental assistant’s responses to the prisoner’s written requests regarding dental care did not show that she was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs, and
that the dental technician’s responses to prisoner’s written requests regarding dental care did not amount to deliberate indifference. According to the court, when the prisoner asked about his status concerning referral to an
oral surgeon, the assistant responded that the dentist would review his chart and that the matter would be determined by the prison’s review panel. The court found that there was no evidence that the brief delay during the
period of time that the assistant was responding to the prisoner’s requests caused any harm, given that he saw the
oral surgeon less than two months after his first request.
The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a fact dispute as to whether the prisoner suffered
harm as a result of the two month delay between complaints of pain and his receipt of dental care. (Nevada Department of Corrections, Northern Nevada Correctional Center)

U.S. Appeals Court
TRANSSEXUAL
GID- Gender Identity
Disorder
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE

Reid v. Griffin, 808 F.3d 1191 (8th Cir. 2015). A prisoner, who was born male but identified as female, and who
had performed a self-castration, brought a § 1983 action alleging that refusal by a prison, the prison medical
director, the prison doctor, and the prison health psychiatrist to provide hormone-replacement therapy for Gender
Identity Disorder (GID) was deliberate indifference to the prisoner’s serious medical needs in violation of the
Eighth Amendment. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The
prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the defendants were not deliberately indifferent to the
prisoner’s serious medical needs. According to the court, in denying the prisoner estrogen-replacement therapy,
the prison medical director, prison health psychiatrist, and prison doctor were not deliberately indifferent to prisoner’s medical needs in violation of Eighth Amendment, where numerous mental-health professionals evaluated
the prisoner, but none had diagnosed Gender Identity Disorder (GID) or concluded that GID treatment was appropriate, and the prisoner had several other mental health issues for which the prisoner received treatment and
monitoring. (Varner Super Max Unit, Arkansas Dept. of Correction)

U.S. Appeals Court
TRANSSEXUAL
GID- Gender Identify
Disorder
DELIB. INDIFFERENCE
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE

Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2015). A transgender inmate brought a pro se § 1983 action alleging
that prison officials violated the Eighth Amendment by their deliberate indifference to her serious medical needs.
The district court dismissed the action without leave to amend. The inmate appealed. The appeals court reversed
and remanded, finding that the inmate’s complaint, alleging that she suffered from severe gender dysphoria for
which male-to-female sexual reassignment surgery (SRS) was the medically necessary treatment, but that prison
officials refused to provide the surgery, stated a cause of action under Eighth Amendment. (Pleasant Valley State
Prison, California)

29.305

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICATION
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
PRIVATE PROVIDER

Rowe v. Gibson, 798 F.3d 622 (7th Cir. 2015). A prisoner brought § 1983 claims against prison administrators
and employees of a prison medical services company, claiming that the defendants were deliberately indifferent
to his serious medical needs by preventing him from having access to heartburn medication before he ate meals,
and by denying him access to prescribed, rather than over-the-counter, heartburn medication for 33 days, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. The prisoner
appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court found that summary
judgment was precluded by issues of fact as to whether restricting the time the prisoner took heartburn medication, several hours after a meal, departed from professional practice, and whether prison medical staff told the
prisoner that they were withholding the prisoner’s heartburn medication to convince the prisoner not to file lawsuits. (Corizon, Inc., and Pendleton Correctional Facility, Indiana)

U.S. District Court
PRIVATE PROVIDER
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES
INTAKE SCREENING

Sanders v. Glanz, 138 F.Supp.3d 1248 (N.D. Okla. 2015). A pretrial detainee's guardian filed a § 1983 action
against a sheriff, the jail's private healthcare providers, and a booking nurse to recover for injuries that the detainee suffered from a severe assault by fellow prisoners. The defendants filed for dismissal. The district court
granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that the detainee, who had been assaulted by other
county jail inmates, stated a plausible municipal liability claim under § 1983 against the corporation that assisted
in developing the sheriff's policies with respect to medical and mental health care of inmates, where the detainee
alleged that the corporation shared responsibility with the sheriff to adequately train and supervise its employees,
and that the corporation's policies, practices, and customs posed substantial risks to inmates' health and safety,
but failed to take reasonable steps to alleviate those risks.
The court found that the detainee's allegations were sufficient to state a plausible claim against the sheriff in
his individual capacity by alleging that the sheriff was responsible for creating and enforcing regulations, policies, practices, and customs at the county jail, and that pursuant to those practices, policies, and customs, the jail
maintained a longstanding, constitutionally deficient system of medical and mental health care. According to the
court, the sheriff knew of substantial risks created by that system but failed to take reasonable steps to alleviate
the risks, but instead took intentional and active steps to conceal the dangerous conditions at the jail, and the
sheriff disregarded known and obvious risks of severe harm from lack of adequate mental health assessment and
treatment, classification, supervision, or protection. (David L. Moss Criminal Justice Center, Tulsa County Sheriff, Oklahoma, Correctional Healthcare Management, Inc. and, Correctional Healthcare Management of Oklahoma, Inc.)

U.S. Appeals Court
TRAINING
PRIVATE PROVIDER
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
NEGLIGENCE

Shadrick v. Hopkins County, Ky., 805 F.3d 724 (6th Cir. 2015). The mother of deceased inmate brought a § 1983
action against a county and a medical provider, which contracted with county to provide medical services to
county inmates, alleging that the medical provider’s failure to train and supervise its nurses violated the inmate’s
constitutional right to adequate medical care and that the medical provider was negligent under state law. The
twenty-five year old inmate had entered the jail to serve a short sentence for a misdemeanor offense. He died
three days later from complications of an untreated methicillin-resistant staphylococcus aureas (MRSA) infection. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the medical provider. The mother appealed. The
appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of
material fact as to whether the medical provider’s training program was inadequate, whether the inadequacy
resulted from its deliberate indifference to inmate’s right to adequate medical care, and whether the inadequacy
caused, or was closely related to, the inmate’s death. The court noted that the nurses were required to make professional judgments outside their area of medical expertise, and unless training was provided, the nurses lacked
knowledge about the constitutional consequences of their actions or inactions in providing medical care to inmates.
The court found that the medical provider did not derive its existence and status from the county, and thus
was not entitled to share the county’s governmental immunity on a Kentucky negligence claim. The court noted
that nearly all of the inmate’s medical conditions-- high blood pressure, rheumatoid arthritis, gout, osteoporosis,
and staph infection-- had been diagnosed by a private physician as mandating treatment, and deputy jailers could
tell that the inmate needed prompt medical treatment even though they did not have the same medical training as
the nurses who were employed at the county jail. (Hopkins County Detention Center, Southern Health Partners,
Inc., Kentucky)

U.S. District Court
PRIVATE PROVIDER
INADEQUATE CARE

Shehee v. Saginaw County, 86 F.Supp.3d 704 (E.D.Mich. 2015). A diabetic inmate at a county jail, who fainted
due to low blood sugar and broke his neck, brought a § 1983 action against the county and the private contractor
that provided medical services to the jail, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the
motion. The court held that the jail’s medical director did not have authority to make a final policy regarding
medical decisions, as required to hold the contractor and county liable under § 1983. The court found that the
director’s alleged practices of having limited contact with inmates, providing occasional care, and providing
phoned-in treatment did not show deliberate indifference. (Saginaw County Jail, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
MEDICATION
DENTAL CARE

Shorter v. Baca, 101 F.Supp.3d 876 (C.D. Cal. 2015). A pretrial detainee brought an action against a county,
sheriff, and deputies, alleging under § 1983 that the defendants denied her medical care, subjected her to unsanitary living conditions, deprived her of food, clean clothes, and access to exercise, and conducted overly invasive
searches. The detainee had been classified as mentally ill and housed in a mental health unit at the detention
facility. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied
in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to what policies governed classification of pretrial detainees who were mentally ill. The court found that there was no evidence that county jail employees’ alleged failure to adequately treat the detainee’s blood condition caused her
measurable harm, where there was no indication that the alleged denial of treatment caused the detainee any
physical pain, or that any mental anguish the detainee suffered was related to denial of her medication. The

29.306

court denied summary judgment to the defendants on the detainee’s claim that she was denied dental treatment.
(Century Regional Detention Facility, Los Angeles County, California)
U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
NEGLIGENCE
PRIVATE PROVIDER

Simmons v. Corizon Health, Inc., 122 F.Supp.3d 255 (M.D.N.C. 2015).The guardians and conservators of a
county jail inmate, who suffered a catastrophic hypoxic brain injury after going into cardiac arrest caused by
excessive internal bleeding from a perforated ulcer, brought an action against the jail medical provider, the county, the sheriff, and the local government excess liability fund, asserting claims for deliberate indifference, negligence, and loss of consortium. The provider moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and the remaining
defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim and for lack of personal jurisdiction. The district court
granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that the medical provider’s alleged violation of its
contract with the county, which required it to comply with standards set by the National Commission on Correctional Health Care, with respect to its treatment of the county jail inmate could not serve as a basis for the inmate’s negligence claim under North Carolina law.
The court found that the inmate and his guardians and conservators stated a deliberate indifference claim
against the medical provider by alleging that the inmate made the provider’s staff aware that he was experiencing
severe stomach pain and was vomiting blood, that medical records documented the vomiting of blood, decreased
urine output, and no bowel movements for two weeks, that despite his repeated complaints of severe stomach
pain and vomiting blood, he received no further medical care and was not provided a physician consultation, and
that shortly thereafter, he went into cardiac arrest caused by excessive internal bleeding from a perforated ulcer.
The court also found that the allegations were sufficient to support a claim for punitive damages under § 1983.
According to the court, the fact that the county allegedly contracted out to the private medical provider did
not preclude its obligation to provide inmates with medical care and the county could be held liable under § 1983
for the provider’s allegedly constitutionally inadequate medical care of the inmate. The court noted that the provider was allegedly delegated some final policymaking authority and the county allegedly failed to review the
provider’s policies, such that some of the provider’s policies became those of the county. (Corizon Health, Inc.,
and Guilford County Jail, North Carolina)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
NEGLIGENCE

Simmons v. Corizon Health, Inc., 136 F.Supp.3d 719 (M.D.N.C. 2015). A county jail inmate, who suffered a
catastrophic hypoxic brain injury after going into cardiac arrest caused by excessive internal bleeding from a
perforated ulcer, brought a § 1983 action against the jail medical provider, the county, the sheriff, and the local
government excess liability fund, asserting claims for deliberate indifference, negligence, and loss of consortium
on the part of the inmate’s guardian and conservator. After the district court denied the sheriff’s motion to dismiss, the sheriff moved for reconsideration. The district court granted the motion, finding that a single, isolated
prior alleged incident was insufficient to establish the sheriff's office policy or custom of deliberate indifference
to the medical needs of prisoners, and the inmate failed to state a claim for deliberate indifference to the inmate's
serious medical needs based on failure to train sheriff’s deputies. (Corizon Health Inc. and Guilford County
Sheriff, North Carolina)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE

Smith v. Eovaldi, 112 F.Supp.3d 779 (S.D. Ill. 2015). A state inmate, proceeding in forma pauperis, brought a §
1983 action against several prison officers, alleging use of excessive force and exposure to inhumane conditions
in his cell. The prisoner alleged that after he had a “negative outburst” and was “maced” by a lieutenant and
removed from his cell by a corrections officer, he was taken to an infirmary bullpen, where he was forced to lie
on the floor. While he was on the floor, the prisoner alleged that officers kicked and punched him for ten
minutes, causing him to defecate upon himself. He alleged that after the incident, he was stripped of his prison
clothes and “inadequately seen” by “medical” personnel. At the screening stage of the case, the district court
dismissed the complaint in part against some defendants, but declined to dismiss with regard to the others. The
court held that the inmate sufficiently alleged § 1983 claims against several prison officers for use of excessive
force by alleging that the officers engaged in prolonged attacks against him and that one officer subsequently
attacked him again. The court allowed the prisoner’s claims against several prison officers regarding conditions
of his confinement to proceed. The prisoner alleged that two officers did not feed him for several days after the
alleged attack against him, that two other officers did not allow the inmate to shower or otherwise clean off fecal
matter for several months, and that two other officers denied him hygiene products and warm clothing during
winter months. (Menard Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
PRIVATE PROVIDER
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE

Stojcevski v. County of Macomb, 143 F.Supp.3d 675 (E.D. Mich. 2015). A former county jail inmate, individually and as the administrator of the estate of his brother, who died after being incarcerated at the same jail, brought
an action against a county, county officials and employees, the jail's private medical provider, and the provider's
employees, alleging deliberate indifference to medical needs and municipal liability under § 1983 and gross
negligence under state law. The defendants moved to dismiss. The court held that the employees' delegation of
medical care of the inmate to an outside contractor did not entitle them to qualified immunity on Eighth
Amendment deliberate indifference claims arising from the inmate's death. According to the court, regardless of
the county's reliance on the contractor, if the employees were aware of a risk to the inmate's health, drew the
inference that a substantial risk of harm to the inmate existed, and consciously disregarded that risk, they too
would be liable for the inmate's injuries under § 1983. The court found that allegations by the administrator of
the estate were sufficient to state a Monell claim against the county and the jail's private medical provider for
municipal liability under § 1983. The court noted that although many of the policies and procedures set forth by
the administrator in support of his claim, such as failure to adhere to national standards, did not state a constitutional violation, the examples of where such standards were not followed were factual allegations supporting his
assertion that inmates at the jail were not afforded adequate medical treatment. (Macomb County Jail, Michigan)

29.307

U.S. Appeals Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
DISCRIMINATION
REHABILITATION ACT
WHEELCHAIR

Turner v. Mull, 784 F.3d 485 (8th Cir. 2015). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that correctional officials violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), and Rehabilitation Act by failing to transport him in wheelchair-accessible van, exposing him to unsanitary conditions in the van, and retaliating against him for filing a complaint. The district court
entered summary judgment in the officials’ favor and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the officials were not deliberately indifferent to the inmate’s serious medical needs when
they precluded him from using a wheelchair-accessible van, even if the inmate was required to crawl into the van
and to his seat. The court noted that the inmate was able to ambulate, stand, and sit with the use of leg braces and
crutches, the inmate did not ask to use a readily available wheelchair, no physician ordered or issued a wheelchair for the inmate, and improperly using or standing on a lift was considered dangerous due to the possibility
of a fall.
According to the court, officials were not deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of the inmate in
violation of Eighth Amendment when they required him to be transported and to crawl in an unsanitary van,
where the inmate was exposed to unsanitary conditions on a single day for a combined maximum of approximately six hours.
The court found that prison officials did not discriminate against the inmate on the basis of his disability, in
violation of the Rehabilitation Act, when they refused to transport him in a wheelchair-accessible van, where the
prison’s wheelchair-users-only policy was rooted in concerns over undisputed safety hazards associated with
people standing on or otherwise improperly using a lift, and the inmate did not use a wheelchair or obtain a physician’s order to use a wheelchair-accessible van. (Eastern Reception Diagnostic Correctional Center, Missouri)

U.S. Appeals Court
WHEELCHAIR
TRANSPORTATION
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
REHABILITATION ACT

Wagoner v. Lemmon, 778 F.3d 586 (7th Cir. 2015). A paraplegic inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that a state
department of corrections and its commissioner failed to properly accommodate his disability, in violation of his
constitutional rights, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Rehabilitation Act. The district court
entered summary judgment in the defendants’ favor and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The
court found that the officials did not violate the paraplegic inmate’s rights under Title II of ADA or the Rehabilitation Act as a result of their failure to provide him with an adequate wheelchair backrest or a wheelchair-ready
van, despite the inmate’s allegation that he was inconvenienced with longer waits and humiliation, as when he
had to crawl off a regular van because it did not accommodate his wheelchair. The court noted that the inmate
did not assert that he was denied all access to some programs and activities, or that his access to others was severely limited, and the state provided the inmate with a new wheelchair before he filed his grievance about the
backrest. (Indiana Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
FEMALE PRISONERS
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
TRANSPORTATION
TRANSFER

White v. Bukowski, 800 F.3d 392 (7th Cir. 2015). A pregnant county prisoner brought a civil rights action under §
1983 against a county sheriff’s office, alleging violation of her Eighth Amendment rights, alleging deliberate
indifference to her need for proper prenatal care and prompt transport to a hospital for delivery of her baby while
she was in their temporary custody. The county moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion and the
prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that no administrative remedies were available, and thus the prisoner did not fail to exhaust administrative remedies under the requirements of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act. The prisoner alleged that the delay in her transport to the hospital contributed to her baby’s birth defects. According to the court, the prisoner had no opportunity to grieve the delay in transport until
after the harm was done, the prisoner was uninformed about any deadline for filing a grievance, the prisoner
would not have known that she would be transferred to another jail four days after returning from the hospital,
and the prisoner could not have filed a grievance after she was transferred. (Kankakee County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE
MEDICATIONS

White v. Clement, 116 F.Supp.3d 183 (W.D.N.Y. 2015). A state prisoner sued the New York State Department
of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS) and a superintendent, two physicians, a registered nurse, a
nurse administrator, and a chief medical officer (CMO), who were employed by DOCCS, claiming violation of
the Eighth Amendment by denying adequate medical care. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The
district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded
by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a registered nurse ignored the prisoner’s excruciating pain and
vomiting up blood from adverse reactions to his prescription medications, in retaliation for the prisoner’s filing
of prison grievances. The court also held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material
fact remained as to whether the registered nurse refused to treat or to document the prisoner’s excruciating pain
and vomiting up blood from his adverse reaction to his prescription medications. (New York State Department of
Corrections and Community Supervision, Southport Correctional Facility

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE
PRIVATE PROVIDER
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE

White v. Washington County, Tenn., 85 F.Supp.3d 955 (E.D.Tenn. 2015). The mother of a county jail detainee
who committed suicide in custody brought an action against the county, county sheriff, and the private contractor
that provided health care services to county jail inmates, alleging federal constitutional claims and state-law
negligence claims. The defendants moved to dismiss. The court held that claims against the private health care
provider were “health care liability claims,” under Tennessee law, for which the mother was required to a file
certificate of good faith and a pre-suit notice of a potential claim, where the mother asserted that the provider
failed to properly assess or provide adequate care for detainee’s mental health issues. (Washington County Jail,
Tennessee)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE

Woodson v. City of Richmond, Virginia, 88 F.Supp.3d 551 (E.D.Va. 2015). A city jail inmate brought an action
against city, sheriff, and deputies, alleging deliberate indifference to the inmate’s medical needs during a severe
heat wave. The sheriff moved for summary judgment. The district court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as: (1) whether the sheriff instituted a policy of confining inmates with
medical issues to their cells during mealtime, denying the inmates access to air conditioning in the dining hall;
(2) whether the sheriff’s decisions to keep inmates confined would qualify as a policy; (3) whether the sheriff

29.308

was subjectively aware that conditions at the jail posed a substantial risk of harm to inmates; (4) whether the
sheriff was subjectively aware that his response to the risks posed to inmates by excessive heat was inadequate;
(5) whether the sheriff’s policy caused the inmate’s injuries; (6) whether the sheriff’s alleged failure to investigate two instances of heat-related deaths at the jail, was not persistent and widespread; and (7) whether the sheriff had at least a constructive knowledge of his deputies’ alleged failure to perform required 30-minute security
checks at a flagrant and widespread level. (Richmond City Jail, Virginia)
U.S. District Court
RESTRAINTS

Young v. District of Columbia, 107 F.Supp.3d 69 (D.D.C. 2015). A pretrial detainee who was shot in the back
by a police officer brought an action against the municipal police department and the officer, alleging under §
1983 that the defendants violated his Fourth Amendment rights by seizing him without probable cause and using
excessive force. The defendants moved for partial dismissal for failure to state claim. The district court granted
the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity from the
claim that handcuffing and shackling of the detainee during hospital treatment violated his due process rights,
where the law regarding use of handcuffs and shackles on a pretrial detainee during hospital treatment was not
clearly established at the time of the incident in question. The court held that the detainee failed to state a § 1983
claim based on the municipality’s alleged failure to train the officer, absent allegations regarding any specific
policy or custom, the enforcement of which caused the detainee’s injury, or any particular deficiency in training
or supervision resulting in the officer’s allegedly shooting an unarmed man with his hands raised. (District of
Columbia and D.C. Metropolitan Police Department)
2016

U.S. Appeals Court
EMERGENCY CARE
DELAY IN CARE

Bailey v. Feltmann, 810 F.3d 589 (8th Cir. 2016). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action against a law enforcement
officer, alleging that the officer’s decision to transport him to the jail rather than a hospital denied him emergency medical care for lacerations to his hand. The district court entered summary judgment in the officer’s favor
and the arrestee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that: (1) the Fourth Amendment right
against unreasonable delay in medical care for an arrestee was not clearly established at the time of the incident;
(2) it was clearly established, under the Due Process Clause, that pretrial detainees or arrestees had the right to be
free from deliberately indifferent denial of emergency medical care; and (3) evidence did not support the finding
that the arrestee had an objectively serious medical need for treatment. (Jefferson County Sheriff’s Department,
Missouri)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELAY IN CARE

Heard v. Tilden, 809 F.3d 974 (7th Cir. 2016). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against the medical director of a corrections department, the health care provider that contracted with the department to provide medical
care for inmates, and a provider’s employee, alleging that they violated the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel
and unusual treatment by delaying surgery for his recurrent hernia. The district court entered summary judgment
in the director’s, provider’s, and employee’s favor. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part,
vacated and remanded in part. The court held that the prisoner’s allegation that the medical director was involved
directly in the choice to stall necessary surgery for the prisoner’s recurrent hernia was sufficient to state a claim
against the director, in his individual capacity, for deliberate indifference to the prisoner’s medical need in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Illinois Department of Corrections, Wexford Health Sources)

U.S. Appeals Court
RESTRAINTS

Hernandez v. Dart, 814 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 2016). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a sheriff and the
county that employed him, alleging excessive force and deliberate indifference for shackling him to his hospital
bed and failing to provide assistance to move between his geriatric (jerry) chair and bed, with the result that his
bed sores did not improve. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment based on the
prisoner’s alleged failure to exhaust his administrative remedies, and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court
reversed and remanded. The court held that a prison employees’ failure to inform the prisoner of the grievance
procedure available to him at the time when he was hospitalized and complaining of being shackled to his hospital bed, meant that the grievance procedure was unavailable and that the prisoner did not have to exhaust his
administrative remedies. (Cook County Department of Corrections, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELAY IN CARE
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE

Mathison v. Moats, 812 F.3d 594 (7th Cir. 2016). A federal inmate brought a Bivens action against prison staff,
alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs when he suffered a heart attack. The defendants
moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion and the inmate appealed. The appeals court
affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that a prison supervisory lieutenant, who was not
medically trained and who had learned of the inmate’s symptoms of excruciating chest and arm pain only from
talking to the inmate from outside his cell, inferred from the inmate that he was having heart attack, spent 20
minutes trying unsuccessfully to reach a prison nurse, had authority to call 911 and summon an ambulance, but
failed to call a doctor or a hospital emergency room for advice. According to the court, that failure left the inmate in agony for almost five more hours, and thus the lieutenant was deliberately indifferent to the inmate’s
acute medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
The court found that a prison nurse, who was told second-hand by a person with no medical training, that the
inmate was experiencing acute chest and arm pain, asked unspecified and unexplained questions, and did not
request more information to help the nurse ascertain whether the inmate needed immediate treatment, failed to
exhibit a minimum level of care to which the prisoner who was suffering a heart attack was entitled, and was
liable for violation of the Eighth Amendment. The court noted that the nurse was aware of the inmate’s medical
history, which included the fact that the inmate was in the prison’s chronic care program for treatment of his
chronic high blood pressure, a condition that creates an increased risk of heart attack. (Federal Correctional Institution, Pekin, Illinois)

29.309

29.310

XIX

XIX

vacated in part, and remanded. The court held that police department employees who lacked a
subjective knowledge of the detainee’s potential for suicide were not liable, in their individual
capacities, for any constitutional violations. The court noted that the employees had no knowledge
of either the detainee’s emergency room records showing that the detainee told emergency room
staff she had attempted suicide four times before, or of doctor’s notes showing that the detainee
had suicidal ideation. The court denied summary judgment for one police officer, finding fact issues
as to whether he believed that there was a strong risk that the detainee would attempt suicide and
did not take any action to prevent her suicide. According to the court, the city’s alleged lack of a
suicide policy did not cause any constitutional violation. (City of Citronelle Jail, Alabama)
U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE

Scarver v. Litscher, 371 F.Supp.2d 986 (W.D.Wis. 2005). A state prison inmate sued officials

U.S. Appeals Court
INVOLUNTARY
MEDICATION

U.S. v. Evans, 404 F.3d 227 (4th Cir. 2005). A detainee appealed the decision of a district court to

U.S. Appeals Court
INVOLUNTARY
MEDICATION

U.S. v. Rivera-Guerrero, 426 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2005). The district court entered an order
permitting a defendant, who was committed to a federal medical center, to be involuntarily
medicated. The defendant appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded with instructions.
The court held that the district court abused its discretion by denying the defendant’s request for a
continuance, which prevented him from presenting any evidence to rebut the government’s medical
assertions and precluded the development of the requisite medically-informed record. (Federal
Medical Center, Springfield, Missouri)

U.S. District Court
INVOLUNTARY
MEDICATION

U.S. v. Rivera-Morales, 365 F.Supp.2d 1139 (S.D.Cal. 2005). After a defendant was determined to
be incompetent to stand trial and was committed to the Attorney General for treatment, the
government moved for an order directing the facility director to evaluate the defendant for future
dangerousness. The district court held that the use of involuntary medication to restore the
defendant to competency was inappropriate and ordered the defendant to be detained for an
additional 30 days to determine if he was subject to state commitment. (Federal Medical Center,
Butner, North Carolina)

seeking damages for their alleged indifference to his illness and challenging his conditions of
confinement. The district court entered judgment in favor of the officials. The court held that the
officials did not show deliberate indifference to the inmate’s mental illness condition, because he
was examined and prescribed various antipsychotic medications. The inmate alleged that the only
deficiency in his treatment was that officials failed to provide art supplies when they were
requested. The court found that there were fact issues as to whether the inmate was subjected to
conditions that were severe enough to violate the Eighth Amendment, but that the officials had
qualified immunity from the inmate’s damages suit. The court held that placing the mentally ill
inmate in a continuously-illuminated maximum security cell without windows was not clearly
established to be an Eighth Amendment violation at the time they placed the inmate in the most
extreme isolation section of the maximum security prison. (Wisconsin Secure Program Facility)
medicate a detainee against his will to render him competent to stand trial. The appeals court
vacated and remanded with instructions, finding that the government failed to demonstrate that
involuntary medication would “significantly further” its prosecutorial interest and that it was
“medically appropriate.” According to the court, the government did not disclose the particular
medication and dose range that it proposed to give the detainee, or indicate that it considered the
detainee’s particular mental or physical condition in reaching its conclusions. (Federal
Correctional Institution, Butner, North Carolina)

2006
U.S. Appeals Court
PSYCHIATRIC CARE

Borello v. Allison, 446 F.3d 742 (7th Cir. 2006). A prisoner brought a federal civil rights suit

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
SEGREGATION

Clark-Murphy v. Foreback, 439 F.3d 280 (6th Cir. 2006). The estate of a state inmate who died of
dehydration while in an observation cell brought two civil rights suits against prison employees,
alleging deliberate indifference to the prisoner's medical needs in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. The district court denied qualified immunity to 15 corrections officers and they
appealed. The appeals court held that a captain and sergeant who assisted the inmate after he
collapsed outside the mess hall were not subjectively indifferent to his serious medical needs in
violation of his Eighth Amendment rights, and thus were entitled to qualified immunity. The court
noted that each perceived that the inmate faced risks to his psychological health and took

against prison employees, alleging they were deliberately indifferent to the danger posed by
leaving him in a cell with a mentally unstable cellmate, who attacked him. The district court
denied the employees' motion for qualified immunity and they appealed. The appeals court
reversed and remanded, finding that the prison employees did not deliberately condone the
cellmate's attack on the prisoner, in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights, when they
reasonably responded to the prisoner's complaints by honoring his request to be transferred to
another cell, and by immediately taking the cellmate to a psychiatrist when he began acting
strangely, and by interviewing both men. The prisoner was attacked by his cellmate one week after
the cellmate's psychiatric evaluation. (Menard Correctional Center, Illinois)

30.33
XX

reasonable steps to ensure that officers in charge of the inmate's care secured psychological
services for him, and that neither officer had any further contact with the inmate or any reason to
believe that the inmate's medical needs were not being met. The court found that prison officers
and a psychologist who were in the position to perceive that the inmate, who was acting strangely
and had been locked in an observation cell and had not received the psychological assistance he
needed, were not entitled to qualified immunity on the Eighth Amendment claim alleging
deliberate indifference given their interactions with the inmate and their apparent failure to go up
the chain of command when a referral did not secure assistance for the inmate. The court also
found that the officers and psychologist were not entitled to qualified immunity on the claim that
they were deliberately indifferent to the hydration needs of the inmate who died of dehydration
after six days in an observation cell, as they could have perceived a serious risk to the inmate
based on a heat wave, the fact that water was repeatedly cut off to inmate's cell during their shifts,
and the reports of other inmates that the inmate had called out for water. The court found that a
correctional nurse who worked just one shift shortly after the inmate's placement in an
observation cell was entitled to qualified immunity from liability given her limited exposure to the
inmate and the resulting absence of evidence that there was reason to believe that the nurse
perceived that psychological help had not been obtained for the inmate or that his condition was
deteriorating. (Bellamy Creek Correctional Facility, Ionia, Michigan)
U.S. Appeals Court
PRETRIAL
DETENTION
INTAKE SCREENING

Drake ex rel. Cotton v. Koss, 445 F.3d 1038 (8th Cir. 2006). The legal guardian for an
incapacitated person who attempted to commit suicide while he was a pretrial detainee in a county
jail, and a state department of human services sued a county and various officials in their
individual and official capacities under § 1983, alleging violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments, and asserted a state law claim for negligence. The district court granted the
defendants' motion for summary judgment and the guardian appealed. The appeals court affirmed.
On rehearing, the appeals court held that county jailers' actions did not constitute deliberate
indifference, and the jailers' decision not to assign a special need classification to the pretrial
detainee was a discretionary decision protected by official immunity. According to the court, the
jailers' actions of conducting well-being checks of the pretrial detainee only every 30 minutes,
failing to remove bedding and clothing, and failing to fill the detainee's anti-anxiety prescription in
a timely manner did not constitute deliberate indifference. The court found that the jailers' view of
the risk was shaped by the diagnosis and recommendations of a psychiatrist, who indicated that
the detainee was not suicidal but simply manipulative. The court noted that the jailers' decision
not to assign a special need classification to the pretrial detainee, that would have required more
frequent observation, was a discretionary decision rather than a ministerial duty, protected by
official immunity. The detainee was discovered hanging by a bed sheet from a ceiling vent in his
cell. He was not breathing and the jailers immediately set to work resuscitating him and then
transported him to a nearby hospital. He survived, but suffered serious brain injuries as a result of
the suicide attempt. (McLeod County Jail, Minnesota)

U.S. District Court
PRETRIAL
DETENTION
RESTRAINTS

Glisson v. Sangamon County Sheriff’s Department, 408 F.Supp.2d 609 (C.D.Ill. 2006). A detainee
brought a civil rights action against county defendants and a police officer, alleging various
violations of his constitutional rights in connection with his arrest and detention. The defendants
moved to dismiss. The district court dismissed in part and declined to dismiss in part. The court
held that the detainee sufficiently stated claims under the Eighth Amendment and Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment against a jail and a correctional officer with respect to both
his first and second detentions. The court found that the detainee, who was awaiting a probation
revocation hearing, sufficiently stated a claim under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by
alleging that the county jail maintained policies and customs that tolerated cruel and unusual
punishment of convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees, and that the correctional officer
strapped him to a wheelchair for several hours, forcing him to urinate on himself and to sit in his
urine for several hours, while he was in a manic state. The inmate alleged that the jail and
correctional officer knew of his mental condition because it was documented and that the officer's
and jail's acts were intentional with malice and reckless disregard for his federally protected
rights. The court held that the detainee sufficiently stated denial of access to courts claims against
a county jail and correctional officers by alleging that the jail maintained a policy and practice of
arbitrarily denying inmates’ confidential consultations with their attorneys and that the officers
directly participated in the arbitrary and capricious denial of his access to counsel. The court found
that the detainee stated an equal protection claim against a county jail and officer by alleging that
the jail maintained a policy and practice that discriminated against him because of his mental
illness, and that an officer discriminated against him in terms of the type of confinement on the
basis of his mental illness. (Sangamon County Jail, Village of Grandview Police, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
RESTRAINTS

Hadix v. Caruso, 461 F.Supp.2d 574 (W.D.Mich. 2006). State prisoners filed a class action under §

1983 in 1980, alleging that conditions of their confinement violated their constitutional rights.
Following settlement of claims by consent decree, and termination of the enforcement of mental
health provisions of the consent decree, a prisoner moved to reopen the judgment regarding mental
health care and for the issuance of preliminary injunction. The district court granted the motion.
The court held that reopening the mental health provisions of the consent decree was warranted

30.34
XX

where many recurrent problems noted by physicians concerned “cracks” between medical and
mental health care. The court noted that forcing separate enforcement actions on related topics
would do a disservice to prisoners and administrators by forcing them to function under multiple
enforcement regimes. According to the court, the prison’s failure to provide daily psychologist
rounds to mentally ill prisoners in a segregation unit violated their Eighth Amendment rights,
inasmuch as such prisoners often had psychiatric needs which could not be accommodated without
rounds due to their lack of movement and the prisoners’ inability to request care, and that
segregation often placed prisoners with mental illness at a heightened risk of mental
decompensation and in conflict with correctional officers. The court held that the pattern and
practice of non-treatment of prisoners with mental illness, and the uncoordinated treatment of
prisoners presenting complicated cases with interdisciplinary problems, violated the Eighth
Amendment, in that it deprived prisoners of necessary services for serious medical and mental
health needs. The court found that the prison’s use of mechanical in-cell restraints, including “top
of the bed” restraints consisting of chaining a prisoner’s hands and feet to a concrete slab, as
disciplinary method and/or control mechanism constituted torture and violated the Eighth
Amendment, notwithstanding a six-hour limit on bed restraints but which did not prohibit the use
of other dangerous restraint devices at end of the six-hour period. (Southern Michigan State
Prison, Jackson)
U.S. Appeals Court
INVOLUNTARY
MEDICATION
PRETRIAL
DETENTION

Hills v. Kentucky, 457 F.3d 583 (6th Cir. 2006). An arrestee brought a civil rights action against a
treating psychiatrist at a state correctional psychiatric center where the arrestee was held,
alleging constitutional violations arising out of his being forcibly medicated. The district court
denied the psychiatrist’s motion for summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity and
the psychiatrist appealed. The court of appeals reversed and remanded, finding that the
psychiatrist was entitled to qualified immunity. According to the court, a reasonable governmental
employee in the position of the treating psychiatrist who prescribed medication to be forcibly
administered to the arrestee would not have clearly known his conduct was unlawful, and thus,
the psychiatrist was entitled to qualified immunity in the arrestee’s civil rights action against him.
The court order that authorized the arrestee’s transfer to the center for treatment and
examination after the court had found that the arrestee was not competent to stand trial on a
burglary charge, stated that the treatment ordered included forced medication if necessary, and
after seven weeks of treatment, the center’s mental health professionals concluded that the
arrestee could benefit from antipsychotic medication. (Kentucky Correctional Psychiatric Center)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Moots v. Lombardi, 453 F.3d 1020 (8th Cir. 2006). A state prisoner sued various prison officials,
alleging that they were deliberately indifferent to his serious mental health needs and that they
retaliated against him for filing a grievance. The district court entered summary judgment for the
officials and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed and held that: (1) the failure to
house the prisoner with cellmates of his choosing did not constitute deliberate indifference to his
serious medical needs, where the officials had ample reasons for their action, including safety
concerns, and the officials had no reason to know that their housing choices would have a serious
negative impact on the prisoner’s mental health; (2) any failure to ensure that the prisoner’s
medications were promptly transferred to solitary confinement did not constitute deliberate
indifference to his serious medical needs, absent a showing by the prisoner that he suffered harm
as a result; (3) a conduct violation for fighting did not constitute retaliatory discipline, where the
prisoner was bruised around his eye, and the fact that a conduct violation was later expunged did
not mean that there was not some evidence for its imposition; and (4) transfer to another prison
did not constitute disciplinary retaliation, where he disputed neither the computation of his
classification score nor the conclusion that his score made him ineligible to remain at the prison
from which he was transferred. (Missouri Eastern Correctional Center)

U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Perez v. Oakland County, 466 F.3d 416 (6th Cir. 2006). The father and personal representative of

an inmate's estate brought a § 1983 action against a county, sheriff department, sheriff deputies,
inmate caseworker, and psychiatrist alleging the defendants violated the inmate's Eighth
Amendment rights by failing to provide appropriate mental health treatment or monitoring while
he was being held in a county jail, leading to the inmate's suicide. The eighteen-year-old inmate
had hanged himself from a bedsheet tied to a vent in his single cell. The district court granted the
defendants' motions for summary judgment and the father appealed. The appeals court affirmed.
The court held that a county policy allowing a caseworker, who was not medical personnel, to
make decisions regarding housing assignments for mentally ill inmates did not demonstrate
deliberate indifference. The court noted that the caseworker was well-trained in mental health
needs and suicide, nothing established that the policy had ever resulted in suicide or attempted
suicide by another prisoner in the county jail, and the father's expert stated that prisoner
screening and placement decisions were commonly made by non-medical officials. The court held
that the caseworker was entitled to qualified immunity because it was not clearly established at
the time of the suicide that a county jail caseworker could be found to be deliberately indifferent to
an inmate's medical needs by moving him to single cell housing without first consulting the
inmate's treating physician or the jail's psychiatrist, even though the inmate had threatened
suicide and attempted suicide in the past. The court noted that the inmate was not deemed

30.35
XX

suicidal when he was moved to a single cell, the inmate was not generally deprived of medical
treatment involving his mental health needs, and prisoners had no general right to be correctly
screened for suicidal tendencies. (Oakland County Jail, Michigan)
U.S. District Court
RIGHT TO
TREATMENT

Price v. Wall, 428 F.Supp.2d 52 (D.R.I. 2006). An inmate brought a § 1983 suit against corrections
officials, alleging that he was intentionally transferred to the facility where he was confined in an
effort to frustrate his rehabilitation, in retaliation for his filing of a motion to compel compliance
with a state court order, in violation of the First Amendment. The defendants moved to dismiss.
The district court held that the inmate stated a First Amendment retaliation claim where he
alleged that corrections officials intentionally transferred him to the facility in retaliation for his
court action. According to the court, the question was not whether the defendants had a right to
transfer the inmate, but whether such action was accomplished for an unlawful purpose. The
inmate had been required, as a condition of his sentence, to complete certain rehabilitative
programs, including psychological and psychiatric treatment while incarcerated. After not
receiving any of the court-mandated treatment, the inmate filed a motion in the state courts
seeking to compel the Department of Corrections to comply with the state court order. After
several skirmishes, the Department of Corrections agreed to provide the inmate with the courtmandated treatment. The parties further agreed that if the inmate successfully completed the first
round of treatment, the Department of Corrections would upgrade his classification status,
permitting him to participate in further rehabilitative treatment as mandated by the state court.
The inmate successfully completed his first round of treatment and appeared before a classification
board for review of his classification status. Based on his successful completion of the initial round
of treatment and pursuant to the agreement between the inmate and the Department, the board
recommended that the inmate’s classification be upgraded. But the defendants refused to permit
an upgrade and instead launched no less than three separate, unrelated investigations into
various matters, delaying the inmate’s classification status upgrade and prohibiting him from
participating in further rehabilitation. (Rhode Island Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONFINEMENT
SEGREGATION

Scarver v. Litscher, 434 F.3d 972 (7th Cir. 2006). A state prisoner brought a civil rights action

U.S. Appeals Court
INVOLUNTARY
MEDICATION
PSYCHOTROPIC
DRUGS
DUE PROCESS

Spann v. Roper, 453 F.3d 1007 (8th Cir. 2006). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a

U.S. District Court
DELAY IN CARE
SUICIDE

Thomas v. Walton, 461 F.Supp.2d 786 (S.D.Ill. 2006). A state prisoner brought civil rights claims

against officials at a “supermax” prison, alleging that his conditions of confinement had aggravated
his mental illness. The district court granted summary judgment for the officials and the prisoner
appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the officials did not unconstitutionally subject
the prisoner to cruel and unusual punishment, absent evidence that they knew that the conditions
were making his mental illness worse. According to the court, prison authorities must be given
considerable latitude in the design of measures for controlling homicidal maniacs without
exacerbating their manias beyond what is necessary for security. The prisoner alleged that the
heat in the cells in the Summer interacted with the his antipsychotic drugs and caused him
extreme discomfort, and that the constant illumination of the cells also disturbs psychotics. The
prisoner alleged that the low level of noise, without audiotapes, a radio, or any source of sound,
prevented him from stilling the voices in his head. (Wisconsin Secure Program Facility)

prison nurse alleging deliberate indifference and violation of the due process clause. The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of the nurse. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court
affirmed in part and remanded in part. The court held that the nurse did not act with deliberate
indifference in forcing the prisoner to take another inmate’s medication. According to the court,
summary judgment was precluded by fact questions as to: (1) whether the state prison nurse’s
mistaken conduct in forcing the prisoner to take psychiatric medication created a serious medical
condition that the nurse knew of but ignored; and (2) whether immediate medical attention, such
as pumping the prisoner’s stomach, could have removed the medication before it was totally
absorbed in the prisoner’s system. The court found that the prisoner’s due process rights were not
implicated by the nurse’s inadvertent administration of another inmate’s psychiatric medication
because the nurse’s decision did not involve the treatment of an unwilling patient with psychiatric
medication. A few minutes after taking the medication, the prisoner felt his legs collapse and the
room spin. He awoke in pain in another room with a sore throat and dried blood. (Transitional
Care Unit, Missouri)

against correctional officials, alleging use of excessive force, deliberate indifference to medical
needs, and retaliation in violation of his First Amendment rights. The defendants’ motion for
partial summary judgment was granted in part and denied in part. The district court held that a
one-day delay in providing access to a mental health professional following the prisoner’s suicide
attempt did not involve deliberate indifference and that a 10-day delay in providing medical
attention was not deliberate indifference. The court found that the prisoner’s repeated refusal to
comply with an order to submit to a strip search during a cell inspection justified spraying him
with the chemical agent. The court found that the spraying did not involve the use of excessive
force, where the chemical was not used in a quantity greater than necessary to subdue the
prisoner, secure his compliance with the order, and assure the safety of the officers. The court
noted that the prisoner was being held in segregation in a maximum security prison and had a

30.36
XX

history of assaults on correctional officers. (Tamms Correctional Center, Illinois)
U.S. District Court
PRETRIAL
DETENTION
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE

U.S. v. Terrell County, Ga., 457 F.Supp.2d 1359 (M.D.Ga. 2006). The federal government brought a Civil Rights of
Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA) action against a county, county sheriff, and various other county officials,
seeking a determination that county jail conditions were grossly deficient in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The district court granted the government’s motion for summary judgment. The court held that the sheriff and other
officials were deliberately indifferent to the jail's gross deficiencies in the areas of medical and mental health care for
inmates, protection of inmates from harm, environmental health and safety of inmates, and fire safety, in violation of
the due process clause. The court noted that the lack of funds is not a defense to, nor legal justification for,
unconstitutional conditions of a jail, for the purpose of analyzing a deliberate indifference claim under the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Even if a defendant argues that it is planning or working towards construction of
a new jail to remedy the unconstitutional conditions at the current facility, the failure to implement interim measures to
alleviate those conditions demonstrates deliberate indifference, according to the court. (Terrell County, Georgia)

U.S. Appeals Court
EVALUATION

Williams v. Consovoy, 453 F.3d 173 (3rd Cir. 2006). A former state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against parole
board members, a psychologist who contracted with the state to provide mental health services, and others, alleging that
his arrest for a parole violation and the subsequent decisions of the parole board violated his Fourth and Eighth
Amendment rights. The district court granted summary judgment for some parole board members and the arresting
officer on immunity grounds, and granted the psychologist’s motion for summary judgment. The former prisoner
appealed. The appeals court affirmed and held that: (1) the claim against parole board members and the arresting
officer was not cognizable under § 1983; and (2) the psychologist enjoyed absolute immunity. According to the court,
regardless of the fact that federal habeas relief was no longer available, the parole revocation decision had not been
rendered invalid, and success on the former prisoner’s claims would necessarily invalidate a revocation decision. The
court held that the private psychologist who contracted with the state to perform the evaluation and presented his
findings to the adjudicative parole board, which then relied on his report and expertise in reaching its ultimate decision
to deny the inmate parole, acted as an arm of the court and enjoyed absolute immunity from the inmate’s § 1983 action
alleging the wrongful denial of parole. (New Jersey State Parole Board)

U.S. District Court
PRETRIAL
DETENTION

Winters ex rel. Estate of Winters v. Arkansas Department of Health and Human Services, 437 F.Supp.2d 851 (E.D.Ark.
2006). The administrator of the estate of mentally ill pre-trial detainee/civil committee who had died of peritonitis
while in custody of a sheriff sued the sheriff and the Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) under § 1983, the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Rehabilitation Act. Following bench trial, the district court held that
neither DHS nor the sheriff caused or contributed to the death of the detainee/committee, and they were not liable under
the Due Process Clause, Eighth Amendment, Rehabilitation Act, or ADA. The court found that the sheriff had no
policy or custom to apprehend and incarcerate acutely mentally ill persons, as indicated by the fact that the detainee
may have been only person under civil commitment ever housed in the sheriff's detention facility. (Benton County Jail,
Arkansas)
2007

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
FAILURE TO
PROVIDE CARE
PSYCHOTROPIC
DRUGS

Anderson ex rel. Cain v. Perkins, 532 F.Supp.2d 837 (S.D.Miss. 2007). A daughter, as next friend of a jail detainee
who suffered second-degree burns on her ankles, thighs, and buttocks while awaiting mental health commitment,
brought a civil rights suit against a sheriff and a county. The sheriff moved for summary judgment on claims brought
against him in his individual capacity. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the sheriff did not
violate the detainee's right to be protected from harm, absent evidence showing that restraints were likely used to
subdue her. The court found that the sheriff was not deliberately indifferent to the detainee's medical needs in failing to
administer her anti-psychotic medications, where the detainee's refusal to take her medications prior to being taken into
custody, coupled with her violent and psychotic behavior as the result of the refusal, was the basis for her commitment.
The court found that the sheriff was not deliberately indifferent in failing to discover second-degree burns of an
unknown origin on the detainee's ankles, thighs, and buttocks because jailers regularly observed the detainee through a
viewing window in her cell door, but did not actually enter the cell to visually inspect the detainee for signs of injury.
(Amite County Jail, Mississippi)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO
PROVIDE CARE
MEDICATION

Baylis v. Taylor, 475 F.Supp.2d 484 (D.Del. 2007). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against various defendants,
alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The defendants moved for dismissal. The district court
granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the inmate’s administrative remedies with respect to
his claim that prison personnel were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs were presumed to have been
exhausted, for the purposes of the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s requirement that administrative remedies be
exhausted before a § 1983 action could be brought, since no further remedies were available to the inmate. The court
held that the inmate failed to state a § 1983 claim for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs against a
prison doctor. The inmate alleged in his complaint that the doctor stopped prescribing a particular medication that the
inmate deemed appropriate for treatment of his attention deficit disorder, but the court held that this indicated merely a
difference of opinion as to treatment that did not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. According to the
court, the inmate stated a § 1983 claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs against a prison
psychologist by alleging that, despite his promises, the psychologist failed to provide the inmate with therapy for his
attention deficit disorder, and failed to have the inmate revisit a psychiatrist. The court also found that the inmate stated
a § 1983 claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs against a prison employee, with his complaint that
alleged that the inmate had no teeth, that he presented himself for dental care, and that the employee refused to let the
dental work go forward. (Delaware Correctional Center)

30.37
XXI

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO
PROVIDE CARE

Dickens v. District of Columbia, 502 F.Supp.2d 90 (D.D.C. 2007). A decedent's sister brought a wrongful death action
against a railroad and the District of Columbia after the decedent was struck and killed by a train shortly after his
release from prison. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint. The district court granted the railroad’s motion
and denied the District’s motion. The decedent’s sister alleged that her brother was severely mentally ill and was
released from the D.C. Jail without adequate preparation and without informing his relatives, which led to his death.
(District of Columbia)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
SUICIDE

Estate of Hill v. Richards, 525 F.Supp.2d 1076 (W.D.Wis. 2007. The estate of a county jail inmate who committed
suicide sued the social worker who interviewed the inmate shortly before her suicide, claiming deliberate indifference
to the inmate's suicidal mental condition, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The social worker moved for summary
judgment. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by fact issues as to whether the worker was aware of a
suicide risk, as the result of a statement by the inmate that she had poked herself with a thumbtack, and as to the
adequacy of the worker’s response to the inmate's statement. The court noted that expert testimony was not required to
establish that the social worker violated the Eighth Amendment by being deliberately indifferent to the health and
safety of the jail inmate; under those circumstances a jury of laypersons could conclude that there was a duty to protect
the inmate. The social worker knew, from her experiences with the inmate, that the inmate had a history of depression,
that she had been prescribed multiple medications for depression and that she previously had expressed a desire to die.
The social worker also knew that the inmate had not been taking her medication for several weeks and that she was
being housed in segregation at the jail, where neither other prisoners nor staff could easily monitor her. (Dane County
Jail, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
FAILURE TO
PROVIDE CARE

Giddings v. Joseph Coleman Center, 473 F.Supp.2d 617 (E.D.Pa. 2007). A parolee brought a civil rights action against
a parole officer and warrant officers who transported him back to prison from a halfway house, alleging that they were
deliberately indifferent to his serious physical and mental health needs in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments. The defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity. The district court
granted the motion. The court held that the parole officer was entitled to qualified immunity from the Eighth
Amendment claim that she was deliberately indifferent to the parolee’s need for medical treatment for a self-inflicted
cut on his arm, noting that the cut was not serious because the parolee did not experience significant blood loss or
infection, and the officer was not indifferent to the cut as evidenced by her offer to take the parolee to the hospital the
next day. The court ruled that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity from the claim that she was deliberately
indifferent to parolee’s mental health needs, where evidence did not show that the parolee’s mental health needs were
serious on the day he cut himself, as there was no indication of a genuine suicide attempt, and the officer was not
indifferent to those needs as she sent the parolee to the mental health unit of the halfway house. (Joseph Coleman
Center, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
INVOLUNTARY
TREATMENT
PSYCHOTROPIC
DRUGS

Hendon v. Ramsey, 528 F.Supp.2d 1058 (S.D.Cal. 2007). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that prison
medical officials involuntarily administered anti-psychotic medications without following proper procedures and in
deliberate indifference to his medical needs. The officials moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in
part and denied in part. The court held that the involuntary administration of anti-psychotic medications to the inmate
did not demonstrate deliberate indifference to the inmate's serious medical needs, as required to establish an Eighth
Amendment violation, where the officials administered the drugs in an attempt to treat the inmate's mental health crisis.
But the court held that the post-deprivation remedies available to the California inmate after the officials forcibly
administered anti-psychotic drugs were insufficient to protect the inmate's due process liberty interest in being free
from involuntary medication. According to the court, although state law established procedural safeguards before
inmates could be involuntarily medicated, the prison officials allegedly disregarded their duty to comply with those
established pre-deprivation procedures. The court found that the inmate's right to be free from arbitrary administration
of anti-psychotic medication was clearly established by existing case law in 2002, the time of this incident, and
therefore state prison officials were not entitled to qualified immunity from liability. (California State PrisonSacramento)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO
PROVIDE CARE
RECORDS
SUICIDE

Justus v. County of Buchanan, 517 F.Supp.2d 810 (W.D.Va. 2007). The administrator of a pretrial detainee's estate
filed a § 1983 action against a sheriff and county jail employees arising out of the detainee's jail suicide. The detainee
had a history of schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, anxiety, paranoia, and delusions and had been hospitalized for these
conditions several times in the three years prior to his suicide. His treatment records show that he was hospitalized
because family members reported suicidal ideation and bizarre, violent, and sexually inappropriate behavior. The
defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the sheriff's
deputies' failure to provide the pretrial detainee with prompt medical care after they discovered him hanging in his cell
did not amount to deliberate indifference to the detainee's serious bodily injuries, in violation of the detainee's due
process rights. The court noted that, even though the detainee was still alive when they took him down approximately
13 minutes after discovering him, there was no showing of an affirmative causal link between their inaction and the
detainee's death from hypoxic brain injury.
The court found that the sheriff was not deliberately indifferent to the pretrial detainee's suicidal nature, and thus
was not subject to liability under § 1983 for failing to take steps to prevent his suicide, even though a notation on an
incident report two months before the detainee's suicide indicated that another prisoner reported that the detainee “was
threatening suicide”. The court found no proof that the report did not simply inadvertently escape the sheriff's
knowledge.
The court held that a reasonable sheriff would not have understood from existing law that the absence of an
operating video surveillance system in the county jail would violate a suicidal pretrial detainee's constitutional rights,
and thus the sheriff was entitled to qualified immunity from liability under § 1983, even though the jail policy and
procedure manual required immediate repair of any defective security equipment, and the sheriff was aware that the
equipment had not been operating for some time.
According to the court, under Virginia law, the deputies' failure to provide the pretrial detainee with prompt medical

30.38
XXI

care after they discovered him hanging in his cell did not amount to gross negligence as required to overcome their
immunity from tort liability. (Buchanan County, Virginia)
U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE
RESTRAINTS

Norris v. Engles, 494 F.3d 634 (8th Cir. 2007). A county jail detainee, who had been diagnosed with manic bipolar
depression, sued a jail official under § 1983, alleging due process violations arising from his physical restraint. The
district court denied the official's motion for summary judgment based upon qualified immunity. The official
appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that the official's alleged conduct of cuffing the detainee
to a floor-grate toilet in an uncomfortable manner for approximately three hours, if proven, did not violate the
detainee's substantive due process rights. According to the court, the official’s alleged actions did not shock the
conscience and thus did not violate the detainee's substantive due process rights, inasmuch as official took such
action after the detainee, who had been diagnosed with manic bipolar depression, had threatened to pull out her own
peripherally inserted central catheter (PICC) so that she would bleed to death, and after the detainee had shown that
having her hands handcuffed behind her back was alone not an adequate form of restraint. (Independence County
Jail, Arkansas)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
ADA- Americans With
Disabilities Act

O'Guinn v. Lovelock Correctional Center, 502 F.3d 1056 (9th Cir. 2007). A prisoner filed a pro se suit claiming
prison officials denied him accommodation and treatment for mental illness, under the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act. The district court dismissed the suit pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform
Act (PLRA) and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the prisoner's suit did not
arise under § 1983 and that exhaustion is required under PLRA. The court found that the prisoner failed to exhaust
administrative remedies. According to the court, the prisoner's filing of grievances requesting a lower bunk due to
poor balance resulting from a brain injury were not equivalent to claims of denial of mental health treatment, and the
prisoner’s complaint to the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) did not exhaust the prison's internal grievance
process. The court found that the DOJ's investigation of the prisoner’s claims did not satisfy the exhaustion
requirement as the investigation did not terminate the prisoner's rights to pursue ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims
internally. (Lovelock Correctional Center, Nevada)

U.S. District Court
EVALUATION
SUICIDE

Probst v. Central Ohio Youth Center, 511 F.Supp.2d 862 (S.D. Ohio 2007). A plaintiff, on behalf of the estate of her
son who committed suicide while incarcerated at juvenile detention facility, brought a wrongful-death action against
the facility, its superintendent, a non-profit provider that performed suicide evaluations at the facility and a social
worker employed by the provider. The plaintiff asserted claims under § 1983 and state law. The facility and nonprofit moved for summary judgment. The district court denied the motion. The court held that under the state
compulsion test, the private provider that performed suicide evaluations at the juvenile detention facility was not a
“state actor” for § 1983 purposes. The court noted that the facility did not exert any control over suicide evaluations
and the provider performed evaluations on an as-needed basis using its own standards and procedures. According to
the court, the facility had discretion to implement the provider's recommendations resulting from the evaluations.
But the court held that the private provider was a state actor for § 1983 purposes because it was performing a “public
function.” (Central Ohio Youth Center)

U.S. Appeals Court
HOSPITALIZATION
ADA- Americans With
Disabilities Act

Winters v. Arkansas Dept. of Health and Human Services, 491 F.3d 933 (8th Cir. 2007). The administrator of the
estate of a mentally ill pretrial detainee/civil committee who had died of peritonitis in a county jail sued a sheriff and
the Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) under § 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and
the Rehabilitation Act. The district court entered judgment for the defendants. The administrator appealed and the
appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the pretrial detainee was not discriminated against on the basis of
his mental illness, as required to a establish violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) or the
Rehabilitation Act. The court noted that the detainee was arrested for criminal trespass, and although he was not
treated for his peritonitis due to his inability to communicate because of his mental illness, the sheriff and other jail
officials sought immediate treatment for the detainee's mental illness, and attempted to transport him to a state
hospital, but he was denied admittance due to lack of available space. The court found that neither the Arkansas
Department of Human Services (DHS) nor the county sheriff were deliberately indifferent to the serious medical
needs of the detainee, nor was there a policy or custom to deprive mentally ill detainees of treatment. According to
the court, the detainee died from a condition that neither defendant knew of or suspected, the sheriff and other jail
officers attempted to get the detainee into a mental health treatment facility, but no facility would accept custody of
him. (Benton County Jail, Arkansas)
2008

U.S. Appeals Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
MEDICATION

Gibson v. Moskowitz, 523 F.3d 657 (6th Cir. 2008). The representative of the estate of a mentally disabled inmate
who died of dehydration in a state prison brought a § 1983 action against a prison psychiatrist and others, alleging
deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, and asserting medical malpractice claims. The district court denied
the defendants' motion for summary judgment, and subsequently entered judgment, upon a jury verdict, in favor of
the representative. The court awarded $1.5 million in compensatory damages and $3 million in punitive damages.
The psychiatrist appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed in part.
The court held that evidence was sufficient to support a determination that the inmate had an objectively serious
medical condition and that the psychiatrist subjectively ignored the inmate's serious medical needs. The court found
that the compensatory damages award was not excessive and that the representative was entitled to recover punitive
damages. The court found that the punitive damages award was not excessive.
According to the court, the psychiatrist was in charge of the inmate's treatment team, he admittedly was aware
that the temperature in the observation room where the inmate was held exceeded 90 degrees, and that the
combination of the inmate's medication and the room temperature was potentially deadly. A psychiatric expert
testified that the inmate's medication affected the part of the brain that regulated body temperature and dissipated

30.39
XXII

heat, and another medical expert testified that the inmate's dehydration occurred over a period of several days.
Evidence was presented that during that period, the inmate lost 42 pounds. The psychiatrist never asked for the
inmate's temperature to be monitored, even when he had learned from a nurse and other prison employees that the
inmate had vomited. The nurse had advised the psychiatrist that the inmate was suffering from dehydration and
severe weight loss, and that his condition was deteriorating. The psychiatrist did not examine the inmate, change his
medication, or move the inmate to a cooler room.
The case was remanded to the district court to provide justification for its allocation of $1.5 million in
compensatory damages awarded by the jury between the § 1983 Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim
and the medical malpractice claim. The court had allocated $683,500, representing Michigan's high-tier noneconomic damages cap to the medical malpractice claim, and the rest to the deliberate indifference claim, but it
failed to provide any explanation for the allocation. The appeals court held that the allocation did not follow
intuitively from the evidence, since a higher standard of culpability was required for the deliberate indifference
claim. (Riverside Correctional Facility, Michigan)
U.S. District Court
PSYCHOTROPIC
DRUGS
SEGREGATION
SUICIDE

Graham v. Van Dycke, 564 F.Supp.2d 1305 (D.Kan. 2008). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against medical
providers working at a state correctional facility, alleging violations of her Eighth Amendment due process rights
arising from a strip search conducted by a male officer. She also challenged her mental health confinement. The
district court granted summary judgment for the medical providers. The court held that the prison doctor's decision
to remove the inmate from her cell after she became agitated and demanded two psychotropic drugs and to place her
in mental health segregation was not deliberate indifference. The court noted that the doctor's decision was based on
the inmate's previous history of mental illness and the doctor's knowledge that the inmate previously had a bad
experience using one of the drugs she requested. The inmate threatened to harm other inmates, and the doctor feared
for the inmate's safety because she had access to scissors. The court found that removal of the female inmate from
her cell into administrative segregation and removal of her clothing, after she became agitated and demanded
psychotropic drugs, did not violate her privacy or Eighth Amendment due process rights, even though officers who
performed such tasks were all male. According to the court, the inmate was on suicide watch, which required
removal of clothing to avoid self-injury, removal was done pursuant to established procedure and was videotaped,
and a staffing shortage rendered it impractical to include a female officer on the removal team. (Topeka Correctional
Facility, Kansas)

U.S. District Court
MEDICATION
RIGHT TO
TREATMENT
TRANSFER

Jarecke v. Hensley, 552 F.Supp.2d 261 (D.Conn. 2008). A prisoner who suffered from antisocial personality and
borderline personality disorders challenged his mental health treatment and an attempt to transfer him to a
correctional facility with dormitory housing, alleging violation of the Eighth Amendment. The prisoner moved for a
preliminary injunction to prevent his transfer and to be prescribed lithium and assigned to a single cell. The district
court denied the motion. The court found that the prisoner did not have a likelihood of success on the merits of his
claim, and that the prisoner would not suffer irreparable harm without an injunction. The court noted that the
prisoner's medical treatment was adequate, as lithium was generally not used to treat such disorders, and that no
medical diagnosis precluded his transfer to a dormitory setting or required confinement in single cell. (Connecticut)

U.S. Appeals Court
FORCED MEDICATION
PSYCHOTROPIC
MEDICATION

Obriecht v. Raemisch, 517 F.3d 489 (7th Cir. 2008). A state prisoner filed a pro se § 1983 action against prison
officials alleging that he was denied procedural due process when transferred to a state facility and when he was
forced to take psychotropic medications. The district court granted summary judgment to the officials and denied
motions for reconsideration. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the prisoner failed to
exhaust challenges to the transfers and forced medication. The court also found that the prisoner forfeited the
argument that exhaustion should be excused because of an inadequate law library because that issue had not been
raised in the district court. The court noted that a prisoner's exhaustion of administrative remedies before filing a §
1983 claim is required even if the prisoner believes his efforts in securing relief will be futile or if the administrative
authority has no power to grant the requested relief. (Wisconsin Resource Center and the Wisc. Dept. of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
COMMUNICATION
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
SPECIAL HOUSING
SUICIDE

Osterback v. McDonough, 549 F.Supp.2d 1337 (M.D.Fla. 2008). Inmates sued corrections officials, alleging that
conditions of close management (CM) status amounted to cruel and unusual punishment. Following the grant of the
inmates' motion to certify the class, and issuance of an order entering the officials' revised offer of judgment (ROJ),
the officials moved to terminate the ROJ pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The district court
granted the motion. The court held that corrections officers were deliberately indifferent in violation of the 8th
Amendment when inmates on close management (CM) status who truly were suicidal or otherwise suffered from
severe psychological distress declared psychological emergencies. According to the court, the officers failed to
summon mental health staff, and inmates thereafter attempted to commit suicide or otherwise harmed themselves, or,
in one case, actually committed suicide. But the court found no Eighth Amendment violations with regard to mental
health screening procedures, access to mental health care, the level of mental health staff, and instances in which
security staff interfered with the delivery of mental health services. The court held that termination of the revised
offer of judgment (ROJ), which was previously adopted by the district court as a final order and judgment, was
appropriate under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) in that isolated instances of prison staff's failure to
appropriately respond to a bona fide psychological emergency of inmates in close management status did not create
a current and ongoing violation of the class members' Eighth Amendment rights. (Everglades Corr’l Inst., Florida)

U.S. District Court
MEDICATION

Sauve v. Lamberti, 597 F.Supp.2d 1312 (S.D.Fla. 2008). A former prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a sheriff
and correctional health services corporation, alleging that the defendants denied the prisoner access to medications
while he was incarcerated. The district court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court held
that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to the extent that a doctor employed by
the corporation with which the county contracted for correctional health care services was aware of the prisoner's
history of drug problems, mental health issues, and prior noncompliance with treatment at the time of his decision
not to place the prisoner on medication. The court also found genuine issues of material fact as to whether the

30.40
XXII

decision not to place the prisoner on medication for the first 49 days of his incarceration was based on the medical
judgment of the doctor. The court held that summary judgment was also precluded by genuine issues of material
fact as to whether the corporation had a practice or policy that resulted in the prisoner being denied medication for
49 days during his incarceration. The court ruled that the sheriff failed to establish an entitlement to summary
judgment, even though the former prisoner presented evidence only as to the private corporation with which the
county contracted for correctional health care services because the county remained liable for constitutional
deprivations caused by policies or customs of the corporation. (Broward County Jail, Florida, and Armor
Correctional Health Services)
U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICATION
RESTRAINTS
STAFF

Shook v. Board of County Commissioners of County of El Paso, 543 F.3d 597 (10th Cir. 2008). County jail inmates
brought a class action suit alleging that jail conditions for prisoners with mental health needs violated the Eighth
Amendment's ban against cruel and unusual treatment. The district court denied the prisoners' motion for class
certification and dismissed the suit. The appeals court reversed and remanded. On remand, the district court again
denied certification, and the inmates appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that class certification could be
denied due to unmanageability, namely the difficulty of crafting specific injunctive relief applicable to the class as a
whole. The court noted that the plaintiff inmates variously complained that they were denied medications,
inadequately supervised, or subjected to excessive force or excessive restraint, and the propriety of the jail's actions
depended on circumstances that varied from class member to class member. (El Paso County Jail, Colorado)

U.S. District Court
DELAY IN CARE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
EVALUATION
MEDICATION

Swift v. Tweddell, 582 F.Supp.2d 437 (W.D.N.Y. 2008). An inmate brought a pro se § 1983 action against a sheriff,
deputies, and jail employees. The district court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court
found that the jail employees were not deliberately indifferent to the inmate's serious medical needs, in violation of
the Eighth Amendment, in connection with a delay in prescribing the inmate's “mental health” medications. The
court noted that on the day that the inmate submitted a request for mental health clinic services, the jail nurse
referred the request to the county Mental Health Department (MHD) pursuant to standard practice at the jail, but
because the inmate did not appear to be an emergency case and because he made no further requests for mental
health services, he was not seen by a psychiatrist from MHD for more than two months. He was prescribed Prozac
but did not, according to the court, suffer serious adverse effects as a result of the temporary gap between his request
for mental health care and his psychiatric examination. (Steuben County Jail, New York)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
SUICIDE

Tatsch-Corbin v. Feathers, 561 F.Supp.2d 538 (W.D.Pa. 2008). Survivors of an inmate who committed suicide sued
a jail's forensic specialist under § 1983, claiming violations of the Fourteenth Amendment's prohibition against
deprivations of life without due process. The district court denied the forensic specialist’s motion to dismiss. The
court found that the fact that the jail's forensic specialist lacked a contractual relationship with either the jail or a
health care contractor retained by the county did not preclude her from being considered a “state actor,” as required
for imposition of liability under § 1983 in connection with the inmate's suicide. According to the court, her role was
to provide mental health care to inmates, regardless of her other job responsibilities or the contractual nuances
through which she came to work at the jail, and she could not have done so without the authorization of the state.
The court found that the inmate's survivors alleged sufficient facts to establish that the forensic specialist should
have known, or did know, that the inmate presented a suicide risk and failed to take necessary or available
precautions to protect him. According to the court, alleged facts suggested that the inmate had made various threats
to kill himself, which had been taken seriously enough by jail officials to warrant the request of an evaluation by a
mental health professional, and he had a documented history of attempted suicide and psychiatric hospitalization, of
which the specialist was allegedly aware. (Blair County Prison, Pennsylvania)

U.S. Appeals Court
INVOLUNTARY
MEDICATION
PSYCHOTROPIC
DRUGS

U.S. v. Green, 532 F.3d 538 (6th Cir. 2008). A pretrial detainee who had been determined to be mentally incompetent
to stand trial on narcotics trafficking indictments, appealed the order of the district court for involuntary
administration of psychotropic medications. The appeals court affirmed, finding that an important governmental
interest was at stake in the prosecution, as required to support an order for involuntary medication. (Federal Medical
Center, Rochester, New York)

U.S. District Court
INVOLUNTARY
MEDICATION

U.S. v. Moruzin, 583 F.Supp.2d 535 (D.N.J. 2008). A defendant was indicted on charges of bank robbery and jury
tampering. The government moved for the involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication to the defendant
to render him competent to stand trial. The district court denied the motion. The court held that the administration of
medication would not significantly further the state's interests, that alternatives existed to involuntary administration
of the drug Haldol, and that involuntary administration of Haldol was not in the defendant's best medical interest.
(Federal Medical Center, Butner, North Carolina)
2009

U.S. District Court
COMMITMENT
DUE PROCESS
SEX OFFENDERS
TRANSFER

Bailey v. Pataki, 636 F.Supp.2d 288 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). Convicted sex offenders brought an action against state
officials, alleging that their involuntary psychiatric commitment deprived them of constitutional due process
protections. The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, or, in the alternative, for a stay pending
resolution of certain pending state court proceedings. The district court denied the motion. The court held that the
allegations of the convicted sex offenders were sufficient to state a procedural due process claim against state
officials for deprivation of the offenders' liberty interests in not being confined unnecessarily for medical treatment.
The offenders alleged that: (1) they were involuntarily transferred to state-run mental institutions based on the
certification of doctors designated by the New York State Office of Mental Health and the New York Department of
Correctional Services, instead of independent, court-appointed doctors; (2) that some were never served with a
notice of petition for their involuntary commitment; (3) that notice was not provided to any of the offenders' friends
and family; (4) and that they were not provided an opportunity to request a pre-commitment hearing and an
opportunity to be heard. The court found that the procedural due process rights of the convicted sex offenders, to

30.41

certain pre-transfer procedural safeguards, including notice, an opportunity to be heard, and a psychiatric evaluation
by court-appointed doctors, was clearly established at the time of their involuntary commitment and transfer from
prison to a mental hospital, so as to preclude any claim of qualified immunity on the part of New York officials. The
court noted that the offenders were certified for involuntary commitment after being examined for short periods of
time lasting no more than 20 minutes, and once certified, all six offenders were transported in handcuffs and
shackles where they were broadly evaluated for treatment. (New York State Office of Mental Health, New York
Department of Correctional Services)
U.S. District Court
ADA-Americans with
Disabilities Act
PSYCHIATRIC CARE

Burke v. North Dakota Dept. of Correction and Rehabilitation, 620 F.Supp.2d 1035 (D.N.D. 2009). A state inmate
filed a § 1983 action against prison officials alleging statutory and constitutional violations, including interference
with his free exercise of religion, lack of adequate medical care, retaliation for exercising his constitutional rights,
failure to protect, refusal to accommodate his disability, and cruel and unusual punishment. The district court granted
summary judgment for the defendants. The court held that: (1) failure to provide Hindu worship services on
Thursdays did not violate the inmate's equal protection rights; (2) the decision to reduce Hindu worship services at
the facility did not violate the Free Exercise Clause; (3) restriction of the Hindu inmate's use of camphor, kumkum,
incense, and a butter lamp during worship services did not violate the Free Exercise Clause; and (4) failure to find a
qualified Hindu representative to assist the inmate in the study of his religion did not violate the Free Exercise
Clause. The court found that the inmate's purported schizoid/sociopathic personality did not substantially limit any
major life activity, and thus did not constitute a “disability” under ADA, where the inmate did not describe the
nature and severity, duration, the anticipated duration, or the long-term impact of his mental impairment. The court
held that the inmate failed to demonstrate that his mental impairment substantially limited his ability to care for
himself. Similarly, the inmate's hepatitis C did not substantially limit any major life activity, and thus did not
constitute a “disability” under ADA. (North Dakota State Penitentiary)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
DUE PROCESS
SUICIDE

Cabral v. County of Glenn, 624 F.Supp.2d 1184 (E.D.Cal. 2009). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against
a city and a police officer alleging violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and claims under California
law. The city and officer filed a motion to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part.
The court held that the detainee, a psychotic and suicidal individual who collided with the wall of a safety cell and
broke his neck, failed to plead that a police officer, who extracted the detainee from his holding cell and used a stun
gun and pepper spray on him following an incident in which the detainee rubbed water from his toilet on his body,
was deliberately indifferent to the detainee's need for medical attention, as required to state due process claim under
§ 1983. According to the court, the detainee failed to allege that the officer knew he was suicidal and was not
receiving medical care, or that the officer attempted to interfere with the detainee's receipt of such medical attention.
The court found that the detainee's allegations that the officer used a stun gun, a stun-type shield and pepper spray in
an attempted cell extraction while the detainee was naked, unarmed and hiding behind his toilet were sufficient to
state an excessive force claim under § 1983. The court denied qualified immunity for the officer, even though the
detainee had not responded to the officers' commands to come out of his cell. The court noted that the law clearly
established that police officers could not use a stun gun on a detainee who did not pose a threat and who merely
failed to comply with commands. (City of Willows Police Department, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
EVALUATION
SUICIDE

Cloaninger ex rel. Estate of Cloaninger v. McDevitt, 555 F.3d 324 (4th Cir. 2009). A former detainee, who had been
seized by deputies for a psychological evaluation, brought a § 1983 action against deputy sheriffs and others alleging
violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court awarded summary judgment in favor of the
defendants and the detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court found that the deputies had probable
cause to seize and detain the detainee for a psychological evaluation, after a dispatcher received a 911 call from a
hospital to report that the detainee, who had called the hospital to report an adverse reaction to his prescription
medication, had threatened suicide. The deputies knew that the detainee had made prior suicide threats, that police
had responded to those threats, and that firearms had been found in the home. The court held that exigent
circumstances existed to support the warrantless seizure of the detainee for psychological evaluation in his home.
(Burke County, North Carolina)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO
PROVIDE CARE

Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, 922 F.Supp.2d 882 (E.D.Cal. 2009). State prisoners brought class actions against a
governor and other officials, alleging unconstitutional conditions of confinement as to the provision of medical and
mental health care. After granting a correctional officer association's motion to intervene as a plaintiff, the motion to
convene a three-judge panel was granted, to consider plaintiffs' request for order to reduce prison population. The
court held that clear and convincing evidence established that overcrowding was the primary cause of the provision
of inadequate medical and mental health care; (2) deficiencies in the provision of medical and mental health care
could not be resolved in the absence of a prisoner release order; (3) reduction in the California state prison
population to a system-wide cap was warranted; (4) the court's order was the least intrusive means necessary to
correct the violations, as required by PLRA; and (5) reduction in the California state prison population to a systemwide cap of 137.5% was warranted. (California Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
SUICIDE
SUPERVISION

Cuebas v. Davila, 618 F.Supp.2d 124 (D.Puerto Rico 2009). The mother of a man who committed suicide in a jail
cell filed a § 1983 action on behalf of herself, her minor daughter, and her deceased son, claiming deprivation of
constitutional rights by the arresting police officers and their supervisors, and seeking compensatory damages for
pain and suffering due to the loss of her mentally ill son. The district court dismissed the case in part, and declined to
dismiss in part. The court held that the mother, as sole heir of her deceased son, under Puerto Rico law, had Article
III standing to bring a § 1983 suit on behalf of her son against the police officers and supervisors for alleged
constitutional violations, since the mother inherited her son's cause of action. The court found that the mother's
allegations that arresting officers and their superiors were deliberately indifferent to her son’s risk of suicide in his
jail cell following his arrest were sufficient to state a § 1983 claim that the son's due process rights were violated
under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court held that the mother's allegations that the police officer in charge of

30.42

detainees was deliberately indifferent to her son's risk of suicide were factually sufficient to state a § 1983 claim that
the officer violated her son's due process rights, including allegations that the officer was aware of the likelihood that
the arrestee might commit suicide, and that the officer did not take obvious steps to prevent the arrestee's suicide.
The mother had explained to the officers that her son was mentally ill and that he had recently attempted suicide.
The son was placed in a cell after his shoes and belt had been removed. At some point during that night he
committed suicide. The mother alleged that he was not properly monitored while being held in custody, as he should
have been, by the officers who were aware he was suicidal. She alleged that his cell was not adequately monitored
even though the police officers who arrested him and who monitored him knew that he was mentally ill and had
recently attempted suicide. (Puerto Rico Police Department, Salinas Police Headquarters)
U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
SUICIDE

Edwards v. District of Columbia, 616 F.Supp.2d 112 (D.D.C. 2009). The representative of the estate of a woman
who committed suicide while being held in a District of Columbia jail brought an action against the District and the
jail's medical services contractor in the Superior Court for the District of Columbia, alleging negligence in the
provision of mental health care in ensuring that the woman was not a danger to herself. The representative also
alleged that the District and contractor failed to adequately provide a medical response upon discovering the woman
in the immediate moments after her suicide. The contractor removed the case to federal district court and moved to
dismiss. The district court held that the representative was required to exhaust administrative remedies under the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) on claims against the contractor before bringing an action under FTCA and that the
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over FTCA claims and claims against the District. (Dist. of Columbia Jail)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
MEDICATION
PSYCHIATRIC CARE

Estate of Rice ex rel. Rice v. Correctional Medical Services, 596 F.Supp.2d 1208 (N.D.Ind. 2009). The estate of a
prisoner who died while detained at a county jail, where he suffered from schizophrenia and various complications
as the result of his refusal to take his medication and his self-imposed starvation, brought an action against a private
hospital and a physician at the hospital. The estate alleged that the physician deprived the prisoner of his
constitutional rights in violation of § 1983, and that the hospital and physician negligently failed, under state law, to
provide adequate medical care and treatment to the prisoner. The district court granted summary judgment for the
defendants in part. The court held that an expert's summary judgment report, in which he stated, among other things,
that the treating physician was fully aware that the deceased prisoner had been refusing food, drink, and medications,
and that she had no reason to believe that the same pattern would not subsequently continue back in jail, was
admissible. The court also found that the expert's summary judgment report that the physician who treated the
schizophrenic prisoner prior to his death showed indifference to the prisoner's serious medical condition “by turning
a blind eye to the likely outcome of a return to jail” was admissible. The court noted that the expert was not offering
a legal conclusion as to the treating physician's subjective knowledge. The court found that the prisoner had a serious
medical need, as an element of his alleged Eighth Amendment violation. The court noted that the prisoner went to a
hospital because he was not taking his medications, was not eating, had lost 50 pounds in 13 months, and was
uncommunicative. Medical records indicated that the prisoner had severe mental problems, including schizophrenia,
which posed a risk of serious damage to his future health. The physician who treated the prisoner acknowledged the
seriousness of his condition in her medical recommendation, and ten weeks after his hospital stay, the prisoner died
from malnutrition. (Elkhart County Jail, Indiana)

U.S. District Court
ADA-Americans with
Disabilities Act
MEDICATION

Flynn v. Doyle, 630 F.Supp.2d 987 (E.D.Wis. 2009). Prisoners at a state correctional institution brought a class
action against a governor and other defendants, alleging that medical and mental health care provided to them at the
institution violated the Eighth Amendment and Title II of Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The prisoners
moved for a preliminary injunction and the district court granted the motion. The court found that the class of
prisoners was reasonably likely to succeed at trial on the merits of its Eighth Amendment claims against a governor,
institution and other defendants alleging that continued use of correctional officers to distribute medications at the
institution posed a substantial risk of serious harm to members of the class. According to the court, the defendants
knew of the risk but failed to take reasonable steps to abate it. (Taycheedah Correctional Institution, Wisconsin)

U.S. Dist r ict Cour t
ADA- Amer icans wit h
Disabilit ies Act
EQUAL
PROTECTI ON

Flynn v. Doyle, 672 F.Supp.2d 858 (E.D.Wis. 2009). Female inmates filed a class action alleging that medical, dental, and mental health care provided to prisoners at a state facility violated the Eighth Amendment, Equal Protection
Clause, Title II of Americans with Disabilities Act, and Rehabilitation Act. The officials moved for partial summary
judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment
was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether there were systemic and gross deficiencies in staffing, facilities, and procedures at the state correctional facility that resulted in provision of inadequate medical care
for female inmates. The court also found that summary judgment was precluded on the inmates' claim that the state
violated Title II of ADA by failing to provide access to programs to inmates with mobility, visual, and hearing disabilities. The court found a genuine issue of material fact as to the effectiveness of accommodations offered to disabled inmates at a state correctional facility. The court found that the female inmates' allegation that the state provided
inpatient mental health services for male inmates, but not for female inmates, was sufficient to state claim against the
state under the Equal Protection Clause, despite the state's contention that the disparity was natural outgrowth of the
historically small number of female inmates in the state. (Taycheedah Correctional Institution, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
INTAKE SCREENING
PRETRIAL DETENTION
SUICIDE
SUPERVISION

Francis ex rel. Estate of Francis v. Northumberland County, 636 F.Supp.2d 368 (M.D.Pa. 2009). The administrator
of the estate of a detainee who committed suicide while in a county prison brought an action against the county and
prison officials, asserting claims for Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment reckless indifference and Eighth Amendment
cruel and unusual punishment under § 1983. The administrator also alleged wrongful death under state law. The
county defendants brought third-party claims against a psychiatrist who evaluated the detainee, and the psychiatrist
counter-claimed. The county defendants and psychiatrist moved separately for summary judgment. The court held
that the County, which paid $360,000 in exchange for a release of claims brought by the estate of the detainee,
would be entitled to indemnity on third-party claims against the psychiatrist who evaluated the detainee if a jury
determined that the psychiatrist was at fault in the detainee's suicide. The court held that summary judgment was

30.43

precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to: (1) whether the evaluating psychiatrist knew the pretrial detainee
was a suicide risk and failed to take necessary and available precautions to prevent the detainee's suicide as would
show deliberate indifference to the detainee's medical needs; (2) whether the evaluating psychiatrist was an
employee of the county prison entitled to immunity under the Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Tort Claim Act
(PSTCA) or was an independent contractor excluded from such immunity; (3) whether the evaluating psychiatrist's
failure to appropriately document the pretrial detainee's medical records led to the detainee's removal from a suicide
watch; (4) whether the recordation of the pretrial detainee's suicide watch level was customary, precluding summary
judgment as to whether the evaluating psychiatrist had a duty to record this information; (5) whether the evaluating
psychiatrist's failure to communicate the appropriate suicide watch level to county prison officials resulted in the
pretrial detainee's suicide; and (6) whether the evaluating psychiatrist communicated the appropriate suicide watch
level for the pretrial detainee to county prison officials and whether the psychiatrist was required to record the watch
level in the detainee's medical records. The court found that the county prison had an effective suicide policy in
place and thus the psychiatrist who evaluated the pretrial detainee had no viable Fourteenth Amendment inadequate
medical care and failure to train counterclaims under § 1983 against the county. According to the court, while at
least one individual at the prison may have failed to carry out protocols for the diagnosis and care of suicidal
detainees, the policy would have been effective if properly followed as was customary at the prison. The court held
that the county prison warden adequately trained subordinates with regard to protocols for the care and supervision
of suicidal inmates and adequately supervised execution of these protocols, and thus the psychiatrist who evaluated
the pretrial detainee had no viable counterclaim under § 1983 against the warden for failure to adequately train or
supervise under the Fourteenth Amendment. (Northumberland County Prison, Pennsylvania)
U.S. District Court
PSYCHIATRIC CARE
RESTRAINTS

Gay v. Chandra, 652 F.Supp.2d 959 (S.D.Ill. 2009). A state prisoner, who suffered from antisocial and narcissistic
personality disorders, brought a § 1983 action against a psychiatrist who treated him in prison, alleging that conditions of confinement to which the psychiatrist subjected him violated the Eighth Amendment. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the psychiatrist in part, and denied in part. The court held that summary
judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the cell where the prisoner was restrained
naked was excessively cold, and as to whether the psychiatrist knew that the prisoner would in fact be restrained
naked in excessively low temperatures. Similarly, the court found fact issues as to whether the psychiatrist's decision
not to allow the prisoner to wear any clothing while he was restrained denied the prisoner a “civilized measure” of
life's necessities, and as to whether the psychiatrist was deliberately indifferent to the fact that the prisoner was restrained without clothes. According to the court, summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether the psychiatrist's denial of food to the prisoner while the prisoner was restrained for 32 hours constituted an Eighth Amendment violation. The court found that the decision of the psychiatrist to use therapeutic restraints on the prisoner did not, in and of itself, violate the Eighth Amendment; where the psychiatrist's decision to
restrain the prisoner was to protect the prisoner from harming himself. The court found that the psychiatrist was not
entitled to qualified immunity in the prisoner's § 1983 action alleging Eighth Amendment violations arising from his
medical treatment; where a fact issue existed as to whether the psychiatrist violated the prisoner's Eighth Amendment rights, and the prisoner's right to receive medical treatment for his serious medical needs, and his right not to be
punished through conditions of his confinement, was a clearly established right. (Tamms Correctional Center, Ill.)

U.S. District Court
DELAY IN CARE
DUE PROCESS

Greene v. Furman, 610 F.Supp.2d 234 (W.D.N.Y. 2009). A state inmate brought a pro se § 1983 action against
corrections officials, alleging various constitutional violations arising out of disciplinary proceedings instituted after
he allegedly spit at another inmate. The district court dismissed the case. The court held that an allegation that a
corrections officer issued a false misbehavior report against the inmate failed to state a claim for a due process
violation. The court noted that the issuance of false misbehavior reports against an inmate by corrections officers is
insufficient on its own to establish a denial of due process. According to the court, the allegation that the inmate,
who was being escorted to a mental health appointment when he became involved in an altercation with another
inmate and was not allowed to continue to his appointment, failed to state a claim for an Eighth Amendment
violation. The court found that any delay in the inmate's mental health treatment did not cause him actual harm or
put his health at risk, and there was no evidence that the delay resulted from any sadistic or otherwise impermissible
motive. (Southport Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
ADA-Americans with
Disabilities Act
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE

Hughes v. Colorado Dept. of Corrections, 594 F.Supp.2d 1226 (D.Colo. 2009). A state prisoner brought a § 1983
action against the Colorado Department of Corrections (CDOC), the Colorado Parole Board, and the operator of a
residential community corrections facility, alleging failure to adequately respond to the prisoner's mental health
needs in violation of his constitutional rights and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The district court
dismissed the complaint in part and denied dismissal in part. The court held that the prisoner's § 1983 claims against
the Colorado Department of Corrections (CDOC) and the Colorado Parole Board were barred by the Eleventh
Amendment, where Colorado had not waived Eleventh Amendment immunity, Congress had not abrogated state
sovereign immunity for § 1983 claims, and both the CDOC and Board were state agencies. The court held that the
prisoner's allegations of physical injury merely stemmed directly from his alleged mental illness and constituted only
common manifestations of depression and anxiety, and thus were insufficient under the Prison Litigation Reform
Act (PLRA) to state a claim for money damages against the CDOC and the Board for alleged ADA violations.
According to the court, the prisoner's allegations were sufficient to plead a claim against the CDOC for
discriminatorily denying the prisoner access to medical care in violation of Title II of the ADA. The prisoner alleged
that the CDOC maintained a policy of assuring that inmates and parolees received required mental health treatment,
that the CDOC intentionally failed to provide him mental health treatment while he was at the correctional facility,
and that the CDOC denied his access to such treatment while on parole. The court noted that Title II of the ADA
does not categorically bar a state parole board from making an individualized assessment of the future dangerousness
of an inmate by taking into account the inmate's disability. (Sterling Corr’l Facility, Independence House, Colorado)

30.44

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
MEDICATION
PRIVACY

Hunter v. Amin, 583 F.3d 486 (7th Cir. 2009). The sister of a pretrial detainee who committed suicide in a county jail
brought an action on her own behalf, and as the personal representative of the estate of her deceased brother, against
a jail psychiatrist, county sheriff, and the county, asserting claims under § 1983, as well as claims of medical
malpractice. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the sister appealed. The
appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The appeals court held that the county jail's policy
that prevented the pretrial detainee from speaking to the jail psychiatrist without a jail officer being present did not
violate the detainee's constitutional rights, so as to serve as the basis for holding the county liable for the detainee's
death under § 1983. According to the court, the pretrial detainee had a constitutional right to adequate mental health
treatment, but there was no evidence suggesting that the detainee could not have received adequate mental health
treatment in the presence of a corrections officer. The appeals court held that summary judgment was precluded by a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the jail psychiatrist committed medical malpractice by discontinuing the
medication of the detainee who later committed suicide. (St. Clair County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
PAMII- Protection and
Advocacy for Mentally
Ill Individuals Act

Indiana Protection and Advocacy Services Com'n v. Commissioner, Indiana Dept. of Correction, 642 F.Supp.2d 872
(S.D.Ind. 2009). The Indiana Protection and Advocacy Services Commission (IPAS) brought an action against the
Indiana Department of Correction, alleging violations of federal and state law in the conditions of custody of
mentally ill prisoners. The Department moved to dismiss for lack of standing. The district court denied them motion.
The court held that IPAS had an associational standing under the Protection and Advocacy of Mentally Ill
Individuals Act (PAMII) to bring suit, and the action was not an intramural dispute between two state agencies that
could be resolved by the governor. The court noted that mentally ill prisoners would have standing to sue on their
own behalf for violations of federal and state law in the conditions of their custody, and the interests that IPAS
sought to protect were not merely germane to the IPAS's purpose, they were its reason for existence. According to
the court, IPAS was not a traditional state agency, was independent of the governor, was funded by the federal
government under the Protection and Advocacy of Mentally Ill Individuals Act (PAMII), received no state funding
and had authority independent of the state to pursue administrative, legal, and other appropriate remedies to ensure
the protection of individuals with mental illness who are receiving care or treatment in the state. (Indiana Department
of Correction)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
MEDICATION

Mastroianni v. Reilly, 602 F.Supp.2d 425 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against a sheriff and
medical personnel at a county correctional center, alleging a violation of his Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendment rights. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants in part, and denied in
part. The court held that the inmate's treatment by the jail's director of psychiatry and its mental health group did not
pose any particular risk of harm or result in actual adverse consequences to the inmate, as would constitute deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The inmate was seen by someone in the
mental health department, including the director, on a regular basis, and when he saw the director, he examined the
inmate and discussed his problems. The inmate's medications were changed during the course of his treatment as a
result of meeting with practitioners in the mental health department, and on one occasion the inmate complained to
the director about his medication being discontinued and the director reacted appropriately and had it reinstated.
(Nassau County Correctional Center, New York)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
PSYCHIATRIC CARE

Proctor v. Applegate, 661 F.Supp.2d 743 (E.D.Mich. 2009). State prisoners brought a § 1983 action against
Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) employees and multiple prison facilities, alleging violations of their
constitutional rights. The defendants moved to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds and for failure to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court
held that a prisoner's allegation in his complaint that an MDOC employee did not refer him for psychiatric treatment
after he attempted to commit suicide sufficiently stated a § 1983 claim for an Eighth Amendment violation based on
denial of medical treatment. (Michigan Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE

Scott v. DiGuglielmo, 615 F.Supp.2d 368 (E.D.Pa. 2009). A state inmate filed an action seeking a declaration that he
had serious and continuing mental health condition and had not been receiving adequate treatment, and an injunction
ordering prison officials to make corrections to his prison charts. The district court granted the officials’ motion to
dismiss in part and denied in part. The court held that the inmate had standing to seek declaratory and injunctive
relief against prison officials based on his claim that he had a serious and continuing mental health condition and had
not been receiving adequate treatment, where the alleged denial of proper medical and psychiatric care was
continuing, and there was a substantial likelihood that his injury would be addressed by the requested relief. (State
Correctional Institution at Graterford, Pennsylvania)

U.S. Appeals Court
COMMITMENT
SEX OFFENDERS

Serna v. Goodno, 567 F.3d 944 (8th Cir. 2009). A patient of a state mental hospital, involuntarily civilly committed
as a sexually dangerous person pursuant to a Minnesota sex offender program, brought a § 1983 action against a
program official and against the head of the state's Department of Human Services. The patient alleged that visual
body-cavity searches performed on all patients as part of a contraband investigation violated his Fourth Amendment
rights. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, and the patient appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The court held that visual body-cavity searches performed on all patients of a state mental hospital, as part
of a contraband investigation following the discovery of a cell-phone case in a common area, did not infringe upon
the Fourth Amendment rights of the patient involuntarily civilly committed to the facility as a sexually dangerous
person. According to the court, even though facility-wide searches may have constituted a disproportionate reaction,
cell phones presented a security threat in the context of sexually violent persons, there was a history of patients' use
of phones to commit crimes, and the searches were conducted in a private bathroom with no extraneous personnel
present and in a professional manner with same-sex teams of two. (Minnesota Sex Offender Program, Moose Lake,
Minnesota)

30.45

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
PSYCHIATRIC CARE

Vallario v. Vandehey, 554 F.3d 1259 (10th Cir. 2009). County jail inmates sued a county sheriff and a county's
administrator of jail operations in their official capacities, alleging disregard of risks to inmates from restraint chairs
and other devices, and the denial of access to psychiatric care for indigent inmates. The district court granted the
inmates' motion for class certification and the defendants petitioned for interlocutory appeal. The appeals court
granted the petition and remanded the case. The court held that the district court abused its discretion by
misconstruing the complaint as alleging that denial of adequate mental health treatment affected all inmates, and
abused its discretion by refraining from any consideration whatsoever of the action's merits. (Garfield County Jail,
Colorado)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
SUICIDE

Vann v. Vandenbrook, 596 F.Supp.2d 1238 (.D.Wis. 2009). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a crisis
intervention worker, registered nurse, and several corrections officers, alleging deliberate indifference to a serious
medical need in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The prisoner moved to proceed in forma pauperis and for the
appointment of counsel. The district court granted the motion to proceed in part and denied in part, and denied the
motion for appointment of counsel. The court held that the prisoner stated a § 1983 claim against the intervention
worker and the unknown officer where they were aware of the prisoner's suicide risk when the worker refused to
place the prisoner in an observation program and the officer provided the prisoner with a razor and a nail clipper and
left the prisoner unattended. The court found that the registered nurse's failure to provide treatment to the prisoner
constituted deliberate indifference to the prisoner's serious medical needs, as required for the prisoner to state a §
1983 claim for violation of the Eighth Amendment, where the prisoner had sustained 133 self-inflicted wounds that
were bleeding and the nurse merely inspected his wounds. According to the court, the corrections officers who
performed an emergency cell extraction of the prisoner following his suicide attempt, transported him to a day room
where the prison's registered nurse performed an inspection of the prisoner's wounds, thus precluding the prisoner's §
1983 claim against the officer for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of Eighth
Amendment. (Columbia Correctional Institution, Wisconsin)

U.S. Appeals Court
INTAKE SCREENING
MEDICATION
SEGREGATION

Vaughn v. Gray, 557 F.3d 904 (8th Cir. 2009). A detainee’s sister brought a § 1983 action against several officers
and county employees alleging they were deliberately indifferent to the detainee’s serious medical needs which
resulted in his death. The district court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment based on qualified
immunity and the defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that a genuine issue of material
fact existed as to whether jail officials deliberately disregarded the medical needs and condition of the detainee. The
detainee was charged with first-degree sexual assault. During the jail's intake procedure, he completed a medical
intake form, indicating that he had a history of mental illness, headaches, epilepsy/seizures, ulcers, and
kidney/bladder problems, but indicating that he did not have a history of heart problems or high or low blood
pressure. Although the detainee had no medications with him upon his arrival at the jail, his mother later brought his
medications, including an anti-depressant. He received his medication for several days until the prescription ran out.
He missed several doses before a new prescription arrived. During the time he was without medication, his cellmate
told jail employees that the detainee had been ingesting shampoo and engaging in other odd behavior. The detainee
was moved to an isolation cell to be monitored on an hourly basis. He was observed vomiting and asked to see a
nurse but he was not provided access. He was later found dead in his cell. An autopsy determined that he died of
natural causes: arteriosclerotic cardiovascular disease, causing a heart attack that resulted in his death. (Greene
County Jail, Arkansas)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
MEDICATION
PSYCHIATRIC CARE

Wade v. Castillo, 658 F.Supp.2d 906 (W.D.Wis. 2009). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against prison
psychiatrists, alleging that the psychiatrists committed medical malpractice and exhibited deliberate indifference to
his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The psychiatrists moved for summary judgment.
The district court granted the motion in part, and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was
precluded by genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the prisoner, who was diagnosed with a psychotic
disorder, had a serious medical need at the time the prison psychiatrist discontinued the prisoner's medications, and
whether the psychiatrist was aware that he was exposing the prisoner to a substantial risk of serious harm by taking
him off the medications. The court held that the refusal of the prisoner's treating psychiatrist to prescribe
psychotropic medication did not amount to deliberate indifference to the prisoner's serious medical need, as would
violate the Eighth Amendment, where the psychiatrist did not prescribe medication because he was uncertain
whether the prisoner had a psychotic disorder. The court found that summary judgment was precluded by genuine
issues of material fact as to whether the prisoner's treating psychiatrist met the requisite standard of care for
psychiatrists when he refused to prescribe psychiatric medication to the prisoner and in providing psychiatric care to
the prisoner, and as to whether the psychiatrist's alleged negligence was a substantial factor in causing the prisoner's
harm. (Green Bay Corr'l. Institution, Dodge Correctional Institution and Racine Correctional Institution, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE

Wilson v. Taylor, 597 F.Supp.2d 451 (D.Del. 2009). The mother of a deceased prisoner, who died in his solitary cell
as a result of asphyxia due to hanging after an apparent attempt to feign suicide, brought a § 1983 action against
Delaware Corrections officials. The district court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court
held that fact issues precluded summary judgment on the mother’s § 1983 claim, custom or policies claim, deliberate
indifference claim, qualified immunity grounds, wrongful death claim, and claim for punitive damages. The court
found genuine issues of material fact as to: (1) whether the prisoner's detention was valid at the time of his death; (2)
whether Delaware Corrections officials failed to train and or maintain customs, policies, practices, or procedures,
relating to the prisoner's repeated release inquiry; (3) whether Delaware Corrections officials' ignored the prisoner's
risk of hurting himself to get the attention of guards as to his repeated release inquiries; (4) whether a correctional
officer acted in good faith and without gross or wanton negligence in throwing the prisoner against a bench in his
cell while holding his throat and threatening him verbally; and (5) whether Delaware Corrections officials' conduct
in ignoring the prisoner's repeated release inquiries was a proximate cause of the prisoner's ultimate death. The court
also found that fact issues existed as to whether Delaware Corrections officials acted outrageously and with reckless
indifference to the rights of others, precluding summary judgment on the mother's § 1983 claim for punitive
damages. (Delaware Correctional Center)

30.46

2010
U.S. District Court
DELAY IN CARE
DUE PROCESS
PAMII- Protection and
Advocacy for Mentally
Ill Individuals Act
TRANSFER

Advocacy Center for Elderly and Disabled v. Louisiana Dept. of Health and Hospitals, 731 F.Supp.2d 583 (E.D.La.
2010). A disability advocacy organization and incompetent detainee's next friend brought an action against the
Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals and Department officials, challenging the Department's practice of
subjecting incompetent criminal defendants to extended delays in parish jails before their transfer to a mental health
facility. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court denied the motion. The court held that the action fell
within the Ex Parte Young exception to sovereign immunity, where the organization alleged an ongoing violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment and sought prospective relief in the form of a permanent injunction requiring officials to
accept custody of incompetent defendants and provide them with proper restorative treatment. The court noted that
the Ex Parte Young exception to sovereign immunity holds that a suit is not barred when it is brought against state
officials to enjoin the enforcement of an allegedly unconstitutional law. The court found that the disability advocacy
organization had associational standing to bring the due process challenge where the organization was allied with
and representative of its constituents, who had standing to sue in their own right. The federal laws under which the
Advocacy Center was established include the Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act of
1986 (“PAIMI”). (Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals, Feliciana Forensic Facility)

U.S. District Court
DELAY IN CARE
DUE PROCESS
TRANSFER

Advocacy Center for Elderly and Disabled v. Louisiana Dept. of Health and Hospitals, 731 F.Supp.2d 603 (E.D.La.
2010). A disability advocacy organization brought an action challenging the Louisiana Department of Health and
Hospitals' practice of subjecting incompetent criminal defendants to extended delays in parish jails before their
transfer to a mental health facility. The organization moved for a preliminary injunction. The district court granted
the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the organization demonstrated a substantial likelihood of
success on the merits of its due process claim, and demonstrated a substantial threat of irreparable injury if the
injunction did not issue. The court found that the organization demonstrated that the threatened injury outweighed
the damage the injunction might cause, and the organization demonstrated that the public interest would not be
disserved if an injunction was issued. The organization claimed that the Louisiana Department of Health and
Hospitals' practice of subjecting criminal defendants found to be incompetent to stand trial to extended delays in
parish jails before their transfer to a mental health facility was not rationally related to the restoration of the
defendants' competency, in violation of their due process rights, where incompetent defendants remained in parish
jails because mental health facility was full, not because remaining in jail might restore their competency. The court
noted that the organization presented evidence that continued incarceration in parish jails could exacerbate the
incompetent defendants' mental conditions. The court held that inadequate funding could not excuse the
Department's perpetuation of unconstitutional conditions of confinement. (Louisiana Department of Health and
Hospitals, Feliciana Forensic Facility)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE

Antonetti v. Skolnik, 748 F.Supp.2d 1201 (D.Nev. 2010). A prisoner, proceeding pro se, brought a § 1983 action
against various prison officials, alleging various constitutional claims, including violations of the First, Fifth, Sixth,
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court dismissed in part. The court held that the prisoner's
allegations were factually sufficient to state a colorable § 1983 claim that prison officials violated the Eighth
Amendment by depriving him of needed medical care. The prisoner alleged that he was housed in
segregation/isolation, leading to a mental health breakdown, and: (1) that he was seen by mental health professionals
eight times over a five year period instead of every 90 days as required by administrative regulations; (2) that mental
health professionals recommended he pursue art and music for his mental health but that prison officials denied him
the materials; (3) and that the officials' actions resulted in the need to take anti-psychotic and anti-depression
medications due to suffering from bouts of aggression, extreme depression, voices, paranoia, hallucinations,
emotional breakdowns and distress, unreasonable fear, and systematic dehumanization. The court found that the
prisoner's allegations were sufficient to state a colorable § 1983 Eighth Amendment claim for violation of his right to
be free of cruel and unusual punishment where the prisoner alleged the exercise provided to him was to stand in a
completely enclosed cage alone, in extreme heat or cold without water, shade, exercise equipment or urinals, and
that as a result he suffered sunburns, cracked and bleeding lips and a lack of desire to exercise, resulting in a loss of
physical and mental health. (High Desert State Prison, Nevada)

U.S. Appeals Court
EVALUATION
PRETRIAL DETENTION
SUICIDE
SUPERVISION
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Clouthier v. County of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232 (9th Cir. 2010). The estate of a pretrial detainee brought a §
1983 action against a county, mental health specialist, and two sheriff's deputies alleging they violated the detainee’s
due process rights by failing to prevent his suicide while he was confined. The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the defendants and the estate appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded. The court held that the estate had to show that the detainee was confined under conditions posing a
substantial risk of serious harm and that correction officers were deliberately indifferent to that risk.
The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the mental
health specialist at the jail, who was on notice of the pretrial detainee's suicidal condition, was deliberately
indifferent to a substantial risk of harm to the detainee when she removed the detainee from an observation log and
told deputies that the detainee could be given regular clothes and bedding. According to the court, it was clearly
established at the time of detention that a reasonable mental health professional would not have removed key suicide
prevention measures put in place by a prior mental health staff member, and therefore the specialist was not entitled
to qualified immunity. The court found that the estate failed to establish that a sheriff's deputy at the jail knew that
moving the detainee to the general population in the jail posed a substantial risk of serious harm to the detainee,
where the deputy only knew that the detainee had missed meals and free time, and that the detainee had been taken
off an observation log. The court noted that the deputy spoke to the detainee all weekend and noted he had a positive
outlook on wanting to get out of the room, and earlier that day the mental health specialist found that the detainee
was not actively suicidal at the time. The court held that the estate failed to establish that another sheriff’s deputy
knew that the detainee was suicidal and deliberately ignored that risk, where the deputy knew only that the detainee
was suicidal and needed to be on 15-minute checks and the mental health specialist told the deputy to give the

30.47

detainee his regular clothes and bedding. The court noted that nothing indicated that the deputy saw the detainee's
knotted sheet. According to the court, the county did not have a longstanding custom or practice of moving pretrial
detainees from an observation cell into the general population without consultation with mental health staff, or a
longstanding practice of miscommunication between mental health staff and custodial staff. The court found no
pattern of repeated wrongful conduct by county staff, and nothing that indicated another suicide resulted from the
improper transfer of a detainee. The court found that the affidavit of the estate's expert, who opined that custodial
staff and mental health staff did not work together as a team, was speculative and conclusory, and thus was
insufficient to avoid summary judgment. The court noted that the factual basis for the expert's declaration was
limited to a sequence of events and statements of participants surrounding the detainee's transfer to the general
population in the jail, and the report did not address the key question of whether the alleged disconnect was so
obvious as to have been deliberate indifference. (Contra Costa County Martinez Detention Facility, California)
U.S. District Court
PSYCHOTROPIC
DRUGS
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Miller v. Beard, 699 F.Supp.2d 697 (E.D.Pa. 2010). An inmate brought a § 1983 suit against prison officials, a
health care provider and medical personnel, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs under the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The court held that a prison
nurse was not deliberately indifferent to the inmate's mental health issues, thus defeating his § 1983 claim of an
Eighth Amendment violation, despite the claim that she engineered the discontinuance of his psychotropic
medications by falsely accusing him of hoarding his medication. According to the court, the nurse had a reasonable
subjective fear that the inmate was hoarding his medication. The court held that summary judgment was precluded
by genuine issues of material fact as to whether a physician failed to provide adequate treatment for the inmate after
taking the inmate off powerful psychotropic medications, and whether the abrupt discontinuance of the medications
had a negative impact on the inmate's mood and behavior. The court found that the injuries the inmate suffered as a
consequence of the physician's refusal to provide him with asthma, allergy, and migraine medication were not
“serious,” thus defeating the inmate's § 1983 claim of an Eighth Amendment violation in deliberate indifference to
his serious medical needs. (State Correctional Institution at Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania)

U.S. Appeals Court
PSYCHIATRIC CARE
SEX OFFENDERS
TRANSFER
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Nelson v. Shuffman, 603 F.3d 439 (8th Cir. 2010). A pretrial detainee resident of the Missouri Sexual Offender
Treatment Center brought a § 1983 action against 13 treatment center officials, alleging violations of his
constitutional rights. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of six of the 13 defendants. The
remaining seven defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that summary judgment
was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as follows: (1) as to whether the officials recklessly disregarded an
objectively serious risk of harm to the pretrial detainee resident by placing him with a roommate who had a history
of sexually assaulting vulnerable young males; (2) as to whether the pretrial detainee had a serious medical need and
whether a treatment center official deliberately disregarded the need by failing to provide the psychological
treatment she prescribed; (3) as to whether officials retaliated against the detainee resident for filing an abuse and
neglect charge and several grievances complaining about treatment center officials' failure to provide him necessary
psychological treatment; and (4) as to whether officials' transfer of the detainee resident to an unfinished ward that
only housed one resident who was confined to shackles twenty-four hours a day was punitive and violated due
process by imposing a punishment that had no legitimate institutional objective. (Missouri Sexual Offender
Treatment Center)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
DUE PROCESS
PSYCHIATRIC CARE
SEGREGATION

Orr v. Larkins, 610 F.3d 1032 (8th Cir. 2010). An inmate brought a § 1983 claim against prison officials alleging his
rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Eighth Amendment were violated when
he was kept in administrative segregation for nine months. The district court dismissed the complaint as frivolous
and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the inmate's nine-month stay in
administrative segregation did not constitute an atypical and significant hardship when compared to the burdens of
ordinary prison life, as required to support the inmate's claim that his liberty interests under the Fourteenth
Amendment were violated. The court found that prison officials who provided the inmate with anti-depressants, and
later with anti-psychotic medication, during his nine-month stay in administrative segregation, were not deliberately
indifferent to the inmate's worsening mental illness, as required to support the inmate's Eighth Amendment claim.
(Eastern Reception, Diagnostic and Correctional Center, Missouri)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
PSYCHIATRIC CARE

Paine v. Johnson, 689 F.Supp.2d 1027 (N.D.Ill. 2010) affirmed in part 678 F.3d 500. The guardian of the estate of a
pretrial detainee, who allegedly suffered from bipolar disorder, brought a § 1983 action against a city and city police
officers, alleging civil rights violations in connection with the detainee's arrest and subsequent release from custody
without being provided access to mental health treatment. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The
district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by
a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the detainee, who exhibited drastic and unnatural behavior throughout
her 28-hour detention, had a serious mental health condition. The court also found a genuine issue of material fact as
to whether the arresting city police officer, and other police employees, who witnessed the arrestee singing rap
lyrics, taking her clothes off and dancing provocatively for different men, acting erratically, discussing the price of
oil, and screaming bizarre and vulgar statements, among other things, had notice that the arrestee had a serious
mental health condition that required medical attention. The court noted that a city police officer, who spoke on the
telephone with the detainee's mother, and was informed by her mother that the detainee was likely bipolar and might
be having an episode, had notice that the detainee had a serious mental health condition that required medical
attention, precluding summary judgment.
The court also found genuine issues of material fact as to whether a city police officer, who had actual knowledge
of the pretrial detainee's mental health condition based on observations of her behavior while in custody, placed the
detainee in a position of heightened risk when she released the detainee from the police station and pointed her
toward an area known for violent crime, without providing the detainee with food, money, or medication, and as to
whether the officer's conduct “shocked the conscience.” The court identified a fact issue as to whether the detainee
would not have been raped and seriously injured absent a city police officers' failure to provide the detainee with

30.48

psychiatric care. The court held that city police officers were not entitled to qualified immunity from the § 1983
claim brought by the mother of the detainee, for unreasonably failing to provide the detainee with mental health care
under the Fourth Amendment, as it was clearly established that pretrial detainees were entitled to mental health
treatment for serious mental health conditions. On appeal (678 F.3d 500), the appeals court held that the arresting
officer was entitled to qualified immunity. The district court also denied qualified immunity for the city police
officer who released the detainee, where the law was clearly established that the officer could not release the
detainee from custody in a manner that increased her risk of harm. (Chicago Police Department, Illinois)
U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
SPECIAL HOUSING
SUICIDE

Silvera v. Connecticut Dept. of Corrections, 726 F.Supp.2d 183 (D.Conn. 2010). The representative of a pretrial
detainee's estate filed a § 1983 action alleging that state prison officials' decision to house the detainee with a
convicted inmate and their failure to provide adequate mental health care caused the detainee's suicide death. The
officials moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that
allegations that prison medical staff ignored abundant evidence demonstrating that the pretrial detainee was an acute
suicide risk were sufficient to state a claim of deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, in violation of the
Due Process Clause. The court noted that evidence included a judge's instructions to keep him on suicide watch, the
detainee's prior medical records, contemporaneous complaints and behavior, and examinations by medical staff, all
of whom concluded that the detainee suffered from severe mental health issues. Nonetheless, officials placed him in
a cell by himself, rather than in specialized housing, with access to materials with which he could hang himself,
failed to check on him regularly, and ignored signs that his mental condition had deteriorated.
The court found that a state prison supervisor was not liable under § 1983 for the pretrial detainee's suicide death,
even if the supervisor had some training with regards to caring for mentally ill detainees, and his subordinates failed
to properly oversee the detainee's activities. The court noted that the detainee was placed in the general prison
population based on a mental health professional's recommendation, the supervisor was not aware that the detainee
posed an excessive risk of suicide, and subordinates were given proper orders to keep the detainee under constant
surveillance and interact with him at frequent, irregular intervals. The court described the change in the detainee’s
conditions of confinement prior to his suicide. “Inmates housed in the Charlie Unit—apparently unlike those in the
specialized housing unit where Mr. Lyle was held from May 11 until May 15—have the ability to turn the cell's
lights on and off at will. Additionally, the Charlie Unit has bunk-style beds, which are outfitted with standard-issue
sheets and pillow case—both of which would play a role in Mr. Lyle's suicide. Once transferred to the Charlie Unit,
Mr. Lyle was given standard DOC clothing, whereas previously he had been given only a ‘suicide gown.’ ”
According to the court, the pretrial detainee's right to due process was not violated merely because he was forced
to share a cell with a convicted prisoner, absent an allegation that the detainee suffered an injury from being housed
with a convicted inmate, or that placement with the convicted inmate was intended to punish the detainee. (Garner
Correctional Institute, Connecticut)

U.S. Appeals Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
JUVENILE
SUICIDE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Simmons v. Navajo County, Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2010). Parents of a pretrial detainee who committed
suicide while in custody brought a state-court action against various jail personnel, their supervisors, and their
county employer, asserting claims under state tort law, § 1983, and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the parents appealed. The appeals court
affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court held that there was no evidence that a prison nurse knew
the pretrial detainee who subsequently committed suicide was in substantial danger of killing himself, as required to
demonstrate the prison nurse was deliberately indifferent to such risk in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
According to the court, although the nurse was aware that the detainee had previously attempted to take his own life,
suffered from depression, and was at some risk of making another attempt, at the time detainee killed himself, over a
month had elapsed since his suicide attempt, during which time the detainee received counseling, took
antidepressants, and by all accounts, was doing better. The court found that prison nurses were not deliberately
indifferent, under the Fourteenth Amendment, to the detainee who committed suicide, because they failed to ensure
that the detainee had daily evaluations pursuant to the suicide prevention policy, absent evidence that they knew
detainee was in a suicidal crisis. According to the court, the prison nurses' failure to retrieve the used gauze the
pretrial detainee used to hang himself did not constitute deliberate indifference in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, absent evidence that the prison nurses were aware the pretrial detainee had accumulated the gauze.
The court found that the teenage pretrial detainee waved the prison nurse away on the morning of the day he
committed suicide, when the nurse tried to speak with him, because he was absorbed in watching television, did not
show that the prison nurse was subjectively aware of the detainee's risk of suicide, so as to support a deliberate
indifference claim against the prison nurse under the Fourteenth Amendment. (Navajo County Jail, Arizona)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
RESTRAINTS
USE OF FORCE

Thomas v. Bryant, 614 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2010). Inmates incarcerated at the Florida State Prison (FSP) brought a §
1983 action against various officers and employees of the Florida Department of Corrections (DOC), alleging that
the use of chemical agents on inmates with mental illness and other vulnerabilities violated the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. The claims against individual correctional officers responsible for
administering the agents were settled. After a five-day bench trial on the remaining claims against the DOC
Secretary and the FSP warden for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, the district court entered findings of
fact and conclusions of law. The court ended final judgment and a final permanent injunction in the inmates' favor.
The Secretary and warden appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that, notwithstanding his untimely
death, the inmate who obtained declaratory and injunctive relief could still be the “prevailing party” entitled to
attorney fees for the cost of district court litigation under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act (42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1983, 1988.) The court found that in reaching its conclusion the district court did not clearly err in finding that an
inmate was sprayed with chemical agents at times when he had no capacity to comply with officers' orders because
of his mental illness, or in finding that those sprayings caused the inmate lasting psychological injuries.
According to the court, the repeated non-spontaneous use of chemical agents on an inmate with a serious mental
illness constituted an extreme deprivation sufficient to satisfy the objective prong of the test for an Eighth
Amendment violation. The court noted that the inmate's well-documented history of mental illness and psychotic

30.49

episodes rendered him unable to comply at the times he was sprayed, such that the policy was unnecessary and
without penological justification in his specific case. The court found that the DOC’s policy and practice of spraying
inmates with chemical agents, as applied to an inmate who was fully secured in his seven-by-nine-foot steel cell, was
not presenting a threat of immediate harm to himself or others, and was unable to understand and comply with
officers' orders due to his mental illness, were extreme deprivations violating the broad and idealistic concepts of
dignity, civilized standards, humanity and decency embodied in the Eighth Amendment.
The court held that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the record demonstrated that DOC officials
acted with deliberate indifference to the severe risk of harm an inmate faced when officers repeatedly sprayed him
with chemical agents for behaviors caused by his mental illness. The appeals court held that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in concluding that injunctive relief was warranted and necessary, despite contentions that an
inmate was currently incarcerated at a facility where he was not subject to DOC's chemical agents policy. The court
noted that the permanent injunction against violations of the mentally ill inmate's Eighth Amendment rights from
sprayings with chemical agents did not extend further than necessary to correct a constitutional violation and was not
overly intrusive. According to the court, in addition to being closely tethered to the identified harm, the district
court's permanent injunctive relief was narrowly drawn and plainly adhered to the requirements of Prison Litigation
Reform Act (PLRA). (Florida State Prison)
U.S. District Court
EVALUATION
SEX OFFENDER

U.S. v. Broncheau, 759 F.Supp.2d 694 (E.D.N.C. 2010). Former federal prisoners who had been certified as sexually
dangerous persons moved to dismiss the government's petitions for their commitment. The district court granted the
motion and the government moved to stay the order. The district court denied the motion. The court held that a
motion to determine mental competency was the proper way for the government to seek commitment, and the public
interest was served by having a federal inmate transition from incarceration with a period of supervised release.
(Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Federal Bureau of Prisons)

U.S. District Court
INVOLUNTARY
MEDICATION

U.S. v. Burhoe, 692 F.Supp.2d 137 (D.Me. 2010). The government moved for order permitting involuntary
administration of medication to render a defendant competent to stand trial on charge of possession of firearms after
having been previously committed to a mental institution. The district court held that the government established an
important governmental interest in the prosecution of the defendant, granting the motion. The court noted that the
defendant was charged with the offense of possession of firearms after having been previously committed to a
mental institution, arising out of an incident in which he allegedly fired a rifle at a state trooper and ultimately was
shot by the police, and there were also state charges pending against the defendant for aggravated attempted murder
and reckless conduct with a firearm, arising out of the same incident that brought about the federal charge. (Maine)

U.S. District Court
COMMITMENT
EVALUATION
SEX OFFENDERS

U.S. v. Graham, 683 F.Supp.2d 129 (D.Mass. 2010). The federal government brought a civil action seeking to
commit a federal prison inmate as a sexually dangerous person pursuant to the Adam Walsh Child Protection and
Safety Act. At the conclusion of a bench trial, the parties proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. The court
held that the government failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the inmate suffered from
nonconsensual sex paraphilia as would make him sexually dangerous to others. According the court, despite a
criminal history involving three sex offenses, there was no evidence that the inmate was aroused by, fantasized
about, or fixated on non-consenting partners. The court noted that the inmate's criminal history included a number of
non-sexual offenses, including assault, battery, and petit larceny, which further indicated the paraphilia diagnosis
was inappropriate, and the testimony and report of the government's licensed psychologist supporting a paraphilia
diagnosis not only conflicted with conclusions of the court-appointed psychiatrist and psychologist, but contained a
number of factual inconsistencies and evinced a reluctance to credit contradictory evidence, which pointed to a bias
in finding that inmate suffered from paraphilia that detracted from a government psychologist's credibility. (Adam
Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Federal Bureau of Prisons)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE

Wells v. Bureau County, 723 F.Supp.2d 1061 (C.D.Ill. 2010). The estate of a 17-year-old pretrial detainee who
committed suicide while in custody at a county jail brought an action against the county, county sheriff, and
corrections officers, alleging claims pursuant to § 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the
Rehabilitation Act. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and
denied in part. The court held that the fact that the pretrial detainee, who committed suicide while in custody at a
county jail, did not need a mental health professional when he was booked at the jail after being arrested on charges
of illegal consumption of alcohol by a minor and possession of drug paraphernalia, was not dispositive of whether
the detainee presented a serious need when he was booked at the jail approximately two weeks later after being
arrested on charges of contributing to the delinquency of a minor.
The court held that information received by booking officers after pretrial detainee's suicide, including
information that the detainee had been kicked out of his father's house, that the detainee was living in a tent, that the
detainee and his girlfriend had a suicide pact, and that the detainee had commented to other inmates that if he was
going to prison he would “shoot himself,” was irrelevant to establishing what was in the officers' minds at time they
were alleged to have been deliberately indifferent to the risk that the detainee would commit suicide. According to
the court, the corrections officers lacked actual knowledge of a significant likelihood that the detainee would
imminently seek to take his own life, or even of facts that would promote the inference of a subjective awareness of
such a substantial risk, and thus the officers did not act with deliberate indifference to that risk in violation of due
process, despite any alleged negligence in assessing and observing the detainee prior to his suicide.
The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the county
sheriff's policy that correctional officers not personally observe prisoners during the overnight shift was
constitutionally inadequate. From 10 PM to 6:30 AM, detainees are locked in their cells. During the overnight period
from 11 PM on June 8, 2007, to 5 AM on June 9, 2007, Officer Keefer did eleven cell checks on Cellblock 2. While
standing in the guard walkway, officers are able to look into two of the four cells and observe detainees in those
cells, but officers are unable to see the detainees in the other two cells in the cellblock. During her checks, Officer
Keefer personally observed the detainees in two of the cells in Cellblock 2 because she could see them from the

30.50

guard walkway, but did not observe Wells in his cell because she was unable to see into his cell from the guard
walkway. At 6:45 AM, when another officer let the detainees in Cellblock 2 out of their cells for breakfast, he
discovered Wells hanging in his cell. (Bureau County Jail, Illinois)
2011
U.S. District Court
EVALUATION
INTAKE SCREENING

Chess v. U.S., 836 F.Supp.2d 742 (N.D.Ill. 2011). An inmate who suffered personal injuries in an assault by a fellow
inmate brought an action against the federal government under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), alleging it
failed to properly screen the fellow inmate upon intake and also failed to monitor him. The inmate had suffered
second-degree burns when the other inmate threw a cup of scalding water onto his face and then physically assaulted
him by hitting him with the cup and punching him. The parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The district
court denied the plaintiff's motion, and granted the defendants’ motion in part and denied in part. The court held that
the government failed to comply with certain directives aimed at monitoring federal prisoners suffering from mental
illness, for the purposes of its attempt to avoid liability to the federal inmate who suffered personal injuries in an
assault by a fellow inmate under the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) waiver
of sovereign immunity. The court found that the inmate’s claims relating to a corrections officer's alleged failure to
monitor inmates during lockup were not barred by the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) discretionary function
exception. According to the court, while there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Bureau of Prisons
(BOP) officials complied with requirements to review the inmate's central file upon intake and to review the
assaulting inmate's mental health on a monthly basis, the assaulted inmate failed to raise the issue for trial as to
whether the Bureau’s failure to review the assailing inmate's central file proximately caused his injury.
The court found that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact, as to whether, after
his second placement, BOP officials knew or reasonably should have known that the inmate should have been
segregated from the administrative population. The court also found genuine issues of material fact as to whether a
correctional officer's alleged failure to monitor the unit at the time of the attack constituted negligence and
proximately caused the attacked inmate's injuries. (Federal Bureau of Prisons, Metropolitan Correctional Center
Chicago, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE

Davis v. Correctional Medical Services, 760 F.Supp.2d 469 (D.Del. 2011). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action
alleging that prison medical officials failed to provide mental health treatment, failed to follow policies and
procedures to prevent officers and other inmates from harassing him, and failed to provide adequate medical
treatment for his broken nose. The district court granted the officials’ motions to dismiss and for summary judgment.
The court held that the failure of the prison's mental health administrator to speak to the inmate or to investigate his
complaint regarding his treatment and his living conditions did not violate any recognizable constitutional right, as
required to sustain the inmate's § 1983 claim against the administrator. According to the court, prison medical
officials were not deliberately indifferent to the inmate's fractured nose, in violation of the Eighth Amendment,
where the officials took an x-ray two months after the incident, the inmate did not complain about his nasal
condition for seven months, once he did, the condition was consistently monitored and evaluated on several
occasions, and the inmate was approved for surgery, but he refused to undergo the procedure. (James T. Vaughn
Correctional Center, Delaware)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE
INTAKE SCREENING
PSYCHIATRIC CARE

Smith v. Atkins, 777 F.Supp.2d 955 (E.D.N.C. 2011). The mother of a schizophrenic inmate who committed suicide
at a jail and the mother of the inmate's children brought a § 1983 action in state court against a county deputy sheriff,
jail officials, a medical contractor, and a nurse employed by the contractor, alleging that the defendants violated the
inmate's Eighth Amendment rights in failing to provide adequate medical care. The defendants removed the action to
federal court and moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motions. The court held that the
deputy sheriff who happened to be at the jail delivering a prisoner when the inmate, who had been diagnosed with
schizophrenia, committed suicide, did not know that the inmate was at a substantial risk of committing suicide or
intentionally disregarded such risk. The court found that the deputy was not liable under § 1983 where the deputy
did not know the inmate or anything about him, or have any responsibilities associated with the inmate's custody.
The court also found that jail officials were not deliberately indifferent towards the schizophrenic inmate who was
awaiting transfer to a state prison, as would violate the inmate's Eighth Amendment rights, because there was no
indication that the officials subjectively knew that the inmate was at a substantial risk of committing suicide and
intentionally disregarded that risk. According to the court, simply because the jail inmate, who was diagnosed with
schizophrenia, had previously been on a suicide watch at the jail did not put jail officials on notice that he was
suicidal during his subsequent incarceration two years later. The court held that jail officials' mere failure to comply
with a state standard and a jail policy requiring a four-time per hour check on any prisoner who had ever been on a
suicide watch did not violate the Eighth Amendment rights of the inmate. The court found that the mother of the
inmate failed to show a direct causal link between a specific deficiency in training and an alleged Eighth
Amendment violation, as required to sustain the mother's § 1983 Eighth Amendment claim against jail officials
based on their alleged failure to train jail employees. (Bertie–Martin Regional Jail, North Carolina)
2012

U.S. District Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
DUE PROCESS
EVALUATION
SEGREGATION

Anderson v. Colorado, 887 F.Supp.2d 1133 (D.Colo. 2012). A mentally ill inmate sued a state, its Department of
Corrections (DOC), the DOC's director, and a warden, asserting claims for alleged violations of due process, the
Eighth Amendment bar against cruel and unusual punishment, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the
Rehabilitation Act. Following a bench trial, the district court held that: (1) denying the inmate in administrative
segregation any opportunity to be outdoors and to engage in some form of outdoor exercise for period of 12 years
was a serious deprivation of a human need; (2) the defendants were deliberately indifferent to the inmate's mental
and physical health; (3) the inmate failed to establish that he was denied a necessary and appropriate medication in
violation of ADA and the Rehabilitation Act; (4) the defendants had to assign a department psychiatrist to reevaluate
the inmate's current mental health treatment needs and take steps concluded to be appropriate in the psychiatrist's

30.51

medical judgment; (5) the inmate failed to establish a violation of his rights under the Eighth Amendment, ADA, and
the Rehabilitation Act due to the alleged denial of treatment provided by a multidisciplinary treatment team; (6) the
inmate had a due process-protected liberty interest in progressing out of administrative segregation; and (7) the new
stratified incentive system that was being implemented with respect to inmates in administrative segregation, if used
fairly, was consistent with due process. (Colorado Department of Corrections, Colorado State Penitentiary)
U.S. District Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
MEDICATION

Anderson v. Colorado, Dept. of Corrections, 848 F.Supp.2d 1291 (D.Colo. 2012). An inmate brought an action
against a state, the Department of Corrections (DOC), the DOC's director, and a warden asserting violations of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments as well as violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and
Rehabilitation Act. The inmate moved for partial summary judgment and to reopen discovery, and the defendants
moved for summary judgment. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material
fact as to whether the maximum security prison's denial of outdoor exercise to the inmate for the more than 11 years
of his incarceration was sufficiently serious and whether prison officials acted intentionally or with deliberate
indifference. The court also found genuine issues of material fact as to whether the inmate's lack of outdoor exercise
during his 11 years of incarceration caused his muscles to grow weaker, on the grounds that the inmate could
demonstrate a physical injury. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material
fact as to whether prison officials arbitrarily administered a demerit program that would allow the inmate to progress
to higher levels and ultimately out of administrative segregation and into the general population, depriving him of a
liberty interest without the due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
The court held that summary judgment was also precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether a
primary reason that the inmate had not progressed out of administrative segregation and into the general population
was that he was denied a prescribed non-formulary medication, such that his mental illness was improperly and
inadequately treated, and whether prison officials were deliberately indifferent to the inmate's serious mental health
condition when he did not receive certain medications prescribed by physicians for the treatment of his mental
illness. The court also held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether
the inmate received adequate treatment for his mental illness, with regard to his Rehabilitation Act and ADA claims
against the state and prison officials. (Colorado State Penitentiary)

U.S. District Court
SEGREGATION
SUICIDE

Disability Law Center v. Massachusetts Dept. of Correction, 960 F.Supp.2d 271 (D.Mass. 2012). A nonprofit
organization, which represented mentally ill prisoners, brought an action against a state's Department of Correction,
alleging that the Department and its officials violated the federal constitutional rights of prisoners by subjecting them
to disciplinary and other forms of segregation for prolonged periods of time. After extensive negotiations, the parties
jointly moved for approval of a settlement agreement. The district court granted the motion, finding the agreement to
be fair, reasonable, and adequate. The court noted that the agreement addressed the fundamental issue of prison
suicides by providing a process for minimizing the possibility that inmates with serious mental illnesses would be
confined in segregation, and for reviewing their mental health while in segregation. The court held that the
agreement did not order any “prospective relief,” or in fact any “relief” at all, thereby precluding the applicability of
the requirement of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), that prospective relief not extend further than
necessary to remedy violation of a federal right. (Massachusetts Department of Correction)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
SUICIDE
SUPERVISION

Estate of Miller, ex rel. Bertram v. Tobiasz, 680 F.3d 984 (7th Cir. 2012). The minor siblings of an inmate who
committed suicide brought a § 1983 action against correctional facility staff members, alleging deliberate
indifference to the inmate's serious medical condition involving a long history of suicide attempts, self-harm, and
mental illness. The district court granted qualified immunity to the management-level defendants and others, but
denied qualified immunity to an intake nurse, psychology associate, and prison guards. The defendants who were
denied qualified immunity appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the inmate's siblings
adequately alleged that the intake nurse and a psychology associate were subjectively aware that the inmate was a
suicide risk, as required to state a claim alleging deliberate indifference to the inmate's serious medical condition.
The court found that the inmate's siblings adequately alleged that prison guards were subjectively aware that the
inmate was a suicide risk. According to the court, the siblings adequately alleged that the intake nurse and
psychology associate failed to take reasonable steps to prevent the harm from the inmate's suicidal tendencies, and
that prison guards failed to take reasonable steps to prevent the harm from the inmate's suicidal tendencies. The court
held that the intake nurse, psychology associate, and prison guards were not entitled to qualified immunity.
The court noted that the guards allegedly knew or should have known of the inmate's mental illness and suicide
attempts because he was adjudicated mentally ill, he had court-ordered medications he refused to take the night he
died, and he had a well-documented history of suicidal behavior. The inmate was housed in a unit where inmates in
need of greater supervision were placed. The guards allegedly failed to call for medical attention despite finding the
inmate with no pulse and not breathing on the floor of his cell with a white cloth wrapped around his neck, and
waited to assemble an entry team and then applied restraints to the inmate before removing the ligature from around
his neck. (Columbia Correctional Institute, Wisconsin)

U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE
PRETRIAL DETENTION

Luckert v. Dodge County, 684 F.3d 808 (8th Cir. 2012). The personal representative of the estate of her deceased son,
who committed suicide while detained in a county jail, filed a § 1983 action against the county and jail officials for
allegedly violating due process by deliberate indifference to the detainee's medical needs. Following a jury trial, the
district court entered judgment for the personal representative, awarding actual and punitive damages as well as
attorney fees and costs. The jury awarded $750,000 in compensatory damages and $100,000 in punitive damages.
The district court denied the defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law and the defendants appealed. The
appeals court reversed the denial of the defendants’ motion and vacated the awards. The appeals court held that
while the detainee had a constitutional right to protection from a known risk of suicide, the jail nurse and the jail
director were protected by qualified immunity, and the county was not liable. According to the court, the county jail
nurse's affirmative but unsuccessful measures to prevent the pretrial detainee's suicide did not constitute deliberate
indifference to his risk of suicide, where the nurse assessed the detainee twice after learning from his mother that he

30.52

had recently attempted suicide, the nurse arranged for the detainee to have two appointments with the jail's
psychiatrist, including an appointment on the morning of the detainee's suicide, the nurse contacted the detainee's
own psychiatrist to gather information about the detainee's condition, she reviewed the detainee's medical records,
and she responded in writing to each of the detainee's requests for medical care.
The court held that the county jail director's actions and omissions in managing jail's suicide intervention
practices did not rise to the level of deliberate indifference to the pretrial detainee's risk of suicide, even though the
director delegated to the jail nurse significant responsibility for suicide intervention before formally training her on
suicide policies and procedures, and the jail's actual suicide intervention practices did not comport with the jail's
written policy. The court noted that the jail had a practice under the director's management of identifying detainees at
risk of committing suicide, placing them on a suicide watch, and providing on-site medical attention, and the
detainee remained on suicide watch and received medical attention including on the day of his suicide. The court
held that the county lacked a custom, policy, or practice that violated the pretrial detainee's due process rights and
caused his suicide, precluding recovery in the § 1983 action. The court found that, even though the county had flaws
in its suicide intervention practices, the county did not have a continuing, widespread, and persistent pattern of
constitutional misconduct regarding prevention of suicide in the county jail. (Dodge County Jail, Fremont, Nebraska)
U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

McCullum v. Tepe, 693 F.3d 696 (6th Cir. 2012). A deceased inmate's mother sued a prison psychiatrist under §
1983, claiming that he was deliberately indifferent to the serious medical need of the inmate, who hung himself from
his bed. The district court denied the psychiatrist's motion for summary judgment and he appealed. The appeals court
affirmed, finding that the psychiatrist could not invoke qualified immunity. According to the court, a physician
employed by an independent non-profit organization, but working part-time for a county as a prison psychiatrist,
could not invoke qualified immunity in a § 1983 suit arising out of his activities at the prison. The court found that
there was no common-law tradition of immunity for a private doctor working for a public institution at the time that
Congress enacted § 1983. (Butler County Prison, Community Behavioral Health, Ohio)

U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE
JUVENILE
MENTAL HEALTH
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
TRANSFER

Miller v. Harbaugh, 698 F.3d 956 (7th Cir. 2012). The mother of a minor who hanged himself while incarcerated at a
state youth detention facility, on her own behalf and as the minor's representative, brought a § 1983 action against
state officials, alleging deliberate indifference to the minor's serious mental illness. The 16-year-old youth had a
history of mental illness and was known to have attempted suicide at least three times. The district court granted
summary judgment for the officials. The mother appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that,
even assuming that state supervisory officials' decision to use metal bunk beds in rooms of a youth detention facility
that were occupied by residents who were mentally disturbed but did not appear to be imminently suicidal, amounted
to deliberate indifference to the residents' serious medical needs, the law was not then so clearly established as to
defeat the officials' defense of qualified immunity to the due process claim. The court found that a psychologist at
the state youth detention facility, who had authorized the minor's transfer after learning of minor's unsuccessful
participation in the facility's drug abuse program, was not deliberately indifferent to the minor's serious medical
needs, in violation of due process. According to the court, even if he knew that the minor, who had mental health
issues, presented a suicide risk and that the transferee facility was using metal bunk beds like that which the minor
thereafter used to hang himself. The court found that the psychologist's involvement with the minor was minimal, the
decision to make the transfer was made after the psychologist met with the facility's entire treatment staff, and the
psychologist did not know which room at the transferee facility the minor would be given or that the facility's other
suicide prevention measures would prove to be inadequate. (Illinois Youth Center, IYC Kewanee, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
INVOLUNTARY
MEDICATION
TRAINING
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
DUE PROCESS

Olaniyi v. District of Columbia, 876 F.Supp.2d 39 (D.D.C. 2012). A pretrial detainee brought an action against the
District of Columbia and the United States, asserting claims under § 1983 and the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA),
arising from his detention and a separate incident involving a traffic stop. The defendants moved for summary
judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that past alleged deficiencies in medical services at
the District of Columbia jail that were unrelated to unconstitutional forced medication of inmates could not have put
the District on notice of the need for training to avoid an alleged due process violation arising from the detainee's
being forcibly injected with a psychoactive drug while residing in the jail's mental health unit, and thus could not
sustain a finding of deliberate indifference necessary to hold the District liable under § 1983 for an alleged due
process violation. The court also held that the detainee failed to establish a pattern of similar due process violations
by untrained or inadequately trained jail employees that could have put the District on notice of a need for more
training with respect to forced medication of inmates, thus precluding the detainee's § 1983 due process claim
against the District based on a failure to train theory. (Mental Health Unit of the District of Columbia Jail)

U.S. Appeals Court
DUE PROCESS
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
INTAKE SCREENING

Paine v. Cason, 678 F.3d 500 (7th Cir. 2012). The guardian of the estate of an arrestee, who allegedly suffered from
bipolar disorder, brought a § 1983 action against a municipality and police officers, alleging civil rights violations in
connection with the arrest and subsequent release from custody without being provided access to mental health
treatment. The arrestee was raped at knifepoint after her release and either jumped or was pushed from a window,
causing permanent brain damage. The district court denied summary judgment in part for the defendants. The
defendants sought relief through interlocutory appeal. The appeals court affirmed in part, denied in part, and
remanded. The appeals held that: (1) the arrestee, as a person in custody, had clearly a established right for police to
provide care for her serious medical condition; (2) whether the police should have understood that the arrestee had a
serious medical condition, and thus should have provided care, was a factual issue that could not be decided on
interlocutory appeal; (3) causation was a factual issue not suited to resolution on interlocutory appeal of denial of
qualified immunity; (4) the arrestee did not have a clearly established constitutional right for her release to be
delayed pending mental-health treatment; (5) the arrestee had a clearly established due process right for the police to
not create danger, without justification, by arresting her in a safe place and releasing her in a hazardous one while
unable to protect herself; (6) the arresting officer was entitled to qualified immunity; (7) the watch officer was not
entitled to qualified immunity; and (8) a detention aide was not entitled to qualified immunity. According to the
court, a police officer who was responsible for preparing the arrestee's individual-recognizance bond and collecting

30.53

possessions that were to be returned on her release, and who received a telephone call from the mother of the
arrestee regarding the arrestee's bi-polar condition and did nothing in response and who did not even note the call in
a log, was not entitled to qualified immunity to the civil rights claims that the police had created a danger, without
justification. The court found that the detention aide who was responsible for evaluating inmates, observed the
arrestee behaving in a mentally unstable way, such as smearing menstrual blood on her cell walls, and transferred
another person out of the arrestee's cell because of her inappropriate behavior, and yet did nothing to alert other
personnel at the stationhouse, was not entitled to qualified immunity to the civil rights claims that the police did not
arrange for medical treatment of serious conditions while the arrestee's custody continued. (Eighth District Station,
Second District Station, Chicago Police Department)
U.S. District Court
SUICIDE
MEDICATION
PRETRIAL DETENTION
SUPERVISION
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Ponzini v. Monroe County, 897 F.Supp.2d 282 (M.D.Pa. 2012). Survivors of a pretrial detainee sued prison officials,
medical care providers and a corrections officer under § 1983 and state tort law, claiming that they were deliberately
indifferent to the serious medical needs of the detainee, who committed suicide. The detainee allegedly did not
receive his medication during his confinement. The survivors noted that one of the medications, Paxil, has “a short
half-life and leaves a user's system very quickly,” and that its withdrawal symptoms include “worsening of
underlying anxiety or depression, headache, tremor or ‘shakes', gastrointestinal distress and fatigue-, all of which
were allegedly present in detainee during his incarceration.” The detainee had also been taking Trazadone. The
survivors alleged that during the period in which the detainee was incarcerated at the facility, officers were aware
that the detainee should have been monitored closely and placed on a suicide watch. The survivors asserted that,
although the detainee was not on a suicide watch, the inmate housed in an adjacent cell was on such a watch. An
officer was expected to pass the neighboring cell, and by virtue of its location, the detainee’s cell, every fifteen
minutes. The survivors alleged that the officer falsified documents demonstrating that he properly made his rounds
every fifteen minutes, and that officer failure to properly maintain a suicide watch on the detainee’s neighbor
facilitated the detainee’s own suicide. The detainee killed himself by swallowing shreds of his own t-shirt. The court
held that the survivors stated a § 1983 claim under the Fourteenth Amendment against prison officials for deliberate
indifference to the serious medical needs of the detainee, who committed suicide allegedly as a result of a lack of
daily medication necessary to treat depression and other psychological issues. According to the court, the complaint
raised the possibility that prison officials knew that the detainee suffered from a severe medical condition and did
not attempt to provide appropriate, necessary care in a timely manner. The court held that the survivors also stated a
§ 1983 claim under the Fourteenth Amendment against the corporate medical provider for deliberate indifference.
(PrimeCare Medical, Inc., and Monroe County Correctional Facility, Pennsylvania)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
DUE PROCESS
PRETRIAL DETENTION
SEGREGATION
SUICIDE

Rice ex rel. Rice v. Correctional Medical Services, 675 F.3d 650 (7th Cir. 2012). Following a pretrial detainee's death
while incarcerated, his parents, representing his estate filed suit pursuant to § 1983, alleging among other things that
jail officials and medical personnel had deprived the pretrial detainee of due process by exhibiting deliberate
indifference to his declining mental and physical condition. The district court entered summary judgment against the
estate. The estate filed a second suit reasserting the state wrongful death claims that the judge in the first suit had
dismissed without prejudice after disposing of the federal claims. The district court dismissed that case on the basis
of collateral estoppel, and the estate appealed both judgments. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part,
and remanded. The appeals court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to
whether jail officials were deliberately indifferent to the pretrial detainee's conditions of confinement, and whether
his conditions of confinement were sufficiently serious to support his Fourteenth Amendment due process claim.
The court noted that whether the detainee himself created the unsanitary conditions was a fact relevant to the claim,
but given detainee's mental condition, it did not foreclose the claim. The court found that the estate failed to show
that the detainee's assignment to an administrative segregation unit of the jail for approximately seven months
violated the detainee's due process rights, where the estate failed to identify feasible alternatives and to tender
evidence supporting the contention that the detainee likely would have fared better in one of those alternative
placements. The court held that jail officials did not employ excessive force, in violation of due process, to the
pretrial detainee who had been fighting with his cellmate and failed to comply with a directive that he step out of his
cell which he refused to leave for 18 hours, by spraying his face with pepper foam, and placing him in a restraint
chair. The court held that jail officials did not have notice of a substantial risk that the mentally ill pretrial detainee
might be assaulted by other inmates, as required to support the pretrial detainee's claim of deliberate indifference in
violation of due process. The court noted that while jail personnel were aware that the detainee had a hygiene
problem, they had no notice that he was at risk of assault because of that problem, particularly within the more
secure confines of the administrative segregation unit. The court found that neither jail guards or supervisors were
deliberately indifferent to the risk that the mentally ill pretrial detainee might engage in a behavior such as
compulsive water drinking that would cause him to die within a matter of hours and did not consciously disregarded
that risk, and therefore they were not liable for his death under § 1983. According to the court, while a factfinder
might conclude that the guards exhibited a generalized recklessness with respect to the safety of the inmates housed
in the administrative segregation unit by failing to conduct hourly checks of the unit, there was no evidence that the
guards or supervisors were subjectively aware of the possibility that the detainee might injure himself to the point of
death before anyone could intervene. (Elkhart County Jail, Indiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE
TRANSFER
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Rosario v. Brawn, 670 F.3d 816 (7th Cir. 2012). The father of a detainee who committed suicide while in police
custody brought a § 1983 action against police officers, alleging deliberate indifference to the detainee's risk of
suicide in violation of the detainee's right to due process under Fourteenth Amendment. The district court granted
summary judgment to the police officers, and the father appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the
police officers did not intentionally disregard a substantial risk that the detainee would commit suicide, as required
for liability on a due-process claim alleging deliberately indifferent treatment of the detainee. The detainee
committed suicide while being transported to a mental health facility after exhibiting self-destructive behavior. The
officers failed to discover the detainee's razor blade, which he used to commit suicide. According to the court, their
overall actions toward the detainee showed protection and compassion by searching the detainee, arranging for

30.54

assessment of his mental condition, ensuring his comfort during transportation, and personally administering first aid
despite his resistance. (Washington County Sheriff, Wisconsin)
U.S. District Court
INVOLUNTARY
MEDICATION
PSYCHOTROPIC
DRUGS

Santos v. Bush, 874 F.Supp.2d 408 (D.N.J. 2012). A mentally ill inmate brought an action under § 1983 against a
doctor and a warden at the prison where he was formerly housed, alleging that the defendants forcibly medicated
him without due process. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The
court held that the prison warden was not involved in any of the mental health evaluations the inmate received or the
development of his treatment plans, nor did the warden have any direct involvement, or even actual knowledge, of
the specific circumstances surrounding the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication to the inmate, as
would subject her to liability under § 1983 on the inmate's due process claims. According to the court, the warden's
letter to the inmate's grandmother related to issues of the inmate's unwillingness to take psychotropic medication
voluntarily was insufficient to demonstrate personal involvement, or knowledge and acquiescence, by the warden in
approving or otherwise deciding whether the inmate should have been involuntarily medicated, as would subject the
warden to liability under § 1983. The court found that the involuntary medication administration (IMA) procedure
utilized by the New Jersey Department of Corrections (DOC), and the prison's involuntary administration of
psychotropic medication to the mentally ill inmate, complied with substantive due process. According to the court,
the procedure was reasonably related to the state's legitimate interests in responding to the dangers posed by the
mentally ill inmate, providing inmates with treatment in their medical interest, and ensuring the safety of prison
staff, administrative personnel, and inmates. The court found that the prison's administration of psychotropic drugs
to the mentally ill inmate under its involuntary medication administration (IMA) procedure did not violate the
inmate's procedural due process rights, where: (1) the inmate was diagnosed with a serious mental illness, based on a
series of well-documented delusions, paranoid beliefs, and behaviors exhibited by the inmate; (2) at least four
psychiatrists evaluated the inmate at various points during his treatment; (3) four separate treatment review
committees (TRC) were convened during the inmate's treatment; (4) the inmate received notice of each TRC
hearing; and (5) the inmate's involuntary medication was periodically reviewed in accordance with the IMA
procedure. (South Woods State Prison, New Jersey)

U.S. Appeals Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
EVALUATION
SUICIDE
SUPERVISION

Shelton v. Arkansas Dept. of Human Services, 677 F.3d 837 (8th Cir. 2012). The administratrix of the estate of a
mental health patient brought an action against various public officials and health professionals, alleging
shortcomings in the way the medical professionals responded after the patient hanged herself while a patient at the
facility. The district court dismissed the action. The administratrix appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court
held that the state actors' discovery of an unconscious voluntary mental health patient hanged in her room did not
trigger duties related to involuntary commitment nor did it give rise to a constitutional-level duty of care. According
to the court, after the state actors discovered the patient, she was no different than any unconscious patient in an
emergency room, operating room, or ambulance controlled by the state actors, and, in such circumstances, the state
actors owed patients state-law duties of care based upon standards for simple or professional negligence. The court
found that the physician's decision to remove the mental health patient from a suicide watch was a medical-treatment
decision, and therefore a claim based on that decision could not be brought pursuant to either the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) or the Rehabilitation Act, absent any allegation that the removal from suicide watch was
influenced by anything other than the physician's judgment. (Arkansas State Hospital)

U.S. District Court
EVALUATION

Soneeya v. Spencer, 851 F.Supp.2d 228 (D.Mass. 2012). A state prisoner, a male-to-female transsexual, brought an
action against the Commissioner of the Massachusetts Department of Correction (DOC), alleging violations of her
Eighth Amendment rights. Following a bench trial, the district court held that the prisoner's gender identity disorder
(GID) was a serious medical need and the treatment received by the prisoner was not adequate. The court found that
the Commissioner was deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's serious medical need and the DOC's pattern of
obstruction and delay was likely to continue, as required for the prisoner to obtain injunctive relief on her Eighth
Amendment claim, where the DOC's policy for treating GID imposed a blanket prohibition on cosmetic and sex
reassignment surgery without exception. The court noted that the transsexual prisoner's gender identity disorder was
a “serious medical need” within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment, the prisoner's GID was diagnosed by a
physician as needing treatment, and she had a history of suicide attempts and self castration while in custody. The
court found that the treatment received by the transsexual prisoner was not adequate, although the DOC provided the
prisoner with psychotherapy and hormone treatment, it failed to perform an individual medical evaluation aimed
solely at determining appropriate treatment for her GID as a result of its blanket prohibition on cosmetic and sex
reassignment surgery. (MCI–Shirley, Massachusetts)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEX OFFENDERS
DUE PROCESS
RIGHT TO
TREATMENT

Strutton v. Meade, 668 F.3d 549 (8th Cir. 2012). A civilly-committed sex offender brought a civil rights action
challenging the adequacy of his treatment at the Missouri Sexual Offender Treatment Center. The district court
entered judgment in favor of the defendants, and the plaintiff appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court found
that the offender had standing to bring the due process challenge to the adequacy of Missouri's four-phase treatment
program for such offenders, where he demonstrated that his alleged injury of not advancing in treatment was not due
solely to his own recalcitrance and could have been due to the lack of adequate treatment resources. But according to
the court, the treatment received by offender did not shock the conscience, in violation of substantive due process.
The court noted that although budget shortfalls and staffing shortages resulted in treatment modifications that were
below standards set in place by the center's directors, temporary modifications in the treatment regimen of
eliminating psychoeducational classes and increasing the size of process groups was neither arbitrary nor egregious,
and the center sought to maintain essential treatment services in light of the challenges it faced. The court found that
the treatment center's use of the “restriction table” and the later use of a restriction area in treating the civillycommitted sex offender did not shock the conscience, and thus did not violate offender's Fourteenth Amendment due
process rights. A resident assigned to the Restriction Table, which was located near a nurses' station, was not
permitted to speak to another person unless that person was also seated at the table, and was only allowed to leave
the table for meals, classes, process groups, and for an hour of exercise. Residents would remain at the table from

30.55

early morning until late evening. Despite its name, residents assigned to the Restriction Table were not physically
restrained and were allowed to stand, stretch, get a drink of water, or use the restroom as needed. Use of the table
was discontinued and it was replaced with a “Restriction Area.” According to the court, residents assigned to a
restriction table or restriction area retained a comparatively free range of movement and activities, including the
ability to get up and stretch, to leave to attend group sessions and meetings, to converse with other residents, to work
on homework or legal issues, and to play cards. (Missouri Sexual Offender Treatment Center)
U.S. Appeals Court
INVOLUNTARY
MEDICATION
DUE PROCESS

U.S. v. Loughner, 672 F.3d 731 (9th Cir. 2012). In a prosecution for attempted assassination of a Congresswoman,
murder of federal judge, murder and attempted murder of other federal employees, injuring and causing death to
participants at a federally provided activity, and related weapons offenses, the district court denied the defendant's
emergency motion to enjoin an involuntary medication decision, and he appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The
appeals court held that: (1) procedures used to determine whether the defendant ought to be involuntarily medicated
complied with due process; (2) the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) medical facility did not act arbitrarily in finding that the
defendant was a danger to himself and that antipsychotic medication was in his best interest; and, (3) due process did
not require the BOP to specify a medication regimen before it could involuntarily medicate the defendant. (U.S.
Medical Center for Federal Prisoners in Springfield, Missouri)

U.S. Appeals Court
DUE PROCESS
EVALUATION
SENTENCE

U.S. v. Thornberg, 676 F.3d 703 (8th Cir. 2012). Following his apprehension more than six years after escaping from
federal prison camp, a defendant pled not guilty, by reason of insanity, to the charge of escape from custody. The
district court granted the defendant's first motion for a psychiatric evaluation, denied his second motion for a
psychiatric evaluation, and sentenced him to 30 months in prison upon his conviction by a jury for escape. The
defendant appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court found that although a forensic psychologist from
the federal Bureau of Prisons did not review the indigent defendant's full medical history, a psychiatric evaluation
determining that the defendant did not suffer from a severe mental defect was not deficient, precluding his claim of
deprivation of due process by a single evaluation performed by a psychologist rather than psychiatrist, and by denial
of his request for a second evaluation to assess his competency to stand trial. The court noted that the psychologist
reviewed defendant's medical records dating from the time of his escape and concluded that his feelings of
persecution from his family that allegedly coerced him to escape from prison were not evidence that he had
delusions, as those feelings disappeared immediately after he escaped, and that his attempts to evade detection after
escape could be seen as evidence of his understanding of the wrongfulness of his conduct. (Federal Prison Camp,
Duluth, Minnesota)
2013

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
EQUAL PROTECTION
RIGHT TO
TREATMENT

Barnes v. Ross, 926 F.Supp.2d 499 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). A mentally ill inmate brought a § 1983 action against the
Commissioner of the New York Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS) and employees
of the New York Office of Mental Health asserting Eighth Amendment and equal protection claims. The mentally ill
African-American inmate alleged that he and other minorities were subject to discriminatory treatment because of
their race, in that white inmates were sent to the hospital for proper treatment, while African-Americans and Latino
inmates were placed in observation for long periods and then were sent back to their cells, where they would harm
themselves or try to commit suicide. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part
and denied in part. The court held that: (1) requirements of class certification were not satisfied; (2) the inmate failed
to plausibly allege an Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs; (3) the
inmate stated a claim of racial discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause; (4) the inmate adequately
alleged the personal involvement of an employee; but (5) the inmate did not adequately allege the personal
involvement of the Commissioner. The court held that the employees were not entitled to qualified immunity
because the right of a prisoner to be free from racial discrimination was clearly established, and the inmate
adequately alleged that the employees intentionally discriminated against him on account of his race. (Sullivan
Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
DUE PROCESS
EQUAL PROTECTION
RIGHT TO
TREATMENT
SUICIDE
TRAINING

Belbachir v. County of McHenry, 726 F.3d 975 (7th Cir. 2013). The administrator of the estate of a female federal
detainee who committed suicide in a county jail filed suit against the county, county jail officials, and employees of
the medical provider that had a contract with the county to provide medical services at the jail, alleging violation of
the detainee's due process rights and Illinois tort claims. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of all
county defendants. The administrator appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
The appeals court found that the jail inmate who was detained by federal immigration authorities pending her
removal hearing was in the same position as a lawfully arrested pretrial detainee. The court noted that a pretrial
detainee was entitled, pursuant to the due process clause, to at least as much protection during her detention as
convicted criminals were entitled to under the Eighth Amendment-- namely protection from harm caused by a
defendant's deliberate indifference to the inmate's safety or health. The court asserted that persons who have been
involuntarily committed are entitled, under the due process clause, to more considerate treatment during detention
than criminals whose conditions of confinement are designed to punish.
The court found that the alleged conduct of a clinical social worker at the county jail who interviewed the
detainee, in noting that the detainee suffered from a major depressive disorder, hallucinations, acute anxiety, and
feelings of hopelessness, but allegedly failing to report those findings to the jail guards or any other jail staff or to
recommend that the detainee be placed on a suicide watch or receive mental health treatment, amounted to deliberate
indifference to the detainee's risk of suicide, in violation of the detainee's due process rights. The court held that a
nurse manager employed by the medical provider was not deliberately indifferent to the detainee's risk of suicide, as
would violate the detainee's due process rights, where the nurse manager treated the detainee for panic attacks and
anxiety, and recommended that she be given a cellmate and transferred to a medical treatment area at the jail, both of
which were done, and there was no showing that the nurse manager knew that the detainee was suicidal. According
to the court, the county sheriff's and county jail director's failure to provide annual training to jail staff on how to

30.56

recognize the risk of suicide in detainees, and their failure to implement a suicide prevention policy, did not render
the county liable under § 1983 for the detainee's suicide during her detention at the jail, absent a showing that such
failures caused the detainee's suicide. (McHenry County Jail, Illinois)
U.S. Appeals Court
JUVENILE
RESTRAINTS
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Blackmon v. Sutton, 734 F.3d 1237 (10th Cir. 2013). A former juvenile pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action
against various members of a juvenile detention center's staff, alleging they violated the Fourteenth Amendment
rights guaranteed to him as a pretrial detainee. The district court denied the defendants' motion for summary
judgment based on qualified immunity. The defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, and reversed in
part. The court held that the eleven-year-old pretrial detainee's right to be free from punishment altogether was
clearly established at the time the staff allegedly used a chair bearing wrist, waist, chest, and ankle restraints to
punish detainee, for the purposes of the juvenile detention center's staff's qualified immunity defense. According to
the court, the senior correctional officer approved a decision by one of his subordinates, a fully grown man, to sit on
the chest of the eleven-year-old without any penological purpose.
The court found that the detainee’s Fourteenth Amendment due process rights were violated when employees
allegedly failed to provide the eleven-year-old detainee with any meaningful mental health care despite his obvious
need for it. The court noted that prison officials who assumed a “gate keeping” authority over the prisoner’s access
to medical professionals were deliberately indifferent to the detainee's medical needs when they denied or delayed
access to medical care. But the court also held that the detainee's alleged right to be placed in a particular facility of
his choice while awaiting trial was not clearly established at the time the director failed to transfer detainee to a
nearby shelter, for purposes of the juvenile detention center director's qualified immunity defense..
The court stated: “Weeks before eleven-year-old, 4'11," 96–pound Brandon Blackmon arrived at the juvenile
detention center in Sedgwick, Kansas, officials there made a new purchase: the Pro–Straint Restraining Chair,
Violent Prisoner Chair Model RC–1200LX. The chair bore wrist, waist, chest, and ankle restraints. In the months
that followed, the staff made liberal use of their new acquisition on the center's youngest and smallest charge.
Sometimes in a legitimate effort to thwart his attempts at suicide and self-harm. But sometimes, it seems, only to
punish him. And that's the nub of this lawsuit.” (Juvenile Residential Facility, Sedgwick County, Kansas)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE

Coleman v. Brown, 922 F.Supp.2d 1004 (E.D.Cal. 2013). State prison inmates brought Eighth Amendment
challenges to the adequacy of mental health care and medical health care provided to mentally ill inmates and the
general prison population, respectively. The inmates moved to convene a three-judge panel of the district court to
enter a population reduction order that was necessary to provide effective relief. The motions were granted and the
cases were assigned to same panel, which ordered the state to reduce the prison population to 137.5% of its design
capacity. The state moved to vacate or modify the population reduction order. The district court denied the motion.
The three-judge panel of the district court held that: (1) the state's contention that prison crowding was reduced and
no longer a barrier to providing inmates with care required by the Eighth Amendment did not provide the basis for a
motion to vacate the order on the ground that changed circumstances made it inequitable to continue applying the
order; (2) the state failed to establish that prison crowding was no longer a barrier to providing inmates with care
required by the Eighth Amendment; and (3) the state failed to establish it had achieved a durable remedy to prison
crowding. (Calif. Dept. of Rehabilitation and Corrections)

U.S. District Court
DELAY IN CARE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
SEGREGATION
SUICIDE

Coleman v. Brown, 938 F.Supp.2d 955 (E.D.Cal. 2013). California state prisoners with serious mental disorders
brought a class action against various prison and state officials, alleging failure to provide mental care in violation of
the Eighth Amendment. After a three-judge court found that overcrowding was the primary cause of ongoing
constitutional violations, and was affirmed by the United States Supreme Court, officials moved to terminate all
prospective relief and vacate the judgment. The district court denied the motion, holding that: (1) there remained an
ongoing violation of the Eighth Amendment in inadequate assessment, treatment, or intervention regarding prisoner
suicides; (2) prisoners placed in administrative segregation units continued to face a substantial risk of harm; (3)
prisoners continued to face delays in access to care; (4) prisons continued to have shortages in treatment space and
access to beds; and (5) officials were deliberately indifferent in implementing policies to remedy the Eighth
Amendment violations. (California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation)

U.S. District Court
DELAY IN CARE
RIGHT TO
TREATMENT

Coleman v. Brown, 960 F.Supp.2d 1057 (E.D.Cal. 2013). California prisoners with serious mental disorders brought
a class action against a Governor, alleging that due to prison overcrowding, they received inadequate mental health
care, in violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. Separately, California
prisoners with serious medical conditions brought a class action asserting constitutional claims similar to those in the
other action. In the case concerning mental health care, the district court found Eighth Amendment violations and
appointed a special master to oversee the development and implementation of a remedial plan. In the case
concerning medical care, the State stipulated to a remedial injunction, and, after the State failed to comply with that
injunction, the district court appointed a receiver to oversee remedial efforts. A three judge district court panel
consolidated the two cases and the panel entered a remedial order requiring the State to reduce its prison population
to 137.5 percent of design capacity within two years. The Governor appealed. The United States Supreme Court
affirmed the population reduction order. The district court subsequently denied the defendants' motion to vacate or
modify the population reduction order, and directed the defendants to comply with the population reduction order.
The defendants' moved to stay the order directing compliance pending appeal to the United States Supreme Court.
The district court denied the motion, finding that: (1) the State was not likely to succeed on the merits of the
prisoners' lawsuit challenging prison conditions; (2) the State would not be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3)
issuance of a stay would substantially injure the prisoners; and (4) the public interest favored denying the stay.
(California)

U.S. Appeals Court
EVALUATION

De'lonta v. Johnson, 708 F.3d 520 (4th Cir. 2013). A pre-operative transsexual inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging
that state prison officials' continued denial of consideration for sex reassignment surgery as treatment for her gender
identity disorder (GID) constituted deliberate indifference to her serious medical need in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. The district court dismissed the complaint, and the inmate appealed. The appeals court reversed and

30.57

remanded. The court held that the inmate's allegation was sufficient to state a plausible Eighth Amendment claim
against the officials, even though the officials had provided the inmate with hormone treatment and mental health
consultations, and had allowed her to live and dress as a woman, where the standard protocol for treatment of GID
indicated that sex reassignment surgery might be necessary for individuals who continued to present with severe
GID after one year of hormone therapy and dressing as woman. The court noted that the officials failed to evaluate
the inmate concerning her suitability for surgery, despite her repeated complaints as to the persistence of her
symptoms and the inefficacy of her existing treatment. (Powhatan Correctional Center, and Buckingham
Correctional Center, Virginia Department of Corrections)
U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE
SPECIAL HOUSING

Earl v. Racine County Jail, 718 F.3d 689 (7th Cir. 2013). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against a county jail and
various jail officers, asserting claims for denial of due process and deliberate indifference to his serious medical
condition. The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, and the inmate appealed. The
appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the inmate's five days on suicide watch were neither long enough
nor harsh enough to deprive him of a due-process-protected liberty interest, where: (1) the only changes to the
inmate's meals were that trays upon which food was served were disposable foam rather than plastic; (2) eating
utensils were quickly removed after each meal; (3) the inmate was not denied bedding but was given a mattress and a
blanket; (4) the inmate was denied writing materials for only the first 48 hours; and (5) rather than being prohibited
human contact, deputies were assigned to closely and personally monitor the inmate to ensure his safety. The court
found that jail officers were not deliberately indifferent to the inmate's allergic reaction to suicide garments in
violation of the Eighth Amendment. The court noted that after the inmate told an officer about his allergic reaction to
a suicide gown, the officer called a nurse who immediately examined the inmate and gave him cream and
medication, and the officers appropriately deferred to the nurse's medical decision that the inmate did not need
different garments because there was no sign of rash or bumps on the inmate. (Racine County Jail, Wisconsin)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
DUE PROCESS
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
SUPERVISION

Goodman v. Kimbrough, 718 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 2013). The wife of a pretrial detainee who suffered from dementia
and who was severely beaten by his cellmate filed a § 1983 action against jail officials in their individual capacities
for alleged violation of the Due Process Clause by deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of harm to the
detainee. The wife also asserted a supervisory liability claim against the sheriff in his official capacity and a state law
claim for loss of support and consortium. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The wife
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that there was no evidence that jail officials were subjectively
aware of a risk of serious harm to which the pretrial detainee was exposed from his severe beating by a cellmate, and
that the officials deliberately disregarded that risk, as required to support the detainee's § 1983 claim of deliberate
indifference in violation of the Due Process Clause. According to the court, the officers' failure to conduct cell
checks and head counts and their deactivation of emergency call buttons constituted negligence but did not justify
constitutional liability under § 1983. According to the court, jail officials' policy violations by failing to enter every
cell in conducting head counts and in deactivating emergency call buttons did not constitute a custom so settled and
permanent as to have the force of law. (Clayton County Jail, Georgia)

U.S. District Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
MEDICATION

Hahn v. Walsh, 915 F.Supp.2d 925 (C.D.Ill. 2013). The estate of a diabetic pretrial detainee brought an action
against a city, police officers, a county, the county sheriff, and a jail medical provider, alleging under § 1983 that the
defendants were deliberately indifferent to the detainee's serious medical needs. The defendants moved for summary
judgment. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that a city police officer at
the scene of the arrest who had no involvement with the diabetic detainee could not be held liable under § 1983 for
being deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of detainee, who died from diabetic ketoacidosis after she
was taken to a county jail. The court also found that city police officers who transported the detainee to the county
jail, rather than a hospital, were not deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of the detainee, where the
officers were entitled to defer to the judgment of the paramedics on the scene. According to the court, there was no
evidence that the county sheriff knew of a serious risk to the health of the diabetic pretrial detainee and consciously
disregarded that risk, that any prior deaths at the jail involved medical care provided to an inmate, much less that
medical care involved an inmate with diabetes, or that the sheriff's decisions about certification of the jail's medical
contractor had any adverse effect on the detainee, as would subject the sheriff to liability under § 1983, in his
individual capacity, for his alleged deliberate indifference to the detainee's serious medical needs. The court found
that the county's actions in shutting off water to the mentally ill, diabetic pretrial detainee's cell when the inmate was
stuffing clothing into the cell's toilet did not violate the detainee's Fourteenth Amendment rights. According to the
court, the estate's claim against the county that the detainee, who died of diabetic ketoacidosis after allegedly
refusing diabetic treatment and food while incarcerated, was not properly treated for her mental illness and diabetes
was not actionable under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) or the Rehabilitation Act. (Champaign County
Jail, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
EVALUATION
JUVENILE
PSYCHIATRIC CARE
PSYCHOTROPIC
DRUGS
SPECIAL HOUSING

Harrelson v. Dupnik, 970 F.Supp.2d 953 (D.Ariz. 2013). The mother of 17-year-old inmate who died while housed
at a county jail brought an action in state court against the county, the county sheriff, the healthcare provider which
contracted with the county to provide medical and mental health care at the jail, and employees of the provider,
individually and on behalf of the inmate's estate, alleging under § 1983 that the defendants were deliberately
indifferent to the inmate's serious medical needs. The defendants removed the action to federal court and moved for
summary judgment. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The district court held that: (1)
the county defendants' duty to provide medical and mental health services to an inmate was non-delegable; (2)
intervening acts of the medical defendants did not absolve the county defendants of liability for alleged negligence;
(3) the mother failed to state a claim for wrongful death; (4) the county was not deliberately indifferent to the
inmate's rights; (5) the provider was not subject to liability; but (6) a fact issue precluded summary judgment as to an
Eighth Amendment medical claim against the employees.
According to the court, the duty of the county and the county sheriff to provide medical and mental health
services to the 17-year-old county jail inmate, who suffered from bipolar disorder and depression, was non-

30.58

delegable, and thus the county and sheriff were subject to vicarious liability, under Arizona law, for the alleged
medical malpractice of the healthcare provider which contracted with the county to provide medical and mental
health services at the jail. The court noted that there was no evidence that the legislature intended to permit the
county or sheriff to delegate their duties and obligations they owned to the inmate. The court found that the
intervening acts of the contract medical provider, in allegedly failing to properly diagnose and treat the inmate's
medical and mental health needs, both before and after the inmate received an injection of a psychotropic
medication, were not so extraordinary as to absolve the county and the county sheriff of liability for their failure to
protect the inmate.
The court found that there was no evidence that the county jail's policy or custom of placing inmates in protective
custody for their own protection amounted to deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of the inmate, who
died while on protective custody status. According to the court, there was no evidence that the county had actual
notice of a pattern of risk of harm or injury as a result of the county jail officials' use of isolation, or an
administrative segregation policy in the juvenile detention housing unit at the county jail, or that any omissions in
the county's policies necessarily gave rise to the situation in which the inmate, died from a purported cardiac event.
The court found that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the inmate's
prescribing physician knew of the inmate's serious medical need for a full psychiatric assessment, and failed to
timely provide that assessment, and as to whether jail medical personnel were aware that the inmate was suffering
from a reaction to a psychotropic medication or unknown serious medical illness, and, if so, whether they were
deliberately indifferent. (Pima County Adult Detention Complex, and Conmed Healthcare Management, Inc.,
Arizona)
U.S. Appeals Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
DUE PROCESS
SUICIDE
SUPERVISION

Lemire v. California Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 726 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2013). The estate, parents, and
daughter of a mentally ill inmate who died in custody brought a § 1983 action against the California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), CDCR officials, and prison staff. The plaintiffs sought to recover damages
for alleged violations of the Eighth Amendment, based on the inmate's right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment, and the Fourteenth Amendment, based on the family's substantive due process right of familial
association. The district court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs. The appeals court affirmed in part,
vacated in part, and remanded. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material
fact as to whether: (1) withdrawal of all floor staff from a prison building which housed mentally ill inmates, for up
to three and a half hours, created an objectively substantial risk of harm to the unsupervised inmates in the building;
(2) the captain who called staff meetings, and a warden, who purportedly authorized the meetings, were aware of
risks posed by withdrawing all floor officers from the building for over three hours; (3) any risk of harm could have
been prevented with adequate supervision; and (4) the actions of the warden and the captain shocked the conscience.
The court also found genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether (1) floor officers who were the first
prison personnel to arrive in the cell of the mentally ill inmate who apparently committed suicide were deliberately
indifferent to the inmate's serious medical needs when they failed to provide cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR),
despite being trained to administer it; (2) the officers' failure to provide medical care caused the inmate's death; and
(3) the officers' actions shocked the conscience, precluding summary judgment as to the § 1983 Eighth Amendment
medical claim brought by the inmate's family against officers and family's substantive due process claim against the
officers. (California State Prison at Solano)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
USE OF FORCE

Moses v. Westchester County Dept. of Corrections, 951 F.Supp.2d 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). The estate of a deceased
prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a county, its department of corrections (DOC), and a corrections officer,
alleging state and federal claims after the prisoner was beaten by the officer. The defendants moved to dismiss. The
district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court found that the family exercised reasonable
diligence in pursuing the action, as required to equitably toll the limitations period for the § 1983 action. The estate
alleged that the corrections officer “kicked and stomped” on the prisoner’s head, causing injuries that eventually led
to his death. The officer was indicted in county court for assault and the Federal Bureau of Investigations opened an
investigation into allegations that the officer had used excessive force against the prisoner. The officer was
eventually convicted of reckless assault. The prisoner’s death also prompted a federal investigation into conditions at
the jail, and investigators found a number of instances of the use of excessive force by jail staff, a failure to provide
an adequate review system, and a failure to provide adequate mental and medical health care. (Westchester
Department of Corrections, New York)

U.S. District Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
DUE PROCESS
EQUAL PROTECTION

Poche v. Gautreaux, 973 F.Supp.2d 658 (M.D.La. 2013). A pretrial detainee brought an action against a district
attorney and prison officials, among others, alleging various constitutional violations pursuant to § 1983, statutory
violations under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act (RA), as well as state law
claims, all related to her alleged unlawful detention for seven months. The district attorney and prison officials
moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that the detainee
sufficiently alleged an official policy or custom, as required to establish local government liability for constitutional
torts, by alleging that failures of the district attorney and the prison officials to implement policies designed to
prevent the constitutional deprivations alleged, and to adequately train their employees in such tasks as processing
paperwork related to detention, created such obvious dangers of constitutional violations that the district attorney
and the prison officials could all be reasonably said to have acted with conscious indifference. The court found that
the pretrial detainee stated a procedural due process claim against the district attorney and the prison officials under
§ 1983 related to her alleged unlawful detention for seven months, by alleging that it was official policy and custom
of the officials to skirt constitutional requirements related to procedures for: (1) establishing probable cause to
detain; (2) arraignment; (3) bail; and (4) appointment of counsel, and that the officials' policy and custom resulted in
a deprivation of her liberty without due process. The court held that the detainee stated an equal protection claim
against the prison officials under § 1983, by alleging that the officials acted with a discriminatory animus toward her
because she was mentally disabled, and that she was repeatedly and deliberately punished for, and discriminated
against, on that basis. (East Baton Rouge Prison, Louisiana)

30.59

U.S. Appeals Court
PSYCHIATRIC CARE

Quigley v. Tuong Vinh Thai, 707 F.3d 675 (6th Cir. 2013). The administrator of a deceased prisoner's estate brought a
§ 1983 action against a prison psychiatrist, alleging violations of the Eighth Amendment, as well as state claims for
gross negligence. The district court denied the psychiatrist's motion for summary judgment and the psychiatrist
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of
material fact as to: (1) whether the psychiatrist violated prisoner's Eighth Amendment right; (2) whether the
psychiatrist violated the prisoner's clearly established right; (3) whether the psychiatrist's treatment of the prisoner's
depression was so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether an injury resulted; and (4)
whether the psychiatrist's treatment of prisoner's depression was the proximate cause of prisoner's death. (Michigan
Department of Corrections Guidance Center, and Correctional Medical Services, Inc.)

U.S. District Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
SUICIDE
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE

Randle v. Alexander, 960 F.Supp.2d 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). An African-American state inmate with a history of
serious mental illness brought an action against officials of the New York State Department of Corrections and
Community Supervision (DOCCS), correctional officers, and mental health personnel, alleging under § 1983 that the
defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs and that he was retaliated against, in violation
of his First Amendment rights, among other claims. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the
motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the correctional officers' alleged actions in forcing the inmate
to fight a fellow inmate, and threatening to beat the inmate with a baton and engage in a joint cover-up if the two
inmates did not “finish” their fight within a specified area of the prison, which ultimately resulted in the fellow
inmate sustaining fatal injuries in the fight, had no legitimate penological purpose, and was far afield of the species
of force employed to restore or maintain discipline. The court held that the alleged actions reflected indifference to
inmate safety, if not malice toward the inmate, as supported the inmate's § 1983 Eighth Amendment failure to
protect claim. The court found that the inmate stated an Eighth Amendment inadequate medical care claim against
mental health personnel. The inmate alleged that he had a history of serious mental illness, that his symptoms
increased following a forced fight with a fellow inmate, that the inmate attempted suicide on three occasions, two of
which required his hospitalization, that prison mental health personnel evidenced deliberate indifference to his
medical needs, as they recklessly disregarded the risk the inmate faced as result of special housing unit (SHU)
confinement, and that the inmate was confined to SHU despite a recommendation that he be placed in a lessrestrictive location. (Green Haven Correctional Facility, Protective Custody Unit, New York State Department of
Corrections)

U.S. District Court
ADA-Americans with
Disabilities Act
PSYCHIATRIC CARE

Slevin v. Board of Com'rs for County of Dona Ana, 934 F.Supp.2d 1270 (D.N.M. 2013). A detainee brought an
action against a county board of commissioners, detention center director, and medical director, alleging violations
of his rights with regard to his medical care. The detainee alleged that, because of his mental illness, officials at the
Detention Center kept him in administrative segregation for virtually the entire 22 months of his incarceration,
without humane conditions of confinement or adequate medical care, and without periodic review of his
confinement, causing his physical and mental deterioration, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The
jury awarded the detainee $3 million in punitive damages against the Detention Center Director, and $3.5 million in
punitive damages against the facility medical director. The jury fixed the amount of compensatory damages at $15.5
million, which included $500,000 for each month that detainee was incarcerated, plus an additional $1 million for
each year since the detainee’s release from custody. The defendants moved for a new trial or for reduction of the
damages awards. The district court denied the motion, finding that the compensatory damages award was supported
by substantial evidence and it would not be set aside on the ground that it was the product of passion or prejudices.
The court also declined to set aside the punitive damages awards as excessive. (Doña Ana County Detention Center,
New Mexico)

U.S. Appeals Court
EQUAL PROTECTION
RIGHT TO
TREATMENT
DUE PROCESS

Spavone v. New York State Dept. of Correctional Services, 719 F.3d 127 (2nd Cir. 2013). A state prisoner brought a
suit against corrections officials under § 1983 and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), alleging, among other
things, that the defendants' denial of his request for a medical leave to obtain additional treatment for his posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of the law and his
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment. The prisoner had traveled to
Nicaragua in the 1980s to join the Contra rebel forces and saw combat while fighting with them in that country's
civil war. He also was working on the scaffolding of a building across the street from the World Trade Center on
September 11, 2001, and was credited with risking his life to rescue several of his coworkers. He witnessed victims
of the attack jump from the towers. The district court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment based on
qualified immunity, and the defendants appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The appeals court held
that the corrections officials were entitled to qualified immunity on prisoner's equal protection claim, and on the
prisoner's Eighth Amendment claim. According to the court, even if the prisoner was in need of absolutely necessary
medical care, neither official had reason to conclude that such care was not available to him in the prison, and thus
there was a rational basis for distinguishing between leaves of absence for the treatment of mental illness as opposed
to other sorts of illness for which leave was available. The court noted that there no evidence that either official
thought that denying the prisoner's request for a leave of absence would cause him harm, much less harm so serious
that it would be objectively unreasonable for them to believe that the policy of restricting leaves of absence for
mental health treatment was consistent with prisoner's right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment. (New York
State Department of Correctional Services)

U.S. Appeals Court
INVOLUNTARY
MEDICATION
PSYCHOTROPIC
DRUGS

U.S. v. Hardy, 724 F.3d 280 (2nd Cir. 2013). The district court granted the motion of the United States to authorize
the Bureau of Prisons to medicate a mentally ill detainee without his consent, and the detainee appealed. The appeals
court affirmed, finding that there was no basis for disturbing the district court's order authorizing involuntary
medication of the pretrial detainee to reduce the danger he posed to Bureau of Prisons staff. The court noted that
involuntary medication of the detainee to reduce the danger he posed to staff was warranted, where the detainee
suffered from schizophrenia, the consensus of the testifying psychiatrists and psychologists was that antipsychotic
medication was the treatment of choice for someone with the detainee's condition. The court noted that the detainee's

30.60

past conduct, which included threats of harm, attempts to bite or hit officers, repeated throwing of liquids in their
faces, and attempted and actual stabbings, indicated that he posed a danger to others. (United States Bureau of
Prisons, Metropolitan Corrections Center, New York City, Metropolitan Detention Center, Brooklyn, New York)
2014
U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Cano v. Taylor, 739 F.3d 1214 (9th Cir. 2014). A former prisoner brought a § 1983 action against prison officials,
alleging deliberate indifference to his mental health needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and violations of
his right to freely exercise his religious beliefs and to have access to the courts, in violation of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. The district court granted summary judgment to the officials on the deliberate indifference
claim and dismissed the remaining counts for failure to exhaust administrative remedies pursuant to the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The former prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part,
and remanded. The court held that the inmate's claims for injunctive and declaratory relief arising out of alleged
constitutional violations that occurred while in prison were mooted by his release from prison. The court found that
there was no evidence that prison mental health care providers were deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's medical
needs, as required to support an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim, where the prisoner was seen by
mental health care employees regularly for his complaints, and evidence showed that the prisoner's suicide threats
were manipulative in nature. (Arizona Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE

Carl v. Muskegon County, 763 F.3d 592 (6th Cir. 2014). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against a
psychiatrist, who served as an independent contractor to the provider of jail mental health services, claiming that the
psychiatrist failed to provide necessary mental health services in violation of the detainee's Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights. The district court dismissed and the detainee appealed. The appeals court reversed and
remanded, finding that the psychiatrist was a state actor for the purposes of inmate's § 1983 claim. (Muskegon
County Jail, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
USE OF FORCE
SPECIAL HOUSING
RESTRAINTS
SEGREGATION
SUICIDE

Coleman v. Brown, 28 F.Supp.3d 1068 (E.D.Cal. 2014). Nearly 20 years after mentally ill inmates prevailed on class
action challenges to conditions of their confinement and a special master was appointed to implement a remedial
plan, the inmates moved to enforce court orders and for affirmative relief related to the use of force, disciplinary
measures, and housing and treatment in administrative segregation units (ASUs) and segregated housing units
(SHUs). The district court granted the motions in part. The court held that prison officials' excessive use of force on
seriously mentally ill inmates by means of pepper spray and expandable batons, pursuant to prison policies and
without regard to the impact on inmates' psychiatric condition, was not yet remedied, as required by the prior
judgment in favor of inmates. The court found that prison officials' changes in policies and practices of housing
mentally ill inmates in administrative segregation units (ASUs) and segregated housing units (SHUs) were
inadequate to remedy the systemic Eighth Amendment violations identified in the prior judgment in favor of
inmates.
According to the court, the placement of seriously mentally ill inmates in the harsh, restrictive, and nontherapeutic conditions of administrative segregation units (ASUs) for non-disciplinary reasons for more than the
minimal period necessary to transfer the inmates to protective housing or a housing assignment violated the Eighth
Amendment. The court noted that nearly half of the suicides in ASUs were by inmates placed there for nondisciplinary reasons, and such placement subjected inmates to significant restrictions including no contact visits,
significant limits on access to both exercise yards and dayroom, eating all meals in their cells, being placed in
handcuffs and restraints when moved outside their cells, and receiving mental health treatment in confined spaces
described as “cages,” with strip searches before and after treatment. (California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation)

U.S. District Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act

Cox v. Massachusetts Dept. of Correction, 18 F.Supp.3d 38 (D.Mass. 2014). A mentally disabled state prisoner
brought an action against a state department of correction (DOC) and various officials, alleging violations of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and Massachusetts Declaration of
Rights. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court
found that the prisoner's grievance alleging he was improperly classified, resulting in a sexual assault, provided the
DOC with sufficient notice to investigate, and therefore, the prisoner's claims under the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA) were administratively exhausted. The prisoner alleged that the DOC did not keep him safe and that he
was mentally challenged. According to the court, the prisoner's allegations that he was sexually assaulted by other
inmates, that he suffered other abuses, that prison officials knew of the risk of harm to the prisoner, that his history
of mental illness was well-documented, and that officials were responsible for policies, procedures, and training that
led to his injury were sufficient to state a § 1983 claim against the officials for violations of the Eighth Amendment,
and a claim under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, absent allegations of threats, intimidation, or coercion by
officials. The court held that the prisoner’s allegations that prison officials knew of his disability, that medical
professionals encouraged staff to provide appropriate housing to prevent the prisoner from being targeted by other
inmates, and that he was sexually assaulted after failure to provide appropriate housing were sufficient to state a
failure to accommodate claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). (Massachusetts Department of
Correction, Old Colony Correctional Center)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Goodvine v. Ankarlo, 9 F.Supp.3d 899 (W.D.Wis. 2014). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against Wisconsin
Department of Corrections (WDOC) officials and psychologists, as well as an admissions officer at a mental health
facility operated by the Wisconsin Department of Health Services (DHS), alleging that the defendants failed to
prevent him from engaging in acts of self-harm, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The defendants moved for
summary judgment. The court held that: (1) the psychologists were not deliberately indifferent to the inmate's need
for protection against self-harm; (2) officers who interacted with the inmate during meal-tray pickup were not
deliberately indifferent to his need for protection against self-harm; (3) a psychologist was not deliberately

30.61

indifferent in failing to alert security staff after the inmate advised him that he was having “cutting urges;” and, (4)
an admissions coordinator was not deliberately indifferent to the inmate's need for adequate mental health care. The
court also held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the sergeant
who failed to contact the prison's psychological services unit (PSU) after the inmate told the officer that he was
“feeling unsafe” and needed to go to an observation area for additional monitoring “immediately” was aware that the
inmate presented a serious risk of self-harm, but failed to take reasonable measures to protect him.
According to the court, summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a
correctional officer knew that the inmate who requested to be moved from disciplinary segregation to observation
because he was suicidal was at a serious risk of self-harm, but failed to alert supervisory or psychological services
unit (PSU) staff to conduct further evaluation before the inmate attempted suicide by cutting himself. Fact issues
precluding summary judgment were also found by the court as to whether correctional officers who escorted
mentally ill inmates to appointments with psychological services unit (PSU) and medical staff were deliberately
indifferent to the mentally-ill inmate's need for protection against self-harm when they failed to summon PSU staff
or a supervisory official after the inmate, who had a history of cutting himself with sharp objects, expressed thoughts
of self-harm. Summary judgment was also found to be precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a
captain's decision to retain the mentally ill inmate at the prison, rather than transport him to a hospital after the
inmate had changed his mind about refusing medical treatment, was reasonable under the circumstances. (Columbia
Correctional Institution, Wisconsin)
U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE

Graves v. Arpaio, 48 F.Supp.3d 1318 (D.Ariz. 2014). Pretrial detainees in the Maricopa County, Arizona, jail system
brought a class action against the county and the county board of supervisors, seeking injunctive relief for alleged
violations of their civil rights. The parties entered into consent decree which was superseded by amended judgments
entered by stipulation of the parties. The defendants sought to terminate the remaining court-ordered injunctive relief
regarding medical, dental, and mental health care for detainees. The district court denied the motion. The court held
that: (1) termination of injunctive relief requiring the timely identification, assessment, and placement of detainees
suffering from serious health conditions was not warranted; (2) termination of injunctive relief requiring the timely
identification, assessment, and placement of detainees suffering from mental illness was not warranted; (3)
termination of injunctive relief requiring the timely identification, segregation, and treatment of detainees with
communicable diseases was not warranted; (4) termination of injunctive relief requiring that the detainees have
ready access to care to meet their serious medical and mental health needs was not warranted; and (5) the detainees
were the prevailing party for the purpose of awarding attorney's fees. (Maricopa County Jail, Arizona)

U.S. District Court
PRIVACY
SUICIDE
SUPERVISION
MEDICATION
SEGREGATION
SPECIAL HOUSING

Houston v. Cotter, 7 F.Supp.3d 283 (E.D.N.Y. 2014). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against corrections officers
and a county, alleging a due process violation in connection with his placement on a suicide watch while
incarcerated at a county correctional facility. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The district
court denied the motions, finding that summary judgment was precluded by fact issues as to whether a protected
liberty interest was implicated. The inmate alleged that the county had a policy or custom permitting classification
officers to keep an inmate on suicide watch as a form of punishment, after mental health personnel had deemed a
continued suicide watch unnecessary. The inmate remained on suicide watch for eight days after a psychiatrist and a
social worker recommended his removal from the suicide watch. The court also found a genuine dispute of material
fact as to whether the inmate's conditions of confinement while he was placed on suicide watch imposed an atypical
and significant hardship on him in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life, such that it implicated a protected
liberty interest. While on suicide watch, officials took away the inmate’s clothing and required him to wear a
suicide-safe garment-- a sleeveless smock made of a coarse, tear-resistant material and Velcro. He was not allowed
to wear underwear, socks, or any other undergarment with the smock. He was housed in a stripped cell in the
Behavioral Modification Housing Unit. The cell contained a bare mattress and a blanket made out of the same coarse
material as the smock. Corrections officers situated immediately in front of the Plexiglass cell window constantly
supervised the inmate. According to the county, suicide watch inmates have access to the yard, a plastic spoon, a
rubberized pen, the law library, showers, razors, and medical and mental health services, but the inmate claimed that
he had no showers, telephone calls, prescription medications, food, or access to the law library while in the BMHU.
(Suffolk County Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE
MEDICATION

Johnson v. Conner, 754 F.3d 918 (11th Cir. 2014). The mother and personal representative of a mentally ill inmate
who committed suicide by hanging himself with bed sheet while in custody at a county jail filed suit against
corrections personnel working at the jail at the time of the suicide, as well as various county entities. The mother
alleged that jailers were responsible for administering her son’s medication daily, and failed to do so, that her son
had previously attempted to commit suicide with a bed sheet while incarcerated, and that the jailers failed to take
appropriate precautions with her son following that suicide attempt. The district court denied immunity to the jailers
and the jailers appealed. The appeals court certified questions to the Alabama Supreme Court, which the Supreme
Court declined to answer. The appeals court held that the statute extending immunity to county jailers did not apply
retroactively to conduct which occurred prior to its enactment. (Barbour County Jail, Alabama)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEGREGATION
SUPERVISION

Keith v. DeKalb County, Georgia, 749 F.3d 1034 (11th Cir. 2014). The administrator of the estate of a pretrial
detainee who was murdered by a fellow inmate in a jail's mental health unit brought an action against a county, the
county sheriff, and correctional officers, alleging under § 1983 that the defendants violated the detainee's substantive
due process rights. The district court denied the sheriff's motion for summary judgment based on the doctrine of
qualified immunity. The sheriff appealed. The appeals court reversed. The court held that while a correctional officer
on duty at the time the detainee was murdered by a fellow inmate may have acted contrary to jail policy by using a
cell phone within the jail, the administrator of the detainee's estate failed to show that the use of personal cell phones
within the jail was a widespread problem or that the county sheriff was aware that officers routinely violated the
policy and failed to correct the problem. The court found that the sheriff was entitled to qualified immunity on the §
1983 due process claim that he was deliberately indifferent to the safety of the detainee, in failing to segregate

30.62

mental health inmates with violent histories from those with nonviolent histories and by failing to separate mental
health inmates charged with a violent crime from those charged with a nonviolent crime. According to the court,
even if the sheriff violated the detainee's due process rights, it was not clearly established that he had a constitutional
obligation to disregard the medical expertise of mental health contractors he hired to ensure that inmates' mental
health was tended to. The court also found that the administrator of the estate of the detainee failed to show that the
county sheriff was subjectively aware that the jail's policy of requiring detention officers to alert mental health staff
when relocating mental health inmates to different cells within the same pod was disregarded on a widespread basis,
as would have subjected the sheriff to supervisory liability under § 1983. (DeKalb County Jail, Georgia)
U.S. Appeals Court
PSYCHOTROPIC
MEDICATION

King v. Kramer, 763 F.3d 635 (7th Cir. 2014). The estate of a pretrial detainee who died while awaiting trial in a
county jail brought a civil rights action against the county and the health care provider for the jail. Following
reversal in part of the grant of summary judgment in favor of the county and the provider, the court entered judgment
for the county and the provider on a jury verdict. The estate appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded,
finding that: (1) the county was not liable for the death of the detainee who was found dead in his jail cell after jail
medical staff rapidly tapered off his psychotropic medication, absent evidence that the county had an official custom
or policy in place to deprive inmates of their prescribed medications; (2) the district court could not take judicial
notice of a contract between the county and the provider; and (3) the indemnification agreement between the county
and the provider was inadmissible to show liability. (La Crosse Jail, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act

Meeks v. Schofield, 10 F.Supp.3d 774 (M.D.Tenn. 2014). A state prisoner, who allegedly suffered from paruresis, a
mental anxiety disorder that made it difficult to urinate without complete privacy, brought an action against the
Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Correction, its Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) officer, a
housing unit supervisor, a grievance board chairman, and a warden, asserting § 1983 claims for First Amendment
retaliation and violation of his right to privacy, and alleging violations of the ADA and Title VII. The defendants
moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the prisoner failed to
establish retaliation claims against the ADA officer, the housing unit supervisor, and the warden. The court found
that the prisoner, who was assisting other inmates with their legal work, was not engaged in “protected conduct,” as
required to establish a First Amendment retaliation claim against the housing unit supervisor, where the prisoner was
not authorized to help other inmates with legal work, and thus was in violation of department policy. According to
the court, the state prison's decision to remove exterior bathroom doors and refusal to put at least one door back to
accommodate the prisoner, who allegedly suffered from paruresis, a mental anxiety disorder that made it difficult to
urinate without complete privacy, was not intentionally discriminatory and did not violate the ADA.
The court held that the transfer of the prisoner to a medical housing unit did not result in denial of access to
prison programs and services available to the general population, so as to support an ADA claim of discrimination
on the basis of a perceived disability. The court noted that the transfer was intended to accommodate the prisoner's
complaints about bathroom doors being removed in the general housing unit, and the prisoner was allowed to
continue his prison job, have access to the law library, and participate in the same activities he was allowed to
participate in while he was housed with the general population. (Lois M. DeBerry Special Needs Facility, TN)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE
SUPERVISION

Nagle v. Gusman, 61 F.Supp.3d 609 (E.D.La. 2014). Siblings of a mentally ill pretrial detainee who committed
suicide brought an action against numerous employees of a parish sheriff’s office, alleging a due process violation
under § 1983, and asserting claims for wrongful death and negligence under state law. The siblings moved for partial
summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that: (1) a deputy had a duty to take
reasonable measures to protect the detainee from self-inflicted harm; (2) the deputy breached his duty by failing to
observe the detainee for long periods of time; (3) the deputy’s abandonment of his post was the cause of the
detainee’s suicide; (4) the sheriff was vicariously liable; and (5) the deputy’s repeated decision to abandon his post
violated the detainee’s due process right to adequate protection from his known suicidal impulses. According to the
court, the detainee was suffering from psychosis and was suicidal while in custody, the detainee was placed on a
suicide watch, suicide watch policies and training materials of the sheriff’s office explicitly required officers to
continuously monitor detainees on a suicide watch and to document that they had done so, and it was during one of
the deputy’s extended absences that the detainee succeeded in killing himself. The officer left his post at least three
times during his suicide watch shift, to help another employee distribute meals to other inmates, to take a restroom
break, and to visit the nurses’ station. During these absences, the detainee went unobserved for an hour and a half,
fifteen minutes, and two hours respectively. No other staff took the officer’s place observing the detainee during the
times when the officer abandoned his post. During the officer’s final absence, an inmate notified an on-duty officer
that the detainee was lying on the floor of his cell, unresponsive. It was later determined that the detainee had
asphyxiated after his airway became blocked by a wad of toilet paper. (Orleans Parish Sheriff’s Office, House of
Detention at Orleans Parish Prison, Louisiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
PRIVATE PROVIDER
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE

Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657 (9th Cir. 2014). State prisoners, and the state's authorized protection and advocacy
agency, filed a class action for declaratory and injunctive relief against senior officials from the Arizona Department
of Corrections (ADC), asserting Eighth Amendment claims, based on allegedly serious systemic deficiencies in
conditions of confinement in isolation cells, and in the provision of privatized medical, dental, and mental health
care services. The district court granted class certification and prison officials appealed. The appeals court affirmed.
The court found that the prisoners were not merely aggregating many claims of individual mistreatment, and instead
were alleging that ADC policies and practices of statewide and systemic application exposed all inmates in ADC
custody to substantial risk of serious harm, to which the senior officials allegedly were deliberately indifferent, even
if the risk might ultimately result in different future harm for different inmates. (Arizona Department of Corrections)

30.63

U.S. District Court
COMMITMENT
DETENTION

Pierce v. Pemiscot Memorial Health Systems, 25 F.Supp.3d 1198 (E.D.Mo. 2014). A mental health detainee brought
a § 1983 action against a medical director and a program director employed by the company that contracted to
provide psychiatric services to a county hospital, alleging violations of her due process rights and Missouri law. The
parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The district court denied the motion, granted the defendants’ motion in
part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment on the issue of punitive damages was precluded by
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the conduct of the medical director and the program director in
continuing to detain the mental health detainee was motivated by an evil motive or involved reckless indifference to
the detainee's rights. The detainee brought the action to challenge her detention in an inpatient psychiatric unit
following the expiration of a 96–hour detention order. She alleged that her continued detention violated her due
process rights under the United States and Missouri Constitutions, governing involuntary commitment procedures.
(Pemiscot Memorial Hospital, Missouri)

U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE
PRETRIAL DETENTION

Pittman ex rel. Hamilton v. County of Madison, Ill., 746 F.3d 766 (7th Cir. 2014). By and through his guardian, a
pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against a county and various jail officials, alleging the defendants were
deliberately indifferent to his risk of suicide in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court granted the
defendants' motion for summary judgment and denied the detainee's motion for a new trial. The detainee appealed.
The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The appeals court held that a nurse and doctor
were not deliberately indifferent, that there was no evidence that the sheriff or a captain knew of a substantial risk of
harm for the detainee, and that the jail's suicide prevention policies and practices were not so inadequate that they
violated the detainee's rights. But the appeals court also held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether a deputy and a sergeant were aware of the detainee's risk of suicide, where the
detainee requested to see a crisis intervention person. According to the court, when an inmate presents an officer
with a request to see a crisis intervention person and the officer also is aware that the reason for the request well may
be a serious psychological condition that is beyond the officer's capacity to assess definitively, the officer has an
obligation under the Eighth Amendment to refer that individual to the person who, under existing prison procedures,
is charged with making that definitive assessment. (Madison County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
DUE PROCESS

Revilla v. Glanz, 7 F.Supp.3d 1207 (N.D.Okla. 2014). Four pretrial detainees or representatives of their estates
brought an action against a county sheriff, asserting claims under § 1983 and the Oklahoma Constitution, relating to
allegedly deficient medical care. The sheriff filed a motion to dismiss. The district court denied the motion, finding
that the plaintiffs stated a § 1983 claim against the sheriff for supervisory liability in his individual capacity, and a §
1983 claim against the sheriff for liability in his individual capacity. The court noted that the Due Process Clause of
the Oklahoma Constitution protects pretrial detainees against the denial of medical attention. The plaintiffs alleged:
(1) that the sheriff was responsible for ensuring that pretrial detainees received appropriate medical care; (2) that he
was responsible for creating, adopting, approving, ratifying, nd enforcing the policies that his subordinates allegedly
violated; (3) that he failed to provide prompt and adequate care in the face of known and substantial risks to each
detainee's health-;, and (4) that he had long known of systemic deficiencies in the jail's medical care. The plaintiffs
cited numerous incidents and reports, as well as inmate deaths, which they alleged provided clear notice to the
sheriff of seriously deficient medical and mental health care which placed inmates at a serious risk of injury or death.
One such notice included a report by the United States Department of Homeland Security's Office of Civil Rights
and Civil Liberties which “found a prevailing attitude among clinic staff [at the Jail] of indifference.” (Tulsa County
Jail, Oklahoma)

U.S. Appeals Court
SPECIAL HOUSING
SUICIDE
SUPERVISION

Townsend v. Cooper, 759 F.3d 678 (7th Cir. 2014). An inmate suffering from a significant mental illness brought a §
1983 action against prison officials, claiming that imposition of a behavior action plan in response to the inmate's
disruptive behavior and threats of suicide violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights, deprived him of
the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities and exhibited an indifference to his serious medical needs in
violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment for the prison officials and the
inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court held that the behavior
action plan resulted in an atypical and significant hardship compared to ordinary prison life, and thus, the inmate had
a liberty interest in not being placed on the plan sufficient to support his Fourteenth Amendment due process
challenge against the prison officials, where the plan involved removal of the inmate's personal property from his
cell, provision of a bag lunch, provision of a paper gown, and limited access to toiletries. The court found that
summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether prison officials acted in disregard
of a substantial risk of serious harm to the inmate, and a fact issue as to whether the behavior action plan was
imposed for safety reasons or as a disciplinary measure. The court found that prison psychologists were not
deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of the inmate when they placed the inmate on the behavior
action plan, where the psychologists repeatedly visited the inmate, regularly adjusted the inmate's access to property
that he could use to harm himself, and repeatedly placed the inmate on observation status to ensure his safety when
he was suicidal. (Green Bay Correctional Institution, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
EVALUATION
MEDICATION

Trueblood v. Washington State Dept. of Social and Health Services, 73 F.Supp.3d 1311 (W.D.Wash. 2014). Pretrial
detainees brought a class action against the Washington Department of Social and Health Services and two state
hospitals, alleging that in-jail waiting times for court-ordered competency evaluations and restoration services
violated their Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The detainees moved for summary judgment. The district
court granted the motion, finding that in-jail waiting times for court-ordered competency evaluations and restoration
services violated the Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights of mentally incapacitated pretrial
detainees. The court noted that detainees were incarcerated for many weeks, not because they were convicted, found
to be dangerous, or posed a flight risk, but because Department of Social and Health Services and state hospitals did
not have sufficient bed space or available staff to provide the services they were required to provide. Some detainees
were held in solitary confinement due to space issues, exacerbating any mental illness, and the rate of medication
compliance was lower in jail. (Washington State Department of Social and Health Services, Western State Hospital

30.64

U.S. District Court
MEDICATIONS
PSYCHOTROPIC
DRUGS
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE

and Eastern State Hospital)
Williams v. Board of Regents of University of New Mexico, 20 F.Supp.3d 1177 (D.N.M. 2014). A mental health
detainee and his mother brought an action against a county, alleging medical negligence, negligence per se,
intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and loss of consortium, based on conduct while the
detainee was being held at a county medical center and jail. The plaintiffs alleged that the detainee was not given his
psychotropic medications while detained. The county moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion.
According to the court, the New Mexico Tort Claims Act (NMTCA) did not waive the county's immunity for any of
the detainee's claims. (Bernalillo County Metropolitan Detention Center, New Mexico)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Young v. Choinski, 15 F.Supp.3d 172 (D.Conn. 2014). A state prisoner brought an action against prison officials and
personnel under § 1983, alleging deliberate indifference to his medical and mental health needs in violation of the
Eighth Amendment. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and
denied in part. The court held that the prisoner failed to establish that his medical need was objectively serious, as
required to support a claim against prison officials and personnel for deliberate indifference to a serious medical
need in violation of Eighth Amendment. The court noted that, although the prisoner alleged he cut his arms with a
metal object causing severe bleeding, none of wounds appeared to be bleeding on a video recording of the prisoner
as he was escorted from his cell to a medical unit, the prisoner did not allege that the abrasions significantly
interfered with his daily activities or caused him substantial or chronic pain, and he offered no evidence that the
wounds required any further treatment beyond cleaning and antibiotic ointment. The court found that the prisoner
suffered from a serious mental health need, as required to support claim against prison personnel for deliberate
indifference to his serious mental health needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment, where the prisoner had been
diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder, borderline personality disorder, and antisocial personality disorder,
and the prisoner's health records reflected that he had made prior attempts and threats to commit suicide.
The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether a
corrections officer intentionally refused to take action to summon mental health or medical personnel to evaluate and
treat the prisoner after he became aware of the prisoner's suicidal thoughts, and then the officer learned that the
mental health unit had closed for the evening. (Northern Correctional Institution, Somers, Connecticut)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Young v. Choinski, 15 F.Supp.3d 194 (D.Conn. 2014). A prisoner, proceeding pro se, brought a § 1983 action
against prison officials and personnel, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical and mental health
needs, constituting cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. After the district court
granted the defendants' summary judgment motion in part and denied it in part, the defendants moved for
reconsideration. The district court denied the motion. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a
genuine dispute of material fact as to whether a correctional officer was subjectively aware of the prisoner's serious
mental health needs. The court found that the prisoner’s complaint alleging deliberate indifference, failure to prevent
and protect from self-harm, denial of medical care, and that a correctional officer failed to assist the prisoner with
prompt medical attention was sufficient to state a claim against the officer for deliberate indifference to serious
medical and mental health needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Northern Correctional Institution, Somers,
Connecticut)
2015

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE
MEDICATION

Hernandez v. County of Monterey, 110 F.Supp.3d 929 (N.D. Cal. 2015). The plaintiffs, current and recently released
jail inmates seeking relief on behalf of a class, brought an action against the county, the sheriff’s office, and the
private company that administered jail health care facilities and services, alleging that substandard conditions
constituted deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and failure to
accommodate in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The plaintiffs moved for a preliminary
injunction. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the
merits in their action, alleging that county jail conditions constituted deliberate indifference in violation of Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments and failure to accommodate in violation of ADA. According to the court, there was
significant evidence that the jail’s policies and practices with regard to tuberculosis (TB) screening, suicide and selfharm prevention, alcohol and drug withdrawal, and continuing medical prescriptions, were noncompliant with
contemporary standards and guidelines, placing inmates at risk and constituting deliberate indifference to their
serious medical needs. The court noted that there was significant evidence that inmates with disabilities were
excluded from access to exercise, religious services, and other meetings that were conducted in inaccessible
locations, or from sign language interpreters, in violation of ADA. The court found that the plaintiffs were likely to
suffer irreparable harm, absent preliminary injunctive relief, where the jail continued to fail to provide proper
tuberculosis (TB) identification, isolation, diagnosis and treatment, to eliminate potential suicide hazards for
unstable mentally ill patients, to continue community medications, and to properly treat inmates withdrawing from
drugs and alcohol, and inmates with disabilities would continue to suffer access exclusion and lack of sign language
interpreters. (Monterey County Jail, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE

Jackson v. West, 787 F.3d 1345 (11th Cir. 2015). The estate of a detainee who committed suicide while in the
custody of a county jail brought a § 1983 action against a county sheriff and against 10 corrections officers, alleging
violation of the detainee’s due process rights. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of three officers
on qualified immunity grounds, but denied summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds with respect to the
remaining officers. The remaining officers filed an appeal. The appeals court reversed, finding that the officers
lacked a subjective knowledge of a strong risk that the detainee would attempt suicide, so that the officers did not act
with deliberate indifference in failing to prevent the suicide. The court noted that the detainee had made explicit
suicide threats and he was placed in the suicide prevention unit, as was proper protocol, and the detainee was
released from that unit when prison medical staff later determined that he no longer presented such a risk. The court
stated: “This case is troubling. The Marion County Jail tragically failed to keep Mr. James safe while he was

30.65

incarcerated. Under our precedent, however, an officer is liable under § 1983 for the suicide of an inmate only if he
had subjective knowledge of a serious risk that the inmate would commit suicide and he disregarded that known
risk.” (Marion County Jail, Florida)
U.S. Appeals Court
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Lee v. Willey, 789 F.3d 673 (6th Cir. 2015). A former prisoner brought a § 1983 claim against a part-time prison
psychiatrist, alleging that he suffered sexual abuse by another prisoner as a result of the psychiatrist’s deliberate
indifference to his health and safety in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court entered summary
judgment in the psychiatrist’s favor. The former prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the
district court’s ruling that the former prisoner did not submit a substitute prison grievance letter was not clearly
erroneous, and the former prisoner failed to exhaust administrative remedies prior to bringing his § 1983 claim.
(Charles Egeler Reception and Guidance Center, Michigan)

U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE
DELIBERATE
INDIFFERENCE

Letterman v. Does, 789 F.3d 856 (8th Cir. 2015). Parents of a deceased prisoner, who died from injuries suffered
while in jail, brought a § 1983 action against a prison sergeant, lieutenant, and case manager, alleging that the
employees were indifferent to the prisoner’s medical needs. The prisoner had been arrested for possession of
marijuana and was given a 120 “shock sentence” in confinement. He became suicidal and was transferred to a
padded cell at the request of mental health personnel. He was to have been personally observed every 15 minutes by
staff and procedure required the prisoner to give a verbal response each time. After a shift chance, the oncoming
officer decided to monitor the prisoner via closed circuit television rather than making the required in-person rounds.
During the shift, the prisoner injured himself in the cell and eventually died from his injuries. The district court
denied the employees’ motion for summary judgment, based on assertions of qualified immunity. The employees
appealed. The appeals court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to
whether a prison sergeant, who was in charge of the unit where prisoner was kept, and a lieutenant, were deliberately
indifferent to the risk of harm to the prisoner who died from injuries allegedly sustained in a padded cell. (Missouri
Western Reception, Diagnostic and Correction Center)

U.S. Appeals Court
GID- Gender Identity
Disorder
TRANSSEXUAL

Reid v. Griffin, 808 F.3d 1191 (8th Cir. 2015). A prisoner, who was born male but identified as female, and who had
performed a self-castration, brought a § 1983 action alleging that refusal by a prison, the prison medical director, the
prison doctor, and the prison health psychiatrist to provide hormone-replacement therapy for Gender Identity
Disorder (GID) was deliberate indifference to the prisoner’s serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The prisoner
appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the defendants were not deliberately indifferent to the prisoner’s
serious medical needs. According to the court, in denying the prisoner estrogen-replacement therapy, the prison
medical director, prison health psychiatrist, and prison doctor were not deliberately indifferent to prisoner’s medical
needs in violation of Eighth Amendment, where numerous mental-health professionals evaluated the prisoner, but
none had diagnosed Gender Identity Disorder (GID) or concluded that GID treatment was appropriate, and the
prisoner had several other mental health issues for which the prisoner received treatment and monitoring. (Varner
Super Max Unit, Arkansas Department of Correction)

U.S. District Court
INTAKE SCREENING

Sanders v. Glanz, 138 F.Supp.3d 1248 (N.D. Okla. 2015). A pretrial detainee's guardian filed a § 1983 action against
a sheriff, the jail's private healthcare providers, and a booking nurse to recover for injuries that the detainee suffered
from a severe assault by fellow prisoners. The defendants filed for dismissal. The district court granted the motions
in part and denied in part. The court held that the detainee, who had been assaulted by other county jail inmates,
stated a plausible municipal liability claim under § 1983 against the corporation that assisted in developing the
sheriff's policies with respect to medical and mental health care of inmates, where the detainee alleged that the
corporation shared responsibility with the sheriff to adequately train and supervise its employees, and that the
corporation's policies, practices, and customs posed substantial risks to inmates' health and safety, but failed to take
reasonable steps to alleviate those risks. The court found that the detainee's allegations were sufficient to state a
plausible claim against the sheriff in his individual capacity by alleging that the sheriff was responsible for creating
and enforcing regulations, policies, practices, and customs at the county jail, and that pursuant to those practices,
policies, and customs, the jail maintained a longstanding, constitutionally deficient system of medical and mental
health care. According to the court, the sheriff knew of substantial risks created by that system but failed to take
reasonable steps to alleviate the risks, but instead took intentional and active steps to conceal the dangerous
conditions at the jail, and the sheriff disregarded known and obvious risks of severe harm from lack of adequate
mental health assessment and treatment, classification, supervision, or protection. (David L. Moss Criminal Justice
Center, Tulsa County Sheriff, Oklahoma, Correctional Healthcare Management, Inc. and, Correctional Healthcare
Management of Oklahoma, Inc.)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE

Shepard v. Hansford County, 110 F.Supp.3d 696 (N.D. Tex. 2015). A husband brought an action against a county
and a county jail employee under § 1983 alleging deliberate indifference to detainee health in violation of the right to
provision of adequate medical treatment under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, following his
wife’s suicide while in the county jail. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the
motion in part and denied in part. The court held that: (1) the jail employee was entitled to qualified immunity; (2)
summary judgment was precluded by a fact issue as to whether the jail employee violated the detainee’s rights, (3)
the county had an adequate suicide risk prevention training policy, where employees were required to attend training
to learn about suicide risk detection and prevention methods, and were required to read the county’s policy on
conducting face-to-face suicide checks with detainees; (4) the county adequately trained employees on cell entry; but
(5) a fact issue existed as to whether the county had an unwritten policy of understaffing the jail, precluding
summary judgment. The court noted that it was not clearly established at the time of the suicide that an employee
was required to abandon other duties to ensure that suicide watch checks were completed, and it was not clearly
established that the employee was prohibited from providing a detainee with a towel in a cell with “tie-off points,”
since the employee was not aware of any other suicides in that cell. According to the court, the jail cell entry policy

30.66

prohibiting jail employees from entering a cell alone did not amount to training employees to be deliberately
indifferent to the needs of detainees, and was not causally related to the detainee’s death, and thus the county was not
liable under § 1983 for deliberate indifference to detainee health. (Hansford County Jail, Texas)
U.S. District Court
MEDICATION

Shorter v. Baca, 101 F.Supp.3d 876 (C.D. Cal. 2015). A pretrial detainee brought an action against a county, sheriff,
and deputies, alleging under § 1983 that the defendants denied her medical care, subjected her to unsanitary living
conditions, deprived her of food, clean clothes, and access to exercise, and conducted overly invasive searches. The
detainee had been classified as mentally ill and housed in a mental health unit at the detention facility. The
defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court
held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to what policies governed
classification of pretrial detainees who were mentally ill. The court found that summary judgment was precluded by
a genuine issue of material fact as to whether jail conditions imposed on the detainee, including permitting the
detainee, who was incarcerated for 32 days, to shower only three times, only permitting the detainee outside of her
cell for recreation on one occasion, failing to clean her cell, failing to provide the detainee with clean clothing, and
depriving the detainee of food, amounted to punishment. The court found that there was no evidence that county jail
employees’ alleged failure to adequately treat the detainee’s blood condition caused her measurable harm, where
there was no indication that the alleged denial of treatment caused the detainee any physical pain, or that any mental
anguish the detainee suffered was related to denial of her medication. (Century Regional Detention Facility, Los
Angeles County, California)

U.S. Supreme Court
SUICIDE

Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S.Ct. 2042 (2015). The widow of a deceased inmate brought a § 1983 action against the
commissioner of a state department of correction (DOC), the warden of a state correctional institution, and others,
alleging that they violated the Eighth Amendment in failing to prevent the inmate's suicide. The district court denied
the commissioner's and warden's motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The commissioner
and warden appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, finding that any right of an
incarcerated person to proper implementation of adequate suicide prevention goals was not clearly established at the
time of the inmate’s death, and, thus, the commissioner and warden were qualifiedly immune from the widow's
claim. (Howard R. Young Correctional Institution, Delaware)

U.S. District Court
EVALUATION
SEGREGATION

Trueblood v. Washington State Dept. of Social and Health, 101 F.Supp.3d 1010 (W.D. Wash. 2015). Members of a
class of pretrial detainees suspected of being mentally incompetent, the next friends of such pretrial detainees, and a
disability rights organization brought an action seeking a permanent injunction and a declaratory judgment
establishing a time frame within which due process required that the Department of Social and Health Services
provide a competency evaluation and restoration of services to such detainees. After a bench trial, the district court
held that: (1) the disability rights organization had standing to bring the action; (2) the next friends of the pretrial
detainees had standing to bring an action; and (3) due process balancing favored the interests of the pretrial
detainees, and thus seven days was the maximum justifiable period of incarceration while awaiting a competency
evaluation and restoration of services. A permanent injunction was ordered. The court noted that jails could not
provide an environment or type of care required for such detainees, especially as they were often held in solitary
confinement without access to medication, and that confinement in jails actively damaged detainees’ mental
condition and each additional day of incarceration caused further deterioration of the detainees’ mental health,
increased the risk of suicide and victimization by other inmates. (State of Washington, Department of Social and
Health Services)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE

White v. Washington County, Tenn., 85 F.Supp.3d 955 (E.D.Tenn. 2015). The mother of a county jail detainee who
committed suicide in custody brought an action against the county, county sheriff, and the private contractor that
provided health care services to county jail inmates, alleging federal constitutional claims and state-law negligence
claims. The defendants moved to dismiss. The court held that claims against the private health care provider were
“health care liability claims,” under Tennessee law, for which the mother was required to a file certificate of good
faith and a pre-suit notice of a potential claim, where the mother asserted that the provider failed to properly assess
or provide adequate care for detainee’s mental health issues. (Washington County Jail, Tennessee)
2016

U.S. Appeals Court
PSYCHIATRIC CARE

Saylor v. Nebraska, 812 F.3d 637 (8th Cir. 2016). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that prison officials
retaliated against him by transferring and reclassifying him, that the transfer and classification review process
violated his due process rights, and that officials were deliberately indifferent to his post–traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD). The district court denied the officials’ motion for summary judgment, and they appealed. The appeals court
reversed. The court held that the prison’s medical officials were not deliberately indifferent to the inmate’s post–
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), in violation of Eighth Amendment, despite the inmate’s contention that treatment
that occurred after his treating psychiatrist left the prison rose to the level of cruel and unusual punishment. The
court noted that officials attempted to provide the inmate with another psychiatrist at the facility, ultimately found
him another psychiatrist at a different facility, continued medication as they saw fit within their independent medical
judgment, and gave him his requested private cell. The court found that the officials’ decision to transfer the inmate
to another facility and to place him in administrative segregation was not in retaliation for his complaints about his
medical care, in violation of the First Amendment, where the reason for the transfer was to provide the inmate with
necessary psychiatric care after his treating psychiatrist’s contract with the state ended and the inmate refused to
meet with the facility’s other psychiatrist. The court noted that the inmate was placed in administrative segregation
because he refused to share a cell within any other prisoners, and there were no other private cells. (Nebraska
Department of Correctional Services, Nebraska State Penitentiary, Tecumseh State Correctional Institution)

30.67

U.S. District Court
SEGREGATION

Szubielski v. Pierce, 152 F.Supp.3d 227 (D. Del. 2016). A state prisoner, acting pro se and in forma pauperis (IFP),
brought a § 1983 action against prison officials, relating to his continuing classification for solitary confinement. At
the screening stage of the case, the district court held that the prisoner stated a First Amendment retaliation claim
against a prison warden and an Eighth Amendment claim regarding conditions of confinement. The prisoner
complained of 24-hour cell confinement, limited recreation, extreme social isolation, environmental deprivation,
limited telephone calls, and limited visits. The prisoner suffered from schizophrenia, severe manic depression, and
an anxiety disorder. The court found that the prisoner's allegations that the prison warden retaliated against him after
a civil rights advocacy organization filed a lawsuit challenging solitary confinement of prisoners, by keeping the
prisoner in solitary confinement despite a classification committee's reclassification of the prisoner for mediumsecurity housing, stated a First Amendment retaliation claim. According to the court, the prisoner's allegations that
his continued solitary confinement, which had already lasted nine years, involved extreme social isolation,
inadequate medical care, limited recreation, and environmental deprivation, stated a claim the under the Eighth
Amendment regarding conditions of confinement. (James T. Vaughn Correctional Center, Delaware)

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XIX

XIX

XIX

part. The court held that their positions fell within the Elrod-Branti policy-making exception to the
general prohibition on termination of government employees because of their political affiliation.
(Illinois)
U.S. District Court
TITLE VII
HOSTILE WORK
ENVIRONMENT
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
RETALIATION

Sasser v. Alabama Dept. of Corrections, 373 F.Supp.2d 1276 (M.D.Ala. 2005). A Caucasian state

U.S. District Court
DISABILITY
RETALIATION
TERMINATION

Shape v. Barnes County, N.D., 396 F.Supp.2d 1067 (D.N.D. 2005). A county employee who was

U.S. District Court
FREE SPEECH
RETALIATION

Vantassel v. Brooks, 355 F.Supp.2d 788 (W.D.Pa. 2005). A former correctional employee brought a
§ 1983 action against corrections officials, alleging he was discharged in retaliation for exercising
his free speech rights. The district court held that the employee’s criticisms of a superintendent’s
expenditures on her state-owned residence involved matters of public concern for the purposes of
the employee’s retaliation claims. The court noted that the employee complained of the
superintendent’s excessive spending and misappropriation of funds to co-workers and to the
superintendent herself. The court denied summary judgment for the defendants, finding genuine
issues of material fact as to whether the employee would have been discharged if he had not
criticized the superintendent’s spending on her residence. (State Correctional Institution,
Cambridge Springs, Pennsylvania)

corrections employee brought an action against his employer alleging race discrimination, hostile
work environment, and retaliation under Title VII, and claims for due process, equal protection
and free speech under § 1983. The district court awarded summary judgment in favor of the
employer. The employee had been suspended and reassigned to another unit after he made a racial
slur to an inmate and assigned inmates to day labor based on their race. The court held that the
employee was not similarly situation to an African-American co-worker who stated openly that she
did not like “white people” or to an African-American co-worker who had breached security and
also called the employee a “redneck,” where there was no evidence that the co-workers had similar
positions and responsibilities. The court found that the alleged retaliatory acts against the
employee which included African-American co-workers referring to him as a racist, an AfricanAmerican co-worker refusing to let the employee take his urine sample, and the issuance of a
written warning, did not amount to adverse employment actions where the employee was not
subjected to any changes in the terms and conditions of his employment. The court noted that the
alleged retaliatory acts were also not frequent or severe enough to create a racially hostile work
environment under Title VII. The court ruled that the employee’s § 1983 claims against the
department alleging violations of his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and
against a warden in his official capacity, were barred by the Eleventh Amendment. (Work Release
Center, Alabama Department of Corrections)

demoted from a position of Chief Correctional Officer and then terminated shortly after he filed a
grievance sued a county and sheriff alleging discrimination, retaliation, and free speech and due
process violations. The district court held that the employee failed to prove that he was “disabled”
by his attention deficit disorder for the purposes of a state human rights claim, absent evidence
that his claimed disorder substantially limited his ability to perform either a class of jobs or a
broad range of jobs. The court found that the employee established a prima facie case for
retaliatory discharge under a state whistleblower statute and that genuine issues of material fact
existed as to whether the county’s proffered non-retaliatory reasons for his discharge were
pretextual. The court also found issues of material fact as to whether the employee’s grievance was
a substantial factor in the termination decision, and whether the employee was provided with an
impartial grievance committee. (Barnes County Jail, North Dakota)

2006
U.S. District Court
TERMINATION
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act

Almond v. Westchester County Dept. of Corrections, 425 F.Supp.2d 394 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). A
probationary corrections officer who was terminated after she displayed hysterical behavior and
underwent a psychiatric evaluation following training in disturbance control and use of a baton,
brought an action against a county Department of Corrections (DOC) alleging wrongful discharge
in violation of Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and New York State Human Rights Law
(NYSHRL). The employer moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the motion.
The court held that the officer failed to establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination
under ADA, on the theory that the employer perceived her to be either a drug addict or mentally
ill, where she did not prove that the employer perceived her to be drug addict despite her
statement that she had overmedicated herself, her admission to taking some sort of drug on the
day of the subject incident, and her superior's order that a drug test be administered, and
assuming that the employer perceived her to be mentally ill. The court concluded that she did not
show that the employer believed she was impaired from working or from performing some other
major life activity. The employer alleged that the plaintiff complained that the exercises were “too
hard,” and asserted that she had been exhibiting nervous and erratic behavior throughout the day,
crying and complaining that the training was too tough. The court declined to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the officer's remaining claim under NYSHRL, instead dismissing it
without prejudice. (Department of Corrections for Westchester County, New York)

31.67
XX

U.S. District Court
FREE SPEECH
RETALIATION
PROPERTY INTEREST

Barry v. Luzerne County, 447 F.Supp.2d 438 (M.D.Pa. 2006). A county correctional officer brought

U.S. Appeals Court
TERMINATION
TITLE VII
FREE SPEECH
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION

Burke-Fowler v. Orange County, Fla., 447 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir. 2006). A former correctional officer

U.S. District Court
ASSOCIATION

Clark v. Alston, 442 F.Supp.2d 395 (E.D.Mich. 2006). An applicant for a probation officer position
filed a § 1983 claim against a judge, alleging he violated her First Amendment right to freedom of
intimate association when he withdrew her offer of employment after learning she was married to
a former inmate. The district court granted summary judgment to the judge, finding that it was
not an undue intrusion into the applicant's marital relationship for the judge to deny her
employment with the court after learning she was married to a former inmate. According to the
court, the marriage itself was not a substantial motivating factor in the judge's denial of
employment, where the primary reason was the judge's concern that the applicant had not been
completely truthful at her first interview, that she had some hesitancy to permit him to review an
investigative file by himself, and that she might not have had a good working relationship with her
supervisor. The court noted that while there was no evidence that her relationship with the inmate
while she was employed at a prison was of a sexual nature, the fact that their marriage took place
approximately one month after she terminated her employment strongly suggested that some type
of “personal” relationship had to exist while she was employed there, and the judge's concern about
such a relationship would be a legitimate business reason for denying employment. (74th District
Court Probation Department, and Standish Correctional Facility, Michigan)

U.S. Appeals Court
TITLE VII
DEMOTION
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION

Davis v. Wisconsin Dept. of Corrections, 445 F.3d 971 (7th Cir. 2006). A state corrections employee

U.S. Appeals Court
TITLE VII
HOSTILE WORK
ENVIRONMENT
FAILURE TO PROTECT

Erickson v. Wisconsin Dept. of Corrections, 469 F.3d 600 (7th Cir. 2006). A female civilian employee
of a state department of corrections brought an action against her employer under Title VII and §
1983, claiming hostile work environment after she was raped by a prisoner at an all-male
minimum security prison that was housed in same building as her office. The district court denied
the employer's motion for judgment as matter of law after a jury returned a verdict in favor of the
employee. The employer appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that
whether the employer was negligent in addressing the risk that the female employee might be
harassed by a male prisoner was for the jury. The district court concluded that “the evidence was
sufficient to support the jury's verdict that [WDC's] agents knew of a significant risk of serious
harassment, were in a position to take remedial action and failed to act to prevent the sexual

an action against a county and officials, stemming from his suspension and demotion after
publication of articles about a county prison escape. The officer had spoken with a newspaper
about the escapes. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants in part, and
denied it in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by fact issues as to
whether the officer engaged in protected speech, whether the officials were entitled to qualified
immunity, and whether the officer suffered an adverse action. The court found that the county was
subject to municipal liability, where the prison board was the authorized policymaker of the county
for purposes of making policy decisions regarding the county prison, and the board had the
authority to bind the county to its decision regarding the officer's employment. The court held that
the officer lacked a protected interest in his employment. (Luzerne Co. Corr’l Facil., Pennsylvania)
brought an action against a county alleging that her termination was racially discriminatory, in
violation of Title VII and § 1981, and was based on her marital status in violation of state law. The
district court granted the county's motion for summary judgment and the officer appealed. The
appeals court affirmed, finding that the African-American officer failed to establish that her
discharge for developing an intimate romantic relationship with, and later marrying, an inmate, in
violation of a prison's anti-fraternization policy, was the result of racial discrimination and that
the county did not discriminate against the officer simply because she was married, in violation of
the Florida Civil Rights Act. The court noted that even though white officers who had close
relationships with inmates were not as severely disciplined, one white officer developed the
relationship with a former inmate without the knowledge of her partner's criminal history, another
white officer had established his relationship with an inmate prior to her arrest, and two other
white officers had relationships that were not romantic, while the African-American officer's
relationship with an inmate commenced with her full awareness of his status as an inmate and she
pursued the relationship shortly after he left her direct authority. (Orange County Corrections
Department, Florida)

brought an action against the agency and supervisors under Title VII and § 1983, alleging that he
was demoted because of his race. The district court entered judgment upon jury verdict in favor of
the employee, and defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that evidence was
sufficient to support the jury's verdict in favor of the employee. The court noted that although
there was no direct evidence that the agency and supervisors were motivated by racial bias when
they demoted the employee after he was found to have harassed a co-worker, an agency memo
drafted and approved by the supervisors indicated that the employee's violation was a category B
violation. Two white employees received far less severe penalties for category B violations, and
testimony that the supervisors thought the employee's violation was more serious than category B
came from the supervisors rather than from disinterested witnesses and was not supported by
documentary evidence. (Jackson Correctional Institution, Wisconsin)

31.68
XX

harassment from occurring.” The employee that she had previously found the prisoner in her office
after hours staring at her in a way that made her very uncomfortable. (Wisconsin Correctional
Center System, and Oregon Correctional Center)
U.S. District Court
FREE SPEECH
HARASSMENT

Farley v. Andrews, 430 F.Supp.2d 786 (N.D. Ill. 2006). County jail officers sued sheriffs and

U.S. Appeals Court
TITLE VII
WORKING
CONDITIONS
FREE SPEECH
HOSTILE WORK
ENVIRONMENT

Freitag v. Ayers, 468 F.3D 528 (9th Cir. 2006). A female former corrections officer brought an
action against a state department of corrections and department officials, alleging hostile work
environment claims based on the officials' alleged failure to stop male prisoners' sexual
harassment of the female officer and retaliation in violation of Title VII and the First Amendment.
The district court entered a jury verdict in favor of the officer and the defendants appealed. The
appeals court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held that the department of
corrections could be held liable under Title VII for failure to implement policies to protect its
female corrections officers from sexual harassment by male prisoners, and that substantial
evidence supported the determination that the officer was subjected to a hostile work environment.
According to the court, testimony and exhibits established that the officer witnessed prisoners'
masturbating in an exhibitionist manner, oftentimes while they directed verbal taunts and crude
remarks at her, and such incidents were severe. The court found that substantial evidence
supported the determination that the department of corrections failed to take prompt, corrective,
and reasonable action to address inmate sexual misconduct and that officials were aware of the
officer's complaints about the ongoing sexual harassment and her complaints about the
department's failure to adequately address the harassment, as required to establish a Title VII
retaliation claim. The court found that the officials took an adverse action against officer as a
result of her complaints, as required to establish a First Amendment retaliation claim, and that
the officer's communications with a state senator and the state office of the inspector general
constituted protected speech. (Calif. Dept. of Corr. and Rehabilitation, Pelican Bay State Prison)

U.S. District Court
TERMINATION
DUE PROCESS
RETALIATION

Henderson v. New York, 423 F.Supp.2d 129 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). A terminated state corrections officer
sued a lieutenant and commissioner, asserting race discrimination and other claims. The
lieutenant and commissioner moved for summary judgment and the motions were granted. The
district court held that: (1) the lieutenant's alleged pre-termination actions, if proven, were not
adverse employment actions; (2) the officer's termination was not causally related to his deposition
testimony, and thus did not constitute retaliation; (3) the commissioner did not retaliate against
the officer; (4) the officer received procedural due process prior to his termination; (5) the officer's
termination did not constitute a substantive due process violation; and (6) the lieutenant's alleged
actions, if proven, did not violate the officer's substantive due process rights. (Taconic Correctional
Facility, Beacon Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
WORKING
CONDITIONS

Kaucher v. County of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418 (3rd Cir. 2006). A corrections officer filed suit under §
1983 against a county and several county employees responsible for the operation of a correctional
facility, alleging violation of his substantive due process rights, contending he contracted a
Methicilin Resistant Stapylococcus Aureus (MRSA) infection as a result of the defendants’
conscience-shocking behavior in creating unsanitary and dangerous conditions at the facility. The
district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and the officer appealed. The
appeals court affirmed. The court held that: (1) the alleged inadequate remedial and preventative
measures to stop the spread of MRSA within the correctional facility did not rise to a level of
deliberate indifference that could be characterized as conscience shocking, and (2) the facility’s
alleged failure to act affirmatively to improve conditions at the jail and alleged failure to act
affirmatively to educate and warn inmates and corrections officers about MRSA infections and to
train them in infection prevention were not the cause of the corrections officer’s infection. The
court noted that the state corrections department found the jail to be substantially in compliance
with state standards, giving the defendants reason to believe their measures were adequate, only
two of 170 corrections officers tested positive for colonization of the infection, and the facility had
in place policies and procedures to ensure sanitary conditions in the jail, including requirements
that cells be regularly cleaned with an all-purpose detergent and that showers be disinfected with
a bleach and water solution. The court also noted that the officer chose to remain employed at the
jail, in a position that obliged him to work amidst MRSA infections and from the outset of his
employment, he was aware of the safety risks associated with working in a prison, and he was on
notice of the jail’s standard operating procedures, which described proper methods of handling
inmates with communicable diseases. (Bucks County Correctional Facility, Pennsylvania)

individual officers claiming they were harassed for exercising their First Amendment right to
speak out against the abuse of inmates. The district court granted summary judgment for the
defendants in part, and denied in part, finding that: (1) the plaintiff officers’ speech was about a
matter of public concern, protected by First Amendment; (2) there were fact issues whether the
sued defendants were aware of the First Amendment activity; (3) there were fact issues whether
the speech was a motivating factor in the sheriff office investigators' delays in investigating
mistreatment claims; (4) there were fact issues regarding the sheriff's § 1983 liability; and (5)
there was no civil conspiracy. The plaintiff officers alleged that fellow officers were beating
prisoners. (Cook County Department of Corrections, Illinois)

31.69
XX

U.S. District Court
FREE SPEECH
DISCIPLINE

Matrisciano v. Walker, 417 F.Supp.2d 1014 (C.D.Ill. 2006). A public employee who was formerly
the deputy director of a state corrections department sued the department, claiming that his First
Amendment rights were violated when he was reassigned and then locked out of his new position
after he appeared before the parole board advocating parole for a gang member convicted of
murder. The department moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the motion.
The court held that the employee was a “policymaker” who could be punished for his appearance,
without the need for balancing his interest in free speech against the government's need for
efficient operations. According to the court, the employee supervised assistant wardens who were
found by the court of appeals to be policymakers, and was active in the review of proposed policies.
The court noted that the factors to be considered in determining whether a public employee can be
punished for exercise of his First Amendment free speech rights, include: (1) whether the
employee's statement would create problems in maintaining discipline by immediate supervisors
or harmony among co-workers; (2) whether the employment relationship is one in which personal
loyalty and confidence are necessary; (3) whether the speech impeded the employee's ability to
perform his daily responsibilities; (4) the time, place, and manner of speech; (5) the context in
which the underlying dispute arose; (6) whether the matter was one on which debate was vital to
informed decisionmaking; and (7) whether the speaker should be regarded as a member of the
general public. (Illinois Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
FLSA- Fair Labor
Standards Act

McGavock v. City of Water Valley, Miss., 452 F.3d 423 (5th Cir. 2006). Municipal firefighters filed

U.S. Appeals Court
HARASSMENT
HOSTILE WORK
ENVIRONMENT
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION

Patterson v. Balsamico, 440 F.3d 104 (2nd Cir. 2006). An African-American former employee of a
county sheriff's department brought an action against another corrections officer, alleging the
existence of a racially discriminatory hostile work environment and the intentional infliction of
emotional distress. After a jury trial, the district court awarded the former employee nominal
damages on the hostile work environment claim, $100,000 on the emotional distress claim, and
$20,000 in punitive damages. The court denied the corrections officer's motion for a new trial and
awarded the former employee attorney fees. The parties appealed. The court of appeals affirmed in
part, and vacated and remanded in part. The appeals court held that the district court did not
abuse its discretion when, pursuant to New York law, it declined to reduce compensatory damages
of $100,000 awarded to the plaintiff on his claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress,
arising from an assault in which the officer and others sprayed the plaintiff with mace, covered
him with shaving cream, and taunted him with racial slurs. The court noted that the plaintiff had
testified as to his humiliation, embarrassment, and loss of self-confidence, as well as to his
sleeplessness, headaches, stomach pains, and burning in his eyes from the use of mace. The
appeals court found that the punitive damages award of $20,000 did not exceed the maximum
permissible amount considering that this was a thoroughly reprehensible incident, particularly in
light of its racial motivation, and that the punitive damages award represented a relatively small
fraction of $100,000 compensatory damages awarded on the emotional distress claim. The court
noted that the officer against whom the award was made should have appreciated the gravity of
the racially motivated assault on a fellow officer and should have understood that such conduct
could have adverse economic consequences. But the appeals court concluded that the $20,000
damage award was excessive in light of the personal finances of the defendant corrections officer,
who earned an annual salary of approximately $37,632, was married and had two children. The
court found that an award of no more than $10,000 would provide sufficient punishment and deter
future conduct. The court remanded the case for a new trial on punitive damages, unless the
plaintiff agreed to remit the portion of the punitive damages award that exceeded $10,000. The
plaintiff alleged that he had been subjected to a racially discriminatory hostile work environment
and that his employment had been terminated because of his race. He alleged that he heard fellow
employees use racial slurs and make disparaging remarks about African-Americans on
approximately 12 occasions during his first three months of employment. (Oneida County
Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEXUAL
HARASSMENT
TITLE II
HOSTILE WORK
ENVIRONMENT
RETALIATION

Randolph v. Ohio Dept. of Youth Services, 453 F.3d 724 (6th Cir. 2006). A female former employee

a Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) overtime action against a city. The district court granted
partial summary judgment to the defendants. The district court held that because of their nonexempt work as dispatchers, the plaintiffs were not employees engaged in fire protection activity
and therefore were not subject to the exemption. The firefighters and the city appealed. The
appeals court reversed and remanded. The appeals court held that the firefighters were employees
“engaged in fire protection activities” and were thereby exempt from coverage of the overtime
provisions of FLSA even though they spent more than 20% of their time engaged in nonexempt
activities. (City of Water Valley, Mississippi)

at a state juvenile facility brought an action against her state employer, alleging sex
discrimination, hostile-work-environment, sexual harassment, and retaliation in violation of Title
II. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer and the female former
employee appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held: (1) the employee
did not fail to exhaust her administrative remedies; (2) the employee’s testimony was sufficient to
demonstrate that the alleged harassment was based on gender; (3) the employee engaged in a
protected activity; (4) the employer knew that the female employee was engaged in a protected

31.70
XX

activity; (5) the employee suffered an “adverse employment action”; and (6) the employee
demonstrated a causal connection. The former employee testified that she was subjected to daily
threats, derogatory comments, verbal harassment, foul language, and several serious physical
assaults to which members of the opposite sex were not exposed, and that the alleged conduct
caused her to become suicidal and necessitated hospitalization and counseling. The employee
reported to her supervisors that she was choked, that she was verbally harassed, and that she was
subjected to sexual assault. It was undisputed that the employee complained to the supervisors
several times about the verbal harassment and the physical assault. The female employee was
placed on administrative leave shortly after she reported to the supervisor that she was sexually
assaulted, she was terminated several months later, and after she reported the incidents, she was
also subjected to rumors and investigations concerning her alleged inappropriate behavior. The
employee was later reinstated with 70 percent back pay. (Circleville Youth Center, Ohio)
U.S. Appeals Court
DEMOTION
POLITICAL AFFILIATION
DUE PROCESS

Rodriguez-Marin v Rivera-Gonzalez, 438 F.3d 72 (1st Cir. 2006). Employees of Puerto Rico's

U.S. District Court
PROMOTION
EQUAL PROTECTION
DISCRIMINATION

Rogers v. Haley, 421 F.Supp.2d 1361 (M.D.Ala. 2006). A Caucasian state corrections sergeant sued
his superiors, claiming that he was denied promotions due to his race in violation of his equal
protection rights. The defendants moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the
motion in part and denied it in part. The court held that the equal protection rights of the sergeant
were not violated when a Black officer was selected over him for promotion to lieutenant, despite
the claim that the recruitment policies of the department encouraged blacks to apply for the
position, decreasing the prospects of whites to receive the appointment. The court noted that the
Black applicant interviewed very well, showed an outstanding grasp of the elements of the
position, and had local experience. The court held that summary judgment was precluded as to the
Equal Protection Clause claim alleging purposeful discrimination. The court found that a warden's
affidavit, admitting that he would have recommended the White male correctional officer for
promotion to lieutenant but for his belief that a “no-bypass rule” required him to promote any
black or female employee from the promotional register, precluded summary judgment for the
defendant. At the time of the events giving rise to this litigation, the department and all other
state agencies were subject to a 1970 injunction which provided that: “Defendants shall not
appoint or offer a position to a lower-ranking white applicant on a certificate in preference to a
higher-ranking available Negro applicant, unless the defendants have first contacted and
interviewed the higher-ranking Negro applicant and have determined that the Negro applicant
cannot perform the functions of the position, is otherwise unfit for it, or is unavailable. In every
instance where a determination is made that the Negro applicant is unfit or unavailable,
documentary evidence shall be maintained by the defendants that will sustain that finding.” This
provision is now called the “no-bypass rule.” (Alabama Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
TITLE VII
DISCRIMINATION
PROMOTION

Rogers v. Haley, 436 F.Supp.2d 1256 (M.D.Ala. 2006). A white male correctional officer sued the
Alabama Department of Corrections (ADOC) and several ADOC supervisors and other employees
in their official capacities, claiming he was denied promotion because of his race and gender,
seeking relief under Title VII and the Fourteenth Amendment, as enforced through § 1983. The
district court entered summary judgment for the defendants on the race discrimination claims in
an earlier decision, and addressed the gender discrimination claim in this decision. The district
court refused to credit a retired ADOC warden's testimony that he would have recommended the
plaintiff for a lieutenant position but for an outstanding court order and an ADOC regulation he
understood to restrict appointment of males over females on the same certification regardless of
their qualifications, finding that the warden's sole reason for wanting to recommend the plaintiff
was his belief that women should not be correctional officers in male prisons. The court held that
the ADOC and individual defendants established, by clear and convincing evidence, that the
female candidate who was selected was more qualified than the plaintiff, and their proffered
reason was not a pretext for gender discrimination. (Ala. Dept. of Corr., Elmore Corr’l. Facility)

corrections administration filed suit under § 1983 against the administration alleging political
discrimination, claiming that they were demoted in violation of their First Amendment and due
process rights. The district court entered a verdict for the employees, awarding compensatory and
punitive damages, and the defendants appealed. The court of appeals affirmed, finding that
evidence was sufficient to support the jury finding that the employees were demoted based on their
political affiliation. The court noted that the employees were long-standing, competent employees
and that both were demoted without being given any notice or opportunity to defend their
demotions, and that important documents were missing from their personnel files. According to
the court, punitive damages of $120,000 to $195,000 assessed against the chief legal advisor of the
new political administration were not excessive because the demotions jeopardized the employees'
livelihood. As a result of their demotions, one employee's salary was reduced by 60 percent and the
other's was reduced by 43 percent. Both employees suffered harm to their professional careers,
were unable to meet their financial obligations because of their reduced salaries, and suffered
emotional distress for which they sought medical attention. The court noted that “discrimination
based on political-party affiliation is rampant in government employment in Puerto Rico.”
(Administration of Corrections, Puerto Rico)

31.71
XX

U.S. District Court
TITLE VII
DISCRIMINATION
FREE SPEECH
ADEA- Age Discrimination in Employment
Act

Salas v. Wisconsin Dept. of Corrections, 429 F.Supp.2d 1056 (W.D.Wis. 2006). An Hispanic

U.S. Appeals Court
RELIGION
FREE SPEECH
DISCRIMINATION

Shrum v. City of Coweta, Okla., 449 F.3d 1132 (10th Cir. 2006). A law enforcement

U.S. Appeals Court
TERMINATION
RETALIATION
FMLA- Family Medical
Leave Act

Toeller v. Wisconsin Dept. of Corrections, 461 F.3d 871 (7th Cir. 2006). A terminated state
corrections department employee sued the department, alleging interference with his rights and
termination of his employment in retaliation for his attempt to assert his rights under the Family
Medical Leave Act (FMLA). The district court denied the department’s motion to dismiss and the
department appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that Congress did
not effect valid abrogation of state sovereign immunity in enacting FMLA's “self-care” provision, at
least for non-pregnancy self-care leaves. The court noted that, unlike the FMLA family-leave
provision, the self-care provision was not adopted to combat longstanding sex discrimination, and
thus the suit against a state agency under that provision could not rest on the enforcement clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Wisconsin Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
PROSECUTION

U.S. v. LaVallee, 439 F.3d 670 (10th Cir. 2006). Former prison officers who were convicted in
district court of conspiracy and deprivation of inmates' constitutional rights, appealed their
convictions. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the defendants were not denied their
due process right to a fair trial when a former prison supervisory attorney allegedly assisted the
prosecutor. The court found that the de minimus injuries suffered by inmates when they were
attacked by the defendants were sufficient to support a conviction. According to the court, a twolevel downward sentencing departure based on the defendants' susceptibility to abuse in prison
was not abuse of the court’s discretion. The court noted that the government began investigating
allegations of the widespread abuse of prisoners and the falsification of records to cover up that
abuse at the prison in 1997. As a result of the investigation, eight Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”)
correctional officers were indicted and two were charged. Three officers pleaded guilty and
cooperated with the government by testifying at trial. (U.S. Penitentiary, Florence, Colorado)

U.S. District Court
HARASSMENT
RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION
RETALIATION

Vaden v. Lantz, 459 F.Supp.2d 149 (D.Conn. 2006). An African-American employed by a state
Department of Corrections brought an action against a corrections department and several
corrections officials, alleging that he was subjected to racial slurs, physical harassment, racially
disparate evaluation and discipline, and retaliation. Employer filed a motion for a more definite
statement. The district court denied the motion and held that: (1) allegations of direct involvement
by all individual defendants sufficiently placed each defendant on notice as to the conduct leading
to the plaintiff’s equal protection and due process claims, and (2) allegations of direct involvement
and separate allegations pointing to individual defendants as having known of the discriminatory
and retaliatory acts of others sufficiently delineated to which defendant employee attributed

probation and parole agent who was terminated purportedly because of his failure to supervise an
offender, and for his alleged falsification of documents relating to that offender, sued state
corrections officials, alleging they discriminated and retaliated against him in violation of his
rights under Title VII, § 1983 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). The district
court dismissed all ADEA, and Title VII discrimination and retaliation claims against the officials
in their individual capacities. The defendants moved for summary judgment on the remaining
claims. The district held that: (1) the employee failed to state § 1983 claim against the department
of corrections; (2) the employee failed to produce evidence that three pre-disciplinary hearings he
received were shams; (3) the employee failed to provide admissible evidence that he was treated
differently from similarly-situated non-Hispanic coworkers or that the decision to terminate his
employment was motivated by animosity toward him because of his national origin; and (4) the
employee's speech was not a substantial and motivating factor in his termination. The court noted
that the parole agent's protected speech, in the form of testimony before an Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) on behalf of a coworker who had filed a race discrimination
complaint, was not shown to be a substantial and motivating factor in the agent's termination as
required for his First Amendment retaliation claim, where his superiors were unaware of the role
he planned to play in the EEOC investigation. (Wisc. Dept. of Corrections)

officer/clergyman who resigned from a police department after the police chief allegedly rearranged
his work schedule so it would conflict with his duties as a minister filed a § 1983 action against
the city, police chief and city manager alleging violations of his constitutional rights to freedom of
association, free exercise of religion, and substantive due process. The chief appealed a partial
denial by the district court of his motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.
The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that the police
chief was not entitled to qualified immunity on the officer's claim of interference with free exercise
of his religion, finding that the mere refusal of the chief and police department to accommodate the
officer's religious scheduling needs, without more, would not establish a constitutional violation.
The officer alleged he was moved to the day shift because of the chief's knowledge of his religious
commitment, claiming that the transfer decision was not neutral but rather was motivated by the
officer's religious commitments. The officer apparently successfully juggled his two responsibilities
for eight years, but his relationship with the management of the police department soured and his
schedule was changed. Forced to choose between his police and his ministerial responsibilities, he
resigned from the department and sued. (City of Coweta, Oklahoma)

31.72
XX

alleged unconstitutional conduct, thus placing each defendant on notice as to the particular equal rights and due
process claims against him or her. (Gates Correctional Institution, York Correctional Institution, Connecticut)
U.S. Appeals Court
RETALIATION

Witte v. Wisconsin Dept. of Corrections, 434 F.3d 1031 (7th Cir. 2006). A physician, as a public employee,
brought a civil rights action against a state corrections department alleging retaliation for his exercise of his
constitutional rights and violation of the state whistle-blower statute. The district court granted summary judgment
in favor of the defendants and the physician appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the physician had
not been deprived of his due process rights by the manner that the employer handled his numerous disciplinary
proceedings. The physician had written several letters to correctional officials expressing concerns about the
management of the correctional facility. (Racine Correctional Institution, Wisconsin)
2007

U.S. Appeals Court
WORKING CONDITIONS

Adair v. U.S., 497 F.3d 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Current and former federal prison employees brought an action
against the government for back pay, hazard pay, environmental hazard pay, and contributions to thrift savings
accounts due to their exposure to second-hand cigarette smoke at their workplace. The U.S. Court of Federal
Claims granted the government's motion to dismiss. The employees appealed. The appeals court affirmed on an
alternative ground. The appeals court held that the employees' exposure to second-hand cigarette smoke was not
an unusual physical hardship or unusual hazard, given that the exposure was an expected condition of
employment usually involved in carrying out the duties of their positions, especially when those duties involved
the caretaking or monitoring of inmates and second-hand smoke, as part of the ambient air, was commonly
encountered indoors and outdoors where people worked or played. The court found that the employees' exposure
to second-hand smoke was not an unusually severe working condition or an unusually severe hazard within the
plain meaning of the statute mandating additional compensation for federal employees whose duties involved
such severe conditions. The court held that at the time the statute was enacted, second-hand smoke was not
considered unusually severe. (Federal Correctional Institution, Jesup, Georgia)

U.S. District Court
HOSTILE WORK
ENVIRONMENT
SEXUAL HARASSMENT
TITLE VII

Akines v. Shelby County Government, 512 F.Supp.2d 1138 (W.D. Tenn. 2007). Female correctional officers
brought Title VII, § 1983 and a Tennessee Whistleblower Act suit alleging hostile work environment arising from
a county's indifference to sexual harassment of the officers by county jail inmates. The district court granted
summary judgment to the county on the claims of certain officers. The county renewed its motion with respect to
the remaining officers and the court granted it. The court held that the county's taking of appropriate disciplinary
steps in response to reports of inmate harassment precluded a finding that it had fostered a hostile work
environment in violation of Title VII. According to the court, the county was not deliberately indifferent to the
rights of the female officers or a moving force behind the harassment, as required for a violation of § 1983. The
court noted that the presence of one incident in which the institution apparently did not respond to a female
correctional officer's filing of a disciplinary complaint against one inmate for alleged sexual harassment was
insufficient to establish a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII, where the institution responded by
disciplining inmates in connection with other reported incidents. (Shelby County Correctional Center, Tennessee)

U.S. District Court
SEXUAL HARASSMENT
RETALIATION
TERMINATION
EQUAL PROTECTION

Briggs v. Waters, 484 F.Supp.2d 466 (E.D.Va. 2007). A former employee of a county sheriff's office sued a
former county sheriff and others, claiming that she was subjected to quid pro quo sexual harassment and was fired
in retaliation for spurning the sheriff's advances. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The appeals court
denied the motions. The court held that the female employee showed that the conduct of the male sheriff was
unwelcome, as required for a Title VII action and a § 1983 suit alleging equal protection violations based on
sexual harassment, when she initially offered an excuse when asked to accompany him on business trip and did
not respond to a follow-up e-mail, and by shrugging away when the sheriff hugged her. The court found that
summary judgment was precluded by a material issue of fact as to whether the request by the sheriff that the
employee accompany him on a trip was request for a date or, given the past conduct of the sheriff, was a request
for sex. The court also found that summary judgment was precluded by material issues of fact as to whether the
sheriff's termination of the employee, who had been convicted of obstructing justice in an unrelated matter and
was appealing the decision, was a pretext for termination based on her rebuff of his sexual advances. The court
held that the employee established a prima facie case of disparate discipline, in violation of Title VII and her
equal protection rights, through showing that she was terminated following her conviction for obstructing justice,
while two male officers convicted of drunken driving were not terminated. (City of Portsmouth Jail, Virginia)

U.S. District Court
TITLE VII
RETALIATION
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
SEXUAL HARASSMENT

Cobb v. Marshall, 481 F.Supp.2d 1248 (M.D.Ala. 2007). An older black female correctional officer sued a sheriff
under Title VII, Fourteenth Amendment equal protection as enforced by § 1983, and state law for hostile work
environment sexual harassment, retaliation, and race discrimination. The sheriff moved to dismiss for failure to
state a claim. The district court granted the motion in part and denied the motion in part. The court held that the
Title VII claims would not be dismissed on the basis of failure to name the sheriff in the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) charge, but that the officer could not bring Title VII claims against the sheriff
in his individual capacity. The court found that the officer stated Title VII claims for retaliation and race
discrimination, where she alleged that she filed an EEOC charge and provided favorable testimony in support of a
coworker's claim “against the department,” that as a result of those activities she was subjected to various forms of
retaliation, including denial of her request for leave, all in violation of Title VII, and pleaded that she was
disciplined more harshly than other similarly-situated Caucasian employees and was denied certain benefits which
other similarly-situated Caucasian employees received. (Montgomery County Sheriff's Department, Alabama)

31.73
XXI

U.S. District Court
TERMINATION
FREE SPEECH
RETALIATION

Curran v. Cousins, 482 F.Supp.2d 36 (D.Mass. 2007). A corrections officer sued a sheriff's department, claiming
termination in retaliation for exercise of his First Amendment free speech rights. The parties moved and cross
moved for judgment on the pleadings. The district court entered judgment in favor of the sheriff. The court held
that the officer made a statement of public concern when he posted an Internet statement critical of the
department, but the sheriff's interest in the efficient discharge of his public responsibility outweighed the
employee's interest in urging fellow employees to oppose the sheriff, allowing the termination of the officer. The
court noted that posting a statement on the Internet gave the statement a public character, and the statement did
articulate a claim that the sheriff rewarded political allegiance rather than merit in the operation of department,
which is a public issue. The statement was posted on an employees' union Internet website, and compared the
department to Nazi Germany, and exhorted corrections personnel to disobey department orders, as German
officers had defied Hitler at end of the Second World War. (Essex County, Massachusetts)

U.S. Appeals Court
FREE SPEECH
RETALIATION
TERMINATION

Curran v. Cousins, 509 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 2007). A corrections officer sued a sheriff's department, claiming
termination in retaliation for exercise of his First Amendment free speech rights. The district court granted the
department's motion for judgment on the pleadings and the officer appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The
court held that the officer's speech, consisting of statements that the sheriff's political/union rivals were unfairly
disciplined and harassed, was on matters of public concern, but the department had adequate justification for
terminating the officer based on his statements on a union website. The officer made statements on the website
comparing the sheriff to Hitler, those who followed sheriff's instructions to Hitler's generals, and officers to Jews
who were marched into death chambers. (Essex County Sheriff's Department, Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
POLITICAL AFFILIATION

Gullick v. Ott, 517 F.Supp.2d 1063 (W.D.Wis. 2007). A plaintiff filed a § 1983 action alleging that a deputy
sheriff detained him and issued a citation because of his support for a candidate opposed by the deputy in a
sheriff's race, in violation of the First Amendment. The deputy moved for summary judgment. The district court
denied the motion. The court held that the plaintiff did not have to demonstrate an absence of probable cause in
order to establish a First Amendment retaliation claim. The court found that summary judgment was precluded by
fact issues as to whether the deputy sheriff had probable cause to detain the plaintiff and issue him a citation, and
whether the deputy's actions were motivated by the plaintiff's support for the candidate. The court found that the
plaintiff suffered sufficient injury to support a retaliation claim and that the deputy was not entitled to qualified
immunity because it was clearly established at the time of the incident that law enforcement officers could not
retaliate against citizens for exercising their First Amendment rights. The court opened its decision by stating
“The facts of this case sound like they came straight from a bad movie on cable TV…” (Columbia County,
Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
HOSTILE WORK
ENVIRONMENT
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
TRAINING

Hawkins v. County of Oneida, N.Y., 497 F.Supp.2d 362 (N.D.N.Y. 2007). An African-American corrections
officer sued a county, county sheriff's department, sheriff, undersheriff, and other officers, alleging racially
discriminatory employment actions and a racially hostile work environment in violation of Title VII, state human
rights law, Equal Protection Clause, and federal civil right statutes. The officer also alleged a conspiracy to violate
his civil rights, neglect to prevent civil rights violations, breach of contract, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, wrongful termination, negligence, and gross negligence. The defendants moved for summary judgment.
The district court granted the motion in part, and denied in part. The court held that the officer did not show that
the stated reasons of the county and sheriff's department for not providing him with tower and weapons training
(that probationary employees were not eligible for such training) and for not providing him with emergency
response team training (that no academy for such training was held during officer's employment), were a pretext
for race discrimination, and thus failed to establish that the alleged failure to train violated Title VII and state
human rights law.
The court held that summary judgment was precluded my material issues of fact existed as to: (1) whether the
extension of the officer's probationary period following an incident in which the officer allegedly acted
disrespectfully toward a deputy after being stopped for speeding; (2) whether the reason proffered for termination
of the officer--that he allowed an inmate to perform his security tours--was a pretext for race discrimination; (3)
whether the officer was subjected to discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that was so severe or
pervasive as to alter the conditions of his employment and create an abusive working environment; (4) whether
racial animus motivated the undersheriff in making decisions to extend the probationary period of the officer and
to terminate his employment; (5) whether a sergeant who was present when a deputy allegedly made racist and
racially charged remarks directed towards the officer and whether the lieutenant to whom the officer reported
racist and racially charged remarks and treatment was personally involved in the discriminatory conduct; (6)
whether there was a persistent or widespread custom of race discrimination within the sheriff's department and
whether actions of the undersheriff in extending the probationary period of, and then terminating, the officer
constituted official policy. (Oneida County Sheriff's Department, New York)

U.S. District Court
HIRING/
QUALIFICATIONS
RETENTION

Heckenlaible v. Virginia Peninsula Regional Jail Authority, 491 F.Supp.2d 544 (E.D.Va. 2007). An inmate
brought an action against a correctional officer and regional jail authority, seeking to recover monetary relief for
injuries suffered as a result of an allegedly nonconsensual sexual encounter between her and the officer. The jail
authority moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part, and denied in part. The
court found that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
correctional officer, whose duties required him to observe inmates in the shower, was acting within the scope of
his employment when he allegedly sexually assaulted the inmate after he observed her showering and during a
“cell search” thereafter. The court held that the inmate’s deposition testimony that she was the victim of a sexual
assault by the correctional officer was sufficient to preclude summary judgment in favor of the jail authority on
her intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. The court found that absent evidence indicating that the
correctional officer was known by anyone to have a propensity to commit sexual assault at the time he was hired,
or evidence indicating that some testing would have revealed that the officer would pose a danger to inmates, the

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jail authority was not liable under Virginia law on the inmate's negligent hiring claim. The court also found that
since the jail authority never received any complaints from inmates about the officer, and swiftly investigated the
matter and took appropriate action upon learning that a sexual encounter had occurred, it was not liable for
negligent retention. (Virginia Peninsula Regional Jail)
U.S. District Court
FREE SPEECH
TERMINATION

Jennings v. County of Washtenaw, 475 F.Supp.2d 692 (E.D.Mich. 2007). An employee sued a county and a
supervisor under § 1983, alleging that she was discharged for exercising her free speech rights. The defendants
moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the motion. The court held that the employee did not
speak as citizen in reporting a co-worker’s alleged safety violation of allowing juvenile center detainee to take
shower on the midnight shift when only three employees were present, and, thus, the employee’s speech was not
protected by First Amendment, in that she was acting as public employee carrying out her professional
responsibilities. The court also found that the employee did not speak on matter of public concern. (Washtenaw
County Juvenile Detention Center, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
OVERTIME
FLSA- Fair Labor Standards
Act

Jeter v. Montgomery County, 480 F.Supp.2d 1293 (M.D.Ala. 2007). An African-American employee brought a
state court action against a county, alleging denial of earned wages, retaliation, and race discrimination. The
action was removed to federal court, where the employee moved for leave to amend her complaint, and the county
moved for dismissal. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that
amendment of her complaint to add a claim alleging violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) wage
requirements would not be futile, where the amendment claimed that the county failed to pay her overtime for
work she did in excess of 40 hours per week. The employee asserted that after she complained about her lack of
overtime pay, her home detention verification program was canceled, her workload increased, and she was told by
superiors that she was not “team player.” The court also held that amendment of her complaint to add a claim
alleging an equal protection violation due to race-based discrimination in pay would not be futile, where she was
also claiming that she was treated differently, based on her race, from a similarly situated white employee.
(Montgomery County Youth Facility, Alabama)

U.S. District Court
PROMOTION
RELIGION

Milwaukee Deputy Sheriffs Ass'n v. Clarke, 513 F.Supp.2d 1014 (E.D.Wisc. 2007). A union and county sheriff's
deputies brought a § 1983 action against a county sheriff, sheriff's captain and county alleging that the defendants
violated the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the Constitution. The plaintiffs were seeking an
injunction barring the defendants from permitting any further presentations given by a religious group. The
defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The
court held that inviting the religious organization to speak within the sheriff's department was an unconstitutional
endorsement of religion. The court found that an organization of law enforcement officers, which assisted
officers in dealing with stress through Bible study, encouragement and support, was a religious organization for
the purposes of the sheriff's deputies' Establishment Clause action. The court noted that even though the
organization did not bar non-Christians from joining, members of an evangelical church created the organization
at meetings held at a church. The organization's literature contained numerous references to Christ and the name
of the organization was “Fellowship of Christian Centurions.” Speakers had instructed deputies that civil
government was “God's idea” and that they were “ministers of God”. A presenter had quoted books of the Bible
and the organization made available copies of a book about Christian faith. The sheriff had invited the
organization to make a presentation at a department leadership conference which previously had included only
secular speakers. The department subsequently asked the organization to make similar presentations at department
roll calls. The department required attendance of deputies and did not advise them that they could skip the
organization's presentations. Before the leadership conference the sheriff had spoken of promotion criteria and
distributed written material recommending that deputies surround themselves with people of faith. The court
found that a sheriff's captain could be held liable under § 1983 for the department's Establishment Clause
violation in endorsing the message of a religious organization composed of law enforcement officers because the
captain took an affirmative role in setting up the organization's presentations and failed to take any action to
alleviate the appearance of government endorsement of religion. However, the court held that evidence was
insufficient to establish that the county sheriff had made Christianity a prerequisite for promotion in violation of
Free Exercise Clause. The sheriff had distributed religious material prior to the leadership conference when he
was speaking about promotion criteria. (Milwaukee County Sheriff's Department, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
FLSA- Fair Labor
Standards Act
OVERTIME
SUPERVISION

Mullins v. City of New York, 523 F.Supp.2d 339 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). Police sergeants brought an action against a
city and its police department to recover overtime compensation to which they were allegedly entitled under the
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), but for which they had not been paid. The sergeants moved for partial
summary judgment on the issue of the defendants' liability. The district court granted summary judgment for the
defendants in part and denied in part. The court held that the sergeants were exempt from FLSA as executives for
the period governed by the “short test.” According to the court, the primary duty of the police sergeants was
management and therefore they were exempt from FLSA overtime pay requirements as executives for the period
governed by the “short test.” The court noted that although the sergeants spent most of their shifts working
alongside their subordinates and performing many of the same law enforcement tasks, they were responsible for
ensuring that their subordinates performed their assignments, and they were personally subject to discipline for
failure to do so. The court denied summary judgment in part because of genuine issues of material fact as to
whether the police sergeants had the authority to hire or fire other employees, or whether their suggestions and
recommendations as to the hiring, firing, advancement, promotion or any other change of status of other
employees were given particular weight. (New York City Police Department)

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U.S. District Court
FLSA- Fair Labor
Standards Act
OVERTIME

Murphy v. Town of Natick, 516 F.Supp.2d 153 (D.Mass. 2007). Police officers filed a complaint against a
Massachusetts town, its police department, and the chief of police, on behalf of themselves and 54 other current
and former patrol and superior officers employed by the town. The officers alleged willful violations of the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA), specifically, that the town failed to pay all the overtime they were due for hours
worked in excess of 40 per week. The district court held that the town was required to include all wage augments
in the calculation of the regular rate with the exception of an in-service training differential, and that the officers
were to be paid FLSA overtime for performing town details. The court found that sergeants and lieutenants fell
within the executive exemption to the FLSA overtime requirement, but that detectives did not. (Natick Police
Department, Massachusetts)

U.S. Appeals Court
TITLE VII
PROMOTION
TERMINATION

Perez v. Illinois, 488 F.3d 773 (7th Cir. 2007). A Hispanic corrections employee sued a state under Title VII,
alleging that he was terminated and, after reinstatement, denied promotion because of his national origin. The
district court entered summary judgment in favor of the state. The employee appealed. The appeals court affirmed,
finding that the employee was not similarly situated to a suspended co-worker, and the state's proffered reason for
not promoting the employee was not pretextual. The court held that the employee, who was terminated for
violating rules prohibiting conduct unbecoming an employee and unprofessional conduct, was not similarly
situated, for purposes of a prima facie Title VII case, to a co-worker who was suspended for five days for
violating the same rules, where the employee was a captain but the co-worker was lieutenant, and the employee
was punished for sexual harassment over a two-year period, while the co-worker was punished for a single
incident of consensual kissing and embracing a subordinate employee while on duty. According to the court, the
state's proffered reason for not promoting the employee to shift commander-- that he scored the lowest on an
examination given to 12 applicants for the job-- was not a pretext for a national origin discrimination, inasmuch as
the test scores had a factual basis, and, even if the correctional captain lied about his knowledge of an unrelated
investigational interview and a test administrator was unfamiliar with the test scoring method, such facts did not
alter the quality of the answers that the employee gave. (Illinois Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
BFOQ- Bona Fide
Occupational
Qualifications
SEX DISCRIMINATION
RETALIATION

Piercy v. Maketa, 480 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir. 2007). A female former employee with a county sheriff's office
brought suit against the sheriff's office, sheriff, and board of county commissioners alleging sex discrimination
and retaliation in violation of Title VII. The employee alleged that her supervisors began an investigation of her
violation of personnel policies after she notified her superiors at the county sheriff's office that she planned to
pursue formal discrimination charges. She was fired after the investigation was completed. The court found that
her allegations were sufficient to establish the causation element of a prima facie claim of retaliation for filing a
complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) under Title VII. Civil Rights Act of
1964. The district court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment, and the former employee
appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The appeals court held that the
employee's failure to obey orders, departure from the truth, and violation of uniform requirements by wearing a
tongue ring constituted a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for her discharge. According to the court, the
reason offered by the sheriff was not a pretext for retaliation in violation of Title VII. The court noted that the
decision to recommend dismissal of the employee was made only after completion of the internal affairs
investigation and nothing suggested the under-sheriff acted in bad faith in ordering the termination of employee or
that the sheriff acted in bad faith in sustaining the dismissal. The appeals court held that the sheriff's office policy
of not allowing female deputies to take jobs at a maximum-security facility housing only male inmates was
facially discriminatory under Title VII. According to the court, differences in duties between a mixed gender jail
and a maximum security facility which housed only male inmates were sufficiently substantial that any transfer of
the employee from the former to the latter would not have been purely lateral, so that denying a transfer to the
female employee would be an adverse employment action supportive of a sex discrimination claim under Title
VII. The court held that the sheriff's office shift-bidding policies, that required certain numbers of female and
male officers to be available at jail, were a mere inconvenience and did not constitute an adverse employment
action, as required for former employee's sex discrimination claim under Title VII. In her motion for summary
judgment, the employee asserted that the policy preventing women from taking jobs at the Metro facility
discriminated on its face and thus only a “bona fide occupational qualification” [BFOQ] under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(e) could justify such facial discrimination. Officials suggested two reasons for the policy that restricted the
employee from bidding for a shift at Metro: (1) at the time, there were not enough female officers available to
staff the female ward at CJC; and (2) privacy and safety considerations required sufficient female staff at CJC.
The appeals court found that while these reasons may be adequate to support EPSO's policy as a bona fide
occupational qualification that permits discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e), the district court did not
address this question. The appeals court remanded the case to the district court with instructions to make a
decision on this question. (El Paso County Sheriff's Office, Colorado)

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
SEX DISCRIMINATION
CONTRACT
UNION

Pina v. Lantz, 495 F.Supp.2d 290 (D.Conn. 2007). Ten current and former correctional employees brought suit
against a Commissioner of Correction and other administrators for alleged violations of their due process rights
and Title VII when they were terminated from their temporary positions and not hired for newly created positions.
The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part.
The employees formerly held temporary positions as Correctional Officer First Class or Correctional Sergeant and
were denied appointment to the newly created position of Parole Officer I, on the basis that they either did not
have sufficient experience for the position or they did not score sufficiently high on interviews. They were
returned to their former jobs when their temporary positions were abolished. The court held that this did not
violate substantive due process, as the executive action did not shock the conscience. The court found that the
employees did not have a property interest protected by due process in positions at a higher class that were
classified by the Department of Correction (DOC) as temporary or durational, rather than permanent. The court
noted that job postings advertised positions as temporary, and state law and DOC policies provided that temporary
assignments to a higher class were not permanent. The court held that the employees did not have a protected

31.76
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property interest in those positions pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement that recognized that durational
employees were not guaranteed continued employment.
The court held that the DOC was not required to give the employees a pre-deprivation hearing to protect any
property interest in their temporary positions at a higher rank, where the employees did not make any request for a
hearing despite being notified of the pending abolition of their temporary positions. The court noted that providing
correctional employees with advance notification of the termination of their temporary positions at higher rank
and an opportunity for a pre-termination hearing, in conjunction with a process by which employees could file
post-deprivation grievances, satisfied the procedural due process requirements attaching to any property interest
they had in their positions.
The court found that summary judgment on a gender-based disparate treatment equal protection claim and
Title VII claim was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a correctional employee's gender
and a member of the interview committee's alleged track record of discrimination against female employees
played a role in denying her a position as a parole officer. (Connecticut Department of Correction)
U.S. Appeals Court
ASSOCIATION
DISCIPLINE
FREE SPEECH
RETALIATION

Piscottano v. Murphy, 511 F.3d 247 (2nd Cir. 2007). Correctional employees brought a § 1983 action against
state officials alleging that discipline imposed on them for associating with a motorcycle club violated their First
Amendment and due process rights to freedom of expressive association and freedom of intimate association. The
employees asserted a “void-for-vagueness” challenge to the regulation under which they were disciplined. The
district court entered summary judgment for the state officials and the employees appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The court held that the conduct of three employees constituted expressive activity on a matter of public
concern but the discipline of the three employees did not violate their freedom of expressive association. The
court found that the regulation prohibiting correctional officers from engaging in behavior that could reflect
negatively on the corrections department was not void for vagueness as applied to the three employees. The court
noted that the motorcycle club was not an organization that spoke out on matters of public concern. According to
the court, the state correctional employees' approval or endorsement of the club necessarily would constitute
expressive conduct on a matter of public concern where the employee testified that what the club was “all about”
riding motorcycles, having parties and having fun. According to the court, in a public employee's action alleging
retaliation for exercising speech rights, evidence that harms or disruptions have in fact occurred are not necessary
for the employer to justify an adverse employment action. The court found that the employer need only make a
reasonable determination that the employee's speech creates the potential for such harms. (Connecticut
Department of Correction)

U.S. Appeals Court
MILITARY SERVICE
TERMINATION

Pittman v. Department of Justice, 486 F.3d 1276 (Fed Cir. 2007). An employee sought review of a decision of the
Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) denying his request for relief under the Uniformed Services
Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), alleging that the Federal Bureau of Prisons failed to
reemploy him following his military service and improperly removed him from his position. The court affirmed in
part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court found that the statute prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
military service requires an employee making a claim under the statute to bear the initial burden of showing by a
preponderance of evidence that the employee’s military service was a substantial or motivating factor in the
adverse employment action. If this requirement is met, the employer then has the opportunity to come forward
with evidence to show, by a preponderance of evidence, that the employer would have taken the adverse action
anyway, for a valid reason. Prior to his military activation, the employee’s performance at the agency was more
than satisfactory and had warranted a number of performance-based awards. While serving in Iraq he was
stationed at the Whitehorse detention facility, and he was found guilty at a court-martial proceeding of one count
of dereliction of duty under the Uniform Code of Military Justice and one count of assault. A two-page summary
of these convictions identified the underlying conduct as the failure to safeguard the physical health, welfare, and
treatment of Iraqi prisoners and the unlawful striking of unknown Iraqi prisoners. He was reduced in rank from
sergeant to private and sentenced to sixty days of hard labor without confinement. He nevertheless continued to
remain a member of the Marine Corps Reserve and was released from active duty status under honorable
circumstances. After his return from Iraq, he returned to active duty at the agency and worked one shift. After that
shift, he was confronted about the conduct underlying the court-martial convictions. At the agency’s request, he
signed an affidavit acknowledging the convictions but declaring them to be unsupported by evidence. He was
issued a notice of proposed removal and he responded to the charges orally and in writing and alleged that the
agency’s proposed action violated USERRA. He also submitted a supporting affidavit from his commanding
officer that described the mitigating circumstances surrounding his conduct in Iraq and a letter of recommendation
from the sheriff of Rockland County, New York. (Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn, New York)

U.S. District Court
SEX DISCRIMINATION
SEXUAL HARASSMENT
TITLE VII

Reed v. Cedar County, 474 F.Supp.2d 1045 (N.D.Iowa 2007). A female county employee, the jail administrator,
filed a complaint against a county and its sheriff, in his individual and official capacities, alleging she was
subjected to sex discrimination and sexual harassment in violation of Title VII and the Iowa Civil Rights Act
(ICRA), and battery in violation of Iowa common law. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The
district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that the jail administrator’s placement
on paid administrative leave was not a “tangible employment action” where the jail administrator had continued to
receive her full salary, raises and benefits. The court found that the county’s anti-sexual harassment policies,
along with its reporting procedure and county-wide employee mandatory training program, were sufficient to
show that the county exercised reasonable care to prevent sexual harassment. The jail administrator received a
copy of county’s sexual harassment policy when she commenced employment and a copy of an updated policy,
she understood each policy and knew she could complain about harassment by bypassing the sheriff and reporting
directly to either the Board of Supervisors or County Attorney, and was not only trained to use the policy but was
herself the trainer at times for other employees. But the court found that summary judgment was precluded by
genuine issues of material fact, as to whether the county took prompt, corrective action once they learned about
the sheriff’s sexually harassing behavior. The court noted that, in accordance with the county’s revised policy, the

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jail administrator brought the problem to the attention of her department head, the chief deputy, who failed to take
action on at least five occasions over a two-year period. (Cedar County Sheriff, Iowa)
U.S. Appeals Court
FREE SPEECH
EQUAL PROTECTION
DISCRIMINATION
DUE PROCESS
TITLE VII

Salas v. Wisconsin Dept. of Corrections, 493 F.3d 913 (7th Cir. 2007). A Hispanic former employee sued a state
corrections department, alleging that he was terminated for discriminatory and retaliatory motives in violation of
Title VII and § 1983, and asserting due process, equal protection, and First Amendment claims. The district court
granted the summary judgment in favor of the department and the employee appealed. The appeals court affirmed.
The court held that the employee's termination was not caused by his protected speech of testifying at a coworker's Title VII investigation. According to the court, the employee failed to identify similarly situated nonHispanic employees that were treated more favorably for his § 1983 equal protection claim. The court found that
the employee was not deprived of procedural due process. The court noted that although the employee did not
identify the Hispanic nation from which he originated, his allegation that he was Hispanic sufficiently identified
his national origin to demonstrate that he was member of protected class, in his suit alleging national origin
discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. (Wisconsin Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION
RETALIATION
TITLE VII
WORK RULES

Simmons v. The G.E.O. Group, Inc., 528 F.Supp.2d 583 (E.D.N.C. 2007). An African-American employee at a
private correctional detention facility sued his employer, claiming race discrimination under Title VII. The
employer moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the employee,
who was disciplined in connection with his guilty plea to driving while intoxicated (DWI) and failure to inform
the facility of the charges until later confronted, was not similarly situated to a Caucasian coworker who had been
charged with a misdemeanor offense of failing to obey a traffic officer. According to the court, the employee's
complaint concerning the employer's smoking policy was not a protected activity under Title VII and could not
form the basis for a retaliation claim. (G.E.O. Group, Inc., Rivers Correctional Institution, North Carolina)

U.S. District Court
HOSTILE WORK
ENVIRONMENT
SEX DISCRIMINATION

Singleton v. City of New York, 496 F.Supp.2d 390 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). A male employee brought an action against a
city under Title VII and state law, alleging that the city subjected him to a hostile work environment because of
his gender. After a jury returned a verdict awarding the employee $1,000,000 in damages, the city moved for
judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, for a new trial or remittitur. The court reduced the jury award to
$300,000, finding that the jury award was unreasonable, given that harassment by the employee's female
supervisor, both on and off the job, created a workplace atmosphere in which the employee felt pervasive fear and
led to the dissolution of his relationship with the mother of his child, and his consequent separation from both.
(New York City Department of Corrections, Rikers Island)

U.S. Appeals Court
RETALIATION
FREE SPEECH

Spiegla v. Hull, 481 F.3d 961 (7th Cir. 2007). A state prison employee sued prison officials under § 1983, alleging
that they changed her shift schedule and assignment in retaliation for exercise of her free speech rights. The initial
grant of summary judgment in favor of the officials was reversed by the court of appeals. On remand, the district
court entered judgment on a jury verdict award of $210,000 for the employee. The defendants appealed, The
appeals court vacated and remanded, finding that the officer who reported a possible breach of prison security, did
so as part of her official responsibilities to keep the prison secure, and thus did not engage in “citizen” speech that
was protected from First Amendment retaliation. The court noted that public employees who are speaking
pursuant to their official duties are speaking as employees, not citizens, and thus are not protected by the First
Amendment from retaliation, regardless of the content of their speech. According to the court, the fact that the
officer’s statements highlighted potential misconduct by prison officers did not change the fact that she was
speaking pursuant to her official responsibilities, not as citizen. (Westville Correctional Facility, Indiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
PROMOTION
PROPERTY INTEREST
DUE PROCESS
EQUAL PROTECTION

Teigen v. Renfrow, 511 F.3d 1072 (10th Cir. 2007). Employees of the Colorado Department of Corrections (DOC)
brought a § 1983 action against DOC officials alleging that the officials engaged in a policy of blacklisting
employees who maintained administrative appeals of state personnel actions, in violation of the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses. The district court dismissed the action and the employees appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The court held that although the employees had a protected property interest under Colorado law in their
continued employment, they were not deprived of a protected property interest by the DOC officials' alleged
policy of blacklisting. The court found that the right to be fairly considered for promotions was not a due process
property right and that the policy of denying promotions to employees because they maintained administrative
appeals did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. (Territorial Correctional Facility, Colorado Department of
Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
BFOQ- Bona Fide
Occupational
Qualifications
SEX DISCRIMINATION

Tipler v. Douglas County, Neb., 482 F.3d 1023 (8th Cir. 2007). A female correctional officer brought a gender
discrimination action against a county jail employer, alleging violation of § 1983 and Title VII. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the employer and the correctional officer appealed. The appeals court
affirmed, finding that reassignment of female officer to a different shift, pursuant to county jail's gender-based
staffing policy, did not violate Title VII. The court also held that the reassignment did not violate the equal
protection clause. The appeals court noted that where the employer is a prison [jail], a bona fide occupational
qualification analysis (BFOQ) under Title VII is unnecessary if the policy requiring female-only supervision of
female inmates is reasonable, and if such a policy imposes only a minimal restriction on the employee. According
to the court, when the state [county] makes a classification based on gender, under the equal protection clause the
state must show at least that the challenged classification serves important governmental objectives and that the
discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives. The court held
that the jail's reassignment of the female correctional officer to a different shift did not violate the equal protection
clause because the reassignment was substantially related to important governmental objectives, including
compliance with state law, and proper jail administration. (Douglas County Correctional Center, Nebraska)

31.78
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U.S. Appeals Court
HOLIDAYS
MILITARY SERVICE

Tully v. Department of Justice, 481 F.3d 1367 (Fed.Cir. 2007). A federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) employee
sought review of a decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board, which held that the BOP did not owe him
payment for 27 holidays which occurred while he was on leave without pay to serve on active duty in the U.S.
Army. The court of appeals held that the BOP was not required, under the Uniformed Services Employment and
Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) to pay the employee for the 27 holidays which occurred while he was on a
two-and-one-half year leave of absence without pay to serve on active duty in the U.S. Army, even though during
employee's leave the BOP provided holiday pay to employees who took paid leaves of absence to attend judicial
proceedings as jurors or witnesses. According to the court, the typically brief duration of an absence for court duty
and the employee's two-and-one-half year absence for active service were not comparable leaves of absence.
(Federal Bureau of Prisons, D.C.)

U.S. District Court
PHYSICAL REQUIREMENTS
DISABILITY
ADA- Americans With
Disabilities Act

Van v. Miami-Dade County, 509 F.Supp.2d 1295 (S.D.Fla. 2007). A county correctional officer suffering from
diabetes sued a county, seeking damages for discrimination pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) and the Florida Civil Rights Act (FCRA). The county moved for summary judgment, and the employee
moved for partial summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant. The
court held that the officer who was suffering from diabetes was neither disabled nor regarded as disabled, thus
defeating his discrimination claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Florida Civil Rights
Act (FCRA), even though he was regarded as unable to fill the position of correctional officer while he had a
glucose level of 8.0% or higher. At a required physical examination, the examining physician concluded that the
officer’s diabetes was not under control and that he would not be allowed to perform the safety-sensitive duties of
a correctional officer and would be placed on restricted duty. The physician told the officer that he would be
released to full duty as soon as he was able to provide a He-Alc test result showing that his sugar level was 8.0%
or less. According to the court, the position of “correctional officer” was a single, particular job, which could not
constitute a substantial limitation of the major life activity of working, and the county did not view the employee's
impairment of uncontrolled diabetes as a substantial limitation on his ability to work in a broad class of positions.
According to the court, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) did not require a county to create a long-term
or permanent restricted duty position for an allegedly disabled corrections officer suffering from diabetes, and
thus, the county was not required to alter its policy of six months' restricted duty followed by compulsory leave in
order to reasonably accommodate the employee. (Miami-Dade County Dept. of Correction and Rehabilitation)

U.S. District Court
RETALIATION
FREE SPEECH

Wesolowski v. Bockelman, 506 F.Supp.2d 118 (N.D.N.Y. 2007). A sheriff's department employee and his wife
sued a sheriff, county, and jail officials, claiming that he was retaliated against, in violation of the First
Amendment, for filing a report describing an inmate's alleged beating by a corrections officer, and that his wife
was not hired by the department as retaliation for the report. The defendants moved for summary judgment and
the district court granted the motion. The court held that the filing of the report was within the employee's job
responsibilities, and thus, the First Amendment did not protect him from discipline for such conduct. (Ulster
County Jail, New York)
2008

U.S. District Court
SUPERVISION

Adams v. Bouchard, 591 F.Supp.2d 1191 (W.D.Okla. 2008). A jail inmate brought a § 1983 action against
sheriff's deputies and a sheriff, alleging the deputies assaulted him, used excessive force, and that the sheriff failed
to properly supervise the deputies. The defendants moved for summary judgment and qualified immunity. The
district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded
by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the inmate properly exhausted administrative remedies prior to
bringing the federal action. The court found that the inmate's efforts towards exhausting his § 1983 excessive
force claim against sheriff's deputies were insufficient to satisfy the exhaustion requirement under the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) as to his claim that the sheriff failed to supervise the deputies. The court held that
summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the force used by the sheriff's
deputies against the inmate was necessary. According to the court, the sheriff's deputies were not entitled to
qualified immunity from the inmate's Eighth Amendment excessive force claim because it was clearly established
at the time of the alleged excessive force that prison officials could not maliciously and sadistically inflict injury
for the very purpose of causing harm. (Oklahoma County Detention Center, Oklahoma)

U.S. District Court
DISCIPLINE
DISCRIMINATION
HOSTILE WORK
ENVIRONMENT
PROMOTION
RETALIATION
TERMINATION
TITLE VII

Admire v. Strain, 566 F.Supp.2d 492 (E.D.La. 2008). A former deputy sheriff brought an action against county
officials under Title VII and § 1983, alleging discriminatory failure to promote, disparate treatment with respect to
promotion, disparate treatment with respect to disciplinary action, discriminatory termination, retaliation for
engaging in protected activities, and a discriminatory hostile work environment. The district court granted the
officials’ motion for summary judgment in part and denied in part. The court held that a county jail warden's
alleged statement that “women don't belong in law enforcement” did not constitute direct evidence of gender
discrimination sufficient to establish the female deputy sheriff's claims under Title VII for discriminatory failure
to promote, even if the statement was proximate in time to the denial of a promotion, where the deputy was
already in law enforcement when the warden made the statement. The court held that summary judgment was
precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the county jail warden's failure to promote the female
deputy sheriff was motivated by gender discrimination. According to the court, the county's failure to promote the
female deputy sheriff to corporal on the ground that candidates selected for promotion received higher scores on a
test, or to promote her to sergeant on the ground that the successful candidate had more experience, was already a
corporal, and had no disciplinary marks on his record were not a pretext for gender discrimination, in violation of
Title VII, where there was no direct evidence of discrimination, and six of ten employees promoted to corporal
were female, and two of four employees promoted to sergeant were female. The court found that the female
deputy sheriff who was denied promotion to corporal on the ground that she had an adverse disciplinary action
within six months of seeking promotion, was not similarly situated to a male sergeant who was appointed

31.79
XXII

lieutenant within six months of an adverse disciplinary action, and thus the deputy failed to establish disparate
treatment claim under Title VII, even though the county had no written policy against promoting deputies within
six months of disciplinary actions, where the county applied different standards to promotions up to the rank of
sergeant and appointments to lieutenant and above. (St. Tammany Parish Sheriff Office, Louisiana)
U.S. District Court
HOSTILE WORK
ENVIRONMENT
PROMOTION
TITLE VII

Anderson v. Nassau County Dept. of Corrections, 558 F.Supp.2d 283 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). A female county
correctional employee, a sergeant, brought a Title VII action against a county department, lieutenant, undersheriff,
and sheriff, alleging she was passed over for promotion to the rank of lieutenant in violation of § 1983, Title VII,
and the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL). The district court held that summary judgment for the
defendants on the hostile work environment claims was precluded by a triable issue of fact as to whether the
employee's treatment was severe and pervasive. The court also found triable issues of fact as to how many
promotions were made after the employee became eligible for the rank of lieutenant, the reasons for failure to
promote her, and the defendants' intent in selecting the persons who were promoted. (Nassau County Sheriff's
Department, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
DUE PROCESS
RETALIATION
SEXUAL HARASSMENT
TERMINATION

Argyropoulos v. City of Alton, 539 F.3d 724 (7th Cir. 2008). A former city employee who had worked as a jailer
brought a Title VII action against the city and former coworkers alleging sexual harassment and retaliation, and
brought a § 1983 claim alleging that the city's failure to provide a pre-termination hearing denied her of due
process. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants and the employee appealed. The appeals
court affirmed. The court held that the city's admission that the employee's surreptitious recording of a meeting
was a significant factor in her dismissal did not amount to direct evidence of retaliation. The court found that a
seven week interval between the employee's sexual harassment complaint and her subsequent arrest and
termination, without more, did not amount to direct evidence of retaliation. According to the court, the employee
did not show that she was performing her duties satisfactorily. The court’s opinion began with the assertion that
the employee’s “turbulent tenure as a jailor…lasted just ten months…” (Alton Police Department, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
FREE SPEECH
OVERTIME
RETALIATION
STAFFING LEVELS
UNION

Balas v. Taylor, 567 F.Supp.2d 654 (D.Del. 2008). The executrix of the estate of a state department of corrections
(DOC) employee, who committed suicide, brought a § 1983 action against the DOC and the employee's
supervisors, alleging that the employee's suicide was proximately caused by the defendants' retaliation in violation
of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The court held that resignation from a special emergency unit by the
employee was “symbolic speech” protected by the First Amendment, supporting the First Amendment retaliation
claim brought by the executrix of the employee's estate. The court noted that, at the time of the resignation, the
DOC and a labor union were in the middle of contract negotiations, and the extent to which the prisons were
understaffed and the imposition of mandatory and voluntary overtime were major issues in the dispute. According
to the court, the resignation of the employee along with other members of the emergency unit was meant to
communicate their lack of support for overtime to prison management, and the employee's resignation from the
unit was not pursuant to his suit and yet elected amounted to a refusal to perform his duties. The court held that
summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the employee’s resignation was
a substantial or motivating factor in the alleged retaliatory actions taken against the employee, which included
poor performance reviews, and whether the same alleged adverse actions would have taken place in the absence of
the protected conduct. The court found that the employee’s supervisor was not entitled to qualified immunity for
his alleged conduct of giving the employee a mediocre performance evaluation with falsified criticism and taking
other retaliatory action against the employee, because of the employee's protected activities of supporting his
labor union, refusing to cross a picket line, and resigning from a special prison emergency unit. According to the
court, the alleged conduct was retaliatory, and a reasonable official in the supervisor's position could not have
believed that his actions were constitutionally permissible, as clearly established law prohibited retaliation for
union membership and activity, and exercise of First Amendment rights. (Correction Emergency Response Team,
Sussex Correctional Institute, Delaware)

U.S. Appeals Court
RETALIATION
SEXUAL HARASSMENT
TITLE VII

Barker v. Missouri Dept. of Corrections, 513 F.3d 831 (8th Cir. 2008). An employee sued the Missouri
Department of Corrections (MDOC) under Title VII alleging that it retaliated against him for aiding a co-worker
to report sexual harassment. The district court entered summary judgment for the MDOC and the employee
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that an alleged remark by the manager of a prison's special
needs unit could not support an objectively reasonable belief that the remark constituted sexual harassment, and
thus, the employee failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation. The alleged remark to the male co-worker
implied that women were better suited for work in the unit because they were more nurturing. (Potosi Correctional
Center, Missouri)

U.S. District Court
DISCRIMINATION
POLITICAL AFFILIATION
UNION

Bergeron v. Cabral, 535 F.Supp.2d 204 (D.Mass. 2008). Corrections officers filed a § 1983 action alleging that a
sheriff's revocation of their commissions as deputy sheriffs shortly after her election constituted retaliation and
political discrimination in violation of their First Amendment rights. The sheriff moved for summary judgment.
The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the revocation was of
sufficient consequence to constitute an “adverse employment action.” The court held that summary judgment was
precluded by fact issues as to whether the sheriff's decision to revoke the officers' commissions as deputy sheriffs
was motivated by their dissemination of letters and a press release during a political campaign, which would
indicate that the sheriff engaged in political discrimination. The court noted that the commission was
discretionary, unremunerated and was not a requirement for service as a corrections officer. The commission had
no bearing on the officers' work hours, vacation days, or job assignments, but its revocation resulted in the
diminution of the officers' status, and deprived them of the opportunity to supplement their income by working
private details. The court found that the sheriff's interest in maintaining order and discipline among her officers
outweighed any legitimate interest of the corrections officers in promoting their union's bargaining position by
publishing allegations of the sheriff's malfeasance during an election campaign, and therefore the sheriff's alleged
retaliation against union officers did not violate the First Amendment. (Suffolk County Sheriff, Massachusetts)

31.80
XXII

U.S. Appeals Court
RETALIATION
SEXUAL HARASSMENT
TITLE VII

Brannum v. Missouri Dept. of Corrections, 518 F.3d 542 (8th Cir. 2008). A female Missouri Department of Corrections (MDOC) correctional officer filed a Title VII retaliation claim against the MDOC. The district court
granted summary judgment for the MDOC and the employee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court
held that the female officer did not engage in a “protected activity,” as required to establish a prima facie case of
retaliation, when she assisted a new male officer in reporting a functional unit manager's allegedly sexually harassing comment. According to the court, even if the female officer was actually attempting to object to what she
perceived as disparate treatment of an officer on account of his gender, she could not have reasonably believed
she was opposing the disparate treatment as he was not subject to any “adverse employment action.” The female
employee alleged that the manger commented that “women are better by and large as they do a better job than
men anyway and are more patient and nurturing.” (Potosi Correctional Center, Missouri)

U.S. District Court
FREE SPEECH
HARASSMENT
HOSTILE WORK
ENVIRONMENT
RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION

Brown v. New York State Dept. of Correctional Services, 583 F.Supp.2d 404 (W.D.N.Y. 2008). A correctional
officer brought an action against the New York State Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) and several
other institutional and individual defendants, alleging race discrimination and harassment in violation of Title VII,
§ 1981, § 1983, and the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL). The district court granted summary
judgment for the defendants in part and denied in part. The court held that: (1) the officer satisfied the personal
involvement requirement for stating a § 1981 hostile work environment claim against his co-workers; (2) the
alleged harassment by his co-workers was not done under color of law for the purposes of a § 1983 claim; (3) the
officer's complaints to supervisors about alleged discrimination and harassment based on his race did not constitute speech protected under § 1983 and did not relate to matters of public concern; (4) the officer's state law
claims against individual state officials and employees were barred by the election-of-remedies provision in
NYSHRL; (5) genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the actions and statements of his co-workers
created a hostile work environment under Title VII; (6) genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the
DOCS took appropriate steps to put an end to the alleged harassment; and (7) genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether his co-workers and supervisors acted with retaliatory animus. (Elmira Corr'l. Facility, N.Y.)

U.S. Appeals Court
OVERTIME
WORK RULES

Carlsen v. U.S, 521 F.3d 1371 (Fed Cir. 2008). Federal employees of the Bureau of Prisons brought an action
against United States under the Federal Employees Pay Act (FEPA) alleging that they were entitled to be paid for
overtime that they had worked. The United States Court of Federal Claims granted judgment for the United States
and the employees appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the occasional or irregular overtime
work allegedly performed by the Bureau of Prisons employees who worked in a secure environment was not subject to compensation under FEPA unless the overtime was directed or approved in writing by a person authorized
to approve such overtime. The court noted that the employees worked in a setting in which they were required to
follow all orders, written or oral. The court found that documents such as agency manuals, standards of conduct
and training documents which emphasized that employees were required to follow orders of their superiors, when
considered together with verbal directives that had the effect of requiring employees to work outside their scheduled shifts, did not constitute express written directives or orders to the employees to work overtime. According to
the court, documents such as emails of employees' performance standards and emails from a warden's secretary
and announcements of times and places of meetings that the employees were expected to attend did not constitute
sufficient written orders to the employees to work overtime. The court ruled that the time that employees spent
waiting in a key line did not constitute overtime work. However, the court found that “post orders” that defined
employees' duties for each shift by inherently requiring the presence of two employees, one of whom was offduty, in order to exchange information and equipment at change of shifts, did constitute written orders to work
overtime, but the tasks for which an employee was entitled to overtime credit, which amounted to less than ten
minutes per day, were de minimis. (Federal Bureau of Prisons)

U.S. District Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
EQUAL PROTECTION
SEX DISCRIMINATION

Cole v. Taber, 587 F.Supp.2d 856 (W.D.Tenn. 2008). A female correctional officer brought a suit against a county and county officials and supervisors, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Title
VII, equal protection, and the First Amendment. The county moved for summary judgment and the district court
granted the motion. The court held that the officer, who could not perform 90% of the essential functions of her
job was not otherwise a qualified individual under ADA. The court held that the officer's equal protection rights
were not violated and that her speech did not concern matters of public concern for the purpose of her First
Amendment retaliation claim. The officer admitted that she could not perform 90% of the essential functions of
her job due to ruptured tendons and a degenerative joint disease that made it difficult for her to walk. According to
the court, male county correctional officers who received temporary assignments to light duty work to accommodate illnesses that were not job-related were not similarly situated to the female correctional officer who was denied permanent assignment to light-duty jobs to accommodate her foot injuries, as required to establish a prima
facie case of sex discrimination based on alleged differing treatment afforded to female and male officers regarding permanent accommodations. (Shelby County Div. of Corr., Tennessee)

U.S. Appeals Court
DISCIPLINE
RETALIATION
SEXUAL HARASSMENT
TITLE VII

Culton v. Missouri Dept. of Corrections, 515 F.3d 828 (8th Cir. 2008). A state employee filed a Title VII action
alleging that an agency retaliated against him for confronting a supervisor about the supervisor's unwanted sexual
advances toward a subordinate employee. The district court entered summary judgment in the agency's favor and
employee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the employee failed to establish the causation
branch of his claim that his transfer to a lower status position was in retaliation for his confrontation with the
supervisor. According to the court, the decision maker decided on the transfer before learning of the employee's
sexual harassment allegation, and the employee did not dispute the factual accuracy of anything reported by the
supervisor. The court held that the agency's decision to dock the employee's pay for taking unauthorized sick
leave was not a pretext for retaliation against the employee, despite the employee's contention that the agency
failed to follow its policy when docking his pay. The court noted that the employee did not offer any evidence
showing that the agency treated him differently than similarly situated employees. (Missouri Department of Corrections)

31.81

U.S. Appeals Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
BFOQ-Bona Fide Occupational Qualifications
DUE PROCESS
QUALIFICATIONS

Dargis v. Sheahan, 526 F.3d 981 (7th Cir. 2008). A county corrections officer, who was placed on leave without
pay after he returned to work following a stroke, brought an action against the county sheriff's department, county
sheriff, and others, alleging violation of his due process rights, and violation of the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the officer on the due process claims, granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on the ADA claims, and dismissed the state law claims. The officer
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the officer, who had suffered a stroke, failed to establish
an ADA discrimination claim because he could no longer perform the essential functions of the position of corrections officer. The court noted that the officer's physician advised that he could no longer have contact with inmates, could have no physical contact, no physical activity other than sitting in a chair with brief episodes of
standing and walking, no lifting, kneeling, stooping, or running, and must have a work environment with adequate
heat and air conditioning. The sheriff’s office had stated that correctional officers are primarily responsible for
maintaining vigil, standing watch over inmates, counting inmates, breaking up fights among inmates, inspecting
for contraband, escorting inmates outside their cells, searching inmates and visitors, and searching for escaped
inmates. Although there are some positions requiring less inmate contact than others, the sheriff’s office asserted
that all officers, regardless of the position to which they were assigned, must be able to respond to emergencies
such as riots or escapes, and must be able to rotate through various positions as needed. This requirement, often
occurring due to unforeseeable events, meant that the Sheriff's Office was unable to guarantee that any assignment
would shield an officer from all inmate contact. (Cook County Sheriff's Office of Corrections, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
FREE SPEECH
RETALIATION
UNION

Davignon v. Hodgson, 524 F.3d 91 (1st Cir. 2008). County corrections officers brought a § 1983 First Amendment
retaliation action against a sheriff in his individual and official capacities, alleging that disciplinary actions taken
by the sheriff had been motivated by the officers' union activities. The officers also asserted state-law civil rights
and tort claims. The district court entered judgment on a jury verdict against the sheriff on the § 1983 claims
against him in his official capacity, and against the sheriff on some state-law claims. The sheriff appealed. The
appeals court affirmed. The court held that the officers' private speech to coworkers concerning a planned picket,
whose stated purpose was to allow union members to publicly express criticism of management and to alert the
public to the behavior of the sheriff was on a matter of public concern. According to the court, there was no evidence of actual or potential disruption from the officers' brief statements to coworkers concerning a planned picket by the union, and conversely there was ample evidence that the officers had been suspended because of their
pro-union activity rather than for reasons of disruption of public safety. The court held that the attorney fee award
to the officers’ attorneys of approximately $172,000 was not excessive, even though the back-wages damages
award was only approximately $18,000. According to the court, the award under a civil rights attorney fee statute
did not necessarily have to be proportionate to the amount of damages. The court also held that the officers' lack
of success on one of their claims did not preclude the fee award because the officers were successful on the claim
that had propelled the litigation. (Bristol County Sheriff's Office, Massachusetts)

U.S. Appeals Court
DISCRIMINATION
TITLE VII
WORKING CONDITIONS
WORK RULES

Diaz-Romero v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 115 (1st Cir. 2008). A former Public Health Service (PHS) officer brought an
action against various government defendants claiming damages arising from alleged employment discrimination
while working for the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP). The officer sought both compensatory and punitive damages for the alleged Title VII, constitutional, and tort violations. The government moved to dismiss and the district
court granted the motion. The officer appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the officer's injuries arising from alleged employment discrimination were incident to his service and thus his claims under the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) were barred by the Feres doctrine. The court noted that the incidents that allegedly caused the officer's injuries, i.e., his supervisors' application of BOP regulations to him, occurred while he
was actively serving in his PHS assigned post with the BOP, and his supervisors were acting in cooperation with
the PHS in that the PHS placed the officer with the BOP. (Metropolitan Det. Center, Guaynabo, Puerto Rico)

U.S. District Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
DISCRIMINATION
RETALIATION
WORKING CONDITIONS

DuBerry v. District of Columbia, 582 F.Supp.2d 27 (D.D.C. 2008). A former employee brought an action against
the D.C. Department of Corrections, alleging that the department discriminated against him on the basis of his
disability in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Title VII, § 1983, § 1981, and the D.C. Human Rights Act. The district court granted summary judgment to the parties in part and denied in part. The court
held that the employee sufficiently exhausted his ADA claims and that there was sufficient evidence to allow a
reasonable jury to conclude that the department discriminated and retaliated against the employee. The court also
found that evidence was sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to conclude that the department's proffered reasons
for termination and refusal to rehire were pretextual. The court held that the department did not violate Title VII, §
1983 or § 1981. The former employee had been diagnosed with diabetes and his condition required him to eat
meals at designated times and prevented him from skipping meals. He was transferred to the third shift and he
requested an accommodation because he believed working that shift would be incompatible with the diabetes
treatment regimen prescribed by his physician. The Department denied his accommodation request and transferred him to the third shift. He was eventually transferred to the first shift after using 208 hours of sick leave
during his first three months on the third shift. When he was later denied a promotion, he filed an EEOC complaint. (District of Columbia Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
ASSIGNMENT
SEX DISCRIMINATION
SCHEDULE

Duckworth v. St. Louis Metropolitan Police Dept., 491 F.3d 401 (8th Cir. 2008). Female police officers who filed
a grievance over their assignment on a rotating basis to night watch, then were permanently placed on night
watch, allegedly in retaliation for the grievance, alleged gender discrimination under § 1983, Title VII, and the
Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA). The district court denied qualified immunity to the officers’ police superiors, and they appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court stated that although there was direct
evidence of gender discrimination in the officers’ reassignments, and the proffered justifications for the reassignment were not exceedingly persuasive, reasonable police administrators could believe that assigning the female
officers to night watch was lawful, and qualified immunity should have been granted by the district court. (St.
Louis Metropolitan Police Department, Missouri)

31.82

U.S. District Court
FLSA-Fair Labor Standards
Act
OVERTIME

Fraternal Order of Police Barkley Lod. v. Fletcher, 618 F.Supp.2d 712, (W.D.Ky. 2008). A police union, union
local, and current and past corrections officers at the Kentucky State Penitentiary filed a complaint alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), the Portal to Portal Act (PPA) and mandatory career retention programs provisions under state statutes. The action was brought against a former Kentucky Governor, the Department of Corrections Commissioner, and three wardens, all in their individual and official capacities. The district
court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss in part and denied in part. The court held that state officials and
public employees can be liable as “employers” under FLSA. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants exempted
and continued to deny overtime compensation to them in violation of FLSA. (Kentucky State Penitentiary)\

U.S. District Court
PRIVACY
SEARCHES
TERMINATION

Garcia Rodriguez v. Laboy, 598 F.Supp.2d 186 (D.Puerto Rico 2008). Employees of a correctional facility
brought a § 1983 action alleging Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations against canine unit officers of the
Puerto Rico Correction Department, individually and in their official capacities. The employees challenged the
officers' alleged public strip searches involving narcotics dogs and body cavity searches. The court granted two
officers’ motion to dismiss. The employees challenged searches that required them to make a line where narcotics
dogs would sniff them. If the dogs alerted to the presence of narcotics, the employees would be subject to a strip
search. However, the employees had to sign release forms before the strip search, and were forced to do so without time to read the forms and under the threat of losing their jobs. Then, the employees were required to undress
and subject themselves to a body cavity search. The searches took place in areas to which the public, other employees, and inmates had access to, where they were able to witness the process. The court noted that when conducting these types of searches, officers of the Canine Unit violated several of the internal regulations of the Unit.
The regulations required the officers to take every person searched before a supervisor, write a memorandum
about each search, and ensure that the area of inspection was not contaminated prior to that particular search.
Also, the search had to be limited to a physical search. The court noted that the officers of the Canine Unit
searched over thirty employees, but never found any controlled substances. (Correction Department of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Correctional Complexes of Guayama 500 and Las Cucharas)

U.S. Appeals Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
FMLA- Family and Medical
Leave Act
RA- Rehabilitation Act

Haybarger v. Lawrence County Adult Probation and Parole, 551 F.3d 193 (3rd Cir. 2008). A former state employee brought an action against his employer and others, alleging violations of the Rehabilitation Act (RA), the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). The district court dismissed all but the employee’s RA claims, and the defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that
receipt of federal funds by a subunit of a Pennsylvania judicial district waived Eleventh Amendment immunity
under the Rehabilitation Act (RA) for claims against the employer. The court noted that an Eleventh Amendment
immunity waiver under the Rehabilitation Act applies to all of the operations of a state department regardless of
whether the particular activities are federally assisted. (Lawrence Co. Adult Prob. and Parole Dept., Pennsylvania)

U.S. Appeals Court
BFOQ-Bona Fide
Occupational Qualification
OVERTIME
RETALIATION
SCHEDULE
STAFFING LEVELS
TITLE VII

Henry v. Milwaukee County, 539 F.3d 573 (7th Cir. 2008). Female corrections officers brought a Title VII action
against a county, challenging a staffing policy that reduced the number of shifts available to them at a juvenile
detention center, and alleging other incidents of discrimination as well as retaliation. Following a bench trial, the
district court entered judgment for the county. The officers appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed
and remanded in part. The court held that a sex-based classification, requiring that each unit in the juvenile detention center be staffed by at least one officer of the same sex as the detainees in the unit, was not reasonably necessary for the rehabilitation, security, or privacy functions of the facility, with respect to the third shift when only
one officer was present on each unit. According to the court, the classification was therefore not a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ), so as to be exempt from Title VII. The court noted that no staff-on-inmate sexual
assaults had occurred, the county had not investigated alternatives to same-sex staffing, juvenile privacy concerns
were not limited to the third shift, and the effectiveness of role-modeling programs did not require the presence of
a same-sex staff member at all times. The court found that the reduction in overtime hours available to female
officers resulting from the policy was an adverse employment action within the meaning of Title VII, in that overtime pay had been a significant and expected component of the female officers' compensation, and the policy had
the greatest effect on the third shift, which provided the majority of overtime work and a pay premium.
The court held that the incidents alleged by the female officers, such as being told not to wear sweaters or to eat
in front of the juveniles, unspecified “intimidation” and door slamming by the head of a shift, missing or marked
up time-cards, occasional early morning phone calls, and not being assigned to work together on same the shift or
in easier pods, if proven, did not rise to the level of an adverse action under the anti-retaliation provision of Title
VII. (Milwaukee County Juvenile Detention Center, Wisconsin)

U.S. Appeals Court
RETALIATION
SEX DISCRIMINATION
TITLE VII

Hervey v. County of Koochiching, 527 F.3d 711 (8th Cir. 2008). A female jail administrator brought an action
under Title VII and the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), alleging that her employer and her supervisors
discriminated against her on the basis of her gender and retaliated against her for participation in a protected activity. The plaintiff also alleged that her employer was liable for violations of the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act (MGDPA). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, and the plaintiff
appealed. The appeals court affirmed and remanded with directions to modify the final judgment so as to dismiss
the MGDPA claim without prejudice, so that it may be considered, if at all, by the courts of Minnesota. The court
held that the female jail administrator failed to demonstrate that her supervisors took away many of her major
responsibilities and twice suspended her without pay because of her gender, in violation of Title VII and the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA). The court noted that although the supervisors allegedly changed the management structure of the sheriff's office without approval of county board, nothing about this change in management structure supported the inference that subsequent action taken by a new management team were based on
gender. The court found that the administrator failed to establish that similarly situated male employees were not
punished as severely for their misconduct as she was, and that this differential treatment constituted a submissible
case of discrimination based on sex under Title VII or the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA). The court
noted that the administrator's alleged misconduct in recently lying to a supervisor about leaving a voicemail on his

31.83

telephone when she was going to be absent from work was not similar to the acts of misconduct that she cited in
support of her sex discrimination claim, one of which involved a supervisor allegedly lying on his application to
become a licensed police officer some 25 years earlier, and the others of which involved alleged off-duty misconduct or misconduct that was not shown to have been reported to supervisors.
The court held that the administrator failed to show that her alleged harassment by her supervisors was based
on sex, as required to establish her claim of hostile work environment under Title VII and the Minnesota Human
Rights Act (MHRA). According to the court, although the administrator claimed that supervisors created a hostile
work environment by, among other things, constantly criticizing her, requiring her to report to the under-sheriff,
and yelling at her on several occasions, she did not produce any evidence that she was the target of harassment
because of her sex and that the offensive behavior was not merely non-actionable, vulgar behavior.
The court held that the record did not support a reasonable inference that the administrator's supervisors retaliated against her, in violation of Title VII and the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), for filing a claim with
the state human rights department. The court noted that the administrator's conduct in filing a claim was protected,
but the administrator was accused of insubordination before she notified her employer of her protected activity.
(Koochiching County Jail, Minnesota)
U.S. Appeals Court
DISCIPLINE
FREE SPEECH
RETALIATION

Houskins v. Sheahan, 549 F.3d 480 (7th Cir. 2008). A social worker employed by a county corrections department
brought a § 1983 First Amendment action against a sheriff, alleging that she had been disciplined in retaliation for
reporting an assault by a corrections officer. The district court entered judgment on a jury verdict for the social
worker, denied the sheriff's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, and denied the officer's motion to
throw out the jury verdict. The sheriff and officer appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed in
part. The court held that the social worker's internal complaint to the department's internal affairs division, alleging that she had been assaulted by a corrections officer in a parking lot, was speech made pursuant to the social
worker's official duties, not speech made as a citizen. According to the court, the report fulfilled the social worker's responsibility as a department employee to report incidents of misconduct immediately to her supervisor. The
court found that a police report filed by the social worker, alleging that she had been assaulted by a corrections
officer in a parking lot, was not speech addressing matters of public concern, as required to support the social
worker's § 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim against the sheriff. According to the court, the police report
amounted to a personal grievance against the officer, and statements in the report were tied to a personal dispute
and were not intended to bring to light any wrongdoing by the sheriff. The court noted that its finding that the
county employee's speech about an alleged assault by a fellow employee was not protected, and that she had suffered no First Amendment injury from the alleged retaliation that followed the speech, precluded recovery on the
employee's § 1983 Monell claim against the county and the sheriff. The court held that the district court did not
abuse its discretion by a denying motion to sever the accompanying state-law assault and battery claim against the
fellow employee, and instead giving limiting instructions. The court also found that the district court did not abuse
its discretion by denying a motion reduce the $50,000 punitive damages award in the civil assault and battery
action, even though the jury may have been confused as to how to assess damages given the fact that the plaintiff
had asked the jury for $5,000 in damages. The altercation occurred in a staff parking lot after a dispute about
parking spaces. (Cook County Department of Corrections, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
PROMOTION
RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION

Jo v. District of Columbia, 582 F.Supp.2d 51 (D.D.C. 2008). A lieutenant with the District of Columbia Department of Corrections commenced a § 1983 action against the District, three District employees, and others, alleging that he was denied a promotion to the rank of captain because of his South Korean descent. The defendants
moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion, finding that the District demonstrated a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision not to promote the lieutenant and that the decision was not
pretextual. The court also found that the lieutenant failed to demonstrate the existence of any policy. The court
noted that the use of the lieutenant's picture on a recruitment poster that contained the phrase “Professional Dedicated to Duty” did not give rise to an inference of discrimination, on account of the lieutenant's South Korean
descent. According to the court, there was no evidence that the persons selected for depiction in the poster were
the most qualified lieutenants in the Department, and other individuals depicted in the poster were not even supervisory employees. (D.C. Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
PROMOTION
RETALIATION
UNION

Justice v. Danberg, 571 F.Supp.2d 602 (D.Del. 2008). An employee of the Delaware Department of Corrections
(DOC) brought an action pursuant to § 1983 against the DOC and its commissioner and director of human resources, alleging a denial of promotion in retaliation for his involvement in union activities, in violation of the
First Amendment. The district court held that the employee was acting as a citizen when participating in union
activities, the employee's participation in union negotiations was of considerable concern to the community, and
the employee's interest in participating in union negotiations outweighed the DOC's interest in the efficiency of its
public service operations. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by fact issues as to whether the
employee's participation in union activities was the substantial motivating factor in the DOC's failure to promote
him and as to whether the employee's union activity was a motivating factor in the loss of his application for promotion. (Delaware Department of Correction, Morris Community Correctional Center)

U.S. District Court
CONTRACT
DISCRIMINATION
RETALIATION
TERMINATION

Marcelus v. Corrections Corp. of America/Correctional Treatment Facility, 540 F.Supp.2d 231(D.D.C. 2008). A
former employee of a private correctional facility brought an action against a former employer alleging discrimination, retaliation and breach of contract in connection with his termination. The former employee claimed that he
was fired in retaliation for complaining about discrimination and filing incident reports against co-workers and
supervisors. The former employer filed a motion to dismiss the claims for retaliation and breach of contract,
which the district court granted. The court held that the former employee's retaliation claim was not like or reasonably related to the allegations in his Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) charge, and thus the
claim was barred for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The court also declined to excuse the former
employee's failure to exhaust a grievance procedure under the collective bargaining agreement (CBA), prior to

31.84

bringing a breach-of-contract claim, even though the former employee was allegedly unaware that he had further
recourse because he was never provided with an employee handbook or a copy of the CBA. (Correctional Corporation of America/Correctional Treatment Facility)
U.S. Appeals Court
HOSTILE WORK
ENVIRONMENT
RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION
RETALIATION
TITLE VII

McCann v. Tillman, 526 F.3d 1370 (11th Cir. 2008). An employee, a correctional officer, brought suit against an
employer alleging she was subject to race discrimination and retaliation under § 1981 and § 1983, with respect to
matters of employment discipline, compensation, a lowering of service rating, failure to promote, and failure to
reassign or transfer. The employee also alleged that she was subject to a hostile work environment. The district
court granted the employer's motion for summary judgment on all claims. The officer appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The court held that the employee was not similarly situated to white employees who were allegedly
treated more favorably, as required for a race discrimination claim under Title VII. Neither of the employee's
comparators committed similar or more serious offenses as those committed by the employee, including violating
a uniform directive, or abusing the indicia or privileges of their office. The court found that the employer's policy
that employees who were suspended could not recover for their unpaid leave by working overtime upon their
return to work was a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason under Title VII for restricting the employee from working overtime. According to the court, the employer's reasons for giving the employee an unsatisfactory service
rating were not a pretext for unlawful retaliation under Title VII. The employer cited the employee's chronic tardiness, her manner of requesting leave by calling in, and her suspension. The court also held that the alleged instances of racially derogatory language, extending over a period of more than two years, were too sporadic and
isolated to establish that the employer's conduct was so objectively severe or pervasive as to constitute a hostile
work environment under Title VII. (Mobile County Jail, Alabama)

U.S. District Court
AGE DISCRIMINATION
EQUAL PROTECTION
PHYSICAL
REQUIREMENTS

Petzak v. Nevada ex rel. Department of Corrections, 579 F.Supp.2d 1330 (D.Nev. 2008). A 74-year-old correctional officer brought a § 1983 action against his supervisor, alleging that statutory stress electrocardiogram
(EKG) testing for officers over the age of 40 violated equal protection. The district court granted summary judgment for the supervisor in part and denied in part. The court held that the differential treatment of correctional
officers violated equal protection, but the supervisor was entitled to qualified immunity from damages. According
to the court, the differential treatment of correctional officers over and under the age of forty, under Nevada's
statutory electrocardiogram (EKG) testing requirements, was not rationally related to a legitimate government
interest, and thus, violated equal protection. The court noted that while the state had an interest in requiring insured employees to submit to physicals and to be physically fit for duty, there was no evidence why officers had
to undergo a stress EKG test only after reaching 40 years of age. (Nevada Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
ASSOCIATION
DUE PROCESS

Poirier v. Massachusetts Dept. of Correction, 532 F.Supp.2d 275 (D.Mass. 2008). A former prison guard sued the
Massachusetts Department of Corrections (DOC) and its commissioner under § 1983, claiming that a regulation
prohibiting her from associating with present or former inmates violated her First Amendment associational rights
and her Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The defendants moved to dismiss and the district court granted
the motion. The court held that there was a legitimate reason for imposing the regulation, precluding a Constitutional challenge, and that the commissioner had qualified immunity. According to the court, the right of a female
prison guard to have an intimate association with a former inmate was not a “fundamental” right which could not
be interfered with for other than a compelling state interest, but was rather a right that could be impeded when
there was a rational and legitimate reason for doing so. The court noted that one reason for the regulation was that
guards could be used as a possible conduit for unsanctioned contact between former and present inmates. (Massachusetts Department of Correction)

U.S. District Court
FREE SPEECH
RETALIATION
TERMINATION

Redd v. Dougherty, 578 F.Supp.2d 1042 (N.D.Ill. 2008). A correctional officer who was discharged from the
Cook County Department of Corrections (DOC) for “failing to cooperate in an ongoing criminal investigation”
and for “providing the State's Attorney with false statements in said investigation,” filed an action against a Chicago police detective, Assistant State's Attorney (ASA), the county's personnel director, the sheriff, unknown and
unnamed county employees, the City of Chicago, and the County, raising claims under § 1983 for alleged deprivations of her constitutional rights and related claims. The court held that the officer who claimed she was discharged in retaliation for protected speech adequately alleged she was speaking in her capacity as a private citizen,
where she alleged she witnessed an altercation outside a private residence, gave a statement to the police about
what she saw, and was thereafter pressured by the police to change her statement. (Cook County Department of
Corrections, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
ADA-Americans with
Disabilities Act
BFOQ-Bona Fide
Occupational Requirement
RETALIATION
TERMINATION

Shepheard v. City of New York, 577 F.Supp.2d 669 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). A New York City Department of Correction
(DOC) employee, a correction officer, brought a pro se action against the DOC and the City of New York, alleging they discriminated and retaliated against her in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The
district court granted summary judgment for the DOC and the city. The court held that the employee failed to
establish a prima facie case of discrimination, as she did not meet the burden of proving she could perform the
essential functions of her position as Captain with or without reasonable accommodation. The court found that the
employee failed to state a claim for discriminatory termination. The court noted that the tasks of a Captain's position required an individual to be “focused, attentive, alert, and vigilant,” all of which were attributes that were
either impaired or lacking as the result of her depression and/or medication she was taking in order to treat that
condition. The court also noted that her attendance record evinced her inability to report to work, and her inability
to perform the essential functions required of a Captain also implicated safety concerns. (New York City Department of Corrections, New York)

31.85

U.S. District Court
ADA-Americans with
Disabilities Act
BFOQ-Bona Fide
Occupational
Requirements
DISCRIMINATION
QUALIFICATIONS
RA- Rehabilitation Act

Taylor v. Hampton Roads Regional Jail Authority, 550 F.Supp.2d 614 (E.D.Va. 2008). An applicant who was
rejected for a position as a corrections officer sued an employer, claiming it discriminated against her on the basis
of her disability when it did not hire her, and seeking monetary and injunctive relief pursuant to the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990 and the Rehabilitation Act. The district court denied the employer’s motion
for summary judgment. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact
as to whether the one-handed applicant was disabled, whether she could perform each essential function of the
position, whether the proposed accommodations were unreasonable, whether she would pose a direct threat to
herself or her fellow employees, and whether her disability was a motivating factor in the decision not to hire.
(Hampton Roads Regional Jail Authority, Virginia)

U.S. Appeals Court
FREE SPEECH
RETALIATION
TERMINATION

Trigillo v. Snyder, 547 F.3d 826 (7th Cir. 2008). A former employee brought a § 1983 action against a Department
of Corrections (DOC), alleging that she was fired in retaliation for filing reports of misconduct. The DOC moved
for summary judgment and the district court granted the motion. The employee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the filing of reports was not protected speech, and the termination was not retaliatory.
The court noted that the employee, who was responsible for advising DOC officials about legal and regulatory
issues regarding procurement, did not speak as a citizen and thus her speech was not protected by the First
Amendment when, pursuant to her official duties, she filed a report with the Illinois Attorney General and the
director of Department of Central Management Services (CMS) which flagged potential misconduct within DOC.
According to the court, the filing of such a report was a means to fulfill the employee's employment obligations.
The court held that termination of the employee was not in retaliation for her alleged action in reporting to the FBI
that a contract approved before she became employed by the DOC may have been issued because someone rigged
the bidding process, absent competent evidence that the decision-maker who did not renew the employee's term of
employment knew or thought that the employee was the person who had called the FBI. (Illinois Department of
Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
PROSECUTION

U.S. v. Moore, 525 F.3d 1033 (11th Cir. 2008). Two male correctional officers at a federal correctional institution
were charged with a variety of misconduct arising from their inappropriate sexual contact with female inmates
and their distribution of contraband to inmates. Both defendants were found guilty of conspiracy to accept an
illegal gratuity. One was also found guilty of witness tampering and the other of bribery. The district court sentenced the defendants to twelve months of incarceration, followed by a three-year term of supervised release, and
ordered them to pay a fine. The defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that there was
sufficient evidence that the officers' conduct constituted an “official act” to support their conviction for conspiracy
to accept an illegal gratuity. According to the appeals court, the district court did not commit a plain error by instructing the jury that sex was a “thing of value” under the bribery statute. The court also held that there was sufficient evidence to uphold the officer's witness tampering conviction. The court noted that the government offered
evidence of five instances which satisfied the official act requirement, where officers switched unit assignments,
one officer permitted an inmate to telephone another officer to request contraband, one officer telephoned another
officer on an inmate's behalf, one officer permitted an inmate to leave her unit to meet with another officer, and
one officer gave another officer the key to staff offices to meet with an inmate in the middle of the night. The
district court had instructed the jury that “contraband” was defined as “anything whatsoever not approved by the
warden”, despite the defendant's claim that a broad federal regulatory definition of “contraband” should have been
used. (Federal Correctional Institute in Tallahassee, Florida)

U.S. District Court
CONTRACT
DISCIPLINE
TERMINATION

Washington v. District of Columbia, 538 F.Supp.2d 269 (D.D.C. 2008). Former employees brought a civil rights
action against the District of Columbia Department of Corrections (DOC) and its director alleging violation of
their due process rights, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court granted the
DOC’s motion to dismiss. The court held that the employees had to exhaust their grievance arbitration according
to the terms of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA), or through review by the Office of Employee Appeals
(OEA) according to the terms of the Comprehensive Merit Protection Act (CMPA), before bringing suit. The
court found that the allegedly defamatory statements made by the director of the DOC regarding the culpability of
former employees for a jail escape sufficiently related to a “personnel” issue to require administrative exhaustion
under the employee grievance provisions of the CMPA. Two employees had been terminated in response to the
escape of two prisoners. The court opened its opinion by stating “This case concerns a prison break, mass personnel terminations, mass personnel reinstatements and the various efforts undertaken by the defendant (the District
of Columbia) and the plaintiffs (D.C. Jail security officers) to enlist this court in a tug-of-war over the right of the
D.C. Department of Corrections (“DOC”) to subject its employees to a second round of disciplinary review and
firings after an administrative appeals board found the preliminary round deficient.” Two days after two inmates
escaped, the DOC Director issued written notification to twelve D.C. Jail employees, including the plaintiffs,
placing them on paid administrative leave pending further investigation of the escape. At a press briefing the Director announced the summary firings of the plaintiffs for dereliction of duty. (District of Columbia Jail)
2009

U.S. Appeals Court
DUE PROCESS
PROPERTY INTEREST

Akande v. Grounds, 555 F.3d 586 (7th Cir. 2009). A former employee of a state corrections agency brought an
action against the agency and agency officials, alleging that they deprived him of a property interest in his employment in violation of the due process clause. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the employee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the employee of the Illinois
Department of Corrections was not deprived of a due process property interest in his employment by a supervisor's decision to alter the employee's job duties. The court noted that the employee remained at the same position
and received the same salary, and that the Illinois Personnel Code defined the employee's protected property right
as the right not to be removed, discharged, demoted, or suspended for more than 30 days without cause, but none
of those events occurred. (Illinois Department of Corrections, Robinson Correctional Center)

31.86

U.S. District Court
INVESTIGATION
TERMINATION

Boyd v. Nichols, 616 F.Supp.2d 1331 (M.D.Ga. 2009). A female, who had been housed in a jail for violation of
her probation, brought an action against a former jailer, county, and former sheriff, under § 1983 and state law,
relating to the sexual assault of the inmate by the jailer. The county and sheriff moved for summary judgment and
the district court granted the motions. The court held that the sheriff was not “deliberately indifferent” to a substantial risk of serious harm to the inmate under the Eighth Amendment or the Georgia constitution in failing to
protect the inmate from sexual assaults by a jailer, absent evidence that the sheriff had knowledge or indication
that the jailer was a threat or danger to inmates, or that male guards, if left alone with female inmates, posed a risk
to the inmates' health and safety. The court noted that the sheriff's actions in calling for an investigation and terminating the jailer's employment upon learning of the jailer's actions was not an “indifferent and objectively unreasonable response” to the inmate's claims, and thus, there was no violation of the inmate's rights. The court
found that the sheriff's failure to train deputies and jailers in proper procedures for escorting and handling female
inmates did not support supervisory liability on the § 1983 claim of the inmate, where the sheriff had no
knowledge of any prior sexual assaults at the jail or any problems with jailers improperly escorting and handling
female inmates, and the jailer who committed the assault had been trained previously on how to interact with
inmates and knew it was improper to have intimate contact with inmates. During the time period in question, the
county did not have a policy prohibiting a male jailer from escorting a female inmate within the Jail. The court
held that the county and sheriff had sovereign immunity from the state law claims of the inmate, absent evidence
that such immunity had been waived by an act of the General Assembly. (Berrien County Jail, Georgia)

U.S. District Court
HARASSMENT
SEXUAL HARASSMENT
SUPERVISION
TITLE VII

Brown v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 603 F.Supp.2d 73 (D.D.C. 2009). A former female correctional officer sued the
District of Columbia, a private corrections contractor, and the director of the Department of Corrections (DOC) in
his official capacity, asserting claims under Title VII and § 1983 alleging that her supervisor sexually harassed
and raped her. The district court dismissed the case in part and denied dismissal in part. The court found that the
Title VII claim and the § 1983 claim against the director were redundant of the claims against the District. The
court held that the former female correctional officer's allegations were sufficient for a municipal liability claim
under § 1983 against the District of Columbia, including allegations that the District adopted a custom of permitting sexual harassment to occur in correctional facilities by failing to take corrective action in response to her
numerous sexual harassment complaints against the supervisor. The officer also alleged that the District allowed
the supervisor to continue his incessant and relentless harassment and that ultimately the District's inaction led to
her sexual assault by her harasser. The officer alleged that the District knew the sexual assault occurred at the
correctional facility because sexual harassment was a standard operating procedure at the facility. The officer
asserted that she suffered harm due to the District's willful blindness and failure to implement and effectuate appropriate policies to remedy and/or prevent sexual harassment and rape.
The court held that the issue of whether the District of Columbia and the private prison contractor were the
correctional officer's joint employers, as required for the officer's Title VII claim against District, could not be
resolved by a motion to dismiss. According to the court, there was a factual dispute as to whether the District
possessed sufficient control over the contractor's employees to be considered a joint employer of officer. (District
of Columbia, Corrections Corporation of America Correctional Treatment Facility)

U.S. Appeals Court
FREE SPEECH
RETALIATION

Cabral v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 587 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2009). A nurse practitioner working as a contractor in a
county house of correction brought an action against a county sheriff claiming that she was barred from entering
the house of correction, in violation of her free speech rights, for informing the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) of alleged prisoner abuse. The county sheriff brought an Administrative Procedure Act (APA) proceeding
against the United States Department of Justice, seeking discovery of relevant documents. The district court denied the requested discovery and the sheriff appealed. A jury found in favor of the contractor in the underlying
free speech case and the district court denied the defendants' motions for a new trial. The appeals from the two
judgments were consolidated. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the sheriff's request for information
concerning a meeting between the nurse and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) would directly and adversely impact the FBI investigations into prisoner abuse in the house of correction and violate the Privacy Act, so
as to warrant denial of such requests. The court held that evidence was sufficient to support the jury's determination that the county sheriff barred the nurse practitioner from a county house of correction with a conscious indifference to her free speech rights, as was necessary to support an award of punitive damages in the nurse’s § 1983
action. The court found that the award of $250,000 in punitive damages to the nurse was not excessive, where the
sheriff's conduct was reprehensible and the award could have been greater. (Suffolk County House of Correction,
Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
EQUAL PROTECTION
HOSTILE WORK
ENVIRONMENT
OVERTIME
TITLE VII

Cantu v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections, 653 F.Supp.2d 726 (E.D.Mich. 2009). An employee, a Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) officer who was of Caucasian and Hispanic descent, brought an action against
MDOC, a correctional facility, a facility warden, and several other corrections officers, alleging violations of Title
VII, Michigan law and § 1983, as well as claims of conspiracy and gross negligence. The defendants moved for
summary judgment. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as
to: (1) whether the alleged hostile work environment and disparate treatment of the MDOC employee of Caucasian and Hispanic descent were attributable to his race and national origin; (2) whether the Department promptly
investigated complaints of the employee regarding his alleged harassment by African-American co-workers, and
as to whether an appropriate action was taken in response to any investigation conducted; and (3) whether the
employee experienced an adverse action when he was unable to receive anticipated overtime as the result of administrative leave, which was allegedly precipitated by the employer's actions. The court held that the prison warden was not entitled to qualified immunity from the § 1983 equal protection claim brought against the employee,
where the employee's factual allegations in support of his equal protection claims against the warden regarding his
treatment subsequent to his assault by an African-American co-worker, the employee's stress leave, and the warden's possible failure to respond to the employee's complaints of continued harassment stated violations of wellestablished rights at the time of those events. (Ryan Correctional Facility, Michigan)

31.87

U.S. Appeals Court
TERMINATION
UNION

Civil Service Employees Ass'n, Local 1000, AFSCME v. N.L.R.B., 569 F.3d 88 (2nd Cir. 2009). A union representing correctional officers at a county correctional facility petitioned for review of a National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) decision that upheld an employer's termination of non-union employees for having picketed a
health clinic. The appeals court granted the petition and vacated the NLRB decision. The appeals court held that
the peaceful picketing of the health clinic by county correctional facility employees, in their individual capacity,
for the purpose of collective bargaining but without the requisite notice from a union under the NLRA, did not
deprive the employees of their status as employees protected by the NLRA or constitute unprotected conduct, as
would have exposed the employees to discharge. The employees sought to organize and represent the employees
of a health clinic that was operated by Correctional Medical Services, Inc. (CMS). The union had requested that
CMS recognize it as the collective-bargaining representative of all clinic employees except physicians, supervisors and one clerical worker, but CMS rejected the request. (Albany County Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
ADEA-Age Discrimination
In Employment Act
POLITICAL AFFILIATION
RETALIATION
TERMINATION
TRANSFER

Cox v. DeSoto County, Miss., 564 F.3d 745 (5th Cir. 2009). A county employee brought an action against her
county employer, alleging that as result of her age, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA), and in retaliation for her refusal to campaign actively for reelection of the county sheriff, in violation of
the First Amendment, she was reassigned to the jail and later terminated. The district court granted summary
judgment as to the termination claims, and entered judgment, upon jury verdict, in favor of the employer on the
First Amendment claim, and in favor of employee on the age discrimination claim in connection with her reassignment. The employee appealed the grant of summary judgment. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in
part, and remanded. The court held that the decision of the Mississippi Employment Security Commission
(MESC), that the employee was not eligible for unemployment compensation benefits because she was discharged
for work-related misconduct, did not collaterally prohibit the employee from claiming that she was terminated in
retaliation for bringing an ADEA wrongful transfer claim, given the detailed administrative remedy provided by
ADEA for such claims. (DeSoto County Sheriff, Mississippi)

U.S. District Court
FREE SPEECH
RETALIATION
STAFFING LEVELS
TERMINATION

Dewees v. Haste, 620 F.Supp.2d 625 (M.D.Pa. 2009). A former deputy warden brought an action against a county, a county prison warden, a county commissioner, and members of the county's prison salary board, alleging that
his position was eliminated in retaliation for his exercise of his First Amendment rights. The defendants moved
for summary judgment and the district court granted the motion. The court held that the speech activities of the
deputy warden, who provided information to the county district attorney regarding the prison's food services contract and reported misappropriation of inmate funds to a county commissioner, were conducted pursuant to his
employment with the prison, precluding his First Amendment retaliation claims. The court noted that the employee handbook required the deputy warden to report any corrupt or unethical behavior or violations of rules or law.
According to the court, the county prison board's proffered legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for eliminating the
deputy warden's position--that the county was seeking to cut employment-related expenses and the position had
been deemed expendable--was insufficient to show that the budget cuts were not for cause. The court held that the
county commissioner was entitled to legislative immunity on the former deputy warden's First Amendment retaliation claim where the commissioner's actions of recommending and voting for elimination of the deputy warden’s
position, as part of an effort to reduce the county's budget, was squarely within the sphere of his legislative work.
(Dauphin County Prison, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
EQUAL PROTECTION
TRAINING

Edwards v. Washington, 661 F.Supp.2d 13 (D.D.C. 2009). A trainee at the District of Columbia Department of
Corrections brought a pro se action against the Department's director, alleging due process and equal protection
claims arising from personal injuries she sustained during an employment qualification training exercise. The
district court dismissed the action. The court held that the trainee waived her right to bring any claims in negligence against the Department by voluntarily signing a liability release form. The court noted that the prospective
liability release form was unambiguous and clear in releasing the Department from liability. (District of Columbia
Department of Corrections (“DCDC”).

U.S. Appeals Court
FREE SPEECH
HARASSMENT
RETALIATION

Fairley v. Andrews, 578 F.3d 518 (7th Cir. 2009). Former guards at a county jail brought a § 1983 action against
various jail officials and others, alleging conspiracy to cover up inmate abuse and violation of their First Amendment rights. Following a grant of summary judgment in favor of certain defendants, the district court entered
summary judgment in favor of the remaining defendants. The guards appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part,
reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that the guards' reports about alleged inmate abuse at the jail perpetrated by other guards was not protected speech under the First Amendment, and thus, could not be the basis of
a First Amendment retaliation claim. The court noted that a county jail policy required guards to report misconduct by their colleagues, and even if an unwritten policy prohibited such reports of misconduct, it did not offend
the 1st Amendment. The court found that the coworkers who allegedly bullied and made threats against the guards
in order to deter the guards from testifying in favor of an inmate violated the guards' free speech rights under the
First Amendment, and the guards could recover under § 1983 for such a violation. (Cook County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
PHYSICAL
REQUIREMENTS
TRAINING

Hennagir v. Utah Dept. of Corrections, 587 F.3d 1255 (10th Cir. 2009). An employee who was part of the medical
staff for a state department of corrections (DOC), brought an action against her DOC employer, alleging disability
discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), in connection with the
DOC's refusal to allow the employee to continue in her position without completing the required physical safety
training. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer. The employee appealed. The
appeals court affirmed. The court held that completion of the required physical safety training was an “essential
job function” for the employee, and that allowing the employee to continue with her identical job duties, by eliminating the essential job function of completion of the required physical safety training, was not a “reasonable
accommodation.” The court held that completion of the required physical safety training was an “essential job
function” for the employee within the meaning of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The court noted
that the DOC required all personnel who had contact with inmates to complete the training, the employee had

31.88

regular contact with inmates as part of her job, and although the employee claimed that she never had to use the
safety training techniques during her eight years of employment at the prison, the potential consequences of an
inmate attack against any staff were incredibly severe. (Utah Dept. of Corrections, Central Utah Corr’l Facility)
U.S. District Court
EQUAL PROTECTION
RELIGION
RETALIATION

McCollum v. California, 610 F.Supp.2d 1053 (N.D.Cal. 2009). A volunteer Wiccan chaplain for inmates incarcerated by the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) filed suit alleging disparate
treatment from volunteers of other faiths and retaliation for his complaints about the CDCR's treatment of Wiccans. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court held that equal protection was not denied to the volunteer Wiccan chaplain who alleged he was not being permitted to see inmates at
times and in locations when and where other chaplains were permitted, and that being denied access to chapel
time for religious instruction and benefits extended to other administrative volunteer chaplains including access to
telephone and computer, and being subjected to more rigorous security scrutiny. According to the court, there was
no evidence that other voluntary clergy did not encounter the same difficulties or as to inmates that were denied
access to his services. The court found that the CDCR did not retaliate against the volunteer Wiccan chaplain for
protected speech complaining against the mistreatment of Wiccans by “denigrating” him while addressing a group
of Protestant chaplains or by refusing to hire him as community partnership manager at a women's facility and a
state prison. The court noted that the claimed denigration, even if true, did not result in the loss of a valuable government benefit, and that the decision not to hire him was based on the superior qualifications of those ultimately
hired rather than on his religion. (California Corrections Institution)

U.S. Appeals Court
ASSOCIATION
DUE PROCESS
TERMINATION

Poirier v. Massachusetts Dept. of Correction, 558 F.3d 92 (1st Cir. 2009). A discharged prison guard sued the
Massachusetts Department of Corrections (DOC) and its commissioner under § 1983, claiming that a regulation
prohibiting her from associating with present or former inmates violated her First Amendment associational rights
and her Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The district court dismissed the case and the prison guard
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the First Amendment associational and Fourteenth
Amendment due process rights of the prison guard were not violated when she was discharged for violating a
DOC regulation prohibiting non-approved association with a former inmate. The court found that the DOC's legitimate interest in preserving prison security was reasonably advanced by prohibiting a guard-former prisoner relationship, and that the DOC's interest outweighed the degree of intrusion into the guard's private life imposed by
the regulation. The court held that the Massachusetts Department of Corrections (DOC) was entitled to sovereign
immunity, and that the Commissioner of the DOC had qualified immunity from liability in the § 1983 claim because it was not clearly established that enforcement of the regulation would be an unlawful act. (Massachusetts
Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
FREE SPEECH
RETALIATION
TERMINATION

Shumpert v. Johnson, 621 F.Supp.2d 387 (N.D.Miss. 2009). A sheriff's department employee who had been terminated brought a suit against a county sheriff alleging that she was terminated for discussing an alleged jail assault with an attorney in violation of her First Amendment rights. The district court entered judgment on a jury
verdict for the employee, awarding $34,000 to the employee. The defendant moved for judgment as a matter of
law or, alternatively, a motion for a new trial. The district court denied the motion. The court held that the sheriff
was aware that the employee had a discussion with an attorney about an assault and terminated the employee due
to the conversation, as required for the employee's First Amendment retaliation claim. According to the court,
there was a plausible inference that the sheriff had a motive to terminate the employee based on her conversation
with the attorney, as required for the employee's First Amendment retaliation claim. The court found that the sheriff did not provide a legitimate explanation for terminating the employee, as required for the employee's First
Amendment retaliation claim. (Lee County Jail, Mississippi)

U.S. Appeals Court
FMLA-Family Medical
Leave Act
RETALIATION
TERMINATION

Simpson v. Office of Chief Judge of Circuit Court of Will County, 559 F.3d 706 (7th Cir. 2009). A former employee sued an employer alleging that the employer denied her request for a leave of absence and later terminated her
employment in violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). The district court granted the employer’s
motion for summary judgment. The employee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the employee's poor work performance constituted a legitimate, non-pretextual reason for her termination. The court
found that there was no evidence that the employee was similarly situated to an employee who was treated more
favorably and who did not take FMLA leave, for the purposes of her retaliation claim. (Will County, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
ADEA-Age Discrimination
In Employment Act
DISCRIMINATION
HARASSMENT
UNION

Slater v. Susquehanna County, 613 F.Supp.2d 653 (M.D.Pa. 2009). A former prison employee brought action
against her employer, employee union, union representative, city, and others, alleging violations of § 1983, the
federal civil conspiracy statute, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), Title VII, and state law. The
union and its representative moved for dismissal or for summary judgment. The plaintiff alleged that she and
other female correctional officers over the age of fifty have been harassed by supervisors and other officers, including a group of co-workers called the “Secret Sisters,” who were aided and abetted by prison wardens and a
union official. The court granted the union’s motion for summary judgment, finding that the union and its representative were not acting under the color of state law, for purposes of a § 1983 claim. According to the court, the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) does not provide for individual liability. The court found that
the union representative could not be held liable for age and gender discrimination against a prison employee
under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act. The court held that the employee’s allegations that she was harassed by supervisors and co-workers during the course of her employment, that the employee union collectively
allowed the harassment to continue and indeed encouraged the treatment, and that the union believed the employee passed information regarding a prisoner's death to the deceased's attorney and, in response, began manufacturing reasons to discipline and ultimately terminate her, did not give rise to an intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim under Pennsylvania law. (Susquehanna County Correctional Facility, Pennsylvania)

31.89

U.S. District Court
FREE SPEECH
RETALIATION
SEXUAL HARASSMENT
TITLE VII

Smith-Thompson v. District of Columbia, 657 F.Supp.2d 123 (D.D.C. 2009). A female correctional officer stationed at a District of Columbia jail brought an action in District of Columbia court alleging that officials permitted her to be sexually harassed by a fellow officer and retaliated against her in violation of Title VII. The officer
alleged that the District was liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court held that the officer
sufficiently pleaded a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, even though she failed to specify in her complaint the precise dates of her involvement in the protected activity of lodging a complaint with the Office of the
Special Inspector, her assistance in the Special Inspector's investigation, and her contact with the Office of Human
Rights (DCOHR). According to the court, the officer's allegations suggested that the District of Columbia Department of Corrections placed her on unpaid leave shortly after she engaged in the protected activity. (District of
Columbia Jail)

U.S. Appeals Court
HOSTILE WORK
ENVIRONMENT
SEXUAL HARASSMENT

Sutherland v. Missouri Dept. of Corrections, 580 F.3d 748 (8TH Cir. 2009). A state corrections employee sued her
employer for sexual harassment and retaliation in violation of Title VII. The district court granted the Department
summary judgment and the employee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the employee's harassment was not sufficiently severe or pervasive for a hostile work environment claim, and the employee was not subjected to materially adverse retaliatory actions. The court noted that the employee alleged only
one incident of a co-worker's offensive touching, but other harassment did not involve the co-worker or physical
contact. (Missouri Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
DISCIPLINE
RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION
SEX DISCRIMINATION
TERMINATION

Wimbley v. Cashion, 588 F.3d 959, (8th Cir. 2009). An African-American female correctional officer brought a §
1983 claim against a warden, alleging race and sex discrimination. The district court denied the warden's motion
for summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity. The warden appealed and the appeals court affirmed. The court held that a White male correctional officer who was not terminated for discharging pepper spray
at an inmate was similarly situated to the African-American female correctional officer who was terminated after
she discharged pepper spray, supporting the female officer's prima facie § 1983 race and sex discrimination claims
against the warden. The court noted that both officers were involved in similar pepper-spray conduct, but were
disciplined differently. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact
as to whether the warden's proffered reason for terminating the female corrections officer, that she did so in violation of department of corrections policy to intimidate inmates, was a pretext for race and sex discrimination. (Arkansas Department of Correction, Delta Regional Unit)
2010

U.S. District Court
ASSIGNMENT
BFOQ- Bona Fide
Occupational Qualification
TITLE VII
TERMINATION
SEX DISCRIMINATION

Ambat v. City and County of San Francisco, 693 F.Supp.2d 1130 (N.D.Cal. 2010). Sheriff's deputies brought an
action against a city and county, alleging various claims including retaliation, and that a gender based staffing
policy violated Title VII and California's Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). Cross-motions for summary
judgment were filed. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants in part, and denied in part.
The court held that the sheriff's department policy that only female deputies would be assigned to female-only
housing units was implemented to protect the interests that amount to the essence of the Sheriff's business, including safety and privacy, as required to establish a bona fide occupational qualification as a defense to the deputies'
claims of employment discrimination under Title VII and California's Fair Employment and Housing Act
(FEHA). The court noted that the policy was implemented to prevent sexual misconduct and inappropriate relationships between male deputies and female inmates, to alleviate male deputies' fears of false accusations of misconduct resulting in a reluctance to supervise female inmates closely, which created opportunities for smuggling
and use of contraband, and to prevent female inmates from being required to dress and undress in front of male
deputies. The court found that the sheriff was entitled to deference in his policy judgment to implement the department policy that only female deputies would be assigned to female-only housing units and in determining
whether the policy was reasonably necessary to achieve issues of safety and privacy and to ensure normal operation of the jails, as required to establish a bona fide occupational qualification as a defense to the deputies' claims
of employment discrimination under Title VII and California's Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). The
court noted that, despite not conducting formal studies or seeking consultation, the policy was based upon the
sheriff's experience and observations over thirty years as sheriff and conversations with senior officials and jail
commanders over several months. The court noted that suggested non-discriminatory alternatives to the sheriff's
department policy, including cameras and additional training, were not feasible alternatives that furthered the
objectives of safety, security and privacy. Installation of cameras in the units was cost-prohibitive and did not
address privacy concerns or the fact that misconduct took place outside of the units, additional training would not
eliminate sexual abuse since deputies already knew it was forbidden, and there was no effective testing or screening method to identify deputies who might engage in sexual misconduct. The court found that the fact that the
deputy made statements to the National Academy of Arbitrators, alleging that the sheriff was influenced by financial contributions and nepotism and that the sheriff's general counsel had engaged in sex tourism was a legitimate,
non-retaliatory reason to terminate the deputy under Title VII and the California Fair Employment and Housing
Act. (San Francisco Sheriff's Department, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
HOSTILE WORK
ENVIRONMENT
SEXUAL HARASSMENT
TITLE VII

Beckford v. Department of Corrections, 605 F.3d 951 (11th Cir. 2010). Female employees at a state correctional
institution filed a state court action under Title VII alleging that the state Department of corrections failed to remedy a sexually hostile work environment created by male inmates. After removal to federal cou, the district court
entered judgment in the employees' favor, and the department appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court
held that the department of corrections was not entitled to a blanket exemption from liability under Title VII arising from its failure to remedy a sexually hostile work environment created by male inmates whenever female
employees were present, even if its employees did not participate in or encourage the harassment. According to
the court, the exhibitionist masturbation and gender-specific verbal harassment by male inmates in the state correctional institution in the presence of female employees was sex-based and highly offensive conduct that could

31.90

be used to establish a Title VII claim against the department of corrections for failing to remedy a sexually hostile
work environment. (Florida Department of Corrections, Martin Correctional Institution)
U.S. District Court
FMLA- Family Medical
Leave Act
PROMOTION
RETALIATION

Bosse v. Baltimore County, 692 F.Supp.2d 574 (D.Md. 2010). A correctional officer in the Baltimore County
Department of Corrections sued the county, the director of the department, and his supervisor, alleging interference and retaliation under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). The court held that summary judgment
was precluded by genuine issues of material fact, as to the willfulness of the alleged violations. The court found
that a jury reasonably could find that the defendants recklessly disregarded the fact that the bulk of the officer's
leave time was FMLA leave and allowed his FMLA leave time to impact his performance negatively, and that
they thereby interfered with the officer's FMLA rights by discouraging him from using FMLA leave in the future.
The court also held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact, as to whether the
county and individual defendants interfered with, restrained or denied the correctional officer's exercise of his
FMLA rights and whether he suffered prejudice in the form of wages he allegedly would not have lost had his
FMLA requests been granted. According to the court, summary judgment was also precluded by a genuine issue
of material fact, as to whether the county did not promote the correctional officer because of the extent of his
absences, the majority of which were for FMLA leave. The court noted that non-promotion was an adverse action,
and the officer showed that the county's decisions not to promote him were in temporal proximity to at least some
of his absences. Summary judgment was also precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
county's proffered legitimate reasons for not promoting the correctional officer were a pretext to retaliate against
him for conduct protected under the FMLA. According to the court, the officer did not have to prove that he was
better qualified than those promoted. He offered evidence that those promoted had better attendance than he and
that his unscheduled leave, which included FMLA leave, garnered attention and negative remarks on his otherwise positive performance evaluations. (Baltimore County Department of Corrections, Maryland)

U.S. Appeals Court
BFOQ- Bona Fide
Occupational Qualification
DISCRIMINATION
TITLE VII
EQUAL OPPORTUNITY

Breiner v. Nevada Dept. of Corrections, 610 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 2010). Male correctional officers brought suit,
challenging an employment policy of the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDOC) of hiring only female correctional lieutenants at a women's prison. The district court granted summary judgment for the Department and
the officers appeals. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that a male correctional officer who
had previously applied for correctional lieutenant positions, but allegedly was deterred from applying for lieutenant positions at women's prisons by his knowledge that his application would be futile because of the prison's
policy of hiring only women for that position, had standing to pursue a Title VII claim. According to the court,
denial of single opportunity to a man for promotion to correctional lieutenant at the women's prison was not “de
minimis,” and could violate Title VII, despite the existence of promotional opportunities for men across the system as a whole. The court found that gender was not a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) that would
justify the facially discriminatory policy of hiring only female correctional lieutenants at the women's prison,
where there was no factual basis for concluding that all male correctional lieutenants would tolerate sexual abuse
by their subordinates, that all men in a correctional lieutenant role would themselves sexually abuse inmates, or
that women, by virtue of their gender, could better understand the behavior of female inmates. (Nevada Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
ADEA- Age Discrimination
in Employment Act
AGE DISCRIMINATION
EQUAL PROTECTION

Cook v. Illinois Dept. of Corrections, 736 F.Supp.2d 1190 (S.D.Ill. 2010). A former employee brought an action
against the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC), alleging age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and Illinois Human Rights Act (IHRA). The employer filed a motion for
summary judgment. The district court denied the motion. The district court held that summary judgment was
precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to: (1) whether the employee was discriminated against because of
her age; (2) whether the employee was performing legitimate business expectations; (3) whether the employee
suffered an adverse employment action; (4) whether coworkers were similarly situated; (5) whether the employee
was not promoted due to her age; and (5) whether the employee was constructively discharged. (Illinois Department of Corrections, Centralia Correctional Center)

U.S. District Court
RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION
RETALIATION
SEX DICSRIMINATION
TERMINATION
TITLE VII
TRANSFER

Cortes v. City of New York, 700 F.Supp.2d 474 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). A former city corrections officer brought an
action against his former city employer, alleging retaliation and discrimination based on gender and race, in violation of Title VII, § 1981, the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and the New York State Human Rights Law
(SHRL). The defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings. The district court granted the motion in part and
denied in part. The court held that the officer's participation as a witness in support of his coworker's Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) complaint was “protected activity,” for the purpose of his Title VII
retaliation claim, and that the officer's transfer to an undesirable facility and his termination constituted “adverse
employment actions.” The court found that the officer established a causal connection necessary to support his
Title VII retaliation claim, and that his allegations stated gender and race discrimination claims, and a hostile
work environment claim. According to the court, the officer's assertions constituted speech on matter of public
concern, for the purpose of his First Amendment retaliation claim. (New York City Department of Correction)

U.S. Appeals Court
DISCRIMINATION
RELIGION
TITLE VII

E.E.O.C. v. GEO Group, Inc., 616 F.3d 265 (3rd Cir. 2010). The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) brought an action on behalf of a group of female Muslim employees against their employer, a private
company that was contracted to run a prison, alleging that the employer violated Title VII's prohibitions on religious discrimination when it failed to accommodate the employees by providing them an exemption to the prison's dress policy which precluded them from wearing Muslim head coverings-- called khimars--at work. The
district court granted the employer's motion for summary judgment and denied the EEOC's cross-motion for
summary judgment. The EEOC appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the employer's refusal
to allow employees to wear khimars at work did not violate Title VII. According to the court, the employer, a
private company, was not required under Title VII to provide to female Muslim employees an exemption to the
prison's dress policy, as such a religious accommodation would have caused a safety or security risk and resulted

31.91

in undue hardship to the employer. The court noted that khimars, like hats, could have been used to smuggle contraband into and around the prison, khimars could have been used to conceal the identity of the wearer, creating
problems of misidentification, khimars could have been used against prison employees in an attack, and accommodating the employees would have necessarily required additional time and resources of prison officials. (GEO
Group, Inc., George W. Hill Correctional Facility, Delaware County, Pennsylvania)
U.S. District Court
FREE SPEECH
PROMOTION
RETALIATION
UNION

Justice v. Machtinger, 733 F.Supp.2d 495 (D.Del. 2010). A correctional officer brought a § 1983 action against a
human resources director alleging his First Amendment freedom of speech rights were violated by denial of a
promotion in retaliation for union activities. The director moved for summary judgment. The district court granted
the motion. The court held that the human resources director was entitled to qualified immunity. According to the
court, there was no evidence that the human resources director was personally involved in the misplacement of the
officer's application, or had a motive other than his position to retaliate against the officer. The officer alleged that
the DOC's human resources director violated his First Amendment free speech rights by intentionally misplacing
his application for promotion in retaliation for the officer's union activities. In a prior court decision, the court
found that the officer's participation in union negotiations was of considerable concern to the community and that
his interest in participating in union negotiations outweighed the DOC's interest in the efficiency of its public
service operations. (Delaware Department of Correction)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEXUAL HARASSMENT
TITLE VII

King v. McMillan, 594 F.3d 301 (4th Cir. 2010). A female former deputy sued her employer sheriff in his official
capacity, under Title VII, for sexual harassment and in his individual capacity, under state law, for battery. The
sheriff left office and the incoming sheriff was substituted in the action. A jury returned verdicts for the deputy on
both claims, and the district court entered judgment for the deputy, awarded compensatory and punitive damages,
and granted the sheriff's post-trial motion to reduce the compensatory damages award. Both sheriffs appealed. The
appeals court affirmed. The court held that substitution was appropriate for the claim under Title VII. The court
held that, under Virginia law, the punitive damages award of $100,000 imposed for the sheriff's battery of the
female deputy by unwanted touching was not excessive. The court also found that the compensatory damages
award of $50,000, reduced by the district court from $175,000, was not excessive. (City of Roanoke, Virginia)

U.S. District Court
HOSTILE WORK
ENVIRONMENT
RETALIATION
SEXUAL HARASSMENT
TITLE VII

Morales v. GEO Group, Inc., 824 F.Supp.2d 836 (S.D.Ind. 2010). A former employee brought a Title VII action
against a private correctional facility manager, her former employer, alleging sexual harassment, retaliation, and
constructive discharge. The employer moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part
and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the sexually charged comments made by the female employee's supervisors and co-workers over a ninemonth period were sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile work environment. The court also found that
summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the female employee engaged
in a protected activity by complaining about sexual harassment and whether she suffered an adverse employment
action by being required to attend a meeting with her alleged harassers, and whether a reasonable person would
have felt compelled to resign under the circumstances presented to the female employee. She had been assigned to
a new unit after complaining about sexual harassment but was never given any training or a password to log on to
her computer. (Geo Group, Inc., and Indiana Department of Corrections, New Castle Correctional Facility)

U.S. District Court
DISCIPLINE
HIRING/QUALIFICATIONS
SUPERVISION

Sexton v. Kenton County Detention Center, 702 F.Supp.2d 784 (E.D.Ky. 2010). Two female detainees brought a §
1983 action against a county detention center and officials, alleging deliberate indifference with respect to hiring
and supervision of a deputy who sexually assaulted them while they awaited arraignment. The defendants moved
for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the detainees failed to establish
deliberate indifference with respect to the center's hiring of the deputy. The court noted that none of the deputy's
prior misdemeanor offenses, including his driving infractions and domestic assault, demonstrated a propensity to
commit rape. The court found that the detainees failed to demonstrate a causal link between the center's alleged
policy of not terminating employees with excessive absenteeism and the deputy's conduct. The court noted that
"...Absent evidence of prior complaints of sexual assault, the mere fact that a male guard supervises a female
inmate does not lead to the conclusion that the inmate is at a great risk of being sexually assaulted by the guard."
According to the court, the detainees failed to establish that the county detention center was deliberately indifferent to their constitutional rights by not effectively monitoring surveillance equipment, and thus they could not
recover in their § 1983 action against the center, where there was no evidence that the center had a policy or custom of ineffective surveillance. The detainees argued that only one person monitored the 89 cameras that were
used throughout the Detention Center and that they were mainly monitored only for ingress and egress of secured
doors. They asserted that the county should have had cameras in the video arraignment room for the inmates'
protection. The court noted that state jail regulations do not require constant monitoring of video surveillance
cameras or dictate where the cameras are to be placed inside a detention facility. (Kenton County Detention Center, Kentucky)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCHES
TERMINATION

True v. Nebraska, 612 F.3d 676 (8th Cir. 2010). A former correctional facility employee brought a § 1983 action
against the Nebraska Department of Correctional Services (DCS) and correctional officials, alleging violations of
his First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendants and the employee appealed. The appeals court reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded. The
appeals court held that the former employee had standing to bring the § 1983 action against the Department and
correctional officials, where the employee lost his job due to enforcement of a department policy of randomly
searching employee vehicles, and the employee sought reinstatement, lost pay and an injunction prohibiting enforcement of the policy. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact
as to the circumstances of inmate access to the correctional facility parking lot. The employee was terminated
because he refused to permit a search of his vehicle. The court held that the Department’s policy of random,
suspicionless searches of only employees' vehicles, rather than including visitors' vehicles, was rationally related

31.92

to a legitimate state interest of institutional security, contraband interdiction and administrative efficiency. The
court noted that employees' vehicles were at the facility daily, making it easier to smuggle contraband. (Lincoln
Correctional Center, Nebraska)
2011
U.S. Appeals Court
DISCIPLINE
DUE PROCESS
SUSPENSION

Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. County of Los Angeles, 648 F.3d 986 (9th Cir. 2011). Current or
former deputy sheriffs who had been charged with felonies, suspended, reinstated after suspension, and then discharged, brought § 1983 claims based on Fourteenth Amendment due process violations against the county, its
board of supervisors, civil service commissioners, and sheriff. The deputies were joined by their union. The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court granted the motion and the former deputies appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded. The appeals court held that: (1)
due process required that the deputies receive post-suspension hearings in addition to the limited procedures they
received before their suspensions; (2) all four deputies adequately stated Monell claims against the county; (3)
civil service commissioners were entitled to qualified immunity from the claims of the deputies who did not receive post-suspension hearings, although those claims could go forward against the sheriff and county supervisors; and (4) all individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity from the § 1983 claims of the two
deputies who received post-suspension hearings, as their right to a more substantial hearing was not clearly established at the time of the violations. (Los Angeles County, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
DEMOTION
FREE SPEECH
INVESTIGATION
PROMOTION
RETALIATION
TRANSFERS

Bardzik v. County of Orange, 635 F.3d 1138 (9th Cir. 2011). A sheriff's lieutenant brought a § 1983 action against
a county, sheriff, and others alleging that the defendants retaliated against him for his support of the sheriff's opponent in an election challenge, in violation of his First Amendment rights. The defendants moved for summary
judgment. The district court denied the motion and the sheriff appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and
reversed in part. The appeals court held that the sheriff was entitled to qualified immunity for his allegedly retaliatory demotion of the lieutenant from a policymaking position, but the sheriff was not entitled to qualified immunity for his alleged retaliation against the lieutenant while the lieutenant was not in a policymaking position. The
court noted that when the lieutenant was the Reserve Division Commander, the lieutenant had broad responsibility, influence on programs, frequent contact with elected officials, technical competence, and power to control
others, and that the lieutenant impeded the sheriff's agenda. In his subsequent role with the court operations unit,
the lieutenant was not a policymaker. The lieutenant alleged that the sheriff retaliated against him by transferring
him from the prestigious position of Reserve Division Commander to an undesirable post at Court Operations, and
that the sheriff continued punishing him even after he was transferred by denying him a pay raise and taking the
unprecedented step of directing that the lieutenant’s rating on his annual evaluation be reduced from “exceeds
expectations” to “meets expectations.” The lieutenant was also denied the opportunity to interview for Chief of
Police positions in 2006 and 2007, even though all lieutenants were allowed to interview even if they were considered unqualified. The court noted that two internal investigations were initiated against the lieutenant, which
were ultimately dismissed as unfounded. (Orange County Sheriff's Department, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCHES

Braun v. Maynard, 652 F.3d 557 (4th Cir. 2011). Prison employees brought a § 1983 action against prison officials, alleging that a search using a portable ion scanning machine violated their Fourth Amendment rights. The
district court granted the officials' motion to dismiss and the employees appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The
court held that it was not clearly established that the use of an ion scanning machine to detect drugs and other
chemicals could not create reasonable suspicion to justify a strip search, and therefore, prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity from the § 1983 action by prison employees alleging that a strip search following a
positive scan violated the Fourth Amendment. The court found that it was not clearly established that the Fourth
Amendment was violated by strip searches of prison employees conducted in a restroom with a same-sex prison
officer following a positive test from an ion scanning machine that could detect drugs and other chemicals, and
therefore, officers and officials were entitled to qualified immunity in the employee's § 1983 action. (Maryland
Correctional Training Center)

U.S. District Court
FREE SPEECH
POLITICAL AFFILIATION
SUSPENSION

Corbin v. Gillen, 839 F.Supp.2d 376 (D.Mass. 2011). A correctional officer employed by a county sheriff's department brought a § 1983 action against the department's superintendent and assistant superintendent, alleging
that the defendants violated his right to free speech by disciplining him for disparaging remarks he made to a
county selectman. The officer's statements to the county selectman were made during a jail tour, during which the
officer derided the current sheriff and criticized the sheriff's department. The defendants moved for summary
judgment. The district court allowed the motion. The court held that the officer's statements were made in performance of his official duties, the officer's speech did not penetrate the realm of public concern, and the temporal
proximity between the officer's displaying of a bumper sticker on his car and his suspension without pay was
insufficient to establish a First Amendment political affiliation claim. (Plymouth County Sheriff's Department,
Massachusetts)

U.S. Appeals Court
HOSTILE WORK
ENVIRONMENT
RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION

Ellis v. CCA of Tennessee LLC, 650 F.3d 640 (7th Cir. 2011). African–American former employees, who were
nurses working in the health care unit of a privately run jail, sued their employer, claiming they were subjected to
racial discrimination and a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII, and that they were constructively
terminated in violation of a state whistleblower law. The district court granted summary judgment for the employer, and the employees appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the former employees were not
subjected to a hostile work environment under Title VII or § 1981, despite their claims of derogatory references to
“monkeys,” confederate flag garb, skin-color comments, and disparate discipline and treatment based on race.
(Marion County Jail II, Indiana, operated by Corrections Corporation of America)

31.93

U.S. District Court
STAFFING LEVELS
UNION

Federal Bureau of Prisons v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 654 F.3d 91 (D.C. Cir. 2011). The Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) brought a Petition for Review from a final order of the Federal Labor Relations Authority
(FLRA), holding that the BOP had a duty to bargain over its implementation of a “mission critical” standard for
staffing at federal correctional institutions. The district court granted the petition, vacated and remanded. The
appeals court held that the BOP was not required to bargain with the union before deciding that certain positions
designated as non-critical were to be performed by relief officers and only as needed. The court noted that the
collective bargaining agreement gave the agency the exclusive, non-negotiable right to assign work, but provided
that the agency could bargain with a representative of its employees over procedures it would use when it exercised that authority. (American Federation of Government Employees, Council of Prison Locals No. 33, District
of Columbia)

U.S. Appeals Court
DUE PROCESS
FAILURE TO PROTECT
STAFFING LEVELS
WORKING
CONDITIONS

Fields v. Abbott, 652 F.3d 886 (8th Cir. 2011). A female jailer brought a § 1983 action against a county, sheriff,
county commissioners, and several other defendants, alleging violations of her substantive due process rights. The
district court denied the sheriff's and commissioners' motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity and the defendants appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that the defendants' failure
to act was not deliberate indifference as to the safety of the jailer. According to the court, the sheriff's and county
commissioners' awareness of potentially dangerous conditions in the jail, including that the jail was understaffed
and that the drunk tank had an interior-mounted door handle, and failure to take action regarding those conditions,
which resulted in the jailer being attacked and taken hostage by two inmates, was not deliberate indifference as to
the safety of the jailer, as would violate the jailer's Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights on a
state created danger theory. The court found that the defendants’ failure to act was at most gross negligence, rather than deliberate indifference, and the jailer was aware of the conditions as she had been injured previously due
to the handle and staffing issue, such that she could take these issues into account in interacting with inmates.
(Miller County Jail, Missouri)

U.S. Appeals Court
FREE SPEECH
MARRIAGE
DEMOTION
TERMINATION
TRANSFER

Gaspers v. Ohio Dept. of Youth Services, 648 F.3d 400 (6th Cir. 2011). Married employees filed a § 1983 action
asserting claims for retaliation and deprivation of the right to freedom of intimate association in violation of the
First Amendment, against the Ohio Department of Youth Services and a juvenile facility. They alleged that the
husband was terminated without just cause and the wife was transferred following publication of newspaper article about the employers' purported nepotism regarding husband-and-wife employees. The district court dismissed
all claims against the employers and against the public officials in their official capacities, but denied qualified
immunity in part to certain public officials. Those public officials appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the husband's claim that he was terminated by the state agency and the wife's claim that she
was demoted and transferred on the basis of their protected marital relationship constituted an undue intrusion by
the state in that relationship, and therefore the married employees of the same state agency satisfied the adverseaction prong of their First Amendment retaliation claims against the public officials based on freedom of association. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
husband would have been fired in the absence of his protected marital relationship, and whether the wife would
have been demoted and transferred in the absence of her protected marital association. According to the court,
married employees' rights of intimate association were clearly established by the Supreme Court long before the
husband was terminated and the wife was demoted and transferred, and, therefore, it was objectively reasonable to
require public officials seeking qualified immunity on the married employees' First Amendment retaliation claim
to be aware of and to observe that constitutional right. (Ohio Department of Youth Services, Ohio River Valley
Juvenile Correctional Facility)

U.S. District Court
FREE SPEECH
RETALIATION
TERMINATION

Halkett v. Correctional Medical Services, Inc., 763 F.Supp.2d 205 (D.Me. 2011). An employee, a prison counselor, brought an action in state court against an employer alleging violations of the Maine Whistleblower Protection
Act (MWPA) and the Maine Human Rights Act (MHRA). Following removal to federal court, the employer
moved for summary judgment. The district court denied the motion. The court held that the prison counselor had
a reasonable belief that his employer, the prison's medical provider, had improperly handled inmate treatment
notes in violation of Maine law, and there was sufficient proximity between his complaints to the provider about
misfiled and missing mental health care notes and his termination, so as to establish a prima facie case of violation
of the Maine Whistleblower Protection Act (MWPA). The court held that summary judgment was precluded by
genuine issues of material fact as to whether the prison medical provider's proffered reason for terminating the
prison counselor--that he had violated policies regarding telephone contact by prisoners with those on the outside-was a pretext for what the counselor asserted was the actual reason for his termination, the counselor's many
complaints to the provider about its lax and, in his view, unlawful procedures concerning inmate treatment records.(Correctional Medical Services, Inc., Downeast Correctional Facility, Maine)

U.S. Appeals Court
ASSOCIATION
FREE SPEECH
RETALIATION
WORKING
CONDITIONS

Hernandez v. Cook County Sheriff's Office, 634 F.3d 906 (7th Cir. 2011). County corrections officers who were
investigated in connection with a jailbreak brought an action against the county sheriff's office and its officials,
alleging, among other things, that the defendants retaliated against them in violation of their rights to free political
association and free speech under the First Amendment. The district court denied the defendants' motion for
summary judgment and the defendants appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that:
(1) the defendants did not waive their qualified immunity argument as to the officers' First Amendment retaliation
claims; (2) the officers' workplace safety complaints were not protected by the First Amendment; but (3) the appeals court would not decide the issue of whether the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity from First
Amendment political retaliation claims because the district court had decided the matter was waived and had
never reached a conclusion on that issue. The event that precipitated this case was a jailbreak at the Abnormal
Behavior Observation (ABO) unit of the Cook County jail. An inmate had overpowered a jail officer after temporarily blinding him by throwing a cleaning solution in his face. The inmate then released seven other inmates from
their cells. The inmates shut off the lights and set a diversionary fire, and the first inmate put on the officer’s uni-

31.94

form. In the confusion, the disguised inmate convinced other jail officers to open certain internal doors, after
which the inmates beat several officers. Using keys obtained from the subdued officers, six inmates managed to
escape from the facility. They were soon recaptured and Sheriff's Office authorities immediately suspected that
the inmates had help from within the Sheriff’s Office. The plaintiffs in this case included six former officers of the
Special Operations Response Team (SORT), and four other officers. The inmate who began the escape process
identified three officers as having advance knowledge of the jailbreak and additional officers were then implicated. The inmate asserted that one of the officers had approached him multiple times with a proposition to stage a
jailbreak to draw adverse attention to the leading Cook County Sheriff candidate, in advance of a pending election. The officers claimed that in the days following the jailbreak, investigators detained them under guard for up
to 24 hours and denied them food, water and sleep. Several claimed that they were discouraged from contacting a
union steward or an attorney. All of the plaintiffs were brought up on administrative charges. (Cook County Sheriff's Office, Illinois)
U.S. District Court
DISCRIMINATION
HOSTILE WORK
ENVIRONMENT
TITLE VII

Hunter v. County of Albany, 834 F.Supp.2d 86 (N.D.N.Y. 2011). A former county corrections officer who was a
Native American brought an action against the county, asserting claims of unlawful discrimination and harassment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and New York State Human Rights Law. The county moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the officer did not
suffer an adverse employment action, as required to establish a prima facie Title VII discrimination claim, as a
result of a lone instance of being ordered to perform an irregular task by his supervisor. The court held that a supervisor's reference to the Native American county corrections officer and his co-workers as “cunts,” and an inmate escape video portraying the officer and co-workers as “Keystone Cops,” did not give rise to an inference of
discriminatory intent as required to establish a prima facie Title VII discrimination claim, where the incidents at
issue did not single the officer out on the basis of race or nationality, but portrayed the officer and co-workers in
same light. The court concluded that the alleged misconduct suffered by the officer was not sufficiently continuous and concerted or severe and pervasive as to alter the officer's employment conditions and to create an abusive
working environment, as required to support a Title VII hostile work environment claim. (Albany County, N.Y.)

U.S. District Court
EQUAL PROTECTION
LIBERTY INTEREST
SEX DISCRIMINATION
SEXUAL HARASSMENT

Konah v. District of Columbia, 815 F.Supp.2d 61 (D.D.C. 2011). A Liberian female formerly employed by a
private health care corporation that contracted with the District of Columbia to provide medical treatment to inmates in a particular penitentiary, whose employment was terminated after she reported alleged harassment and
assault and battery by inmates, sued the District and a correctional officer, claiming they violated the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments, Title VII, the District of Columbia Human Rights Act (DCHRA), and common laws. The
defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in
part. The court held that the employee adequately pled a claim that a correctional officer's failure to promptly
open a “sally port” to allow her to escape inmates in their undergarments who allegedly surrounded her, jeered at
her, used sexually explicit language, and grabbed her on the buttocks was an “unreasonable seizure of her person”
in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The court found that the employee adequately pled a claim of discrimination on the basis of gender in violation of equal protection against the correctional officer, noting that her allegations that the officer and the District of Columbia “failed to remedy sexually offensive conduct by inmates,”
which included “gender specific abusive language” and “sexual assaults.” The court also held that the employee
adequately pled a due process claim against the correctional officer who deliberately refused to open the “sally
port” because the officer prevented her exit and deprived her of her liberty. The court found that the correctional
officer was not entitled to dismissal, on the basis of qualified immunity, of § 1983 claims brought by the employee where it was clearly established that the Fourth Amendment prohibited the detention of individuals without any
cause, that the correctional officer's discrimination on the basis of sex violated the Fifth Amendment, and that the
government could not deprive an individual of her liberty by detaining her without due process. (Unity Health
Care, Inc., and the District of Columbia, Central Detention Facility)

U.S. District Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
TRAINING
PROPERTY INTEREST

Robert v. Carter, 819 F.Supp.2d 832 (S.D.Ind. 2011). A former civil deputy process server brought an action
against a sheriff, county, its council, and its board of commissioners, alleging that the defendants failed to grant
him a medical exemption from stun gun training or to provide him with a reasonable accommodation, in violation
of Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The deputy also alleged that the defendants terminated him in violation of his procedural and substantive due process rights. The defendants moved for summary judgment and the
district court granted the motion. The court held that stun gun training was essential to the deputy’s position and
that an exemption from training was unwarranted. According to the court, the defendants had no obligation to
consider the deputy's non–back–related ailments in determining a reasonable accommodation, and the deputy had
no property interest in continued employment. (Hamilton County Sheriff's Department, Indiana)

U.S. District Court
TERMINATION
FREE SPEECH
RETALIATION
DUE PROCESS

Smith v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections, 765 F.Supp.2d 973 (E.D.Mich. 2011). A Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) employee, a prison guard who was fired from his job and subsequently reinstated, brought an
action against the MDOC and MDOC officials. The guard alleged, among other things, that the defendants denied
him certain pre-termination procedures in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and that the defendants retaliated against him in violation of Title VII. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted
the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that: (1) the employee stated a procedural due process claim;
(2) the employee's filing of an internal complaint with the MDOC's Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) office
was protected conduct; (3) the employee stated a First Amendment retaliation claim; and (4) the defendants were
not entitled to immunity from tortious interference and conspiracy claims under Michigan's Governmental Tort
Liability Act. (Parnall Correctional Facility, Michigan)

31.95

U.S. District Court
PHYSICAL
REQUIREMENTS
BFOQ- Bona Fide
Occupational
Qualification
SEX DISCRIMINATION
TITLE VII

U.S. v. Massachusetts, 781 F.Supp.2d 1 (D.Mass. 2011.) The United States of America brought an action against
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, seeking an order enjoining the Commonwealth from administering a physical abilities test in the selection of correctional officers due to its alleged disparate impact on women in violation
of Title VII. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motions in part and denied
in part. The court held that the Commonwealth's use of the test unintentionally imposed a disparate impact on
women, and an issue of material fact existed as to whether the test was job related and consistent with a business
necessity. The court noted that in two out of three years in which the test was conducted, the disparity between
male and female pass rates well exceeded two-to-three standard deviations, the range considered statistically significant in the context of disparate impact. (Massachusetts Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
DISCIPLINE
EQUAL PROTECTION
PROMOTION
QUALIFICATIONS
SEX DISCRIMINATION
TITLE VII
BFOQ- Bona Fide
Occupational Qualification

White v. Department of Correctional Services, 814 F.Supp.2d 374 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). A female correction officer
brought an action against New York State, the New York State Department of Correctional Services (DOCS), and
supervisory officers, alleging violations of Title VII and § 1983. The defendants moved for summary judgment.
The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether reasonable alternatives existed to the prison's gender-based
hiring policy under which the officer in charge (OIC) position was posted for male corrections officers only, in
light of the fact that the urine testing and strip frisks of male prisoners comprised only a small part of the OIC's
job duties and that female officers had worked the OIC position in the past. The court also found that summary
judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the notice of discipline against the female corrections officer, which threatened severe consequences such as dismissal from service and loss of accrued
annual leave, as well as a counseling memoranda and negative comment in the officer's performance evaluation,
were sufficient to dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of sex discrimination.
According to the court, summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the
proffered reason for a notice of discipline and counseling memoranda against the female corrections officer, that
she had violated Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) policies by leaving her post and entering an area in
which she was not allowed, were a pretext for retaliation for the officer's having filed sex discrimination complaints with a state agency and her union. The court found that genuine issues of material fact as to whether a
supervisory officer and the prison's superintendent were personally involved in the male-only designation of the
officer in charge (OIC) position precluded summary judgment on the female corrections officer's § 1983 claim
alleging her right to equal protection was violated when these officials discriminated against her because of her
gender by denying her the OIC position, on the grounds that the female officer had not established the officials'
supervisory liability. (Lincoln Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
ADA-Americans with
Disabilities Act
DUE PROCESS
FREE SPEECH
RETALIATION

Zembiec v. County of Monroe, 766 F.Supp.2d 484 (W.D.N.Y. 2011). A deputy sheriff jailor brought an action
under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), § 1983, and § 1985 against a county, sheriff's department,
sheriff and undersheriff, seeking damages for alleged violations of his rights. The defendants moved for judgment
on the pleadings. The district court granted the motion. The district court held that the deputy's medical records
were not published on jail computers in retaliation for his speech on matters of public concern, and that the publication was not sufficiently shocking to violate substantive due process. The court noted that there was no allegation that the officials were involved with the posting. The court found that procedural due process was not violated by the fact the deputy was forced to use up his sick leave because he was denied disability payments. According to the court, the deputy failed to state a valid civil rights conspiracy claim and failed to state a claim against
the sheriff for inadequate training and supervision or against the county on the theory of municipal liability. The
court noted that the deputy sheriff jailor's complaints about alleged corruption and misconduct within the county
sheriff's department sufficiently alleged he engaged in speech about matters of public concern protected by First
Amendment, for the purposes of his retaliation claim. (Monroe County Jail, New York)
2012

U.S. District Court
DRUG TESTING

Allen v. Schiff, 908 F.Supp.2d 451 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). A former county corrections officer brought a civil rights
action against a county sheriff and a county for constitutional violations allegedly arising out of the administration
of a mandatory, random drug test. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the
motions in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of
material fact regarding the reasonableness of the drug testing program, which required the county corrections
officer--who had not refused or failed a prior drug test-- to provide a urine sample while being directly observed
from the front. According to the court, the sheriff had final policymaking authority on the manner in which testing
was administered to department employees, such that the county could be liable under § 1983 to the extent that
this testing violated the Fourth Amendment. The sheriff had spearheaded the change in the mandatory, random
drug testing policy for corrections officers employed by the county sheriff's department, and he directed the entity
performing the tests to directly observe the collection of urine samples from corrections officers. (Sullivan County
Sheriff's Department and Jail, New York)

U.S. District Court
PROSECUTION
DISCIPLINE

Amobi v. District of Columbia Government, 882 F.Supp.2d 78 (D.D.C. 2012). A corrections officer brought an
action against other officers, a prison director, and the District of Columbia, alleging false arrest and malicious
prosecution. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held
that the officer could not assert false arrest and malicious prosecution claims against other corrections officers for
reporting his restraint of a transgender inmate, which resulted in criminal charges against the officer, even though
the assault charges were eventually dropped against the officer upon the inmate's admission that he had provoked
the officer. The court noted that the reporting officers described what they observed and provided probable cause
for the arrest and prosecution. (District of Columbia Jail)

31.96

U.S. Appeals Court
FREE SPEECH
RETALIATION
EQUAL OPPORTUNITY
TERMINATION

Brooks v. Arthur, 685 F.3d 367 (4th Cir. 2012). Terminated employees of the Virginia Department of Corrections
brought a § 1983 action against two supervisors, in their individual capacities, alleging retaliation. The district
court granted the supervisors' motion to dismiss and the employees appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The
court found that one correction officer's speech could not be fairly characterized as constituting speech on a matter
of public concern, as required for protection under the First Amendment. According to the court, the officer's
concern had not been expressed in terms of a breakdown in effective prison management, but rather had been
focused on his personal displeasure with his supervisors, the complaint had been made in the context of the Equal
Employment Opportunity (EEO) process, and the officer did not seek anything other than improvement of his
own situation. The court held that another correction officer's termination after his involvement in another employee's Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaint that was intended solely to address the other employee's personal grievances, and not any matters of public concern, did not give rise to a claim under the First
Amendment free speech clause. (Virginia Department of Corrections, Rustburg Correctional Unit # 9)

U.S. District Court
UNION

Corrections U.S.A. v. McNany, 892 F.Supp.2d 626 (M.D.Pa. 2012). A national association of correctional officers
brought a diversity action against a state association of correctional officers and the association's officers, alleging
interference with an existing contract, interference with a business relationship, and interference with prospective
relations. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The district court
held that: (1) there was no evidence that the actions of the state association's executives interfered with the relationship between the national association and its members; (2) the state association president's letter to members
regarding the decision to withdraw its organizational membership in the national association did not breach a
privilege; (3) there was no evidence that the state association acted with the specific purpose of harming the national association or that the alleged interference and harm were ever carried out intentionally; and (4) no prospective contractual relations existed between the national association and individual correctional officers in Pennsylvania. The court noted that under Pennsylvania law, the president of the state association of correctional officers
was acting in his official capacity by sending a letter to the association's members notifying them of the executive
board's decision to withdraw its organizational membership in a national association of correctional officers, and
thus, the president was not a third party to the contract between the state association and the national association
for purposes of the action by the national association for interference with a contract. According to the court, the
president's letter constituted the type of work the state association's president was intended to perform, fell substantially and clearly within the authorized time and space limit of the president's employment, and helped actuate, at least in part, the executive board's new policy. (Pennsylvania State Corrections Officers Association, Corrections U.S.A.)

U.S. Appeals Court
EQUAL PROTECTION
HOSTILE WORK
ENVIRONMENT
SEXUAL HARASSMENT

Crutcher-Sanchez v. County of Dakota, 687 F.3d 979 (8th Cir. 2012). A female former county correctional officer filed suit, pursuant to §§ 1983 and 1985, against her employer, a sheriff, a supervisor, and a co-worker who
was later promoted to supervisor, claiming that the sheriff and supervisor created or fostered a sexually hostile
work environment, and that the supervisor and co-worker conspired to deprive the employee of equal protection.
The district court denied the defendants summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds and the defendants
appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that: (1) the supervisor was not entitled to qualified immunity from the hostile work environment sexual harassment claim; (2) the
employee was not the victim of a civil rights conspiracy; and (3) the sheriff did not subject the employee to a
sexually hostile work environment. The court found that the supervisor's harassing conduct started shortly after
the employee began working at the jail and included the supervisor looking the employee “up and down” during
work, driving to a parking lot of her second job while repeatedly calling her on the telephone, subjecting her to
constant sexual attention, and asking her to not tell anyone about their sexual relationship. The court found that
the supervisor's unwelcome sexual harassment directed toward the female officer was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of her employment and create a hostile work environment in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, where the supervisor took advantage of employee when she was intoxicated and vulnerable,
the employee felt harassed by the supervisor's leering, the employee was subject to sexual attention by the supervisor during nearly her entire employment with the county, and the employee was fired for ending her sexual
relationship with the supervisor. The court held that the supervisor was not entitled to qualified immunity from the
female correctional officer's § 1983 claim since it was clearly established at the time of the harassment that the
supervisor's attempt to have sex with a subordinate violated the subordinate's civil rights. According to the court,
the sheriff's offer of a box of chocolates to the female correctional officer, and asking her out several times, was
not sufficiently severe or pervasive conduct to create a sexually hostile work environment, as required to support
the officer's § 1983 claim for sexual harassment in violation of Fourteenth Amendment equal protection, since the
sheriff's inappropriate acts were not so intimidating, offensive, or hostile as to poison the work environment. (Dakota County Jail, Nebraska)

U.S. District Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
HARASSMENT
HOSTILE WORK
ENVIRONMENT
SEXUAL HARASSMENT
SUPERVISION
TITLE VII

Davis v. Vermont, Dept. of Corrections, 868 F.Supp.2d 313 (D.Vt. 2012). A former employee of the Vermont
Department of Corrections (DOC), who worked as a prison guard, brought an action against his former employer,
alleging, among other things, that he was retaliated against in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) and that he was sexually harassed on the basis of his sex in violation of Title VII and the Vermont Fair
Employment Practices Act (VFEPA). The employer moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district
court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that: (1) as a matter of first impression, the
employer was immune from the employee's ADA retaliation claim; (2) the employee stated a Title VII hostile
work environment claim based on harassing conduct that suggested the employee failed to conform to gender
stereotypes; (3) the employee sufficiently stated that he was disabled under the Rehabilitation Act; (4) the employer failed to show that any perceived impairment of the employee was both transitory and minor, as a defense
to the Rehabilitation Act claim; (5) the alleged incidents were sufficiently severe to alter the conditions of the
employee's employment, as supported by the hostile work environment claims; (6) the alleged harassment by coworkers and inmates could be imputed to the employee's supervisors for purposes of holding the employer vicari-

31.97

ously liable; and (7) there was a causal connection between the employee's protected activity and the adverse
employment actions, as supported a prima facie case of retaliation. The court found that although images sent to
the male DOC employee in e-mails by his supervisors and co-workers referring to genitalia may have been tinged
with offensive sexual connotations, the images did not constitute discrimination because of sex, as would support
the employee's Title VII sexual harassment claim, where no inference could be drawn that the conduct was due to
general hostility to the presence of males in the workplace or that it was due to the disparate treatment of members
of the opposite sex. According to the court, allegations in the employee's second amended complaint that a supervisor sent him an e-mail stating “way to milk it, buddy,” referring to the time the employee took off due to a
work-related testicular injury, and that a male inmate stated, “good luck making kids with that package,” sufficiently stated a Title VII hostile work environment claim based on harassing conduct that suggested the employee
failed to conform to gender stereotypes. The court held that the alleged incidents in which supervisors of the employee, a prison guard who sustained a work-related testicular injury, sent the employee two e-mails on consecutive days containing explicit references to his genital pain, the e-mails were circulated to other staff, and were
hung in a mail room where employees, both male and female, could see them, the employee received a threatening note in his mailbox after he returned from hernia surgery that stated “how's your nuts/kill yourself/your done,”
and the employee was copied on an e-mail containing a cartoon drawing of someone with gun to his head with the
caption “Kill Yourself,” were sufficiently severe to alter the conditions of the employee's employment, as supported his hostile work environment claims based on disability discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act and
the Vermont Fair Employment Practices Act (VFEPA). (Vermont Department of Corrections)
U.S. Appeals Court
EQUAL PROTECTION
HOSTILE WORK
ENVIRONMENT
PROMOTION
SEXUAL HARASSMENT

Duncan v. County of Dakota, Neb., 687 F.3d 955 (8th Cir. 2012). A female former county employee brought a §
1983 action against a county, a supervisor, and others, alleging hostile-work-environment, sexual harassment, and
constructive discharge in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district
court denied the supervisor's motion for summary judgment, and he appealed. The appeals court reversed and
remanded, finding that the supervisor's alleged conduct was not so objectively severe, extreme, or intimidating as
to alter the term, condition, or privilege of the employee's employment. The supervisor allegedly engaged in sexual favoritism and traded preferential treatment for sexual favors. According to the court, the supervisor's alleged
conduct had not been physically threatening or humiliating to the officer, the supervisor had not denied the officer
any benefits or opportunities, and any promotion for which the officer had been available had not gone to any
employee who had had a sexual relationship with the supervisor. (Dakota County Jail, Nebraska)

U.S. District Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
ADEA- Age Discrim. in
Employment Act
FMLA- Family Medical
Leave Act
RACIAL DISCRIM.
TITLE VII
TRANSFERS

Fields v. Department of Public Safety, 911 F.Supp.2d 373 (M.D.La. 2012). A Black female employee brought an
action against a state and its department of public safety (DPS), alleging violations of Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Family and Medical
Leave Act (FMLA). The state moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part.
The court held that the employee's allegations that she was denied a request for transfer while a white employee was granted a transfer were sufficient to state a disparate treatment claim in violation of Title VII against the
state department of public safety.
The court noted that the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) does not provide for recovery of punitive
damages. (Elayn Hunt Correctional Center, Louisiana)

U.S. District Court
DISCRIMINATION
FREE SPEECH
PROMOTION
QUALIFICATIONS
RELIGION
RETALIATION
TERMINATION
TITLE VII

Finnie v. Lee County, Miss., 907 F.Supp.2d 750 (N.D.Miss. 2012). A female Pentecostal juvenile detention officer
brought an action against a county and a sheriff, alleging that her termination violated her First Amendment rights
of free speech and free exercise of religion and that it was religious and gender discrimination and retaliation
under Title VII. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and
denied in part. The court held that: (1) the county's pants-only uniform policy did not violate the Free Exercise
Clause; (2) the officer was not replaced by someone outside her protected class as a female; (3) the uniform policy
was not sex discrimination or sex stereotyping; (4) requiring the county to offer the officer an exemption to the
uniform policy would subject the county to undue hardship; and, (5) the officer did not show that the county's
proffered reason for her termination was a pretext for discrimination. According to the court, requiring the county
employer to offer the Pentecostal female juvenile detention officer an exemption to its “no skirts” policy as a
religious accommodation would subject the county to undue hardship, and thus, policy was not religious discrimination under Title VII. The court noted that there were legitimate safety concerns presented from female officers
wearing skirts, including impairment of an officer's ability to perform defense-tactic maneuvers because of the
likelihood that an assailant could pin the material of the skirt to the floor with his knees, preventing the officer
from moving her body to perform maneuvers, and the female officer, who lacked a GED certificate at the time she
worked for the county, was not qualified for vacant positions which would allow her to wear skirt. But the court
found that summary judgment was precluded by an issue of material fact as to whether the county's proffered
reason for terminating the officer was a pretext for retaliation, where less than one month passed between the
filing of a charge and the officer's termination. (Lee County Juvenile Detention Center, Mississippi)

U.S. Appeals Court
PROBATION
RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION
TERMINATION

Harris v. Warrick County Sheriff's Dept., 666 F.3d 444 (7th Cir. 2012). An African American former deputy sheriff sued a sheriff's department under a federal civil right statutes, alleging that he was terminated from his probationary employment due to his race. The district court granted summary judgment for the department and the
former deputy appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that: (1) coworkers' use of racially
tinged nicknames and workplace exposure to excerpts from a movie apparently perceived as treating racism as
acceptable did not establish that the former deputy was terminated due to his race, and (2) the department's different treatment of white deputy sheriffs who had performance problems during their probationary employment
did not establish that former deputy was terminated due to his race. (Warrick County Sheriff, Indiana)

31.98

U.S. District Court
EQUAL PROTECTION
FREE SPEECH
LIBERTY INTEREST
DISCIPLINE
SEX DISCRIMINATION

Kinney v. Anglin, 889 F.Supp.2d 1101 (C.D.Ill. 2012). A female employee, and instructor at a state correctional
facility, brought an action against facility officials and supervisors, alleging a due process violation, an equal
protection violation on the basis of gender, and retaliation in violation of the First Amendment. Following the
grant, in part, of the defendants’ motion to dismiss, the defendants moved for summary judgment. The district
granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the instructor did not have a liberty interest in
working at the facility and there was no evidence that the instructor suffered a tangible loss of other employment
opportunities as the result of her public disclosure. According to the court, the instructor's complaint regarding
misappropriation of funds to her supervisors was made pursuant to her official duties, while her complaint to a
state agency regarding concerns of governmental waste by her supervisors was made as a citizen on a matter of
public concern. The court found that the terminated female construction trade instructor demonstrated that she
was similarly situated to a male contractual employee at the facility, as required to support a prima facie case of
discrimination in her § 1983 action alleging violation of her equal protection rights based on gender. According to
the court, although the male employee was given a stop order for fraternization, whereas the female instructor was
given a stop order for allegedly encouraging false allegations of sexual harassment, such distinction was not material, as the conduct of both employees violated the facility's rules, and if true, would have been appropriate
grounds for the entry of a stop order. (Danville Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
DEMOTION
FREE SPEECH
TRANSFER

Mosholder v. Barnhardt, 679 F.3d 443 (6th Cir. 2012). A corrections officer at a state correctional facility sued
corrections officials, asserting a First Amendment retaliation claim regarding her transfer from a school officer
position to a general corrections officer position. Following the defendants' removal of the action from state court,
the district court granted summary judgment against the officer, and she appealed. The appeals court reversed and
remanded. The court held that a letter by the corrections officer to elected officials, which was critical of a rap
music competition for youthful offenders at a school where she worked, primarily addressed a matter of public
concern, for purposes of determining whether it was protected by the First Amendment, regardless of her personal
motivation, including her own desire to see different policies enacted. The court noted that the letter lodged complaints about the administration of a public safety facility that, in her view, promoted behavior that could offend
victims and their families, and also potentially put prisoners and staff immediately, and the general public eventually, at risk. (Thumb Correctional Facility, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
CONTRACT
DUE PROCESS
UNION

New York State Correctional Officers & Police Benev. Ass'n, Inc. v. New York, 911 F.Supp.2d 111 (N.D.N.Y.
2012). A state employees union representing correctional officers and police officers, and its president, on behalf
of themselves and all others similarly situated, brought an action against the State of New York and various public
officials, alleging that defendants unilaterally increased the percentage of contributions that plaintiffs were required to pay for health insurance benefits in retirement, and, thereby, violated the Contracts Clause and Due
Process Clause, impaired the plaintiffs' contractual rights under the terms of their collective bargaining agreement
(CBA), and violated state law. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and
denied in part. The court held that the request of state employees union and its president, for an order declaring
unconstitutional the law increasing the percentage of contributions that plaintiffs were required to pay for health
insurance benefits in retirement, was prospective, and therefore not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. According to the court, the union and its president sufficiently brought a state law contractual impairment claim against
state officials, by alleging that the state officials' implementation of reduced contribution rates to plaintiffs' health
insurance benefits in retirement was not authorized by state law. The court held that the union and its president
sufficiently alleged in its § 1983 action that state officials' implementation of reduced contribution rates to plaintiffs' health insurance benefits in retirement was beyond the scope of the officials' authority as public officials, as
required to defeat the state officials' motion to dismiss based on legislative immunity. The court also found that
the union and its president pled sufficient facts suggesting that the state defendants' actions violated the parties'
collective bargaining agreement (CBA), past state practices, and representations made by the state, and were not
reasonable and necessary to meet a stated legitimate public purpose, as required to state a Contracts Clause claim
against state defendants. (New York State Correctional Officers & Police Benevolent Association, Inc.)

U.S. District Court
CONTRACT
DUE PROCESS
UNION

Roberts v. New York, 911 F.Supp.2d 149 (N.D.N.Y. 2012). Retired state employees brought an action against the
state of New York, state departments, and state officials, alleging that the defendants unilaterally increased the
percentage of contributions that retired employees were required to pay for health insurance benefits in retirement
and violated the Contracts Clause and Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution, impaired the retired
employees' contractual rights under terms of their collective bargaining agreement (CBA), and violated state law.
The retirees sought injunctive relief, declaratory judgments and monetary damages. The defendants moved to
dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The district court held that: (1) claims
against the state of New York and state departments were barred by the Eleventh Amendment; (2) the allegations
stated a claim against state officials for violation of the Contracts Clause; and (3) the allegations stated a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against state officials. According to the court, the retired state employees'
allegations that state officials did not issue a declaration or any other kind of finding stating that it was necessary
to raise the contribution rates, that raising the contribution rate was not part of a state budget, that the only “rationale” or “purpose” asserted by the officials was that it was necessary to implement negotiated agreement between the State and the bargaining unit, that a substantial impairment on the retirees' rights defeated the significant public purpose, and that the unilateral implementation of the reduced contribution rates violated the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) and was an abuse of power, were sufficient to suggest that the officials' actions
were not reasonable and necessary, as required to sustain their claim against state officials for violation of the
Contract Clause. (Council 37, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
PROSECUTION

U.S. v. Wilson, 686 F.3d 868 (8th Cir.2012). Following the denial, in part, of his motion to suppress evidence, the
defendant, the chief administrator of a county jail, was convicted, by a jury in the United States District Court of
four counts of deprivation of rights and two counts of making false statements, arising out of injuries caused to

31.99

four inmates. He appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the district court did not err in
applying the physical-restraint enhancement where the defendant violated his victims' constitutional rights while
they were prisoners locked up in enclosed areas in a county jail, and the jury found that he purposefully moved
two of them from cells where they were safe so that they would be assaulted in a cell holding violent inmates. The
court noted that not only did the administrator, in moving the two prisoners, insinuate that the other inmates
should assault them, but he rewarded the assaulting inmates with cigarettes after each of the incidents. The district
court sentenced the administrator to 120 months' imprisonment on each of the § 242 counts, and 60 months' imprisonment on each of the § 1001 counts, with all terms to be served concurrently. (Washington Co. Jail, Mo.)
U.S. District Court
RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION
RETALIATION

Washington v. California City Correction Center, 871 F.Supp.2d 1010 (E.D.Cal. 2012). A discharged AfricanAmerican employee, who worked as corrections officer, brought an action against her former employer alleging,
among other things, that she was discriminated against on basis of her race in violation of California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), and wrongfully terminated in violation of public policy. The employer
moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court found
genuine issues of material fact as to whether the discharged African-American corrections officer exhausted her
administrative remedies with respect to her claim that her employer failed to prevent racial discrimination, and as
to whether actionable discrimination occurred, precluding summary judgment as to the employee's failure to prevent discrimination cause of action under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). The court
held that the African-American corrections officer's allegations in her administrative complaint that her employer
subjected her to a wrongful investigation of inappropriate behavior because of her race, and that the employer
retaliated against her by wrongfully investigating her behavior after she complained to the employer about her
supervisor's racially motivated discrimination, were sufficient to encompass claims of retaliation under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), for administrative exhaustion purposes. (California City Correction Center, CCA of Tennessee)

U.S. Appeals Court
HOSTILE WORK
ENVIRONMENT
SEX DISCRIMINATION
SEXUAL HARASSMENT

Williams v. Herron, 687 F.3d 971 (8th Cir. 2012). A female correctional officer brought a § 1983 action against a
county and a former chief deputy sheriff, who were her employers, alleging gender discrimination in violation of
her Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court entered an order denying the sheriff's motion for summary
judgment and the sheriff appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the sheriff's sexual harassment was
sufficiently severe and pervasive to alter the conditions of the officer's employment, and the officer had a clearly
established right to be free from a hostile work environment. The court found that the female correctional officer's
conduct in informing the chief deputy sheriff that she was uncomfortable continuing their sexual relationship was
sufficient to demonstrate that the sheriff's continued actions in grabbing and hugging her were unwelcome, as
required to prevail on her hostile-work-environment claim for sexual harassment under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court noted that the chief deputy sheriff had previously used sexual coercion to entice other female
employees, and once an officer began viewing the sheriff's conduct as unwelcome, her employment status became
jeopardized. (Dakota County Jail, Nebraska)
2013

U.S. District Court
FREE SPEECH
RETALIATION
TERMINATION

Caruso v. City of New York, 973 F.Supp.2d 430 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). A former Inspector General at the New York
City Department of Investigation (DOI), who was responsible for the Department of Correction (DOC) brought
an action pursuant to § 1983 and state law alleging that he was terminated by his former employer in retaliation
for his truthful testimony before a grand jury investigating whether the then-Commissioner of the DOC had attempted to influence criminal and administrative investigations of a corporation, and had received undisclosed
benefits from the corporation in the form of an apartment renovation. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was
precluded by fact issue as to whether the defendants would have made the decision to terminate the plaintiff in the
absence of his grand jury testimony. (New York City Department of Correction)

U.S. District Court
ASSOCIATION
FREE SPEECH
MARRIAGE
WORK RULES

Corso v. Fischer, 983 F.Supp.2d 320 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). A correctional officer brought an action against the Commissioner of the New York Department of Corrections and Community Supervision's (DOCCS), alleging
DOCCS's work rule prohibiting personal association of DOCCS employees with current and former inmates and
their associates was overbroad, in violation of the First Amendment. The parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the officer’s motion. The court held that the work rule was facially overbroad in
violation of the First Amendment, where DOCCS had enforced the rule against the officer and denied her the right
to associate with her former husband and the father of her grandchild.
The court found that the rule was not narrowly tailored to further the State's compelling interest in maintaining
safe and orderly administration of its prisons, as applied to constitutionally protected close familial relationships,
and thus, did not withstand strict scrutiny on the First Amendment overbreadth claim. The court noted that the
rule provided no temporal or geographical limitation with respect to the former inmate's incarceration, nor did its
prohibition account for variations in the seriousness of that person's offense or his or her prison disciplinary history. The court found that the rule was substantially overbroad, in violation of the First Amendment, as applied to
close familial relationships, where the rule would prevent a DOCCS employee from visiting, or even corresponding with an incarcerated spouse if the couple had no children or if their children did not maintain a relationship
with the incarcerated parent, and the rule prohibited employees from ever reestablishing contact with a spouse,
child, sibling, or parent when that person was released and became a “former inmate.” (New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision)

31.100

U.S. District Court
DEMOTION
POLITICAL
AFFILIATION
PROMOTION
RETALIATION
SEX DISCRIMINATION
TITLE VII
TRANSFERS

Ezell v. Darr, 951 F.Supp.2d 1316 (M.D.Ga. 2013). Female county deputy sheriffs brought an action against a
sheriff and a city consolidated government, alleging under § 1983 that the sheriff retaliated against them for their
political support of a former sheriff's reelection bid, and that they were denied promotion and demoted because of
their gender. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and
denied in part. The court held that under Georgia law, loyalty to an individual sheriff and the goals and policies he
sought to implement through his office was an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of a deputy
sheriff, and thus the sheriff did not violate the First Amendment by transferring deputies who did not support him
in an election. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the sheriff's proffered legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for promoting a male deputy to the position
of captain of jail administration, rather than the female deputies--namely, that the male deputy had relevant experience and that he was the only candidate who had been working in that area for years under a captain the sheriff
was seeking to replace-- was a pretext for gender discrimination in violation of Title VII and § 1983. The court
also found a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the male county sheriff's proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for denying a female deputy comp time, namely, that the deputy had been exempt from
accruing comp time for 20 years, was a pretext for gender discrimination. The court held that the newly-elected
male sheriff's proffered legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for transferring the female deputy from the position
of jail commander to a clerk of the Recorder's Court-- that the sheriff was dissatisfied with the way jail had been
operating under the deputy and he felt that members of the deputy's staff were unprofessional-- was not a pretext
for gender discrimination. (Muscogee County Sheriff, Muscogee County Jail, Georgia)

U.S. District Court
ADA-Americans with
Disabilities Act
PHYSICAL
REQUIREMENTS
RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION
PSYCHOLOGICAL
SCREENING
RETALIATION

Franklin v. City of Slidell, 936 F.Supp.2d 691 (E.D.La. 2013). An African-American formerly employed by a city
as a senior corrections officer in a police department filed a pro se race and disability discrimination and retaliation suit against a city, six city employees, and a doctor who performed a psychological evaluation on the employee and found that he was not fit for duty as a law enforcement officer. The former employee alleged they
violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and regulations. The district court granted the doctor's motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The city and the employees moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The district court held that the officer adequately
pleaded that he was disabled within the meaning of ADA, and that the officer's ADA claim stemming from being
required to undergo medical and psychological fitness for duty examinations before returning to work from sick
leave would not be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, for the officer's failure to plead he
was a “qualified individual with a disability,” or on account of a business necessity exception. (Slidell Police
Department, Louisiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
DEMOTION
FREE SPEECH
RETALIATION

Haverda v. Hays County, 723 F.3d 586 (5th Cir. 2013). A corrections officer brought an action against a county,
the sheriff's office, and the sheriff, alleging retaliation in violation of the First Amendment. The district court
granted summary judgment for the defendants. The officer appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded.
The appeals court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of fact as to: (1) whether the
corrections officer's protected speech motivated his demotion; (2) whether the corrections officer would have
been demoted in the absence of his protected speech; and (3) whether the corrections officer's First Amendment
speech rights were violated by his demotion. The court held that the officer’s writing of a letter to the editor was
speech made as a citizen, rather than in his role as a public employee, and therefore, the letter was protected by the
First Amendment, for purposes of his retaliation claims. The court noted that the officer wrote the letter during an
election campaign, the letter expressed support for the incumbent and criticized his political opponent, the officer
did not receive compensation for the letter, the letter was public, and it was not part of the officer's duties to speak
to the media or write letters to the editor. (Hays County Sheriff's Office and Jail, Texas)

U.S. Appeals Court
DISCIPLINE
PROSECUTION

Keith v. Koerner, 707 F.3d 1185 (10th Cir. 2013). A female former prison inmate who was impregnated as a result
of her vocational-training instructor's unlawful sexual acts brought a § 1983 action against a former warden and
other Kansas Department of Corrections employees. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted
the motion in part, but denied qualified immunity for the former warden, who appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the former prison inmate adequately alleged that the former warden violated a clearly
established constitutional right, precluding qualified immunity for the warden in the § 1983 action alleging that
the warden was deliberately indifferent to sexual abuse by the vocational-training instructor. According to the
court, the inmate alleged that the warden had knowledge of the abuse but failed to properly investigate or terminate staff when abuse allegations were substantiated, and that the prison's structural policy problems contributed
to abuse by failing to address known problems with the vocational program or to use cameras to monitor inmates
and staff. (Topeka Correctional Facility, Kansas)

U.S. District Court
CONTRACTORS
HARASSMENT
HOSTILE WORK
ENVIRONMENT
TERMINATION
TITLE VII

Konah v. District of Columbia, 915 F.Supp.2d 7 (D.D.C. 2013). A Liberian female formerly employed as a Licensed Practical Nurse (LPN) by a private health care corporation that contracted with the District of Columbia to
provide medical treatment to inmates in a penitentiary, whose employment was terminated after she reported
alleged harassment and assault and battery by inmates while administering medication to them, sued the District
and a correctional officer, claiming they violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, Title VII, the District of Columbia Human Rights Act (DCHRA), and common laws. The district court partially granted the defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The employer and correctional officer moved for summary judgment,
and the District of Columbia moved for judgment on the pleadings. The district court granted the motions in part.
The court held that under District of Columbia law, the correctional officer did not assault, batter, or intentionally
inflict emotional distress on the nurse absent evidence he delayed opening the front gate to a corridor outside the
unit, in response to the LPN's request so she could get away from inmates making lewd and sexually threatening
comments, with the intention that she suffer assault, battery or emotional distress. According to the court, the
reason for his delay was that there were inmates in the sally port who would have been able to escape confinement
if he opened gate. The court found that the private health care corporation was not liable for a hostile work envi-

31.101

ronment allegedly created for the LPN when on one occasion inmates made lewd and sexually threatening comments toward her and one grabbed her buttocks while she was administering medication to them. The court found
that the corporation took reasonable and appropriate corrective steps to prevent harassment and to ensure that the
environment for its nurses at the detention facility would be a safe and non-hostile job situation in a jail requiring
direct contact with inmates could be, and the LPN knew of escort policy and a sick call room policy and was apparently in violation of those policies when the incident in question took place. But the court found that the District of Columbia was not entitled to judgment on the pleadings with regard to the LPN's allegations that the District did not sufficiently train its employees in the Department of Corrections to ensure that nurses employed by
the private health care corporation which was contracted to provide medical care for inmates at the detention facility were not subjected to constant gender-based lewd and nasty catcalls or acts by inmates. The court held that the
LPN's allegations were sufficiently clear and detailed to make out a § 1983 cause of action based on Monell liability for a policy or custom, and importantly, the LPN had alleged sufficient facts to state a claim that District officials knew of the problem and that their failure to address it was deliberately indifferent. (Unity Health Care, Inc.,
Central Detention Facility, District of Columbia)
U.S. District Court
CONTRACTORS
DUE PROCESS
EQUAL PROTECTION
SEXUAL HARASSMENT

Konah v. District of Columbia, 971 F.Supp.2d 74 (D.D.C. 2013). A licensed practical nurse (LPN), formerly employed by a private health care corporation that contracted with the District of Columbia to provide medical care
to inmates, brought a § 1983 action against the District, alleging that its failure to train correctional employees to
adequately respond to inmates' sexual abuse of staff violated her right to equal protection under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The District moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The
court held that: (1) the alleged inadequate training of correctional officers was not the cause of the LPN's sexual
harassment; (2) evidence did not show that the District was deliberately indifferent to the risk of sexual harassment; and (3) even if the District was on notice of the risk to nurses, its response did not show deliberate indifference. The court found that the precipitating cause of the sexual harassment of the nurse by inmates while distributing medications at the jail was the LPN's decision to violate longstanding jail policy and deviate from her standard practice of waiting for a correctional officer to escort her before entering the jail's housing unit. The court
noted that the District collaborated with the LPN's employer to institute a policy directing nurses to distribute
medications from sick-call rooms, and responded when the LPN was sexually harassed by inmates by ordering an
immediate medical evaluation, a meeting with the warden, and offering criminal prosecution of the inmate. (D.C.
Central Detention Facility, District of Columbia)

U.S. District Court
HOSTILE WORK
ENVIRONMENT
RETALIATION
SEX DISCRIMINATION
SEXUAL HARASSMENT
TITLE VII
ASSIGNMENT
EQUAL PROTECTION

Meadors v. Ulster County, 984 F.Supp.2d 83 (N.D.N.Y. 2013). Female county corrections officers brought an
action under § 1983, Title VII, and the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL) against a county, a sheriff, a jail superintendent, and a deputy jail superintendent, alleging sex discrimination, hostile work environment,
sexual harassment, retaliation, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The defendants moved for summary
judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment
was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to: (1) whether the female corrections officers' work environment was hostile and abusive; (2) whether the county had a good faith complaint procedure; and (3) whether the
county treated a female corrections officer differently than similarly-situated male officers with regard to discipline, for matters that occurred outside the workplace.
The court held that county officials did not retaliate against a female corrections officer, in violation of Title
VII, for filing a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), even
though her supervisor revoked her shift change, another supervisor assigned her to an undesirable unit, and she
was not selected for a desirable intake position. The court also found that county jail officials' reassignment of a
female corrections officer to a different position after she verbally complained about a co-worker's sexual harassment, even if it was a less desirable position, did not constitute a materially “adverse employment action” required
to support her Title VII retaliation claim. According to the court, county jail officials' rescission of a female corrections officer's request for light duty assignments during her pregnancy, her reassignment to work in male housing units, and her receipt of a written discipline report for noting her reassignment, did not constitute materially
“adverse employment actions” required to support her Title VII retaliation claim. (Ulster County Jail, New York)

U.S. District Court
AGE DISCRIMINATION
RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION
TERMINATION
TITLE VII

Morris v. Carter Global Lee, Inc., 997 F.Supp.2d 27 (D.D.C. 2013). An African-American employee brought an
action against his former employer, a contractor for the District of Columbia Department of Corrections, in the
Superior Court of the District of Columbia, alleging wrongful termination and violation of his civil rights under
the Fourteenth Amendment, Title VII, § 1981, and other various statutes. The employer removed the action to
federal court and moved to dismiss. The federal district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The
court held that the employee stated a claim against his former employer under § 1981, even though the employee's
complaint contained no mention of his race or racial discrimination in the termination of his employment contract,
where the defendant attached to his amended complaint his charge of discrimination filed with the District of
Columbia Office of Human Rights, and made a presentation to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC). The employee alleged, “I was terminated for alleged gross misconduct,” and “I believe I have been discriminated against because of my race (Black American) and age (54), in violation of Title VII.” (District of Columbia Jail, Carter Goble Lee [CGL] Contractors)

U.S. District Court
DISCRIMINATION
DUE PROCESS
EQUAL PROTECTION
RETALIATION
SEX DISCRIMINATION
TITLE VII

Rother v. NYS Dept. of Corrections and Community Supervision, 970 F.Supp.2d 78 (N.D.N.Y. 2013). A female
corrections officer brought an action against a state department of corrections, correctional facility, supervisors
and coworkers, alleging sex discrimination and retaliation under Title VII, denial of equal protection pursuant to §
1983, denial of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, First Amendment retaliation, conspiracy under §
1985, and various state claims. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and
denied in part. The officer alleged that a coworker told the officer, in front of inmates, coworkers, and the officer's
subordinates, that she had received an administrative-sergeant position by performing sexual favors and that she
was a “bitch and a backstabber,” “a stupid cunt,” and a “whining bitch” who “sucked.” She alleged that she was

31.102

subjected to discriminatory coworker shunning and tire-slashing threats, assignment denials, performance criticisms, discipline, vigilant monitoring, and denial of overtime and leave pay denials. The appeals court held that,
through the description of the emotional and psychological toll of her treatment, the officer subjectively perceived
her work environment to be abusive.
The court found that the officer’s complaint alleged the “materially adverse action” element of a Title VII
retaliation claim against a correctional facility and the state department of corrections by alleging that she endured
unmerited criticism and discipline, failure to remedy a coworker's mistreatment, repeated coworker shunning and
threats of tire slashing, video-camera monitoring, denial of vacation pay, and delay in filling out workers' compensation paperwork. The court also held that the officer's complaint stated a § 1983 claim against the state department of corrections and the correctional facility for violation of the Equal Protection Clause, where her complaint alleged that no male employee was subjected to the treatment of which she complained, and that the officer
was criticized and disciplined repeatedly for proper and innocuous conduct while a male coworker received no
criticism or discipline for his patently improper and inappropriate verbal tirade, which included explicitly sexist
language. According to the court, the state's commissioner of corrections, by virtue of his supervisory position,
had both a direct connection to the alleged gender discrimination against the female corrections officer, and the
authority to reinstate and transfer the officer, supporting her § 1983 equal protection claim against the commissioner in his official capacity seeking injunctive or declaratory relief. (Coxsackie Correctional Facility, N.Y. State
Department of Corrections and Community Supervision)
U.S. Appeals Court
DISCRIMINATION
FREE SPEECH
RETALIATION

Singer v. Ferro, 711 F.3d 334 (2nd Cir. 2013). A corporal and corrections officers brought a § 1983 action against
a sergeant, captain, sheriff, and various other officials, alleging retaliation in violation of their First Amendment
speech and association rights. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. The plaintiffs appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that an advertisement parody was not protected by the First
Amendment. According to the court, the allegedly corrupt practices of certain officials at a corrections facility in
favoring certain individuals for promotions and the granting of days off, purportedly referred to by the corporal in
creating a parody advertisement with facility officials placed in or on bottles of alcohol with a caption reading
“Absolut Corruption” were not matters of public concern, and therefore, the parody was not protected by the First
Amendment. The court noted that the parody was comprehensible only to others who worked at the facility, and
the corporal only shared it with five other employees. (Ulster County Sheriff's Office and Jail, New York)

U.S. District Court
CONTRACTORS
DISCRIMINATION
EQUAL PROTECTION
HOSTILE WORK
ENVIRONMENT
RETALIATION
SEX DISCRIMINATION
SUPERVISION
TITLE VII

Stoner v. Arkansas Dep. of Correction, 983 F.Supp.2d 1074 (E.D.Ark. 2013). A nurse employed by a company
which contracted with the Arkansas Department of Correction (ADC) to provide on-site medical services to ADC
inmates brought an action against ADC, a warden, and the company under Title VII and the Arkansas Civil Rights
Act for gender discrimination and retaliation. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court
granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that the ADC was the prison nurse's employer for
purposes of the nurse's Title VII gender discrimination and retaliation claims against ADC and a warden. According to the court, although the nurse was hired by a company which contracted with ADC to provide on-site medical services to inmates, ADC trained company employees on sexual harassment policies and reporting requirements, the warden held company employees accountable to the same standards as ADC employees, and the warden had the ability to ban the nurse from the prison complex, effectively terminating her employment.
The court held that the warden employed by ADC was subject to personal liability with respect to the female
former prison nurse's claims for gender discrimination under § 1983 and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act (ACRA),
where the nurse's right to be free from gender discrimination was secured by the Equal Protection Clause, and her
right to be free from retaliation based on protected speech was secured by the First Amendment, and the warden,
as a prison authority, was acting under the color of state law.
According to the court, the alleged harassment of the nurse by the prison warden was not part of the same
employment practice as a correctional officer's prior alleged harassment of the nurse, and thus the warden's alleged harassment did not constitute a continuing violation for the purposes of the nurse's Title VII hostile work
environment claim. The court noted that the alleged conduct was committed by different actors, and the harassment seemed to have been motivated by different animus, specifically, the officer's harassment was based on sex,
while the warden's harassment was based on retaliation.
The court held that ADC took prompt and effective remedial action after learning of the male correctional
officer's alleged sexual harassment of the female nurse, and thus ADC could not be held liable under Title VII for
the alleged hostile work environment created by the officer's conduct, nor could the company be held liable as a
third-party for such alleged conduct. (Correctional Medical Services, and Arkansas Department of Correction,
McPherson Unit)

U.S. Appeals Court
UNION
WORKING CONDITIONS

U.S. Dept. of Justice Federal Bureau of Prisons Federal Correctional Complex Coleman, Fla. v. Federal Labor
Relations Authority 737 F.3d 779 (D.C.Cir. 2013). The Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) petitioned for review,
and the BOP and the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) cross-applied for enforcement of FLRA's order
stating that the BOP was required to bargain with a labor union over proposals relating to the BOP's use of metal
detectors at a high security prison. The BOP moved to dismiss on the grounds of mootness. The appeals court
denied the motion, granted a motion to vacate in part, and granted a motion to enforce, and remanded. The court
held that the decision to use the federal prison's compound metal detectors to screen only those inmates suspected
of carrying contraband did not render moot the FLRA decision stating that the BOP was required to bargain with
the employee union over proposals relating to safety issues arising out of the prison's use of metal detectors, absent a showing that there was no reasonable expectation that the union's safety concerns would not recur. The
court found that the FLRA's determination that the BOP was required, under the Federal Service LaborManagement Relations Act (FSLMRA), to bargain with the labor union over a proposal that prison management
have inmates turn in all watches that did not clear the compound metal detector, treat such watches as contraband,
and assure that watches sold in the prison store would not set off the metal detectors, in order to avoid bottlenecks
of inmates at the entrance to the compound/detector area, was eminently reasonable and supported by the record.

31.103

According to the court, the proposal was sufficiently tailored to target employees likely to be harmed by the installation of outdoor metal detectors, was intended to reduce nuisance alarms triggered by prohibited watches,
thereby moving inmates through the compound-detector bottlenecks more quickly, and would not excessively
interfere with the BOP's management rights. The court found that the FLRA determination that the labor union's
proposal requiring construction of a block and mortar officer's station near one of the prison's two metal detectors
was non-negotiable as a whole under FSLMRA. (Federal Bureau of Prisons Federal Correctional Complex Coleman, Florida)
U.S. Appeals Court
DISCIPLINE
FREE SPEECH
RETALIATION
SUSPENSION
WORK RULES

Volkman v. Ryker, 736 F.3d 1084 (7th Cir. 2013). An employee at a correctional center brought a § 1983 action
against various officials alleging retaliation in violation of the First Amendment arising from the issuance of a
written reprimand and suspension following his comments to a state attorney regarding the criminal prosecution
of a co-worker. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The employee appealed.
The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the employee failed to show that a reasonable official
would have known that to restrict or punish his speech regarding a co-worker's punishment was unconstitutional
at the time of his discipline, as required for the employee to defeat a supervisors' claims of qualified immunity
from the employee's § 1983 claim of retaliation in violation of his First Amendment speech rights. According to
the court, the Illinois Department of Corrections' interests in suppressing the speech of a supervisor at a correctional facility regarding a co-worker's discipline outweighed the supervisor's interests in making the speech, and,
thus, the supervisor's First Amendment speech rights were not violated when he was disciplined for such speech.
The court noted that supervisors were tasked with enforcing rules and regulations, and when the supervisor criticized a disciplinary decision it undermined respect for the chain-of-command, and there was value in maintaining
order and respect in the paramilitary context of a correctional center. (Lawrence Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
CONTRACTORS
SEARCHES

Vollette v. Watson, 937 F.Supp.2d 706 (E.D.Va. 2013). Former food service and medical care contractors who
worked at a city jail brought an action against a sheriff, who oversaw the jail, and sheriff's deputies, alleging under
§ 1983 that their being required to undergo strip searches at the jail violated their Fourth Amendment rights, and
that they were retaliated against, in violation of the First Amendment. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was
precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to what triggered the strip searches of contractors who worked at
city jail, the nature of such searches, and the factual predicate for revocation of the contractors' security clearances. According to the court, at the time the contractors were strip searched, it was clearly established, for qualified
immunity purposes in the contractors' § 1983 Fourth Amendment unlawful search action against the sheriff and
sheriff's deputies, that prison employees did not forfeit all privacy rights when they accepted employment, and
thus, that prison authorities were required to have reasonable and individualized suspicion that employees were
hiding contraband on their person before performing a “visual body cavity search.” The court also found that
summary judgment as to the contractors’ claims for false imprisonment and battery was precluded by genuine
issues of material fact as to what triggered the strip searches. (Aramark and Correct Care Solutions, Contractors,
Portsmouth City Jail, Virginia)

U.S. District Court
CONTRACTORS
FREE SPEECH
RETALIATION
SEARCHES

Vollette v. Watson, 978 F.Supp.2d 572 (E.D.Va. 2013). Employees of private contractors providing services to
inmates housed at a jail brought a § 1983 action against a sheriff and deputy sheriffs, alleging that they were subjected to unlawful strip and visual body cavity searches at the jail. The next business day after the suit was filed,
the sheriff issued a blanket order revoking the security clearances of the contractor's employees who were still
working at the jail. The district court denied the employees' motion for a preliminary injunction ordering the sheriff to reinstate their security clearances at the jail pending the outcome of the litigation. The district court also
partially granted and partially denied the defendants' summary judgment motion. A jury decided the constitutionality of the strip searches. This left the First Amendment retaliation claim by six of the nine plaintiffs. The district
court entered summary judgment for the plaintiffs on the retaliation claim. The court held that: (1) the contractor's
employees suffered irreparable injury from the sheriff's revocation of their security clearances for which there was
no adequate remedy at law; (2) the balance of hardships plainly weighed in favor of a permanent injunction; (3)
the public interest would be enhanced by the entry of a permanent injunction; and (4) the plaintiffs demonstrated
violation of their First Amendment rights, and the sheriff had to reinstate their security clearances and update any
relevant internal jail records to reflect the same. The court noted that the sheriff's candid statements that he felt
betrayed by the federal lawsuits filed by the employees who were subjected to strip searches for contraband, and
that the suits “pushed [him] over the edge” were an admission that the adverse employment action of revoking the
employees' security clearances was taken against them in response to their exercise of their First Amendment
constitutional rights to free speech and to petition the government for redress of grievances. (Portsmouth City Jail,
Virginia)

U.S. Appeals Court
SUPERVISION
TRAINING

Wilson v. Montano, 715 F.3d 847 (10th Cir. 2013). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action against a county sheriff,
several deputies, and the warden of the county's detention center, alleging that he was unlawfully detained, and
that his right to a prompt probable cause determination was violated. The district court denied the defendants'
motion to dismiss. The defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded in
part. The detainee had been held for 11 days without a hearing and without charges being filed. The appeals court
held that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity from the claim that they violated the arrestee's
right to a prompt post-arrest probable cause determination, where the Fourth Amendment right to a prompt probable cause determination was clearly established at the time. The court held that the arrestee sufficiently alleged
that the arresting sheriff's deputy was personally involved in the deprivation of his Fourth Amendment right to a
prompt probable cause hearing, as required to support his § 1983 claim against the deputy. The arrestee alleged
that he was arrested without a warrant, and that the deputy wrote out a criminal complaint but failed to file it in
any court with jurisdiction to hear a misdemeanor charge until after he was released from the county's detention
facility, despite having a clear duty under New Mexico law to ensure that the arrestee received a prompt probable

31.104

cause determination. According to the court, under New Mexico law, the warden of the county's detention facility
and the county sheriff were responsible for policies or customs that operated and were enforced by their subordinates, and for any failure to adequately train their subordinates. The court noted that statutes charged both the
warden and the sheriff with responsibility to supervise subordinates in diligently filing a criminal complaint or
information and ensuring that arrestees received a prompt probable cause hearing.
The court found that the arrestee sufficiently alleged that the warden promulgated policies that caused the arrestee's prolonged detention without a probable cause hearing, and that the warden acted with the requisite mental
state, as required to support his § 1983 claim against the warden, regardless of whether the arrestee ever had direct
contact with the warden. The arrestee alleged that the warden did not require filing of written criminal complaints,
resulting in the detainees' being held without receiving a probable cause hearing, and that the warden acted with
deliberate indifference to routine constitutional violations at the facility.
The court held that the arrestee sufficiently alleged that the county sheriff established a policy or custom that
led to the arrestee's prolonged detention without a probable cause hearing, and that the sheriff acted with the requisite mental state, as required to support his § 1983 claim against the sheriff, by alleging that: (1) the sheriff allowed deputies to arrest people and wait before filing charges, thus resulting in the arrest and detention of citizens
with charges never being filed; (2) the sheriff was deliberately indifferent to ongoing constitutional violations
occurring under his supervision and due to his failure to adequately train his employees; (3) routine warrantless
arrest and incarceration of citizens without charges being filed amounted to a policy or custom; and (4) such
policy was the significant moving force behind the arrestee's illegal detention. (Valencia County Sheriff's Office,
Valencia County Detention Center, New Mexico)
U.S. District Court
DISCRIMINATION
DISABILITY
CONTRACT NEGOTIATION
PHYSICAL REQUIREMENTS
TERMINATION

Yeager v. Corrections Corp. of America, 944 F.Supp.2d 913 (E.D.Cal. 2013). A former correctional employee
brought an action against his private corrections employer, alleging failure to engage in a good faith interactive
process, disability discrimination in violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), and
FEHA retaliation. The employer moved for summary judgment and summary adjudication. The district court
granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded in the employee's failure to engage in a good faith interactive process claim, by a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether, under California law, there were reasonable accommodations available to the employee who sought
them, due to a knee injury. The court also held that summary judgment was precluded on the employee’s disability claim, due to genuine issues of material fact as to whether the employer's proffered reason for terminating the
employee, that the employee did not pass a background check, was a pretext for disability discrimination. (Corrections Corporation of America, California City Correctional Center, California)
2014

U.S. Appeals Court
SEX DISCRIMINATION
BFOQ- Bona Fide
Occupational
Qualification
SUPERVISION

Ambat v. City and County of San Francisco, 757 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 2014). Current and former sheriff's deputies
brought an action against a city and county, alleging various claims including retaliation and that a policy prohibiting male deputies from supervising female inmates in housing units of jails operated by the county violated Title
VII and California's Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). The district court granted the defendants' motion
on gender discrimination claims and denied the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration. The plaintiffs appealed. The
appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated in part, and dismissed the appeal in part. The court
held that the county was not entitled to summary judgment based on a bona fide occupational qualification
(BFOQ) defense, in light of fact issues as to whether a reasoned decision-making process, based on available
information and experience, led to the sheriff's adoption of the policy such that the policy would be entitled to
deference. The court also found fact issues as to whether the policy of excluding male deputies because of their
sex was a legitimate proxy for reasonably necessary job qualifications. The court noted that the primary justification for the policy was to protect the safety of female inmates by reducing the possibility of sexual harassment and
abuse by male deputies, a secondary justification was that employing male deputies in female housing pods posed
a threat to jail security because of a threat of manipulation, a tertiary justification was protecting the privacy interests of female inmates, and the final justification was promoting female inmates' rehabilitation. (San Francisco
Sheriff's Department, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEX DISCRIMINATION
AGE DISCRIMINATION
RETALIATION
FMLA- Family Medical
Leave Act

Doucette v. Morrison County, Minn., 763 F.3d 978 (8th Cir. 2014). A female former county employee who had
served as an Assistant Jail Administrator brought an action in a state court against the county, alleging that her
discharge constituted discrimination based on her sex and age, in violation of the Minnesota Human Rights Act
(MHRA), that it was reprisal for filing a discrimination complaint, and that she was retaliated against for taking
leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). Following removal to the federal courts, the district
court granted in part and denied in part the county's motion for summary judgment. The employee appealed the
grant of summary judgment on her MHRA claims. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that: (1) the county
proffered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s termination, namely, that the employee repeatedly made billing errors after being reminded of the importance of accuracy and receiving accommodations
for her workload; (2) male employees were not similarly situated, for purposes of establishing pretext; (3) an
alleged statement by the employee's supervisor was not direct evidence of sex-plus-age discrimination; and (4)
evidence of a uniform break policy did not support the employee's sex-plus-age discrimination claim. (Morrison
County, Minnesota)

U.S. Appeals Court
DISCRIMINATION
HARASSMENT
HOSTILE WORK
ENVIRONMENT
SUPERVISION

Ellis v. Houston, 742 F.3d 307 (8th Cir. 2014). African American corrections officers brought an action under §
1981 and § 1983 against prison administrators and supervisors, alleging race based harassment and retaliation, and
disparate treatment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The plaintiffs appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that: (1) the officers had
a subjective belief that the discrimination and harassment they experienced was severe and pervasive; (2) the
officers established a broad pattern of harassment, and thus specific individual acts had to be viewed as illustrative; (3) the acts, comments, and inaction by a supervisor were purposeful and objectively actionable; (4) the of-

31.105

ficers suffered materially adverse consequences after they filed an official complaint, as required for a retaliation
claim; (5) supervisors who permitted and participated in racially derisive remarks, and then assigned inferior work
assignments, were not entitled to qualified immunity. The court noted that the officers experienced anxiety, dread,
and panic attacks, they felt like they were being treated more like inmates than fellow officers, they initially enjoyed going to work but subsequently found their job to be depressing and anxiety-producing due to discrimination and harassment, they felt personally at risk because they no longer trusted that their fellow officers would
come to their aid in a dangerous situation, and one officer's hair started to fall out from the stress he suffered. The
officers had alleged that they experienced racist remarks on a near daily basis, that supervisors had been present
and laughing without objection to statements made by others, and each officer became aware of offensive remarks
even if each individual did not hear it first-hand. Supervisors allegedly acted to intensify the pattern of harassment
of African American corrections officers after they filed an official complaint of a racially hostile environment,
subsequently assigning them inferior or less desirable jobs, “papering” their files with reports on trivial or invented misconduct, and singling them out for additional work details and consistently forcing them to take unpopular
details. The court held that these were materially adverse employment actions sufficient to support the officer's
prima facie case of retaliation under § 1981.
The court found that a reasonable prison supervisor would have understood that permitting and participating in
racially derisive remarks, and then assigning inferior work assignments for reporting such conduct, would have
violated the rights of the African American corrections officers, and thus the supervisors who did permit and participate in racially derisive remarks, and then assigned inferior work assignments, were not entitled to qualified
immunity to the officers' hostile work environment and retaliation claims under § 1981 and § 1983. (Nebraska
State Penitentiary)
U.S. District Court
DISCRIMINATION
RETALIATION
SEX DISCRIMINATION

Gethers v. Harrison, 27 F.Supp.3d 644 (E.D.N.C. 2014). A female employee of a county detention center brought
Title VII gender discrimination and retaliation claims against her employer after she was terminated for allegedly
being untruthful regarding a situation in which she was present while a male detainee on suicide watch used the
shower. The county moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion, finding that the employee failed to demonstrate that she was meeting job expectations or that she was engaged in a protected activity. The
employee had been demoted for violating a detention center policy by being present while a male detainee on
suicide watch showered naked despite the presence of two male officers, and for extracting the detainee from his
cell by herself, creating a risk of danger. The court noted that the male detention officers who assisted male detainees on a suicide watch to shower were not similarly situated to the female detention officer who was also present, under the detention center's policy prohibiting officers of the opposite sex from being present while a detainee showered; the court noted that the proper comparison would be a male officer remaining in a shower area while
a female prisoner showered, and there was no indication that such male officer would not also be punished. (Wake
County Sheriff's Office, Detention Center, North Carolina)

U.S. District Court
FMLA- Family Medical
Leave Act
LIGHT DUTY
INJURY
WORKERS COMPENSATION

Gillman v. Okaloosa County Florida, 58 F.Supp.3d 1305 (N.D. Fla. 2014). A former county employee who had
worked as a correctional officer and who had injured her hand and taken leave, brought an action against the
county, alleging interference and retaliation under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). The employee had
sustained an on-the-job injury when her right hand became lodged in a hydraulic door. She was transported to a
hospital where she was treated for a crush injury to her right thumb. As a result of her injury, she was unable to
perform many of the basic functions of her job, including tasks that required hand and finger manipulation. The
county moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the motion. The court held that: (1) the county
had no obligation under FMLA to place the employee in a light-duty position so that she could take FMLA leave
intermittently, where the employee was not medically capable of performing her regular job duties; (2) the county’s proffered reason for terminating the employee was not a pretext for FMLA retaliation; (3) the county’s proffered reasons for refusing to place the employee in a light-duty position were not a pretext for FMLA retaliation;
and (4) there was no causal connection between the employee’s termination and her workers’ compensation
claim. The court noted that the county had no policy allowing for light duty, and the no designated light duty job
existed for the employee’s position, and that no light duty job was available when the employee requested it.
(Okaloosa County Jail, Florida)

U.S. Appeals Court
FREE SPEECH
TERMINATION

Hurst v. Lee County, Miss., 764 F.3d 480 (5th Cir. 2014). A former corrections officer with a county sheriff's department brought an action against the county, alleging that termination of the officer's employment, based on the
officer's violation of a department's media policy through unauthorized release of information to a newspaper
reporter regarding the arrest of a state university's football player, violated his First Amendment right to free
speech. The district court granted judgment as a matter of law to the county. The officer appealed. The appeals
court affirmed. The court found that statements that the corrections officer made to a newspaper reporter were
ordinarily within the scope of the officer's duties, and thus, the officer's speech was not protected by the First
Amendment. (Lee County Jail, Mississippi)

U.S. District Court
WORKERS
COMPENSATION
HARASSMENT

Nesvold v. Roland, 37 F.Supp.3d 1022 (W.D.Wis. 2014). The jail administrator for a county sheriff's office
brought an action against his supervisor, the county sheriff, alleging assault within the assault exception to the
exclusive remedy provision of Wisconsin's Worker's Compensation Act. The sheriff moved to dismiss. The district court denied the motion. The court held that the administrator’s claims that the sheriff yelled at him, threatened to harm him physically, rushed at him, pointed a finger in his face, intended to restrain him physically, and
that the administrator suffered nausea and emotional distress as a result, were sufficient to allege a physical assault, as required to state a claim under the assault exception to the exclusive remedy provision of Wisconsin's
Worker's Compensation Act. (Burnett County, Wisconsin)

31.106

2015
U.S. District Court
HARASSMENT
FREE SPEECH
HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT
RETALIATION

Aspinall v. Thomas, 118 F.Supp.3d 664 (M.D. Pa. 2015). A former county correctional officer brought a § 1983
action against correctional officers, a deputy warden, and a warden, alleging that the officers’ harassment constituted retaliation in violation of the free speech clause of the First Amendment. The officers, deputy warden, and
warden moved to dismiss. The district court denied the motion. The court held that: (1) the officer’s speech, regarding the alleged mistreatment and hostile work environment he suffered as the result of other officers’ harassment, implicated a matter of public concern, as required to support the officer’s First Amendment retaliation
claim; (2) the officer’s interest in commenting on a matter of public concern outweighed the government’s interest
in promoting workplace efficiency and avoiding workplace disruption, and thus the officer’s speech was constitutionally protected as required to support a First Amendment retaliation claim; (3) the officer’s factual allegations
sufficiently established a causal relationship between protected speech and subsequent harassment by other officers, as required to state a First Amendment retaliation claim; and (4) the officer alleged sufficient facts to support
a § 1983 claim against the deputy warden and the warden under the theory of supervisory liability for their alleged
knowledge and acquiescence of other officers’ alleged First Amendment retaliation, where the officer informed
them of other officers’ harassment and alleged retaliatory conduct, and they did not take any action. The court
found that the defendants failed to demonstrate that the officer’s First Amendment free speech rights were not
clearly established at the time, as required for the officers, deputy warden, and warden to be entitled to qualified
immunity. The court noted that the officer alleged an escalation in harassment after he lodged complaints about
the harassment, and alleged that another officer subjected him to a barrage of insults and offensive statements
after learning of the complaints. (Wayne County Correctional Facility, Pennsylvania)

U.S. Appeals Court
FLSA- Fair Labor
Standards Act
BENEFITS
OVERTIME

Babcock v. Butler County, 806 F.3d 153 (3d Cir. 2015). A corrections officer brought a class action against a
county, alleging that the county failed to properly compensate her and others similarly situated for overtime during mealtimes in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The district court dismissed the action. The
corrections officer appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the officer received a predominant
benefit of a 15 minute unpaid mealtime and was thus not entitled to receive compensation for it under the FLSA.
The court noted that the predominant benefit test, which asks whether a law enforcement employee is primarily
engaged in work-related duties during meal periods, is the appropriate standard for determining whether law enforcement employees’ meal breaks are compensable time under FLSA. The court noted that during the 15 minute
period, officers were not entitled to leave the prison without permission from the warden or deputy warden and
were required to remain in uniform, in close proximity to emergency response equipment, and were on call to
respond to emergencies. The officers’ collective bargaining agreement (CBA), though silent on the compensability of the 15 minute period, provided officers with the benefit of a partially-compensated mealtime and mandatory
overtime pay if the mealtime was interrupted by work. (Butler County Prison, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
CONTRACTOR

Barouch v. United States Department of Justice, 87 F.Supp.3d 10 (D.C.D.C, 2015). A prisoner who was convicted
of bribing a public official and conspiracy to commit bribery moved for acquittal. The district court denied the
motion, finding that evidence was sufficient to establish that the prisoner induced a prison official to assist in
smuggling contraband. According to the court, the prisoner found a lucrative business opportunity in the institution’s ban on tobacco and cell phones. He paid a prison nurse to smuggle this contraband into the prison and to
look the other way when it came to reporting his illegal possessions to other prison authorities. The prisoner and
nurse were eventually caught and prosecuted. Following a two-day jury trial, the prisoner was convicted. (Federal
Bureau of Prisons, United States Penitentiary–Lee County, Virginia)

U.S. Appeals Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
RACE DISCRIMINATION
GENDER DISCRIMINATION
TITLE VII

Carothers v. County of Cook, 808 F.3d 1140 (7th Cir. 2015). A former government employee, an AfricanAmerican woman, brought an action against a county and the Office of Transitional Administrator, an agency that
oversees the operation of a county juvenile detention center (JDC), alleging disability discrimination in violation
of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), as well as race discrimination, sex discrimination, and retaliation
in violation of Title VII. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The
former employee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that: (1) the employee was not disabled
within the meaning of ADA; (2) evidence supported the determination that the employee’s anxiety disorder did
not prevent her from working with all children; (3) under the direct evidence theory, circumstantial evidence did
not point to race discrimination; (4) the employee did not satisfy the legitimate expectations of her employer; (5) a
Caucasian male comparator was not similarly situated, as required to establish race discrimination; and (6) the
employee was not similarly situated to two male comparators, as required to establish sex discrimination. The
court noted that in the two months preceding the employee’s discharge, she refused to follow instructions regarding submitting required paperwork for her disability application, she did not schedule an appointment to return to
work, the employee ignored reasonable requests to submit or re-submit missing documentation, and at time of her
discharge she had exceeded the allowed number of unexcused absences by more than ten days. (Cook County
Juvenile Detention Center, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
TITLE VII
RETALIATION
SEARCHES
DISCRIMINATION

Davis v. NYS Dept. of Corrections Attica Correctional Facility, 110 F.Supp.3d 458 (W.D.N.Y. 2015). An African-American correctional employee, who was employed as a substance abuse counselor, brought an action
against her former employer, alleging unlawful retaliation in violation of Title VII and state law. The district court
granted the employer’s motion for summary judgment. The court held that the employee did not engage in a protected activity, as required to establish retaliation under Title VII, when she complained that she believed she had
been assigned a disproportionate number of minority and/or behaviorally difficult inmates. According to the court,
the employee could not have reasonably believed that assignment of inmates constituted unlawful discrimination,
given that the inmates were assigned based on release date, and the waiting list from which inmates were assigned
did not identify race. According to the court, the alleged search of the employee’s office following her complaints
of being assigned a disproportionate number of minority and/or behaviorally difficult inmates, was not a

31.107

materially adverse employment action. The court noted that searches at facility were routine due because the facility was a maximum security prison, areas were searched randomly, and all individuals were subject to visual inspection of bags. (Attica Correctional Facility, New York)
U.S. Appeals Court
UNION
CONTRACT

Doe v. Cook County, Illinois, 798 F.3d 558 (7th Cir. 2015). Detainees at a county juvenile detention center brought
a class action against the center and the county, alleging that some employees at the center violated their constitutional rights by abusing their charges. The facility administrator, who was appointed to run the detention center as
part of a settlement between the parties, proposed to terminate the employment of 225 direct-care employees and
require them to apply to fill the new positions. The union for the employees intervened to oppose the administrator’s plan, arguing that the proposal violated Illinois employment law by overriding the collective bargaining and
arbitration statutes. The district court authorized the administrator to implement the plan. The union appealed. The
appeals court reversed and remanded. The appeals court held that the district court’s approval of the administrator’s plan was not a simple enforcement of the order appointing the administrator, and thus the district court was
required pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) to make findings that the relief requested by the
administrator was narrowly drawn, extended no further than necessary to correct the violation of a federal right,
and was the least intrusive means. (Cook County Juvenile Temporary Detention Center, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
RETIREMENT

Duberry v. District of Columbia, 106 F.Supp.3d 245 (D.D.C. 2015). Retired correctional officers brought an action for injunctive and declaratory relief to compel the District of Columbia Department of Corrections (DOC),
their former employing agency, to classify them as “retired law enforcement officers” under the federal the Law
Enforcement Officers Safety Act (LEOSA) so that the officers could obtain current firearm certification required
for them to carry concealed firearms across state lines. The District of Columbia moved to dismiss. The district
court granted the motion, finding that the LEOSA did not confer a right enforceable under § 1983 for officers that
would compel the DOC to classify them as “retired law enforcement officers.” (District of Columbia Department
of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
FMLA- Family Medical
Leave Act
LIGHT DUTY
DISCRIMINATION

Gibson v. Milwaukee County, 95 F.Supp.3d 1061 (E.D. Wis. 2015). Two county corrections officers, one who
experienced severe migraine headaches, and one who had an autoimmune disorder, brought an action against a
county alleging failure to accommodate them in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), as well
as interference and retaliation in violation of the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA). The county moved for
summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the employee who could not work more than eight hours per day due to severe migraine headaches was not qualified for
a temporary position of lieutenant in the county sheriff’s department, and thus the county employer’s rescinding
of the employee’s temporary appointment to a lieutenant position did not violate ADA. The court noted that an
essential function of the position required employees to be able to work more than eight hours per day to handle
emergent situations or to cover for sick employees.
The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine disputes of material fact as to whether the
county employer discouraged employees from taking FMLA leave, and whether the decision to rescind the county
employee’s temporary promotion was due to his taking of FMLA leave.
The court found that the employer’s refusal to move the correctional facility employee with temporary work
restrictions, caused by her autoimmune condition, to light-duty assignments that did not require interaction with
inmates, was a failure to accommodate, in violation of the ADA, notwithstanding that the employee’s condition
was not caused by her employment. According to the court, the county was prohibited under ADA from granting
or denying an accommodation based on whether the employee’s disability was associated with an on-the-job injury. (Milwaukee County Sheriff’s Department, County Jail, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
TITLE VII
SEX DISCRIMINATION
MILITARY SERVICE
TERMINATION
PROBATION

Gipson v. Cochran, 90 F.Supp.3d 1285 (S.D.Ala. 2015). A former employee of a county sheriff’s department, a
female, who was also a member of the United States Air Force Reserve, brought an action against the sheriff alleging sex discrimination in violation of Title VII, and alleging violation of the Uniformed Services Employment
and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA). The sheriff allegedly extended the employee’s probationary period to
account for absences due to military training, and subsequently terminated her employment. The sheriff moved for
summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held the extension
of the employee’s probationary period, and the termination of her employment, did not violate USERRA. The
court held that summary judgment was precluded by a fact issues as to whether the decision to terminate was
based on sex. (Mobile County Sheriff’s Department, Alabama)

U.S. District Court
BENEFITS
CONTRACTORS

Gorman v. Rensselaer County, 98 F.Supp.3d 498 (N.D.N.Y. 2015). An employee in a county sheriff’s department
brought a § 1983 action against the county, sheriff, master sergeant, and the company which provided psychological evaluations for public safety agencies. The district court dismissed the action finding that under New York
law, the employee did not a state claim for negligent misrepresentation against the company, whose psychologist
performed an independent medical examination of the employee in connection with his applications for benefits
while on medical leave. The court also held that the company was not a state actor for the purposes of the employee’s § 1983 action. The court noted that although the company was contracted by the sheriff to perform an
independent medical exam of the employee, the mere fact that a private actor was paid by state funds, or was
hired by a state actor, was insufficient to establish a state action, and the employee’s allegations that the company
conspired or acted in concert with the county were wholly conclusory. (Rensselaer County Sheriff’s Office, New
York)

U.S. Appeals Court
MARRIAGE

Riker v. Lemmon, 798 F.3d 546 (7th Cir. 2015). A female former prison worker brought an action against prison
officials, alleging that the officials denied her request to marry an inmate in violation of her fundamental rights.
The district court granted the officials’ motion for summary judgment and the worker appealed. The appeals court
reversed and remanded, finding that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to

31.108

whether the prison’s decision to deny the worker’s request to marry an inmate was reasonably related to its legitimate penological interests. The worker had been an employee of Aramark Correctional Services, Inc. that operated and managed food services in the prison. She became involved with an inmate worker who was under her supervision. She quit her job after being discovered in a romantic relationship with the inmate. She was denied visiting privileges after she left her job. The former worker alleged that prohibiting her marriage to the inmate was an
exaggerated response to the prison’s security objectives and that the prohibition was unnecessary for the maintenance of a safe and orderly institution. She emphasized that she only sought “a single visit to the institution, of a
short duration, for the limited purpose of marrying her fiancé.” (Wabash Valley Correctional Facility, Indiana)
U.S. District Court
TITLE VII
SEXUAL HARASSMENT
WORKING CONDITIONS

Sanchez v. California, 90 F.Supp.3d 1036 (E.D.Cal. 2015). A female employee of the California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation brought an action against her employer alleging violations of Title VII and the
California Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), and against a coworker under § 1983, for alleged sexual harassment by the coworker. The parties consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge and the defendants
moved for summary judgment. The magistrate granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that
summary judgment was precluded by a fact issues as to whether the employer permitted conditions at work that
allowed the employee to be harassed, and whether the employee established that the alleged adverse action was
causally related to the complaints. (California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, California State
Prison–Corcoran)

U.S. Appeals Court
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT

Story v. Foote, 782 F.3d 968 (8th Cir. 2015). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against four corrections officers
for violation of his Fourth Amendment rights arising from a visual body-cavity search that allegedly took place in
view of a female officer and other inmates, during which the officer allegedly called the inmate a derogatory
name. The district court dismissed the case and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held
that the visual body-cavity inspection search after the inmate returned to the correctional facility from outside the
institution did not violate a clearly established right, as would preclude the qualified immunity defense, and the
manner in which the search was conducted did not violate a clearly established right. According to the court, such
a search was not unreasonable considering the serious security dangers inherent at a correctional institution and
the institution’s strong interest in preventing and deterring the smuggling of contraband into the prison.
The court noted that the manner in which the search was conducted did not violate the inmate’s rights. The
inmate alleged that a female officer observed the search on a video screen in a master control room, that the
search was conducted in the presence of other inmates, and that the officer called him a “monkey” during the
search. According to the court, there was a rational connection between the sex-neutral visual surveillance of
inmates and the goal of prison security. The court found that the staffing adjustments that would have been necessary to prevent the female officer from viewing the search would have interfered with the female officer’s equal
employment opportunities and burdened the prison. The court noted that the inmate did not allege that a more
private, equally secure, and cost-effective means of conducting the search was available away from other inmates,
and a single use of a term with potential racial overtones was not unconstitutional race discrimination. (Williams
Correctional Facility, Arkansas)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEX DISCRIMINATION
BFOQ- Bona Fide
Occupational Qualification
TITLE VII

Teamsters Local Union No. 117 v. Washington Dept. of Corrections, 789 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2015). A union representing prison guards filed a Title VII complaint challenging the Washington Department of Corrections (WDOC)
practice of designating certain positions as female-only in response to alleged sexual misconduct by male correctional officers and female inmates. The district court granted summary judgment to the WDOC and the union
appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that WDOC’s policy rationales were reasonably necessary to the
essence of prison administration, and gender was an objective, verifiable qualification for posts designated as
female-only, which appropriately considered reasonable alternatives. Male correctional officers asserted they had
suffered types of harm from the WDOC policy, most importantly lost overtime. The court noted that a facially
discriminatory employment practice, such as a sex-based hiring practice, may pass legal muster if sex is a bona
fide occupational qualification (BFOQ). According to the court, a Title VII bona fide occupational qualification
(BFOQ) defense is written narrowly and has been read narrowly by the Supreme Court and applies to special
situations where employment discrimination is based upon objective, verifiable requirements that concern jobrelated skills and aptitudes.
The appeals court decision began by stating: “For years, Washington faced problems common to a number of
states in their women’s prisons: sexual abuse and misconduct by prison guards, breaches of inmate privacy, and
security gaps. A primary driver, according to prison authorities, was the lack of female correctional officers to
oversee female offenders and administer sensitive tasks, such as observing inmates showering and dressing and
performing the pat (or “pat-down”) and strip searches that are stitched into the fabric of day-to-day prison life.
After long wrestling with this gender gap, the state undertook a comprehensive assessment and ultimately designated a limited number of female-only correctional positions—specifically, 110 positions to patrol housing units,
prison grounds, and work sites.”
The court was apparently surprised by one of the union’s experts. “Amazingly, one of the Union’s experts
offered the following view: Female inmates cannot be shielded from the world in which we live. If they are to
reintegrate into society, they have to be taught how to deal with abusive staff, male or female. They have to be
taught what constitutes a healthy interaction and what does not. They cannot learn those skills if they are sheltered
from contact with males in a position of authority. Sexual abuse is present in all areas of our society: in schools,
(at all levels), business, government, military and families. Just as females have to be taught how to deal with
those abuses in the larger society, female inmates must be taught as part of the rehabilitation process how to deal
with all abusive staff: males and females, custody staff and civilian staff.” The court continued: “To state something so obvious we never imagined it would need to be written: we reject any suggestion that female prisoners
would benefit from being subjected to abusive prison guards as ‘part of the rehabilitation process’ so that they
may better ‘reintegrate into society.’” (Washington Department of Corrections)

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U.S. Appeals Court
GENDER DISCRIMINATION
POLITICAL AFFILIATION
PROMOTION

U.S. v. Rose, 802 F.3d 114 (1st Cir. 2015). A female deputy sheriff brought an action against a sheriff and a citycounty consolidated government, alleging under § 1983 that the sheriff retaliated against her for her political support of the former sheriff’s reelection bid, and that she was denied promotion and demoted based on gender. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, in part, and denied the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment, in part. The deputy appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that political loyalty
was an appropriate requirement for the effective job performance of a deputy sheriff, and the sheriff’s proffered
nondiscriminatory reason for transferring the female deputy and replacing her with a male deputy was not a pretext for gender discrimination. The sheriff asserted that he transferred the female sheriff’s deputy from her position as supervisor of the jail and serving in the sheriff’s command staff, and replacing her with male a deputy,
because he was unsatisfied with ineffective lines of communication and other problems within the jail and wanted
new management as part of his jail reorganization plan. (Columbus Consolidated Government, Muscogee County
Jail, Georgia)

U.S. District Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
RETALIATION
CONTRACTORS

Velez-Ramirez v. Puerto Rico, 98 F.Supp.3d 388 (D.P.R. 2015). An independent contractor brought an action
against the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Puerto Rico Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
(DOCR), the company that managed the provision of healthcare services for DOCR, and the company’s secretary,
alleging that failure to renew her professional services contract violated the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA), the Rehabilitation Act, and Puerto Rico law. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district
court granted the motion. The court held that the plaintiff was not qualified to work as a training and professional
development coordinator, and the DOCR’s failure to renew the plaintiff’s contract was not a pretext for retaliating
against her for seeking a reasonable accommodation for her diabetic retinopathy. (Bayamón Correctional Complex, Correctional Health Services Corporation, Puerto Rico)
2016

U.S. Appeals Court
TITLE VII
HARASSMENT
SEXUAL HARASSMENT
EQUAL OPPORTUNITY
HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT

Arizona ex rel. Horne v. Geo Group, Inc., 816 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2016). The Arizona Civil Rights Division
brought a state-court action, and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) brought a federal action, on behalf of a class of female employees who were working for a private company that operated correctional
facilities. The plaintiffs alleged that the employer violated Title VII and Arizona Civil Rights Act (ACRA) protections against discrimination, harassment, and retaliation. One employee alleged that a male sergeant grabbed her
crotch and pinched her vagina while she was at work. She filed an incident report with her employer but contended that the employer did not remedy the harassment. Five additional female correctional officers who witnessed or
complained of sexual harassment were identified by state Civil Right Division. Even more female employees who
were subjected to sexual harassment were identified when the Division interviewed current and former employees. The actions were consolidated in federal court and the district court granted the employer’s motion for partial
summary judgment. The Civil Rights Division and EEOC appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded.
The court held that summary judgment was precluded by fact issues on the claim of hostile work environment
asserted on behalf of a particular employee. (GEO Group Inc., operating the Arizona State Prison, Florence West
Facility, and the Central Arizona Correctional Facility (“CACF”)

31.110